THE TECHNIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE
IN THE WORKS OF MANDEVILLE, SHAFTESBURY AND BERKELEY

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the dramatic and dialectical techniques of the dialogues of Maneville, Shaftesbury and Berkeley. In the process of examining these writers, as well as important contemporary authorities on the genre, such as Richard Hurd, Hugh Blair, William Gilpin and Shaftesbury himself, the salient characteristics of philosophical dialogue in the neo-classical mode will emerge. The study of this genre will show not only its great intrinsic value but its historical significance in preparing the way for the greatest British masterpiece of the genre, Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

Broadly speaking, there are two important characteristics that distinguish the neo-classical dialogue from the Platonic and Ciceronian models of the genre. Firstly, the elaborate Ciceronian rhetoric is rejected in favour of a dialectic strictly subordinated to logic. Such a dialectic was recommended as the basis of prose style by the Royal Society and the cornerstone of valid reasoning by Locke. Secondly, however, there is also a rejection of Socratic hair-splitting in favour of reproducing the flow of cultivated, and broad-minded, conversation. The emphasis on rigorous logic inevitably clashed with the requirements of conversational verisimilitude but it is the very tension between these two aims that produced interesting work in the genre.

Maneville, Shaftesbury and Berkeley all found different ways of resolving this tension. For Maneville, it consists in modifying other genres, notably Restoration comedy, in order to
reproduce exchanges where logic is disguised as outrageous paradox which serves as bait to entice the evasive "honnête homme" into desultory repartee turning into serious philosophical argument when it is too late for him (or the reader) to withdraw. Berkeley solved the problem in two very different ways. In the Three Dialogues both interlocutors are rigorously logical but they also display an earnestness about the moral consequences of their philosophical opinions that makes their exchanges more dramatic than purely intellectual. It is as if both were staking all their most cherished beliefs on the final outcome of their arguments for or against immaterialism. In the Alciphron, two modes of argument are contrasted. One, that of the two Christian interlocutors, is strictly based on reason, and the other, that of the "freethinkers," is based simultaneously on emotional prejudice and "minute" logic-chopping. It is the contrast between these two modes of argument, and their variations, which is the centre of interest and lends itself to very lively conversational exchanges of every variety. Finally, it is one of the conclusions of this thesis that Shaftesbury in The Moralists evades rather than solves the problem because the exchanges in his dialogue result in a kind of Romantic monologue rather than true dialectical confrontation.
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Thesis embodies the results of my own special work, and that it has been composed by myself.

Signed Mario Palich
Date 12 October 1976
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

"A dialogue ... on some philosophical, moral, or critical subject, when it is well conducted, stands in a high rank among the works of taste; but is much more difficult in the execution than is commonly imagined. For it requires more, than merely the introduction of different persons speaking in succession. It ought to be a natural and spirited representation of real conversation; exhibiting the character and manners of the several speakers, and suiting to the characters of each that peculiarity of thought and expression which distinguishes him from another. A dialogue, thus conducted, gives the reader a very agreeable entertainment; as by means of the debate going on among the personages, he receives a fair and full view of both sides of the argument; and is, at the same time, amused with polite conversation, and with a display of consistent and well supported characters. An author, therefore, who has genius for executing such a composition after this manner, has it in his power both to instruct and to please."

Hugh Blair in Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783)

At least until the middle of the eighteenth century, the dialogue was almost as protean a literary form as the novel or short story. Comprehensive theories as to its nature were, however, remarkably scarce. In his preface to The Works of Lucian, Dryden outlined the problems of dealing critically with the dialogue in the following manner: 

I will not here take notice of the several kinds of dialogue, and the whole art of it, which would ask an entire volume to perform. This has been a work long wanted, and much desired, of which the ancients have not sufficiently informed us, and I question whether any man now living can treat it accurately.¹

According to Eugene R. Purpus, this state of affairs has not changed much since Dryden’s day though he, himself, has extensively examined the theory and practice of dialogue in English literature from 1660 to 1725.² He demonstrates that critical comments on the dialogue usually concentrated on what was considered to be its unique way of presenting abstruse matter in a "plain, easy, and familiar way" and that the word was used to designate publications which ranged from completely undramatic half sheets of questions and answers to elaborate conversations in which characters were fully developed, action was clearly indicated, and background was carefully drawn.³


2. Purpus, 47-58.

3. Purpus, 52.
The definition, based on critical observations of the period, which Purpus finally adopts is predictably open-ended:

It is a form of expository writing, commonly in a plain and familiar style, presented entirely through the conversation of two or more persons, dramatic only to the extent of attempting to present an impression of the talk of real people, and aimed at the communication of information or points of view through the interplay of arguments on more than one side of the issue at hand. ¹

It should be emphasized that Purpus's definition is especially applicable to the dialogue in the eighteenth century and not far from the conclusions reached about the dialogue form by the neo-classical critic Richard Hurd.

Apart from Shaftesbury, Hurd is probably the most interesting and consistent theoretician of the dialogue form in the eighteenth century. For Hurd, dialogue was an expository literary method used by the Ancients to render abstruse subjects "either of morals or government" more palatable and entertaining. He does, however, distinguish between the aims of "Dissertation" and "Dialogue" for in Dissertation, truth is presented directly while in Dialogue though Truth be not formally delivered ..., it may be insinuated; and a capable writer will find means to do this so effectually as, in discussing both sides of a question, to engage the reader insensibly on that

¹. Purpus, 53.
side, where the Truth lies."

As a neo-classical critic, Hurd felt that the dialogue, to be successful as a literary work, must have an air of decorous verisimilitude and that the failure of Modern dialogues, even by those whom Hurd considered the "best" practitioners of it, Shaftesbury, Berkeley, and Addison, lies in their use of characters who, being fictitious, violate the decorum of verisimilitude because when a writer undertakes to instruct or entertain us in the way of Dialogue, he obliges himself to keep up the idea, at least, of what he professes. The conversation may not have really been such as is represented; but we expect it to have all the forms of reality.

In short, for Hurd dialogue must resemble or at least give the illusion of conversation between familiar and historical personalities recognizable to the reader, though he also warns against an overly accurate depiction of character, which would only result in indecorous "mimicry". Hurd's definition of dialogue, accordingly, is predictably lofty and decorous: "An imitated, and mannered conversation between certain real, known, and respected persons, on some useful or serious subject, in an elegant, and suitably adorned, but not

2. Hurd I, xxiii.
3. Hurd I, 1.
characteristic style."¹ Such a definition, of course, emphasizes the conversational and expository elements of the dialogue at the expense of polemical and dramatic ones, so that it is probably no accident that Hurd mentions his fellow bishop, Berkeley and the aristocratically cultured Shaftesbury as the best dialogue writers of their time, but not Mandeville whose dialogues, as will be seen, are highly polemical and even aggressive in tone;² nevertheless, Hurd's notion of dialogue as a method of "insinuating truth", if not his definition by itself, does some justice to the dialectical complexities of Berkeley's and Shaftesbury's philosophical dialogues and, indeed, the philosophical dialogue in general. Before taking a closer look at philosophical dialogue, however, other forms of dialogue, elements of which are often found in philosophical dialogue itself, should be briefly investigated.

Elizabeth Merrill's doctoral dissertation on the Dialogue in English (pub. 1911) contains some useful classifications of dialogues. She broadly categorizes all dialogues as basically polemical, expository, or philosophical and considers the expository ones to be closest to the English literary genius, with Walton's Compleat Angler, Dennis's Impartial Critic, Dryden's Essay of Dramatic Poetry and Boswell's Life of Johnson as important examples. Her definition of the principal aim of the expository dialogue is as follows: "not to elicit truth through argument, but rather to set forth facts or principles or theories already existent in the mind of the writer ..."³

¹ Hurd I, 133.
² As noted before, Hurd also mentions Addison as a great dialogue writer but his highly expository Treatise on Vedals cannot properly be considered a philosophical dialogue.
As such, according to Verrill, the expository dialogue differs from the polemical only in that it lacks a "satirical or ironical"\(^1\) vein. Bartolow V. Crawford is more specific in his description of the polemical dialogue and, on the basis of his research on the political dialogues of the Commonwealth and Restoration, concludes that "Almost never was the purpose of the polemical dialogue anything but utilitarian. Its object, to defeat or discomfit an antagonist, might be in various ways, now serious, now jocular; by satire, personal or general."\(^2\) Both Verrill and Crawford agree that the polemical dialogue has little literary value\(^3\) but, as will be seen later, Mandeville's philosophical dialogues, as well as Berkeley's Alciphron, skilfully exploit polemical and satirical techniques for dialectical and philosophically legitimate purposes.\(^4\)

Perhaps a more consciously "literary" type of polemical dialogue was the "dialogue of the dead" - a form directly inspired by Lucian's famous device of setting dialogues in the after-life of Hades for

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1. Verrill, 57.


3. Verrill, 57 and Crawford, 605. Crawford also demonstrates statistically that the polemical dialogue was most common during periods of the greatest political and social stress (Crawford, 602).

4. Polemical dialogues also flourished during the Reformation but, as far as literary merit is concerned, those published in Germany (Erasmus and Hutten being among the most prominent authors of such dialogues) far outstrip any British example. Those that do achieve literary distinction, mainly in the work of Thomas Kere, are, in fact, more expository than polemical, which seems to confirm Verrill's view that the English genius is more suited to the expository than the polemical dialogue. See Charles H. Herford, *Studies in the Literary Relations of England and Germany* (Cambridge, 1866), pp. 21-70.
scurrilous and satirical purposes. It is a vexed question whether "dialogues of the dead" have more in common with the polemical type or with what Benjamin Boyce calls "Lucianic satire", much of which was written in the form of letters and "visions" as well as dialogue.¹ A glance at Boyce's comprehensive bibliography of "dialogues of the dead" and other Lucianic works shows that in England at least, these dialogues seem to have served mainly polemical purposes. Generally the French, especially Fontenelle with his "elegant cynicism,"² were much better at writing "dialogues of the dead" than their British counterparts who could boast only of Matthew Prior and, arguably, Lyttelton as masters of the form. Prior, however, wrote only four such dialogues and though Lyttelton is sometimes elegant and perceptive, he is more often dull and moralistic. If categorized with other forms of Lucianic satire, Boyce is probably right in declaring that "the common feature of these pieces ... is not their form but their subject matter and the treatment given it."³ With their subtle handling of philosophical ideas and, despite their underworld setting, worldly social mores, Fontenelle's and Prior's dialogues, in any case, seem far closer to the philosophical than the polemical type.⁴ One relatively recent book on Fontenelle, in fact, has been mildly criticized for relating his use of dialogue more to

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2. Boyce, 424.


Plato's dialectical techniques than Lucian's satirical ones.¹

As for the philosophical dialogue, Merrill defines it in the following manner, taking Plato's dialogues as ideal models: "The Platonic dialogue may almost be described as drama in which the character-element is strong, the action of minor importance, and the leading motive a struggle for intellectual and ethical truth."² She considers the philosophical dialogue as more truly a form in its own right than the expository, which she calls a literary method.³ By her insistence on the uniqueness of philosophical dialogue as an entirely separate kind of literary work, however, she seems to be using the word "form" in the sense of "genre" and, indeed, the word "method" in the sense of "form."

Although Merrill's recognition of the uniqueness of philosophical dialogue is justified, her tendency to judge all philosophical dialogues in terms of Plato's often leads her to miss out other possibilities of the genre and even to assert that "The English philosophers succeeded in different degrees in attaining power in their use of the dialogue-form, but they were always directly imitative rather than creative in their literary methods, because they were philosophers, and not poets."⁴ and that

The fundamental weakness of eighteenth-century philosophical dialogues ... is that they represent,

2. Merrill, 4.
3. Merrill, 11.
in too many cases, the attempt to pour new
wines into old bottles; it is but too evident
that their writers did not create anew to
meet new and changed conditions of life. 1
Whatever the truth of her assertions, and it is one of our aims to
demonstrate that eighteenth-century philosophical dialogues were no
more directly imitative than such typically Augustan works as Pope's
Horatian epistles, 2 one would do well to heed J.W. Cosentini's
warning against taking Plato as an "ideal model" for all other
philosophical dialogues to follow. As a criticism of Merrill's
methodology, he points out that
The safest thing to do is to avoid setting
up the dialogues of any one writer as a norm
by which to judge those of others, a rule,
however, which does not mean we cannot make
comparisons between them. Such a procedure
can be most fruitful. The above formula is
sufficiently broad and elastic to do justice
to the dialogues of all writers, for it
concentrates upon what is essential to the
genre. When Plato, Fontenelle, Fenelon,
Diderot write good dialogue, they meet on one  

1. Merrill, 65.

2. As is well known, in the eighteenth century a "man of letters"
and a "philosopher" were often the same person. Hume is a case
in point and his self-confessed ambition to succeed as a "man of
letters" was often erroneously thought (especially in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries) to be incompatible with a
sincere search for truth in his philosophical investigations.
For an interesting discussion of this aspect of Hume, see Ernest
Campbell Lossnor, "Philosophy and Biography: The Case of David
Hume" in Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by V.C.
Chappel (London and Melbourne, 1968), 6-34.
common ground, no matter how different they
may be in other respects: they have succeeded
in expressing to advantage the drastic
possibilities of the type, though they may not
use the same means in all cases to achieve
this end. 1

Purvis makes a similar point when he remarks that "A real understanding
of the growth and importance of the dialogue in English has been
prevented by a preoccupation with what might have been instead of what
actually was." 2

The eighteenth-century philosophical dialogue, in fact, was
"imitative" only in the sense of imitation where, in Dryden's words
about translators applied to dialogue writers, "the translator (if
now he has not lost that name) assumes the liberty, not only to vary
from the words and sense, but to forsake them both as he sees occasion;
and taking only some general hints from the original, to run division
on the groundwork, as he pleases." 3 At first sight, one dialogue
writer, George Stubbins, in an introduction to his Dialogue on Beauty,
seems to disapprove of imitation in Dryden's sense: "Some few
Dialogues have indeed been received with just applause; but none of
them are strict imitations of Plato, or much designed to resemble him." 4

1. John W. Cosentini, Fontenelle's Art of Dialogue (New York, 1952),
p.227. Hereinafter to be cited as Cosentini.

2. Purvis, 58.

Dryden's quotation is from his Preface to
Eikon Basilike, Translated by Several Hands
divisions into framework" means "to invent variations on a musical theme."

An examination of the dialogue, however, soon reveals that although the interlocutors, Socrates and Aspasia, are drawn from Plato's time, Stubbes's "strict" imitation is so obviously set in an eighteenth-century drawing-room that Aspasia, at one point, even anachronistically refers to Newton. Thus, for Stubbes, and probably for many other dialogue writers, "imitation" meant only an attempt to reproduce Plato's dialectical method rather than a translation. Dialectical reasoning, however, whether closely based on Plato's method or not, does not automatically constitute the slavish imitation that Merrill implies, since dialogue by its very nature is dialectical when not exclusively expository.

To return to Cosentini, his definition of Dialogue (i.e. the philosophical dialogue) is as follows: "Dialogue is a literary form that reflects to perfection the intellectual manoeuvrings (perhaps even meanderings) of the human mind in its efforts to reach the elusive truth" and he supplements this definition with a comment to the effect that "In the Dialogue two or more characters converse and argue, but actually the author of the Dialogue is conversing and arguing with himself." Cosentini's view of the dialogue form seems to hark back to Shaftesbury's notion of it as an "inward colloquy" where the author devises dramatic characters to symbolize a debate between the nobler and baser sides of his soul, thus making the dialogue serve as a form of self-examination. Even Shaftesbury's notions of philosophical

1. Stubbes, 8.
2. Cosentini, 21.
dialogue, however, are not quite so introspective as Cosentini's for, according to Shaftesbury, portraying the baser side of a human soul demands "of necessity a kind of mirror or looking-glass to the age," which, in terms of dialogue as a literary form, implies dramatic verisimilitude. Cosentini, in any case, does treat the dialogue form as a genre and, it is primarily philosophical dialogue which he treats as a genre.

Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, a writer of philosophical dialogues himself, pointed out that though the philosophical dialogue represents the form at its best, it nevertheless "suffers from a certain incompatibility between its dramatic and controversial elements, which prevents it ... from being a pure and perfect form of art." Unlike Merrill, he relates the dialogue more closely to conversation rather than to drama: "dialogue is argument and discussion purged of its chaos and intemperance. A good dialogue will therefore preserve the manner of conversation and also its dramatic qualities." Another way of saying much the same thing, though perhaps not so felicitously, was Rudolf Hirzel's definition of dialogue as "strictly speaking a discussion in the form of a conversation."

From the standpoint of conversational style, the Augustan age

1. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. by John K. Robertson and introduced by Stanley Grean, vol. I (New York, 1964), p.131. Hereinafter to be cited as Characteristics I or II. The Characteristics, which is a collection of Shaftesbury's treatises, was first published in 1711. The Robertson edition was first published in 1900.


was a period especially suited for the writing of good formal dialogue. It should be noted, for example that, especially among literary men, coffee-house discussions undoubtedly induced a lively flair for good conversation as distinctly reflected in much Augustan prose, whether even-tempered, such as Addison's or sharply ironic, such as Swift's. As Crawford points out about the inter-relationship of conversation and prose in the Augustan age,

The solid prose of the period is full of questions and answers, objections and answers, first personal pronouns; printed versions of trials sold with readiness; there was about the prose a dialogical tone adapted alike to discussion and pedagogy. This tendency shows itself in every field of thought; in politics, religion, philosophy, and criticism.

The conversational prose of the period, then, was highly favourable to the production of philosophical dialogues intended to bring philosophy, as Addison claimed of his periodical essays, "out of closets and libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at tea-tables and in coffee-houses." Furthermore, again as Crawford points out,


2. Bartholow V. Crawford, "The Use of Formal Dialogue in Narrative," Philological Quarterly, 1 (1922), 179. Also, see Sutherland, 100-01.

3. Quoted in Sutherland, 94.
In its essence the dialogue is more than a contest or exchange. The speech must approximate the speech of men; the speakers must be differentiated sufficiently to give their speech the semblance of reality. Inasmuch as the period during which the style of English prose most plainly exhibits this quality is also the period of supremacy of the dialogue, a sympathetic relationship is not hard to postulate. Mutual influence there must have been.  

If Crawford is right, it is the Augustan flair for conversational prose and its influence on dialogue writers which, more than any other factor, makes eighteenth-century philosophical dialogues far more rewarding as works of literature than the polemical ones of the Commonwealth and Restoration. Although Crawford's remarks about the relationship of prose dialogue to conversation are useful, however, they are more applicable to a relationship between dialogue and the conventions of conversational prose. This becomes evident in the light of Louis T. Milic's warning that "the term 'conversational style' provides no very adequate description of a writer's linguistic procedure" and that "The most diverse writers are lumped together as conversational and conversation itself is visualized under such varying aspects that nothing emerges but a sense of generalized approval." Milic's well-argued view, which is also supported by


strong evidence from the field of linguistics, suggests that Crawford's remarks should be amended to apply more to the popularizing tendency of early eighteenth-century prose.

Part of the popularizing tendency, however, was based on notions of conversational good-breeding and ideal conversation promoted by the highly-polished talk of coffee-house conversationalists. Good conversation, in fact, was considered not merely as entertainment but as the basis of social intercourse in a manner related to the older, and more narrow, aristocratic concept of good-breeding. Whatever "good-breeding" may have meant in aristocratic social mores, for Augustan literary men it seemed to mean, amongst other things, conversational good-manners. Thus William Temple, aristocrat and amateur man of letters, could write in his unfinished "Heads Designed for an Essay on Conversation" that "Good breeding is as necessary a quality to accomplish all the rest, as grace in motion or dancing" and add that the "good sense" of "easy and agreeable conversation" is harder to achieve than conversation spiced with the "meaner parts" of "wit" and "ridicule" in the same way that it is easier to dance a "jig" than the "corrant."¹

¹ William Temple, Miscellanea, ed. by Jonathan Swift (London, 1701), pp.325-6. According to the article on the "dance" in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the "Courante" was a very popular dance in the court of Louis XIV. It is described as "a court dance performed on tiptoe with slightly jumping steps and many bows and courtesys." The article also mentions that "a nobleman's education could hardly have been said to be begun until he had mastered the Courante." For an acute analysis of dancing not only as an essential part of polite behaviour but as the very emblem of a gentleman's education, which included a temporary, but nonetheless embarrassing, dependence on socially inferior dancing-masters, see C.J. Rawson, "Gentleman and Dancing-Masters: Thoughts on Fielding, Chesterfield, and the Gentle," Eighteenth-Century Studies, 1 (1967-68), 127-58.
aristocratic "Essay on Conversation" has been plausibly described as "a kind of courtesy-book in little, an amiable guide to manners in everyday relations with others." In short, the aristocratic concept of "good-breeding" applied to conversation meant urbanely graceful disquisition metaphorically related to the highly elaborate, yet graceful, courtly dances.

The metaphor of the dance also implied the notion of conversation as a polite relationship between people, so that not even admirable disquisition, by itself, was quite enough to tally with the requirements of good-breeding. Thus Swift could condemn in his "Hints Towards an Essay on Conversation," the conversational practice of "a Man of Wit"

who is never easy but where he can be allowed to dictate and preside; he neither expecteth to be informed or entertained, but to display his own Talents. His Business is to be good Company and Not good Conversation; and, therefore, he chuseth to frequent those who are content to listen, and profess themselves his Admireurs.2 (italics added)

The model for the "man of Wit" was probably Addison at Button's coffee-house,3 especially as Pope satirized him for similar reasons:

1. Miller, 117.


Like Cato gives his little Senate Laws,
And sits attentive to his own Applause;
While Wits and Templars ev'ry Sentence raise,
And wonder with a foolish Face of Praise.
What Pity, Heav'n! if such a Man there be.
Who would not weep, if A——n were he?
("Fragment of a Satire," ll. 61-6)¹

Pope's last line is ironic precisely because he actually admires Addison's conversational talents,

Blest with each Talent, and each Art to please,
And born to write, converse, and live with ease ...
(ll. 45-6)

even if not his self-centred way of using them. In short, Addison was attacked by Swift and Pope for his lack of good-breeding:

And so obliging that he ne'er obliged: (l.58)

The observations of both Swift and Pope suggest that there may well have been a significant correlation between Addison's conversational practice and his habit of writing periodical essays in which he displayed opinions on countless subjects, in a manner informally expository and univocal rather than familiarly dialectical, as Mandeville did in the short-lived Female Tatler. Thus, if eighteenth-century dialogue at its best had any significant relationship with the conventions of conversational good-breeding, it is more likely to correspond to polite, urbane conversation taking others into account than admirable disquisition of a more self-centred kind.

Where Swift and Pope singled out a transparently-disguised individual for censure, Shaftesbury, through the persona of "Philocles"

in his dialogue, The Voralists, seems to have condemned the conversational practice of his day in general and, more to the point, as part of an attack on what he took to be the lack of first-class dialogues by his contemporaries:

This brings to my mind a reason I have often sought for, why we moderns who abound so much in treatises and essays are so sparing in the way of dialogue, which heretofore was found the politest and best way of managing even the graver subjects. The truth is, 'twould be an abominable falsehood and belying of the age to put so much good sense together in any one conversation as might make it hold out steadily and with plain coherence for an hour's time, till any one subject had been rationally examined.¹

Shaftesbury made a similar point in his "treatise," Advice to an Author, but in a somewhat more moderate tone: "Our commerce and manner of conversation, which we think the politest imaginable is such, it seems, as we ourselves cannot endure to see represented to the life."²

Shaftesbury's claim actually seems to have been more applicable to the rougher manners of the Restoration period, which are indirectly reflected in Dryden's Essay of Dramatic Poesy. One of its chief defects, as dialogue or conversation-piece, according to Donald Davie, is its failure, as a result of trying to be faithful to the best kind of conversation in Dryden's age, to render the cut and thrust of

¹. Characteristics II, 6.
². Characteristics I, 134.
conversational debate. As Shaftesbury would have expressed it, there is not enough "good sense" among the interlocutors for the conversation to flow smoothly or, more accurately, for the conversation to turn from polite exchanges of opinion to a genuine debate of the mutually incompatible positions implied by the point-of-view of each speaker. In short, the urbane tone of the conversation is only superficial because genuine urbanity welcomes opposing points-of-view by which each interlocutor can clarify, defend, and even modify his own opinions.

Dryden's failure to recreate a discussion sufficiently urbane to be genuinely dialectical was perhaps due to his fear that, in Davie's words, "in reality the cut and thrust would not have been verbal only." By Queen Anne's day, however, the rougher elements of aristocratic manners were already being considerably modified by more restrained and less rigid ideals of conduct as advocated in Addison's Spectator, so that Shaftesbury's strictures seem to have been considerably exaggerated and perhaps attributable to "the numerous dialogues which were used for scurrilous attacks upon his famous grandfather." Whatever the level of exaggeration in Shaftesbury's claim, he did, in any case, significantly link dialogue to the conversational practice of his day.

1. Donald A. Davie, "Dramatic Poerty: Dryden's Conversation-Piece," Cambridge Journal, 5 (1951-52), 554. Another way of describing Dryden's failure is to say that his dialogue on Dramatic Poety is too expository to be considered legitimately philosophical.

2. See C.S. Lewis, "Addison" in Essays of the Eighteenth Century Presented to David Nichol Smith (Oxford, 1945), p.7. This is not to deny that there may have been a large residue of aristocratic bad-manners, and many dull conversationalists, in Queen Anne's day.

3. Purpus, 58 n.
Conversational decorum, however, is not the only decisive characteristic of the philosophical dialogue in the eighteenth century. What also has to be taken into account is the techniques of rhetorical persuasion inherent in the formal dialogue, and it has a long history of such use, ranging from the highly formalized question-and-answer techniques of catechisms to the dialectical subtleties of Plato's dialogues. Those dialogues which resemble ordinary conversation can be considered as expository and akin to the essay, while those which resemble argumentative conversation are usually philosophical and akin to the drama. Furthermore, the dramatic nature of philosophical dialogue is intimately bound up with its heuristic function. In the words of Albert William Levi, "The dramatic imagination ... has its cognitive tasks also, and these are suggested by that passage from idle conversation to formal dialogue, and from formal dialogue to dialectical method as this movement is exemplified in the works of Plato." Thus, an essential characteristic of the philosophical dialogue is that it combines the requirements of rhetorical exposition with dialectical subtlety to create the illusion of valuable, entertaining, and dramatic conversation, nor are the requirements of rhetoric and dialectic conflicting for, as the first sentence of Aristotle's Rhetoric declares, "Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic."

As far as rhetorical exposition is concerned, Augustan theories


of dialogue as a technique of "plain, easy, and familiar" exposition are adequate. Such theories, in fact, suggest that dialogue, though ostensibly an "ancient" form, was considered far from incompatible with the new rhetoric of direct plainness advocated by the Royal Society. This new rhetoric was largely superseding the older one of elaborately ornamental "tropes and figures" which, itself, had largely replaced the centuries-old classical tradition of rhetoric.  

The reforms of Peter Ramus and other Renaissance grammarians, however, had turned rhetoric into a process dealing with mainly ornamental considerations, such as the tropes and figures, while dialectic dealt mainly with methods of argument and, moreover, methods of argument were intended to be strictly logical, so that dialectic, itself, came to be scarcely distinguished from logic.  

It may well be that the eighteenth-century philosophical dialogue, at least to some extent, restored dialectic as a process distinct from logic, even though based on it.

1. W.S. Howell, Eighteenth Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton, New Jersey, 1971), pp.448-502. Hereinafter to be cited as Howell. Perhaps it is not amiss to point out here that there is much truth in Millicent's statement to the effect that "the realization of the disjunction between what are really only two ways of writing - the simple and the ornate - is not located at any point in time but occurs over and over in the history of English prose" (Millicent, 285).

2. It should be pointed out, in this context, that, broadly speaking, for Aristotle, Cicero and other classical theoreticians of discourse, rhetoric and dialectic differed mainly in that dialectic was a strict ("close-fisted") mode of discourse, while rhetoric was a looser ("open-handed") and more popular mode, but the rules for the handling of both were similar, hence Aristotle's dictum. On this point see W.K. Wimsatt Jr. and Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism: A Short History, vol. 1 (London, 1970), p.67 n. 2.

As mentioned before, it was men prominent in the activities of the Royal Society who played a large part in replacing the ornamental rhetoric of tropes and figures in favour of what Robert Boyle, the great physicist, called the "eloquence of plainness" and which another famous member of the Royal Society, John Locke, formulated as an alternative rhetoric addressed, in Howell's words, "to the communication of truth and knowledge by means of coherent and stylistic plainness."¹ Thus, the new rhetoric emerging at the beginning of the eighteenth century tended to be closer to dialectic in its more rigorous treatment of argumentative discourse and closer to logic in its emphasis on clear exposition, and it is in the eighteenth-century philosophical dialogue that the emphasis of the new rhetoric on exposition and dialectical reasoning can perhaps be best appreciated.

There is not likely to be a work as useful as John Locke's Conduct of the Understanding to gain an insight into the constellation of qualities possible in the eighteenth-century philosophical dialogue. This is so because Locke's Conduct served as a popular guide to clear thinking and the search for truth, on the premise that all reasoning tends to be "partial" and only becomes less so when one is willing to test one's ideas in conversation with others. As Locke put it,

We see but in part, and we know but in part, and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right from our partial views. This might instruct the proudest estesnor of his own parts, how useful it is to talk and consult

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¹ Powell, 492.
with others, even such as come short of him in capacity, quickness and penetration; for, since no one sees all, and we generally have different prospects of the same thing, according to our different, I may say, positions to it; it is not incongruous to think, nor beneath any man to try, whether another may not have notions of things, which have escaped him, and which his reason would make use of, if they came into his mind. ¹

This is not to say that Locke necessarily favoured the writing of dialogue, especially as he warned against arguing on more than one side of a question, as a dialogue writer inevitably has to do. Locke's stricture, in fact, almost reads like a condemnation of dialogue or, at least, the writing of it:

Interest and passion dazzles; the custom of arguing on any side, even against our persuasions, dims the understanding, and makes it by degrees lose the faculty of discerning clearly between truth and falsehood, and so of adhering to the right side.²

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¹ John Locke, *Conduct of the Understanding*, ed. by Thomas Fowler, third edition (Oxford, 1890), sec. 3, p. 7. In an amusing set-piece dialogue on charity between Parson Adams and the morose Peter Pounce in Joseph Andrews (bk. III, ch. XIII), Adams mentions a "prospect" he has enjoyed, but Pounce is only interested in the "prospects" available on his own estate. As the dialogue progresses, and it may legitimately be called "philosophical," it becomes evident that Pounce's enjoyment only of prospects he owns, is reflected in his very narrow-minded attitude to charity and Adams's far broader interpretation of its meaning, so that his appalling selfishness is intimately connected with his conversational intolerance, the opposite being true of Adams. Thus Fielding, like Locke, found the notion of physical prospects a good metaphor for broadmindedness and impartiality in conversation. Hereinafter, Locke's *Conduct* will be cited as Locke.

The dialogue at its best, nevertheless, does allow the reader to examine various points-of-view from a highly advantageous position. In Lockean terms, the reader is exposed to different arguments and thereby gains a high enough "prospect" from which he can judge their validity. It seems likely that Locke would have considered dialogue harmful to the writer but beneficial to the reader. He did not, in any case, write any dialogues himself.

As for the dialectical method of philosophical dialogue, it conforms with Locke's emphasis on persevering with a problem no matter how difficult: "The understanding should be brought to the difficult and knotty parts of knowledge, that try the strength of thought, and a full bent of the mind, by insensible degrees; and in such a gradual proceeding nothing is too hard for it." Locke's prescription, however, does not tally so well with the dialectical method of Socratic or Lucianic irony as with the gentler dialectical method of a work like Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous where there is no personal antagonism between the interlocutors but a highly-idealized, yet mutually-opposing, master-disciple relationship.

It is very possible that Locke would have agreed with Hurd's remark that

The Sage [Socrates] would have dropped his
Irony, in the company of the good and wise;
The Rhetorician [Lucian], is never more
pleased than in confounding both, by his
intemperate Satire.

1. Locke, sec. 28, 63.
3. Hurd I, xxxi. One cannot help feeling that both Locke and Hurd would have preferred Socrates to associate more often with the "good and wise."
Locke's version of the dialectical method, in fact, may well be what he defines as the process of "bottoming out." It consists of finding the premise or "proposition" on which an argument or set of arguments is based, coupled with a distrust of informal conversations:

Most of the difficulties that come in our way, when well considered and traced, lead us to some proposition, which, known to be true, clears the doubt, and gives an easy solution of the question; whilst topical and superficial arguments, of which there is store to be found on both sides, filling the head with variety of thoughts, and the mouth with copious discourse, serve only to amuse the understanding, and entertain company without coming to the bottom of the question, the only place of rest and stability for an inquisitive mind, whose tendency is only to truth and knowledge. ¹

When questions are too complex to be reduced to certain premisses, Locke recommends the "balancing" of arguments, a process closer to ordinary conversation:

Where a truth is made out by one demonstration, there needs no farther inquiry; but in probabilities, where there wants demonstration to establish the truth beyond doubt, there it is not enough to trace one argument to its source, and observe its strength and weakness, but all the arguments, after having been so examined on both sides,

¹. Locke, sec. 44, 95-6.
must be laid in balance one against another, and, upon the whole, the understanding determine its assent.¹

While "bottoming" resembles Platonic dialectic shorn of its Socratic irony,² "balancing" seems to correspond to Cicero's broader dialectic. Since one of the essential characteristics of Cicero's dialogues is that they almost all display an attempt to have opposing philosophical positions rendered as fairly and accurately as possible,³ it would seem that there is very little difference between Cicero's dialectic and Locke's method of "balancing." Locke's dialectical method, however, is a more straightforward affair because, unlike Cicero, he does not look for truth in the rhetorical eloquence of the arguments put forward but in discovering the logic of each argument and only then "balancing" one against another.

1. Locke, sec. 7, 23.

2. Locke would also have probably objected to the hair-splitting equivocations and distinctions often comprising Plato's dialectic; indeed, what Locke disparagingly calls "the art of disputing," though meant mainly against the last vestiges of scholasticism, could also have referred to Plato's dialectic:

In arguing, the opponent uses as comprehensive and equivocal terms as he can, to involve his adversary in the doubtfulness of his expressions; this is expected, and therefore the answerer on his side makes it his play to distinguish as much as he can, and thinks he can never do it too much; nor can he indeed in that way wherein victory may be had without truth and without knowledge. (Locke, sec. 31, 70-1)

Although Plato also condemned this kind of disputation, especially as practised by the Sophists, his dialectic could not escape a certain amount of disputational hair-splitting. Among other things, this was because of the primitive state of logic in Plato's time. On this point see Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, second edition (Oxford, 1970), pp.2-3.

3. Cicero, in his more philosophical and less expository dialogues, such as De Natura Deorum and Tusculanae Disputationes, did not overtly take sides but probably expected that the most eloquently expressed point-of-view would win out in the reader's mind.
Locke's dialectical method is well illustrated by Richard Hurd in a "moral dialogue" on the Uses of Foreign Travel between interlocutors representing Shaftesbury and Locke. In this dialogue Locke, before delivering his own point-of-view on the question, reassembles the flatulent rhetoric of Shaftesbury's argument into simpler and more logically rigorous terms:

"Your Lordship has so many good words at command upon all occasions, that one cannot but be entertained, at least, with your rhetoric, if not convinced by it. But my present concern is, to have a clear conception of your argument, which in plain terms, as I apprehend it, stands thus; "That every nation has many vices and follies to correct in itself; that this is perhaps more especially the case of our own; and that early Travel is the only, at least the most proper, cure for them."

Shaftesbury, as might be expected, denies that his rhetoric is superfluous but unsuitably betrays his own lack of understanding of Locke's point: "THAT, Sir, is my meaning; and though expressed in more words than may be, it is surely not coloured by any rhetorical exaggerations."¹ In other words, Shaftesbury does not realize that by Locke's rigorous standards, superfluous words and rhetorical exaggerations are almost identical and that what Locke is really demanding, albeit in a very polite and deferential tone, is a more dialectical form of argument based on his method of "balancing" and

¹. Hurd III, 34-5.
"bottoming out" rather than Socratic irony or the copiousness of Ciceronian rhetoric.¹

If we return to the Augustan notion of good-breeding in conversational practice, it will be seen that "impartiality," which was considered an essential attribute of dialogue in theory if not always in practice,² was an important aspect not only of conversational good manners but of the Lockean dialectic as well. Locke's Conduct repeatedly exhorts the reader to be "indifferent" to any opinion, including his own, until it is thoroughly examined. Rarely was Locke's exhortation more eloquently expressed than in the following passage:

In these two things, namely, an equal indifference for all truth, I mean the receiving it in the love of it as truth, but not loving it for any other reason before we know it to be true, and in the examination of our principles, and not receiving any for such nor building on them till we are fully convinced, as rational creatures, of their solidity, truth, and certainty, consists that freedom of the understanding which is necessary to a rational creature, and without which it is not truly an understanding.³

1. Samuel Johnson, for one, seems to have considered dialectic a crucial part of dialogue when he complained about Lyttelton's Dialogues of the Dead that "The names of his persons too often enable the reader to anticipate their conversations; and when they have met, they too often part without any conclusion." See Johnson's Lives of the Poets, ed. by Arthur Quayle, vol. 6 (London, 1896), p.202.

2. Purvis, 51.

3. Locke, sec. 12, 33-4.
Like his remarks on the need to gain a "prospect" from which truth may be surveyed, Locke's advocacy of "indifferency" is closely connected to conversational good-breeding and its urbane tolerance of the opinion of others.

