GOVERNMENT AND MISSIONARY POLICIES ON AFRICAN SECONDARY EDUCATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ANGLICAN AND WESLEYAN METHODIST CHURCHES 1934 - 1971

by

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1980
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Summary

The thesis discusses the development of government and missionary policies on African secondary education in Southern Rhodesia between 1934 and 1971 in the context of the country's colonial history.

It examines the rationale for state and church policies, their objectives and overall impact on secondary educational development. Extensive use is made of archival material of the Anglican and Wesleyan Methodist churches.

It is argued that the factors which determined secondary educational policies originated in the nature of the colonial system which came into existence with the advent of white rule in 1890. Three basic themes are discussed. One deals with the link which recurs continually in the study between colonial politics and the nature of educational policies and programmes that evolved.

A second theme examines the interaction between government and missionary policies and the conflict between them in terms of the objectives of their educational programmes. Also considered is the conflict between missionary political support for white colonialism and their educational policies which appear to contradict that position.

A third theme discusses the scope for educational reform in an essentially conservative colonial society.
that was resistant to political, economic and social changes which may have benefited the black majority. Also discussed are the limitations and implications of educational reform in such a society.
Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge the important debt owed to my supervisors David Alexander and Mark Bray for their scholarly guidance and advice during the course of this study. Without their assistance and constant encouragement, this work would not have been accomplished. It is not possible to name everyone who gave help, but I feel particularly indebted to the following people:- Professor Ranger of the University of Manchester for the advice he gave on the structure of the thesis, Dr. Andrew Roberts of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, for his advice on the analytical framework used in this study, Mr. Chris Allan of the Department of Political Science of the University of Edinburgh, for Bibliographical assistance and Rodger Riddell of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, for providing some data.

I am also grateful to the secretaries of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Council for World Missions for giving me access to their closed archival sources. Without their kind co-operation, this study could not have been undertaken.

I am indebted to the British Council for financing my studies in the United Kingdom. Had it not been for their assistance I would not have been able to undertake this study. Lastly I wish to thank my typist, Mrs Norquay, who put considerable effort in typing this work.
Declaration

I certify that this thesis has been composed entirely by myself.

[Signature]
R.J. Zvobgo
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<td>Amer. Episc. Meth. Church.</td>
<td>American Episcopal Methodist Church</td>
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<tr>
<td>B.S.A. Co.</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Community Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNC</td>
<td>Chief Native Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Cambridge School Certificate</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWM</td>
<td>Council for World Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Dutch Reformed Church</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNE</td>
<td>Department of Native Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of Native Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Department of Native Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt.</td>
<td>Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSC</td>
<td>Higher School Certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC/CBMS</td>
<td>International Missionary Council/Conference of British Missionary Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Junior Certificate</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>London Missionary Society</td>
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<td>PTL</td>
<td>Lower Primary Teacher's Certificate</td>
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<td>PTH</td>
<td>Higher Primary Teacher's Certificate</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>Roman Catholic Church</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>Rhodesia Front</td>
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<td>RJC</td>
<td>Rhodesian Junior Certificate</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAJC</td>
<td>South Africa Junior Certificate</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAGMB</td>
<td>South Africa General Matriculation Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Seventh Day Adventists</td>
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<tr>
<td>SJ</td>
<td>Society of Jesus</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>Society for the Propagation of the Gospel</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRCC</td>
<td>Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRMC</td>
<td>Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mic/fi</td>
<td>Microfilm</td>
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<td>WMMS</td>
<td>Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society</td>
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</table>
Main Cities, Towns and Regions of
SOUTHERN RHODESIA

NORTHERN RHODESIA (Zambia)
- Wankie

MATEBELELAND
- Plutetre

BECHUANALAND (BOTSWANA)
- Bulawayo

SOUTH AFRICA

MASHONALAND
- Salisbury
- Hartley
- Gatoomoa
- Que-Que
- Gweilo
- Fort Victoria
- Mashaba
- Shabani
- Marandellas
- Chipinge

MANICALAND
- Umtali

MOCAMBIQUE
INTRODUCTION

The history of African education in Southern Rhodesia is essentially a part of the history of white colonialism. In a colonial society, where the rulers form a distinct numerical minority and depend for their privileged survival on the maintenance of political, economic and social domination over the majority, the educational institutions and systems that evolve are either overtly or implicitly designed to sustain that domination.

This was the case in Southern Rhodesia, where African education was developed within the broad framework of colonial policies and objectives. As with the political, economic and social systems, the structure of African education was determined by the state in accordance with the policy of separate racial development which formed the basis of Southern Rhodesian colonial society and was intended to perpetuate white privilege and supremacy.

In April 1899, Cecil John Rhodes, the founder of the colony, advised a committee which was deliberating on the first education ordinance, on the structure of the country's education system. A racially segregated system was evolved and a disproportionate emphasis was laid by the colonial government on the development of European education, while African education was left
2.

exclusively in the hands of Christian missionaries.

Although for many years African education was developed by missionaries, the influence of the colony's racial politics and the effects of government control on its overall development was considerable since missionaries depended on the colonial state for financial aid and political support. In order to understand the forces which determined the structure and development of African education in this country, it is therefore important to examine the interaction between church and state in this field against the background of white settler colonial politics.

This thesis deals with the history of government and missionary policies on African secondary education and examines their development in the context of the history of colonialism. It is argued that a comprehensive understanding of the various issues of contemporary educational realities in this colony can be arrived at only through a historical and political analysis.

Such an analytical framework provides for a closer examination of the impact of colonial history on educational developments. It facilitates the discussion of the factors which influenced and in some cases determined the policies of missionary churches and successive colonial governments on African secondary education in terms of the politics of white colonialism. The considerable impact of the racial attitudes and
interests of the white settler community on both church and state work in African secondary education throughout Southern Rhodesian colonial history, makes the use of that analytical approach appropriate and imperative.

Two churches, the Anglican and Wesleyan Methodist, have been selected for detailed analysis because, after the Roman Catholic church, they were the most important missionary societies in the development of African secondary education in terms of their involvement and the influence they exercised on the policies of successive colonial governments. Originally it was the intention of the author to include the Roman Catholics in this study but lack of access to their most recent primary sources precluded this. However, reference is made to them where available sources and data permit.

The dates selected provide two important landmarks in the history of African secondary education in this colony. The year 1934 marks the beginnings of African secondary education in terms of planning for its initiation, whereas 1971 marks the end of the first Five Year Plan for African secondary education under the Rhodesia Front Government. Both dates are therefore significant in the history of African secondary education.

THEMES

The thesis examines three broad themes. One theme discusses the impact of the colonial policy of protecting white political, economic and social interests on
government and missionary policies and programmes in African secondary education. Particular attention is paid to the rationale for, and objectives of, state policy and the methods applied by successive colonial governments to influence and control missionary policies so as to determine the structure of African secondary education, its rate of development and its curriculum.

The second theme considers the conflict and/or convergence between (a) the objectives of government and missionary policies and (b) the policies of different missionary churches.

The third theme examines the scope and limits of progressive educational reform in a colonial society which was opposed to rapid African political, economic and social advancement. In this respect, particular reference will be made to the attempts by Garfield Todd and Edgar Whitehead to reform educational policy between 1954 and 1962 and the implications of those reforms for the development of African secondary education.

THESIS STRUCTURE

The thesis falls into five chapters. Chapter 1 examines the evolution and development of white colonialism in Southern Rhodesia and the emergence of a social structure based on race. In this context, the discussion centres on the conquest and colonisation of Southern Rhodesia by the British South Africa Company and
the white settlers in 1890. Also discussed is the role of missionaries in the colonisation process.

In the light of this history, an attempt is made to examine the factors which influenced government and missionary policies on African pre-secondary education and compare the objectives and impact of their policies. The chapter also studies the attempts by successive colonial governments to determine and subordinate missionary educational policies to the major colonial objective of maintaining white privilege and domination.

Chapter 2 looks closely at the factors which influenced government and missionary policies on African secondary education and discusses its introduction and development during the period 1939 to 1952. Part I discusses the transition from primary to secondary education between 1934 and 1938 and the attempt by the missionaries and the government to evolve a policy for secondary educational development. Part II studies the establishment of African secondary education and the evolution of state and church policies during the war period (1939-1945). Part III investigates the government's attempts to control missionary policies and overall development of secondary education during the post war period (1946-1952). Also considered is the conflict which developed between state and church policies and the implications of this conflict for secondary educational development. Part IV summarises the policy situation by 1952.
Chapter 3 discusses the introduction and implementation of relatively progressive educational reform in African secondary education in Southern Rhodesia during the ten years of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1953-1963. Part I examines briefly the formation of the Federation and the concept of multi-racial partnership on which it was supposed to be based. Part II looks at the attempts by Garfield Todd (Premier of Southern Rhodesia between 1954 and 1958) to reform some aspects of the colonial system in his effort to implement a form of multi-racialism. Part III studies, in the light of Todd's reformist policies, the introduction of educational reform by the government and the missionaries acting in collaboration. The impact of educational policy reform on the development of secondary education is examined as are the limitations and implications of "progressive" educational reform in an essentially conservative Southern Rhodesian white society. Part IV investigates the continuation of Todd's educational reforms by his successor, Edgar Whitehead (1958-1962) and analyses the achievements and limitations of a unified church and state secondary educational policy.

Chapter 4 examines the changes in government and missionary policies, administration and organisation of African secondary education under the Rhodesia Front regime between 1963 and 1971. In Part I a close look is taken at the political ideology of the Rhodesia Front
Party as a framework for government educational policy and, in Part II, an examination is carried out of the changes which occurred in the administration and organisation of African secondary education and their implications. Part III discusses the changes in government and missionary policies and looks, firstly, at the introduction of vocational secondary education, the rationale behind it, its implementation and implications. Secondly, the change in overall academic secondary educational policy is also examined. Of major significance are the implications of the Rhodesia Front government policy for the development of African academic secondary education. Also considered is the scope for African secondary school graduates to acquire university education and the employment opportunities available for secondary and university graduates under the government's racist policy.

Chapter 5 summarises the main arguments raised in the study and draws conclusions from these arguments.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Most contemporary research on African education in Southern Rhodesia has been concerned with the development of primary education and the role of individual churches in that process. In his study of the history of Christian missions in Matebeleland between 1859 and 1923, Bhebe, for example, examined the attempts
by the London Missionary Society (LMS) to establish primary education with little success until the advent of colonial rule. He discussed the problems and constraints which confronted the LMS missionaries in obtaining African support for their religious and educational work. He showed that the Society failed to make significant achievements in both the religious and educational spheres until it was provided with political and financial support by the colonial administration following the conquest and colonisation of Southern Rhodesia in 1890. In the colonial period 1890-1923, the author discussed the rapid expansion of the LMS and other mission stations and educational work in Matebeleland as a result of the assistance given to the missionaries by the British South Africa Company.¹

Similarly, in his study of the history of Christian missions in Mashonaland between 1890 and 1930, Mashingaidze examined the contribution of various missionary bodies in the establishment and development of African primary education in the context of the colonial system. He also discussed the impact of mission education on Africans in terms of its contribution to

the propagation and acceptability of Christianity\textsuperscript{1}.\n
Zvobgo, in his discussion of the history of Wesleyan Methodist Missions in Southern Rhodesia during the period 1891 and 1945 examined the development of specific Methodist primary schools and assessed their contribution to the spread of Wesleyan Methodism\textsuperscript{2}.

Kamusikiri\textsuperscript{3} and Rennie\textsuperscript{4} examined the roles of the Methodist Episcopal Church and the American Board for Foreign Missions in the establishment and development of primary education in the Manicaland and Gazaland provinces of Southern Rhodesia in the years 1896 to 1960 and 1890 to 1935 respectively. The latter also discussed the contribution of mission education to the rise and development of African nationalism in that part of the country.

\textsuperscript{1} E.K. Mashingaidze: \textit{Christian Missions in Mashonaland - Southern Rhodesia 1890-1930} (Ph.D. Thesis, University of York, 1973), Ch. VIII.


Atkinson, in his study of the history of education of all the races in Southern Rhodesia, discussed at length the development of African primary education and European, Asian and coloured primary, secondary and university education. Where reference to African secondary education was made, the treatment was sparse.

Research on more recent developments in African education has concentrated on the impact of Rhodesia Front Government policies on various aspects of educational growth and the school leaver unemployment problem. But the emphasis has been on developments in the 1970s. Murphree's sociological study examined the aspirations of African secondary school leavers in the 1970s, while Riddell discussed the development of both African primary and secondary education in the context of employment between 1970 and the 1978 internal political 'settlement'.

As far as the available literature is concerned, there has so far been little or no systematic attempt to examine the role of church and state in the development

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of African secondary education in the period covered by this thesis. Part of the reason is that most missionary archival sources for this period are closed to the public, thus making research on African secondary education difficult to undertake.

Using sources, most of which have not been previously available, this study goes beyond primary education and undertakes to examine various aspects of African secondary educational development from the point of view of the policies through which those developments were carried out. The significance of this study, it is hoped, lies in its intrinsic historical value and the use and interpretation of primary sources. Also, an understanding of the educational developments discussed, the achievements and limitations of past educational policies and programmes, may assist in the implementation of appropriate educational reform in terms of the needs and motivations of students and their parents in the present socioeconomic and political context.

Of some importance may be the contribution this thesis makes to the current debate on the relevance to individual student's needs for vocational and/or academic education in the context of a school leaver problem which, in post colonial Southern Rhodesia and other developing countries, is already acute. The problems of an educational reformer in independent Zimbabwe may, in
certain respects be similar to those of Todd and Whitehead and the Anglican and Methodist churches.

It is hoped that this study will make a significant contribution to the history of African education in Southern Rhodesia.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis is based on archival and library research and uses three types of primary source: one being that of missionary archival material which is divided into the following categories: Correspondence, Synod/Conference Minutes and Annual Reports of -
(a) The Anglican Church; (b) The Wesleyan Methodist Church; (c) International Missionary Council/Conference of British Missionary Societies; (d) Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference (later, the Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference); (e) Society of Jesus; and (f) Council for World Missions. Most of these sources have not been previously available.

The second type of source comprises official reports of successive Southern Rhodesian governments on African education and these appear under five different titles:-
(a) Reports of the Chief Native Commissioner
(b) Reports of the Director of Native Development
(c) Reports of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development
(d) Reports of the Director of Native Education
(e) Reports of the Secretary for African Education

The third type includes newspapers, British government colonial documents, some Rhodes House archival material and miscellaneous reports. Considerable use is also made of published and unpublished theses and a wide range of secondary sources.

With regard to the primary sources used, one of the main limitations is that they contain little or no recorded African opinion on the various educational issues. This is perhaps inevitable since government reports reflect official thinking on educational programmes and policies while missionary sources represent mainly a record of missionary work. But, in the absence of recorded African opinion, it is difficult to arrive at a comprehensive assessment of African attitudes and responses to the education they received. Had this study been conducted at a time when the political situation in Southern Rhodesia was ideal, some research in that country might have proved useful in providing information not found in the sources used. However, the war situation which prevailed precluded this.

Another drawback encountered with the primary sources was the lack of recorded information pertaining to the socio-economic background of the African pupils/students who attended schools, or their careers after school, apart from teaching and evangelical work. Such information
would have been of considerable value in assessing more fully the motivations behind the students' search for education and parental support or otherwise.

Similarly, very little information on the churches' political views is found in missionary records (with the relative exception of Wesleyan Methodist sources). The scarcity of this information is due, in part, to the censorship imposed on the archival sources by the missionary authorities who allowed the present author access to selected closed archives. Again, the lack of records prevented a more comprehensive analysis of missionary political support for colonialism, especially in the 1960s and 70s. Such an analysis would have proved useful in contrasting the political position of the missionaries with their educational policies. However, the sources provide a rich insight into several aspects of government and missionary educational policies and programmes.

In all research there is room for differences of opinion, even where opinion is based on evidence. But where evidence has to be inferred or assumed, the possibilities of disagreement are even greater. Whatever limitations of interpretation or analysis of evidence may appear in this work should be considered in the light of the limitations of the sources used.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the establishment and development of white colonialism in Southern Rhodesia. This is necessary to provide a framework for the analysis of various aspects of the evolution of policies on African education in this colony. The chapter then proceeds to examine the development of government and missionary educational policies in the context of that colonial framework.

It is argued that the factors which influenced African educational policies and programmes originated in the nature of the colonial system which came into effect in 1890. It is useful at the beginning to stress the important link between colonial politics and the development and implementation of church and state policies on African education in Southern Rhodesia. This link recurs continually throughout the study.

The chapter falls into two parts. Part I discusses the colonisation of Southern Rhodesia by the British South African Company and the establishment and consolidation of colonial rule. In it, is also examined the role of the
missionaries in the colonisation process. The intention is to show how this compromised them to the colonial system and initially undermined their position and acceptability in African society.

Part II discusses the evolution of government and missionary policies on African pre-secondary education. It examines the rationale for state and church policies and the differences and/or similarities between them in terms of the objectives of their educational programmes. Also considered is the interaction between (a) church and state policies in their implementation and (b) the conflict between missionary political support for colonial rule and white supremacy and their educational policies which appear to contradict that position.

PART I

EARLY COLONIAL HISTORY

Colonisation of Southern Rhodesia

The colonisation of Southern Rhodesia was organised from South Africa by one of the champions of British imperialism, Cecil John Rhodes. It was effected in 1890 when a group of white settlers, known as the Pioneer Column, marched into the country and raised the Union Jack at Salisbury.

This colonial venture was part of Rhodes' grand design of bringing the whole of Africa from Cape to Cairo under British rule. It had therefore as its primary
objectives the establishment of colonial rule and the fostering of colonial capitalism in Southern Rhodesia

The attractions of the colony were considerable. It possessed a wide range of natural resources including gold and fertile land, large reserves of cheap human labour and a climate ideal for white settlement. The scope it provided for the development of a capitalist economy and its strategic importance as a trade base in Central Africa led to the granting of a Royal Charter to the British South Africa Company (BSA Co.) by Queen Victoria in 1889. The Charter authorised the company to administer the colony on behalf of the Crown. Many British citizens


were encouraged by their Government to go and take advantage of the opportunities the country offered and many came to settle. (Between 1890 and 1901 the European population rose from 196 to 11,000.) These settlers came determined to establish a permanent white colony and create a society in which white political, economic and social position was supreme.

The BSA Co. immediately set up an administration through which to govern the colony. The reason for excluding direct British rule was, according to Palley, that the British Government wanted to avoid the financial burden of direct administration. But, in opting out of direct rule, Britain effectively conceded local autonomy to the settlers and British authority was, in practice, only nominal.

Between 1894 and 1898, the Company set up the main instruments of government and African administration which

1. See Duke of Fife's address to the BSA Co. in London in 1893, Minutes of the BSA Co. Annual Report 1893, p.23.
3. Palley, op. cit., p.94.
became the basis of white rule throughout the territory's colonial history. The legal system\(^1\), the instruments of law enforcement\(^2\), land policy\(^3\) and the electoral system were created in that period and, in 1899, a legislative council dominated by whites was established\(^4\).

In the absence of adequate British control over the way the company administered the colony, the settlers were free to function with little external restraint. This left African rights and interests largely unprotected and subject to violation.

From the first year of occupation, for example, the BSA Co. began to expropriate African lands for European settlement. In 1894 the company divided the country into European and African areas with the objective of setting aside productive land for the settlers\(^5\). In the process many Africans were evicted from their homes in order to make room for white immigrants. By 1895, more than 15,000,000 acres of land had been taken over by the company\(^6\).

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1. Palley, op. cit., p.117.
2. Ibid., pp.135-136.
5. Palmer, op. cit., pp.30-34.
Furthermore, the Company administration began to use force to recruit Africans to work in the mines and on white farms and plantations because they would not voluntarily undertake wage employment. This was because the majority of Africans feared that wage labour would destroy traditional communal life as those who went to work stayed away from their homes for a long time. This also deprived the villages of male adult manpower needed to work in the fields and thus threatened to destroy subsistence agriculture on which the African communities depended.

Deprivation of land, forced labour, the lack of caution and sensitivity displayed by the Company officials and the settlers in dealing with Africans led to the 1896-97 revolt during which the Ndebele and Shona tribes engaged in a war of resistance against colonial rule. In that war the settlers and European missionaries joined forces in suppressing African resistance.

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The missionary role in the occupation of the colony

Missionaries of some European churches came into the country with the Pioneer Column. Leading officials of such churches as the Anglican, the Wesleyan Methodist, the Roman Catholic Society of Jesus, the Dutch Reformed and the Salvation Army, on hearing of Rhodes' proposed venture into Mashonaland, volunteered to join the column from their bases in South Africa. Other churches followed soon after white occupation of the colony had been effected.

All of them were anxious to see the country colonised and white power established because this would provide them with the political protection they needed in an area in which many of them had failed to operate in the past due to the hostile attitude of African chiefs towards missionaries. Rhodes personally encouraged missionary participation in his colonial design because he believed that their presence would give respectability to his plans which were already under criticism in England. Like his contemporary advocate of British imperialism, Sir Harry Johnston, Rhodes believed that missionary religious influence would provide an ideological arm for colonialism in African society which would, as Sir Harry put it:

1. Mashingaidze, op. cit., pp.60-68.
strengthen {colonial hold over the country .... spread the use of the English language .... (and) induct the natives with the best kind of civilisation.

Each mission was regarded as of vital importance in the propagation of Christianity, western civilisation and culture and in aiding the establishment of colonialism in those areas the British intended to annex to the empire. Many missionaries themselves displayed active enthusiasm in the colonisation of Southern Rhodesia. Those who came up with the Pioneer Column gave medical, moral and spiritual attendance to the trekkers. The Reverend Father Hartman of the Society of Jesus observed that, had it not been for missionary medical aid, few of the trekkers would have survived the regular attacks of malaria. On arrival, missionaries acted as emissaries between the settlers and Africans and gave tacit support to the methods used by the Company to subjugate the African population. When the revolt broke out, many members of missions present in the country joined the BSA Co.'s military forces in suppressing African resistance in order to preserve white rule. Also, during the revolt, mission


2. For an account of the missionary role in the overall colonial process, see *Rhodesia Herald* (Special Pioneer Number), 12th September 1930.

stations were used as centres of intelligence by the Company\(^1\). According to a prominent Wesleyan Methodist missionary and one of the founders of the church in the colony, the Reverend Frank Noble, missionaries co-operated with the Company in crushing African resistance because this would eliminate the "heathen and tyrannous native rule" and enable the churches to operate under "a civilised and Christian government"\(^2\).

The role of missionaries in the colonisation process made them initially unwelcome amongst most Africans and seriously undermined the acceptability of their missionary work. They were regarded as part of the colonial machinery and, consequently, during the revolt, mission stations, missionaries themselves and those Africans loyal to them were attacked by African forces. The attack against the churches was so violent that missionary work almost came to a halt during the rebellion\(^3\).

By supporting white colonialism, missionaries directly or indirectly condoned the oppression and exploitation inflicted on the African people for whose advancement and wellbeing they claimed to be responsible\(^4\). The contradiction between missionary political support for white

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2. C/M/B, John White to M. Hartley, 10th November 1896, WMMS Archives.
3. Ranger (1968) \emph{op. cit.}, p.142.
4. See C/M/B, John White to M. Hartley, 10th November 1896, WMMS Archives.
supremacy and their commitment to promote African advancement through education and training (which the settlers regarded as a threat to white security) is a major continuing theme underlying the conflict between missionary and government educational policies.

**Consolidation of white power**

The suppression of the revolt in 1897 marked the end of African jurisdiction over the territory. The Company embarked on a series of measures designed to consolidate white power and these can be divided into three categories: (a) laws and policies designed to enhance white political control; (b) economic policies intended to establish white economic domination and (c) social policies designed to foster white supremacy in the Rhodesian colonial society.

Amongst the political measures were the Pass Laws first introduced in 1894 but vigorously enforced after the revolt. These required all male adult Africans to obtain passes which they should carry on their persons at all times. The objective was to control African freedom of movement within the native reserves (areas allocated for their residence under the 1894 Lands Act) and in European areas. This was intended to prevent collective African political activity and the organisation of another revolt. The Pass Laws caused serious hardship to Africans because, in many cases, those who did not carry the passes or were
found in areas in which they were not supposed to move, were prosecuted and either fined or imprisoned.

Another measure taken to strengthen white power was the franchise system formulated in 1899. This introduced a system of voting based on property and income qualifications which required that an applicant to the electoral register possess a building within the electoral district to the value of £75, or own a mining claim, or receive wages at the rate of £50 per year\(^1\). Africans met none of these requirements. In the first instance, no African had a house of the stipulated value. Secondly, Africans were prohibited by the Company from holding mining rights. Thirdly, the most that Africans earned from wage labour was, on average, only £5 to £8 per year\(^2\). Consequently, none had the required income or property. This effectively denied Africans franchise and therefore political power and representation in the Legislative Council. Moreover, the replacement of the African traditional system of government and administration by a colonial system run by European District and Native Commissioners also effectively consolidated white power in African society. This gave the settlers the overall dominant political position they needed.

\(^1\) Palley, op. cit., p.136.

\(^2\) C/R/B, Reverend George Eva to M. Hartley, 12th April 1910, WMMS Archives, Box 825.
to determine economic and social policies.

In the economic sphere, the BSA Co. administration sought to establish white supremacy through a variety of legislative Acts and policies. From the time of colonisation, the Company gave supreme importance to the establishment of a predominantly white economy. In mining, for example, this was done by giving whites a monopoly of the industry. All prospecting and mining by Africans was made illegal, while European private companies, syndicates and individuals were encouraged to undertake extensive mining operations. They were readily provided with mining licences and cash capital investments for that purpose. By 1895, as much as £1 million had been made available to Europeans by the BSA Co. as an investment in the mining industry and as many as 70 mining companies and syndicates were already operating. Such preferential treatment gave whites access to one of the richest sources of income and wealth. By the 1920s, for example, revenue from mining had reached £4.1 million.

2. Rhodesia Herald, 11th January 1895.
In the agricultural sector, the BSA Co. also gave priority to the settlers by undertaking to assist all those who were interested in establishing themselves on the land. This was done through a policy of land division between the races which made it legally possible for the company to evict Africans from areas allocated for white settlement. Under the 1894 Lands Act, for example, 15 million acres of land were compulsorily acquired from Africans for European use. That figure rose to nearly 122 million acres under the 1914 Lands Act and increased further to 149 million acres under the 1930 Land Apportionment Act (LAA). This land was sold to white farmers at as low a rate as 8½d. per acre for cattle ranching purposes and 3/9d. per acre for agriculture, while Africans in the reserves became increasingly more short of land.

This land shortage was aggravated by the government's refusal to readily sell productive land to Africans. By 1925, for example, out of the 122 million acres set aside for individual buyers under the 1914 Lands Act, only 40,000 acres had been sold to Africans compared to 3 million acres sold to whites. The reason for this massive disparity was largely that the government did not

2. Ibid., p.82.
3. Leys, op. cit., p.28.
want to encourage African competition in farming. Also, the government feared that, if land was readily sold to any Africans who could afford the price, this would retard the influx of Europeans into those areas in which Africans bought land due to white resentment against African farmers as neighbours. Moreover, it was feared that the presence of African farmers in any area would lead to the depreciation of the value of land in that area. So government policy was to refuse Africans access to the areas best suited to agriculture. This ensured that Europeans obtained the most productive areas and boosted their agricultural production.

Apart from providing white farmers with productive land, the BSA Co. also gave them other forms of assistance. In 1908 a Department of Agriculture was set up to undertake agricultural research and advise farmers on the best farming methods to achieve high quality yields. The department also provided farmers with extension facilities. In addition, a Land Bank was established in 1912 to provide credit facilities to white farmers to enable them to buy land, livestock and farm equipment.

All these provisions helped to foster white confidence in the future of farming and attracted many more farmers

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3. Ibid.
from overseas. Census figures revealed that their numbers rose from 545 in 1904 to 11,324 in 1911. Crop production also increased. Maize production, for example, rose from 17,000 bags in 1899-1900 to nearly 46,000 in 1903-1904 and, by 1920, it had risen to 1,120,000 bags. Legislation such as the 1934 Maize Control Act protected Europeans against African competition and gave them a monopoly of the market.

In the area of African labour, on which the entire white economy depended for its development, a series of laws and policies were enacted to ensure the regular availability and flow of labour to all industrial sectors. In Mashonaland, the shortage of African labour in the first two decades of white rule led to the use of force to secure that labour. Native policemen were used to recruit Africans into the mines. When that proved inadequate, a system of taxation was introduced soon after the 1896-97 revolt to force Africans to seek employment. Personal tax on all male adults, hut tax, livestock tax and other forms of taxes were introduced and designed to make it more imperative for Africans to undertake employment. Those who failed to pay

2. Ibid.
these taxes on time were fined or imprisoned. This compelled many Africans to engage in wage labour. By 1910, for example, as many as 34,000 Africans had undertaken employment in the mining industry and 21,000 in farming and agriculture\textsuperscript{1}.

The tax system served a dual purpose. Apart from enabling the BSA Co. to secure the much needed African labour force, it also provided considerable revenue and in 1904-1905 African tax payments accounted for 41.4\% of the total public revenue. This was an increase of nearly 15\% over the 1902-1903 period and was a much higher contribution than that paid by Europeans whose contribution only accounted for 27\% of the total public revenue even though they were wealthier than Africans\textsuperscript{2}. Despite this high African contribution to public revenue, the 1910-1911 Native Affairs Inquiry Committee recommended a further increase in African taxation because it felt that "the supply of labour would be increased as men would be compelled to work more to earn the increased amount"\textsuperscript{3}. Many who continued to refuse to enter employment had their livestock confiscated to deny them alternative sources of income with which to pay the taxes\textsuperscript{4}. Those at places of work were forced to remain

\textsuperscript{1} Rhodesia Herald, 27th May 1910.
\textsuperscript{2} Loney, \textit{op. cit.}, p.52.
\textsuperscript{3} Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Inquiry 1910-11 (Government Printer, Salisbury, 1911), para. 181.
\textsuperscript{4} Rhodesia Herald, 20th May 1910.
there by native policemen employed to guard them.

This measure was reinforced by the 1910 Masters and Servants Act\(^1\) which prevented African employees from leaving their places of work or absenting themselves from duty without prior permission. This Act served as an effective means of labour control.

The overall effect of these policies was to create an economic system which depended on the exploitation of cheap African labour and resources - a system in which the European economic position was dominant.

In the social sphere, the land policy provided the basis for Southern Rhodesia's racial segregation system which continued to exist throughout the country's colonial history. This system led to the evolution of a policy of parallel racial development and a dual system of education for the black and white races. All these features of the Southern Rhodesian colonial system were designed to establish and consolidate overall white supremacy. As will

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1. Palley, op. cit., p.54.
The Masters and Servants Act was a common feature of British colonial administration elsewhere in Africa. It served the dual purpose of controlling labour and providing a code of conduct for African employees. In all cases it defined the punishable offences for its contravention and these included: (a) neglect of duty, (b) failure to start work after signing a contract, (c) refusal to carry out employers' instructions, (d) drunkenness at work, (e) leaving place of work without prior permission and with intent not to return. See Raymond Buell: *The Native Policy in Africa* (Macmillan, London, 1928), Vol. I, p.42. In Southern Rhodesia 13,000 Africans were prosecuted under this Act between 1910 and 1915. The Act codified and entrenched a system of forced labour already prevailing in the mines. See Charles Van Onselen: *Chibaro - African Mine Labour in Rhodesia* (Plato Press, London, 1976), passim.
be seen in Chapter 2, Godfrey Huggins (Premier of Southern Rhodesia from 1933 to 1952) adopted and developed the separate racial development policy into his party political ideology. This ideology determined every aspect of his governmental policies including that on education. But, even in the very early stages of the country's colonial history, the racial segregation and development policy was already an important factor in determining government policy on African education.

By 1923, when Southern Rhodesia gained self government, there had emerged in this colony a social structure in which the European political, economic and social position was dominant.

Transition from BSA Co. rule to responsible government and implications for African education

Under the terms of the Royal Charter, BSA Co. rule was to end after a 25 year period. As that period reached its close, it became necessary for the British government to find ways of determining what form of government would administer the country in the future. Discussions between the Colonial Office and the BSA Co. administration in 1920-21 produced a solution. The settlers were given two alternatives. One was to join South Africa and become part of the Union and the other was to become a self-governing territory. In 1922, the 33,620 whites made their choice in a referendum from which Africans were excluded, and opted to make Southern Rhodesia a self-governing territory.

The decision to opt for self-government was dictated largely by the fear of the majority of whites that joining South Africa would lead to their being dominated by the Afrikaners and thereby losing the supremacy they had gained in Southern Rhodesia. In 1923, the Southern Rhodesian colony was granted responsible government by Britain\(^1\). In doing so, the British Government gave the colony a unique status in which the whites had a parliament of their own to decide and control internal affairs. They also controlled African administration, the army and the police. Thus, the colony was granted powers which were not given to the settlers in other British colonies (except Kenya). From 1923, Southern Rhodesia was never, in any real sense, ruled by Britain as were other colonies where direct British rule was operative.

In terms of education, the attainment of responsible government had significant implications as it meant that state educational policy was decided not by the Colonial Office in London but by the settler government which had its own independent policy-making machinery and procedures.\(^2\)

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2. For a discussion of British Educational Policy, see Brian Holmes: Educational Policy and the Mission Schools (Case studies from the British Empire) (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967), pp.5-45 & 83-111. For a detailed description of British colonial educational policy in Africa, see High Leigh: "Educational Policy in Africa" (1924), IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 253 & Box 255.
British colonial policy on education, as operated in other British colonies, was therefore not applicable to Southern Rhodesia. This differentiated, in many ways, state educational policy in this colony from that which existed in other British colonies. The Rhodesian colonial educational policy resembled more that of South Africa's than that in other colonies in its racial orientation and aim of promoting separate racial development. In the discussion that follows, it is the intention to examine the nature of Southern Rhodesian colonial government policy on African education in the context of the history of the colony as outlined earlier in this chapter. In that respect, the factors which determined that policy will be studied and it is also intended to examine the factors which influenced missionary educational policies, in particular those of the Anglican and Wesleyan Methodist churches. An attempt will be made to identify the areas of conflict and/or convergence in the policies of (a) the churches and (b) between the missionary policies and that of the colonial government(s).

The Governments of the European West African colonies have, through the greater period of their West African existence, been endeavouring to train the natives on European lines, to make them competent in .... professions with no fear of their competition with the ruling class which in the tropics can administer but cannot colonise. In Africa, South of the tropics where the European thrives, the effect of the development of the native and his social and other relations with the white man has constantly been kept in view by the governments concerned and has led, at any rate, in most cases, to that development being checked rather than encouraged. 1

After the colonisation of Southern Rhodesia had been effected, all the missionary churches present in the country were given substantial areas of land on which to establish themselves by the BSA Co. The land was given partly as a token of appreciation for the role played by the churches during the colonisation process and partly to enable them to embark quickly on their Christian work. Company officials were anxious to ensure that Christianity was propagated quickly because they believed that its influence would make Africans less rebellious, more

1. Memorandum prepared for the Imperial Education Conference held in London in 1925 by J. Lenfesty, a Southern Rhodesian Schools Inspector, 3rd December 1923, IMC/CBMS Archives {Africa}, mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224.
submissive and easier to administer. Christianity would make Africans "better servants, honest and truthful."

The role of missionaries was seen by the company administration largely in utilitarian terms to create a moral order, to make Rhodesia safe for the shop-keeper, the farmer and the labour recruiter and to make it easier for masters to deal with their boys.

Missionary work was therefore expected by the company and the white settler community to promote colonial interests. As such, the churches were also expected to operate within the framework of company policies and objectives.


3. While this was the intention of the BSA Co. administration, in aiding missionaries, it had its own counter effects. For example, missionary work and the education it provided, far from making Africans submissive, made them more vocal and critical of white rule. In some cases, missionary activities turned against the government, as in the case of the Watch Tower movement which became politically subversive. Some missionaries, like the Reverend Shearley Cripps of the Anglican church, became outspoken critics of government policies. See, for example, Reverend A.S. Cripps: Memorandum prepared for submission to H.M. Secretary of State at the Dominion Office, London, on the subject of the Segregation Proposals of the Land Commission in H.M. Colony of Southern Rhodesia 1925. SPG.S/R/General/C, D 1925 SPG Archives. Marxist historians nowadays see revolutionary significance in such activities. See J.E. Habibawn *Labouring Men* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1973), Ch. 3.
The Anglicans were given 35,359 acres of land; the Wesleyan Methodists, 44,486 acres and the Roman Catholics 127,059 acres¹. By 1899, the BSA Co. had made land grants totalling 325,730 acres to the ten missionary churches present². However, as far as most missionaries were concerned, this assistance from the Company did not commit them to work for Company interests and, although they supported the continuation of colonial rule, they had their own religious and educational goals to fulfil in African society. After all, that was their reason for coming to the country. The pursuit of those goals sometimes led to conflict with the BSA Co. when their objectives were thought to undermine colonial political, economic and social interests. In the case of the Anglicans and the Methodists, they were soon in conflict with the Company administration when its officials began to interfere with the development of their educational work by attempting to determine policy.

In discussing church and state relations in African education and the evolution of their educational policies, it is important to look at the three main areas in which conflict developed: (a) curriculum - which of two types


N.B. There is no obvious explanation for the differences in the size of land given to the various churches.

2. Ibid.
of education, academic or vocational, was to receive priority in African schools? (b) development policy - what programmes should be given priority? and (c) what role should be played by church and state in developing African education?

The establishment of African primary education by the mission churches began soon after the colonisation of the country in 1890. From that time, the BSA Co.'s primary concern was to ensure that the aims of that education did not conflict with, or undermine, white colonial interests in terms of the influence it could have on African political, economic and social aspirations and their attitudes towards undertaking manual work. This was important especially at a time when the settlers were seeking to establish and consolidate their supremacy. The dependency of the white capitalist economy on the availability of cheap, uneducated and unskilled African labour for its development has already been discussed earlier in this chapter. Because of this dependency, the Company administration did not want African education to concentrate on academic work but rather on vocational training. The objective of such vocational training was to train Africans in rural trades and simple skills which would enable them to improve rural life without, at the same time, making them resent manual labour or aspire to compete with Europeans for white collar professional, managerial jobs and other skilled services.

