Social change and nationalism in modern Scotland.

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Introduction.

At the General Election of October 1974, the Scottish National Party achieved 30 per cent of the Scottish vote. The aim of thesis is to account for this rapidly achieved electoral success on the basis of an analysis of patterns of social change in modern Scotland. The study offers a range of widely differing perspectives on this single problem. As far as possible however these perspectives are presented as aspects of a structured account.

On the one hand I have been both theoretically and methodologically eclectic in order to get as many triangulations on the problem as possible. On the other hand, the overall shape has been determined by the need to inter-relate these differing perspectives and the levels of social reality on which they focus.

The first years of work on this study were spent in a search for an adequate theoretical framework and initially the intent was to produce a primarily theoretical work. At this stage, the two most important sources of inspiration were the works of Alain Touraine and Jurgen Habermas. From Habermas I gained a sense of the importance of communicative processes in the generation of orientations to the state in late capitalist society. Touraine's theoretical legacy has been equally pervasive
but in a rather perverse manner. I had originally approached Scottish nationalism intending to apply a Tourainian framework to it as a social movement. As my topic shifted to that of explaining the electoral success of the S.N.P. it became clear that the categories developed by Touraine for the analysis of 'post-industrial movements' were not appropriate. What I did learn from Touraine was a 'totalizing' approach to the problem.

As the opportunity arose to introduce a good deal more empirical material than I had originally intended or thought possible, the balance of the study shifted. The main legacy of the early theoretical work is the structure of the study as a whole.

If electoral trends are to be understood in terms of an analysis of social change, social change cannot merely be regarded as something happening 'in the background' or as something which must simply be 'taken into account'. In the real world, there is no neat dividing line between the factors which influence how people vote and the pattern of social change as a whole in all its complexity. The relatively complex structure of the thesis is only a reflection of the complexity of social change.

Given this rather labyrinthine structure, the main purpose of this introduction is to indicate the contents of the various chambers and, more importantly, to provide some guiding threads to show how they are connected.

Chapter 1 provides an empirical lead-in to the more theoretically based chapters which follow. It is purely and
simply an exercise in data reduction - the data being the patterns of voting in Scotland at the six general elections from 1964 to 1979. In particular it aims at illustrating what could be called national (Scottish), regional and constituency levels of voting change. The final section of Chapter 1 presents the correlation of S.N.P. voting with sex and age at the S.N.P.'s peak election of October 1974.

Chapter 2 represents a shift to a quite different level of analysis. It should be seen as providing a form of 'deep theoretical background' for the rest of the study. It is an exploration of how Marxism has tended to handle 'the national level of analysis'. This exploration was provoked by a need to understand some of the theoretical reasons why it has often seemed plausible to apply an analytical imagery derived from Third World to Scotland's present condition. I also explore some aspects of Marx's own approach to the 'national level'. The main purpose here is to understand how Marx's 'blind spot' with respect to the national level came about, in order to provide a relatively solid footing for applying some of his insights to the quite different historical conditions of today.

The following four chapters divide into two strands. One strand, Chapters 3 and 4, is aimed at grounding an understanding of nationalism in late capitalist society in terms of what can most concisely be expressed as the experience of the state. The other strand, contained in Chapters 5 and 6, presents a more conventional account of
social change in modern Scotland.

Chapters 3 and 4 run very much in tandem. Chapter 3 develops a concept of ideology which enables us to deal with the ideological implications of the shift from liberal to late capitalist society. Chapter 4 outlines the successive satisfaction of several conditions of possibility for the electoral success of the S.N.P. The first was the emergence at a British level of the conception of a national economy which can be managed. Only in this context, could the conception emerge of Scotland as an analogous economic unit. Finally the chapter traces some of the mechanisms by which this framework was transmitted to the mass electorate.

Turning to the other strand of analysis, Chapter 5 is a 'socio-graphic' account of social change in modern Scotland. The aspects covered are industrial and occupational structure and patterns of social mobility and female employment with a final section dealing with some relevant demographic aspects of social change. One main concern of the chapter is to show the structural interconnections between these different domains. The other is to assess the extent to which such patterns of social change in Scotland were typical of the rest of Britain.

Chapter 6 is an attempt to take us closer to an understanding of how these patterns of social change were experienced. This provides a context for an analysis of the socio-economic correlates of S.N.P. voting on the basis of the October 1974 Scottish Election Survey. Finally,
television is discussed as a crucial mediator between the experience of everyday life and the experience of national politics.

Chapter 7 attempts to pull some of the earlier themes together in the context of a focus on the role of Scottish identity and symbolism.

The main problem involved in adopting a wide-ranging approach is that inevitably the exploration of each perspective on the problem has had to be stopped short in a rather arbitrary manner. I am acutely aware that many individual sections deserve more comprehensive treatment. My only justification is that the most important thing is to get a sense of how different levels of social and political change are interwoven. This brings us to what is in one sense a problem but in another sense an advantage. In attempting to show how an array of different theoretical and substantive levels inter-relate, what emerges most clearly is the nature of the gaps remaining to be bridged. The chasm which I see as yawning widest, although no doubt others will pinpoint different lacunae, is that between the general and theoretical consideration of the treatment of social change at the national level in Chapter 2 and the socio-graphic treatment of social change in Scotland in Chapter 5. Similarly, although Chapters 3 and 4 run parallel, one theoretical and one more concrete, their relationship is anything but unproblematic. In general I have tried to suggest connections even if I have not been
able to establish them adequately and despite the intellectual vertigo which this causes.

When I started work on this topic in 1976, the growth of the 'Scottish nationalism industry' was still accelerating. Since then it has reached full tide and ebbed away again. This study takes a rather broad, structural approach, standing well back from events. I hope that the flood of words on Scottish nationalism has to some extent relieved me of the responsibility of spending time on a detailed historical account. Although I do not refer to them specifically, the following works in particular have been invaluable in providing a sense of historical security: Hanham's *Scottish Nationalism* (1969); Harvie's *Scotland and Nationalism* (1977); Brand's *The National Movement in Scotland* (1978); Drucker and Brown's *The Politics of Nationalism and Devolution* (1980) and *The Referendum Experience: Scotland 1979* (1981) edited by Bochel, Denver and McCartney. In Chapter 4 in particular I have found myself echoing the insights of Kellas' *The Scottish Political System* (1975).

I have found myself operating in the space between two approaches to the understanding of Scottish nationalism which, to judge from the extent they refer to each other, might as well be on different planets. The first is the broadly Marxist approach concentrating on placing the Scottish experience in its long term 'world-historical' context. The second is that of electoral survey analysis.

Not surprisingly I have found myself defining my
approach in these two directions. On the one hand, in terms of and to an extent against the work of Tom Nairn and on the other hand in terms of and to an extent against the analyses of the Scottish Election Survey. If these in particular have been the focus of my criticism it is only because of their importance to the process of the development of the analysis.
Chapter 1.
The Pattern of Electoral Change

Introduction.

This chapter sets out the explanandum of the study as a whole. In any study which is to any extent structural however explanation is never so neatly one way and placing the electoral success of the Scottish National Party firmly in its temporal and spatial context itself provides many of the most important clues as to its social meaning. This initial empirical account is not angled towards presenting only those patterns which are explicable in terms of the subsequent more theoretical discussion but simply aims to provide as transparent a picture as possible and if the account raises more questions than are subsequently answered, well and good.

The purpose of this first chapter is simply to set out the main trends in voting at General Elections in the period which encompassed the electoral rise and fall of the Scottish National Party.

Methodologically the chapter can be regarded as a mapping of surface events while the rest of the study will be devoted to mapping the 'deeper' levels of social change which have worked to determine them.

Recent electoral trends in Scotland have been well documented. (1) The ambitions of the present survey are limited to providing a minimum description highlighting
broad trends of spatial and temporal variation.

The main focus will be on the six General Elections from 1964 to 1979. One of the more perilous forms of political commentary in Scotland in recent years has been prognostication about the electoral prospects of the S.N.P.

### Table 1.1A. Trends in S.N.P. voting 1945 to 1979.

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Seats fought</th>
<th>Share of vote in seats fought</th>
<th>Share of total vote</th>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>65</td>
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<td>11.4</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>22.1</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>71</td>
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### Table 1.1B. Other main parties, percentage share of total vote, 1964 to 1979.

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<td>(71)</td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
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<td>(71)</td>
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<td>(71)</td>
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<td>(71)</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
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<td>(24)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
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However, the six General Elections in question can safely be said to have constituted a particularly well-marked phase in the electoral history of the S.N.P. By 1979, the all but halving of the S.N.P. vote compared with 1974 heralded the end of this phase. Most recently, the result
of the 1983 General Election, although it cannot be included in the analysis, with S.N.P. support down to 11% confirms the ending of the phase.

Table 1.1A gives the number of seats fought by the S.N.P., its share of the votes in those seats and its share of the total Scottish vote from 1945. Table 1.1B gives the share of the vote of the other main parties from 1964 to 1979. The tables largely speak for themselves and I will leave further discussion of these national trends to be woven into the analysis of regional trends, since the two trends interrelate in an intriguing way. The one point which should be made here is that it can be seen from Table 1A that the 1964, 1966 and 1970 General Elections saw a 'widening' rather than a 'deepening' of S.N.P. support in that the S.N.P.'s increasing share of the total Scottish vote resulted more from their contesting more seats rather than from achieving higher shares in the seats they did contest. Only from 1970 when the SNP first contested the vast majority of Scottish seats did the 'deepening' process take off.

Regional trends.

We only begin to get a feel for the texture of S.N.P. support when we begin to explore trends at a regional level. The methodology employed will aim at giving a panoramic overview followed by a more detailed probing of
shifts in the crucial period after 1970 when the S.N.P. was operating, in terms of seats fought, at a national level.

Table 1.2 gives regional trends in the mean constituency share of the vote for the four main parties from 1964 to 1979 (see the Key to Figure 2 on pp28-29 for the constituency composition of the ten regions used.)

The normal way of analysing regional shifts in voting is to add up all the votes for each party in each region and to calculate the share of the total regional vote obtained by each party. Given that the S.N.P. fought only a fifth of all seats in 1964 and around a third in 1966, and that the number of seats fought by the Liberals fluctuated markedly throughout the period, such a method would lead to a distortion if what is really wanted is an idea of trends in the share of the vote only in those constituencies which were actually fought.

The alternative which I have used throughout is to base all the calculations on each party's percentage share of the vote at the constituency level. (2)

For example, in 1970 the SNP fought five of the six seats I have classified as comprising the Highlands and Islands region. Thus the SNP 'share' for the region was calculated simply by averaging the SNP's share of the vote in the five constituencies it actually fought. This means of course that the percentages for all four parties in a given region may add up to more than 100%. The figures in Table 2 do not represent party shares of the regional vote but the average constituency share of the vote obtained by
each party.

The main stumbling block to a series such as this is the major revision of constituency boundaries between the General Elections of 1970 and February 1974 (3). In such a situation one is pulled by the opposing demands of strict continuity and completeness of coverage. For the purposes of the present regional analysis, it was decided to retain all constituencies which had maintained any degree of continuity. Given that most of the redistribution took place within the regions, the degree of resultant distortion at the regional level is likely to be small and is more than compensated by the completeness of coverage.

Given this extremely loose criterion, only one of the constituencies extant from 1974 to 1979 was dropped entirely - Glasgow Queen's Park which had only 52% continuity with the former Glasgow Gorbals. In addition two constituencies, Dunbartonshire East and Lanark were each split into two at reorganisation. For the purposes of this analysis the two resulting pairs, East and Central Dunbartonshire, and Lanark and East Kilbride, were recombined into the original units.

The constituencies were assigned to regions on the basis of fairly common-sense criteria - primarily geographical contiguity, the separation of rural from urban constituencies, and maintaining the integrity of the cities. Table 1.2, as is the case with all large and complex tables, is itself not very helpful for revealing broad patterns and
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>Con</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renfrewshire and Ayrshire</td>
<td>Con</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
trends. Figure 1 represents an attempt to present the information in Table 1.2 in as concise a way as possible, using the technique of multi-dimensional scaling purely as a tool for data reduction. It must be stressed that the multi-dimensional scaling plot is used purely to give a visual overview of the regional trends since details will inevitably be distorted by the technique.

The principle involved is simplicity itself. Each election for each region is treated as a single data point. Thus each data point consists of four percentages e.g. the Highlands and Islands in 1970 are defined as a data point with the four values of 30.4, 28.4, 21.5 and 35.0.

The first step is to calculate the percentage differences between all pairs of the 60 data points (6 elections multiplied by 10 regions) e.g. the percentage difference between the Highlands and Islands in 1970 and Southern Scotland in 1970 is the sum of the absolute differences between the four pairs of party percentages i.e. the difference between 47.2 and 30.4 equals 16.8 plus the difference between 27.3 and 28.4 equals 0.9 plus the difference between 12.8 and 21.5 equals 8.7 plus the difference between 25.6 and 35.0 equals 9.4 equals 35.8

This figure, 35.8, can be taken as a measure of the dissimilarity between the voting pattern in the Highlands and Islands in the 1970 General Election and that in Southern Scotland at the same election. The same principle is applied when the region is the same but the election is different or when both region and election are different.
Figure 1. Regional voting trajectories, 1964 to 1979
This dissimilarity measure, the percentage difference,\(^{(4)}\) is calculated for all pairs of region/election data points and the resulting triangular matrix of dissimilarities fed into the multi-dimensional scaling program \(^{(5)}\). All the program tries to do is to reproduce these dissimilarities in terms of distances in the plot of data points (i.e. Figure 1). The program tries to maximise the extent to which the smaller are the percentage differences between the election/regions (i.e. the more similar are the voting patterns), the closer together are the corresponding points on the plot.

Given that the 60 data points consist of 6 successive elections for each of the 10 regions, we can 'join up the dots' for each region, producing a 'track' or 'trajectory' for the region which can be seen as tracing its motion through 'political space'.

Given that each data point consists only of four percentage values, we could plot the points perfectly in four dimensions. The trouble is that we can't visualise patterns in four dimensions and have great difficulty in doing so in three dimensions. What the program has done is to squeeze information which needs four dimensions for perfect representation, into a more comprehensible two dimensional form. It does this by squeezing out fine detail and idiosyncratic variation, retaining only the broad pattern of variation.

The points to remember in interpreting a plot such as Figure 1 are that
1. the closer together are two points, the more similar are their voting patterns likely to be

2. the more parallel are the 'tracks' joining two pairs of data points, the more similar will be the changes in voting patterns indexed by these tracks

3. the longer a track is, the more change in voting pattern there has been between the two dates for the region concerned.

Thus armed, we can glean a good deal from this one plot, which is purely and simply a condensation of the information contained in Table 1.2, to which we can turn for confirmation.

The most obvious feature is the division of the regions into two clear groups - a tight cluster of the 'non-peripheral' and more urban regions on the left and a looser cluster of the more peripheral and rural regions - the Highlands and Islands, the North-East and Tayside and Southern Scotland - on the right.

The major differentiating factors involved here are the generally higher Liberal vote and lower Labour vote in the more peripheral and rural regions.

This could be seen to be related to the persistence in the more rural and peripheral areas of what has been termed the 'the politics of independence' (6). The term has nothing to do with independence for Scotland but refers to the relative independence of politics in these regions from national party structures and trends - the most obvious
manifestation of this being the prolonged influence in many of the local authorities in these areas of 'Independent' councillors. In terms of the pattern of voting, the higher Liberal and lower Labour vote in these areas can be seen as a direct reflection of the fact that these areas were to a certain extent by-passed by the national trends whereby the Labour Party took over from the Liberal Party as the main opposition to the Conservatives.

This is only one aspect of the way in which 'the politics of independence' reflects the extent to which politics in the periphery has not been 'nationalized' or fully absorbed into the dominant national pattern (whether British or Scottish).

Another indicator of the divide between the urban/non-peripheral and the rural/peripheral regions is that whereas, especially after 1970, the changes in voting patterns in the urban regions show a close parallelism from region to region, the trajectories of the three peripheral regions are somewhat more heterogeneous, with the Highlands and Islands having a particularly idiosyncratic pattern.

In terms of the kinds of social forces underlying these trends, voting changes in the non-peripheral regions would seem, especially from 1970 onwards when the SNP was fighting the vast majority of seats, to have been governed primarily by forces operating at a national level to produce these strikingly parallel shifts. Of course, these national forces were also at work in the three peripheral regions but there they were operating as an overlay to a
much more strongly constituted and independent local political system. Even at this level of aggregation, the effect of personal factors, themselves an aspect of the continued relevance of micro-structural factors in small communities, can be perceived. Much of the idiosyncracy of the track of the Highlands and Islands can perhaps be attributed to the effect of the continued personal hegemony of Jo Grimond in Orkney and Shetland for the Liberals and the rise to a position of almost non-partisan community representative on the part of Donald Stewart in the Western Isles.

The methodological implication of this contrast is that in order to understand the growth of the SNP on the periphery, the situation to be examined in each area, constituency, town or village will be a complex interaction between local and national factors, whereas in the rest of the country, the balance of causality will be found to lie much more at the national level - as indexed by the relative parallelism of voting changes in these areas - or, to use the more familiar term, the uniformity of swing.

Although the fit is inevitably imperfect, the share of the vote of at least three of the parties seems to be represented fairly unambiguously by directions in the 'political space' represented in Figure 1.

The Labour vote increases as one moves leftwards across the plot in a direction 'just North of East'. The Conservative vote increases as one moves towards the top of
the plot in a North North-Westerly direction. Most clearly of all, the S.N.P. vote increases towards the bottom of the plot. Apart from the obvious divergence of the peripheral and non-peripheral regions with the Liberal vote generally higher in the former, the directionality of the Liberal vote in the plot is not so clear cut.

For looking at more detailed aspects of the regional trends we are safer working more closely with numerical changes derived from Table 1.2 and for this purpose the discussion will focus separately on the three inter-election periods from 1970 onwards when the S.N.P. was contesting most or all of the Scottish seats.

Regional voting shifts: 1970 to February 1974

The general pattern of change between the General Election of 1970 and that of February 1974 was that the S.N.P. picked up votes from both Labour and Conservative but took rather more from Labour, so that whereas in England the two party swing was 1.3% to Labour, in Scotland it was 1.2% to the Conservatives. (Butler and Kavanagh, 1974, p278).

More interesting however are the regional variations in the balance of vote loss by Labour and Conservative. Table 1.3 gives the the regional average percentage point change in the share of the vote gained by the four main parties in the constituencies that they fought. (These figures are simply the difference between the 1970 and February 1974 figures in Table 1.2).
Table 1.3. Regions. Percentage point change in mean share of vote in constituencies fought. 1970 to February 1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>Prop. change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>+6.9</td>
<td>+7.5</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fife</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>-11.1</td>
<td>+10.3</td>
<td>+6.1</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeen/Dundee</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
<td>+17.6</td>
<td>+6.7</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
<td>+13.9</td>
<td>+3.9</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renfrew/Ayr</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>+7.3</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanarkshire</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>+7.6 ( +11.2)</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>+10.1 (+9.9)</td>
<td>-19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands + Is.</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>+13.1</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.E. + Tayside</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>+13.8</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
<td>+5.1</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Bracketed figures. No Liberals stood in region in 1970 and 1 in Lanarkshire, 3 in Glasgow in February 1974)

In terms of relative vote loss by Labour and Conservative, the seven non-peripheral regions divide into three main groups.

First are the three regions in which Labour lost around double the votes lost by the Conservatives - Edinburgh, Fife and Central. This similarity is reflected in the parallelism of the 1970 to February 1974 tracks of these regions in Figure 1.

On its own is Aberdeen/Dundee which showed the largest shift in terms of losing both Labour and Conservative votes and of gaining SNP votes.

Also losing roughly similar numbers of Labour and Conservative votes but at around half the level of Aberdeen/Dundee come the three 'Western industrial' regions. Glasgow in particular stands out as being the only region to lose fewer Labour votes than Conservative votes between 1970 and February 1974. This is especially
important if we remember that in 1970 the mean constituency share of the Conservatives in Glasgow was 35% whereas that of Labour was 55%. So if we take the percentage point loss between 1970 and February 1974 divided by the share of the vote in 1970 as giving us a rough measure of the proportional loss of votes, Glasgow's position is put into even clearer perspective (see last two cols of Table 1.3). Lanarkshire and Glasgow were the only regions to lose an appreciably smaller proportion of Labour votes than Conservative. Renfrew/Ayrshire and Aberdeen/Dundee lost a similar proportion while in the rest of Scotland, Labour lost proportionately more votes than the Conservatives.

This trend was most pronounced in the Highlands and Islands and North-East and Tayside regions. Although in absolute terms the falls in the share of Conservative and Labour were very close to the national trend (e.g. 5.0% and 8.4% in the case of the Highlands and Islands), as a proportion of the percentage voting Conservative and Labour in 1970 the difference was much greater, with the Labour vote being cut by almost a third in the Highlands and Islands and by almost a half in the North-East and Tayside.

One important aspect of what was happening was pinpointed by Michael Steed in his analysis of the results of the February 1974 Election:

"... where conditions were made favourable for tactical switching, it was extremely marked." (in Butler and Kavanagh, 1974, p321).

He picked out as satisfying these conditions the four seats in Scotland in which a Nationalist had won second place in
a Tory seat in 1970 with a margin of less than 25%. In the same format as Table 1.3, the changes were as follows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argyll</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>-12.7</td>
<td>+19.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moray and Nairn</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>-15.7</td>
<td>+21.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banff</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-11.0</td>
<td>+23.2</td>
<td>-8.0</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeenshire East</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>-11.3</td>
<td>+21.0</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In these seats, the extremes of a wider pattern, the Conservative share of the vote went down by around an eighth while the Labour vote slumped by from a half to two thirds.

Thus at the two poles of the political spectrum of Scotland's constituencies, Glasgow's Labour strongholds, and traditionally rural Conservative seats, there were parallel processes of opposite political sign. In Glasgow, it was the Tory vote which slumped to the relatively limited benefit of the SNP while in the periphery it was a collapsing Labour vote which gave the SNP several victories. (7)

Regional voting shifts. February 1974 to October 1974

As we have seen, in the period 1970 to February 1974, a major feature of patterns of voting change was the differential crumbling of the Labour vote—both in percentage point terms and, even more markedly, in proportionate terms. In contrast, the single most dramatic feature of the period February to October 1974, apart from the SNP surge itself, was the way the Labour vote stabilized in all regions, so that the increase in the
share of the vote of the SNP was matched only by a drop in Conservative and Liberal support. In Figure 1 this can be seen very clearly reflected in the parallel tracks for the period February 1974 to October 1974 (between the '+' markers) of the seven non-peripheral regions. The tracks for Edinburgh, Fife, Aberdeen/Dundee and Central appear to form a kind of 'wavefront' with the tracks for Renfrew/Ayr, Lanarkshire and Glasgow, stepped back from but parallel to this front.

Table 1.4 again gives the change in the four main parties average constituency share of the vote from February to October 1974.

Table 1.4. Regions. Percentage point change in mean share of vote in constituencies fought. February 1974 to October 1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>Lib</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
<td>+9.8</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fife</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>+10.1</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeen/Dundee</td>
<td>-7.8</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>+7.8</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>+7.7</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renfrew/Ayrshire</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>+9.1</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanarkshire</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>+10.1</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
<td>+6.4</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands and Islands</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
<td>-12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East and Tayside</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>+5.6</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
<td>+7.1</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that there was very little decrease in the share of Labour anywhere in Scotland after February 1974, it would appear that the Labour vote in that election represents very much the maximum penetration of the SNP into the Labour vote of all these areas. In other words it would seem that by February 1974 the SNP had run out of the
'soft' Labour votes the variable crumbling of which had produced much of the variation in trend of the previous inter-election period and before.

By looking at the 'V's formed between the February 1974 to October 1974 tracks and the October 1974 to 1979 tracks, we can see very clearly the variation in this maximum penetration both in terms of the SNP peak share and the 'hard-core minimum' of the Labour vote.

As a rough interpretative approximation, the further down the plot the 'V's of the non-peripheral regions penetrate, the higher was the peak SNP vote. Thus Central represented the greatest penetration with an SNP average in October 1974 of 38%, followed by Aberdeen/Dundee at 33%, Fife at 31%, Lanarkshire at 30%, Glasgow at 27% and finally Renfrew/Ayrshire and Edinburgh at 24%.

Even more interesting is the ordering of these regions in the level of the 'minimum' Labour support of both 1974 elections. The lowest level was reached by Edinburgh at 33%. Then followed Fife, Aberdeen/Dundee and Central at around 39-40% closely followed by Renfrew/Ayr at 41%. Then as we move through Labour's industrial heartland in the West, the Labour vote in Lanarkshire troughed at 47% while the low in Glasgow was 49%.
Regional voting shifts. October 1974 to 1979

Several features of the pattern of change (Table 1.5) from the General Election of October 1974 to that of 1979 deserve comment.

Table 1.5. Regions. Percentage point change in mean share of the vote in constituencies fought. October 1974 to 1979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>Lib</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
<td>+5.9</td>
<td>-13.7</td>
<td>+3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fife</td>
<td>+7.2</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
<td>+8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeen/Dundee</td>
<td>+4.9</td>
<td>+5.6</td>
<td>-11.0</td>
<td>+2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>+8.9</td>
<td>+8.9</td>
<td>-16.5</td>
<td>+3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renfrew/Ayrshire</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
<td>+2.2</td>
<td>-12.2</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanarkshire</td>
<td>+9.0</td>
<td>+8.7</td>
<td>-17.4</td>
<td>+9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
<td>+9.6</td>
<td>-14.9</td>
<td>+4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands and Islands</td>
<td>+4.6</td>
<td>+4.9</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.E. and Tayside</td>
<td>+6.2</td>
<td>+2.8</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>+3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>+4.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-9.0</td>
<td>+4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With respect to the extent of the SNP collapse, one could not have a clearer contrast between the 'peripheral' and 'non-peripheral' regions. In all three peripheral regions the decline was less than ten percentage points, in all seven non-peripheral it was more.

The general pattern was for the decline in the SNP vote to be matched by roughly equivalent increases in the Conservative and Labour vote. The most important exceptions to this were, at one extreme, Glasgow, with a much larger increase in the Labour vote than in the Conservative, and at the other end of the spectrum, Southern Scotland and the North-East and Tayside where part of the relative resilience of the SNP vote appears to have been associated with the failure of Labour recovery to match Tory recovery after October 1974.
Regional voting shifts: 1970 to 1979

Looking at the pattern of change over the whole period 1970 to 1979 (Table 1.6) allows us to see how the trends within each of the three inter-electoral periods already discussed combined to produce an overall pattern of change in the 1970s.

Table 1.6. Regions. Percentage point change in mean share of the vote in constituencies fought. 1970 to 1979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>Lib</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>+3.0</td>
<td>+6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fife</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>+5.8</td>
<td>+8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeen/Dundee</td>
<td>-11.6</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>+14.4</td>
<td>+2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>+5.0</td>
<td>+3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renfrew/Ayrshire</td>
<td>-9.3</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>+4.2</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanarkshire</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>+2.2</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
<td>(+14.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>+4.3</td>
<td>+1.6</td>
<td>(+9.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands and Is.</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>+5.4</td>
<td>-10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.E. and Tayside</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>+12.3</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>+3.3</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Bracketed figures: no Liberals stood in region in 1970)

In terms of the overall Labour/Conservative balance at a Scottish level, the decisive period would appear to have been February to October 1974. In the period 1970 to February 1974, the Conservative decline was accompanied by a smaller Labour decline (see Table 1.1B). Between February and October 1974 the Conservative decline continued while that of Labour was halted while both shared equally in the recovery of the period October 1974 to May 1979. Thus while the Conservatives had had two periods of decline and one of recovery, adding up to a net loss of six percentage points in the national share of the vote, the Labour Party had
suffered one period of decline, one of stability and largely recovered its ground in the third to leave a net loss of three percentage points.

Turning to the regional trends for the decade, it is clear how much any sustained SNP advance was concentrated in the North-East of the country (North-East and Tayside and Aberdeen/Dundee). The resilience of the SNP vote in the Highlands and Islands should also be noted, given that it started from the highest base there in 1970. Conversely it is clear how little lasting progress the SNP made in Lanarkshire and Glasgow.

An equally clear pattern can be seen in the relative loss of votes by Labour and Conservative. In only two regions did Labour lose more votes than the Conservatives - the Highlands and Islands and the North-East and Tayside. The modal pattern was for regions, in line with the national trend, to lose more Conservative votes than they did Labour. In only two regions did the average Labour share increase - Glasgow and Lanarkshire.

So, just as Scotland as a whole has been represented as an extreme in a Britain-wide pattern of North-South polarization (8) so we see a similar pattern of political polarization within Scotland - the areas beginning the decade with the lowest Labour share marginally losing Labour votes relative to Conservative and the regions with the largest Labour share in 1970 ending the decade with an even larger share.
The pattern of change at constituency level.

So far, the primary aim has been to identify broad regional patterns of change in voting. At the lowest level of aggregation however, the constituency itself, there is an added layer of complexity.

William Miller has given an excellent account of the extent to which SNP success (and in particular the winning of seats) has been associated with factors operating at the constituency level. In the first place, the S.N.P. polled relatively well at General Elections, compared with national trends, in seats which they had previously won in by-elections. Secondly, as the S.N.P. tide in general ebbed between October 1974 and 1979, the S.N.P. vote 'held up best in the party's best seats' (Miller, 1981, p209). The analysis which follows largely serves to confirm, or rather illustrate, Miller's findings and again should be regarded simply as a search for patterns in the data.

Although it would have been nice to apply the same scaling technique at the constituency level as was applied at the regional level, the number of data points involved (6 elections times, say, 60 constituencies) far exceeds the current capacity of the available multi-dimensional scaling programs and even if they could cope numerically would produce an immensely complex and probably incomprehensible plot. (It is possible to apply the technique already used to limited subsets of constituencies, e.g. all the Highlands and Islands constituencies, and interesting patterns can be discerned.)
As a limited alternative however it was possible to make a stab at scaling constituencies on the basis of a dissimilarity measure assessing how different constituencies were in terms of the pattern of change in voting between 1964 and 1979.

Since the boundary changes which were implemented between the 1970 and February 1974 elections have much more drastic effects on patterns of change at the individual constituency level than they do when the figures are averaged at the regional level, it was necessary to be be rather less permissive in deciding which constituencies to retain.

There can be no hard and fast cut off point. In the end, 10 constituencies were dropped which had a continuity of 76 per cent or less to leave 58 constituency units for the constituency level scaling.

Fortunately, none of the constituencies in the 'peripheral' regions and none of the constituencies in which the S.N.P. had won the seat in a byelection had to be dropped.

The constiuencies dropped, with their degree of continuity in brackets, were, by region:

- **Fife:** Central/WestFife (64%), Dunfermline (66%)
- **Edinburgh:** Central (70%), North (72%), West (70%)
- **Renfrew/Ayr:** Greenock and Port Glasgow (76%)
- **Glasgow:** Cathcart (71%), Central (62%), Kelvingrove (68%), Springburn (71%)

For the purpose of calculating the dissimilarity measure, the pattern of voting change for each constituency was regarded as consisting of a maximum of twenty components.
Each component consisted of the percentage point change in the share of the vote of one party in one inter-election period. In a constituency in which all four parties fought all six elections, we have four parties and five inter-election periods to give twenty components. The next stage was to compare, for each pair of constituencies, the corresponding party/inter-election period components.

If for example in Constituency A the Conservative share of the vote declined from 25% to 15% between the elections of 1970 and February 1974—a decline of 10 percentage points—and in Constituency B, the Conservative share of the vote declined from 25% to 20%—a decline of 5 percentage points—in the same period, the difference between the two constituencies in the change in the Conservative vote is the difference between a decline of 10% and a decline of 5% which equals 5. This calculation was made for each party and each inter-election period and all the resulting absolute differences were added together to give a crude dissimilarity measure.

The fact that all four parties did not stand at all six elections in all 58 constituency units introduces a complicating factor which can be only partially overcome. The fact that in comparing voting changes between two constituencies the same set of parties may not have stood in the two constituencies at either or both of the elections involved will obviously lead to distortion. The problem cannot be completely circumvented.
However the following rules of thumb were adopted in calculating the dissimilarity measure in order to rule out the more obvious distortion due to differences in the parties contesting the two seats.

The change in vote for a given party in a given inter-electoral period was only allowed to contribute to the overall measure of dissimilarity between two constituencies if either of the following two conditions were satisfied:

1. the party had fielded candidates in both elections in both constituencies
   or 2. in the first election the party had not stood in either constituency but in the second election had stood in both constituencies. (9)

This cuts out false comparisons such as would result if e.g. the Liberals had stood in Constituency A in 1964 and 1966 but in Constituency B had stood in 1966 but not in 1964 or vice versa. Obviously comparing the change in the Liberal vote between the two constituencies would in these circumstances be meaningless.

Explicitly excluding such meaningless comparisons however solves only half of the problem. It does not deal with the differential effects on changes in the share of the vote of the other parties contesting the seats of, for example, the Liberals having contested both seats in 1964 and only one in 1966.

Obviously one could try various analytical subterfuges to minimise this distortion but such an attempt would probably involve an overestimate of the precision of this
Figure 2. Constituency voting changes, 1964 to 1979.
Key to Figure 2 and composition of Figure 1 regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Continuity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highlands and Islands.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 H Orkney and Shetland</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 H Caithness and Sutherland</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 H Ross and Cromarty</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 H Western Isles</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 H Inverness</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 H Argyll</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North-East and Tayside</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 N Moray and Nairn</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 N Banff</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 N Aberdeenshire East</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 N Aberdeenshire West</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 N Angus North and Mearns</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 N Angus South</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 N Perth and East Perthshire</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 N Perth, Kinross and West Perthshire</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Scotland</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 S Berwick and East Lothian</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 S Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 S Dumfries</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 S Galloway</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aberdeen and Dundee</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 A Aberdeen North</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 A Aberdeen South</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 D Dundee East</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 D Dundee West</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fife</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 F East Fife</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 F Kirkcaldy</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Central Fife (formerly West Fife)</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Dunfermline</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Edinburgh</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Central</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 E East</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 E Leith</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X North</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 E Pentlands</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 E South</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X West</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued over)
Central

21 C Stirlingshire, Clackmannan and East Stirling 96%
22 C Stirlingshire West 100%
23 C Stirling, Falkirk and Grangemouth 97%
24 C Dunbartonshire West 87%
25 C Dunbartonshire Central/East (formerly East) 100%
26 C West Lothian 100%
27 C Midlothian 100%

Lanarkshire

36 L Bothwell 86%
37 L Coatbridge and Airdrie 100%
38 L Hamilton 81%
39 L Lanarkshire North 87%
40 L Motherwell and Wishaw 97%
41 L Rutherglen 90%
42 L Lanark/East Kilbride (formerly Lanark) 100%

Renfrewshire and Ayrshire

43 R Paisley 100%
44 R Renfrewshire East 81%
45 R Renfrewshire West 76%
46 Y Ayr 99%
47 Y Ayrshire Central 92%
48 Y Ayrshire South 100%
49 Y Kilmarnock 92%
50 Y Bute and North Ayrshire 100%

Glasgow

51 G Craigton 90%
52 G Garscadden (formerly Scotstoun) 86%
53 G Govan 84%
54 G Hillhead 79%
55 G Maryhill 85%
56 G Pollok 100%
57 G Provan 76%
58 G Shettleston 85%
59 G Springburn 71%

Numbers on left refer to Reference Plot for Figure 2, letters to Figure 2. Constituencies not included in constituency level scaling marked X.

The figure for continuity "represents (on the basis of the 1970 registers) the percentage of the electorate in an old seat, or the percentage of the electorate in an old seat who are now in a new seat (whichever percentage is the lower)." (Butler and Kavanagh, 1974, p282)
exercise. There is also the point that although differences due to parties fighting or not fighting seats are not the same as differences reflecting the sharing of votes between parties actually standing, they are still real differences, and should find some reflection in the overall trends.

Finally, disqualifying some of the party/inter-election period components from the calculation so that they are not added in to the overall dissimilarity measure will itself reduce the magnitude of the overall measure. To compensate, the dissimilarity measure was 'standardized' by dividing by the number of components actually included.

At this point, having completed the methodological preliminaries we can turn to Figure 2 (10) see what message it has for us.

The most important interpretative principle is that the closer a constituency is scaled to the centre of the plot (marked by a cross) the nearer that constituency was to following the national trend (or more precisely the mean trend of the 58 constituencies scaled) of voting change between 1964 and 1979. Conversely, the further away a constituency is from the centre of the plot, the more voting change in that constituency deviated from the national or average trend.

The first point to be made is the graphic illustration of the extent to which seats which the SNP actually won (marked with a 'thistle') whether at a General Election or not, tended to deviate from national patterns of voting
change. The seats which the SNP have won at any time are scattered towards the edge of the plot. What Hamilton and Govan have in common of course is that they were the SNP's two most famous byelection victories. What differentiates them is that Govan (1973) was six years (one General Election) after Hamilton (1967). What pushes them towards the 'North-East' of the plot is that although the SNP share of the vote held up well (if not enough for the SNP to retain the seats at the subsequent General Election) until October 1974, it collapsed in 1979. It is this collapse which differentiates these two SNP 'post-byelection' successes in the Central belt from the SNP successes which lie more towards the 'South East' of the plot. These more peripheral SNP successes showed a much greater consolidation of the vote between October 1974 and 1979. In Govan, the SNP share of the vote fell by 27 percentage points between October 1974 and 1979 and in Hamilton, 22 percentage points. In the Western Isles the equivalent figure was 9 and in Galloway 2. In general then the timing of the SNP's success is represented by the plot in terms of an anti-clockwise rotation around the centre.

In contrast to the SNP successes which are scattered round the edge of the plot, it is the urban, and in particular the city constituencies which cluster most closely towards the centre of the plot. This parallels the finding earlier that the non-peripheral regions tended to move in parallel whereas the peripheral regions had less predictable tracks. This is mirrored by the extent to which
the peripheral constituencies are relatively widely scattered on the plot compared with the tight clustering of urban constituencies round the mean.

Even within this relatively crowded 'urban' cluster at the centre however there is identifiable regional separation. Most obviously the constituencies classified into the Central Scotland region (marked 'C') cluster to the 'North' of the origin. This position oriented towards the positions of Hamilton and Govan reflects the fact that they share with Hamilton and Govan the rapid collapse by 1979 of a once sizable SNP vote. Similarly, the four Edinburgh constituencies retained in the analysis cluster very closely round the origin. Such detailed interpretation could be carried on ad infinitum. Take any cluster of seats and it is usually fairly easy, armed with the actual results, to discover what it is that they have in common.

However, the main point of the plot is to give some graphic expression to the operation simultaneously of two quite distinct patterns of variation.

On the one hand, and especially in urban and industrial areas, changes in voting patterns at both regional and constituency level showed a sometimes uncanny parallelism.

On the other hand, in many peripheral seats and in seats which the SNP have actually won, there being a good deal of overlap between these two categories, such national trends appear to have been overlain by constituency
specific factors.

Age, sex and S.N.P. voting.

In this preliminary empirical chapter I do not propose to explore the socio-economic correlates of S.N.P. voting, leaving such analysis until it can be firmly grounded in a discussion of patterns of social change in modern Scotland. Nevertheless, the two most basic variables, sex and age, were so strongly correlated with S.N.P. voting at the S.N.P.'s peak General Election in October 1974 that these relationships should be presented as indispensable background material. The analysis in this section is based on data from the Scottish Election Survey of October 1974. Details of the survey and the use I have made of it are given in Appendix 1.

Table 1.7. Voting for four main parties as percentage of four-party vote by sex. October 1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.N.P.</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

excludes - Other
  Did not vote | 66         | 71         |
  D.K. or refused | 14        | 22         |
As can be seen from Table 1.7, a much higher proportion of male voters (34%) supported the S.N.P. than of female voters (23%). As far as I know, this differential has received remarkably little attention (11) and remains highly puzzling. Towards the end of the study I will make a highly speculative attempt to begin to account for the differential but until then the least we can do is to keep this sex difference clearly in mind whenever we are looking at any relationship between S.N.P. voting and another variable.

As far as the other main parties are concerned, the deficit of women voting for the S.N.P. was matched by an approximately equal surplus voting for the Conservatives (28% of women versus 22% of men) and the Liberals (11% versus 5%).

Even more clearly marked than this sex difference in voting S.N.P. is the variation in S.N.P. support by age. Table 1.8 gives the relationship between party voting and age and sex.

The relationship between voting SNP and age is clear—a steady decline with increasing age which is very close to 5 percentage points per decade of age, with around 40% of those aged under 35 voting S.N.P. compared with 16% of those over 65.

The Conservative pattern is almost an exact mirror image of that of the SNP—approximately a 5 percentage point increase in the proportion voting Conservative for every ten years of age. Neither Labour nor Liberal voting
Table 8. Per cent of four-party vote by age and sex. October 1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>NI*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 to 24</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 or over</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MALE VOTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>NI*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 to 24</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FEMALE VOTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>NI*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 24</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NI: not included predominantly did not vote cf Tab. 1.7

varied significantly with age.

Although the whole story is undoubtedly extremely complex, it could be that these 'mirror-image' associations between S.N.P. and Conservative voting and age contain the key to the dynamics of why the balance in Scotland swung so strongly from Tory to Labour, in a sense via the S.N.P., in the course of the 1970s.

From the separate male and female tabulations in Table
1.8, it can be seen that the age/voting relationships are by no means the same for the two sexes.

First, with respect to voting S.N.P., the age gradient is much less steep for women than it is for men. The same percentage (16%) of the 65 and over age group of both sexes voted S.N.P. whereas in the youngest age group, 50% of men compared with 32% of women voted S.N.P.

Perhaps most intriguing of all, however, is that the association between age and voting Labour shows an opposite trend for the two sexes, voting Labour tending to increase with age for men and decrease with age for women. Although Conservative voting tended to increase with age for both men and women, the gradient was much steeper among women.

Conclusion.

Briefly, there are two main points to be carried forward from this preliminary empirical survey.

The first is that regional trends in voting in Scotland at General Elections in the period 1964 to 1979 divide clearly into a national component concentrated into urban and non-peripheral areas and more idiosyncratic trends concentrated in the more rural and peripheral areas to the North and South of the central industrial belt. Of course it is always possible to achieve such a separation into national and local components in a statistical sense, but in this case there are grounds for believing that the separation reflects a real, social structural difference
between the fully 'nationalized' politics of the central industrial belt (this including for these purposes Aberdeen) and the maintenance of more parochial mechanisms in rural and peripheral areas. Being a general analysis at the national level, this study will obviously have much more to say about the former rather than the latter - always remembering that even in the seats with the most idiosyncratic patterns of voting change, the national forces are never entirely obliterated by local mechanisms but rather interact with them to produce local complexity.

The second point concerns the association between S.N.P. voting and age. One could almost say that this suggests that the meaning of S.N.P. voting is largely to be found in the experience of a generation - a generation that came to political maturity in the thirty years after the Second World War. However, the rate of fluctuation of the S.N.P. vote itself - from 11% in 1970 to a peak of 30% in October 1974 and back down to 17% in 1979 - was far too great for it to be explicable in terms of the differing political beliefs of successive cohorts of voters. In order to understand how the experience of a generation, or to put it more precisely, the pattern of long term social change, was related to the electoral rise and fall of the S.N.P., we have to introduce an intermediate level of analysis. In short, certain aspects of social change in its widest sense in post-war Scotland created the conditions for the emergence of a particular orientation towards politics, a taken-for-granted framework specifying what politics is
about, which itself constituted the political environment within which the rapid rise and fall of the S.N.P. was possible.
Chapter 2.

Marxism and the national level of analysis.

Introduction

The last chapter consisted of a description of the voting trends involved in the electoral rise and fall of the Scottish National Party over the last twenty-five years. In many respects, voting is the realm of ideology par excellence and the immediate determinant of such voting change was ideological change. The shape of the rest of this study is to move down to deeper levels of social change and to work up from them back to the level of the events outlined in the first chapter.

In one sense the delimitation of the social changes involved is quite simple. Self-evidently we are concerned with social change in Scotland.

In another sense, this same obvious national delimitation of the social and political changes involved presents problems because of its very obviousness.

The fact that we are talking about the social changes which underpinned the electoral success of a nationalist party should not be allowed to distract us from the fact that these social changes should not be dealt with in principle any differently from any other set of social changes occurring within a given territorially delimited social unit.

In this chapter then I will be dealing in a general way with how social change at a national level is to be
analysed. Putting the problem this way - social change at a national level - begs a lot of questions and it is with these questions that I will be concerned. The argument will be that what this 'national level' is and implies should emerge from the analysis rather structuring it from the beginning as a taken-for-granted frame of reference.

This is especially important in trying to explain the success of a nationalist movement because taking the 'national' frame as unproblematic means that one is sharing, to some extent, the ideological framework of nationalism itself. To the extent that an explanatory strategy shares the cognitive framework an increase in the ideological and political salience of which is precisely what is to be explained, that explanatory strategy will fail - although it won't necessarily know it. One needs a solid grounding framework other than the nation in order to be able to understand either the nation or nationalism. The goal of the analysis in short is to understand the nation without reifying the nation - or in the present case, to understand Scotland without reifying Scotland.

This chapter in particular contains much more digging among the theoretical foundations than is strictly necessary for an analysis of social change in Scotland or even an analysis of the social determinants of the growth of Scottish nationalism. The principal justification for this is that accounts of Scottish society and of the emergence of Scottish nationalism have in particular been
structured by precisely the kind of taken-for-granted assumptions about Scotland as a unit and Scotland as a nation which I have just outlined. Although the main theme of this study is to account for the electoral success of the Scottish National Party, it has been neither possible nor desirable to avoid this second more theoretical issue which, to the extent that academic and political debate has overlapped in Scotland - as it should, cannot be separated from the first.

The discussion of Marx and Marxism's treatment of the national level of analysis serves several related purposes. First I wanted to situate myself as firmly as possible for the more empirical work which follows. Secondly, I wanted to trace some of the sources within Marxism and within Marx's own thought which have helped make highly plausible the set of assumptions which have served to structure and distort a good deal of the analysis of modern Scotland. Finally and most generally, the discussion might shed some needed light on the issue of Marxism's failure to deal adequately with the national level of analysis and with nationalism in particular.

I hope that this makes clear that although my critique focusses upon Marxist ideas this is because it is primarily on the basis of these ideas that I see the possibility of advancing the debate on the national level of analysis. When one turns to how non-Marxist social science has tended to handle the national level of analysis or the nation, there is very little with which to argue or on which to
build precisely because so much of this non-Marxist analysis is unreflexively structured by the national framework itself. (2)

The debate within Marxism

The complex of questions surrounding the national level of analysis can be introduced in terms of what has been perhaps the most widely ramified debate within Marxism of recent years. The two main sites of the debate have been 'dependency theory' and the discussion of the mechanism of the transition from feudalism to capitalism.

The question of what to call the two sides of the debate is not particularly important. Probably the simplest solution is to call the two approaches the classical Marxist and the neo-Marxist. For convenience I will also refer to them as the 'internalist' and 'externalist' approaches.

The table of oppositions set out in Table 2.1 is an attempt to list the main analytical categories which are given differential emphasis by the two sides of the debate and to give an idea of the reach of its interlocking ramifications. There is no attempt at a logical ordering of the oppositions or any consistency in their conceptual status. The only ordering principle is that each member of an opposing pair occupies a broadly corresponding position to that of its opposite number in the overall theoretical architecture of the respective sides of the debate.
Table 2.1 Principal oppositions of formulation and emphasis in the classical/neo-Marxist debate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;Classical&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Neo-&quot;</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production relations</td>
<td>Market exchange relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Circulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class relations</td>
<td>Relations of dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal causation</td>
<td>External causation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Economic space'</td>
<td>'Geographic space'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Vertical' social structuration</td>
<td>'Horizontal' spatial structuration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalist mode of production</td>
<td>World system of capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social formation as articulation of modes of production</td>
<td>Territorial or national unit as sub-system of global system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear, evolutionary development</td>
<td>Structural trajectories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stages, modes of production</td>
<td>Structural positions within world economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation within labour process</td>
<td>Transfer of surplus value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be clear that I am talking about an opposition of positions, an opposition of emphasis, rather than identifying two clear cut schools of Marxism. Some writers can be classified fairly unambiguously on one side or another, for example, Althusser, Dobb and Brenner on the internalist side and Sweezy, Wallerstein and Nairn on the externalist side. Other writers have made quite considerable shifts of emphasis in the course of their careers. It is probably true to say that Frank has moved away from a fairly extreme externalist position in his early work to a more central position in his more recent formulations. (3)
In presenting the emphases of the two sides of the debate in such a crudely schematic form as Table 2.1, I am acutely aware that I am ignoring more recent and sophisticated contributions which have moved the debate onto more fruitful ground. My purpose is to contribute neither to dependency theory nor to an understanding of the transition from feudalism to capitalism but rather to get some leverage on some of the perverse theoretical origins of much of the dominant imagery and emphasis applied to Scotland as a unit of analysis. For this purpose, I have relied primarily on some of the early 'classics' of the dependency debate and on some of the useful surveys of the field.

Given the plethora of existing critical commentary, all I propose to do here is to set out as briefly as possible the implications of the two respective positions, for what I have been calling the national level of analysis.

A crude schematic representation such as that presented above has the merit that it reveals how such a rigid separation of the two sets of emphases produces two caricatures rather than two theories. A 'pure' version of either side is not to be found in the writing of any one writer. The purest versions are probably to be found in the form of the straw men which are erected to represent the position of one side by its opponents.

Presenting the two poles side by side in a stripped down form is enough in itself to show the absurdity of the proposition that either side could stand alone as an
exemplar of the Marxist problematic. At the most elementary level, one needs only to accept the centrality to Marx's thought of the axiom that production and circulation are inseparable moments of the same process of capitalist accumulation and reproduction. The very structure of Capital as a whole is witness to the folly of overemphasizing one side to the neglect of the other.

Each side offers a different mode of approaching the national level (or the level of the territorial unit). Each side can be regarded as involving in principle a different method of 'deconstructing the nation'.

According to the purely 'internalist' mode of analysis, a given national unit would be analysed as a social formation consisting of a combination or articulation of modes of production each defined on the basis of the relations of production involved.

According to a purely 'externalist' mode of analysis, the given national unit would be regarded as a sub-unit of a broader global system with the emphasis on its position within the global system rather than on its internal structuration.

In principle, the national unit is in both cases analysed as a second order construct - built up in the one case from internal structural elements and situated in the other case as an element in a global system. This is to be contrasted with the position in non-Marxist social science in which the nation-state tends implicitly to be the first
order construct which grounds the analysis.

The danger within the Marxist problematic arises not so much from the deconstruction that is done in either mode but from the neglect of the other mode.

In a purely 'internalist' formulation, the failure to situate the given national unit within the global system means that the external environment, the 'outside' becomes a black box.

In the opposite case the national unit becomes a black box looked at from the outside.

In both cases what could be called a fetishization of the national level takes place. In the 'internalist' case the national unit defines the universe of analysis and cannot itself be defined - it tends implicitly to become the global system of which the modes of production and their instances are sub-elements. In the external case, the nation-state becomes the internal boundary of analysability.

To the extent that the nation-state or other territorially defined collectivity is not theorized either from the inside or the outside, i.e. is not theorized on the basis of a problematic which can account for 'inside' and 'outside' in its own terms, the boundaries of the unit becoming the defining concepts, the grounding categories for the analysis.

The debate under discussion has been conducted within a self-consciously Marxist problematic and considerable use has been made of citation from Marx in justification of
both positions.

However, before moving on to a discussion of the relation between Marx's own work and the emphases and imagery of the two sides of the debate, I want to address an even more fundamental question - Marx's own treatment of the national level of analysis.

Marx and the national level of analysis.

The main purpose of this section is to explore some of the factors which lay behind Marx's neglect of the national level of analysis. I will approach the issue in two ways.

First I want to look at the problem in terms of Marx's mature methodology, primarily as exemplified in the Grundrisse and Capital.

Then I want to make some observations on the way in which Marx's immediate intellectual and political environment, especially in the period of the formation of his thought, operated to systematically downgrade in Marx's eyes the significance of the national level.

Before proceeding however it is worth pointing out that the single most important factor underlying Marx's lack of interest in the national level, and of which the above two points are largely specifications, was the historical period in which he was writing.

This point has been made most cogently with respect to Marxism in general by Tom Nairn. It is important to remind
ourselves, however that Nairn is talking about the Marxist theory of nationalism ('The theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure' - Nairn, 1981, p329) whereas I am talking about the more general issue of the national level of analysis.

"Their 'failure' (Lenin, Luxemburg, Bauer etc. - SWK) was not a simply conceptual or subjective one. .... The fact is, that if they could not put together a tolerable theory about nationalism, nobody could, or did. Historical development had not at that time produced certain things necessary for such a 'theory'. The time was not ripe for it, or for them. Nor would it be ripe until two further generations of trauma had followed 1914. There is nothing in the least discreditable to historical materialism in the fact, although it is naturally lethal to 'Marxism', in the God's eye sense.

The philosophical failings lead us back in turn to real history. They lead us back to the material conditions under which the enigma of modern nationalism presented itself to these past generations. Lacking angelic perspicuity, they had to confront it under very severe limitations. Nationalism is a crucial, fairly central feature of the the modern capitalist development of world history. Time-bound like other systems of speculation, Marxism did not possess the power to foresee this development, or the eventual, overall shape which capitalist history would assume. As regards nationalism, the trouble is that not much less than this is required for approaching the problem." (Nairn, 1981, p331)

This is spirit in which I want to approach the question of how Marx's own intellectual and political environment, his own conjuncture, affected his approach to the complex of questions surrounding the national level of analysis, including nationalism. If Marx had a blind spot with respect to these issues, the only alternative to throwing out the baby of his methodology with his concrete prognostications concerning the national level, is to try to come to an understanding of how and why the blind spot
came about. Nairn has identified Marxism's blind spot with respect to nationalism and uneven development in general with the European Enlightenment's 'idea of an even and progressive development of material civilisation and mass culture' (Nairn, 1981, p336). Not only did Marx share elements of this Enlightenment vision but the immediate, German, environment in which his thought developed acted in a particularly powerful manner to reinforce in his case the general Enlightenment stress on rationality and Progress and to downgrade the significance, or rather permanence, of, and here we run the risk of anachronism,

"the complex of refractory, unassimilable phenomena linked to nationalism and its many derivatives (racism, anti-semitism, etc.) which time and time again appeared to undermine and thoroughly discredit Western rationality." (Nairn, 1981, p337)

In trying to understand Marx's approach to the national level of analysis, I firstly want to explore some aspects of his mature methodology as exemplified primarily in the **Grundrisse** and **Capital**.

Before proceeding the general and perhaps obvious point has to be made that Marx, even in his early and broadest outlines of what was to become his theoretical life-work, never went beyond the intention of producing a work focussing primarily on political economy - as witnessed by the title of his proposed six book magnum opus, 'Critique of Political Economy' (Nicolaus, 1973, p54)

In methodological terms, Marx did not leave behind a systematic theorization of the national (and international) level because it did not belong at the level of abstraction
at which Marx was working in the volumes of Capital which he was able to complete.

Marx's original 1857 outline for what was eventually to emerge as Capital consisted of six books:

I on capital  
II on landed property  
III on wage-labour  
IV on the state  
V on foreign trade  
VI on the world market and crises  

(Rosdolsky, 1980, p12; Nicolaus, 1973, p54)

The material intended for the first three books according to this outline was eventually incorporated in a modified form and with varying degrees of comprehensiveness into the first three volumes of Capital as published. The last three books which would have brought Marx much closer to providing a theorization of the national and international levels were precisely the books that Marx did not write. As Rosdolsky puts it:

"We believe that we can conclude from our examination of the Capital manuscripts that the last three books of the six originally planned were never definitely 'abandoned' by Marx but rather destined for the 'eventual continuation' of the work." (Rosdolsky, 1980, p53)

The principles underlying the order of priority implied by Marx's original conception of Capital emerge more clearly in the proposal contained in the 1857 'Introduction':

"The order obviously has to be

(1) the general, abstract determinants which obtain in more or less all forms of society, but in the above explained sense
(2) The categories which make up the inner structure of bourgeois society and on which the fundamental classes rest. Capital, wage labour, landed property. Their inter-relation. Town and country. The three great
social classes. Exchange between them. Circulation. Credit system (private).