Such "indifferency" could take many forms and one was a profession of "scepticism" as in Dryden's *Defence of an Essay on Dramatic Poetry*: "I must crave leave to say, that my whole discourse was sceptical, according to the way of reasoning which was used by Socrates, Plato, and all the Academics of old, which Tully and the best of the Ancients followed, ..."¹ That this scepticism was more of an attitude of tolerant impartiality than a critical weapon becomes evident when one examines Hurd's notions of scepticism and impartiality in the philosophical dialogue. Echoing Dryden, Hurd associates Cicero's impartiality with "scepticism" and approves of it wholeheartedly, except in matters of serious religious and moral import, which shows that he was not prepared to entertain a more thoroughgoing, iconoclastic scepticism.² In his *Commonplace Book*, he even interprets the Socratic method as a weapon ultimately directed against scepticism:

Socrates shows finely that scepticism and misanthropy arise from similar causes; the latter from a want of knowing the true state of human nature; the former from not perceiving the true state of human reason.³

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1. Quoted in *Purgus*, 51.
Perhaps it was a nineteenth-century figure, Walter Savage Landor, who best expressed why impartiality was ideally suited to the dialogue form:

I approve of the Dialogue for the reason you have given me just now; the fewness of settled truths, and the facility of turning the cycle of our thoughts to what aspect we wish, as geometers and astronomers the globe.1

Landor's view, in fact, is quintessentially eighteenth-century for, in the above passage, an "imaginary conversation" between Cicero and his brother, he extols the dialogue basically for its leisurely qualities of impartiality and urbanity. Thus, "impartiality" was considered to be not only conducive to good conversation but to the reproducing of it, given the rhetorical conventions necessary to do so, in dialogue form. What Hurd and, later, Landor really demanded of dialogue was civilized, urbane discourse rather than dialectical disputation. Hurd says as much in his Commonplace Book: "The genius of the Dialogue calm, moral, instructive; not disputative or controversial; the end, a reasoned opinion to be taken up, not a question to be casuistically discussed."2 Though Hurd's conception of philosophical dialogue relies heavily on conversational decorum, however, it does not necessarily eliminate dialectic. This is because truth "insinuated" by good conversation cannot be all that different from Locke's dialectical method of "balancing"3 and a "reasoned

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2. Kilvert, 252.
3. As mentioned before, Hurd himself utilized the "balancing method" in his imaginary "moral dialogue" between Shaftesbury and Locke.
opinion to be taken up" implies a dialectical process, even if a modest one. If Hurd actually advocates not the elimination of dialectic but a "hidden" version of it distinct from an "open," disputatious kind, then Hurd's observations on the nature of philosophical dialogue can be generally applied to the widely-divergent dialogues of Mandeville, Shaftesbury, and Berkeley; all of whom have at least this in common, that they are attempts to simulate conversation where "raillery" of varying degrees of abrasiveness is included (generally less so in Berkeley's Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous and Shaftesbury's The Moralists than in Mandeville's dialogues and Berkeley's Alciphron) but truth is nevertheless "insinuated" rather than rhetorically imposed.

One consequence of Hurd's scrupulous impartiality, already mentioned earlier on, was his insistence on the subordination of character to the requirements of conversational decorum, and this seems to be true of many of the best philosophical dialogues including Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and those of Mandeville, Shaftesbury, and Berkeley. It is such an insistence that makes the eighteenth-century philosophical dialogue often seem almost more expository than dialectical but the intricacies of reproducing ideal conversation, at the expense of character, imply an emphasis on dialectic. Thus, in Hurd's "moral dialogue" between Waller and More, Waller does almost all the talking, but his attempt to justify insincerity, and his own well-known insincere acts as a politician, as an inevitable mode of survival in the "commerce of the world," sufficiently condemns him in the eyes of the reader, so that the piece could easily have been a dramatic monologue. More's infrequent
interpolations, in any case, simply lead Waller to more improbable words of self-justification, so that a genuine dialectic is generated whereby More serves the function of allowing Waller "more rope by which to hang himself." In short, because of More's restraint, a very gentlemanly dialectic develops and it is not so much the characters of More and Waller which fascinate the reader, as he would be familiar with them in any case, as the twists and turns of Waller's conversation, its "casuistry."

Swift's Compleat Collection of Gentle and Ingenious Conversation is a good, though obviously satirical, example of what the eighteenth-century philosophical dialogue tried to avoid. It consists of skilfully composed conversations which never develop beyond compliments, commonplace expressions, superficial discussions of the weather, and other such trivial matters. It is full of verbal gesturing but devoid of developing ideas, full of urbane conversation but of an urbanity so artificial that it never develops into dialectic.

Besides the pitfalls of extreme conversational decorum, Swift's target may also have been the tendency of the mind to wander too fast from one subject to another. As Locke warned,

The eagerness and strong bent of the mind after knowledge, if not warily regulated, is often an hindrance to it. It still presses into farther discoveries and new objects, and catches at the variety of knowledge; and therefore often stays not long enough on what is before it, to look into it as it should, for haste to pursue what is yet out of sight.¹

¹. Locke, sec. 25, 56.
At its best, the philosophical dialogue could satisfy such a tendency in the reader's mind and still eventually reach the goal of its dialectic. Signs of this tendency are most evident in Mandeville's dialogues, especially in the opposing interlocutors. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, Mandeville's effect is not one of static exposition but one of rhetorical exuberance, on the part of the opposing interlocutor, lubricating the dialectical "engine" generated by Mandeville's persona. In short, as Muret implied, the hallmark of eighteenth-century philosophical dialogue is a unique combination of conversational urbanity and dialectical rigor.

Among twentieth-century critics who have examined the dialogue form, including Merrill, Dickinson, Miller and Cosentini, there seems to be a consensus of opinion that the philosophical dialogue is a literary genre because of its unique blend of two ordinarily incompatible elements, one from the realm of literature (dramatic characterization) and one from philosophy (dialectical development of ideas). In this, they differ little from Aristotle who recognized the hybrid nature of philosophical dialogue as a literary genre and, according to the fragments of Diogenes Laertius, considered "that the genre of Plato's dialogues lies between poetry and prose" because of its poetically imitative qualities. As far as modern literary theory is concerned, it provides an even more solid basis for declaring the philosophical dialogue a genre for, as Wellek and Warren point out,

Modern genre theory is, clearly, descriptive. It doesn't limit the number of possible kinds and doesn't prescribe rules to authors. It supposes that traditional kinds may be "mixed" and produce a new kind (like tragi-comedy). It sees that genres can be built up on the basis of inclusiveness or "richness" as well as that of "purity" (genre by accretion as well as by reduction). Instead of emphasizing the distinction between kind and kind, it is interested — after the Romantic emphasis on the uniqueness of each "original genius" and each work of art — in finding the common denominator of a kind, its shared literary devices and literary purpose.¹

In this context, Dickinson's comment to the effect that though philosophical dialogue represents the form at its best, it nevertheless "suffers from a certain incompatibility between its dramatic and controversial elements, which prevents it ... from being a pure and perfect form of art,"² is highly significant for it confirms that philosophical dialogue partakes of a genre by virtue of its "richness" rather than its "purity." Thus, formal dialogue, by itself and in all its many manifestations, partakes of genre, philosophical dialogue being undoubtedly the best example of the

2. Dickinson, 19.
genre at its richest as a literary art-form.

With their blend of dialectical disputation and rhetorical persuasion, philosophical dialogues are especially prone to analysis in terms of rhetoric. Michael Torrisroe Jr., for example, has analyzed Hume’s *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* not only in relation to its logical objections against the argument from design, but also in terms of its rhetoric which, in the context of Hume’s argument, is not logically or philosophically necessary, but serves the purpose of undermining the reader’s psychological propensity to accept the argument from design. Hume’s example, by itself, confirms that Restoration and Augustan theories of dialogue as a "plain, easy, and familiar way" of dealing with weighty matter are inadequate. That only accounts for their tendency to popularize difficult ideas in the spirit of Locke’s "rhetoric of plainness" but not the remarkable varieties of ways that dialogue writers tried to achieve such an aim. They hardly begin to describe the rhetorical and dialectical complexities of philosophical dialogue, of which Hume was not the only great practitioner in the eighteenth century. Mandeville, if not as great, was more prolific and highly inventive. Shaftesbury has only one philosophical dialogue to his credit, *The Moralists*, but it introduced an almost Romantic aesthetic dimension, partly derived from Plato, to the philosophical dialogue which was not taken up again until Landor’s monumental

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series of *Imaginary Conversations*. Berkeley's contributions to the philosophical dialogue range from the vigorously dialectical *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous* to that engaging work of Christian apologetics, *Alciphron*.

These three authors are linked in having similar moral concerns expressed in many ways, but most interestingly, certainly most dramatically, within the framework of philosophical dialogue where their moral concerns are presented in terms of the inter-action of personalities rhetorically rather than naturalistically depicted.\(^1\) All three expanded the possibilities of philosophical dialogue beyond slavish imitation of Platonic and Ciceronian models and all three had critical opinions about it, Shaftesbury's being the most elaborately developed. Even minor writers of philosophical dialogues, such as Hurd, the little-known George Stubbes, Shaftesbury's disciple, David Fordyce, and William Gilpin sometimes achieved effects worthy of examination.

It is in the first half of the eighteenth century, however, that the most important of these dialogue writers flourished so that, as a writer of philosophical dialogue, Hume is a rather isolated figure in the latter half of the eighteenth century.\(^2\)

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1. For an illuminating analysis of how the characters of Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* are given just enough personality, in the sense that Hurd advocated, although this is not mentioned by the article, to enliven the rhetoric and dialectic of the debate, see Michael Morrisroe, Jr., "Characterization as Rhetorical Device in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion," *Enlightenment Essays*, 1 (1970), 95-107.

2. One should take into account, however, another Scotman, the painter Allan Ramsay, whose *Dialogues on Taste* (1763), though apparently never popular with the reading public, is nevertheless a very elegantly-written and highly entertaining philosophical dialogue.
unless one groups him with such continental masters of the genre
as Voltaire and Diderot. One interesting reason why the dialogue
was a more successful literary mode in France was suggested
anonymously in a contemporary review of Lyttelton's *Dialogues of the
Dedal:

The English being generally reserved
and uncommunicative in their dispositions,
are sententious and nervous in their
expressions; which naturally inclines
them to deliver their sentiments in set
dissortations. The French, on the
contrary, who, in some particulars, come
closer to the polite Athenians, being more
open, communicative, and social in their
nature, have carried the charms of
conversation to higher perfection, and
are consequently better capable of
writing in the familiar way of dialogue.¹

In Britain, at any rate, the philosophical dialogue was, apparently,
rapidly superseded by other forms of discursive writing such as the
periodical essay and formal philosophical treatise in a "belle-
letttrist" mould. Thus, Butler's *Analogy of Religion* was far more
popular than Berkeley's *Alciphron* with the generality of readers
and, possibly, the tendency to scorn intellectual arguments in
favour of assertive pronouncements, such as that displayed by

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¹ Owen Ruffhead, "Dialogues of the Dead," *The Monthly Review,* 22 (1760), 403. The author has been identified by Benjamin
Johnson or Burke, became more acute as the century progressed.¹

Whatever the reasons for the decline of the dialogue form in the latter half of the eighteenth century, a close analysis of the philosophical dialogues of Mandeville, Shaftesbury, and Berkeley in their Augustan context should yield new perspectives on a major genre of the time and its relationship to other genres destined to supersede it. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that Mandeville's first substantial series of dialogues, apart from *The Virgin Unmask'd*, appeared anonymously in a periodical, *The Female Tatler*. This set of dialogues and their relationship with the informally disquisitional style of periodicals will be the subject of the next chapter.

¹ Such a statement, of necessity, has to be made with great care as there are many other factors that must be taken into account in analyzing the styles of eighteenth-century writers, but there is probably a lot of truth in the claim that the argumentative rhetoric of Johnson and Burke was highly assertive, certainly more so than dialectical. For an extreme view of the alleged assertiveness, and even anti-intellectualism, of eighteenth-century style in general, see Russell Fraser, "Rationalism and the Discursive Style," *Hudson Review*, 18 (1965), 376-86.
"I said, it was amusing to see the way in which he fell upon Steele, Shaftesbury, and other amiable writers, and the terror you were in for your favourites, just as when a hawk is hovering over and going to pounce upon some of the more harmless feathered tribe."

William Hazlitt in Conversations of James Northcote, Esq. R.A. (1830)

One aspect of the polemical dialogue that had influenced the development not only of philosophical dialogue but of the novel and periodical essay in the eighteenth century as well, was its occasional tendency to deal with a set-topic in a more exploratory and disquisitional than purely polemical manner. Such a tendency was especially displayed by the polemical "dialogue-journals" of the Restoration, the most prominent and innovative of which was Roger L'Estrange's Observator.\footnote{1}

In spite of the fact that the Observator was a partisan publication supporting the policies of Charles II,\footnote{2} L'Estrange's dialogues were often witty and even dialectically subtle. One issue, for example, deals with the topic of political manipulation of public opinion, with special reference to that practised by the Whig Opposition. The protagonists are the "Observator" himself and "Trimmer," who represents the Whigs. Although L'Estrange's aim in the dialogue is to discredit the Whigs, he does so in an oblique manner, as in the exchange where Trimmer describes the technique of manipulation:

\begin{quote}
Trim. ... Schism is signified with the Name of Conscience, the Story of their Grievances, is the Bitterest of Satyras; Their very Petitions have the force of Invectivas; and the Soother, the Softer, you find the Surface of them, the Falsar, and the more Dangerous they are at the Bottom; For betwixt the Persecution that is Insinuated, on the part of the Government, & the Innocence, the Piety, and the Modesty, on that of the Sufferers, Nothing can more
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1}{The first dialogue-journals appeared only seventy-two days before the Observator in Dialogue (to give it its full title), which first appeared on 13 April 1661. See the editor's introduction to Roger L'Estrange, Selections from the Observator, ed. by Violet Jordain, The Augustan Reprint Society, no. 141 (1970), i. Hereinafter to be cited as Observator.}
\footnote{2}{See Observator, iv-v.}
\end{footnotes}
Provoke, a Horror, and Indignation for the One, or a Tenderness, & Compassion, for the Other.

Ob. That is to say, among Those that are not Well Enformed, in the Reason, and Equity of the Cause in Question.

Trim. Come Come. I tell ye nakedly how things Are, and not how they Ought to be: and I speak of Those Men too, that neither Do, nor Will, nor Can make a Right Judgement upon the Matter in Issue. They do not take down Reasons in Connexion; neither do their Teachers so much as Offer at 'em; but their Work is, only to Feed Itching Ears, and Rumours, with New-Cutn'd Words, Affectate Phrases: And briefly, to Instruct their Disciples, by Signs and Tokens, like so many Dancing Horses to fall Lamé upon all Four, for the Pope to come-over, for the Grand Vizier; and at the very Sound of Babylon, Anti-Christ, or Absolute Power, to Snort, and Popple, as if they Smelt Fire. ... 1

Trimmer is not condemned outright here. Instead, L'Estrange presents a discussion, racily colloquial in style and gentlemanly in tone, the dramatic point of which is to expose Trimmer's cynicism about how the Whigs exploit popular prejudices for their own ends. The whole seems intended to arouse the reader's suspicions about Whig motives, however legitimate they may seem on the surface. Despite L'Estrange's evident partisanship here, in any case, the dialogue is so finely dramatic and dialectically acute in what it insinuates about the Whigs, that it works as an informal disquisition on political manipulation. As Violet Jordain puts it, "L'Estrange ... creates both adversariuses as dramatic personae rather than as simple straw men, a departure from the run-of-the-mill Restoration dialogue." 2

1. Observator, 36-7. The issue is that of 21 August 1686.
2. Observator, viii.
Thus, although the Observer, and other dialogue-journals, were, in R. F. Bond's phrase, "vehicles of partisanship" undoubtedly related to the polemical pamphlets of the Commonwealth and Restoration,¹ the dialogues in L'Estrange's journal, at least, are not always devoid of artistry.

Later journals influenced by the Observer, such as Defoe's Review and Steele's Tatler did not confine discourse on a set-topic to dialogue but to the essay as well. Defoe and Steele, nevertheless, were very adept in their use of the form. Before examining the dialogues in the Review and Tatler, however, it should be noted that though dialogue declined in periodical essays in the first half of the eighteenth century, the self-contained dialogue on a set-topic continued to be a frequent device in the eighteenth-century novel.

It would be misleading to say, however, that the informal essay and the self-contained dialogue competed for popularity in periodical publications, or that the frequency of self-contained dialogue in novels compensated for its declining importance in periodical essays. This is because all these forms, far from being mutually-exclusive, shared a similar presentation of argument, namely informal disquisition on a set-topic, a device not only very popular with readers but also fully consonant with the neo-classic emphasis on conversational ease and rational tidiness.

According to Bartholow V. Crawford, the self-contained dialogue within a narrative "was a factor of real importance in England from

Crawford describes such dialogues as being mainly discussions of abstract topics in which characterization is non-existent, though they made an important contribution to the development of the novel. He does not, however, consider the contribution to have been wholly positive:

In a sense, instructive conversation was an experiment, not wholly successful, but at the same time useful to the developing novel. It tended on the one hand to break up straight narration by introducing situations involving two or more persons in an intellectual relationship; on the other hand it developed into real conversation which advanced characterization and plot.

This is probably true as far as it goes, but Crawford neglects the strong possibility that such "formal dialogues" made one other contribution to the eighteenth-century novel in that the informal disquisitions in dialogue in which character plays a part, though they do not contribute to the plots of the novels in which they

1. What Crawford has in mind is not only the eighteenth-century novel but also seventeenth-century romances in which self-contained dialogues occur, such as those by Scudery and Calprenede, which were later satirized by Charlotte Lennox's Female Quixote (1752), and such English works (to name only a few) as Howell's Farley of Beasts (1660), Samuel Hartlib's Description of the famous Kingdom of Utopia (1641), and James Fuddle's The Club (1711). See Bartholow V. Crawford, "The Use of Formal Dialogue in Narrative," Philological Quarterly, 1 (1922), 179-91. Hereinafter to be cited as Crawford.

2. Crawford, 179. Henry Knight Miller confirms Crawford's view of the positive effects of the "formal dialogue" on the development of the novel when he says of Fielding's novels that "there is no doubt that the dialogue, usually with two or three interlocutors, remained a basic structural element with Fielding even in his novels; and it is partly his skill in this form - which by its very nature demands that action, setting, and character be conveyed through the words of the speakers - that makes the conversation of the novels so lively, dramatic, and revealing of character." See Henry Knight Miller, Essays on Fielding's "Miscellanies" (Princeton, New Jersey, 1961), pp. 415-6.
appear, may have directly developed from formal dialogues on set-topics which occur in the narratives of the seventeenth century. The breaking-up of straight narration by self-contained dialogues, at any rate, should not necessarily be considered a defect. To do so is to judge the eighteenth-century novel by the standards of Henry James, who assumed that the novel at its best must display a "fine central intelligence" through which all observations and descriptions in the novel are filtered, but the eighteenth-century novel, which undoubtedly reached peaks of excellence in the novels of Fielding, Richardson, and Sterne, should not be considered as merely a stage in the eventual development of the Jamesian novel and its successors.

The role of self-contained dialogue in eighteenth-century novels can perhaps best be appreciated in those of Fielding. In Joseph Andrews (1742), for example, the dialogues not directly contributing to the plot give the reader a sense of the leisurely play of ideas for their own sake, which slows down its pace and contributes to its overall aesthetic effect on the reader. Thus, the dialogue between the Player and the Poet (Ex. III, ch. X), which has little to do with the fortunes of the protagonists, works as an entertaining interlude before the reader is once again plunged into the frenetic escapades of Joseph Andrews and Parson Adams. Another example from Fielding, and one closer to philosophical dialogue, is Ex. IX, ch. III of Amelia (1751), which is labelled "A conversation between Dr. Harrison and others." Init, as soon as "the ladies

withdraw," including the heroine of the title, a "Colonel Bath, who had been very brisk with champagne at dinner" discusses duelling with the clergyman, "Dr. Harrison" or, rather, attempts to bully him into submission to his own views about it. Dr. Harrison, however, is more than a match for him, as in the following exchange:

"Drink about, doctor," cries the colonel; "and let us call a new cause; for I perceive we shall never agree on this. You are a Churchman, and I don't expect you to speak your mind."

"We are both of the same Church, I hope," cries the doctor.

"I am of the Church of England, sir," answered the colonel, "and will fight for it to the last drop of my blood."

"It is very generous in you, colonel," cries the doctor, "to fight so zealously for a religion by which you are to be damned."

"It is well for you, doctor," cries the colonel, that you wear a gown; for, by all the dignity of a man, if any other person had said the words you have just uttered, I would have made him eat them; ay, d—n me, and my sword into the bargain."

The colonel's position in favour of duelling is undermined by dramatic insinuation because he shows himself too ready to resort to violence in the settling of an argument, which implies that duelling cannot be justified in rational terms, as well as a coward in threatening a clergyman who cannot accept challenges. At the same time, opposing views on the morality of duelling are succinctly presented, as they


2. *Amelia* III, 14.
would be in philosophical dialogue. 1

Sarah Fielding's *The Adventures of David Simple* (1744) contains dialogues that, very much as in the dialogues and essays of Steele's *Tatler*, are sometimes aimed at improving the reader's "taste." Thus, in one dialogue, the shallowness of drama criticism in the conversation of "polite" circles is exposed. At one point, the "Ladies," talking all at the same time, express their preference for Addison's *Cato* over George Lillo's sentimental drama *The London Merchant*: "Oh intolerable! cry for an odious Apprentice-Boy, who murdered his Uncle, at the Instigation of a common Woman, and yet be unmoved, when even Cato bled for his Country." 2 The amusing manner in which Sarah Fielding conveys the snobbery of the "Ladies," and thereby satirizes it, reveals her preference for Lillo's play over Addison's. There is also the critical judgment implied that Lillo's play is better because it shows greater sympathy for the personal emotions of ordinary people rather than the abstract, public ones of a remote historical "hero."

One other characteristic worth noting about *David Simple* is that, in common with many other eighteenth-century novels, especially

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1. A novel which comes very close to philosophical dialogue is Sarah Scott's *A Description of Millenium Hall* (1762). As W.M. Crittenden describes it, it "is an account of a sort of charity school conducted in the west of England by five ladies who joined their fortunes in order to finance the work." It has elements of philosophical discussion, as Crittenden points out, on "major social, political and religious problems" and, secondly, because the discussions take place in idyllic surroundings reminiscent of many philosophical dialogues, including Plato's dialogues, Henry More's *Elevine Dialogues*, and Shaftesbury's *The Moralists*. This is how the traveller who visits it describes his first impression of the grounds of "Millenium Hall": "... the eye is so charmed with the remarkable verdure and neatness of the fields, with the beauty of the flowers which are planted all round them, and seem to mix with the thickest hedges, that time steals away insensibly." See Sarah Scott, *A Description of Millenium Hall*, ed. by Walter M. Crittenden (New York, 1955), pp.7 and 31.

by minor writers, character is subordinated to the demonstration of a thesis. Thus, Simple himself holds the reader's interest less as a character than the embodiment of a thesis, namely the instructive contrast between moral simplicity and the double-dealing hypocrisy of the world. As a recent editor of the novel puts it, "Miss Fielding is admirable at detecting and analysing malignity and pride cloaked by hypocrisy within the human heart, but she does not dramatize what she analyses."¹ This dialectical tendency culminated, on the one hand, in that "moral tale" (Sarah Fielding herself called her novel a "Moral Romance")¹ which can scarcely be considered a novel, Samuel Johnson's Rasselas (1759) and, on the other, novels illustrating, by means of set-piece conversations, radical political and social ideas. These appeared at the end of the century, at a time of political agitation in England and revolution in France, and include such works as Robert Bage's Hesperides (1796), Elizabeth Inchbald's Nature and Art (1796), Thomas Holcroft's Anna St. Ives (1792), and William Godwin's Caleb Williams (1794). The role of self-contained dialogue in the eighteenth-century novel, at any rate, undoubtedly needs further study. It is sufficient to note here that the self-contained dialogue of the novel and the informally disquisitional dialogue of the periodical essay both fulfilled an evident demand by the reading public for entertainment and edification in the form

¹. Simple, xii.
of leisurely discussion.¹

The periodical dialogues of Defoe's Review, Steele's Tatler and, especially, Mandeville's contributions to the Female Tatler,² in any case, sometimes went beyond the disquisitional mode in their complex patterns of dialectic. This is the case in Defoe's dialogue (one of a series) between a Jacobite and a Presbyterian in issue no. 164 of the Review. The subject was a controversial one, the recently-accomplished union of England and Scotland. Despite his dislike of both protagonists, Defoe avoids the Lucianic temptation of satirizing one or both of them and only gives them enough personality to sustain the flow of argument. His reasons for choosing two such interlocutors are as straightforward as one could wish:

In my last Review, I began the fatal Dialogue between a cunning sly Jacobite, and a well meaning but ignorant Presbyterian in Scotland; in pursuing which Discourse, perhaps the whole Mystery of Iniquity in that Part of the World

1. Sterne's Tristram Shandy seems to play havoc with the eighteenth-century reader's expectations of leisurely discussion for he is subjected to long disquisitions (for example, the famous one on noses) which are abruptly cut-off and then unexpectedly taken up again in other chapters, argument where the characters talk at cross-purposes but blithely ignore the fact, Walter Shandy's futile attempts to engage his wife in philosophical discussion, and so forth. Unlike Sterne's work, Thomas Amory's The Life of John F uncle (1756) does not play with the reader's expectation of informal disquisition but it takes the dialogue in the disquisitional mode to such absurd lengths that it is certainly one of the factors that accounts for the unintentional comedy that novel is famous for. For a succinct description of the eccentric role of F uncle's loquacious disquisitions in the novel, see Crawford, 166.

2. The Female Tatler appeared roughly twice a week for 115 issues from July 6, 1709 to Mar. 31, 1710. In addition, spurious editions of issues 19-44 also appeared under the same title and at the same time as the originals. See R.T. Milford, "The Female Tatler," Modern Philology, 29 (1931-32), 350-1.
may be laid open, and the Riddle, of what
we call in England the Kirk opposing the
Union, be expounded.1

In short, Defoe is using dialogue here to dramatize the polemical
point that the opposition of the Church of Scotland to union with
England is due to the blandishments of the Jacobites rather than
outright hostility to the proposal and therefore, presumably,
amenable to revision once Jacobite intrigues are exposed. After
many exchanges of opinion between the Jacobite and the Presbyterian,
where the Jacobite tries to convince the Presbyterian that an
alliance with the lesser evil of "Papist" France would be far more
advantageous than union with an England dominated by "Prelacy," the
Jacobite quickly falls into a trap laid for him by the Presbyterian
whose suspicions were undoubtedly earlier aroused:

Pres. And you will join with us, will you?
Jac. Ay, with all our whole Strength.
Pres. And will you capitulate with us to
establish the Protestant Religion, Presbytery
and Church Government?
Jac. Let us destroy this Union, and raise
the Parliament first, and we'll easily
agree afterwards to as to please all Parties.
Pres. Behind me, Catan! Now I have found it all
out, no Sir, I have done; ... I see the Drift;
'tis all Jacobitism, Popery, Prelacy and

1. All the issues of Defoe's Review are available in a facsimile
dition entitled Defoe's Review, ed. by Arthur Wellesley Second
(New York, 1938). All references to Defoe's Review are to this
ey. Thus the above quote is to be found in vol. III, no.164.
Hereinafter to be cited as Review.
Tyranny, and I have done Sir, and all my
Friends; my word for it, Sir, you get not a
Cameronian in all Scotland to side with you
on that Foot, I should be glad to have
Security for the Kirk on good and safe
Foundation, but not at that Price, Sir, by
no means, 'tis too dear a great deal.

There is a certain amount of irony, both intended as far as the
machinations of the Jacobite are concerned, and probably unintended
as far as the irony might reflect on the Presbyterian's duplicity,
in the fact that though Defoe describes the Jacobite as "sly" and
"cunning," it is the Presbyterian who wins the argument by the very
shrewd device of leading the Jacobite to admit unwittingly that an
independent Scottish Parliament would be established first and any
other grievances settled later, thus discovering that the re-
establishment of the Catholic Pretender is uppermost in the Jacobite's

"moral dialogue" On Retirement between Sprat and Cowley is very
similar to that of Defoe's dialogue though the subject is
evidently more urbanezly philosophical. Sprat's "mission," one
instigated by Cowley's former patron, in this dialogue, is to
persuade Cowley that his abrupt retirement from court life was
an unsociable, selfish act which could only be rectified by
giving up his retirement in the country. Sprat seems to win the
argument until he points out to Cowley all the comfortable
advantages of life at Court. Cowley pounces on this ploy because
it exposes Sprat's willingness to use any argument to persuade
him to return. Sprat has fallen into the trap of attempting to
appeal to Cowley's selfishness, or self-interest, just after all
attempts to appeal to his moral sense or altruism have failed.
Part of the effectiveness of this dialogue, as that of Defoe's,
is perhaps due to the biblical prototype of the temptation of
Christ by Satan for, ultimately, it is really political power and
influence that Sprat is actually offering to Cowley and the same
can be said of the Jacobite, though the choices faced by the
Presbyterian are both worldly. See Richard Hurd, Moral and
Political Dialogues with Letters on Chivalry and Romance, Fourth
mind, not the protection of the Kirk.

It is the process by which the Presbyterian balances, in
Lockean fashion, the advantages of union with England or alliance
with France, which makes Defoe's dialogue veer towards the
philosophic. The Jacobite, in fact, supplies good arguments for
alliance with France and it is for that reason that despite the
humiliation of his defeat, there is a genuine development of ideas
in the dialogue. In the words of W.L. Payne about Defoe's use of
dialogue in the Review:

We may conclude that he used it as a device
to lighten and make more interesting what
otherwise would have been bleak, formal
argument. Certainly he must have been
aware that by its very nature it shows the
development of an idea, and when employed
to clarify abstract ideas, allows the
author to make his point, and the reader
to grasp it, in a more leisurely fashion
than would direct exposition. In short,
Mr. Review used it for the same reason he
used Definition - as an aid to clarity.¹

One need only add that though Defoe used dialogue sparingly in his
periodical, when he did use it, it was with such artistry that he
often achieved the dialectical effects of philosophical dialogue.

Steele's Tatler employed dialogue even less than Defoe's Review
and often in conjunction with other forms. One good example is
Tatler no. 165 where Bickerstaff presents a satirical

¹. William Lytton Payne, Mr. Review: Daniel Defoe as Author of
The Review (New York, 1947), p.35. Hereinafter to be cited as
Payne.
"character"\(^{1}\) of a literary critic before describing his intrusion into a domestic gathering made up of Bickerstaff, a married couple, and their maidenly daughters. As the critic is courting the eldest daughter, this dialogue evidently has elements of the comedy of manners; moreover the satirical side of the Lucianic mode reveals itself in exchanges like the following:

I must confess, continued she, (for I found she was resolved to exasperate him) I laughed very heartily at the last new Comedy which you found so much Fault with. But, Madam, says he, you ought not to have laughed; and I defy any one to show me a single Rule that you could laugh by. Ought not to laugh! says she, Pray who should hinder me? Madam, says he, there are such people in the World as Rapin, Dacier, and several others, that ought to have spoiled your Birth.\(^{2}\)

The dialogue itself is encapsulated within a light-hearted, yet eminently serious, Bickerstaffian essay on the perils of pedantry.

Although in Tatler no. 165 Steele employs dialogue to create a comic scene illustrating Bickerstaff's essayistic disquisition on pedantry, he was also very adept at dialogue in a more disquisitional,

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1. The "character" or character-sketch was a very frequent device in the Tatler and Spectator. Usually such "characters" were influenced by those of La Bruyère, whose character-sketches were more individualized than those of Theophrastus. Marreville, himself, made ample use of the "character," again in the mode of La Bruyère, in his contributions to the Female Tatler. For the influence of La Bruyère on Steele and Addison, see Margaret Turner, "The Influence of La Bruyère on the Tatler and the Spectator," Modern Language Review, 48 (1953), 10-16. For the influence of La Bruyère on the earlier Female Tatlers, see R.B. Anderson, "La Bruyère and Mrs. Crackenthorpe's Female Tatler," Publications of the Modern Language Association, 52 (1937), 100-03.

2. The Lucubrations of Isaac Bickerstaff Esq. (Dublin 1751), pp.218-19. Hereinafter to be cited as Lucubrations I, II, III or IV.
even if mildly satirical, mode. The finest of these is probably the one on duelling in Tatler no. 39. Bickerstaff’s intention to “bottom out” the causes of duelling are clearly stated in his introduction to the dialogue: "The persons concerned in it are Men of Honour and Experience in the Manners of Men, and have fallen upon the truest Foundation, as well as searched the Bottom of this Evil." The conversation centres on what Col. "Plume," an old Cavalier, has to say about the custom in his time, which adroitly serves as a short exposition of duelling during the Restoration. There is a certain amount of raillery on the part of the two other conversationalists, "Sir Mark" and "Mr. Sage," for they hardly conceal their contempt for duelling. Thus, at one point, Sir Mark is led to exclaim sarcastically: "If the Fashion of Quarrelling and Tilting was so often changed in your Time, Colonel Plume, a Man might fight, yet lose his Credit for Want of understanding the Fashion." That, in fact, is the conclusion arrived at, that duelling was mainly a fashionable custom, closely wedded to aristocratic notions of honour, but that like all fashionable customs, it constantly changed in detail so that one style of duelling was deemed honourable one day and despicable the next. The corollary follows that duelling can have very little in common with morality, honour, and good sense, and it takes the form of an angry rhetorical question from Mr. Sage: "BUT what is the Reason, that Men of the most excellent Sense and Morals (in other Points) associate their Understandings with the very pretty Fellows in that Chimera of a Duel?" The question is answered just as rhetorically by Sir Mark: "THUS is no disputing against so great a Majority."  

1. Lucubrations I, 233.  
2. Lucubrations I, 235.  
That has been said thus far about the dialogue only describes the direction of its dialectic. It is also very amusing, as in the following exchange, in which Col. Plume recites an anecdote about the custom:

I was going to tell you, Mr. Sara, that one Cornet Medish had desired his Friend, Captain Smart's Opinion in some Affair, but did not follow it; upon which Captain Smart sent Major Adroit (a very topping Fellow of those Times) to the Person that had slighted his Advice. The Major never enquired into the Quarrel, because it was not the manner then among the very topping Fellows; but got two Swords of an equal Length, and then waited upon Cornet Medish, desiring him to choose his Sword, and meet his Friend Captain Smart. Cornet Medish came with his Friend to the Place of Combat; there the Principals put on their Pumps, and stripped to their Shirts, to show they had nothing but what men of Honour carry about them, and then engaged.

Sir Mark. AND did the Seconds stand by, Sir?

Col. Plume IT was a received Custom till that Time; but the Swords of those Days being pretty long, and Principals acting on both Sides upon the Defensive, and the Morning being frosty, Major Adroit desired that the other Second, who was also a very topping Fellow, would try a Thrust or two only to keep them warm, till the Principals had decided the Matter, which was agreed to by Medish's
Second, who presently whipt Adroit through the Body, disarmed him, and then parted the Principals, who had received no Harm at all.

Even the amusing anecdotes, however, serve the purpose of furthering the dialectic, as the one just quoted is probed by Mr. Sage with the result of demonstrating how duels are determined by frivolous fashions:

Mr. Sage. BUT was not Adroit laughed at?
Col. Plum. ON the contrary, the very topping Fellows were after of Opinion, That no Man who deserved that Character, could serve as a Second, without fighting; and the Smarts and Zodies finding their Account in it, the Rumour took without Opposition.

Mr. Sage. PRAY, Colonel, how long did the Fashion continue?
Col. Plum. NOT long neither, Mr. Sage; for as soon as it became a Fashion, the very topping Fellows thought their Honour reflected upon, if they did not proffer themselves as Seconds when any of their Friends had a Quarrel, so that sometimes there were a Dozen of a Side.2

In short, this dialogue, despite its brevity, is not only concise and pleasantly conversational in tone but, in its shrewd dialectic, it also partakes of the characteristics of fine philosophical dialogue. It ends very effectively with an ironic comment from Sir Mark: "THY, Gentlemen, if they are Men of such nice Honour, (and must fight) there will be no fear of foul Play, if they throw up Cross or File who should be shot."3

2. Lucubrations I, 236.
3. Lucubrations I, 238.
In view of the sophisticated use of dialogue by Steele, Defoe, and even, at times, L'Estrange in their periodical journals, it is evident that Mandeville had ample precedent for going beyond strident political partisanship in his brief excursion into periodical journalism. He was, however, far more committed to the dialogue form, both qualitatively and quantitatively, than either Defoe or Steele. At least seventeen of Mandeville's thirty-two contributions to the Female Tatler are cast in dialogue form either in whole or considerable part. He may thus be said to have restored the importance of dialogue, at least briefly, to periodical publications but, as will be seen, in a manner more akin to Defoe and Steele, than to L'Estrange and the numerous imitators of his dialogue-journal.

Mandeville, however, retained much of L'Estrange's sharpness of wit and turned it against what he no doubt considered the excessive gentility of Steele's Tatler. The Female Tatler, in fact, was both an imitation and a rival of Steele's publication and its articles often provide a running, and by no means uniformly flattering, commentary on preceding issues of the Tatler. Steele, in his Rickerstaffian persona, complained of the "sniping" from imitators, including the Female Tatler:

To enumerate some of these my doughty Antagonists,
I was threatened to be answered Weekly Tit for Tat;
I was undermined by the Whisperer, haunted by Tom
Brown's Ghost, scolded at by a Female Tatler ... I
have been annotated, retattled, examined, and condemned;
But it being my standing Maxim never to speak ill of
the Dead, I shall let these Authors rest in peace, and
take great Pleasure in thinking that I have sometimes
been the Means of their getting a Belly-full.

Bickerstaff, however, more usually ignored rival publications, so that it is apparently impossible to gauge how seriously the Female Tatler was taken by Steele in comparison with other, far more ephemeral, imitations.¹

"Andeiville's contributions to the Female Tatler, in any case, are consistently critical of the social observations made by Bickerstaff though, as in Lucinda's favourable comments on Steele's musing of Bickerstaff's reflections as "lucubrations," he fully recognized the elegance and popularizing tendency of Steele's style.²

As Lucinda puts it,

The better sort are of Opinion, that the Squire being an Airy facetious Man, that Writes with Strength and Spirit, and would make the World believe that his Papers are Wirte off Hand, has call'd his Tatlers Lucubrations, in derision of those sower (sic) Laborious Pedants that have taken such wonderful Pains, and yet not been so Diverting or Instructive as himself ...³

Before dealing with Andeiville's contributions, however, a few words

1. The tendency of the Female Tatler to have each issue devoted to one thematic essay, however, was speedily adopted by Steele's Tatler. On this point, see Walter Graham, English Literary Periodicals (New York, 1930), p.68.

2. In another contribution (Female Tatler no.66), however, the Andeivillian persona of the "Oxford Gentleman" criticizes the type of popularization obviously not written by an expert on the subject: "Those that would Write for Publick Entertainment, I reckon as much obliged to touch upon nothing but what they are well assured of, as if they Write the most serious Epick Poem; they ought never to speak of any Art, otherwise but that those who profess it might think they were Masters of it, or at least have no reason by their Writings to think the contrary."

3. Unlike the Tatler, Female Tatlers have never been reprinted in volume form so that one has to rely on bound original copies or facsimiles only available in a few libraries, including the Bodleian. The quotation is from Female Tatler no.61.
need to be said about the development and general policy of the

Female Tatler.