In the opinion of one Native Commissioner (NC), literary
primary education was not to be encouraged because it would:

unfit the natives for the work they were required to perform. They would refuse to work, preferring to loaf about as learned vagabonds rather than stoop down to what they regarded as below their dignity on account of their literary knowledge. 1

The Company administration indicated clearly that academic education for Africans should not be considered for a long time and that the policy should be to "develop the native's natural proclivities first on lines less likely to lead to any risk of clashing with Europeans." 2

From 1899, when the first Education Ordinance was issued, the BSA Co. tried to use financial aid as a lever by which to influence missionary educational policies and programmes. It laid down certain conditions which missionaries were required to follow if they were to receive government grants. One of the conditions was that a school should devote at least two out of every four hour school day to vocational training 3. According to Mashingaidze, the objective of this condition was to force missionaries, at the time they needed money most for their educational work, to design curricula as specified


by the Company. This would ensure that the development of African education was on lines less likely to lead to economic and political conflict with Europeans in the future.\(^1\) Atkinson observed that the insistence of the Company government on industrial education constituting a substantial part of the curriculum was a significant "revelation of the main lines of the official policy towards African education in the years which followed."\(^2\)

In his view, the objective of the Company was to ensure that Africans were given only such education as would enable them to "become efficient workers in agriculture and industry and perhaps render more efficient service to European employers"\(^3\) but not make them competitive or ambitious to reach the European political, economic and social position. There was, therefore, no interest on the part of the Company in Africans gaining literary educational qualifications.

There were significant differences between the attitudes of the Company and missionaries, particularly the Anglicans and Wesleyan Methodists, towards African academic primary education. In the latter case, formal education was considered of crucial importance in two

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3. Ibid.
respects. Firstly, as a vehicle for promoting their Christian work and, secondly, for aiding the socio-economic advancement of African society by providing Africans with qualifications which would enable them, in the future, to secure better jobs with higher wages and so improve their lives.

The Anglicans and Wesleyan Methodists took the decision to engage in educational work while they were still in South Africa. Two leading officials of the Anglican Church, Bishop Knight Bruce, former resident commissioner of Bloemfontein, and the Reverend Canon Balfour, approached Rhodes in 1890 to negotiate terms under which they would join his venture. The assurances they sought were land, financial support and protection of the BSA Co. for the educational and religious work they proposed to undertake in Mashonaland. It was only after receiving those assurances that they agreed to join the Pioneer Column. On arrival in the colony, their undertaking of educational work amongst Africans was immediate. By 1914 they had already established a dozen prominent educational institutions with St. Augustine's, Penhalonga (1891), St. Faith's, Rusape (1910), St. Michael's, Runyarano (1911), St. David's,

3. Ibid.
Bonda and St. Patrick's, Gwelo (1912)\(^1\) as their main stations.

The head of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in South Africa, the Reverend Owen Watkins, sought similar assurances from Rhodes. He received a guarantee of adequate land for the church's proposed educational and religious work, plus a yearly grant of £100 towards the cost of maintaining the missions they intended to establish\(^2\). It was after receiving these guarantees that Watkins asked his assistants Isaac Shimmin and George Eva to lead the Methodist team into Mashonaland\(^3\). In the same period as the Anglicans, the Methodists established eight missions, of which Negumbo (1891), Epworth (1895), Tegwani (1897) and Woddilove (1911) were the main centres of educational work\(^4\).

From a religious viewpoint, both the Anglicans and Methodists saw literary education as a powerful force by which to weaken the influences of indigenous religion, superstition and witchcraft on African society and expedite

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2. R/C/A/B/6 mic/fi copies: Papers of Owen Watkins, 9th December 1890, WMMS Archives.
the acceptance of Christianity. Their experiences in South Africa and elsewhere in British Africa had shown the importance of education in religious work. Schools became nerve centres of Christian work by serving as places where Christian values and beliefs were systematically inculcated in the young. The Methodists in their West African experiences had discovered that, in places where schools had closed down, the church had tended to wither away. But, in those areas where schools had thrived and people were taught to read and write and follow the scriptures on their own, the church had found a firm foundation and flourished. Both the Methodists and the Anglicans were therefore determined to expand their network of primary schools in order to promote their religious work. As Shimmin explained in 1899:

"It is with the children that our main, indeed our sole hope of building up a Christian community in this country rests and from the beginning it is our aim to endeavour to provide them with a Christian education."

Also, the development of African primary education was seen as of considerable importance because it facilitated the education and training of Africans for the ministry. This was necessary especially during these early days when

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1. C/R/B, Isaac Shimmin to M. Hartley, 18th May 1899, WMMS Archives, Box 825.

2. Ibid.

3. C/R/B, Isaac Shimmin to M. Hartley, 17th June 1899, WMMS Archives.
missionaries were little acquainted with the local conditions, languages and customs and needed Africans to assist them in evangelical work. The speedy acceptance of the Christian church in African society was very much dependent on the active participation of Africans themselves in Christian work as the Anglican Bishop for Southern Rhodesia explained in 1910:

The whole future of the church depends on our training in our schools African catechists, lay preachers, teachers and school masters to take an active part in our Christian work. 1

While the BSA Co. administration supported the speedy growth of the Christian church amongst Africans, it was opposed to what it saw as attempts, by the Methodists and Anglicans in particular, to encourage Africans through education to aspire to rapid socio-economic advancement because this threatened not just the European socio-economic position but also the political future of the white population given the existing franchise system based on income and property.

The BSA Co. was especially concerned about the Anglicans encouraging other churches to provide universal primary education for Africans. Two of the resolutions adopted by the Anglicans at their 1904 Synod Conference held in Cape Town confirmed the Company administration's fears that the church's aims and activities

1. SPG.S/R, General/C, D.1910, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia to SPG Overseas Secretary, 12th September 1910, SPG Archives.
in African education might encourage rapid African advancement and undermine white security. Resolution 3, for example, urged the Company to co-operate with the churches in introducing "as soon as possible a universal system of education" for Africans. A resolution that was even more objectionable to the BSA Co. was that which called upon the churches to educate Africans "for the highest services they were capable of offering to society". This resolution also emphasised "the right of educated Africans to exercise the full rights of citizenship".

The Company administration regarded these resolutions as an attempt by the Anglicans to propagate ideas of racial equality and encourage Africans to seek political, economic and social parity with whites which, in the Southern Rhodesian colonial society was anathema. The Anglican church, however, maintained that it had no intentions of encouraging racial equality because "neither individuals nor races are born with equal facilities or opportunities". As such, Africans could not claim

2. Ibid., Resolution 7.
equality with whites until they had shown themselves "possessed in some degree of personal and corporate responsibility". The church supported the development of African academic education because, in the view of its officials, African advancement was the true justification for Christianity and a credit to white rule. To deny Africans the opportunity to advance, was to defeat the very purpose for which missionaries came to the country. The Bishop of Southern Rhodesia warned in 1905 that, as long as Africans remained uneducated and barred from the influences of Western civilisation, European advancement would be held back.

The Wesleyan Methodists were of the opinion that educating Africans had practical advantages. The Reverend John White, Chairman of the Methodist Synod for many years and the man who made a considerable contribution towards the development of African education, thought that:

The object of the government and the missionary societies ought to be to teach them {Africans} to read, write and speak English as this would save a lot of misunderstandings between employers and employees.

1. See SPG.S/R General/C, D.1905, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia to SPG Overseas Secretary, 4th March 1905, SPG Archives.
2. SPG.S/R General/C, D.1905, Bishop Gaul to SPG Overseas Secretary, 20th May 1905, SPG Archives.
3. C/R/B, Rev. J. White to M. Hartley, 12th February 1905, WMMS Archives, Box 825.
At the 1905 Synod Conference, he argued strongly that the education and advancement of Africans was inseparable from Christian work. It was he and the Anglican Bishop, the Right Reverend Gaul, who strongly urged all the churches to co-operate in organising African primary education. The two men succeeded in bringing together all missionary churches in the country for the first time in 1906. The objective was to discuss ways of co-ordinating all missionary educational and religious work. The significant outcome of that meeting was the formation of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference (SRMC) - a representative body of all the missionary churches. Its objectives were to work for the propagation of Christianity amongst Africans, to promote the speedy development of African education, welfare and development and to make representations to the Company on matters relating to African interests.

Strong criticism of Anglican and Methodist approaches to African education came from the Society of Jesus (SJ), an order of the Roman Catholic church. The SJ believed firmly in the myth of the superiority of the white race and supported the settlers and the BSA Co. in every possible way in establishing and

1. S/M/S/A/B 1906-1911, Synod Minutes for 1906, WMMS Archives, Box 1906-1911.
2. S/M/S/A/B 1906-1911, Synod Minutes for 1907, WMMS Archives, Box 1906-1911.
3. Ibid.
consolidating white rule. In the opinion of its leading officials, it was absurd for any church to provide Africans with an education which was likely to encourage them to foster false hopes of equality with Europeans. Literary education for Africans was therefore not to be considered for many years to come. Father Hartman, founder of the SJ in Southern Rhodesia, and its spokesman (who spent the two years of the 1896-97 revolt in military service with the BSA Co. forces) clearly spelt out his church's policy: "We teach the natives religion and how to work but we do not teach them how to read and write. This is fifty years too soon." 1

The Jesuits believed that the mind of an African was not fully developed to cope with academic education and appreciate its value. According to Hartman, to cram African minds with such knowledge was to do them more harm than good. 2

In a bitter criticism of the Anglicans and the Methodists, another leading Jesuit official, the Reverend W.F. Rea, accused them of proceeding on wrong lines by providing Africans with a literary education because this "unfit the natives for the services they were required to offer." 3 Academic education would produce "the most

pernicious effects upon the pupils .... inflate the native and rob him of his simplicity"\(^1\). He would begin to regard himself as "a gentleman who must on no account demean himself by honest toil"\(^2\). He warned those people who were "in favour of the kaffirs receiving an education such as {was} imparted to the European youth of fair ability"\(^3\) against the political consequences of such action.

The Jesuits, as members of the SJ, were called, shared the opinion of the BSA Co. that African education should concern itself primarily with religious and vocational training. When, in 1906, other churches agreed to co-operate in developing African primary education, the Jesuits refused to join the SRMC because they felt that it was a pro-native association.

Neither the Anglicans nor the Methodists objected to providing industrial education in their schools. They acknowledged the fact that it had an important role to play in rural development. The Anglicans provided training in animal husbandry, farming and agriculture, soil conservation, building, carpentry, nursing and domestic science

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
and other trades at almost all their main institutions\textsuperscript{1}, as did the Methodists at theirs\textsuperscript{2}. But, unlike the BSA Co. and the Jesuits, the Anglicans and Methodists considered it important to give priority to academic training and educate Africans to apply their minds "intelligently and profitably and aspire to higher professions"\textsuperscript{3}. In the opinion of John White, the reason for not giving priority to industrial education was that, from the point of view of employment, the demand in Rhodesia was for unskilled and not skilled African labour.

I believe in industrial training but difficulties in the way here are such as to make it practically very difficult. Suppose you, e.g., train twenty pupils for brick laying, their own people cannot, and the Europeans will not employ them. The greatest need here at present is for unskilled and not skilled labour. \textsuperscript{4}

The Company argued equally strongly that, in terms of employment, academic education had no place in the white economy. European employers did not wish to employ a "jumped up mission native with the gratuitous insolence

\begin{enumerate}
\item SPG.S/R/D, Annual Reports of the Bishop of Southern Rhodesia for 1910, 1912 and 1915, SPG Archives and Missionary Reports 1915, 'E' Series, SPG Archives.
\item S/M/R/B, 1912-22 Rhodesia Synod Minutes for 1912, WMMS Archives, Box 1912-22.
\item C/R/B, John White to M. Hartley, 2nd February 1907, WMMS Archives, Box 826.
\item S/M/R/B, Rhodesia Synod Minutes for 1911. Evidence given by Rev. John White to the Native Affairs Commission of 1910 on behalf of the Methodist Church, WMMS Archives, Box 1906-11.
\end{enumerate}
acquired to perfection from no more than 2 years of mission training"¹. Such Africans were considered a bad influence on the rest of the labour force. One native Commissioner explained that:

Of all the qualifications of which an employer {had} need, reading and writing {were} the least. Here and there, it {was} convenient to have a native who {could} read and write and pay a little extra wages for being so but in a vast majority of cases it {was} an accomplishment in a native for which there {was} no market. ²

The problem facing the progressive missionary educator at this time was that, in the attempt to develop African education, he found himself confronting not just the BSA Co. but also the entire white colonial society of which he was an integral part. This was because, by encouraging African education and advancement, he was indirectly undermining white supremacy. It is, however, quite possible that, in a historical context, many missionaries did not see their educational policies and actions as in any way conflicting with colonial interests.

The Anglicans and the Methodists continued to seek the support of the BSA Co. administration in developing African academic primary education throughout SRMC. A Committee of Inquiry set up by the Company government in

¹. Rhodesia Herald, 5th April 1906.
². Rhodesia Herald, 18th October 1908.
1910 to look into various aspects of African affairs and education, urged the Company to co-operate with missionaries in their African educational work. The Committee regarded such co-operation as the only effective way by which the Company administration could gain greater influence over missionary policy and be in a position to direct African education into the paths of which it approved. In the Committee's opinion, there was no way in which the Company could stop Africans from obtaining an academic education. It was therefore in the Company's interest to participate in providing that education so as to influence the curriculum. This was made clear in the Committee's report:

The expediency or otherwise of giving the native any literary education has greatly exercised the minds of many witnesses {consulted by the Commission}. The Committee are of the opinion, however, that those who would with-hold it have not realised that the movement for literary education has long assumed practical form, and that, do what we may, the native will get it. Apart from the responsibilities of the dominant race in regard to this question, we should .... accept the inevitable and take every means of retaining the control of this class of education so that it may be directed into paths which we can approve of and can be applied to its most useful purpose. 1

As more and more Africans began to regard education as the escape route from rural poverty and manual labour, the demand for it increased. The BSA Co. started to seriously consider ways of controlling African educational development. One way was by increasing grants to mission schools

in order to make them more dependent on government aid. This would enable the Company to gain a stronger voice in the decision and policy-making processes. The Inquiry Committee proposed that, in addition to using financial aid to control missionary educational work, the Company should give schools inspectors more administrative authority over mission schools. This would enable them to influence teaching methods and curricula and ensure that no subversive literature or undesirable material was taught to pupils.

Although missionaries needed more government funds to expand their educational work, many were not willing to let the Company wield too much control over policy. They feared that this would severely curtail their ability to control their own schools. Between 1911 and 1917, attempts were made by the SRMC to seek a more agreeable basis for church/state co-operation in African primary education. But these attempts suffered a serious setback when Company policy took on a more concrete form from 1917 onwards with the appearance of H.S. Keigwin on the educational scene.

1. BSA Co. grants to the 115 approved mission schools in existence in 1910 stood at £2,780. See Franck, op. cit., p.118.

2. Proceedings of the SRMC held at Great Zimbabwe, 24th-29th June 1915, RMC/CBMS Archives {Africa}, mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224.
A native commissioner in the Department of Native Affairs (DNA) which was responsible for rural African administration, Keigwin believed that the government should take a firm step towards controlling African education and ensure that it was directed more into industrial lines. He impressed upon the Company the need to create a Department of Native Development (DND) which would be responsible for directing African education, welfare and development\(^1\). His primary objective was to evolve an educational policy and development strategy capable of dealing effectively with the problems of rural African development. He considered the main purpose of African education to be that of building up an agricultural, rural society rather than encouraging Africans through academics to aim for the white collar professions\(^2\).

Keigwin had conceptualized a policy and scheme of African education which aimed at taking out pupils from what he described as the "cold intellectual atmosphere of a classroom"\(^3\) into outdoor training in such rural trades as basket weaving, carpentry, building and, most

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2. Ibid.

importantly, farming and agriculture. He regarded carpenters, builders and agricultural demonstrators as the kind of manpower more needed in the native reserves than scholars. But Keigwin did not hide the fact that he intended this education to serve as an instrument of promoting the policy of separate racial development. If Africans were directed away from white collar professions, he thought, this would prevent them from developing any notions of acquiring the same jobs and status as Europeans. As he explained:

If we do not intend to admit blacks, be it now or by degrees, to encroach on social equality, let us not put false ideas into their heads nor encourage them to foster hopes of equality.  

The creation of the DND and the educational philosophy of its progenitor, were both unwelcome to missionaries. In the first instance, they saw the creation of the DND as an attempt by Keigwin to take over their responsibility for organising African education. Secondly, they (in particular, the Anglicans and Methodists) resented Keigwin's plan to bring missionary educational policy into line with that of the BSA Co. as this would severely reduce their


ability to determine curriculum and overall policy. Thirdly, they regarded Keigwin's industrial education scheme as an unnecessary and expensive duplication of courses already provided in many mission schools\(^1\). Most importantly, however, the missionaries feared that, if Keigwin became the Company's chief educational policy-maker, he would use his influence to make the Company administration less sympathetic towards the needs of mission primary education. This would draw away most of the Company funds from primary to industrial education. Indeed, when the SRMC approached the colony's administrator, Sir Charles Drummond, in 1920 with a request for increases in government expenditure on African primary education, they found him unsympathetic and unco-operative. He turned down all three of their requests: one calling for a government subsidy for the salaries of those teachers in primary schools who had completed two or three years of training in a recognised training establishment\(^2\). The second called for capitation grants to be given to all mission schools on a £ for £ basis\(^3\), and the third called for the provision of school equipment grants also on a £ for £ basis\(^4\). The administrator's reason for turning

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1. Proceedings of the SRMC held at Salisbury 16th-19th June 1920, IMC/CBMS Archives {Africa}, mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224.
2. Proceedings of the SRMC held at Salisbury 30th May - 4th June 1922, IMC/CBMS Archives {Africa}, mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224, Resolution 1.
3. Ibid., Resolution 3.
4. Ibid., Resolution 4.
down all three of the requests was that he could not commit a new impending government to an expenditure it might not approve of. In reality, however, the administrator's decision had been influenced by Keigwin who prevailed upon him not to yield to missionary demands until they had agreed to fall into line with government educational policy. In addition to financial sanctions, missionaries were subjected to further pressures aimed at frustrating their work and eliciting their co-operation with the Company in implementing Keigwin's proposed scheme. From 1921 onwards, mission schools were to be rigorously and regularly supervised and inspected by Native Commissioners and officials of the DND. This made it difficult for missionaries to operate freely restricted as they were by having to seek prior approval from the government for their programmes.

The SRMC was anxious to reach some kind of compromise with Keigwin because it realised that, unless a working relationship was established with the DND, it would be very difficult for missionaries to operate in primary education. At the 1922 SRMC, its Chairman, John White of the WMMS, and the Anglican Bishop, impressed upon all the member churches the need to recognise that "cordial

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1. Proceedings of the SRMC held at Salisbury 30th May - 4th June 1922, IMC/CBMS Archives {Africa}, mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224, Appendix 3.

co-operation of government and missionaries was essential for the development of Native Education". In the opinion of White, the only way in which missionaries could have effective influence on government policy was by having a body in which the churches and the government were represented. Such a body would be responsible for determining policy. The presence of missionaries on it would be a great advantage in that their views would be more effectively expressed to the government and their interests would be better protected. A Central Advisory Board of Native Education was proposed and it was the SRMC's idea that the Board should consist of six representatives - three selected by the government and the remainder by the missionaries.

Although Keigwin approved of the idea of the Central Advisory Board, and closer co-operation between the missionaries and the government, he left the missionaries in no doubt whatsoever that he did not approve of their academically oriented educational policy. In his own words, the government did not believe in:

institutionalising native life or standardising our educational products so that we produce one type of intellectual machine-made, bookish native child.... We do not believe in producing change for the sake of change.  

1. Proceedings of the SRMC held in 1922, Appendix VIII.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Keigwin was therefore determined to ensure that industrial education was given priority in mission schools.

The implementation of Keigwin's industrial educational policy and programme

In 1920, Keigwin persuaded the BSA Co. to set up two African industrial schools which would provide Africans with the type of education he had in mind for them. Domboshawa and Tjolotjo schools were built near Salisbury and Bulawayo in 1921 and 1922 respectively to specialise in training Africans in farming and agriculture and building.\(^1\) The Phelps Stokes Commission arrived in the country in 1923 from the United States to inquire into the state of African education in Central Africa. After studying Keigwin's scheme, the Commission impressed upon the newly elected Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia's responsible government, Charles Coghlan, that the utmost priority must be given to the scheme by way of resources and official support.\(^2\)

In the Commission's view, industrial education provided more scope for African rural development than mission academic education. Keigwin was persuaded by the Commission in 1924 to visit the two famous Black American Institutes of Tuskegee and Hampton at its expense in order

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that he might study how the industrial education scheme was organised, taught and applied to rural development. Keigwin was so impressed by what he saw at Tuskegee and Hampton that, on his return, he was more determined than ever before to develop the Domboshawa and Tjolotjo training programmes. Considerable government resources were spent on the two schools. In 1922, for example, government expenditure on Domboshawa and Tjolotjo was nearly half as much as that spent on all mission primary schools - £7,500 - compared to £16,000 spent on 856 mission schools. That figure rose even further in 1924. Missionaries felt that much of this money could have been put to better use in those mission schools providing both industrial training (for teenagers) and academic education.

However, from the opening of Keigwin's training scheme in 1922 up to 1926, only 228 trainees had enrolled at Domboshawa where Keigwin was Principal (as well as being the Director of the DND). An even smaller figure had been enrolled at Tjolotjo. The training itself in these two institutes was described in the 1926 report of the Chief Native Commissioner as a major success.

1. King, op. cit., p.236.
3. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the Year 1926, p.15. For further reports on the development of industrial training at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo, see Reports of the Director of Native Development for the Year 1932, pp.1-2; 1933, pp.5-9.
Experimental farming carried out by the agricultural demonstrators and farmers under training at Domboshawa resulted in a high maize yield according to the report. At Tjolotjo, similar experimental farming projects conducted on land belonging to local Africans in the Gwaai reserve were reported as producing an even higher maize yield than that of Domboshawa. For Keigwin and the government, this was evidence enough of the practical value of industrial training over academic education.

If the training provided at the two schools was as popular with Africans and as successful as it was reported to be by the Director of Native Development, the fact that pupil response was very poor, despite a massive government campaign to attract large numbers for training, requires some explanation. Firstly, academic education introduced into African society a new element of social mobility and an escape from manual labour which pupils and parents were quick to perceive as lacking in industrial education. Those pupils who went to mission schools found that three or four years of primary education


brought within easy reach such popular, prestigious and well-paying professions as teaching, becoming a school-master, evangelist, court messenger or interpreter, or foreman on European farms, plantations or in the mines\(^1\). This increased the popularity of academic education. In the 1920s missionaries no longer had to go from one village to another looking for pupils, as they had to in the 1890s, when education had not yet achieved popularity and parents were suspicious of schools and reluctant to entrust their children to missionaries. Now parents queued at mission schools during the opening days in order to ensure that their children got places\(^2\). In government aided schools, enrolment rose sharply from 205 in 1901 to 9,873 in 1910, and to 43,094 in 1920. The number of government sponsored mission schools also increased in response to the demand for education from 3 in 1901 to 115 in 1910, and to 750 in 1920\(^3\).

Parents took a special interest in ensuring that their children were taught academic subjects. An incident which occurred at the Roman Catholic mission of Kutama in 1926 is a case in point. Parents, on hearing from their

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1. C/R/B Rev. John White to Oversease Secretary, 23rd June 1924, WMMS Archives, Box 828.
2. Ibid.
children that they were being taught industrial subjects most of the time, approached the Principal and told him that:

They definitely did not want their children to learn such things as agriculture, arts and crafts but simply and solely book subjects and that they did not want them to return to school unless they were sure that this was going to be the plan. 1

This parental rejection of industrial education was also due to African suspicion that this education was intended by the white man to prevent Africans from advancing as fast as Europeans so that the latter could maintain a superior political, economic and social position. As Hea explained:

The trouble arises from the fact that they {parents} know something of white schools and think that white ascendency is due to different teaching in the schools and that there is a white conspiracy to keep the blacks down as underdogs .... They think that, if schools are run as they would like them, the black would become in one generation as the white .... 2

Industrial education was therefore looked down upon.

Despite the practical skills acquired by those pupils who went to Domboshawa and Tjolotjo, their status in African

1. Fr. J.O. Hea Missionary Letters 1925-30, SB/K/1/26, 22/1/26, File SF/1, SJ Archives.

2. Ibid.
society and amongst 'educated' Africans was low. Most pupils regarded enrolling for industrial training as the last resort and only for those who had failed to succeed in the formal school system, and most of them, therefore, shunned going to the two industrial schools.

Secondly, an important factor which militated against the early acceptability of industrial education, particularly during the first decade of its establishment, was that those who graduated from Domboshawa and Tjolotjo found considerable difficulty in obtaining employment. The rural areas in which the graduate farmers and agricultural demonstrators were supposed to be of assistance in developing were so poor in resources and land productivity, because of population overcrowding, that they offered little scope for productive farming. Moreover, there were no government funds which could be invested in land development: neither was there any land nor agricultural bank from which the graduates could draw aid for farming projects. But, even assuming that such aid had been available, government policy of not readily selling

productive agricultural land to Africans was still a serious obstacle to the Domboshawa and Tjolotjo graduates engaging in productive farming.

Similar difficulties were experienced by those who trained as builders. Rural Africans did not require their skill because they were capable of building their own houses. Europeans in urban areas could not easily employ them because European trade unions were anxious to protect their members against African competition. Moreover, the quality of training African builders and other craftsmen were given at the two training schools was kept low deliberately in order to protect the job security of their European counterparts. Africans were further denied training in the more specialised trades such as plumbing, printing, metal work and engineering which provided ready access to well paying jobs in the urban and other industrial areas. Training in these trades was reserved for Europeans. This policy was enunciated by Keigwin himself in 1924 in a statement of reassurance to whites that the Domboshawa/Tjolotjo training schemes did not threaten their economic interests.

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If a critic feels that this plan will be imperilling both his and the country's labour supply, he should feel assured that our policy far from decreasing the supply of labour should increase it both in quantity and efficiency. Our plan is to stimulate effort among the people, to put purpose into their lives and to develop simple skills in industries that do not offer direct competition with Europeans. 1

The lack of opportunity for the Domboshawa and Tjolotjo graduates to apply their skills and training in both the rural and urban areas led most of them to seek teaching jobs in those mission schools which taught industrial subjects 2 alongside academic primary schooling.

Most parents, aware as they were of the poor job prospects for industrial school graduates, did not want to send their children for industrial training. They preferred to send them to academic schools because they knew that those children who went to academic schools stood a much better chance of getting the few white collar jobs available for blacks and earning considerably more money than the children who went to industrial schools and therefore did not obtain academic qualifications. In many developing countries today, parents

are often unwilling to send their children for vocational education for similar reasons.

In Southern Rhodesia, the industrial education issue was further complicated by the racial element which accounted for the provision of an inferior standard of training for Africans in order to keep them out of those jobs reserved for Europeans. This undermined Africans' chances of finding skilled employment in urban and industrial areas. For the reasons discussed, Keigwin's industrial training and rural development schemes found little African support.

In this chapter so far the evolution of church and state policies on African education between 1890 and 1923 have been discussed. The reasons for the conflict in policies, the rationale on which these policies were based and the nature of educational programmes that evolved from them have been examined. In the section which now follows a study is made of the development of church and state policies on African academic/primary education between 1923 and 1933.

The development of church and state policies on African academic primary education between 1923 and 1933

From the time of the implementation of Keigwin's scheme, government policy towards African primary education became even less sympathetic than it had been in
the past. After the country attained self-government in 1923, there were many Europeans who felt that the government should take effective measures to control missionary educational policies and ensure that African education developed on lines approved by the state.

European opposition to the government aiding mission African schools also increased. Highly influential right wing parliamentarians like Ethel Tawsie Jollie and the arch conservative Gilfillan were opposed, in principle, to the idea of the government financing any programme of African education. They were intensifying their campaign to get the government to stop providing grants to mission schools because they wanted missionaries to pay for their own educational work¹. There was a second force - that of officials of the DNA (native and district commissioners), who believed that mission education should not be encouraged because it had a bad influence on African youth. In the opinion of the Native Commissioner for Marandellas, "Native education (as carried through sectarian competition {was} costly and fundamentally weak" because it gave the African "a wholly erroneous conception of education"².

He considered the popularity of mission schools as due to

2. See Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the Year 1928, p.5.
pupils "seeking freedom and licence from the social conditions rather than a desire for religion or education"\(^1\).

In response to these pressures, the government took steps in 1923 to gain more control over African primary education. Several control measures were gazetted giving the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) and his assistants considerable powers over the running of mission schools. Under the new regulations, the CNC could, for example, withdraw altogether the lease of a mission school if he suspected or felt that the school's activities "promoted feelings of ill will or hostility against the state"\(^3\). A local Native Commissioner (NC) could inspect a school at any time without prior notice to "check against subversive propaganda being taught or pupils being encouraged to disturb public peace"\(^4\). In future no mission school could be opened unless it had obtained prior consent of the CNC. Also, all teachers had to have their character scrutinised and approved by

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2. S/M/R/B 1923-33 Synod Minutes for 1923, WMMS Archives, Box 1923-33.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
the CNC prior to their being employed in any mission school\(^1\). This not only interfered with the established procedures of running the schools, it also greatly frustrated missionary educational work by curtailing the missionaries' ability to operate freely. There were strong objections to the new regulations from the SRMC because the procedure of obtaining government approval for every educational programme that missionaries wanted to undertake imposed serious restrictions on overall educational development. A representation was made by the Methodists in 1924 seeking the immediate withdrawal of those regulations, but to no avail\(^2\).

Furthermore, although the government did not terminate grants to mission schools as demanded by many whites, it became less willing to make the required increases in financial aid, thus hampering missionaries from maintaining their educational work and allowing for planned development to take place. This restriction on aid to mission schools by the government was despite the fact that Africans were making substantially high contributions to public revenue through taxes. For example, African tax revenue rose from £230,099 in 1924 to £328,370.12s.8d. in

\(^1\) S/M/R/B 1923-33 Synod Minutes for 1923, WMMS Archives, Box 1923-33.

\(^2\) S/M/R/B 1923-33 Synod Minutes for 1924, WMMS Archives, Box 1923-33.
1925\textsuperscript{1}, a rise of over £98,000 in one year. But, in return, the total increase in educational expenditure by the government on African schools for the same period amounted to only £8,670\textsuperscript{2} and this was for a total African enrolment that had risen from 43,094 in 1920 to well over 75,000 in 1925. This, as the Anglican Bishop pointed out in 1925, was inadequate to meet the needs of such a large enrolment\textsuperscript{3}.

Government fears that a wholly academic education would facilitate the growth of a class of Africans which would not only gravitate towards the professions but also engage in political activity was vindicated by the role of some notable educated Africans in the political sphere. This had the effect of making the government even less enthusiastic in assisting in the development of African primary education. Men like Twala, the founder of the Bantu Voters Association in 1923, and Maziyani, the Anglican school teachers and others assumed a significant role in organising urban black protest movements of that time. These men demanded the extension of franchise to more Africans, higher pay, better working and living

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the Year 1926, p.10.
\item \textsuperscript{2} SPG.S/R General/C, D.1925, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia to SPG Overseas Secretary, 28th October 1925, SPG Archives.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
conditions for urban workers and more educational facilities for Africans\(^1\). The government regarded the role of such men as politically undesirable and felt that there should be an adequate check against the education system producing too many men of this type. The government's determination to force the predominance of industrial education in the African school curricula was indicative of its desire to direct African education away from the academic into the less politically and economically threatening field of vocational education\(^2\). As the 1925 Native Education Commission pointed out, an educated native was regarded as a formidable rival to Europeans in every sphere of life\(^3\).

The SRMC attempted to evolve a unified missionary response to what it regarded as a government policy designed, deliberately, to frustrate missionary work and undermine the development of African education. But the various missionary bodies were divided over the extent to which they should go in opposing government policy. The Wesleyan Methodists advocated defiance of the government and urged the other missionaries to recognise that:

> having come to the country and taken for ourselves the best of the land, and having put to use the riches of the country, let us realise that, in all fairness, we must discharge the only duty of the stronger towards the weaker - a duty which fortunately matches our own interests and provide for them the fullest opportunity to develop

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3. *Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the matter of Native Education in all its bearings in the Colony of Southern Rhodesia* (Govt. Printer, Salisbury, 1925), para.752.
While the Anglicans agreed that missionaries should take a tough stand against the government in defending African interests, the new Anglican Bishop, the Right Reverend Edward Paget felt that, to take too militant a position, would be counter productive in two ways. Firstly, missionaries could antagonise their European congregation from whom most churches received considerable cash contributions for their Christian and educational work amongst Africans. Secondly, the government might take a tougher stand against the churches and impose even more severe restrictive measures on their educational work. Some churches, such as the Roman Catholic, * the DRC and the Salvation Army which supported government policies, were unwilling to let the SRMC be seen by the white population as a defender of African interests and a mouthpiece for the expression of African political, economic and social grievances. These churches advocated a less militant approach to government policy. To maintain

1. Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department 1924, No. 2, p.15. Also see Paper read to the SRMC by Mr. Orner on behalf of Dr. W.L. Thompson, on the need to educate Africans: Proceedings of the SRMC held in Salisbury 30th May-4th June 1924. IMC/CBMS Archives {Africa}, mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224.

2. SPG.S/R/General/C, D, 1926, Bishop E. Paget to SPG Overseas Secretary, 13th March 1926, SPG Archives.


* The Roman Catholic Church joined the SRMC in 1920.
unity amongst all the member churches, the SRMC had to adopt a less militant response to the government's attitude and policy towards African education. In any case, the churches could not afford to create a situation of open conflict with the government because they needed its political support and financial assistance for their work.

Moreover, it was not the intention of the churches, even those like the Wesleyan Methodist which claimed to be progressive to antagonise the government which they supported and agreed with in many other spheres. They, for example, supported some of the government's blatantly racist policies which undermined African interests. This was clearly demonstrated by the open support the Methodists gave to the Land Apportionment Act, the pillar of racial segregation and African under-development in Southern Rhodesia. Even before the LAA had been debated in parliament, the Methodist Synod not only welcomed it but wished it could be extended to other British colonies.

Many of us have the greatest hope that our land segregation policy rather than promote racial strife, will be a supreme contribution to racial harmony and that Rhodesia will in the matter of land legislation between the black and white races set an example to some of our colonies that are tremendously in need of one.  

1. S/M/ R /B 1923-33, District Synod Minutes for 1929, WMMS Archives, Box 1922-33. Also see Rhodesia Herald, 18th January 1929.
A prominent Methodist official, the Reverend P. Hardaker, was convinced that the land policy was necessary in order to give the blacks an opportunity to:

develop more naturally and gradually in their own sphere as too rapid African contact with European civilisation at this stage (could) be a danger. 1

Most churches, too, believed that many government policies were necessary to protect white interests and ensure the continuation of white rule civilisation and Christianity. Only the isolated voices of such missionaries as the Anglican Reverend Shearley Cripps were to be heard opposing government policies and challenging their Christian basis 2. His Anglican colleagues, however, generally regarded him as a political embarrassment to the church and out of touch with the realities of Rhodesian politics 3.

Given the Methodist and Anglican support for colonial government policies, it appears paradoxical that they should have pursued educational policies which conflicted with that of the state but, in their view, the objectives of

1. Proceedings of the SRMC held in Salisbury on 30th May - 4th June 1924, Appendix V, IMC/CBMS Archives {Africa} mic/ii 99, Box 1221-1224.
2. SPG.S/R/General/C, D. 1926, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia to A.E.A. Sulston, 18th September 1926, SPG Archives. Also see "Notes on Native Affairs in Southern Rhodesia" compiled by A.S. Cripps, 14th May 1921, File: General: Native Affairs, 1921, IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 1221.
their policies and programmes were consistent with the aims of their Christian work - to Christianise Africans, educate them and aid their advancement\(^1\). They also believed that, by educating Africans and enabling them to adapt themselves to the colonial situation so that they could work and live under white rule with contentment, their policies contributed to the stability and security of colonial rule\(^2\). They did not consider the political, economic and social consequences of educating Africans in the way the government did.

One church, however, made clear that the aims of its educational policy were to educate Africans so that they could secure political, economic and social rights. The American Board for Foreign Missions surprised the government and other churches when its representative declared before the 1925 Native Education Commission that, besides aiming at raising the economic and social status of the African communities, Christian and non Christian:

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\text{a large part of its educational work was to train and educate natives to take their proper place in the body politic. The aim would be training the natives to fit them to get franchise and to take part in the administration of the country.} \quad 3
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1. C/R/B, J. White to F. Noble, 6th June 1928, WMMS Archives, Box 828.

2. This thinking was also reflected in the report of the 1925 Native Education Commission. See Southern Rhodesia - Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the matter of Native Education in all its bearings in the colony of Southern Rhodesia (Govt. Printer, Salisbury, 1925), paras. 695-698.

The official went on further to explain that, to achieve the given objectives, the church taught in its schools "civics and methods of self government and {had} always done so"\(^1\).

The church's views were, however, dismissed by the Commission as being influenced by the ideals of the American constitution which upheld man's equality. The government nevertheless took serious note of the church's political position and, for a long time, its educational activities were kept under the watchful eye of the Native and District Commissioners and Schools Inspectors in the Gazaland and Eastern provinces of Southern Rhodesia in which it operated\(^2\).

Although the SRMC decided not to take too militant a position with regard to the government's policy, it decided that missionaries should strive to gain more freedom in running their educational affairs and should also put more pressure on the government for more aid. Of equal importance was the decision taken at the 1926 Conference that the churches should extricate themselves from working under the DND and the DNA, both of which, they believed, had no genuine interest in African education and were responsible for many of the administrative

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2. See Kamusikiri, *op. cit.*, Ch. 3.
problems confronted by missionaries in day to day educational work.\(^1\)

The SRMC proposed to Premier Coghlan that a Department of Native Education (DNE) be formed to take over responsibility for Africans from the DND and the DNA. The SRMC believed that such a department, wholly committed to the organisation and development of African education, would take greater interest in its welfare than had so far been shown by the DND. The real issue, however, was whether the proposed DNE would be able to make positive changes in government policy and secure more support from the government for the development of primary education.