(5) The world market and crises.'

(Marx, Grundrisse, p108)

Here the dominant principle clearly at work organizing the proposed order of presentation is the ascent 'from the simple relations such as labour, division of labour, need, exchange value, to the level of the state, exchange between nations and the world market' which Marx had defined as 'obviously the scientifically correct method' several pages earlier. (Grundrisse, p101)

The picture which emerges is not so much, as Frank puts it, simply that

"Marx's preoccupation with the productive process in the metropolis leads him to relegate our problems to a volume that he never came to write" (Frank, 1978, p3)

as that, given the methodologically determined order of priority for the topics which the 'Critique of Political Economy' was originally intended to theorize, it was those topics or levels which could only be theorized as "a rich totality of many determinations" (Grundrisse, p100) and which lay furthest from the abstract constitutive categories of 'capital in general' which were sacrificed, partly as a result of the appalling pressures of illness and poverty under which Marx worked.

It must be stressed that what is under discussion here is the order of presentation of the proposed books of what
became Marx's life work. This order of presentation does not correspond at a more detailed level with the order of conceptual derivation. Just because the order of presentation at the level of whole books of Capital was dominated by the ascent from the abstract categories to the concrete determinations does not mean that analytically there would have been a one way process - that the later books would have been merely mechanical applications of the categories developed at the level of capital in general. The reverse passage was also seen as necessary - the complex totality which has been dissected and reconstituted in terms of the previously developed abstract categories then becomes the basis for a fuller comprehension of the categories themselves. This almost inexpressible, and perhaps methodologically Utopian, circularity is well expressed in the passage in Volume III in which Marx mentions the eventual continuation of Capital. (5)

"The phenomena under investigation in this chapter assume for their full development the credit system and competition on the world market, the latter being the very basis and living atmosphere of the capitalist mode of production. These concrete forms of capitalist production, however, can be comprehensively depicted only after the general nature of capital is understood. It is therefore outside the scope of this work to present them - they belong to a possible continuation. Yet the phenomena listed in the title to this section can still be discussed here in broad terms" (Capital, Vol III, p205)

Here is an example of Marx explicitly stating that the theoretical analysis at the level of capital in general is only one moment of a complete analysis and that the analysis of the constitutive elements of the capitalist
system with which Capital deals should eventually be completed by analysis at the level of the capitalist system in its real, concrete totality, at the level of the world economy.

In practice however, Marx, simply in order to get written what he did had to 'bracket out' the full development in terms of (in this case) the credit system and the world market.

However, it seems clear that in addition to the final three books being at the end of the queue in terms of practical and methodological priorities, Marx did not envisage the need to devote as much time or attention to these final three books as he envisaged for the first three.

As Nicolaus puts it:

"Marx did not at any point intend to make each of the six books of equal size. In a letter written even before the completion of the seven workbooks, he said 'It is by no means my intention to work out evenly all six of the books into which I divide the whole, but rather, in the last three, to give mostly only the basic strokes; whereas in the first three, which contain the basic developments proper, elaboration of details is not always unavoidable." (Nicolaus, 1973, pp54-55)

Thus there is some justification for looking at another set of factors which go beyond simple practical exigencies in accounting for Marx's relative neglect of the national and international levels in terms of systematic theorization. They have to do with the combined implications of the role of competition in Marx's general theory and the specific historical period in which he wrote Capital
A discussion of the conceptual role of 'competition' in Marx's work leads into a frighteningly complex area. A passage from the Grundrisse gives a reasonable summation at a general level of both the centrality and conceptual status of competition in Marx's analysis of capitalism.

"Competition generally, this essential locomotive force of the bourgeois economy, does not establish its laws, but is rather their executor. Unlimited competition is therefore not the presupposition for the truth of the economic laws, but rather the consequence - the form of appearance in which their necessity realises itself. For the economists to presuppose, as does Ricardo, that unlimited competition exists is to presuppose the full reality and realization of the bourgeois relations of production in their specific and distinct character. Competition therefore does not explain these laws; rather, it lets them be seen, but does not produce them." (Grundrisse, p555)

The central point to be made here is that the main mechanisms which we would now see as operating to regulate or interfere in market mechanisms at the international level - and in particular the action of the national state - whatever their real impact was at the time Marx was writing, could not, by definition, be systematically analysed at the level of generality at which Marx was operating. To the extent that the operation of the laws of capital is seen as implying/presupposing 'unlimited competition', the national level, in terms of making a difference, is in principle irrelevant.

And here, of course, the date of the writing of Capital, the 1860s, is highly significant. By almost any of the array of broad periodizations of the international capitalist economy Marx wrote Capital towards the end of
what we would now regard as a 'window' of relatively free trade (often termed, significantly enough, the era of competitive capitalism) in the sense of a relative absence of explicit intervention in international market mechanisms by national states. What we now see as a 'window' preceded by 'mercantilist' state intervention and succeeded by 'imperialist' state intervention, Marx saw as historical confirmation of the move towards the unfettered operation of the laws of capitalism. (6)

Marx discusses many of the features which pertain to the national level of analysis in the context of the 'historical significance' of competition:

"... competition appears historically as the dissolution of compulsory guild membership, government regulation, internal tariffs and the like within a country, as the lifting of blockades, prohibitions, protection from the world market ... it appears historically, in short, as the negation of the limits and barriers peculiar to the stages of production preceding capital ..." (Grundrisse, p649)

and goes on to contrast this mere historical appearance with the tight structural unity between capitalism as a mode of production and free competition:

"... competition is very far from having only this historic significance, or merely being this negative force. Free competition is the relation of capital to itself as another capital, i.e. the real conduct of capital as capital. The inner laws of capital - which appear merely as tendencies in the preliminary historic stages of its development - are for the first time posited as laws; production founded on capital for the first time posits itself in the forms adequate to it only in so far as and to the extent that free competition develops, for it is the free development of the mode of production founded on capital; the free development of its conditions and of itself as the process which constantly reproduces these conditions. ... The predominance of capital is the presupposition of free competition." (Grundrisse, p651)
In an even tighter formulation, the association of fully developed capitalism with free competition is shown to be so close that restrictions on competition can only be seen as harbingers of the end of capitalism:

"As long as capital is weak, it still itself relies on the crutches of past modes of production, or of those which will pass with its rise. As soon as it feels strong, it throws away the crutches, and moves in accordance with its own laws. As soon as it begins to sense itself and become conscious of itself as a barrier to development, it seeks refuge in forms which, by restricting free competition, seem to make the rule of capital more perfect, but are at the same time the heralds of its dissolution and of the dissolution of the mode of production resting on it. Competition merely expresses as real, posits as an external necessity, that which lies within the nature of capital..." (Grundrisse, p. 651)

However, when Marx is working at his highest level of abstraction, at the level of 'capital in general' in Volume I of Capital, even 'free' competition must itself be abstracted out of the model. As Rosdolsky puts it:

"What all capitals have in common is their capacity for expanding their value - the fact that they appropriate (directly or indirectly) the surplus-value created in the capitalist production process. The analysis of 'capital in general' must, therefore, begin with the investigation of the production process. This must show how money, goes beyond its simple quality of being money' and becomes capital, how it then produces surplus-value through the consumption of human labour and finally how the production of surplus-value for its part, leads to the reproduction of both capital and the relation of capital itself. All this can be developed without our having to pay attention to the presence of several capitals and the differences between them ...

So if the basic presupposition of the capital relation is to be understood, i.e. the relation of capital to labour and the role of surplus-value as the driving force of capitalist production, we must begin not with 'many capitals', but with .... 'capital in general'." (Rosdolsky, 1980, pp44-45)

Only in Volume III when a level of analysis is reached
which does involve assessing the implications of the interactions of different capitals, must competition must be brought in as a component mechanism of the explanation of, to take the most important example, the determination of the average rate of profit.

In Rosdolsky's words (referring to the same transition in the Grundrisse)

"... the establishment of a general rate of profit and the transformation of values into prices of production which corresponds to it, presuppose competition and hence occur at a level which is excluded from the study of 'capital in general', according to Marx's original outline. It must be evident here that in the sentences we have just quoted that Marx is already speaking about the capital of the entire capitalist class, the 'aggregate social capital'..." (Rosdolsky, 1980, p46).

Marx has already used the category 'aggregate social capital' in Volume I to counterpose to that of 'individual capital' (Rosdolsky, 1980, p65) and it plays its most central role in the section on 'The Reproduction and Circulation of Total Social Capital' in Volume II. However, it is only in Volume III that the use of 'aggregate social capital' must be combined with the introduction of competition as a mechanism. It is this juxtaposition which perhaps crystallises more than anything else the untheorized nature of Marx's usage and discussion of 'the national level'.

The unit of 'aggregate social capital' in terms of which Marx tended to carry out the analyses of Volumes II and III of Capital tended to coincide with the nation-state. The boundaries of the state tended to be adopted by
Marx as demarcating the total system of capitalist production and reproduction.

Claudia von Braunmuhl discusses this issue at greater length and comes to an even stronger conclusion when she points out that Marx

"... speaks of the process of the equalization of the rate of profit 'in a given national social formation' and thus applies the concept of 'total social capital' in a concrete manner only within a national framework. In fact he cannot conceive of the world market as anything other than an aggregation of national units." (von Braunmuhl, 1978, p165)

As will have become apparent, this area of Marx's methodology is rather paradoxical. The full development of capitalism is expressed in the development of free competition which involves the tearing down of national barriers. However, in order to analyse 'total social capital', a totality within which competition as an expression of the relations between individual units of capital is a mechanism, the unit adopted "in moments of empirical concretization" (von Braunmuhl, 1978, p165) is primarily that of the internal market of the bourgeois nation-state. If capital is fully developed there are no barriers around this internal market (apart perhaps from physical ones) and thus the differentiation of the unit of analysis is to that extent merely abstract - and does not represent any real economic unit. And of course, for Marx, this is precisely what the use of the 'national unit' precisely was - a heuristic abstraction. An abstraction necessitated by the ambitiousness of his project and the essential elements of circularity in his method i.e. a full
grounding of this assumed national unit would require precisely the analysis of the state and the world market, the foundations of which he saw himself as engaged in building.

So far I have concentrated on accounting for Marx's neglect of the national level in terms of his fully developed methodological priorities.

The other approach can be summed up as exploring the implications of the fact that Marx's thought was formed in early nineteenth century Germany. The import of this can be seen both in terms of Marx's reactions to the development of German economic policy and in terms of the intellectual environment provided by Germany at this time - an environment dominated by Hegel and saturated with Romantic nationalism and an environment against which Marx struggled to define his own position. Not for nothing was Marx's spleen against the Young Hegelians vented under the title of 'The German Ideology'.

First, a passage from the young Marx shows how the emergence of the idea and reality of national protectionism in Germany, a protectionism which foreshadowed the end of the era of free-trade, was seen by Marx as a ludicrous anachronism.

"The relation of industry, of the world of wealth generally, to the political world is one of the major problems of modern times. In what form is this problem beginning to engage the attention of the Germans? In the form of protective duties, of the prohibitive system, of national economy. Germanomania has passed out of man into matter, and thus one morning our cotton barons and iron champions saw themselves turned into
patriots. People are therefore beginning in Germany to acknowledge the sovereignty of monopoly within the country by lending it sovereignty abroad. People are thus about to begin in Germany with what people in France and England are about to end. The old corrupt condition against which these countries are rebelling in theory and which they only bear as one bears chains is greeted in Germany as the dawn of a beautiful future which still hardly dares to pass from cunning theory to the most ruthless practice. Whereas the problem in France and England is: Political economy or the rule of society over wealth, in Germany it is National economy or the mastery of private property over nationality. In France and England, then, it is a case of abolishing monopoly that has proceeded to its last consequences; in Germany it is a case of proceeding to the last consequences of monopoly. There it is a case of a solution, here as yet a case of collision. This is an adequate example of the German form of modern problems, an example of how our history, like a clumsy recruit, still has to do extra drill in matters that are old and hackneyed in history." (Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law; Collected Works; Volume 3, p175)

Although such an early outburst on the issue can in no way be taken as representing Marx's mature thought, it does give us an idea of how Marx saw the dominant historical trend in the years preceding the formulation of Capital.

Marx tended in general to use words such as national, local and patriotic as terms of abuse directed against his opponents and to associate the terms with the outmoded, the soon to be swept away. His attitude to German romantic nationalism is gloriously expressed in the following

"Good-natured enthusiasts, Germanomaniacs by extraction and free-thinkers by reflection ... seek our history of freedom beyond our history in the primeval Teutonic forests. But what difference is there between the history of our freedom and the history of the boar's freedom if it can only be found in the forests? Besides, it is common knowledge that the forest echoes back what you shout into it. So let us leave the ancient Teutonic forests in peace." (Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, Collected Works, Vol 3, p175)
The context of this passage, the Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, points us towards a context which cannot be disregarded in taking stock of the conceptual status of the 'nation' in Marx's thought - Marx's relation to Hegel and to German idealism in general.

The nation, the Volk or in particular the Volksgeist, was a central category in Hegel's philosophy of history. Hegel saw the nation as the form in which spirit manifested itself in history and although citation from Hegel is a tricky business, in this case he does express the matter concisely enough.

"The rational is that which has being in and for itself, and from which everything else derives its value. It assumes varying shapes; but in none of them is it more obviously an end than in that whereby the spirit explicates and manifests itself in the endlessly varying forms which we call nations." (Hegel, 1975, p28)

"The spirit in history is an individual which is both universal in nature and at the same time determinate: in short, it is the nation in general, and the spirit we are concerned with is the spirit of the nation. (Volksgeist)" (Hegel, 1975, p51)

It is not unlikely that inherent in Marx's early battles against idealism was a battle against the nation, the spirit of the nation, and certainly against the spirit of the German nation, as an organizing category, as an essential determinant.

Behind Hegel's concept of the state, the attack on which provided an early context for the crystallization of Marx's materialist outlook, lay implicitly the concept of the Volk. For Hegel the Volksgeist was the spiritual underpinning for the more rational armature of the state
and the constitution.

To move out even further onto somewhat thin ice, the nation can be seen as playing a role in Hegel's philosophy of history analogous to that of the class in Marx's, with of course, the order of derivation between ideas and material reality reversed, but the nation and the class each playing a mediating role within this derivation.

For Hegel the movement is from idea to reality: the spirit 'realizes' itself in the consciousness of the nation. By a dialectical progression the spirit, through its repeated realization in the form of nations, advances to the transcendence of the nation:

"... the essence of the spirit, its supreme imperative, is that it should recognize, know and realize itself for what it is. It accomplishes this end in the history of the world; it produces itself in a series of determinate forms and these forms are the nations of world history. Each of them represents a particular stage of development, so that they correspond to epochs in the history of the world. Or on a more fundamental level, they are the principles in which the spirit has discovered itself, and which it is impelled to realise. There is therefore an essential connection between them in which the nature of the spirit alone is expressed. ... The principles of the national spirits in their necessary progression are themselves only moments of the one universal spirit, which ascends through them in the course of history to its consummation in an all-embracing totality. (Hegel, 1975, p64)

To the extent that Marx, in his intellectual apprenticeship, was defining himself both in terms of and against Hegel, the nation will have seemed a particularly dangerous, nebulous and misleading concept precisely because it played in Hegel's system a role highly analogous to that of class in his own. For Hegel, the nation was the
locus wherein the spirit did manifest itself in the real, historical world, the very terrain on which Marx was to ground his system. For Marx, the nation as a category will have primarily appeared in contexts in which it was to him at least as epiphenomenal as religion, if not more so—and just as distant from the conceptual foundations which he was to carve out in the Grundrisse and Capital.

In this section then I have outlined two sets of considerations which could be said to have shaped Marx's treatment of the national level of analysis. The first set concerned the level of abstraction at which Marx was working in the published volumes of Capital. The second had to with features of Marx's early intellectual environment which could be said to have helped set his later theoretical priorities. Both were closely related to the historical period in which Marx's thought developed. The point is not whether or not Marx was a nationalist. He tended to take a highly (but not entirely) pragmatic approach to the national movements of his time. The point is rather that in his vision of long term historical development, national factors were destined to play a role of declining significance.

Nowhere does this emerge more clearly and consistently than in Marx's attitude to the historical role of free trade. In his "Speech on the Question of Free Trade" of 1848, the inevitably intertwined economic and ideological role of free-trade is spelled out clearly:
"To sum up, what is Free Trade under the present conditions of society? Freedom of Capital. When you have torn down the few national barriers which still restrict the advance of capital, you will merely have given it complete freedom of action. So long as you let the relation of wage labour to capital exist, no matter how favourable the conditions under which you accomplish the exchange of commodities, there will always be a class which exploits and a class which is exploited. It is really difficult to understand the presumption of the Free Traders who imagine that the more advantageous application of capital will abolish the antagonism between industrial capitalists and wage-workers. On the contrary. The only result will be that antagonism of these classes will stand out more clearly.

Let us assume for a moment that there are no more Corn Laws, no more customs, no more town dues; that in a word all the accidental circumstances which today the workingman may look upon as a cause of his miserable condition have vanished, and we shall have removed so many curtains that hide from his eyes his true enemy. He will see that capital released from all trammels will make him no less a slave than capital trammelled by import duties. ...generally speaking, the Protective system in these days is conservative, while the Free Trade system works destructively. It breaks up only nationalities and carries the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the uttermost point. In a word, the Free Trade system hastens the Social Revolution. In this revolutionary sense alone, gentlemen, I am in favour of Free Trade. (Collected Works, Vol 6, pp463-465)

Finally, to confirm that this conviction was not just an early aberration, we can turn to Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Programme" of 1875. In rebuttal of what he saw as the merely abstract internationalism of Lassalle's proposals, Marx concluded

"In fact, the internationalist avowal of the programme stands infinitely below even that of the Free Trade Party. The latter also asserts that the results of its efforts will be "the international brotherhood of peoples.". But it also does something to make trade international and by no means contents itself with the consciousness - that all peoples are carrying on trade at home." (Critique of the Gotha Programme, Selected Works, Vol III, p22)
There has been a consistent tendency for subsequent Marxists to downgrade the significance of this 'universalizing theme' in Marx. Most obviously because the era in which Marx wrote was succeeded by an era of rising tariffs and the 'national' features of what came to be termed monopoly capitalism and imperialism.

It would seem to me that for the purposes of learning from Marx, it is better to accept that Marx meant exactly what he said about the 'world-historical' role of free trade in universalizing and even simplifying capitalist economic relations and about the ideological effect of free trade in making the exploitative nature of these relations all the more transparent. Only in this way can we give ourselves a solid methodological basis for exploring the implications of the fact that the significance of the national level has not diminished since Marx's day. Rather, as the role of the state has expanded, the national level, economic and ideological, has increasingly interposed itself between the consciousness of and the reality of the capitalist system.

Marx and the origins of the debate

So far I have been discussing why Marx left largely untheorized the space around what I have been calling the national level of analysis and the 'transition from feudalism/dependency theory' debate.

In this section, I want to make a limited exploration
of the sources in Marx's central theoretical works of the imagery used by the two sides of the debate.

Much of the contrast in emphasis laid out in Table 2.1, and in particular the contrasting emphasis given to relations of exchange as opposed to relations of production and to 'external' causation as opposed to 'internal' causation can be traced back to two different phases of Marx's argument, phases which have a different methodological structure and which correspond to different phases in the development of capitalism. The two phases are the generally recognized ones of the phase of the pre-conditions or the genesis or the 'becoming' of capitalism on the one hand and of developed industrial capitalism on the other. The contrast and much of its methodological import is well expressed, albeit in rather Hegelian terminology, in a passage from the Grundrisse.

"The conditions and presuppositions of the becoming, of the arising, of capital presuppose precisely that it is not yet in being but merely in becoming; they therefore disappear as real capital arises, capital which itself, on the basis of its own reality, posits the conditions for its realization. Thus ... while the presuppositions under which money becomes capital appear as given external presuppositions for the arising of capital - (nevertheless) as soon as capital has become capital as such, it creates its own presuppositions, i.e. the possession of the real conditions of the creation of new values without exchange - by means of its own production process. These presuppositions, which originally appeared as conditions of its becoming - and hence could not spring from its action as capital - now appear as results of its own realization, reality, as posited by it - not as conditions of its arising, but as results of its presence. It no longer proceeds from presuppositions in order to become, but rather it is itself presupposed, and proceeds from itself to create the conditions of its maintenance and growth."

(Grundrisse, pp459-460)
A fundamental distinction between the two phases, or more precisely, Marx's analysis of them, is in what could very loosely be called the relationship between theory and history. As Zelenyi puts it:

"Marx's analysis operates simultaneously on two levels, on the level of theoretical development (Marx sometimes speaks of 'logical development') and on the level of real historical events." (Zelenyi, 1980, p35)

Between Marx's discussion of the pre-conditions of capitalism and his discussion of developed industrial capitalism there is a necessary difference in the relation between the two levels. (9) We could almost see this difference as defining two modes of analysis in Marx depending upon which phase is under discussion and which level has priority. For the sake of simplicity, I will call the mode Marx applies to the preconditions phase, the historical mode and the mode he applies to fully developed capitalism, the logical mode.

In the period of the genesis of capitalism, specific historical conditions are necessary for the emergence of capitalism but by definition, these historical developments cannot be driven by the logic of capitalist accumulation in the way in which once 'accumulation, the gradual increase of capital by reproduction' (Capital, Vol I, p780) is under way, subsequent historical development is predicated on the logic of this accumulation. In Marx's words:

"This historic process is not the product of capital, but the presupposition for it" (Grundrisse, p505).
Probably the clearest juxtapositions of Marx's two approaches occur in the context of his discussions of the role of merchant's capital or commerce in general. And of course depending upon whether Marx is treating merchant's capital as a historical precondition for the emergence of capitalism or as one moment in the overall reproductive process of industrial capital, the relative priority of relations of exchange as opposed to relations of production could be said to be different.

If Marx is treating merchant's capital as a historically necessary precondition for the emergence of industrial capitalism, then relations of exchange in this historical sense could be said to have causal priority. When Marx is developing the concept of commercial capital in the context of capitalist reproduction on the other hand it is defined simply as one cog in the mechanism of the overall process but in no way as a driving force. For example

"Commercial capital, therefore, is absolutely nothing more than the commodity capital of the producer which has to go through the process of transformation into money, to perform its function as commodity capital on the market; only instead of being an incidental operation carried on by the producer himself, this function now appears as the exclusive operation of a particular species of capitalist, the merchant, and acquires independence as the business of a particular capital investment." (Capital, Vol III, p382)

Only having accomplished a derivation of commercial capital in terms of its role within the reproductive process of capitalist reproduction does he feel free to deal with "Historical Material on Merchant's Capital."
"Up to now we have considered merchant's capital from the standpoint of the capitalist mode of production and within its limits. And yet not only trade, but also trading capital, is older than the capitalist mode of production, and is in fact the oldest historical mode in which capital has an independent existence ... 

In all earlier modes of production ... commercial capital ... appears as the function of capital par excellence, and the more so, the more production is directly the production of the producer's means of subsistence. Thus there is no problem at all in understanding why commercial capital appears as the historic form of capital long before capital has subjected production itself to its sway. Its existence, and its development to a certain level, is itself a historical precondition for the development of the capitalist mode of production ... 

In the context of capitalist production, commercial capital is demoted from its earlier separate existence, to become a particular moment of capital investment in general, and the equalization of profits reduces its profit rate to the general average. It now functions simply as the agent of productive capital." (Capital, Vol III, pp442-444).

The theoretical circle is turned again. Now, if everything were kept in its place, the existence of one mode of analysis for one set of events and another mode of analysis for the rest would cause few problems - except for the problem of determining which class of events is in question and thus which mode of analysis is appropriate. However, what would seem to have happened is that the two modes of analysis in Marx have provided contrasting sets of imagery - which stress either the primacy of production relations and internal causation etc.on the one hand, or the primacy of exchange relations and external causation on the other.

With respect to what has been referred to as the
national level of analysis the problem is compounded by two connected features of the published form of Capital which have already been noted. The structure of the 1857 plan at the level of whole books can be seen to follow what we have been calling the logical mode as opposed to the historical mode. This is precisely what Marx says in yet another of the famous methodological precepts contained in the 1857 Introduction:

"It would therefore be unfeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow one another in the same sequence as as that in which they were historically decisive. their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems to be their natural order or which corresponds to historical development. The point is not the historic position of the economic relations in the succession of different forms of society. Even less is it their sequence 'in the idea' .... Rather, their order within modern bourgeois society."(Grundrisse, p107)

If the final three books on the state, foreign trade, and the world market and crises had been written then this 'logical' mode of analysis, appropriate to developed industrial capitalism, would have been extended to the international level. However, because, proceeding as he did, Marx had to 'bracket out' this international level as not yet theorized, and because the unit available to him within which the logic of the capitalist accumulation and reproduction process could most conveniently be worked out was the existing nation-state, Marx's 'internal' analysis of capitalist accumulation and reproduction was carried out 'internally' in another sense, internally to the modern nation-state.
Conversely, because the last three books were not written, almost all the concrete imagery and analysis of the international level and a high proportion of the analysis of a capitalist system which transcended the boundaries of the nation-state, referred to the pre-conditions of industrial capitalism or the period of primitive accumulation rather than its full development.

Thus was laid down the pattern for the kind of mirror-image formulations which have bedevilled Marxism in its attempt to deal with the international level.

In very simple fashion, the templates which are discernible within Marx's work which have made the subsequent construction of one-sided formulations so feasible were:

1. In the analysis of the pre-conditions of industrial capitalism according to the historical mode, commercial relations are given an independently causal role in capitalist development. Commercial relations can operate at the international level and thus impinge 'externally' on a national or territorial unit.

2. In the analysis of fully developed capitalism according to the logical mode, commerce is analysed as an integral but subordinate moment of the overall process of capitalist reproduction. This process of capitalist reproduction tends to be shown operating within the national unit.

The derivation is made explicit in an early statement
of his position by Andre Gunder Frank

"To understand underdevelopment, I suggest, it is important to realize that the underdeveloped countries are still living in what, for them, is essentially a mercantilist system (I would revise that formulation in 1969). It may be that in the metropole with the development of industry and of capitalism, the determination of productive considerations by mercantile ones gave way to the determination of mercantile considerations by productive ones as Marx and others suggest. The same did not happen in the underdeveloped countries." (Frank, 1967, p53)

Samir Amin is even more explicit

"Since Capital is the theory not of socio-economic formations in general but of the capitalist mode of production - being, as its subtitle indicates, a critique of political economy - Marx does not provide us with a fully developed theory of accumulation on a world scale. This theory appears only in connection with primitive accumulation, considered as the prehistory of the capitalist mode of production. But this prehistory is not over and done with: it goes on, through the extension of capitalism on the world scale. Parallel with the mechanism of accumulation characteristic of the capitalist mode of production, namely expanded reproduction, a mechanism of primitive accumulation continues to operate and to be characteristic of relations between the centre and the periphery of the world capitalist system." (Amin, 1974, p38)

The 'development of underdevelopment' then is seen in both these cases as a freezing of structural development so that peripheral regions remain trapped in historical circumstances for which the mode of analysis developed by Marx as appropriate to the phase of primitive accumulation or the pre-conditions of developed industrial capitalism remains appropriate.

Just as, as we have seen from Marx's analysis, the priority of the logical or historical modes of analysis, the importance of internal and external factors and the weight to be given to relations of production compared with
relations of exchange, depends primarily upon the period of history in question - pre-conditions as compared with full development of industrial capitalism - so, to the extent that whether or not a given country does or does not achieve developed industrial capitalism depends upon its structural position in the world economy, the kind of analysis appropriate to that country will itself depend upon that country's structural position in the world economy.

In these terms, whether or not a particular country undergoes the transition to the capitalist mode of production (or in the original case - where in the world this happened) would be analysed primarily in terms of a mode of analysis analogous to Marx's historical mode. It would be absurd to analyse the situation in a nation where the transition to industrial capitalism has not taken place according to a logical mode of analysis whose applicability depends upon the prior dominance of industrial capitalism.

Conversely (and here Scotland is in mind), it would be absurd to analyse a society which par excellence has been dominated by the logic of industrial capitalism for well over a hundred years in terms of a mode of analysis whose applicability is premised on the fact that the transition to industrial capitalism has not yet taken place.

To the extent that this section has been laying methodological groundwork (or at least clearing away methodological rubble) for the analysis of Scotland, the
message is loud and clear and points away from modes of analysis developed with reference either to the emergence of the capitalist system or to the impact of capitalism on the world periphery.

Scotland and Dependence

Despite this basic theoretical point, however, if we try to situate analyses of Scotland which have been produced over the last fifteen to twenty years in terms of their position with respect to the broad polarity of positions we have been discussing, they have tended to be heavily weighted towards the externalist/dependency pole.

If this had been done on the basis of an 'externalist' theory which was capable of handling any structural position within the world economy as well as any other, then the distortion introduced by remaining within this 'externalist' mode would have been limited to the implicit 'fetishization of the nation' discussed earlier. There would at least have been the possibility of coming to an adequate location of Scotland as a unit within the world economy.

A holistic approach is implicit in any form of dependence theory and in principle, the framework should be adequate for the analysis of any of the partial structures which make up the global system. To the extent that the whole of the global system - the capitalist world economy - has to be theorized in order to understand any segment of
it, any segment should in principle be analysable within the framework.

But of course, as the name implies, the concepts developed as dependence theory apply precisely to the dependent parts of the system. The 'independent' centre was left relatively untheorized (unless of course one goes back to the more orthodox theories of imperialism). For a while, the vocabulary developed within what might now be called a 'world system' perspective was restricted to the analysis of the dependent parts of the system. Of course, the 'non-dependent' parts of the system had to be referred to - as 'metropolis' or 'core' - but these were negative definitions, defined primarily in opposition to that which was the real focus of attention, the 'satellites' or the 'periphery'. And of course, given the peripheral context of the development of dependence theory this was inevitable. It is only very recently and very partially that this asymmetry has begun to be balanced out, primarily through the work of Wallerstein and the mushrooming world system 'school' which in the United States is rapidly acquiring all the depressingly predictable accoutrements and orthodoxies of any successful academic fashion. This exercise itself of course cannot be carried through as a simple 'reverse application' of the concepts developed to deal with dependency. As emerged in the previous section it is quite likely that modes of analysis applicable to the periphery of the world economy are not equally applicable to the core. So far, Wallerstein's detailed account of the
development of the world system (1974, 1980) has not gone beyond 1800 - when, in Marx's terms, we are still in the period of the genesis of capitalism rather than that of its self-sustaining dynamic, and when, therefore, because of a certain symmetry between the two 'outsides' (the 'before' and the 'still outside') of capitalism, there is more plausibility in the interchange of approaches between dependence theory and the analysis of the emergence of the capitalist world economy than there is between dependence theory and the analysis of developed capitalism. It will be interesting to see whether and how Wallerstein's framework changes as his analysis moves closer to modern times. However, in the crucial period of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the theoretical vocabulary which was available, newly minted, for situating Scotland was that of dependence theory. This vocabulary allowed only one aspect of Scotland's position to be analysed - the extent to which Scotland was 'dependent'. To the question 'What is wrong with Scotland' came the overwhelming chorus 'Scotland is dependent'. Of course this wasn't just, or even primarily, because there was only one theoretical vocabulary available, but this one had the right radical aura and chimed in beautifully with the prevailing political mood.

The reasons underlying this enthusiastic application of concepts developed to answer the question of why Latin American countries had not been able to industrialise to a country which had been among the first in the world to
industrialise had far more to do with the prevailing political mood than with any empirical considerations.

In the process, any real structural element in dependence theory had to be jettisoned, leaving little but the rhetoric. The application of any 'strongly structural' Marxist theory which saw the crucial aspect of dependence as being, for example, the disarticulation of the dependent society i.e. the maintenance and reproduction of a pre-capitalist sector alongside the capitalist sector precisely so that a process of primitive accumulation could be maintained, would have shown up the absurdity of the parallel between Scotland and the Third World. Samir Amin provides a clear account of the structural differences between a developed capitalist and a peripheral economy.

"The concrete socioeconomic formations of capitalism of the centre bear this distinctive feature, that in them the capitalist mode of production is not merely dominant but, because its growth is based on expansion of the internal market, tends to become exclusive. These formations therefore draw closer and closer to the capitalist mode of production, the disintegration of precapitalist modes tending to become complete and to lead to their replacement by the capitalist mode, reconstituted on the basis of the scattered elements issuing from this break up process. The concrete socioeconomic formation tends to become identical with the capitalist mode of production. This justifies Marx's analysis, and his assertion that this analysis, as set forth in Capital, is that of the system toward which the most advanced capitalist country of his time, Britain, was developing. The socio-economic formations of the periphery, however, bear this distinctive feature, that though the capitalist mode of production does indeed predominate, this domination does not lead to a tendency for it to become exclusive, because the spread of capitalism is here based on the external market. It follows that precapitalist modes of production are not destroyed but are transformed and subjected to that mode of production which predominates on the world scale as well as locally - the capitalist mode of production." (Amin, 1974, p37)
There is no question as to which side of this divide Scotland lies. It is hardly surprising that application of dependence theory to Scotland has tended to rely on the less structural versions, such as Frank's early formulations, or, even more convenient, non-Marxist dependence theory.

An early and especially blatant example was Buchanan's application of a loosely Frankian framework to Scotland and Wales (the temptation to lump together Scotland and Wales and even Ireland is especially strong within applications of the dependence framework). In Buchanan's work there is no attempt to justify the application of the dependence framework - Scotland and Wales are assumed to be dependent, wholly dependent and nothing but dependent from the start. After a discussion of Culloden and the Highland Clearances, Buchanan continues:

"This exploitation, as John Prebble has written, 'was within the same pattern of colonial development - new economies introduced for the greater wealth of the few, and the obstacle of a native population removed or reduced'. It was a pattern of exploitation subsequently repeated by Britain in her overseas colonies suited to settlers of British stock, and in a more sophisticated form it is this process of exploitative development that still governs the relationship between Scotland and her more powerful English neighbour.

This relationship was - and still is - a satellite/metropolis relationship of the type described by A.G. Frank; within it no real and balanced development of the satellite could take place. And as the Welsh and Scottish nationalist movements realize, it is only by breaking this pattern of dependence that the various manifestations of underdevelopment in the Celtic countries can be eliminated and real development - economic, social, cultural - be initiated. This is the awareness which lies behind the nationalist resurgence in what are today England's largest remaining colonies." (Buchanan, 1968, p39)
Then follows the listing of a series of indicators - unemployment, per-cent of workforce receiving industrial injury benefits, expenditure per mile on roads, per capita planned motorway mileage, expenditure on railways electrification, per cent of households with telephones, and, most bizarre of all, percentage of UK total defence expenditure - for England, Scotland and Wales. Dependence is reduced to being a characterization of, or rather its existence can be proved by, the existence of differences in the level of a series of socio-economic indicators.

Similarly the application of a non-Marxist dependence framework to Scotland leads to a dead-end. Bryden found on the basis of his own attempt to apply dependence theory to Scottish problems, or rather to the industrial West and the Highlands, that

"It is difficult to escape the conclusion that when one talks about 'dependence' in the Scottish context one is for the most part talking about the problems of Nationhood and Centralism" (Bryden, 1979, p271)

Bryden's account can be seen as demonstrating that if you want to apply the term 'dependence' to Scotland it is quite feasible, but if you do, the term will end up implying little more than that Scotland is integrated into the world economy and is part of the United Kingdom.

By far the most sophisticated attempt to apply a theoretical framework developed in a Third World context to Scotland is that of Michael Hechter which is again anchored firmly at the externalist end of the analytical spectrum.
The 'internal colonialism' thesis received its first theoretical refinement in Latin America, acquired an ethnic and cultural twist in applications to the U.S. racial structure and was finally brought across the Atlantic by Hechter as the grid through which to examine the Celtic fringe of Britain. The saddest thing about Hechter's work is that much the impressive statistical sophistication of the book is little more than an expression of the methodological gymnastics required to force the historical material into the form of testing the internal colonialism model against a straw man diffusionist null hypothesis. Hechter has subsequently admitted in any case that

"Scotland may not have experienced internal colonialism to any degree." (Hechter, 1982, p10)

Finally, we can look at the most influential theorization of Scotland. In no way has Tom Nairn fallen into the 'Third Worldism' trap of seeing Scotland's relation to England as structural identical to the relation of dependent Third World countries to the core.

However his resolutely externalist paradigm does lead him into difficulties. The most straightforward example has been the way in which he has been forced into giving two versions of Scottish nationalism depending upon whether Scotland is seen as being relatively underdeveloped or relatively (or potentially) overdeveloped.

In the first version, Scotland is seen as an exemplar of neo-nationalism which itself consists of the political reaction to 'relative deprivation' (as opposed to the
absolute deprivation of the original 'development gap') of areas on the fringe of the new metropolitan growth zones.

"The impact of the oil industry on Scotland and of the U.S. multinationals on the French Midi is provoking a new Scottish and Occitan separatism; but, to a greater extent than is realized, this is a sui generis phenomenon which should not be assimilated to classical European or Third World 'nationalism' at all. It is the devastating rapidity and scale of the impact of these new conditions that has made Scotland into the exemplar of neo-nationalism in this sense." (Nairn, 1981, p130)

The second version is that Scotland, again because of oil, belongs to the class of areas

"whose problem is that they developed more rapidly and successfully than the territory surrounding them" (Nairn, 1981, p203)

"The two types of nationalist dilemma in Western Europe are, respectively: under-developed or pillaged regions that have finally begun to react against this treatment; and quite highly-developed epicentres of industrialization, middle-class cultures who are for one reason or another out of phase with the ruling nation-state and want separate development to get ahead faster" (Nairn, 1981, pp204-205)

I suppose there is no reason why Scotland should not exhibit both types of nationalist dilemma at the same time but the necessity of having to posit their simultaneous operation does point up the difficulties inherent in characterizing nationalisms purely on the basis of the relative position of the relevant unit in the capitalist system.

Immanuel Wallerstein's model of 'the world system of capitalism' can be regarded as one of the most complete and consistent operationalization of the categories and emphases listed on the 'externalist' or 'neo-Marxist' side
of Table 1.

The irony of Wallerstein's formulation of the world system perspective is that although he consistently makes a strong methodological case (11) for shifting the appropriate unit of analysis for the explanation of social change up from the nation state to the level of the capitalist world economy, in his application of the framework (looking down from this world level as it were), the units he tends to see as occupying structural positions in the world economy are nation-states (12).

Given Wallerstein's exemplification of the 'externalist' style of analysis derived largely from the moment of Marx's analysis relating to the pre-conditions of the emergence of industrial capitalism, the applicability of Wallerstein's framework to Scotland would seem to be greatest with reference to the period when Scotland itself was at the stage of the pre-conditions of industrial capitalism.

In other words, in the early stages of the incorporation of Scotland into the world economy - or to use Wallerstein's terms, of Scotland's move from external arena to periphery to core, it was Scotland's favourable conjunctural position which was decisive (13). Here a model appropriate to the genesis of capitalism would be likely to be more appropriate, with the generative role of exchange relations - of primitive accumulation - being particularly important, notably in terms of the significance of Scotland's participation in England's
colonial trade which was the most significant and immediate fruit of the Union for Scotland.

The mid- and late nineteenth century, however, when Scotland most unambiguously enjoyed core status, was precisely the period when one could have expected the relative weight of the inner logic of industrial capitalism to have been at its greatest. Marx, for example, made no differentiation between England and Scotland as sources of material illustrative of development in terms of this logic. The irony is that at this time and especially towards the end of the nineteenth century, when Scottish economic and social change was most directly subject to the 'inner logic' of capital, and when in fact Scotland should have been most 'autocentric' (to use Amin's phrase for the condition opposite to 'dependent') both British and Scottish 'self-interest' was defined primarily in terms of the free unfettered operation of market forces. Marx's phrase that capital knows no frontiers had its purest historical exemplification in late-nineteenth century Britain. Scotland's potential 'autocentrism' turned out to be no such thing in the hands of the Scottish bourgeoisie, who expressed their control in the form of a massive outflow of capital.

The very period in which Scotland had its nearest approximation to 'its own' capitalism - in institutional terms such as the existence of firms based in Scotland and forming a relatively differentiated Scottish industrial
complex (14) - was the very period in which this fact was likely to make least difference. This was not because Scotland was England's 'junior partner' but because Scottish capital was conforming to the international logic of capital.

In a very direct sense, the seeds of Scotland's and Britain's decline were sown precisely in this period of core status. Thus although Wallerstein's imagery, which allows us to conceptualise decline as well as 'development' is useful, the conclusion should not be drawn that the 'dependence' or 'peripherality' towards which Scotland and Britain are moving can be analysed in the same terms as what might be called pre-capitalist or semi-capitalist dependence or peripherality.

The irony of Scotland's present 'dependence' is that it is largely a result of Scotland's period of core status being dominated by the operation of a logic of capital unaffected by national frontiers, a logic which steered capital towards high profit ventures in the Empire and elsewhere rather than towards investment in Scotland.

Conclusion.

The implications of this chapter for the rest of the study are primarily negative. It has been a perhaps overelaborate exorcism of the theoretical temptations to take 'Scotland' as an unproblematic unit of analysis.

In one sense, Marx's vision of the ability of the process of capital accumulation on a world scale to ride
roughshod over national boundaries has applied particularly to Scotland. Whether it is a matter historically of the pattern of investment of 'Scottish' capital, or of the pattern of investment of 'British' capital, or, with more contemporary relevance, of the pattern of investment of multi-national capital, the pattern of industrial development in Scotland has been determined by a global pattern of capitalist accumulation which allowed the border of Scotland to interfere relatively little with the operation of market forces.

And yet, the state at both British and Scottish levels has assumed a level of economic intervention, and perhaps even more importantly of economic responsibility, well beyond Marx's expectations.

These two considerations together constitute a paradox. It could be this paradox which contains the secret of the puzzling dynamics of Scottish nationalism and the analysis from now on will diverge to pursue separately its two terms.

Chapter 5 will take up a line of analysis which begins with an empirical exploration of patterns of social change in modern Scotland. One of the major driving forces behind social change in Scotland has been industrial change. A fully adequate analysis of industrial change in Scotland would ground it in the rhythms of Scotland's mode of insertion in the global system of capitalist accumulation. Practical considerations of time and resources preclude any
attempt at the long slog from the abstract to the concrete which such a procedure would entail. Instead the aim will be to build up a reasonably systematic picture of social change in Scotland, taking especial care not to allow this national framework to distort the conclusions.

Chapters 3 and 4 follow a different thread which could be summed up as an attempt to ground the dynamics of support for Scottish nationalism in terms of the changing experience of the state.

The main short-cut involved here is not to attempt any derivation of British and Scottish state forms from the global process of capital accumulation, and in many ways the British state is one of the least likely candidates for such a derivation, but rather to accept that the state has real, material effects - economic or otherwise - and that these material effects have effects on consciousness.

Having resolved to cut that Gordian knot, the first pre-requisite is to develop a conception of ideology which will allow us to look at these effects on consciousness. Then we can look at how the continuing, and increasing, economic role of the state has affected consciousness of the state and of the nation.
Chapter 3.

The state, ideology and national consciousness.

Introduction

In this chapter, I want to set out some general considerations on the relationship between ideology, the state and national consciousness in late capitalist society. In no way is it an attempt to lay down a rigid problematic but should simply serve as a reminder of some of the theoretical connections which have in part guided and in part arisen from the subsequent more empirical analysis. In particular it should serve to make the analysis sensitive to the implications of long term changes such as the increase in state intervention in the economy and the advent of television. The importance of such kinds of change, precisely because they occur at such a general, societal level often tend to be missed by analyses with a narrower focus. In particular because they constitute a change in the environment which is in an important sense shared by everyone their causal role cannot be picked up in terms of correlational techniques. Yet as I will argue, these two shifts, although they cannot be correlated directly with the electoral success of the Scottish National Party, are probably the two most significant factors involved in creating a political and communications environment in the absence of which the kind of rapid electoral rise and fall experienced by the Scottish National Party in the late 1960s and the 1970s would have
been incomprehensible. In many ways the Scottish National Party was an embodiment of these environmental changes. Because they are such 'deep background' factors it is easy to forget them and although in themselves they were by no means sufficient to explain the success of the S.N.P. they were certainly necessary.

**Ideology.**

The object of this section is not to justify one 'valid' meaning of the term 'ideology' but rather to bring together in a coherent but inevitably crude framework the more common usages of the concept, especially, though not entirely, in Marxist social theory. The discussion is primarily oriented towards setting out how these differing usages of the term ideology each point towards different lines along which ideological change can be traced back to the effects of changes in other levels of the social structure.

As a first step, three usages of the term 'ideology' or 'ideological' can be identified, with a tight structural linkage between the three meanings. They can most simply be termed general, negative and positive.

(a) **general** - ideology as a level of social reality, as in the trilogy: economic, political and ideological, often associated with the notion of 'superstructure'

(b) **negative** - ideology as 'fetishism', 'reification', 'false consciousness', illusion
(c) positive - ideology as world-view, often with the implication that the more ideological is a world-view the more it is structured, rational, totalising i.e. ideology as 'penetration'

The relations between these three usages are extremely simple. The negative and positive senses are exact complements. To the extent that consciousness is ideological in sense (b) it is not ideological in sense (c) and vice versa.

Following on from this, (b) + (c) = (a), or conversely, ideology in general can be divided into (b) and (c).

In his discussion of Marx's own usage, Jorge Larrain is primarily concerned to differentiate within Marx meanings (a) and (b), the general and the negative.

"In effect, occasionally one has the impression that the term 'ideological' is used to make general reference to all forms of consciousness, theories and intellectual representations corresponding to a certain economic base. From here various interpreters derive the term 'ideological superstructure'. But in the majority of cases ideology refers to a particular, distorted kind of consciousness which conceals contradictions." (Larrain, 1979, p50)

Larrain's prescriptive emphasis is to limit the use of the term ideological to the negative sense, reserving the term 'idealistic superstructure' for the general meaning. However he does recognize the existence of 'non-ideological consciousness' if only to the extent that 'Marx envisaged his own thought as non-ideological' (Larrain, 1979, p52) and this would correspond in our terms to sense (c) - the
positive.

Whereas the use of the term 'ideology' in senses (a) and (b) does have some precedent in Marx's own writing, the same is not true of sense (c). However the use of the term ideology in a positive sense has a long tradition behind it. As Alvin Gouldner puts it:

"Marx and Engels emphatically condemned 'ideology' as a system of ideas made with a false consciousness that inverted social reality and that was subservient to the interests of the bourgeoisie, helping them dominate society. To some extent, then, Marx and Engels' judgement on ideology was continuous with Napoleon's condemnation of it. It is, therefore ironic that certain subsequent Marxists should have reversed Marx's usage, reverting to a view of ideology as positive, and, indeed, as almost synonymous with rational social theory or science." (Gouldner, 1976, p13)

Perhaps it is not so much a matter of irony as of dialectics. To use another image, if the ideological sphere is defined as a field of struggle, then the dividing line between the positive and negative senses of ideology is precisely what defines the sides of that struggle and the stake of that struggle. The Marxists mentioned by Gouldner (Althusser, Lukacs, Lenin) also used in their theories concepts corresponding to Marx's original usage - think only of Lukacs development of the concept of reification. In other words, the main point is not to legislate for a particular usage of the term ideology but to understand the field of theoretical relationships of which it is a condensation.
The Sources of Ideological Change.

The next step is to use the aspects or moments of the concept of ideology as pointers towards the kinds of changes in other levels of social structure which are likely to produce ideological change.

1) Ideology as fetishism - the negative concept of ideology.

This aspect of ideology points us back to the social structure in two directions.

The simplest way of looking at this is to follow back the implications of the fact that to conceive of ideology as fetishism is to recognize that consciousness is a reflection of reality but that this is a limited or distorted or superficial reflection. (The imagery of the 'warped mirror' stretches back to Bacon cf Larrain, 1979, p19).

Marx's construction of the negative concept of ideology was developed most fully in his analysis of commodity fetishism. This moment of Marx's analysis of consciousness in capitalist society was primarily concerned with consciousness of and in a capitalist market economy, whereby society was seen to be governed by the natural-seeming laws of the market. To the extent that Capital was a critique of the categories of bourgeois political economy, it was an analysis of this consciousness. Bourgeois political economy took the laws of the market, as relations between commodities, as the natural basis for the science of economics and the understanding of society as a
whole. In liberal capitalist society, relations between men appeared, and were understood as, relations between things.

However, the main point to be made here is that for Marx, commodity fetishism was not 'mere illusion'.

"The categories of bourgeois economics ... are forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore objective, for the relations of production belonging to this historically determined mode of production, i.e. commodity production." (Capital, Vol I, p169).

With respect to this particular moment of the relation of reality to consciousness, it is clear that it is the objective reality of commodity production which produces this relation between consciousness and reality. (1) It is a passive, reflection theory of consciousness which is involved here - which makes it all the more important to insist that this is only one moment of the relation of consciousness to objective reality. If one is talking about a direction of causality, then here the direction is all one way - reality determines consciousness.

As Geras puts it:

"In every case where Marx presents us with an example of fetishization, he goes to great pains to indicate the roots and raison d'être of the resulting illusions in the reality itself. .... If ... the social agents experience capitalist society as something other than it really is, this is fundamentally because capitalist society presents itself as something other than it really is." (Geras, 1972, p296)

He goes on to cite Godelier's concise statement of the locus of causality, which in more extended form reads:

"for Marx, the model constructed by science corresponds to a reality concealed beneath visible
reality. But he goes further: for him this concealment is not due to the inability of consciousness to 'perceive' this structure, but to the structure itself. .... It is not the subject who deceives himself, but reality which deceives him, and the appearances in which the structure of the capitalist production process conceals itself are the starting point for individuals conceptions." (Godelier, 1972, p337)

As Marx himself makes the point:

the "fetishism of the world of commodities arises from the peculiar social character of the labour which produces them.

Objects of utility become commodities only because they are the products of the labour of private individuals who work independently of each other. The sum total of the labour of all these private individuals forms the aggregate labour of society. Since the producers do not come into social contact until they exchange the products of their labour, the specific social characteristics of their private labours appear only within this exchange. In other words, the labour of the private individual manifests itself as an element of the total labour of society only through the relations which the act of exchange establishes between the products, and, through their mediation, between the producers. To the producers, therefore, the social relations between their private labours appear as what they are, i.e they do not appear as direct social relations between persons in their work, but rather as material (dinglich) relations between persons and social relations between things. (Capital, Vol I, p166).

To sum up, the model of commodity fetishism proposed by Marx can be seen as consisting of

1) a social reality dominated by commodity production with relations between producers taking place solely through the market

2) fetishistic consciousness of this social reality being a passive reflection of it

In terms of this model then ideological change must be seen as resulting from a change in the nature of objective
reality itself. The change upon which our attention will focus will be interference in the market by the state. To the extent that such state-intervention takes place, the market no longer presents itself as governed by natural laws. Commodity fetishism must break down to the extent that the 'natural laws of the market' are replaced by conscious political decision-making, no matter how limited.

However this is only one moment of ideological generation. One has to turn to the other moment, the positive concept of ideology, in order to understand the emergence or regression of the social conditions which shape the possibilities of consciousness penetrating behind the fetishized appearance, or in other words the disruption of the 'passive' determination of consciousness by reality. This possibility cannot be derived from the 'fetishism' model and in fact contradicts it. (2)

2) Ideology as penetration - the positive concept of ideology.

The 'positive' concept of ideology, ideology as penetration (3) can, as we have seen, be regarded as a simple opposite to the 'negative', to ideology as fetishism. We can easily posit a dimension running between the two. A belief system is ideological in the positive sense to the extent that it is structured, coherent, totalizing in scope and reflexive. This is obviously a very brutal condensation of and inevitable distortion of a wide range of sources.
What is much more crucial than the implicit dimensionality itself however is an insistence in these sources that the development of ideology in this positive sense is crucially dependent upon the communicative contexts (4) in which belief systems are generated. At one end of the scale are communicative contexts in which a person's thinking about the world is formed in an active process of involvement and debate while at the other extreme information is received passively in a manner involving little active effort to integrate it with the existing stock of knowledge.

The underlying insight is that the consciousness of each individual is formed within an array of communicative contexts in which he participates or to which he is exposed and which in large part determine how he interprets his real conditions of existence. In contemporary society these communicative contexts would include, in a rough order from the micro- to the macro-, from the personal to the impersonal, the family, peer-group, school, neighbourhood, work, trade-union, political party and finally the mass-media.

An important theme in what follows will be the tracing of how social change affected both the immediate material circumstances in which people lived and the communicative contexts which served to generate the frameworks in terms of which they would interpret these material circumstances and relate them to wider political questions.

Given that the raw material of such patterns of
ideological generation are the material circumstances in which people live, it would be fruitless to spend time on a general discussion. Instead the analysis of communicative contexts will be interweaved with the analysis of more material aspects of social change - first, at a 'macro-' level in terms of the impact of state intervention, and secondly as part of a more conventional analysis of social change in Scotland. This is particularly important in the case of the communicative context which plays probably the crucial role in the discussion which follows - television, analysis of the effects of which has fallen too often into generalisation.

One general point should be made however. The dangers of over-estimating the extent to which 'Red Clydeside' of fifty or sixty years ago could be generalized as a model of the state of working-class consciousness in Scotland as a whole are now generally well-recognized. This should not blind us to the fact however that in many areas of Scotland - Clydeside itself, the Vale of Leven, the mining areas of Fife - there did exist a working class which in many ways was one of the most politically advanced the world has ever seen. A working class which was a real embodiment of the 'positive' pole of the ideology dimension and one which equally embodied the close tie up between communicative context and the generation of ideology as penetration. Now this is a very pretentious way of expressing well known historical facts. I only express them in this way in order
to make the point that the social processes involved in the generation of support for the S.N.P. lay at the other end of the spectrum, both in terms of communicative context and ideology. The analysis which follows is very much an analysis of 'the dynamics of fetishism' or the 'dynamics of alienation'.

The state and ideology.

Marx's conception of commodity fetishism hinges on the fact that in a capitalist market economy, the perception that the economy is governed by natural laws is a valid reflection that, within the limits of such an economy, the economy is governed by the laws of the market.

Now we have to ask what happens to 'ideology as fetishism' when the market begins to lose its appearance of the natural operation of economic laws because something else - something beyond 'natural laws' - begins to intervene in the economy. That something else being of course the state.

In other words, what are the implications of applying what we have been calling the negative concept of ideology, ideology as fetishism, to the shift from liberal to monopoly or late capitalism. Most simply, the 'natural appearance' of the economy loses its real basis to the extent that economic events become the object of political decision-making on the part of the state. The appearance of naturalness is lost moreover to the extent that economic
events appear to be the result of state action, whether or not that state action actually does what it appears to. To the extent that the state involved is a national state, the unit of 'economic naturalness' shifts upwards from the level of the individual or the competing capitalist unit to the level of the nation-state. (5)

In the discussion of the kinds of social change which had to be taken into account in understanding ideological change, it was suggested that to the extent that ideology is a reflection of reality change in that reality has to be taken into account. This in itself sounds so obvious that it is almost tautological. However in speaking of changes in state activity as having to be treated as changes in reality, again obvious enough, we are going against that rarely explicit strand of thinking in Marxism which would regard the state as superstructural, as in a sense illusory - as not being real in the sense in which the economy is real.

In part this imagery arises from seeing the state as some thing external to the economy, which affects it from outside.