To begin with, it should be noted that the first fifty-one issues, published in 1709, were edited by Mrs. Crackenthorpe, "a Lady that knows everything." She is usually identified as a pseudonym for either the minor novelist Mary de la Rivière Manley or the minor playwright Thomas Baker.¹ Whoever invented Mrs. Crackenthorpe, he or she displayed a consistently feminist point-of-view and one apparently stimulated by Steele's feminism in the "Jenny Diastaff" papers, supposedly by Eickerstaff's half-sister, in the Tatler.² With issue no.52, the editorship passed to a "society of ladies," usually identified as Maneville and the playwright Mrs. Centlivre.³ The papers written by Lucinia and Artesia are usually acknowledged to be by Maneville and comprise thirty-two of the sixty-five issues of the later Female Tatler.⁴ What did not change, however, was the feminism,


2. During the short-lived period of the Female Tatler, these consisted of Tatlers no.10, 13, 36, 37 and 38.

3. See P.B. Anderson, "Innocence and Artifices: or, Mrs. Centlivre and the Female Tatler," Philological Quarterly, 16 (1937), 352-75. Since the other two probable editors of the Female Tatler were dramatists, it would be interesting to speculate on how involved Maneville was with the theatre personalities of his day. Possibly his partiality for the dialogue form may have been partly induced by an avid love of theatre, especially comedy.

which was not far different from that of Mrs. Crackenthorpe.

Mandeville’s feminism, in fact, is important in relation to his use of dialogue in the *Female Tatler* because, among other things, it was a useful device by which to oppose not just Steele’s social opinions, but his very attitude to life as expressed by Sickerstaff, of which his treatment of women in the pages of the *Tatler* was but a symptom. Thus, a few observations about the contrasting attitudes to women by Steele and Mandeville are necessary as a preliminary to analyzing Mandeville’s opposition, much of it in dialogue, to Steele.

Steele’s attitudes towards women, as his attitudes towards much else, were neither those of a reformer nor a conservative but cautiously “liberal.” Thus, while he did not believe that women are equal to men in intelligence nor capable of the same responsible social roles as men, he did believe that, as marriage partners, husband and wife are equals and have equal responsibilities; indeed that marriage is a partnership between two rational beings rather than a convenient way of preserving property, as the conservatives implied.

1. Graham, 269. “Feminism” is a rather elastic term in this context. An earlier periodical, the *Athenian Mercury*, published in the 1690’s, for example, could be called “feminist” in that it dealt, and with no mincing of words, with the problems, moral and otherwise, of women. A later one, the *Female Spectator* (1744-46), on the other hand, could be called “feminist” in that it dealt with matters of courtesy and genteel behaviour towards women. Both were aimed primarily at women audiences. The *Female Tatler*, however, may well have been read, though this has not been corroborated one way or another, mostly by men and probably by more intellectually-inclined women. Its feminism was of a more radical kind, possibly ahead of its time and, as will be seen, directly opposed to the apparent feminism of Steele’s *Tatler*. For examinations of the above-mentioned periodicals, see Earths-Jonica Stearns, “The First English Periodical for Women,” *Modern Philology*, 28 (1930), 45-49 and James Hodges, “The Female Spectator, a Courtesy Periodical” in R.P. Bond, ed., *Studies in the Early English Periodical* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1957), pp.151-82.
or an amazing sexual bond, as some of the Restoration "wits" presented it. To the extent that Bickerstaff criticized maltreatment of the opposite sex, especially in marriage, Steele was a feminist reformer but no more so.

Like Steele's, Mandeville's attitudes were equally complex. He tended to be both a reforming feminist and one who was fully aware, and even appreciative, of the psychological differences, whether socially-induced or not, between the sexes. Thus, in Female Tatler no. 66, Artesia can say that "it is with Virtues as it is with Beauties, some become the men and others the women most" so that there is no female "Virtue nor good quality more valuable than Chastity" and still maintain that women are capable of equally honourable male virtues, such as the courage displayed by Elizabeth I against the Armada. Mandeville's feminism, in fact, was entirely consistent with his tough-minded views on the role of self-interest in human behaviour. He could both condemn what he considered to be male dominance of women by trickery and the female propensity to be deceived by such trickery. As Artesia puts it in issue no. 66, the men like wary Conquerors, keep us Ignorant, because they are afraid of us, and that they may the easier maintain their Dominion over us, they Compliment us into Idleness, pretending those Peaceansanta to be the Tokens of their Affection, which in reality are the Consequences of their Tyranny; But what enrages us most is to see our Sex so stupid as to believe themselves

2. Lond, 84-90.
better treated than the Woman in other Nations, because we are more egregiously Cheated of our Right and Liberties than they; ... 

The vividness of Artesia's remarks points to Mandeville's striking success in playing the role of an intellectually emancipated woman frowning on other women's unthinking acceptance of their place in society and probably Mandeville's awareness of the more favourable status of women in the more egalitarian Dutch society contributed in no small measure to the plausibility of Artesia's resentment.

As personae, the "sisters" Lucinda and Artesia are individualized to the extent that they represent two different temperaments. Lucinda is usually somewhat idealistic and conventional; Artesia, more provocative and impetuous in her attitudes. They are both good hostesses, however, for Artesia is not quite as aggressively "conservative" as a certain "Col. Worthy" nor is Artesia as outspoken as the Colonel's antagonist, an "Oxford Gentleman." In their roles as hostesses conducting lively conversations on various philosophical, political and social topics, Lucinda and Artesia, in fact, curiously resemble the "blue-stockings" of the salons which were to become popular in the 1750's.¹ These mixed social gatherings presented in the pages of the Female Tatler soon to have been unusual in the

1. On how the salons of Mrs. Montagu and other blue-stockings were cases of lively and occasionally philosophical conversation in a desert of gambling mania as a favoured pastime on the part of the aristocracy, see E. Chuchon's concluding chapter to his Mrs. Montagu and her Friends (London, 1907).
"polite" society of Queen Anne's day. Despite the apparent feminism of Mandeville's device, however, the views of Lucinda and Artesia are far more prominent in the more conventional essays, and in some of the more trivial discussions, than in the philosophical debates featuring Col. Worthy and the Oxford Gentleman. An exception is the dialogue on mothers-in-law in issue no. 76. Here Artesia generates a discussion by talking about how young wives often have their lives made miserable by their mothers-in-law, even when they are otherwise of unimpeachable character. After some argument between Artesia and another lady on why mothers-in-law behave so peculiarly, Lucinda brings the discussion to a more philosophical plane by searching for an explanation "more generally applicable to 'en all that can be alleged as a reason of that hatred with which they are so generally inspired." The gist of Lucinda's view turns out to be the penetrating psychological reason that mothers-in-law are reminded of their husbands by their sons, so that the daughter-in-law becomes a kind of usurper to their affections. As a crowning dramatic touch, a mother-in-law challenges Lucinda's analysis in terms that confirm it. There is certainly a very careful gradation of argument in this dialogue, from Artesia's remarks on what she has heard about mothers-in-law to Lucinda's generalized conclusion. The mother-in

1. Swift himself complained about the exclusion of women from serious conversation:

*THis Degeneracy of Conversation, with the pernicious Consequences thereof upon our Humours and Dispositions, hath been owing, among other Causes, to the Custom arisen, for some Years past, of excluding Women from any Share in our Society, further than in Parties at Play, or Dancing, or in the Pursuit of an Amour.*

law, in turn, unwittingly supplies the proof of Lucinìa's conclusion. In terms of dialectic, it is an interesting dramatization of argument by induction and the one philosophical dialogue in the Female Tatler in which the flow of argument is dominated by Lucinìa and Artesìa.  

In a later issue (no. 98), a dialogue ensues between an "unmannèrd Old Fellow" and Artesìa over the education of women – a proposal that Steele seemed to be against, but in the guise of favouring education proper to women. There is a certain amount of comedy involved in this dialogue as the old man intrudes upon an assembly of women trying to decide which women to include in the Female Tatler's "Table of Fane," an obvious rival of the Tatler's male Table of Fame, but his arguments, though wittily expressed, are serious. The essence of the old man's argument is contained in the following words:

Every body loves Women that are Gay and Witty, but Solidity and Learning are no more becoming than Brooches; and Latin is as ungentle

1. If Mandeville had a preference for either one of his creations, it was probably for the more realistic Artesìa, even allowing for Lucinìa's more prominent role in the dialogue discussed above, as she is deemed to be the "author" of Mandeville's poem on "Grinning Honour" in issue no. 78.

2. Rao Blanchard concludes about Steele's attitude towards the education of women that "whatever may have been Steele's attitude toward the feasibility and the desirability of educating woman, his constructive efforts did not go beyond producing another moral treatise for her perusal in the vein of the seventeenth-century conservative tradition" (Blanchard, 342–3). Mandeville's attitude was far more straightforward, for in the last issue of the Female Tatler (no. 115) Lucinìa states quite bluntly about the feasibility of women learning such supposedly unfeminine subject as arithmetical, that "It must be own'd, the Dutch Women have a far better Method to attain that Art by counting their Guins, and confining it to Trade; but when English Husbands will give a sincere account of their Affairs, and consult with their Wives and confide in their Friendship and Diligence, I dare believe they will soon overtake their Neighbours in the use of that Comendable Science; ..."
a Furniture for the inside of a Woman's Head, as a Beard is for the outside: Young Women shou'd only Study how to get Husbands; you see Mr. Pickarstaff's Sister Jenny is happily Married: She writ Tatlers almost as well as her Brother, but unless he was out of the way she never meddled with it, and then always remembered that she was a Woman.

The reference to Jenny Distaff is there for the humorous puncturing of Steele's pretensions to feminism, especially as it comes from the mouth of one who can hardly be considered a feminist; indeed, the scanty number of Jenny Distaff papers in the Tatler display very little authentic feminist sentiment, and none of it in a blunt, contentious tone. In Tatler no. 35, for example, Jenny Distaff introduces herself this way:

MANY Affairs calling my Brother into the Country, the Care of our Intelligence with the Town is left to me for some Time; therefore you must expect the Advices you meet with in this Paper to be such as more immediately and naturally fall under the Consideration of our Sex. History therefore written by a Woman, you will easily imagine to consist of Love in all its Forms, both in the Abuse of, and Obedience to that Passion. As to the Faculty of Writing itself, it will not, it is hoped, be demanded, that Stile and Ornament shall be so much consulted, as Truth and Simplicity; which latter Qualities we may more justly pretend to beyond the other Sex. 1

1. Lucubrations I, 214.
In view of Jenny Distaff's deliberate circumscribing of the subjects she feels capable of dealing with and her half-apologetic assertion that women can be better writers than men, it is an understatement to say that Lucinda's and Artesia's concerns are far broader in scope and therefore, by implication and in the context of Queen Anne's reign, far more aggressively feminist.

Artesia's answer to the old man is very deft, but not in the tradition of philosophical dialogue, for she neatly sidesteps the old man's objections to the education of women and makes the point that the old man's real objections are to the Female Tatler itself. This gives a psychological twist to the argument which leads to an impassioned defence of the periodical. In other words, Mandeville here creates a miniature comic scene in the Lucianic vein for expository purposes. What the defence of the Female Tatler boils down to is that its aims, just like those of any other periodical in the vein of the Tatler, is to civilize and polish the manners of the age.

Bickerstaff's expertise in these matters is acknowledged by Lucinda but she insists that he is not the only worthy periodical
moralist in the field: ¹

That Mr Bickerstaff has a more happy Genius this way than any body else yet discovered, we don't dispute, but his being the greatest Mastiff, proves not that all the rest are Curs; A Man of Seven Foot has reason to brag of his Height, but he is in the wrong to call all Dwarfs that are under it. If we can but seldom divert People of refin'd Palates, we may often instruct those of lesser Capacities.

Lucinda's remarks can be construed as "damning with faint praise" for though on the surface she seems to praise Bickerstaff's refinement, she also implies that he is over-refined. It is very likely that Mandeville considered the Female Tatler to have a healthier influence on manners because it was not over-refined, thus avoiding the danger of

¹. On this issue, feelings still seem to run high. As recently as 1971, partiality for the undoubted virtues of the Tatler was expressed this way:

With some readers the Female Tatler succeeded better than any of the other early imitators. It had within its moderate span good social portraiture and a more than occasional running wit. But its style was frequently stringy and at times opaque, and the paper rather obviously lacked the Tatler's richness in themes and characters, its coupling of utility and delight. This document in what we now call feminism could never pretend to Tatlerian stature beyond that of a clever adjunct or a genuine tribute to the one Bickerstaff and his Lucubrations. Perhaps the ladies bantered him to gain attention, as Isaac must have understood. The final significance of this exercise in imitation may lie in the conclusion that a close mimicry of a celebrated work is to a tolerable degree readable.

(Ford, 198)

As should be evident even at this stage, Mandeville's opposition to the values the Tatler stood for was considerably more serious and certainly many of Mandeville's dialogue contributions to the Female Tatler had no lack of "richness in themes."
hypocrisy in its analysis of social mores. That Mandeville considered
the Tatler to be occasionally hypocritical can be discerned from
Lucinda's remarks in issue no.72 where she has this to say: "But
above all, what Virtuous Man alive that pretends to give Council to
People in Love, would advise 'em to go to a Whore, as was done in
the Tatler of Thursday last?" That refers to Tatler no.107 where
Bickerstaff advises a gentleman visitor suffering from unrequited
love to "change the Passion itself into some other Passion, that is
to speak more plainly, find out some other agreeable Woman." This
is only one alternative among others more "respectable" proposed by
Bickerstaff but Mandeville was undoubtedly not so much shocked by it
as highly amused at the mincing, and therefore somewhat hypocritical,
tone in which it was expressed. To sum up, Mandeville's feminism,
up to this point, can be described as a weapon against Steele's
genteel moralism but, in the context of Mandeville's contributions
as a whole, it is also one of many devices in Mandeville's analysis
of sociability, a trait often found at its most interesting in the
relations between the sexes. In their views of the nature of

1. The two other alternatives were to fall in love with someone
else and to, as we would now call it, sublimate passionate
feelings in pursuit of "Profit, Preferment, Reputation." In
the same issue Mandeville revived the old Swiftian jest about
Bickerstaff's prediction of the death of Partridge the astrologer
and turns it on Bickerstaff himself, now a creature of Steele's
rather than Swift's imagination, because "Wisdom, Virtue and
Laboriousness, have always been inseparable from the famous
Bickerstaff, but if the Characters that have first recommended
him to the Publick, and by which only he was known to the World,
are no more to be found in those Works that go under his Name,
the Author is Dead, and the Papers are Spurious." For a highly
entertaining account of the background to this long-running, and
eminently confusing, jest at the expense of the hapless Partridge,
see R.P. Bond, "Isaac Bickerstaff Esw." in Restoration and
Eighteenth-Century Literature: Essays in Honor of Alan Durald
McKillop (Chicago, 1963), pp.103-24. For observations on the
Female Tatler's proclamation of Bickerstaff's "death," see p.121.
sociability, Mandeville and Steele differed as much as in their feminism, and in a way related to their differing use of dialogue.

There is no doubt that both Steele and Mandeville considered sociability, and the rules of good-breeding designed to reinforce it, a desirable trait and one, to a greater or lesser extent, indispensable to civilized society. Nor can it be said that they disagreed as to its artificiality, in the sense that sociability needs constant cultivation. Where they differed was in their notion of the social function of good-breeding. In Steele's view, the function of good-breeding was to make conversation as pleasant and beneficial a pastime as possible for any given social gathering. As Bickerstaff puts it, "The most necessary Talent therefore in a Man of Conversation, which is what we ordinarily intend by a fine Gentleman, is a good judgment." In the character-sketch of a certain "Sophronius" in issue no. 21 Bickerstaff makes clear what he means by "good judgment" in this context:

His Judgment is so good and unerring, and accompanied with so cheerful a Spirit, that his Conversation is a continual Feast, at which he helps some, and is helped by others, in such a Manner that the Equality of Society is perfectly kept up, and every Man obliges as much as he is obliged: For it is the greatest and justest Skill in a Man of superior Understanding, to know how to be on a Level with his Companions. 1

1. Lucubrations, 123.
In short, good judgment promotes good conversation and its result, sociability.

Mandeville would have probably agreed with Steele's description of good-breeding but did not consider it either necessarily a virtue nor indispensable to the smooth functioning of society. In a characteristically dialectical manner, he employs dialogue in Female Tatler no. 62 to make an oblique attack on the importance attached by Steele to good-breeding. The dialogue begins with Artesia asserting in a Bickerstaffian manner that in the conversation she is about to report, "We happen'd to have no Scandal, and were agreeably diverted our selves without talking ill of others." In other words, no one violated the demands of good-breeding. After some arguments on both sides of the question on whether man is a sociable creature, Lucinda broadens the scope of the argument by not only asserting that man is a sociable creature but also adding that "I am of the ingenius Mr. Bickerstaff's Opinion, that none are to be counted Alive, but such as, setting aside all private Interest and Personal Pleasure, are Generous enough to labour and exert themselves for the benefit of others." Thus, without even saying so directly, Lucinda assumes a connection between altruism and sociability. Her visitors assume much the same connection for, as Artesia reports, "Here Lucinda having found in most of us, what by her Looks she seem'd to demand, a tacit Applause, left off." An "Oxford gentleman," however, intervenes in the conversation and eloquently argues that it is not sociability which brings men together, but self-interest and not self-interest alone but diverse interests, even when they take the form of the most deplorable
vices, skilfully managed by politicians to form society. Apart from attacking the notion of the social importance of good-breeding in such an oblique manner, the Oxford Gentleman perhaps even offends against the very canons of good-breeding by stating his argument so abrasively, even if honestly, that its effect is to stop the flow of conversation altogether. In Artesia's words, "He would have gone on, but seeing by our Countenances that no body admired his Doctrine, he said no more, and in a little while after the Company broke up."

The differing treatments of the notion of good-breeding by Mandeville and Steele lead one to conclude that, as moral "censor," Bickerstaff dictates, albeit with a velvet glove, what good-breeding should consist of and he does so in univocal essay-form with the occasional aid of such typical periodical devices as the "character" or "episode" to illustrate his points. Lucinda and Artesia, on the other hand, do not speak with one voice but generate situations, in a good number of papers at least, in which Mandevillian personae, such as the Oxford Gentleman, do not merely illustrate a point but articulate it dramatically. Mandeville does this, however, at the expense of conventional good-breeding which, at least in Bickerstaff's notion of the term, implies avoidance of controversy. Unlike Bickerstaff, then, Lucinda and Artesia do not dictate but expose various points-of-view, even potentially offensive ones, on many topics to the reader.

This is how they describe their own role in issue no.100:

1. It is the frequent occurrence of this sort of argument, highly reminiscent of the Fable of the Bees, which makes it difficult not to attribute the Lucinda-Artesia papers to Bernard Mandeville.
As to the Party we are of, it is that which meddles with no Faction or encourages any sort of Rebellion whatever, and detests all Trumpeters of Sedition. We are of that Party that far from siding with any, instead of corroding Arguments to uphold one against the other, studies how to prevent the Misunderstandings, and allay the Anamosities (sic) of all, that without wishing ill, much less destroying, either Party would extirpate the Names of both, and heal up the Wounds of our unhappy Divisions, with that admirable Panacea of Concord and Unanimity.

There is a certain amount of irony here because Lucinda and Artesia are referees of very heated discussions even if they themselves are "impartial." Mandeville's declaration, through Lucinda and Artesia, of his own impartiality, however, is not disingenuous because his general aim in the Female Tatler appears to be to articulate various viewpoints on the interaction of ethics and social mores in order to arrive at a deeper, and philosophically detached, understanding of social behaviour — an understanding beyond considerations of party or religious belief. It is not surprising, then, that dialogue is a far more frequent device in Mandeville's contributions to the Female Tatler than in Steele's periodical.

Even when Mandeville employs the essay-form, he lends it a considerable amount of dramatic liveliness. One good example is in Female Tatler no. 56 where the resources of the periodical essay are skilfully orchestrated. In terms of form, it best fits the
"narrative" type of periodical essay where "the relationship of one part of the essay to another is chronological"\(^1\) and its underlying motif is a satirical jibe against scandalmongering. The scene is set with Lucinda relating that "two young Gentlewomen that are Cousins of whose Affairs I knew more than either of them imagined" had come to see her to complain about the lack of scandalous material in the *Female Tatler*. Lucinda obliges them by claiming that she was just in the process of considering the publication of two scandalous stories, but she reveals to the reader that she was setting a trap in revenge for their criticism of the periodical. Both scandalous stories, in fact, are really about Chloe and Celia, the two gentlewomen. Celia's malicious reaction to the thinly-disguised story about Chloe is very humorously described by Lucinda:

> I had observ'd, that whilst, as they thought, I was reading this Story, Celia all along had been wonderfully pleased, and continually Sniggering and Nodding at her Cousin, who for her part look'd very Grave, and seem'd as uneasy as if she had sat upon Nettles, and when I had finish'd, as the one call'd it, a silly Story, and wonder'd Celia could laugh at any thing so dull and insipid, so the other extolling it as extravagantly, said, it was the best she huer heard, and earnestly pressed me to go on with the second.

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Lucinda gleefully turns to the second story, as requested by Celia, but Celia is soon discomfited as it leaves her exposed to the tender mercies of the injured Chloe:

When I made an end of Celia's Character, and been particular enough in the Description of her Person and Circumstances to make her known, I saw that her Birth was over, and all her good Rumour vanish'd: but on the other side Chloe by degrees recovering from herumps, assum'd a merrier Countenance, and at last seem'd to feel the same Satisfaction which her Cousin had expressed before.

The hypocrisy of both ladies having been exposed, like true scandalmongers they turn against each other, which results in this farcical scene described by Lucinda:

The clatter of the China, the screaming of one Dog, and the barking of another, joyn'd to the loudness of the combatants; and the Noise of my Parrot, who upon occasions is used to joyn in the Chorus, made such a hideous Consort, that I was glad to quit the Room, and get up into my Closet, to set down what had happen'd. 1

The high-spirited comedy of this particular piece by Lucinda, though highly dramatic, uses to great advantage the conventions of the periodical essay such as the anecdotal story that proves a moral.

1. Lucinda's description of farcical chaos is somewhat reminiscent, though obviously not quite as extravagantly expressed, of some of the high-spirited chaotic scenes in Urquhart's translation of Rabelais.
point, in this case the exposure of hypocrisy, and the "character." Celia, for example, is described this way:

Celia was the Reverse of Chloe and seem'd as affectedly Cautious as the other was over free. She pretended to have a great Aversion to Men, was very Circumspect in their Company, and thought ill of all Women that were not equally Coy, and retir'd as herself.

This kind of "character," since it is descriptive more of a person than a generalized type, follows La Bruyère rather than Theophrastus, just as Steele's and Addison's "characters" do. The satirical succinctness of Mandeville's use of "character," however, is highly corrosive rather than mildly censorious, as Addison and Steele usually are. Even though Mandeville's contributions to the Female Tatler do not always reach a high standard of felicity; periodical writing, at their best they often genuinely achieve the stylistic informality coupled with serious but highly entertaining moralizing of the Tatler. What makes the Female Tatler different from Steele's periodical, then, is not so much the style, obviously much indebted to the Tatler, but the more caustic effect of Mandeville's satire and his propensity to be more interested in how morality and immorality serve larger social ends than in propagating personal morality.

Mandeville's first volume of dialogues, The Virgin Unmask'd,

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which appeared just before his first contributions to the *Female Tatler* in 1709,\(^1\) has some of the levity of style and miscellaneous content of the periodical essay and the periodical dialogue but in it can also be discerned Mandeville’s first gropings towards a mature style of philosophical dialogue. As the two fictional tales, which make up almost half of *The Virgin Unmask’d*, serve to illustrate certain points of moral import made by the older woman, Lucinda, in her conversations with her younger protégé, Antonia, Mandeville’s work reverses the usual role of the set-piece dialogue in the eighteenth-century novel. As a result, and in view of Mandeville’s later development, it is more of an experiment in philosophical dialogue than a novel-manqué.\(^2\) *The Virgin Unmask’d*, in any case, provided excellent training for the style of dialogue in the *Lucinda-Artesia Papers* and the second part of *The Fable of the Bees*, and it is from such a perspective that it will be approached in the next chapter.

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1. G. S. Vichert in his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on Mandeville assumes that *The Virgin Unmask’d* was published sometime before Mandeville’s first contribution to the *Female Tatler* because one of the editors, Thomas Baker, was probably attracted to the feminism of *The Virgin Unmask’d* before he asked Mandeville to share the editorship with Mrs. Centlivre. It is also probable that Mandeville’s commitments to the *Female Tatler* late in 1709 did not give him much time for writing such a lengthy book as *The Virgin Unmask’d*. See Gordon S. Vichert, *A Critical Study of the English Works of Bernard Mandeville* (University of London, 1964), p. 71.

2. This is how Gordon S. Vichert treats *The Virgin Unmask’d* in his unpublished dissertation.
CHAPTER III. DIALECTICAL DECEPTION AND NOVELISTIC DETAIL IN

MACHEVELLE'S THE VIRGIN UNMASK'D

Finchwife: ... a mask! No - a woman
    masked, like a covered dish, gives a
    man curiosity and appetite; when, it
    may be, uncovered, 'twould turn his
    stomach: no, no.

Alithea: Indeed your comparison is
    something a grossy one. But I had a
    gallant used to say, "A beauty masked,
    like the sun in eclipse, gathers more
    gazers than if it shined out."

William Wycherley's
The Country Wife (Act III,
So. I)
Mandeville's *The Virgin Unmask'd*, first published in 1709, is not only his first volume of dialogues but his first considerable prose work as well. In subject-matter it is almost as diffuse as the Lucinda-Artesia Papers but the use of dialogue is far more consistent. In terms of rhetorical technique, it basically employs the fictional tale and the Erasmian colloquy. As far as dialectical technique is concerned, it employs a highly empirical kind of reasoning which, in the fictional tales at least, is essentially hostile yet closely-related to the casuistical reasoning of "advice" columns in such periodicals as the Athenian Mercury and Defoe's Review. Both the elements of colloquy and fictional tale, however, are subordinated to a common dialectical pattern which, as will be demonstrated, accounts for the *Virgin Unmask'd* being a genuine philosophical dialogue despite the diversity of topics discussed.

Before examining the role of *The Virgin Unmask'd* as Erasmian colloquy, it should be noted that, as has been pointed out by Vichert, the title alone raised expectations of a pornographic work in dialogue form such as the *Regiomantius* of Aretino and its English imitations, Nicholas Chorier's *Satyrus Sotadica* (1660), later translated as *A Dialogue between a Married Lady and a Maid* (1668), and *The School of Love containing several dialogues between Tullia and Octavia* (1707). Both of these productions in an Aretinian vein, and no doubt many others, took the form of dialogues between an older and younger woman – a convention which remained the norm for at least

It is this framework of scurrilous dialogue between an older and a younger woman which *The Virgin Unmask'd* shares with its pornographic forebears, and even the younger woman or "virgin" in Mandeville's book is named, unless by sheer coincidence, after the younger woman called Antonia in Aretino's work. While Mandeville's titillating title probably served to attract many kinds of readers, the "unmasking" promised has nothing to do with narrowly pornographic considerations but with the dialectical unmasking of false ideas about many aspects of the relationship between the sexes.

Although *The Virgin Unmask'd* cannot be construed as in any way pornographic, it is nevertheless the most pungently colloquial of all of Mandeville's dialogues. As such, it is chiefly influenced not by Aretino but by the *Colloquies* of Erasmus, as Mandeville himself hints at in the preface,

> Erasmus in his *Ichthuophagia* treats of more abstruse Matters, than I do in any Part of the Dialogues; and yet the Persons in all Probability are less accomplish'd than mine; for one is a Butcher, and the other a Fishmonger.

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2. Mandeville may have been familiar with Aretino's *Ragionamenti* either in its free English adaptation entitled *The Crafty Whore: or, the mistery and iniquity of bawdy houses* (London, 1658) or the Dutch translation entitled *Het leven en d'arglistige treken der courtisanen te Rome* (Leyden, 1680). Both are mentioned in Foxon, 167.

3. Mandeville's *Treatise of the Hypochonriack and Hysterick Diseases* is almost as pungently colloquial but includes, as well, highly technical medical terminology.

Apart from its colloquial style and dialogue method, what Erasmus's "Ichthuophagia" or "A Fish Diet" also has in common with the Virgin Unmask'd is its rhetorical structure since both dialogues deal with a very wide range of topics loosely subordinated to a hidden dialectical pattern. In Erasmus's colloquy, with its wide variety of religious topics, which include the most trivially doctrinal and the most profoundly ethical, the unifying factor is, in Craig R. Thompson's words, "Christian Liberty - that favorite theme for reformers and Protestants - as contrasted with 'Judaism', the contrast between Law and Gospel, letter and spirit."¹ In the Virgin Unmask'd, the overall pattern of dialectic centers on the many diverse implications of the relationship between the sexes; so much so that even an extended discussion of politics in general (and Louis XIV in particular) is included.

Where colloquies chiefly differ from the more staid varieties of philosophical dialogue is that, as the word "colloquy" itself suggests, they are more colloquial in style and often employ arguments somewhat more rhetorical than dialectical. Thus, it is not surprising that Erasmus considered his own colloquies as a medium of popular instruction in philosophical matters: "Socrates brought philosophy down from heaven to earth; I have brought it even into games, informal conversations, and drinking parties."² In a similar vein, a rhetorical handbook of the Restoration defines the "colloquy" as "a feigned discourse betwixt two or more Persons," one of the rules of


² Quoted by Craig R. Thompson in Erasmus, xxvii.
which is that it must be "pleasant, with witty jerks, quibbles and
fancies (such as you shall often find in Erasmus) joking upon a
name, action, proverb or the like."

Quibbles certainly abound in

*The Virgin Unmask'd*, as well as such favoured Erasmian devices as
the parable, the proverb, and the "simile" or analogy. Erasmus's
view of the colloquy, while not overly concerned with conversational
decorum, is evidently fully compatible with the eighteenth-century
ideal of popularizing philosophy for the reading public, whether in
the form of philosophical dialogue or periodical essay. It is even
more fully compatible with Mandeville's ideal of philosophical
dialogue, where frankness and plain-speaking count for more than
conversational decorum.

For our purposes, the use of analogy is the most important
dialectical element of the Erasmian colloquy employed by Mandeville
in *The Virgin Unmask'd*. What distinguishes Erasmus's use of
analogy is that it is not always strictly dialectical but often
amusingly rhetorical, in the sense that the amusing aspect of an
analogy is employed to undermine an opponent's argument. Thus, in
a colloquy between an older and a younger wife, marriage is compared
to the relationship between a trainer and his animal:

Thus we see that the beating of a Drum will
set a Tiger stark raging mad, so that he
will tear his own Flesh; and thus your
Jockies have particular Sounds and Whistles,
and Strokes to flatter their Horses when
they are ill-condition'd. How much more

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1. Ralph Johnson, *The Scholars Guide from the Accidence to the
does it concern us then to use all imaginable means to fix our selves in our Husband's good Grace, with whom, whether we will or no, we must live all our Lives at Bed and at Board, till Death comes to our Relief?¹

Brassus’s analogy, however, does not lessen the seriousness of the older woman’s advice but makes it more entertaining, even more acceptable. Another way of putting it is that the rhetorical devices of the colloquy may often be satirical but at the same time serve to further dialectical discussion, and while this is true of Brassus, it is even more true of Mandeville. In Mandeville’s case, however, it is more fruitful to discuss the rhetorical devices of the colloquy in terms of the overall dialectical pattern of the Virgin Unmask’d.

If, as assumed, the pattern of dialectic in the Virgin Unmask’d is a consistent one, what makes it consistent, and the sets of dialogues structurally unified, is the dialectical demonstration of various levels of deception. The emphasis on deception is already hinted at in the preface which attacks the whole “raison d’être” of prefaces: “but why, says another, should you hate Prefaces? The Reason is plain, because I am Honest, and I never saw any, (those of Saints excepted) but what were full of Hypocrisy and Dissimulation.”² He also warns against taking the first dialogue at its face-values:

When in the First Dialogue you meet
with any Thing harsh, and, perhaps,
very disagreeable to the Ladies, suspend
your Judgement till you come to the
Second; for there you'll find, that what
Lucinda has said to her Niece before,
was only a Sophistical Way of Arguing,
to put a Young Beautiful Lady out of
Conceit with herself, in hopes to make
her neglectful of her Charms.¹

The first dialogue, in fact, is highly deceptive about Lucinda's
real motives for excoriating Antonia and her "sophistical" criticism
of Antonia's semi-exposed breasts sounds more like hypocritical
prudery than genuine advice: "If your Breasts were Yellow or
Freckled you know, they would not be so inviting to the Fellows; but
I declare it, was I a Man I'd spit at 'em."² As Mandeville states
in the passage from the preface and as the succeeding dialogues
indicate, however, Lucinda's apparent prudery is only a device for
making Antonia aware of the dangers of her own sexuality.

Lucinda finds her own deceptive tactics all the more necessary
because Antonia herself wears the insincere "mask" of unconcern for
men; a "mask" all too discernible to Lucinda's experienced eyes but
one which forces her to adopt a mask of her own to make clear to
Antonia the dangers she is exposing herself to:

But when after all my Care I saw, that
skilfully you began to manage wilde
Nature, and grew dextrous at covering
your eager Wishes with Art and

¹ Mandeville, L6-67.

² Mandeville, 2-3.
Dissimulation, I found your fear of Man was vanish'd; you could speak to them without blushing, and look 'em in the Face with seemingly no more Concern, than in your Primitive Innocence: Then I lost all my Hopes, and grew outrageous; I knew nothing would rouse you more, than to question your Vertue; I would leave nothing untry'd; and this has been the Way, that of late, I have attacked ye, in hopes to work some Change.¹

Lucinia's emotionally-charged explanation of her tactics indicate that her duplicity is not only a dialectical device but, in terms of drama, her reaction against Antonia's deception. Thus, Vaneville's use of the term "unmask'd," instead of some less suggestive equivalent such as "revealed," is especially appropriate because of the dramatic qualities of The Virgin Unmask'd.

Though Vaneville's dialectic in The Virgin Unmask'd is more philosophical than dramatic, as he is more interested in dissecting the erroneous ideas and attitudes which lead to deceptive behaviour than the theatrical mechanics of deceptive behaviour itself, Lucinia's process of unmasking nevertheless has a dramatically plausible motive, namely that Lucinia is afraid not only that Antonia will marry the wrong man but that she will no longer have Antonia for company if she marries.² The first two dialogues, in fact, are psychologically subtle in a dramatic sense because, as is evident by the end of the second dialogue, Lucinia's bad-tempered

¹. Vaneville, 23.
². See Vaneville, 24.
railing against Antonia actually brings them closer together and even strengthens the basis of their relationship from one in which Antonia's "mask" was beginning to intrude, to a more open one. As Antonia puts it,

Indeed you have unmask'd my Soul, and traced my Thoughts through every Chink and Cranny of my Heart: I own, all what you have said is true, but you shall not need any more take such Pains to search my Inclinations; henceforth I'll keep no Secret from you.¹

Thus, from a dramatic viewpoint, the first two dialogues portray an emotional crisis between Lucinda and Antonia with duplicity on both sides, but any duplicity between Lucinda and Antonia in succeeding dialogues is purely heuristic and for the dialectical purposes of philosophical dialogue.

In this connection it should be noted that, as is well known, masks were a favoured traditional device in comedy since the time of Aristophanes and this was still true of Restoration comedy. Wycherley's plays especially make skilful use of the mask in both a literal and metaphorical sense. As J.S. Bowman points out about Wycherley's use of the mask,

Essentially, almost all of the movement within Wycherley's plays, whether it manifests itself in pure spectacle or in plot-action, arises out of attempts to deceive or to expose deceit. The characters therefore, are continually engaged in masking or unmasking - often literally.²

¹ Mandeville, 24.

Hanseville's process of unmasking, then, may well have been derived from Restoration comedy, especially as it exposes deceptions in what is, after all, a theme dear to the Restoration stage, the relationship between the sexes.1

From a more strictly dialectical viewpoint, Hanseville's process of unmasking goes even deeper, as rationality itself is shown to be illusory at times, and for two complementary reasons. One is that women's reasoning faculties are inferior to those of men because "In Reasoning, women can never cope with men, they have a Thousand Advantages beyond us; our Wit may be equal to theirs, but in every Thing else they exceed us, as well as in Strength of Body ..." and the other is that women's reasoning faculties are weaker in relation to their desires. As Lucinda puts it, "Thus it is with a Maid, that a Man lays Siege to; what Confidence can she have in her Reason, when she feels that her own Wishes within betray and overpower it?"2 Lucinda, however, not only warns against such reasoning, especially in the tales, she also employs it herself for the purpose of showing Antonia how deceptive superficially plain reasoning can be.

Almost inevitably, Lucinda's distrust of reason in the relationship between the sexes includes a strong, and not at all philosophically-detached, but rhetorical, antipathy towards marriage. It is especially evident when she reinforces her arguments against it by using an analogy which not only exposes even the favourable aspects of marriage as deceptive but is itself devious on many levels:

1. Hanseville's probable collaboration with Thomas Backer in the Female Tatler makes his familiarity with the mechanics of comic drama a distinct possibility.

May I not say of an Angler's Bait, what you say of Marriage? There must be something very inviting in it, or else the Fishes would not catch at it so greedily. You and I may talk of this, till we lose our selves; but Nobody shall ever persuade me, to be in love with the Bait, if I know that I must swallow the Hook at the same time.¹

What makes this analogy deceptive is that it is emotionally loaded and self-enclosed, in the sense that it clarifies Lucinda's attitude to marriage but does not actually logically prove that marriage is an evil. As soon as Antonia invokes a more favourable aspect of the analogy, in fact, Lucinda cannot answer and, instead, supplies yet another analogy which keeps the argument self-enclosed:

Ant. But then do you think there would be Pleasure, if it was not for the Hook?

Luc. That's another Question: I never was marry'd, I can't tell that Experience is not to be had at my rate; would you have Anybody try, whether the Ice was strong enough to bear him, if he saw People fall in before him?

Ant. That's a cold Simile in Summer.