Keigwin's resignation from his influential position in 1926 cleared the way for missionaries to put pressure on the government for the immediate formation of the DNE. But Premier Coghlan died in 1927 before the proposed department had been agreed on. He was, however, succeeded by a man who was sympathetic to missionary problems. H.U. Moffat, grandson of the famous London Missionary Society missionary who established the first mission school in pre-colonial Southern Rhodesia in 1859, became Prime Minister in 1927. As a former missionary himself, he understood the nature of the

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problems confronted by missionaries in their educational work.

Moffat approved the setting up of the Department of Native Education in 1927 but not without experiencing considerable parliamentary criticism from the Opposition and some of his more conservative ministers. They accused him of creating expensive and unnecessary dualism in the administration of African education and development. It was only after Moffat agreed to bring the DNE and DND under one directorship that parliament approved the DNE in 1929. The two departments, however, had entirely separate responsibilities. The DND remained in charge of African rural development while the DNE became responsible for African education.

The man who succeeded Keigwin and became Director of both departments was Harold Jowitt. A prominent educationist from the Natal Province of South Africa, his experience in dealing with missionaries suited him well for his new job. But, like his predecessor, he also believed that African education should develop on agricultural and industrial lines. He also indicated his intentions to observe the recommendations of the 1925 Native Education Commission that African education should follow the lines set out by Keigwin.

2. Ibid.
To emphasise his preference for industrial education, he chose as some of his advisers and assistants the heads of Domboshawa and Tjolotjo. It is true, however, that, in comparative terms, he was less strict with the missionaries than his predecessor\(^1\), and attempted to solve some of their complaints. He made the gesture of co-operation by, for example, withdrawing some of the 1923 regulations such as the vetting of teachers' characters by DNA officials and the constant threat of cancellation of school leases by the CNC if he felt that any school's activities were undesirable. He allowed missionaries more freedom to operate and make their own decisions in the administration and planning of their educational programmes\(^2\) although government approval for the establishment of new schools was still required.

Apart from relaxing government restrictions over missionary educational activities, there was very little positive contribution made by Jowitt towards the development of African primary education. It is therefore not true to claim, as Mlambo does, that Jowitt was a progressive educationist in the sense that Garfield Todd was in the 1950s\(^3\). In fact, under his directorship of

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2. S/ M/R/B 1923-33, District Syond Minutes for 1929, Cap F, WMMS Archives, Box 1923-33.
the DNE, African education suffered serious financial problems arising from the cuts he introduced in government educational expenditure between 1929 and 1932. At this time missionaries were requesting more financial aid to cope with a school enrolment that had more than doubled from 43,094 in 1920 to 107,122 in 1930\(^1\), but Jowitt withdrew completely government grants to 231 kraal schools which, under the re-classification of schools in 1929, were considered ineligible for any further government assistance\(^2\). At least 9,000 pupils were affected by this cut in grants\(^3\) and many of them who could not afford the cost of their education left school altogether. Others, as Mlambo himself pointed out, were able to remain in school only by paying for their fees through labour carried out during weekends and holidays\(^4\). In many cases, parents offered their services to schools in return for their children's education. This happened in many Methodist and other mission schools\(^5\). A further reduction in government

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3. *Ibid*.
5. C/R/B, Rev. H. Carter to F. Noble, 10th May 1930, WMMS Archives, Box 829.
grants to mission schools was made in the 1932-33 academic year. After that reduction, the government contribution to African education fell by 25% from what it was in 1926, leaving a total which only accounted for 10% of the full cost of running the African school system.

Jowitt's action came as a great surprise to the missionaries: firstly, because they had not been duly consulted as promised and, secondly, because government expenditure on African education per pupil over the years was not so high as to warrant any reduction. The following table illustrates this point:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grants to Mission Schools</th>
<th>No. of Schools eligible for Grants</th>
<th>No. of Pupils enrolled</th>
<th>Amount per Pupil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>£133</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>£0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>£2,780</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>9,873</td>
<td>£0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>£9,467</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>43,094</td>
<td>£0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>£48,436</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td>107,122</td>
<td>£0.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, government expenditure amounted to an average of only £0.40 per pupil per year - a sum which was inadequate

   N.B. Jowitt was able to implement his policies despite Moffat's sympathy towards missionary educational needs because, under the Rhodesian political system, departmental power lay in the director rather than in the Minister. If the permanent head of a department was conservative, as in Keigwin and Jowitt's cases, the Minister in charge of the department, if he was liberal, found difficulty in implementing his policies. See Mlambo, op. cit., p.77.

to meet the demand for education by Africans - and this figure contrasted sharply with a government average annual expenditure of £15 per European pupil in village schools and £12 per head for those in farm schools in 1908. European education was given preference over African education by successive colonial governments since its establishment by the Catholic Dominican nuns in 1891. The BSA Co. took direct control of European primary education in 1908 and, since that time, considerable resources were spent on its development. In 1921, for example, the BSA Co. expenditure on 80 European schools with 5,408 pupils was £187,831 or £34.15s. per head compared to less than £10,000 spent on 750 African schools with an enrolment of 43,094. (This amounted to less than five shillings per head.) In 1931, primary education was made free and compulsory for all white children up to the age of 12.

At the secondary education level, which became commonplace for Europeans since its establishment by the Society of Jesus in 1903 (at which time the debate was

1. Atkinson, op. cit., p. 57
still continuing as to whether or not Africans should receive a literary education), a number of scholarships were made available\(^1\) to enable children from low income families to attend school. Moreover, the structure of European primary and secondary education was designed to cater for children of different backgrounds, talents and abilities in both academic and non-academic spheres\(^2\).

Missionaries did not object to the government spending so much money on European education but they (and in particular the Methodists) objected to the injustice of the government in reducing aid to the already under-financed African education even though Africans paid as much tax as Europeans.

The bitterness felt by the Methodists (and indeed by the other missionaries) over the cuts in government grants to African education was strongly expressed in 1932 by the Reverend Herbert Carter, current Chairman of the Methodist Synod and a leading official of the SRMC, in his letter to the Overseas Methodist Board in London:

> We are beginning to battle with government cuts old and new in the Native Development vote and shall probably be asking your assistance and that of the Methodist Lords and Commons to put a


bit of pressure on at home. The rank injustice of cutting these grants when the natives are paying up their local taxes like Britons is too much to pass over and, if these local politicians of ours, in mean minded deference to local public opinion, are going to penalise natives and their development in this way, they will have to learn that there is another public opinion overseas. Missionaries are being docked another three thousand (pounds) this year which brings the cuts to 25% of the grants authorised by Government Notice 676 of 1926.

Though the large reduction in government grants imposed a heavy financial burden on missionaries, it had two main advantages. Firstly, by becoming less dependent on state aid and more on their own resources to maintain and develop African education, missionaries became more independent of government control in their educational affairs. They no longer feared financial reprisals if they refused to co-operate with the government in implementing directives they disagreed with or had not been adequately consulted on. A good example of this was the way in which the missionaries made a very negative response to the 1932 government directive making it compulsory for all mission African schools of every type to provide industrial education. The Anglican Education Committee declined to implement the directive until it had been


debated and approved by the SRMC. The Methodists thought the directive irrelevant, since most mission schools were already providing industrial education as part of the curricula. In fact, the government lost much of the influence and control it had exercised over mission education while at the same time contributing a larger proportion of educational expenditure. Missionaries became relatively free to plan their educational programmes with little reference to the government.

Secondly, the poor financial position of missionaries, due to the cuts, brought more aid from their overseas headquarters and other foreign and local organisations than prior to these government cuts. As a result, most missionaries were able to continue with their educational work, albeit with some difficulty. In the case of the Methodists and the Anglicans, they received enough aid from their headquarters to enable them to continue with educational development programmes more or less independently of the government.

Between 1930 and 1933, the Methodists received from their London office some £10,000 towards the cost of developing two of their main schools. £4,000 was

2. C/S/R/B, H. Carter to F. Noble, 10th November 1932, WMMS Archives, Box 834.
3. S/M/R /B 1923-33 District Synod Minutes for 1933, WMMS Archives, Box 1923-33.
allocated for the development of upper primary education at Tegwani mission. The school was, as a result, able to provide more and better boarding facilities for pupils and enabled girls to be admitted to the school as boarders, for the first time, in 1933\(^1\). Another £2,000 was allocated for the improvement of teacher training facilities, while the remaining £4,000 was assigned to Woddilove mission for the same purpose as that of Tegwani\(^2\). By 1933, both these schools were amongst the most developed in the country, with a much higher enrolment than most schools\(^3\). The impact of government cuts, however, limited the range of educational expansion.

The Anglicans received from the SPG Marriott Bequest Scheme nearly £14,000 for the development of primary and teacher training education at St. Augustine's, Penhalonga mission, St. Patrick's, Gwelo, St. David's Bonda Girls' Mission and Faith's Rusape mission\(^4\). By 1934, when the SRMC met at Great Zimbabwe to review the current situation in African primary education, the Anglicans had four boarding schools providing a full eight year primary education\(^5\) - the second largest in number to the Roman

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1. S/M/R/B 1923-33 District Synod Minutes for 2933, WMMS Archives, Box 1923-33.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
Catholic societies\textsuperscript{1}.

Thus, the government's policy, instead of seriously undermining the development of African primary academic education as was intended, encouraged the contrary to take place. This was borne out by the fact that, by 1933, the number of mission central and day schools providing Africans with a complete primary education throughout the country had risen to 35\textsuperscript{2} from 28 in 1927\textsuperscript{3}. The number of government aided African primary schools owned by the ten missionary churches and engaged in African education stood at over 1,432 and pupil enrolment at 107,122, compared to 750 schools in 1920 and 43,094 pupils\textsuperscript{4}. Having secured this tremendous progress despite very limited government support, missionaries felt sufficiently encouraged to go beyond the primary school level into secondary education. As will be seen in Chapter 2, the 1934 Meeting of the SRMC marked the transition from primary to secondary education.

\footnotesize{1. There was a significant change in Catholic policy in the late 1920-30s when interdenominational competition for pupils persuaded them to provide academic primary education in order to attract more Africans to Catholicism. See Linden, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.29-34 and Fr. J.O. Hea (SJ) \textit{Missionary Letters} 1929-37, File SF/1, Society of Jesus Archives.


4. Franck, \textit{op. cit.}, p.118.}
In the present chapter an examination has been made of the evolutionary process of church/state policies on African education, academic and industrial. The factors determining these policies and the reasons which accounted for the differences in their objectives and programmes have been discussed and, from this discussion, it is evident that the problems which confronted the development of African education were largely due to the failure of the church and state to agree on the aims of African education. This prevented the evolution of a unified church and state policy and development strategy, both of which were necessary for the long term planning of African educational development. From the evidence in this chapter, it is clear that the Anglicans and the Methodists regarded the aims of African education as the socio-economic and intellectual development of African society. This, in their view, did not undermine, but rather enhanced, colonial rule and Christianity. Colonial governments, on the contrary, regarded the development of African literary education as a serious threat to European political, economic and social domination. They viewed African advancement as a challenge to the white monopoly of political and economic power and this was evidenced by the insistence of successive governments on African education developing on vocational lines and in a different system from that of European education. The fear of African competition in all spheres
of life prompted successive governments to pursue a policy designed to undermine the development of African academic primary education\(^1\). This policy of protecting white colonial interests was, as will be shown in the next chapter, the major determinant of government policy on African secondary education and had considerable influence and impact on the development of missionary policies in that field.

\(^1\) See Atkinson, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
Chapter 1 discussed the evolution of government and missionary policies on African academic primary and industrial education during the early years of Southern Rhodesian colonial history and the nature of educational programmes that evolved. This chapter discusses the evolution of church and state policies on African secondary education and their implications for its development during the period 1934 and 1952.

Part I (1934-1938) looks at the transition from African primary to secondary education and the search for a policy and development strategy by missionaries and the government. Firstly, the ideological basis of the policy of Huggins' government on African education in the context of Southern Rhodesian colonial politics will be discussed and, secondly, following the framework of analysis developed in Chapter 1, the central issues which constituted the debate for and against the introduction of African secondary education will be examined.

Part II (1939-1945) discusses the introduction of secondary education and the policies on which it was founded. The objective is to identify the factors which accounted for church and state co-operation in the
development of secondary education during the war period. Also considered are the scope and limits for policy reform and educational innovation in a conservative colonial society.

Part III (1946-1952) analyses developments in secondary educational policies during the post second world war period, as well as the attempts by the government to control policy and the resulting conflict between state and church policies. An assessment is made of the impact of that conflict on the development of secondary education and, in a concluding note, the overall policy situation by 1952 is examined.

PART I

TRANSITION FROM AFRICAN PRIMARY TO SECONDARY EDUCATION AND THE SEARCH FOR POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY BY MISSIONARIES AND THE GOVERNMENT 1934-1938

The ideological basis of the educational policy of Huggins' government

When the SRMC met at Great Zimbabwe for its 1934 conference, on its agenda were two important issues. One related to the need to improve church/state relations in the field of African education. This became particularly important during the period following the election to power in 1933 of an extreme conservative Reform Party government
led by Godfrey Huggins. Huggins had already established his reputation in Rhodesian politics as an avowed racist and he became the leading proponent of the policy of separate racial development.

There were genuine fears amongst even the more conservative missionary elements within the SRMC that Huggins' racial politics might impose even more severe constraints on missionary educational work than already existed. Almost all missionary churches were therefore anxious to be on good terms with Huggins' administration. Their primary objective was to seek the mutual co-operation of the government in developing African education.

The second issue related to a proposal made by the Anglicans urging the churches and the government to provide facilities for secondary education for the significant number of African pupils reaching upper primary education and seeking opportunities for further academic education. This proposal, as will be shown shortly, aroused considerable debate between the SRMC and the government.

Huggins came to power at a time of worldwide economic recession. The Southern Rhodesian economy was going through a difficult period with prices for farm products at their lowest level. European unemployment reached a record level in 1934 and whites, as a result, became more apprehensive of African competition than ever before.
There were growing demands from the European population that the government should take effective steps to protect white interests against increasing African competition on the labour market. This competition came from two sources. Firstly, from the growing number of Africans acquiring a complete eight year primary school education in mission schools and then finding few avenues open to them for post-primary courses. Records show that, in 1931, the number of Africans completing upper primary education in mission schools stood at 1,012\(^1\) and, by 1932, the number reached 1,285\(^2\) and rose to 1,309 in 1934\(^3\). With the exception of a few who were accepted for teacher-training courses (numbers being restricted because of limited training facilities), most primary school graduates went to urban and industrial areas in search of blue and white collar jobs.

Secondly, the growing number of Africans returning from South African schools with primary and secondary education qualifications afforded competition to Europeans. Others came back with skills in trades which, in Rhodesia, were a white monopoly. In addition, there were those who

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2. Report of the Director of Native Education for the Year 1933, p.17.

acquired their qualifications through correspondence courses with private South African colleges. Although no figures are available to determine how many of these graduates there were in this period, there are constant references in Methodist archival sources to the growing European concern for the number of Africans qualifying from South Africa and coming on to the labour market\footnote{1}. This concern was also apparent in the way European trade unions set about barring Africans from undertaking employment in the European job sectors\footnote{2}. In 1934, Stanlake Sam kange and, shortly afterwards, G.D. Mhlanga, both Rhodesian Africans, surprised whites by returning from South Africa with B.A. qualifications. Their educational attainment increased the European sense of insecurity because it demonstrated the extent of African ambitions, aspirations and capabilities.

There grew, therefore, demands from the white population for more government control of African education and the rate of African political, economic and social advancement, with a view to preventing the Africans from encroaching on the European position. These demands were expressed strongly by Huggins himself in a speech he delivered to parliament in 1934:

\footnote{1. C/S/R/B, Rev. H. Carter to F. Noble, 14th March 1933, WMMS Archives, Box 834.}
\footnote{2. See D.J. Murray, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.215-220.}
The European in this country can be likened to an island of white in a sea of black with the artisan and tradesman forming the shores and the professional classes the highlands in the centre. Is the native to be allowed to erode away the shores and gradually attack the highlands? To do so would mean that the leaven of civilisation would be removed in this country. The higher standard of life cannot be allowed to succumb. 1

Huggins came to the office of premiership fully determined to foster white dominance and suppress all African attempts to encroach on white privileges. His first step towards achieving that objective was to swiftly outlaw inter-racial competition in every sphere of life through a policy of parallel racial development which he incorporated into his party's political ideology. This policy was based on the principle that the social, economic and political development of Africans must follow lines different from those of the white race. In Huggins' own words, the policy visualised the two races:

living side by side yet apart, each working in his own area, not in competition with each other but complementary to it as in partnership. 2

As part of the policy of containing African competition, a series of Acts were passed. In the economic sphere, the Maize Control Act of 1934 imposed severe restrictions on African maize production and access of African maize to the

open market in order to protect European farmers. Also, in response to European trade union demands for better protection of European jobs, Huggins passed the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act. This Act denied to all Africans many rights whatever their qualifications, legal labour rights (such as the right of access to skilled and professional employment, protection against unfair dismissal and denial of pension) and also increased the likelihood of those Africans already in employment in those areas designated as European losing their jobs without recourse to the law. The objective was to further entrench professional and skilled job sectors as European preserves. In addition, the 1934 Civil Service Act barred all Africans from entering key civil service jobs: they could only be employed as clerks or departmental messengers. Most significantly, no African trade union organisations were permitted to operate.

In the social sphere, the 1936 Native Registration Act further restricted African movement into white areas, areas which encompassed all urban and industrial centres. The Pass Laws were more vigorously enforced under this Act with the objective of preventing Africans other than

those required for unskilled labour or for specific semi-skilled or skilled jobs from leaving their native reserves. Such a measure became necessary because of the practice of some Europeans who privately employed trained or skilled African at lower pay rates than they would have had to pay European workers doing the same job and having the same qualifications. The government moved swiftly to stamp out this practice by requiring all Africans visiting European areas to secure a special pass which allowed them to remain in such areas for a specified period (approximately 21 days), after which they had to return to their native reserve or face arrest and prosecution for trespassing.

Above all, the land segregation policy itself ensured that Africans remained in their designated areas. Those employed in European areas could not, by law, become permanent residents of those areas but were required to return to their native reserves when their services were no longer required by the employers

Political measures were also taken to control the growth of the African electorate which, in 1933, stood at only 58 out of a total electorate of 28,573. The 1937 constitutional amendments made it even more difficult for Africans to acquire the franchise. Property qualifications were altered in such a way that all African

1. MacGregor, op. cit., Ch. 2.
housing property on European land was discounted in computing the value of a person's property\(^1\). This was intended to prevent black urban workers and small businessmen from obtaining franchise.

All these measures reflected the racial position or orientation of Huggins' government which formed the basis of its policy on African education. The government racist policies, by fostering and protecting white interests and supremacy, determined state policy on African secondary education as much as they influenced the policies of previous governments on African academic primary and vocational training. Huggins regarded the government's ability to control African education as essential to the preservation of white security. In his opinion, two safeguards were of paramount importance. Firstly, the government should be able to control or influence missionary educational policies in order to determine the structure and development of African education with the objective of ensuring that missionary aims in this respect were not in conflict with those of the government. Secondly, Europeans should receive the best education the state could provide in terms of equality and extent of opportunity because this would assist in legitimising

\(^1\) Palley, op. cit., pp.286-300.
European control of the political institutions and machinery of government, as well as the professions and skilled services. Many Europeans were convinced of the effectiveness of the various forms of legislation that have just been discussed in protecting their dominant position in the colonial system but were aware that much depended on their children receiving a better education than that provided for Africans and on those differences in education being maintained. As mentioned previously, a similar view was adopted by Huggins himself and he reiterated this to parliament in 1937:

"... I will go a little further and say that it is only by allowing our race the very best education and bringing out the latent talents there maybe that we will enable our race to survive in Africa. I will go even further and admit that, although our youth may be able to play Rugby football and would protect their skin with differential legislation, they will not be able to preserve their white brain and if they are to survive it will be by nothing but by superior education." 1

The attitude thus portrayed by Huggins was a significant pointer towards future government policy on African education and epitomised the rationale behind the government's approach to matters of African education.

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Negotiations between the SRMC and the DNE for the introduction of African secondary education and the search for policy

Signs of African aspirations to secondary education began to surface in the 1920s with isolated cases of pupils making their way privately to South African schools and others undertaking correspondence courses with South African colleges. The decision by the SRMC, at its 1934 Conference, to urge the government to co-operate with missionaries in providing secondary education facilities for Africans locally was a recognition of the demand which had become apparent. For a growing proportion of African youth, the attainment of 'higher' academic qualifications was seen as the only hope of escape from the rigours of manual work which awaited them in the mines and on white farms. It was regarded as the gateway to the much sought after white collar jobs and professions. Their faith in education was all the more reinforced by the success of their European counterparts (who had a better education) in securing better jobs.

In historical terms, the 1934 Missionary Conference marked the beginning of the transition from African primary to secondary education. The churches decided that an initiative should be taken, with government

1. Proceedings of the SRMC held at Great Zimbabwe, 21st - 25th June 1934, IMC/CBMS Archives (Africa), mic/ fi 99, Box 1221-1224.
assistance, to proceed beyond the primary school level and provide the opportunities for further education sought by African pupils. No definite plans were laid down at that Conference but the Anglicans proposed that consultations with the DNE concerning the issue should be sought as a matter of urgency.

There were a number of reasons why the churches began to advocate the introduction of African secondary education at this time and not earlier. Firstly, the increase in upper primary school facilities, especially between 1927 and 1933 (as was discussed earlier), enabled more pupils to acquire a full primary education than in the past. As a result, the demand for post-primary academic education also increased to a point where it became necessary for missionaries to respond. There were fears amongst the churches that, unless provision was made for those seeking access to secondary education locally, a growing number of pupils would leave mission schools for South African schools with little guarantee that they would return to serve the church, or even remain as church members.

Secondly, with primary education undergoing rapid development, the need for teachers with a more sound educational background became more pressing. The qualifications of most African teachers in mission schools and their standard of teaching was so low that it militated against the achievement of the kind of expansion that was
needed, particularly at the upper primary school level, to cope with African demand for 'higher' education. Very few teachers were capable of teaching efficiently in upper primary classes. In 1931, for example, of the 1,965 African teachers in service, 660 had received an education below Standard III, 440 had attained Standard III, 392 - Standard IV, 164 - Standard V and 194 - Standard VI. Only 103 had qualifications beyond VI and these had been acquired in South Africa\(^1\). Only these 103 teachers were qualified sufficiently to teach in upper primary classes and the existing lower teacher training course (PTL) only provided training for lower primary school teachers (i.e. sub standard A to III). The need to produce better educated teachers locally was, therefore, considered important and the missionaries believed that secondary education would produce such teachers. A higher teacher training course (PTH), designed to train upper primary school teachers, was already under active consideration by the SRMC and the DNE and candidates with at least a two year secondary education were required for such training.

Thirdly, most churches felt that the secondary course would also provide better candidates for the ministry to

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cope with increasing Christian work, especially in the fast expanding urban and industrial areas. Lastly, such education, it was felt by the missionaries, would provide school leavers with better long term prospects for employment.

Because of the financial constraints confronting most churches as a result of the cuts in government grants to mission schools, the SRMC conceded that, by themselves, missionaries would be unable to finance successfully a secondary educational programme. The plan agreed at the 1934 Conference was that the government, which was least involved in primary education, should be urged to establish one secondary school. The role of the churches would be to co-operate in providing boarding facilities and in ensuring that the school was run on Christian lines. The Wesleyan Methodists, in particular, wanted the government to finance this programme because, as Carter argued, Africans paid taxes to the government and not to churches and had a right to receive their share of social welfare benefits in return. Although the


3. Ibid.

Anglicans agreed that the government should be made to accept its share of the responsibility for African education, they argued that, if the government refused to initiate the establishment of African secondary education, the churches should do so in the interests of the students.

The government was in no position to undertake such a programme. To begin with, it was not prepared to invest money in 'higher' education for Africans. Moreover, it was inconceivable that parliament, at this time of economic recession, would approve expenditure on such a scheme when it was not even prepared to meet the demands of primary education. Huggins himself, critical as he was of the socio-economic and political implications of providing Africans with 'high' academic education, was not, to say the least, enthusiastic about the government financing the establishment of African secondary education.

Secondly, from the government's point of view, there were no employment prospects for African secondary school graduates in their own native reserves. There were very few industries requiring educated African manpower and, so long as the native reserves would not provide jobs commensurate with such a high level of education, there was a danger of African school graduates filtering into the
European job sectors. But, even assuming that some government departments or industrial sectors did agree to employ African high school leavers, the question remained as to how many of these could be employed without jeopardising the employment opportunities of their European counterparts. Investigations made by the Methodist Education Committee in 1935 to assess the employment prospects, in different industries, of Africans with high school education revealed that only two industries—postal services and printing—were willing to accommodate a few Africans with secondary education qualifications. Even here there was a problem as those Africans who were accepted for employment would have to undergo a period of apprenticeship. No apprenticeship facilities were available to Africans and, therefore, none of the high school graduates could in fact take up employment in either of these two industries. Over and above these obstacles, no white trade unions were prepared to allow Africans to be employed in the skilled job sectors which were a European monopoly. For these reasons government officials took pains to dissuade the government from approving the introduction of an education they believed

1. Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department, No. 16, 1939, p.102.


Thirdly, it was the opinion of most native and district commissioners that secondary education was unrelated to the African rural situation and African needs for development and would therefore have very little constructive role to play in the general scheme of rural uplift. According to one native commissioner, there were no indications, either, that secondary education would make Africans more responsible or capable of applying what they learned to solving the day to day problems of African society:

The most that may be said of the educated native in this direction is his ability to propound confused ideas of western culture without any attempt to apply the underlying principles to the present development of the people. Nor is he apparently capable of indicating how the welfare of his kinsfolk can best be served, except by repeating 'shibboleths' of educational needs as if literary instruction without ethical convictions should be a universal panacea for the careless masses.

What most Europeans, including government officials, did not appreciate was the fact that African faith in education as the panacea for their problems was largely generated by the importance Europeans themselves attached to education as the prerequisite for entry to the professions and skilled services. Moreover, the fact

1. *Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department, No. 16, 1939*, p.16.

108.

that whites gave considerable importance to the education of their own children made Africans regard education as the source of white power and wealth. As a result, they too wanted their children to acquire education.

C.L. Curbutt, Huggins' racist Chief Native Commissioner, and a man who exercised much influence on the government on matters pertaining to African affairs, strongly opposed the suggested African secondary education scheme. His objections stemmed largely from an administrative viewpoint. He felt that the presence in rural areas of unemployed youths with such an education would undermine "peace and social order and even encourage political activity amongst the rural masses"1. He also felt that their presence in urban and other industrial areas would have a bad influence on the uneducated workers and encourage labour unrest2.

A continuing trend in white political thinking which was an important factor in determining European attitudes towards African education can be discerned here. For instance, little consideration was given to African interests and their needs for advancement. The policy was to give paramount importance to white colonial interests. Another attitude deriving from such a policy was that European development was dependent upon the

2. Ibid. Also see C/S/R/B, Rev. H. Carter to F. Noble, 27th October 1937, WMMS Archives, Box 835.
suppression of African development and the maintenance of African society as a pool of cheap, unskilled, uneducated labour with no aspirations to rising above such a position. Any attempts by Africans to improve their political, economic and social position were regarded as a threat to white supremacy.

The secondary education scheme, however, received a more positive response from the DNE than it did from Huggins or the DNA. This was because of the influence of its new director, D.J. Stark, who succeeded Jowitt in 1935 following his resignation. A progressive director, compared to his two predecessors, Stark regarded the policy of suppressing African advancement and the development of African education as politically counter-productive. In his opinion, the only way the government could prevent simmering African frustration and discontent with the colonial system from assuming a virulent political form, was to co-operate with the churches and assist them in providing more educational opportunities for Africans. He also felt that government participation in secondary education would enable it to influence its development. Moreover, he believed that European security depended on the government's willingness to improve African life and to convince them that there was a future for black people

under white rule. He therefore urged the government to approve the establishment of African secondary education and provide assistance to the churches\textsuperscript{1}.

Between 1935 and 1937, a series of consultations took place between the SRMC Executive and the DNE in an attempt to secure government approval for the initiation of African secondary education\textsuperscript{2}. The government agreed in 1937 that the matter should be more extensively discussed by missionaries and the DNE at the joint conference on African education scheduled for 1938. Throughout the period of consultations between the SRMC and the DNE, the Anglicans indicated strongly their intention to undertake secondary education by themselves if the government gave approval\textsuperscript{3}. An element of inter-denominational competition was already becoming apparent.

The 1938 joint conference on African education

The conference was convened by the DNE for the purposes of examining, with the churches, the current situation in African education. One of the objectives was to establish closer co-operation between the department and missionaries

\begin{enumerate}
\item C/S/R/B., Rev. H. Carter to F. Noble, 3rd June 1936, WMMS Archives, Box 835.
\item \textit{Ibid.}
\end{enumerate}
in the overall development of African education. In historical perspective, the conference had significant implications for the future of African education.

DNE representatives came to the conference more willingly than in the past, to listen to and consider the problems confronted by the churches in the educational field. There were also indications from the DNE Director that his department was willing to co-operate with the missionaries in developing a common strategy by which to resolve some of the more pressing problems in primary and teacher training education.

But a more significant change in the DNE's attitude to African academic education was demonstrated by the readiness with which the DNE approved in principle the proposal of the SRMC for the immediate establishment of African secondary education. Instrumental in persuading the department to support the secondary education scheme were two influential officials of the SRMC - the Anglican Bishop Paget and the Methodist educationist, Rev. H. Carter. Two points advanced by the SRMC representatives seem to have impressed the department so much as to secure its approval.

1. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner and the Secretary for Native Affairs for the Year 1938, p.16.
support. One related to the difficulties faced by Southern Rhodesian Africans who wanted to obtain secondary education. At this time they either went to South African schools or undertook correspondence courses and, in both cases, the expenses were considerably high. The second was the responsibility of the department to care for African educational needs and to ensure that such opportunities as could be made available were provided. The SRMC also indicated its willingness to co-operate with the department in establishing secondary education locally for Africans. In a statement issued jointly by the SRMC and the DNE, the extent of the latter's change of attitude towards African academic education and its support for the cause of African secondary education was clearly spelt out:

It has been the concern of this Department as well as that of missionaries that there is at present no centre within the territory to which native students can go for a Junior secondary course.... It cannot be regarded as satisfactory that Southern Rhodesian natives should be forced to go to schools in the Union for a Junior secondary course. Still less satisfactory is it for Southern Rhodesian natives to attempt, as increasing numbers are doing, to take the Junior secondary course through correspondence schools in the Union of South Africa. The only solution to the problem therefore is to start a Junior secondary school course within the country.


2. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner and the Secretary for Native Affairs for the Year 1938, pp.15-16.
The department's support for the establishment of African secondary education was, however, constrained by financial limitations. It could only provide missionaries with such assistance as was sanctioned by parliament in the African development budget vote and given to it by the government. This means, in fact, that the department could do very little to assist missionaries in the initiation of African secondary education until such time as the government decided to provide more funds for that purpose. Although the government was persuaded by both the DNE and the SRMC to permit the establishment of African secondary education, it declined emphatically to provide any funds. As far as it was concerned, the churches could go ahead with the scheme if they could pay for it. No state aid towards capitation costs or teachers' salaries would be forthcoming. Moreover, the churches would have to recruit teachers by themselves and at their own expense. 

In the circumstances, the DNE proposed to the SRMC that the best strategy for the development of the secondary education scheme would be for all missionaries, Protestant and Catholic, to pool their resources and to set up one inter-denominational school which would cater for students from all mission schools. This arrangement, in the opinion of the

2. Ibid.
DNE, would make it easier for the churches to raise the necessary funds for the scheme. However, inter-denominational rivalry and clash of interests made such a plan difficult to implement. To begin with, missionaries could not agree amongst themselves on the character such a school should adopt. Moreover, no church was genuinely interested in spending its resources on the establishment of a school which would not serve its specific denominational interests. Each church was anxious to retain its pupils within its own sphere of influence and to ensure that they were educated under its observation. The SRMC had considerable difficulty in bringing the Roman Catholics and Protestants to agree to discuss the issue. The Catholics would not, as a matter of policy, agree to let their pupils attend a non-Catholic school, and would not take part in such a scheme. For their part, the Anglicans and the Wesleyan Methodists would also not accept an arrangement by which they had to work closely with the Catholics, neither did they regard it as acceptable that their pupils should be in daily contact with Catholic pupils.

The SRMC Executive tried unsuccessfully to make the two sides agree to co-operate. The Anglicans threatened to resign from the SRMC if they were forced to work with

the Catholics\(^1\), whilst the Catholics withdrew their membership of the conference altogether rather than agree to co-operate with the Protestants\(^2\). Given this situation, the joint plan failed to materialise and the SRMC decided that the establishment of secondary education should be left to the initiative of individual churches as was the case in primary education.

By failing to maintain unity at this crucial time, missionaries placed themselves in a position of weakness with the government. Once divided, no one church alone could put enough pressure on the government to provide financial aid to African secondary education. Without adequate financial aid, it would be difficult for the churches to develop secondary education individually. Also, the lack of an agreed policy and strategy for its development could lead to similar policy clashes and conflicts between church and state as existed in primary education.

Following the failure of the churches to reach an agreement over the joint plan, the Anglicans decided to make a lone venture into the field of secondary education. As will be seen in the next section, this initiative marked the foundations of African secondary education.

\(^1\) D.J. Murray, *op. cit.*, p.297.
\(^2\) Ibid.
The Anglican initiative

The decision of the Anglican diocese in 1938 to undertake secondary education without government aid was strongly criticised by the Wesleyan Methodists who were urging the postponement of this scheme in the hope that the government could still be persuaded to provide capitation grants. The Methodists felt that, once missionaries entered this expensive field without state aid, the government could argue that the churches were capable of developing African secondary education without its assistance.

The Anglicans, however, were disinclined to wait and were anxious to gain recognition as the founders of African secondary education. More importantly, the exodus of African pupils from the church to South Africa in search of secondary education had become a distinct phenomenon which worried the Anglicans as well as the other churches. To retain their best pupils in the church, the Anglicans recognised the need for secondary education to be urgently provided locally. After a meeting of the Anglican Diocese Education Committee in 1938, the Bishop


2. Ibid.
of the diocese, Edward Paget, wrote to the SPG Board in London expressing the reasons for the church's decision to start a Junior secondary course:

The matter has been discussed by us and it is quite clear to us that secondary education for our people must be established at one of our mission centres. It is from these people that we shall be drawing our pastors, teachers, catechists and our ordination candidates, and secondary education must be given in a church atmosphere and with a definite church teaching. If we are not to establish secondary education, we are then likely to lose some of our best people, through their desire for educational advancement .... and this would be disastrous both in our education and in our pastoral work in the future.  

In the Bishop's opinion, the dangers of letting the growing number of pupils leave for South Africa was that they became exposed to "a wholly alien environment" where they got false ideas about money and the like and were in danger of not returning and, if they did return, would be unsuited for the work we could offer them and discontented with the wages we could offer.  

The objective of writing to the SPG Board was to seek aid for the Junior secondary course scheme.

Initially, the SPG Board was critical of the diocese's initiative on the grounds that it was ill planned and too expensive a project to be undertaken without


government assistance. Moreover, the Board was not in a position to provide adequate funds for this purpose because its resources were already committed to the running of primary schools in Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere in British Africa, particularly West Africa where the Anglicans had a large educational network.

The problems involved in raising adequate funds for the project became apparent to the Anglicans. Although St. Augustine's, Penhalonga, the mission selected for the course was well developed for primary education, considerable resources were required to provide the necessary facilities for secondary education. Estimates made by the synod education committee revealed that a capital sum of £4,000 was needed to provide classroom and boarding accommodation, together with other facilities, for an estimated Form I class of only 20 students.

To overcome the financial problem, the committee decided to negotiate a joint undertaking of the course with one British Anglican missionary society, the Community of the Resurrection (CR). The CR came to Southern Rhodesia in the early 1920s as a charity missionary organisation and was engaged in medical and Christian work mainly in the Eastern province of

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1. SPG.S/R/General/C, D.1938, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia to SPG Overseas Secretary, 22nd June 1938, SPG Archives.
Manicaland. Though not previously engaged in educational work, they were enthusiastic about participating with the Anglicans in the development of secondary education. Their strong financial position made them an ideal partner for the Anglicans\(^1\), whose resources were diminished by their wide primary educational network. In an agreement reached between them in 1938, the CR offered to provide substantial financial and manpower assistance towards the scheme, provided the Anglicans were able to raise £500 towards capital costs and commit themselves to providing £250 per year for four years towards the cost of maintaining the school\(^2\).

A fund raising scheme launched by the church raised £300 from the Beit Trust\(^3\), and £250 from European Anglican church members. The SPG Board made a £200 grant from its Marriott Bequest fund plus an annual grant of £50\(^4\). Although the Board's contribution fell disappointingly short of the £1,000 requested by the church, the Bishop considered it a significant pointer towards the Board's

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1. SPG.S/R/General/C, D.1938, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. France, 7th April 1938, SPG Archives.
3. Ibid.
approval of the scheme considering that most Board officials were opposed to financing the secondary school course because they did not feel that secondary education was urgently needed. They preferred that any available money should be spent on improving primary education facilities and basic literacy programmes for both young and old\(^1\). A further direct appeal by the Bishop to the Board Committee for aid in August 1938 succeeded in securing for the diocese the full support of the Board in establishing the Junior secondary course. The Board agreed to give the financial assurance sought by the CR and thus enabled preparations for the secondary school scheme to get under way.

The CR advanced £2,000 towards capital costs and also appointed their most experienced administrator and former educationist in England, the Reverend A. Winter, to become Principal of the secondary school, in addition to being Head of the St. Augustine's primary school. The CR also appointed three of their men to the Junior secondary teaching staff\(^3\).