As Poulantzas points out, however, the state cannot be regarded as 'mere' superstructure. To the extent that the state has always been 'present in the constitution and reproduction of the relations of production', the State cannot be regarded as 'a mere appendage or reflection of the economic sphere, devoid of its own space and reducible
to the economy'. (Poulantzas, 1978, p15)

Much of Poulantzas' last work is devoted to an exposition of the 'institutional materiality of the state' which is his expression for what underlies the reality, the non-illusory nature, of the effects of state action. To put it at its simplest, the state 'makes a difference' that is not reducible, that has to be taken into account. Or as Poulantzas puts it, the State must be seen as acting 'in a positive fashion, creating, transforming and making reality'. In objecting to the limitations of seeing the State's role restricted to the exercise of organized physical repression and to the organization and inculcation of the dominant ideology, Poulantzas continues

"...it is quite simply wrong to believe that the State only acts in this manner: the relation of the masses to power and the State - in what is termed among other things a consensus - always possesses a material substratum. I say 'among other things', since in working for class hegemony, the State acts within an unstable equilibrium of compromises between the dominant classes and the dominated. The State therefore continually adopts material measures which are of positive significance for the popular masses, even though these measures represent so many concessions imposed by the struggle of subordinate classes. ... The invariable presence of ideological allurement does not therefore change the fact that the State also acted by producing a material substratum for mass consensus - a substratum which, while not the same as its ideological presentation in state discourse, was not simply reducible to propaganda." (Poulantzas, 1978, pp30-31)

It is within the context of this mass consensus and in full recognition that it does not consist of baseless illusions about the nation that we must situate the analysis of the S.N.P. Not that such a mass consensus is relevant to the S.N.P. in a way in which it was not
relevant to the other political parties in the thirty years after the war. What such mass consensus consisted of, and to an extent still consists of, was a generally shared but rarely explicit set of assumptions about what politics was about. To the extent that politics was about the British state delivering the goodies at a national level, that framework was implicitly nationalist. Apart from the fact that it had a different national referent, the Scottish National Party was in the dead centre of the mainstream of this framework. Its distinctiveness lay less in the fact that it was Scottish than in the fact that it was the first to make the framework explicitly nationalist.

This can perhaps be made to sound somewhat less paradoxical by anchoring the analysis in relation to that of Tom Nairn (1981). What is most important is the conclusion which Nairn did not come to in his analysis of Scottish Nationalism in the twentieth century but which would seem to me to be implicit in his thoroughly convincing discussion of why there was no significant Scottish national movement in the nineteenth century.

Nairn emphasizes how Britain's early start in the industrial revolution meant that the state could play a less interventionist role in fostering capitalist development than was the case for states which were later starters in the capitalist developmental process. This he puts forward as one of the primary reasons why Scotland did not develop a political nationalism in the 19th century while all over Europe other proto-nationalities were doing
According to Nairn what really counts

"...is that this was the first such 'bourgeois revolution' proceeding on a sufficient territorial basis. Just because it was first, it developed gradually, and in a highly 'empirical' and decentralised fashion. All those societies which developed later, in its wake, could not help doing so more competitively, through a much more intense political and state organisation. After the first huge strides forward England had made, after here Agrarian and Industrial Revolutions and her colonial and commercial triumphs over France, other lands were forced to be in some sense 'late-comers' - forced therefore to compensate for their backwardness by a more conscious, a more state contrived and militant type of development" (Nairn, 1981, p138)

The main implication of this for Scotland is that Scottish civil society was in a sense left alone in terms of mobilization for political development. The lowland Scots were able to 'escape the normal dilemma of "development" and its cruel consequences.'(Nairn, 1981, p179)

What is of interest here however is what happens when such relative state non-intervention is no longer possible in a world of late capitalist nation states. The strange separation between Scotland's civil society and government in Westminster is no longer possible. Nairn uses 'the strange separation' as an explanatory factor behind the warped forms of Scottish national identity - cultural sub-nationalism and the tartan monster. The end of the story of the relation between state and civil society in Scotland is not spelled out in such detail. Nairn relates it in this way:
"I suggested originally that two factors in combination had created the conditions for nationalist resurgence: the multi-national petroleum business, and the degeneration of British politics. But the failure of socialism is surely another way of regarding the second of these. It is the failure of the left to advance far enough, fast enough, on the older State-nation platform which history had provided, it is the inability of great nation socialism to tackle advanced contradictions properly, that has made this 'second round' of bourgeois nationalisms inevitable" (Nairn, 1981, p179)

Without denying the validity of that formulation, there is a more global and unifying implication of his analysis of the earlier phases. Which is that as Britain moved into the late capitalist phase, the separation of state and civil society has disappeared. This is not a process peculiarly characteristic of Britain, although of course it has British peculiarities, but is a process characteristic of late capitalist societies in general. It is this process which must provide the framework within which to view both the impact of oil and the failure of the British left along with the decline of British politics, as explanatory of the growth of Scottish nationalism.

In another context Nairn identified a major aspect of the central development involved.

"The Attlee government ... closed and sealed the epoch of British 'national socialism', by the formation of a new totality in which reforms of the State effectively regained the allegiance of the proletariat and so subordinated the class struggle to the 'national interest'" (Nairn, 1971, p17)

Nairn sees this process of 'nationalization' associated with changes in the type and level of state action as relevant solely at the British level, as relevant to British nationalism. What I hope to establish is that
this same set of developments at the state level were the most important factors in determining the nature of Scottish nationalism.

Nairn's argument could be said to centre upon the implications for developments at the ideological level, at the level of national consciousness and nationalism, of the nature and degree of the articulation between the state and the economy. Britain's unique historical and structural position meant that very little direct internal intervention was necessary for economic development. It was primarily by means of external, imperialist intervention that the British state helped create the conditions for its internal economic development. We must now try to grasp the implications for national consciousness of what happened when, in the course of the twentieth century, and in particular in the years surrounding the second world war, the British state was forced to intervene much more explicitly in internal economic affairs.

The analysis must deal, in a nutshell, with how the increasing intervention of the state in the economy affected the way the state was experienced. It is in terms of how changes in intervention by the British state - operating at both British and Scottish levels - have been experienced, that the emergence of Scottish nationalism as an effective political force is to be understood.

If there is a secret to the power of national consciousness in late capitalist society it could be said
to lie in the area of the twofold nature of the state. On the one hand the state has had increasingly important effects at the economic level. On the other hand it plays a central role at the ideological level — as the representative state(6). In is in terms of this crucial conjunction — of the reality of the economic effects of the state with the ideological role of the state — that changes in how the state is experienced can be understood and materially grounded.

Nairn recognizes the extension of state activity, and, to some extent, its ideological implications.

"The war effort itself signified a huge development in state intervention, upon lines already present in the Liberal Party's reform programme of Edwardian times: public enterprise and control of the economy and social welfare. As was to happen also in the second world conflict, the ideological reinforcement of British patriotism co-incided with important structural developments favourable to working class interests. These developments took the form of the constant extension of state activity and influence, and ultimately — after World War II — of the pioneer 'welfare state' which for a brief period served as a model for other capitalist countries." (Nairn, 1981, p47)

Nairn recognizes that these developments might be seen as contradicting his general characterization of the nature of the British state but goes on to say that it is the latter which counts not the former. The extension of state activity doesn't much matter.

"... the growth of the state ... has never seriously changed its underlying nature. This has been demonstrated by the character of the growth itself: random, ad hoc formation of new agencies and functions, which rarely question the basic principles of government. This amoebic proliferation has merely surrounded and preserved the essential identity of the British Constitution." (Nairn, 1981, p48)
Nairn has already clearly laid down what he sees as being the central factor in explaining (as part of the general process of the disintegration of the British state) the rise of modern Scottish nationalism.

"The way things have actually gone poses two related questions. Firstly, why has the old British state-system lasted so long, in the face of such continuous decline and adversity? Secondly, why has the break-down begun to occur in the form of territorial disintegration rather than as the long awaited social revolution - why has the threat of secession apparently eclipsed that of the class-struggle in the 1970s?

In my view the answer to both these questions depends mainly upon one central factor, unfortunately neglected in the majority of discussions of the crisis. This central issue is the historical character of the British state itself." (Nairn, 1981, p14)

The implied syllogism in Nairn's analysis is as follows. The first premise is that the central factor behind the upsurge of modern Scottish nationalism is 'the historical character of the British state itself'. Add to this the second premise that 'the growth of the state ... has never seriously changed its underlying nature' and the implication would seem to be that the growth of the state in itself is largely irrelevant to explaining the rise of modern Scottish nationalism.

Here in a nutshell would seem to be the reason why Nairn cannot draw the conclusion that, although in the nineteenth century the lack of state intervention explains why there was no Scottish national movement, the presence of state intervention in the twentieth century does explain the emergence of a Scottish national movement. For Nairn, it is not what the state does which matters but what the
Another way of looking at the relative weight of the factors involved is that the British state after the second world war was a British state with a number of archaic peculiarities which were deeply entwined with the nature of the British class system, but it was also a late capitalist state whose pattern of activities closely paralleled that of other late capitalist states such as Germany, France and the United States. In terms of its activities the post-war British state had more in common with these post-war states than with the pre-war British state.

The plan of the following analysis is to take changes in what the state does as a basis for understanding changes in the way the state is experienced, a changing experience which is the primary matrix within which the nature of national and nationalist consciousness is determined.

But, the question will be asked, how can experience of the British state account for Scottish nationalism? At this stage, the only answer is that it is very hard to imagine where else Scottish nationalism in the form in which it has manifested itself in the last twenty years could have come from other than from the experience of the post-war British state. Where else did the people who voted S.N.P. get their idea of what a state action at a Scottish level could or could not do other than from their experience of living in the British state? I'm not sure whether this is an overwhelmingly obvious point or a dangerously provocative
one. Perhaps the most telling point is that of all the neo-nationalist 'movements', the Scottish national party has been the one to take on most fully and comprehensively the institutional form of a mainstream political party. Rather than being a challenge to the conventional pattern of British political activity, the S.N.P. succeeded in part because it was so successful in assuming the mantle of a 'normal' and 'unthreatening' political party. (7) To a greater degree than any other neo-nationalist movement, in modern Scottish nationalism the party dominated the movement rather than vice versa.

The onwards path then is to trace changes in state action and the effects of these changes on consciousness. The experience of the state is one which is inevitably highly mediated. We also need to trace changes in the communicative contexts in terms of which the state is experienced.
Chapter 4.
State action and the media.

Introduction

In the last chapter I presented a fairly abstract model of how ideological change can be related to change in the level of economic intervention by the state. In particular, I suggested that in the absence of critical perspectives, or ideology in the positive sense, increased economic intervention by the state would tend to shift the level of 'fetishism' or 'obviousness' from the level of the market to the level of the nation-state. The most concise expression of these changes was in terms of the experience of the state.

In the broadest terms, the present chapter seeks to establish the conditions of possibility for the electoral success of the S.N.P. in terms of the changing experience of the state at both a British and a Scottish level.

It is this changing experience which has served to define the parameters within which mainstream electoral debate has taken place. It has served to define what politics are generally held to be all about.

The central dimension of change has been in expectations of what government action is capable of achieving in economic terms. My broadest generalization is that these expectations have been determined in the main by the perception of how effective previous government action
has been.

The kind of time-scale involved is best expressed in terms of a fifty year rise and fall in belief in the effectiveness of state action. This cycle takes off from the generally accepted powerlessness of the state in the 1930s\(^1\). Faith in the power of government then received an incalculable boost from the experience of war-time mobilization, a faith which was prolonged by the favourable conditions of the post-war boom. Finally comes the long downward curve of disillusion of the last twenty years culminating in the uncanny parallel in the 1980s of the mood of the 1930s.

This is of course a caricature. This chapter will be concerned with tracing in rather more detail but still at a very general level the 'upward curve'. In other words, the aim is to trace the coming together of the elements of the British post-war political consensus, highlighting those aspects which make it possible to see the electoral success of the S.N.P. not as a fracturing of this consensus but as an expression of it.

The British Level.

A fairly obvious distinction will be useful in tracing the developments which converged to produce the relationship between the individual and the national state in the years following the Second World War.

As Winch puts it, we can distinguish between "...measures designed to provide increased protection and security to workers or citizens through
collective provision of welfare services, and those measures which have in view the improvement in the overall economic performance of society." (Winch, 1969, p17)

In short we can distinguish between a welfare or social and an economic management strand of intervention.

It is the emergence of the second strand, that of economic management, which is central to the present analysis. Most fundamentally the emergence of economic management is inseparable from the emergence of a national economy which can be to some extent managed. The constitution of such a British national economy is a central concern of Tomlinson's work on British economic policy from 1870 to 1945. For this reason I will use his work as the main framework for my account although Winch (1969) deals with the same processes from a rather different point of view.

The historical base line for the emergence of a managed national economy can be taken as Britain's dominant position in the nineteenth century world economy and in particular Britain's adherence to the three closely associated policies of the gold standard, free trade and low central government expenditure. Tomlinson's account of the determinants of this tight web of orthodoxies and its breakdown is necessarily complex and the following summary does it scant justice.

However, the main point to be made is that adherence to both free-trade and the gold standard ruled out the possibility of moving beyond the
"general subordination of national economic policy to international economic events" (Tomlinson, 1981, p32)

"The 'solidity' of Britain's adherence to the gold standard ... meant the almost total absence of a problem of national monetary policy, because adherence to gold implied the subordination of domestic monetary policy to international flows of gold." (Tomlinson, 1981, p43)

It was not that there was no conception of the national interest, it was simply that the national interest could not be expressed in terms of a national economy to be managed:

"the whole conception of a national economy to be managed did not exist at this time, and such a conception was ... partly predicated on the absence of the gold standard." (Tomlinson, 1981, p32)

In terms of the free-trade position

"what was best for the British economy ... was seen as indissolubly linked to the prosperity of the world economy (as well as world peace). The principle of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest can, if one desires, be seen as an effect of a clear calculation of where the British national interest lay at a particular period. But it did imply a particular conception of Britain's insertion in the world economy, an insertion in terms of the free movement of commodities and capital across national boundaries. This kind of insertion meant that British prosperity would be best guaranteed by an absence of policy at the level of the national economy. This conception was of course fully consonant with free trade and the gold standard. Free trade meant that the national origin of commodities would not be grounds for regulation by the state. The gold standard meant that there could be no domestic monetary policy as such, because domestic monetary conditions would be subordinate to international gold flows" (Tomlinson, 1981, p49)

The final abandonment of the gold standard in 1931 constituted a first condition for the emergence of the kind of national economic policy which characterised the post-war decades.
departure from gold in the British conditions of the 1930s gave space for a number of conceptions of a national economy to grow up, because, with the insulation from the world economy, manipulation of an economy at the level of the nation state became much more plausible. Thus in the 1930s there were a large number of commentators who tried to outline how the British economy could be improved in a variety of directions, ... what was innovative was the focus on internal conditions, and the decline in interest in external. ... Articulated with these arguments are the beginnings of 'management' of the economy in the modern sense."

More generally, Tomlinson argues that the post-war pursuit of Keynesian policy (in the sense of "the use of budget deficits to regulate employment within fairly narrow parameters" (pl21)) was premised on "a range of specific factors without which such a a policy change would have been inconceivable" (pl24).

The first, as already discussed, was the move off the gold standard.

The second was the existence of a large, controlled and manipulable central government budget.

"By 1945, the growth of public expenditure and the changes in its composition and control had, in principle, made plausible the manipulation of the budget to affect the economy in a way inconceivable at the beginning of the 1930s." (Tomlinson, 1981, p127)

The third precondition had to do with the technical means for the management of a national economy i.e.

"an elaborated system of national accounts. Only with these can the likely effect of budgetary changes on the economy of the nation be assessed." (ibid, p129).

Although Tomlinson concentrates on national accounting as a technical pre-condition for the management of national economy, this development can more generally be seen as one
aspect of an increase in the availability of economic indicators in general - be they of the balance of payments, unemployment, inflation, or economic growth - all of which for the first time combined to produce a quantitative language in which national economic performance could be discussed, and in terms of which the performance of governments could be assessed. This language only emerged during and after World War II.

The three factors mentioned so far fall into the category of technical preconditions for the emergence of a national managed economy. The fourth pre-condition identified by Tomlinson is rather different and concerns what Tomlinson calls the radicalisation of the population. The combination of the experience of the depression with the necessity for the mobilization of popular support for the war effort meant that expectations of what the state could do and should do were greatly expanded. The combination of the exigencies of wartime mobilization and increased popular demands and expectations provided the political motivation for putting into effect what the more technical developments already discussed made feasible.

By the end of World War II, then, the preconditions were present for the type of economic management of the national economy, with the government taking explicit responsibility for employment, prices, balance of payments and, somewhat later, economic growth, which came quickly to be taken for granted as what politics was about in the post-war years.
Paralleling, and in mutual interaction with, these developments in the management of the economy, were the developments in social policy which culminated, again with much of the momentum deriving from the experience of the Second World War, in the welfare state.

The two strands had different implications for the relation between the individual and the state.

The welfare state strand implied a direct link between individual economic well-being and state policy primarily in the form of more or less adequate guarantees of cash benefits or services when needed. There was a long-term tendency however for the welfare state, and this implied direct relation between the individual and the state, to disappear from the explicit political agenda once the initial commitment had been made by the post-war Labour government.

Political discourse came increasingly to centre upon the other, more indirect, relation between state action at the national level and individual economic well-being. This relation involved the state taking responsibility for the performance of the national economy as a whole, with this national economic performance then having repercussions on individual incomes and jobs (although for the first twenty years after the war, relatively full employment, like the welfare state, tended to be taken for granted.)

This gradual shift in the political agenda was reflected in popular consciousness. Although precise
comparison is impossible because of changing question wordings the shift can be traced in terms of opinion poll responses to questions of the form 'What is the most important/urgent problem facing the nation/government at the present time'. The discussion will be restricted to domestic issues since as we have recently seen in the case of the Falklands, foreign military adventures such as Suez and Cyprus provoke rapid short term swing in responses to such questions. In the immediate post-war years responses focussed on immediate material shortages - food, fuel, housing. The fifties produced a relatively mixed bag of responses with 'the cost of living' or 'economic affairs' emerging as a major factor but not tending to be massively more significant than issues such as housing or pensions. Only in the nineteen sixties did responses begin to focus overwhelmingly on 'economic affairs' - this connoting precisely the strand of national economic management as opposed to more social or welfare issues which were tending to fade out of the responses.\(^2\) These responses were largely a reflection of the fact that this image of what politics was about - national economic management - was one which was shared and promulgated by the government, politicians in general and the media.

To sum up, the period of the Second World War and the post-war Labour government saw the constitution of a relationship between the individual and the state significantly different from that which had obtained in the years before the war.
Once this reciprocal configuration of individual expectations and state responsibilities had been set up, electoral competition served to keep up the pressure.

Once it became plausible that the government could 'control' the economy, it was in the parties' interests to make promises in opposition about what they could achieve and to hold those in power responsibility for whatever happened under their 'control'. The long post-war boom provided the objective economic conditions within which it was at least plausible that government policies were in part responsible for rising standards of living.

From a pre-war situation in which the dominant orthodoxy was that the government could do very little, there was a move in the post-war years to a general belief that government could control, and thus be held responsible for, the general performance of the economy.

It was only within this new, post-war universe of political discourse dominated, for the first time, by the conception of Britain as a national economic unit which could be managed and with the fate of which the economic well-being of the individual was directly implicated, that the emergence of a conception of Scotland as an analogous type of national economic unit can be comprehended.

The Scottish Level.

The growth of government activity at the Scottish level
can also be separated into two strands, with a certain parallelism with those defined at the British level.

The first consists of the piecemeal growth over the last century of administrative functions centred around the Scottish Office to do with the supervision of such areas as health and education. Much of this expansion has been a corollary of the general growth of the welfare functions of the British state.

The impact on Scottish political consciousness of this strand of expansion in state activity at the Scottish level appears to have been relatively slight. As Kellas puts it,

"... the degree of decentralisation to Scotland, however great it might appear to be, has little effect on the consciousness of mass public opinion in Scotland. Scots know very little of it, and what they know they probably regard as a subsidiary part of British government having few independent powers of its own." (Kellas, 1975, pp 37-38)

The state of ignorance of the mass of the Scottish population as to the functions of the Scottish Office was revealed in particular by the painstaking survey carried out for the Kilbrandon Commission. (3)

The corollary of this lack of awareness is that the growth of this administrative apparatus owed very little directly to mass political demands expressed at the Scottish level. The process rather presents a picture of almost absent-minded accretion in the face of new responsibilities defined at the British level and delegated administratively to the Scottish.

The second strand of state action at the Scottish level is that concerned with economic development - either
through regional policy implemented from Westminster or through specifically Scottish institutions. The plausibility of this kind of intervention was particularly dependent upon the background shift from perceived government powerlessness to control the economy before the war to a perceived quasi-omnipotence after it. Pre-war regional policy was closer in philosophy to a welfare approach than to a dirigiste, what elements there were of the latter consisting largely of an emphasis on transferring surplus workers out of the depressed areas. The emphasis was one of combatting unemployment but hardly one of promoting regional economic development.

The complex series of developments in this second strand of state activity in Scotland in the twenty years after the war were important not primarily in terms of their rather limited concrete effects on Scotland's economy, but rather in terms of their contribution to the creation of a frame of reference in which the unit of economic development became not Britain, or a particular region of Scotland, but Scotland as a whole - a unit whose economic position could be easily and numerically compared with others, usually England. In short, these developments provided an institutional embodiment of 'the Scottish economic dimension'.

Developments which contributed to the crystallization of this frame of reference in the post-war decades, and particularly in the 1950s and early 1960s included
developments in regional economic theory, the activities of non-governmental bodies such as the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) and the S.T.U.C., the development of economic planning functions within the state apparatus, the appearance of widely publicized 'Plans' for the Scottish economy and the availability of increasingly comprehensive economic and social indicators at a Scottish level. (4)

To some extent there was an inbuilt dynamic to this process. It was in the interests of every organization institutionalized at the Scottish level - and this is before taking into account the political parties - to make demands, to formulate proposals and to increase expectations. There were few penalties for doing so, since the failure of the many grandiose schemes could be blamed on wider factors and on Westminster in particular.

The discrepancy between expectations and the possibility of their fulfillment within the existing (or even an expanded) institutional structure was much greater at the Scottish level than at the British. The instruments of economic control which had even a possibility of making an impact - in particular those which influenced the level of demand - were all at the British level. The instruments available at the Scottish level could have marginal effects at the best.

By the early 1960s these contradictions were at their sharpest. At a British level, growthmanship was in the air with Wilson an ardent evangelist for the 'white-hot
technological revolution'. Although Scottish unemployment was relatively high compared with, say, the South of England, compared with the nineteen thirties or the eighties the position can only be seen as one of relatively full employment. There were manifestations of a Scottish 'growth project' such as the Toothill Committee Report on the Scottish Economy in 1961 and and the embodiment of an economic planning function within government in the form of the Scottish Development Department in 1962. In 1964 the opening of the Forth Road Bridge was a particularly potent symbol of a dynamic future.

Expectations which in England focussed primarily on Westminster were soon dashed by the fumbling and 'pragmatic' policies of a Labour Government which were in sharp contrast to the rhetoric of long-term planning for growth on which it had been elected. In Scotland the failure of the Labour government could be regarded simply as that and no more, with no implications for the plausibility of the Scottish project. Failure at Westminster in fact was the perfect explanation for the gap between expectations at the Scottish level and the means available for fulfilling them.

So far I have been discussing factors underlying the generation, within the general framework of high expectations of what governments could achieve at the British level, of a parallel frame of reference at the Scottish level. Whether or not this frame of reference
would have had any effects outside the world of government departments, quangoes and University Departments of Economics or Regional Planning, depended primarily upon two institutions - the Labour Party and the mass media. Restricting the focus to the first half of the 1960s we can rule out the impact of the S.N.P. as a major transmitter of the frame of reference except on a fairly localized basis. Only after their success in the Hamilton by-election of 1967 would the S.N.P. emerge as the main articulator of the themes involved in the Scottish growth project and Hamilton must be seen primarily as the result - or more precisely the embodiment of - a frame of reference which had been given credibility elsewhere.

The role of the Labour Party in establishing and disseminating the Scottish economic frame of reference in the late 1950s and early 1960s has been well documented and its impact cannot be overestimated. As Miller puts it

"Between 1959 and 1964 Labour made much of the case for a reviving S.N.P." (Miller, 1981, p35)

The fullest study of the relation between the Labour party and the Scottish national dimension is that by Keating and Bleiman (1979). In terms of the period 1959-1966, they summarize the Labour strategy as follows

"Labour's attitude to the Scottish question was based upon the assumptions that the basis of any discontent was economic and that the electorate were more concerned about the economic goods which they received than with the constitutional mechanism by which they were delivered."(p151)

Labour based its electoral appeals on

"its ability to gain material benefits for
Scotland. This would be achieved partly through the beneficial effects which Labour's overall U.K. strategy would bring, but partly through the ability of Labour's Scottish representatives to gain special concessions." (Keating and Bleiman, 1979, p153)

Labour can be seen as being a major vehicle for the simple transfer of the mode of discourse dominant at the British level - government policies will ensure economic growth - to the Scottish level.

In this context it is worth noting that in one of the early studies of the electoral impact of television - Blumler and McQuail's (1968) analysis of the 1964 General Election - one of the very few issues to have increased measurably in salience during the campaign and the one to have shown by far the largest increase in salience, was, precisely, that of economic growth. The percentage naming 'Get fast and steady growth of the economy' as one of the five issues it was most important 'for the next (new) government to tackle rose from 21% to 33%, the increase being most marked among skilled manual workers (14% to 29%) (Blumler and McQuail, 1968, Tables 10.1 and 10.2). The authors felt that the evidence suggested that

"in contrast to earlier elections, the 1964 campaign was remarkable for having directed the attention of many voters to certain issues which had not previously seemed important to them - notably that of economic growth but to a lesser extent that of the nuclear deterrent as well ... In the years that followed the General Election of 1964, economic growth in particular may have provided a criterion by which a growing number of voters were prepared to judge the merits of rival parties." (Blumler and McQuail, 1968, p181)

The emergence of the 'Scottish growth project' then in the late 1950s and early 1960s can be seen as a result both
of an increase in the political salience of the Scottish economic dimension and in that of the economic growth dimension, which combined to produce the frame of reference in terms of which political and economic events were increasingly interpreted. Only in the context of this widely accepted framework does the rapidity of the rise in voting for the S.N.P. become comprehensible. Voting S.N.P. did not involve a change to a different and new type of political thinking - voting S.N.P. was just one, and in many respects the least contradictory, manifestation of one underlying frame of reference. The ingredients of this frame were simply that (1) governments could influence and largely control national economic performance - and this was the bedrock assumption of British post-war politics although it was only in the early 1960s that it took on the more explicitly technocratic form of fostering economic growth and that (2) this could take place at a Scottish level - and as we have seen this was very much the conventional wisdom in elite circles in Scotland in the early 1960s. These assumptions were sufficiently 'apolitical' or technocratic not specify any particular political party as being the one necessary for the implementation of the implied project. The choice was simply a matter of credibility. Labour soon lost that at the British level - hoist on its own pragmatic (by your results shall you be judged) petard - and a vote for the S.N.P. allowed expression of dissatisfaction along with
continuing faith in the Scottish growth project. In terms of rapidity and magnitude, the shift in voting to the S.N.P. was unprecedented in British politics. Rather than invoking the transformation of basic political orientations to explain such a massive shift, it would seem to make more sense to see it as reflecting a shift within a political frame of reference. This was a frame of reference shaped by the experience of British politics since the Second World War, involving particular expectations of the state, and the emergence within this frame of what I have been calling the 'Scottish growth project'.

However, the rapidity with which all the developments already cited could have an ideological effect was crucially dependent upon the structure of political communication.

The mass media.

The fact that Scotland had in the post-war period a daily and Sunday press with an even greater degree of autonomy than is the case at present meant that there was an inbuilt tendency to emphasize the Scottish dimension. This is a banal point but an important one. There is no need to posit any change in the situation or interests of the Scottish press for it to act as an amplifier for the emergence of the Scottish economic dimension. As Kellas puts it:

"All Scottish papers are part of the economic log-rolling of the Scottish interest groups (among them the trade unions, employers associations and the Scottish
Council (Development and Industry)), who seek further
government-aided development in Scotland. The
political affiliation of the papers then becomes
somewhat irrelevant." (Kellas, 1975, p175)

Again the point has to be made that such an emphasis
presupposes a situation in which there are logs to be
rolled i.e. in which government intervention and demands
for government economic intervention are at least plausible
ways of generating economic goodies, and again the
comparison is with the situation before the war.

Just as was the case for any other institution whose
membership or custom was Scottish, there was very little to
lose by stressing the Scottish dimension - and in such an
emerging climate, quite a bit to lose by not stressing it.

The existence of a largely separate Scottish press can
be taken as a relatively constant background factor. The
same could probably be said of Scottish radio in the 1950s.
The Scottish Home Service broadcast just under 10 hours
per week of Scottish made material. The Broadcasting
Council for Scotland claimed that between 20 and 25% of the
Scottish population were tuned into the daily early evening
Scottish News bulletins in the mid-nineteen fifties (Annual

If changes in the structure of political communication
can be held to have played a role in generating a
widespread consciousness of the Scottish economic
dimension, there is only one change in that structure which
is a candidate - the arrival of television.

The B.B.C. began television transmission in Central
Scotland from Kirk o'Shotts in 1951. By 1956 one third of Scottish families had T.V. licences. S.T.V. began transmission from Black Hill in August 1957 and the next few years saw a rapid move towards a situation in which the vast majority of homes had television. (Table 4.1)

Table 4.1. T.V. licences per 100 families.

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<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: B.B.C. Annual Reports)

Even more important than this simple growth of the television audience in Scotland however was the expansion of specifically Scottish news and current affairs coverage. The immediate impetus behind this development was the arrival of S.T.V. which had a regional focus (15% of its output to be Scottish) written into its contract (I.T.A. Annual Report, 1956). Throughout the early and mid-1950s, the B.B.C. broadcast no specifically Scottish news programme on television. It was no coincidence that the B.B.C. introduced 'a Scottish news service for viewers in Scotland – the first of its kind in B.B.C. television' (B.B.C. Annual Report 1957-58, p9) on August 30th 1957, the day before S.T.V. began to transmit from Black Hill. This was only part of a general response by the B.B.C. to S.T.V.'s Scottish focus. In the year ending 30th March 1957
only 25 hours of programmes were produced in Scotland for transmission only in Scotland by the B.B.C. By 1958, the figure had reached 148 hours and by 1961 208 hours - not earth-shattering figures but enough to encompass a significant expansion in Scottish news and current affairs coverage. (B.B.C. Annual Reports)

By the early 1960s, the pattern of television news and current affairs coverage had settled into the shape which it has maintained, in broad outline, ever since. The focal time-slot was between 6 and 6.30 p.m. taking the form of a news magazine incorporating a Scottish news summary immediately following the national (British) news on both channels. In addition there were 5 minute lunchtime Scottish news bulletins. Current affairs coverage was completed by a weekly 'in-depth' programme such as S.T.V.'s 'Dateline Scotland' and more infrequent specialist programmes such as those spotlighting parliamentary affairs.

The most sustained impact however was undoubtedly that of the main evening news magazines. Their week-day monopoly of the 6 to 6.30 p.m. time-slot on both channels may have helped maintain their audiences although this is by no means certain. That they did have very high viewing figures - at least for news-oriented programmes - is more certain. In the two weeks ending 31st March 1963, the average percentage of television homes (i.e. all those with television sets) logged as being tuned into the nightly
'Here and Now' programme was 49% - the same proportion as were tuned into the main I.T.N. news. 'Dateline Scotland' in a 6.30 pm on Friday evening slot, notched up an even higher figure of 54%. (I.T.A. Annual Report, 1962-63, p52). These figures apply to just one, admittedly by far the more popular, channel.

These programmes in addition had a relatively strong economic and particularly industrial focus. Both the B.B.C. and S.T.V. had Scottish Industrial Correspondents. This focus was given explicit recognition and approval in the Annual Reports of both networks.

The Broadcasting Council for Scotland reported in 1963 that


and in 1964 that

"The economic situation and the White Paper on Central Scotland were the subject of special programmes on the Scottish Home Service and in 'Checkpoint', the weekly television programme on Scottish affairs. The Secretary of State and others gave interviews on this subject in the News and 'Six-Ten' and it was discussed in 'Scotland in Parliament' (B.B.C Annual Report, 1963-64, p109)

while at the British level, the general review of the year pointed out that

"A third aspect of Regional broadcasting which is less obvious to the audience but is of particular importance in a year which has seen growing interest in Regional planning in the economic, social and cultural spheres, is the contribution made by Regional experts to current affairs programmes on the national networks. The B.B.C.s Regional Industrial Correspondents in particular have made notable contributions to such
programmes as 'Panorama' and 'Gallery' when they have been dealing with Regional aspects of the country's economic life." (B.B.C. Annual Report, 1964, p65)

On the other side it was pointed out that

"of special note was the development of a greater interest in and coverage of industrial and technological matters, particularly by Scottish Television, Tyne Tees Television and Grampian Television." (I.T.A. Annual Report, 1964-65)

Now it is the nature of such documents for much of their content to consist of self-satisfied and self-serving waffle. However, in addition to their informative value, these citations are evidence of the extent to which the regional and Scottish economic dimensions were 'in the air' at the time - particularly among the broadcasting establishment - a fact which would not be slow to filter down to more executive levels. The citations might appear fairly trivial in themselves, especially from the standpoint of the present, when an even heavier focus on the Scottish economic dimension is taken for granted. The point to be made is that these themes had not appeared before 1963 in the annual reports of the television networks with anywhere near the degree of prominence or explicitness that they were subsequently to enjoy.

We have then, three levels of rapid change in the amount and type of television to which Scots were exposed in the late 1950s and early 1960s. First was the rapid expansion of television itself. Second was a relative expansion of specifically Scottish news and current affairs coverage. Third was a strong economic and industrial slant within this news and current affairs coverage. Taking the
three together, it is hardly an exaggeration to speak of a qualitative shift in the degree of exposure of the Scottish people to the 'Scottish economic frame of reference'.

From establishing the degree of this exposure we have to turn to establishing what its likely effects will have been. What I will argue is that the kind of effect likely to have been produced by such exposure is precisely the kind of effect which recent thinking in media studies has come to see as most important - not an effect in terms of specific attitudes or opinions but an effect in terms of the frame of reference in terms of which people make sense of political reality.

Discussion of the effects of television on political attitudes and behaviour was for a long time imprisoned within a focus on the kinds of short-term opinions and effects which could be operationalised in terms of survey methodology and it was in these terms that the orthodoxy grew up in the 1950s and 1960s that political effects attributable to the mass communications media - and in particular television - had been greatly overestimated.

It is only when we step back from the kind of effects which can be identified on the basis of survey techniques, that we can move towards a more realistic assessment of the long-term effects of the arrival of television in Scotland.

The first point to be made is that television is generally accepted to have quite rapidly become the primary source of political information for the majority of the
population (see e.g. Blumler and Gurevitch, 1982, p247; Blumler, 1977, p5; Seymour-Ure, 1974, p105). Even this simple fact implies that the late 1950s and early 1960s saw a shift in the structure of political communication matched only by that associated with the emergence of the popular press in the late nineteenth century, the latter taking place over a much longer time period.

The second point is that media research in general is coming increasingly to recognize that television's main effects are not to be found in the area of changing attitudes or opinions but rather in the imposition or reinforcement of the frames of reference in terms of which the world is understood. In the context of a broad survey of trends in research into the political effects of the media, Blumler and Gurevitch see the emergence of the 'agenda-setting' strand of research as reflecting

"a shift from preoccupation with attitude and opinion change in the earlier stages of media effects research towards a concentration on the contributions of the media to the formation of frameworks through which people regard political events and debates" (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1982, p262)

Similarly they characterise the 'construction of social reality' vein of effects studies as seeing the media playing a pivotal role in

"not merely in conveying discrete information to people about social and political events, but in shaping the background canvas of meanings and preferred ways of seeing the socio-political arena, within which such events will placed" (ibid., p263)

In the same volume Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott point to the contribution of Marxist critiques
"to a growing recognition within empirical communications research that more attention needs to be paid to the influence of the media on the ideological categories and frames of reference through which people understand the world" (1982, p16)

In terms of the present study, the most important point to make with respect to the kind of framework which the media, and in particular television, are likely to transmit involves linking the discussion to the previous chapter. (5)

As Morley points out

"If we look at the news media, and their role in providing for the audience an account of developments in society which is largely restricted to reflecting the surface level of social relations ... we see that the 'common sense' understanding of events which they provide, precisely because of its ahistorical, 'foregrounded' nature, is the crucial locus of ideology. It is at this level that the media operate so as to reinforce the ideological structure and content of 'what everybody knows' about our social world." (Morley, 1976, p264)

I have hypothesized that the effect of the arrival of television, and of television coverage with a particular economic and political focus, in Scotland was to facilitate the transmission to the mass electorate of a frame of reference which I have called the 'Scottish economic dimension' or 'the Scottish growth project'. It would seem to me that this is precisely the kind of effect which media research is increasingly seeing as likely to occur. It must be remembered that what is involved here is not a case of television conjuring up a version of political reality out of thin air. We need only see television accepting, transmitting and reinforcing a framework of assumptions about what politics was all about - the economic management of a national unit - which was already established and
taken for granted. The only framing assumption that specifically Scottish television news and current affairs coverage did not share with national (British) television news and current affairs coverage was the identity of the national unit in question. This equivalence of national unit which made the transfer all the more plausible can itself be seen as grounded in certain important forms of obviousness. Firstly, if it is not primarily in terms of specific attitudes or items of information that the media has its ideological effects but is rather in terms of the categories in terms of which news coverage itself is organized, the most fundamental category in terms of which television news coverage in Scotland is organized is precisely the Scottish/British distinction - as shown most 'obviously' in the nightly six o'clock switch from the national (British) to national (Scottish) news. Secondly, the most obvious grounding is the sense of Scottish national identity (and despite its long latent political effects, the existence of such national identity has never been in doubt) on the part of the audience. (6)

The inferences drawn here are admittedly indirect. We do not have direct evidence that the arrival of television in Scotland and its soon acquired 'Scottish economic perspective' influenced the way people looked at politics in Scotland. All that can be said is that the framework through which television presented Scottish political and economic affairs was increasingly likely to be, for those
viewers lacking solidly grounded alternative frameworks, the framework in terms of which they interpreted Scottish political and economic affairs. After all, we are talking quite literally about a change in the way people saw Scotland.

Conclusion.

This chapter can be seen as an account of the successive satisfaction of a set of nested conditions of possibility which culminated in the acceptance of a widely-shared political framework of which voting S.N.P. was a readily comprehensible expression.

To recap, the successive conditions of possibility were:
1. the preconditions necessary for the emergence of a national British economy to managed - departure from the gold standard, a large central government budget, national accounting procedures and, less technical, popular expectations.
2. the general acceptance that British politics was about the management of this national economy, with an increasing emphasis on the generation of economic growth
3. the transfer of this framework, initially at an elite level, to Scotland as the relevant national unit of economic growth
4. the transfer of this 'Scottish growth project' from an elite to a mass level - the primary agents here being the Labour Party and television
Now, no matter how many nested conditions of possibility are satisfied, one is still left with no more than the establishment of a possibility. All we can say at this stage in the analysis is that at the 'macro-level' - the level of the state and the media - the conditions were present by the early 1960s for the message of the S.N.P. to chime naturally with prevailing dominant perceptions of what Scottish politics was about - the generation of economic growth for Scotland.

The next task is to specify who it was that responded to the message of the S.N.P. sufficiently to vote for them. A precondition for this is a description of the patterns of social change in Scotland which paralleled the developments at the macro-level outlined in this chapter and which were transforming the everyday lives of the Scottish people. It is in terms of the experience of these changes in occupational and family life, that differential responses to the appeal of the S.N.P. can be understood. And it is only by relating the impact of television to this level of differential experience that its effects can be more closely specified.
Chapter 5.
Social change in modern Scotland.

Introduction.

Since the bulk of this chapter consists of a fairly dense empirical examination of some of the basic processes of social change in modern Scotland, it is worth spending some time outlining how the chapter fits into the logic of the study as a whole.

What I hope to show in this chapter is that it is possible to establish some fairly solid causal connections between different aspects of social change in modern Scotland. The next chapter will show how patterns of S.N.P. voting can be related to the impact on different categories of voters of these patterns of social change. However, and demonstrating this will be the second main concern of the present chapter, these patterns of social change in Scotland differed very little from those which occurred in Britain as a whole.

Establishing this similarity in patterns of change in such basic characteristics as industrial structure, occupational structure and patterns of social mobility serves two important functions for the study as a whole.

The less significant such differences are shown to be, the weaker becomes the case for attributing differences in electoral behaviour, specifically the success of the Scottish National Party in Scotland, to such social
structural divergences.

However, as I hope to show, these patterns of social change are important in understanding the nature of S.N.P. support. In order to relate the nature of S.N.P. support to these 'objective' aspects of social change, it is necessary to invoke, as an intervening level of explanation, more 'subjective' aspects of social change to do with changing and inter-related orientations towards work, family and politics. This level of analysis then shades into discussion of the changing context of political communication. Whereas information on industrial and occupational change comes primarily from official statistics, information on these 'softer' aspects has to be derived primarily from standard sociological survey work. Since the amount of such work undertaken in Scotland has been relatively small and has been far exceeded by that undertaken in Britain as a whole, it is helpful to be able to invoke the parallelism in basic patterns of social change as a justification for bringing the implications of 'Britain-wide' survey work to bear on processes of social change in Scotland.

This chapter then has two jobs to do

The first is an empirical mapping of some basic aspects of social change and in particular the mapping of the causal connections which can be established between them.

The second is an assessment of what weight to assign to the specificities of Scotland's experience compared with
patterns of change which it has shared at one level with the rest of Britain and at another level with the advanced industrial world in general.

Both these aspects require a minimum of further introduction.

Cause and interdependence.

This chapter as a whole is organized according to what could be called a very elementary 'model of determination'. Each section will describe the main patterns of change in a particular aspect - such as industrial structure or occupational mobility - of the social structure but I will also try to map the main pathways along which change in one area has affected or been affected by change in the other areas.

This 'causal chain' will begin with patterns of industrial change. A full explanation of the pattern of industrial change in Scotland would need to be grounded in an analysis of the complex interaction between Scotland's changing position in the international division of labour and mechanisms of change more generally operative in advanced industrial society. I will only be able to deal with this problem in a very general way.

The discussion then moves on to deal with occupational change and involves an attempt to distinguish between those aspects of occupational change caused by changes in the
industrial structure and those which have consisted of changes in occupational distributions within industries. Patterns of change in the remaining three areas can be traced back more or less directly to patterns of industrial and occupational change. The high levels of upward occupational mobility since the war have been primarily a reflection of the expansion of non-manual employment while the most important single factor behind the massive entry of married women into paid employment in the nineteen sixties and nineteen seventies was the expansion of employment in the service sector. Finally it seems likely that a major factor underlying the fall in fertility from 1964 to 1977 was the change in familial economic parameters associated with increased employment opportunities for married women.

In terms of time-scale, I am primarily concerned with the period leading up to the S.N.P.'s electoral peak in the mid-nineteen seventies and do not deal in any detail with what are likely to have been significantly different patterns as Britain and Scotland have moved into slump in more recent years.

The idea of the interdependence of the parts of a social system - that a change in one element will cause changes in at least some of the others - is hardly new.

The two major systems of thought for which the idea of such interdependence has played a particularly central role have been Marxism and, in non-Marxist social thought,
functionalism and especially structural functionalism.

Perhaps the most valuable aspects of the 'functionalism debate' have been the attempts to distil from the more grandiose pretensions of structural-functionalism a more precise formulation of the nature of the causal mechanisms and structural dependencies implicit in the structural-functional model. (1)

From the other side, the main concern of the Althusserian project can be seen to have been to push to the limit the ideas on structural causality and determination implicit in Marx.

The parallels between structural-functionalism and Marxism in terms of their common emphasis on the causal interdependence of parts have often been remarked and it comes as little surprise that the work of specifying the causal mechanisms involved in social change can draw fruitfully on either tradition. On the non-Marxist side the most thoroughgoing attempt to specify social theory - Marxist, functionalist or whatever - in terms of causal mechanisms has been that of Arthur Stinchcombe (1968, 1978). On the Marxist side, Erik Olin Wright acknowledges his debt to Stinchcombe for stimulating Wright's project of "trying to formulate a systematic language for capturing the causal imagery of Marxist theory." (Wright, 1978, p14)

In all these enterprises the emphasis has been upon developing a systematization of the causal logics of social theory. Inseparable from this of course is the problem of specifying the links between the theoretical categories and
the available data.

Since Wright's discussion reaches down from theoretical abstraction to social reality in an explicit fashion, further presentation of his approach will be useful in situating the present enterprise.

Wright clearly formulates the nature of the gap to be bridged:

"It is ... important to develop a more systematic way of understanding the causal relations between the structural categories of marxist theory and the level of appearances tapped in empirical investigation. That is, historical investigation gathers data at the level of appearances (by definition): events, personal ties, manifest economic variables, institutional arrangements, demographic distributions and so on. In some sense these phenomena constitute "effects" of structural relations. The problem is to define more systematically what "effects" means. If empirical investigation is to be directly linked to the logic of the theory itself, then much greater rigour in understanding the logic of causality implicit in the theory is necessary." (Wright, 1978, p14)

Wright limits himself, in his initial exemplification of the six 'modes of determination' or types of structural causality which he identifies as implicit in Marxist theory, to the relations between four broadly defined 'structural categories' - economic structure, state structure, state policies/interventions and class struggle. Even at this level of generality, four structural categories between which can operate five modes of determination plus the mode of mediation which operates on relations rather than categories, quite a complex 'model of determination' is built up. However his characterization of the role such a model should play does match quite closely
the role which our own 'model of determination' played in structuring the research.

"Models of determination ... should not be thought of as the end product of a serious historical investigation. Rather they are a prelude to such research. They are designed to lay out explicitly the logic of relations to be explored in a particular historical investigation. A model of determination charts the terrain of an investigation; it does not provide the answers for that investigation. Concrete historical studies are essential to spell out how limitation and selection processes operate, how class struggle transforms and mediates those relations, how the transformation of social structures generates non-reproductive relations and so on. The model helps to clarify the questions to be asked in research, and it may help to facilitate the theoretical integration of different research projects, but the actual historical research is still essential for any genuine understanding of historical development." (Wright, 1978, pp25-26)

In terms of the bridge between theory and data, Wright, in this discussion, is very much operating from the theory end. He is concerned with specifying how, in ideal conditions, the gap between theory and data should be bridged, primarily by gathering the data in a form, or modifying the data to fit a form, which is tightly specified in theoretical terms.

The cost of attempting to apply categories developed in accordance with a rigorously defined model - be it theoretical or mathematical or both - is the loss of the information contained in any data which is not defined in terms of such categories.

The most important consideration in the present enterprise was to extract the maximum amount of relevant information from existing data. If the starting point is that the social totality is a constantly shifting web of
causes and effects and that any categorization, however meticulously developed, is only going to capture one aspect of what is going on, then the emphasis moves towards getting as many triangulations on that totality as possible - especially if they can be mutually related in however crude a form - and away from expending all one's energy on developing one particular triangulation.

From an exploratory standpoint, where the emphasis is on an initial harvesting of data and on extracting the maximum of information with the minimum of effort, it almost becomes an advantage to operate with categories that are 'rough' in that there is less temptation to regard them as providing answers in themselves (as being 'the answers') - their very 'roughness' is a constant reminder that they are not the be all and end all but very preliminary and very partial viewpoints.

A much more concrete advantage of staying with conventional categorizations has to do with the form in which data is available, particularly in the Census. Take the example of an attempt to construct an occupational classification based on Marxist categories such as the divisions between manual and mental labour or productive and unproductive labour. Such an enterprise would have to go down at least to the level of individual occupational codes and at best would want these codes cross-classified by employment status and industry. This is all reasonably feasible. However, if one then wanted to cross-classify the
new classification with other classifications in order to explore for example the linkages between occupation and industrial structure problems would be likely to appear. This is for the simple reason that cross-classifications in the Census tend to be at a much cruder level than the simple distributions. With a recategorization on the basis of individual occupation codes one would be restricted, in linking occupation to other parameters, to those cross-classifications published at the level of individual occupation codes which are few and far between. If one is working on the basis of a widely used classification, such as socio-economic groups, on the other hand, the categories might not be 'theoretically pure' but there is little problem in linking them up to other parameters in the Census and even in a good deal of survey data. One can thus get many more triangulations on how socio-economic groups link up with other aspects of the social structure than is possible with a theoretically better classification which requires for its construction data at a much finer level of differentiation. This is not to say that one approach is always better than the other. The decision has to be made pragmatically on the basis of available time and resources. In the context of the astonishing lack of research on macro-social change in Scotland, an initial survey of social change on the basis of conventional categories does have a degree of practical justification. (2)

Of course, the mapping of the causal connections which can be established on the basis of available quantitative
and largely 'official' data provides a picture of only one aspect of social change. This brings us to that vast area of debate surrounding the relationship between 'structure' on the one hand and the realm of social reality characterized in such terms as 'agency', 'reflexivity', 'meaning' or 'class struggle' depending on the theoretical framework involved (3).

Rather than attempt any more ambitious clarification of these issues, suffice it to note that the direction of the next two chapters will be to move from macro-structural shifts which determine the objective circumstances of peoples' lives to their own experience of and responses to these changes— one outcome of which is the way they vote.

Scotland as a unit of analysis.

In Chapter 2 I dealt theoretically with some of the issues surrounding the 'national level of analysis'. In this section I want to deal with some of the same issues as they relate to the more empirical concerns of the present chapter.

In the earlier discussion it was noted that much of the analysis of social change and nationalism in Scotland has been dominated by an 'externalist' perspective. In this chapter, I am more concerned with tracing structural articulations internal to Scotland.

Speaking of 'internal' or 'external' approaches as
absolutes however implies falling into precisely the trap of reifying the national level which was the topic of Chapter 2. In this section I want to make some brief remarks, in causal terms, which should serve to help keep an open mind about the weight of external influences relative to internal articulations in accounting for social change in Scotland.

The first points concern the degree of 'boundedness' - the degree to which it makes sense to speak of an 'inside' and an 'outside' - of the Scottish social system.

The safest initial assumption is that only when there has been an exploration of the extent to which social change in Scotland is determined by processes or mechanisms which are themselves part of a wider system can there be any attempt at an assessment of the extent to which social change in Scotland is the result of structural connections internal to Scotland.

The most important route for the exercise of external influence on social change in Scotland is that leading from Scotland's external economic environment, the world economy, to Scotland's industrial structure. To call this a causal route is of course misleading. This 'pathway' is a condensation of the fact that the Scottish economy is highly integrated with the rest of the world economy.

Only to the extent that the Scottish border marks a discontinuity in the web of causal forces which is the capitalist world system, does it make sense to speak of a
'Scottish economy' in a real sense. (4)

The same consideration applies in principle to all the other webs of determination of whatever form of which different aspects of the Scottish social structure are components. (5)

At the most abstract level, what must initially be regarded as an open question in order to avoid reifying 'Scotland' is the degree to which the Scottish social system is in fact a separable sub-system, or, to put exactly the same point another way, the degree to which the Scottish social system is bounded in the sense that the Scottish border corresponds to a causal discontinuity.

In these terms, one could define three abstract conditions in terms of the relative weight or importance of 'across the border' interdependencies as compared with 'internal' interdependencies.

At one extreme, if all the interdependencies are internal to the border and there are none across it, there is not a sub-system but rather a self-contained system.

At the other extreme, if all the interdependencies are across the border and there are none within the border, there is no sub-system.

In an intermediate situation, if the border corresponds to no change in the density of the web of interdependencies, then the border defines a sub-system only in an arbitrary sense. The border defines what would better be regarded as a 'slice' or 'segment' of the global system rather than a sub-system with its own logic.
The real world systemic status of Scotland is likely to lie somewhere between this latter position and the first—a higher density of interdependence within the border than across it but also a relatively high degree of interdependence across the border.

The dimension complementary to that of the relative weight of cross-border as opposed to internal interdependencies is that of the directionality of these determinations. One pole of this dimension could be taken as perhaps the most abstract possible definition of one aspect of 'dependence'—whereby all cross-border influences flow inwards.

I have set out these points simply to clarify an abstract logic for dealing with 'the national level'. In no way does the following discussion fully operationalize this logic. One is caught in the bind that in order to fully situate social change in Scotland, one would ultimately have to deal in full with all the global systems in which different aspects of the Scottish social structure are enmeshed (in other words the 'history of the world' approach). On the other hand, the explanandum is Scottish nationalism and the immediate determinant of that level of social reality is what happens in Scotland.

As a half-way house, an extremely simple analytical division has been very useful when looking at empirical material. The division aims at categorizing the mechanisms which produce social change or the factors underlying
social change as they relate to the national, or in this case the Scottish, level of analysis.

Briefly it is useful to distinguish between

a) differential mechanisms - mechanisms which express the impact on Scotland's social structure of Scotland's particular structural position within a global system. By far the most important of such global systems is the world economy. Consequently the most important differential mechanism of social change is that which operates via the industrial structure to the extent that the latter is an expression of Scotland's changing position in the international division of labour.

b) common mechanisms. These would be mechanisms which, for whatever reason, operate in Scotland in parallel with their operation in other societies which can be classified in some respects as akin to Scotland. For example Scotland is an advanced industrial society having certain kinds of social change in common with other advanced industrial societies. A type of change which one would have to attribute to such common mechanisms was the massive fall in the birth rate from the mid 1960s to the late 1970s shared by all the countries of Western Europe. Although the underlying factors have not been precisely identified, one would have to postulate a high degree of coincidence for similar factors not to have been at work. In this study, however, the most important level of commonality is the British.
c) specific mechanisms. These are the mechanisms underlying patterns of social change which can be attributed neither to the differential impact on Scotland of its position in a global structure nor to factors common to other advanced industrial societies or to Britain as a whole.

This third category is residual and deliberately so. It is only by making every effort to link up what is happening in Scotland to more general mechanisms that it is possible to establish what is in fact caused by specifically Scottish factors.

The taking of such precautions is necessary because much of the distortion which has resulted from adopting Scotland as a topic has been due to a tendency in discussing social change in Scotland to define as noteworthy only those aspects which are specific to Scotland. The logic seems to be that in looking at the Scottish social structure in order to explain events specific to Scotland - and here Scottish nationalism is in mind - the only aspects of the social structure of Scotland which need to be taken into account are those which are themselves specific to Scotland or in some way 'different' (often, implicitly, to the British or English pattern).

It is worth briefly setting out the causal logic of the remainder of this study in terms such as those just outlined. Suppose one had identified ten causal factors whose combined effect could be held to account for the
electoral success of the S.N.P.

In this situation, the first point to be borne in mind is that it is quite possible for only one of these factors to be specific to Scotland (as opposed to being common to Scotland and the rest of Britain, for example) in order to adequately explain the divergence of Scotland's political behaviour from that of the rest of Britain.

Although at least one specific factor has to be identified to explain the divergence, this does not imply that the other nine factors are superfluous. The nine common factors may be just as important to the overall explanation as the single specific factor.

What might seem especially perverse, particularly to a Marxist, is that there is no need for the specific factor in question to be at all 'basic' - in the sense of base and superstructure - for the overall explanation to accord a primary role to 'basic' or material and economic factors, all of which could, in this case, be common to Britain as a whole. In other words, in order to provide a materialist explanation for the success of Scottish nationalism, it is not necessary to ground such an explanation in material (economic, objective) differences between Scotland and the rest of Britain.
Industrial structure.

In terms of the general logic of this chapter, a discussion of Scotland's changing industrial structure has two related functions to perform.

The first is to set out the pattern of change in the industrial structure of employment in Scotland as the first link in the 'causal chain' which leads on to change in the occupational structure, social mobility and so on.