Thus, Lucinda's angling analogy is a deviously rhetorical device serving not only to define her attitude to marriage but also to stop all effective discussion on Antonia's part.²

1. Manievilla, 112.

2. Earlier on, Lucinda uses the same analogy to describe her own deceptiveness in argument: "I confess, what I said was a little suspicious; but I did it to see how soon you would swallow the Hook if it was cover'd with that Bait" (Manievilla, 97). She can afford to admit her own occasional deceptiveness, however, because it is for the purpose of educating Antonia to beware of far more serious deceptions.
Considering Lucinda's partiality on the question of marriage, it is highly ironic of Mandeville to make her describe herself as judging "of things as I find them, without being influenced by my Love, or my Hatred." Mandeville, however, probably intended the case against marriage to be rhetorically-loaded because women readers, and possibly even male ones, would probably not have been induced to seriously examine their strongly-held ideas about marriage by purely rational analysis. Precisely because of its strong attraction, especially to "maidens," then, Mandeville's attack on marriage is almost wholly directed at the reader's emotions rather than his or her intellect. This is especially true when one considers that, as will be seen, the main thrust of the fictional tales, which belong more to the realm of rhetoric than dialectic, is a warning against the name of marriage.

On political matters, however, Lucinda's evaluation of herself is more accurate and Mandeville, himself, justifies the discussion of political matters in the following manner: "I expect to be censured for letting women talk of Politicks; but first mind, how little Antonia says to the Matter, and then examine Lucinio's Character." What Mandeville seems to imply here is that Lucinda is no ordinary woman inevitably ignorant about many subjects but a highly knowledgeable one. This aspect of Lucinda's "character," in any


2. As has been noted in the introductory chapter to this thesis, Hume used a similar tactic in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, though a far more rhetorically-sophisticated one, to undermine "the reader's psychological propensity to accept the argument from design."

case, makes it possible for Mandeville's dialectic to examine political matters. Thus, the political discussions in *The Virgin Unmask'd* are introduced almost casually when, challenged by Antonia for her apparent inconsistency in both hating and admiring men, Lucinda remarks, by way of analogy, that her attitude is no more contradictory than that of politicians who both admire and detest the powerful Louis XIV.¹

Lucinda's analogy, however, is not merely a species of verbal wit but actually relates deception between the sexes to political duplicity and leads to a key exchange which acts like an alternating current changing the direction of the dialectic to political matters:

*Ant.* Then, it seems, the King of France, has given those Princes and States great Provocations; and it is very reasonable they should be his Enemies. What has Mankind done to you? How have they deserv'd your Hate?

*Luc.* They have enslaved our Sex: In Paradise, Man and Woman were upon an even foot; see what they have made of us since: Is not every Woman that is marry'd a Slave to her Husband; I mean, if she be a good Woman, and values her Promise.²

Lucinda and Antonia in this exchange may still be basically talking about the relationship between the sexes but, coming as it does at the end of the sixth dialogue, they also irretrievably add a political dimension which dominates the next two dialogues. Just as a machine which generates alternating currents always uses the same electricity

so, too, Mandeville's dialectic may change its emphasis but is still a dialectic whose dynamic force is the exposure of deception.

Such a mechanical analogy to indicate the dialectical consistency of Mandeville's elaborate arguments in *The Virgin Unmask'd* may be anachronistic, in the sense that alternating current generators were not invented until the early nineteenth century, but not entirely inappropriate as Mandeville, himself, makes vivid use of mechanical analogies. One such is in Lucinia's description of the nature of government:

> It is very hard in some Countries to be well acquainted with the hidden Springs that give Life to the several Courts of Justice; the several Pulleys, by the help of which, the Money is boisted up from the very Bottom to the Top, as well as the many Holes thro' which it is suffer'd to drop down again, with the Wheels that turn it, and all the other Parts that compose the Machine of Government.¹

Such an analogy is reminiscent of Frasian ones in its satirical overtones but it also has the effect of inducing, because of the way it satirically reduces the awesome power of governments to a matter of wheels and pulleys, an analytical detachment towards the questions involved, so that Mandeville's dialectic indeed makes full use of analogy, sometimes for the purpose of advancing the argument in a quick and unexpectedly "witty" way and almost always for the inducement of a detached analytical spirit in the reader, rather than for

purely rhetorical persuasion. In short, despite the rhetorical complexities of Mandeville's analogies in The Virgin Unmask'd, they usually serve a fundamentally dialectical or "philosophical" purpose; so much so, in fact, that though Louis XIV is portrayed as an arch-deceiver and tyrant, tribute is paid to his courage and political capacity—in spite of the fact that Mandeville wrote and published The Virgin Unmask'd at a time when both Holland and Britain were at war with France.

One more effect of Mandeville's dialectical use of analogy is that it considerably weakens the reader's resistance to his ideas. The reader, in fact, is very much in the position of Antonia who is completely dominated not only by Lucinda's brilliance but by her cunning as well. Thus, when Lucinda compares Louis XIV's skill at political deception to those of a doctor administering effective medicines, Antonia is understandably puzzled. Lucinda explains that the "medicines" are "Bribery" and "lulling to sleep." To this Antonia counters very straightforwardly and in a seemingly definite manner: "If what you say, be true, it is strange that a great many People should think him so often mistaken!" Instead of defensively taking issue with Antonia's statement, Lucinda stays on the offensive by introducing yet another analogy, to the effect that a gardener is always full of predictions about whether his plants will bear fruit but that they change from day to day depending on the weather, so that his long-term predictions are often wrong. Again, the analogy puts Antonia on the defensive: "That's a Riddle to Me." This gives Lucinda an opportunity to continue her argument about

1. Mandeville, 149.
the French King's great political skill by explaining that she is
dealing with metaphorically measurable political facts not with
prognostications. She does not say so directly, however, but by
expanding on the analogy of the garden: "I never say or think any
Thing of it before the Fruit is ripe, but when they gather it, I
have it measured, and then I can tell you what there is to half a
Peck."¹ In short, when one analogy is successfully countered,
another one, or an aspect of the same one, takes its place and brings
more hydra-headed complexities into the argument.

One must even resort to analogy to make the point that arguing
with Lucinda is like playing chess with a much superior opponent so
that no matter what moves one makes, they are not just countered
but contained within a restricted range of choices. In view of
Lucinda's considerable advantage in argument, it is hardly surprising
that at the end of one dialogue, when Lucinda suggests a game of
chess, Antonia asks for a rook advantage, at which Lucinda responds
generously by conceding a queen.² While Lucinda's superiority in
chess is probably intended by Mandeville to reflect her superiority
in argument, she herself uses the chess-analogy in a more direct
manner to condemn Louis XIV's ruthlessness while admiring his
political skill:

That arbitrary, that knowing himself to be
the Cause of War and Famine, beholds the
Miseries of his own People with less Concern
than you can see a Play; the Bane of Mankind,

¹. Mandeville, 149.
². Mandeville, 117.
that can draw whole Schemes of the Destruction and Devastation of flourishing Cities and plentiful Countries, with the same Tranquility as I can play a Game at Chess; and if it but contributes to his gigantick Aim, esteeming the Lives of a Hundred Thousand of the most faithful of his Subjects, no more than I value the losing of a single Pawn, if it forwards my Design upon your Game.  

In spite of her condemnation of Louis XIV’s indifference to human suffering, however, Lucinda’s own manner of discussion is, like Louis’s policies, in the spirit of a ruthless game of chess but, as she implies about herself as a chess-player, her aims are essentially benevolent. Lucinda’s argumentative strategy, in fact, is also like a game of chess in the sense that it cannot really damage but, on the contrary, strengthen the inexperienced Antonia’s "virtue" just as a game of chess, if played in the proper spirit, can only enhance one’s mental abilities.

As mentioned before, the overall dialectical pattern of the Virgin Unmask’d includes the fictional tales which are, in a sense, extended analogies though they do have a life of their own independent, but not quite, of the rest of the Virgin Unmask’d. Thus, if their contribution to the overall dialectical pattern is to be understood, they must first be discussed as separate entities.

The two tales are described in the table of contents as "The History of Aurelia" and "The History of Leonora" and take up almost

half of *The Virgin Unmask'd* It seems likely, in fact, that Mandeville was experimenting in *The Virgin Unmask'd* to find out whether his purpose of creating an entertaining vehicle for philosophical analysis was better served by the philosophical dialogue or the fictional tale. Both tales are narrated by Lucinda and, although in terms of plot they are patterned after the artificial conventions of novels and romances of the day, they deal with psychological motivation in so detailed a way that they look forward to the kind of realism found in the novels of Defoe, Richardson and Fielding and defined by Ian Watt in the following manner:

Formal realism ... is the narrative embodiment of a premise that Defoe and Richardson accepted very literally, but which is implicit in the novel form in general: the premise, or primary convention, that the novel is a full and authentic report of human experience, and is therefore under an obligation to satisfy its reader with such details of the story as the individuality of the actors concerned, the particulars of the times and places of their actions, details which are presented through a more largely referential use of language than is common in other literary forms.

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1. They take up five out of ten dialogues (Dials. 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10) and ninety-three out of two-hundred pages.

2. Vichert identifies "The History of Aurelia" as based on and reacting against the Augustan fictional device of "the obstacle-strewn love intrigue which culminates in marriage" and "The History of Leonora" on the anti-romantic device of the "tale of illicit love." See Vichert, 64.

Before appraising Lucinda's tales, it should be noted that pre-Richardsonian "realism" was not quite as exhaustive as the "formal realism" described by Watt but a highly rhetorical product in the form of the fabliau or picaresque tale where "economic or carnal motives are given pride of place in their presentation of human behaviour." Such "realistic," fictions, then, are "inverted romances" rather than novels.1

While the fictional tales of The Virgin Unmask'd are not full-fledged novels in Watt's sense, they do go beyond the conventions of the "inverted romance." Lucinda herself seems to be hinting at such an aim on Mandeville's part when she tells Antonia that

"Had I been telling you a Romance, I would have made use of Art; I know as well as you, Niece, what should have been done according to their Rules ... But in a true Story, we must relate things as they happen."2

Further evidence that Mandeville was groping towards a more comprehensive realism is provided in the following exchange, where Lucinda half apologizes for the time she spends in analyzing motives:

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1. Watt, 11. Also see A.J. Tieje, The Theory of Characterization in Prose Fiction Prior to 1740 (Minneapolis, 1916), p.45. Maximilian E. Novak dissents from Watt's view that formal realism in the novels of Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding is qualitatively different from the techniques used in romances, early novellas and various other early forms of fiction. However that may be, Mandeville's tales in the Virgin Unmask'd do seem to have elements of "formal realism" in Watt's sense and, as will be seen, he certainly disparaged the romance for what he considered to be its lack of credible psychological motivation. Novak's argument is to be found in "Fiction and Society in the Early Eighteenth Century" in H.T. Swedberg, Jr., (ed.), England in the Restoration and Early Eighteenth Century (Los Angeles and London, 1972), pp.51-70.

Luc. ... I know you are a Critick,
Antonia, don't you think my Tale
tedious?

Ant. No indeed, Aunt; far from it.
Luc. I was afraid you thought me
lonely; because one should not be so
particular in Circumstances that are
immaterial to the Plot, and foreign
from the End to which a Story is told.
Ant. I have heard nothing but what
was very material ... ¹

Lucinda's remarks, in fact, point to an awareness on Mandeville's
part of the tensions between a conventional plot structure designed
to draw a "moral" and a thoroughly thoroughgoing analysis of motives. Thus,
although he was probably not aware of this, Mandeville came close to
drawing a distinction between the artificial realism of "inverted
romance" and the formal realism of the novel. In this he went
beyond the distinctions between "novel" and "romance" drawn by
Congreve in his preface to Incorrigible:

Novels are of a more familiar nature;
Come near us, and represent to us
Intrigues in practice, delight us
with Accidents and odd Events, but
not such as are wholly unusual or
unprecedented (sic), such which not
being so distant from our belief
bring also the pleasure nearer us.
Romances give more of "order,
Novels more Delight.²

1. Mandeville, 42.

2. William Congreve, The Complete Works, ed. by Montague Summers,
Where Congreve considers realism as an entertaining device, Lucinda's remarks, however hesitating in tone, point to a "circumstantial" or detailed realism independent of the exigencies of an entertaining plot. In short, the realism of Mandeville's tales is not one that differs from the schematism of the romance merely in its seamy subject-matter or entertaining verisimilitude, as advocated by Congreve, but one which probes into the motives of character in such a way that he or she becomes, as in many a novel, more of an imagined individual than a type.\footnote{Mandeville, 43.}

One important point related to the issue of novelistic realism is that Mandeville even seems to have been aware that his attention to detail made a qualitative difference in terms of entertainment value. That, at any rate, seems to be the case when Antonia exhorts Lucinda in the following manner: "But pray don't be more concise; for it is so entertaining, I shan't have enough of it."\footnote{Mandeville, 43.} Antonia's remark, in fact, seems to reflect a possible rejection on Mandeville's part of conciseness as a literary aim in the writing of fiction, again a characteristic of the novel as it was to develop in the hands of Defoe and Richardson. As Ian Watt points out about the conciseness of Augustan prose,

... the prose norm of the Augustan period remained much too literary to be the natural voice of Moll Flanders or Pamela

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1. As far as Mandeville's interest in the individuality of Aurelia is concerned, it should be noted that before even beginning to narrate the "History of Aurelia" Lucinda makes it quite plain that when she talks about Aurelia, she is talking about an acquaintance; moreover, one she remembers "when she was yet in Hanging sleeves, and I a Woman grown ..." (Mandeville, 35). On the "individualism" of the novel, see Watt, 118-19.

2. Mandeville, 43.
Andrews and although the prose of Addison, for example, or Swift, is simple or direct enough, its ordered economy tends to suggest an acute summary rather than a full report of what it describes.  

Although many of Mandeville's prose writings display the Augustan conciseness described by Watt, it nevertheless seems to be the case that in *The Virgin Unmask'd* Mandeville shows an awareness that conciseness would detract from Lucinda's tale being a novelistic "true history" rather than just a moral "exemplum."

Just how Mandeville's realism operates in the tales, however, should become evident upon examining probably the most vivid section of "The History of Aurelia" which occurs at the turning-point of the tale when Aurelia's romantic illusions about her husband, Dorante, are finally dispelled. In terms of plot, what happens is that Dorante attempts to convince his wife to commit adultery with a lord willing to pay for the privilege. Mandeville's handling of this situation is neither rhetorically moralistic nor pornographically satirical but somewhere in between these two alternatives. Dorante's attempts to induce Aurelia to commit adultery are described by Lucinda as a series of encounters between Aurelia and her husband, the full meaning of which she does not comprehend until the last moment. At first he merely flatters her charms and suggests that she would be a fit mistress for a king. Later he introduces her to a nobleman and expostulates "on his Wit and other good qualities."


Other gambits on Dorante's part include his leaving her alone for lengthy periods with the nobleman and "ridiculing the Sinfulness of Adultery and unlawful Love." Aurelia puts up with the nobleman for Dorante's sake but it never occurs to her that she is expected to prostitute herself for him.

Exasperated at Aurelia's ignorance of his design, Dorante finally makes his purpose clear and in a most brutal manner: "Would you have me to be more plain! Let him lye with you, and you'll oblige: If not, I can keep you no longer; turn out with your brats." He then goes on to expound on how money is the only real value and how Aurelia's love for him is meaningless if she is unwilling to do him such a trifling favour. Before even waiting for her reaction, Dorante summons the nobleman to their bedroom. Aurelia's sorrowful reaction to Dorante's revelation is described in great detail:

... she was so overwhelm'd with Grief at the Thoughts of the unheard of Treschery of the Man she lov'd with such a violent Passion, she was not able to utter a Word; but the Tears, not dropping but flowing from her Eyes in Streams, wept so bitterly sobbing and wringing her Hands, with all the Signs of a profound and real Sorrow, that any Man but Dorante, would have had Compassion on her.

Mandeville avoids bathos, however, by making Lucinda describe Aurelia's subsequent actions not in an exaggerated rhetorical fashion

1. Mandeville, 54.
but with an almost understated precision:

She neither made great Noise, Bit or Scratch'd, but appear'd so resolute, and her Resistance was made with so much eagerness, and in such good earnest, that the Amorous Spark, seeing there was nothing to be done without breaking her Hands, and coming to downright Brutish Force, and being pretty well tir'd, let go his hold, and came to Perawasious (sic). 1

One could go on analyzing this section of the tale but what is really worth keeping in mind is that up to the point where Aurelia rejects the advances of the nobleman and even succeeds in arousing his pity, Lucinda acts almost as an omniscient narrator vividly setting forth a series of actions described with much realistic detail.

Mandeville's narrative technique, however, also includes detailed discussion between Lucinda and Antonia about Aurelia's motivations. Antonia, in fact, asks the sort of questions often uppermost in any discerning reader's mind. Both Lucinda and Antonia are especially thoroughgoing in analyzing Aurelia's reaction to Dorante's scheme. 2 On Antonia's query about how it could be possible for Aurelia to be deceived about Dorante's intentions, Lucinda has this to say:

As to your other Doubt, how she came not to find out his Design before he told it her so openly, the same Excess of Love answers all; she knew how

1. Mandeville, 61.
little she could have parted with him to any other Woman, and measuring his Love by her own, how should she think that he intended to make a Whore of her? That he carry'd her into this Nobleman's Company, often left 'em together, and order'd her to be merry and not disoblige him by being Starch'd, was always constru'd in Dorante's Favours. She call'd it the great Confidence her Husband put in her, to put in her, to trust her with a Man of ill Repute among Women. She suffer'd his Gallantry, because she thought her Husband had some end in it, which she never examin'd into; and really Dorante had such an ascendant over her, he might have made her do any thing, and perhaps as Sinful as that, as long as it was not inconsistent with her Love. Nobody commits a Sin for the sake of its being a Sin.¹

Lucinda's answer, especially the last sentence, no doubt has its moralistic aspect but it also involves a concrete, almost novelistic, analysis of Aurelia's motives.

In short, Mandeville's quasi-novelistic realism is the product of an unusual combination of philosophical dialogue and vividly-detailed storytelling so that Lucinda plays the part of omniscient narrator and Antonia that of the alert, though somewhat romantically-inclined, reader. Mandeville's experimental attitude

¹ Mandeville, 67-8.
to his fictional tales, at any rate, seems to be confirmed when
Antonia exclaims at the end of the "History of Aurelia" that "There
is Variety enough in her Life, to make a Novel of." The
implication is that Aurelia's "history" should be considered as a
novel precisely because of its detailed realism but, in spite of
their realism, the fictional tales primarily serve the rhetorical
purpose of buttressing Lucinda's arguments in the series of
dialogues as a whole. The two fictional tales, in fact, especially
the second one, the "History of Leonora," are not only quasi-
novelistic but also exploit the resources of casuistic discourse
in their detailed analysis of character. From this standpoint the
two tales read as "cases" to be judged; to be specific, matrimonial
cases.

Matrimonial cases were found, and no doubt avidly read, not
only in casuistical treatises and handbooks such as Joseph Hall's
Resolutions and Decisions of Divers Practical Cases of Conscience in
Continuall Use Among Men (1650) and Richard Baxter's A Christian
Directory (1673) but in popular periodicals such as Dunton's
Athenian Mercury and Defoe's Review. The aims of casuistry, or
discussion of difficult "cases" of conscience, undoubtedly cannot be
equated with those of fiction, however morally "exemplary," but it
does seem that the "cases" found in a periodical like the Athenian

1. Mandeville, 98.

2. For a survey of the contents of casuistical treatises and
handbooks, see John T. McNeill, "Casuistry in the Puritan Age,"
Religion in Life, 12 (1942-43), 76-89.

3. Defoe's regular feature in the Review, "Advice from the Scandal
Club," often included casuistical problems. For evidence that
Defoe and Dunton were familiar with casuistical manuals and
treatises, see C. A. Starr, Defoe and Casuistry (Princeton, New
Mercury were not always schematic but sometimes rich enough in detail to resemble short-stories. In the words of Bertha-Monica Stearns,

From the beginning the Athenian Mercury had offered a variety of "cases" for the consideration of its readers. With the development of the Mercuries for ladies, these cases became more elaborate in detail and if not actually short-stories, certainly offered plot material for the curious. Dunton had, undoubtedly, a narrative gift that enabled him to give an air of verisimilitude to fictitious material, and to endow it with interest. ¹

As in the case of the Athenian Mercury, it may well be that Mandeville, apart from his evident philosophical interest in the moral and psychological complexities of human behaviour, may have been encouraged to provide elaborate analysis of motives in The Virgin Unmask'd for the benefit of women readers.

As far as matrimonial cases are concerned, one familiar topic for discussion was the question of to what extent parents had the right to forbid prospective marriages. One such query turns up during Lucinda's narration of "Leonora's History" when Antonia reacts to the enforced separation of Leonora and her suitor, Cleander, by demanding of Lucinda if she "approves of this rigorous Way of treating Children?" After a spirited exchange taking in the various circumstances that led Cleander's father to forbid the match and even force Cleander to leave the country, Lucinda concludes

her deliberations in favour of the father's authority for the following reason: "It is not safe for Parents to give their Consent to any Thing of moment that Children may ask, whilst they are under Age, unless it brings a visible Advantage to them." Although Lucinda's statement is intended as a general rule, it is hedged on all sides by casuistical distinctions so that the father's authority is not absolute but qualified by circumstances, such as that the son must be under-age, there is no "visible advantage" in sight and so forth. The Athenian Mercury dealt with quite a number of similar cases, though these were not always hypothetical but often from genuine correspondents, and in a similar manner. In one case concerning the rights and wrongs of parental authority and secret engagement vows, for example, the advice from the "Athenian Society" begins with this stern upholding of parental authority:

"You have no Power to dispose of your Self contrary to your Father's Consent, and if he forbid your Proceedings as soon as he heard of them, your Vows are wholly void, because God Almighty has in this case given him the Disposal of them."

only to be immediately qualified by the following advice:

"But on the other Side, we much commend those Parents that do not abuse their Authority, remembering they are

1. Mandevilla, 179.

2. A good proportion of the matrimonial cases in the Athenian Mercury deal with cases of parental authority and in the Athenian Oracle collection of queries from the Mercury usually come under the heading of "Marriage" in the "Alphabetical Table" or index.
commanded not to be bitter against their Children, as it would be, to contradict them in such an Affair, wherein often the Happiness of their Lives depends, without they'd a great deal of Reason for it. ¹

Although the kind of discussions Lucinda has with Antonia about the motivations of the characters in the fictional tales can be considered casuistical, in the sense that moral judgements are made, it remains to be seen whether Mandeville was really a casuist in the same sense as Duntun or Defoe.

Although Mandeville never seems to have made any direct statements about casuistry as such, he did declare disparagingly in his Free Thoughts on Religion that the Jesuits were "the easiest casuists" among priests. In this he no doubt followed Pascal's satirical critique of Jesuit casuistry in the famous Lettres Provinciales and Pierre Bayle's highly censorious attitude to casuistry. ²

Mandeville's attitude to casuistry, however, could not have been wholly negative because the one casuistical principle he did follow was that motives determine whether an action is sinful or not.

Pascal, himself, was corrosively ironic about the casuistical emphasis


Car, pour vous témoigner que nous ne permettons pas tout, scavez que, par exemple, nous ne souffrons jamais d'avoir l'intention formelle de pecher pour le seul dessein de pecher, et que quiconque s'obstine à borner son désir dans le mal pour le mal même, nous rompons avec luy; cela est diabolique; voila qui est sans exception d'âge, de sexe, de qualité. Mais, quand on n'est pas dans cette malheureuse disposition, alors nous essayons de mettre en pratique notre méthode de diriger l'intention, qui consiste à se proposer pour fin de ses actions un object permis. Ce n'est pas qu'autant qu'il est en nostre pouvoir nous de detournions les homes des choses defendues; mais, quand nous ne pouvons pas empescher l'action, nous purifions au moins l'intention; et ainsi nous corrigeons le vice du moyen par la pureté de la fin.  

Pascal's Jesuit, in other words, is all but saying that sinful actions are nonexistent except in those who deliberately intend to sin. Probably few casuists, whether Protestant or Catholic, actually went this far but Pascal is drawing attention to how the emphasis on intention could well lead to moral laxity. Mandeville's emphasis on intention, however, leads to a very different analysis of morality. When Antonia calls Dorante "the

Devil's own Casuist," for example, there is no doubt that it is partly because just before abandoning Aurelia to her would-be lover, he tells her, as a last resort in his protracted efforts to convince her to prostitute herself, that if she has no intention to be lustful no sin will be involved: "... and if your Conscience be so foolishly scrupulous, as to boggle at Sin, there is no occasion of committing any, unless you have a mind to it; for it being an Act of the Soul, it is in your Power to prevent it, by having no Lustful Thoughts ..."¹

As mentioned before in the context of Mandeville's quasi-novelistic analysis of motives, Lucinda herself remarks about Aurelia's actions that "Nobody commits a Sin for the sake of its being a Sin"² but, unlike Pascal's Jesuit, she means not that hardly anyone ever sins but that the sinfulness of an action does not depend on a sinful intention. Like Pascal, in fact, the only intention Mandeville admits to make an action virtuous is the ascetic one of doing it solely for the sake of the Gospel.³ Thus when Mandeville states what any casuist would approve of, namely "that to judge from our actions, we ought to enquire into the motives that set us to work,"

¹. *Mandeville*, 60.

². *Mandeville*, 68.

³. Whether, like Pascal and Calvin, Mandeville was Augustinian in his religious beliefs is a highly controversial question beyond our scope but it is generally agreed that his notion of virtue is a rigorous one. Whatever Mandeville's religious beliefs or lack of them, however, he really did seem to believe that human beings are capable of disinterested, virtuous actions, however rare he thought such actions to be in practice. On this point, see John Colman, "Bernard Mandeville and the Reality of Virtue," *Philosophy*, 47 (1972), 125-39. For a controversial assessment of Mandeville as an Anglican humanist in the tradition of Hooker, see Elias J. Chiasson, "Bernard Mandeville: A Reappraisal," *Philological Quarterly*, 49 (1970), 489-519.
it is preceded by a very strict interpretation of what kind of intention makes for a virtuous action, namely "that all the rules of morality, and other duties incumbent on a christian (sic), are not to be perform'd for any worldly consideration, or other reason, but the love of GOD and holiness." From this standpoint, Mandeville's casuistry seems to be an "inverted" one which, instead of seeking the circumstances of a "case" in order to render a fair moral judgment or advice, seeks to analytically expose how far from true, disinterested virtue almost every human action tends to be. Perhaps the weakness, and a paradoxical one at that, of Mandeville's casuistry, from an honest casuist's point-of-view, is that, as has been seen in the Lucinda-Artesia Papers, at worst, it seems to inspire an attitude of neutrality and analytical curiosity about moral matters or, at best, and this was hardly considered desirable by the orthodox in the eighteenth century, it secularizes morality and makes it dependent on the needs of society, which are not always necessarily spiritual.

Mandeville's "inverted" casuistry is especially evident in the "History of Leonora" which is somewhat more schematic than the "History of Aurelia." On the most basic level, "Leonora's History" is an exemplary moral tale designed to prove Lucinda's proposition to the effect that "no Woxan, tho' of the most exemplary Virtue, is able to withstand the Treachery of some Men; if once she abandons that Fear, which is so necessary for her Protection, and thinking herself secure, ceases to be upon her Guard." The story is divided

1. Free Thoughts, 9.
into two parts, one dealing with Leonora's abortive engagement to Cleander and the other with her married life with Alcandor. Both parts illuminate certain facets of Leonora's "virtue." In the first part, she acts according to her passions and even when Cleander is forced to leave the country by his father, she remains faithful to him in spite of pressure from her grandmother to marry a duke. Lucinda, however, leaves the question of her virtue "open" by suggesting various motives, including the most virtuous one, for her fidelity:

Now Leonora was attack'd on both Sides; yet in spite of the Duke's Assaults, and the old Woman's Treachery, she remain'd unmoveable; whether a Principle of real Virtue, a Dislike to something in the Duke's Person, or else the Love to Cleander, was the Cause, could not easily be determined. ¹

Only when tricked into believing that Cleander is dead does she marry someone else, the somewhat staid but well-off jeweller, Alcandor.

The first part shows that though impetuous at first, Leonora eventually settles for a marriage of mainly financial convenience but in both her phases she seems to be, in the terminology of the time, "inclined to virtue." It is in the second part of the story, however, that her virtue really begins to be tested. Her first test is when, much to her surprise, she meets Cleander again and finds that her love for him has not diminished. With great self-sacrifice and moral rigour she discourages any further meetings. She justifies her decision on the grounds that it is the only way to preserve her virtue: "I confess I should not have Strength to

¹ Mandeville, 181.
resist the Temptation; and yet I hope I am vertuous, because I feel I want not Resolution to avoid it for ever." The second test, however, is much harder to pass and Lucinda details the circumstances which make it so. For one thing, Leonora is not very satisfied with her husband who is somewhat indifferent towards her, so that although she can reject Cleander for the sake of virtue, she is not quite as prepared for the wiles of the cunningly hypocritical Mincio.

Mincio, who insinuates himself into Leonora's household by befriending her husband is, in fact, a "jilted" lover long since committed to ruining as many women as possible. It is at this point especially that Leonora's "history" takes on the aspect of a "case." She is at first suspicious of him but he shrewdly wins her trust by never making an advance or giving the least appearance of doing so, as well as never making use "of a double Entendre, or any Expression, tho' in the highest of his Birth, that had the least Tendency to Looseness and Immorality" and even by keeping Alcandor at home in perpetual good spirits. Thus, it is as soon as Leonora begins to consider Mincio a good friend that her virtue is in its greatest danger. According to Lucinda, it is precisely Mincio's hypocritical mask of virtue which deceives Leonora:

What strange perverse Creatures we Women are! The chaste and wary Leonora, who would so bravely have resisted him, in Case he had assaulted her with Love; she that prepar'd herself for a vigorous

1. Mandeville, 168.
Defence, whilst she dreaded the Dangers of Vice, was foil'd by well dissimul'd Vertue, and envying his cold Indifferency, was ready to quarrel at the Weakness of her Charms, 'till quite disarm'd of all her Fear, she almost could have wish'd him less insensible.  

Lincio does not take long to press his advantage and begins to act as if he were desperately and virtuously hiding his love for Leonora. At this Leonora takes pity on him, whereupon he makes good use of a conniving doctor to give the impression that he has fallen mortally sick. Blaming herself for his sickness, Leonore reveals that she is ready to reciprocate his love for her. He pretends to be surprised at being "discovered" and protests hypocritically that nothing could torment him more than ruining her virtue.  

It is at this point, with Leonora's virtue hanging in the balance, that Lucinda's tale ends and she asks: "Now, Antonia, tell me where you can blame Leonora yet? Consult your Pillow upon it, and to Borrow you shall know all." In terms of Mandeville's strict casuistry, anti-

1. Mandeville, 194-5.

2. It has been pointed out by Charles Nish in his introduction to Short Fiction of the Seventeenth Century (New York, 1963) that in the romance "Frustrated love normally leads to dire sickness unto death, but luckily the plots prefer to end happily" (p.xii). Mandeville seems to make fun of such a convention by allowing Cleander to disappear and die abruptly and by having Lincio pretend to be dying of love. Antonia, in fact, expects Leonora and Cleander to be eventually reunited but Lucinda disabuses her of that expectation by declaring that she looks for a happy ending "because you are so us'd to Romances, where, in the Beginning, you may always see who and who will be together; but in Nature, it most commonly happens otherwise" (Mandeville, 184). On the whole, "Leonora's History" is more of an "inverted romance" than the far more realistic "history" of Aurelia.

then, Leonora's case is one of deciding at what point she made the decision contrary to the dictates of virtue rather than what circumstances led her to a situation where her virtue was in danger and even possibly lost, at least in her apparent intention to satisfy Mincio's desires. As all the circumstances in Leonora's "case" seem to mitigate her final apparent loss of virtue, this is no doubt deliberate on Mandeville's part in order to demonstrate that even in such a difficult moral dilemma casuistry is of no avail because virtue does not depend on worldly circumstances and intentions but on a determinedly ascetic choice to be virtuous in all circumstances. For Lucinda, the point at which Leonora made the fatal decision was the point at which she decided to trust Mincio and this is related not only to Mandeville's strict interpretation of moral choice but to Lucinda's warnings against the wiles of men in other parts of *The Virgin Unmask'd* as well. Although Mandeville's preface promises a sequel to the "History of Leonora," it is quite possible that he left the story hanging in mid-air because the reader has all the evidence needed at his disposal to judge Leonora, and judge her by the strict canons of Mandeville's "inverted" casuistry, whether she actually gives in physically to Mincio or not.

In view of Mandeville's apparent hostility towards any casuistry which dilutes the ascetic rigors of virtue, it is not surprising that *The Virgin Unmask'd* is not very casuistical in emphasis when compared with the casuistical dialogues of Defoe. For example, *Defoe's Religious Courtship* has certain points in common with *The Virgin *

Unmask'd. The subject of Defoe's series of dialogues is the necessity for husbands and wives to be of the same religion and full of piety. Although such a subject seems foreign to the concerns of the Virgin Unmask'd, it should be noted that Mandeville was just as eager as Defoe to impart good advice to women in their choice of husbands.

The important difference between the two series of dialogues, then, lies not in differing objectives but in their different treatment of similar objectives. In this instance, in fact, it is Defoe who uses more dialogue than Mandeville. The dilemma posed by Defoe, namely whether a daughter should disobey her father and reject a highly eligible, but apparently irreligious, suitor, is handled dramatically and with full-blooded characters having constant discussions with each other. The discussion in the following exchange, for example, is both dramatic and fraught with casuistical implications as the younger daughter, who is the one being courted, faces a complicated moral choice:

Eld. Sist. Dear sister, what will you do in this matter? My father is gone.

Yo. Sist. What can I do? I think my father is very unkind to me.

Eld. Sist. My father is passionate, you know.

Yo. Sist. But not to hear me, not to ask my reason, this is very hard! Do any fathers marry their daughters by force?

Eld. Sist. Why, I'll tell you what my father says to that: he says he knows your reasons beforehand, and he thinks them of no weight.

Yo. Sist. Dear sister, do you think them of no moment?

Eld. Sist. It's hard for a daughter to make herself judge between her father and the rest of his children; I am sorry you are so hard pushed at.
Ye. Sist. What would you do in my case?

Eld. Sist. Indeed that's hard to say too; I would act as my conscience should tell me was my duty; I confess there is a powerful force in a father's command.¹

The discussions between Lucinda and Antonia, on the other hand, have no such air of urgency as Antonia has no immediate moral choices to make.

Thus, whatever casuistry there is in The Virgin Unmask'd is confined to the tales and serves more to alert Antonia's and, by extension, the reader's critical faculties or "judgment" rather than to engage his and Antonia's sympathies. Even the quasi-novelistic realism of the tales is the result of a kind of detachment which emphasizes the emotional complexities of human motivation rather more than the relationship of conscience to motivation. Another way of putting it is that the reader may be sympathetically drawn to the problems of Aurelia and Leonora but is encouraged to be more interested in how weaknesses in their emotional make-up determine their actions and reactions than in whether they are making correct moral choices. Mandeville's description of his own method of dialogue, in fact, is inimical to casuistical earnestness in its liberal attitude to moral exhortation:

My Design through the whole, is to let young Ladies know whatever is dreadful in Marriage; and this could not be done, but

by introducing one that was an enemy
to it. Therefore, tho' Lucinda speaks
altogether against Matrimony, don't
think that I do so too.¹

The prescriptive casuistry of Defoe's method of dialogue, on the
other hand, may be attractively described by Defoe but without in
the least hiding its primarily didactic aim:

Historical dialogues, it must be confessed,
have a very taking elegancy in them, and the
story being handed forward in short periods,
and quick returns, makes the retaining it in
the mind the easier, and the impression the
more lasting, as well as delightful.²

In short, whatever casuistical discussion appears in The Virgin
Unmask'd, especially in Lucinda's narratives, it is not, as in
Defoe's casuistical dialogues, part of the dramatic situation of
dialogue between Lucinda and Antonia but subordinated to the broader
dialectical pattern of the series of dialogues in The Virgin Unmask'd
as a whole.

In conclusion, the overall effect of The Virgin Unmask'd is to
create an overwhelming sympathy for the plight of women, yet one
devoid of sentimentality for, with the aid of the rhetorical devices
of the colloquy and the fictional tale, Mandeville's dialectic
relentlessly exposes deceptions between men and women not for the
purpose of apportioning blame but to make clear in the reader's mind,
especially if she is a woman fond of romances, what complex

¹. Mandeville, [A-67].
². Defoe, ix.
psychological and social forces are involved in the relationship between the sexes. Nevertheless, although the overall effect of The Virgin Unmask'd is worthy of philosophical dialogue, it is somewhat too rhetorically discursive and has too large a proportion of fictional tale to fit comfortably into the genre.

With A Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions, however, Mandeville opted for a purer form of philosophical dialogue, rather than novelistic fiction, as a way of popularizing his philosophical opinions and attitudes. Although the Treatise, as its title would imply, has too many pages of direct exposition to qualify as a "pure" philosophical dialogue, its dialectic, as will be seen in the following chapter, is not only stricter than that of The Virgin Unmask'd, but dramatic in a way genuinely extending the possibilities of the genre. It is with the Fable of the Bees Part Two, which will be examined in the next chapter but one, however, that Mandeville comes closest to "pure" philosophical dialogue in the eighteenth-century sense. In it the raillery and ridicule characteristic of the colloquy become fully merged with a highly-sophisticated dialectical technique which includes a rich vein of comedy.
CHAPTER IV. DIALOGUE AS THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE: MANDEVILLE'S TREATISE OF THE HYPOCHONDRIACK AND HYSRICK DISEASES

Soc. 0 Gorgias, how I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers!
   Cor. Well, Socrates, I do think myself quite good at that.
   Soc. I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric:
   with what is rhetoric concerned?
   Cor. With discourse.
   Soc. What sort of discourse, Gorgias?
   - such discourse as would teach by what treatment the sick might get well?
   Cor. No.
   Soc. Then rhetoric is not concerned with all kinds of discourse?
   Cor. Certainly not.
   Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?
   Cor. Yes.
   Soc. And to understand that about which they speak?
   Cor. Of course.
   Soc. But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
   Cor. Certainly.
   Soc. Then medicine also treats of discourse?
   Cor. Yes.
   Soc. Of discourse concerning diseases?
   Cor. Just so.

from Plato's Gorgias

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It has been said by a biographer of Samuel Johnson, John Hawkins, that "He thought highly of Mandeville's Treatise of the Hypochondriacal Disease." Presumably Dr. Johnson found Mandeville's sensible medical advice agreeable but it is also not unlikely that he would have appreciated the very lively way that Mandeville presented his notions of "hypochondriasis," a disease not far removed in its effects from Dr. Johnson's bouts of melancholia. It is unfortunate that Hawkins did not reveal whether Johnson's recommendation was primarily literary or medical. It is, however, interesting to note that Mandeville's Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases (first edition, 1711) was unusual in its day in being a medical treatise in dialogue form.