Once these arrangements were completed, the construction of the Junior school classrooms, student and staff

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accommodation, got under way. By October 1938, the school committee had already applied for affiliation of the Junior course to the Cambridge school certificate. Due to the lack of science teachers and laboratory facilities, the committee decided that, for a start, the school would select for its curriculum mainly arts subjects. These included the English Language, Bible Knowledge, Geography, History, Arithmetic and Mathematics\(^1\).

Although it took two years for the Junior school to reach completion, once the administrative arrangements had been finalised, the first Form I class was in session in early 1939 in provisional accommodation\(^2\). Despite pressure on the school committee from many Anglicans that the Junior school should be co-educational, the diocesan Synod ruled that the school would be only for boys and that arrangements would be made in the near future to establish a girls' Junior school. As a result, the first enrolment of six students was made up of boys only, all of whom were Anglican and had given an undertaking to join the ministry or the teaching profession on completion of their studies\(^3\). No non Anglicans were considered for

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3. Ibid.
admission because, as Bishop Paget explained, the church could not cater for students from other churches.

Though the intake was small, Anglican officials were pleased that the course had finally commenced and, in time, might become the leading centre of 'higher' education for Africans. When the second world war broke out, however, it became administratively difficult for the school to continue with the Cambridge school certificate courses (CSC). The affiliation with Cambridge had to be terminated and urgent arrangements made for a change of course to the South African Junior Certificate (SAJC).

The success of the Anglicans in pioneering African secondary education did not abate the criticism of the Methodists who were convinced that, by proceeding to undertake the course alone, the Anglicans had seriously undermined the unity of the SRMC in fighting for government assistance. Also, the Methodists felt that the Anglican's private venture would encourage other churches to separately enter into secondary education which the Methodists feared would weaken the unity the Protestant churches needed to guard against Roman Catholic penetration.

1. SPG S/R/General/C, D.1939, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. France, 28th January 1939, SPG Archives.
into every part of the country. For the Methodists, this Protestant unity became even more important after the Catholics indicated in 1939 their plans to start their own secondary schools in the near future. In his letter to the SPG Board, Bishop Paget explained what he considered to be the root cause of Methodist criticism of the Anglicans:

There is no doubt that our initiating secondary education and our refusal to unite in this effort with the non-conformists has stirred up such jealousy and let loose their fury and opposition ... the Methodists are angry and fearful that we will not join them in opposing the Roman Catholic aggression. I feel confident that there is a move to divide our people and thus weaken our influence... For some time, there has been active propaganda to belittle our position and claim equality with us. 1

Growing disunity, not just between the Methodists and the Anglicans, but within the SRMC also, on the approach to secondary educational development, threatened to weaken missionary influence on the government in matters of education. Despite these inter-denominational conflicts, the Anglicans continued to make good progress at St. Augustine's. The Principal's report, read on St. Mathias Day in 1940, to mark the first anniversary of the Junior secondary course, showed that enrolment had risen to 20 and was expected to double in 1941.2 Moreover, the fact

1. SPG S/R/General/C D.1939, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. Baker, 2nd May 1939, SPG Archives.
2. SPG/Mash/D, Annual Report of the Bishop of Southern Rhodesia for the Year 1940, SPG Archives.
that the Anglicans had succeeded in establishing African secondary education without government assistance was a significant achievement.

Although the lack of government aid militated against rapid expansion of the Junior school, there were some advantages. Anglican non-reliance on state aid made them independent of government control in planning for future developments and in determining administrative policy and curricula. They were also free to operate in secondary education without consulting with or seeking the approval of the DNE as they had to in primary education. But this freedom, as will be shown later, lasted only until the government became involved in African secondary education.

Having discussed the Anglican initiative in the field of secondary education, it is necessary to examine the government's response and its implications for secondary educational policy and the development of secondary education itself.

Changes in government policy and the implications for secondary educational development

This section examines the factors which prompted changes in the government's policy on African secondary education during the second world war period and the implications of these changes on the development of secondary education.
Earlier on, a discussion of the attitude of Huggins' government towards the introduction of African secondary education revealed that its opposition was influenced, to a very large extent, by the socio-economic conditions of the years of economic recession and the need therefore to protect white interests. The outbreak of the second world war in 1939, however, created a new situation which necessitated a reconsideration, by the government, of its own position and policy on African secondary education and advancement. As will be seen, the socio-economic and political conditions of the war period led to a change in the government's policy towards African secondary education.

In the first instance, the outbreak of the war created an upsurge in South Africa of hostile Afrikaner nationalism which persistently supported Hitlerism and opposed Smuts' policy of co-operation with Britain in the war. With the Afrikaners on the side of Hitler, Huggins' government sought to have Africans in Southern Rhodesia as allies in the war. Huggins thought this could best be achieved through changes in his government's policies and attitudes towards the blacks. In his opinion, the first step towards appeasing the Africans and securing their co-operation was to stop legislating against them. During the war not a single anti-African law was passed and even the LAA was amended in 1941 in favour of Africans¹. The Maize Control Act of 1934 was relaxed to

¹ See Southern Rhodesia Land Apportionment Act 1941 (as amended).
allow African farmers to produce and sell more maize.

Secondly, Huggins thought it was also important to attend to the Africans' most pressing needs and problems such as education, urban unemployment, housing, and working and living conditions. Steps were taken to improve the situation in these areas with particular regard to education and employment.

Also, the war acted as a stimulant to the development of local industry and the revitalisation of the economy by barring the importation of foreign goods on which the country had previously depended. To revive industry from the deep recession into which it had fallen, the government found that more trained and educated manpower was required, and as a result, the government felt compelled, for the first time, to encourage the training and education of Africans and their employment in skilled services. Moreover, the enlistment of 8,448 Europeans for the war out of a total white population of just over 176,300 created a further shortage of skilled manpower in the various sectors of industry and increased further the demands for trained black manpower for those jobs which were previously reserved for whites. As Murray and Riddell pointed out, the war brought a new emphasis in government policies on advancing Africans for political

and economic reasons. The underlying factor determining the government's change of policies was fundamentally the same as before - to enhance white economic and political interests. The training and education of Africans for employment in industry was now seen as necessary but only so far as it was of benefit to Europeans by developing their economy and protecting their investments.

The change in the government's educational policy was reflected in the measures the government took to encourage African education. In 1944, for example, Huggins raised government grants to mission African schools (academic and industrial training) to £140,000 - an increase of £47,000 over the previous year and a much bigger rise than ever given in the past. Also, for the first time, the government proposed to establish urban primary schools for blacks - a most significant innovation.

An even more significant change in the government's educational policy was the government's decision in 1941


3. Ibid.
to establish a state run secondary school for Africans with the stated objective of producing better educated Africans for apprenticeship training in industry and employment in the lower ranks of the Civil Service.

It is argued by Atkinson, however, that the economic reasons given by the government for this change of policy - convincing as they may appear - are not sufficient in themselves to explain the timing of the government's decision to enter into the field of African secondary education. He sees the government's change of policy as, to a large, extent, a carefully worked out strategy aimed at eventually gaining control over missionary policies on secondary education, overall development of secondary education itself and curricula.

In conclusion he states that:

....having accepted the inescapability of an immediate move into the field of secondary education, officials were wary lest they should lose the ability to control the structure of the curriculum. Such an eventuality might lead to the reproduction in greatly exaggerated form of the curriculum problems encountered in the case of primary education during the earlier years of the century. African pupils might be engaged in courses of study which, on the one hand, were unsuited to the aim of raising the standards of African life and, on the other, were capable of bringing them into competition with Europeans in employment. 1

This claim was later vindicated by the government's approach to the development of African secondary

1. Atkinson, op. cit., p.119. This notion was also shared by the Anglicans: see SPG. S/R/D, Annual Report of the Bishop of Southern Rhodesia for the Year 1941, SPG Archives.
education. However, this does not imply that the economic and political factors were not important in determining the government's policy, but rather that the full explanation for this change in policy can be attributed to a combination of all the foregoing factors and not only these two in isolation.

The plan by the government for its entry into African secondary education was to seek the co-operation of the churches in developing a non-denominational school which would be organised and controlled jointly by church and state,¹ a plan similar to that proposed to the missionaries by the DNE in 1938. When this new proposal was presented to the SRMC Executive at the 1942 Joint Conference with the DNE, it appeared attractive and full of advantages. In the first instance, the missionaries regarded the proposal as an opportunity to utilise government funds for their educational purposes. They also were of the opinion that a joint venture with the DNE would enable them to influence government policy more effectively. Moreover, the Protestant churches in the SRMC saw the plan as an opportunity to isolate the Roman Catholics and prevent them from gaining access to government funds for their proposed work in secondary education. The Methodists, however, did not support the idea that the churches

should contribute out of their meagre resources towards the cost of developing and running the proposed secondary school. Instead they wanted the government to take full responsibility for financing African secondary education, just as it did for Europeans, and in this way enable the missionaries to concentrate their efforts on primary education. It appeared to the Methodists that the DNE' insistence that the proposed new secondary school should be jointly financed by the state and the churches was nothing more than an attempt by the government to evade its full responsibility as it had done in the case of primary education.¹

However, at the 1942 SRMC and DNE Conference, the former's representatives decided that the churches would take advantage of the government's offer of co-operation. They felt that the joint plan was ideal in that it made it possible for even the smaller churches to participate in developing secondary education as the financial contributions they would have to make were far less than they would otherwise have to make if they were to undertake secondary education by themselves. Moreover, the difficulties confronted by the Anglicans

¹ S/M/S/R/B 1940-45, District Synod Minutes for 1942, WMMS Archives, Box 1940-45.
in raising money for their Junior secondary course had demonstrated to other churches the magnitude of the problems involved in undertaking such a costly venture. The government's offer was therefore considered an advantage which could not be turned down.¹

Having agreed to co-operate, the DNE and the SRMC decided to appoint a board of councillors who would be responsible for planning and organising the establishment and development of the proposed secondary school as well as determining the policy and regulations by which it would be run.² A council of six was appointed to undertake these responsibilities: three of the councillors were nominated by the DNE and three by the SRMC.³ The council was also given the right to make direct recommendations to the Minister of Education for any facilities or provisions which might be required by the school in the course of its development. In addition, they could directly refer to the Minister any matters of policy or administrative difficulties. The

2. Report of the Director of Native Education for the Year 1942, p.68.
3. Ibid.
equal representation of the church and state on the school council was considered important by the churches because it assured them of an effective voice in determining policy and curriculum.

Further discussions between the DNE and SRMC produced agreement on a wide range of issues relating to the character of the school, the administrative and pupil enrolment policies and the selection of subjects for the curriculum. The school was to be non denominational and, as such, would admit pupils from all mission schools purely on academic merit. The recruitment of teachers was to be the responsibility of the government which paid their salaries; conditions of service for teachers were also to be drawn up by the government. However, curriculum selection from the Cambridge school certificate courses and the formulation of administrative rules and regulations governing the school were matters to be decided by the board of councillors. Once these preliminary arrangements had been completed, a site for the new school (named Goromonzi) was found in the Chinyika reserve near Salisbury. An area of about 60 morgen was chosen

2. Ibid.
for the site of the school and construction work began that same year - 19421 - with the government providing most of the capital for classrooms, school equipment and teachers' accommodation and the churches contributing to the cost of student accommodation.2

The government's decision to encourage the development of African secondary education and to participate in that process met with considerable opposition from the more conservative members of the government and the ruling party. They regarded the change in the government's policy as leading to the erosion of the basis of white security and the party's ideological stance on preserving the paramountcy of white interests. Influential party members such as J.H. Smith, the veteran parliamentarian, and others did not believe that the outbreak of the war had created a situation which the whites could not contain without African assistance.3 They saw the government's support for African education and training as an encouragement to Africans to aspire to European positions and thus break up the long established white monopoly of the professions and skilled services and trades. In addition, such support

1. Report of the Director of Native Education for the Year 1942, p.68.


was seen as encouraging the growth of the African middle class which Europeans regarded as the main threat to their political, economic and social dominance. White opposition to the government gained momentum as many long-term party supporters became disillusioned with the new trend in government policies and a crisis was reached in 1942 when J.H. Smith, together with a significant number of influential party members, rebelled and formed a new party which they ironically called the Liberal Conservative Party. This development in itself did not alter the course of Huggins' government immediately but it was indicative of European opposition to any change in government policy intended to improve the African position. The attitude of the opposition in fact demonstrated quite clearly the type of problem a white government could expect to confront, in the Rhodesian colonial system, if it attempted to reform policy in any sphere in favour of Africans. In particular, it made manifest the scope and limits for educational policy reform and innovation in a colonial society. As will be seen, Huggins' refusal, during the war, to abandon the "reformist" trend he had initiated, had serious political consequences for him.

The government had hoped that Goromonzi secondary school would be completed within two years from the start of its construction. However, the scarcity of building materials in war-time conditions delayed its completion and it was not until 1945 that the school was ready for use for the 1946 academic year and the first class of 50 boys from various mission schools were admitted to the Form I class.

Despite the promise to the government of co-operation by the missionaries, some churches quickly became dissatisfied with the overall joint plan under which Goromoni was founded. The reason for this was that it seemed to the churches that, although there were financial advantages in the scheme for them, there were also many serious disadvantages. Firstly, the missionaries discovered that they had very little influence over the selection of students from the various schools; for example, individual churches could not decide which of their pupils should be admitted to the secondary school, but the Anglicans could do so at their school. In fact the Anglicans could admit a student to their school if he was devoted to the church and

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N.B. Girls were not admitted until 1948 due to the lack of boarding facilities for them.
had the potential for a good catechist or ordinand. The fact that such a student may have had poor results in his Standard 6 examinations became unimportant. Other churches were not allowed to select pupils on this basis but were required to put forward for admission to Goromonzi only those pupils who met the required academic standards.

Secondly, the Anglicans exacted an undertaking from those students they admitted to St. Augustine's to either serve the church or teach in an Anglican school at the end of their Junior secondary course. In this way, the church ensured that it benefited from the education it provided. Other churches were prevented from carrying out such a practice, again for the reason that the only criteria for admission to Goromonzi were the Standard 6 results. These churches did not benefit directly from the education they provided because pupils were free to pursue courses or professions of their own choice, with no obligation to the church to which they belonged. Thus, the churches were spending a lot of their resources on a scheme from which they stood to gain very little in terms of their specific denominational needs and priorities.

Thirdly, as a non-denominational institution, Goromonzi did little to maintain a religious atmosphere and this situation worried some of the churches as it could lead to an undermining of the Christian influences
which they had inculcated in their pupils throughout their primary school years. This concern was greatly aggravated by the fact that the staff appointed to the school were neither missionaries nor men with a proven religious background to whom the churches could entrust their pupils. All the teachers appointed, including the Principal, were professional educationists who had very little to do with religion in their work.

An issue which provoked conflict within the School Council between missionary and DNE representatives was the choice of curriculum. The church representatives wanted the school to provide a wider range of subjects than that offered at St. Augustine's and to include both academic and technical subjects so that students could leave school with some skills to offer industry. The Methodists were particularly vocal on this point.

To begin with, however, the DNE selected only academic (grammar school type) arts and science subjects, claiming that the school could not yet provide facilities for technical courses. To some extent, this was true.

1. A statement issued by the Seventh Day Adventists and quoted in H. Carter to F. Noble, 12th March 1946, WMMS Archives, Box 1948-1952.

2. S/M/S/R/B 1946-47, District Synod Minutes for 1946, WMMS Archives, Box 1946-47.

3. Ibid.
as the school had just started to operate. But the churches wanted commercial and technical courses to be introduced the following year, 1947, and the DNE could not give any guarantee that such courses could be implemented until the government had indicated a willingness to provide funds for their provision together with salaries for the necessary teachers.

Overall, the missionaries began to feel that, if they had their own secondary schools, they would be better able to determine policy and ensure that secondary education was organised and run on the lines of which they approved. In addition, with their own schools, they stood to benefit from their educational work in terms of their specific denominational interests, as did the Anglicans.

The Catholics, who had been planning their own secondary school since 1938, started such a school in 1945. The Marist brothers, Catholics of Canadian origin, initiated a Junior secondary course at their Kutama mission in the Makwiro district\(^1\). With the much feared Catholic competition in secondary education now a reality, individual Protestant churches began to make arrangements to set up their own secondary schools. The churches no longer wanted to operate with the

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government and, in 1945, the Church of Christ (of Swedish origin) applied to the DNE for approval of a Junior secondary course at their main mission Dadaya, near the town of Mashaba. Since, in 1938, the government had authorised the undertaking of secondary education by the churches provided they could raise the necessary funds, it granted approval for both the Catholic and the Church of Christ schools with the proviso that government sanction must be obtained for the teachers to be employed at the schools. No government grants were to be made available but a subsidy was provided to cover part of the cost of the teachers' salaries. By early 1946, there were three mission African secondary schools with a total enrolment of 130 boys and 17 girls.

Given the financial constraints facing the churches, this was both an encouraging and significant beginning in the field of secondary education. Of equal significance with regard to the war period developments in African secondary education was the support afforded by Huggins' government. Unfortunately this support was of short duration as, after the war ended in 1945, the government was faced with a new situation which prompted the withdrawal of its support for the development of African secondary education and a change in its policy.

2. Ibid.
PART III

CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND CHURCH POLICIES DURING THE POST WAR PERIOD AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION 1946-1952

Changes in government policy

The support of the government for African education and advancement and its overall policies during the war period had serious political implications for Huggins. European disillusionment with his government's African policies eroded Huggins' electoral support. The dissidents who had left his party in 1942 took advantage of the growing white opposition to the government to further discredit its position. Huggins' opponents presented his policies to the European public as a serious threat to white control of the key professions and services and therefore as a threat to white power in essence.

The extent of white opposition to the government policies was made manifest in the 1946 General Election when Huggins' party, which had controlled 24 of the 30 parliamentary seats since 1933, lost 12 of their seats to the dissident Liberal Conservatives. As a result, Huggins was forced to enter into coalition with the official opposition party, the Labour Party. For

Huggins, this humiliating result represented a clear rejection by the whites of the policies his government had pursued throughout the war period and prompted him to change those policies. The political consequences of his war-time policies, from the point of view of his own standing and popularity amongst the white settlers, were indicative of the strength of the resistance of Southern Rhodesia colonial society to any policy changes and reforms likely to undermine white interests by seeking to improve conditions for Africans.

The end of the war also brought new problems which demanded urgent government attention. The resettlement of ex-servicemen and the post war boom in white immigration called for immediate financial resources and an effective policy to meet the needs of these people, most of whom sought employment without undue delay. (Records show that some 64,634 white immigrants entered Southern Rhodesia from South Africa, Britain and Europe between 1946 and 1951.)

The high rate of white unemployment made it unnecessary for the government to educate and train Africans for skilled jobs. These were once again regarded as a European monopoly and the government changed its employment policies in order to ensure that whites found jobs first. While the government used European opposition to socio-economic reform and African advancement to justify its change of policies after the war, to the

1. Leys, op. cit., p.74.
Africans this was a clear indication that their future under white rule was bleak. Their frustration grew and soon manifested itself in outbursts of violent confrontation with the government. Between 1945 and 1948, there were nationwide strikes by urban black workers which nearly paralysed industry in every town as the black workers resorted to militant action in an endeavour to secure trade union rights so that they could protect their job security. The ruthlessness of the methods employed by Huggins to deal with this situation was in sharp contrast to the response that he had given during the war period to African demands for increased access to skilled jobs and better working and living conditions.

Also at this time, a change of government policy on African secondary education became apparent. Firstly, steps were taken to enforce government administrative authority over all mission secondary schools through the inspectorate department of native education. A code of administrative procedures was circulated to the

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2. Ibid.

3. Report of the Director of Native Education for the Year 1945, p.222. Also see S/M/S/R/B 1946-47, District Synod Minutes for 1946, WMMS Archives, Box 1946-47.
various missionary bodies whereby all churches were
required to submit their plans for the development or
establishment of secondary schools to the DNE for
approval before they could be implemented\(^1\). Besides,
each school had to obtain DNE approval for its selected
curriculum before it was adopted for teaching\(^2\).

DNE officials claimed that these measures were
intended to provide for a uniform policy framework for
secondary educational development\(^3\). The churches,
however, saw the measures as an attempt by the govern-
ment to determine and control missionary policies as
well as the administration, organisation and development
of secondary education. The Anglicans believed that
the government also wanted to control the curricula in
order to ensure that African students did not gain access
to higher technical, commercial or managerial training
which, in turn, could lead to key industrial jobs\(^4\).

Secondly, the government also began to take tough
measures to control the expansion of Junior secondary
school networks at a time when more and more churches

1. SPG.Mash/DS/C, Bishop of Southern Rhodesia to Mr.
   A.E.A. Sulston, 30th October 1946, SPG Archives.
2. Report of the Director of Native Education for the
   Year 1945, p.222.
3. Report of the Director of Native Education for the
   Year 1947, p.17.
4. SPG.DS/C, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. A.E.A. Sulston, 17th
were indicating their intentions of engaging in secondary education. After two more Junior secondary schools were established in 1948— one by the American Episcopal church at their Hartzell Mission near Salisbury, and another by the Seventh Adventists at Solusi Mission near Bulawayo\(^1\) the government announced its intention of restricting the number of Junior secondary schools that would be allowed to open in the future\(^2\). The government claimed that the reason for this proposal was that there were not enough jobs for the graduates from the existing schools. As Riddell pointed out, however, this was untrue considering the large number of jobs created in industry by the post-war economic boom and industrial expansion\(^3\).

The churches were not prepared to accept this unilateral imposition of restrictions on the expansion of secondary education at this stage in its development. Their contention was that, since there were only five mission schools in existence to provide secondary education for the growing number of primary school pupils seeking entry into Form I, it was growth in this area that was called for and not restriction. In fact, secondary education in the mission schools was available,

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1. Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Commissioner and the Director of Native Development for the Year 1950, p.35.
2. SPG.Mash/DS/C, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. Sulston, 16th September 1948, SPG Archives, Box 1948-50. Also see S/M/S/R/B 1948-49 District Synod Minutes for 1948, WMMS Archives, Box 1948-49.
at this time, to very few students due to limited facilities and the inability of most students from low income rural families to pay the average annual tuition fees of between £5 and £7.

Adding to the financial difficulties, no government grants were available. Over and above these constraints, missionaries also lacked adequate numbers of teaching staff because most of their teachers had to be obtained from overseas at high expense. Faced with such insurmountable problems, the missionaries could see little prospect of effecting any improvement in the present provision of secondary school education and therefore felt they had a strong case for more, and not less, government co-operation and assistance in developing Junior secondary school provision. Thus, the government proposal to impose a ban on further expansion on such provision, together with its overall policy changes since the end of the war, aroused anger amongst the churches and led to conflict between the missionaries and the government.

**Anglican and Methodist responses to government policy**

The government attempts to control mission secondary educational policy and development were severely criticised by the churches. The Anglican Diocese Education Committee discussed at length the changes in government policy and, in 1948, resolved to oppose them
for a number of reasons.

Firstly, the Committee felt that, since the government was not paying any grants to the missionaries for the work they were undertaking in secondary education, there were no grounds for its interference either with the developments in that field or by prescribing policy and regulations for the churches to observe\(^1\).

Secondly, the Anglicans resented the arbitrary manner in which the government imposed conditions under which the missionaries were required to operate. The policy agreed at the 1938 Joint Conference of the SRMC and DNE stated that all matters of policy relating to the organisation, administration and development of African education should be discussed adequately between the churches and the DNE. Any changes in policy required the mutual consent of both parties\(^2\). The government's apparent failure to observe this agreement caused the Anglicans to feel that they were under no obligation to accept any of the government's regulations, conditions or changes in policy which did not have the consent of the SRMC.

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1. SPG.Mash/DS/C, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. Sulston, 27th March 1948, Box 1948-50, SPG Archives.

2. SPG.Mash/DS/C, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. Sulston, 8th April 1948, Box 1948-50, SPG Archives.
In a memorandum prepared by the Anglican Education Committee in 1950 for a Commission of Inquiry appointed in that year by the government to examine the situation prevailing in African education, the Committee strongly criticised the government's attitude to the educational work of the missionaries. The memorandum spelt out the Anglican objections to the intended ceiling on the development of African secondary education and warned that this could lead to a confrontation between the churches and the DNE. In the view of the Anglican Committee, it was not true that there was an over-production of Junior secondary school graduates or that neither industry nor other employment sectors could not absorb these graduates. The 1948 secondary school enrolment figures showed that there were in the five existing mission Junior secondary schools a total of only 329 students, compared to more than 2,000 whites in European schools. Of the 329 in Forms I and II, less than half were due to graduate and this figure, in the opinion of the Anglican Committee, was far too small to be regarded as an over-production and certainly did not justify the restrictive measures the government proposed to impose on Junior secondary educational development.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., para. 2.
Moreover, the Committee also believed that these graduates could easily be absorbed into industry if the government altered its employment policy to allow the various industrial sectors to employ them. The overall Anglican position, as defined in the memorandum, was that rigorous efforts should be made by the government and churches to increase secondary education provision instead of attempting to limit it¹.

The Anglican position received the full support of the Methodists and the 1948 Synod Conference reacted angrily to the government's attempts to undermine missionary efforts. The Conference called upon the government to recognise that the overall development of African education depended upon the co-operation of the SRMC and the DNE and that no changes in policy could be made by either party without prior consultations with each other². In a strongly worded statement, the Methodists warned the government in 1950 against changing policies and prescribing rules and regulations for missionaries to follow without their prior approval:


We are not a department of the civil service to whom regulations and instructions can be issued without prior agreement by our responsible leaders.  

The 1950 District Synod also warned that, in future, missionaries would refuse to co-operate with any government directives which were issued without their consent. The Synod also urged other churches to oppose the imposition of any restrictive measures on their work by the government unless they had been asked to co-operate by the SRMC. Even the Roman Catholics, the traditional supporters of government educational policy, indicated their opposition to the government's intention to impose arbitrary upper limitation on the expansion of Junior secondary education.

It thus became apparent to the government that missionaries would not co-operate. In what appeared to be a flagrant show of disregard for the measures the government intended to impose, the Methodists began to prepare for the establishment of a Junior secondary course at their Tegwani Mission shortly after Huggins announced his intention to curb missionary educational work in 1948. A secondary education committee was set

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2. Ibid.

up by the Synod to prepare for the initiation of the course. In the report submitted to the 1950 Synod Conference, the committee urged the immediate undertaking of secondary education. The Reverend Hay Pluke, its Chairman, indicated that the Methodists would urge other churches to intensify their secondary educational work. The establishment of the Methodist Junior course received considerable support from their London headquarters which contributed £5,000 towards capital costs. Some of the local Rhodesian companies which were interested in employing African secondary school graduates also gave financial support. The Standard and Barclay's Banks contributed £2,000 each and the Beit Trust also gave £2,000. With this aid, the construction of classrooms and student and staff accommodation began in the same year (1950), and although the work on these buildings was not completed until 1953, the first Form I class of 21 boys and 9 girls was in session in 1951, with the Reverend Hay Pluke as Principal.

2. Ibid.
The combined opposition of the Anglicans, Methodists and the SRMC to government policy forced Huggins to concede two points. Firstly, he abandoned his plan to ban the establishment of more mission secondary schools. Secondly, he called for a meeting of the DNE and SRMC to discuss ways of resolving the differences between the missionaries and the government and to find a fresh basis for co-operation with each other. As a token of goodwill to missionaries, the government set up a loan system from which the churches could draw up to £500 a year, half of which was not refundable, for the purposes of promoting their secondary educational work. It has been argued that part of the reason for this show of goodwill was that Huggins was trying to secure the support of the missionaries for his plan (which was already under the active consideration of the British government) to federate Southern Rhodesia with her two northern neighbours, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The objective was to create a larger community in which the whites would dominate and gain access to more of the wealth of the whole of the central African region.

Huggins knew that missionary opinion was influential


abroad and could lend more weight to his federal plan. But he could not obtain their support if he continued to antagonise them through his educational policies. The conciliatory measures he adopted in 1950 and 1951, such as giving missionaries more administrative authority in both primary and secondary schools, the loan aid system to secondary education and the increase in grants for teacher training seem to support the claim that he was trying to elicit missionary support for his political designs. He also considered such measures as expedient to gain African support for the proposed federation.

The churches took advantage of the government's attempts to secure missionary and African support for the federal plan by demanding more state aid for the development of secondary education. They also took advantage of the government's compromising attitude to embark on further secondary education work. Three more mission schools were started: one was founded by the Catholics at Gokomere mission near Fort Victoria in 1951; a second was established at Zimuto mission, also close to Fort Victoria, in 1951 by the Dutch Reformed Church (which had previously maintained that it was too early for the churches to provide secondary education for

Africans); and a third school was established by the Brethren in Christ Church at Matopo mission, outside Bulawayo, in 1952. This brought the total number of African secondary schools in 1952 to ten\(^1\). Nine of these were mission schools with a total enrolment of 270 boys and 28 girls in Form I, 154 boys and 28 girls in Form II and 59 boys and 9 girls in the Form III senior secondary class\(^2\).

The massive disparity between male and female enrolment was due to a number of reasons, not least of which were related to the sociology of African traditional society. Most parents were not prepared to spend their limited resources on a girl's education because they believed that her place was primarily in the home and not in the professions. They saw little advantage in providing a girl with a higher education because, on marriage, she left her family and thus deprived it of any material benefits accruing from her education. Most parents therefore felt that, to educate a daughter beyond basic literacy was simply to enrich another family. As a rule, few girls reached the upper primary classes, let alone completing primary education, and those who did were mainly from families in professions.

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1. Report of the Secretary of Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and the Director of Native Development for the Year 1952, p.46.
2. Ibid., p.43.
such as teaching or in urban employment. Because the girls were so overwhelmingly outnumbered by boys, they found competition for post-primary courses very intense.

The Anglicans and Catholics attempted to resolve this problem by providing separate schools for girls, at both primary and secondary levels, where there was no male competition and girls could go a little higher on the educational ladder than they could in a co-educational school. In actual fact, however, those girls who obtained entry to a full eight year primary education course mostly opted for teacher training or domestic science and nursing courses. Very few proceeded to secondary education, partly from their own choice and partly because few parents were prepared to spare tuition fees for a girl's education at a secondary school, with the added cost of board, books and school uniform. A letter written by a girl at Goromonzi in 1950 and published in the school magazine was indicative of parental reluctance to spend money on a girl's education. The girl recalled an evening when her father brought his friends home. As they sat by the firelight, one of the friends, on hearing that his host's daughter was about to go to Goromonzi, asked him:

Have you turned a millionaire that you are thinking of sending your daughter to secondary school? You may as well throw your money in the Gambo river as waste it on your daughter. 1

1. Quoted in Atkinson, op. cit., p.120.
As far as boys were concerned, however, the situation was quite different. Almost every parent - even the very poor ones - wanted to have their sons educated because they were the hope and future security of the family's comfort. Parents went to great lengths to obtain school fees for their sons' education. In some cases, they sold their cattle at the market place, or grain, to raise the necessary money. At other times, a parent would offer his services to a school and pay for his son's education through labour done. Quite often, a student from a poor or low income family would offer his services to the school after classes, during weekends and school holidays to raise the fees for his education. Considerable importance was attached to the education of boys because a son cared for the family when the father became too old to earn a living or died. Apart from material benefits, it was prestigious in African society for a father to have an educated son. A family with educated boys was very highly respected in the community.

On the whole, the extent of secondary educational development by 1952, both in terms of the number of schools and enrolment was a significant achievement.


2. Ibid.
for missionaries, considering the lack of government grants and policy constraints which confronted them in their work during this post war period.

In terms of employment, a significant number of Junior secondary school graduates (approximately between 20 and 25%) went into teacher training courses and many of these had an undertaking with their respective churches to teach in their denominational schools on completion of their secondary education studies\(^1\). Most students found this arrangement quite acceptable because, apart from securing the education they needed, the undertaking guaranteed a secure job in a prestigious profession at a time when it was difficult to find employment in industry. Some banks did take Junior school graduates for junior clerical jobs. The Goromoni school leaver record showed that, between 1948 and 1951, at least 30 Junior school leavers were taken for employment by the Standard and Barclay's Banks\(^2\). A few of the graduates found employment in the clerical and lower ranks of the Civil Service as court interpreters or district and native commissioner assistants. Most girls went in for teacher training and nursing education\(^3\).

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1. SPG. Mash/EX/DS/C, Bishop E. Paget to Mr. Sulston, 12th February 1952, File 1951-52.
3. Ibid.
However, the majority of Junior secondary school leavers did not readily find employment in industry because most employers gave job preference to European school leavers.

The foregoing discussion has examined the three stages in the development of government and missionary policies on African secondary education between 1934 and 1952. The first stage examined the transition from primary to secondary education and the factors which influenced the foundations of secondary education and the policies on which it was established. Stage two discussed the foundations of secondary education and the evolution of the policies on which its development was based. Also studied were the factors which determined government support for the development of secondary education during the war period. Stage three looked at changes in government policy during the post war period, the conflict between state and church policies and the implications of that conflict for secondary educational development.

A crucial dimension which now needs to be taken into account, because of its great impact and far-reaching influence on the evolution of the policies so far discussed, is the status and value placed on secondary education in the Southern Rhodesian colonial society. This was a highly significant factor in determining, firstly, the African demand for secondary education and, secondly, in influencing government and missionary responses to that
demand and, consequently, the nature of their policies.

The previous chapter showed how the high status and value accorded to formal educational qualifications in early Southern Rhodesian colonial society, from the point of view of employment, heightened African demand for formal, rather than industrial, primary education. However, as more Africans acquired academic primary education and threatened to enter in greater numbers the areas of European political, economic and social social control, the more urgent became the need for successive governments to restrict the numbers of Africans gaining access to those regions of power. This situation led to educational qualifications for gaining franchise, access to certain key professions and skilled services being periodically raised beyond the reach of most Africans. Evidence of this was in the revision of the 1899 franchise qualifications in 1912, 1928, 1937 and 1953¹.

The more the qualifications were raised, the more Africans sought to acquire them in order to improve their political, economic and social position and mobility within the colonial capitalist system. This fact was demonstrated by the rise in the number of Africans who sought secondary and higher education in South Africa as early as the 1920s and 30s. From the time that secondary education was provided locally, demand for it became even greater and began to influence, and even determine, the rate at which missionaries expanded secondary educational provision. Huggins' policy, during the war period, of encouraging Africans to enter skilled and professional jobs stimulated

¹. See Palley, op. cit., pp.286-300.
further the African demand for secondary education.

In the Southern Rhodesian colonial system, ridden with racial segregation and discrimination in every sphere of life, secondary or higher educational qualifications became important to Africans as a means of acquiring positions of status and success. Such qualifications became crucial in one respect - they legitimised the status acquired by those Africans who made the grade in school or were favoured in the process of educational selection and training in the formal school system. Those who failed in school or were rejected in the selection process did not achieve success or positions of status. Their failures were, therefore, also legitimised by the educational system¹.

In the circumstances, the demand for secondary or other academic qualifications, which provided access to the esteemed white or blue professions or other jobs of high income and status, became overwhelming. At Goromonzi alone, the Principal received in 1950, 800 applications for only 40 Form I places, while, in 1952, Tegwani received more than 400 applications for 35 Form I vacancies². The linking of high status jobs and success in the political, economic and social spheres to educational attainment, strengthened the legitimation process. As a result, the African search for 'higher' education became intense.

Harry Franklin observed that, from the late 1940s onwards, academic education became a passion for Africans:

If one issue could be closer to the hearts of Africans than any other .... it is education.
The passion for education is perhaps the most universal of contemporary African characteristics.

1. This is a phenomenon which is a direct consequence of the formal school system, not only in a colonial situation, but also in any capitalist society. See Earl Hopper (ed.): Readings in the Theory of Educational Systems (Hutchinson, London, 1971), pp. 13-35 and Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis: Schooling in Capitalist America (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976), pp.102-112.

This is the political demand to which native politicians and colonial administrators must respond .... This is the .... demand which conditions the African's search for a place to live and work. The European colonisers have diligently taught that education is the indispensable prerequisite to economic progress and political privilege. The African has come to wholeheartedly believe it. The cult of education, which began in Africa as a justification for white supremacy, has become the established black religion. 1

As will be shown in the next chapter, the African demand for secondary education became more intense as they sought to gain access to more jobs and to the privileged European political, economic and social positions. The need to meet this demand led to the government and the churches evolving a common policy and strategy for secondary educational development.

Overall policy situation by 1952

From the overall discussion of the evolution of church and state policies on African secondary education during the period 1934 to 1952, it is possible to identify some of the main factors which accounted for the problems confronted in secondary educational development. These factors are important since they will provide the focus for discussion in the next chapter. Firstly, there was no uniformity of objectives in church and state policies to provide for a unified framework and strategy for the effective organisation, long term planning and development of African secondary education. Secondly, the lack

of adequate co-operation and agreement over policy matters, particularly during the post war period, militated against secondary educational development. The refusal of the government to provide grants for secondary educational expansion added to the problems of achieving the goals desired by the churches. Thirdly, there was little attempt to diversify the grammar school type of curriculum by the inclusion of technical, commercial and administrative courses which would have greatly enhanced the prospects of Junior school graduates of finding employment. Given the financial and administrative constraints confronted by the missionaries, it is perhaps understandable that they were unable to develop such courses in their schools during the years of pioneer work in this field. But, the government policy of protecting white job interests was a factor which made it even more difficult for the churches to orient the curriculum to employment. Above all, the attitude and resistance of the white colonial society against any innovation or reforms in education, political, economic and social policies likely to favour Africans was another element which counted against the efforts of the churches to broaden their curricula and thereby improve the chances of African secondary school graduates benefiting from their education in terms of obtaining employment in the various industrial sectors.

In summary, the major real obstacles to rapid secondary educational development were the racial attitudes and policies prevalent in the white colonial system towards African advancement.

The following chapter will examine attempts by Garfield Todd and the mission churches to reform secondary educational policies, the rationale behind the reforms and their impact on the development of secondary education itself.
CHAPTER 3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT AND MISSIONARY POLICIES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND 1953 - 1963

Chapter 2 discussed the foundations of government and missionary policies on African secondary education and their overall implications for its development.