The other is to examine how the pattern of industrial change in Scotland has compared with that of other regions of Britain and in particular to assess the degree and nature of Scotland's industrial specialization.

This second strand of analysis is of special relevance to a discussion of the social basis of Scottish nationalism because of a common belief that Scotland's 'dependent' relationship with England has worked to distort Scotland's pattern of industrial development thus providing a readily understandable and material basis for nationalist protest.

A simple presentation of trends in the industrial structures of Scotland on the one hand and England and Wales or Britain on the other will not solve the debate about the precise nature of the structural articulations between the economies of Scotland and England and Wales and the mode of their insertion into the world economy. However, the work of C.H. Lee in making the attempt to reclassify the industrial and occupational data in the Censuses from 1841 to 1971 according to the 1968 Standard Industrial Classification provides an opportunity to come
to a more precise estimation of the degree of specificity of Scotland's pattern of industrial development since the middle of the nineteenth century. (See Appendix 2 for a full specification of Lee's data series and Appendix 3 for the socio-economic classifications employed.)

Among the methodological pitfalls in constructing and using such a series are those resulting from changes in principles of enumeration and classification between successive censuses, to say nothing of the wider issues raised by real changes in the nature of the industrial groups themselves - the textile industry in 1971 is a far cry from that of 1841, this qualitative change making any quantitative comparison over such a long period something to approach with caution. However until someone attempts the task of constructing a series on the basis of less time-bound and theoretically more firmly based categories than those of the 1968 Standard Industrial Classification, Lee's series is the best we have, and is incomparably better than what was available before. There are fewer pitfalls however in making inter-regional comparisons at a given point in time. In this case, all that one is depending upon is the use of the same procedures by the census-takers in the different areas. Although there may well have been some variation in practices, there seems little reason to believe that major inter-regional distortions resulted.

For this initial comparative exercise the category
TABLE 5.1
Industrial Employment by Industrial Order.
Britain, Scotland and Wales. 1851 to 1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial Order</th>
<th>Britain 1851</th>
<th>Britain 1911</th>
<th>Scotland 1851</th>
<th>Scotland 1911</th>
<th>Wales 1851</th>
<th>Wales 1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Mining</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. F.D.T.</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chemicals</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Metal manuf.</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Mechanical eng.</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Instrument eng.</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Electrical eng.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ships/mar. eng.</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Vehicles</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Oth. metal gds</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Textiles</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Leather etc.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Clothing/ftwr.</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Bricks etc.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Timber/furn.</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Paper etc.</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Other manuf.</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

(Source: Lee series)
'industrial employment' includes the sixteen manufacturing orders plus mining and quarrying (See Appendix 3). Table 5.1 gives the structure of industrial employment for Britain as a whole and for Scotland and Wales in 1851 and in 1911. (Wales is included for comparative purposes in view of the practice of lumping together the 'Celtic peripheries' in many discussions.) It can clearly be seen that although there are differences between Britain and Scotland, they are not dramatic and are dwarfed by those between Britain and Wales.

To get a more precise estimate of degrees of similarity we can use the simplest measure of similarity between percentage distributions like these industrial employment structures - the positive percentage difference, often simply referred to as the index of dissimilarity. For example, to calculate this index for the dissimilarity between the industrial structures of Britain and Scotland in 1851, one simply adds together the differences between the British and Scottish percentages for those industries for which the British figure is higher. If the structures were identical, the index would be zero. If there were no overlap at all the value would be 100. The index thus has a nicely intuitive meaning in percentage terms. In 1851 the index of dissimilarity between Britain and Scotland was 12.3 and in 1911, 10.2. This may be compared with an index of dissimilarity between the industrial employment structures of Britain and Wales of 37.6 in 1851 and 41.9 in 1911.
For comparative purposes the same index was calculated for the other eight standard regions of Britain (See Appendix 4 for composition of regions) as shown in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2. Indices of dissimilarity between regional industrial employment structures and British structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Anglia</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorks/Humberside</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, in both 1851 and 1911 Scotland had the industrial structure which was closest to that of Britain as a whole while Wales was the most differentiated of all the regions.

The generally accepted image of the situation is well expressed in a passage from a standard work on Scottish economic history:

"... by the nineteenth century Scotland had developed a very specialized regional branch of the British economy, heavily oriented towards the manufacture and export of capital goods and coarse textiles" (Lenman, 1977, p204)

The data would seem to offer no support for the conventional wisdom. The significant specialization was that which Scotland shared with the rest of Britain, and that which took place, as we shall see, within Scotland.

Kirby offers a convenient snapshot of the nature of
British industrial specialization

"The distinctive nature of Britain's industrial structure was in fact one of the most outstanding features of the pre-1914 economy. In 1907 the old-established staple trades of textiles, coalmining, iron and steel and general engineering accounted for approximately 50 per cent of net industrial output and employed 25 per cent of the working population. Most were heavily dependent upon an increasing narrow range of export markets located mainly within the British Empire, South America and Asia, and coalmining, textiles and iron and steel alone contributed over 70 per cent of the country's export earnings." (Kirby, 1981, p3)

If Kirby's characterization is compared with Table 5.1 it can be seen that Scotland had a higher proportion of industrial employment in all four of the industries named by Kirby as British specialisms reflecting Britain's control over Imperial markets. In other words, Scotland's industrial structure was more "British" than that of the rest of Britain, and in terms of the structural basis of this industrial pattern of specialization could be said to have been more 'imperialist' than the rest of Britain. Scotland was simply better adapted to take advantage of Britain's highly advantageous structural position within a world economy itself shaped around Britain's interests.

This rapid and thorough adaptation of Scottish industry to Britain's imperially guaranteed niche in the world economy is clearly brought out in the account of Scotland's economic development given in "Scottish Capitalism" (Dickson (ed.), 1980). The authors point out for example that

"In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the leading sectors of British industry were concentrated
to a remarkable degree in Scotland and above all in the Clydeside region, based upon a unique combination of raw material resources, fuel, geographical convenience and labour skills" (Dickson, 1980, p248)

and later

"no region in Britain was better integrated than Scotland into the structure of the imperialist economy" (ibid., p254)

However, intertwined with this account of how this situation developed is a characterization of Scottish capitalism as a "client capitalism" which adds nothing to the explanatory power of the main argument and to a certain extent contradicts it. The term "client capitalism" receives no theoretical definition other than its relation to the distinction between 'complementary' and 'competitive' capitalism, this implying a distinction between complementary and competitive patterns of economic specialization.

"In relation to Britain as a whole, what were to emerge in Scotland were complementary rather than competitive forms of capitalism, their interdependence being regularized under the political domination of Westminster. Such were the roots of the dependent or client status of the Scottish bourgeoisie." (Dickson, 1980, p90)

What is involved in this distinction between complementary and competitive capitalism is never spelled out. What seems to be implied, and what would be a plausible way of implementing the distinction, would be to define competitive specialization as resulting from the operation of market forces (competitive capitalism) whereas complementary specialization would result from non-market forms of Scotland's dependence on England. When it comes to
accounting for particular manifestations of Scotland's pattern of economic specialisation in concrete terms however, all that are referred to are market mechanisms. To take three examples, the factors set out as underlying Scotland's dominance in the eighteenth century tobacco trade, mid-nineteenth century 'hot blast' iron manufacture and late nineteenth century shipbuilding, are as follows—
geographical position (tobacco trade, p100; shipbuilding, p191), labour costs (tobacco trade, p100; hot blast iron, p189; shipbuilding, p192), raw materials (shipbuilding, p191), banking facilities (tobacco trade, p100; hot blast iron, p188), technical expertise (hot blast iron, p188; shipbuilding, p191) (All references, Dickson, 1980). And yet despite an inability to pinpoint any mechanisms at work other than the operation of comparative advantage within the context of British imperialism, there is an insistence that these developments demonstrate complementarity rather than competitiveness with respect to English development.
The usage is not even as consistent as this would imply. For example, the development of the Scottish textile industry is shown as illustrating

"how the changing product mix of the Scottish economy shifted rapidly along complementary lines in response to competitive pressures from England". (Dickson, 1980, p185)

In short, in the account given in "Scottish capitalism" the terms 'client capitalism' or 'complementary development' would seem to be entirely superfluous to an adequate account of the pattern of Scotland's industrial
development. Such an account could be couched entirely in terms of the process of capital accumulation in the context of Britain's structurally dominant position in the world economy and the bulk of "Scottish Capitalism's" account is couched in these terms. It is unfair to single out this analysis in particular in that it is one of the more balanced accounts, but this only goes to show the ubiquity of the temptation to pull in theoretically unnecessary terms in order to suggest the operation of a mechanism analogous to dependence between Scotland and England. What seems to be happening in such an account is a kind of conceptual slippage. Because Scottish industry was highly integrated into the international economy, it was in a sense 'dependent' on developments in this economy. If England is then seen as dominating this international economy it is easy to take the next step of seeing Scotland as dependent on England. We can see this happening in the following passage from "Scottish Capitalism".

"The prominence of the Indian market for the turkey red-dyers, centred in the Vale of Leven, illustrates Scotland's dependence upon an English dominated trading system" (Dickson, 1980, p187)

We are almost at the bizarre stage of seeing Scotland being 'dependent' upon occupying a dominant position in the world economy, a position which (in this case) is predicated upon the prior destruction of the Indian textile industry. It is as if England having created the British Empire, Scotland was forced into a position in which it had to exploit - was dependent upon exploiting - the British
Empire

There was one category of English capital which might be said to have had a relation of structural dominance with Scottish capital and that was finance capital centred on the City of London. Even here however Scottish capitalism, to the extent that it did have its own financial institutions was in a better position than many English manufacturing regions. Paradoxically, of course, to the extent that Scotland's financial network exhibited a greater tendency to channel investment funds abroad than was the case elsewhere in Britain (Lenman, 1978, p192) it was precisely Scottish autonomy which contributed to the lack of investment in Scottish industry which itself made the impact of the post-World War I collapse of the international economy so much more of a catastrophe for Scotland. Even more ironically, through this greater tendency to invest abroad in search of higher profits, Scottish capitalism was more classically 'imperialist' in the sense used by Hilferding and Lenin than was the case south of the border. Yet again, the roots of Scotland's decline are to be found in a 'surfeit of imperialism' rather than, as is so often made out, in a position of clientage or dependence with respect to England.

To return to the rapid survey of the development of Scotland's industrial structure, the First World War and the brief post-war boom served to make even closer the adaptation of Scotland's and Britain's industrial structure
to their imperial niches in a world economy of a particular form. The inevitable corollary was however that when this international order collapsed, Scotland, given its greater adaptation to it, suffered all the more.

The extreme localisation of the effects of this collapse within Scotland in the 1920s and 1930s stemmed from the degree of regional specialization which had occurred within Scotland. In 1851, the mean inter-regional positive percentage difference between the industrial employment structures of Scotland's twelve principal industrial regions was 26.4. (See Appendix 4 for the definition of the regions on which this calculation was based). By 1911, this index of dissimilarity had risen to 43.0. From a shared emphasis on the production of textiles in 1851, industrial specialization rapidly took place along two main axes. The first, focussed in particular on Renfrewshire and Dumbartonshire (more precisely on Clydeside) was into engineering and shipbuilding. The second was into coal and steel. By 1911 there was thus a roughly tripartite pattern of regional industrial development formed by these two axes and that formed by the regions which had maintained their specialization in textiles — primarily around Paisley, Dundee and the Borders.

To anticipate a little, it has been this pattern of specialization — reflecting Scotland's rapid adaptation to the market opportunities resulting from the Empire — from
TABLE 5.3


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<td>3.4</td>
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<td>17.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
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<td>4.6</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

(Source: Lee series)
which Scotland, and particular regions of Scotland, have found it difficult to break in the course of the twentieth century.

Due to changes in Census procedures, and in particular a switch from an occupationally based to an industrially based classification in the Population Census, it is much more difficult to trace industrial employment changes over the crucial years from 1911 to 1931. Campbell (1980, Tables 5 and 7) has carried out calculations based on the Censuses of Production of 1907 and 1924 which cover roughly the same industries (with the addition of public utilities). Again the general picture is one of parallel change (the positive percentage difference between the Scottish and United Kingdom industrial employment structures according to Campbell's somewhat different categorization moves from 12.0 to 10.5).

Table 5.3 gives the pattern of industrial employment for Britain and Scotland from 1931 to 1971. Over this period, the industrial employment structure of Scotland appears to have been marginally more differentiated from that of Britain as a whole than was the case in the nineteenth century - at least to judge from the indices of dissimilarity given in Table 5.4. This table also gives two versions of what could be called an index of specialization of the ten British Standard regions. The first is the mean index of dissimilarity between all pairs of regions. The second is the mean index of dissimilarity between the ten
regions and the British structure. These indices show that there was a process of convergence at a regional level in which Scotland did not take part. This must be seen in the context of the fact that in 1931 and 1951 Scotland was still the region with the industrial structure closest to the British mean and in 1961 and 1971 only the North-West of England was closer. In other words, there was a tendency for the other regions of Britain to converge on Scotland.

Table 5.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index of dissimilarity</th>
<th>Indices of British regional specialization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>between Scottish and</td>
<td>(I)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British industrial</td>
<td>1931 15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>employment structures.</td>
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<td>1931</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>29.1 30.2</td>
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<td>1951</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>24.5 26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>24.1 24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>21.1 20.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

An idea of the relative pace of industrial transformation in these years can be gained by simply calculating the positive percentage difference between the industrial structures at successive Census dates:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1931-1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951-1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961-1971</td>
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</table>

This gives the interesting result that industrial change at this level of aggregation would appear to have proceeded at a relatively constant rate in Britain as a whole but to have shown a marked acceleration in Scotland in the 1960s.
A major aspect of this relatively accelerated rate of industrial change in Scotland in the 1960s was that Scotland caught up to some extent in terms of Industrial Order 8, electrical engineering. Scotland's historically low proportion of employment in this order had long been held to be perhaps the major symptom of Scotland's failure to change over from the highly vulnerable 'nineteenth century' industries to the 'next wave' of industries - vehicles, consumer goods and electrical engineering (with an increasing electronic component) - whose growth in the English South and Midlands in the 1920s and 1930s had been the main factor behind these regions surviving the depression in much better shape than areas still reliant on the older, heavier industries. Table 5.3 shows the extent to which Scotland had indeed lagged behind Britain as a whole in terms of employment in electrical engineering. By 1971 however the gap was much smaller - particularly if one includes the closely related industrial order of instrument engineering. By then 9.7% of Scotland's industrial employment was in these two orders compared with 11.6% of British. Most of the higher British figure can be accounted for in terms of the concentration of employment in these two orders in the two regions of South-East England (18.3%) and East Anglia (14.0%) with all but two of the other British regions lying in a band between 8.9% (Wales) and 11.4% (South-West England).

Although, as we have seen, there was a general process
of convergence in the industrial structures of the British regions in the course of the twentieth century, this had not occurred - at least up to 1971 - within Scotland. The industrial employment structures of the main Scottish industrial areas (See Appendix 4 for definitions), although they have tended to move away from some of the more extreme traditional specializations, have tended to remain broadly within the main lines of specialization bequeathed by the high tide of Victorian industrial expansion. The index of specialization for these areas (mean positive percentage difference between all pairs of these regions, over all industries) showed little change: 51.1 in 1931; 52.7 in 1951; 55.5 in 1961 and 49.4 in 1971. This stability seems to have been the result of two processes working in opposite directions. One the one hand the decline in employment in some of the more localised traditional industries - in particular, mining and shipbuilding - worked to reduce the degree of regional specialization. On the other hand, much of the more recent industrial development - in particular chemicals and motor vehicles - was also extremely localized and thus worked to increase specialization. Localization in the latter case had less to do with historical factors such as deep-water or raw materials and much more to do with the increase in the minimum size of individual production units. As the fate of Linwood and Bathgate showed much of this 'new' investment was just as vulnerable and eventually produced a new pattern of localized unemployment in its wake.
So far I have been presenting the main trends in the structure of 'industrial' employment only, since this has tended to be the main focus of discussions of Scotland's 'dependence'. Industrial structure in this narrow sense, and in particular the specificities of Scotland's industrial structure, has had a great deal of symbolic significance, outwith its technical relationship to economic development, particularly in the crucial period of the 1960s when the Scottish 'project', based on the emergence of Scotland as a unit of economic policy, took shape. This concern has often spilled over into academic discourse on the success of nationalism, and has indeed provided much of the imagery for this discussion. The usual line, implicit or explicit, has been that because Scottish nationalism is a specifically Scottish phenomenon, it must have had its origins in the specificities of Scottish economic development. Scotland's industrial structure has been a primary area in which to look for these specificities. What I have tried to do in this extremely superficial survey is to put the specificities of the development of Scotland's industrial employment structure into proportion. The main point which is clear is that in terms of industrial change what Scotland has shared with the rest of Britain far outweighs what has differentiated it. Or, to make the point another way, far from being a specialized region of Britain, an image which is much closer to the truth is that Scotland is a miniature version
of Britain as a whole (there are many parallels, one of the most obvious being that Edinburgh's employment structure in relation to the rest of Scotland is very similar to that of London as compared with the rest of England). Another conclusion is that in terms of industrial structure, Scotland is the wrong unit. Industrial differentiation within Scotland has been of a much higher order of magnitude than the industrial differentiation of Scotland from the rest of Britain.

In order to lay a foundation for an understanding of occupational change in terms of the changing employment structure, we need to widen the focus to encompass all employment and not just industrial employment narrowly defined.

The sectoral structure of employment.

In terms of understanding occupational change, change at the broader sectoral level has been much more important than change in the industrial structure of mining and manufacturing. Again I will operate with common-sensically defined sectors based on the simple aggregation of industrial orders. (See Appendix 3)

Table 5.5 shows the long term trend in sectoral employment structure for Britain and Scotland from 1851 to 1981.
TABLE 5.5.

Sectoral employment structure. Scotland and Britain. 1851 to 1981

Scottish figures in bold

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<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
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<th>Manuf</th>
<th>Const</th>
<th>Inter</th>
<th>Service</th>
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<td>8.7</td>
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The master trends can be fairly briefly outlined, although such a rapid survey will inevitably gloss over deviations due to cyclical factors (in particular the effects of the depressions of the 1870s and 1930s to say nothing of the present one) and also some quite fundamental changes in the composition of the sectors themselves (for example the service sector has swung over from consisting predominantly of domestic service categories to consisting predominantly of categories associated with the expansion of the state apparatus such as the education and health sectors).

The long term decline in the proportion of employment in agriculture, forestry and fisheries proceeded very much in parallel for Scotland and Britain. This decline has also reduced the contribution of this sector to the overall difference between the sectoral employment structures of Britain and Scotland. The long term rise and fall of employment in mining and quarrying has also proceeded in parallel at the Scottish and British levels.

The main explicit classificatory shift in the data series occurred between Lee's Series A (up to 1911) and his series B (1911 onwards - see Appendix 2). The major substantive recategorization involved at this date was the transfer of the employment categories now included in industrial order 23, Distributive Trades, from the respective manufacturing orders to this order. At the sectoral level this involves moving these categories from
the manufacturing to the intermediate sector. As can be seen by comparing the Series A distribution for 1911 with the series B distribution for the same year, this recategorization involved around 8% of employment for both Scotland and Britain. Making allowance for this recategorization (either by adding on 8% to the figures for manufacturing for the years after 1911 or subtracting 8% for the years before) what stands out is the quite remarkable stability in the share of manufacturing employment, for both Britain and Scotland, in the hundred years from 1851 to 1951.

Up to 1911, Scotland's proportion of employment in manufacturing was around 3 percentage points higher than that for Britain as a whole. The greater impact of the depression in Scotland however pushed Scotland's share below that for Britain, where it has since remained.

The main implication of the hundred year stability in the share of manufacturing employment is that, contrary to the most commonly held image of long term sectoral change, the decline in employment in agriculture, forestry and fisheries was accompanied not by an increase in the share of manufacturing employment but by a growth in the shares of the intermediate and service sectors, plus, in the nineteenth century, mining and quarrying.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the corollary of Britain's lower share of employment in agriculture, forestry and fisheries was a higher share of employment in the service sector than was the case in
Scotland. This imbalance was the largest component of the difference between Scotland and Britain's sectoral employment structures in the years up to 1911. This difference in service employment between Scotland and England was almost entirely due to the contribution of South-East England to the British figure. In 1851, the percentage employed in the service sector in England and Wales outwith the South-East was 17% - just one per cent above the Scottish figure - compared with 31% in the South-East itself. In 1911, again, the figure for England and Wales outwith the South-East was just one percentage point higher, at 21%, than that for Scotland, compared with a figure for the South-East of 38%.

To put the degree of differentiation of the Scottish sectoral employment structure from the British into perspective, in both 1851 and 1911 Scotland's structure was the closest to the British of all ten standard regions - as we saw was the case for industrial employment above.

In comparison with the relatively clear cut trends and differentiations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the patterns from 1931 on are somewhat more complex, although there is a slight trend towards a convergence of sectoral employment structures both between Scotland and Britain and between the standard regions in general.

It is only from 1951 onwards (at least in terms of Census dates) that what is usually regarded as the dominant
trend of the 'occupational transition' in advanced industrial societies - the switch in employment from the manufacturing (secondary) sector to the service (tertiary) sector - can be said to have gathered steam. Even by the 1960s however, the by now rapid relative expansion in the service sector was accompanied by an uneven pattern of decline across all the other sectors rather than by a decline in the share of manufacturing alone. Only in the 1970s was the pattern predominantly one of a straight switch from manufacturing to services under the impact of an ominous combination of processes common to other advanced industrial societies as well as Britain's specific loss of industrial competitiveness.

As can be seen from the positive percentage differences between the Scottish and British sectoral employment structures given in the last column of Table 5.5, by 1971 Scotland's sectoral structure of employment was extremely close to that of Britain as a whole. This can be seen as an aspect of a general process of convergence between the sectoral employment structures of the British regions. By 1981, only three of the standard regions had an index of dissimilarity from the British sectoral structure greater than 6 - the South-East (8.1) with a disproportionate share of service employment (though by no means to the extent that this was true of the nineteenth century) and the East (10.7) and West (11.1) Midlands which had managed to hold out longer against the drop in the share of manufacturing employment.
The accelerating increase in the share of the service sector, from 24% in 1951 to 26% in 1961 to 33% in 1971 and finally to 43% in 1981 - a jump of 19 percentage points in 30 years, or 17 percentage points in twenty years - has been by far the greatest single shift in the sectoral employment structure which Scotland has experienced in a comparable time span - certainly in the period covered by the data, and probably ever.

Compared with the sheer brute fact of this shift, the specificities of Scotland's pattern of change - even the fact that the comparable shift at the British level was only 15 percentage points compared with Scotland's shift of 19, so that Scotland moved from having a lower to a higher share of service employment - pale into relative insignificance.

This shift into service employment has been a powerful motor of social change in Scotland since the Second World War. Major aspects of changes in occupational structure, social mobility and patterns of female employment can be said to have been determined by it.
Occupational Structure.

The main task of this section is to set out the main trends of occupational change in modern Scotland. However, given the interlocking nature of this chapter as a whole, it is also necessary to look 'backwards' along the causal sequence by assessing the extent to which occupational change can be attributed to changes in the industrial structure. We also need to look 'forwards' in that occupational change has been a major determinant both of patterns of social mobility and patterns of female employment. These two aspects of social change will be dealt with specifically in the sections which follow.

The problems involved in constructing a long term series based on the Census showing changes in the occupational structure are even more daunting than those involved in constructing an industrial series so much have the bases of classification changed. However, as background work to the Scottish Mobility Study, an attempt was made to reclassify the occupational distributions published in the reports of the 1921, 1931 and 1951 Censuses of Scotland according to the Socio-economic Group Classification used in the 1961 and 1971 Censuses (Payne 1977a).

No detailed description of the classification procedures used is available and the status of, or even the possibility of, such a series has been questioned.(6) However if we bear in mind that recategorization of distributions built up on different bases can never completely bridge the gap between them and that the
constantly changing nature of individual occupations undermines the continuity of reference between any categorization built up from these individual occupations, Payne's series is probably the best possible short of access to the data at the individual level. The Census reports themselves, particularly in 1921 and 1931, tried to assess change in occupational structure correcting for changing bases of classification and their conclusions back up the trends revealed by Payne's series. If one does not try to squeeze too much out of it, the series can be accepted as as giving, in broad outline, a sketch of the evolution of the Scottish occupational structure between 1921 and 1971. Payne did the same recategorization for England and Wales and these figures are juxtaposed with the Scottish in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. The discussion will focus initially on the trends in Scotland.

Tables 5.6 and 5.7 present a reworking of the series initially presented by Payne and will provide the basis for the discussion of long term trends from 1921 to 1971. Commentary will be primarily in terms of Table 5.7 showing socio-economic groups as a proportion of the non-farm non-armed forces workforce.(See Appendix 3 for fuller definitions of the socio-economic groups).

Apart from the relatively unproblematic decline in agricultural occupations, two marked uni-directional trends stand out over the period as a whole. Firstly, there was a long term decline in skilled manual workers (socio-economic
Table 5.6.
Socio-economic groups as percentage of total economically active population. Scotland/England and Wales. 1921-1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.e.g.</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 and 2 Emps. Scot</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and mgrs. E+W</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Professional self emp. Scot</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Professional employees Scot</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Intermediate non-manual Scot</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Junior non-manual Scot</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Personal service Scot</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Foremen and supervisors Scot</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Skilled manual Scot</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Semi-skilled manual Scot</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Unskilled manual Scot</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Own account workers Scot</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Farmers - emps. and mgrs Scot</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Farmers - own account Scot</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Agricultural workers Scot</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p.p.d. between structures

(Source, Payne, 1977a)
Table 5.7.

Socio-economic groups 1 to 12 (non-farm, non-armed forces) as percentage of total in s.e.g.s 1 to 12. Scotland/England and Wales. 1921 to 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.e.g.</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 and 2. Emps and mgrs. Scot</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Professional self emp. Scot</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Professional employees Scot</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Intermediate non-manual Scot</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Junior non-manual Scot</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Personal service Scot</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Foremen and supervisors Scot</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Skilled manual Scot</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Semi-skilled manual Scot</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Unskilled manual Scot</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Own account workers Scot</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E+W</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p.p.d. between structures 5.1 3.2 3.0 4.1 5.2

(Source, Payne, 1977a)
group 9) as a proportion of the non-farm workforce from 35.3% in 1921 to 24.3% in 1971. Secondly, there was a continuous rise in non-manual employment - although it is worth noting that no single non-manual socio-economic group shows an increased share for all four intercensal periods.

From Table 5.7 it can be seen that the decline in skilled manual workers was concentrated into two intercensal periods - 1921 to 1931 and 1961 to 1971.

It seems fairly clear that the decline in the period from 1921 to 1931 was primarily a reflection of the decline in Scotland's traditional heavy industries. The occupations showing the greatest numerical decreases between 1921 and 1931 bring this out clearly - mining and quarrying occupations were down 18% to 124,000 and metal workers down 23% to 189,000 (Census of Scotland 1921 and 1931, Occupational Tables).

Similarly the relative stability in the proportion of skilled manual workers from 1931 to 1961 is probably explicable in terms of industrial structure. As was seen in the previous section, the increase in employment in mechanical engineering just about compensated for any declines in employment in coal, steel and ships (cf Table 5.3).

For the period from 1961 to 1971 we can move onto rather more solid ground in assessing the sources of change in the occupational structure in general and the decline in skilled manual workers in particular. The fact that the socio-economic group and industrial classifications were
only slightly changed between 1961 and 1971 makes it possible to carry out a form of shift-share analysis to separate shifts in the occupational structure which can be attributed to changes in the industrial structure of

**TABLE 5.8A.**

Socio-economic groups 1 to 12. 1961, 1971 and change.

**MEN IN EMPLOYMENT**

All numbers thousands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.e.g.</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E+M Lge. ests.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+M Sm. ests.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. s.e.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. emp.</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>+19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interm. n.m.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>+18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior n.m.</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pers. serv.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled man.</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-sk man.</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsk. man.</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own account</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total segs 1-12</td>
<td>1372</td>
<td>1258</td>
<td>-114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: as in shift share analysis. See App. 5)

employment and shifts which reflect changes in occupational structure within industries (Technical details of the shift-share techniques employed are given in Appendix 5). The patterns tend to be completely different for men and women so that they will be discussed separately. Changes in the socio-economic group structures of men and women in employment in 1961 and 1971 are shown in Tables 5.8A and 5.8B.
The number of skilled manual male workers in employment fell by almost exactly 100,000 or 18.3% between 1961 and 1971. Both the occupational nature of the skilled jobs lost and the shift-share analysis would suggest that over half the decline can be attributed to the fall in employment in Scotland's traditional heavy industries - in particular coal-mining, steel-making and shipbuilding. Numerically, the main occupational contributors to the decline are easily identifiable. The number of underground workers in coal mines shrank dramatically from 55,000 to 23,000. The number of skilled workers in metal production fell by 9,000

**TABLE 5.8B.**

Socio-economic groups 1 to 12. 1961, 1971 and change.

WOMEN IN EMPLOYMENT All numbers thousands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.e.g.</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. E+M Lge. ests.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. E+M Sm. ests.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Prof. s.e.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Prof. emp.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Interm. n.m.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>+28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Junior n.m.</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>+28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Pers. serv.</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>+21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Forem + sup</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Skilled man.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Semi-sk man.</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Unsk. man.</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>+24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Own account</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total segs 1-12</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>+98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: as in shift share analysis. See App. 5)
to 12,000 and the number of metal plate workers and riveters by 5,000 to 11,000. These three occupational groups alone then accounted for 46,000 of the total decline of 100,000.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>OC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Fmen. and sup.</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Semi-skilled man.</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Unskilled manual</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The shift share analysis shows that in net terms industrial change could be held to account for 57,000 of the total loss of skilled male manual jobs (Table 5.9). The most important individual industrial components of change were attributable to the shrinking of total employment in the mining (35,000) and shipbuilding and marine engineering (14,000) industries.

Apart from this decline due to industrial change the shrinking proportion of skilled manual jobs for men within industries accounted for 43,000 of the total. Almost all manufacturing industries ended the decade with a lower proportion of male skilled manual workers and almost all the skilled manual occupational groups shrank in size. The only exceptions were plumbers, skilled electrical workers and lorry drivers.
It is worth noting that in sectoral terms, less than half of all male skilled manual workers were employed in the manufacturing sector in both 1961 and 1971, with, in 1971 just under 20% working in construction, 20% in the intermediate sector and just under 10% in the service sector.

Skilled manual jobs for women suffered an even sharper decline of 27% from 67,000 to 49,000 (Table 5.8B). The greatest single factor was a simultaneous contraction of total employment in the textile industry and a reduction in female skilled manual workers as a proportion of total employment in the industry. The number of skilled manual women employed in the textile industry declined from 26,000 to 16,000 - 6,000 of this reflecting the decline of total employment in the industry, the rest reflecting the fact that proportion of workers in the industry who were skilled female manual workers fell from 27% to 21%. There was an even sharper fall in female skilled manual workers as a proportion of total employment in the clothing and footwear industry - from 24% to 16%. In manufacturing in general, the proportion of women workers classified as skilled manual fell from 40% to 29%. Only one occupational group of women workers classified as skilled showed a significant increase - from 500 to 1,200 - and this hardly compensated the general picture of an even more savage squeeze on skilled work by women than was the case for men.

As can be seen from Table 5.7 the long term trends for
semi- and unskilled manual workers (socio-economic groups 10 and 11) were much less clear-cut. The semi-skilled group is especially heterogeneous in occupational terms – only a relatively small proportion conforming to the accepting image of a worker standing at an assembly line – and without better details of the classification procedures used for the earlier Censuses, it is probably safest to regard the long term picture as one of relatively stability for both these groups.

From 1961 to 1971 however there was one especially marked change and that was the 46% increase in the number of female unskilled manual workers. This increase could be largely accounted for in terms of two quite different occupational categories. The number of charwomen and office cleaners went up from 38,000 to 52,000 and this increase was associated particularly with the education and health apparatuses. It should also be noted that 85% of women workers in this occupation group worked part-time in 1971. The other female unskilled category to expand dramatically was 'labourers and other unskilled workers' from 6,000 to 16,000. The expansion of this group did reflect a deskilling process within manufacturing – the proportion of women's jobs classified as unskilled manual rose from 7% to 11.5% in the food, drink and tobacco industries and from 3.5% to 8.7% in textiles.

To sum up the general pattern of change in the patterns of manual employment, although much of the decline in the number of skilled workers could be attributed to industrial
change, there was an equally powerful pressure at work within industrial orders which could be summarized as producing a relative shift away from male labour towards female labour and away from skilled labour towards unskilled labour. This is most simply expressed by the fact that of the six categories formed by cross-cutting male and female and skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled, it was the skilled female group which declined fastest and the unskilled female group which increased fastest.

Apart from the decline in skilled manual employment, the other major long-term trend was the growth in the share of non-manual employment. The trend in the share of non-farm employment in broader groupings of the white collar socio-economic groups is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>S.e.g.s 1 to 5</th>
<th>S.e.g.s 1 to 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would be unwise to generalise about the factors underlying this overall increase in the share of white-collar employment, since as can be seen from Table 5.7 the timing and magnitude of the increase varies greatly between the individual white-collar groups.

Most obviously, it was the junior non-manual group which accounted for the bulk of the increase up to 1951 and for almost half of total white-collar growth in the period from 1951 to 1961. There was no further increase in the share of this group in the 1960s however. In this decade
the running was made by the intermediate group (s.e.g. 5), employed professionals (s.e.g 4) and the employers and managers (in fact the growth was entirely in the managerial category) of s.e.g. 1 and 2.

For the years before 1961 we can only make a tentative assessment of the sources of these changes in terms of industrial change and occupational change within industries. However, from the simple fact that between 1931 and 1961 the share of the service sector only rose from 24\% to 26.2\% it is likely that the bulk of the growth in white-collar employment was due to occupational change within

Table 5.10. Non-manual socio-economic groups. Industrial (IC) and occupational (OC) components of change. 1961 to 1971. Thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.e.g</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>OC</td>
<td>IC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. E and m, lge ests</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. E and m, sm ests</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+13</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Prof. self-emp.</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Prof employees</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Intermediate</td>
<td>+33</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Junior</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

industrial orders rather than to a change in the sectoral structure of employment.

Again the shift-share analysis allows us to specify more precisely the sources of growth in white-collar employment in the period from 1961 to 1971. The net
industrial and occupational components of change for the six white-collar groups are given in Table 5.10.

Looking first at the junior non-manual group, the stability in the size of the group concealed a sizable shift in its sex composition. This process had been well under way long before 1961. For example, the number of males in occupation order XXIII (clerks, typists etc.) increased by 12% from 63,000 to 70,000 between 1931 and 1951 whereas the number of female clerks and typists rose by 84% from 76,000 to 139,000 in the same period. In the decade 1961 to 1971 the number of men in the junior non-manual group as a whole fell from 185,000 to 152,000 while the number of women in the group rose from 276,000 to 304,000.

As its name suggests, s.e.g. 5, intermediate non-manual, is relatively heterogeneous in occupational terms. However it is dominated in numerical terms by the two occupations of nurses and teachers - both of these, nurses in particular, being predominantly female. This occupational composition is reflected straightforwardly in the pattern of change revealed by the shift-share analysis. Since nurses and teachers are concentrated overwhelmingly into one industrial order - Professional and Scientific Services - which encompasses both the health and education establishments, the rapid increase in total employment in this order - an increase of 44% from 134,000 to 193,000 - was the main factor underlying the increase in the numbers
of women in s.e.g. 5. The expansion of this one order alone accounted for 22,000 of the total increase of 28,000 in intermediate non-manual women. Intermediate non-manual males are rather more occupationally diverse - including civil service executive officers, social welfare workers and an increasingly significant component of lab assistants and technicians and other technical and related workers. The number of workers in these latter "technician" groups increased from 11,000 to 20,000. This increase of 9,000 thus accounted for around half of the total increase of 18,000 in the number of male intermediate non-manual workers. In terms of the sources of this change, about half was due to occupational change within industrial orders and about half to industrial change - again primarily the expansion of professional and scientific services.

The first point to make about the professional groups, s.e.g 3, self-employed and s.e.g 4, employed professionals, is the extent to which they were male dominated in 1961 with the patterns of change in the sixties only making feeble inroads on this imbalance. In 1961, women made up 4% of self-employed professionals and in 1971, 7% (this increase consisting almost entirely of a growth in the number of women doctors). Among employed professionals 10% were women in both 1961 and 1971.

The total number of self-employed professionals declined from 15,000 to 14,000 whereas the number of employed professionals went up from 38,000 to 59,000. This difference in trend between self-employed and employed
professionals partially coincided with a change in the balance of the professional group as a whole away from the older professions - doctors, dentists, lawyers etc. - and towards the more technologically oriented professions - engineering in particular. The number of doctors, dentists and lawyers remained relatively stable at a total of just under 14,000 and the number of clergy fell by 36% to 4,500. The number of engineers on the other hand more than doubled from 7,000 to 15,000 and the group of 'other technologists' increased from 3,400 to 8,300. The next fastest rising professional groups were surveyors, architects and town planners up 54% to 10,000 and university teachers up 58% to 4,000. If we regard the professional groups as making-up the heart of the middle-classes the sixties saw a quite massive shift in the internal balance of the group.

There is no simple pattern to the sources of these changes in terms of industrial and occupational components of change. Approximately a third of the rise in the number of professional employees could be attributed to change in the industrial structure of employment - primarily, again, in the form of the expansion of Professional and Scientific Services. This leaves two thirds of the increase to be attributed to an increase in the proportion of professionals within industries. Half of this positive occupational component took place in manufacturing - the engineering and electrical goods industries (Industrial Orders 7 to 9) alone taking on 3,800 extra professionals.
Finally we come to the apex of the socio-economic group hierarchy - socio-economic groups 1 and 2, employers and managers. As might be expected, from their very definition in terms of position in the intra-organisational hierarchy - ownership and control in fact - the increase in the numbers in these groups was dominated by an increase in their proportions within industries.

Although the 1961 Census of Scotland did not publish a breakdown of the two socio-economic groups into their employer and manager components, it is possible to come to a reasonable approximation on the basis of the employment status by occupation tables with the following results.

The number of employers (overwhelmingly in small establishments i.e. employing less than 25 people - there were only 1060 employers of more than 25 people in 1971) fell by 26% from 65,000 to 48,000. the number of managers in large establishments (25 or more workers) rose by 33% from 43,500 to 58,000 while managers in small establishments increased by almost 50% from 43,000 to 64,000.

It can be seen from this already very condensed analysis that the sources of the two dominant trends in of occupational change in Scotland in this century cannot easily be summarized - even at the level of the most simple analytical step of differentiating, for a single decade, between shifts due to change in the industrial structure of employment and shifts taking the form of occupational change within industries.
Having covered the more important trends, we can now turn to the rather more problematic area of assessing the significance of the Scottish deviation from the patterns in England and Wales. The general impression given by Tables 5.6 and 5.7 is one of parallel development. The positive percentage difference between the two non-farm structures showed some convergence from 5.1 in 1921 to 3.0 in 1951 followed by some divergence back to 5.2 by 1971. England and Wales tended to move ahead in terms of the proportion of non-manual workers whereas Scotland maintained its relative preponderance of skilled manual workers. By 1971, however, the biggest discrepancy was Scotland's larger proportion of unskilled manual workers.(7)

It is interesting at this point to look at the way Payne initially presented this data series. (Payne, 1977a) This is not for any additional substantive information, but rather because his interpretation of the data and the way it has subsequently entered the conventional wisdom present perhaps the paradigmatic example of the way socio-economic comparisons between Scotland and the rest of Britain have tended to be made. Differences are seized upon and parallelisms ignored.

Payne concluded, on the basis of the data presented here in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 but presented in a rather more opaque form in his own paper, that

"Clearly, Scotland has become more working class and its population is now less skilled, vis-a-vis England, than at any time since the First World War."
(Payne, 1977a, p33)
As can be seen from Tables 5.6 and 5.7, this statement is true of some aspects of the comparison, is not true of others and in general refers to what could be regarded as fairly trivial differences. What is perhaps even more interesting is the way in which Payne's general conclusion has been accepted, often in the form of citation of this particular passage, as an adequate characterization of the relative trends of the Scottish and English occupational structures.

For example, in discussing the effects on the occupational structure of the penetration of the Scottish economy by multi-national firms, "Scottish Capitalism" states:

"...in importing production line branch plants requiring, in the main, semi-skilled workers and a disproportionately low number of technical and skilled workers as against indigenous employers, US firms reinforced the de-skilling processes already at work in the economy. This deskilling led one writer to conclude that by the mid-1970s Scotland was 'more working class and its population ... less skilled, vis-a-vis England, than at at any time since the First World War'" (Dickson, 1980, p296)

It is not even clear that what "Scottish Capitalism" is referring to as de-skilling, primarily a swing away from skilled manual to semi-skilled manual, is the same as what Payne is refers to as de-skilling. The most common usage of de-skilling in Payne's paper refers to the increasing deficit of non-manual workers (including skilled manual workers) as compared to manual workers in Scotland as compared with England and Wales. It would seem that by the time Payne's conclusion has reached the state of being
quoted in isolation its assumed meaning bears almost no relation to the data patterns which it originally purported to summarise.

Finally, Payne himself draws the conclusion, on the basis of the comparative series as a whole, that

"Hechter's ideas of internal colonialism, or the models of dependency and exploitation of the periphery seem better suited to the explanation of the impoverishment of Scotland's manpower than the grand but unworkable theories of convergence and technological determinism." (Payne, 1977a, p35)

Now I have no more sympathy with 'grand but unworkable theories of convergence and technological determinism', whatever they are, than Payne. Who would? But if an analyst needing evidence of parallelism in long term patterns of occupational change in order to support a pet theory were to look at Payne's data, that analyst would be rubbing his hands in glee. In the real world they don't come much more parallel. But again, that would perhaps be another case of seeing in the data what you want to see.

As one small contribution towards identifying where the main territorial discontinuities in occupational structure in Britain in fact lie, Table 5.11 gives the socio-economic group structures (unfortunately only the data for men are available) for the ten standard British regions.

We have already seen that in terms of the structure of industrial employment and the sectoral structure of employment, Scotland has been closer to the British pattern than any other region of Britain. On this basis we would not expect Scotland's occupational structure to be
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.e.g.</th>
<th>England and Wales</th>
<th>South-East</th>
<th>South-West</th>
<th>East Midlands</th>
<th>North-West</th>
<th>North</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| p.p.d. from Great Britain (Source: 1971 Census. Great Britain Regional Economic Activity. Pt IV, Tab.31) |
|-------|------------------|------------|------------|---------------|------------|-------|
|      | 6.6              | 10.2       | 11.1       | 8.3           | 7.9        | 6.9   | 5.1 | 7.3 | 9.0 | 8.3 |
particularly deviant. As can be seen from the indices of dissimilarity from the British structure at the foot of Table 5.11 this is in fact the case. Only the North-West of England had in 1971 an occupational structure closer to that of Britain than Scotland's (remember that the North-West was the only region to have an industrial structure closer to that of Britain in 1971).

In terms of white-collar employment, the divide is not between Scotland and the rest but between the South-East of England and the rest, with East Anglia and the South-West also having relatively high proportions of white-collar employment. This will be partly a reflection of the fact that the service sector makes up a relatively high proportion of employment in these regions. For all the white collar groups, Scotland occupies a fairly median position. In terms of skilled and semi-skilled workers the division is again between the three 'southern' regions, this time with low proportions, and the rest. Scotland in 1971 did have the highest proportion of unskilled manual workers (socio-economic group 11). In this case, the major divide was between the Southern and Midlands regions and the rest. Scotland also had a relatively low proportion of the two groups with a 'petty-bourgeois' tinge - owners and managers of small enterprises (s.e.g. 2) and own account workers (s.e.g. 12).

The overall message of this section on occupational structure is analogous to the conclusion of the section on industrial structure. Just as it was then concluded that in
terms of impact on the overall process of social change in Scotland, the expansion of the service sector was by far the single most important transformation, so in terms of occupational change, the expansion of white-collar employment has been by far single most important transformation since the war and one which Scotland has shared with the rest of Britain.

Occupational mobility

To anticipate the findings of the next chapter, upward social mobility, or more precisely the experience of inter- or intra-generational occupational mobility from the manual to the non-manual category, was the socio-economic characteristic most unambiguously associated with voting S.N.P. at the General Election of October 1974.

For this reason it becomes especially important to specify the sources of upward occupational mobility in Scotland in the period from World War II to the mid-1970s and to situate Scotland's experience in terms of other advanced industrial societies and in comparison with England and Wales in particular. Given the dearth of systematic data on patterns of female social mobility, the discussion in this section will be entirely in terms of male occupational mobility.

The level of occupational mobility or changes in this level can be said to have two sets of determinants.

The first is change in the occupational structure, the
topic of the previous section. Occupational structure lays down the distribution of origins (occupational backgrounds or fathers' occupations) and occupational destinations (cf. Halsey, Heath and Ridge, 1980).

The second consists of the institutional mechanisms which operate to determine how the mapping of origins onto destinations actually takes place. Of these mechanisms, the educational system is the most important. Since the conclusions relating to education as the principal mapping mechanism are essentially negative, I will deal with it first. The most important trend, throughout this century has been the increasing centrality of the education system, primarily in the form of the increased importance of academic certification in determining job status.

Two examples, both of which have been extremely important in Scotland, should illustrate how this is occurring.

The first concerns the role of fee-paying education in Scotland. There could be said to be two kinds of motivation for sending children to school outside the state system. The first relates to a belief in the intrinsic value of attending a fee-paying school. Attendance at such a school is itself seen as a marker of belonging to the privileged stratum and this intrinsic significance - together with non-academic corollaries of such attendance such as social skills, contacts and accent - and the level of academic qualifications attained is a relatively secondary concern.
The second is that fee-paying schools give a better chance of achieving academic qualifications, it being the latter which are the principal determinants of subsequent job status. What seems to have been happening over the last fifty years has been a swing away from the former motivation towards the latter (cf Highe, 1969, p201). In other words, the role of the fee-paying school has changed from being a method of signalling membership of the upper class to being a method of converting a privileged background into the increasingly common coin of academic qualifications.

The more widely significant way in which the education system has become increasingly central in determining job status has been the expansion of school-leaving certification. In the immediate post-war years school leaving certification was relevant only to the small minority of school-leavers who were trying for university entrance. Certification expanded inexorably thereafter so that by the 1970s the majority of school leavers were attempting to obtain some form of school leaving certification.

As formal certification expanded to cover a much larger proportion of the school-leaving population, there occurred what David Raffe (1981, p7) has termed a widening bond between educational qualifications and occupational level.

Now this increasing centrality of the educational system, and in particular paper qualifications, to the process of mapping origins onto destinations, has in itself
no implications for the level of inter-generational occupational mobility. What these implications are depends increasingly however upon the link between origin and academic success. If the link between social background and academic success remained relatively unchanged, then the increased centrality of academic qualifications for occupational level had at best neutral and at worst negative implications for the level of occupational mobility. In one of the most sophisticated exercises of its kind, the Centre for Educational Sociology compared the relationship between social background and a wide range of indicators of academic success for those children in Scotland who transferred from primary to secondary school in 1948 with the same relationship for those children who transferred in the years 1970/72. The authors felt able to conclude that

"... the general level of class inequality in Scottish education has remained remarkably constant since the war" (Gray, McPherson and Raffe, 1983, p226)

What this means is that for the purposes of understanding occupational mobility patterns in Scotland since the war, the educational system as well as other mechanisms for the transmission of inequality such as inheritance patterns can be accorded a relatively subsidiary explanatory role in comparison to the the main causal factor involved, occupational change. As was seen in the last section, by far the most important aspect of occupational change has been the expansion of non-manual jobs since the war.
Before moving on to looking at how occupational change has affected mobility patterns we can briefly place Scotland's mobility pattern into a broad comparative context. Anthony Heath (1981) has collated mass mobility rates (inter-generational moves across the manual/non-manual line for the non-farm population) calculated on the basis of surveys carried out in the ten years around 1970 for 19 industrial societies including most of Western Europe, the U.S.A., Canada, Japan, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia. The range was from 37.5 for Canada to 25.5 for Italy (Heath, 1981, Table 7.1). When we calculate the same rate for Scotland on the basis of the Scottish Mobility Study (see below), Scotland's mass mobility rate of 31.7 comes almost precisely in the middle of the range, two percentage points lower than the rate for England and Wales.

Tables 5.12A and 5.12B are the inflow and outflow tables for Scotland and England and Wales for Hope-Goldthorpe classes presented by Goldthorpe on the basis of the Oxford (9) and Scottish (10) Mobility Studies and are to date the only relatively fine-grained basis for comparison we have. Comparison of such tables is extremely tricky, primarily because of the effects of the differing marginal frequencies (distributions of fathers' and sons' occupations) of the two areas on the mobility patterns. For this reason it is not immediately apparent from these tables that much of the difference in mobility patterns
TABLE 5.12A. Oxford and Scottish Mobility Studies. INFLOW Tables.
Percentages in each Hope-Goldthorpe Class of respondent with father of given
Hope-Goldthorpe class at age 14. Scottish figures in bold

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fathers class</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>Father's class marginal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Goldthorpe 1980 Tables 2.1 and A5. See Appendix 3 for H-G Classes.)
### TABLE 5.12B. Oxford and Scottish Mobility Studies. OUTFLOW Tables.

Hope-Goldthorpe Classes of respondent's as percentage of those with given H-G Class of father at age 14. Scottish figures in bold

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fathers class.</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>45.2</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>36.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resp. Class</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marginal</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Goldthorpe 1980 Tables 2.1 and A5. See Appendix 3 for H-G Classes.)
across the manual/non-manual line between Scotland on the one hand and England and Wales on the other consists of a greater tendency towards self-recruitment in the three 'middle-class' Hope-Goldthorpe classes. This can be shown most clearly in terms of what could be called the self-recruitment odds ratios for these classes - these are shown in Table 5.13. Take the example of Hope-Goldthorpe Class I.

**TABLE 5.13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Total Non-farming</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Total Non-farming</th>
<th>England and Wales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>8.4 (8.1)</td>
<td>6.6 (6.4)</td>
<td>Class II</td>
<td>3.5 (3.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II</td>
<td>3.5 (3.2)</td>
<td>2.5 (2.4)</td>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>1.1 (1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>1.1 (1.1)</td>
<td>1.5 (1.5)</td>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>9.0 (5.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>9.0 (5.3)</td>
<td>4.3 (3.8)</td>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>1.6 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>1.6 (1.6)</td>
<td>1.5 (1.5)</td>
<td>Class VI</td>
<td>2.1 (1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VI</td>
<td>2.1 (1.9)</td>
<td>2.0 (2.0)</td>
<td>Class VII</td>
<td>1.8 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VII</td>
<td>1.8 (1.7)</td>
<td>2.2 (2.1)</td>
<td>Source: Calculated from Table 5.12.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The self-recruitment odds ratio of 8.4 this Class in Scotland means that the chances of the son of a Class I father ending up in Class I are 8.4 times the chances of the son of a father who is not in Class I ending up in Class I. A more general comparison of inter-class reciprocal odds ratios between Scotland and England and Wales confirms that whatever greater rigidity there is in
mobility patterns within Scotland is concentrated around Hope-Goldthorpe Classes I and IV—precisely the classes for which as Goldthorpe points out

"the transmission of economic resources may be expected to be particularly important. ... Class I comprises a minority of large proprietors and independent professionals who will often be in a position to pass on businesses or practices to their sons; and furthermore, they, and also members of the majority groupings in this class, are likely to be able to aid their sons' occupational chances substantially by the use of their relatively large incomes and accumulations of wealth—for example, by buying them a privileged education, extensive training, or indeed, a business or practice of their own. In Class IV we then have all other 'independents' ... not covered by Class I. While their capitals will certainly vary considerably in size and form, one may suppose that a majority within this class will still have the potential to transmit capital to some extent. So far as the likelihood of intergenerational transmission of class position is concerned, we would therefore wish to regard these two classes as being sui generis." (Goldthorpe, 1980, p100)

The available evidence would suggest therefore that these processes of the intergenerational transmission of class position are relatively more powerful in Scotland than south of the border, contrary to Scotland's egalitarian mythology.

Making the contrast even starker, is the fact that the evidence points towards greater social fluidity within the working class and between the working class and routine non-manual occupations than is the case in England and Wales.

As always, these differences must be seen in the perspective of the sheer scale of occupational mobility generated since the war by the expansion of of white-collar occupations since the war—an expansion common to Scotland
and England. We can get some limited leverage on how the pattern of occupational change translated into patterns of occupational mobility on the basis of the findings of the Scottish Mobility Study.

To date, the most detailed information published on the basis of the Scottish Mobility Survey has related to the pattern of recruitment to first jobs (11).

Among respondents who started work in the 1930s the proportion of first jobs which were non-manual was under 20%. This non-manual proportion of first jobs then rose to around 25% during and immediately after the war, falling back to a level of 22 to 23% in the early 1950s. Then followed a steady rise to a level of over 40% in the late 1960s.

The implication of this trend in terms of upward occupational mobility depends of course on how many of the non-manual first jobs were filled by men with manual backgrounds. In fact, if we assess the contribution of the rise in the proportion of first jobs which were non-manual to upward mobility as the proportion of all first jobs which were non-manual and filled by men from manual backgrounds, this proportion was relatively stable. It rose erratically from a level of just under 10% in the 1930s to around 15% in the mid-1950s stabilizing at this level thereafter. The demand created by the rapid rise in the proportion of non-manual first jobs from the mid-1950s onwards was satisfied overwhelmingly by an increase in
recruiting from non-manual backgrounds.

Why this happened - why the surge in non-manual employment does not seem to have been accompanied by a surge in recruiting to non-manual first jobs of men from non-manual backgrounds - can be explained in terms of two related considerations. First, when the non-manual first jobs are broken down into the component social grades, it seems to have been true over the whole period that the higher up the status spectrum, the lower a proportion of first jobs were filled by men from non-manual backgrounds. In other words, movement up over the manual/non-manual line had conformed to the well-known pattern of being disproportionately into the lower non-manual grades. What happened in the nineteen sixties was that an important section of these lower non-manual grades - routine clerical - began to be increasingly filled by women.

This should not overshadow the main finding however that from the mid-fifties to the late nineteen sixties, fifteen per cent of all non-manual first jobs were filled by men with manual backgrounds.

The trends discussed so far have related primarily to only one step in the full mobility pattern - that between father's occupation and respondent's first job. Information on intra-generational career mobility is rather more patchy - allowing glimpses rather than an overview of the whole pattern. To date the data on intra-generational mobility presented by the Scottish Mobility Study is too ambiguous to present briefly. Much more serviceable is the snapshot
of early career patterns presented by the follow-ups to the Scottish Mental Survey (12).

What should first be pointed out is the probability of a high overall level of job movement in the early years of work. Maxwell (1969, p58) showed that the average number of jobs held by the male respondents to the 1963 follow-up to the Scottish Mental Survey during their first ten years of potential employment was between 3 and 4.

The implications of this rapid job changing in terms of early career occupational mobility can be seen in terms of the straight manual/non-manual dichotomisation of Table 5.14.

TABLE 5.14 Scottish Mental Survey. Mobility patterns at ages 18 and 27.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Son</th>
<th>Age 18 (1954)</th>
<th>Age 27 (1963)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>49 (9.6%)</td>
<td>54 (10.5%)</td>
<td>75 (16.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>29 (5.7%)</td>
<td>381 (74.3%)</td>
<td>102 (22.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: calculated from Macpherson, 1958, Table LXIII and Maxwell, 1969, Table 18)

At age 18, over half of the sons with non-manual backgrounds were in manual jobs. Conversely only 29 (or 7%) of the 410 sons with manual fathers were in a non-manual category (which here includes most full-time education). Thus at this stage in the sons' careers, there was an overall bias towards downward mobility with a particularly
low incidence of upward mobility.