By the end of the seventeenth century, all scientific writing, including medical treatises, tended to follow the Royal Society's injunction that scientific prose should be purely expository and avoid rhetorical embellishments. As far as the dialogue form is concerned, the use of characterized interlocutors and the sketching of background, at the very least, could be regarded as rhetorical embellishments

3. At least one famous physician of the time, Francis Glisson, joined other scientists in their campaign against rhetorical ornament in scientific writing. See Richard Foster Jones, "Science and English Prose Style" in The Seventeenth Century by Richard Foster Jones and Others Writing in His Honor (Stanford, Calif., 1951), p.79 (on Glisson) and pp.75-110.
but, as Purpur has shown, neo-classical critics generally considered the dialogue as a "plain, easy, and familiar way" of presenting abstruse matter to general readers. Mandeville's preface in all editions wittily justifies his use of the dialogue form on the grounds that those who suffer from hypochondriasis, or what we would now call nervous disorders, if not neurosis, need to be entertained because of their characteristic impatience. That he saw himself as dealing with abstruse matter in an entertaining way is clear from the following comment:

To this end looking out for something both serious and diverting that might embellish, and yet not be too remote from the Subject, I pitch'd upon the Physical Remarks, which you shall find interwoven with the main Matter.

Thus, on the most immediate level, Mandeville employed the method of dialogue because he was addressing general readers as well as fellow doctors. His use of dialogue, then, was not automatically incompatible with the Royal Society's efforts to reform scientific prose style in the interests of clarity and plainness, even though other medical writers found the expository essay a more convenient form of scientific expression.

1. Mandeville's view of hypochondriasis was close to that of Sydenham whose "description of hypochondriacal melancholia ... is strongly remindful of the modern definition of depression. In Sydenham's day the word hypochondriasis did not yet contain the connotation of a morbid preoccupation with physical health." See Ilza Veith, "On Hysterical and Hypochondriacal Afflictions," Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 30 (1956), 238.


In the Treatise itself, the exigencies of clear and lively exposition are combined with the therapeutic uses of conversation. As Hisomedon, the patient, gratefully tells his doctor, Philopirio,

You can't imagine, how a pertinent lively Discourse, or anything that is sprightly, revives my Spirits. I don't know what it is that makes me so, whether it be our talking together, the Serenity of the Air, or both; but I enjoy abundance of Pleasure, and this Moment, methinks, I am as well as ever I was in my life.¹

Hisomedon's enjoyment of conversation with Philopirio is undoubtedly the dramatic counterpart of the enjoyment Mandeville hoped the reader, whether suffering from "hypochondriasis" or not, would feel from reading his "pertinent, lively discourse" on "hypochondriack" diseases.

Mandeville's aims, however, were not purely expository. The Treatise is also an elaborate polemic against what Mandeville took to be the propensity of "rationalist" doctors to construct hypotheses on the causes of disease without sufficient empirical evidence taken into account. Mandeville's polemic against a great number of contemporary doctors assumes that on one side were arrayed those physicians who emphasized a rationalistic, systematic approach to medicine based on Galen and, on the other, those who emphasized the everyday practice of medicine as prescribed by Hippocrates. Which attitude was more "scientific" is a question not within our scope but even a cursory acquaintance with eighteenth-century medicine indicates

¹. Diseases, 45-6.
that the rift was by no means as absolute as Mandeville made it out to be. It could not have been when, as has been pointed out by an authority in the field, even an "empirical" doctor like Sydenham, whose methods and treatment of "hypochondriaci" Mandeville enthusiastically approved of, tended, in typical rationalist fashion, to infer too much from his empirical observations. For our purposes, however, it is enough to point out that Mandeville assumed that he was conducting a legitimate polemic against "rationalists" whose practice of medicine he considered deceitful.

Mandeville's polemic, however, is strictly subordinated to dialectical purposes and one important strand of dialectic by which Lisomidon arrives at the "correct" notion of medicine is in the way he is forced to re-examine his notion of "method" throughout the dialogue. The notion of "method" in medicine was a very old one and it is no accident that the argument between Philopirio and Lisomidon revolves around it. The concept of "method" had as much to do with the rhetorical expression of theoretical medicine as it did with its

1. Diseases, 118-19.


3. In this, according to C.S. Rousseau, Mandeville was ahead of his time: "By 1740, not much more before, a belief grew that observationists were the genuine pioneers in the advancement of medical knowledge. Before that idea was inchoate, appearing only occasionally, without significant consequences in the medical world, and was underdeveloped in contrast to the elaborate propaganda and printed dogma of the rationalists. Mandeville, in his Treatise of Hysterick and Hypochondriack Passions (1711), a dialogue between an 'empirical' physician and his skeptical patients, had voiced some of these beliefs years before they became fashionable. During the subsequent fifty years (1711-60) such assertions were more widespread." See C.S. Rousseau, "Sowing the Wind, and Reaping the Whirlwind: Aspects of Change in Eighteenth-Century Medicine" in Paul J. Korshin, ed., Studies in Change and Revolution: Aspects of English Intellectual History, 1640-1800 (Kenston, England, 1972), p.142.
practice. In the words of Walter Ong, "The ancient medical concept of method ... involves, besides the notion of a routine of efficiency in healing, the broader paralogical notion of an intelligent approach (in a social, aphoristic, and more or less pedagogical context) to a complex problem."¹ When Epimetheus recounts his experiences with rationalist doctors, he talks in terms of their medical "method" as in the following excerpt: "I was pleased with the clear idea I had of my condition, thought myself ex Umbra in Solem, and hastened with alacrity to the rational method, which he proposed to put me in."² He goes on to complain somewhat comically that doctors "notoriously ... contradict one another to this day, even in the method of curing, which is the very end of Physick; and this not only in the same Nations, Universities and Cities, but within the hearing of the same Patients ..."³ Despite his disillusionment, however, Epimetheus clings all the more strongly, no doubt because of his disease-induced insecurity, to the notion that some sort of rationalist method is absolutely necessary to "cure distempers." Thus, when Philopirix claims that a knowledge of Anatomy, Chemistry or other sciences is not really relevant to medicine but is cultivated by doctors to impress their patients,⁴ Epimetheus objects that "These I have lock'd

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2. Diseases, 17. Mandeville translates the Latin as "From Darkness into Light."
3. Diseases, 32.
4. See Richard Foster Jones, Ancients and Moderns, second edition (St. Louis, 1961), p.216. R.F. Jones writes of a group of moderato-minded physicians who "applauded chemical experiments" but "condemned chemical theories" purporting to explain and lead to the cure of diseases. Mandeville can perhaps be considered as a member of such a group. Hereinafter Jones's book will be referred to as Jones.
upon as the only valuable Branches of Physick: Why do you call them inconsiderable? Can any Man pretend to Methodical Practice without them?"¹

Philopirio's reaction to Misomedon's insistence on rationalist method is to employ a devious dialectical procedure by which he at first condemns the notion of "method" and reinforces his objection by claiming that such a notion was absent in ancient (presumably pre-Galenic) Greek medicine:

As for curing Distempers immethodically; ... if by Method you mean a certain Rule, a qua deviare piaculum est, and ask me, whether I have a constant Theory, by which I am always directed in the Cure, I will answer in the Negative ... I must put you in mind, that neither Hippocrates himself, ... nor any of the physicians of Old Greece, which without dispute were the best that ever the World could boast of, follow'd any Theory, or what you call Method at all; ..."²

Near the end of the Treatise, nevertheless, it emerges that Philopirio is not against a methodical approach to medicine but that he has an altogether different notion of "method". This becomes clear in the following exchange:

Misom. ... But is this, pray, the general Method you take with all Hypochondriacks, mutatis mutandis, which now you have prescrib'd to me?

Phil. Mutatis mutandis it is; but that is all in all, for as the Symptoms differ, so I alter my Method; and I never saw yet two hypochondriacal Cases exactly alike.³

¹ Diseases, 37.
² Diseases, 38. Mandeville translates the Latin as "Which it would be a Crime to deviate from."
³ Diseases, 343.
Philopirio's "method", in other words, is highly flexible and geared for the treatment of individual cases, while the "rationalist method" treats diseases on a more generalized level, abstracted from the individual patient. Such a notion of method is highly compatible with the dialectical procedure of philosophical dialogue. Thus, Philopirio's way of arriving at the "true way" or "method" of treating Misomedon's disease is by the use of questions and discourse as well as, in view of his professed empiricism, physical examination. Such an interlocutor as Misomedon is not only a "typical" case of hypochondriasis but an individual whom hypochondria affects in a combination of ways bound to be different from its effect on any one other patient.

Where the notion of "method" is one important strand of dialectic, the broader dialectical pattern of the dialogue centers on the process by which Misomedon is "weaned away" from his erroneous rationalism. It involves Philopirio's slow process of unfolding to Misomedon what the "true" practice of medicine, both doctrinally and empirically, should consist of. Before the dialogue begins, Mandeville warns the reader that Misomedon's "learning" is a disease-induced sham which, by implication, hinders his appreciation of what the "true" practice of medicine consists of:

... and as Misomedon is represented as an Admire of polite Literature, and having been a Lover of Reading from his Youth, so I thought it not unnatural, that such a Man, upon the least turn of his Head, might become over-fond of Latin Proverbs, and fuller in his Discourse of Quotations from
the Classicks, than a Man of Sense, that understands the World, would chuse to be, if his Head was perfectly clear.

Philopirio, on the other hand, is always rigorously logical and consistent, if sometimes devious, forcing Misomedon to either shift his ground or modify his views until he is finally convinced of the validity of Philopirio's notions of the theory and practice of medicine.

The pattern of dialectic in the argument is already hinted at in the Greek names of the two interlocutors. Philopirio is the "Lover of Experience" while "Misomedon" can be roughly rendered as "hater of prudence." A key to Philopirio's dialectical role is found in the preface to the first edition where Mandeville mentions how he brought himself into the dialogue in the same way that Seneca brought himself onto the stage in his Octavia "with this difference, that he kept his own Name, and I changed mine for that of Philopirio ..." The play depicts Seneca as a political advisor advocating moderation to Nero. Similarly, Philopirio has the task of moderating Misomedon's impulsiveness. Seneca tries to appeal to Nero's better nature. He certainly cannot condemn Nero outright nor can the doctor deal with Misomedon cavalierly. The pattern of dialectic, then, involves Philopirio's attempts to gain Misomedon's trust in him, so that he can convince him of the errors of his rationalist-

1. Diseases, xiv.
2. Bernard Mandeville, A Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions (London, 1711), p.xi. This is, of course, the first edition of the Treatise. Hereinafter to be referred to as Passions.
3. According to the Oxford Classical Dictionary, the Octavia is not by Seneca but by an anonymous author writing soon after the deaths of both Nero and Seneca.
4. Passions, xi.
oriented medical views.

Just how Philopirio "wants" Kissmedon away from his impulsive rationalism can best be observed by analyzing certain representative arguments in the dialogue which are crucial to its dialectical and rhetorical pattern as a whole. Before doing so, however, one must take to heart Mandeville's warning in the Preface:

From what I have hinted, I don't question but some of my Readers have already taken a Prejudice against me: But let me beg of those impatient ones, that for what I have said yet, and what they shall further see upon this Head in the first Dialogue, they would not censure, or by way of Pun condemn me for an Enemy to Reason, before they are come to the End of the Second, and that I shall have shew'd them what sort of Reasoning it is, I speak against.¹

Such a warning should alert the reader that Philopirio's opposition to medical rationalism is more of a dialectical device than a philosophical position. The purpose of Philopirio's dialectical opposition to Kissmedon's rationalism is not fully revealed until the second dialogue in the section where Philopirio's extensively criticizes a hypothesis by the rationalist physician, Thomas Willis.² This section of the Treatise is perhaps the clearest example of Philopirio's

1. Diseases, vii.

2. Like Mandeville, Willis was also an anti-Galenist but he did not escape Mandeville's censure because Mandeville's position was probably close to that of a group of physicians described by Foster Jones as holding moderate views about the relative merits of Ancients and Moderns and "who, though committed wholeheartedly to the new science, were more respectful to antiquity and tradition as well as less severe upon the established physicians." See Jones, 216.
dialectical method of "meaning" Misomedon away from his excessive rationalism with the aid of rhetorical devices. It is, therefore, well worth examining in detail.

What fascinates Misomedon about Willis is his seemingly-brilliant and highly-detailed comparison of the human body to a still. Misomedon knows in advance that Philopirio will not be pleased by such a vague analogy but he is carried away with its supposed impressiveness: "I know you are no Admirer of those Flights of Physick, but I must read you a Passage or two of the fifth Chapter."¹ As often before in the dialogue, Misomedon here shows himself to be still susceptible to the siren-call of elegantly-expressed analogical reasoning. Philopirio's next step, accordingly, is to apply shock tactics. Instead of demonstrating the fallacies inherent in Willis's analogy, Philopirio first attempts to deflate and ridicule Misomedon's enthusiasm by the rhetorical device of introducing a satirical analogy comparing a sexually yielding woman to "a green Faggot that's laid upon the Fire."² After a bawdily descriptive "refutation" of this particular analogy, he asks rhetorically about Willis's analogy: "Can a Stan that understands but half so much of Anatomy as one may learn at a Butcher's-Stall, think, that a Woman is like a Faggot, or the inside of the Body like a Still?"³ Philopirio's amusingly ribald analogy deflates Willis's analogy comically so that the reader is put into a frame of mind favourable to the subsequent serious refutation.

The refutation is better described, as Philopirio himself does, in metaphorical terms, as a dismantling of Willis's analogy of the still.⁴

1. *Diseases*, 95.
2. *Diseases*, 98.
He does so in painstaking detail and a rather scathing tone. He first asks what comparison there can be between the function of the "chimney" (alembic) of the still and that of the heart. Lisomedon assumes that Willis means the furnace, or fire-place, of the still which, when heated, begins the process of fermentation which is somehow analogous to the function of the heart as the source of the circulation of the blood.¹ Philopirio immediately warns Lisomedon that "there is more Artifice in this than you are aware of" and points out that Willis deliberately avoided using the word "furnace" because "if he had call'd the Heart the Furnace, as he ought to have done, it would have been too plain, that he had made the Fire between the Head and bottom of the Still."² He similarly examines every other element in the analogy only to find that the implications of it are absurd.

Not surprisingly, Mandeville's total rejection of Willis's hypothesis gives Lisomedon the impression that Philopirio is against any attempt at reasoning about diseases and their cures. Philopirio, however, springs a great surprise at Lisomedon, but not at the attentive reader who has remembered Mandeville's warning, when he reveals that he is not against the use of reason but only its abuse in the form of outlandish hypotheses. This is really where Lisomedon's "enlightenment" begins. Up to this point, Philopirio was treating Lisomedon as less than an equal in order to gradually

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¹. Willis, as a physician of the "iatro-chemical" school, attributed many internal bodily processes, especially those connected with digestion and the blood, to various kinds of fermentation. See Hansruedi Ialer, Thomas Willis 1621-1675 (New York and London, 1968), pp.52-6.

². Diseases, 100.
wean him away from his preconceived notions of reason. His dialectical strategy was to pretend that he was against any form of reasoning, in order to undermine Misomedon's predilection for any seemingly well-argued hypothesis and to use rhetorical devices, such as raillery and ridicule, to lower Misomedon's confidence in his own powers of dialectical disputation.

This devious mode of argument is certainly more convincing in dialogue since it is not the reader who directly falls victim to it; yet the reader, too, learns his lesson, especially if up to this point he had supported Philopirio unreservedly. The critically alert reader should, indeed, neither have supported Philopirio nor Misomedon. By not treating Misomedon as an intellectual equal, Philopirio is dramatically demonstrating Mandoville's conviction that amateurs should not indulge in medical reasoning. To justify his elaborate deception, Philopirio employs an analogy to the effect that a crooked stick, in order to be straightened, must be bent the other way - an analogy apparently derived from Joseph Glanvill's Scepsis Scientifica (1665) where the same analogy was employed to justify scepticism.\(^1\) Glanvill's point was that a dose of scepticism is needed to avoid dogmatism and arrive at the truth. Philopirio's argumentative strategy, in short, was to undermine Philopirio's dogmatic rationalism dialectically and rhetorically, in order that a more empirical rationalism could take its place. Even when Philopirio reveals his allegiance to a rationalism based on empirical data, he does so with great caution, taking care to distinguish between the "prideful" rationalism of

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the rationalists and the "humble" rationalism of the empiricists:

I would not have you think, that I speak of that lofty self-sufficient Reason that boldly trusts to its own Wits, and leaving Experience far behind mounts upon Air, and makes Conclusions in the Skies; what I make use of is plain and humble, not only built upon, but likewise surrounded with, and every way limited by Observation, from view of which it never cares to stir. 1

It is highly likely that Mandeville risked the inattentive reader's displeasure at being apparently deceived in order to induce a sceptical, critical attitude in him. The reader is forced into such an attitude if, as a result of following the dialectic too closely without realizing its real direction, he finds himself sharing, with Misedon, an uncertainty about what position to take in relation to the argument. Philopirio could have announced from the beginning where he stood but his aim is to show that the "correct" attitude towards medicine implies a certain amount of humble scepticism which he induces in Misedon by forcing him to examine what he means by "rationalism", so that he can arrive at "truth" in the form of what constitutes a proper dose of reason in the practice of medicine.

Besides its dialectical critique of the "method" of medical rationalism, Mandeville's Treatise also attacks its characteristic rhetoric. As will be seen, this involves a critique of the " unholy" alliance of "reason" and "wit" where "wit" is the rhetorical mode by

1. *Diseases*, 130. For a discussion of the role of intellectual humility in the rationalism of John Locke, see D.G. James, *The Life of Reason* (London, 1949), p.98. John Locke began his career not as a philosopher but as a physician and one of his closest associates was the "empyrick" physician Sydenham, who is often approvingly quoted by Philopirio.
which medical rationalists express their erroneous ideas. As
Mandeville puts it, his avowed aim is to defend the "silent
Experience of Pains-taking Practitioners" against "the witty
Speculations of Hypothetical Doctors." Thus, Mandeville's unstated
notion of the therapeutic effectiveness of dialogue also involves an
attack on the superficially similar "witty" discourse of the
rationalist doctors, so much so that his emphasis on the "silence"
of empirical medicine obscures the fact that, as has already been
implied, his dialogue is constructed in such a way that it can be
interpreted as a dramatic analogy for therapeutic discourse.

That Mandeville's identification of "wit" with frivolous rhetoric
is related to his anti-Galenism becomes clear when Philopirio claims
that Galen's attempts at systematizing medicine were an imposture
designed to impress his contemporaries:

He was well acquainted with the state of
Physick and the Palate of his Garrulous Age,
and found, that nothing would sooner or
easier establish his Reputation, than his
Wit: Accordingly he left the Observations to
them that liked them, and fell a writing
fine Language in a florid Style. 2

Such a statement shows that Mandeville took the Royal Society's
injunction to heart and that he identified rationalism with elaborate
rhetoric. He is especially wary of analogies ("similes"), as in
Philopirio's refutation of Willis, but what is significant in his
attack is his downgrading of "wit," as in the following statement:

1. Diseases, v.
2. Diseases, 63-4.
The witty Philosopher, who can so exactly
tell you which way the World was made, that
one would think he must have had a hand in
it, in his Talk cures all Diseases by
Hypothesis, and frightens away the Gout with
a fine Simile, but when he comes to practise
oftener reasons a trifling Distemper into a
Consumption. 1

Although here Philopirio attacks the "wit" of the medical rationalists,
he does so by being witty himself in a satirical way; nevertheless it
does seem that Mandeville would have agreed with Locke's downgrading
of "wit" in relation to sober-minded "judgment":

For *wit* lying most in the assemblage of ideas,
and putting those together with quickness and
variety, wherein can be found any resemblance
or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant
pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy;
*judgment*, on the contrary, lies quite on the
other side, in separating carefully, one from
another, ideas wherein can be found the least
difference, thereby to avoid being misled by
similitude. — II, xi (Essay Concerning Human
Understanding) 2

Mandeville's distrust of "wit" is not only anti-rationalist but anti-
rhetorical as well, as in Philopirio's warning about the limitations
of language:

1. Diseases, 36.

2. Quoted in William K. Wimsatt Jr. and Cleanth Brooks, Literary
Henceforth to be referred to as Wimsatt. Mandeville's physio-
logical definition of "wit" seems to be similar to Locke's as
when Philopirio tells Nismedon that "as Thinking, consists in a
various Disposition of the Images received; so what we call Wit
is nothing but an Aptitude of the Spirits by which they nimbly
turn to, and dexterously dispose of the Images that may serve
our purpose" (Diseases, 237).
The practical knowledge of a Physician, or at least the most considerable Part of it, is the Result of a large Collection of Observations, that have been made not only on the minutiae of things in human Bodies both in Health and Sickness, but likewise on such Changes and Differences in those minutiae, as no Language can express; ...

Here again Mandeville shows a sympathy for the linguistic aims of the Royal Society, one of which was Sprat's famous recommendation that scientific prose should be purified to such an extent that every "word" represents a "thing" as far as possible. Anything else, according to Sprat, was superfluous rhetoric.

Basically, Philopio attributes "wit" to a kind of intellectual laziness by which reason is chained to "wit" in such a way as to hide rather than explain difficulties, and which employs lively rhetorical devices, including spurious analogies, to camouflage the weaknesses of an hypothesis: "You see, Misomedon, how your witty Men give every thing a Glose, and let not the least Shadow of Reason slip that can assist them: Proverbs, vulgar Sayings, anything to give a lift to an Hypothesis ...

Mandeville, here, of course, exposes himself to the charge that he too is in the habit of employing proverbs and "vulgar sayings" but he uses such entertaining rhetorical devices to deflate rather than inflate the scope of reason. In this respect, Mandeville's dialogue resembles a "colloquie," one of whose rules a

1. Diseases, 61.


3. Diseases, 105.
rhetorical handbook laid down as "Indeavour to make your Colloquie pleasant, with witty jerks, quibbles and fancies (such as you shall often find in Erasmus) joking upon a name, action, proverb or the like."1 His witty assault on "wit" exposes to what extent logical reasoning can be distorted by rhetorical devices, as in the superfluous rhetoric of the following exchange:

Phil. ... The means I order (allow me to speak in the Style of Willis) will draw upon you, toward Evening, an agreeable Weariness, the moving Orator of sweet Repose, that breathing Health and Peace to every Part, persuades the Soul to Rest, and having 'brib'd the watchful Spirits from their Posts, locks up the unguarded Senses in charming Bonds of Slumber.

Mysomedon: I want no Rhetorick to encourage me; the great Desire I have of being cured is more eloquent than your Persuasion: I would bear any thing to be bless'd again with those sound spontuous Sleeps I formerly enjoy'd.2

Mysomedon's negative reaction is, of course, precisely the one that Philopirio expects Mysomedon to apply to the less-easily detected superfluous rhetoric of medical rationalism in general, since at this point Mysomedon is finally convinced of the dangers of rationalism.

1. Ralph Johnson, The Scholars Guide from the Accidence to the University (Harston, England, 1971), p.13. This is a facsimile reprint of the first edition of 1665. Hereinafter to be referred to as Johnson. Mandeville's Treatise could be considered an Erasmian "colloquy" against rationalist "folly" except for the fact that Philopirio has no intention of making a fool out of Mysomedon and just leave at that, as often happens in Erasmus's Colloquies, but to employ a complex, if devious, dialectic to make him see the error of his views.

2. Bion, 342.
As a satirist, Mandeville was not simply ridiculing rationalist "vice" but using "raillery" to defend "virtue" in the form of empirical scrupulousness in matters of medical investigation. Here again he complied with the requirements of the Royal Society, for Sprat had written that "The true Raillery should be a defence of Good and Virtuous Works, and should only intend the derision of extravagant, and the disgrace of vile and dishonourable things." For Mandeville, almost all types of deductive rationalism were excessive and therefore "vile and dishonourable." To quote Sprat again, Mandeville uses witty raillery as a salt "which preserves and keeps sweet the good, and sound parts of all Bodies, and only frets, dries up, and destroys those humours which putrify and corrupt."¹ What remains after Philopirio's "salty" raillery is reason closely linked to empirical observation rather than wit. Mandeville's devotion to raillery as a satirical mode is perhaps hinted at when Philopirio, in a discussion about the harmful effects of wine, casually comments about Horace: "I always thought that there was as much good Sense, polite Knowledge, and fine Raillery to be met with in his Epistles, his Satyrs and his Art of Poetry, as in any other Part of his Works."²

It does seem as if Mandeville would have agreed with Sprat's well-known injunction against the use of "this vicious abundance of Phrase, this trick of Metaphors, this volubility of Tongue"³ but he did so through the medium of the dialogue form and, in his manner of using it, it demands the reader's participation far more than a

2. Diseases, 364.
straightforward essay treatise. The reader of Mandeville's dialogue treatise cannot passively accept information. He is constantly forced to keep up with the arguments or risk failing to appreciate how many of the minor points debated are related to the main question about medical rationalism. A discriminating reader would also recognize the cogency of some of Misomedon's objections and, despite Mandeville's warning in the preface, feel somewhat puzzled by Philopirio's apparent intransigence against any form of rationalism. This makes for a certain amount of ambiguity between the reader and Mandeville as he can never be sure when Philopirio acts as Mandeville's "mouthpiece". This process is most obvious in the first dialogue when Misomedon argues against the immortality of the soul with scarcely an objection from Philopirio, only to claim later on in the second dialogue that this was a mere "Flight of Fancy" on his part and unrelated to his "real and settled Sentiments" on the matter. Mandeville's deviousness here as to whether he agrees with Misomedon's earlier views on the immortality of the soul was perhaps a defence against the charge of atheism, but he consistently forces the reader to be on the alert as to which direction the argument is going.

Considering Mandeville's complex use of dialogue, there can be little doubt that he would have only partly agreed with Sprat as to the use of rhetorical devices in scientific treatises but, apart from the ambiguities inherent in the discourse between Philopirio and Misomedon, he does deal with medical and philosophical issues in a clear and cogent way as Plato, Erasmus and others had done before.

him. The ambiguity lies in the relationship between Philopirio and Misomedon in one direction and that between Kandeville and the reader in another, rather than in the philosophical and medical arguments. As such, Kandeville's Treatise is a literary work employing, in Kimsatt's words, the "superficially plain form" of conversational prose dialogue as opposed to the "fully plain form" of scientific treatises, much like Dryden and Pope used the "superficially plain form" of conversational verse in their literary works.

It remains to examine in what sense Philopirio's therapeutic mode of discourse differs from rationalist rhetoric. The difference has much to do with the importance of listening to what the patient has to say. Very early on, Philopirio tries to induce an atmosphere of sociability as part of his treatment. As he tells Misomedon,

> Your Story is so diverting, that I take abundance of delight in it, and your Ingenious way of telling it, gives me a greater insight into your Distemper, than you imagine: Wherefore, let me beg of you to go on, Sir; I am all Attention, and shall not interrupt you.\(^2\)

Philopirio's willingness to listen to anything Misomedon has to say, whether directly related to his disease or not, has a certain correspondence to the psychoanalytic method. The "hypochondriasis" of the early eighteenth century, in fact, has recently been plausibly identified with that group of psychological disturbances now called "neurosis."\(^3\) Kandeville's implied belief in the therapeutic

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1. Kimsatt, 244.
2. Diseases, 19.
3. Fischer-Homberger, 393.
Efficacy of conversation is perhaps nowhere better suggested than in the following exchange:

Phil. How strangely have we been run away from our subject this half hour! But whilst I am easy and diverted, I can never be out of my way.

Linoedon. Our grand affair is your health, Linoedon, and you can never consult that better than by endeavouring to be cheerful.¹

Linoedon's very method of argument consists of alternating bouts of overconfidence and despair very much connected with his "neurotic" state of mind. When Linoedon says that "however my temper and constitution are spoilt; my reason, even when I am at the worst, is only clouded, but not impaired. The consideration of this has often been a solamen miseriæ to me, in the midst of pains and other troubles,"² he unconsciously betrays his excessive reliance on reason because he does not realize that, like his bodily processes, his powers of reasoning were also seriously affected by his disease, and therefore not to be trusted even in one of his "lucid" moments. He is conscious, however, in one of his moments of exhilaration, that a bout of depression is likely to follow and expresses his anxiety in very vivid language:

'Tis heaven to me when I think how perfectly well I am; but then how miserable on the other side again is the thought, of harbouring some where within me, tho' now I feel it not, a vast enormous monster, whose savage force may in an

¹ Diseases, 206.

² Diseases, 50. Mandeville translates the Latin as "A solace of Misery."
Instant bear down my Reason, Judgement, and all their boasted Strength before it.¹

Misanodon's suffering, then, is just as much psychological as physical.

Mandeville's emphasis on the doctor-patient relationship and the dialogue as a rhetorical technique of dramatically presenting a hypothetical example of it, not only prefigures psychoanalysis but, ironically enough, also harks back to "Ancient" medicine even if Mandeville's empirical approach is more closely identifiable to that of the experimental doctors of the Royal Society. The relationship of rhetoric and psychoanalysis to such a personal approach to medicine has been described by Walter Ong in the following manner:

It (medicine) had a tendency to regard patients as psychosomatic wholes and to make much of the physician-patient relationship as one which involved not merely abstract issues but a person-to-person situation of the sort traditionally handled by rhetoric. This is not to say that medicine consciously practiced psychoanalysis or other techniques, but only that it had not yet learned to favor the mechanical elements over the non-mechanical, psychological elements in the physician-patient situation, ...²

Although Philopirio accepts the mechanical analogy for bodily processes, nevertheless, when Misanodon asks him whether he thinks "all the Operations of the Body to be mechanical?,"³ he answers in

1. Diseases, 53-4.
2. Ong, 226.
3. Diseases, 170-71.
the affirmative but with the proviso that, for practical purposes, the operations of the mind are too subtle to be explained mechanically. It is possible that Mandeville felt that the mechanical analogy of the human body, though basically correct, is not always therapeutically useful. Here, as in many other places in the Treatise, he displays a tendency to accept what he considered to be the best elements in the Ancient and Modern medicines, without committing himself to one or the other. It even seems that Philopirio's relationship with Miscoledon is closer to that of psychoanalyst and patient because Philopirio definitely rejects the rhetoric of rationalized medicine where the doctor's relationship to his patient depends not so much on therapeutic discourse but on explaining a disease and its "method" of cure to a patient in a convincing manner. Mandeville's is the rhetoric of therapeutic discourse rather than the rhetoric of rationalized medicine and it may be that he discovered it while writing the dialogue in a manner at first more explicitly expository. Perhaps his choice of the dialogue form at first rested on the notion of it as a convenient device for "plain and familiar" exposition, but it ended in his defining himself as a doctor in a personal, almost psychoanalytic, relationship with his patient.

Even Mandeville's inclusion of Miscoledon's wife Polytheca is not solely for the purpose of expounding his views on the female equivalent of hypochondriasis, hysteria, but also for Philopirio to make good therapeutic use of Miscoledon's strained relationship with his wife. At one point in her quarrel with Miscoledon about the
relative merits of doctors and apothecaries,\(^1\) she is goaded to remark that, "my Ailings I know are very trifling, at least in some People's Opinion"\(^2\) and not much later makes an abrupt exit as the result of a sudden headache. Hisomedon, of course, expects Philopirio to side with him but Philopirio, instead, uses this opportunity to show Hisomedon how self-centred he had become as a result of his disease. The whole scene is somewhat farcical and, indeed, theatrical and self-contained enough so that it could probably be staged to very amusing effect.

Hannieville’s construction of Hisomedon’s character is so carefully worked out that, again in a manner analogous to psychoanalysis, his disease could be attributed to his "ruling passion" of imprudence. If the "ruling passion" is to be defined as the dominant tendency in the make-up of one’s character, as in Pope’s Essay on Man,\(^3\) then aristocratic imprudence is Hisomedon’s ruling passion, as he unsuitably reveals when he recounts his life in the first dialogue. Among other things, he reveals that after squandering his inherited fortune, he was saved from dire poverty only by unexpectedly inheriting another one and that from then on he led a very sober life studying the classics and amusing himself with his wife or, as he puts it, "inter Veneram & Nunas."\(^4\) Near the end of the second dialogue, however, Philopirio points out that "immoderate Exercise of the Brain" and "Excess of Venery"\(^5\) are among the most common causes of hypochondriasis, so that even the later phase of Hisomedon’s life is

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1. Philopirio does not arbitrate the argument but he is more on Polytheca’s side when he characteristically points out that an experienced apothecary may well know just as much medicine as many a doctor whose training is purely theoretical (Diseases, 304).

2. Diseases, 272.


4. Diseases, 6.

5. Diseases, 212.
actually imprudent, even if not so irresponsible. L'icoiodon's ruling passion, then, though often making him a figure of fun, also makes him more believable as a full-fledged character whose disease is very thoroughly diagnosed.

L'icoiodon's ruling passion, in fact, is highly compatible with the "decorum" of dialogue as "prosopopoeia" - a type of dialogue, probably with some of Erasmat's "colloquies" as models, where, according to the rhetorical handbook cited previously, it is essential to consider the case and condition of the person you represent, and imagine yourself in such a place, so qualified. Observe what passions the person is most affected with, as love, joy, sorrow, fear, hatred, anger, despair; also what virtues or vices he is inclined to, and by the Rules of moving passions ... make use of those figures and arguments which best suit the purpose. Consider the time, place, condition, age, sex, religion, and former state of the person, that all things may be done ad decorum, not unsuitably in any circumstances.¹

Strict adherence to verisimilitude of character and situation seems to be the aim of "prosopopoeia" and, indeed, in the Treatise, Mandeville did succeed in fusing the rhetorical requirements of dialogue as "prosopopoeia," including a certain amount of psychological depth in the characterization of L'icoiodon, with the dialectical flow

¹. Johnson, 15. The above quotation is slightly abridged and taken from Bartholow V. Crawford, "Teaching by Dialogue," Philological Quarterly, 3 (1924), 27-8. Ralph Johnson's definition of dialogue prosopopoeia is the following: "A Prosopopoeia is a discourse, pathetically, and lively setting forth what we conceive a person might say in such or such a case."
of the central (anti-rationalist) argument. In short, Mandeville's fusion of rhetorical verisimilitude and anti-rationalist dialectic is what accounts for the literary value of Mandeville's Treatise as philosophical dialogue.

With Lisomedon as a kind of "test-case," Mandeville's Treatise emphasizes the psychological nature of hypochondriasis and its predominance among scholars and the leisured aristocracy. Thus, at one point, Philopirio calls it the "Disease of the Learned" and also mentions how those in "sedentary occupations" are likely to suffer from it as well.1 Only three years after the third edition of the Treatise, the famous physician George Cheyne would have this to say about what he called "the English Malady":

The title I have chosen for this treatise, is a reproach universally thrown on this island by foreigners ... by whom nervous distempers, spleen, vapours, and lowness of spirits are ... called the English Malady. And I wish there were not so good grounds for this reflection. The moisture of our air, ... the rankness and fertility of our soil, the richness and heaviness of our food; the wealth and abundance of the inhabitants (from their universal trade) the inactivity and sedentary occupations of the better sort (among whom this evil mostly rages) and the humour of living in great, populous and consequently unhealthy towns, have brought forth a class and set of distempers, ... scarce known to our ancestors, and never rising to such fatal heights, nor afflicting such numbers in any other known nation.²

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1. Diseases, 216-17. Also see Diseases, 106 where Philopirio mentions that the word for "the Passio Hypochondriaca" means "the Disease of the Learned" in High Dutch.

2. Quoted in Fischer-Homberger, 392.
Like Mandeville's *Treatise*, The English Malady was another medical book highly recommended by Samuel Johnson¹ and its subject, hypochondriasis, has been called, in a highly Mandevillian phrase, "the fashionable disease of the century."²

By now it should be evident, however, that unlike Cheyne's book, Mandeville's *Treatise* is a genuine literary work in the mould of philosophical dialogue. The subject, as has been noted, felicitously lends itself to dramatization of the doctor-patient relationship, and, together with dialectical argument about the nature of medicine, makes for a unique extension of the genre probably never repeated since, at least among English medical writers. Mandeville's only predecessor in medical dialogue of literary merit is the Elizabethan physician William Bullein. None of his dialogues, however, are true examples of the genre of philosophical dialogue. The *Fulwarke of Defence* (1562) contains two dialogues, the *Book of Simples*, which is an expository dialogue between instructor and questioner on medicinal herbs, and *A Dialogue between Sorenes and Chyrurgi* on *Apostumacions and Wounds*. The second dialogue not only expounds on the art of surgery (including its history and a list of reliable surgeons of the time) but also, to some extent, dramatizes a doctor-patient relationship. The doctor's discourse, in fact, is induced by the patient asking to be cured of his sores, which are illustrated for the benefit of the reader. The nature of the patient's disease, however, leaves little scope for characterization.³ Bullein's most

¹. *Boswell*, 736, 782.
literary work is his *Dialogue Against the Fever Pestilence* (1564)
which contains a series of dramatic scenes in which a London merchant,
his family, and other characters (a dozen in all) combat the plague
by taking advice from a doctor and telling each other amusing stories.
W.S. Mitchell, in his article on Bullein, has described it as a
"medieval novel in dialogue form" and, as such, it has more in common
with The Virgin Unmank'd than Mandeville's medical dialogue, though
both of Mandeville's works are considerably more philosophical than
Bullein's. Bullein's work, in fact, is more like an Erasmian
colloquy (one of the more boisterous and less philosophical ones)
than any other kind of dialogue. The second dialogue in the work is
especially interesting because it highlights one aspect of the doctor-
patient relationship when the plague-stricken patient, who is beyond
recovery, pathetically hopes that offering the doctor more money will
lead to his recovery.2

To sum up about Bullein's *Treatise*, it is not just a "plain,
easy, and familiar" expository handbook on various aspects of
hypochondriasis and hysteria and recommended methods of treatment,
but a philosophical dialogue with complex dialectical and rhetorical
qualities. As dialogue, it is both expository and discursive, and
what gives it its dialectical unity is the dramatization of argument
as therapeutic discourse. Its rhetorical unity stems from its
satirical jibes against rationalist medicine which serve to
distinguish in the reader's mind, for the most part implicitly rather

1. Mitchell, 197.

2. William Bullein, *Dialogue Against the Fever Pestilence*, ed. by
   in this section of Bullein's *Dialogue* there is some philosophical
discussion, mainly of Aristotle's scientific notions or, in
Elizabethan terminology, "natural philosophy."
than explicitly, self-serving rationalist rhetoric from humbly "disinterested" therapeutic discourse. Mandeville's dialogue treatise on hypochondriasis, therefore, not only describes that disease but presents one hypothetical case of a man suffering from it and his relationship with his doctor. Philopirio's attempts to make Isomedon aware of his own deficiencies and his elaborate dialectical process of "weaning" him away from his errors through a series of arguments spiced with piquant observations and asides, are all part of his treatment of Isomedon's disease. Philopirio, however, is also Mandeville's mouthpiece, through which he makes a polemical attack against medical rationalism, but, whether intentionally or not, the polemical aims are subordinated to a dramatization of therapeutic discourse as philosophical dialogue. As will be seen, Mandeville was to continue writing philosophical dialogues, and become more conscious of doing so, but his initial impetus would always be polemical and, in terms of literary technique, rhetorical.
CHAPTER V. DRAMATIC REPARTUE AND PICTORIAL IMAGINATION IN

KANDEVILLE'S THE FABLE OF THE BEES, PART TWO

Trimmer. Did ye call this Reasoning, or
Ridiculing?