This chapter examines the development of secondary educational policies under the conditions of multi-racial politics which prevailed in Southern Rhodesia during the years of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963). The central focus of the chapter is concerned with the strategies adopted by Garfield Todd and his successor, Edgar Whitehead, and the mission churches in dealing with the problems of secondary educational development in an essentially racist and conservative colonial society. The discussion will largely concentrate on the reforms in government and missionary secondary educational policies, their objectives and impact on the development of secondary education. A major aspect of the overall discussion concerns the
scope and effectiveness of educational reform in aiding African advancement in a colonial society which was opposed to fundamental political, economic and social reforms. An attempt will be made to identify the limitations of educational reform in such a situation.

In Part I a brief look is taken at the politics of the period, with particular reference to the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 and the concept of a multi-racialist partnership. An examination of this concept is essential to provide the framework for an analysis of the educational reforms introduced by Todd and the rationale behind them.

Todd's attempts to reform some aspects of the Southern Rhodesian colonial system in the pursuit of multi-racialism come under scrutiny in Part II. Consideration is given to the objectives of these reforms and their implications. In the lengthy discussion which follows, the exact nature of the reforms introduced in secondary educational policies, their objectives, implementation and impact on secondary educational development together with their limitations in aiding African economic, social and political advancement, are examined in detail.

Part III continues the above discussion of policy reforms under Todd's successor, Edgar Whitehead. Attention will also be paid to the political consequences for the government of these reforms.
FORMATION OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION

The year 1953 brought about an important political development. Southern Rhodesia was federated with two of her neighbouring British colonies, Northern Rhodesia (modern Zambia) and Nyasaland (modern Malawi). The plan to federate the three colonies originated in the late 1930s as an attempt by Huggins and the British government to create a central African political and economic community which would strengthen white political control in this region and give Europeans access to more of the African central areas' rich natural resources.\(^1\)

But also, behind this initiative was the British government's hope that federation would:

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turn the governing white oligarchy in Southern Rhodesia away from the "apartheid" of the Nationalists in South Africa towards a more enlightened native policy. \(^2\)
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The process which ultimately led to the formation of this federation was initiated in 1945 by the British government, supposedly as an experiment in multi-racial partnership and co-existence. Such a scheme, it was argued, would:

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build a new dominion in Central Africa, welding together its people into one nation, unconscious of colour, or race of its communities
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and contribute towards racial harmony, justice and

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equality\(^1\). However, its white proponents - at home and abroad - were more interested in the political and economic advantages the federal scheme gave to Europeans. As will be seen shortly, when the federation came into existence, many aspects of it (in particular, the franchise policy) negated the very concept of multiracialism, racial equality and justice for all as defined in the federal preamble. This franchise policy consolidated and legitimated continued white control of the state political apparatus and economic and social power.

The federal plan met with considerable opposition from the emerging African Nationalist movements in the three territories concerned. Africans were deeply suspicious and resentful of the federation because of their fears that such a move would strengthen white domination in Central Africa\(^2\). Their past experiences with Europeans made them distrustful of the federal politicians and the white community in general, and they were doubtful that federation would promote genuine multiracialism. Africans were also sceptical that whites would refrain from racial discrimination and admit them

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2. Barber, *op. cit.*, p.16.
into white society and to those occupations hitherto considered to be a white monopoly. In brief, they could not "trust the white man to agree to share political, economic and social equality with blacks".

African opposition to federation was more pronounced in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland where Africans feared that close association with Southern Rhodesia would bring them under the harsh racial laws and policies operating in that colony. As Carter explained after a Methodist Synod discussion of the federation scheme in 1952:

There were very few Africans in Southern Rhodesia and practically none in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland who favoured federation because they feared that it would strengthen white power and repression.

On the whole, the churches supported the idea of a multi-racial federal community because they believed that this would improve race relations and create racial harmony, particularly in Southern Rhodesia. The SRMC, which combined with the Southern Rhodesia Native Missionary Conference in 1952 to form the Southern

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2. For a discussion of African opposition to federation, see Mason (1960), op. cit., pp.91-98 and 128-132. Also see Palley, op. cit., p.338.


4. Ibid.
Rhodesia Christian Conference (SRCC), thought that federation would provide a new opportunity for rapid African advancement under multi-racial partnership\(^1\). But the SRCC also believed that, apart from the socio-economic benefits federation would bring for Africans, it would strengthen European ability to prevent "irresponsible black nationalism and communist influence" from gaining ground in the three territories\(^2\). The Anglicans were especially vocal on the preservation of white civilisation and rule in Central Africa:

> Black people need European leadership for an undetermined length of time. It would be absurd to allow the basis of civilised white society to be destroyed by the shouts of black nationalists we are beginning to hear in this country. It would even be more absurd to give every raw tribesman the vote now. \(^3\)

The Wesleyan Methodists also supported federation but they warned that, if the federal scheme was going to succeed, it should not be forced upon the black people but should be implemented with their full support:

> If the British government forces federation on the three territories against African opinion, there will be little case left for

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refusing Malan {the South African premier} the protectorates of South Africa and the continent will see a blaze of revolt. 1

The dire necessity of obtaining African support for federation was also emphasised by the Methodist Synod in 1952. In its view, African suspicion that federation was a plan designed to increase white power over the black masses had to be overcome but this could not be achieved by promises of mere constitutional safeguards as the blacks were suspicious that "what a whiteman writes into a constitution today, he may erase tomorrow"². African fears could only be allayed through a demonstration by the Europeans of a genuine desire to implement true multi-racial partnership. The first step to achieving this end was to remove racial segregation together with many of the racially offensive laws and policies:

Our Africans would largely agree with Nkomo {a black nationalist} who said, remove the discriminatory legislation first, and then we will believe in partnership and look more favourably on the idea of the Federation. As we see it, to force federation on an unwilling 6 million people is to postpone sine die, any prospects of partnership in any of the territories. 3


However, little attempt was made to consult African opinion on federation by either the British government or the governments of the three territories. The widespread African opposition to federation went unheeded, and did little to hinder the federation from coming into effect. After several debates in the House of Commons, together with extensive consultations between the British government and the white governments of the three territories, the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland came into existence in 1953.

African fears that Europeans would not uphold multi-racialism were soon vindicated by the statements made by federal government leaders and politicians. As Creighton pointed out, it soon became apparent that most Europeans did not believe in true multi-racial partnership and objected to the kind of political, economic and social equality with Africans implied by the concept.


of multi-racial partnership and co-operation on which federation was supposed to be based. Huggins, who resigned as Southern Rhodesia premier to become the first federal premier, publicly admitted that he did not believe there could be any real equality between the races. He regarded 'partnership' as a "blessed word" conveniently used for the purposes of securing local black and external European support for the federal scheme\(^1\). He believed that the only form of partnership that could exist between blacks and whites was the kind of relationship existing between "a horse and a rider"\(^2\). The Federal Party Congress defined multi-racial partnership as the "gradual extension of political rights to those who conform to civilized standards of behaviour and culture"\(^3\), while Sir Roy Welensky, who succeeded Huggins as federal premier in 1957 regarded the term as meaning "close association but not integration between Europeans and certain Africans"\(^4\).

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1. Address by the Hon. Sir Godfrey Huggins to the Royal Empire Society, 24th January 1952, IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 293. Also see Secretary for Council for World Missions to Prof. W.M. MacMillan, 24th August 1952, IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 293.


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.
Further evidence of the negation of the multi-racial partnership was demonstrated in the allocation of responsibilities between the federal and territorial governments. All aspects of European education, health, economic and social development, and administration were placed under the Federal government\(^1\) which had more resources. African education, welfare and development became the responsibility of the territorial governments\(^2\) which had less funds to cater for the large African population in each of the territories. Such an arrangement was a clear endorsement by the Federal government of the policy of separate racial development on which, for many years, Southern Rhodesian society was based, and was in direct conflict with the essence of multi-racial partnership, racial equality and justice as spelt out in the federal preamble.

In terms of education, such a policy meant that Africans and Europeans continued to be educated separately but, most importantly, it also meant that, while European education became the responsibility of the federal state and received full state aid, African education in the three territories remained largely the responsibility of

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the missionaries, just as it had in the past.

Although this policy was racist and disadvantageous to African education in terms of access to the more plentiful federal funds, the exclusion of African education from federal responsibility proved beneficial in other ways. In Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland it saved African education from coming under the racial oriented policies of the federal government where Huggins' ideology still prevailed. Africans in these territories had resisted their incorporation into the federal scheme for precisely the reason that they did not want to become part of a repressive and racist political machinery, controlled largely by Southern Rhodesian white settlers. With Huggins as premier of the federation, blacks in the two territories feared that their welfare and development, if they were incorporated into the federal scheme, would be put severely at risk.

Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were used to a less racist British colonial educational policy than that operating in Southern Rhodesia where white settler rule was effective. The first African secondary schools in both territories were government schools as, since the establishment of Munali government secondary school in Northern Rhodesia in 1938, the colonial administration had continued to take an increasing interest in the
development of African post primary education. The Ministry of African Education was advised by an Advisory Board on which Africans were represented but this was never the case in Southern Rhodesia. Besides, Northern Rhodesian blacks were more readily accepted into the Civil Service and other administrative and professional jobs than blacks were in Southern Rhodesia.

Nyasaland had an even less racist colonial administration than her two neighbours and enjoyed a less racist educational policy. The colonial government was directly engaged in promoting primary and secondary educational work long before the Southern Rhodesian government contemplated such action. The Nyasaland colonial government was also comparatively more co-operative with missionaries in their educational work than was the case in Southern Rhodesia. Capitation grants for African education were provided to mission churches much earlier than in Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, Africans


N.B. However, both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had far less educational provisions for Africans than those which existed in Southern Rhodesia. The presence of a large body of mission churches, engaged in educational work in Southern Rhodesia partly accounted for the disparity.

2. Franck, op. cit., p. 166.


4. Ibid.
in Nyasaland had access to civil service and professional and skilled jobs much more readily than in either Northern or Southern Rhodesia\(^1\), for the reason that it was colonial policy in Nyasaland to train Africans for administrative and professional services and to prepare them for eventual self rule\(^2\). (This was also the case elsewhere in British Africa, e.g. Ghana and Nigeria, where the white population was small in number and non-settler in the sense that whites in Southern Rhodesia were.) But it was not the case in Southern Rhodesia where the white settler policy determined that the whites should dominate the administrative, professional and skilled services in order to safeguard the continuity of white supremacy and rule. Therefore, it was to the advantage of the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that their affairs, including education, remained under territorial governments, and they were consequently not as much directly affected by racist federal policies as they would have been if they had come under federal responsibility.


Similarly, Southern Rhodesian Africans benefited from having their educational affairs remain under territorial government and missionary responsibility as before. In this way, they also escaped the direct influence of Huggins' federal policies.

Under Huggins' successor, Garfield Todd, African education in Southern Rhodesia received considerable government support and underwent massive expansion. A new educational policy introduced by Todd led to innovations in African education which would have been inconceivable under Huggins' regime.

**GARFIELD TODD: HIS POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES**

Todd was one of the few white liberal politicians in Southern Rhodesian history whose belief in genuine multi-racial partnership provided the framework for his government's political, economic and social policies and reforms. As will be seen shortly, his 'progressiveness' led to significant attempts by his government to reform some aspects of Southern Rhodesia's colonial system and educational policy.

A farmer and former missionary from New Zealand turned politician, Garfield Todd became Prime Minister following the 1954 General Election in which his United Rhodesia Party won an overwhelming victory of 26 out of 30 parliamentary seats. Like his predecessors, he was

brought to power by a predominantly white electorate but, unlike his predecessors, he adopted policies which showed a significant departure from the doctrinaire racial politics of past administrations. Although he is sometimes criticised for the repressive measures he adopted to contain some aspects of African nationalism, it is difficult to dispute the fact that Todd was in many respects liberal.

To begin with, he advocated a policy of closer racial co-operation at the risk of antagonising his federal counterpart and the white electorate. Most importantly, he identified the basic sources of racial conflict in Southern Rhodesia and the federation as the lack of parliamentary representation for Africans, racial segregation and discrimination and deliberate suppression of African advancement, particularly in Southern Rhodesia. These were the aspects of Southern Rhodesian colonial society which Todd believed needed urgent reform if genuine multi-racialism was to exist.

His approach to the issue of parliamentary representation for Africans was to broaden franchise and admit the African 'middle class' which his educational, social and economic policies were designed to enlarge. This is a very important point because it was a major factor in

determining the educational reforms which Todd introduced. In other words, Todd's belief in genuine multi-racial partnership in government and in the social and economic spheres provided the rationale for his educational reforms.

Todd considered African participation in the central political, economic and social systems as essential if they were to secure a place alongside Europeans. He saw this participation by Africans as necessary to safeguard white interests against radical black nationalism which, if allowed to have its way, could destroy the white future. At the same time he wanted to ensure that the future of Africans was protected against the extreme right wing colonial politics which, if also allowed to proceed unchecked, could severely damage African interests and lead to further racial confrontation and, thus, to a political crisis. Todd believed that, if the two extremes were avoided, a truly multi-racial society could be established in Southern Rhodesia. Racial harmony could be achieved provided there was genuine reform of those aspects of the colonial system which were most offensive to Africans.

One of the areas to which Todd gave priority for reform was the franchise system because he considered that the injustice inherent in it provided a rallying point for African nationalism and opposition to white rule. It is important to examine the nature of the franchise
system as it existed at this time, and the constraints which such a system imposed on African political advancement, before discussing how Todd sought to reform it. The strategy for achieving reform in this sphere was closely linked to educational reform owing to the fact that the franchise qualifications were based on education, income and property.

Under the 1953 Constitution, there were in Southern Rhodesia two voters rolls - the 'A' roll and the 'B' roll. Under the 'A' roll (also known as the General roll), the requirements were so high that it was difficult for the majority of Africans to qualify for franchise. These requirements were as follows:

(1) £720 p.a. income and ownership of immovable property valued at £1,500 plus basic literacy to enable the applicant to complete the application form in English and without assistance.

Or:-

(2) £480 p.a. income and ownership of immovable property valued at £1,000 plus primary education (for Africans, Standard 6).

Or:-

(3) £300 p.a. income and ownership of immovable property valued at £500 plus four years secondary education.

Or:-

(4) Minister of religion with university degree or
five years of training at a theological school or
two years at the school and three years in service\textsuperscript{1}.

Condition 1 disqualified the majority of Africans
who had basic literacy but fell short of the required
income and property. Estimates made by the Federal
African Affairs Board in 1956 revealed that the average
income of Africans in employment in Southern Rhodesia
was only £70 p.a.\textsuperscript{2}, and also that they possessed little
or no property of any significant value. Cattle, the
African's only property of significance, were discounted
in computing the overall value of property owned, as such
property was movable. Acceptable property included
such items as land, buildings or mines and other forms
of stationary business, and this was deliberately
designed to ensure that not many Africans could meet the
required property qualifications.

In the case of Europeans, however, even those with
little formal education, such as farmers, policemen,
road construction workers, forest personnel etc., were
able to qualify as, under the country's wage structure,
whites were guaranteed high salaries irrespective of
either their qualifications or the nature of the job
they performed. Colin Leys has shown that few Europeans

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Palley, op. cit., p.392, footnote No. 2.
\item[2.] Franck, op. cit., p.177.
\end{itemize}
in 1956 earned less than £720 p.a. and that most of them owned or occupied immovable property valued at well over £1,500, since Europeans possessed most of the productive land and business enterprises in the country. The result was that the majority of Europeans qualified to vote¹.

Under Condition 2, most of the Africans who had a complete primary education also failed to qualify on grounds of income and wealth. The average annual income of a school teacher, educated to Standard 6, plus possession of a lower teacher's certificate acquired after two years' training, was only £120 and this fell far short of the required £480². The wealth of Africans in this category was negligible and, as a result, some 3,331 of the teachers in service in 1955³ were disqualified from registering under the 'A' roll.

Under Condition 3, most Africans failed to qualify because they did not possess the required four years of secondary education or the necessary income⁴. Virtually no African minister of religion had a university education as prescribed under Condition 4 and most African ministers

1. Leys, op. cit., p.222.
2. Ibid.
of religion from independent churches had no formal theological training and this meant that only a handful of those trained in mission schools could qualify.

Conditions laid down under the 'B' roll, also known as the Special roll, were much lower and were intended to enable some of those who failed to meet the 'A' roll requirements to obtain franchise. As will be seen, however, not many Africans were able to register even under this roll. The conditions were as follows:—

1. £150 p.a. income plus immovable property valued at £500 plus basic literacy.

Or:—

2. £120 p.a. income, no property required but a two year secondary education¹.

Given the fact that the average annual income of an employed African was only £70, the majority of Africans still failed to qualify under Condition 1. Although an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Africans with Junior secondary qualifications in 1953 could theoretically qualify for franchise under Condition 2 and thus substantially increase the African electorate, the effectiveness of the 'B' roll was pre-empted by the condition that the total number of African voters admitted to the electoral register under this roll could not exceed 20% of the total electorate². When that figure was reached, no more were admitted except through

2. See Ibid., pp.415-416.
the 'A' roll. Moreover, constituencies were delimited in such a way that no more than one-third of the voters in one constituency could qualify under the 'B' roll\(^1\). Thus, even if many Africans succeeded in acquiring the qualifications stipulated under the 'B' roll, the growth and effectiveness of the African electorate was already pre-determined to such an extent that Africans could never constitute a substantial proportion of the total electorate, let alone vote Europeans out of power.

On the basis of this franchise, virtually all Europeans could qualify for the 'A' role but the vast majority of Africans could qualify for neither the 'A' nor 'B' rolls. Of those Africans who did qualify, almost all did so through the 'B' roll. The result was that the electorate was dominated by whites. The 1957 Tredgold Franchise Commission observed that, for an African to qualify under these conditions, he must have acquired the position of an agricultural supervisor, building overseer, clerk, interpreter, minister of religion, chief editor or journalist, medical orderly, building contractor, artisan or policeman, with not less than ten years' service or of the rank of non-commissioned officer, which was very rare indeed. An African department messenger did not qualify until his thirty-seventh year of service, or his eleventh year of service

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as a head messenger. An African nurse would qualify only if she were state registered. A teacher who had passed standard six and taken a two year primary teacher's lower certificate course would only qualify after many years of service. To qualify at the outset of his teaching career, he needed to have taken a two year secondary course, plus a higher teacher's certificate.

On the basis of this franchise, only 441 Southern Rhodesian Africans, out of a total black population of two and three quarter million, had the vote in 1953. This was in sharp contrast to the 48,870 whites with franchise out of a total white population of 219,000. The injustice of this system aroused considerable African criticism and become one of the prime targets of nationalist politics which crystallised with the formation, in 1955, of the Salisbury Youth League political organisation by two of the early founders of black nationalism, James Chikerema and George Nyandoro.

Todd's first step towards reforming the franchise system was to set up an electoral commission of inquiry in 1956 to "consider and report on a system for the just representation of the people of the colony". The commission, which was chaired by Sir Robert Tredgold, recommended a series of changes to the existing franchise. These involved the introduction of a special franchise for Africans in which the income qualifications were lowered substantially to (a) Annual income of £240 plus literacy or (b) Standard VIII (i.e. Form II secondary education) and an annual income of £120. Educational qualifications remained largely unchanged because, according to the commission, with more education facilities being provided by the government, many Africans would be able to acquire enough education to enable them to earn the proposed incomes and thus qualify. In addition, the commission proposed that (a) in computing the value of a person's income, board, lodging and clothing, or any money received for provision for any or all of these, should be included; and (b) the income of a married man and his wife should be added together and the total should

2. Franck, op. cit., p.188. Also see Rhodesia Herald, 15th August 1957.
4. Ibid., lines 734-735.
be deemed to be the income of each, and that a wife should be deemed to occupy the same property as her husband.\(^1\)

Such reforms, to say the least, horrified the white electorate who had voted Todd into power to preserve their political power. His declared intention in 1957 to enfranchise at least 6,000 Africans during his tenure of office greatly surprised even his own government ministers.\(^2\) Although the Tredgold Commission's recommendations were not implemented after Todd's fall from power in 1958, they represented a rare attempt by a white colonial premier to reform the colonial system, a system wherein he was supposed to preserve the status quo. For most whites the colonial system was the only one which could guarantee eternal white supremacy. To Todd, however, nothing short of incorporating many more Africans into the colonial government machinery could preserve the white future and, in this belief, he differed significantly from his predecessor who had placed his faith in unadulterated white power.

Todd also emphasised the need for socio-economic reforms, stressing that, as long as the majority of

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2. Franck, op. cit., p.186.
Africans were poorly paid and discriminated against, the country would not achieve full development. His first initiative in the reform of these spheres was to formulate the Apprenticeship Bill and the New Conciliation Bill to enable Africans to be prepared for, and admitted to, skilled jobs as well as allowing them to participate in multi-racial trade unions. But white opposition to both bills prevented their approval by parliament. Both bills were referred to a select committee and did not become law until Whitehead became premier.

However, Todd succeeded in reforming wage structures in 1957 in order to give urban black workers higher wages. To the astonishment and anger of even some of his cabinet ministers, he raised the minimum wage for all urban African workers by as much as 30%. He also legislated for a variety of other reforms relating to land and urban African residences in a bid to create a home-owning African middle class and skilled proletariat.

A crucial aspect of Todd's overall reform strategy was the development of African education. He believed

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that the expansion of educational opportunities for Africans was essential for the achievement of the objectives of his political, economic and social reforms, and the creation of a multi-racial society. He argued that more educational opportunities must be provided to enable Africans to acquire the acceptable European standards and, in this way, become incorporated into the central colonial, political economic and social machinery and institutions. For him, education was basic to the enlargement of an African middle class capable of sharing (with responsibility) rights and privileges with Europeans\(^1\). Todd also recognised that the welfare of the country depended upon the maximum development and utilisation of the potential of every citizen, black or white\(^2\). Moreover, he regarded the lack of education amongst blacks as one of the main reasons for their present level of serious underdevelopment and frustration with the colonial system. It was therefore Todd's plan to promote massive African educational development in order to prepare Africans for professional, skilled and semi-skilled jobs in every possible employment sector and it was in the area of

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African education that Todd effected the most significant and long term reforms.

**TODD'S SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL REFORMS: OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS 1954-58**

One of Todd's more immediate tasks in seeking to develop African secondary education, which he felt had been seriously neglected by the previous government, was to review current government and missionary policies in the context of his multi-racial policies. His primary objective was to develop a unified church and state policy which was consistent with his belief in a multi-racial partnership. Such a policy would enable his government to co-operate with missionaries in securing the rapid expansion of African secondary education. As a former missionary himself, he was fully acquainted with the nature of the problems which confronted the churches in the educational field and it was his aim to directly involve the government in resolving these problems. In Todd's opinion, co-operation between churches and state was crucial to the achievement of effective planning, organisation, administration and development of secondary education for Africans.

The first stage in the process of creating church and state co-operation was marked by the calling of a joint conference by the government of the SRCC and the DNE to seek ways of achieving such co-operation.
The conference discussed and agreed on collaboration between both parties\textsuperscript{1}. The government agreed to consider introducing a grants-in-aid system for secondary schools to ensure regular availability of funds for missionary secondary educational work\textsuperscript{2}. A Central Advisory Committee, similar to that created in 1942, was established and charged with the responsibility of investigating the needs of secondary education and the exact nature and extent of assistance the government could provide\textsuperscript{3}. The Committee was to submit its recommendations to the Director of Native Education.

The Committee Report contained a series of recommendations which were of vital importance to the future of secondary education. It called for (1) close consultation between the DNE and SRCC on all matters of policy in order to ensure continuity in educational planning and development\textsuperscript{4}; (2) provision by the government of capitation grants to enable the establishment of more primary and secondary schools\textsuperscript{5}; (3) no restrictions on the expansion of secondary education\textsuperscript{6};

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held in Salisbury, 14th December 1954, IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292.}
\item \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textit{Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held in Salisbury, 15th December 1955, para. 4(d), IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292.}
\item \textit{Ibid.}, para. 4(d) iii.
\item \textit{Ibid.}
\end{enumerate}
(4) the administration and supervision of secondary schools to become the joint responsibility of the DNE and the SRCC; (5) state scholarships to be made available to poor students by the government at both Junior and Senior secondary school levels; and (6) the incorporation of technical and commercial courses in the secondary school curriculum, as was already the case in European schools.

The ready acceptance of these recommendations by the government underlined the change of state policy. Most of the recommendations were incorporated into what became official government and missionary policy on African secondary education - the first Five Year Plan - announced by the DNE in 1956.

The Five Year Plan as a policy framework

The Five Year Plan was the outcome of the ideas developed by the DNE, the SRCC and the Central Advisory Committee. It covered several aspects of the development of African education, from primary to teacher training and secondary education, and provided the policy framework within which missionaries and the

1. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held in Salisbury, 15th December 1955, para. 4(d) iii.

2. Ibid., para. 4(e)
government planned for this development. The objectives of this Plan were, firstly, to expand upper primary school provisions to enable more pupils to acquire a complete primary education\(^1\). This was to be achieved through increased government grants to mission churches. Secondly, teacher-training at the PTH level was to be expanded to provide more scope for Junior secondary school graduates to train for teaching in upper primary classes\(^2\). The intention was not just to provide employment for secondary school leavers but also to overcome the problem of a shortage of trained teachers in many mission schools as identified by the 1951 Kerr Commission. Expenditure on teacher training was therefore to be increased substantially during the period of the Five Year Plan\(^3\).

The most significant developments were, however, envisaged at the secondary school level where one of the main objectives of the Five Year Plan was to ensure that every pupil who passed Standard 6 had the opportunity to acquire at least two years of secondary education\(^4\). This was to be achieved through unrestricted expansion

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1. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held in Salisbury on 13th December 1956, para. 4(d), IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. para. 6.
of the Junior secondary school network accompanied by the development of Senior secondary education. The government was to become more directly involved than ever before in the expansion process through the provision of funds and administrative personnel who were to assist the missionaries in the day to day development work. One of the important innovations envisaged in the Plan was the introduction of industrial courses in schools providing secondary education. These courses were to be made available in two different ways: (a) either as part of the curriculum, in which case the students had the option to take or leave the courses or (b) they could form entirely separate diploma courses for those students with two or four years of secondary education who were interested in training for employment in industry or business offices. Missionaries were to be free to decide on the introduction of the courses in their respective schools and to select, in consultation with the DNE, the academic courses they proposed to teach. The objective was to give missionaries freedom to determine and control their curricula in collaboration with the DNE.

1. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held in Salisbury on 13th December 1956, para. 6.

2. Ibid.
The Five Year Plan committed the government to heavy expenditure on African education, expenditure that neither the white electorate nor some members of the government were willing to accept. Placing the government in the forefront of educational development in terms of providing financial and manpower resources, as well as taking a leading role in planning and policy making, was a costly undertaking which had serious political consequences for Todd as the European taxpayer did not want any of his money to be used for the advancement of African interests. Other unforeseen expenses made the undertaking even more expensive and objectionable to the European electorate. For example, once the Five Year Plan had been drawn up, it became necessary to re-organise the administrative system of secondary education to facilitate the effective implementation of the innovations envisaged. This involved the creation of a local Junior Secondary Education Board capable of running an expanding secondary school system and, in addition, to provide for the efficient organisation and administration of Junior secondary education. The Board was required to perform a number of functions. Firstly, it was to be responsible for designing the Junior certificate curricula from which the various schools would select the courses they wished to teach. Secondly, the
Board was to set examinations and award certificates with the objective of terminating the existing affiliation of the local Junior school certificate to the South African secondary education system, and thus create an autonomous Junior secondary board which could establish local standards. Such a measure would also ensure that the local system was responsive to local conditions and that the examination standards were related to the teaching standards in the various schools.

In 1956, Todd successfully created an independent board for the Rhodesia Junior Certificate by breaking the affiliation of the local Junior school certificate to the South African junior certificate board. The costs of establishing this board, financing it and employing the necessary personnel, ran into thousands of pounds and aroused further white discontent with the government policies.

In order to ensure that the educational developments and innovations contained in the Five Year Plan were implemented, and that the missionaries received the necessary aid and support, Todd took over responsibility for the DNE by appointing himself as its director in 1956. As Prime Minister, and Director of

2. Ibid.
the department, he was in a much stronger position than previous directors to get his plans approved by parliament and to sanction more resources for African education. In the first year of the Five Year Plan, for example, there was a large increase in government expenditure on African education when £1,544,211 was sanctioned by parliament compared to £754,710 passed in 1951-52 - an increase of 105%.

With so much money at its disposal, the DNE made special grants totalling £30,000 for the development of new Junior secondary schools. This was followed in 1957 by the provision of capitation grants which missionaries had been seeking for secondary education since 1939. These grants amounted to £20,000 for each new secondary school being built, spread over a period of five years. A further proposal for £160,000 towards the maintenance of all of the existing schools in the secondary sector was also approved. Such large resources coupled with the progressive terms of the Five Year Plan provided the first real opportunity for the extensive development of secondary education.

1. Franck, op. cit., p.118.
2. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held in Salisbury on 29th December 1957, IMC/CMBS Archives, Box 292.
4. Ibid.
Implementation of the Five Year Plan and the implications for the development of secondary education

Government policy received the acclamation of all the churches. The policy represented the kind of response and co-operation that the missionaries had sought for many years. More significant was the fact that, this time, the churches were actively involved in policy-making and were therefore implementing a policy the objectives of which they were all in agreement with. Co-operation between church and state encouraged local and overseas donors, interested in aiding African advancement, to provide further substantial assistance and this was of great value to the missionaries enabling, as it did, further expansion of secondary education to take place.

The Anglicans embarked on a full scale development of their secondary institutions in 1957 with the establishment of a second secondary school at Cyrene Mission, near the town of Plumtree. With the backing of £20,000 in capitation grants from the DNE, £10,000 from the sale of church property in Salisbury, and £2,000 from the SPG Board in London, this secondary

3. Ibid.
school for boys made rapid progress in development. By early 1958, basic facilities were available to enable the first class of 40 Form I boys to begin their studies. Another boy's secondary school was begun at St. Bernard's Mizeki Mission, near Marandellas, in 1957 under the aegis of the Bernard Mizeki Trust. This school was established as an experiment in non racial secondary education and, as such, received a special government grant of £30,000 to assist in its development, and a further £10,000 from the Mashonaland diocese of the church. In addition, considerable financial aid came from multi-national companies which wanted to promote multi-racial partnership. The companies believed that non-racial education was a significant step towards the establishment of a multi-racial society and deserved assistance. The BSA Co., the Anglo-American Co. and the Rio-Tinto Steel and Zinc Companies raised £50,000 altogether to be used over a period of 15 years for the development of a full six year secondary education course. This financial aid served a very useful purpose in assisting the rapid development of

3. Ibid.
the school. The incentive to quickly develop senior secondary education at the school came with the opening of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1957 and this provided new scope for Africans to acquire higher education\(^1\).

The school, however, faced serious difficulties in implementing non-racial education. In the first instance, white farmers in the surrounding area opposed the integration of African and European students whatever the objective\(^2\). Secondly, the white community in general was opposed to multi-racial education because Europeans feared that, if such a scheme was successful, it would encourage false hopes of equality with whites in those Africans who attended the school. The Reverend Robert Grinham, under whose supervision the school was developed, observed in 1958 that European parental opposition to Bernard Mizeki school made it very difficult to obtain white students\(^3\). Indeed, when the school opened in 1960, not a single European student had applied for admission and all the first 70 Form I boys were African\(^4\). For many years the school continued to be African. Besides, the high cost


\(^2\) SPG.Mash/D/C/ TF261, Confidential Report, R. Grinham to Mr. Sulston, 2nd May 1959, SPG Archives.

\(^3\) SPG.Mash/D/C/ TF263, Finance File 1958-60, R. Grinham to Mr. Sulston, 13th June 1958, SPG Archives.

of tuition and boarding which amounted to £60 per year\(^1\), and doubled to £120 per year in 1962\(^2\), made the school an institution largely for students from black middle class business families. The majority of African students could not afford the cost of attending the school.

The Wesleyan Methodists concentrated on developing Tegwani school. Between June 1956 and June 1958 the school underwent extensive expansion which raised the level of secondary education from Form III to Form V\(^3\), the complete South African higher school certificate and equivalent of the Cambridge school certificate (CSC). The school enrolment also increased from 110 to 204\(^4\). All this was achieved at a cost of £30,000, £15,000 of which came from the government\(^5\), £10,000 from the Overseas Methodist Board\(^6\), and £5,000 from the Beet Trust\(^7\).

Several schools were established by other denominations with the assistance of the government.

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2. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
The government itself directly engaged in the development of secondary education when, in 1957, it established its second secondary school for boys at Fletcher, outside Gwelo\(^1\), and for the first time introduced secondary education for urban blacks. Another school was established in the Highfield African township of Salisbury in 1957\(^2\), with two more schools coming under construction in Bulawayo and Umtali towns in 1958\(^3\).

By 1958, the number of African secondary schools had risen to 19\(^4\) from 11 in 1954, when Todd came to power (an increase of eight schools in four years). This was more than two-thirds of all the secondary schools established during the first 15 years of secondary education under Huggins' government. The increase in enrolment during the four years of Todd's premiership can be shown as follows:

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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
Table 3.1.
Increase in enrolment in African secondary schools between 1954 and 1958

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<th>Form</th>
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<th>1954(1) Total</th>
<th>1958(2) M</th>
<th>1958(2) F</th>
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Such an increase within a four year period represented a substantial achievement and underlined the effectiveness of church and state co-operation in promoting secondary educational development.

Further successes resulted from the Five Year Plan. The government introduced in 1957 a uniform curriculum at the senior school certificate level. This was carried out by making all senior secondary schools take the CSC courses and thus eliminating the practice whereby some schools offered South African Matriculation Board courses at the post Junior certificate level while others offered CSC courses. An advantage of all the

1. Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development for the Year 1955, pp.122-123.

N.B. There was no Form IV class in 1954.


3. Minutes of the Executive Council of the SRCC held at Goromonzi on 14th December 1958, IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292.
senior schools taking courses from the Board was that, administratively, it worked out cheaper for the DNE to organise high school examinations. Moreover, such an arrangement facilitated the transfer of teachers and students from one school to another during the course of the school year.

In addition to assisting with the development of formal secondary education, the government took steps to organise correspondence courses. After the creation of the Rhodesia Junior Certificate Board in 1956, Todd re-organised the secondary education correspondence system by making the DNE serve as the local authority for the South African Education Department, through which courses were offered by several private union colleges\(^1\). This arrangement, by providing facilities locally, had the advantage of making correspondence courses cheaper. The DNE provided students with printed lectures at subsidised rates and also acted as the post office for students' correspondence with the South African colleges. Indeed, now that most of the administrative costs of supplying study material and organising examinations (formerly borne by the South African Education Department) were covered by the DNE, the overall cost of undertaking correspondence

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courses became much cheaper. This enabled more Africans to undertake private studies and records show that in January 1956, before the changes were effected, about 184 subjects at the Junior certificate level were taken through correspondence courses\(^1\). By 1958, however, this number had risen to 678\(^2\). A similar increase was noted at the Senior school certificate level where numbers rose from 111\(^3\) to 945\(^4\) in the same period showing that more students were now able to afford the cost of private studies.

The foregoing discussion demonstrates the extent of secondary educational development under the Five Year Plan policy. At this stage, it is now important to consider the impact of these developments on African political, economic and social advancement with the aim of examining how far the development of African secondary education assisted in the achievement of the goals which Todd set out to attain when he introduced his reforms. The discussion centres on the limitations

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1. Report of the Director of Native Education for the Year 1956, p.3.
and implications of educational development in an essentially conservative colonial system which was opposed to rapid African advancement.

Todd, in collaboration with the churches, succeeded in providing a significant proportion of Africans with secondary education. He impressed Africans so much in that respect that he was described by a leading black journalist in 1957 as the only European in the central African federation whom the 7½ million Africans in the territory might be persuaded to cast their suspicions aside for and follow in the multi-racial partnership. ¹

Stanlake Sam'Kange, one of the prominent intellectuals and politicians of the day, openly said of Todd that he had convinced Africans that he was a Prime Minister for them as well as for the whites ².

However, the availability of more educational facilities for Africans did not guarantee them the social, economic and political advancement they sought and which Todd intended them to secure. Fundamental changes in the colonial system were needed but, despite Todd's attempts to effect such changes, the extent of his success was restricted by European opposition and his own fear of antagonising the electorate which had brought his government to power. In some cases

parliament declined to ratify the reforms he proposed, as was the case with the industrial relations and land reform bills in 1957. The primary reason for parliament's rejection of both bills was that they went too far in seeking to give Africans more rights and this, parliament believed, could undermine white privileged status and power. The failure to obtain parliamentary approval for the recommendations of the Tredgold franchise commission also pointed to the strength of white opposition to African political advancement.

Another aspect of colonial society which withstood Todd's efforts at reform concerned the white racial attitudes which accounted for the high level of racial discrimination and segregation existing in Southern Rhodesia. Africans discovered that, despite having obtained the necessary educational qualifications, this discrimination continued to place them at a serious disadvantage on seeking employment. Thus the euphoria amongst Africans generated by more educational opportunities becoming available than ever before was tempered by the realities of post school unemployment, a reality which many Junior and Senior school leavers were already experiencing.

The reasons for this situation can be divided into four categories: (1) the limitations of the secondary school curricula; (2) employment policy; (3) discrimination against educated Africans by Europeans and (4)
the failure by Todd to sufficiently reform the colonial system because the system would not permit him to do so.