With the passage of a further 9 years however, by which time the respondents were aged 27, the situation had been entirely transformed. The number of downwardly mobile had halved, while the number of upwardly mobile had trebled. In the latter case, more than twice as many men were upwardly mobile between the ages of 18 and 27 as had experienced inter-generational mobility before the age of 18. Nearly 17% of the entire sample were men with manual backgrounds, who had been doing a manual job at age 18 yet who had moved into the non-manual group by the age of 27 in 1963.

Thus the general message of the available data on patterns of occupational mobility in Scotland in the thirty years after the war is that, although there is no evidence of any weakening of the mechanisms maintaining inequality of opportunity, this fact was camouflaged by the existence of a considerable degree of upward occupational mobility across the manual/non-manual line due almost entirely to the expansion of the white collar sector.

Discussion of the implications of these mobility patterns for social and political perceptions will be left for the next chapter. Here the aim has been simply to establish the source of the pattern of upward mobility and to confirm that Scotland was very much in line with the rest of Britain in experiencing these patterns.
Women in the workforce.

So far this chapter has dealt with aspects of social structural change in modern Scotland - industrial change, occupational change and patterns of social mobility - whose relevance to an understanding of political change has generally been recognized.

This section and the next will deal with aspects of social change - changes in the pattern of female economic activity and changes in patterns of child-bearing - which have rarely been explicitly linked with patterns of political change. I include a brief discussions of these aspects of social change not because I have been able to establish any explicit and direct linkage between them and the pattern of S.N.P. success but for rather more general and indirect reasons.

Most generally, any discussion of social change which omitted them would be highly partial. In the years of the S.N.P.'s electoral advance - say from the early nineteen sixties to the mid nineteen seventies, quantitative shifts in these areas were greater than any quantitative shifts of an equivalent generality in industrial or occupational structure. Between 1961 and 1971, the proportion of married women who were economically active rose from 23 to 40 per cent and this trend continued into the nineteen seventies. Between 1964 and 1977, the Scottish birth rate fell from 20 births per thousand population to 12. As we have seen, the only aspect of general employment patterns to have come near to matching this rate of change was the expansion of
employment in the service sector. This was no coincidence in that the expansion in service employment was the most important single factor in the general expansion of employment opportunities for women, the latter in turn being probably the main driving force behind the fall in the birth rate (see the discussion in the next section). In terms of the general causal logic of this chapter then, a long causal chain is completed by a discussion of changing women's work patterns and patterns of child-bearing.

Whereas changes in the industrial and occupational structure are macro-socially determined shifts over which individuals have little if any control, changes in fertility can be seen as responses to these macro-social trends in the one domain in which people (or rather couples) have been able to exercise some degree of control - that of planning a family.

In the next chapter the focus is on changing orientations towards work and the family and the meshing of these orientations with political perspectives. The increase in the paid employment of married women and falling marital fertility can be regarded as being among the most significant objective correlates of such changing orientations.

The greatest single shift in the labour market since the Second World War has been the large-scale entry into paid employment of married women.

As far as can be made out on the basis of Lee's series
of employment data (See Appendix 2 for description of the data) women as a proportion of the Scottish labour force slowly declined in the course of the second half of the nineteenth century. They made up 34% of those whose occupations were enumerated in 1851, a figure which fell to 29% by 1911. This seems largely to have been associated with a shift in the balance of industrial employment away from textiles (53% of employment in textiles was female in 1851) and clothing and footwear (50% female) towards the heavier industries of Scotland's 'second wave' of nineteenth century industrialization - coal, steel, shipbuilding and engineering - in which employment was almost exclusively male.

By 1931, women made up 30% of those classified as 'gainfully occupied' (roughly equivalent to the current term 'economically active') or 32% of total employment. This represented a female 'economic activity rate' of 34.5%.

Tables 5.15 and 5.16 give the distribution of economic activity by age, for all women and for married women respectively, from 1921 to 1971.

Throughout this period, variations in the total level of economic activity by women and in age-specific female activity rates have been the outcome of shifts in the age-specific economic activity rates of married and unmarried women and in the age of marriage.

From 1951 to 1971 there were three master trends, with different relative strengths for the different age groups.
1. Among the two youngest age groups an increase in the take-up of continuing full time education.

2. A continuing rise in the proportion of women married in each age-group - this having the greatest impact on the younger age groups.

3. A continuous increase in the proportion of married women of all ages going out to work or actively seeking work.

Table 5.15 All women. Percentage in age group economically active, 1921 to 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>1921 (Age)</th>
<th>1931 (Age)</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 to 19</td>
<td>44.1 (14-15)</td>
<td>49.1 (14-15)</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 19</td>
<td>73.5 (16-17)</td>
<td>75.6 (16-17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 24</td>
<td>67.7 (18-24)</td>
<td>64.7 (21-24)</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 34</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 59</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 to 69</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 to 69</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 plus</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All aged 15 and over</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: Census of Scotland: 1931, Vol III, p ix; 1951, Vol IV, Table C; 1961, Vol 6, I, Table 3; 1971, Econ Act Table 1.)
TABLE 5.16 Married women. Percentage in age group economically active. 1921 to 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 to 19</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 34</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 59</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 to 64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 to 69</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 plus</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All aged 16 and over</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: Census of Scotland: 1931, Vol III, Table F; 1951, Vol IV, Table E; 1961, Vol 6, I, Table 3; 1971, Economic Activity Tables, Table 1.)

Among the two youngest age groups, 15 to 19 and 20 to 24 it was a combination of the first two trends which predominated in the 1950s and 1960s to produce a falling activity rate.

The most complex case is the 25 to 29 year old group. In the 1950s, the continuing rise in the proportion who were married (from 70% to 80%) was sufficient to outweigh the effects of increased participation among those who were married. Thus there was a fall in the economic activity rate for women in this age group. In the 1960s, the rise in the proportion married (from 80% to 84%) was having an
increasingly marginal effect so that the rise in the proportion of married women economically active was sufficient to push the total economic activity rate back up to 40%.

Among the older age groups, it was primarily the dramatic increase in economic activity rates for married women which pushed up the overall activity rate. By 1971, 54.5% of married women aged 45 to 54 (this age group representing the 'peak') were economically active compared with only 27% in 1961.

By 1961, the age distributions of economic activity for women in general and for married women only followed a bi-modal pattern. This bi-modal pattern can be seen in embryo in the 1951 distribution, but not at all in 1931. The return to work after having children appears to have been an essentially post-war phenomenon.

Although this bi-modal pattern was clearly discernible in 1961 and 1971, its level and shape had changed dramatically between these dates. In 1961, the rise from the low level of economic activity among married women (22.4% for the 30 to 34 age group) associated with having and bringing up children was only a matter of 5 percentage points to a 'post-children' peak of 27.8% in the 35 to 44 age group. By 1971 the trough of economic activity in the 25 to 29 age group was itself higher at 31.9% than the post-children peak in 1961. The 1971 peak was both later (age 45 to 54) and much higher (54.5%) than in 1961.
In general, the increase in the proportion of married women in paid employment outside the home can be seen to be the resultant of supply and demand factors pushing in the same direction. On the supply side was a reduction in the numbers of unmarried women available for employment due to the combined effects of prolonged full-time education and the fall in the average age of marriage. On the demand side were patterns of occupational and sectoral change greatly increasing the demand for cheap and flexible female labour.

**TABLE 5.17.**

**A. Sectors as percentage of total female employment.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agr, for, fish</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B. Percentage of employment in sector which was female.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agr, for, fish</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Lee, 1980. See App. 3 for sector definitions.)

The close association between this general increase in economic activity on the part of women and the main directions of change in the sectoral structure of employment can be seen in Table 5.17. By far the most
significant single factor since the war has been the growth of the service sector which contributed to the growth of female employment in two ways. Female employment as a share of total employment in the service sector increased from 48% to 59% from 1951 to 1976 and this, coupled with the expansion in total employment in the sector, increased the service sector's share of total female employment from 38% in 1951 to 55% in 1976.

The complementary contractions in the share of female employment took place in the manufacturing and intermediate sectors. It is perhaps worth noting the stability in the proportion of manufacturing employment which was female.

We have already noted some of the occupational characteristics of the increase in female employment in the section on occupational change.

The most valid generalization is that the increase in women's employment took place at the lower levels of both the non-manual and manual skill and status hierarchies.

In 1961, 72% of women employed in the six main non-manual socio-economic groups (1 to 6) were in the least skilled and lowest paid, junior non-manual, with another 20% in the intermediate group (s.e.g. 5) leaving only 8% in the professional and managerial groups 1 to 4. For men the figures were 45% in junior non-manual, 13% in intermediate and 41% in the professional and managerial. As Table 5.18 shows, the balance swung even further against women in the 1960s.
TABLE 5.18. Economically active women and men in socio-economic groups 1 to 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th></th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 4 Prof. and manag.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5     Intermediate</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6     Junior</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have already seen how the balance of manual employment for women swung heavily towards work classified as unskilled.

The other main category in which female employment rose in the 1960s was socio-economic group 7, personal service workers. Female employment in this group increased by 26% to 104,000. Again the expansion was greatest in the more menial, low-paid jobs of the category - barmaids, waitresses, canteen assistants and maids.

The final point to be made with respect to the overall increase in female employment is that it can be accounted for entirely in terms of an increase in the number of part-time jobs. Using the standard definition of part-time employment as involving working less than 30 hours a week, a very low proportion of women's jobs were part-time in 1951. By 1961 the figure was 17% and by 1971 had rocketed to 33.5%. Between 1961 and 1971 in fact, while the total number of women in employment increased by 80,000, the number of women part-time workers went up by 145,000. This figure includes however around 24,000 teachers, or 73% of
all women teachers, who were classified as part-time presumably because many school hours clock up to less than 30 hours. Apart from this anomaly with respect to teachers, part-time employment in 1971 was overwhelmingly concentrated into a few low-paid occupations - 41% (37,000) of shop assistants, 68% (29,000) of maids and related workers and 85% (43,000) of charwomen and office cleaners were part-time. These three occupational categories of part-time workers accounted for approaching half of all women part-time workers in 1971.

As we have seen throughout, patterns of industrial, sectoral and occupational change in Scotland have been very close to those of Britain as a whole. It comes as no surprise then that the same is true of the level of economic activity among women. In 1961, the Scottish female activity rate was 1.5 percentage points below that of Britain as a whole. By 1975, this relatively small difference had diminished to 0.1 percentage points.

Finally, we can briefly sum up the implications of the last three sections taken together. The conclusion has to be that the patterns of occupational change in Scotland in the thirty years after the war were rather more favourable for men than they were for women, with women tending to move into jobs at the lower levels of both the manual and non-manual hierarchies. One implication of this shift in the sexual division of labour was likely to have been that social mobility patterns for men were rather more favourable than one would have expected solely on the basis
of gross shifts in the manual/non-manual balance. Conversely women were increasingly taking on dual roles at home and at work involving heavy demands on time and energy. The next chapter will deal with what could be called the experience of social change as basis for understanding the appeal of the S.N.P. We saw in chapter 1 that men supported the S.N.P. at the General Election of October 1974 in much greater numbers than women. It could be that the patterns of occupational change we have been discussing provided the material basis for an experience of social change which was much less favourable for women than it was for men.

Changing fertility patterns.

In the last section it was briefly suggested that there might well be a connection to be established between patterns of change in child-bearing behaviour and patterns of political change. I do not pretend to be able to establish precisely what this connection is but before attempting a brief exploration, it is worth making a few general points which, although they prove nothing in themselves, would seem to make it highly unlikely that changes in voting patterns and changing patterns of fertility occurred entirely independently of each other.
First, as already noted, there is the simple matter of simultaneity. In the years 1964 to 1977, the Scottish birth rate fell by over a third, the greatest sustained decline over a comparable period since birth registration began in the mid-nineteenth century. Give or take a couple of years either way, the coincidence between this period and the period of sustained rise in S.N.P. support is almost perfect.

The second point follows fairly obviously from the first. Without attempting to be too precise, the age group whose changing orientations such changing fertility patterns reflect - those getting married and forming families in the 1960s and early 1970s - were also the age group which showed the highest level of support for the S.N.P. at the October 1974 General Election.

Thirdly, and to anticipate the more detailed discussion of the next chapter, major themes of the sociology of modern Britain, relating in particular to the period with which we are concerned, have been the couplet of instrumentalism and privatization. Instrumentalism denotes an attitude towards work whereby it is seen almost entirely as a means to an end, with little intrinsic sigificance, and is thus downgraded as a shaper of attitudes. Privatization denotes a centring of life on the isolated, nuclear family, private household unit. To the extent that instrumentalism reduces work to a means to an end, that 'end' is (or was) increasingly what might be called the nuclear family 'project' defined primarily in consumer
terms. To the extent that the 'centre of gravity' of life was shifting from work towards the nuclear family, likewise the relative balance of influence on social and political perceptions will have shifted away from the workplace and towards the home. There are no better data on changes in the way people have actually lived their 'private' lives, have implemented their family projects than changes in marriage patterns and birth rates.

A minimum of straight demographic discussion is needed to put the rapidly changing fertility patterns of the last twenty years in long term context.

Reliable birth records based on registration go back to 1856. From then until the mid-1870s, the Scottish birth rate stayed fairly steady at around 35 births per 1000 of the population. Then followed a long and steady decline over the next sixty years, interrupted only by fluctuations during and after World War I, to a level of 18 per 1000 by the mid-1930s. This relatively low level was maintained throughout World War II and then followed the brief post-war baby boom in the late 1940s, taking the birth rate up briefly to the low twenties. By the early 1950s, the rate was back down to around 18 per 1000. The subsequent and more celebrated baby boom of the late 1950s and early 1960s was quantitatively a matter of a mere 2 births per 1000 population, taking the rate up to a peak of around 20 per 1000 in the early 1960s, and was soon dwarfed by the massive decline in the birth rate which followed. The birth
rate had dropped below the previous lowest sustained level, that of the 1930s, by 1971, and continued to decline to a low point of 12 per 1000 in 1977, after which there was a marginal but extremely tentative turnround which has already turned down again in the face of economic recession.

In broad terms, these post World War II trends have been typical of much of Western Europe. If anything, Scotland's baby bulge of the early 1960s was somewhat more marked than was the norm for Western and the subsequent decline was also steeper than the Western European norm.

Historically, the trend of Scotland's crude birth rate has broadly paralleled that for England and Wales. For much of the nineteen fifties, the Scottish birth rate was around 2 births per 1000 or 10% above the rate for England and Wales. The nineteen sixties however saw a convergence so that throughout the 1970s the Scottish birth rate tended to be only one or two decimal points above that for England and Wales.

One factor to marginally influence the birth rate in the post-war years was the changing pattern of marriage.

The one trend in marriage patterns which has overshadowed all others in Scotland as in much of the developed world over the last fifty years has been a marked increase in the proportion of the population of marriageable age who are married, this being particularly true of younger age groups. This has been due both to a lowering of the average age at first marriage and a
decrease in the proportion of people never marrying. Only in the 1970s were there signs of the trend coming to an end with a stabilisation of the average age of first marriage and a decrease in the numbers of marriages and the proportion married in the younger age groups.

Although all Social Classes have experienced the decline in the average age of marriage, this average is much lower for the manual groups and in particular the unskilled manual group. Table 5.19 gives an idea of the quite remarkable class variation involved.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Under 20</th>
<th>20 - 24</th>
<th>25 or over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Professional</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Intermediate n.m.</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Skilled non-man.</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Skilled manual</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Semi-skilled man.</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Unskilled manual</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: 1971 Census of Scotland Fertility Tables, Part II, Table 1.)

The factors underlying the general fall in the age of marriage have received remarkably little attention and changes in the pattern of class differentials even less.

We do not have direct data on trends in class differentials in age of marriage but on the basis of Census fertility tables which break down married couples according to age of wife at marriage and duration of marriage
(convertible to date of marriage) it is possible to do an approximate retrospective reconstruction of trends in age of marriage for the different Social Classes. On this basis it would appear that average age of marriage moved down very much in parallel for the different Social Classes.

The effect of the falling average age of marriage until the early nineteen seventies was to damp down the effect of falling marital fertility on the birth rate. Thereafter the moderate decline in the proportion married compounded the effect of the still falling marital fertility rate.

Despite the impact of these changing marriage patterns, and of changing patterns of illegitimate fertility, by far the most important component of the fall in the birth rate between 1964 and 1977 was the falling marital fertility rate. This was a decline shared by all age groups of married women.

The process of understanding the determinants of this most significant demographic transformation since the war is precisely that of showing its relationship to the pattern of change in orientations towards work and the family.

To date there is very little agreement about the factors which caused the massive fall in fertility from 1964 to 1977, in Scotland, as in most of the advanced industrial world. There is no shortage of plausible candidates, including more reliable means of contraception, improved family planning services, feminism in its broadest sense, increased consumption aspirations and an increase in
the number of married women going out to work. They all undoubtedly played a role, the problem being to assign their relative importance.

Given the complexity of the arguments in this area and the lack of agreement among the specialists, all one can do is give a considered opinion on the most likely pattern of causality. Before doing this however, a highly relevant circumstance should be taken into consideration which is that the fall in fertility in Scotland coincided with falling differentials in fertility - in terms of both Social Class, and, it seems likely, religion. (13)

TABLE 5.20. Mean family size by year of marriage and Social Class. 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of marriage</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>IIIm</th>
<th>IIIm</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966-71</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-66</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-61</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-56</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-51</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-46</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-41</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Census of Scotland Fertility Tables, Table 1.)

In charting trends in Social Class differentials, we are on relatively solid ground. The most detailed
information on Social Class differences in fertility was, until 1971, given in the Census. Table 5.20 is a boiling down of the information in the Social Class fertility table of the 1971 Census of Scotland.

The impression given by Table 5.20 and one which is confirmed by more detailed analysis such as breaking down the data by age at marriage is that fertility differentials between the Social Classes changed very little in the period from World War II to the early 1960s.

In Scotland, we have been fortunate in that since 1950, the Registrar General has published on an annual basis the number of births categorized by Social Class, age of mother and parity (i.e. number of previous births to the mother). On this basis, we can see in detail annual variations in child-bearing patterns for the five Social Classes. Although we can't work out fertility rates for each Class on this basis (not having information on the class distribution of potential mothers), we can chart in detail, for example, changes in the proportion of births in each Social Class which are births of fifth or higher parity.

On the basis of charting such changes, it becomes clear that the 1971 Census, in terms of the information it could give on completed families (information on the 1966 to 1971 marriage cohort being information on the timing of births within marriage rather than on completed family size) was looking back on a period of relative stability in Social Class differentials in fertility which had come to an end by time of the 1971 Census Annual trends on the basis of
the Registrar General's figures show that the period of the falling birth rate from 1964 onwards was also a period of convergence in fertility patterns between the Social Classes.

This is shown most clearly in terms of the parameter which has historically displayed the greatest Social Class differential, the existence of very large families. In terms of the Registrar General's data this can be operationalised as the proportion of births in the Class which are of parity five or greater. In the early 1960s, fifth and further births accounted for between 18 and 20% of births to Social Class V mothers, 13-14% in Social Class IV, 10% in Social Class III, 7-8% in Social Class II and finally 3-4% of all births to Social Class I mothers. These proportions all dropped rapidly as the birth rate in general fell so that by 1978 the range was from 5-6% for Social Class V to 1% for Social Class I. Third and fourth births as a proportion of total births for each Class moved down at a more sedate rate for all Classes. Conversely, first and second births increased as a proportion of total births for all Classes. What the trends clearly show in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s is an accelerating trend towards the two child family shared by all social classes, but having its most dramatic effect in terms of the fertility pattern of the Social Classes who were initially furthest away from the two child pattern - the manual groups and in particular, the unskilled manual
Finally, the most balanced way to assess change in family size differences on the basis of the Registrar General's data is to take the average family size for all couples registering births. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, the mean family size for Social Class I mothers (including the birth being registered) hovered around the two-child mark, peaking at 2.07 in 1964. Over the same period, the mean family size for Social Class V mothers moved within the band between 3 and 2.8 with a peak of 2.97 in 1963 and 1964. For much of the post-war period then the range was over 35% of the national mean. By 1977, the range was down to that between 1.75 for Social Class I and 2.06 for Social Class V - or around 16% of the national mean. Throughout the period, the mean family size of the Social Classes in between Social Classes I and V were ranged in order between these extreme groups.

There are good grounds for thinking then that a sizable proportion of the overall reduction in fertility was not common to all social classes but in fact consisted of fertility falling faster among the manual than among the non-manual groups.

In addition to coinciding with falling Social Class differentials, the fall in fertility in Scotland coincided with a clearcut regional convergence in fertility levels within Scotland. The main component of this was the moving into line with the rest of Scotland of the most highly Catholic areas of the industrial West of Scotland.
Variations in inter-regional Social Class composition were insufficient for the declining Social Class fertility differential to have made a major contribution and there thus seem to be strong ecological grounds for believing that a marked decline in the Catholic fertility differential in Scotland took place.

We need an explanation then that will account for this coincidence between falling fertility and declining relative fertility differences. An extremely simple model which would seem to fit the bill involves a changing balance between economic motivations to plan families on the one hand and various factors which had historically worked against family planning on the other.

Economic motivation to reduce fertility can be seen to have increased because of increased employment opportunities for married women in the context of the higher consumption standards of a generation whose aspirations had developed in the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties.

These increased economic motivations had to work against existing obstacles to family planning among certain groups. Among Catholics there had been doctrinal objections to the most effective forms of contraception. In the case of manual workers, a much more complex set of obstacles will have been at work — ranging from fatalistic attitudes associated with experience of economic insecurity to working-class patterns of intra-familial communication.
precluding the development of joint decision-making.

Many explanations of the fall in fertility (14) assume an economically rational, consumption-oriented outlook as a framework in terms of which couples react to increased economic opportunities by reducing fertility. The coincidence of declining religious and class differentials with the general fall in fertility would seem to suggest a slightly more complex process. Although a central role can still be given to increased economic motivations, that part of the fall in fertility which coincides with declining differentials must be attributed to the establishment of an 'economically rational' outlook on family building in place of more 'traditional' orientations which had involved obstacles to family-planning. The declining role of such obstacles could be attributed either to their being 'overridden' by increased economic motivations or more simply to the declining importance of the 'traditional orientations' which supported them. In a nutshell, if what had historically maintained the various religious and class differences had been various forms of obstacle to family-planning supported by various 'traditional' or 'cultural' orientations, the universalization of a more economistic orientation to family building in place of such factors would produce a simultaneous fall in both the level of fertility and the level of differentials.

In the most general sense, we have arrived at a position from which can see the fall in fertility, the major demographic shift of recent years, as representing an
increased level of control or decision-making within the family sphere. In the tritest sense of course the term 'family planning' itself has the same implication. However, what is more important is the virtual universalisation of an orientation according to which the shape of the nuclear family is something constructed as a result of decisions.

This may seem like a very odd place at which to end the long causal chain which began with industrial change, moved on to occupational change, changing female employment patterns and finally the fall in the birth rate. What this final link in the causal chain represents however is one aspect of how people have been able to react, in the a sphere in which they can hope to have some control over their own lives - the nuclear family, to the juggernaut of social change over which they have virtually no control and which is represented by the earlier links in the chain.

Conclusion.

This chapter has given an outline of some of the more 'socio-graphically' describable aspects of social change in modern Scotland and some of the more easily established connections between them.

Despite the fairly high level of generality of much of the discussion, it emerges quite clearly that the patterns of industrial and occupational change have been quite complex. There is no way that they can easily be summarized in terms either of differential mechanisms to do with
Scotland's changing position in the international division of labour or in terms of common mechanisms such as those hypothesized for advanced industrial societies by theorizations of occupational transition. A full understanding of the determinants of Scotland's changing industrial and occupational structure would involve the specification of the complex interaction between the two sets of factors.

However, whatever the reasons and at the risk of over-simplifying, it does seem clear that the thirty years after the war constituted a period of rapid and widely ramified social change. In general the period can best be summed as one of expanding opportunities. In particular, it must be remembered that the gross shifts in industrial and occupational structure which formed the primary matrix of social change, will have had disproportionate effects on the opportunity structure facing those entering the labour market. For the generation entering the labour market in the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties the nature of industrial and occupational change constituted an exceptionally favourable environment. This is of course all the clearer looking back from the quite different conditions of the early nineteen eighties, when the cessation of post-war growth has had a much more immediately perceptible impact on those entering the labour market.

To reiterate a theme which has been sounded throughout the chapter, despite the complexities of these patterns of
social change, their rhythms at the British level have been closely paralleled at the Scottish level. We are carried one step further along the chain of argument according to which although the appeal of the S.N.P. can be grounded in terms of the experience of this relatively favourable episode of social change in Scotland, these patterns of social change were qualitatively no different to the general British pattern. In the next chapter I will try to make these connections more explicit by looking more closely at aspects of social change which take us closer to understanding how the changes mapped in this chapter were experienced.
Chapter 6.

Social change and political orientations.

Introduction.

This study as a whole offers in its separate chapters a range of global perspectives or triangulations on a particular phase of the electoral history of the S.N.P. This chapter presents a range of more tightly focussed triangulations aimed at deciphering the meaning of S.N.P. voting as one expression of the experience of social change in Scotland since World war II.

The dominant experience of this period was one of prosperity and economic security - whether in the form of rising standards of living, full employment, better housing or the welfare state. Section I of this chapter sets out to document this set of broad 'background aspects' of social change with an emphasis, yet again, on establishing that what Scotland shared with the rest of Britain far outweighed what differentiated it.

Such background factors, together with some of the more structural changes discussed in the last chapter, constituted in many ways the preconditions for the next, more indefinable and immediately pre-political, level of social change. Perhaps the best way to think of this level of social change is to see it as a pattern of change in the relative significance of the worlds of work, family and community and in particular of changes in the way these three worlds tended to mesh together to shape political
perspectives. These topics are dealt with in section II.

Given the relatively paucity of empirical research on patterns of social change in Scotland since the last war, we are largely dependent for insight into such changes in what might be called the texture of social life on studies such as 'The Affluent Worker' and Young and Willmott's work on changes in family life. Part of the rationale for the emphasis of the previous chapter and Section I of this chapter on the parallelism of social change in Scotland and the rest of Britain was to justify bringing to bear on Scotland itself the implications of research carried on outwith Scotland.

Section III takes us to the heart of the matter. It presents evidence from the October 1974 Scottish Election Survey on the socio-economic correlates of S.N.P. voting - correlates which take on their full meaning only in the context of the preceding sections.

Section IV attempts to assess the role of television within the context of this complex of social change. The section also serves to link the discussion of social change in this chapter back to that of Chapter 4 in which the arrival of television was presented as a historical event which made possible the widespread acceptance of 'the Scottish economic dimension' as a framework in terms of which politics came to be perceived.

What the chapter sets out to demonstrate is that it was those groups which could be said to have most fully
embodied the patterns of social change to be outlined which tended to support the S.N.P.

I. Background factors - affluence, full employment and the welfare state.

Factors such as rising living standards, relatively full employment, the existence of the Welfare State and improved housing standards are in a sense so mundane that it is easy to forget that for the thirty years after the second world war they were probably the most powerful motors of social change in both Britain and Scotland.

For example, most discussions of changing patterns of family life in post-war Britain conclude by invoking, sometimes almost reluctantly, these general background factors as the main driving forces behind such changing patterns.

In accounting for the shift from the extended to the nuclear family pattern, Young and Willmott concluded that of all the contributory factors, if forced to plump, they would

"give special prominence to the higher standard of life and to migration" (1973, pp92-93).

Similarly, Anderson observes

"Since the Second World War ... we have apparently seen further changes leading to some eclipse of the most solidary and normative kinship bonds. In terms of this analysis I should attribute this change on the one hand to some decline in the frequency of critical life situations as health improved, family size declined, and the scourge of unemployment was reduced, and on the other to an increase in people's ability to meet these crises for themselves through increased wages and increased benefits and services from the welfare
Perhaps the most immediate index of the strength of the pressures operating in favour of the nuclear family pattern in the immediate post-war years was the rapid fall in the age of marriage. Zweig's characterization of the factors underlying this trend is an early and comprehensive summarization of many of the themes of this section.

"I think that the tendency towards earlier marriage is largely to be explained in terms of ability to support a family earlier; social and economic independence comes earlier. Full employment, opportunities for women's work, and good wages are supporting the young men who wants to build his nest early. Young men feel more confident about the future; they also feel that home life has so far much more to offer with all the modern amenities and gadgets, while family planning and the facilities of the Welfare State reduce risks" (Zweig, 1961, p11)

Given that there seems to be fairly general agreement that rising standards of living had been an important factor underlying changes in the pattern of family and community life, it is worth making an assessment of the extent of the rise in living standards since the war. This is, of course, a methodological minefield and I simply want to give some idea of the order of magnitude of the increase.

In Scotland, the closest approach to the topic has tended to be that of economists with an interest in changes in the earnings differential between Scotland and the rest of Britain. Even at the British level, accounts of changes in the real value of earnings are relatively few and far between. On the basis of published work then, the only way to assess the magnitude of changes in the value of real earnings in Scotland would seem to be via the indirect
route of assessing changes at the British level and then charting the trend of Scottish deviation. For more recent years it is possible to go directly to the Family Expenditure Survey.

At the British level, Brown and Browne calculated the real value of annual money earnings including employer's contributions to social security as rising from an index value of 84 in 1946 to one of 115 in 1960, a rise of around 37%, this 1946 figure itself representing a rise of 22% compared with 1939 (1968, Appendix 3). For the period 1949 to 1959, they give the annually cumulated percentage change in real wages as 2.2% (1968, Table 30). For the period 1960 to 1970, Routh (1980, p180) assesses real wages as having risen by 30%. Finally, Hunter and Robertson (1969, Table 13.3) put the rise in the real earnings index from 1948 to 1958 as being 22%, with a further rise of 24% from 1958 to 1966. They also concur with Brown and Browne in putting the rise in real earnings from 1938 to 1946 at 23%. Taking these assessments together, we are fairly safe then in assuming that the rise in real earnings from the end of the war to 1970 was at least 50%, the war itself having contributed a previous rise of around 20%. The annual rate of increase appears to have been around 2% in the 1950s and nearer 3% in the 1960s. All the estimates so far cited refer to the average level of male pre-tax earnings and leave us well short of an assessment of changes in spending power. A closer approach to real disposable income per
capita would involve an assessment at the very least of changes in taxation, changes in the proportion of women—and in particular married women—going out to work and changes in household size. However, Scottish commentators have concentrated on the earnings differential between Scotland and the U.K. and it is in the context of this long term rise of 50% or more at the British level that their findings must be interpreted.

For the 1950s, the fullest account is that of McCrone (1965). He sums up the experience of the period 1951 to 1960 as follows:

"Income per employee starts the period at 94.6 per cent of the United Kingdom figure and remains approximately at this level until the last two years when it falls slightly (to 93.5% in 1960 - SWK)"
(McCrone, 1965, p37)

Johnston, Buxton and Mair writing in 1971, assessed the experience of the 1960s in the following terms,

"... over the past decade, average weekly earnings per male manual worker in Scotland, both in manufacturing and in all industries covered, have remained constantly below those of the U.K. Yet, over this period, Scottish earnings have been rising at a faster rate, so that the gap between Scottish and U.K. figures has been steadily closing ... both in manufacturing and in all industries covered the level of earnings per man in Scotland has risen from 91 per cent to over 97 per cent of the national average."
(Johnston, Buxton and Mair, 1971, pp60-61)

Moving on into the 1970s, average weekly earnings of male manual employees actually overtook the British level from 1975 to 1978 (Scottish Economic Bulletin, Summer 1980, Table 5.2.)

These brief citations are simply intended to confirm that earnings in Scotland rose at a rate comparable to the
rate for the U.K. as a whole and somewhat faster in the 1960s. There are no grounds in this area for saying that Scotland's experience was qualitatively different from that of the U.K. as a whole.

To get nearer to assessing the impact of this rise in the value of real earnings upon the level of spending power we have to take into account three main factors. Working against an increase in spending power was an increase in the bite taken by taxation.

"Over the period, 1959 to 1974-75, the average rate of tax paid by the bulk of the population, the lowest 90%, more than doubled" (Pond, 1977, p57)

The main factors working in the other direction, the increase in the number of women going out to work and the fall in the birth rate leading to a fall in family and household size have already been charted.

The simplest way to cut the Gordian knot of methodological problems in this area is to go to the Family Expenditure Survey. Table 6.1 gives household income and income per person for the U.K. and Scotland from 1961-63 to 1979-80. The rate of increase of household income in the 1960s is broadly in line with the estimates for real earnings cited above. Scotland's faster rate of increase relative to the U.K. in terms of income per person is probably due to the cumulative effects on household size of the progressive convergence in birth rates between Scotland and England and Wales. Scotland's greater average household size however meant that income per person
Table 6.1 Household income and income per person. U.K., Scotland. 1961-63 to 1979-80.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Household income</th>
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<th>67-68</th>
<th>69-70</th>
<th>71-72</th>
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<th>77-78</th>
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<td>52.2</td>
<td>74.7</td>
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<td>126.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>117.3</td>
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<th>75-76</th>
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<td>25.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
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<tr>
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Table 6.2. Household expenditure and expenditure per person. U.K., Scotland.
1953-54 to 1979-80

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<th>Years (inclusive)</th>
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<td>Scotland as % of U.K.</td>
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<td>95.1</td>
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Expenditure per person

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<th>53-54</th>
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<td>Scotland as % of U.K.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
remained at only around 90% of the U.K. level throughout the 1970s.

Growth in household expenditure and expenditure per person proceeded at a rather more sedate pace however (Table 6.2) the main factor behind the difference being the growth in the share of direct taxation. Thus, whereas in Scotland, household income rose by some 39% between 1961-63 and 1973-74, expenditure rose by only 28% or 2.4% per annum in the same period. Again, expenditure per person shows a more favourable picture, with a 42% increase in the same period, or an annual rate of 3.7%, approximately double the earlier rate of increase between 1953-54 to 1961-63.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>64-66</th>
<th>75-76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>Washing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>64-66</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75-76</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
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<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75-76</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-east</td>
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<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75-76</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
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<td>64-66</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75-76</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: British Labour Statistics Historical Abstract. Table 195. British Labour Statistics Yearbook 1976 Table 138)

The targets of much of this expenditure can be documented in the rising trend of ownership of consumer
durables. Table 6.3 should simply serve to confirm that Scotland was by no means atypical in the pattern and pace of acquisition of cars and household amenities.

Perhaps the single most important social structural difference between Scotland and the rest of Britain has been in patterns of tenure. Scotland has historically had a higher proportion in local authority housing and a lower proportion of owner occupiers. This pattern has long been associated with Scots spending a lower proportion of total expenditure on housing. As can be seen from Table 6.4, the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Owner occupied</th>
<th>Local authority /new town</th>
<th>Privately rented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCOTLAND</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENGLAND AND WALES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Census Housing Tables)

years from 1961 to 1981 saw no narrowing of the gap in patterns of tenure between Scotland and the rest of Britain. However, Scotland did follow the British pattern of rising home ownership. Equally significant however is the fact that in the nineteen sixties the major component
of change in patterns of tenure was still the shift from privately rented to local authority or new town housing. Most important to note is that these housing shifts and the improvement in housing standards which they represented will have had disproportionate effects on the experience of young couples setting up home for the first time.

The two other main factors underlying the patterns of social change with which we are concerned are full employment and the post-war welfare state. Taking the period from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, both can be taken as relatively constant background factors.

The role of the level of unemployment should be briefly spelled out. In these years of relatively full employment, the emphasis of Scottish commentary tended to be placed on the higher level of unemployment in Scotland than in the U.K. as a whole. The size of this differential has to be seen in the context of a general level of relatively full employment, compared either with the situation in 1983 or the situation before the war. The corollary of the fact that unemployment hits the unskilled and the unqualified hardest, is that for the rest of the population even the relatively low national unemployment rates of the thirty years after the war overstated the risk of extended employment.

It is important to distinguish here two routes by which the level of unemployment influences political perceptions. The first is that whereby the level of unemployment is taken as an indicator of the state of the national economy.
In Scotland this has primarily taken the form of concern over Scotland's high rate of unemployment relative to that of the U.K. as a whole. The second has to do with the impact of personal experience of unemployment or employment or, more precisely, with the impact of the individual's lifetime experience of unemployment and employment upon his personal, social and political outlook. It is with the second route that I am here concerned. From this point of view, the central feature of the post-war years in Scotland was the experience of relatively secure employment - even for manual workers - with the knowledge that finding another job was not likely to present a major difficulty.

From the point of view of people's personal experience of unemployment, which of the following two contrasts carried the greater weight? That between the nineteen fifties and sixties on the one hand and the nineteen twenties, thirties and eighties on the other, or that between a rate of unemployment of 3.6% in Scotland in 1964 compared with one of 1.8% in the U.K. as a whole. I am not trying to belittle the fact that Scotland had double the national average unemployment over much of the period. I am just trying to come to an assessment of the relative weight in understanding social and political change which should be given to the Scotland/U.K. differential compared with the fact that the bulk of the generation which grew up in Scotland after the war experienced and unprecedented level of economic security. Full employment was part of this.
The other aspect was the greatly extended scope of the welfare state. The most important, albeit obvious, point to bear in mind is that the standard of entitlement for most welfare benefits and services was uniform at the British level.

The main message of this section then is that to the extent that this range of 'background factors' - a rising standard of living, better housing, full employment and the welfare state - were among the main driving forces of social change in the post-war years, their cumulative impact in Scotland is unlikely to have been qualitatively different from that in Britain as a whole.

II. Patterns of social change: work and the family.

In assessing dominant trends in the kind of social change which was in large part the outcome of the factors just outlined, we are dependent for clues primarily on studies with a varying and often quite specific empirical focus, some carried out in Scotland, others in other parts of Britain. Because of their relatively narrow focus, the main problem involves the degree to which their findings can be generalized to society as a whole or the working class as a whole. One is forced to operate somewhere between the rigour possible in the studies themselves and facile generalization. This section can in no way offer proofs in itself but should be regarded as one more triangulation on a complex of social and political
change. What follows then is an inevitably coarse-grained attempt to pinpoint the strands of change most likely to have affected voting patterns.

In terms of the family, the most general trend has been in terms of a relative drawing in of family ties to the confines of the nuclear family unit. At the beginning of the last sectioned I pointed out that such aspects of post-war economic security as the N.H.S. and full employment had tended to remove the need for extended family ties just as patterns of migration were removing the feasibility of close dependence on kin. These in a sense were negative reasons for the drawing in of day-to-day family ties to within the confines of the nuclear family unit.

A more positive factor was simply an increase in the relative attractiveness of the home both in terms of space — better housing and fewer children — and in terms of the widening range of 'home-centred' consumer durables, with television playing a crucial role, compared with more traditional and communal sites of sociability.

This drawing in family ties, especially if it is seen in terms of a wider set of processes involving the separation of the nuclear family unit from work-based patterns of sociability and from communal or neighbourhood patterns of interaction (2), can be seen as creating the possibility of an increasing separation between the spheres of work-life and home life.

In terms of patterns of consciousness, the most straightforward implication of such a separation is the
possibility of dualistic or segmented forms of consciousness. This can be seen as one aspect, and in terms of the present study by far the most important aspect, of Mann's more general point that

"... in several ways the worker's experience does not form the totality suggested by either 'end of ideology' theorists or Marxists. Several segmentations - between work and non-work, between industrial and political action, between the economic and social aspects of industrial action itself - give to class relations in contemporary capitalism their peculiarly unstable nature, their paradoxical character of unresolved and unresolvable dialectic" (Mann, 1973, p20)

I will deal with some aspects of this central dualism in Section IV but here I am more concerned with the possibility created by the separation between work and family life of a change in the balance of, to use an awful but apt expression, 'where politics are coming from'.

To put my general point in a nutshell, a rising standard of domestic consumption coupled with a work situation showing no signs of becoming less alienating is a powerful reason for viewing the world from the domestic standpoint rather than from that of the work-place - that of a consumer rather than a producer.

A central aspect of why this can be expected to occur is pinpointed in The Affluent Worker(3).

"Their existence outside of work represents for our affluent workers the realm of at least relative freedom; as consumers, as home-makers, they can exercise some autonomy and creativity in shaping the pattern of their lives. But the price of this is that work itself must be accepted as the realm of necessity." (Goldthorpe et al., 1970, p143)

As we will see in section IV it is these non-work
roles or self-images - consumer or home-maker - which receive confirmation in the dominant media and which mesh with the official version of democratic politics.

It is important to stress that such beliefs are not fantasies, they can be based on experience. As The Affluent Worker points out

"before resorting to claims of 'false' consciousness, it is important to recall that the social experience of many of our respondents was of a kind that could reasonably lead then to be less impressed by the weakness and vulnerability of their class position than by the extent to which they had been able to achieve economic advance within the existing social framework." (Goldthorpe et al., 1969, p155)

An important aspect of increased commitment to family life as a source of identity is for family life to increasingly take the form of a 'project', something over which there is felt to be control and which is seen to be the result of decisions.

Again the paradigmatic case is provided by the The Affluent Worker sample and again the change can be seen to be the result of experience of affluence and economic security.

"... we consider our affluent workers not primarily as members of a given industrial organisation but rather, in this case, as men who, in some more or less conscious way, have 'projects' for themselves and their families which they seek to realise through work in one form or another." (Goldthorpe et al., 1970, p116)

Before moving on to explore the 'way in which (the affluent workers) evaluate further possible means of advancing their projects and of achieving their
objectives', the authors make the point that the most important contextual consideration is that

"in comparison with many workers in older age-groups, or with workers in less prosperous regions of the country, the men in our sample have had relatively little direct experience of economic insecurity thus far in their working lives; and further, that they appear to feel no great anxiety about their basic security for the future ... the degree of security which our affluent workers enjoyed encouraged them to abandon the 'fatalism' about the future which was the traditional worker's characteristic defence against the constant uncertainties of his economic life." (Goldthorpe et al., 1970, pp117-118)

I read this in the sense that the main factor behind thinking about life in terms of a 'project' is past experience of a secure basis on which to construct it. In short, planning takes confidence and confidence is built up on a basis of security. And it is important to remember that this planfulness was restricted by the affluent worker to the consumption role.

The political corollary of this affluent worker syndrome (an instrumental attitude to work for the sake of a consumption oriented family project) was characterized as an instrumental attitude to politics.

Although the group of manual workers interviewed in the Affluent Worker study were overwhelmingly Labour supporters, and although the concept of class still figured largely in their political consciousness,

"attitudes having to do with the 'pay-off' to be expected from a Labour Government in the way of higher living standards and better social services were also clearly in evidence. Indeed such considerations were dominant in the replies given by the Labour supporters in our sample when they were evaluating the significance of a Labour victory at the next General Election." (Goldthorpe et al., 1968, p80)
Politics as a whole is seen as relatively peripheral,

"the new worker often regards politics as being of only marginal relevance to the concerns of his private life; still less than the traditional worker, one would suggest, does he recognise connections between his personal hopes and fears and public issues."

(Goldthorpe et al., 1969, p190)

Of particular importance, however is the way in which the affluent worker does perceive what link there is between his own fortunes and larger political events.

"The importance attached by the majority to the economic fortunes of the country as a whole or of their particular forms or industries reflects the fact that for these workers generally, as they themselves largely recognized, the influence that they could personally exert over their own economic futures, though not perhaps insignificant, was none the less strictly limited." (Goldthorpe et al., 1969, p123)

and along the same lines, the optimistic majority of the respondents

"envisaged their material advancement as resulting in some more or less automatic way from the continuation of economic growth, and made relatively little mention of the part to be played in this respect by collective action. In other words, these men looked forward to being the collective beneficiaries of a developmental process rather than seeing their yet more affluent future as dependent upon the outcome of social struggles in the industrial or political arenas."

(Goldthorpe et al., 1969, p153)

This discussion, which has been primarily in terms of the Affluent Worker Study, has I hope operated at two levels. Firstly, the orientations of the 'affluent workers' can be taken as exemplifying much wider patterns of social change. Secondly, a syndrome such as the instrumental privatised one of the affluent worker can be explained quite adequately on the basis of the experience of particular economic circumstances - here affluence.
A study which is closer to home and which, although its explicit focus is far removed from politics, explores a similar theme is Janet Askham's study of the connection between fertility patterns and experience of deprivation. In 1970, Askham interviewed 90 women living in Aberdeen who had been married in Aberdeen in 1960/61. The sample was chosen to cover four groups, divided by social class and number of children. The two classes were skilled manual (Social Class III manual) and unskilled manual (Social Class V). Within each Class, groups were chosen with either 2 children or 4 or more children.

Askham's major hypothesis was that

"the greater the impact of situational factors such as economic and social deprivation, insecurity and powerlessness, the greater the need for adaptation in terms of norms and behaviour patterns involving no planning ahead and being unable to control one's own environment. The greater the need for this type of adaptation, the more likely it is that a couple will have a large family since such adaptation hinders both the motivation for small families and the ability to control and restrict the family size achieved." (Askham, 1975, p14)

By and large the hypothesis was confirmed over a large range of indicators.

The differences between the groups were not to be found in terms of abstract values

"On the contrary, it appears reasonable to conclude that the groups were more remarkable for their cultural similarities than their differences" (ibid, p125)

The differences between the groups consisted primarily of differences in beliefs about what was and was not possible. Askham summarizes in terms of Class V respondents
with 4 or more children. One only has to reverse the terms to get a characterization of Class III and a fortiori Class III respondents who had limited their families to two children.

"Thus those in group V4+ were more pessimistic than others about the possibility of looking towards the future, about the possibility of individuals planning their lives or 'getting on' in life through individual effort; they appeared somewhat less likely to believe in the individual's influence upon wider events; and they were more pessimistic than others about the chances of their children achieving the kind of jobs which they would like for them." (ibid, p125)

Across a wide range of behavioural indicators - saving, getting a home of their own and, most important, political attitudes, the Social Class III group exhibited a greater future orientation, a greater sense of control. Askham does not give voting figures but her observation that the Social Class III group showed a more instrumental approach to voting and were more likely to change their vote points very strongly, in Aberdeen, in 1970, in one direction.

Askham presents what could be called a syndrome of behaviour and beliefs, aspects of which include a relatively future oriented outlook, a sense of control over one's own life and an instrumental attitude to politics. And just as the contrasting syndrome is based upon experience of economic insecurity or deprivation so this syndrome has to be seen as based on experience of economic security or affluence.

Now the links which can further be drawn here are extremely tenuous. I suggested in the last chapter that on simple grounds of simultaneity it would be surprising if
there were no connection, however indirect, between the fall in fertility and the electoral success of the S.N.P. On the basis of such studies as *The Affluent Worker* (4) and Askham's study it is at least possible to see something of where that connection might lie. The connection would seem to lie in the area of association between a family 'project' and an instrumental orientation to politics. Askham concentrated on the influence of the prior existence of a 'future orientation' on fertility levels. She interviewed women who had had their children in the early to mid-nineteen sixties when Social Class differentials were still as high as they had been at any time since the war. Since then, as we have seen, Social Class fertility differentials have plummetted, a process which was particularly rapid in the early 1970s. Now whatever the reason for this fall in fertility which affected manual groups in particular - and increased economic motivation associated with increased employment opportunities for married women along with better methods of contraception and family planning services would seem the likeliest candidates - the fall in fertility did represent an increase in the level of control in the family-consumption sphere. And whether this is simply the expression of increased involvement in this sphere as a 'project' or indeed one of the factors which increased the plausibility of this sphere as a 'project' doesn't really matter from the present point of view. In other words, it is not
Askham's finding in terms of the direction of causality which is at issue - her aim being to show that an experienced based lack of future orientation was a cause of high fertility - but simply the likelihood that the fall in fertility and the increased salience of a family project go together. In no way am I suggesting a causal relation between the fall in fertility and voting S.N.P. Simply that further understanding of the significance of both of them would seem to lie in the context of the same highly complex set of changes in social and political orientations.

The points made in this section so far have concentrated on changes in the pattern of working class life. For certain groups, the impact of economic security and rising standards of living fostered an outlook centred on the nuclear family, on what might be called the nuclear family project, with a corresponding political outlook best characterized as instrumental.

A group which experienced similar changes in life style to an even greater degree were those who had been upwardly mobile from a manual background. Here, however the negative factors in the work situation, and in particular the lack of opportunities for career advancement, which in the case of 'the affluent workers' forced the 'project' exclusively into the family context would apply to a lesser extent. In the case of the upwardly mobile we can expect the experience of mobility itself to have encouraged a conception of life as a whole as 'project' both at work in
the form of a career and domestically in terms of higher standards of consumption. In a sense, those moved up out of the working class 'lived' in an intense and telescoped form many of the changes in family patterns which large sections of the working class were experiencing over a longer period.

The main common factor of course is relative affluence. The other is a privatised style of life. The privatised nature of the family life of the upwardly mobile has received little specific attention. The family life-style of the middle class as a whole tends to be taken for granted.

For example, in their discussion of the effect of affluence on the British class structure, Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963) assumed the primary focus of white collar aspirations already to be the future position of the nuclear family. It was a shift on the part of the working class towards sharing these family-centred aspirations which formed one half of the process of convergence which they saw as being the two strata closer together. At the same time white collar workers were seen as moving away from individualistic action as a means towards this family centred end towards a more collective mode of action of an apolitical and instrumental type. (1963, p152)

Perhaps the most straightforward reason why those who achieved upward mobility from manual to white-collar jobs in Scotland should have developed an outlook centred on the immediate nuclear family is that such upward mobility has
general involved a good deal of geographical mobility (see, for example, Goldthorpe, 1980, p152). Probably the simplest empirical illustration of the association between upward social mobility and geographical mobility comes from Colin Bell's sample of 120 middle class families in two new estates in Swansea. Of the 31 upwardly mobile families in the sample none came from the area (west Swansea) in which they were living. (Bell, 1968, p44)

The relation of the next section, exploring the socio-economic correlates of S.N.P. voting, to the discussion in this section can perhaps be best summed up in terms of Goldthorpe and Lockwood's suggestion that we should be

"seeking some understanding of how the behavioural patterns in question are related to, and take meaning from, the life-histories and life-situations of the individual and group concerned" (1963, p142)

A picture of very general, societal levels of social change - including higher standards of living, full employment, the welfare state, favourable patterns of occupational change - has been presented primarily in order to assess the implications of these background, macrosociological circumstances for the way people - and in particular people coming to political maturity under these conditions - come to interpret their own lives, their place in society and thus society and politics in general.

The experiences of two groups in particular were likely to have reflected most fully the impact of these general patterns of social change. I have suggested in short that the more affluent members of the working class and those
upwardly mobile from the working class have most fully embodied these patterns of social change and are thus most likely to have had their political outlook shaped by them.

The next section will show that it was these two groups which were particularly susceptible to the appeal of the S.N.P.

III. Socio-economic characteristics and voting.

It has been a commonplace that the S.N.P.'s vote has been well distributed across the social classes.

What I want to do in this section is to probe the socio-economic distribution of the S.N.P. vote on the basis of reanalysis of the October 1974 Scottish Election Survey (see Appendix 1 for details of the survey). I will concentrate in particular upon those features whose salience is suggested by the preceding discussion of broad trends of social change in Scotland.

Table 6.5 gives the distribution of votes according to the 'social grade' classification which has so far been most often used for exploring the correlates of S.N.P. voting (see Appendix 1 for grade titles.)

Taking both sexes together, the pattern is indeed one of very little variation in S.N.P. voting across the social grades. The non-manual grades vary very little around the mean figure of 28%. The main contrast is within the manual
Table 6.5. Percentage of voters voting for four main parties by social grade and sex. October 1974.

All voters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social grade:</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C1A</th>
<th>C1B</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.N.P.</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (100%)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(101)</td>
<td>(112)</td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>(337)</td>
<td>(183)</td>
<td>(1001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage not voting</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C1A</th>
<th>C1B</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.N.P.</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (100%)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>(54)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(181)</td>
<td>(101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage not voting</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
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Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C1A</th>
<th>C1B</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>All</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.N.P.</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (100%)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(156)</td>
<td>(82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage not voting</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Scottish Election Study)
group. Skilled manual workers (C2) had the highest percentage voting S.N.P. at 32% while semi- and unskilled workers (D) had the lowest at 23%. This last contrast was particularly marked among male voters.

Voting S.N.P. showed even less variation among the women respondents although it should be noted that the tendency for fewer women to vote S.N.P. held across all social grades. (5)

Table 6.6. Percentages voting S.N.P., Conservative and Labour by social grade and age.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Grade</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C1A</th>
<th>C1B</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35 to 54</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55 plus</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35 to 54</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55 plus</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35 to 54</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55 plus</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>(125)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(49)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(125)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(86)</td>
<td>(87)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source:S.E.S)

Since the S.N.P. vote varied so strongly with age, it is worth looking at the pattern by social grade and age (Table 6.6) although even at this relatively mundane level of cross-classification some of the cell frequencies are beginning to get perilously small.

The overall patterning of S.N.P. support by social grade and age can be most easily seen by breaking down the
S.N.P. part of Table 6.6 into four quadrants. If we take the three 'lowest' grades, lower non-manual (C1B) and the two manual grades (C and D), S.N.P. support is concentrated into the lowest age group. In these three grades, 43% of those aged under 35 voted S.N.P. compared with 22% of those aged 35 or more.

Taking the three 'highest' grades however, the skilled non-manual (C1A) and the two managerial grades (A and B), the break in S.N.P. voting comes between the two lowest and the highest age groups. Among those aged under 55 in these three grades, 36% voted S.N.P. compared with only 12% of those aged 55 and over. As will be seen, this relatively greater penetration of S.N.P. support into the middle age category among non-manual voters may well have something to do with patterns of social mobility among the different age groups.

The bastions of Conservative support are clearly among the older members of the non-manual groups while the level of Conservative support among younger non-manual voters appears to be highly variable.

Labour support remained most solid among the less skilled and older portions of the manual grades. Only among young skilled manual workers did Labour support fall below 50% in this, the peak election for the S.N.P.

The social grades are relatively heterogeneous in occupational terms, especially among the non-manual grades, and we get closer to the occupational distribution of voting by looking at it in terms of socio-economic groups.
(Table 6.7). On this basis the peaks in S.N.P. support stand out somewhat more clearly. The skilled manual group still stands out but so does the intermediate non-manual group.

Table 6.7. Per cent voting for four main parties by main socio-economic groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,2 Employers and managers</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,4 Professionals</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>(57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Intermediate</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Junior non-manual</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Foremen and supervisors</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Skilled manual</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>(264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Semi-skilled manual</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Unskilled manual</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: S.E.S)

In terms of the patterns we would expect on the basis of the analysis of the previous section it is the contrast within the manual group which is most important whereby 35% of skilled manual voters voted S.N.P. compared with only 23% of both the semi-skilled and unskilled groups.

A further perspective is given by dividing the male manual group into some fairly common-sense groupings.

The Scottish Election Survey sample contained 260 men who voted and belonged to manual occupations outwith the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector. On the basis of a fairly ad hoc occupational categorization a much clearer
division of S.N.P. support can be seen than emerged on the basis of social grades or socio-economic groups. Only 21 (less than 10%) of these male manual workers could be placed unambiguously according to their occupation codes into a grouping consisting of 'labour movement heartland' trades with strong union traditions. These were the miners, workers in metal production, textile workers and print workers. Of this 21, only 4 (19%) voted S.N.P. Two other occupational groups also showed a low level of S.N.P. support - construction workers at 19% and labourers at 21%. All the other manual groups showed S.N.P. support at 40% or higher. One group was constructed to represent Scotland's newer industries - electrical and electronic workers and chemical process workers i.e. classic representatives of the 'new working class'. 48% of this group voted S.N.P. Engineering trades made up a fairly heterogeneous group of 58 male voters - the most numerous occupations being welders, machine tool operators, motor mechanics, fitters and plumbers - and of this group 43% voted S.N.P. The group with the highest level of S.N.P. support were the 36 transport and communication workers, of whom half were lorry drivers and of whom half voted S.N.P. Finally among the residual category of manual occupations which included butchers, bakers and if not candlestick makers then carpenters, glass and ceramic workers, food processors and warehousemen, 41% voted S.N.P.