Observer. 'Tis Both in One: For it is the
Ridiculous Truth, and the Just Reason, Method,
and State of the Matter: And when People are
once Juggled Out of their Wits, they must be
Fool'd Into 'em again. Now there needs no more
to the doing of That Work, than the bare Drawing
of the Curtain, and letting People into the
Tyring-Room. For the Cause, is all over, Theatrical:
The Actors are Hypocrites, in their Manner, as
well as in the Etymon; and the whole Manage,
fitter for a Stage, then (sic.) a Pulpit. So
that the most Certain Way in Nature, for the
making of the Practice, Odious; and the
Disabusing of the Undiscerning Multitude, is to
lay Open their False Colours, Shapes, & Disguises;
and Expose Every thing in its Naked Simplicity to
the Light.

from Roger L'Estrange's
Observer (28 Sept. 1685)\(^1\)

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Though both Mandeville's Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases and The Virgin Unmask'd succeed in significantly extending the range of philosophical dialogue, it is with the Fable of the Bees, Part Two that a strong case can be made for considering him as at least a minor master of the form. This is partly because the second part of the Fable is as "pure" a philosophical dialogue as one could wish but also because it fully explores and is an engagingly ironic example of the Augustan preoccupation with applying conversational decorum to prose style.

Mandeville, himself, gives a fairly conventional reason for adopting dialogue after the notorious success of the brilliantly satirical "rhapsody" of the first part of the Fable:

1. As is well known, editions of the first part of the Fable expanded in content from the original doggerel poem The Grumbling Hive (1705) to the first edition of the Fable (1714), which included the "Enquiry into the Origin of Loral Virtue" and extensive "Remarks" by way of commentary to the poem. The third edition (1723) adds "An Essay on Charity and Charity Schools" and "A Search into the Nature of Society"; the fourth (1724), a "Vindication." It is probably for this reason that Mandeville's preface to the second part describes the first part of the Fable as a "rhapsody," in the sense of not being a clearly unified work. The second part, however, never changed substantially and, as will be shown, has all the unity of a full-fledged philosophical dialogue. Mandeville's remark occurs in The Fable of the Bees, ed. by F.D. Kaye, vol. II (London, 1966), p. 5. Its original title was The Fable of the Bees, Part II and first published in 1729. Kaye's annotated two-volume edition of both parts of the Fable, the standard scholarly one, was first published in 1924. The second volume is based on the first edition of the second part of the Fable and, according to Kaye, "nearest to Mandeville's text" (vol. I, p.xi). Hereinafter, it will be cited as Fable II and the first volume as Fable I. For Kaye's description of the editions of both parts, see Fable II, 386-400.

2. In the "Vindication," a late essay added to the first part of the Fable, Mandeville describes it as a "Rhapsody void of Order or Method" but one that "has diverted Persons of great Probyt and Virtue, and unquestionable good Sense." He does, however, claim a serious, not to say philosophically ambitious, purpose behind it. It is to trace "Self-love in its darkest Recesses; I might safely add, beyond any other System of Ethics." See Fable I, 405.
The Reader will find, that in this Second Part I have endeavoured to illustrate and explain several Things, that were obscure and only hinted at in the First.

Whilst I was forming this Design, I found on the one hand, that, as to myself, the easiest way of executing it, would be by Dialogue; ...

This fully complies with the clarifying and popularizing function of dialogue favoured by Augustan critics but barely hints at the considerable complexity of Mandeville's method of dialogue. To begin with, there is the underlying dialectical strategy of defending the first part of the Fable, which also involves attack, in the form of a polemical and satirical critique of Shaftesbury's philosophical ideas. The critique of Shaftesbury, in fact, is Mandeville's primary polemical aim. His primary expository aim, the only one which he straightforwardly admits, is to analyze the social function of "polite" behaviour - an aim not far removed from Mandeville's adamant rejection of Shaftesbury's notion that the social virtues are innate, nor from the Augustan concern for conversational decorum. Apart from the underlying dialectical strategy of defense-by-attack, it is the surface polish of dramatic repartee which makes a unified whole out of the polemical and expository aims. The repartee is especially apt when generated in the discussions about "polite" behaviour, as brilliant repartee itself was an important element of the aristocratic ethos of good-breeding. It also enhances Mandeville's dramatization of a strained but friendly relationship.

1. Fable II, 7 (all in italics).
Such, then, are the main facets of Mandeville's complex style of dialogue which, as will be demonstrated, decisively contribute to the elegance of his achievement.

Mandeville, himself, does not seem to have regarded the second part of the Fable as primarily a defence of the first part, since he claims in the preface that a defence is ready for publication:

A considerable Part of the Defence I mention'd, has been seen by several of my Friends, who have been in expectation of it for some time. I have stay'd neither for Types nor Paper, and yet I have several Reasons, why I do not yet publish it; which, having touch'd no body's Money, nor made any Promise concerning it, I beg leave to keep to my self. Most of my Adversaries, whenever it comes out, will think it soon enough, and no body suffers by the Delay but my self.¹

There was, in fact, no such defence forthcoming unless, as Kaye speculates, Mandeville included it in An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War, and the Letter to Dion, both published in 1732.² Alternatively, if one considers that the second part of the Fable, though not a chapter-and-verse defence of the first part, is certainly a defence of the general direction of Mandeville's ideas, it may well be possible that his promise to publish a future "defence" is not to be taken literally but as an ironic barb against his critics.³ The third dialogue, for example,

1. Fable II, 5-6 (all in italics).
2. See Kaye's note in Fable II, 4 n. 2.
3. With Shakespeare's Julius Caesar in mind, Mandeville might have said something along the lines of "I have come to explain my insights not to defend them."
begins with a discussion of what Mandeville had to say about duelling in the first part of the Fable, and expands on it, but through the dramatic device of "Cleomenes" defending what he had read in Mandeville's book:

Horatio. But your Friend makes no such Religious Reflections: he actually speaks in Favour of Duelling.

Cleo. What, because he would have the Laws against it as severe as possible, and no Body pardon'd without Exception that offends that way?

Hor. That indeed seems to discourage it; but he shews the Necessity of keeping up that Custom, to punish and brighten Society in general.

Cleo. Don't you see the Irony there?¹

Such passages, and others like it, should surely be considered as to some extent a defence of the first part of the Fable, including the serious purpose of its irony and satire, even though the arguments they defend are usually further developed. Mandeville, in fact, comes close to admitting such an aim when he remarks that his method of dialogue is similar to that supposedly adopted by Descartes' rival, Pierre Gassendi:

But how good soever the excuses are, that might be made for this manner of Writing, I would never have ventured upon it, if I had not liked it in the famous Gassendi, who by the help of several Dialogues and a Friend, who is the chief Personage in

¹ Fable II, 101.
them, has not only explain'd and illustrated his System, but likewise refuted his Adversaries: Him I have followed, and I hope the Reader will find, that whatever Opportunity I have had by this Means, of speaking well of my self indirectly, I had no Design to make that, or any other ill Use of it.¹

Whether Gassendi actually wrote dialogues or not,² Mandeville's comments make it plain that he is eager to follow Gassendi's footsteps in exploiting the possibilities of dialogue as an effective way of

¹. Fable II, 21. Except for "Gassendus" the passage is all in italics.

². Gassendi apparently wrote no dialogues and Kaye's note "I find no such dialogues in Gassendi" (Fable II, 21, n.1) seems to be still applicable. Mandeville's reference to Cassendi as his model for the use of dialogue is something of a riddle in Mandeville scholarship. Even if the reference to Cassendi is a printing error, it is rather puzzling that under "Gassendus" in Mandeville's "Index" to the second part of the Fable it is noted that he "is the Example the Author has follow'd in these Dialogues" (Fable II, 365). Broadly speaking, Mandeville's method of expounding a "system" of sorts and refuting his adversaries at the same time is not dissimilar to that followed by Malebranche in his dialogue entitled Entretiens sur la Metaphysique (1668) and by Galileo in his Dialogo dei Massimi Sistemi (1632). Galileo's famous dialogue (the same one which aroused the Inquisition against him) contrasts the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems and, in its subtle arguments and characterization, as well as in its vigorous baroque style in the Italian vernacular, is, indeed, a neglected masterpiece of the genre. Although both Malebranche and Galileo employ three interlocutors, in both dialogues a "system" is defended and opposing systems attacked in informal conversations. The conversations are between two close friends and a somewhat more impartial "third party" in Malebranche and a simple-minded one in Galileo appropriately named "Simplicio." While Mandeville has no such "third party" in the second part of the Fable, except briefly in the first dialogue, Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion makes use of a "third party" with the novelty that he is neither an impartial intermediary nor a simple-minded observer of the main discussion but the fanatically close-minded Demea. For interesting observations on Galileo's style of dialogue see Galileo Galilei, Dialogue on the Great World Systems in the Salusbury Translation, revised and annotated by Giorgio de Santillana (Chicago, 1953), pp. xxxi-xxxvi.
There can be little doubt that by 1729, when the first edition of the second part of the Fable was published, Mandeville must have felt harried on all sides. The Fable of the Bees had more than its fair share of adverse criticism, from William Law's distinguished critique of 1724, Remarks upon a Late Book, Entituled, The Fable of the Bees, called a "masterpiece of controversial writing" by Kaye to a scurrilous letter in the London Journal; from John Dennis's portentously rationalistic critique, Vice and Luxury Public Mischiefs (1724) to George Bluet's anonymous and substantially philosophical Enquiry (1725); as well as many critical remarks in anonymous book-reviews. The scurrilous letter which, among other things, accused Mandeville of immorality, Jacobitism, and "Railing under the Appearance of Reasoning against the best Things in the World" was dealt with in a vigorously straightforward manner in the "Vindication" found at the end of the first part of the Fable, and which includes the following dignified remarks:

1. For Kaye's analysis of Law's critique, see Fable II, 401-6.
2. This letter was reprinted by Mandeville and is found in Fable I, 386-401. Also see Kaye's listing of it in Fable II, 419.
3. For Kaye's analysis of Bluet's critique, see Fable II, 409-11.
4. See, for example, the excerpt from an anonymous review in the Tea-Table by Eliza Heywood extracted by Kaye in Fable II, 420. Kaye's edition provides a comprehensive, if not complete, list of "references to Mandeville's work." For a list of articles and reviews published during Mandeville's lifetime, and which therefore may have influenced his defence of the Fable in the second part, see Fable II, 418-26.
5. Quoted by Mandeville in Fable I, 395.
If the Arguments I have made use of are not convincing, I desire they may be refuted, and I will acknowledge it as a Favour in any one that shall convince me of my Error, without ill Language, by shewing me wherein I have been mistaken. But Calumny, it seems, is the shortest Way of confuting an Adversary, when Men are touch'd in a sensible Part.¹

Such a lofty tone, ordinarily uncharacteristic of Mandeville, is certainly an appropriate retort to crudely vituperative criticism, but for the sophisticated critiques of Law, Bluest, Dennis and others, Mandeville needed a more pliable kind of defence eminently served by the "polite" method of philosophical dialogue. The central problem he faced was how to defend his hard-headed, and highly satirical, analysis of morality in the Fable in such a way as to invite serious consideration of his ideas from educated readers who were all too likely to sympathize with his critics. This is why the second part is far more straightforward in its appeal to the judgment and impartiality of the reader and, indeed, considerably less satiric than the first.²

One of the most frequent satiric devices used by Mandeville in

1. *Fable I*, 410.

2. This has been noted by, among others, Sterling P. Lamprecht: "I feel rather certain that in the six dialogues which form volume two of the Fable, ... Mandeville deliberately softened the asperity of his earlier impressions and sought to make his statements more clear and less likely to be misunderstood. But I find no change in doctrine from the verse and the remarks which formed the first volume of his work." The quote is from "The Fable of the Bees," *Journal of Philosophy*, 23 (1926), 565.
the first part is to take up the persona of an honest, plain-speaking man whose unpalatable "truths" are challenged by obviously prejudiced individuals. In Remark "T," for example, a "good man" tries to stem the drift of Mandeville's argument and fails abysmally in the process. The "good man" objects that even if "public benefits" are obtainable from the free-spending habits of harlots, as Mandeville's plain-speaking persona asserts, God would confer even greater benefits vastly exceeding "the Profits that are now got by Harlots" if prostitution were to be abolished. This immediately exposes the "good man" as a hypocrite more interested in profits than in virtue but Mandeville takes the irony further by admitting the validity of the "good man"'s insincere objection and then undercutting his own assent by pointing out that if trade is to prosper, it must nevertheless rely on the "vanity and fickleness" of women, be they harlots or not. This sort of ironic superiority over an imagined objector was perhaps acceptable to Mandeville's audience but it is probable that they were not quite as fond of his manipulation not of imagined objectors, but of the reader. Thus, in Remark "T," again, if the reader had sophistication enough to detect the hypocrisy of the "good man" and laugh at it, or at the exposure of the "epicure" who because of his own gluttony, firmly believes that self-denial is not a prerequisite of virtue, he would probably not be very amused at the passage where Mandeville suddenly takes the reader by surprise in his insinuation that the reader himself is tainted with hypocrisy, unless he accepts the truth of Mandeville's argument.

1. Fable I, 225.
These are the Apologies, the Excuses and common Pleas, not only of those who are notoriously vicious, but the generality of Mankind, when you touch the Copy-hold of their Inclinations; and trying the real Value they have for Spirituals, would actually strip them of what their Minds are wholly bent upon. Ashamed of the many Frailties they feel within, all Men endeavour to hide themselves, their Ugly Nakedness, from each other, and wrapping up the true Motives of their Hearts in the Specious Cloke of Sociableness, and their Concern for the publick Good, they are in hopes of concealing their filthy Appetites and the Deformity of their Desires; while they are conscious within of the Fondness for their darling Lusts, and their Incapacity, barefaced, to tread the arduous, rugged Path of Virtue.  

(italics added)

This eloquently sums up Mandeville's view of human nature but in such a way that if the reader disagrees with him, he faces the possibility that his own views are nothing but "the Apologies, the Excuses ... etc." It is precisely because Mandeville's satire was so successful in the first part, that he had to turn to gentler

1. Fable I, 234.
methods in the second.  

At the very heart of Mandeville's defence is the relationship which develops between the two interlocutors, Horatio and Cleomenes. What makes their discussion inherently dramatic is that both Horatio and Cleomenes are special-pleaders. Cleomenes is determined to defend the Fable and to expand on its implications. In his role as special-pleader for Shaftesbury, Horatio's function is to be as critical as possible and to probe every weak point in Cleomenes' argument. Horatio at one point even admits Cleomenes' superiority in argument but with the playful zest of a rallying manner confirming his role as special-pleader:

I don't think my self a Match for you in
in Argument; but I have a Mind to be your
Gentleman's Advocate against all your
infallibility: I never liked a Cause
better in my Life. Come, I undertake to
defend him in all the Suppositions you
can make, that are reasonable, and consistent

1. It has been plausibly argued by Philip Harth that the satiric target of the earlier sections of the first part of the Fable is Christian rigorism and that of the later sections, the benevolism of Shaftesbury, Cibber and Latitudinarian divines. Harth's conclusion is that "In the Fable, Cibberian benevolism takes its place in the essays added in 1723 without displacing, or so much as disturbing, the rigorism displayed full length in the earlier remarks. The concordia discors of satiric targets in Mandeville's book is the result of chance rather than original design, but it is nevertheless a remarkable harmony." Whether Harth's observations are basically true or not, there can be little doubt that the first part of the Fable is far more satirical than the second and this seems to be indirectly confirmed by Harth in that he concentrates almost exclusively on the first part. See Philip Harth, "The Satiric Purpose of The Fable of the Bees," Eighteenth-Century Studies, 2 (1969), 321-40. Hereinafter to be cited as Harth.
with what you have said before.\textsuperscript{1}

Cleomenes, for his part, has already previously recognized that he must accept Horatio's stringent scrutiny if he is to convince him not merely of his own superiority in argument but of the truth of his convictions: "Have Patience, and I promise you, that I shall take nothing for granted, which you shall not allow of yourself."\textsuperscript{2}

The burden of proof, then, is always on Cleomenes' shoulders.

Mandeville's dramatic technique of dialogue, however, includes more than the dialectics of special-pleading. Horatio and Cleomenes, in fact, are not mere pawns in a dialectical chess game but fairly complex characters.\textsuperscript{3} Horatio, according to Mandeville, is a worldly man or "honnête homme" with many good qualities, though not necessarily rigorously "virtuous" ones:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Fable II, 81.} In terms of Mandeville's "satiric" attitude to human nature, Horatio is a special-pleader on behalf of humanity. As Cleomenes puts it, "You labour hard, I see, to vindicate the Honour of our Species" (\textit{Fable II}, 214). With the growth of sentimentalism, satire came to be considered as a viciously dishonest picture of human nature rather than a moral corrective. On this point see Bertrand A. Goldgar, "Satires on Man and 'The Dignity of Human Nature," \textit{Publications of the Modern Language Association}, 80 (1965), 535-41. It should be noted that though the second part of the Fable is, on the whole, not a satirical work, Cleomenes nevertheless displays an attitude to human nature considered to be "satiric" and true by Mandeville but "satiric" and false by his opponents.

\item \textbf{Fable II, 64.}

\item They are no more complex, however, than they need to be for the purpose of Mandeville's dialectic. Mandeville's philosophy is so psychologically orientated that the interlocutors in his dialogues are rarely mere mouthpieces of certain attitudes but are actually psychological examples of such attitudes or, as has been noted in the chapter on the Lucinda-Artesia Papers, "characters" of those attitudes. Euma, perhaps, learned from Mandeville here for the interlocutors in his \textit{Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion} certainly behave not merely as rhetorically-skilful disputants but as psychologically-motivated ones.
\end{enumerate}
He is a Man of strict Honour, and of Justice as well as Humanity; rather profuse than covetous, and altogether disinterested in his Principles. He has been Abroad, seen the World, and is supposed to be possess'd of the greatest part of the Accomplishments, that usually gain a Man the Reputation of being very much of a Gentleman.¹

He is, in fact, very similar to the kind of leisured and refined aristocrat described by Mandeville in the first part of the Fable as an ideal companion:

A Man of tolerable Fortune, pretty near accomplish'd ... that still improves himself and sees the World till he is Thirty, cannot be disagreeable to converse with ... When such a one either by chance or appointment meets with Three or Four of his Equals, and all agree to pass away a few Hours together, the whole is what I call good company. There is nothing said in it that is not either instructive or diverting to a Man of Sense.²

Clemens, on the other hand, is neither an "honnête homme" nor a paragon of virtue but a man of complex personality described at far greater length than Horatio. As any "honnête homme"³ he has "great

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1. Fable II, 16. (all in italics)
2. Fable I, 339.
3. Although Mandeville uses the adjective "worldly" rather than "honest" to describe one of the principal characteristics of both Horatio and Clemens, it should be noted that in eighteenth-century usage the word "honest" sometimes denoted conformity to the standards of one's own class, as distinct from purely Christian ones, so that the values of an "honest tradesman" and an "honest gentleman" might well have been totally opposed. See William Empson, The Structure of Complex Words (London, 1951), pp.195-200. Interestingly enough, the title of the French versions of the Fable of 1740 and 1750 was La fable des abeilles ou les fripons devenus honnêtes gens. See Jacob Viner's note in his
Regard ... for the Opinion of Worldly Men" and enjoys the company of sociable aristocrats but, at the same time, believes that

> In the very Politeness of Conversation, the Complacency, with which fashionable People are continually soothing each other's frailties, and in almost every part of a Gentleman's Behaviour, ... there was a Disagreement between the outward Appearances, and what is felt within, that was clashing with Uprightness and Sincerity.

Cleomenes, in other words, shares Maneville's insistence on a rigorous interpretation of what constitutes a truly virtuous action, coupled with scepticism that virtue is easily acquired in ordinary, sociable commerce with others. Horatio's simpler and more conventional attitudes, then, are a perfect foil for Cleomenes' complex ones. Thus, Horatio and Cleomenes, though special-pleaders, are not totally opposed but at different levels of awareness of the complexities of human nature and, appropriately enough in terms of philosophical dialogue, Horatio becomes only gradually aware of this.

It is in the first dialogue that Maneville sets up the dramatic situation and dialectical technique to be applied in the

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3. cont'd. from previous page.


1. Fable II, 19.

2. Fable II, 17.
far more expository subsequent ones. Cleomenes, accordingly, wastes no time in encouraging Horatio to state his case against the Fable which, at first, is an emotionally-charged one:

Hor. That Vileness of our Species in the refin'd Way of thinking you have of late been so fond of, I call it the Scheme of Deformity, the Partizans of which study chiefly to make every thing in our Nature appear as ugly and contemptible as it is possible, and take uncommon Pains to persuade Men that they are Devils.¹

What disturbs Horatio most about the Fable, then, is its uncompromisingly "satiric" view of human nature, but his very vehemence betrays a fear that the Fable may not be very far wrong in its analysis.

Because of Horatio's psychological inability to entertain any arguments in favour of the "satiric" view, Cleomenes is forced to adopt the deceptive tactic of pretending that he is a recent convert to Shaftesbury's optimistic method of judging human actions:

Cleo. But to remove all your Doubts of my Conversion, I'll shew you some easy Rules I have laid down for young Beginners.

Hor. What to do?

Cleo. To judge of Mens Actions by the lovely System of Lord Shaftsbury, in a manner diametrically opposed to that of

¹ Fable II, 30.
At first, Cleomenes' tactic seems too obvious to deceive Horatio, especially when Cleomenes goes so far as to praise the virtuous unselfishness of chimney-sweepers, physicians and clergymen, all of whom, according to his ironic interpretation of Shaftesbury, work solely for the benefit of mankind. Horatio's reaction is to complain that

I perceive your drift: From the strain'd
Panegyricks you labour at; you would form
Arguments ad absurdum: The Banter is
ingenious enough, and at proper times
might serve to raise a laugh; but then
you must own likewise, that those
study'd Encomiums will not bear to be
seriously examin'd into. 2

Although Horatio's complaint is an accurate description of Cleomenes' tactic, the rejection of "panegyrick" it involves inevitably weakens Horatio's resistance to the "satiric" view of human nature. An almost immediate result is that Horatio finds himself arguing against

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1. Fable II, 43. For Mandeville's cutting description of Shaftesbury himself as a worldly man whose own temperate habits, induced in youth by his tutor, John Locke, led him to an unwarranted optimism about human nature in general and the sturdiness of his own virtue in particular, see Fable I, 331-2. It is in this same essay, "A Search into the Nature of Society," that Mandeville describes the worldly aristocrat as his favourite kind of companion. It is possible that he thought it very pernicious for a philosopher like Shaftesbury to elevate, as he saw it, the mundane values of the "honnête homme" into an idealized system of morality. Needless to say, Mandeville was no doubt unfair in considering Shaftesbury, one of the great eighteenth-century moralists, as doing no more than that in his philosophy. The very popularity of Shaftesbury's philosophy, however, indicates that it perhaps did attract many an "honnête homme." For an assessment of Shaftesbury's popularity, see R.L. Bratt, The Third Earl of Shaftesbury (London, 1951), 186-207.

2. Fable II, 48.
Shaftesbury's idealism when applied to the motives of those who are not leisureed aristocrats:

Cleo. But if there be any Reality in the Social System of Shaftesbury, it would be better for the Publick if Men in all Professions were to act from those generous Principles; and you'll allow that the Society would be the Gainers, if the Generality in the three Faculties would mind others more and themselves less than they do now.

Hor. I don't know that; and considering what Slavery some Lawyers, as well as Physicians, undergo, I much question whether it would be possible for them to exert themselves in the same manner, tho' they would, if the constant Baits and Refreshments of large Fees did not help to support Human Nature, by continually stimulating this darling Passion.

Cleo. Indeed, Horatio, this is a stronger Argument against the Social System, and more injurious to it, than any thing that has been said by the Author whom you have exclaim'd against with so much bitterness.

In this exchange, Cleomenes evidently outwits Horatio but, by quibbling on various minor points, Horatio nimbly avoids an outright rejection of Shaftesbury. From this point on, nevertheless, he can no longer ignore Mandeville's ideas.

Cleomenes, in any case, finally corners Horatio in words ironically echoing Horatio's earlier assertions about the "deformity"

1. Fable II, 49-50.
of satire:

... and now no Man can judge of Actions
more severely, and indeed less charitably,
than yourself; ... I little thought, if
once I quitted the Scheme of Deformity,
to have found an Adversary in you; but
we have both changed Sides, it seems. 1

After this, Horatio may justifiably point out that "I would not
have you flatter yourself, that you deceiv'd me by hanging out false
Colours" but Cleomenes is equally justified in maintaining that "I
did not lay on the Disguise so thick, as not to have you see through
it, nor would I ever have discours'd upon this Subject with any body,
who could have been so easily imposed upon." 2 From a dramatic
point-of-view, what Cleomenes' mildly deceptive tactic has achieved
is for Cleomenes to regain Horatio's friendship without actually
having to abjure Mandeville's ideas. The considerable effort that
Cleomenes makes to achieve such a finely-balanced objective is, in
fact, Mandeville's dramatic representation of his own desire to
regain the reader's good-will.

In order to defend his "low" style, Mandeville briefly includes
Cleomenes' "cousin" into the discussion. She is the charming but
bluntly outspoken "Fulvia" and her views on painting and the opera
have much bearing on Mandeville's use of the "low" style. 3

1. Fable II, 56.

2. Fable II, 56. That both Horatio and Cleomenes are not entirely
serious in their arguments but positioning themselves for the
part of the cat in a friendly cat-and-mouse game is especially
evident in Horatio's impatient reaction to what he knows to be
Cleomenes' parody of Shaftesbury's effusive style: "would you
make a Test of this too?" (Fable II, 44).

3. As noted by Kaye, Mandeville was especially sensitive to criticism
from John Dennis on this score. See Kaye's note in Fable II, 32
and Mandeville's Letter to Dion, ed. by Bonamy Dobree (Liverpool,
1954), p.46. The Letter was first published in 1732.
Because Horatio is evidently a follower of Shaftesbury's, and Cleomones is pretending to be one, she is temporarily Maneville's mouthpiece.

She joins in at an early stage of the discussion when Cleomones, still in his guise, criticizes a Dutch Nativity painting for its excessive realism: "But what a fool the fellow was to draw Hay and Straw and Cattle, and a Rack as well as a Manger; it is a wonder he did not put the Bambino into the Manger."¹ Fulvia's reaction is to extol the truthfulness of its naturalistic techniques:

The Bambino? That is the Child, I suppose; why it should be in the Manger; should it not? Does not the History tell us, that the Child was laid in the Manger? I have no Skill in Painting, but I can see whether things are drawn to the Life or not; sure nothing can be more like the Head of an Ox than that there. A Picture then pleases me best when the Art in such a manner deceives my Eye, that without making any Allowances, I can imagine I see the Things in reality which the Painter has endeavour'd to represent. I have always thought it an admirable Piece; sure nothing in the World can be more like Nature.²

Fulvia's puzzlement at the word "bambino" shows that, unlike Horatio, she is not familiar with the latest fashions in painting based on Italian models. Her taste for Dutch painting, though evidently untutored, is far ahead of its time. According to Jean H. Magstrum:

¹. *Fable II*, 32.
². *Fable II*, 32-3.
in fact, "Most eighteenth-century writers in England would have agreed with Bellori's disparagement of the Dutch and Caravaggio as one of the few "realists" of Italian painting and his praise of Raphael, Guido Reni, and the Carracci."  

It should also be noted that her notion of "nature" is not dissimilar to that of Addison, who, in his Spectator series on the "Pleasures of the Imagination," combined "the ancient notion that sight is the greatest of the senses" with "Hobbes's idea that imagination is the reflection of visible - and only visible - objects."  

As it happens, the Addisonian view, though far less idealized than that of Shaftesbury, still conforms to the neo-classical imperative that poetry and other forms of literary composition should be strongly pictorial and, as will be seen, Mandeville does make use of "pictorial imagination" for dialectical and rhetorical purposes.  

Fulvia's view of nature, in any case, is countered by Cleomenes' view of it derived from Shaftesbury and, indeed, many a neo-classical critic.

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3. Because of his emphasis on imagination as a faculty which reproduces "direct visual experience," Addison's view of "nature" was undoubtedly more conducive to the descriptive "realism" desired by Mandeville. See Hagstrum, 134-40.
It is not Nature, but agreeable Nature, la belle Nature, that is to be represented; all Things that are abject, low, pitiful and mean, are carefully to be avoided, and kept out of Sight; because to Men of the true Taste they are as offensive as Things that are shocking, and really nasty.¹

As painting was widely considered to be analogue of poetry, it is not surprising to find Cleoménes referring to Dryden's preface to Du Fresnoy's widely-read De ArtëGraphica² - a poem which expounds the ancient and latterly neo-classical doctrine of "ut pictura poesis" at great length. It is very probable, then, that Fulvia's advocacy of Dutch painting is intended as a justification of Mandeville's "low" style, especially when one considers that, as Cicely Davies points out about neo-classical art-criticism, "it had indeed been the tradition to rank as 'low' styles the genres which seemed most concerned with particulars."³

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2. Fable II, 35. Also see Kaye's note which demonstrates that Mandeville borrowed from Dryden's preface, not, as he maintains, from Graham's. Richard Graham, according to Kaye, "contributed not a preface, but a supplement, to Du Fresnoy's Latin poem." As in Mandeville's remark about Cassendi, this is another instance of his apparent carelessness with references. Du Fresnoy's book was highly popular and frequently translated in the eighteenth century, including a version by Defoe in 1720. See Haezstrum, 175.

3. Davies, 169.
The discussion of opera which follows makes a similar point, but far less against the grain, as Italian opera was considerably less popular than Italian painting. Fulvia reveals that she "never expected anything natural at an Opera" and that she attends them merely to watch the people of fashion.\footnote{1} Horatio is much offended by this and reacts by rapturously describing the charms of such idealized elements of opera as the "solemn Composure of the Action" and the representation of love as always "pure and Zeraphick."\footnote{2}

Fulvia's attitude, however, corresponds more to the taste of the times, as the artificialities of Italian opera were attacked not only by magisterial critics like John Dennis, but in the pages of the Tatler and Spectator as well.\footnote{3} In addition, John Gay's Beggar's Opera, which was first staged in 1728, discredited Italian opera with much of the theatre-going public.\footnote{4} Because of this background of widespread hostility, Mandeville's choice of a discussion of opera to reinforce his implied advocacy of the "low" style in Fulvia's remarks about painting was, indeed, a very shrewd one.\footnote{5}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Fable II, 37.
\item Fable II, 39-40.
\item See Siegmund Betz, "The Operatic Criticism of the Tatler and Spectator," Musical Quarterly, 31 (1945), 315-30. Betz concludes that the criticism was, for the most part, unfair: "As men of letters they judged it by the standards of classical drama. As Englishmen they looked upon it as a piece of foreign foolery."
\item Frank Kidson, The Beggar's Opera: Its Predecessors and Successors (Cambridge, 1922), p.36. Kidson quotes Pope's interesting observation in one of his notes to the Dunciad that the Beggar's Opera "drove out of England for that season the Italian opera, which had carried all before it for ten years; that idol of the nobility and people which the great critic, Mr. Dennis, by the labours and outcries of a whole life, could not overthrow, was demolished by a single stroke of this gentleman's pen." The second part of the Fable, at any rate, was published just after its successful first run, and is mentioned in Mandeville's preface (Fable I, 6).
\item In the preface, Mandeville ingenuously claims, but surely with intended irony, that he introduced Fulvia's discussions of painting and opera into the proceedings merely because he "had a mind to say some things on Painting and Operas, which ... might by introducing her be brought in more naturally, and with less Trouble, than they could have been without her" (Fable II, 19).
\end{enumerate}
opera ends, in fact, with some playfully provocative banter comparing opera to bear-baiting and leading to Cleomenes' serious point, no doubt applicable to the "low" style of the Fable, that "... after all, Vice and what is criminal are not to be confounded with Roughness and want of Manners, no more than Politeness and artful Behaviour ought to be with Virtue or Religion."¹

Although the discussion of painting and opera, and its dramatic framework of good-humoured repartee between Fulvia and the two men, is urbaneiy light-hearted in tone, it prepares the reader to seriously consider, if not accept, a reproach like the following from Cleomenes in the third dialogue: "You take no Delight in the Occurrences of low Life; but if we always remain among Persons of Quality, and extend our Enquiries no farther, the Transactions there will not furnish us with a sufficient Knowledge of every thing that belongs to our Nature."²

Bearing in mind Cleomenes' penchant for investigating "low" life, Mandeville's "satiric" attitude may well be not dissimilar to what we would now call naturalism of style. In this he is closer to a novelist delighting in realistic detail like Defoe than a concise satirist like Swift, a tendency already observable in The Virgin Unmask'd. Horatio, in any case, is, at one point, forced to acknowledge the appropriateness of a "low" simile to make the point, and it is a central one in Mandeville's analysis of the mechanics of political power, that efficient government depends not on the application of lofty principles but on accumulated experience in governing:

1. Fable II, 60.
2. Fable II, 110.
Cleo. The Wisdom I speak of, is not the Offspring of a fine Understanding, or intense Thinking, but of sound and deliberate Judgment, acquired from a long Experience in Business, and a Multiplicity of Observations. By this sort of Wisdom, and Length of Time, it may be brought about, that there shall be no greater Difficulty in governing a large City, than (pardon the Lowness of the Simile) there is in weaving of Stockings.

Nor. Very low indeed.

Cleo. Yet I know nothing to which the Laws and establish'd Oeconomy of a well-order'd City may be more justly compared, than a Knitting-frame. The Machine, at first View, is intricate and unintelligible; yet the Effects of it are exact and beautiful; and in what is produced by it, there is a surprising Regularity: But the Beauty and Exactness in the Manufacture are principally, if not altogether, owing to the Happiness of the Invention, the Contrivance of the Engine. For the greatest Artist at it can furnish us with no better Work, than may be made by any Scoundrel by half a Year's Practice.

Nor. Tho' your Comparison be low, I must own, that it well illustrates your Meaning.¹

¹ This exchange is a good illustration of how Mandeville's stylistic emphasis on homely images, rather than idealized ones - and nothing can be less ethereal than a mechanical image - fully complements the

1. Fable II, 322.
empirical bias of his thought. Such an emphasis, in fact, also contributes to a strongly pictorial element in the dialectic of the second part of the Fable.  

Apart from its relationship with the Addisonian notion of "imagination" as perception of the actual, itself based on the sensationalist psychology of Hobbes and Locke, Maneville's graphic style of argument is also a homespun variant of the Lockean notion, already investigated in the first chapter of this thesis, of argument as a series of points-of-view in which truth commands the highest "prospect." Argument, in other words, is analogous not only to painting as such, but, more specifically, to its perspectival element. Thus, in a work like George Stubbes's *A Dialogue on the Superiority of the Pleasures of the Understanding*, when "Socrates" searches for a strategic prospect, it is evident that he is also talking about the nature of philosophical argument:

> We have passed by a variety of Lawns, and chrysta1 Lakes, a green with pendant Groves, and reflecting inverted Obelisques and floating Ornaments of Architecture. But amidst the Confusion of opening Prospects

1. In this context, the word "pictorial" is preferable to "picturesque" because the latter term was to acquire a very different meaning, suggesting the unusual rather than the actual, in the latter part of the eighteenth century. For neo-classical critics in the early eighteenth century, at any rate, the word "picturesque" had two basic meanings: "like a picture" or "capable of being represented in a picture" and "pertaining to the visually particular." These are the two basic meanings in which the word "pictorial" is used for our purposes. See *Havstrum*, 157-8.

and inviting Avenues, misleading the uncertain
Foot or wandering eye, it is not possible to
form a Judgment of so extensive a Design,
unless you lead me to the Principal Point of
View, from whence only its Beauty can be
understood; and permit me to survey your ample
Territories from this peculiar Spot, perhaps
enclosed from Sight and reserved as sacred to
your own Contemplation.¹

Although there is much florid rhetoric and more than a hint of
platonic idealism, in Stubbes's spatial analogy, it does essentially
describe the same kind of pictorial imagination that Mandeville employs
in his arguments.

Mandeville's technique of pictorial description also includes
adroit use of the "character" or, to use a more apposite term,
"character-sketch," which he had already employed extensively in his
essays and dialogues for the Female Tatler. Cleomenes' highly
pictorial disquisition on the "ideal gentleman," for example, makes
Horatio suspicious about his motives for "drawing" such a figure:

_Hor._ There lies your Fault: It is this
I cannot endure in you.
_Cleo._ What's the matter?
_Hor._ I know what you are about, you
are going to give me the Caricatura of a
Gentleman, under pretence of drawing his
Portrait.
_Cleo._ You wrong me: I have no such
Thought.²

¹. George Stubbes, A Dialogue on the Superiority of the Pleasures of

². Fable II, 63.
Cleomenes' answer is not entirely tongue-in-check, as he believes his sketch to be an accurate portrait, not a caricature. Because his description of the characteristics and mode of life of the typical gentleman is so detailed, and ostensibly impartial, in fact, Horatio is moved to remark that "This is a study'd Piece; but I don't like it the worse for it, pray go on." 1 Cleomenes, however, is, indeed, leading Horatio into a trap, especially when he baits Horatio with this description of the gentleman: "Tho' of every thing he has the best of the sort, and might be call'd curious in Apparel; yet he leaves the Care of it to others; and no Man has his Cloaths put on better that seems so little to regard them." 2 At first glance, this sounds like an admirable trait but there is also a hint of hypocrisy in pretending to be indifferent about clothes. Horatio is so taken up with the accuracy of Cleomenes' description that, despite his wariness, he ignores this implication and betrays his own identification with Cleomenes' ironically-idealized gentleman: "Perfectly right; to be well-dress'd is a necessary Article, and yet to be sollicitous about it is below a Person of Quality." 3 Thus, though Horatio is on his guard, Cleomenes' picture is so attractive that he cannot resist letting him draw it to the last telling detail, and even assisting him in doing so. This is because Cleomenes' ostensibly impartial character-sketch is really a discriminatively

1. Fable II, 68. Elsewhere Horatio even compliments Cleomenes with the revealing words, "You are a good Painter" (Fable II, 234).