**Limitations of the curricula**

The majority of African secondary school graduates could not obtain employment because they left school with no skills to offer industry. This was due to the fact that African schools did not attach importance to the teaching of industrial and technical subjects, despite the realisation of the DNE and the SRCC in 1954 that these subjects were essential, bearing in mind the extent of the unemployment problem which faced past school leavers. The government therefore proposed that a number of vocational, technical and commercial courses be introduced in schools urgently, either as part of the curriculum or as fully fledged diploma courses for those pupils who already had secondary school qualifications but wanted to prepare themselves for employment in industry. The courses included:

(a) building and carpentry; (b) business calculations for boys with a four year secondary education who wanted to become junior accountants in industry; (c) secretarial courses of one year duration; (d) bookkeeping for those interested in office work; (e) typewriting and shorthand for those interested in clerical and secretarial work

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Goromonzi and Fletcher government schools took the lead in initiating the courses\(^1\), and some mission schools followed suit, including St. Augustine's, Penhalonga\(^2\), and Tegwani\(^3\). One of the main weaknesses in the provision of the courses lay in the fact that, where the courses were integrated with the curriculum, they were not allotted the same teaching time as the academic courses. In addition, they were often offered as optional courses but still the overall emphasis in teaching was on academic subjects. Most teachers, because of their own academic background, did not hold non-academic courses in high esteem and thus tended to judge a student's intelligence mainly by his performance in the academic courses. Students did not, therefore, learn to value the importance of industrial education and the skills they could acquire by such study. Even in those schools which made a genuine effort to encourage students to take industrial courses seriously, spelling out the range of employment opportunities available to those who acquired industrial skills\(^4\), there

\(^1\) Report of the Director of Native Education for the Year 1957, p.6.


was another serious setback to the students' acceptance of the courses.

**Employment policy**

It was common knowledge amongst students that employment policy was very much in favour of those who had formal education qualifications, especially in the Public and Civil Service and other employment sectors offering white collar professions. Those who did not possess academic qualifications were not considered for service. For example, entrance requirements for such jobs in the Civil Service as adult education assistant, agricultural laboratory assistant, broadcaster, dispensary assistant or wireless operator, were at least a Standard 6 education. In practice, however, those applicants with Standard 6 education were often passed over in favour of those with secondary education.

Even the wage structure in most professional services was directly linked to academic educational qualifications. For example, in the Civil Service the wage structure for Africans in graded services in 1957 was as follows:

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Table 3.2.
Relationships between income and educational qualifications for Africans in the Southern Rhodesia Civil Service in 1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>No. of Africans</th>
<th>Salary range per month</th>
<th>Qualification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade A</td>
<td>4,911</td>
<td>£6.12s-£22.10s</td>
<td>Std. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade B</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>£17.10s-£40.14s</td>
<td>Form 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade C</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>£27.2s-£55.8s</td>
<td>Form 6 (or Makerere College Diploma or its equivalent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar relationships existed in most other professions, e.g. in the teaching profession, where academic background, professional certificate held, and years of experience determined wage differentials of teachers teaching the same classes.

Promotion was also dependent on educational qualifications. For example, an African police constable with a Standard 6 education needed at least 20 years of service to qualify for promotion, but one with either Form II or IV education could rise to the rank of a non commissioned officer in only half that time.

Therefore, from the point of view of better employment prospects, with associated improvement in income and

social status, most students preferred to acquire academic rather than industrial qualifications. But, even then, not all those who acquired academic qualifications gained access to the professions because of the intense competition for the limited jobs available - more often many industrial, managerial and administrative posts were simply not open to Africans, whatever their qualifications. White trade unions excluded Africans from many such posts and this white monopoly of jobs, plus the fact that, until 1959, apprenticeship of Africans in any industry was legally prohibited, worsened the unemployment situation for African high school leavers.

The unemployment situation was even more acute for those Africans who failed to make the grade in school, or either dropped out or were denied educational opportunities by the selection process. They had neither the required level of formal educational qualifications nor skills to offer and therefore were unlikely to find employment in the professions or other jobs providing high income in either rural or urban areas. Such Africans had to be content with low paying manual jobs in the mines or on farms, if indeed they could find them. Unfortunately there were very many Africans who found themselves faced with such a situation and many of these were dropouts from the school system, at both primary and
secondary levels. The following table provides a guide to the extent of the problem of wastage in African schools:

Table 3.3. "Wastage" in African schools between 1947 and 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intake year</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
<th>Wastage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub. A 1947</td>
<td>81,821</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard II</td>
<td>23,366</td>
<td>58,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard VI</td>
<td>4,429</td>
<td>18,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form II 1956</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>2,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form IV 1958</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>1,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form VI 1960</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of African children who dropped out of the formal school system, and as a result failed to achieve their aspirations for social, economic and political advancement in the given Rhodesian colonial situation, is seen from the table to be extremely high. Of the 81,821 pupils who enrolled in Sub Standard A in 1947, only 4,429 reached Standard 6, showing that 77,392 had dropped out during primary schooling. Of the 1,888 who reached Form II Junior secondary, only 379 got to Form IV, while a mere 15 reached 'A' levels. Put in another way, of an estimated 85% of African children who entered primary school in Southern Rhodesia in the 1950s, only

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1% reached the tenth year of schooling, despite the rapid expansion of educational opportunities under Todd's government. Overall, approximately 80% of the children received schooling up to Standard II, 36% of this 80% reached Standard IV and 18% of the 36% completed primary education. Of those, only 4% reached Form IV, while only 1% of the remainder received a full six year secondary education (Form VI). This meant that only a handful of African children who reached secondary education were, theoretically, within reach of the socio-economic and political aspirations they sought to achieve. Those who failed to succeed in the formal school system stood no chance whatsoever of attaining their goal.

Discrimination against educated Africans in employment

The small proportion of Africans who benefited from formal education by securing positions in the various professional services, and thus joining the ranks of the black educated elite and middle class, soon found that their socio-economic and political positions did not give them equal status with Europeans. In other words, despite having acquired

1. Franklin, op. cit., p.178.
the so-called acceptable standards of civilisation through educational attainment (which Todd hoped would admit them to European society and so create a multi-racial community), educated Africans found that they were not readily accepted by Europeans. They were discriminated against in employment and almost every other sphere of life. Their educational qualifications did little to change the attitudes and pre-conceived racist ideas of the white settlers towards Africans.

Discrimination against educated Africans continued to be clearly evident in employment. If a white employer found a qualified African he wished to employ in a supervisory or administrative position, the European labour force walked out until his appointment was withdrawn¹. Even in the government Civil Service, discrimination was widely practised. In 1957, of the 16,321 employees in the 32 Civil Service departments, only 3,757 Africans were graded, all being in the most junior positions. 8,206 were unestablished². The senior posts were all occupied by Europeans and only they enjoyed secure tenure in the following grades:³

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¹ See Franck, op. cit., pp.167-168.
² Leys, op.cit., p.62.
³ Ibid.
Even some of the 1,227 unestablished whites held higher positions than some graded Africans. Moreover, Africans in government service, with the exception of those who were graded, were excluded from the terms of employment prescribed in the Public Service Act which specified that persons paid on an hourly, daily or monthly basis were, in the legal sense, excluded from the Public Service and had, for example, no right to claim pension funds after retirement from service\(^1\). But even those Africans who were within the terms of the Public Services Act, and were graded, found that their salaries were four to five times less than those of whites in the same grade, with the same qualifications, and doing the same job\(^2\). This was also the case in the salary scales of those in the teaching profession: for example, an African school teacher with four years of secondary

\(^1\) Leys, \textit{op. cit.}, p.62.

\(^2\) Franck, \textit{op. cit.}, p.167.
education, plus two years of higher Primary Teacher Certificate (PTH) training, earned between £15 to £20 a month, while his European counterpart earned over £50 to £70 per month\(^1\). Discriminatory wage differentials existed in all the professions.

The refusal of white colonial society to accept educated blacks on equal terms and accord them the same political, economic and social status and recognition, undermined Todd's plan to bring the African middle class into the colonial system and use them to build a multi-racial society. Because they were rejected and discriminated against by the whites, the educated Africans learned to identify themselves with the underprivileged masses and to co-operate with them in opposing the discriminatory and oppressive colonial system. To a large extent, this explains why the early founders and organisers of modern African nationalism, such as Machael Mawema, Leopold Takawira, James Chikerema, Nathan Shamuyarira, Joshua Nkomo, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and the current Prime Minister of what is now Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, were all formally educated people who became incensed by the racial discrimination which existed in Southern Rhodesia. Most of these nationalists were teachers and civil servants who sought to bring about

\(^1\) S/M/S/R/B 1957-60, District Synod Minutes for 1958, WMMS Archives, Box 1957-60.
more changes in the political, economic and social systems than Todd could, through intensive African opposition to the colonial system.

The dilemma for Todd was that, while he agreed with some of the demands of the nationalists for racial equality, as Prime Minister he could not allow himself to be seen by the whites giving way to pressure from them. Moreover, Todd disapproved of some of the more radical demands made by the nationalists such as 'one man, one vote', or universal suffrage, because he thought this would put the government into irresponsible hands and undermine the 'civilised' white standards. But, even if Todd had wanted to meet some of the justified demands, such as the elimination of white monopoly of the higher civil service and other key professional jobs in government and industry; the introduction of equal pay for equal jobs and qualifications; the right of Africans to full membership of trade unions; the abolition of racial segregation; the passing of a law prohibiting discrimination, he was prevented from so doing by the strong opposition of the white colonial society. The whites dominated the electorate, controlled parliament and all the institutions and instruments of power, and would not allow their privileged status and basis of power to be undermined by such radical reforms.

Frustrated by Todd's inability to make sufficiently far reaching reforms, Africans resorted to intense,
political activity against the colonial system which Todd's government represented. In an attempt to prevent radical black nationalism from undermining the colonial system, the 'liberal' Todd resorted to repressive political measures in 1957-58 when he banned the African Democratic Party and the African National Congress and detained some of the nationalists. Todd was now faced with, on the one hand, severe criticism by the Africans for resorting to repression instead of taking decisive political action to redress their grievances and, on the other, mounting European opposition to the reforms he had introduced. The whites held Todd responsible for encouraging African political, economic and social ambitions to rise to an extent where they began to fight the system in order to reach their goals. They believed that each reform that Todd had introduced merely increased African demand for more reform. Moreover, many whites in Southern Rhodesia did not accept Todd's multi-racialism ideal and therefore did not think it was the responsibility of the whites to strive for African advancement since this, after all, threatened their own position.

By 1957, Todd's popularity amongst the whites had fallen sharply. They regarded his policies and reforms

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as a direct attack on white supremacy. His unwillingness to change his multi-racial policies proved politically disastrous for him. While the electorate opposition increased, discontent with his leadership began to mount within his cabinet. Yet, despite clear evidence of orchestrated white opposition building up against him\(^1\), there was little indication by Todd of his intention to reconsider his policies. In fact, he continued to promote them, as was evidenced in the preparations he made to ensure that the Five Year Plan was not interrupted by lack of funds in the eventuality of his being forced out of office. In a telephone message to the Reverend J.H. Lawrence, Chairman of the SRCC and Methodist District Synod in February 1958, he assured missionaries of his commitment to the development of African education. He informed Lawrence that he had made adequate arrangements for funds to continue to be available for African education whatever happened to him in the campaign that was building up against him within the white community and the Party. Lawrence's letter to the Methodist Overseas Secretary explained the content of the message:

> After a cabinet meeting, before the Party congress which voted against him, Garfield Todd telephoned (off the record) that he had taken steps to ensure that whether he

\(^1\) Franck, *op. cit.*, pp.191-193.
remained in power or not, the necessary funds would be available for African education. 1

Towards the end of 1957, it was becoming clear from the extent of European opposition against Todd, that his days as Prime Minister were numbered. Opposition within the cabinet reached a crisis in March 1958 when the Finance Minister, backed by a number of Ministers, rebelled against Todd while he was on holiday, overthrowing him from premiership and party leadership and thus making way for his successor, Edgar Whitehead, whose leadership was endorsed by the Party Congress that year 2.

Before the 1959 General Election, Todd tried to organise a break-away party in order to fight his way back into office. But his past record of 'liberalism' had destroyed his political career and, in that election, Todd's party was completely wiped out and the man who had come to victory with a landslide victory now stood rejected by the electorate 3. Such outright rejection of Todd and his policies and reforms was a

3. By 1959, however, the African electorate had risen to an estimated total of 2,300 from 441 in 1953. This was one of Todd’s major achievements. See Leys, op. cit., p.232.
clear indication of the constraints and limitations confronting a progressive educational reformer operating in a colonial society which opposes change in the nature and policies of the system upon which the security and supremacy of that society depended.

DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION POLICY UNDER WHITEHEAD'S PREMIERSHIP 1958-1962

Edgar Whitehead's attitudes towards multi-racial partnership

In view of the strength of the white anti-liberal reform protest which had ousted Todd from power, there were genuine fears amongst the churches and nationalists that his successor might reverse government educational policy and seek to undo the achievements so far effected in African education\(^1\). There were also fears that the new administration, in an attempt to gain white support, might resort to measures aimed at slowing down the rate of African advancement\(^2\). The rejection of Todd's liberal policies, it was thought, had predetermined the nature of the policy of his successor. But, as will be seen, the new premier did not deviate from his

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1. See Minutes of the Executive Council of the SRCC held in Salisbury on 29th December 1957, IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292.

predecessor's multi-racial policies and maintained his educational policy.

Edgar Whitehead was no stranger to Southern Rhodesian politics and was well acquainted with the conservative character of the country's white society. He had been a member of parliament since 1940\(^1\), and had held ministerial and ambassadorial positions under Huggins. During those years, his experiences of bad race relations and confrontation had convinced him of the need to promote multi-racial partnership. His inclination towards Todd's multi-racialism did not make him initially a favourite leader with the white electorate. In a by-election, at which he was trying to regain his parliamentary seat after a year's diplomatic service in Washington, as a Southern Rhodesian Minister attached to the British Embassy (1957-1958)\(^2\), he was defeated by a candidate of a right wing party - the Dominion Party - led by the racist, Winston Field. Although he soon afterwards led his party to victory in the 1959 General Election, the margin was narrow. His United Federal Party captured 17 out of 30 seats, with the remaining 13 being lost to the Dominion Party which advocated the adoption of policies similar to those pursued under South Africa's apartheid system\(^3\). That narrow victory was indicative

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
of the degree of resentment amongst many whites against any form of liberalism which threatened to undermine the dominance of the European position in Southern Rhodesian society. To some extent, this imposed constraints on how far Whitehead could pursue multi-racialism but, nevertheless, he began his work by introducing some reforms in the economic and social spheres which more than astonished his supporters and aroused strong criticism from the right wing conservatives.

In 1959, Whitehead amended the Land Apportionment Act in favour of urban Africans. This gave them residential rights and, for the first time in colonial history, the right to buy housing property¹. In the same year, he reformed the Industrial Conciliation Act to give Africans trade union rights and the freedom to organise their own registered trade union movements². He also opened apprenticeship training in all industrial sectors to Africans³ (also for the first time in colonial history). These reforms clearly showed that


3. Leys & Bratt (eds.): op.cit., p.100.
Whitehead was committed to multi-racialism and had no intention of undermining any of the reforms and limited progress Todd had effected as steps towards creating a multi-racial partnership. Like his predecessor, Whitehead believed that, to abandon multi-racialism, was to encourage the development of racial tension and a political crisis, both of which became a distinct possibility with the growing strength of African political activity. He saw continual reform as essential to averting such a crisis situation.

**Trends in secondary educational developments under Whitehead**

Whitehead had shown personal interest in Todd's policy on African education since the time it was developed and implemented. He was known to speak favourably of the Five Year Plan and, on assuming office, he assured the missionaries and the African political leaders that there would be no attempt by the government to go back on the Plan.

Whitehead's first step towards promoting his predecessor's Five Year Plan was to seek the advice of the churches on how this could best be done. As a gesture of his government's commitment to the further development of African secondary education, Whitehead agreed to honour the requests made by the SRCC to the DNE before Todd's fall from power, and these comprised:
(a) an increase in capitation grants for primary and secondary education; the provision of grants and students' scholarships to all mission schools on parity (this having been a point of controversy between the larger and the smaller churches); (c) the establishment of more Junior secondary schools and an increase in equipment grants for schools. Whitehead also promised to financially support the establishment of at least one Senior secondary school in every district to provide Cambridge Higher School Certificate courses (HSC), leading to university education. A plan was jointly drawn up by the SRCC and DNE to ensure that, in future, (a) at least 20% of all those pupils who successfully completed their primary education proceeded to secondary education; (b) at least 50% of all those who successfully passed JC were admitted to Senior secondary education (Form III); and (c) places would be provided for:

1. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held at Goromonzi on 29th December 1958, para. 22(4), IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Also see Atkinson, op. cit., p.137.

4. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held at Goromonzi on 29th December 1958, para. 22(1), IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292.

5. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held in Salisbury on 10th November 1959, para. 6(xi), IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292.
all those who at the Cambridge School Certificate examination proved that they had the academic potential to attempt Sixth Form work and thus prepare for university education. 1

Equally significant was the government's agreement to consider the immediate establishment of a college to train African CSC and HSC graduates for teaching in secondary schools. This was regarded as of vital importance if adequate trained teachers were to be made available for the rapidly increasing number of Junior secondary schools2. However, an even more important innovation was to be the establishment of an African technical college which would provide training in trades similar to those provided in European schools3.

The SRCC welcomed the government's readiness to co-operate in promoting secondary educational work, especially in the face of white opposition to any further commitment of state funds to African education. After the 1959 meeting of the DNE and the SRCC, the new Director of the DNE, Mr. H.C. Finkle, approved a record expenditure on African education - £90,000 a year - to be spent on the development of primary schools, and

1. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held in Salisbury on 10th November 1959, para. 6(xi), IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292. Also see Report of the Secretary for African Education for the Year 1965, p.19.


3. Ibid.
this was to be over and above the regular grants. This was intended to increase provision, especially at the upper primary level.

The government wanted at least 60 new primary schools to be established each year until the end of the Five Year Plan, with the objective of enabling more African children to acquire primary education and thereafter proceed to secondary education.

Further grants were made to secondary education: over and above the £20,000 capitation grants made to each secondary school by Todd, a further £160,000 total grant was approved by Whitehead for further expansion of Junior secondary education and the improvement of school equipment.

Whitehead’s policy led to further expansion of secondary education by the churches. The Anglicans established a girls’ secondary school at St. David’s Bonda Mission in 1959. Apart from government grants, this school also received considerable aid of up to £30,000 from the SPG Board, the Beit Trustees and some locally based multi-national companies which took a

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
great interest in the development of African girls' education. Another Anglican secondary school for boys was founded at St. Mary's Mission in the Hunyani district of North Eastern Mashonaland. This school also received aid from the government and, in addition, £3,000 from the health department for the installation of a water supply system. The SPG Board, the Mashonaland diocese of the church, and some banking companies contributed a further £10,000. A third school for girls came under construction at Nyamandlovu in the Gwaii district of Matebeleland in 1961, but not due to open till 1964.

A second attempt at non-racial secondary education was made at St. Stephen's College at Balla Balla in Matebeleland, at an estimated cost of £150,000. The school was founded on similar lines to English public schools and was intended to provide first rate

1. SPG.Mash/D/C/TF.37, Finance File 1960-65, Budget Form (B), para. 14, SPG Archives.
3. Ibid.
5. SPG.Mateb/D/C/TF.262, General File, Bishop of Matebeleland to SPG Overseas Secretary, 27th September 1960, SPG Archives.
educational facilities and a complete six year secondary education. Financial contributions came from the government, which gave £20,000, while the Dulverton Trust in England contributed £15,000, and considerably more contributions from various business companies.  

However, when the school commenced in 1959, the extraordinarily high fees of £270 p.a. per student kept Africans out. Even those from prosperous families did not apply for admission. For most Africans, this fee was beyond their means, especially when an equally good education could be obtained at low fee paying schools. Consequently no African student was enrolled in 1959 - all the 40 Form I students were European.

Similarly, in 1960, 1961 and 1962, not a single African enrolled. A letter from the school principal to the SPG Board in 1960 indicated that the school board was being kept under constant pressure by European Anglican and non-Anglican parents to maintain the high fees in order to keep out Africans. In fact, the school never became non-racial.

1. SPG.Mateb/D/C/TF.262, General File, Lord Arch. Bishop of Central Africa to SPG Overseas Secretary, 4th October 1960, SPG Archives.
2. Ibid.
3. SPG.Mateb/D/C/TF.262, General File, Bishop of Matebeleland to SPG Overseas Secretary, 27th November 1960, SPG Archives.
4. Ibid.
The Anglicans were criticised by their African congregation and nationalists for not being genuinely interested in promoting non-racial education. Proper conditions for non-racial education did not exist at the school: high fees discriminated against the Africans, the school admission committee consisted mainly of European parents and teachers, and the school Board of Governors was wholly white\(^1\). Also, the school's policy of close collaboration with European parents was seen as a reflection of the church's own support for racial segregation\(^2\).

The Methodists started a second secondary school at Moleli Mission in the Makwiro district of Mashonaland in 1961\(^3\), with the aid of £10,000 from their overseas board in addition to government capitation grants. Plans were also completed for the establishment of three more schools in 1964, 1965 and 1966 at Woddilove, Sandringham, near Salisbury, and Kwenda Mission\(^4\). Many other denominational schools were also established in

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2. Ibid.


4. Ibid.
between 1960 and 1963, particularly by the Roman Catholic societies.

Also in the period 1960-63, the government embarked on establishing a series of new secondary schools of its own. A second school was opened in Salisbury in 1961. Another was set up in the Mzingwane township in Bulawayo and others at Mlezu, outside Bulawayo, and in the Ascot township of Gwelo. In all, by the end of 1962, there were 39 African schools run by 16 mission churches and 10 which were run by the government, bringing the total to 49 with the following enrolments:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Form I</th>
<th>Form II</th>
<th>Form III</th>
<th>Form IV</th>
<th>Form Lr.VI</th>
<th>Form Up.VI</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>B</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>G</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>American Board</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chikore</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Silinda</td>
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<td>58</td>
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From the point of view of the objectives of the Five Year Plan, the establishment of such a large network of secondary schools was indeed a significant achievement by both the governments of Todd and Whitehead and the mission churches, and went a long way to bringing secondary education within the reach of Africans. But the basic problem of school leaver unemployment which had confronted Todd's administration remained unresolved. In fact the problem grew more serious with the expansion of
secondary education facilities as this meant that more Africans were leaving school with formal qualifications and finding no adequate employment opportunities in the urban and industrial areas.

Another reason which contributed to the growing problem of school leaver unemployment was the lack of a concerted policy with regard to rural development, a policy which was necessary to create jobs for school leavers in the rural areas. A political reality of the Southern Rhodesian colonial situation was the fact that Africans were required under the Land Apportionment Act, and the separate racial development policy (neither of which Todd nor Whitehead were able to repeal) to live and work in their own areas away from white urban and industrial areas and, thus, these were the only areas open to them for development. Only those Africans required by European employers in the various industrial sectors were welcome in white areas. Of these, few were formally educated. Moreover, very few white employers wanted to engage a large educated African labour force because, apart from the fact that such Africans threatened white job security, their labour was costly. The vast majority of Africans employed in European industries had little formal education and were unskilled and preference was given to them over educated Africans as they provided cheap labour for various forms of unskilled and non-professional jobs.
A study conducted by H.W. Roberts revealed that, in 1962, of the 6,646 African workers in the manufacturing industries in Salisbury whose educational qualifications were known, only 2.2% had Junior secondary education, 0.4% (31 persons) had CSC and only 13 had HSC. In the processing industries, only 0.8% had JC, 0.3% (21 persons) had CSC and none at all had HSC¹. The less educated Africans comprised the bulk of the labour force: for example, in the manufacturing industries, 24% of the given labour force had less than two years of formal primary schooling, 10% had up to Standard II, 22.4% up to Standard III and 41% to Standard VI. In the processing industries, 41.9% of the given labour force had less than two years of formal primary schooling, 23% had up to Standard II, 27% to Standard III and 7% to Standard VI².

It is quite clear from these figures that very few African secondary school graduates were in employment in the main urban industries. The figures were even less in the smaller towns³. Thus, the majority of secondary school graduates were unemployed.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Skilled jobs were made all the more difficult for African secondary school graduates to obtain because, in many cases, white employers did not want to apprentice Africans. The legislation passed by parliament in 1959, at the insistence of Whitehead, did not alter European resentment against taking Africans for training. To illustrate the level of discrimination against the apprenticing of Africans in the various industries, records of secondary school graduates in apprenticeship training in major industries throughout the country for 1962 show that, out of 436 apprentices, only 10 were Africans. Similar records for 1963 show that, out of 317 apprentices, only nine were Africans. This phenomenon is illustrated further in the following table:

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2. Ibid.
As can be seen, African apprentices were substantially outnumbered by whites in every industry, with the result that the majority of secondary school graduates had little opportunity for training for skilled jobs. Employment figures for 1962 showed that, in the mining industry, 70% of the African labour force had no formal apprenticeship skills and 22% were semi-skilled. Only 8% were in staff jobs. In the manufacturing industries, 87% were unskilled, 10% were semi-skilled, 3% were skilled and none were in staff jobs¹.

Another factor which put some apprenticeship courses such as engineering and mining out of reach of most African secondary school leavers were the qualifications required for entry. After apprenticeship of Africans was legalised in 1959, these industries deliberately raised qualification requirements by demanding the combination of CSC physical science subjects (such as physics, chemistry and mathematics) which was not yet offered in most mission African schools². In other cases, HSC qualifications were required and this excluded many applicants as few Africans had yet attained that level of education, facilities for HSC courses being very limited. Until 1965, only Goromonzi

¹ Roberts: *op. cit.*, p.22.
² Relevant Information of the SRCC Meeting held at Bulawayo in 1960, p.7, IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292.
and Fletcher government schools offered HSC courses. Most of the secondary educational development was taking place at the JC and CSC levels because the costs of setting up HSC courses were considered by the churches to be too high. The priority had been to expand the lower Forms and, therefore, few students had been able to obtain 'A' level qualifications.

The unavailability of adequate employment opportunities and on the job training facilities for African school leavers resulted in most secondary school graduates opting for the teaching profession which provided relatively more jobs than the other professions. In 1962, the 18 mission schools providing higher teacher training courses for Africans with two years of secondary education had a total of 800 trainees in the first and second years of training\(^1\). But, as competition for training increased with the growing number of Junior and Senior secondary school graduates passing from schools each year, the yearly average intake of 450 teacher trainees became too small\(^2\).

The government attempted to provide some solution to the school leaver unemployment problem by

\(^1\) Report of the Director of Native Education for the Year 1962, p.15.

\(^2\) Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held at Salisbury on 15th December 1962, IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292.
establishing, in 1961, a college of technical education for African school graduates with two or four years of secondary education. The Luveve Technical School was set up in the African township of Bulawayo to provide training in urban trades such as motor engineering, plumbing, metal work, painting, brick-laying, radio electronics, etc.\textsuperscript{1}. The government hoped that these courses would enable those who received the training to find jobs in industry more readily. The college evoked an excited response from school leavers all over the country but, in fact, it only operated for two years. In 1964, the right wing Rhodesia Front Party government closed the college down on the grounds that apprenticeship had become non-racial and therefore the college was no longer needed.

Even if the college had continued to function successfully, it is unlikely that the job prospects of those who graduated from it would have been any better, given the high level of European resentment against employing skilled blacks\textsuperscript{2}. Moreover, the policy of training African students solely for urban employment was fundamentally defective in two respects. Firstly, it

\textsuperscript{1} Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the SRCC held at Salisbury on 15th December 1962, IMC/CBMS Archives, Box 292.

\textsuperscript{2} Austin: \textit{op. cit.}, p.49.
ignored the limited employment opportunities available for Africans in urban industries. Secondly, it overtly encouraged African school leavers to believe that the towns could meet their employment needs. This deceptive notion was reinforced by the lack of a government policy for the rural development and industrialisation necessary to provide jobs for school leavers in those areas where their services were most needed. In the absence of such a policy, the problem of school leaver unemployment remained unresolved and inevitably worsened.

The socio-political implications of Whitehead's policy

Whitehead's continuation of Todd's educational policy increased the provisions for secondary education for Africans but, at the same time, it also increased the problem of school leaver unemployment as more students passed from school. This created serious socio-political problems for the government as frustration from lack of jobs and security built up amongst both school leavers and their parents. This frustration and anger was directed at the colonial system which failed to provide adequate opportunities for socio-economic and political advancement which Africans had hoped to acquire on gaining educational qualifications. Discontent with the colonial system was fuelled by the high level of political activity existing at this time under the leadership of the
nationalist Joshua Nkomo. The political repression exercised by Whitehead to control African political activity\(^1\), racial discrimination practised by the whites against both the educated and uneducated Africans and the effects of widespread unemployment, these and a variety of other factors culminated in serious social and political violence which engulfed almost all the cities and towns in the country between 1960 and 1963\(^2\).

Throughout this time of violent uprising, which ended with the banning of all African political activity and the detention of nationalist leaders, African anger and frustration was vented not only against the white political system and institutions but also against colonial education, as was evidenced by the regular attacks involving the stoning and burning down of government and missionary educational institutions\(^3\).

Whitehead attempted to respond to the problem of African school leaver unemployment when, in 1962, he set up an education commission of inquiry to investigate, among other things, the possibility of making African

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2. Barber, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.141-143.

secondary education more oriented towards rural employment and development programmes which the government intended to initiate. The commission, chaired by Professor A.V. Judges, produced a report which became the basis of future government policy. The report recommended the creation of a second system of secondary education to specialise in vocational education and in this way provide secondary school pupils with skills related to rural trades and development needs\textsuperscript{1}.

However, Whitehead's government did not have sufficient time to study the report and implement its recommendations before the December 1962 General Election. By 1962, the limited reforms Whitehead had implemented in industrial relations giving Africans trade union rights, the right of access to apprenticeship training and professional jobs and in education, evoked considerable white opposition against his government. Fear of the effects of these reforms and black nationalism on European political economic security, led to a campaign by extreme right wing whites who advocated the overthrow of Whitehead's government, the halting of all reforms and the restoration and preservation of eternal white supremacy in every sphere of life.

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Report of the Southern Rhodesia Education Commission 1962} (Govt. Printer, Salisbury, 1963), paras. 427-430.
In the 1962 General Election, an extreme right wing Rhodesia Front party led by Winston Field, who had led the Dominion party at the 1959 General Election, decisively defeated Whitehead. This defeat underlined the limitation on how far any white government could go in reforming any aspect of the colonial system without antagonising the white electorate, which was essentially conservative.

Whitehead found himself in the same position as Todd had when he fell from power. On the one hand, he was being criticised and attacked by Africans for not going far enough in his reforms and in creating a multi-racial society. On the other, he was being criticised and penalised by the whites for having gone too far in his pursuit of multi-racialism and in the reforms he had initiated. As Zvobgo points out, Whitehead's fall from power was due to the fact that he had pursued two conflicting political ideals: one represented a multi-racial partnership, and the other, preservation of white supremacy. He continued to sit astride these two stools and ultimately fell between them.¹

The defeat of Whitehead represented a triumph for the 'right' and, as Barber observed, the rise of the

extreme conservatives to power changed completely the future course of Rhodesian colonial history. It led, in terms of education, to dramatic changes in government and missionary policies on the administration and organisation of secondary education.

This chapter has discussed the development of state and church policies on African secondary education under Todd's and Whitehead's administrations. It examined the impact of educational policy reform on secondary educational development and on African political, economic and social advancement. Also considered were the scope, limitations and implications of educational reform in a colonial society.

In the next chapter it is intended to investigate, in the light of the rejection of multi-racial partnership by the whites, the exact nature of the changes which occurred in government and missionary policies on African secondary education, its administration and organisation.

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1. See Barber, *op. cit.*, pp.147-168.
CHAPTER 4

CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT AND MISSIONARY POLICIES,
ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN
SECONDARY EDUCATION 1963 - 1971

In Chapter 3 the attempts at educational reform under the regimes of Todd and Whitehead were discussed, together with their achievements, limitations and implications for secondary educational development and African socio-economic and political development. In this chapter are examined the changes in government and missionary policies and the administration and organisation of African secondary education under the Rhodesia Front (RF) government. The intention is to try to explain these changes in the context of the RF government's ideology of separate racial development which replaced the multi-racialism of Todd and Whitehead and changed the direction of the politics of the colony. Particular attention is paid to ascertaining the exact nature of those changes which occurred in the policies on secondary education, its administration and organisation, and to assessing their overall implications for the development of African secondary education itself.

Part I takes a close look at the transition from Whitehead's form of multi-racialism to the racial policies of RF government and the significance is noted of the
major influence which RF political ideology had on the framework for secondary educational policy.

In Part II the changes which took place in the organisation and administration of African secondary education are examined in the light of the government's concept of African community development policy.

Part III deals with the changes in secondary educational policies under the 1966 New Plan for African education which was formulated by the RF government. This discussion falls into two sections, the first of which examines the introduction of vocational secondary education for Africans and the rationale behind it, special attention being paid to determining the exact nature of this education, student and parental perception of it and its acceptability or otherwise in terms of employment and social status. The second section investigates the implications of the changes in educational policy for the development of academic secondary education.

Part IV deals with the availability or otherwise of opportunities for higher education for African secondary school graduates at the local university and concludes with a brief examination of employment prospects for African secondary school and university graduates.
PART I

THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE RHODESIA FRONT PARTY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL POLICY

The coming to power of the Rhodesia Front Party at the 1962 General Election marked the return to a system of rigid racial segregation and separate racial development, just as had existed under Huggins' regime.

The RF Party was formed in 1960 by D.W. Lardner Burke, M.M. Patridge, W. Howman and other extreme right wing whites strongly influenced by Afrikaner thinking. Their main objectives were to unite whites against the 'liberal' policies and reforms of Whitehead's government which they regarded as having seriously undermined white supremacy; form a front against the growing strength of African nationalism which threatened to overthrow white rule (as had occurred in Ghana in 1957); and re-establish white supremacy.

Winston Field, the man chosen to lead the Party had been the leader of the Conservative Dominion Party in the 1950s and his strong opposition to any liberalisation of racial policies was well known. He came to power fully determined to implement the Rhodesia Front Party's racial political ideology.

The Party's political ideology was clearly defined in its constitution and the most important aspects of this
constitution were (a) to ensure that the government of Southern Rhodesia would remain in responsible hands¹; (b) to uphold the right of each community in Southern Rhodesia to preserve its own identity, traditions and customs, while giving undivided loyalty to the country²; (c) to uphold the principles of the Land Apportionment Act³; (d) to oppose compulsory racial integration and to uphold the right of government at all levels to provide separate facilities and amenities for the various racial groups to enable them to preserve their customs and ways of life⁴; and (e) to ensure permanent establishment of the European in Southern Rhodesia⁵.

As is clearly evident from the RF constitution, its racial ideology was at variance with the form of multi-racial partnership that Todd and Whitehead had attempted to promote in Southern Rhodesia. The policy of maintaining a racially divided society, as emphasised in the constitution, provided the framework for all government

2. Ibid., para. 2.
3. Ibid., para. 5.
4. Ibid., para. 6.
5. Ibid., para. 11.
policies - political, economic, social and educational.

The return to racial oriented politics was seen by the RF to be imperative, especially after the break up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963. Nyasaland became independent in that year to become Malawi, with Northern Rhodesia following suit in 1964 to become Zambia. The whites in Southern Rhodesia were therefore alarmed and frightened by the possibility of black majority rule coming into effect in that colony. The refusal of the British government to grant the whites the independence they were demanding led them to adopt a defensive position by implementing repressive and racist policies.

From 1963, the RF government began to organise the country's political, economic and social systems into line with the objectives of the Party's ideology. Of the changes made, one of the most significant was the restructuring of the system of government, which appeared to separate African affairs and administration from the central government, to a system of local government.


(tribal councils) run by Africans on a tribal communal basis. Under this system, a significant proportion of the administrative and financial responsibility for African primary and secondary education, together with all aspects of African rural development and social welfare services, was placed under local governments while the central government retained overall political control. Responsibility for European administration, education, welfare services and development was retained by the central government.

Although tribal councils had been in existence since the 1940s, they were revived by the RF government to serve as the media through which implementation of its policy of rigid separate racial development and provincialisation could be carried out. Ian Smith, who took over the leadership of the RF Party in 1964 and became Prime Minister, referred to the new system of African 'self government' as a form of community development similar to that which existed in South Africa under the apartheid system. He defined the RF version of Community Development (CD) as:

2. Ibid.
the process by which people of each community are given responsibility for their own development through communal organisation, formally and informally, for democratic planning and action. 1

Under this system, local African communities were to be responsible for their own plans for development with maximum reliance upon resources found within their own areas supplemented occasionally with aid from the central government and other agents outside the communities. They were to be responsible for all programmes of rural uplift, including land and agricultural development, industrialisation and communications. They were also to be responsible for establishing and maintaining social welfare services such as health and education. But the tribal councils, under which African communities were organised, did not have resources with which to undertake such programmes.

Traditional CD in Africa has grave limitations in that it often asks the poor to solve their own problems and frequently the major problems such people have to deal with are not local in origin but are due to external factors arising directly from the nature of the central socio-economic structure. The local communities of poor people have neither the economic resources nor the political power with which to carry out rural development programmes and resolve their many problems and all that CD achieves in such cases is to shift the burden and

1. Quoted in Mlambo, op. cit., p.56.
blame for failure to solve complex problems onto the poor.¹

In Southern Rhodesia, the CD proposed by the RF had far more grave limitations and implications for African political, economic and social development since it was perverted and racist in its objectives. In the first instance, it was a way of denying Africans access to the abundant resources in the European areas and the central government treasury. Such a measure was intended by the RF to ensure the availability of maximum resources for European development. Secondly, CD was a method of implementing the government's ideology of separate racial development. Thirdly, it was a means of ridding the central government of the responsibility for African development, thereby sanctioning the existence of poverty in African society which did not have the necessary resources to cope with the numerous problems of rural underdevelopment created by decades of colonial capitalist exploitation of the resources they originally possessed. The RF government's CD policy was also racist in the sense that it

did not apply to Europeans. Responsibility for their overall welfare and development remained under the central government. Therefore, the RF's version of CD institutionalised separate racial development and had grave implications for overall African development.

The CD policy provided the framework for the government's educational policy which missionaries were forced to adopt and formed the basis upon which the structure and administration of African secondary education was re-organised. The aim was to re-orientate the purpose and objectives of African secondary education into line with those of the political ideology of the RF.