Given that these are fairly ad hoc groupings and that the numbers involved are not very high, these results can
only be suggestive. However, the three groups which appeared to be most resistant to the S.N.P. do fit in with what we might expect from our earlier discussion. The 'traditional workers' precisely because that is what they were with traditional union and community bonds correspondingly more salient, construction workers and labourers being the two groups most exposed to economic insecurity.

Additional small scale evidence for the existence of a contrast in S.N.P. support between 'traditional' skilled working class groups and the 'new' working class is given by a study carried out by Howard Davis, interviewing for which was undertaken between October 1972 and January 1974 (Davis, 1979, p50). Of 19 melters in a West of Scotland steelworks none had voted S.N.P. in 1970 (ibid, p141) whereas a quarter of 34 maintenance fitters at a Grangemouth petro-chemical plant had voted S.N.P. (ibid, p116).

Thus although these occupational variations in S.N.P. support are not overwhelming there is a certain logic to them. The same turns out to be true of the relation between patterns of social mobility and S.N.P. voting.

Cross-classifying by both respondents' and fathers' social grade gives a crude insight into patterns of inter-generational mobility among the respondents to the survey.

Table 6.8 restricts itself to voters for the four main parties, thus giving the cell numbers on which the voting percentages in Table 6.9 are based.
Table 6.8. Fathers' social grade by respondents' social grade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fathers social grade</th>
<th>Respondents social grade</th>
<th>AB</th>
<th>Cl</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB Per cent</td>
<td>AB</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cl Per cent</td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(7 )</td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td>(101)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Per cent</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(184)</td>
<td>(97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Per cent</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(84)</td>
<td>(76)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.9. Per cent voting S.N.P. by respondent's social grade and father's social grade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's social grade</th>
<th>Respondent's social grade</th>
<th>AB</th>
<th>Cl</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>AB</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The broad pattern of occupational mobility conforms to that revealed by the Scottish Mobility Study. There was a relatively high level of upward mobility across the manual non-manual line. 48% of respondents in grades A and B and 70% in grade C1 had fathers who were manual workers. As we saw in Chapter 5 the national pattern of upward occupational mobility was mainly the result of occupational change and this is confirmed in terms of Table 6.8 itself.
Whereas 43% of the respondents to the Scottish Election Survey were in non-manual social grades only 24% of their fathers were non-manual. The counterpart of this is that there was relatively little downward mobility.

Table 6.9 gives the percentage voting S.N.P. in each cell of the mobility table with sufficient numbers to make the exercise meaningful.

Looking first at non-manual voters (grades AB and Cl), the most immediate contrast is that all the cells for non-manual respondents with manual fathers show higher percentages voting S.N.P. than any of the cells referring to non-manual respondents with non-manual fathers. Collapsing the cells to a simple manual/non-manual contrast, 24% of non-manual respondents with non-manual fathers voted S.N.P. compared with 32% of those with manual fathers. If one takes only respondents in the two highest social grades, A and B, the contrast is even sharper, only 21% of those with non-manual fathers voting S.N.P. compared with 37% of those with manual backgrounds.

Among male voters the pattern is roughly the same. 31% of non-manual male respondents with non-manual fathers voted S.N.P. compared with 37% of those with manual backgrounds. Among male AB voters the contrast was 32% for those with non-manual fathers as against 43% for those with manual fathers. The pattern holds firm for women voters. 18% of non-manual women (see note 5 for method of assigning women to social grades) from non-manual backgrounds voted S.N.P. compared with 26% of those from manual backgrounds.
The greatest contrast of all is to be found among AB women voters. Only 10% of those with non-manual fathers voted S.N.P. compared with 30% of those with manual fathers.

Among manual respondents however whether one's father was skilled manual or semi/unskilled manual seemed to have little effect. All that seemed to matter was current skilled status.

With respect to the association between upward social mobility and voting S.N.P., it might be imagined that it was the younger voters who had been upwardly mobile across the manual/non-manual line and that it was their youth rather than their mobility which produced their tendency to vote S.N.P.

Although, as we have seen, the period between the war and the October 1974 Election was especially favourable to upward social mobility because of the growth in white-collar employment, this was by no means entirely a matter of those with working-class backgrounds moving straight into white-collar jobs after completing their education. There was also a great deal of intra-generational mobility involved, with men who had started their careers in manual occupations subsequently moving into white-collar jobs. As we saw from the results of the Scottish Mental Survey which gave a snapshot of early career experiences in Scotland in the 1950s, nearly 17% of all the men in that sample had been in manual occupations at age 18 but had moved into white-collar occupations by age 27. To the extent that such
processes of intra-generational mobility can be assumed to have been fairly typical of the years after the war, to that extent the older the respondent in 1974, the more chance he will have had of experiencing such intra-generational occupational mobility. Thus there was no simple relationship between occupational mobility and age and this is reflected in the Scottish Election Survey sample.

Whereas all the voters in the sample as a whole were divided fairly evenly between age groups - 33% aged under 35, 33% aged 35 to 54 and 34% aged 55 or more, the age distribution of those whose fathers were manual workers but who had moved into the higher non-manual social grades by the time of the survey was much more uneven. 29% of this group were aged under 35, 49% were aged 35 to 54 and only 23% were aged 55 or over. Thus although upward occupational mobility showed a slight overall bias towards younger respondents, it was not a major one. The middle age group had been able to reap the benefit of the increase in white collar employment since the war over a longer period of time than the younger respondents. As already suggested, this exceptionally favourable upward mobility experience of the group aged 35 to 54 could go some way to explaining the greater propensity to vote S.N.P. of non-manual voters in this age group compared with manual.

The most important implication of this age distribution of upward mobility experience is that it is highly unlikely that the overall relationship between voting
S.N.P. and social mobility was a spurious one resulting from their common association with age. To be on the safe side however, Table 6.10 gives the percentage of S.N.P. voters among higher non-manual voters (Social Grades A, B, ClA) categorized by age group and the manual/non-manual status of their fathers.

Table 6.10. Per cent voting S.N.P. among higher non-manual voters according to age and whether father manual or non-manual.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Non-manual</th>
<th>Manual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 or over</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen that the association between voting S.N.P. and the experience of upward occupational mobility holds good for all age categories.

An interesting sidelight on this pattern, and one which almost provides an extension of it to even younger age-groups, is given by Bealey and Sewell's observation of the pattern of political support among a group of 15 year old pupils of Peterhead Academy in 1972. They observed that "the S.N.P. was most successful in winning affiliations from the upwardly aspirant, who were renouncing the class of their homes while not yet entering the middle class" (Bealey and Sewell, 1981, p160).

Probably the greatest single index or expression of the existence of a family-oriented 'project' and, in Scotland
in particular, of moving away from a traditional working class life-style is the buying of a house. Again it has often been noted that the S.N.P. has tended to do particularly well among those who were in the process of buying a house, who had taken out a mortgage.

Since we are looking at house-buying as an aspect of family oriented behaviour, the following analyses will be restricted to married respondents so as to rule out, for example, respondents living with parents who are in the process of buying a house.

Type of tenure, and in particular having a mortgage, is closely related to the life-cycle. In addition the 1950s and 1960s saw something of a shift towards home ownership in Scotland. So mortgage holding will vary significantly by age group. In addition, home ownership has a strong class gradient. Although it is impossible to disentangle entirely the complex of related effects involved here, the precaution should be taken of looking at age and social grade 'variations in tenure.

As can be seen from Table 6.11 and as expected, mortgages are most common among the young, with 36% of married respondents under the age of 35 being in the process of paying off a mortgage. The age gradient for home ownership as a whole however is much less steep, from 42% in the youngest age group to 32% in the oldest and this, together with the reverse gradient for council housing, is much closer to being a reflection of whatever long term trend towards home ownership there had been in the lifetime
Table 6.11 Percentage with specified forms of tenure by age. Married respondents only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age:</th>
<th>Under 35</th>
<th>35 to 54</th>
<th>55 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owned outright</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned (both)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented private</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented council</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented (both)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (261) (339) (237)
(265) (342) (238)

Table 6.12. Percentage with specified forms of tenure by social grade. Married respondents only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social grade:</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C1A</th>
<th>C1B</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owned outright</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned (both)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented private</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented council</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented (both)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (58) (87) (101) (77) (347) (154)
(59) (88) (101) (77) (349) (156)

N.B. Numbers for owned (both) and rented (both) in Tables 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13 include a small number of respondents classified as "owned -unspecified" and "rented -unspecified". Source Scottish Election Survey.

of the older respondents.

The gradients by social grade (Table 6.12) are much steeper. Probably most significant is the continued heavy concentration of manual workers into council housing and their continued low level of home ownership. That there had been some movement towards home ownership among skilled
manual workers is probably best reflected in the fact that 27% of married skilled manual workers under the age of 35 held a mortgage.

The overall pattern of voting by tenure is given in Table 6.13. The concentration of S.N.P. voting among those with mortgages stands out clearly, although this concentration is not nearly so great as that of Labour voters in the council sector or Conservatives in the owner occupied. Since S.N.P. voters tended to be young, and mortgage holders tend to be young, we could have a spurious correlation here. Breaking down the sample into three age groups provides a partial check and it is simplest to focus on the contrast between those holding mortgages and those in the rented council sector.

Whereas the gap in voting S.N.P. between these two sectors for married respondents was around 10% (36% of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Owned</th>
<th>M'gage</th>
<th>Owned</th>
<th>Priv.</th>
<th>Rented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outright</td>
<td>(both)</td>
<td></td>
<td>L.A.</td>
<td>(Both)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.N.P.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

N (102) (171) (279) (69) (385) (456)

N.B. See note to Table 6.12.
mortgage holders, 26% of those in council housing voting
S.N.P.) this falls to around 7% for the under 35 (43% versus 36%) and 35 to 54 (33% versus 25%) age groups with numbers being too few in the oldest age group to allow comparison. A finer control for age might reduce the relationship even more but it seems safe enough to say that there was a genuine 'mortgage' effect on voting S.N.P.

Controlling for social grade however leads to no such unambiguous result. The 'mortgage effect' is much stronger among non-manual respondents. 39% of non-manual respondents with mortgages voted S.N.P. compared with 28% of those in rented council housing. Among manual respondents, the gap was only 32% to 28% and among skilled manual respondents just as many council tenants (31%) voted S.N.P. as did mortgage holders. The main contrast in voting patterns for skilled manual respondents as between mortgage holders and council tenants was in voting Labour or Conservative. Skilled manual council tenants voted 54% Labour and only 10% Conservative whereas skilled manual mortgage holders voted 29% Labour and 33% Conservative.

The simplest way to sum up the general patterns of association with S.N.P. voting which we have outlined would be to say that those people tended to vote S.N.P. who had, in relative terms, 'done well', either within the working class by being part of its most advantaged section or by moving out of the working class altogether.
IV. Social change, political orientation and television.

I have suggested that the form in which such 'doing well' is was experienced, the everyday prism through which its effect on political attitudes was refracted, was that of a consumption oriented, family centred project.

The guiding theme of this chapter has been that in the thirty years after the war, the general direction of social change - rising standards of living, economic security, upward social mobility - has led to the instrumental orientation associated with such a privatised family project becoming a dominant attitude to politics. Some aspects of these patterns of change were global, affecting the vast majority of the population. In terms of relating them to patterns of voting however, the focus has been on their differential effects. And in this sense it is just as plausible to characterise the groups which were least affected. At one end of the spectrum were those whom the general revolution in living standards and housing conditions passed by, those for whom poverty and economic insecurity were not even temporarily banished by the post-war boom. At the other end of the scale were the traditional middle classes who already had the affluence and who, while adapting to some extent to a changing world, were primarily concerned with maintaining a bastion of privilege which, as we have seen, was at least as impregnable in Scotland as in England.

It was the groups in between, the affluent working class and the upwardly mobile who could be be said to have
shifted most radically towards an acceptance of the dominant instrumental attitude to politics. It was the Scottish National Party's good fortune and eventual fate to be the first, but by no means the last, political beneficiary of this mood, and to provide the earliest fulfillment, in its electoral rise and fall, of Goldthorpe and Lockwood's prediction that

"the instrumental attitude to trade unionism is likely to spill over into politics, and his vote will go to the highest bidder ... calculative and opportunistic voting of this kind implies a very tenuous political link, and one does not have to conjure up pictures of widespread unemployment to visualise how it might be severed." (1963, p156)

The picture is still not complete however. We have still not taken account of what was probably the crucial mechanism in binding into a mutually reinforcing framework 'private' projects relating to the family and consumption and perspectives on the wider political world. Here we must return to the general theme of the importance of communicative context in generating political beliefs and in particular we must deal with the impact of television. Too often attempts have been made to assess the impact of television in the abstract. Here I want to situate the impact of television in terms of the patterns of social change analysed in this chapter, just as in Chapter IV the arrival of television was situated in terms of 'macro-level' changes in perceptions of the role of the state and the emergence of the 'Scottish economic dimension'.

Television, in other words, must be seen as 'mediating'
in the fullest sense of the word between two levels of experience. The experience of everyday life - work and the family - and the inevitably highly indirect experience of national political events. Television plays an especially important role here. Firstly, because the arrival of television was itself a major component of the general shift towards a home-centred life style - apart from sleeping, watching television is what people spend most of their time at home doing. Secondly because television is the most important source of political information - particularly for those with a relatively low interest in politics and thus most vulnerable to an unquestioning acceptance of the frameworks implicit in the television picture of the political world.

The close link between the social developments which led to the generalization of the privatised family project and developments in the structures of broadcasting has been clearly expressed by Raymond Williams. He sees the emergence of radio in the 1920s as one aspect of the replacement of earlier more 'public' forms of technology (such as for example the railways or city lighting) by

"...a kind of technology for which no satisfactory name has yet been found: that which served an at once mobile and home-centred way of living: a form of mobile privatisation. Broadcasting in its applied form was a social product of this distinctive tendency."

(Williams, 1974, p26)

In terms of more general aspects of social change, such fruits of struggle as relative improvements in wages and conditions and a reduction in working hours had
"combined in a major emphasis in improvement of the small family home. Yet this privatisation, which was at once an effective achievement and a defensive response, carried, as a consequence, an imperative need for new kinds of contact. The new homes might appear private and 'self-sufficient' but could be maintained only by regular funding and supply from external sources, and these over a range from employment to prices to depressions and wars, had a decisive and often disruptive influence on what was nevertheless seen as a separable 'family' project. This relationship created both the need and the form of a new kind of 'communication': news from outside, from otherwise inaccessible sources....

The full investment in (television) transmission and reception facilities did not occur until the late 1940s and early 1950s, but the growth was thereafter very rapid. The key social tendencies which had led to the definition of broadcasting were by then even more pronounced. There was significantly higher investment in the privatised home, and the social and physical distances between these homes and the decisive political and productive centres of society had become much greater. Broadcasting, as it had developed in radio, seemed an inevitable model: the central transmitters and domestic sets. (Williams, 1974, pp 27-29)

It would probably not be an exaggeration to see the two interlinked processes of privatisation and the advent of television as tending to promote a change in the balance of importance of two primary axes of political communication. One based on a matrix of work, community and family with face to face interaction playing a primary role and containing at least the possibility of communal solidarity. The other based on the home and television involving a much more passive process of filtering information from the outside.

For illustration we can again turn to Davis's detailed probing of social consciousness in two contrasting groups of skilled workers — West of Scotland steelworkers and
maintenance fitters (referred to as craftsmen) in a Grangemouth petrochemical plant. Davis's discussion focusses on perceptions of trade unions but the mechanisms revealed have much wider relevance.

Of the responses of the steelworkers, Davis comments

"Notably absent from the discussion are the 'official', 'institutional' and media interpretations of industrial relations which coloured many of the craftsmen's responses in a similar context .... although their horizons are more bounded than the craftsmen's, their occupational and self identity is complete and self-sufficient. It is this fixed point from which all elaboration of replies takes place and because it is so stable (historically, physically and socially) there is much greater homogeneity and consistency is the melters' social consciousness than among the previous sample" (Davis, 1978, p136)

Among the craftsmen however, a distinct dualism was to be found.

"If the term 'union-mindedness' is taken in the sense implied by respondents who used it (i.e. acceptance that a union is a necessary institution to protect workers' interests or to counter management interests and recognition that it demands a minimum loyalty in terms of membership and payment of dues) the number of those interviewed who could be said to subscribe to this view is nearly three quarters of the total" (Davis, 1978, p105).

However

"In the context of quite specific questions about the union and union membership in the plant, and without prompting, nearly half the workers in the sample began to voice complaints about the unions in general. This alone is significant because it reveals a sense of hostility or grievance not based in the work sphere itself but elsewhere. And, what may be even more important, these externally mediated perspectives are appealed to a priori in judging the meaning and quality of group experiences at work. This must cast doubt on the assertion that the work situation and work relationships create or give rise to occupational and social perspectives" (Davis, 1978, p108).

The only way for the analyst to reconcile such
acceptance of the role of the union within the workers' own plant with widespread elements of hostility towards 'the unions in general'

"is by inferring a change of reference - from the firm and industrial relations at the plant level to the state (the political sphere) .... The two views arise from distinct sources: the collective experience of the group of workers and the highly mediated images of trade union activity deriving from 'public' sources, especially the mass media. Discussion of trade unions can produce both kinds of response.

The fitters, nearly all of whom were regular viewers of television and readers of the Daily Record or the Daily Express were quite fluent in their use of the arguments and frameworks of interpretation which dominate these media sources." (Davis, 1978, pp108-109)

This last paragraph refers us back to the argument that the most important 'effects' of television broadcasting are those which are transmitted in the form of the cognitive framework implicit in the television output and which thus operate to affect the frameworks through which the viewer views the world. As John Westergaard puts it

"... the 'frameworks of perception' which people bring to their viewing, listening and reading - the code with which they decode media messages - come from somewhere, are formed at some time and liable to be reformed over time. The problem defies solution by empirical measurement. But it is hardly conceivable that long-term exposure to the media themselves has no part to play among the sources for those predispositions by which people make sense both of the world and, in turn, of the particular interpretations of the world on offer from the media." (Westergaard, 1977, p111)

It is important to look at how the frameworks of perception deriving from the media mesh with frameworks of perception derived from everyday life. I have been arguing that the ground of everyday experience which was increasingly seen as central and on which identity was
increasingly based was that of family life and consumption. My argument is that the frameworks implicit in mainstream television broadcasting operate to reinforce such self-images and dovetail them with a particular and congruent view of what politics is all about.

The most important assumptions implicit in television broadcasting are assumptions about who or what the viewer is. In a distortion of the process invoked in Mead's looking glass self, the television viewer is the target of assumptions about who he or she - the viewer - is. The broadcast contains implicit definitions of the audience to which it is addressed.

The assumptions implicit in mainstream television broadcasting about who the viewer is are predominantly that the viewer is a citizen, a consumer and the member of a nuclear family. Very rarely is there an assumption that the viewer is a member of a class. Now the point is not that these assumptions are a distortion or even a limitation of reality but that for many people they do mesh unproblematically with their own definitions of who or what they are. These definitions are no doubt in part a result of the television definitions but not entirely.

We are moving very close here to Althusser's view of ideology as functioning through a process he calls interpellation or 'hailing'. As usual Althusser is operating at a very high level of generality, his main point being that the secret of ideology is that it gives individuals the illusory conviction that they are separate
subjectivities by addressing them as separate subjects:

"... all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the subject. .... I shall suggest that ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or 'transforms' the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!'" (Althusser, 1971, pp.162-163)

I am going to borrow Althusser's notion, not for the purpose of saying that television interpellates subjectivity or identity as such, but in order to think of television as interpellating particular identities - Hey, you, the consumer; you British/English/Scottish - but very rarely - Hey you, worker; Hey you, unemployed.

We have seen that television's crucial role is as mediator between everyday experience and experience of national politics. Perhaps the most powerful way in which it performs this mediation and tries to ensure a smooth dovetailing between the two levels is that the interpellations which television carries out at the two levels mesh. They must be plausible at the level of everyday experience and plausible at the level of national politics - hence the interpellations of the consumer, the husband/wife, mother/father, the citizen, with no contradiction involved.

At one level, the image of the consumer is of course implicit in advertising. The impact of advertising here lies not in its specific messages but in its implicit
reinforcement of the consumption oriented family centred project.

However, here I want to concentrate on the implications of the fact that the dominant image of national politics is entirely homologous with the interpellation consumer/citizen.

The point is clearly brought out in David Morley's outline of the frameworks implicit in television coverage of industrial relations in the early 1970s - a period which is particularly important for our purposes in that it was the period just before the S.N.P.'s greatest successes in 1974.

"Society is seen to consist of an aggregate of free individuals who form, through association, a number of competing 'interest groups', whose differing interests are all subordinated to an overall shared 'national interest'. Thus inflation is a 'national' problem - the concern of the whole community - so we as a nation need to be concerned about 'our' exports, the state of the pound etc.

In times of crisis the concept of the 'national interest' will be articulated explicitly - for example, see Mr Heath's speech at the end of the miners strike in 1972: "In the kind of country we live in there cannot be any "we" nor "they". There is only 'us'; all of us".

The unions are basically presented as being motivated for a narrow minded concern for their own sectional interest, while the government is presented as being motivated in a non-sectarian way, by concern for the 'national interest'.

The state is represented as the representative and defender of the 'national interest' and of the rule of law ... as the representative of the 'majority of the people' - not of any particular class interest. As Mr Heath said: "If the government is defeated then the country is defeated, because the government is just a group of people selected to do what the majority of us want to see done." (Speech after the miners' strike, Feb. 1972)" (Morley, 1976, p248)

The triplet "you/we the consumer; you/we the citizen:
you/we the nation" forms a very tight ideological matrix for the dominant interpretation of political events. (6)

Now in Scotland of course there is another available interpellation - you/we the Scots. Unlike the excluded interpellations such as "you/we the working class", the interpellated Scottish identity does not threaten the dominant equation but involves simply a shift in one of its terms.

We saw in Chapter 4 how television can be regarded as the most important medium by which the 'Scottish economic dimension' or the 'Scottish economic project' was transferred from an elite to a mass level. To the extent that 'the national interest' is interpreted in economistic terms - i.e. the appeal is not to patriotic devotion to the nation for its own sake but is rather that as members of the nation we have a common economic stake or fate so that national economic growth will bring us economic benefits - the only grounds upon which the 'two national interests' - British or Scottish - will be judged is in terms of their economic promise. As such the Scottish interpellation meshed no less tightly with the family consumption project than did the British, and as we have seen it was an interpellation which was implicit in Scottish television coverage of political and economic affairs as was the British (or English) interpellation implicit in British level coverage.
Conclusion.

So far I have been more concerned with establishing the material and communicative determinants of a particular kind of ideological field within which the S.N.P. could flourish and with shedding some light on how the meaning of S.N.P. voting can be derived from this context than with the more specific question of why it was the S.N.P. in particular that reaped the benefit of these broader processes. It is now time to focus our attention more closely on that question.

A fairly exhaustive analysis of trends in industrial and occupational structure and in the pattern of social mobility in Scotland and in the rest of the United Kingdom showed that there no differences in fundamental parameters sufficient to produce the difference in voting patterns constituted by the S.N.P. Any argument that the rise of the S.N.P. was due to differential patterns of social change in Scotland - changes, in other words, which were not shared with the rest of Britain - have little empirical basis.

It has been established in this chapter however that there were processes of social change which did have a great deal to do with the electoral success of the S.N.P.

If then we accept that the pattern of social change which provided the enabling context for the rapid success of the S.N.P. in Scotland in the 1960s and early 1970s was in large part common to Scotland and the rest of Britain, we are still left with the $64,000 dollar question of just
what it was that was different about Scotland that made it follow its own course in supporting the S.N.P. This question will form the topic of the next chapter.

The answer which would seem to come closest to the truth will be regarded no doubt as utterly banal. What was different about Scotland was quite simply the existence of 'Scotland' as a category in terms of which the political world could increasingly plausibly be interpreted.

In other words, to explain Scotland's differential political development there is no need to assume the existence of any 'objective' social structural differences.

For most of the period since the Union, 'Scotland' had not operated as the primary category through which the political world was interpreted. The category 'Scotland' would only be activated politically when it received an economic relevance — when people began to see 'Scotland' — as opposed to Britain or the Empire — as the relevant community whose economic fate or fortune would determine their own. The period in which 'Scotland' as this kind of economic and political unit came to be accepted as a central category of perception by a large part of the mass electorate can be precisely dated — the late 1950s and the early 1960s.

The discussion in Chapter 4 can be regarded as a description of the establishment of a series of nesting and increasingly specific conditions of possibility for the emergence of Scotland as this kind of category at a macro- or societal level.
The discussion in this chapter has consisted in part of a similar establishment of the conditions of possibility for voting to be determined by acceptance of Scotland as this kind of political category at the micro-level, at the level of everyday experience.

It was the intersection of these two sets of developments which created the conditions for the rapid shift at the ideological level which produced the meteoric success of the S.N.P.

Afterword: the role of the Scottish National Party itself.

This study has concentrated almost exclusively upon the social structural preconditions for the electoral success of the S.N.P. and has treated the S.N.P. itself - in terms of its organizational development, policy decisions etc. - essentially as a black box. Now obviously this is a dangerous thing to do. How can you explain the success of the S.N.P. without understanding what the S.N.P. as an organization actually did. My main point, however, is that whatever the S.N.P. did or did not do was generally of much less import that the mere fact of what the Scottish National Party was - namely a political party with a virtual monopoly of the 'Scottish' label. In a sense the most important thing that the S.N.P. had to do was to be available as a standard political party in the early 1960s. Probably the best account of how that came about is given
by Webb and Hall. They conclude that in making the decisions which ensured that the S.N.P., by the early 1960s, was in fact a reasonably united party committed to an electoral strategy

"... each issue was ultimately resolved owing to the nature of the political environment within which the nationalists were operating and their perception of that environment. Other outcomes were always possible, and at times had strong proponents, but ultimately the political system imposed constraints on the possible lines of party development if the S.N.P. was ever to be a viable political force." (Webb and Hall, 1978, p41)

In other words, in order that we can say that decisions taken within the S.N.P. made a difference, we would have to seriously hypothesize a course of events whereby the S.N.P. permanently turned its back on the electoral process. It is very hard to imagine.

However, I will concede that the one area in which it is not permissible just to treat the S.N.P. as a black box are those processes within the party which ensured that the S.N.P. was present in Scotland in the early 1960s as a reasonably united party with at least some commitment to fighting elections.

Beyond that proviso the weight of explanation has to fall on factors external to the S.N.P. itself.

The factor which more than any other points towards the role of external factors is the sheer speed of the rise of S.N.P. support.

The connection between the causal role of factors internal and external to the S.N.P. and the rapidity of the S.N.P.'s success cries out for metaphorical expression.
Many images spring to mind but the logic is nicely expressed in a passage from Albert Goldman's biography of Elvis Presley:

"By the end of 1956, Elvis Presley was being universally acclaimed as the King of Rock n' Roll. The boy who began the year as an obscure country singer broadcasting from a hillbilly station at Shreveport ... was now, less than twelve months later, an American Hero. Nobody in the history of show business has ever made it so big so fast. ... Instead of characterizing Elvis's triumph in conventional metaphors - the long, billowy road, the steep ladder, the tightly closed door - you are obliged to seek images that suggest speed, violence and, above all, the sheer inadvertence of the man who walks into a room filled with volatile gases, lights a match - and is blown through the ceiling! Clearly, if you want to understand the phenomenon of Elvis Presley or how he 'did it', you have to start with the powerfully explosive vapours and not with the puny little match." (Goldman, 1982, pp256-257)

True, the S.N.P. took ten years rather than one to move from obscurity to their greatest triumph, but the parallels are suggestive. To paraphrase, no party in the history of British politics has made it so big so fast.

Probably the most crucial parallel lies in the nature of the media which made the two successes possible. For Elvis, it was radio. For the S.N.P., it was television. In their respective fields they were the first major beneficiaries of the electronic age. It has long been observed that the coming of television changed politics. The most generally noted by-product is the increased volatility of the electorate. A major aspect of this was that the coming of television enabled a party to establish a powerful presence without the long march through the grass roots which, for example, the Labour Party had had to make. The S.N.P. was the first British party to take the
television short cut, partly because the frame of reference which it embodied was also, in part, a product of television.

Of course, much more recently we have had an even better illustration of the same process and one whose time scale much more closely matched that of Elvis - the rise of the S.D.P., a party created almost entirely top down with a presence and an image created almost entirely via the mass media and television in particular. A party moreover, which is self-consciously aware, as to an extent the S.N.P. have been, of the particular importance of media coverage for sustaining its appeal. The ultimate illustration of T.V. politics takes us even closer to Elvis of course, to the United States where traditional grass-roots politics have by and large declined into irrelevance, particularly in presidential campaigns, and where the television image is accepted as the supreme reality.

There is even a certain parallelism in the inadvertence of what happened to Elvis Presley and what happened to the S.N.P. The Bridgeton by-election of 1961 was the first by-election the S.N.P. had fought since 1952. Thanks to some extent to the failure of the Liberals to field a candidate, the S.N.P. got 19% of the vote. As Miller describes what happened

"... Ian McDonald, the SNP candidate, was so delighted by his modest achievement that he sold his farm and offered himself full-time national organizer for a nominal salary. The S.N.P. was so used to a negligible performance that 19 per cent in Bridgeton was a cause for rejoicing." (1981, p33)
The following year William Wolfe stood in the West Lothian by-election and gained 23% of the vote. In Webb's words,

"... there was not even a constituency association nor even a constitution available for one, and the policies the S.N.P. were putting before the electorate were basically those developed in 1946-47" (Webb, 1977, p101).

It was only after these two pleasant surprises that the S.N.P. decided to go for a full scale electoral strategy.

There is one area in particular in which it is unlikely that decisions taken within the S.N.P. made much difference to its fortunes and that is the area of policies other than those such as independence or devolution or North Sea Oil which embodied its basic Scottish stance. Keith Webb was able to write in the mid-1970s that "the policies they advocate (with the exception of their stand on Scottish autonomy) have not yet been picked up by most of the voting public" (1977, p102) so it is highly unlikely that they made much difference in the 1960s. Provided of course that the S.N.P. did not stand for anything too extreme such as violence or civil disobedience.

In fact, in a paradoxical way, it is what the S.N.P. did most effectively which most cogently underlines their dependence on developments taking place at other levels. What the S.N.P. did most effectively in the 1960s was to turn themselves into an effective, professional but strangely conventional electoral party. As Webb put it

"Perhaps the greatest contribution of the new generation of S.N.P. leaders has been not so much what they have done, but how they have done it. It is also important to note the sort of people they were. The new
leaders were sufficiently close to the public image of what professional politicians ought to be, that the equanimity of the voting public was not disturbed. In many ways - class, occupation and education - they are not very different from the leadership of the established parties. ... The leadership style is moderate in tone, and tends to be more pragmatic than would normally be expected of a nationalist party. ... The S.N.P. ... has benefited from the type of people who became leaders, and the style of political attack they have adopted. Because of this, in spite of the conservatism of the electorate, the switch to the S.N.P. has not seemed too radical to the voter even though the S.N.P. is proposing a massive change in the organisation of British life." (Webb, 1977, pp102-103)

This was written when the S.N.P. was still riding fairly high in the mid-1970s and was intended as an explanation of that success. Looking back from 1983, it is the paradoxicality implied by the last sentence of the quote which stands out and which seems to say something about the quality of the ideological atmosphere within which such a strange creature could flourish.

It is to an analysis of this ideological atmosphere that the next chapter will be largely devoted. Or, if you want to understand the phenomenon of the S.N.P. or how it 'did it' you have to start with the powerfully explosive vapours and not with the puny little match.
Introduction.

This chapter explores a fairly complex set of issues surrounding the role of Scottish symbolism in accounting for the success of the S.N.P.

Section I sets the problem by presenting Miller's findings on the extent of the parallelism of support for the S.N.P. in Scotland with the taking of other third options in the rest of Britain. This divides the problem into two. First, why did the third option take the form of support for the S.N.P. in Scotland, and second why did support for the S.N.P. move ahead of support for the Liberals in the rest of Britain in October 1974. The main focus of the rest of the chapter is on the first problem with some attempt to deal with the second in the concluding sections.

Section II consists primarily of a critique of the dominant interpretation of the role of 'attitudes to devolution' as the major determinant of S.N.P. support.

Section III attempts a limited exploration of the extent to which ideology - regarded as the most important alternative to symbolism as a framework for structuring political perceptions - was present in the Scottish electorate. Section IV then moves to the heart of the matter by attempting an interpretation of how Scottish symbolism and identity actually operated to make possible
the S.N.P.s electoral success. Section V shows how these symbolic mechanisms must be seen as operating within conditions of possibility determined primarily by changing perceptions of the state. A final section briefly outlines the role of 'attitudes to devolution' in the light of the preceding discussion.

I. Social parallels and political parallels.

Nowhere in the analysis of patterns of social change in Scotland and the rest of Britain did we find any social structural differences sufficient to account for Scotland's differential electoral behaviour. The bulk of the evidence for such 'social parallelism' was empirical data on such aspects of social change as occupational structure, social mobility and real living standards. This made it reasonable to assume that less empirically verifiable but more politically relevant aspects of social change such as the shift towards more privatised lifestyles and the emergence of instrumental orientations to politics were common to Scotland and the rest of Britain. Whatever ideological differences exist at the Scottish level do not derive from differences in more objective aspects of the social structure. Such a conception of social structure obviously does not include institutional aspects as the legal system or the dominant religious denomination.

In his analyses of electoral trends in Scotland and the rest of Britain, William Miller has convincingly
demonstrated, in the period up to and including the election of October 1974, precisely the kind of political parallelism which one would expect on the basis of such social parallelism. This is well expressed in Miller's phrase summarizing the mechanisms at work - 'British causes in a Scottish environment' (Miller et al., 1977, p95).

The timing of S.N.P. successes led Miller to the conclusion that

"Up to and including February 1974 the SNP did well electorally only when Britain-wide factors produced a pool of potential defectors from Labour and Conservative." (Miller et al., 1977, p101)

A detailed comparison of the timing of SNP successes with the timing of Liberal booms and high abstention rates at English elections from 1944 to 1973 (Miller, 1976, p22) provided solid evidence for the conclusion that

"... in the period up to the February election a powerful case can be made that SNP support in Scotland followed trends and achieved levels that were matched in England either by massive abstention as in 1966-70 or Liberal boom in 1972-73." (Miller, 1976, p32)

The parallelism in trend can be extended to include the February 1974 election if it is remembered, as Miller points out, that

"In Scotland the SNP took 22% of the vote with 70 candidates in the 71 seats (the figure stays at 22% if we adjust for the numbers of candidates). So although on the raw figures the SNP in Scotland confounded the polls by doing better than the Liberals in England, the Liberal vote was spuriously depressed by lack of candidates in every seat and after adjustment for candidature the English Liberal vote comes out 2% higher than the SNP vote." (Miller, 1976, p32)

There is evidence that British factors were still powerfully at work in the October 1974 General Election.
Miller found that the relationship between the pattern of trust in Labour and Conservative governments and the exercise of a third option in terms of voting (i.e. doing anything but vote Labour or Conservative) was very similar at the British and Scottish levels. As Miller puts it

"With more options available Scottish levels of third option support was generally higher. But the pattern relating British Liberal votes to trust was the same as that which applied to the SNP - the highest levels went with balanced distrust, balanced trust produced intermediate levels and unbalanced trust very low levels." (Miller et al., 1977, p94)

Table 7.1 is an adaptation of Miller's figures to highlight this parallelism between Scotland and Britain in the relationship between trust in Labour and Conservative Governments and taking any third option (Liberal, SNP or abstention).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust category</th>
<th>Per cent taking 'third option'</th>
<th>Diff w.r.t 'reference category'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes trust Lab. govts.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes trust Con. govts. (&quot;Reference category&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually trust both Lab. and Con. govts. (balanced trust)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely trust either Lab. or Con. govts. (balanced distrust)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually trust Con. govts</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely trust Lab. govts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually trust Lab. govts</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely trust Con. govts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Derived from Table III of Miller et al., 1977)

Miller's analyses allow us to split the question 'what
was different about Scotland and why' into two components.

The first question is: why did the same set of British wide causes lead to support for the S.N.P. in Scotland rather than to support for the Liberals or abstention?

The second question is: why did support for the S.N.P. move well ahead of the British support for the Liberals in October 1974.

Before trying to answer these questions, it is necessary to undertake a fairly detailed criticism of the answer to them which has dominated, and in an important sense has been a methodological framework for, most of the analysis of the 1974 and 1979 Scottish Election Surveys so far carried out.

II. Attitudes to devolution.

To the question of just what it was in the Scottish environment which engendered support for the S.N.P. rather than for some other third option, the answer which has been put forward in the 'official' analyses of the Scottish Election Surveys has been consistent and unequivocal - the existence in Scotland of deep-seated and determining attitudes towards devolution and self-government. These attitudes have been treated as defining a deep and permanent cleavage in Scottish society, a cleavage which is regarded as being unambiguously prior to the electoral success of the SNP and which is to be regarded as the
causal determinant of the latter. As Miller et al put it:

"There is something to be said for treating self-government attitudes as a fourth cleavage line in Scottish society adding it to class, religion and rurality." (Miller et al., 1977, p95)

The recognition of the existence of this fundamental cleavage and the fact that it presents 'an almost perfect-cross cut to the formerly dominant class cleavage' is interpreted as meaning that the basic two-party system is artificial and that the natural party system in Scotland would include one or two parties defined on the devolution cleavage.

In the path analysis which concludes the most detailed analysis to date of the determinants of S.N.P. voting in the General Election of October 1974, a variable derived from the standard 'attitude to devolution' question (see Table 7.2) is entered into the model as the most important immediate determinant of S.N.P. voting.

"By itself devolution had a strong effect on SNP voting and every other variable that influenced SNP support did so only in an interactive combination with devolution." (Miller, 1981, p170).

The fact that 'attitude to devolution' has played such a central role in much of the most influential work which has been carried out on the determinants of S.N.P. voting, justifies a relatively detailed probing of how the issue has been handled.

The place to begin the exploration is the report on the survey(1) carried out for the Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution in 1970. This report shows a sensitivity to the issues under discussion which has not been equalled
First, since the wording of questions is vitally important and since the 'Kilbrandon question' provided a model for most of the subsequently used questions aimed at eliciting 'attitudes to devolution, Table 7.2 gives the original question which plays such a central role in this discussion.

Table 7.2. Wordings of Kilbrandon survey and Scottish Election Survey questions on attitudes to devolution.

1. Kilbrandon question.

Qu. 23. For running Scotland as a whole, which of these five alternatives would you prefer overall?

(1) Leave things as they are at present.

(2) Keep things much the same as they are now but make sure that the needs of Scotland are better understood by the government.

(3) Keep the present system but allow more decisions to be made in Scotland.

(4) Have a new system of governing Scotland so that as many decisions as possible are made in the area.

(5) Let Scotland take over complete responsibility for running things in Scotland.

2. Scottish Election Survey devolution question

Q. There has been a lot of discussion recently about giving more power to Scotland. Which of these statements comes closest to what you yourself feel should be done?

(1) Keep the governing of Scotland much as it is now.

(2) Make sure the needs of Scotland are better understood by the government in London.

(3) Allow more decisions to be made in Scotland.

(4) Scotland should completely run its own affairs.
The first point to note is the statement in the report that 'The five points in the scale were defined by the Commission.' (Kilbrandon, 1973, p63). Thus they were laid down a priori and not developed in the normal way by piloting and pre-testing. Perhaps in part to compensate for this methodological drawback in the question, the survey probed in considerable detail the extent of respondents comprehension of the issues involved.

At the pilot stage, it was apparent that 'the issues covered were quite difficult for some informants to grasp' (Kilbrandon, 1973, p11). Probably the most dramatic exemplification of this lack of understanding of the issues involved came in response to the question: "Is there a special office or organisation which helps to run Scotland?" The responses were: Yes, 48%; No, 34%; D.K. 18%. Among those replying "Yes", the named bodies were: Scottish Office, 18%; St Andrew's House, 10%; The Scottish Home Office/Home Office; Secretary of State, 3%; Other, 6%; D.K., 7%. The report continues:

"About half (49%) the respondents in both countries were unable to say at all what these offices were responsible for running ... Most of the answers of Scottish and Welsh respondents are very similar and do not reflect any awareness on the part of the Scots of the wider powers of the Scottish Office relative to the Welsh Office. The type of answers given also suggests that many informants are making commonsense guesses rather than describing known facts ..." (Kilbrandon, 1973, p85)

Apart from the more general implications of such ignorance, it should be remembered that the first three categories of the devolution question refer to the present
system with two of them asking for opinions on rather nuanced changes to the current system. When over half the sample don't seem to have a clue what the present system is, it would seem dubious whether many people were thinking spontaneously in terms as concrete as those in the question. As the report notes,

"It can be extremely misleading to ask questions about details of organisation of a possible future change as it is too difficult to provide a sufficiently real picture of what is involved for respondent's views to be a valid expression of what their reactions would be if the change took place." (Kilbrandon, 1973, p85)

This stands as a fair prediction of what did in fact happen when people were presented, not even with the actuality of change, but with concrete details of a proposed change in the Referendum of 1979.

The report continues to maintain a healthy scepticism in its analysis of responses to the devolution question and attempts to take full account of the effects of non- or faulty comprehension. There was a careful lead in to the devolution question in the course of the interview, with detailed questioning about specific public services in relation to regional control 'to make informants familiar with the concept of more devolution to regional decision-taking'.

Even so,

"... the indications are that those with a cluster of characteristics which seem to go together (those less able to understand the questionnaire, the elderly, those with little education and those from households where the head is in a semi- or unskilled occupation) tend to select one or other extreme of the scale presented to them. Those rated as understanding the questionnaire, those from professional, managerial and
non-manual households, the more educated and the young seemed to cluster their answers in the three middle parts of the scale." (p66)

with the implication that

"at least some of the small proportion choosing the most extreme option on the devolution scale did so because they failed to understand the issue and were unable to distinguish between the other options presented." (Kilbrandon, 1973, p90)

I quote at such length because the Kilbrandon question became a close model for opinion poll questions and for questions included in the Scottish Election Studies which have been used as pivotal variables in subsequent analysis. In particular, in Miller's (1981) analysis of the causal determinants of S.N.P. voting in October 1974 it is a variable derived from a variation of the Kilbrandon question which is modelled as the immediate determinant of voting SNP. The wording of this Scottish Election Survey devolution question is given in Table 7.2.

One consideration which has been repeatedly cited as evidence for regarding 'attitudes to devolution' as deep-seated and determining is their relative stability, as measured in opinion polls, in the late nineteen sixties and early seventies compared with the much greater fluctuations in the level of support for the SNP both terms of voting and opinion poll responses. This stability is interpreted as implying that 'attitudes to self-government' are something more than mere attitudes. To expand the citation made earlier:

"In a literal sense attitudes to self-government are free-choice opinions like attitudes to entry into the EEC and not social characteristics like class,
religion, or for that matter, country of origin. But attitudes to EEC entry were characterised by an extremely high level of volatility which extended to aggregate levels of support not just to individual's opinions and by a strong tendency for party allegiance to determine attitudes. Indeed many individuals must have changed their EEC attitude several times in response to party cues. We have no panel study information on Scottish electors' attitudes to self-government but all the evidence on aggregate levels indicates stability. There is something to be said for treating self-government attitudes as a fourth cleavage line in Scottish society adding it to class, religion and rurality. Like those other cleavages it helps to define the groups in society who can be made the target of party appeals. (Miller et al., 1977, p95)

In a later work, Miller (1981) presents a series of opinion polls stretching from 1965 to 1974 which tapped attitudes towards devolution and independence. If we restrict ourselves to the national polls which Miller presents, support for independence can be seen to have fluctuated between a high of 33% in 1968 (Gallup, September 1968) to a low of 17% in October 1974 (System Three, October 1974). Backing for the status quo fluctuated between 26% (NOP/Record, December 1969) and 6% (Kilbrandon Commission Survey, Summer 1970). Of course, different question wordings are likely to have contributed somewhat to the apparent fluctuation. Using the Kilbrandon question itself (see Table 7.2 for wording) shows support for the status quo at 6% in Summer 1970 and 14% in April 1974, with support for 'complete responsibility' at 23% in 1970 and 18% in 1974. (Miller, 1981, Table 3.1).

The degree of stability in the aggregate distribution of responses is to some extent beside the point, however. Converse (1969) points out that the apparent relative
stability of an attitude in terms of the aggregate distribution of responses can point either of two ways. It can mean either that

1. the attitude is deeply-embedded, central and not easily subject to change - here a close parallel would be religious beliefs - or that

2. the attitude is closer to being a 'non-attitude' characterized by Converse as

"one polar zone on a dimension describing a relationship between the subject and the political attitude object ... For convenience, we shall call this dimension one of centrality of the attitude-object to the subject." (Converse, 1969, p181)

Thus stability can be seen as the concomitant of an attitude, here the attitude to devolution, being one of either high or low centrality.

Of course, this is not an all or nothing affair. Centrality varies between individuals and a hard core to whom the issue is very central could co-exist with a varying degree of centrality in the rest of the population including some for whom the question is of no interest whatsoever, who have in fact, non-attitudes.

However, in attempting to assess the centrality or salience or importance of the devolution issue we can turn to more direct evidence.

In discussing the effects of attitudes on single choice expressions of political will such as voting in an election or a referendum, the question of the relative importance or centrality or salience of issues is crucial. Given that only one choice is allowed for the outcome it is important
to concentrate on the **most central issues** rather than a wide range of somewhat important issues, since in a forced choice situation, of which voting itself and the devolution referendum of 1979 are both examples, all the issues could be said to be competing for salience and it is only the **most central** which will have a decisive effect.

This is a very tricky area and great care should be exercised not to read into the data more than is there.

The two sources of quantitative empirical information on the salience of the devolution issue relative to that of other issues have been opinion polls and the Scottish Election Surveys of 1974 and 1979.

The main opinion poll series has been that of ORC published in the Scotsman. Their question has taken the form

"What do you yourself feel are the most important problems the Government should do something about? Anything else?"

In the 1974 Scottish Election Survey there was a separate question for each issue of the form

"And when you were deciding about voting, how important was the general question of the form of government for Scotland?"

with specified response categories:

- The most important single thing
- Fairly important
- Not very important

Now of course comparison between these two sources of information is going to be very tricky, given the different forms of the question and the fact that one refers to what the government should do while the other refers to
influences on voting. However, various analyses of the Scottish Election Surveys have tried to make the comparison and have attempted to show that 'devolution' was much more important for voting than it was in terms of being seen as a problem for government.

In reporting the findings of the October 1974 Scottish Election Survey in the context of the ORC series, Miller reports as follows:

"While opinion polls which asked about the most important problems for government action never found more than 10 per cent of Scots choosing devolution, those that asked which issues had been important when deciding about voting found much higher percentages stressing the importance of home rule. In our 1974 SES, for example, it ranked fifth: 81% said prices were important, 72% wage controls, 70 per cent strikes, 68 per cent unemployment, and 61 per cent Scottish government. Home rule was not regarded as a major problem facing the government but was reported to be one important factor in deciding how to vote." (Miller, 1981, p103)

If we refer back to the question formats we can see that Miller is comparing a 'most important' category in the opinion polls with a combination of 'most important' and 'fairly important' in the Scottish Election Study. To assess the full extent of the distortion involved we need to take a closer look at the patterning of responses to the 'salience' questions in the Scottish Election Study. (Table 7.3) What is probably the main reason why the reports on the SES have not reported the categories 'most important' and fairly important separately is the fact that the percentages of 'most important' issues sum to 126 rather than to the 100 which would have been the case if
Table 7.3 Responses to 'importance' questions. Scottish Election Survey October 1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage responding</th>
<th>The most important</th>
<th>Fairly important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prices</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sea Oil</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common market</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalisation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage controls</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish government</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

all the respondents had complied strictly with the requirement of naming only the most important issue as specified in the questionnaire.

The responses can be put into a still more complete perspective if we give the 1974 SES responses by vote in the October 1974 election.

Table 7.4 Percentage responding 'most important' and 'not very important' by party (vote in Oct 1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Con Lab SNP</td>
<td>Con Lab SNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prices</td>
<td>26 32 28</td>
<td>17 15 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>11 12 11</td>
<td>29 30 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>7 13 8</td>
<td>38 26 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>7 18 7</td>
<td>40 29 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>5 9 7</td>
<td>51 41 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sea Oil</td>
<td>3 5 14</td>
<td>50 51 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common market</td>
<td>3 8 7</td>
<td>45 42 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalization</td>
<td>11 3 7</td>
<td>37 64 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>3 8 5</td>
<td>43 40 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage controls</td>
<td>11 15 7</td>
<td>32 25 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish govt.</td>
<td>4 5 43</td>
<td>52 45 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition govt.</td>
<td>7 5 3</td>
<td>42 68 62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can clearly be seen 'Scottish government' is the issue whose salience is most closely associated with party support.

The discussion becomes even more baroque in 'Oil and the Scottish Voter, 1974-79' (Miller, Brand and Jordan, 1980). First a series of results from the ORC 'importance' series is presented. It is reported that in response to the "What do you yourself feel are the most important problems the Government should do something about?" question "they found large numbers naming prices, inflation and unemployment. Very few mentioned oil or devolution."

The full distributions are not given, only the percentages naming devolution and oil. Between April 1974 and October 1976, four surveys found between 6 and 11% naming devolution, while between February 1979 and November 1979 a further four surveys showed between 3 and 6 per cent naming devolution.

Miller, Brand and Jordan then go on to deny that the ORC question has any relation to the factors influencing voting.

"The faults with this question are that it concentrates attention on "problems" and "Government". Inevitably that means it invites replies which are to do with Government outputs and moreover, government outputs where the Government is currently having difficulties solving its "problems". There is nothing wrong with asking questions on that topic. The fault is one of context and interpretation. many of those who have tried their hand at interpreting this "importance" question, and not a few of those involved in setting the question, have treated it as a measure of the issues most likely to have an impact on party support and ultimately on party votes in a general election. For that purpose the ORC importance question is worse than no question at all since it provides actively
misleading information." (Miller, Brand and Jordan, 1980, p34)

That is to overstate the case. Of course questions about government problems and factors influencing voting are not the same. But they are closely related. If elections are about anything they are about governmental outputs. In answering "importance" questions people do not make such fine distinctions. They plump for the issues which are most important to them in either case.

Much later in the paper, the authors return to the self-perceived importance of issues, primarily with respect to oil, but also including some discussion of devolution on the basis of the two Scottish Election Surveys. Presumably because of the difficulty experienced in the October 1974 survey of making respondents stick to a single most important issue, the 'most important' category was replaced by an 'extremely important' category. The question in the 1979 Scottish Election Survey was of the form:

"When you were deciding about voting, how important was the question of (named issue) – extremely important, fairly important, or not very important."

Despite this modification having solved the problem of multiple 'most important' responses however, the same elision is made as was made by Miller in the earlier discussion i.e. the 'extremely' and 'fairly' important responses are lumped together and at no point are these categories given separately, as in

"Both in 1974 and 1979 about 61% quoted devolution as an important factor in determining their vote while 81% quoted prices and inflation. Unemployment was quoted by 68% in 1974, rising to 76% in 1979. North Sea
Oil was quoted by 56% in 1974, falling to 42% in 1979. Amongst SNP voters Scottish government came top with 86% in 1974 rising to 89% in 1979. However, oil was named by only 76% of SNP voters in 1974 and still less, 60%, in 1979. " (Miller, Brand and Jordan, 1980, p99)

This is followed by another sideswipe at the ORC question.

"In contrast to the media pollsters "most important problem facing the government?" question, which has no obvious, direct logical relation with voting choice these figures confirm that Scottish issues were important to the Scottish voters in making up their mind how to vote; and confirm also that they were self-consciously aware of this fact. The figures suggest that devolution rivaled prices and unemployment as a criterion for party choice in general and was the most important factor in the decision to vote SNP ..." (Miller, Brand and Jordan, 1980, p99)

In short, throughout the analyses of the Scottish Election Study there was a consistent tendency to present the data in a way which overstated the salience of the devolution issue. On the one hand the implications of opinion polls which showed devolution being named as one of the most important issues by less than 10% of respondents were dismissed. On the other hand, there was a tendency to overstate the significance of the fact that over 60% of respondents, when asked whether devolution was 'most/extremely important', 'fairly important' or 'not very important' in determining their vote, plumped for one of the first two categories. This of course sounds like reasonable evidence for a high level of salience. However, if there is one unwritten law which should be applied to the interpretation of salience questions of the form "How important was x to your doing y" with three response categories of the form 'most/very/extremely important',
'quite/fairly/somewhat important' and 'not at all/not very/slightly important', it is that the middle category will tend to be the modal response and that respondents will only assign to the bottom category those factors which had never entered their head as having anything to do with the issue at hand or which are actually repugnant to the respondent. Conversely people will put into the middle category everything which they consider could reasonably have had an effect (and the taking into consideration of which contributes to the image of a well-informed political actor which is what many political interviewees are trying to present). That is precisely why salience questions have three categories - to separate the wheat from the chaff. And this separation is achieved at the boundary between the highest and the middle category - not at the boundary between the middle and the lowest which is more akin to a boundary of awareness. Far from the opinion poll responses on devolution being meaningless in this context, it is the use of the 'fairly important'/'not very important' boundary which is meaningless.

The foregoing discussion has been critical of claims that 'attitudes to devolution' have been sufficiently stable, deep-rooted or salient to have played the fundamental role in determining S.N.P. voting. Now of course I do not deny that 'attitudes to devolution and self-government' have 'something to do with' voting S.N.P. What is less legitimate is the notion that 'attitudes to devolution and self-government', as measured by a response
to a single, perhaps ill-comprehended question, can be meaningfully plucked out from the whole complex of how people think about politics in Scotland - a complex which is constantly changing and within which the meaning and significance of 'attitudes to devolution' is itself constantly changing - to constitute an independently defined factor which can be assigned its own 'causal weight'.

The dangers of taking 'attitude to devolution' as an independently definable entity stand out most clearly in the context of Miller's use of attitude to devolution as an element in a causal model which is complex but in which 'attitude to devolution' (as measured by responses to the S.E.S. devolution question given in Table 7.2) is made to play the fundamental causal role in determining S.N.P. voting. In constructing such a causal model it is important to be explicit about the assumptions involved. Miller is explicit about his assumptions and it is these which are problematic. By far the most important claim which is made in a recursive causal model in which an arrow is drawn pointing away from 'attitude to devolution' and towards 'voting SNP' is that the causal influence is all one way. However, the irony is that whether or not the causal influence is all one way is the one thing that the causal model itself cannot determine. The analyst has to assume and specify beforehand that the direction of causality is all one way. The validity of the model depends entirely
upon this assumption being true.

As Miller himself puts it:

"the essence of a 'recursive' model is that there are no loops or circuits of causation in it: that we can assign all the variables to groups and assume that variables in one group may be influenced by those in earlier groups but not by those in the same or later groups." (Miller, 1981, pp218-219)

Most of the assumptions that Miller makes - primarily that social structural variables such as rurality, age, occupational class, religion and house tenure are causally prior to such subjective variables as class identification; 'trust in governments; attitudes on oil and devolution'; and vote - are relatively unproblematic.

It is the assumption that the relationship between attitude to devolution on the one hand and voting S.N.P. on the other is all one way which is much more problematic.