2. Fable II, 69.

3. Fable II, 69.
ironic portrait of the image a gentleman projects in society—an image Horatio himself aspires to as an "honnete homme."¹

Although he consistently finds it very entertaining, Horatio finally rebels against Cleomenes' pictorial method of argument by accusing him of deliberately emphasizing the nastier aspects of what he is describing:

... The Reason why no Government can subsist without Laws is, because there are bad Men in all Multitudes; but to take Patterns from them, when we would judge of human Nature, rather than from the good ones that follow the Dictates of their Reason, is an Injustice one would not be guilty of to brute Beasts; and it would be very wrong in us, for a few vicious Horses, to condemn the whole Species as such, without taking notice of the many fine-spirited Creatures, that are naturally tame and gentle.²

Cleomenes' answer is an elaborately detailed one, but the gist of it is in his retort that "what you call Natural, is evidently Artificial, and belongs to Education: no fine-spirited Horse was ever tame or gentle, without Management."³ Cleomenes' defence, in other words, suggests that his portraits are impartially accurate, emphasizing neither evil nor good in the sitter but making it evident that good is often skin-deep and artificially acquired rather than

1. If, taking his cue from The Virgin Unmask'd, Mandeville had titled the second part of the Fable, "The Gentleman Unmask'd," it would not have been a misleading description of much of its dialectic.

2. Fable II, 269.

3. Fable II, 270.
innate. Horatio, in short, confuses what are only intended to be meticulous descriptions with moral judgments. Mandeville undoubtedly assumed that his descriptive method accurately reflects what is observable in "nature," as opposed to the "Flatterers of our Species" who "instead of separating what is acquired from what is natural, and distinguishing between them, they take Pains to confound them together."\(^1\) As such, Mandeville's method of pictorial description subverts the idealized, neo-classical notion of "nature" attacked by Fulvia and is an important facet of his dialectical technique.

It is made explicitly clear that Cleomenes' pictorialism serves the purpose of making abstract concepts visible when, after a complex discussion pictorially contrasting William Temple's version of the "noble savage" to a hypothetically real one,\(^2\) Horatio exclaims, "I have it now; you have open'd my Eyes, and I see the Origin of Society, as plain as I do that Table." Although Cleomenes replies that "the Prospect is not so clear yet, as you imagine,"\(^3\) Horatio's reference to the table reminds one, as hinted at in Fulvia's comments, that Mandeville would probably have preferred to consider dialectical argument not as an analogue of landscape painting, but of realistic, and equally perspectival, Dutch interiors.

There is perspectival realism even in the carefully-framed setting of each dialogue in the second part of the Fable and, indeed, these settings resemble nothing so much as theatrical "sets." In

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Fable II}, 301.
\item \textit{Fable II}, 192-202.
\item \textit{Fable II}, 202.
\end{enumerate}
the first dialogue, for example, Cleomenes discusses paintings decorating the walls of a room in what is probably his Town-house, and this after having coaxed Horatio out of the street.¹ There is also a "scene" of friendly camaraderie where Horatio surprises Cleomenes in his study.² As for the sixth dialogue, it takes place entirely inside a carriage because of the following invitation from Cleomenes: "I am obliged to dine at Windsor to-morrow; if you are not otherwise engaged, I can carry you, where the Honour of your Company will be highly esteem'd: My Coach shall be ready at Nine; you know you are in my way."³ The illusion of movement which Mandeville's proscenium-oriented theatrical settings provide, is, in fact, a vivid contrast to the quasi-Platonic timelessness of many philosophical dialogues.

Broadly speaking, the settings of philosophical dialogues tend to be either elaborately sylvan or thinly perfunctory. Dialogues with elaborately sylvan settings usually attempt to create an atmosphere of idealized discussion uninfluenced by the intrusions of

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¹ Mandeville provides no "stage directions" but a careful reading of the opening pages shows that Horatio is being induced to enter Cleomenes' dwelling. See Fable II, 29-30 and 32-4.

² Fable II, 148-9.

³ Fable II, 265.
the outside world.¹ British examples in this mode include More's 
Divine Dialogues (1668), Shaftesbury's The Moralists (1709), and 
Berkeley's Alciphron (1731), the latter two of which will be 
extensively examined in subsequent chapters. More's opening to his 
Divine Dialogues is typical of the hint of an idealized world beyond 
the actual that such dialogues consistently convey:

> Philot/heus². ... There is nothing 
more pleasant these summer-evenings than 
the cool open air. And I'll assure you 
it is very fresh here, and the prospect 
very delightful.

> Cuph/ophron². Methinks I envy 
greatness for nothing so much as their 
magnificent houses, and their large 
gardens and walks; their quarters 
contrived into elegant knots adorned 
with the most beautiful flowers, their 
fountains, cascades and statues; that I 
might be in a more splendid capacity of 
entertaining my friends. This would be 
to me no small prelibation of the joys 
of paradise here upon earth.²

1. Probably Plato's Phaedrus is the archetype of this kind of dialogue. 
It seems to have been deliberately set on the tranquil "banks of 
the Ilissus" because its discussion of the nature of rhetoric, with 
its mythic and transcendental elements, could thereby all the more 
readily be abstracted from merely political and superficially 
urbane notions of it. For an interesting analysis of the Phaedrus 
in terms of its explicit and implicit discussion of the nature of 
rhetoric, see Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago, 1965), 
pp.3-26. Addison perhaps had the charming qualities and static 
timelessness of this kind of philosophical dialogue in mind when 
he declared in the "Pleasures of the Imagination" (Spectator no.411, 
June 21, 1712) that "A beautiful prospect delights the soul, as 
much as a demonstration" even though he goes on to compare Aristotle, 
not Plato, unfavourably with Homer, at least as far as their impact 
on the reader's "imagination" is concerned.

2. Henry More, Divine Dialogues, Containing Disquisitions Concerning 
Dialogues with thinly-perfunctory settings tend to be little more than essays of topical concern in dialogue form and, not surprisingly, many of these are found in periodical essays. Jeremy Collier's *Essays Upon Several Moral Subjects* (1703), many of which are in dialogue, contains some of the more interesting examples of philosophical disquisition in this mode, of which perhaps the most distinguished example is Hume's "Of a Particular Providence and Future State" which comprises Section XI of his *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1760). In bringing philosophical discussion to an urbanized "drawing-room," Mandeville was no doubt to some extent influenced by Lucian and his brilliant French "imitator," Fontenelle, but his distinction was to transfer the "drawing-room" into the full daylight of philosophical dialogue rather than "dialogue of the dead" - to strip the underworld, in other words, of its transcendence and restore the "drawing-room" to the world as it is. Mandeville's preference for the "drawing-room," rather than the sylvan setting, is, in any case, fully compatible with his intense interest in the actualities of human behaviour. As for the essay in dialogue form, even in the Female Tatler, as has been seen, Mandeville usually preferred to include some dramatic interaction and "drawing-room" setting in his disquisitions.2

Some of Mandeville's dramatic embellishments, however, also subvert the inherent conservatism of the aristocratic drawing-room.


2. It may well be that Mandeville had set a precedent for Hume and Ramsay to follow in their adoption of the theatrical "drawing-room" for their highly-polished *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* and *Dialogue on Taste*. 
The most outstanding example is Horatio and Cleomenes enjoying a pineapple at the beginning of the fifth dialogue and discussing the implications of doing so. After Cleomenes goes to some lengths to describe its taste as accurately as possible, they go on to discuss its cultivation and other "facts" pertaining to it:

Cleo. This was the third I ever tasted, of our own Growth: the Production of them in these Northern Climates, is no small Instance of human Industry, and our Improvements in Gard'ning. It is very elegant to enjoy the wholesome Air of temperate Regions, and at the same time be able to raise Fruit to its highest Maturity, that naturally requires the Sun of the Torrid Zone.

Hor. It is easy enough to procure Heat, but the great Art consists in finding out, and regulating the Degrees of it at pleasure; without which it would be impossible to ripen an Ananas here; and to compass this with that Exactness, as it is done by the Help of Thermometers, was certainly a fine Invention.

They go on to mention Matthew Decker, a London merchant who first pioneered the raising of pineapples in England. The effect of such a discussion is to bring to the reader a vivid awareness of the bustling world of commerce - a world outside the drawing-room and its

1. Fable II, 194-5. Also see Kaye's note.
strict hierarchy of wits and "honnètes gens." The pineapple, moreover, is a fruit exotic enough to deserve a pastoral setting, such as the paradisial one of Ioro, but, in Maneville’s hands, the reader is not allowed to forget the considerable human effort necessary for its availability.

Although the world of commerce is often alluded to, however, the conversations between Horatio and Cleomenes have something of the aura of an aristocratic comedy of manners. The relationship between Horatio and Cleomenes, in fact, is a comic one and even develops dramatically. Thus, though Horatio at first treats Cleomenes in a curtly formal and supercilious manner, he eventually sheds his stiffness and restores their old friendship, as in this exchange from the beginning of the fourth dialogue:

CLEOMENES. Your Servant.
Hor. What say you now, Cleomenes; is not this without Ceremony?
Cleo. You are very obliging.
Hor. When they told me where you was, I would suffer no body to tell you, who it was that wanted you, or to come up with me.
Cleo. This is friendly indeed!
Hor. You see what a Proficient I am: in a little Time you’ll teach me to lay aside all good Manners.
Cleo. You make a fine Tutor of me. 2

This works nicely as an entertaining bit of dramatic "business" before serious disputation begins. Not only does Horatio surprise Cleomenes

1. For interesting observations about the role of the "honnètes gens" in Restoration comedy, see C.D. Cecil, "Razillery in Restoration Comedy," Huntington Library Quarterly, 29 (1965), 147-59. Hereinafter to be cited as Cecil.

2. Fable II, 148.
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2. Fable II, 148.
in his study but makes use of raillery at its most courteous, for he does not really mean that he is in danger of losing his habitual politeness but that Cleomenes is such a good friend that he does not need to be overly formal with him. This is, indeed, the type of raillery that Swift favoured and defined as being complimentary while seeming to criticise.\textsuperscript{1}

There is, in any case, much good-humoured banter between Horatio and Cleomenes and it is subtle enough to include dialectical "leg-pulling." Horatio complains at one point, for example, that Cleomenes' description of an ideal gentleman, which we have examined in the context of Mandeville's pictorialism, contains the seeds of its own refutation:

\begin{quote}
I am persuaded that, where-ever you have put in this seeming and appearing, you have done it designedly, and with an Intent to make use of them as so many Back-doors to creep out at. I could never have taken Notice of these Things, if you had not acquainted me with your Intention before-hand.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

The fact, however, that such "leg-pulling" is so transparent, as Horatio himself admits, shows that Cleomenes is not using unfair arguments but that he is needling Horatio in order to undermine his preconceptions. As Cleomenes declares on another occasion, "I aim at no Victory, all I wish for is to do you Service, in undeceiving you."\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{2} Fable II, 72.\\
\textsuperscript{3} Fable II, 96.\end{flushright}
Horatio's self-delusion may be dialectically convenient but, psychologically and dramatically, there is nothing arbitrary about it. As the following exchange illustrates, he is divided within himself, in that his genuine search for truth is undermined by his hedonistic unwillingness to grapple with it:

Cleo. I thought you was resolv'd to be better acquainted with yourself, and to search into your heart with care and boldness.

Hor. That's a cruel thing; I tried it three times since I saw you last, till it put me into a sweat, and then I was forced to leave off.1

Even when Horatio acknowledges the validity of Cleomenes' reasoning, he finds it very hard to accept at the emotional level:

I see great difficulties, and now and then a glimpse of truth, that makes me start; I sometimes feel great struggles within; but I have been so used to derive all actions that are really good from laudable motives, that as soon as I return to my accustom'd way of thinking, it carries all before it.2

Cleomenes' task, then, is to wean Horatio away from his own self-deception and he does so, in part, by rallying him:

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1. Fable II, 107. Also see Kays's n.2 which points out that though "The difficulty of self-knowledge was a commonplace, ... a genuine psychological analysis of the causes for this such as is offered throughout the Fable was comparatively rare."

2. Fable II, 74.
Hor. But is not that provoking? I'd give a hundred Guineas with all my Heart, that I did not know it. I can't endure to see so much of my own Nakedness.

Cleo. I never met with such an open Enmity to Truth in a Man of Honour before.  

Cleomenes sometimes appeals, in short, not to Horatio's reason, but to his sense of honour, which is very vulnerable to raillery. This is not only dramatically plausible but fully consistent with Mandeville's belief in the dominance of the passions in matters of rational argument. He takes this conviction so far that Horatio's eventual acceptance of Mandeville's analysis of human nature, as expounded by Cleomenes, is not entirely a matter of being rationally persuaded of its truth, but also of becoming familiarized with new ideas and therefore finding them acceptable. As Cleomenes puts it, "You are now diverting yourself with a Truth, which eight Days ago you would have given an hundred Guineas not to have known."  

Horatio, however, is never entirely convinced that he is really so self-deluded and, apart from the considerable interest that this lends to his character, his scepticism about his own self-delusion makes him amusingly wary and doubtful to Cleomenes' fairness, traits which add piquancy to much of the repartee, as in this choice piece of sarcasm: "I don't care to enter into these abstruse Matters; what have you further to say in Praise of Money?"  

This is not dissimilar to the energetic raillery and banter employed by the "honnête homme"
of Restoration comedy to defend himself against the malicious and the vulgar. It can be said of Horatio and his bantering manner, in fact, what one recent critic has said about the "honnête homme" in Restoration comedy: "A good-humored, bantering manner, tinged with a certain reserve, helps l'honnête homme to remain at ease among those whose judgment he cannot always trust, and in whose presence he consequently risks his composure."

Despite his bantering manner, Horatio never succeeds in effectively ridiculing any of Cleomenes' arguments. Even in this Horatio is self-deluded if one assumes that his penchant for banter is partly encouraged by Shaftesbury's notion that "a subject which would not bear raillery was suspicious." Shaftesbury, however, also implied that such raillery, or ridicule, is part of the reasoning process and therefore a legitimate mode of dialectical argument, such as is often favoured by satirists. This possible aspect of Shaftesbury's notion was later fully analyzed as "argumentative ridicule" by Allan Rammay in his Essay on Ridicule in defence of Shaftesbury. He considered "argumentative ridicule" as a kind of

1. Cecil, 155.

2. Quoted by Kaye in Fable II, 53 n.1. Shaftesbury's assertions about the value of raillery and ridicule (he used such terms interchangeably) in discussion was subject to much misrepresentation and even sustained controversy throughout the eighteenth century. According to A.O. Aldridge, an acute analyst of this controversy, Shaftesbury lauded ridicule in order to advocate free and impartial debate on all subjects, free of solemn dogma or pedantry. See Alfred Owen Aldridge, "Shaftesbury and the Test of Truth," Publications of the Modern Language Association, 60 (1945), 129-56 and esp. 129-32. Hereinafter to be cited as Aldridge. Also see Stuart L. Tave, The Amiable Humorist (Chicago, 1960), pp.35-9. Hereinafter to be cited as Tave.

3. According to Aldridge, "The chief value of ridicule to Shaftesbury was its use as a test of demeanor or attitude, as a weapon against imposture. As such Shaftesbury implied that it is associated with reason although he made no clear statement concerning its operation" (Aldridge, 155). Shaftesbury, however, shrank from satire as such and preferred "good-humoured raillery." On this point, see Tave, 37.
analogical reasoning, first perfected by Lucian. It is abundantly
evident that Mandeville was no stranger to the use of ridicule for
dialectical purposes but it does not appear that he equated such
a use of it with Shaftesbury's observations. Thus, when Horatio
reacts to Cleomenes' parody of Shaftesbury's ideas by making the
petulant remark that "the best Things, you know, may be ridicul'd,"\(^2\)
Cleomenes' answer is highly derisory about Shaftesbury on ridicule:

\[
\text{whether I know that or not, Lord Shaftesbury has flatly denied it; and}
\text{takes Joke and Banter to be the best}
\text{and surest Touchstone to prove the Worth}
\text{of Things: It is his Opinion, that no}
\text{Ridicule can be fastn'd upon what is}
\text{really great and good; his Lordship has}
\text{made use of that Test to try the}
\text{Scriptures and the Christian Religion by,}
\text{and expos'd them because it seems they}
\text{could not stand it.}^{3}
\]

His answer, in fact, indicates that Mandeville did not take Shaftesbury's

\[1. \text{Allan Ramsay, } \text{An Essay on Ridicule} \text{ (London, 1753), pp.16-37. This}
\text{edition is part of a collection of tracts entitled } \text{The Investigator}
\text{(London, 1762). Also see Aldridge, 149-56. Ramsay himself used}
\text{"argumentative ridicule" as an analogical ardent in his Dialogue}
\text{on Taste (London, 1762) when "Col. Freeman" satirizes mathematical}
\text{calculations of proportion for making aesthetic judgments: "...}
\text{the rule of three or rule of proportion, might be applied so as}
\text{to become a golden rule in comparing beauties as much as any thing}
\text{else. It is performed, you know, by multiplying the first by the}
\text{second, and dividing by the third; and being curious this morning}
\text{to know with exactness how much Mrs. D** excelled in beauty Mrs.}
\text{C***, I thus stated the question, as a cat is to a wheel-barrow}
\text{so is Mrs. C*** to Mrs. D**; but though I tried till my brain was}
\text{ready to crack, I never could contrive how to multiply a cat by}
\text{a wheel-barrow; so I could go no farther in my calculations" (p.31).
\text{The Dialogue is also available in the same Investigator collection.}}\]

\[2. \text{Fable II, 52.}\]

\[3. \text{Fable II, 53.}\]
theory of ridicule very seriously but refers to it merely to expose Shaftesbury's alleged irreverence towards religious matters—something he himself was often accused of. Cleomenes, in short, opposes his own plain-speaking banter in the "low" style to Horatio's politely "good-humoured" one.

Cleomenes' plain-speaking banter, however, is not incompatible with gentlemanly civility nor is it primarily polemical, as is Eachard's banter in that philosophical dialogue much admired by Dryden, Mr. Hobbs's State of Nature Considered. Eachard's aim was to refute Hobbes's philosophy of human nature, but his banter concentrated too much on quibbles, as in the following exchange:

"Titethy. You talk, Philautus, of your Humane Nature containing the Elements of Policy; there's one cunning reflection (p. 5) concerning imagination, which is so full of novelty and subtilty, that it is enough alone to set up a man for chief Minister of State, viz. that the absence or destruction of things once imagined, doth not cause the absence or destruction of the imagination it self."

1. In making such an innuendo against Shaftesbury for his supposed irreligion, and even pandering to prejudices against Shaftesbury's theory of ridicule which, despite fears to the contrary from Berkeley and others, was not designed to undermine religious doctrines as such but only spurious ones, Mandeville was, undoubtedly not entirely fair. On this point, see R. L. Brett, The Third Earl of Shaftesbury (London, 1951), PP. 66-7. Mandeville's unfairness is compounded by Horatio, ostensibly a follower of Shaftesbury's, expressing unorthodox sentiments that Mandeville himself probably held. On this point, see Kaye's n.2 in Fable II, 21. It is only in matters of religious doctrine, however, that Mandeville seems to be deliberately unfair to Shaftesbury and uncandid about his own opinions.

Phi. Why, does it?

Tim. Not. For suppose I have a House in Cheapside, which I have sometimes seen, and sometimes imagined; according as I was best at leisure; and this house, upon a day, either runs away from me or I from that; yet still I may phantast my self trading in my own shop, and eating in my own house; may though it should be burnt down to the very ground; yet for a need I can make shift once or twice a year to phantast it still standing, or at least to wish that it were. And surely upon this is founded that old friendly saying, viz. though absent in body, yet present in mind.\(^1\)

This is undeniably entertaining but after many pages of similar banter one wonders to what extent, if any, it succeeds in decisively refuting Hobbes.\(^2\) The relationship between Timothy and Philautus, moreover, is not that between friends who respect each other but, in the succinct words of a modern editor of the dialogue, between "a bad-tempered old genius who continually veers between sublime self-assurance and startled defensiveness, and his pupil ... a pert, young jackanape with an exuberant fancy and a keen sense of absurdity."\(^3\) Although Eachard's dialogue, because of its amusingly ironical and witty banter, was a considerable advance over the abusiveness of polemical


2. Dryden, however, maintained that Eachard "has more baffled the Philosopher of Walmesbury than those who assaulted him with blunt, heavy arguments drawn from orthodox divinity" (Dryden II, 212).

3. Eachard, xxxiii.
dialogues, it is clear that Manleville went even further in the direction of turning banter to dialectical uses. Manleville's banter in the second part of the Fable is, in fact, more good-natured than satirical but distinct from Shaftesbury's because of its blunt plain-speaking.

What prevents Manleville's banter from being merely polemical is that, though not quite as brilliant as in Restoration comedy, there is genuine dramatic repartee between Horatius and Cleomenes. The disquisition on self-love in the third dialogue is as good a section as any in which to examine how dramatic repartee merges with dialectical argument. It begins with the following polite exchanges:

For. You have, without doubt, thought on this subject before now; would you communicate to me some of your guesses?

Cleo. With abundance of Pleasure.

For. You'll give me leave, now and then, when things are not clear to me, to put in a word for Information's sake.

Cleo. I desire you would: You will oblige me with it. ... 3

Plainly beneath the surface of such obliging politeness there is

1. For a study of how the abusive polemics of controversial prose eventually gave way, during the Restoration and after, to urbane banter relying more on irony, see Hugh MacDonald, "Banter in English Controversial Prose After the Restoration," Essays and Studies by Members of the English Association, 32 (1946), 21-39.

2. According to Dryden's Essay of Dramatic Poesy, "As for comedy, repartee is one of its chiefest graces; the greatest pleasure of the audience is a chase of wit kept up on both sides, and swiftly managed" (Dryden 1, 60). The "chase of wit" is not as "swiftly managed" in the second part of the Fable but its slower pace is certainly more appropriate to philosophical dialogue.

3. Fable II, 128-9.
distinct, if gently subdued, raillery and although Horatio seems to be merely asking to be instructed, his rallying way of putting it implies that he does not intend to accept all of Cleomenes' ideas without some argument. Thus, despite much exposition of ideas in what follows, the tension beneath the surface politeness of Horatio and Cleomenes makes for incidental dramatic and psychological interest worthy of philosophical dialogue at its best. In addition, it dramatically reinforces Cleomenes' explicit statements about the insincerity of much polite behaviour.

According to Kaye, the discussion, as a whole, is a rebuttal of Butler's objections to "Mandeville's theory that all conduct is motivated by self-love."¹ Put as simply as possible, Butler's objection is that if self-love motivates all conduct, then no distinctions can be made between calculated and impulsive actions, as both are adequately explained in terms of self-love, which is demonstrably absurd. Mandeville's answer is to have Cleomenes make a distinction between "self-love" and "self-liking." Cleomenes, accordingly, defines "self-liking" as a natural instinct by which "every Individual values itself above its real Worth" and "self-love" as simply the instinct for self-preservation.² He also reinforces his definition of "self-liking" by pointing out that it exists even in horses, whose "self-liking" "may be encreas'd ... by additional Ornaments, and the Presence of Man, whom he knows, to clean, take Care of, and delight in him."³ Horatio reacts by objecting that

1. See Kaye's note in Fable II, 129-30.
2. Fable II, 130.
3. Fable II, 131.
"what you call "self-liking is evidently Pride" but not before implicitly endorsing Cleomenes' observations by quoting Montaigne to the effect that "if brutes were to paint the Deity, they would all draw him of their own species." Thus, not only does Horatio reinforce Cleomenes' point about "self-liking" but, in identifying "self-liking" with pride, he even falls into the trap of giving Cleomenes an opening by which he can demonstrate pride to be at the source of much human behaviour. There is nothing of the "straw-man" in Horatio's linking of "self-liking" with pride for, in the context of the discussion on "self-love," Horatio is simply displaying his mental alertness. As he prefers to say something which might actually undermine his own opposition to Cleomenes, and be considered intelligent, than to be silent and seem foolish, Horatio's very repartee becomes a dramatic instance of what Cleomenes means by "self-liking."

In the next stage of the argument, raillery plays a significantly dramatic and ostensibly dialectical part when Cleomenes describes how "self-liking" has fewer opportunities to assert itself among savages because of their unending struggle for survival and Horatio retorts that "This is thinking very abstractly indeed." This is an oblique reminder of an earlier exchange in which Cleomenes asserted that his reasoning is always mainly empirical:

Cleo. ... When Things are very obscure,
I sometimes make Use of Conjectures to
find my Way.

1. Fable II, 131. Kaye's note points out that Montaigne derived his observation from Xenophanes and acknowledged it.

2. Fable II, 132.
Hor. Do you argue, or pretend to prove any thing from those Conjectures?
Cleo. No; I never reason but from the plain Observations which every body may make on Man, the Phaenomena that appear in the lesser World.\(^1\)

Dialectically, then, Horatio's retort implies that Cleomenes' remarks about savages are based on reasoning not sufficiently empirical, but only if one fails to take into account Cleomenes' advocacy of limited speculation in matters not easily amenable to purely empirical observations.\(^2\) Probably because he expects Horatio to be well aware of this, Cleomenes ignores his objection and the discussion continues unabated. Mandeville, in fact, leaves it to the reader to judge whether Cleomenes' speculations about savages are solidly based on an empirical understanding of human nature, all the more so, as has already been noted, in that his description of savage behaviour and motivation is pictorially concrete and in deliberate contrast to William Temple's idealized, and therefore far more "conjectural," picture. Horatio's retort, then, is not a real objection but, rather, serves the dramatic function of giving Horatio the upper-hand at raillery. Thus, to the extent that the reader identifies with Horatio's anti-Mandevillian stance, he can enjoy his sprightly rallying at Cleomenes' expense, all the more so as Cleomenes is always arguing against the grain. This strongly suggests that Horatio's raillery sometimes acts like a lightning-rod harmlessly deflecting the reader's hostility, in order to induce him to seriously consider

1. Fable II, 128.

2. As has been seen, it was in the Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases that Mandeville dealt very extensively with the problems of empirical and hypothetical reasoning.
the validity of Cleomenes' Mandevillian arguments.

At other times, Horatio's raillery has the function of extending the scope of the dialectic, while also retaining the rhetorical illusion of familiar conversation. Thus, when Horatio finally accepts Cleomenes' arguments about the distinction "self-liking" and "self-love," he does so in a very grudging manner:

I must own that your Observations are entertaining. I am very well pleas'd with your Discourse, and I see an agreeable Glimmer of Probability that runs through it; but you have said nothing that comes up to half Proof on the Side of your Conjecture, if it be seriously consider'd. 1

This is, indeed, a superbly condescending way of yielding to Cleomenes' superior reasoning which, at the same time, forces Cleomenes to extend his exposition of Mandeville's ideas by applying his "conjectures" about "self-liking" and "self-love" in animals and savages to the more empirically observable civilized state of man:

I told you before that I would lay no Stress upon, nor draw any Conclusions from it; but whatever Nature's Design was in bestowing this Self-liking on Creatures, and, whether it has been given to other Animals besides ourselves or not, it is certain, that in our own Species every individual Person likes himself better than he does any other. 2

1. Fable II, 136.
2. Fable II, 137.
Although Cleomenes always triumphs against Horatio, he does so only at the expense of closely-reasoned argument defended in every detail and in such a way as to involve the reader, who is aware of the impending defeat but curious about how it will be accomplished. Horatio's dialectical function, then, is perilously close to that of a "straw-man" - a danger Mandeville was fully aware of:

When partial Men have a mind to demolish An Adversary, and triumph over him with little Expence, it has long been a frequent Practice to attack him with Dialogues, in which the Champion, who is to lose the Battle, appears at the very beginning of the Engagement, to be the Victim, that is to be sacrificed, and seldom makes a better Figure, than Cocks on Shrove-Tuesday, that receive Blows, but return none, and are visibly set up on purpose to be knock'd down. 1

Mandeville sidesteps this perennial problem of philosophical dialogue by making Horatio's role dialectically and dramatically complex; much more so, in fact, than the role of the opposing interlocutors in minor practitioners of the form previously alluded to, such as Eachard, Collier and Stubbes. 2

1. Fable II, 8. Kaye's edition has this passage completely in italics, except for the word "Shrove-Tuesday." Characteristically, Mandeville here employs a felicitously unexpected image culled from the pastimes of common people to make a point frequently, but not very interestingly, made by other critics of dialogue.

2. Collier's "A Moral Essay Upon Pride," for example, like the second part of the Fable, deals with questions of morality and human behaviour but, as a philosophical dialogue, and despite a good number of witty exchanges, it is not nearly as effective as Mandeville's work. This is not so much because Collier's arguments are so much more orthodox and predictable, but because the relationship between "Philotimus" and "Philalethes" is devoid of any dramatic complexity or psychological interest. See Jeremy Collier, Essays Upon Several Moral Subjects, fifth edition (London, 1703), pp.1-94.
To begin with, Horatio is dialectically useful in his sustained weaving of Cleomenes' strands of argument. Sometimes he does so by pinpointing just where he dissents from Cleomenes, as when he remarks that

To enter into an Argument, concerning the Possibility of What you say, might occasion a long Dispute; but the Probability, I think, is very clear against you, and if there was such a Man, it would be much more credible, that he acted from the Excellency of his Nature, in which so many Virtues and rare Endowments were assembled, than that all his good Qualities sprung from vicious Motives.¹

Horatio's opposition here to Cleomenes' argument about how social virtues spring from pride rather than altruism makes it clear that Mandeville is offering to the reader a set of notions or "model" of human nature radically different from any conventional one, unless the reader happens to be a strict Calvinist.² It seems very likely, however, that the type of reader Mandeville addressed was an "honnête homme", whether deist or Anglican with Latitudinarian tendencies, who

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¹ Fable II, 75

² Although Mandeville was probably not a Calvinist, there is little doubt that his analysis of human nature, though not his famous paradox about how private vices can be "dextrously managed" by politicians into public benefits, is not incompatible with the Calvinistic or Augustinian view of it. For an interesting observation on Mandeville's probable familiarity with Calvinism in Holland and Europe, see Harts, 338–9.
leaned to a more amiable view of human nature. At other times, Horatio makes incisive remarks which instantly formulate the particular point Cleomenes is making. Thus, when Cleomenes expounds at some length on man's desire for "uncontroul'd Liberty," Horatio makes the witty rejoinder, based on an ironic reversal of the Golden Rule, that "in short, man naturally will not do, as he would be done by." Such a rejoinder not only illuminates the point behind Cleomenes' elaborate observations, but also gives Horatio a certain autonomy as a good conversationalist not always bent on opposition for its own sake, as is generally the case with "straw-men."

More strategically, Horatio's raillery often clarifies the general direction of Cleomenes' dialectic. This is especially true of a reproach like the following from Horatio: "I can't help observing, that when human Understanding serves your Purpose to solve any thing, it is always ready and full grown; but at other times, Knowledge and Reasoning are the Work of Time, and Men are not capable of thinking justly, 'till after many Generations." Horatio's reproach alerts the reader that Mandeville-Cleomenes is employing a very complex kind of reasoning which posits an evolutionary view of society and man's thinking powers. In the terminology of modern sociology, Mandeville's dialectic shifts "from purpose to function or from function to purpose with considerable effect, and he can shift

1. For a masterly investigation of the pervasive influence of Latitudinarian divines and deists on religious and ethical attitudes in the eighteenth century, see R.S. Crane, "Suggestions Toward a Genealogy of the 'Man of Feelings,'" English Literary History, 1 (1934), 205-30.

2. Fable II, 271.

3. Fable II, 236.
adroitly from one purpose to another."¹ It is very likely, then, that the average reader of Mandeville's time, even if highly cultivated, would have found much of Mandeville's reasoning in the second part of the Fable difficult to follow. Thus, Horatio's reproach not only makes it plain that Cleomenes is reasoning about the origin and development of certain social and human phenomena, as well as these same phenomena in their present state, but also makes it possible for the reader to grasp and consider Mandeville's novel mode of reasoning, even if only to see whether Horatio's reproach is justified. Horatio's rallying reproach, in short, serves the dialectical function of clarifying the strategic direction of Cleomenes' arguments and the engagingly self-effacing rhetorical one of obscuring the genuine brilliance of this mode of thinking and thereby, as has already been mentioned in another context, blunting any hostile envy on the reader's part.

One last important aspect to examine in greater detail about Mandeville's skilful blending of dialectical and dramatic requirements is that Horatio's dialectical contributions consistently sustain the rhetorical illusion of dramatic conversation. For that reason, Horatio often finds himself usefully summarizing the conclusions Cleomenes intends him to reach, as in the following passage:

If I have not misunderstood you, you would insinuate two Things: First, that the Fitness of Man for Society, beyond other Animals, is something real; but that it is hardly

Here, Horatio's weaving of Cleomenes' strands of argument, instead of leaving it to Cleomenes to do so, makes little difference in terms of philosophical argument but rhetorically and dramatically it is very effective. This is because it makes Horatio an active contributor to the discussion, even in its more expository aspects, and makes Cleomenes' conclusions, as reached by Horatio, seem irresistible, as if they were derived from a minimum of reasoning and a maximum of empirical observation.

Another dialectical device, activated by Horatio, which sustains the rhetorical illusion of conversation is Mandeville's wide-ranging use of digression. An exchange like the following, for example, leads the discussion from a digression back to the main strand of argument:

1. Fable II, 188.

2. Sometimes, however, it is Cleomenes who is responsible for digressions, and this is mainly due to his enthusiasm for detecting the hypocrisies of human behaviour at the expense of furthering the argument. As Horatio puts it, "I don't know any man more expert in tracing human Pride, or more severe in humbling it, than yourself; but when the subject comes in your way, you don't know how to leave it" (Fable II, 230). This suggests that Mandeville was acutely aware that his penchant for satire could obscure and obstruct his philosophical analysis.
Her. ... I long to hear the Origin of Society, and I continually retard your Account of it myself, with new Questions.

Cleo. Do you remember where we left off?

Hor. I don't think we have made any Progress yet; for we have nothing towards it but a wild Man, and a wild Woman, with some children and Grandchildren, which they are not able either to teach or to govern.

Cleomenes' absent-mindedness is dramatically apt in that it captures the flavour of a conversation that leisurely veers off the main point but, in terms of dialectical exposition, Horatio's raillery makes the whole exchange an adroit transition from one part of the argument to another. To sum up, beneath the surface of conversational polish, Cleomenes relentlessly observes and Horatio reluctantly concludes.

As far as the dramatic relationship between Horatio and Cleomenes is concerned, all that remains to be noted is that after much protracted argument, the nerves of the two protagonists begin to fray in the final dialogue. This emerges when Horatio exclaims peevishly, "Why don't you speak more openly, and say that there is no Virtue or Probity in the World? for all that the Drift of your Discourse is tending to prove that." It must be assumed that this is an outburst of strained nerves, and a comic one at that, because in all of the previous dialogues Horatio, despite his occasional misgivings, puts enough trust in Cleomenes to stay and listen to what he has to say.

1. Fable II, 221.
2. Fable II, 336.
say. Cleomenes protests his innocence and points out that he had already defended himself on this point and twists the knife deeper, as it were, by adding "... and I am persuaded that you yourself, in reality, don't believe that there are so many virtuous men as you imagine you do." Horatio's reaction is a sarcastic and amusing one: "How come you to know my thoughts better than I do myself?" Horatio's outburst temporarily puts his friendship back to the strained basis it had at the beginning of the first dialogue, as characterized in the following exchange:

Cleo. ... There is no man in the world whose friendship I value more than I do yours, or whose company I like better, yet I can never have it. I profess I have thought sometimes, that you have avoided me on purpose.

Hor. I am sorry, Cleomenes, I should be wanting in civility to you. I come every week constantly to pay my respects to you, and if ever I fail, I always send to enquire after your health.

There is a difference, however, and it lies in the fact that Horatio's temperamental outburst is a truer reflection of his friendly regard for Cleomenes than his previous rather calculating civility. Everything that develops after that first encounter, in fact, overwhelmingly suggests that Horatio is interested, even fascinated, by what Cleomenes has to say, despite its being against all his most cherished beliefs. This is, dramatically and psychologically speaking,

1. Fable II, 336.
2. Fable II, 29.
mainly because, on the whole, Cleomenes allows Horatio to be witty at his own expense and, indeed, practises what he preaches about how friendship needs to be carefully nurtured: "Affection never remain'd long uninterrupted between two Persons, without Art; and the best Friends, if they are always together, will fall out, unless great Discretion be used on both Sides."¹ Because Horatio is no doubt aware of these efforts made by his friend, Cleomenes can afford to be somewhat brusque in their final conversation and it is not surprising that it ends on a note of full reconciliation:

Hor. Here's the Castle before us.

Cleo. Which I suppose you are not sorry for.

Hor. Indeed I am, and would have been glad to have heard you speak of Kings and other Sovereigns, with the same Candor as well as Freedom, with which you have treated Prime Ministers and their envious Adversaries. When I see a Man entirely impartial, I shall always do him that Justice, as to think that, if he is not in the right in what he says, at least he aims at Truth.²

1. Fable II, 306.

2. Fable II, 355. By this time Cleomenes had applied his analysis of human nature, including adroit application of it to the case of Robert Walpole as Prime Minister and dispenser of patronage. The following exchange is typical in its acuteness and lively cynicism, not to mention the "Candor as well as freedom" alluded to by Horatio:

Hor. You say nothing of his Virtue nor his Honesty; there is a vast Trust put in a prime Minister: If he should be covetous and have no Probity, nor Love for his Country, he might make strange Havock with the Publick Treasure.

Cleo. There is no Man that has any Pride, but he has some Value for his Reputation; and common Prudence is sufficient to hinder a Man of very indifferent Principles from stealing, where he would be in great Danger of being detected, and has no manner of Security that he shall not be punish'd for it. (Fable II, 333)
Mandeville, in short, exploits all the resources of dramatic repartee to convey the central dramatic situation of two friends defending their own points of view with all the candour and good-humour they can muster, so that their relationship, even when at its most earnest, is in the realm of the comic rather than the satiric.