**PART II**

**RE-ORGANISATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF AFRICAN EDUCATION 1963 - 1965**

The RF government's plan for African education under its brand of CD envisaged, firstly, the complete transfer of the responsibility for the development and administration of primary education from the churches to African local councils, with the objective of making people in each rural district develop their own education in terms of their priorities for development. The

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1. SPG.Mash/D/C/TF.265, Cecil Mashonaland to Canon Kingsworth, 11th March 1963, SPG Archives.
councils were required to raise most of the money they needed to run primary education from local and other sources outside the community\(^1\). In addition to the funds they could raise themselves, the councils were to receive supplementary grants from the central government. Those churches which were unwilling to hand over their rural primary schools to local councils were allowed to maintain and operate them but only on behalf of the community. However, in such cases, government grants or any other form of assistance provided for the schools would no longer be given directly to the missionaries but would instead be channelled through the local councils which would determine how missionaries could use them\(^2\).

Under the administrative changes, after 1967 no church would be allowed to open new primary schools in rural areas: only local councils could do so. However, the independence of local councils in determining primary educational development was restricted in one important area - they could not determine curricula.


2. Ibid., para. 7.
The decision on what was to be taught and how it was to be taught was entirely in the hands of the Central Ministry of Education.\(^1\)

Central government control of the curricula undermined and contradicted the very basis of the independence of local councils in determining their own affairs and making their own decisions. The reason why the central government kept control of the curricula was quite simply to ensure that curricula content and the overall objectives of African education did not conflict with the aims of government policies.

At the secondary education level, a major innovation was introduced, partly in response to the recommendations of the 1962 Judges' Commission Report and partly as an element of overall government strategy which had as its objective the implementation of separate racial development. In future there were to be two different systems of African secondary education: (1) academic secondary education (referred to as the F1 system), which was to remain under the joint responsibility of the government and the missionaries as in the past and (2) Junior vocational secondary education (referred to as the F2

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1. Comment on the Speech by the Minister for African Education, Mr. Howman, to the Central Advisory Board on Wednesday, May 8th 1963, Mateb/Education Minutes, File 97-F, 1960-63, para. 6, Council for World Missions Archives.
system), which was designed to train those pupils not admitted to the F1 system in rural and urban industrial trades and to provide them with the skills required for rural and urban development. This system, which required F2 school graduates to seek work in their respective communities, was intended in part to resolve the problem of urban school leaver unemployment and to promote the ideals of the separate racial development policy.

The right to undertake F2 vocational secondary education was given to any agency capable of carrying it out. Missionaries, African councils and industrial companies were all encouraged by the central government to participate in the development of the scheme and were to receive some aid from the government for that purpose.

The RF government plan for African education came under strong criticism by most missionaries, African school teachers and parents. From the churches' point of view, such a plan struck at the heart of their educational work and threatened to disrupt the comprehensive system of primary education they had built up over the past 70 years. Taking into account the economic position of rural Africans, there was very little evidence to show that they would be able to maintain and develop such an expensive and complex system
of education with the limited financial and manpower resources available to them. The churches feared that the implementation of this plan would lead to the closure of many schools\(^1\), and they therefore resolved to urge the government to postpone the enforcement of the plan until a comprehensive discussion of its implications had taken place. The SRCC Executive met the Education Minister in 1964 in an attempt to impress upon the government to delay the introduction of the plan but to no avail\(^2\). A further unsuccessful attempt to prevail upon the government was made by the Methodist Synod \(^3\). The government refused to negotiate the plan with the churches and was prepared to apply political pressure to those churches which refused to co-operate with its policy\(^4\).

The African Teachers' Association also mounted a campaign amongst parents in an attempt to enlighten them as to the exact nature of the responsibility being thrust on them by the government. One of the aims of the

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4. Ibid.
campaign was to get the local councils to reject the responsibility for primary education by virtue of the fact that they had no resources with which to run it\textsuperscript{1}. The campaign succeeded in mobilising considerable parental opposition to the government policy but failed to deter the government, in any way, from carrying out its plans. By 1967, the transfer of all rural primary schools from missionary churches to local government was to be completed and, after that date, no church was to be allowed to engage in primary educational work except on behalf of the local communities.

The nature of local governments and the structure of educational administration

In 1964, there were 56 African local councils in existence throughout the whole of the country\textsuperscript{2}. Each council was organised under the titular headship of the tribal chief who was assisted by a host of other personnel, including the Chairman of the Council, the Secretary and his Deputy, the Treasurer and a European District Commissioner who was the overall Chairman of each council in his district. These officials constituted the Council Executive which was responsible

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1. S/M/S/R/B 1964-66 District Synod Minutes for 1964, Central Advisory Board Report, para. 8, WMMS Archives.
  \item 2. Weinrich, \textit{op. cit.}, p.25.
\end{itemize}
for running the affairs of the community it represented including organising community development programmes such as land agricultural development, and maintaining social welfare services, i.e. health and education.

Each local council had an education committee which took over from the churches the organisation and development of primary education and also had charge of the new F2 vocational secondary school system. This committee was also under the titular authority of the tribal chief but the actual management and organisation of education was carried out by the council secretary who also employed the teachers and paid their salaries from the funds sent to him by central government for that purpose. It was also the council secretary who collected school fees from pupils and who was responsible for the overall maintenance of the schools. Where new schools were needed, it was his duty to make the necessary recommendations to the district commissioner through the chief.

The secretary was assisted by a schools supervisor who, under the previous administrative system, functioned as the schools manager, and it was his duty to supervise


classroom work. Above the schools supervisor was the education officer who was appointed by the government to co-ordinate the work of education secretaries of the various district councils and that of the schools supervisors\(^1\). Right at the top of the educational hierarchy was the Provincial Educational Officer whose task it was to co-ordinate the work of the supervisors and education officers throughout his province. He alone could give the final approval for the establishment of new primary and F2 secondary schools and this was an indication of the strength of central government control over the way local governments conducted their affairs. Moreover, it was the Provincial Education Officer who had the power to determine local government educational policy and curricula\(^2\) or even to reject plans drawn up by local councils for educational development if he felt that their objectives were in conflict with the overall central government political, economic and social strategy for the implementation of its policy of separate racial development\(^3\).

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3. Ibid.
Fig. 4.1: Summary of the administrative hierarchy of educational personnel under local governments

PROVINCIAL EDUCATION OFFICER
(co-ordinates the work of Educational Officers and Supervisors)

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EDUCATIONAL OFFICERS
(co-ordinates the work of Secretaries and Supervisors)

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SUPERVISOR OF SCHOOLS
(principally supervises classroom work)

↓

DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
(overall chairman of every council in his district - scrutinises all development programmes)

↓

COUNCIL SECRETARY
(runs the education system in each district on behalf of the chief)

↓

CHIEF
(Head of local government)
As can be seen from Fig. 4.1, the position of the Chief and his African Council Secretary in the educational hierarchy reveals their limited power in the overall administration and organisation of African education. If effective decentralisation had been intended, the Chief and the Council, together with members of the whole community, would have been placed in a position of much greater political authority. The hierarchical structure, however, reveals the illogical nature of a system of decentralisation in which Africans overtly were given responsibility for rural and community development, when in fact they were without either power or sufficient economic resources. The central government had thus, in fact, shifted on to the poor African local communities responsibility for the financial burden for community development. Faced with few resources to implement a development programme, the local communities could make little progress and the government were quick to grasp the opportunity, firstly, to blame the lack of effective and rural development on the African people themselves and, secondly, to reinforce the internalisation of the racist concept of black inferiority amongst both blacks and whites.
PART III

CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POLICY ON SECONDARY EDUCATION

1966 - 1971: IMPLICATIONS FOR MISSIONARY POLICIES

AND SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The 1966 New Education Plan and its implications

The foregoing discussion has investigated the nature of the changes introduced by the RF government in the administration and organisation of African education and the administrative machinery under which the new F2 vocational secondary education was to develop. It is now proposed to examine the changes in government and missionary policies on secondary education under the 1966 New Plan for African education which was announced in the Rhodesian parliament by the Education Minister in 1966. The implications of these changes for the development of secondary education will also be studied.

As pointed out earlier, the most significant aspect of the RF government policy was the creation of a dual system of secondary education comprising F1 (academic) and F2 (vocational) systems. It is now the intention to examine the exact nature of the changes in policy and their implications for the development of the two systems of secondary education.

Soon after declaring unilateral independence from Britain in 1965\(^1\), the RF government began to implement

\[1\] See Barber, op. cit., pp.295-305 and Loney, op. cit., pp.146-151.
its separate racial development policy much more intensively as the colony's politics moved closer to the South African apartheid system. In the pursuit of their objective, the government announced radical changes in the overall secondary educational policy in 1966. Under the new policy, referred to as the New Plan for African Education, in future, only 12\% of all African children passing from primary school each year would be allowed to proceed to F1 academic secondary education\(^1\). This figure was arrived at by the Education Ministry through a controversial study, which had been conducted by the Department of Education of the University of Rhodesia, to determine the proportion of African primary school graduates capable of coping with the rigours of academic secondary education successfully\(^2\). The Ministry readily adopted the figure of 12\% because it was convenient from the point of view of the overall government strategy to divert a large section of African school leavers from academic to non-academic education. In addition, such a figure helped to justify the government's plan to reduce its expenditure on African secondary education.

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In practice, the 12½% who were to be allowed to proceed to F1 education had to obtain a minimum of 75% marks average in Standard 6 English, Arithmetic and General Knowledge examination. Even if more than 12½% of those who took the Standard 6 examination obtained the necessary 75% average, the F1 secondary schools were only allowed to accommodate the stipulated 12½%.¹

With regard to the new F2 Junior vocational secondary schools, 37½% of all primary school leavers were allowed to attend these schools to receive industrial training² in trades considered relevant to their rural or urban environment and needs for development. The remaining 50% of all those who successfully completed primary schooling were left with no access whatsoever to any form of post primary education within the formal school system, contrary to previous practice when it was possible for those who failed to gain entry to secondary school in any one year to re-apply for admission the following year. This 50% were encouraged to undertake private studies⁴.

² Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education for the Year 1966, p.3.
³ Ibid.
Equally drastic were the changes in the government's financial policy towards overall African education which reduced government educational expenditure from 8.6% of the Gross National Product (GNP) in 1965 to 2% in 1967. The cuts were even more severe in primary education which had previously enjoyed 70% of the total education budget but lost much of its allowance on transfer to African local councils.

In deciding on these policy changes, whereas it had been the practice in the past to consult the churches, the RF government showed little interest in seeking the approval of the churches. Indeed, the Education Ministry made policies and decisions which were in accordance with overall government policies and implemented them with or without missionary approval. Thus, the policy-making machinery was fully under government control.

Church response to this lack of consultation by the government was reflected in a deep resentment. The proportion of students allowed to proceed from primary to either F1 or F2 schools was a matter which provoked strong disapproval of government policy.


The churches felt that they should have been given sufficient scope to use their own discretion on admission limits to their schools depending on the particular circumstances with which they had to deal. For example, if in a particular year, Standard 6 results were exceptionally good, the churches wanted all those pupils who merited admission to F1 schools to be allowed to avail themselves of the opportunity and not to be barred by an arbitrarily imposed ceiling.

Also, the decision by the government to leave 50% of primary school leavers with no opportunity at all for further education was regarded by the churches as wrong and bound to have disastrous consequences for the advancement of many Africans. It was felt by almost all the churches that the new policy would cause more frustration amongst Africans and further increase racial tension. But the churches were only too aware of how little they could influence government policy, unlike before when they were actively involved in policy.


2. Ibid. Also see SPG/Mash./D/C/TF.267, 1960-77 File, Secretary for Mashonaland Diocese to Rev. Canon Kingsworth, 22nd September 1966, SPG Archives.
and decision-making processes. The practice of mutual co-operation between state and church no longer existed. In fact, the government went so far as to warn that those churches which refused to co-operate with its policies could face political recriminations or penalties.

Implementation of the 1966 New Educational Plan:
Development of F2 Junior vocational secondary education 1966-1971

Vocational education is not necessarily inferior to academic education and current debate on educational reform in developing countries has emphasised the need to reorient curricula to meet the specific development requirements of the countries concerned. As the limitations of academic education in terms of employment, together with its lack of relevance to these development needs, has become more apparent (particularly with regard to the high levels of the educated unemployed and rural underdevelopment), so has an awareness of the need to encourage vocational technical education.


Such awareness unfortunately is not often matched by a determination to develop more appropriate rural development strategies as such a move would be likely to threaten the position of those currently benefiting from existing socio-economic structures, and those who benefit are usually the ones with high academic qualifications. In Southern Rhodesia, it was the settler government which did not want to encourage effective rural development, since a rapid improvement in the African socio-economic position was regarded as a threat to the political, economic and social security of the white settler community.

The problem of school leaver unemployment and rural underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia had been of major concern since the 1950s both to Africans and to previous governments. In these circumstances it would seem reasonable to suppose that the RF government's policies on F2 vocational secondary education and rural development would have been welcome to Africans, aimed as they were at solving these problems. But, on the contrary, strong opposition to the government's policies emerged from pupils, parents, teachers and even some missionaries. The reasons for this negative response, particularly to the policy on F2 vocational training, require explanation and, to assist in finding this explanation, it is necessary to discuss the nature of F2 Junior secondary education.
(a) The nature of vocational secondary education and the rationale behind its implementation

Vocational secondary education was developed by the RF government to serve two basic functions. Firstly, it facilitated the implementation of separate racial development by training 37½% of the yearly primary school output of African pupils in trades and professions which would enable them to work and live in the areas designated for them under the Land Apportionment Act away from whites. Secondly, it was intended to provide a partial solution to the problem of urban school leaver unemployment. By directing a greater proportion of pupils who were allowed to proceed beyond primary education away from academic education and into vocational training, it was hoped that many African school leavers could be prepared for rural employment. An important distinction was made, however, between the types of skills and trades which were taught to rural and urban African pupils in the F2 schools as consideration was given to the skills most suited to their respective environments.

Rural pupils were to be trained in such trades and professions as farming and agriculture, basket weaving,

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carpentry and building. These were the trades to be taught to boys whereas, in the case of girls, they were to be trained in dressmaking, cookery and other domestic science subjects. The selection of courses for rural pupils was based on the rationale that they provided training in those skills most needed for rural and community development programmes. It was also presumed that, under the community development scheme, local councils would develop those rural industries which would most readily provide employment for the graduates from the F2 schools. Another presumption was that the councils would be able to provide graduates with loans to enable them to launch their own self-employment programmes.

Such presumptions ignored the economic constraints with which the local councils were faced. They did not have adequate sources of income for their various community and rural development programmes which included the construction of roads and bridges, clinics and first aid posts, water supply systems and cattle dipping tanks and the promotion of animal husbandry schemes, the development of agricultural land and the running of primary education. To fund their programmes, they had

to depend largely on loans obtained from the central government. The only local sources of income open to the councils were profits from the sale of beer in council beer halls and taxes levied on the adult males in the community. Between 1962 and 1967 the revenue raised from such sources by 76 local councils rose from £124,726 to just £438,684\(^1\), a sum which was inadequate to maintain the basic social welfare services let alone provide funds for development projects. Faced with these financial constraints, the councils were in no position to initiate the industrial development necessary to provide F2 school graduates with employment. For the same reasons, they were unable to provide loans to individual graduates to enable them to start self-employment schemes. In the absence of adequate grants from the central government, local councils found themselves quite unable to develop their communities adequately.

In the given circumstances, parents became aware that those children who undertook vocational secondary education would become disadvantaged in a number of ways. Firstly, they would be unlikely to find employment in the rural areas. Secondly, they would find it very difficult to obtain jobs in towns because their training

\(^1\) Weinrich, \textit{op. cit.}, p.26.
and trades were designed for rural employment. Thirdly, they would be unable to enter administrative or clerical jobs in urban areas because they lacked academic qualifications\(^1\). Parents were therefore unwilling to send their children to F2 schools as they were of the opinion that an unemployed F1 school graduate was better off than an F2 graduate because his prospects of employment were higher\(^2\).

Urban children, on the other hand, were trained in the trades which were in demand in the existing urban industries. These included motor mechanics, book-keeping, secretarial courses, typing and shorthand, upholstery, plumbing, tailoring and leatherwork\(^3\). Thus, urban children who graduated from urban F2 schools had an advantage over their rural counterparts in that a significant proportion of them did succeed in finding employment, for the most part in industries in the smaller towns such as Gwelo, Que-Que and Gatooma where rapid industrial expansion was taking place\(^4\).

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2. Ibid.


Overall, however, F2 school graduates from both the rural and the urban schools were more disadvantaged than the graduates from F1 schools. To begin with, the average white employer regarded an F1 school graduate as being more intelligent than his F2 counterpart. This widely held belief amongst white employers originated from the Europeans' own preference and respect for formal educational qualifications and this predilection for academic skills carried with it the assumption that an F1 school graduate could cope better with low level administrative, professional or skilled jobs, given a little in-service training. The central government's attitude to F2 secondary education did little to improve this situation. The Minister of Education, in a speech to parliament, explained that only in certain limited trades would the two year Junior vocational course ever lead to the possibility of a trade apprenticeship. For the more skilled trades, only those with an academic secondary educational qualification would be given the opportunity for apprenticeship:

> It is the children from the senior secondary schools who should have the priority in the technical training required to produce skilled tradesmen. 1

With the government publicly advocating the superiority of academic education over vocational training, most

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parents refused to send their children to F2 schools, even if that was their last chance for more education.

Another factor which undermined the credibility of vocational secondary education and militated against its early acceptability was the fact that it was recommended by the 1962 Judges' Commission and thereafter implemented by the Rhodesia Front Government as a course for the less intelligent 37½% who failed to make the grade into the F1 schools\(^1\). The identification of pupils in the selection process as belonging to this 37½% caused great distress to parents as this implied that their children were failures in the formal school system. Moreover, the policy of restricting admission to F2 schools to only those who had been rejected by the F1 schools further reinforced the conviction of most parents that vocational education was only second best\(^2\).

To date, vocational education has not been regarded as favourably as academic education in developing countries. People have tended to identify affluence, influence and status with formal education. Politicians, professional men, leaders of business and industry very often have a formal educational background.

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2. See Mills, op. cit., p.37.
Given a situation where state policy advocates the superiority of academic education, it is not unreasonable that the public should develop a negative attitude towards vocational education. They are aware that it does not lead to the socially and economically prestigious professions and white collar jobs. They will therefore want to ensure that their children go to F1 schools. An incident which occurred in 1969 at the Anglican Mutero F2 school in the Gutu tribal trust land demonstrates the strength of parental opposition to vocational education. A boy with a third class pass in Standard 6 was admitted to the school but his father, on hearing the news, was far from happy and wanted him out of the school because, as he asked the Principal, if his son could not go to St. Augustine's, what could Mutero do for him?¹

This was not an isolated case. There was widespread parental opposition to F2 schools² because they lacked the status accorded to F1 schools which admitted the supposedly intelligent 12½% of the population. The high rating of academic secondary education, implicit in government policy, made


². Ibid. For a further discussion of parental opposition to F2 vocational education, see Mills, op. cit., pp.20-30.
parents regard brain work as superior to handiwork. Parents whose children were admitted to F1 schools were regarded as more fortunate. Moreover, because teachers, headmasters and other educated Africans did not send their children to F2 schools, rural parents took that as a further indication of the worthlessness of vocational education.

(b) Development of F2 vocational secondary education

The development of F2 secondary education was constrained by a number of factors amongst which finance was the most serious. When the F2 scheme was officially launched in 1967, the plan of the central government was to have at least 300 F2 schools within the next ten years. It was hoped that, if private agencies joined the programme alongside the churches and the local and central governments, even this target could be exceeded. The local councils, however, which were expected to play a leading role as this was part of their rural development programme, were seriously constrained by their financial position.

The central government offered to provide grants of up to £10,000 to every local government, mission church or private agency for each F2 school they initiated.


3. Ibid.
The problem was, however, that these were development grants and were conditional on applicants first raising by themselves the necessary capital to cover the cost of building and equipping schools. This half hearted approach towards the establishment of the F2 system by the central government made it difficult, especially for local councils, to initiate such schools.

In the first place, no local council could raise adequate capital costs for a school, overburdened as they already were with the financial costs incurred in developing the various programmes enumerated earlier. Their financial plight was further worsened when they resumed responsibility for primary education. As pointed out earlier, the local councils did not have industries from which to obtain the necessary substantial revenue, as they were caught up in a vicious circle and did not have funds to set up the necessary industries in the first instance. Neither could the councils obtain external financial assistance for their projects as such projects were considered by the international community to be creations of an illegal racist regime. Having declared unilateral independence, Rhodesia was isolated from the international community and money lending agencies. United Nations sanctions made financial

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dealings with the outside world (with the exception of South Africa) difficult. Without external aid, most councils found that the costs required to establish and equip F2 schools were well beyond their means.

Most churches were also reluctant to invest large resources in the F2 system: firstly, because they feared that they might eventually be forced to hand over the F2 schools to the local councils, as had already occurred in the case of primary schools. They wanted to be reassured that this would not occur\(^1\). Secondly, they were uncertain about the viability of the F2 system in a situation where there were insufficient funds for rural development and the necessary industrialisation to create employment for the large body of F2 school graduates expected to pass from the schools\(^2\). Thirdly, some churches (in particular, the Methodists and the Catholics who, after the declaration of illegal independence, became the most outspoken critics of RF policies), considered the objectives of the overall CD plan, of which the F2 system was an integral part, to be racist and for this reason initially did not wish to co-operate in its development. The 1969 Synod Conference strongly criticised the F2 system because of the ideology on which

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2. Ibid., Cap F (3).
it was based\textsuperscript{1}. The Synod regarded the government's unwillingness to inject adequate resources into the community development scheme as indicative of its lack of genuine commitment to rural development\textsuperscript{2}.

Other churches, including the Anglicans, urged missionary participation in the scheme as they thought that, to refrain from providing F2 secondary education, would leave many more primary school leavers with no scope for post primary education\textsuperscript{3}.

Another problem which arose at the initiation and early development of F2 secondary education was that of teacher recruitment. When F2 schools were first established, they were not registered with the Ministry of Education. In other words, they were not considered part of the officially recognised formal school system. In the circumstances, the recruitment of teachers and payment of their salaries was the responsibility of the private agencies concerned\textsuperscript{4}. The lower status of F2 schools meant that most teachers were unwilling to serve in them and, moreover, those teachers who did take up employment in F2 schools found that they could not become members of the Rhodesia African Teachers' Association because their schools were not yet officially

\textsuperscript{1} S/M/R/B 1967-70, District Synod Minutes for 1969, Cap F (10), WMMS Archives, Box 1967-70.

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.


registered with the Ministry of Education\(^1\). The result of this exclusion from the Teachers' Association meant that F2 school teachers did not enjoy the same conditions of service as their counterparts in the F1 system. For example, they did not qualify for government pensions or promotion or transfer to F1 schools\(^2\). The low status accorded to F2 school teachers in comparison to those in F1 schools made it difficult initially for F2 schools to obtain adequate teaching staff\(^3\). Partly because of this shortage of teaching staff, there were no F2 schools in operation between the years 1966 and 1968 and it was only after the establishment of an F2 teachers' college at Umtali in 1968 to train and award the teachers a recognised certificate, accompanied by a revision of conditions of service (giving F2 school teachers equal status and benefits as F1 school teachers) and the official registration of F2 schools with the Ministry, that some African senior secondary school graduates began to consider training for service in F2 schools\(^4\).


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

Because of the factors discussed above, the F2 school system made a very slow start and also received a poor response from the public. From the time of the announcement of the New Education Plan in 1966 until 1969, only 11 F2 schools were established and only 461 students had registered for training. This enrolment was far less than the 37½% of yearly primary school leavers which was the anticipated intake. In an attempt to boost the number of F2 schools, the central government decided, in 1969, to provide capital loans to all agencies which were interested in undertaking vocational secondary education. At the same time, the central government decided to also establish its own F2 schools for urban Africans. The loan system did enable more agencies to engage in F2 secondary education but the improvement in the development of the system was not as spectacular as the central government had anticipated. Between 1969 and 1971, ten more schools were established, bringing the total between 1966 and 1971 to just 21. This means that, during the first five years of the 1966 Plan, only 21 had been established which was less than

10% of the 300 schools originally planned to be operational in ten years' time.

The distribution of the schools was as follows:

Table 4.1. F2 Junior Secondary Schools by 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>No. of Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Council</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Council plus Consortium</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Industries</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Schools</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakubva Committee</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazaland Council</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council for Women</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the above table shows, out of the 145 local councils in existence in 1971, only three (African Council, African Council plus Consortium and Gazaland) had undertaken F2 secondary education and they had established only one school each. The remainder of the local councils had been prevented from participating by severe financial constraints. Missionary interest in F2 secondary education was low and, of the 15 mission churches engaged in African secondary education, only four had undertaken vocational secondary work and

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established nine schools. Of these, four were Anglican. The extent of low public response to the course was evidenced by the fact that only 3,807 students were enrolled in the 21 F2 schools in 1971. This enrolment was distributed as follows:

Table 4.2. Enrolment in F2 Junior Vocational Secondary Schools in 1971 (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Govt.</th>
<th></th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th></th>
<th>Others</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>Girls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Year</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>2,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Grade 8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Year</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>1,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Grade 9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>3,807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first year enrolment of 2,337 was below 30% of the 37½% of primary school leavers expected to enter vocational training in 1971. As Mills pointed out, most parents kept their children at home rather than let them enter F2 schools. Linden accounts for the low public response to both the F2 system and the CD it was intended to serve as being largely due to the fact that

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2. Ibid., p.22, Table 6(a).
3. S/M/R/B 1971-73, District Synod Minutes for 1971, District Education Committee Report, Cap F, WMMS Archives, Box
rural people identified the whole scheme as a RF government design to entrench separate racial development and promote "community underdevelopment". They regarded the philosophy underlying the scheme as racist and repressive of economic and political development¹.

(c) The 1966 Policy and its implications for F1 academic secondary education

People's misgivings about F2 secondary education increased the competition amongst students for admission to F1 secondary schools. This was particularly evident amongst rural children who feared the high probability of not finding employment in the rural areas if they undertook vocational training. With the intake into F1 schools being reduced to 121/2%, the competition became even more fierce.

There were differences in the responses the churches made to the government on the matter of arbitrary imposition of a ceiling on admission to F1 schools. On the one hand were the Wesleyan Methodists and the Catholics who sought overall missionary boycott of the government policy. The Methodist Synod debated the issue at length at its 1966 Conference and the decision taken was that the churches should not co-operate with the government in implementing the 1966 Policy until

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¹ Linden, op. cit., p.75.
it had been discussed by all the churches, African parents and teachers. The Catholics, whose traditional support for white colonialism changed radically in the 1960s and 70s, joined ranks with the Methodists in opposing the implementation of government policy.

On the other hand were the Dutch Reformed Church, the Seventh Day Adventists and other traditional allies of colonial rule who remained among the staunchest supporters of the RF government during the years of illegal independence. They adopted the stance that the churches should not make political decisions concerning government policy and advocated co-operation. Between the two extremes were the Anglicans and the SRCC Executive who tried to evoke a response from the churches which would not lead to direct confrontation with the government. The Anglicans argued that the churches would lose in any confrontation with the RF administration and it was therefore best to seek discussions of the policy issue with the Ministry of Education. This decision was

2. See Linden, op. cit., pp.156-176.
4. Ibid.
upheld by the SRCC Executive. One of the most difficult problems for the churches, and one on which they remained divided, was the response they should give to the government, if, as was almost certain to occur, the Ministry refused to change its policy. In fact, the Ministry made it plain that government policy was not negotiable.

Although the churches could not agree on what action to take, there were certain aspects of the new policy to which they all objected, such as the arbitrary imposition of a rigid ceiling on admission to F1 schools and the heavy reduction in overall government expenditure on African education. A point which raised further bitterness amongst the churches was the elimination from the school system of 50% of all pupils completing primary school each year. Most of these children were aged between 14 and 16 and were unable either to find employment or alternative avenues for further training. The churches felt that such a policy was morally and politically indefensible and not worthy of their support. It was the rural children who suffered most from this policy. Failure on a child's part to proceed beyond primary education and obtain the necessary qualifications to enable him

to get a job, meant that he had to continue to be materially supported by his parents who were not in regular employment and had spent their scarce resources on his education largely in the hope that they would benefit from it when he entered employment. Children whose parents were in regular or part-time employment or generated income from small business activities in the urban areas did not suffer as much from the immediate effects of unemployment if they failed to proceed beyond primary education, because their parents were better able to support them until they found some unskilled job in industry.

The lack of concern on the part of the central government with regard to the disastrous implications of its policy on African children and the future of Africans as a whole, aroused considerable anger amongst many of the churches. In a memorandum prepared by the Methodist Church in 1968 it was made very clear to the government that its attitude and unwillingness to reconsider the 1966 Policy was having disastrous consequences for African education and the churches would no longer sit back in silence:

The education system for Africans in Southern Rhodesia under the new policy has become such a depressing example of separate and unequal facilities between the races that it is no longer possible for missionaries to remain silent.

The Synod Conference warned that the churches might be driven into a situation of conflict with the government unless some significant changes in its policy were made. The government, however, was uncompromising and unmoved by the appeals for change made by various churches. It flatly turned down a call made by all the churches in October 1968 for a non-racial approach to education\(^1\). It also turned down the motion that the schools should use their own discretion in determining Form I enrolments\(^2\).

All attempts by the SRCC to negotiate on the 12½% ceiling mark were dismissed by the Ministry of Education. With all leading African politicians either in detention or prison, the government suppressed African opposition.

A further worsening of relations between the RF government and the churches occurred in 1968 when the full effect and extent of the government policy began to emerge. Not only had the government reduced F1 admission, it also planned a complete ban on the expansion of the F1 system by government aided bodies as from 1969. This was a direct reference to the mission churches\(^3\). In

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2. Ibid.

addition, the government was also to withdraw completely the capital grants to 'A' level courses. This clampdown on mission educational work came as a blow to any prospects that missionaries may have had for the future development of secondary education under the RF government.

The overall effects of the RF government policy soon became apparent in the decline of the rate of growth of secondary education which is particularly noticeable when comparing the pre and post 1966 development of the F1 school system.

Table 4.3. Rate of growth of African secondary education between 1962 and 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that, whereas between 1962 and 1966 the number of government schools doubled from 8 to 16, between 1966 and 1971 there was an increase of only one school. Similarly, on the missionary side, between 1962

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and 1966 the number of secondary schools rose from 33 to 71 but between 1966 and 1971 the overall increase was only 14. In fact, after 1970 no new mission secondary schools were established.

The slow increase in the rate of growth of F1 secondary education after 1966 and the imposition of the 12½% admission ceiling resulted in a slow rate of increase in the secondary school intake. This can also be shown by comparing pre and post 1966 intake figures at the F1 level.

Table 4.4. African secondary school Form I intake between 1962 and 1970 (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of pupils in Form I</th>
<th>Increase over preceding years</th>
<th>% increase over preceding year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2,819</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>11.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3,407</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>20.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4,108</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>20.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5,478</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>33.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>6,137</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>12.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>6,699</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>9.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>6,754</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7,450</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>10.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8,486</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>16.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table shows, between 1962 and 1966, the increase in F1 intake nearly doubled from 2,819 to 5,478

1. O'Callaghan, op. cit., p.65, Table 29.
but, after 1966, the increase was much smaller rising from 6,137 to only 7,450 in 1969. The sharp increase in 1970 enrolment was accounted for by the double output from primary schools in 1969 as a result of the shortening of the primary school course from eight to seven years. But, even then, it was a much smaller intake than the pre 1966 yearly average intake from single primary school output.

The 12½% who were selected to proceed to F1 academic secondary education were not guaranteed a full four year secondary education. Limited places for Form III were available as a direct result of the reduction in government grants to missionary secondary schools from 1969 onwards (amounting to Rhodesian $22,050 in 1970-71)\(^1\), and when natural wastage was taken into account also, only a small proportion of the initial F1 enrolment were able to reach Form IV. An even smaller proportion were able to acquire a full six year secondary education as shown in the following table.

Table 4.5. Wastage in F1 secondary schools between 1966 and 1971 (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Enrolment</th>
<th>Dropout rate in figures over preceding year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>6,137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>6,021</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>3,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>1,967</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Lr.VI</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Up.VI</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Compiled from Annual Reports of the Secretary for African Education for the Years ended 31st December 1966 (p.18, Table 6(a)), 1968 (p.24, Table 6(a)), 1969 (p.27) and 1971 (p.25).
Taking the 1966 enrolment as 100%, the table shows that 98.1% reached Form II in 1967. The figure fell to 33.6% in Form III in 1968. Only 32% of the 1966 Form I enrolment reached Form IV, while a considerably smaller proportion (3%), reached Lower VI. Only 2.9% obtained a full six year secondary education. The situation can be seen even more clearly by the shape of the educational pyramid in Fig. 4.2.

1. Murphree, op. cit., p.25.

N.B. Enrolment for Forms I and II includes F2 students.
As is quite apparent, the pyramid is broad based at the Grade I level of primary school but narrows dramatically to 10,360 at Form I level. From the Form I level, the pyramid rapidly tapers until it almost reaches a point at the Upper VI level. This situation can largely be attributed to the imposition of severe brakes on the overall development of secondary education. Places for secondary education became fewer and could not cope with the growing primary school output. There was, however, another contributory factor in that admission requirements for Form III and the Lower VI were so high that it was difficult for most students to attain them. At the Form II level, a student had to obtain six credits (i.e. 66%) in six subjects to qualify for entrance to Form III. At the Form IV level, a student also needed at least a 66% marks average in six subjects to be considered for admission. These grades were considerably higher than those required of white students. The 1962 Judges' Commission admitted that the requirements were unnecessarily high and examination standards often unrelated to teaching standards in schools. For these reasons many students were prevented from proceeding to Form III or Lower VI. 

ACCESS OF AFRICAN SECONDARY SCHOOL LEAVERS TO UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN THE COLONY

The University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was opened in Salisbury in 1957 as a non-racial federal institution but, during the years of Federation, African student representation was very small. Of the first intake of 71, only 8 were Africans. By 1959, there were 32 Africans (including two women) as against 134 non African students in the university and, in 1960, there were just 38 black students out of a total student body of 168.

There were two major reasons for such a small representation of African students in the university. Firstly, there were very limited facilities for 'A' level education for Africans in all the three territories. In Southern Rhodesia there were only two schools (Goromonzi and Fletcher) providing 'A' level courses for Africans. Northern Rhodesia had just one school (Munali) and Nyasaland also had one school at Dedza at which Africans could obtain 'A' level courses. In consequence, very few black students were able to enter university.

3. Ibid.
Secondly, there was considerable pressure from the white community on the university administration not to let African representation increase too rapidly. Some white parents regularly wrote to the university threatening to send their children to South African universities if there was no adequate control over the number of blacks admitted to the local university\(^1\). In fact, during the initial planning of the university, the whites strongly advocated two separate colleges - one for blacks and the other for whites. This proposal was rejected by the federal government when the university sponsors in Britain refused to provide the £1,400,000 needed to set up the university unless it was going to (a) admit students of all races on an equal footing and (b) allow the students to work and live on the same campus\(^2\).

After the break up of the Federation in 1963, the university lost its federal status and became the University College of Rhodesia. Although, theoretically, the university remained free of government control, the RF government's racial policy had significant influence on the university administration's attitude towards the admission of Africans. At this stage, it is intended to examine some of the problems which, under the RF's racial policy, confronted African secondary students

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trying to gain access to university and, thereafter, to study the problems encountered by those Africans with 'A' level education in their attempts to enter university.

African university graduates were considered by the government, and most whites, as the real threat to Europeans in the higher professional services and, for this reason, it was government policy to try to restrict the university intake of Africans. The government attempted to achieve this end by several measures aimed at containing the number of Africans able to acquire 'A' levels. Firstly, under the 1966 Policy, Form I admission was reduced. Secondly, government grants to existing schools for the purpose of 'A' level courses were withdrawn in 1969, which effectively reduced the places available on HSC courses to intending students. Thirdly, Africans were stopped by the government from taking 'A' level courses at private polytechnics. One example of this was at the Salisbury Polytechnic, where a large number of Africans were engaged in 'A' level science courses (which, unlike Arts subjects, could not be undertaken through correspondence courses) - this was closed to Africans in 1969.¹

In addition to the foregoing measures, a special qualifying examination, through which many Africans qualified for university entrance, was discontinued in

¹ Creighton, op. cit., p.171.
1970 by the then Principal of the University, Mr. Miller. One member of the University Council considered the qualifying course as a "very considerable waste of money" and he further argued that it was not the duty of the university to do the work of the schools\(^1\). In a parliamentary debate on the issue, one speaker, Mr. Ryan, made the same point:

I do not think that it is the purpose of a university to train students and make them fit for admission to that University .... There are sufficient applicants from the schools and from all sections of society of this country without having to go the peculiar device of setting up a pre-University course in order to, if one might use the vernacular, drag some of these students by the hair of their heads in order to stick them in a classroom at the University, to try and instil some further knowledge into them. \(^2\)

One black member of parliament strongly urged the continuation of the course:

When you consider the fact that a large number of our people are not able to get to Sixth Form level owing to certain circumstances beyond their control, and that because of the realisation of that the University is offering them this opportunity to carry on with a degree of work, then I think we should not put difficulties in their way and bar their course towards the higher examination that they can do because of the fact that they are mature men. \(^3\)

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Despite this appeal, the course was terminated, thus closing the door to many Africans who wished to enter university.

Notwithstanding the government's attempts to exclude Africans from university, a significant number of African students found entry to 'A' level courses in mission schools, as well as the two government schools at Goromonzi and Fletcher. Consequently an upward trend in the number of Africans gaining 'A' level education became apparent in the 1960s and 70s (when compared to the 1950s) and Table 4.6 illustrates this phenomenon.

Table 4.6. Increase in 'A' level enrolment in African secondary schools between 1964 and 1971 (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower VI</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper VI</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accompanying this increase in enrolment was a corresponding increase in the number of students qualifying for admission to the university (two 'A' level passes were required for entry). In 1967, for example, out of 146 African students who sat for the Cambridge Higher School Certificate, 103 qualified for admission. In 1969, of

the 178 candidates who took the examination, 132 qualified for university entrance\(^1\). Similarly, in 1971, 145 out of 174 who took the examination, obtained the required two 'A' level passes and qualified for admission\(^2\).