"Now any analytical assumptions are likely to be only approximately true. Some people may feel such a sense of identification with the working class that they go straight from university to an unskilled manual occupation and a council house. But if we admit such reciprocal influences then it becomes very much more difficult in theory, and perhaps impossible in practice, to quantify the degree of influence in each direction along such reciprocal causal links. The weight of influence is, I think, from the earlier groups to the later groups in the model and the assumption of a recursive structure is a reasonable analytical assumption." (Miller, 1981, p219)

These considerations apply just as much to the relationship between attitude to devolution and voting S.N.P. as to any other. The implication of the statement that 'if we admit such reciprocal influences then it becomes very much more difficult in theory, and perhaps impossible in practice, to quantify the degree of
influence' is that if there is any reciprocal influence of voting S.N.P. on attitude to devolution, the model is, in effect, meaningless.

It is not even necessary to postulate that voting S.N.P. has an influence on 'attitude to devolution' for the causal edifice to collapse. That the model assumes no reciprocal causation between attitude to devolution and SNP voting is only a minimum specification of what the model assumes. The model in fact assumes that there is no other connection between attitude to devolution and voting S.N.P. than that by which attitude to devolution is causally prior to voting S.N.P.

Within the bounds of causal imagery, such a connection could be any factor which operated to affect both 'attitude to devolution' and voting S.N.P. It could be that slippery beast 'Scottish identity', it could be a belief that independence or devolution would be economically beneficial to Scotland, it could be resentment against Westminster, it could be any combination of these or it could be a host of other factors. If such factors were operating to determine both 'attitude to devolution' and 'voting S.N.P.' then to that extent the correlation between 'attitude to devolution' and voting S.N.P. would be spurious and any causal relation based upon it would be meaningless. It is not up to the critic of the causal model to specify what these factors are, it is up the the constructor of the causal model to prove that they are not relevant.

So far the criticism has stayed within 'causal
imagery'. The most fundamental objection however is whether such imagery is appropriate in an area such as this. As soon as we recognize a symbolic relationship between 'attitude to devolution' - and remember that this is measured by a response to a question about Scottish devolution options - and voting for the Scottish National Party, this symbolic relationship itself begins to pull the props from under the causal model. And as the emphases make clear, there is a rather obvious semantic relationship between the two variables - they are both about Scotland.

Here we are approaching an area which must be explored in order to come to a more realistic assessment of the determinants of S.N.P. voting and the role of attitudes to devolution. The main issue to be addressed will be the central but devilishly tricky question of the role of 'Scottish symbolism' and 'Scottish identity' in Scottish politics. Before this topic can be dealt with however, it is worth making a limited exploration of what could be seen as the major alternative to 'symbolism' as a basis for the structuring of the political perceptions of the electorate - ideology.
III. Ideological thinking in the electorate.

In Chapter 3, I outlined a dimension of ideological structure according to which belief systems could be regarded as ideological in a positive sense to the extent that they were coherent, totalizing in scope and reflexive. The rather brief discussion in Chapter 3 also emphasized the extent to which the development of ideological structure was critically dependent upon the nature of the communicative context within which a particular political belief system was built up and especially upon the degree of active involvement concerned. It is quite a leap from such theoretical formulations to the empirical studies which have attempted to assess the degree of ideological structuration revealed by responses to attitude items in standard electoral surveys.

Phillip Converse's paper 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics' can be seen as a locus classicus which on the one hand serves to link analysis of ideological structuration with analysis of the communicative contexts in which belief systems are built up and on the other hand served as the theoretical basis for much of the subsequent empirical analysis of attitude structure in mainstream electoral analysis. A presentation of Converse's argument is probably the simplest way then to link up these separate strands in the present discussion.

Converse defines a belief system as 'a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional
interdependence' (1964, p207) - this constraint being a matter of degree. The constraint present in political belief systems is presented in terms of a stratification of 'levels of conceptualisation' based on 'the breadth of contextual grasp of the political system' that each seems to represent. In simple terms, his model is that the more involved one is in politics - and in communicative terms this means the more one deals with, debates or even thinks about politics - the more political information one is exposed to and the more pressure there is to order the information in a coherent, or 'ideological' manner.

It is a distinction that Converse makes between two types of information - and the ease of their transmission - that is most useful for our purposes.

"Where transmission of information is at stake, it becomes important to distinguish between two classes of information. Simply put, these two levels are what goes with what and why. Such levels of information logically stand in a scalar relationship to one another, in the sense that one can hardly arrive at an understanding of why two ideas go together without being aware that they are supposed to go together. On the other hand, it is easy to know that two ideas go together without knowing why. For example, we can expect that a very large majority of the American public would somehow have absorbed the notion that 'Communists are atheists'. What is important is that this preconceived correlation would for most people represent nothing more than a fact of existence, with the same status as the fact that oranges are orange and most apples are red. If we were to go and explore with these people their grasp of the 'why' of the relationship, we would be surprised if more than a quarter of the population even attempted responses (setting aside such inevitable replies as "those Communists are for everything wicked"), and, among the responses received we could be sure that the majority would be incoherent or irrelevant.

The first level of information, then, is simple and straightforward. The second involves much more complex and abstractive information, very close to what
Downs has called the 'contextual knowledge' relevant to a body of information .... The general premise is that the first type of information will be diffused much more readily than the second because it is less complex" (Converse, 1964, p212)

Converse then combines this contrast in ease of transmission between the two types of information with a pyramidal, 'trickle down' model of information transmission to explain the different types of belief system which exist at different levels of the 'conceptual stratification'.

"It is our primary thesis that, as one moves from elite sources of belief systems downwards on such an information scale, several important things occur. First, the contextual grasp of 'standard' political belief systems fades out very rapidly, almost before one has passed beyond the 10% of the American population that in the 1950s had completed standard college training. Increasingly, simpler forms of information about "what goes with what" (or even information about the simple identity of objects) turn up missing. The net result, as one moves downward, is that constraint declines across the universe of idea elements, and that the range of relevant belief systems becomes narrower and narrower. Instead of a few wide ranging belief systems that organise large amounts of specific information, one would expect to find a proliferation of clusters of ideas among which little constraint is felt, even, quite often, in instances of sheer logical constraint.

At the same time, moving from top to bottom of this information dimension, the character of the objects that are central in a belief system undergoes systematic change. These objects shift from the remote, generic and abstract to the increasingly simple, concrete, or "close to home". Where potential political objects are concerned, this progression tends to be from abstract ideological principles to the more obviously recognisable social groupings or charismatic leaders and finally to such objects of immediate experience as family, job, and immediate associates." (Converse, 1964, p213)

The main word of caution which is in order is that Converse is operating very much with an 'elite-mass' model with the political involvement which produces ideological structure seen as being limited largely to elite levels. On
the one hand, to the extent that the pattern of information flow in Scotland is one of transmission from central sources to a mass audience - and television is the obvious example - Converse's model does apply. On the other hand, there is nothing to stop us extending the implications of political involvement for ideological structuration to popular and oppositional levels of political activity to give us an alternative non-elite source of ideology.

Converse's contrast between 'abstract ideological principles' and 'the more obviously recognizable social groupings or charismatic leaders' as potential political objects in belief systems serves to alert us to the implications of his analysis for understanding the role of symbolism in structuring political belief systems - implications which, strangely enough, Converse himself does not seem to have followed up.

Converse has earlier contrasted two classes of political information - "what goes with what, and why". Attitude constraint, the degree to which the response to one attitudinal question can be predicted from the response to another, is seen to result from the depth to which the respondent is aware of the connecting 'whys', this ideological awareness thus serving to structure the responses.

In what is very much an extension of Converse's analysis specifically designed to explore the role of symbolism, Bennett (1975, p80) points out that ideological
coherence or logical constraint is not the only way in which political belief systems can receive structure - belief systems can also be structured symbolically. In Converse's terms, political symbolism is a powerful means of providing information on "what goes with what" and as we shall see in the next section this is precisely what symbolism does - it provides meaning or makes semantic connections. At the risk of oversimplification, we could say that 'ideology', in the positive sense that we have been using, and 'symbolism' provide alternative means of structuring political belief systems i.e. of structuring how the political world is perceived. Now the two are not totally incompatible but it is true that to the extent that someone has a well worked out ideological belief system, that person is relatively unlikely to be swayed in his political perceptions or actions by purely symbolic definitions of reality. Before moving on to look at how symbolic mechanisms might well have operated in the Scottish case, it is worth making a limited empirical assessment of the extent to which political attitudes were structured 'ideologically' at the General Election of October 1974.

Mainstream empirical electoral analysis has (following Converse) used three main methods of assessing the degree of ideological thinking revealed in responses to election surveys.

The first is the only one not to be based upon the analysis of fixed choice responses to attitude items. The
method involves classifying respondents into 'ideological levels' on the basis of the presence or absence of 'ideological' or quasi-ideological terminology in open ended responses elicited with respect primarily to party or candidate images.

The second method requires panel data and concentrates upon the degree of response stability at an individual level as an index of attitude stability.

The third method, and the one which has been most elaborated, as well as being the most controversial, is the assessment of the degree of ideological structuration on the basis of the relationships between responses to questions on different issues. This is the only method which can be employed on the basis of quantitative results from a single cross-sectional survey - here the 1974 Scottish Election Survey.

At its simplest, the ruling assumption is that

"correlations between attitudes that are visible in aggregates are reliable evidence of some structuring of attitudes on the part of the individual members" (Campbell, et al, 1960, p191)

Butler and Stokes tend to use the term 'the organisation of issues':

"what really distinguishes those who think ideologically is the extent to which their attitudes to several issues are organized into a clear structure" (Butler and Stokes, 1969, p211)

In the extensive American literature on attitude structure, the survey items used have primarily been of the form 'Should the Federal government (take a specific
action)' e.g. 'The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost. Do you have an opinion on this or not?' with response categories forming a five-point Likert scale running from 'agree strongly' to 'disagree strongly'. (Nie and Andersen, 1976, Appendix, p133)

In the discussion of attitude structure in 'The American Voter', the domestic items used are characterised: "In primary content these items all have to do with the desirability of governmental action in areas of social welfare" while the foreign items concerned "the desirable degree of United States' intervention in international affairs." (Campbell et al, 1960, p195)

Although there were no exact equivalents of such questions in the 1974 Scottish Election Survey, it does contain a series of questions which tap attitudes towards aspects of governmental action.

The format of these questions (see Table 7.5 below) is rather more slanted towards tapping the perceived salience of the issues than is the case with a response format running from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' - although any question asking for information of strength of feeling will inevitably pick up an element of salience. Given this limitation of the data it is all the more important to present the data in as transparent a way as possible so that the precise derivation of the summary numerical coefficient can be clearly seen.

In the American literature, the standard measure of
association between items has been gamma. This coefficient has the advantage in terms of interpretability of being derived directly from the cross-classification of ordinally categorised variables.

This derivation means that gamma can be directly related to the cross-tabulation from which the coefficient is calculated. This brings the advantage of being able to see a relationship both in terms of the numerical value of the gamma coefficient (for comparative purposes) and in terms of the actual cross-tabulation.

This relative 'transparency' of the coefficient bears the cost that the value of the coefficient is sensitive to the number of categories used (other things being equal, the more categories, the lower the value of gamma) and is distorted by unbalanced marginal distributions.

The Scottish Election Survey contained fourteen items amenable to this kind of analysis. Of this fourteen, I excluded five from the analysis because responses were heavily weighted towards agreement (should the government take tougher measures to prevent crime, get rid of pollution, take tougher measures to prevent Communist influence in Britain, spend more money to get rid of poverty in Britain, make more efforts to protect the countryside and our finest buildings). The question as to whether the government should maintain separate schools for Roman Catholics was omitted from the analysis because it introduces the obvious complication of the religion of the
respondent. Finally, the question as to whether the government should shift power from London to the regions and local authorities was put aside to be discussed in the context of attitudes to devolution.

This left seven items (full text in Table 7.5) on the basis of which to make a first probe into the degree of policy-related attitude structure in the Scottish population.

Table 7.5 Full text of questions used to elicit policy-related attitudes. Scottish Election Survey October 1974.

Qu 27. I am going to read out a list of things that some people believe a Government should do. SHOW CARD. For each one can you say whether you feel it is:

1. Very important that it should be done
2. Fairly important that it should be done
3. It doesn't matter either way
4. Fairly important that it should not be done
5. Very important that it should not be done

Now, using one of the answers on this card, what is your view about:

27A putting more money into the health service?
27B establishing comprehensive schools in place of grammar schools throughout the country?
27C sending coloured immigrants back to their own country?
27D increasing state control of land for building?
27E giving more aid to poorer countries in Africa and Asia?
27H giving workers more say in the running of the place where they work?
27K redistributing income and wealth in favour of ordinary people?
Table 7.6. Collapsed categories for items used in ideological structure analysis.
Percent responding:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The government should</th>
<th>Very important should</th>
<th>Fairly important should</th>
<th>Doesn't matter</th>
<th>Fairly important should not</th>
<th>Very important should not</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>excludes D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase cash to Health Service</td>
<td>LEFT 50 CENTER 38</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1109</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish comprehensives</td>
<td>------LEFT------</td>
<td>CENTRE 27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriate immigrants</td>
<td>------RIGHT------</td>
<td>CENTRE 29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1037</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control land</td>
<td>LEFT 26 CENTER 31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>136</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase foreign aid</td>
<td>------LEFT------</td>
<td>CENTRE 13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give the workers more say</td>
<td>LEFT 20 CENTER 41</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistribute wealth</td>
<td>LEFT 32 CENTER 32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to minimise the effect of unbalanced marginal distributions on the size of the coefficient measuring the relationships between the items, standard American procedure was followed. The five response categories for each item were collapsed into three. In this recoding the main guideline was to try to make the three resulting categories have as even a number of respondents as possible in each category. (cf Nie and Andersen, 1976, p99)

The variables were recoded to run in the same direction so that throughout the discussion a positive gamma between two variables means that 'right-wing' replies on one item have tended to go with 'right-wing' replies on the other. (See Table 7.6 for the distribution of responses according to the original categories and how these categories were collapsed).

Positive gammas can thus be interpreted as indicating the degree of consistency in terms of the conventional right-left dimension and negative gammas as indicating inconsistency.

Before moving on to a discussion of the patterns of attitude structure revealed by the gammas, it is worth looking in detail at a couple of examples of the cross-tabulations, to get an idea of how much consistency or 'structuration' a particular numerical value of gamma reflects.

By far the highest gamma between a pair of the seven selected issues is 0.49, between items 27H, should the government give the workers more say in running their place
of work and 27K, should the government redistribute income and wealth. The cross-tabulation is given in Table 7.7 with the actual survey cell numbers given in bold.

Table 7.7. Cross-classification of responses to items 27H and 27K. Scottish Election Survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workers Control</th>
<th>Redistribution of income.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>122</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 1010 non-missing cases, it can be seen that 135+158+141=494, or around a half, are on the main diagonal i.e. are in the same category on both variables. Conversely only 96 (66+30) are right-wing on one variable and left-wing on the other or vice-versa. For the rest, the situation is not quite as clear cut. Although these cases are in the centre category on one variable and in the right or left category on the other, some of this mis-matching is inevitable given that the marginal distributions of the two variables are unequal. Given that only 20.6% are in the left category of variable 27H (workers control) compared with 31.7% in the left category of 27K (redistribution of wealth) it is impossible for all of this 31.7% to be in the
left category on the other variable as well. Only if the marginal distributions were exactly the same would it be possible for all the cases to lie on the main diagonal, to be in perfect agreement. Thus some of the disagreements between centre and right or left are due to the position of the cutting points - hence the emphasis in recoding the variables so that the marginal distributions are as even as possible.

However, one way of getting some leverage on the degree of structuration independent of the marginal distributions is to compare the observed frequencies in each cell with those which would be expected if there were no relationship between the variables i.e. knowing the response to one item would provide no information on the likely response to the other. These 'expected' frequencies are given below and offset from the actual figures.

For example, comparing the numbers actually giving 'left' responses on both items with the number of 'left-left' matches which would have been expected had responses been unrelated gives a very intuitive idea of the degree of structuration. Over twice as many responded 'left-left' as would have been expected given unrelated responses.

We can combine this approach with a comparison between the number who actually responded 'left-left' with the maximum possible (given the marginal distributions on each variable) who could have responded 'left-left'. Given that 320 people responded 'left' on the 'giving workers more
say' item and 208 responded 'left' on the 'redistributing income' variable, the maximum number who could have responded left-left is 208. So we now have three figures for the 'left-left' cell:

- assuming no relationship gives us an expected number of 66
- the actual number was 135
- the maximum possible number is 208

Thus a very simple measure of structure at the 'left' end of the relationship is how far along the line from no structure (66) to maximum possible structure (208) is the actual number of 135. (135-66)/(208-66) gives a figure of 0.49 - coincidentally the same as the gamma for the whole table. Thus one can say that the number of people responding 'left' on both items was about half-way between a position of zero-structure and a position of maximum possible structure (or constraint or ideological consistency).

Carrying out the same procedure for the 'right-right' cell, we get a figure of 0.26 i.e. the number of people responding right-right represented a situation about a quarter of the way from no structure to the maximum possible structure. Similarly, the two other corner cells can be looked at in the same way, with the actual cell totals being assessed in terms of the number to be expected assuming no relationship and the number in these cells (zero) which would represent a perfect relationship.

Carrying out these simple calculations gives an intuitive check on what the gammas mean. Looking at only the corner cells of the table cuts out some of the
distortions introduced when gamma is calculated on variables with differing marginal distributions.

In general, such values calculated for the corner cells tend, over all pairs of items, to vary around the value of gamma with the mean being somewhat below the mean gamma. Thus in terms of such relationships gamma can be seen as giving a rough indication of the degree of structure, with little tendency to underestimate what structure is there.

The point of this exercise is that too often in the discussions of gamma as an indicator of 'attitude constraint' or 'ideological consistency', all one is presented with is a profusion of gammas without these ever being traced back to the data patterns on which they are based.

Table 7.8. Cross-classification of responses to items 27H (workers control) and 27B (comprehensivisation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comprehensives</th>
<th>Workers control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To return to the examples, we have just looked at the most closely related variables, with a gamma of 0.49, and even these could be seen to be less than half way along
the line from no relationship to the best possible relationship given the marginal distributions.

Much more representative, however, is a gamma, slightly above the mean for all pairs of variables, of 0.24, that between item 27H, 'giving workers more say', again and item 27B, concerning the introduction of comprehensive schooling. The table is laid out in the same format as before.

This time, the number responding 'left-left' (115) is just over a quarter of the way between a situation of no relationship (in which 82 responses would be expected in the left-left cell) and the maximum possible relationship (which would put all the 198 left responses to 27H in the left category of 27B.) In the opposite corner the number responding 'right-right' (135) is only one eighth of the way from zero structure (113) and maximum possible structure (298).

It is not worth presenting the table for a low gamma such as that of 0.02 between item 27B, comprehensivisation, and item 27C, the repatriation of immigrants. For all intents and purposes there is no relationship - actual and expected figures being virtually the same.

Now that we have got some concrete grounding for interpreting gamma, we can look at the general level of inter-item correlations. (Table 7.9)

The mean gamma is 0.22. In itself, this is probably as near as one can get to an index of the degree of
ideological structuration revealed by responses to this fairly representative set of policy-related issue questions.

Table 7.9. Inter-item gammas. Scottish Election Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.H.S. Comps</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comps</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.133 0.017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>0.332 0.294 0.022</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>0.156 0.139 0.301 0.154</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign aid</td>
<td>0.218 0.237 0.106 0.372 0.220</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>0.324 0.417 -0.018 0.390 0.120 0.486</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparison with other similar analyses is extremely hazardous. A major feature on the debate which has raged in American electoral analysis has been the focus on the extent to which changes in question wording can dramatically change the value of gamma(3). So one should not build too much on the fact that this value of 0.22 lies somewhere between the values, calculated with respect to a similar range of issues on the basis of the major American electoral surveys, of around 0.15 in the 1950s and early 1960s and of between 0.3 and 0.4 in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Table 7.9 does nothing however to contradict the general impression of those studies which, following Converse, have revealed a relatively low level of ideological structuration in the population at large. In
Britain, Butler and Stokes carried out a similar analysis, over a slightly wider range of issues, based on their surveys in the mid-1960s. Despite the fact that, working on the basis of a panel survey, they were able to eliminate all respondents whose responses were not stable over three interviews spanning three years - thus discarding 70% of their respondents - the pattern of correlations which they found was very similar. They concluded that

"there is no strong pattern linking the attitudes even of those who do have stable attitudes. Compared with the expectation that any reader of the Economist or New Statesman, say, would have about political positions that naturally go together, the actual correlations are strikingly low." (Butler and Stokes, 1969, p198)

Thus what we are talking about is at best minimal evidence of ideological structuration. Despite this however, when we move on to comparing the degree of structuration shown within different groups of the population, differences do emerge.

Women's responses showed marginally more structuration than men's with a mean inter-item gamma of 0.235 among women compared with 0.215 among men.

If we divide the sample into three age groups however a clearer pattern emerges. Among those aged under 35, the mean gamma is 0.185; among those aged 35 to 54, the mean is 0.198 while for those aged 55 or over the mean is 0.280.

In the main American studies there has been very little discussion of changes in the degree of issue consistency with age - especially in comparison with the extensive
discussion of the general observed increase in partisan identification with age. In the major study of trends in attitude structure in the U.S., covering the period from 1952 to 1972, it is simply stated

"There is no appreciable age difference among age groups in the degree of attitude consistency at any point in the time period we are investigating" (Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976, p151)

Looking at the degree of structuration among voters for the different parties in the October 1974 election also reveals some differences - some explicable in terms of age, some not.

Before looking at the value of these gammas however we should check on the distribution of 'left-right' responses by party to see that they are not so unbalanced that they would seriously distort the gammas. (Table 7.10)

Table 7.9. 'Left' and 'Right' responses by party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>'Left'</th>
<th>'Right'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Con</td>
<td>SNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.H.S.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensives</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of land</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign aid</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers control</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The responses of the SNP voters in particularly are fairly well balanced and for none of the other parties is the pattern of responses sufficiently unbalanced to produce major distortions in the value of gamma.

In general the responses of SNP voters are patterned somewhere in between the values for Labour and Conservative and with a varying but not particularly close relation to the pattern of Liberal responses. The minor exception is that SNP voters provided the fewest 'left' responses to the 'comprehensives' question. The major exception is that SNP voters were marginally more against foreign aid than even the Conservative voters.

To return to the question of attitude structuration, however, the mean inter-item gammas for the four groups of voters were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Gamma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus S.N.P. voters would seem to have had the least coherent pattern of attitudes although to a certain extent this is to be expected given their relative youth. Conservative voters have only a marginally more coherent set of attitudes - this running against the expectation based on the relative age of conservative voters.

It might be argued that the exercise has been biased against revealing coherence in the attitudes of SNP voters because I have not included items relating to devolution or independence - which being relatively more salient to SNP
voters might be thought to be the main site of coherence in the attitude structure of SNP voters. Assessing the significance of gammas between those items in the survey which relate directly to devolution, and which are of different formats, is even more hazardous than doing so for the more general items we have been discussing.

Four questions in the survey can be said to relate fairly directly to devolution. The first is a modification of the Kilbrandon question, the second asks respondents whether or not they are in favour of a Scottish Assembly, the third asks how important was the issue of Scottish government in deciding how to vote while the fourth taps attitudes to decentralisation of power from London to the regions and local authorities. These four items were recoded to three categories of as equal a size as possible. Among SNP voters the mean value of gamma between these four devolution related questions was 0.46. Among non-SNP voters the mean value was 0.46. So we could say that although S.N.P. voters did not show any greater structuration on items relating to devolution, this structuration constituted a higher proportion of the total amount of structuration present in their responses.

However, the main point to be drawn from this analysis of inter-item correlation as a whole is that there is very little evidence of ideological structuring in the Scottish electorate in October 1974.

Now obviously such fixed-choice responses have grave limitations as means of measuring the existence of
'ideology'. I do not intend to get into the vast debate on whether such 'artificial' forms of question do not produce 'artificial' and meaningless responses. The only point which should perhaps be made is that what we are trying to understand is how people vote and in many ways the act of voting is itself a fixed-choice response to a series of options. If attitude questionnaires simplify the world so does voting.

In addition to the findings of electoral survey analysis with respect to generally low levels of ideological structuring of political issues, a wide range of studies have shown relatively low levels of structure in less directly political aspects of belief systems such as class consciousness or 'images of society'\(^\text{(4)}\). It would perhaps be better to see the foregoing limited empirical exploration of the issue as illustration of a condition whose existence has been established much more convincingly elsewhere rather than as proof.

However, the fact that levels of ideological coherence were lowest among young voters and S.N.P. voters is certainly consistent with what we would expect on the basis of the analysis of patterns of social change in the last chapter. In many respects, young voters, and in particular those categories which supported the S.N.P. most strongly, could be said to have most fully embodied a pattern of social change involving a move to a more privatised lifestyle, with a political orientation characterised by
instrumentalism and low involvement and with political information derived primarily from the mass media. Our discussion of the impact of communicative context on the generation of ideological structure would lead us to expect that these same social changes would not be conducive to the development of ideological thinking.

In terms of the present chapter however, the most important implication is that if ideological thinking is seen as a source of meaning which provides an alternative to or even a defence against common-sense ('fetishistic') and symbolic definitions of reality, as relayed by the media in particular, then it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that among younger voters in October 1974, such defences were extremely weak. They were in a condition not far short of ideological vacuum.

This, in itself, was an important pre-condition for the success of the S.N.P. message, an important aspect of which was that the commonsensically obvious and symbolically loaded category 'Scotland' should provide the dominant framework according to which votes should be cast.
IV. The role of Scottish symbolism and identity.

Given the close parallels in patterns of social and political change in Scotland and the rest of Britain which have been charted, it becomes important to try to specify as closely as possible the operation of the category 'Scotland' at an ideological level - since it is on the basis of such ideological distinctiveness that support for the Scottish National Party must be explained. Although this section explores the role of Scottish symbolism and Scottish identity it is especially important to set this 'symbolic dimension' in the context of the patterns of social change and conditions of possibility already established in order not to overestimate its own specific role.

In Chapter 4, the emergence was charted of a particular frame of reference in Scottish politics, a frame characterised as 'the Scottish economic dimension' or 'the Scottish growth project'. The acceptance of this frame of reference on a mass basis can be seen as a result of the satisfaction of three successively narrower conditions of possibility. The first was the emergence at a British level in the years after World War II of a conception of politics as being about government management of the economy, this management being increasingly seen as productive of economic growth. The second condition of possibility was the emergence of Scotland as a relevant unit of economic management. The third was the transfer of this conception
from an elite to a mass level, the primary agents of this transfer being the Labour Party and the mass media, in particular television.

The establishment of this Scottish economic dimension provided the terrain for the early success of the S.N.P. Once the S.N.P. had achieved media prominence its task was to consolidate the framework. It had the additional task of presenting itself as the vehicle through which the Scottish growth project could be fulfilled.

In this way, the developments which made possible the success of the S.N.P. can be seen as changes in the definition of political reality, changes in the categories in terms of which the political world is judged. A conception of politics as competing definitions of reality allows us to come closer to appreciating the role of Scottish symbolism and Scottish identity.

In treating this issue I have been aided especially by the work of two theorists, Murray Edelman and W. Lance Bennett, who are in a tradition which could loosely be described as 'politics as symbolic action' (5) My use of elements of their framework will inevitably be highly selective and somewhat simplified.

The most general point is that symbolism provides a powerful reservoir of meaning which can be used in the transformation of the definition of political reality:

"Symbolic terms in political definitions serve as contexts in which meanings are provided for political issues and events. ... It is important that we do not think of symbols as devices that simply or crudely
mask, cover up, or distract attention from political issues, events and conflicts. We cannot gratuitously "trick" people (even the members of "mass publics") into not seeing the facts of the matter by simply throwing symbols around in a hand-waving fashion. However, the careful use of symbols in constructing a plausible scenario for political conflict, actions and events can alter the meanings of such political "data" in quite profound ways.

Indeed, the successful construction of a political scenario may transform the terms of political conflict into images with significantly different meanings." (Bennett, 1975, p74)

In what follows I will try to outline how Scottish symbolism may have contributed to that transformation of the definition of Scottish political reality upon which the success of the S.N.P. was predicated.

The first point to make is that 'Scotland' itself - as an ideological category - should not be regarded as an isolated, free-standing and self-sufficient entity but rather as the central term of a symbolic network. Anything which is felt to have a Scottish resonance forms a ramification of this network. The salience of each term will vary enormously from person to person but for most people in Scotland some aspects of the network will evoke a Scottish resonance - in terms of football, Hogmanay, drink, poetry, music, literature, landscape - to mention only some of the more obvious non-political subsets of meaning. 'Scotland' or 'Scottishness' is what gives the network its symbolic or ideological unity but conversely 'Scotland' or 'Scottishness' are not unities but are as complex - and unquantifiable - as the symbolic web of which they form the central terms.

Similarly, 'Scottish identity' can be regarded as
neither simple nor unitary. As du Preez puts it:

"We sometimes talk as though identity were a mask to be put on, as though it were something 'found' in an already finished state. This is not the case. Each person has to make something of the identity elements he finds in his own community. He has, to use an analogy, to speak his own 'identity-sentences'" (Du Preez, 1980, p31)

In other words, in thinking about 'Scotland' or 'Scottishness' we should not think about them as simple 'things' but as ways of making semantic connections. As Edelman points out:

"... a symbol can be understood as a way of organizing a repertory of cognitions into meanings" (Edelman, 1971, p34)

This of course is precisely how we have seen ideology in the positive sense operating - as providing structure or organization for a belief system, as providing categories through which the political world is perceived. Symbolism and ideology (in this sense) can be regarded as competing means of structuring definitions of political reality and to that extent a condition for the success of the S.N.P. was an absence of ideology. National symbolism shares with the other pole of ideology, ideology as fetishism, an important attribute - its everyday obviousness. The most important condition for the effectiveness of political symbolism is that it is culturally familiar, or obvious. To the extent that the shift from liberal to late capitalist society inherently involved a shift towards the nation of the level of 'obviousness' or 'fetishism' national symbolism provides an additional layer of obviousness to
the way the world presents itself.

Now of course all the elements of 'Scottishness' I have mentioned existed and exist at a sub-political level. The question is - what effect did the Scottish symbol system have when, largely because of developments at a state level, 'Scotland' as a category became 'energized' politically, when Scotland became relevant as an economic and political unit? Put this way the question answers itself. To the extent that 'Scotland' became a category through which the political world was perceived then all the Scottish symbolism spiralling around the central category 'Scotland' was bound to play a role. The question then becomes what role did all this symbolism, all this stuff of Scottish identity play. To recast the question slightly further: if what was crucial was the establishment of Scotland as a category through which the political world came increasingly to be perceived, what was the role of the associated symbolism in this change.

In trying to understand how Scottish symbolism came to help structure political perceptions it is worth taking a look at what might be called two levels of the Scottish symbol system. At a 'macro-' level we can look at ideas about Scotland or the image of Scotland - the material of Scottish mythology. At a more everyday level we can look at ways in which 'Scottishness' or Scottish identity is lived.

The topic of Scottish mythology has received a good deal of rather baffled attention (6) Its existence is widely recognized (it is obvious) but what is less certain
is whether or how it makes a political difference. In what follows I have no intention of expanding our knowledge of the intricacies of Scottish mythology for the simple reason that the discussion is aimed at exploring the impact of 'Scottish mythology' on popular political perceptions. The more obscure or specialized is an aspect of the Scottish myth, the less relevant it is likely to be in influencing the voting decision.

Edelman's definition cannot be bettered:

"The word 'myth' signifies a belief held in common by a large group of people that gives events and actions a particular meaning; it is typically socially cued rather than empirically based." (Edelman, 1971, p34)

We can include in Scottish mythology any and all taken for granted ideas about Scotland. We would have to include popular - and such a term by no means excludes academics - versions of Scottish history and characterizations of the nature of Scottish institutions, the Scottish character, ethos, way of life or whatever. What is common to most of these characterizations of Scotland is that they involve an implicit counter-referent - England. Scottish history is seen primarily as a struggle for freedom and democracy against English oppression. Scottish society is seen as inherently more democratic and egalitarian than an English society which is characterised as relatively snobbish and elitist. The Scottish character is more down-to-earth and straightforward than the relatively effete character of the English. Not all aspects of Scottish mythology are
structured by this Scottish/English axis but it is by far the dominant one.

The extent to which the assertions of Scottish mythology are empirically true is in this context largely irrelevant. The myth operates to structure perceptions of reality with little opportunity for reality to react back on it. The framework operates in large part to selectively pick up on those aspects of reality which are congruent and to screen out those which contradict it(7). Although Scotland is a relatively small country, 'Scotland' as an ideological category cannot be empirically experienced. The transmission and modification of the concept 'Scotland' and its connotations has always been dependent upon the media of cultural transmission and the nature of their audiences(8). Such mythological material is at least available as a framework for organizing perceptions of political reality - a 'reality' which at the national level is experienced predominantly in a mediated fashion.

At this point, the concept of the political scenario, developed by Lance Bennett on the basis of the work of Kenneth Burke, is helpful

"... an important element of political success involves the ability to construct a compelling public definition out of the problematic set of events surrounding any political conflict. In this light, we will explore the ways in which we structure and interpret political reality. We will look at ways in which fragmentary data can be organized into compelling stories or accounts of political reality.

As members of a political culture we seek to isolate or construct familiar "story lines" out of the problematic data that enter our perceptual field. Whether or not an account of a political event is compelling, arousing, or even believable depends on our
perception that certain familiar and plausible relationships exist among the set of actions, actors, motives, instrumentalities, and scenic qualities that belong to the characterization of the event" (Bennett, 1975, p48).

If there is one particular 'story line' which is highly familiar to the Scots it is that of Scots versus English. The role of the S.N.P. in this context can be seen to have been one of dramatizing the Scottish economic dimension by overlaying it with a less materialistic but highly familiar scenario according to which Scotland's ills were the result of neglect or oppression by England/Westminster. In short, the Scottish symbol system worked to make plausible the S.N.P.'s definition of political reality because the symbolic raw materials of the S.N.P.'s definition were already culturally familiar.

If the level of the Scottish myth pertains to ideas about 'Scotland', then the level to which we must briefly make reference concerns 'being Scottish' in everyday life or the salience of Scottish identity. If Scottish mythology operates as a framework in terms of which the political world may be perceived, then Scottish identity provides the basis for the relevance of that framework for the individual.

This is an even more tricky and touchy area which it is difficult to deal with without trivializing it or adding yet another layer of mystification.

A particular reason for noting it however is that the area of 'the Scottishness of everyday life' seems to me to be the most likely context for an understanding of the
higher level of support for the S.N.P. at the October 1974 General Election among men as compared with women. As was seen in Chapter 1 (Tables 1.7 and 1.8), the Scottish Election Survey showed 34% of men voters voting S.N.P. compared with only 23% of women voters, with the percentage difference in support at an even higher level for all age groups up to the age of 54.

If we do not regard a sense of Scottish identity as something innate or instinctive but as a self-image which is maintained in the context of particular patterns of sociability, then we are directed towards those areas of sociability which have the highest emphasis on 'Scottishness'. In terms of mass pursuits there are two main candidates - sport and drinking.

The Scottish dimension of watching sport - and in particular football and to a lesser extent rugby - needs no elaboration. In football especially, the Scottish/English axis is particularly strong.

The 'Scottishness' of drinking is a bit more problematic. Perhaps the best testimony to the close tie-up between them is the strong Scottish emphasis of television drink - and in particular beer - commercials. It might also be added that Scotland's two most important national festivals - Hogmanay and Burn's night - both have a fairly high alcohol quotient.

In other words, if we are looking for the areas of everyday life in which Scottish symbolism has the highest
profile, those areas are watching football and drinking. They both involve patterns of sociability with a male bias, to say the least. If we do accept the role of Scottish symbolism and identity in channelling support for the S.N.P., these considerations might be a factor in accounting for the greater tendency of men to support the S.N.P.

To sum up the preceding discussion then, we have seen 'Scottish symbolism' operating at three levels. The most immediate is the level of Scottishness in everyday life and comes closest to the notion of 'Scottish identity'.

The second level of operation of Scottish symbolism is that of 'Scottish mythology' - the complex of beliefs about Scotland as a nation. These make up the culturally familiar terms in which Scotland is conceived, the image of Scotland. Whatever personal relevance Scottish mythology has will in a sense have flowed up from the previous level.

What both these levels of symbolism do is to provide the raw material for the 'political scenario' assumed and projected by the S.N.P. Although Bennett specified the conditions for the successful operation of such a 'political scenario' in terms of American politics, Scottish conditions would seem to fit the bill uncannily.

"It is crucial that the flexible terms of political scenarios trigger certain transitions or "inference structures" to contextualise the fixed terms in desired ways. This suggests at least three necessary features of the sorts of political symbols used as flexible, definitional terms.

First, these symbols must be broadly familiar to the audience for which the scenario is constructed."
Secondly, the symbols should suggest a set of paradigms, models or examples (commonly known to members of the political culture) that could serve as the desired inferences between scenic terms. Finally, the flexible symbolic terms of scenarios must be symbols whose inference paradigms are both numerous and personally relevant for members of the culture. This assures that members of a heterogeneous audience can establish personally meaningful (experiential or emotional) links among definitional terms. In short, the inferences drawn between symbol and context are likely to be most durable when they are based on a blend of culturally grounded significance and emotional appeal." (Bennett, 1975, p67)

So far this brief discussion of the political role of Scottish symbolism has been couched in very general terms in order to put across as simply as possible some suggestions as to how the Scottish symbolic system could have operated to structure political perceptions.

It is only when we link the discussion to some of the main themes already developed in this study that the role of Scottish symbolism can be specified more precisely.

In particular, the discussion can be cast in the form of specifying some of the pre-conditions for the Scottish symbol system to structure political perceptions.
V. Attitudes to the state and symbolic mobilization.

As already mentioned, Chapter 4 outlined the emergence of 'the Scottish economic dimension' as a taken-for-granted structure of Scottish political and economic discourse. It combined an assumption about what politics was about (economic management, economic growth) and an assumption that Scotland was the relevant unit for such economic management or economic growth.

Scottish symbolism or Scottish mythology as discussed above can likewise be said to make up a set of taken for granted assumptions about Scotland, its place in the world and in particular its relationship with England.

Both these sets of assumptions constituted what we could call 'pseudo-inference structures' (cf Bennett, 1975, p72) - models of what goes with what in the political world - centred on the category 'Scotland'. The first 'inference structure' linked Scotland to the concept of economic growth in a context in which politics was largely judged in terms of the implications of national economic performance for individual well-being. It could perhaps be said that this inference structure linked Scotland into an instrumental or utilitarian framework. This inference structure was likely to be particularly effective with people judging politics from a largely instrumental viewpoint as discussed in Chapter 6. The second inference structure linked Scotland on the one hand to a range of culturally familiar historical and political myths and on the other to everyday life via the symbolic stuff of
Scottish identity.

It is in the powerful meshing of these two meaning systems that we can perhaps get closest to understanding the rapidity with which the S.N.P. rose and fell. Together they produced a single meaning system which defined what politics in Scotland was all about and which combined the emotional rush of national identification with more material goals. Neither was new but their combination was.

The strategy of the S.N.P. worked very effectively to bring about the combination. On the one hand, in terms of its organization and electoral approach, the S.N.P. was a 'normal' British party. Voting for the S.N.P. was an act which was no more extreme than, and could be justified in the same instrumental terms as, voting for any of the other mainstream parties. On the other hand the S.N.P. took full advantage of the array of national symbolism and mythology which was available. If we wish to make a final assessment of the extent to which the activities of the Scottish National Party itself have to be taken causally into account in explaining its electoral success, it must be in these terms. It adapted extremely effectively to the logic of the situation which had made it possible.

If we see S.N.P. support as dependent upon the meshing of these two separate ideological preconditions - Scottish symbolism and identity and belief in the Scottish growth project - then we can look at the dynamics of these ideological preconditions separately in order to identify
the factors underlying the rise and fall of support for the S.N.P.

There is no evidence to show any significant ebbing and flowing over the period in the level of cultural familiarity with the stuff of Scottish symbolism or in the centrality of Scottish identity in everyday life(9). In order to show that changes in support for the S.N.P. were a result of changes in such symbolic factors, we would have to show that such cultural changes occurred independently of and preceded changes in support for the S.N.P. No evidence has been brought forward to suggest that cultural changes of the required magnitude did take place. This is not to rule out of course changes in the salience of Scottish symbolism and the strength of Scottish identity associated with or more precisely resulting from support for the S.N.P. - but that is not what is at issue. All in all, in terms of the mass electorate at least we probably stay closest to the truth by regarding the level of familiarity with Scottish symbolism and the strength of Scottish identity as relatively constant background factors.

Given that the required mixture for S.N.P. success was the co-existence of such symbolic background factors and the credibility of the Scottish growth project, it becomes obvious that to understand the ebb and flow of S.N.P. success, the explanation is to be found in terms of changes in the factors underlying the credibility of the Scottish growth project, plus the credibility of the S.N.P. itself
as a vehicle for that project.

In order to understand the changes in factors underlying the credibility of the Scottish growth project we can return to the device of describing pre-conditions at different levels of generality, each with its own separate rhythm. We have already used this procedure in accounting for the initial emergence of the Scottish economic dimension in the period between the Second World War and the mid-1960s.

At the most general level is the belief that state action does in fact make an economic difference. Only in the context of a general belief that governments can deliver the goods does a belief that government at a Scottish level can deliver the goods make any sense. At this most general level, looking back from the midst of economic depression in 1983 over the last fifty years we can see a long term rise and fall in the electorate's belief that governments are capable of controlling the economy.

In the depths of the depression of the 1920s and 1930s, as discussed in Chapter 4, there was very little faith in the ability of government to manage an economy most simply because the concept of the economic management of a national economy in a modern sense had yet to emerge. It was the experience of World War II and the subsequent thirty years of economic growth which lent credibility to the belief that governments were responsible for and thus
could be held responsible for the economic fate of the country. This faith could be said to have reached its peak with the election of the Labour Government in 1964 with its promises of the technocratic creation of economic growth.

In other words, if we ask where people get their beliefs about government effectiveness, the answer must be that they get this belief from their own experience, however highly mediated, of what governments have been able to do in the immediate past. The currently apparent belief that a British government can do very little to influence the level of British unemployment, although partly due to governmentally inspired framing of the issues, has much deeper roots in the experience of government failure over the last twenty years.

It is this general, experience-based decline in the belief that governments can achieve what they promise, which can perhaps be seen as the most general reason for the decline in support for the S.N.P. in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The S.N.P. is especially vulnerable to this long term logic because, as we have seen, much of its support has been of a predominantly instrumental kind and instrumental support is defined in terms of the belief that its object can deliver the economic goods.

We must also take account here of another long term shift in attitudes to government, a shift in the balance between expectations of what government can do and perceptions of what government costs. Over the last twenty years by far the most materially relevant factor underlying
this has been the rise in the level of direct taxation. In this respect, it is important to take account of the influence of the framework implicit in governmental pronouncements on the way in which government is perceived and the expectations held of it. In such terms it was the monetarist language of the Labour Government in the late 1970s, which focussed public attention on the previously barely mentioned issue of the level of public expenditure.

The general level of belief that state action can have beneficial economic effects has to be seen as the most general condition for the credibility of the Scottish growth project and thus for the success of the S.N.P.

Given this general faith however, the most important factor underlying support for the Scottish growth project was the relative balance between economic expectations and perceived opportunities at the Scottish level and economic expectations and perceived opportunities at the British level. It would seem quite likely that in 1974, the peak of the S.N.P.'s electoral success, both these factors were maximally favourable to the S.N.P.

Alt (1979, Fig 3.3) has plotted at a British level trends in responses to Gallup's annual New Year questions on personal and national economic (British) expectations throughout the 1960s up to 1975. The two trends were to all intents and purposes parallel. From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, both series described two broad cycles of optimism and pessimism within a long term falling trend.
Both personal and national economic optimism peaked in 1964, fell fairly steadily to a trough around 1968, climbed to another peak in 1970, wobbled downwards in the early 1970s and then fell sharply from 1973 to 1974 to 1975.

The most obvious point is that the two deepest lows - the years around 1968 and the mid-1970s both coincided with the periods of the SNP's greatest electoral success and support in the opinion polls. Without a separate Scottish series however, we cannot assess the relative balance of expectations at the Scottish and British levels.

However, Alt carried out an extremely pertinent analysis based on the October 1974 British Election Survey. He performed a factor analysis of responses to the 15 items in the survey which could be said to relate to aspects of economic outlook or expectations. The first two factors which were derived could reasonably be described as separating out personal and national (British) economic outlook. Alt concluded that

"at least in October 1974, people had two entirely separate economic outlooks: one dealing with their own personal circumstances, and the other dealing with the national economy." (Alt, 1979, p99)

On the factor which was loaded on items of personal economic outlook, Scots scored much higher than the rest of Britain and higher even than the South of England. On the factor loaded on items of national (British) economic outlook, Scots scored much lower than the rest of Britain. There is at least some evidence then
that in October 1974, at the peak of the S.N.P.'s electoral success, there was an imbalance between how Scots saw their own economic prospects and how they saw the economic prospects of Britain as a whole.

The hardest evidence on the real factors which might have underlain this pattern comes from the household income and expenditure data for Scotland and the U.K. already presented in Chapter 6 (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). From those figures it is clear that for Britain as a whole the early 1970s were a period of rapidly rising real income and expenditure per person. Most importantly however it would appear that the rise in real incomes and expenditure in Scotland was particularly concentrated into the period encompassed by the two years 1971-1972 and the two years 1973-74. The figure which comes closest to assessing the impact on standards of living is that for expenditure per person. Between 1971-72 and 1973-74 the index (1961-63 =100) for expenditure per person in real terms rose from 124.2 to 142.2 or 14% in Scotland. In the same period the index for the U.K. as a whole rose from 121.3 to 132.1 or a rise of 9%. Scotland was still lagging behind the U.K. in terms of both income and expenditure per person but the gap was the smallest it had ever been. These figures could well provide the key to the gap in personal economic outlook which Alt calculated on the basis of the October 1974 British Election Survey. At the British national level however the outlook was much more gloomy with the Miners' strike and the three day week of early 1974 providing the
most dramatic illustration of the economic uncertainties of the period.

It is in this context that we have to assess the impact of the heralding of the arrival of North Sea Oil. With a background of rising personal standards of living in Scotland and economic uncertainty at the British level, North Sea Oil could be said to have removed some of the last barriers to the credibility of the Scottish economic project, and in particular to have temporarily weighted economic expectations towards Scotland.

We have to remember that the impact of North Sea Oil on public consciousness was almost entirely mediated and so we have to focus on the media through which its expected impact was transmitted to the general public - primarily the press and television - as well as the organizations and politicians which made sweeping claims about it. If ever there was a raw material which functioned primarily as a symbolic object it was North Sea Oil. The first point to make is one of the truisms of journalism - what is new is news. It was the newness of North Sea Oil which was news in the early 1970s - pioneering technology, harsh conditions, glamorous Texans, helicopters etc. The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 gave a boost to the economic significance of oil. The Miners strike which brought down the Heath government kept energy in the spotlight. Most important of all however were the things which were being said at the British level by Ministers and politicians. Hard as it is
to remember from our present vantage point amidst the wreckage of the British economy, in 1974 the general consensus was that North Sea Oil was going to save the British economy or transform the British economy - at the very least it was going to do a great deal of good for the British economy. Everybody believed that from Harold Wilson to Tom Nairn. And if it was generally believed that it was going to do the British economy a lot of good, how much more was it going to benefit the Scottish economy. Not necessarily because many people believed that Scotland could get away with it all, but because surely Scotland could obtain some differential advantage from the fact that the oil fields were off Scotland's shores. It is in this context, of a general belief, at the British and at the Scottish level, in the beneficial economic import of North Sea Oil that the significance of the SNP's 'It's Scotland's Oil' campaign must be assessed. The impact of that campaign depended upon the general centrality of the oil issue.

However, to return to the main point. The vital contribution of oil to S.N.P. success was its contribution to a belief in the economic viability of Scotland as a unit - a belief which was corroborated at the personal level by already rising standards of living in Scotland.

The great mystery however is - what happened to North Sea Oil as a major political issue or stake after October 1974. To a large extent it disappeared - in particular at the British level. And since the political significance of North Sea Oil was almost entirely a reflection of its
significance in the media, this was a reflection of its disappearance as a major news topic.

As we have seen, these relatively short term factors influencing the balance of perceptions of the economic viability of Scotland as compared with Britain have to be seen within a much longer term cycle in expectations of and attitudes towards government in general. Combining the two levels, it could be said that the S.N.P. reaped its greatest success in a period in which there was a declining faith in the ability of government to achieve its stated goals at the British level, with oil allowing this general faith to be somewhat prolonged at the Scottish level, but before the loss of faith in government had reached a more general stage - a virtual anti-government stage - in the late 1970s.

To the extent that the discussion so far has been cast in general terms, referring to 'voters' or 'the electorate' it has been misleading. The mechanisms outlined will have applied most strongly to particular social groups - the kinds of groups identified in the last chapter as being most likely to vote S.N.P.

On the one hand, the symbolic mechanisms outlined are likely to have led to support for the S.N.P. to the extent that other bases for structuring political perceptions were absent. As we have seen, there was not a great deal of ideological structuration revealed in the responses to the October 1974 Scottish Election Survey and this was true in
particular of younger voters and S.N.P. voters.

On the other hand, the mechanisms linking the rise and fall in support for the S.N.P. with changes in the factors underlying the credibility of the Scottish growth project are predicated upon voting as a primarily instrumental activity. Such instrumental voting is also predicated on the absence of more ideological motives. In the last chapter we saw that S.N.P. support in October 1974 was highest among those groups whose life-experiences has been such as to maximise a highly instrumental - and unstable - orientation to politics.

It is perhaps worth relating these factors - symbolism and instrumentalism - to different components of the S.N.P's support and to its long term dynamics. In the 1983 General Election, the S.N.P. received 11% of the Scottish vote, below the level it received in its first full scale election campaign in 1970. This could be said to present a level of hard-core support for the S.N.P. Among this hard core, instrumental considerations would seem likely to have played a role secondary to powerful affective ties to the S.N.P. based on a strong sense of Scottish identity. Instrumental factors are likely to have been much more important to those voters - a minimum of 20% of Scottish voters but probably considerably more - whose moves towards and away from the S.N.P. shifted its level of support up from the base of -10% to 30% and above and then back down again. Of course, the world is not quite that simple, but that would seem to be as close as one can get to a brief
summing up of the sources and dynamics of S.N.P. support over the last twenty-five years.

This, of course is only another way of saying that the long term ebb and flow of S.N.P. support is to be understood primarily in terms of the factors underlying a conception of government in general and Scottish government in particular without which an instrumental attitude to voting does not make much sense - a conception of government and Scottish government which believes that they can deliver the goods.

From such an instrumental standpoint of course, the third condition necessary to justify voting for the S.N.P is a belief that the S.N.P. is a party able to succeed, to deliver the goods. It is this third factor which has probably made the greatest contribution to the instability of support for the S.N.P. There was what could be a called a multiplier effect on the way up - each S.N.P. success bolstered the belief that the S.N.P. would ultimately have its way - and a reverse multiplier on the way down. So although the more general pre-conditions determined the long term timing of S.N.P. success and failure, this third level has worked to exaggerate the inexorability of the swings.

We can now return to the the questions posed at the end of the first section of this chapter concerning the reasons why Scotland's voting behaviour was different from that of the rest of Britain up to October 1974.
First, why the S.N.P.? Simply because the S.N.P., both in term of the emergence of the Scottish economic dimension in the early 1960s and the availability of a rich, rhetorical language of symbolism, myth and metaphor, had a script written and waiting for it.

Second, why did support for the S.N.P., after paralleling the level of Liberal support and abstention in the rest of Britain up to February 1974, move ahead of this level in 1974. Because October 1974 came at the end of a period of rapidly rising living standards in Scotland and because North Sea Oil was at the centre of public attention, both factors working to increase confidence in Scotland at a time when economic expectations at a British level were at a particularly low ebb.

Reprise: attitudes to devolution.

As we have seen, 'Scotland' can be regarded as a category at the centre of a symbolic web which is both culturally familiar and personally meaningful. The act of voting for the S.N.P. is in a close relationship with this web. The act of responding to a survey question on devolution is also closely connected with this same web. As we have seen, the perceived salience of 'devolution' as a reason for voting was itself closely associated with having voted S.N.P. This makes it highly dubious that 'attitudes to devolution' can be said to exist in sufficient isolation from voting for the S.N.P. for the former to act purely and
simply as a causal determinant of the latter.

One feature of responses to 'Kilbrandon type' survey and opinion poll questions on devolution which has been cited as proof of their centrality and importance has been the long term stability in the aggregate distribution of these responses. As we have seen there are strong methodological grounds for doubting the validity of this deduction. What, in fact, is this relative stability more likely to have reflected? To produce such stability all we need to postulate is that the people of Scotland have a fairly stable and positive attitude towards Scotland and a fairly stable and positive attitude towards democracy. Put the two together in the form of a question about 'Scotland having more control over its own affairs' etc. and what becomes surprising is that there are people who will reject this proposition rather than that 80% of the Scottish population have consistently supported in the abstract the proposition that Scotland should have more control over its own affairs. It is hardly a caricature to say that what the long term stability in responses to Kilbrandon type questions reflect is a long term stability in beliefs that Scotland is 'A Good Thing' and that democracy is 'A Good Thing'. This might sound simplistic but it is closer to the truth than some of the implications which been drawn.

We have seen how support for the S.N.P. was highly contingent on economic perceptions and expectations and on attitudes to the state. Similarly, the level of commitment
to devolution for many voters is likely to have been contingent on the same set of factors. Since devolution takes the form of a change in the state apparatus and can easily be seen as an extension of that apparatus, general attitudes towards the state and in particular the balance of assessment between the costs and benefits of state action, are likely to have been particularly important in determining responses to the actual prospect of devolution. The devolution Referendum of 1979 came at a time when real factors such as rising levels of taxation and ideological factors such as the Labour government's own monetarist anti-public expenditure rhetoric and the nascent anti-state Thatcherist rhetoric had combined to shape an ideological framework which was much less favourable to any extension of state activity.

That such factors as these were operative during the referendum campaign is clearly brought out in the analyses contained in The Referendum Experience (Bochel, Denver and McCartney, eds., 1981). Bochel and Denver cite an ITN referendum day poll which showed that two of the three most important reasons given by 'No' voters for their decisions were related directly to the overall shift from 'positive' to 'negative' perceptions of state activity we have been discussing. 31% of 'No' voters cited the cost of devolution and 23% cited the creation of another level of government as a reason for voting 'No' (31% cited the possibility of the break-up of Britain). Even more graphic illustration of the mechanisms reinforcing the contingency of commitment to
devolution on wider economic perceptions is given by John Fowler in his account of the impact of television coverage of the campaign. He suggests the operation of a 'montage effect' whereby

"news reporting of the campaign could not be isolated from the general reporting of political news during the period" (Fowler, 1981, p130)

As well as the 'guilt by association' which devolution suffered by being the policy of an increasingly unpopular Labour government, a more general factor was the overall tone of the economic news with which reporting of the campaign was juxtaposed.

"An analysis of the news topics covered during the last three weeks of the campaign suggests that Scotland was in the grip of a minor crisis. With the exception of the particularly bad weather, which merely added to the gloom, strikes and industrial unrest monopolized the news. Strikes hit at the most sensitive domestic areas, while signs of a withdrawal of American firms from Scotland suggested long-term, incurable unemployment, as the Government policy of replacing traditional, heavy industry by light industry seemed to be collapsing. Not only did these topics crowd out everything else but more importantly the message they implicitly carried was monotonous: the inability of the Government, whether culpable or not, to provide explanations or even consolations, let alone solutions to these problems." (Fowler, 1981, p131).