A number of difficulties, however, prevented a very large number of those who qualified for university entry from taking up their places and the most serious of these was the lack of adequate financial assistance. Some grants were available from the university for the aid of poor students and these were provided by some private bodies such as the Christian Council of Rhodesia, the P. John Trust, the Schimmelpennink-Campbell Education Trust and the University Service\(^3\). The distribution of the grants was the responsibility of the university, however, racial bias in the awarding of the grants quite evidently favoured white students. The very character and composition of the University Council, where one-third of its members were nominated by the government, allowed racial bias to continue.

Some scholarship boards operated on strict racial lines: for example, the Rhodesia Masonic Lodge, required

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that applicants be children of British subjects of European descent. Others, like the Gordon Milne Bursaries, required that applicants be children of members of the Salisbury all white Caledonian Society. The Goldsmith's Company of London offered postgraduate scholarships but only to people of a United Kingdom parentage. The Chanelick Solomon grants were only for male Europeans, while the Three Feathers scholarships were also restricted to people whose parents were both of European descent.

A detailed study of the scholarships awarded in 1970 revealed that the government made a total allowance of Rhodesian $330,000 in the form of grants, loans and bursaries, to university students. Of this amount $(R)162,000 was given to white students, while Africans received a total of $(R)142,000. Of the scholarships which were allocated on the basis of 'A' level results, 42 were given to whites and 32 to Africans. The largest award was made to those Africans who committed themselves to teach for three years after university study. Such Africans were given 122, with 89 to their European counterparts. But few grants were given to Africans who wanted to join the Civil Service. Only two such awards were made compared to the 50 given to whites. Of the 29 bursaries awarded by companies and private

2. Ibid., p.102.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
foundations in 1971, 18 were awarded to whites, 9 to Asians, and only 2 to Africans\(^1\).

The racial discrimination practised against Africans in the allocation of grants, as described above, coupled with the lack of adequate facilities for 'A' level education for Africans, caused the university to be a predominantly white institution. In 1960, African enrolment was only 38 out of a total student body of 168\(^2\). By 1967, the number of Africans had risen significantly but was still less than half that of the number of Europeans: 211 Africans compared to 432 whites\(^3\). As Martin Loney pointed out, had it not been for the assistance provided by the World University Service, and the Christian Council, not more than 200 African students would have been at the university\(^4\).

By 1971, African representation stood at 40% of the total university enrolment\(^5\).

The degree of racial inequality in terms of educational opportunity was further evidenced by the fact that, while white students were given considerably more

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resources to study at the local university than blacks, they were also provided with government funds to study at South African universities which were closed to black Rhodesians in 1966. In 1967, government overall expenditure on 603 white Rhodesian students in South African universities amounted to well over £131,000. No grants at all were made to Africans for study outside Rhodesia.

Scope for employment for F1 secondary school and university graduates

One of the factors which played a major part in limiting the employment opportunities for African F1 secondary school leavers during the first five years of the RF government policy was, as mentioned earlier, the lack of adequate scope for school leavers to enter apprenticeship training in the various industries. Without this essential training, most jobs in industry remained outside the scope of the majority of school leavers. The European employers' preference for training white school leavers precipitated the problem.

The vast majority of white employers wanted a less

2. O'Callaghan, op. cit., p.98.
educated, cheap, unskilled labour force and this reduced school leaver opportunity for readily finding employment. The 1969 Census figures revealed that 45% of the blacks in self or wage employment had never been to school: 13% had a Standard III education and 36% had a complete primary education. These were employed largely in menial jobs in the mining and agricultural industries or urban manufacturing industries, or as domestic servants. Only 2% of those employed had Form II secondary education and less than 1% had Form IV. In all, between 1966 and 1969, less than 50 Africans had received apprenticeship training for skilled jobs.

A Zimbabwe manpower survey, conducted by Colcolough and Murray for the Commonwealth Secretariat, revealed the high level of secondary school leaver unemployment in 1969. Of the 48,486 Africans with one to two years of secondary education, 27,076 (i.e. 56%) were unemployed. Of the 9,478 with three to four years of secondary education, 4,108 (43%) were unemployed and, of the 998 who had five to six years of secondary education, 568 (57%) were out of work. Those in employment were usually in blue collar jobs, low level clerical or

2. Ibid.
managerial/supervisory positions in various industries. A significant proportion entered the teaching profession.

University graduates had less employment problems as they were readily taken into positions left vacant in industry through white emigration caused by the intensity of the guerrilla war being waged by black nationalist forces against the RF government. In 1970, 8,500 such vacancies became available to African graduates. The 2,500 Africans with local university qualifications easily found employment. Some of the 3,000 blacks who graduated outside Rhodesia quickly filled the remaining vacancies. Other university graduates entered the teaching profession in secondary schools, while a small number entered the Civil Service.

Evidence provided in this chapter demonstrates the reversal (by the RF government) of the secondary education policy developed under Todd's and Whitehead's administrations. The racist nature of their policy, in terms of its objectives and ideology, begs a few concluding observations concerning the role of that policy and of education under the RF regime.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
The most significant aspect of secondary educational policy under the RF was its role as an instrument of implementing a racist ideology of separate racial development. It assisted in effecting a vicious form of human oppression and political, economic and social underdevelopment. The CD scheme, which provided the framework of that policy, represented the RF's design for entrenching that process of underdevelopment.

The first step in the implementation of the policy was the re-organisation of educational administration and structure in relation to the overall RF CD strategy and objectives. The transfer of educational responsibility to the African communities without adequate provision of economic resources and political power undermined the possibilities of their developing education efficiently and achieving effective rural and community development.

Moreover, given the limited scope for rural development, under conditions of scarce resources and poverty such as prevailed amongst rural African communities, the F2 secondary school system provided little or no solution to the complex problems of community development and the achievement of individual advancement, socially, economically and politically. F2 graduates found no unemployment opportunities and scope for participation in active rural uplift because, in the first instance,
there was no genuine policy and political will on the part of the central government to facilitate effective rural and community development.

It can be concluded from the evidence given in the discussion that the F2 secondary school system was designed largely to provide accommodation for the large number of African pupils who were no longer permitted to proceed to academic secondary education under RF government policy. By providing those pupils with a rural-oriented education, the government hoped to reduce the inflow of African secondary school graduates to European towns and cities. There is little evidence to suggest that the RF government genuinely intended the F2 system to assist in the promotion of community development in the absence of essential resources and other prerequisites for such development.

The overall RF government CD policy, of which vocational secondary education was an integral part, had as its primary objective the transfer of the burden and blame for ineffective rural and community development from the central government to Africans themselves.

F1 academic secondary education policy represented a calculated attempt by the RF government, firstly, to halt the rapid expansion of secondary education, which was initiated by Todd and the churches to assist in African political, economic and social advancement. Secondly, it
was designed to minimise the African opportunities to acquire 'higher' formal academic qualifications which provided access to the key professions and skilled services in the urban industrial sectors. This was intended to restore absolute European domination of all key posts in every sphere of life, in keeping with RF racial ideology.

As shown in the discussion, the 1966 Policy, despite missionary opposition, succeeded in reducing educational opportunities for African students at every stage in secondary education to the extent where only a small proportion was able to acquire Form IV and Form VI. That had the overall effect of limiting the number of students able to proceed to university education.

However, even those who succeeded in securing 'O' or 'A' level secondary education were not assured of employment opportunities. An examination of secondary school graduates in 1969 revealed that the vast majority were unemployed. This also undermined African political, economic and social advancement.

Overall, RF educational policy demonstrated the extent to which African education under the RF regime became an instrument of oppression, racial segregation and African underdevelopment.

Throughout this study, various aspects of secondary educational policy development in Southern Rhodesia were discussed in the context of the country's colonial history. An attempt was made to examine the rationale for state and church policies, their impact on secondary educational development and the implications for African socio-economic and political advancement.

This final chapter summarises the main arguments in the study, makes observations on them and, where possible, draws conclusions.

The thesis began with three broad themes: (1) the impact of the colonial policy of protecting white supremacy on the development of church and state policies on African secondary education; (2) the various factors which accounted for the conflict and/or convergence between (a) state and church policies and (b) the policies of different churches; and (3) the scope and limitations of progressive educational reform in a colonial society which was opposed to reforms intended to benefit the majority of Africans.

The first theme discussed the reasons behind the attempts by successive colonial governments to influence and determine secondary educational policies and programmes. It emerged from that discussion that one
primary reason underlying government attempts to control missionary policies was to use education as an instrument in controlling the rate of African political, economic and social advancement in order to preserve white privilege and domination. This theme was elaborated throughout the thesis.

Chapter 1 discussed, against the background of the conquest and colonisation of Southern Rhodesia, the introduction of western formal education for Africans by various missionary churches. The role and position of successive colonial governments in that process of educational development was discussed. It was seen that church and state policies had differing objectives. The chapter also examined, in the light of that conflict, the concerted efforts by the state to control missionary policies and programmes. The policy pursued by successive governments of protecting overall colonial interests against the effects of rapid African political, economic and social advancement, emerged in that discussion as a major determinant of government educational policy. The discussion proceeded to consider the methods by which colonial governments sought to structure African education within the broad framework of their colonial administrative policies and objectives. In that context, Keigwin's policy and educational scheme represented an attempt to ensure that African education
evolved along the lines of separate racial development which were perceived to be less likely to lead to a direct clash of interests with the whites. By determining educational policy and programmes, the government hoped to control the rate of growth of the African electorate and African entry into the key professions and skilled services. The intention was to protect white interests and domination. The importance attached to the accomplishment of these goals was demonstrated by the continual application of financial, administrative and political sanctions on missionary educational work by the responsible governments of both Coghlán and Moffat, in order to bring missionary policies into line with the state policy.

Chapter 2 continued the discussion at the secondary education level. The rationale for the policy of Huggins' government on African secondary education was examined covering the period before, during and after the second world war. The discussion revealed that, during each of the three periods, the primary factor determining government policy was the preservation of white political, economic and social interests. Every attempt was made by the government to influence, determine and control missionary policies in the pursuit of that objective.

Government opposition to the introduction of African secondary education prior to the war was seen to be based
largely on white fear of African competition in the economic and social spheres. During the war, the temporary change in government policy and its support for the establishment and development of African education was influenced by the need to generate a more educated and skilled African labour force required to assist in economic development.

After the war, when educated and skilled Africans were no longer required in large numbers to assist in industrial development (due to the increase in white emigration and the return of white servicemen) government support for the rapid development of African secondary education diminished and, once again, there was an abrupt change in its policy with the government thereafter attempting to control the expansion of African secondary education through a number of restrictive measures. As was seen, this led to conflict between state and church policies, a conflict which seriously undermined the growth of secondary education.

Chapter 3 discussed attempts by Todd and Whitehead, in collaboration with the missionaries, to reform secondary educational policies in the interests of multiracial partnership. However, any achievements in that respect, with the objective of assisting more rapid African political, economic and social advancement,
were constrained by the opposition of the conservative white society which feared the effects of such advancement on its own security and status. As a result, Todd's hopes of building a multi-racial society were frustrated.

Chapter 4 demonstrated emphatic white reassertion of the paramountcy of their interests through the implementation of a racist policy of separate racial development intended to establish absolute white political, economic and social supremacy at the central level. This policy emerged as the framework for educational policy and programmes within which missionaries were forced to operate.

An important link was therefore established in the foregoing theme between colonial history and politics and the development of African secondary educational policies and programmes in Southern Rhodesia. A significant point which emerged was the way in which the nature of those policies and programmes reflected, at every historical period, the racially divided structure of Southern Rhodesian colonial society. This was evident in the racist state educational policy and the racially segregated systems of black and white education. Although, throughout the time of the governments of both Todd and Whitehead, state educational policy reflected government attempts to establish a form of multi-racial society, the racial structure of education continued to
exist, thus also reflecting white determination to maintain a racially segregated society. Under the Rhodesia Front regime, state policy, the structure of education and its objectives, reflected in every respect the 'apartheid' structure of Rhodesian colonial society.

The evidence advanced in the discussion confirms the proposition that educational policies and systems of education operating in every society tell us a great deal about the nature of that society. Educational systems in democratic capitalist societies reflect the democratic capitalist ideals and values of those societies\(^1\), just as much as education in socialist countries reflects socialist ideology and assists in sustaining the existence of a socialist state. It is not the intention to suggest that educational programmes may not be actively involved in the overall process of social change but to agree with Weiler's emphasis on:

\[\ldots\text{ the important degree to which the development of educational systems is conditioned and determined by the state of the social system as a whole, and the fact that educational development and reform is limited to what the existing dynamics of social structure, political power and economic wealth permit.}\]  


In Southern Rhodesia, it was shown that state policy and systems of education under successive governments reflected the development of a racially divided society. As May pointed out, they also reflected white insistence on maintaining racial privilege.

They provided for non-whites limited means of social mobility and ensured that only the most able Africans were able to obtain a full secondary education and thus the means to higher education; that small minority would not pose a numerical threat to young whites in the competition for the goals they reserved for the privileged.

A second conclusion may be derived from the foregoing theme. With the limited exception of the period of Todd and Whitehead, state educational policy and systems served as instruments of African oppression and socio-economic and political underdevelopment. State policy was designed to educate Africans into inferior roles determined for them by the colonial system. This policy encouraged the internalisation amongst both Africans and Europeans of the racist concept of black inferiority, while European achievement of high educational qualifications, partly through policies of racial

discrimination, assisted in legitimising their 'superiority' and control of political power, the professions and skilled services. Government attempts to determine and control missionary policies were based on the premise that the education provided by missionaries encouraged Africans to aspire to political, economic and social equality with whites. This was considered a threat to the continued existence of an inegalitarian and racist colonial system which provided whites with their privileged position and power base.

The second theme discussed the conflict between varying degrees of missionary political support for white rule and their educational policies. Also considered were the differences between church policies. The discussion revealed that, up to the period of Todd, the differences between state policy and those of the Anglicans and the Methodists were not so much due to conflict in the political positions of the churches and successive governments, but rather to what ought to be the purpose and objectives of African education. The governments believed that African education should be designed to equip Africans with skills and knowledge related to rural trades and uplift. The intention was to make Africans efficient workers in their own areas and where their labour was needed by the whites, but without enabling them to compete with whites or threaten
white political, economic and social positions. In that context, successive governments and the white settler community regarded the provision of an academic oriented education or high technical training for Africans as a serious threat to their supremacy. Those churches such as the Roman Catholics, the DRC, the SDA and others which, in the earlier years, believed that providing high academic education for Africans could lead to the undermining of white rule, adopted policies which were in line with those of the state, although they modified their positions in subsequent years.

The Anglicans and the Methodists advocated the provision of academic education for Africans, not because they wanted to undermine colonial rule, but because they believed that rapid African advancement, within the colonial system was a credit to Christianity and also justified white rule. African socio-economic advancement was not seen as in any way in conflict with the objectives of colonial rule or of Christianity but rather as complementary to both in assisting their continued existence.

During the premierships of Todd and Whitehead, when the objectives of state and church policies converged in their intention to promote African advancement and create a multi-racial society, there was rapid development of African secondary education. That situation lasted only until the rise of the Rhodesia Front Party to power in
Thereafter, the conflict between state and church policies arose because the government wished to use education to promote its racist ideology and policies. The churches found that they could not reconcile the blatantly racist objectives of government educational policy and programmes with their Christian principles. Also, they resented government policy because it seriously threatened to undermine the whole basis and structure of African education which the churches had established over a period of many years. Missionaries feared that this would have serious implications for the future of African education.

The third theme discussed the scope and limits of progressive educational reform in Southern Rhodesia, given the conservative character of white society. It emerged in that discussion that a central issue was the dilemma of a progressive reformer who saw the need for reform and was prepared to take appropriate action but was constrained by a conservative white settler community.

The first indications of such a problem were when Huggins, even though essentially conservative, attempted, during the war period, to modify government educational policy for economic and political reasons. The support he gave to the establishment and development of African secondary education in order to create a more skilled and
educated black labour force which was needed to assist
in the revitalisation of the economy, had serious
political consequences for him. White opposition to
African advancement and entry into the professions and
skilled services was one major reason for dissension
within Huggins' party which resulted in his losing an
absolute majority in the 1946 General Election. The
strength of white opposition to reform was evident in
Huggins' re-adoption of a more conservative educational
policy.

One of the reasons the whites feared and opposed
rapid African advancement was that many of the white
immigrants in the 1940s and 50s were unskilled and not
highly educated. They came to Southern Rhodesia in
search of the kind of prosperity many of them could not
achieve in their countries of origin. When they
arrived, their main advantage over the blacks was their
white skin which gave them a higher socio-economic and
political status and access to key jobs. They feared,
therefore, that if Africans were given adequate educa-
tional opportunities and gained entry into some of the
professions occupied by whites, their status might fall.
They might, in the face of growing African competition,
find it difficult to maintain their superior status and
slip down the social scale. When the policies of
Huggins were thought to deviate from the conservatism of
pre-war years, which the whites believed was their best
protection, his government suffered electoral defeat and was forced to enter into coalition with the Labour Party.

Further clear indication of white opposition to reform was evident during the period of Todd and Whitehead. In the first instance, Todd's multi-racial politics appeared to strike at the very heart of white security. The whites in Southern Rhodesia and the Federation were not interested in genuine multi-racial partnership because it threatened to place Africans on an equal footing with Europeans in the political, economic and social spheres. To attempt to reform the franchise system, industrial relations and laws, land and educational policies, as Todd did, was to shake the very foundations of white privileged position and power.

Moreover, white prosperity and the high standard of living they enjoyed, significantly depended on the low wages paid to Africans and their overall poor standard of living. If Africans were to achieve higher educational qualifications, they would firstly be stimulated to seek admission to jobs currently monopolised by whites and, secondly, to demand rates of pay which could affect white standards of living in both relative and absolute terms. As one white settler explained:

If the native were admitted to full partnership, it is doubtful whether it could be possible to maintain the standard of living of all the whites at their present level, under the existing
economic system. It is undoubtedly the appreciation of this fact that is behind the determination to keep the native out of the skilled labour market at all costs.

White opposition to rapid improvement in the African position undermined the possibilities of Todd's educational reforms making a significant contribution to overall African advancement. Todd's failure to implement far reaching reforms in the colonial system meant that most opportunities for advancement in the political and economic spheres remained closed to the vast majority of Africans. White racist attitudes undermined the entry of educated Africans to professions in government and industry. This, in part, accounted for the high level of African secondary school leavers in the 1950s who were unable to find employment.

Those who did find employment were subjected to further discrimination in terms of the positions they could occupy, their prospects of promotion, the wages they received and the labour rights they could enjoy. This situation militated against the establishment of a multi-racial society.

This helps to confirm another proposition that educational reform, by itself, can not bring about social change. To achieve that, educational reform must be accompanied, or preceded, by wider and more effective socio-economic and political reform because education operates within

the mainstream of other forces existing in society\(^1\). Educational reform could not transform an essentially inegalitarian and racist Southern Rhodesian colonial society into a less racist and more just society as Todd appeared to believe. It could not alter white attitudes. Hence, educated Africans were rejected by most white people, even though they had achieved the so-called white civilised standards. Todd's hopes that education would make Africans more acceptable to the white community, and thus provide a basis for creating a multi-racial society, were thus frustrated.

Besides, educational reform and the resulting increase in secondary educational provision for Africans, did not lead to political, economic and social equality, within the African community. On the contrary, it increased the inequalities between the small minority of those who were favoured by the selection process and acquired the necessary qualifications to gain them positions of relatively high status and income in, for

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1. An assumption prevailed in Tanzania in the 1960s and 70s that educational reform, aimed at eliminating the elitist and capitalist tendencies inherent in western education, could create a more egalitarian socialist society. The fallacy of this assumption was soon realised and a call was made for wider political, economic and social reform. See David Court: "The education system as a response to inequality in Tanzania and Kenya", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 14 (Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp.661-680.)
example, the teaching profession and Civil Service, and those who were rejected by the selection process and failed to attain similar positions and benefits. The minority of educated blacks acquired a new social mobility which gave them a better chance of entry into the small number of professional jobs available to blacks than the uneducated, or less educated, majority. Education assisted in legitimising the positions of those who acquired positions of importance. At the same time, it legitimised the failures of those who did not reach those positions due to the lack of the necessary formal academic qualifications. The inequalities between educated and employed blacks and the uneducated masses increased.

An important point needs to be made regarding the limitations of Todd's educational reforms in terms of the relevance or otherwise of academic education to the intentions, needs and aspirations of both students and parents. Todd's reforms were, in part, a response to African demand for adequate provision of 'higher' academic education, which, they believed, would be the solution to most of their problems. Students and parents were aware that, within the existing economic and political realities, those who possessed academic qualifications had better scope for gaining entry to the limited number of jobs in the socially prestigious and high income white collar
professions. The importance given to formal education by Europeans, in every sphere of life, also influenced Africans to seek to obtain it.

But, as shown in the discussion, the expansion of secondary educational provision under the first Five Year Plan, did not guarantee political, economic and social advancement to all those who obtained secondary educational qualifications. In the first instance, urban industries and other employment sectors could not provide all the African secondary school graduates with the professional white collar jobs to which they and their parents aspired. Even if the racial discrimination element, which exacerbated African school leaver unemployment in urban and other industrial areas was removed, this would not have ensured that every school leaver got a job because there was a limit to the number of jobs available at any one time. Moreover, due to the academic curriculum predominant in African secondary schools, students graduated and left school with few vocational skills to offer to industry. Once out of school, they had little scope for undertaking apprenticeship training. This further reduced their chances of finding a job and the result was that many secondary school graduates were unsuccessful in realising their aspirations for advancement.

The relevance or otherwise of academic education to individual, communal or national needs for development in
developing countries is a subject of much contemporary debate. Strong arguments have been advanced in that debate for vocational and rural skills to be introduced to the school curriculum\(^1\). One is tempted, in the light of that debate, to argue that if Todd and the missionaries had introduced vocational and rural skills more effectively, much of the unemployment problem would have been solved through many school leavers taking up rural employment and contributing to rural and community development. But, from recent and contemporary experiences in many developing countries, their attempts to develop a more vocational curriculum have not provided an adequate solution to their unemployment problems or to the fulfilment of individual and/or national needs and aspirations for advancement. This is because such reforms need to be accompanied by a policy of rural regeneration and the development in rural and urban areas of more productive and rewarding forms of employment and/or self employment\(^2\). Unless a policy of

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2. See David Alexander, "Community Based In-Service Teacher Education Programme and Education Extension Centres developed by the North East Group of Teachers' Colleges, Thailand", British Council, 1979, pp.29-30.
rural regeneration accompanies curriculum reform, so that school leavers can engage in beneficial employment in rural areas, they and their parents will reject vocational and rural education. Parents will want their children to acquire academic education because they know that those children who obtain it have a better chance of securing the limited number of white collar jobs available in the relatively developed urban areas.

This phenomenon was evident in the discussion of pupil and parental attitudes towards F2 vocational secondary education under the Rhodesia Front educational policy. Because there was no genuine attempt by the government to promote rural regeneration and industrial development, F2 school graduates could find no profitable employment. Parents and pupils realised that the RF community development policy was not intended to promote effective community and rural development. They knew that, in the absence of such development, there was little scope for F2 graduates to find employment or opportunities for self-employment in the rural areas.

Given the fact that there was, under the governments of Todd and Whitehead, little effective policy for rural and community development, the inclusion of rural and vocational skills in secondary school curricula was not sufficient to assist in the achievement of either the aspirations of parents and students for better paying
jobs and the improvement of their standard of living or in realising social and political advancement. As long as it was not profitable to acquire vocational education and to work in rural areas, parents and pupils would continue to seek academic education and urban emigration and unemployment would persist, no matter what educational reforms were implemented 1.

However, despite these limitations, Todd's educational reforms were of considerable importance in the contribution they made towards the overall development of African education and advancement considering the constraints which confronted Todd and the missionaries in implementing the reforms. Their significance in both historical and future contexts can not be underestimated.

The three themes discussed in this study are of major importance in the history of African education in Southern Rhodesia. These themes and issues are important in terms of understanding the origins and development of past policies on the basis of which African secondary education was developed. An understanding of the achievements and limitations of past

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1. See David Alexander, "Community Based In-Service Teacher Education Programme and Education Extension Centres developed by the North East Group of Teachers' Colleges, Thailand", British Council, 1979, p.30.
policies, programmes and reforms may assist in determining future patterns and the course of educational development in post-colonial Southern Rhodesia to meet the needs and aspirations of the vast majority.
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ii) Southern Rhodesia General Correspondence/D,

and contain Letters and Annual reports of the Bishop of Southern Rhodesia on further developments in the growth of Christian and educational work. The volume also contains letters and reports of priests and lay workers. Letters and Reports for 1934 to 1939 are particularly important because they contain plans for the establishment of African secondary education and are a record of consultations made between the Anglicans, other churches and the Department of Native Education.
iii) Mashonaland Diocese

Files 1940 to 1952 contain letters of the Bishop of Mashonaland and other Church Officials on various aspects of the growth of the Church, the establishment of the new diocese and overall educational work, but the files are particularly important because they relate to the establishment and development of Anglican secondary education for Africans with special reference to St. Augustines' Penhalonga secondary school. Also contained are letters from the Rev. A. Winter to the SPG Board concerning the development of the school and correspondence between the Bishop of Mashonaland Diocese and the Community of the Resurrection concerning joint participation in developing secondary education. Of special significance is the insight the letters give into the conflict between missionaries and the Government over secondary educational policy between 1946 and 1952.

iv) Mashonaland Diocese Correspondence 1940 - 1952

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Mash./EX.DS/C.; 1950
Mash./EX.DS/C., 1951 - 52.

Mashonaland Diocese Files 1953 to 1971 are closed Archives. They cover two important periods discussed in the thesis,
(a) the Federation period 1953 - 63
(b) the Rhodesia Front period 1963 - 71.

Several aspects of Anglican religious and educational work are recorded, but the files are particularly rich in information on the expansion of Anglican secondary educational work especially during Todd and Whitehead's period. The files contain Letters and Annual Reports of the Bishop of Mashonaland Diocese, Principals of Anglican secondary schools, correspondence between the diocese and the Department of Native/African Education. They also contain Government Education circulars issued by Todd, Whitehead and Rhodesia Front administrations, and correspondence between the diocese and other churches. The files, on the whole, are of major importance in terms of the understanding of Anglican educational policy and programmes as well as the differences between the attitudes and objectives of the policies of Todd's government and the Rhodesia Front regime on African education in general and secondary education in particular. The files are classified as follows:-

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Mash./D/C/TF 267, General File 1960-68.
Mash./D/C/TF 551, General File 1971-73.

vi) Matebeleland Diocese Correspondence and Annual Reports.
The files found relevant cover a variety of aspects on
Anglican educational work in Matebeleland. They include Letters and Annual Reports of the diocesan Bishop, reports from school principals and plans for the establishment and funding of secondary schools in the region. Also reflected are the attitudes of the Anglican Church towards the political unrest between 1960 and 1963. All the files are restricted and confidential.

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Missionary Reports 1910 - containing statistics.
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Missionary Reports 1920 - Problems of A.S. Cripps  
schools as a result of non co-operation with the  
Education Department.

Missionary Reports 1921 - St. Augustines taking  
students for Holy Orders.

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Principal of Domboshawa Government School - the  
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creation of the Native Education Department. See Fr. Baker's  
Report.

2) Council for World Missions Archives  (Formerly London  

The relevant files are all restricted and confidential.  
They contain letters of various church missionaries  
and school principals, reports and government circulars  
which relate to many aspects of Church and State  
relations in African education during the period of  
Todd and the Rhodesia Front regimes.

File 97-K 1955-60 Southern Rhodesia: Heads of  
Institutions Committee.


File 97-F 1960-63 Southern Rhodesia: Matebeleland  
Education Committee Minutes.
3) International Missionary Council/Conference for British Missionary Societies Archives.
IMC/CBMS (Africa), Mic/fi 99, Box 1221-1224
Southern Rhodesia.
University of Edinburgh
The box contains minutes of the conferences of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference and correspondences between the SRMC and the International Missionary Council. The sources represent a detailed history of missionary religious and educational work in Southern Rhodesia.

1) Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held at Great Zimbabwe, 24th - 29th June 1915.
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held in Salisbury, 16th - 19th June 1920.
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held in Bulawayo, 5th - 8th July 1922.
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held in Salisbury, 30th May - 4th June 1924.
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held in Salisbury, 2nd - 5th June, 1926.
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held in Salisbury, 26th - 29th March 1928.
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held in Bulawayo, 4th - 8th June, 1930.
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held at the Victoria Falls, 23rd - 28th July 1932.
Conference of Missionaries of Southern Rhodesia with Dr. John R. Mott, Bulawayo, 19th - 20th June 1934.
Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held at Great Zimbabwe, 21st - 25th June 1934.
ii) Southern Rhodesia Conference Correspondence

1) Letters of the Secretary, the Rev. L.P. Hardaker to the International Missionary Council, 1922-28.

11) Miscellaneous letters of the Secretary, the Rev. A.A. Lowe Jr. 1934 - 48.

111) Correspondence of the Secretary with the High Commissioner for Southern Rhodesia 1940.

1IV) Correspondence of the Rev. Frank Noble with the International Missionary Council on the attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government towards African education 1940.

School of Oriental and African Studies, (University of London)
Box 1221 Southern Rhodesia

iii) File - General: Native Affairs


1920: 'Drew's articles on Native Affairs' Part 1, 20 articles by Mr. Alfred Drew.

1921: Home Rule for Rhodesia: Referendum proposed. Also include Notes on Native Affairs in Southern Rhodesia, compiled by A.S. Cripps (S.P.G.) missionary 14th May 1921.

1922: (newscutting) Times 14th May 1922 Southern Rhodesia: Conference at Cape Town. Include terms of the new Constitution.


1925: Extract from Report of Chief Native Commissioner 1924 - Labour supply in Rhodesia
and Memorandum for the Dominion Office 'Segregation Proposals of Land Commission in Southern Rhodesia' by A.S. Cripps, 10th November 1925.


1934: Notes on problems of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.


iv) File - General: Education

1921: Representations to Sir Drummond Chaplin, Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, from T. Jesse Jones regarding observations of Commission on Education.


1923: Statistical Report: Rhodesian Mission Methodist Episcopal Church: Memorandum by Mr. S.J. Lenfesty, Inspector of schools, regarding Item 21 of Imperial Education Conference 'Special Means of Educating non European races within the Empire with a view to developing their highest usefulness to themselves and to the Empire'.

: Report of Visit of Inspection, Domboshawa School 21st - 22nd November 1923 by J.L. Brandy and S.J. Lenfesty

1924: Details of Commission to enquire into the Matter of Native Education in all its bearings 1924.

1929: Letter from Methodist Episcopal Church to Rev. J.H. Oldham regarding report from the Government on control of Education.

v) File - Director of Native Development

Folder - Mr. H.S. Kergwin

1919 - 1925: Correspondence, H.S. Kergwin to J.H. Oldham regarding preparation of Report on Native Development:
role of missionaries; meeting with Dr. T.J. Jones. Phelps-Stokes Commission visit; Paper "An Educational Experiment" read at Ethnological Section and Report of the Advisory Committee on Education; agricultural and industrial education, Kergwin's visit to America sponsored by Phelps-Stokes Fund.

Folder - Mr. H. Jowitt

1930-4 Correspondence between J.H. Oldham and Harold Jowitt regarding regulations under Native Development Act 1929; Native Affairs Department.

vi) Box 1222 Southern Rhodesia


1912: Southern Rhodesia: Native Schools Ordinance 1912.

1920: Southern Rhodesia: Correspondence with the Anti Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society Cmd. 547

vii) Box 292 Southern Rhodesia (1948-64)

This box is restricted and contains correspondence of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference with the International Missionary Council and Minutes of the meetings of the Executive Council of the Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference.

File No. J. General 1948: Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference correspondence with the SCL/CMS.

Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council of the Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference held in Salisbury, 14th December 1954.

Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council of the Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference held in Salisbury, 15th December 1955.

Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council of the Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference held in Salisbury, 13th December 1956.

Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council of the Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference held in Salisbury, 29th December 1957.
Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council of the Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference held at Goromonzi, 14th December 1958.

Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council of the Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference held in Salisbury, 10th December, 1959.


Box 293 Southern Rhodesia (1955-60)
This box is also restricted and contains
1) Papers relating to Percy Ibbotson Memorial Fund 1956 - 57.
111) Consultative Board Minutes 1955-60.
1IV) 'Dissent'.
V) Newspaper cuttings and speeches by G. Huggins 1959-60.

4) Society of Jesus Archives Farm Street Church, London.
Zambezi Mission Letters. These are correspondences between missionaries of the Society in Southern Rhodesia and their London headquarters. They relate mostly to the history of the Society in the colony and cover many aspects of religious and educational work.

i) Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 202-375, 1890-91
Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 376-430, 1892
Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 407-430, 1892
Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 431-475, 1893
Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 476-480, 1894
Zambezi Mission Letter Nos. 516-552, 1895
Zambezi Mission U/18 Letter Nos. 553-639, 1896-1913
ii) 5/3 Mission Letters 367-489, 1902
5/4 Colleges 490-591
BY/1, 1-46 Title Deeds, Zambezi Mission 1902.
BY/2, 47-139 Memorials of the visitation of the
BY/3 Correspondence 140-231, 1920-27 include
letters from school principals and missionaries.
BY/7 Correspondence 382-436.
Other missionary letters were published in
Letters and Notices by Manresa Press. The following
volumes were found relevant:

iii) Letters and Notices Vol. 22, 1893-94
Letters and Notices Vol. 23, 1895-96
Letters and Notices Vol. 24, 1897-98
Letters and Notices Vol. 25, 1899-1900
Letters and Notices Vol. 26, 1901-02
Letters and Notices Vol. 27, 1903-04
Letters and Notices Vol. 28, 1905-06
Letters and Notices Vol. 29, 1907-08
Letters and Notices Vol. 33, 1915-16
Letters and Notices Vol. 37, 1922-23

5) Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society Archives, London
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
The sources are a comprehensive record of the history of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Southern Rhodesia. They include early biographical notes on missionaries who founded the church in the colony, correspondences and synod minutes which cover all aspects of the church's religious and educational work. Almost every file was found relevant.

i) Biographical Central Africa Boxes (B/C/A/B).
B/C/A/B.6., Papers of Owen Watkins and Isaacc Shimmin and correspondence in microfilm 1890-1892.
B/C/A/B.8., Rev. S. Douglas Gray, Circular Letters, Circuit and District Reports.
ii) **Correspondence**: The incoming correspondence is arranged as follows:-

- Transvaal Box (C/T/B), 1891-1896
- Mashonaland Box (C/M/B), 1891-1899
- Rhodesia Box (C/R/B), 1899-1904, Box 825
- Rhodesia Box (C/R/B), 1905-1917, Box 826
- Rhodesia Box (C/R/B), 1917-1923, Box 827
- Rhodesia Box (C/R/B), 1924-1928, Box 828
- Rhodesia Box (C/R/B), 1928-1932, Box 829
- Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 1932-1936, Box 834
- Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 1936-1940, Box 835
- Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 1940-1945, Box 836
- Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 1945-1948

iii) **Synod Minutes**: These are arranged as follows:-

- Transvaal and Rhodesia 1900-1905, Box 345
- Rhodesia and Minutes Box 1912-1922, Box 349
- South Africa Box (S/M/S/A/B), 1889-1899
- South Africa Box (S/M/S/A/B), 1900-1905
- South Africa Box (S/M/S/A/B), 1906-1911
- Rhodesia Box (S/M/R/B), 1912-1922
- Rhodesia Box (S/M/R/B), 1923-1933
- Southern Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1934-1939
- Southern Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1940-1945
- Southern Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1946-1947
- Southern Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1948-1949

All the Correspondence and Synod Minutes Boxes from 1950 onwards are closed and confidential. They are kept by the Secretary of the Wesleyan Methodist Church at the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, 25, Marylebone Road, London.

iv) **Correspondence 1948-1971**

The correspondence boxes are arranged as follows:-

- Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 1948-1952
- Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 1953-1957
- Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 1957-1960
- Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 1961-1963
- Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 1964-1970
- Southern Rhodesia Box (C/S/R/B), 1971-1973
v) Synod Minutes 1950-1971
Southern Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1950-1953
Southern Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1954-1955
Southern Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1956-1957
Southern Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1957-1960
Southern Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1961-1963
Southern Rhodesia Box (S/M/S/R/B), 1964-1966
Rhodesia Box (S/M/R/B), 1967-1970
Rhodesia Box (S/M/R/B), 1971-1973

B) Southern Rhodesia Government Reports

1) British South Africa Company Reports available at the Royal Commonwealth Society, Northumberland Avenue, London.
   British South Africa Company Reports 1896-1900
   British South Africa Company Reports 1901-1902
   British South Africa Company Reports 1902-1914
   British South Africa Company Reports 1914-1922

11) Reports on African Education 1926-1971. These are found at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 27 Russell Square, University of London.
   The Reports are contained in the following publications:

111) Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year ended 31st December 1926.
    Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year ended 31st December 1927.
    Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year ended 31st December 1928.
    Report of the Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December, 1929.
    Report of the Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December 1930.
    Report of the Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December 1931.
    Report of the Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December 1932.
Report of the Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December, 1933.
Report of the Acting Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December 1934.
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December, 1936.
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December, 1937.
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Report of the Chief Native Commissioner and the Secretary for Native Affairs for the year ended 31st December, 1939.
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs and Chief Native Commissioner for the year ended 31st December, 1940.
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December, 1941.
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Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December, 1944.
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December, 1945.
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December, 1946.
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development for the year ended 31st December, 1947.
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief
Native Commissioner and Director of Native
Development for the year ended 31st December, 1943.
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief
Native Commissioner and Director of Native
Development for the year 1949.
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief
Native Commissioner and Director of Native
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Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief
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Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief
Native Commissioner and Director of Native
Development for the year 1952.
Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief
Native Commissioner and Director of Native
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Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief
Native Commissioner and Director of Native
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Annual Report by the Secretary for African Education
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for the year 1961.
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1V) Government Commission of Enquiries Reports

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V) Other Relevant Education Reports

V1) Other Southern Rhodesian Government Publications:
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