What replies to standard survey devolution items reveal is not a level of commitment which has only to be tapped but rather a set of abstract background assumptions which may or may not be mobilizable. The extent to which they are so mobilizable depends upon how they dovetail with wider economic perceptions and in particular attitudes towards the state. While the discussions in The Referendum Experience confirm that the Referendum took place at an
extremely unfavourable moment in terms of the short term balance of such factors, it would be wrong to allow the explanation to rest entirely on such short term considerations. In fact, the same long term shifts in attitudes to the state in the context of economically instrumental political orientations which would seem to have influenced the timing of the rise and fall of the S.N.P. were also at work to determine the outcome of the devolution Referendum. So even if part of the reason for the subsequent decline of the S.N.P. was the 'failure' of devolution, at an even deeper background level there is a case for saying that similar factors were at work to determine both.

If symbolic mechanisms could be said to have determined the nationalist form which instrumental voting took in Scotland, these same symbolic factors worked to determine 'symbolic' responses to survey questions on devolution. Only in the real world crunch of the Referendum did the economic content underlying the symbolic forms emerge crucially to affect the outcome.
Chapter 8.
Conclusion.

In conclusion, it remains only to tie together somewhat more tightly some of the threads which have wound their way through this study and in particular to specify a little more clearly the connection between the electoral success of the S.N.P. and patterns of social change.

Taking 'social change' in the widest sense, each section of this study has been concerned with a different level of social change ranging through from industrial change to attitudes to the state to the falling birth rate. The secret of understanding the timing of the electoral success of the S.N.P. lies in the different time-scales of the various aspects of social change which have been documented and the ways in which they have interacted.

To summarize the message of the study in these terms, the complex of social change can be divided into three levels.

At the first level, we have traced changes in what could be called the 'micro-contexts' of peoples lives, changes in their everyday material circumstances. A 'socio-graphic' portrait of such changes was given in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 moved on to explore some dominant themes relating to how these changes were experienced.

The second level involves changes in state action and in particular the taking on by the state of responsibility for economic management and even economic growth. In
Chapter 3 I put forward a general model of the implications of state action for ideological change and in Chapter 4 traced the developments which led up to Scotland being seen as a relevant unit of economic performance.

The third level of change is concerned crucially with how the changing context of political communication worked to achieve a meshing between experience at the micro-level of everyday life and experience at the macro-level, experience of the state. The crucial event in these terms was the arrival of television. I have not devoted a separate chapter to this strand of change but have tried to show how it interacted with the other two levels of change. At the end of Chapter 4, I showed how television played an important role in establishing 'the Scottish economic dimension' as the framework through which politics in Scotland were increasingly seen. At the end of Chapter 6, I tried to show how television worked to achieve a meshing between dominant forms of experience at the micro-level, notably a consumption oriented family project - and perceptions at the macro-level, both in general and in terms of the Scottish economic dimension.

In the broadest terms it was a particular coincidence of these three levels of social change - change at the level of everyday life, change in the structure of political communication and change at the level of the state - which created the ideological field within which the S.N.P. was able briefly to flourish.

It was the nature of this ideological field which helps
us understand the rapidity of both the rise and fall in electoral terms of the S.N.P. Changes at the level of everyday life and the arrival of television should be regarded as long term background changes defining the ideological field but there was nothing about these levels of social change in themselves which directly pointed towards a Scottish nationalist response. In Chapter 7, I attempted to grapple with some of the factors which take us nearer to understanding why it was the S.N.P. which was the first beneficiary of this new terrain. These factors involved the role of Scottish symbolism in providing a ready made frame of reference for the S.N.P. combined with more economic factors to do with perceptions of the state.

It is only by situating ourselves with such a general picture, however crude, of the meshing of different levels of change that we can assess the significance of particular levels of social change.

I will briefly try to do this for the first of the broad levels, change in the micro-contexts of everyday life as dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6, since this level is closest to a conventional definition of social change.

What tends to be regarded as the key aspect of social change in this sense is occupational change. What has baffled analysts of the electoral fortunes of the S.N.P. more than anything else is the fact that patterns of occupational change in Scotland since the war or even in a shorter time-span have obviously had something to do with
the success of the S.N.P. and yet support for the S.N.P. is consistently shown to be fairly well distributed across social classes or socio-economic groups. In one fairly obvious sense, occupational change is a non-starter as an explanation for the rise in support for the S.N.P. simply because of the different rates of change involved. For example, although the 1960s is regarded as a decade of rapid occupational change, from Table 5.7 we can calculate that the positive percentage difference between the socio-economic group structure in 1961 and that in 1971 was 6.2. In other words, 6.2% of the economically active population in 1961 would have to change socio-economic groups to produce the 1971 socio-economic group structure. Even if all this occupational change was from occupations with a zero propensity to vote S.N.P. to ones with a 100% propensity to do so, we are still well away from the order of magnitude of change involved in the S.N.P.'s achievement of 30% of the vote in October 1974. Even in the entire period from 1921 to 1971 an 'occupational switch' of only 16.5% was involved.

Rather than there being a direct link between occupational change and the success of the S.N.P., it would seem rather that occupational change is just one aspect of a much more ramified pattern of social change and it was this wider set of processes which helped produce a particular ideological terrain which proved fertile ground for the S.N.P. There are two ways in which this wider pattern can be seen as a unity. The first derives from the
extent to which different aspects can be seen as causally connected to each. The second is that these changes are not experienced by social actors as separate compartments but as a total experience.

In Chapter 5 I explored some of the more obvious causal connections between different aspects of social change. The principal motors of the overall process were the partly overlapping expansions of employment in the service sector and white collar employment. The first had its main impact on patterns of female employment and the second on the level of upward occupational mobility.

In order to assess the ideological impact of these patterns of change in the social structure it was necessary to put them in a context of economic security both in terms of rising standards of living and full employment and the welfare state. Moving on to the next stage is trickiest of all. The most general way to express the impact of these changes of political perceptions, and at this level of generality one has to oversimplify, is that the prism through which politics was increasingly experienced was that of a consumption-oriented style of life centred on the nuclear family which such background changes had themselves made feasible.

The arrival of television was itself an important aspect of these general patterns of social change. In particular television provided a channel of communication which on the one hand served to confirm the kind of
identities generated by the pattern of change in occupational and family life and on the other hand served to mesh these identities with identities relating directly to the level of national politics.

I have tried to avoid using terms like 'traditional' working class or middle class compared with 'new' working class or middle class as well as the invocation of general processes such as 'the decline of class based politics' or 'partisan dealignment'. Although such characterizations obviously do capture important aspects of the broad pattern of social and political change, I have been more interested in trying to trace what happens within the emerging ideological framework.

To the extent that political perceptions are not structured by ideology in the positive sense does not mean that they are to that extent chaotic or without meaning. The emerging dominant framework can be seen as an axis running from the consumer, nuclear family member, taxpayer, citizen, English, Scottish set of 'interpellations' at the 'audience' end via channels of political communication dominated by television to the state and the nation at the macro-end. This can be seen as the dominant framework which is available to give meaning to the political world in the absence of critical perspectives, class consciousness or ideology in the positive sense. This axis defines the form of ideology in the negative sense, ideology as fetishism, in Britain and in Scotland.

It is in terms of the determinants of change within
this dominant ideological axis that clues to the major 'surprises' of the last twenty years in British politics are to be found. Given my topic I have focussed almost exclusively on the first of these 'surprises', the electoral success of the S.N.P. I have tried to show the way in which the generalization of this dominant ideological field was one of the preconditions for the rapid success of the S.N.P. The discussion in Chapter 7 can be seen in these terms as an attempt to show the kind of mechanisms of ideological change at work within this dominant field. The concern was with the dynamics of fetishism, the dynamics of change in taken-for-granted, common-sense ways of viewing the political world. I suggested in particular that symbolic mechanisms combined with shifting perceptions of the state and in particular the shifting balance of expectations at a Scottish and British level constituted the most important background factors underlying the rise and fall in S.N.P. support.

I have stressed throughout the study that at an aggregate level patterns of social change in Scotland moved in parallel with those in Britain as a whole. In terms of the main object of the study - explaining the success of the S.N.P. - the purpose was to rule out explanations for this success which depended upon the existence of patterns of social change specific to Scotland. The finding can be turned the other way of course. Much of what was happening in Scotland was happening in the rest of Britain. As
already pointed out, the main effective difference between the emerging ideological field in Scotland and in the rest of Britain was precisely in the area of national symbolism and national identity.

In making the limited exploration in Chapter 7 of the way in which symbolism, and in particular national symbolism, can work to structure political perceptions in the absence of ideologically structured perspectives, I was aware that what I was saying applied just as much to the extraordinary (again, a 'surprise') about turn in the fortunes of the Thatcher government brought about by the Falklands war. This was a transformation occurring within the same dominant axis of political communication and the same dominant ideological field. Thatcherism makes much more explicit use of the terms involved - family, consumer, taxpayer - than was ever the case with the S.N.P. And the crucial difference of course is in terms of the approach to the state. I suggested at the end of the last chapter that a shift in the dominant perception of state action from expectations of the benefits of state economic management to concern about the cost of the state apparatus underlay the effectiveness of some of the dominant themes of the 'No' campaign at the Devolution Referendum of 1979. This shift, based on experience of the failure of economic management, has found its full embodiment in Thatcherism.

I am not trying to say that the appeal of the S.N.P. was like the appeal of Thatcherism, only that they can be seen as inflections of the same ideological field in
different historical circumstances and, of course, in
different countries.

Miller (1981, pp214-216) showed how, at the 1979
General Election, in addition to the presence of the S.N.P.
in Scotland, the major difference between Scottish and
English voting patterns was the extent to which Labour
performed much better in comparison with the Conservatives
than would have been expected on the basis of social
structural differences. This pattern would seem to have
been further embedded at the 1983 General Election. How
does this square with the suggestion that the success of
the S.N.P. and of Thatcherism can be seen as different
expressions of the same ideological field? One has to bring
in the consideration that as voting patterns have moved
away from traditional class loyalties, away from being in a
sense embedded in the social structure, voting trends
depend much more crucially on the way issues are framed in
the media and by politicians and governments and on the
symbolic mechanisms involved in such framing. To the extent
that the explicit emergence of the 'Scottish frame' was in
part a precondition for the success of the S.N.P. and was
further cemented by that success and in response to that
success, it will have provided a defence against the
manipulation of 'the British frame' - a manipulation which
Thatcher has used to great effect in appropriating the
family/consumer/taxpayer/citizen matrix. Two additional
considerations spring to mind in this context, both in the
form of queries for further research. The first would be the extent to which Labour's better performance in Scotland at the last two elections could be seen as a working through of the effects of the much higher proportion of the Scottish population living in local authority housing (see Table 6.4). The second would be to wonder whether the S.N.P.'s success in attracting young voters in 1974 could not be seen as a capturing of these voters for the 'Scottish frame', a frame through which they continued to see the political world even after a loss of faith in the S.N.P. itself.

The main focus of this study has been an attempt to discover the meaning of the S.N.P. surge in terms of the experience of dominant patterns of social change in the thirty years after the war. As tends to be the case, it is what has happened since the S.N.P.'s peak of success in the mid-1970s which allows us to see more clearly that this success was a product of particular social circumstances. The thirty years after the war can in hindsight be seen as a well-marked phase of Britain's and Scotland's social history. Although it was a period of rapid social change, there were certain background features, some of them the motors of this social change, which remained relatively constant - full employment, the welfare state, rising standards of living, a high level of social mobility and a fairly consensual pattern of political competition - and which were taken for granted as 'normality'. It is only in looking back from the quite different circumstances of the
early 1980s, that these taken granted features can be seen as the major shapers of experience they were. From inside that 'normality' it was extremely difficult to see the extent to which the electoral success of the S.N.P. was an embodiment of many of its assumptions rather than a challenge to it. The decline of the S.N.P. coincided with the collapse of these assumptions.

It is this historical specificity of the experience which produced the S.N.P. surge which makes looking into the future all but impossible. What is certain is that whatever the form in which the Scottish dimension is manifested in the future, it will inevitably be quite different from the confident surge which this study has attempted to understand. That is the only inevitability involved.
APPENDICES.

APPENDIX 1. The October 1974 Scottish Election Survey.

The data set of the October 1974 Scottish Election Survey was kindly made available by Dr William Miller of the University of Strathclyde under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council Survey Archive. I also acknowledge Ivor Crewe, Bo Sarlvik and James Alt, the British Election Study at the University of Essex.

The survey was carried out in the months following the General Election of October 1974. In Scotland 1170 interviews were carried out representing a response rate of 76%. Because of a need to dovetail with the British survey, the sampling design in Scotland was relatively complex, involving some weighting by strata. Since my analyses do not require precise estimation of national distributions but rely primarily on well-marked between group differences, I felt safe in not weighting the data on the grounds that any marginal improvement in statistical accuracy gained by weighting would be counter-balanced by the statistical and presentational complexities involved.

Social Grades. Tables 6.5, 6.6, 6.8, 6.9 and 6.12

- **A** Higher managerial.
- **B** Lower managerial
- **C1A** Skilled non-manual
- **C1B** Lower non-manual
- **C2** Skilled manual
- **D** Semi- and unskilled manual
APPENDIX 2. Industrial employment data.

The data on the industrial structure of employment presented in Chapter 5 (Tables 5.1 to 5.5 and passim) are derived from the series produced by C.H. Lee, the fruit of a heroic effort to recategorize occupational and industrial data presented in the Censuses from 1841 to 1971 according to the Standard Industrial Classification of 1968. Full details of the series and the data itself at regional level for Scotland and county level for England and Wales are given in Lee, 1979. What follows is no more than the briefest guide to the origins and coverage of the data.

Series A

Lee's series A data consist of a reworking of the occupation tables of the Censuses of Scotland and England and Wales from 1841 to 1911. Thus the scope of inclusion of Lee's series depends upon the Census's definition of the population to whom occupations were to be assigned.

1851 to 1871 In these Censuses, those in work plus all those out of work who had previously been in some form of employment were included in the occupation tables. This was perhaps the widest definition ever used, and included the retired, the unemployed, institutional inmates as well as 'family workers'.

1881 to 1911 In these Censuses, retired persons, persons in lunatic asylums and inmates of poor houses over the age of 60 were assigned to the 'Unoccupied' group. The 1881 Census Report estimated that had the retired been included as before, they would have amounted to 2% of those appearing in the occupation tables. Lee (1979, p10) comments that the change in practice is 'reflected in the data with a fall of about five per cent in the male activity rate and eight per cent in the female equivalent.'

A particular quirk of the 1891 Census was that 'women engaged in domestic duties about the home were for the first and last time classified not as unoccupied but under the heading of domestic service' (Lee, 1979, p9)

The occupational tables from 1881 to 1911 still included the unemployed and the long term sick who had previously been gainfully employed.

Series B. 1921 to 1971

The series B data are based on the industrial categorization first successfully introduced in the 1921 Census. Although the principle of classification employed is much more compatible with the 1968 Standard Industrial Classification, the form in which the results were
tabulated at county level in 1921 and 1931 laid a methodological minefield.

1931 In Scotland, persons 'out of work' were included in the tabulation, whereas retired persons were excluded. (Census of Scotland, 1931, Vol III, Table 16). The tabulations for the regions of England and Wales excluded 'out of work'.

For comparative purposes I have recalculated the figures for Scotland as a whole to exclude the unemployed in 1931 as well as reducing the figures for Great Britain by the number of Scottish unemployed which was previously included in the British total.

1951, 1961, 1971 Here the position is much clearer, with the industrial tables consistently referring only to people in employment.


The last two rows in Table 5.5 refer to employees in employment. As well as the unemployed, the following categories are excluded: the self-employed, husbands/wives working for wives/husbands, directors not under contract of service, partners, persons working in their own homes, former employees on the payroll as pensioners, private domestic staff working in private households and members of H.M. forces. (Regional Trends, 1980, p210) For a fuller description of the Censuses of Employment from which the figures for 1971A and 1981 are primarily derived see the Department of Employment Gazette, January 1973.
APPENDIX 3.

Socio-economic classifications.

A. INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION

The industrial classification used throughout is based closely on the 1968 Standard Industrial Classification.

1. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries.
2. Mining and quarrying.
3. Food, Drink and Tobacco.
4. Coal and petroleum products.
5. Chemicals and allied industries.
6. Metal manufacture.
7. Mechanical engineering.
8. Instrument engineering.
10. Shipbuilding and marine engineering.
11. Vehicles.
12. Metal goods not elsewhere specified.
14. Leather, leather goods and fur.
15. Clothing and footwear.
16. Bricks, pottery, glass, cement etc.
17. Timber, furniture etc.
18. Paper, printing and publishing.
19. Other manufacturing industries.
20. Construction.
22. Transport and communication.
23. Distributive trades.
24. Insurance, banking, finance and business services.
25. Professional and scientific services.
26. Miscellaneous services.
27. Public administration and defence.

N.B. 1. In the interests of continuity, Lee's series B differs in some minor respects from exact correspondence with the 1968 S.I.C. For full details of the composition of Lee's series B, see Lee, 1979.

N.B. 2. In the interests of the strict continuity demanded by the shift-share analysis, this analysis was carried out on the basis of the 1958 Standard Industrial Classification. See Appendix 5 for full details of the changes involved.
B. SECTORAL CLASSIFICATION

The allocation of the industrial orders to sectors follows fairly common-sense lines, as follows.

Agriculture, forestry and fisheries. I.O. 1
Mining and Quarrying I.O. 2
Manufacturing I.O.s 3 to 19
Construction I.O. 20
Intermediate I.O. 21 to 23
(Gas, Electricity and Water; Transport and Communications; Distribution)
Service I.O. 24 to 27

When the analysis is concerned with the distribution of industrial employment (as in Tables 5.1 to 5.4), the two sectors of mining and quarrying and manufacturing are combined to produce an industrial sector made up of Industrial Orders 2 to 18.

C. SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS.

The following brief definitions of the socio-economic groups are taken from Benjamin, The Population Census, 1971.

1. Employers and managers in central and local government, industry, commerce, etc. - large establishments.
   Persons who employ others or generally plan and supervise in non-agricultural enterprises employing twenty-five or more persons.
2. Employers and managers in industry, commerce, etc. - small establishments.
   As in 1. but in establishments employing fewer than twenty-five persons.
   Self-employed persons engaged in work normally requiring qualifications of university degree standard.
4. Professional workers - employees.
   Employees engaged in work normally requiring qualifications of university degree standard.
   Employees, not exercising general planning or supervisory powers, engaged in non-manual occupations ancillary to the professions but not normally requiring qualifications of university degree standard; persons engaged in artistic work and not employing others thereat; and persons engaged in occupations otherwise
included in Group 5 who have an additional and formal supervisory function.

Employees, not exercising general planning or supervisory powers, engaged in clerical, sales and non-manual communications and security occupations, excluding those who have additional and formal supervisory functions.

7. Personal service workers.
Employees engaged in service occupations caring for food, drink, clothing and other personal needs.

Employees (other than managers) who formally and immediately supervise others engaged in manual occupations, whether or not themselves engaged in such occupations.

Employees engaged in manual occupations which require considerable and specific skills.

Employees engaged in manual occupations which require slight but specific skills.

Other employees engaged in manual occupations.

12. Own account workers (other than professional).
Self-employed persons engaged in any trade, personal service or manual occupation not normally requiring training of university degree standard and having no employees other than family workers.

13. Farmers - employers and managers.
Persons who own, rent or manage farms, market gardens or forests, employing people other than family workers in the work of the enterprise.

14. Farmers - own account.
Persons who own or rent farms, market gardens or forests and having no employees other than family workers.

15. Agricultural workers.
Employees engaged in tending crops, animals, game or forests or operating agricultural or forestry machinery.

16. Members of the armed forces.
D. HOPE-GOLDTHORPE CLASS SCHEMA (Tables 12 and 13)

Class I  Higher-grade professionals; higher grade administrators and officials; managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors.

Class II  Lower-grade professionals and higher grade technicians; lower grade administrators and officials; managers in small business and industrial establishments and services; supervisors of non-manual employees.

Class III  Routine non-manual - largely clerical - employees in administration and commerce; sales personnel; other rank-and-file employees in services.

Class IV  Small proprietors, including farmers and smallholders; self-employed artisans; all other 'own-account' workers apart from professionals.

Class V  Lower-grade technicians whose work is to some extent of a manual character; supervisors of manual workers.

Class VI  Skilled manual wage-workers

Class VII  Manual wage-workers in industry in semi- and unskilled grades; agricultural workers.

(Adapted from Goldthorpe, 1980, pp39-41)
APPENDIX 4.

REGIONAL COMPOSITION

A. British regions.

The regions of Britain used in this analysis are those used by Lee in the published version of his data set. They are the result of an attempt to get as close to the New Standard regions as defined in April 1974 in England and Wales as was possible while retaining the county (the only unit on the basis of which the series was possible) as the basic unit. (For a fuller account see Lee, 1979, pp39-46.)

Thus the British regions are defined as follows:


EAST ANGLIA Cambridge, Huntingdon, Norfolk, Suffolk.

SOUTH-WEST Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, Gloucester, Wiltshire, Dorset.


EAST MIDLANDS Derbyshire, Nottingham, Leicester, Lincoln, Northamptonshire, Rutland.

NORTH-WEST Cheshire, Lancashire

YORKSHIRE AND HUMBERSIDE West Riding, East Riding, Northumberland, Durham.

WALES

SCOTLAND

B. Industrial Regions of Scotland.

1. AYRSHIRE
2. DUNBARTONSHIRE
3. LANARKSHIRE (includes Glasgow)
4. RENFREWSHIRE
5. MIDLOTHIAN (includes Edinburgh)
6. WEST LOTHIAN
7. CLACKMANNANSHIRE
8. STIRLINGSHIRE
9. FIFE
10. ANGUS (includes Dundee)
11. ABERDEENSHIRE (including Aberdeen City)
12. BORDERS Berwick, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Peebles.
APPENDIX 5.

Shift share analysis.

The shift-share analysis reported in Chapter 5 was based upon the industrial order by socio-economic group matrices for Scotland for 1961 and 1971. The Census Tables involved are:


The data from these two tables refers only to the population in employment.

Where reference is made to individual Occupation Codes or Occupational Groups, the data is derived from:
2. Census of Scotland 1971, Economic Activity Tables, Table 5.

These tables refer to the economically active population i.e. including the unemployed.

The 'computational recipe' for the shift-share analysis is as follows:

For each socio-economic group (SEG) and for each industrial order (IO)

1. Calculate the the number in the SEG in 1961 as a proportion of all workers in the IO in 1961.
2. Apply this proportion to the total 1971 employment figure for the IO i.e this gives a hypothetical figure for workers in the SEG who are in the IO in 1971 under the assumption that they still made up the same proportion of employment in the IO in 1971 as in 1961.
3. From this hypothetical figure for 1971 subtract the actual numbers in the SEG in the IO in 1961. This gives the change in numbers which would have taken place if the proportion had remained the same between 1961 and 1971. This is the INDUSTRIAL COMPONENT and must reflect change in the size of the IO as measured by total employment in it.
4. Subtract the hypothetical figure for 1971 from the actual figure for 1971. This gives the change in the number of workers in the SEG in the IO which cannot be
accounted for by the change in total employment in the IO and thus must be a reflection of change in the proportion of the SEG in employment in the industry. This is the OCCUPATIONAL COMPONENT.

In the present analysis, the group made up of, for example, females in SEG 9 has been treated in exactly the same way as the group made up of all workers in SEG 9 i.e. in both cases change in total (male and female) employment in the industry has been taken as the relevant indicator of change in the size of the industry.

In a more complex model it would be possible to take changes in male and female employment in each industry as the relevant indicators, and by comparing the results with those of the present approach (which takes total employment in the industry as the indicator of industrial change) arrive at a specification of processes of substitution between male and female labour.

Industrial classification used for shift-share analysis.

Since the major changes between the 1958 (used at the 1961 Census) and 1968 (used at the 1971 Census) Standard Industrial Classifications consisted of subdividing the 1958 Orders, a greater degree of continuity could be maintained by converting as far as possible the 1971 tabulation back to the 1958 Classification as used in the 1961 tabulation.

The recombinations of industrial order involved were:

1968 Orders 4, Coal and petroleum products and 5, Chemicals and allied industries were recombined to the old Chemicals and allied industries order.

1968 Orders 7,8 and 9, Mechanical, Instrument and Electrical Engineering were recombined to the old Engineering and Electrical Goods order.

The following changes at the minimum list heading (M.L.H.) level were made to the 1971 industry by occupation matrix in order to maximise its continuity with the 1961 distribution.

1190 male and 160 female members of M.L.H. 221, Vegetable and animal oils and fats were transferred back from I.O. 3 (Food, drink and tobacco) to I.O. 4,5 (Chemicals and allied industries)

2640 male and 560 female members of M.L.H. 390, Engineers' small tools and gauges were transferred back from I.O. 12 (Metal goods not elsewhere specified) to I.O. 7,8,9 (Engineering and electrical goods).

3680 male and 4740 female members of M.L.H.s 864, Advertising and market research, 865, Other business
services, and 866, Central offices not allocable elsewhere were transferred back from I.O. 24 (Insurance, banking, finance and business services) to I.O. 26 (Miscellaneous services). Thus for the purposes of the shift-share analysis I.O. 24 consists of Insurance, banking and finance rather than of Insurance, banking, finance and business services.

B. Socio-economic group classification used for shift-share analysis.

Changes in the socio-economic group classification between 1961 and 1971 were not quite so troublesome. The only major change and the only change for which it was possible to adjust was that 'Coal mines - other underground workers' and 'Coal miners (so described)' were reclassified from S.E.G. 10 (semi-skilled) in 1961 to S.E.G. 9 (skilled) in 1971. It was decided to follow the 1971 usage and change the 1961 distribution accordingly. Thus 23,860 workers in the two groups in 1961 were transferred from S.E.G. 10 to S.E.G. 9.

The only other sizable change in classification was that pharmacists, dispensers and opticians with the employment status of employee or apprentice were classified in S.E.G. 5 in 1961 but were accorded professional status and classified to S.E.G. 4 in 1971. No attempt was made to adjust for this change in the analysis, so the it will have artificially inflated somewhat the increase in professional workers. The numbers involved were around 1,000 in 1961 and 1,600 in 1971.
NOTES

Notes to Chapter 1.

1. The fullest account is in Miller (1981) which also contains a bibliography of works relating to Scottish electoral behaviour.

2. The party shares of the vote in each constituency are taken from the successive volumes of the Nuffield series 'The British General Election of ....' (Butler and King, 1965 and 1966; Butler and Pinto-Duchinsky, 1971; Butler and Kavanagh, 1974, 1975 and 1980)

3. This reorganization has of course been superseded by the much more radical reallocation of 1983.

4. The more normal measure of dissimilarity would be the positive percentage difference, equal to half the percentage difference. Since the analysis only takes account of information on the rank order of the dissimilarities the use of one measure as opposed to another makes no difference to the results.

5. The program used was MINISSA, originated by E.E. Roskam at the University of Nijmegen, as implemented in the MDS(X) Series of Multi-dimensional Scaling Programs maintained by the Program Library Unit of Edinburgh University.

MINISSA, a non-metric multidimensional scaling program, implements one of the most basic and straightforward of the family of multi-dimensional scaling algorithms. Given that the similarity measures to be scaled were numerically derived, a metric MDS program could have been employed. The non-metric version was preferred because it makes fewer assumptions about the data and because it gives more information about the achieved solution.

The MINISSA program implements one of the most basic and straightforward of the family of MDS algorithms.

In the present case, as pointed out in the text, the program can be seen as attempting to reproduce the rank order of percentage differences between region/election voting patterns in terms of the rank order of distances between the points representing the region/election data points in the solution space (Fig. 1). If Figure 1 represented a 'perfect' solution, the two most similar region/election voting patterns would be represented by the two points closest together in the solution space, the second most similar by the second closest together and so on. The program attempts to achieve by an iterative 'trial and error' process a solution as close as possible to this perfect solution.
The index of disparity between the rank ordering of the dissimilarities in the data (between voting patterns and the present case) and the rank order of distances between the data points in the solution is known as the stress value, and it is this value which the program attempts to minimise. The stress can be regarded as a measure of the extent to which the solution deviates from a perfect solution. The more dimensions which are specified for the solution space, the easier it is for the program to reproduce the rank order of dissimilarities in terms of distances in the space and thus the lower will be the stress value. For purposes of interpretation however, one wants a solution with as few dimensions as possible. The number of dimensions chosen is always a compromise between the demands of adequate reproduction of the data and the demands of ease of interpretation. There is no rigorous method for making this decision and since we are using the technique simply to show broad patterns in the data (rather than to find any underlying 'dimensionality' in the data — we know what that is, four), two dimensions are adequate. The two dimensional solution had a stress value of .131, just inside the level of .15 which is a rule of thumb limit for a reasonable solution. Over two thirds, .085, of this total stress or 'unscaleability in two dimensions' of .131 was contributed by just four of the region/election data points, the North-East and Tayside in 1970, February 1974 and 1979 and to a much more minor extent, the Highlands and Islands in October 1974. So to the extent that these contributions to stress represent idiosyncracy in voting patterns beyond that which can be accommodated in a two-dimensional solution, most of it is concentrated in the geographically peripheral areas.

The final step was to input the co-ordinates produced by the MDS program to a program specially written using the graph-plot routines of the E.R.C.C. Graphics Package.

6. The topic is explored by Bealey and Sewel (1981) who base their use of the term on the work of Michael Dyer.

7. Miller pinpointed a different aspect of the varying sources of support for the S.N.P. With reference to the October 1974 General Election he points out that

"The working class was more SNP than the middle class on the periphery but less SNP in Strathclyde. However, the strongest class pattern was a pro-SNP vote by workers in Conservative areas balanced by a pro-SNP vote by the middle-class in Labour areas. " (Miller, 1981, p196)

Miller does not agree with the tactical voting interpretation but tends to see the pattern as another exemplification of the operation of 'balanced cross-pressures' deriving from the influence of constituency
class environments. Whatever the explanation, it is the simple fact that the S.N.P. does seem to have been able to stand for different things in different areas which is most interesting. In other words, the meaning of voting S.N.P. does not seem to have been the same in different parts of the country.

8. See Miller's discussion of the widening contrast between Scotland and England in the gap between support for Labour and Conservative (Miller, 1981, pp232-233). The 1983 Election has of course only confirmed the North-South polarization in British politics.

9. It might be thought that on strict grounds of symmetry, one should also include in the overall measure of dissimilarity changes in vote when a party had stood in both seats at the first election and in neither at the second. It is a difficult point to answer but my feeling is that the votes lost when a party fails to stand add little information to that obtained from changes in the votes of the other parties reflecting this failure to stand.

10. The same multi-dimensional scaling procedure (see Note 5) was used to produce Figures 2 as to produce Figure 1.

In this case however the stress value of .191 for the two-dimensional solution was rather higher than one would normally be happy with. Faced with the prospect of presenting and interpreting a three dimensional solution however and given that the two-dimensional solution is readily interpretable, pragmatism triumphed over methodological purity.

We can put ourselves on slightly firmer ground by noting that two thirds (.132) of the total stress was contributed by seven constituencies.

The distances between these constituencies in particular and all the other constituencies in the plot are thus misrepresentations of the similarity of their patterns of voting change to those of all the other constituencies in proportion to their contribution to total stress, i.e.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeenshire West</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govan</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banff</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Isles</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeenshire East</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh South</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The patterns of voting change in these constituencies then are sufficiently idiosyncratic to be to an extent unscaleable in the two dimensions allowed. The likely reasons are readily enough identifiable in most of them,
and its contribution to total stress does not prevent Edinburgh South from clustering fairly close to the other Edinburgh constituencies which were scaled.

11. Miller's only comment on the relationship was that "The more adventurous sections - male, and above all, young had switched more strongly to the SNP." (Miller, 1981, p149)

With respect to support for devolution the same theme was repeated "Men and young people were both pro-independence and pro-devolution. We may guess that these social groups are more restive, more adventurous, more willing to accept or demand change." (Miller, 1981, p116)

Notes to Chapter 2.

1. My use of the phrase 'the national level of analysis' is inspired by Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain's more specifically economic usage. Their relatively common-sense notion is well expressed in the following passage

"What are 'national' economies as a level of analysis? They are the level at which certain crucial parameters and conditions of operation of an economy based on capitalist relations of production are determined; these determinations are various and are by no means necessarily 'economic' (in the classic sense). The concept of 'national' economy does not designate an essence (any more than does the concept 'nation' - moreover the term national is merely on of convenience). What defines such an economy are the factors which operate to determine and delimit the forms and conditions of economic performance within a region. These factors are not given and may vary ...
(Cutler et al, 1979, pp244-245)

or even more concisely

"For us 'national' economy signifies not a pre-given unity of a people or the state as the horizon of a paid or vocational state functionary but a series of precise effectivities with a limit." (ibid, p259)

2. For reasons of space and because of the topic's rather
unproductive import I have refrained from including a preliminary survey of how the conceptual relations between society and the nation have been handled (or rather not handled) by non-Marxist social science. The general position is summed up in Elias' observation that

"... many twentieth century sociologists, when speaking of "society" no longer have in mind (as did their predecessors) a "bourgeois society" or a "human society" beyond the state, but increasingly the somewhat diluted ideal image of a nation-state" (Elias, 1978, p241)

The problem has been addressed in terms of classical social theory by Smith (1983) and in an insightful but characteristically cryptic account by Touraine (1981). Tilly (1975) gives a concise account of the unit of analysis problem as exemplified in the theoretical approaches known as "political modernisation" or "political development".

Edward Shils' (1975) specification of his usage of such notions as integration and centre and periphery is a particularly revealing view from 'inside' a dominant tradition. The element of intellectual autobiography in his account makes clear his direct debt to German idealism.

For an analytical survey of primarily non-Marxist usage of the terms centre and periphery see Claval (1980).

3. As Perry Anderson points out, in discussing Althusser's treatment of historical temporality

"Althusser characteristically assumes that the 'social totality' in question is equivalent to a 'social formation', in other words that national ensembles form the natural boundaries of historical investigation" (Anderson, 1980, p76)

The contrasting positions of Dobb and Sweezy as well as other contributions to the 'transition from feudalism' debate can be found in Hilton (ed), 1978. On Wallerstein's tendency towards 'externalism' see Skocpol, 1977 - quoted in Note 12 below. An especially clear exemplification of the terms of the debate is presented by Brenner (1977).

4. Among the works dealing with dependency theory and wider aspects of the debate the following were especially helpful: Banaji (1977, 1980); Booth (1975); Brewer (1980); Foster-Carter (1974, 1978); Friedman (1976); O'Brien (1975); Roxborough (1976). Among the 'protagonists' Frank's 'auto-critique' and reply to his critics contained in the 'Introductory Questions' of Frank (1978) was particularly useful. In terms of the 'classics' of neo-Marxist dependency theory my main sources were Frank (1967, 1975).
and Amin (1974).
For a debate on the Scottish Highlands conducted in precisely these terms see especially McKenzie (1977).

5. The immediate context is Marx's discussion of the effect of fluctuations in the price of raw materials on the rate of profit and more particularly on the "Revaluation and Devaluation of Capital: Release and Tying up of Capital" although the point can be seen as having wider relevance.

6. For interesting 'internal' confirmation of the timing of the writing of Capital in these terms, see Engels' need, editing Volume III in the 1890s, to point out in a footnote "the new mania for general protective tariffs" and "the cartels formed by manufacturers in whole branches of production for the regulation of production and profits too" which had arisen since Marx had written in 1865

"All ideas of a common, all-embracing and far-sighted control over the production of raw materials - a control that is in fact incompatible, by and large, with the laws of capitalist production, and hence remains forever a pious wish, or is at most confined to exceptional common steps in moments of great and pressing danger and perplexity - all such ideas give way to the belief that supply and demand will regulate one another"

(Capital, Volume III, p215)

7. And of course it is not insignificant that Marx moved from Germany, which in many ways he saw as representing the past, to a Britain which in many ways he saw as representing the future.

8. Marx's stormy relationship with Lassalle, characterised by Lichtheim as:

"A Ricardian socialist in economics, an old-fashioned idealist Hegelian in philosophy, and an unashamed nationalist in politics, Lassalle stood for a synthesis of patriotism and radicalism which was immensely attractive to many Germans of his generation, though plainly quite incompatibility with international socialism as Marx and Engels understood it."

(Lichtheim, 1971, p86)

could almost be seen as the expression in personal terms of Marx's problems with the 'national level'.

9. I realise that this is only one simplified aspect of the extraordinarily complex relationship between the two levels of analysis in the Grundrisse and Capital. Short of a 'methodological atlas' to these works I have found Zelenyi (1980) to be the best guide.
10. The above represents what is perhaps Marx's most elaborate and explicit treatment of the issue. The historical and methodological switching of priority between industrial and merchant's capital or simply between industry and commerce is signalled again and again in the Grundrisse and Capital. One could almost see the issue as perfect opportunity for the display of Marx's pleasure in apparent paradox.


12. Theda Skocpol makes this point in the course of a more general critique of Wallerstein's framework:

"... Wallerstein hoped to overcome the worst faults of modernisation theories by breaking with their overemphasis on national states and their tendency toward ahistorical model building. Ironically though, he himself ends up by reproducing the old difficulties in new ways. Thus strong states and international political domination assume crucial roles in his theory - though, just like the developmentalists he reduces politics to economic conditions and to the expression of the will of dominant groups within each national arena." (Skocpol, 1977, p1069)

Here Wallerstein is characterised as breaking his own methodological precepts by reifying the national unit both from the 'inside' and from the 'outside'.

Skocpol then goes on to make a more general point which because of the way it illuminates the general argument is worth reproducing in full:

"How could these things happen, given Wallerstein's original intentions? The answer, I suggest, is the "mirror image" trap that plagues any attempt to create a new paradigm through direct, polemic opposition to an old one. Social science may, as is often said, grow through polemics. But it can also stagnate through them, if innovators uncritically carry over outmoded theoretical categories (e.g. "system") and if they define new ones mainly by searching for the seemingly direct opposite of the old ones (e.g. "world system" vs. "national system"). For what seems like a direct opposite may rest on similar assumptions, or may lead one (through the attempt to work with an artificial, too extreme position) around full circle to the thing originally opposed. The better way to proceed is to ask what new units of analysis - probably not only one, but several, perhaps changing
with historical points of reference - can allow one to cut into the evidence in new ways in order to investigate exactly the problems or relationships that older approaches have neglected" (Skocpol, 1977, p1089).

Skocpol's points could be seen as applying to some aspects of the more general 'internalist'/externalist' debate.

12. As Wallerstein puts it

"Scotland was a classic case - Lowland Scotland that is - of "development by invitation..." (Wallerstein, 1980b, p633)

"Scotland's secret was not structural; it was conjunctural. The Lowlands were in a position after 1745, in Hobsbawm's phrase, "to take advantage of the exceptionally favourable European and British conjuncture of the end of the eighteenth century" (Wallerstein, 1980b, p639)

See also Smout (1980a,1980b). Although I am not qualified to enter into the niceties of the discussion between Wallerstein and Smout on the crucial factors underlying Scotland's move from periphery to core, from the point of view of this study the main point is that from the Union onwards Scotland's pattern of development was dominated by the fact of occupying a structural niche at the heart of the British Empire.

14. As Scott and Hughes point out

"The Scottish economy has moved away from being a more or less separate economy in the nineteenth century - at least as autonomous as any politically independent nation might have been - and has become merely a relatively autonomous subsystem of the British economy" (Scott and Hughes, 1980, p260)
Notes to Chapter 3.

1. Obviously this discussion of the relation between objective reality and its ideological representation could be greatly extended. For more nuanced treatments see: Fine, 1980, pp4-6; Hall, 1977a, p323ff; Hall, 1977b, pp61-64.

2. Carol Johnson tackles this issue head on, her purpose being

"to explore the relationship between two apparently contradictory elements in Marx's thought; namely his belief that proletarian revolutionary consciousness will develop in a relatively straightforward way under capitalism, and his argument, in his later economic writings that the fetishised nature of capitalist social relations gives rise to forms of ideological mystification which significantly conceal the basic features of the capitalist mode of production." (Johnson, 1980, p70)

Marx seems to have escaped the dilemma by maintaining a faith that effect of the development of objective alienation as the antagonisms sharpened would be to smash through the relatively feeble resistance offered by fetishistic consciousness. The universal, world-wide nature of the preconditions for such a development specified by Marx are often understressed, however, and we can usefully link this discussion back to that of the previous chapter in terms of a chain or nested set of conditions of possibility for the existence of revolutionary ideas presented by Marx in "The German Ideology". The immediate precondition for the existence of revolutionary ideas is, simply enough, the existence of a revolutionary class. (Collected Works, Vol 5, p60). For 'the premises of the latter' we are referred back to passages dealing with the historical role of alienation (Collected Works, Vol 5, p47). Then follows an account of the 'practical premises' for the development of alienation to generate a revolutionary class.

"This "estrangement" ("Entfremdung") ... can, of course, only be abolished given two practical premises. In order to become an "unendurable" power, i.e. a power against which men make a revolution, it must necessarily have rendered the great mass of humanity "propertyless", and moreover in contradiction to an existing world of wealth and culture; both these premises presuppose a great increase in productive power, a high degree of its development."

The passage which follows develops this final premise in a universal 'world-historical' sense

"And, on the other hand, this development of
productive forces (which at the same time implies the actual empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being) is an absolutely necessary practical premise, because without it privation, want is merely made general, and with want the struggle for necessities would begin again, and all the old filthy business would necessarily be restored; and furthermore, because only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which on the one side produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the propertyless mass (universal competition), making each nation dependent on the revolutions of others, and finally puts world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones. Without this, 1) communism could only exist as a local phenomenon; 2) the forces of intercourse themselves could not have developed as universal, hence unendurable powers: they would have remained home-bred "conditions" surrounded by superstition; and 3) each extension of intercourse would abolish local communism. Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples "all at once" and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with them.” (Collected Works, 5, pp48-49)

3. I have borrowed the term 'penetration' from Paul Willis's notion of 'cultural penetration' (Willis, 1977, pp120-121) which has parallels with the my notion of 'ideology as penetration' although Willis himself (1977, p166) uses the term 'ideology' primarily in the negative sense - for him it is ideology which is penetrated.

4. Here, I list only the most directly influential sources for these ideas. Probably the most philosophically coherent working out of the implications of communicative context for the generation of belief systems is that of Jurgen Habermas. Most useful was "Legitimation Crisis" (1976), the paper "Legitimation Problems in the Modern State" (1979) and the brief paper "The Public Sphere" (1974) The implications of Habermas' concept of 'the public sphere' for an understanding of working-class consciousness are discussed in Knodler-Bunte's (1975) presentation of Negt and Kluge's conception of 'the proletarian public sphere'. Also useful was Alvin Gouldner's "The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology" (1976).

From a totally different direction, Phillip Converse's work injected mainstream American electoral sociology for a while with a concern for the effects of communicative context on the generation of political belief systems. See, especially Converse, 1964; Campbell, Converse, Miller, Warren and Stokes, 1960.
5. The kind of transitions involved find an extreme form of illustration in Herbert Marcuse's account, written in Germany in the 1930s, of what he saw as the continuities involved in the transition from liberal to totalitarian thought. This ideological transition had its economic foundations in

'the transformation of capitalist society from mercantile and industrial capitalism based on the free competition of independent individual entrepreneurs, to monopoly capitalism, in which the changed relations of production (and especially the large "units" such as cartels and trusts) require a strong state mobilizing all means of power' (Marcuse, 1968, p18)

Marcuse saw this shift from liberal to monopoly capitalism as underpinning an ideological shift from liberal to totalitarian thought in which

"important elements of liberalism are picked up and then reinterpretated and elaborated in the manner required by the altered economic and social conditions" (ibid, p12)

The most relevant, and perhaps most central, element which is transferred is 'naturalism' - a belief in the natural basis of social relations.

Behind the economic forces and relations of capitalist society liberalism sees "natural" laws which will demonstrate their entire salutory naturalness if only they are left to develop freely and without artificial disturbance. (ibid, p12)

... Liberalism believes that through adaptation to these "natural laws" the conflict between different wants, the strife between the general interest and private interests, as well as social inequality are ultimately overcome in the all-encompassing harmony of the whole, and that the whole thus becomes a blessing for the individual. Here, in the centre of the liberalist system, society is interpreted through its reduction to "nature" in its harmonizing function: as the evasive justification of a contradictory social order." (ibid, p13)

In totalitarian thought, the natural basis of society is the folk (i.e the Volk or nation).

"'Nature' is the first in the series of restricting conditions to which reason is subordinated. The unconditioned authority of the state seems to be the last. .. The naturalistic myth begins by apostrophizing the natural as 'eternal' or 'divinely-willed'. This holds especially for the totality of the folk, whose
naturalness is one of the myth's primary claims. .... The folk is nature itself as the substructure of history, as eternal substance, the eternally constant in the continual flux of economic and social relations." (Marcuse, 1968, pp23-24)

6. See especially Perry Anderson's establishment of the case that

"the general form of the representative state - bourgeois democracy - is itself the principal ideological lynchpin of Western capitalism" (Anderson, 1976, p28)

7. This is well brought out by Webb (1977, pp102-103). See also my discussion in the afterword to Chapter 6 below.

Notes to Chapter 4.

1. See for example Runciman's (1966, pp60-67) discussion of the prevailing mood in the 1920s and 1930s, pinpointing the existence of

"a widespread feeling that a high rate of chronic unemployment was a natural calamity which the political nostrums of any faction or party could do no more than mildly alleviate" (Runciman, 1966, p62)

2. The foregoing is a condensation of post-war trends in responses to 'salience' questions set by Gallup and published in Gallup, ed., 1976.

3. See the discussion in Chapter 7, p308, below.

4. My main source for the above paragraph has been Kellas (1975), Chapters 9 and 11 in particular.

5. For further elaboration of the association between the 'framing' and 'fetishism' effects of ideology the contribution of Stuart Hall would seem to be especially fruitful. See especially Hall, 1977a and 1982.

6. For further discussion of the political effect of 'Scottish identity' see Chapter 5, section IV and Chapter 6, section IV below.
Notes to Chapter 5.

1. See especially Gouldner 'Reciprocity and autonomy in functional theory' (Gouldner, 1967) A more recent contribution has been that of Anthony Giddens - 'Functionalism: apres la lutte', 'Towards a theory of structuration', 'Positivism and its critics.' (all in Giddens, 1979).

2. Most of the empirical analysis in this chapter is based on work carried out by the author as part of the project 'A socio-graphic account of the modern Scottish social structure' funded by the S.S.R.C. (HR6948). Fuller accounts of the processes involved can be found in the Project Working Papers: 1, Demography; 2, Industrial and Occupational Structure; 3. Education and Social Mobility.

3. David Lockwood's (1964) distinction between system integration and social integration is obviously highly relevant here. Useful in the present context is Gidden's specification in causal terms of levels of 'feed-back loop' of increasing reflexivity (Giddens, 1979, p116).

On the Marxist side, the issue has received a great deal of recent attention in the context of E.P. Thompson's assault on Althusser. See especially Anderson's (1980) discussion in 'Arguments in English Marxism'.

4. This comes very close to Cutler et als. (1978) definition of the 'national level' as a level of economic effectivity. See Chapter 2 Note 1 above.

5. This discussion has been heavily influenced by Gouldner's discussion of exogenous and endogenous sources of social change:

"In the analysis of system changes, a distinction is commonly made between endogenous and exogenous sources of change, that is, between forces internal and external to the system. Our emphasis here on degrees of functional autonomy and degrees of system interdependence may be linked up with this distinction between exogenous and endogenous forces, and seen in its further ramifications for the analysis of change.

In noting that the functional autonomy of parts and system interdependence are matters of degree we, in effect, state that exogenous and endogenous factors are not qualitatively but quantitatively different. That is, they are simply at opposite ends of the same continuum of interdependence and functional autonomy. Hence, specific system parts may be both partly exogenous and partly endogenous. Thus, if exogenous forces are peculiarly important to the understanding of system change, as they are commonly
held to be in Parsons' and other system models, any element in the system may be important in understanding system change to the extent that it possesses a degree of exogenosity, though all need not be equally so. ...social systems may be looked upon as composed of parts having varying degrees of functional autonomy and interdependence; thus the difference between the external and internal, the "inside" and "outside" of the system, is not an absolute distinction, and the thickness or permeability of the system boundaries varies at different zones." (Gouldner, 1964, p167)

For some reflections on the 'systemic status' of the Scottish political system see Kellas, 1973, Chapter 1.

6. Payne's (1977a) initial publication and interpretation of the series was the occasion for an assault on his methodological and theoretical procedures by Jones (1977). For Payne's reply see Payne (1977b)

7. Jones (1977, Table 5 and p404) calculated that Scotland's excess of unskilled manual workers over England and Wales was not a reflection of differing industrial structures but was predominantly a reflection of a higher proportion of unskilled manual workers within Industrial Orders in Scotland.


9. The Oxford Mobility Study

The study was carried out by the Social Mobility Group at Nuffield College, Oxford and data was derived from a survey in 1972 into occupational mobility among men aged 20 to 64 and resident in England and Wales. A sample of a stratified two-stage design was drawn using the Electoral Registers as the sampling frame. Interviews producing usable information were conducted with 10,309 men representing a response rate of 81.8%. (Goldthorpe, 1980, p39)

10. The Scottish Mobility Study

The study was carried out by a team based at Aberdeen University. In conception, the study was an offshoot of the Oxford study, although its approach diverged over time. The survey was carried out in 1974/75. Interviews were conducted with 4,887 males aged 20 to 64 resident in Scotland (except for the Outer Isles) which represented a response rate of 81.2%.

11. The following is a condensation of data initially presented in Payne and Payne, 1981. The aggregate trends in recruitment to non-manual first jobs are shown in Figure 1
of Payne and Payne, 1983.

12. The follow-up surveys to the 1947 Scottish Mental Survey.

The 1947 Scottish Mental Survey tested all children in Scotland born in 1936. From this total a sub-sample known as the Six Day Sample was drawn consisting of all children born on the first day of the even months of 1936 — a total of 1208 children. This group were then contacted annually by home visitors drawn largely from the teaching profession. Together with co-operation from schools and the Ministry of Employment, this produced an extremely high rate of follow-up. For example, by the time of the first report on the follow-up (MacPherson, 1958) focussing on the experiences of the sample up to age 18, information on employment was complete for all but 10 of the sample (MacPherson, 1958, p15). By the end of the survey, after the thirteenth schedule issued in 1963, contact had been maintained with 1104 informants from a possible 1198, an astonishing success rate of 92% over 16 years.


14. For example the 'relative income' hypothesis associated in particular with Easterlin's approach and the 'new home economics' model. For an assessment of the adequacy of these approaches in accounting for post-war fertility swings in Britain see Ermisch (1982).
Notes to Chapter 6.

1. Of particular help have been Zweig (1961); Klein (1965); Willmott and Young (1973). The major inspiration has been The Affluent Worker study. For a defence of this usage see Note 2 below.

2. I present the processes involved in this extremely general way in order to avoid the immensely complex set of problems involved in characterizing 'the traditional working class'. Any brief attempt to do so is bound to create an impression which is too homogenous.

3. The inspiration of the following section is primarily The Affluent Worker study (Goldthorpe et al., 1968, 1969, 1970). The degree to which the findings of this study are generalizable is obviously a matter of controversy. The authors themselves are relatively cautious, especially in generalizing to skilled manual occupations.

In partial justification of extending the implications of their research to the working class as a whole, can be cited Goldthorpe's characterization of Hope-Goldthorpe Classes VI and VII (skilled and other manual) based on the follow-up interviews to the Oxford Mobility Study

"Work was not for them a sphere of life within which their ultimate goals were located; rather these goals lay outside their work, chiefly in fact in their domestic and family lives, and the importance that then attached to work was that of being the essential means to their realization." (Goldthorpe, 1980, p239).

I can do no more than express a conviction that the insights gained or confirmed in The Affluent Worker have come closer to the heart of the social trends which have underlain the shifting political patterns of the last twenty years than anything I have come across written since. My main justification for citing the study so monotonously is that it is much easier to follow the thread of the argument in this way.

4. The fact that the Affluent Worker sample were not restricting their fertility to any great extent is quite consistent with these arguments given the timing of the survey, the early 1960s when employment opportunities for married women were only beginning their rapid increase.

5. In assigning women respondents to a social grade I have assigned unmarried women to the social grade of their own job and married women to that of their husband's.

6. It is worth mentioning here that the political issue
which most fully embodies the consumer orientation is inflation. Moreover inflation is an issue which superficially appears to affect everyone equally. In this sense it is also, as Morley suggests in the above passage, the national economic issue par excellence. During the period of the S.N.P.'s greatest success, in fact for much of the late 1960s and, in particular, the early and mid-1970s, this one issue dominated responses to the standard opinion poll survey question as to which was the most important problem facing the government or the country. In the mid 1970s, around 75% of replies to this poll question consistently named one or another aspect of economic policy and as Alt points out:

'From the fourth quarter of 1972 until nearly the end of 1977 prices constituted at least three quarters of economic responses, and sometimes as much as nine tenths.' (Alt, 1979, p49)

The issue of prices similarly dominated the rather more specific questions on the importance of 12 named issues in influencing respondents voting decisions according to the October 1974 Scottish Election Survey. 29 per cent of respondents named prices as being the most important issue, 54% as being fairly important and 18% as not very important. The next most important issue was Scottish government which 16% named as the most important issue influencing their vote, 47% as fairly important and 38% as not very important. Significantly, although 43% of S.N.P. voters named Scottish government as the most important issue (compared with 4% of Conservative and 5% of Labour voters) as high a proportion of S.N.P voters (28%) named prices as the most important issue as did Labour and Conservative voters. (see Chapter 7, Section II for a discussion of the problems experienced with this question in the survey).
Notes to Chapter 7.

1. The survey was carried out by Social and Community Planning Research for O.P.C.S in the summer of 1970. In Scotland, 892 interviews were achieved representing a response rate of 75% (Kilbrandon, 1973).

2. On the first method – assigning respondents to ideological 'levels' based on their degree of usage of 'ideological' terminology see Campbell et al., 1960, pp222-250; Converse, 1964, pp214-218; Nie et al., 1976, Chapter 7.

   On attitude stability, see Converse, 1964, pp238-245; Converse, 1969.

   On 'issue consistency', the third approach, see Campbell et al., 1960, Chapter 9; Converse, 1964, pp227-231; Nie et al., 1976, Chapters 8 and 9; Butler and Stokes, 1969, pp195-199.

3. Nie, Verba and Petrock (1976, also Nie and Andersen, 1976) claimed to have identified a marked rise in issue consistency (i.e. mean inter-item gamma) in the American electorate in the early 1960s. It was subsequently suggested (Bishop, Tuchfarber and Oldendick, 1978; see also Sullivan, Pieresen and Marcus, 1978) that this could have had a great deal to do with a change in question wording. For the rather inconclusive continuation of the debate see Nie and Rabjohn, 1979.


5. Edelman (1971, p2) sees his approach as building on the insights of symbolic interaction theory, structural anthropology and phenomenological sociology. My reason for using the work of Edelman and Bennett (1975) is entirely pragmatic. Their approach seems to take us closer to an understanding of what was going on in Scotland. Despite the flowering of Marxist scholarship in areas not too far from 'the symbolic', its highly theoretical nature and its tendency to 'over-structure' its topic does not help to make it immediately useful.

6. For the most ambitious attempt to ground Scotland's 'state of mind' in its historical experience see Nairn, 1981, Chapters 2 and 3. On egalitarianism and the Scottish myth see McCrone, Bechhofer and Kendrick, 1982. On Scottish educational mythology see Gray, McPherson and Raffe, 1983 pp36-47 and 300-316; also McPherson, 1982.

7. Here of course Raymond Williams' notion of the 'selective tradition' is highly pertinent. (cf Williams, 1977, pp115-120).

8. Very recently there has been a surge of interest in the

9. Whether such things can be 'measured' on the basis of standard survey techniques is questionable. See for example, Brand 1981.
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