By now it should be evident that in its technique of philosophical dialogue and comic characterization, the second part of the Fable is a very different literary product from the first part. This is something, however, not often considered by modern students of Mandeville. One of the most perceptive, Thomas R. Edwards Jr., in fact, describes the second part of the Fable as consisting "of six Dialogues which, in their relative dullness, suggest that [Mandeville's] inner dialectic of feeling lost its force when translated into open ideational debate."¹ This is true enough if all one looks for in the second part is satiric vigour, and the manipulation of personae, but the lack of satirical edge is more than compensated for by virtues more appropriate to the philosophical dialogue; such as subtlety of repartee and involvement in philosophical questions universal enough to be still relevant today. There is, as well, certainly no lack of pleasing irony in Cleomenes' pictorial descriptions.

A rather problematic desire to seek artistic unity in the two parts of the Fable has led another critic to find both parts of it equally satiric and equally Lucianic, the whole forming the protean

genre of "menippean satire." 1 This ignores the fact, however, that satire and irony are almost all-pervasive in Lucian's dialogues. Neither Lucian nor Fontenelle, possibly his greatest imitator, and if we take only the Dialogues des Vôrts into account, had any detailed philosophical system, as such, to propound. Although it is true, as Hind points out, that "Philosophy is fundamentally dialectic, and while the Menippean genre frequently puts forth philosophies of its own (usually cynic or skeptic), it does so by attacking others"2 and also true that Mandeville defends his philosophy by attacking Shaftesbury's, Mandeville's dialectic, nevertheless, differs from the Lucianic in that it includes a large element of philosophical exposition in the tradition of Platonic and Ciceronian dialogue.

Keeping in mind the Platonic Socrates, such exposition is not incompatible with comic and ironic touches, but it is incompatible with the fiercer Lucianic irony and its satirical edge, hence Hurd's attack on Lucian's method of philosophical dialogue alluded to in the first chapter of this thesis. Apart from what he had already declared in the preface, Mandeville's intention to include a considerable amount of philosophical exposition 3 can be discerned in

1. George Hind, "Mandeville's Fable of the Bees as Menippean Satire," Genre, 1 (1968), 307-15. Hind traces some of the characteristics of "menippean satire" as being "its occasional mingling of verse with prose" (p.309), "extensive use of dialogue" (p.310), "use of parable" (p.312) and "use of comic dramatic scenes" (p.313). From here on to be cited as Hind.

2. Hind, 310-11.

3. Hind points out that "The tendency of the dialogues to shade off into more purely moral questions is no doubt partly responsible for the failure to see the satiric structure which underlies the FABLE as a whole" and that "Menippean satire is not incompatible with serious thought" (Hind, 310) but that does not explain why the first part is so much more satirical, nor does it really illuminate the salient features of Mandeville's technique of dialogue. That the first part of the Fable is evidently far more "menippean," even Hind seems to acknowledge in that at least two-thirds of his direct quotations from the Fable are from the first part.
Horatio's very first comment in Mandeville's last publication in dialogue form, *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War*: "I wonder you never attempted to guess at the Origin of Honour, as you have done at that of Politeness, and your Friend in his *Fable of the Bees* has done at the Origin of Virtue." Horatio's remark makes even the first part of the *Fable* seem mainly expository and, in fact, some of it is, such as the essay, "A Search into the Nature of Society." The second part of the *Fable*, then, is not quite as amenable to critical evaluation in terms of the genre of "menippian satire" as that of philosophical dialogue and, as such, is largely independent of the first part.

Mandeville's emphasis on the comic and its attendant good-humoured repartee, in any case, was probably more pleasing to larger numbers of readers than the satire of the first part. The general tendency by this time was certainly away from satire and towards the gentle humour of sentimental comedy and the sentimental novel, not to mention the good-humoured essay. As Thomas Lockwood puts it, "The movement away from satire ... to comedy ... appears as a gradual change from the moral definition of the author-audience relationship to a social one; the writer comes increasingly to identify with the audience on the basis of social likeness of class ambitions and ambitions and

manners rather than moral principles."\(^1\) Mandeville, however, seems to have been a transitional figure in this respect; sometimes satirical and uncompromising, as in the first part of the *Fable*, and sometimes good-humoured and conciliatory, as in the second. He shares with the satirists the unsentimental sharpness of their humour and their pessimism about human nature,\(^2\) but there is also a comic detachment in many of his works which is reminiscent of the somewhat more tolerant attitudes towards human nature of an Addison or a Fielding.

Certainly Cleomenes' relationship with Horatio is comic in the anti-satiric Addisonian sense,\(^3\) for there is genuine friendship between the two. Cleomenes' task is not to humiliate Horatio for any waywardness, as in a Jonsonian "comedy of humours" or in Eachard's dialogue on Hobbes, but to expand his somewhat limited intellectual horizons.\(^4\) The relationship, in fact, is very similar to that

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1. Thomas Lockwood, "The Augustan Author-Audience Relationship: Satiric vs. Comic Forms," *English Literary History*, 36 (1969), 649. The change in audience and writers from a preference for satire to one for comedy can also be discerned in the change of attitude towards "humorous" characters. As E.N. Hooker puts it, "To say that humour was being wrenched loose from satire is another way of saying that at least certain varieties of actions characterized by whim, eccentricity, or individual willfulness had come to be regarded as amusing but harmless, as provocative of mirth but not scorn." See Edward N. Hooker, "Humour in the Age of Pope," *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 11 (1948), 366-7.


3. See Addison's Spectator papers on "humour," which are collected in *Critical Essays from the Spectator*, ed. by Donald F. Bond (Oxford, 1970), pp.26-35. Addison complains about satiric ridicule in Spectator no.249 that if it "were employed to laugh men out of vice and folly, it might be of some use to the world; but instead of this, we find that it is generally made use of to laugh men out of virtue and good sense, by attacking everything that is solemn and serious, decent and praiseworthy in human life" (p.33 of Bond's edition).

4. This is true in a more obvious way in the relationship portrayed in *The Virgin Unmask'd*.\(^5\)
between Philopirio and Hisomedon in *A Treatise of the Hypochoriack and Hysterick Diseases*, except that Cleomenes' "disease" is a more purely intellectual one. Interestingly enough, both Horatio and Hisomedon display symptoms of intellectual laziness; in Hisomedon's case, also physical. Mandeville, in short, seems to have desired not so much a moral change in the "honnête homme" as a greater degree of self-knowledge within him.

It may well be concluded that largely because of the fruitful tension between his satirical analysis of human nature, as vividly conveyed in a pictorial style, and his good-natured tolerance of it, as reflected in the dramatic repartee between Horatio and Cleomenes, Mandeville reached the peak of his powers of dialogue writing in the second part of the *Fable*. His *Origin of Honour* is not quite as accomplished, but the very austerity of its dramatic devices links it with Berkeley's *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*. As will be seen in the next chapter, a comparison of both usefully illustrates how Mandeville and Berkeley, though worlds apart philosophically, employed very similar dialectical devices derived from Augustan literary styles.
CHAPTER VI. PARADOX AS DIALECTICAL DEVICE AND RHETORICAL ILLUSION

IN BERKELEY'S THREE DIALOGUES AND MANDEVILLE'S

ORIGIN OF HONOUR

"Sometimes the Ardour of Conversation, and
Contention of Spirits runs high among us;
but our mutual Friendship and Esteem
preserves a perfect Equality, so that none
offers to dictate to the rest. Such is
the free Turn of our Society, that any one
may propose what Paradox he pleases, provided
he do it with Decency, and defend it with
Coolness and Modesty. And any one may
contradict the clearest Maxim, provided he
neither make personal Attacks, nor pretend
to take too much upon him."

"Sophronius" in Dialogue III of
David Fordyce's Dialogues
Concerning Education (1745)

Perhaps one of the most ironic characteristics of eighteenth-century philosophical dialogue at its best is that, despite its emphasis on a "plain, easy and familiar" style of exposition, it tended to preserve an older tradition of literary paradox derived from Renaissance writers and rather inimical to the "plain style" advocated by the Royal Society. This is especially true in those dialogues where, unlike in the case of the Fable of the Bees, Part Two, dramatic technique does not play an important role in reinforcing dialectical argument. Dialogues like the "sequel" to the second part of the Fable, An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Reasonableness of Christianity in War, and Berkeley's famous Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, for example, derive much of their effect from their brilliant use of paradox both for rhetorical embellishment and as a dialectical device. That this is noticeable in the Origin of Honour mainly because it is dramatically crude compared to the second part of the Fable and noticeable in Berkeley for the almost opposite reason that the argument between Hylas and Philonous is so temperamentally civilized that one's attention is almost immediately drawn to the paradoxical ideas discussed, does not vitiate the interesting fact that, despite their great differences in literary style and philosophical attitudes, both Mandeville and Berkeley made extensive use of paradox in these two very different dialogues.

Before investigating further into Mandeville's and Berkeley's use of paradox, however, it should be noted that just as Mandeville's second part of the Fable and Origin of Honour are a defense of and elaboration on the philosophical content of the Fable of the Bees, so is Berkeley's Three Dialogues a defense of and elaboration on his Principles of Human Knowledge. Even allowing for the fact that the first part of the Fable is just as much satirical as philosophical does not invalidate the similarity of relationship between the Origin of Honour and the Fable of the Bees on the one hand, and that of the Three Dialogues and the Principles of Human Knowledge on the other. The Origin of Honour, in fact, even goes so far as to use the same interlocutors as the second part of the Fable and, moreover, they often refer to their previous "conversations" in the second part of the Fable.¹

The relationship between the Three Dialogues and the Principles, however, is not the same in every respect as that between Mandeville's two works. Berkeley, in fact, treats the Three Dialogues as a different way of expressing the same ideas he dealt with in the Principles rather than, as in the case of Mandeville's treatment of ideas derived from the first part of the Fable, an extension of them. Furthermore, where Mandeville often makes Cleomenes refer to the Fable of the Bees as an indispensable primary text to consult,

¹ That Mandeville was becoming careless about dramatic verisimilitude in his last work, the Origin of Honour, is borne out by the fact that one's sense of spontaneous conversation is considerably jarred when Cleomenes can say "I have told you already, in our Fifth Conversation,..." See Bernard Mandeville, An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War, second edition, ed. by M.A. Goldsmith (London, 1971), p.21. This is a facsimile reproduction of the first edition of 1732. There were no others subsequently. Hereinafter to be cited as Origin.
Berkeley almost implies that the reader need not read the Principles to learn more about the ideas discussed by the two interlocutors, Nylas and Philonous. As Berkeley puts it,

In this treatise, which does not presuppose in the reader, any knowledge of what was contained in the former, \textit{i.e.} The Principles of Human Knowledge, it has been my aim to introduce the notions I advance, into the mind, in the most easy and familiar manner; especially, because they carry with them a great opposition to the prejudices of philosophers, which have so far prevailed against the common sense and natural notions of mankind.\textsuperscript{1}

The "prejudices of philosophers" Berkeley refers to are the ideas and implications of philosophical "materialism" as advocated by, among others, Descartes and Locke\textsuperscript{2} but, from the literary and rhetorical point-of-view, what is important about Berkeley's declaration in favour of the "common sense and natural notions of mankind" is that he defends what he considers to be "common sense" in terms of a dialectical clash of ideas whereby one side attempts to demonstrate that the philosophical materialism of the other is untenably paradoxical.

\textsuperscript{1} George Berkeley, \textit{Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous} in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ed. by A.A. Luce and T.C. Jessep, vol. II (London, 1949), p.168. The Three Dialogues was first published in 1713. Although this text is based mainly on the expanded third edition of 1734, it includes the Preface which appeared only in the editions of 1713 and 1725. The quote from the Preface is entirely in italics in Jessep's text. Hereinafter this definitive edition of Berkeley's dialogue will be cited as \textit{Berkeley II}.

\textsuperscript{2} On this point see the chapter on "Berkeley and Common Sense" in I.C. Tipton, \textit{Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism} (London, 1974), pp.15-56.
More specifically, what generates dialectic in the Three Dialogues is one basic paradoxical proposition, namely that matter does not exist. According to Berkeley, however, the proposition is not actually paradoxical but only appears to be so because it seems to contravene common sense. Thus, his dialectical strategy is to demonstrate that, on the contrary, it is the philosophical notion of matter which is actually contrary to common sense and therefore paradoxical. This dialectical strategy is declared very early on, in the following exchange between Berkeley's spokesman, Philonous ("Lover of Mind") and his friend, Hylas:

HYLAS. You were represented in last night's conversation, as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as material substance in the world.

PHILONOUS. That there is no such thing as what philosophers call material substance, I am seriously persuaded: but if I were made to see any thing absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to renounce this, that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.

In this same exchange it soon becomes clear that Berkeley's use of paradox, itself, is strategic and not merely a tactical aspect of a broader dialectical strategy. Thus, when Hylas expresses his disbelief in the logical coherence of immaterialism, and in a manner reflecting many a reader's hostility to such a belief, Philonous's answer is a tentative suggestion that there are more untenable

paradoxes in philosophical materialism:

**HYLAS.** What can any thing be more fantastical, more repugnant to common sense, or a more manifest piece of scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as matter?

**PHILONOUS.** Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove, that you, who hold there is, are by virtue of that opinion a greater sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnancies to common sense, than I who believe no such thing?¹

Hylas, however, is firmly convinced that immaterialism cannot but be a paradoxical notion and reinforces his point with a logical paradox: "You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and scepticism, I should ever be obliged to give up my opinion on this point."² Philonous's reaction is to shift his ground slightly and, instead of clashing head-on with Hylas, agrees to confine himself to "common-sense" notions: "Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which upon examination shall appear most agreeable to common sense and remote from scepticism?"³ This seems like a concession on the part of Philonous but, in fact, it gives him an opportunity to put Hylas through a rigorous inquisition by asking him to define the term "sceptic." Philosophically speaking, Berkeley's aim here is to show that Philonous's immaterialism is not a "sceptical" notion and this

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¹ Berkeley II, 172. Scepticism, itself, Berkeley considered to lead to harmful self-doubt and destructive paradoxes, hence Philonous's association of "absurd" with "sceptical." For a concise account of Berkeley's attitude to philosophical scepticism, see Richard H. Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," The Review of Metaphysics, 18 (1951), 223-46. Also see Berkeley's Preface to the Three Dialogues.

² Berkeley II, 172.

³ Berkeley II, 172.
is why a clear definition of "sceptic" is necessary but, in order to accomplish such a purely philosophical aim, he employs a dialectical strategy designed to expose Hylas's "materialism" as an untenable paradox, rhetorically as well as logically. This is so because for Berkeley paradox is not merely the result of faulty logic but of atheistic frivolity as well. Thus, when the reader is forced to choose, as he is throughout the work, between Hylas's "materialism" and Philonous's "immaterialism," his choice is based not only on deciding which set of notions is more logical but also on which set of notions is less likely to lead to atheism and "irreligion."

Rhetorical persuasion is inseparable from Berkeley's dialectical strategy in that he makes the debate between Hylas and Philonous an urgent one and it is Hylas who puts it at this level from the very beginning:

I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages, through an affectation of being distinguished from the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to believe nothing at all, or to believe the most extravagant things in the world. This however might be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them some consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. ... ²

In short, to show one set of notions to be "paradoxical" is not merely to find them logically inadequate but also morally pernicious,

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1. In terms of dramatic situation this is a very adroit move on Berkeley's part because the sense of urgency really belongs to his spokesman, Philonous, but by making it originate with Hylas instead he pays the reader the compliment of assuming that the reader, in identifying with Hylas, is fully aware of how morally pernicious erroneous philosophical ideas not directly connected with ethics can be. Berkeley, in fact, is almost humbling himself in implying that his own philosophical notions may have dangerous consequences and that it is up to him to prove otherwise.

and it is this which accounts for the rhetoric of urgency behind Berkeley's dialectical strategy. Even the way Philonous sometimes phrases his questions is rhetorically loaded and implies the paradoxical nature of Elyas's materialist notions. Thus, when Philonous asks "Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an absurdity,"¹ the rhetorical nature of the question is plain in every sense of the term in that the question needs hardly to be asked, as the answer is a basic axiom of logic.

As for the role of paradox in Landeville's Origin of Honour, its very title, in its full version, contains the rather provocative paradox of "the usefulness of Christianity in war." This is similar to Landeville's famous paradox in the first part of the Fable where "private vices" are implicitly equated with "public benefits." This paradox, however, is only a rhetorical device by which Landeville attracts the reader's attention in order to demonstrate how, by "dextrous management," politicians make use of and tolerate private vices for the benefit of the public good.² Landeville's sustained analysis of all that is implied by his paradox, in fact, transforms it into a rhetorical illusion rather than a true paradox as such.

In the case of the Origin of Honour, however, paradox becomes not only a rhetorical illusion but a dialectical device as well and a subtle, wide-ranging one at that. It is interesting to note, in


2. This has been observed by many writers on Landeville but perhaps most succinctly by Franz From in his article on "Landeville's Parado" for Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 10 (1944), 197-215.
this connection, that in his anonymous political pamphlet in dialogue form, The Mischiefsa that ought Justly to be Apprehended from a Whig-
Governament, Mandeville already shows himself to be adept at the use of paradox for dialectical purposes. From a polemical point-of-
view, the dialogue very efficiently exposes the contradictions of the political principles espoused by the Tory party. As Loveright the Whig sums up after much debate with Tantivy the Tory:

> What inconsistent Creatures these Tories are! At one time they complain that the Prerogative has been too much clipt and curtail'd by the Whigs, at another they find fault with the King's Proceedings: If the King employs his Royal Authority against the Church, ought you not to thank God and the Whigs his Power is not greater? ... 2

These contradictions become a full-fledged paradox by the end of the dialogue:

> Tant. Now I have let you run your length without contradicting you, do you imagine you have any ways convinc'd me?
> Love. No, I am persuaded Tories are not to be convinc'd, or else the bare reflection on their Actions would be sufficient to shew them their Folly; for how can a Man more egregiously contradict his principles than by openly shewing himself a Malecontent at the same time he defends the Doctrine of Passive Obedience. 3

1. This pamphlet was first published anonymously in 1714 but for strong evidence in favour of Mandeville's authorship see H.T. Dickinson's introduction to it in Bernard Mandeville, "The Mischiefsa that ought Justly to be Apprehended from a Whig-Governament," Augustan Reprint Society, no.174 (Los Angeles, 1975), i-xii. Hereinafter to be cited as Mischief.


Thus far, and on the level of clashing political principles, the paradox is very damaging to Tory principles but the paradox also becomes an adroit dramatic device in that the Tory potential for treason is implied in the very last exchange that follows:

Tant. You are an incorrigible Whig, and so
fare you well. (sic)

Love. Remember Passive Obedience, and then
fare you well likewise.¹

There is no direct threat or accusation against Tantivy from Loveright but the immediately preceding rhetorical, perhaps even sophistical, paradox of Tories being at the same time "malcontents" and believers in passive obedience gives a cutting-edge to Loveright's parting words. Similarly, but in far greater detail and dialectical subtlety, paradox is a highly efficient rhetorical instrument in Mandeville's last work, the Origin of Honour.

The key to Mandeville's use of paradox as dialectical device and rhetorical illusion lies in his notion of reason as a faculty which, far from being independent, is subject to the passions. As Cleomenes tells Socrates,

All Human Creatures are sway'd and wholly govern'd by their Passions, whatever fine Notions we may flatter our Selves with; even those who act suitably to their Knowledge, and strictly follow the Dictates of their Reason, are no less compell'd so to do by some Passion or other, that sets them to Work, than others, who bid Defiance and act contrary to Both, and whom we call Slaves to their Passions. ...²

¹. Hsieh, 40.
Because of the dominance of the passions, then, reason tends to be corrupted and become what we would now call "rationalization" in the pejorative sense.

In Mandevillian terms, the process of "rationalization" may be described as a tendency to confuse ideals dictated by reason with realities imposed by the passions. Mandeville dramatically illustrates such a tendency by making use of paradoxes which one cannot easily "rationalize" away without becoming aware that the ideal and the real are always in conflict, yet intimately related. Such paradoxes are rhetorical in the sense that the reader is taken by surprise and dialectical in that they occasion argument which eventually exposes them as rhetorical illusions. Logically, however, they are not, strictly speaking, paradoxes at all but statements which seem so because the uninitiated reader, as well as the opposing interlocutor, is deceived into considering them in terms of ideals instead of realities.

The process is basically one in which the discussion leads to the impasse of paradox and the paradox, in turn, leads to more discussion. Thus, after a detailed discussion of the genesis of the principle of honour and its social function throughout most of the first dialogue, an impasse is reached when Cleomenes concludes with the ambiguous statement that "there are Allurements in the Principle

1. Traditionally, the function of paradox as a rhetorical device was to elicit surprise and admiration. As Rosalie L. Colie puts it, "The rhetorical paradox was an ancient form designed as epideixis, to show off the skill of an orator and to arouse the admiration of an audience, both at the outlandishness of the subject and the technical brilliance of the rhetorician." See R.L. Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica (Princeton, 1966), p.4. Henceforth to be cited as Colie.
of Honour, to draw in Men of the lowest Capacity, and even the vicious, which Virtue has not." Because he sees no conflict between the ideals of honour and those of Christian virtue, Horatio treats Cleomenes' statement as a paradox: "I can't see, how a Man can be really virtuous, who is not likewise a Man of Honour. ..." Cleomenes' answer only reinforces the paradox:

... What I would demonstrate, is, that there are many Allowances, gross Indulgences to Human Nature in the Principle of Honour, especially of modern Honour, that are always exclaim’d against by the Voice of Virtue, and diametrically opposite the Doctrine of Christ.

The impasse is complete when Horatio counters by insisting on the close inter-relationship between Christianity and the principle of honour: "Yet the further we lock back for these Seven or Eight Hundred Years, the more we shall find Honour and Religion blended together." Thus far, either Cleomenes or Horatio is guilty of holding an untenable paradox and, purely on the level of ideals, the argument can go no further. The reader may side with Horatio and hold that honour and Christianity are eminently compatible or side with Cleomenes and maintain that Christianity and honour are virtually incompatible. In both cases it is a decision about ideals but Mandeville's strategy is to examine the realities behind such ideals. Because of such a strategy, the first dialogue ends not with an impasse but a considerable extension of the argument and,

1. Orin, 44.
2. Orin, 45.
3. Orin, 45.
4. Orin, 45.
indeed, a trap for Horatio.

The extension of the argument, in fact, introduces what Mandeville considered to be realities, such as the exploitation of honour by the "Church of Rome" for its own secular ends. The argument is highly involved but it is enough to note that Cleomenes frequently generates paradoxes, as in the following observation:

... for by this means i.e. by systematic flattery and pandering to the sense of honour by means of hierarchical religious orders and elaborate ceremonies the boldest and even the most wicked became Bigots. The less Religion they had, the more they stood in need of the Church; and the farther they went from God, the more closely they stuck to their Priests, whose Power over the Laity was then the most absolute and uncontroll'd when the Crimes of These were most flagrant and enormous.

That makes this observation disturbing and paradoxical to Horatio is not what it assumes about the motives of the Roman Catholic Church but the way it implies that Bigotry can spring out of a sense of honour. After much argument, in which the ideals of Christianity are contrasted to realities inimical to its spirit but not to the sense of honour, Horatio is finally forced to admit that there is nothing in common between true Christianity, which is a set of spiritual ideals, and the principle of honour, which is a set of worldly ones: "I own, that in the Light you have put them, they seem to be, as you say, diametrically opposite." The paradox, in short,

1. Origin, 47.
that honour is incompatible with Christianity, even though associated with it, turns out to be literally true mainly because it is actually related not to Christianity, as such, but to the exploitation of honour by the Church for temporal ends. Thus, Horatio is guilty of confusing the ideals of Christianity with the realities of Church power. The paradox, in short, is an apparent one and therefore purely rhetorical and dialectically deceptive.

Although such distinguished Renaissance figures as Rabelais, Montaigne, Thomas Browne and John Donne are famous for their skill in paradoxical arguments promoting a "creative," rather than pyrrhonian, philosophical and religious scepticism, the evident playfulness and relative superficiality of Landevelle's use of rhetorical paradox is more directly related to that displayed by such minor Renaissance writers as Ortensio Lando in his much-translated and much-imitated Paralossi (1543). For Lando the paradox was more a rhetorical device by which astonishing arguments can be generated than the reflection of a philosophical and religious attitude as such.

1. As Landevelle's use of paradox does not differ substantially in the last two of the four dialogues comprising the Origin of Honour, there are only a few brief points to be noted about the last half of it. Most of the last two dialogues are taken up with an analysis of Cromwell's character and his role in the Civil War in order to show how Churchmen and politicians deliberately encouraged false notions about the compatibility of Christianity and honour, and this in order to make effective fighting men out of soldiers. The effect of moving from relatively abstract discussion in the first two dialogues to the discussion of realities from the evidence of history in the last two is that of making the inescapable realities behind ideals even more convincing and the paradox of the "usefulness of Christianity in War" to be considered so only in the realm of the ideal.

2. As Margaret Wiley convincingly argues in The Subtle Knot: Creative Scepticism in Seventeenth-Century England (London, 1952) for such authors faith was not incompatible with scepticism nor could truth, because of its complexity, be devoid of paradoxes.


In this he followed an old tradition of "literary" or "rhetorical" paradox distinct from, yet closely related to, the "logical" paradox, such as the famous one of Zeno. Like Lando, Mandeville does not treat paradox as of profound significance in relation to the complexity of truth, but more as an entertaining and dialectically useful diversion. Still less does he recognize, as Donne and Browne did, that truth can contain mystery, except possibly in strictly religious matters, and this is perhaps why Horatio's reaction to the "paradox" of Christianity being exploited to make men more warlike is to exclaim: "But this increases the Mystery, and makes the Fact less intelligible."

Although Mandeville's use of rhetorical paradox is not quite as frivolously entertaining, it invites comparison with John Dunton's Athenian Sport, or Two Thousand Paradoxes Merrily Argued, To Amuse and Divert the Age, a work inspired by Lando. The paradoxes in Dunton's collection are sufficiently dialectical so as to suggest that, especially as some are in dialogue, even in the matter of employing rhetorical paradox, albeit for consistently dialectical purposes, Mandeville aimed at reaching the same large public as John Dunton and other, more "respectable," periodical essayists, including Mandeville himself in his days as contributor to the Female Tatler. Dunton's infrequent attempts at serious dialectical argument, however, tend to be stilted and this is often the result of a paradox too.

1. See Colie, 3-12 and her article on "Literary Paradox" in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas (ed. by Isaiah Berlin et al.)


3. See Colie, 508. She does not explicitly say that Dunton's work was influenced by Lando but she does mention that it is a late survival of the Renaissance tradition of formal paradox.
ideologically conventional and a dialogue too formal. Thus the "paradoxical" proposition "That 'tis harder for a virtuous Man to do that which is Evil, than for a vicious Man to do that which is Good"\(^1\) is somewhat predictably resolvable in that one expects a "virtuous" man, at least in the conventional sense, rather than the Mandevillian one, to be able, by definition, to resist evil better than other classes of man. The proposition, in any case, is argued out in a rather stiff and tepid manner by members of the "Athenian Society." Each member contributes different observations which culminate in the eventual unravelling of the "paradoxical" proposition but there is little lively dialectic, as there are no clashes of opinion. Although not in dialogue, Dunton's paradoxes about cowardice are equally predictable and devoid of Mandeville's analytical subtlety. Thus he deals with the "paradox" of how it is better to be thought a coward and avoid duels than to accept a challenge or redress an insult.\(^2\) Another one of Dunton's easily resolvable paradoxes is that "only Cowards dare die" - when to live entails more suffering.\(^3\) However predictable and uninteresting Dunton's paradoxes about cowardice tend to be, however, they are an indication of how discussions of honour and related subjects needed paradoxical expression. This is perhaps because, as Mandeville makes far more explicit, the notion of honour was generally felt to be too easy to distort for evil and anti-Christian ends, if not actually

intithetical to Christianity.

Dunton, however, cannot match Mandeville's dialectical subtlety, which sometimes even enables him to put Cleomenes in a position to demonstrate that Horatio's conventional and apparently unexceptionable notions are actually paradoxical. At one point, for example, Cleomenes remarks that a true "Minister of Religion" would have to admonish a duellist in this manner:

... He would recommend to him the Fable of the Bees, and, like that, he'd dissect and lay open to him the Principle of honour, and show him, how diametrically opposite the Worship of that Idol was to the Christian Religion; the First consisting in openly cherishing and feeding that very Frailty in our Nature, which the latter strictly commands with all our Might to conquer and destroy. 1

Thus, Horatio's notion of the harmony between Christianity and the principle of honour becomes an implicit paradox; indeed, a logically untenable one. As far as paradox is concerned, then, Mandeville's dialectical subtlety includes the more direct weapon of rhetorical paradox and the "hidden" one of logical paradox planted in the enemy's camp, as it were.

As for Berkeley's dialectical subtlety, it lies in another direction, that of a fine balance in the weight of persuasiveness of both interlocutors. Thus, though Philonous has undoubtedly more of logic on his side, this advantage is almost cancelled out in that Hylas has more of what seems to be common-sense, and, indeed,

1. Origin, 77.
still does to many people, laymen and philosophers alike. Even as late as the third dialogue, when Hylas has been reduced to admitting that his "materialism" has led to nothing but paradoxes and destructive scepticism, he finds Philonous's immaterialism far more paradoxical and unacceptable:

Put the denying matter, Philonous, or corporeal substance; there is the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most voices, I am confident you would give up the point, without gathering the votes.?

Philonous's reaction to Hylas's persistent doubts about the validity of immaterialism is to reiterate that a fair and impartial inquiry would reveal paradox and scepticism to lie not in his own position but that of the "materialists":

1. Samuel Johnson's "refutation" of Berkeley by kicking a stone is only the most famous case of Berkeley's philosophical ideas being generally considered to be contrary to common sense. On this point, I.C. Tipton's chapter on "Berkeley and Common Sense" in Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism is again instructive.

2. Berkeley II, 237. Although Hume was actually referring to the Principles of Human Knowledge, it is not impossible that he may have been inspired by Hylas's stubborn refusal to accept immaterialism, even after conceding defeat for his own position, when he made the following mischievous remarks about Berkeley's philosophy and mode of argument in a footnote to Part I, Section 12 of his Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding: "... and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, with the exception of the atheists and free-thinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism."
I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices of a learned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains no doubts, of their existence; and you fairly set forth with all your doubts, your paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce in the determination of any indifferent person.  

Later still, a similar exchange develops but this time Hylas is forced to concede that his refusal to accept immaterialism is the result not of common-sense, but of irrational prejudice:

_HYLAS._ ... Nothing now remains to be overcome, but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in my self toward your notions.

_PHILONOUS._ When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of a question; can this, think you, be any thing else but the effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of matter to have very much the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned education.

_HYLAS._ I confess it seems to be as you say.

The above exchange shows that Berkeley was fully aware of the strength of the materialist case and did not shirk in admitting it so that, despite Hylas's total defeat, the arguments on both sides are evenly balanced. What tips the balance in favour of Philonous's argument,

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1. _Berkeley II_, 237.
2. _Berkeley II_, 256-7.
then, is not so much what Berkeley considered to be the outright falsity of materialism but its supposedly greater vulnerability to paradox.

Another way of putting it is that Berkeley's dialectical strategy employs paradox in order to arouse doubt and perplexity about notions associated with philosophical materialism and thereby render the reader more amenable to his own immaterialism. Thus, even as early as the preliminary stages of the argument in the first dialogue Hylas is reduced to complaining, but not refuting, about Philonous's method of argument: "You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my own meaning."¹ It is in the second dialogue, however, that Philonous's relentless reduction of Hylas's arguments to paradox results in his hopeless entanglement in the snares of "scepticism and paradoxical notions." Hylas, nevertheless, still does not necessarily accept the validity of Philonous's arguments, but only the inadequacy of his own: "I freely own my self less fond of my notions, since they have been so accurately examined. But still, methinks I have some confused perception that there is such a thing as matter."² That the dialectical strategy of Berkeley-Philonous is to consistently exploit the reduction of argument to paradox is corroborated by Hylas who declares, in the beginning of the third dialogue, his intention to fight back by dealing with Philonous's arguments in the same manner: "... suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as many

¹ Berkeley II, 184.
² Berkeley II, 220.
perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.¹

This process in miniature can be seen to work in the following exchange, which is also a particularly good example of Berkeley's piercing clarity and imposing dialectical skills:

PHILONOUS. Well, then, let us examine the relation implied in the term substance.
Is it not that it stands under accidents?
HYLAS. The very same.
PHILONOUS. But that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not be extended?
HYLAS. It must.
PHILONOUS. Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former?
HYLAS. You still take things in a strict literal sense; that is not fair, Philonous.
PHILONOUS. I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only I beseech you, make me understand something by them. You tell me, matter supports or stands under accidents. How is it as your legs support your body?
HYLAS. No; that is the literal sense.
PHILONOUS. Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you understand it in. — How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?
HYLAS. I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well enough what was meant by matter's supporting accidents. But now the more I think on it, the less can I comprehend it; in short, I find that I know nothing of it.²

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Here Berkeley insinuates that the philosophical term "substance" is actually a logical paradox and does so dramatically by making Philonous reduce Hylas to an almost comic perplexity. Furthermore, Berkeley's absolute disdain of paradox is indirectly, but unmistakably, revealed in Philonous's demand for the "strict literal sense" of philosophical terms, which points to a view of language hostile to the rhetorical subtleties of paradox.¹

A wider implication of Berkeley's rather negative use of paradox is that it short-circuits all argument, in the sense that Philonous's refutations of Hylas's arguments are not tentative but absolute. Unlike what happens in the relationship between Horatio and Cleomenes, Philonous does not attempt to demonstrate that Hylas's notions are only partly true or imperfectly reasoned, but that they are totally false and misleading. Thus, at the end of the Three Dialogues, Philonous has this to say about the term "substance": "... And in philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out; since there is not perhaps any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind toward atheism, than the use of that general confused term."² Hylas, in other words, is being exhorted to avoid using the term "substance" not merely because it is logically absurd but, and this, in Berkeley's mind, is inseparable from its paradoxical quality, because it is morally depraved as well.

Mandeville's use of paradox, by contrast, is highly open-ended and, together with his diverse repertory of dialogue techniques,

² Berkeley II, 261.
designed to arouse a critical, even sceptical spirit. It may be objected that Berkeley also arouses a critical spirit in the reader but it is mainly for the purpose of preparing him to reject one set of philosophical notions ("materialism") in favour of another ("immaterialism"). Mandeville, on the other hand, seems more interested in inducing the reader to think in a certain manner rather than merely accept certain doctrines. Thus, unlike Hylas, Horatio is never demoralized by sceptical "cul-de-sacs" but stimulated to further arguments by them. The process by which Mandevillian paradox generates a critical frame of mind can be discerned in the following exchange:

Hor. ... When I ask'd what Occasion there was for Divines in an Army, I was not ignorant of the Necessity there is of having Religion and Priests of some sort or other, to humour as well as awe the Multitude; but I wanted to know the Mystery, and be let into the Secret, by which the Doctrine of Peace is made serviceable to the carrying on of War; for that Preachers of the Gospel have not only exhorted men to Battle, but likewise they have done it effectually; and that Soldiers have been inspired with Courage, and made to fight with Constancy by their Sermons, the History of almost every Country can witness.

Cleo. A little Accuracy will set us to Rights. That what you say has been, and is often done by Sermons and Preachers, both Protestant and Popish, is certainly true. But I deny, that ever it was once done by a Preacher of the Gospel.

Hor. I don't understand your Distinction. Are not all Christian Divines call'd Preachers, as well as Ministers of the Gospel?

Cleo. But many People are call'd, what, strictly speaking, they are not. ... 1

1. Origin, 156.
Here it is Horatio, not Cleomenes, who first perceives a familiar paradox that needs explaining. Cleomenes' solution is to rigorously analyze the meaning of the terms leading to the paradox that "the Doctrine of Peace is made serviceable to the carrying on of War."

It should be noted, however, that though Cleomenes' emphasis on "a little Accuracy" in the use of terms is similar to Philonous's emphasis on the "literal sense" of philosophical terms, the end-result is not the abject defeat of Horatio, as is the case with Hylas, but an intensification of the argument, which culminates in Horatio's blunt question and Cleomenes' equally blunt retort. Even when, later on, Horatio is more decisively defeated, paradox generates argument in such a way as to induce wariness on Horatio's part rather than querulous perplexity. The wariness, moreover, is expressed in pungent colloquialisms, as in the following exchange:

Cleo. ... But as to the vilest Reprobates among the Vulgar, from their very Curses and the most profane of their Oaths and Imprecations, it is plain, that they are Believers.

Hor. That's far fetch'd.

Cleo. I don't think so. Can a Man wish himself damn'd, without supposing, that there is such a Thing as Damnation. Believe me, Horatio, there are no Atheists among the Common People: ... 1

One argument, in short, leads to another, which clarifies and enlarges the previous one in an almost endless series, and that is

1. Orison, 189.
why Mandeville's use of paradox tends to be more open-ended than Berkeley's.

Berkeley, nevertheless, was capable of using paradox in a manner similar to Mandeville's and he does so brilliantly in the second dialogue of his Alciphron, which is a sustained attack on what he considered to be Mandeville's ethical views. The following exchange, for example, is highly Mandevillian in its use of paradox as a way of arousing the reader's attention just before the exposition of an important point:

CRITO. ... So that, upon the whole, it should seem those gentlemen who are called men of pleasure, from their eager pursuit of it, do in reality, with great expense of fortune, ease, and health, purchase pain.

LYSICLES. You may spin out plausible arguments, but will after all find it a difficult matter to convince me that so many ingenious men should not be able to distinguish between things so directly opposite as pain and pleasure. How is it possible to account for this?

CRITO. I believe a reason may be assigned for it, but to men of pleasure no truth is so palatable as a fable. Jove once upon a time ...

The above exchange is also close to Mandeville's method of paradoxical argument in that the paradox about pain, which is itself the conclusion

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1. George Berkeley, Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher, in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ed. by A.A. Luce and T.B. Jessop, vol. III (London, 1950), pp. 89-90. The text is based on the third edition of 1752. It was first published in 1732. All first three editions were published "anonymously." According to Jessop on p. 1, "the authorship was not in fact thereby concealed." Hereinafter to be cited as Berkeley III.
of a previous argument, generates dialectic in a manner very similar to Mandeville's use of paradox as a kind of dialectical short-cut. ¹

Berkeley, however, not only borrowed Mandeville's technique of paradoxical argument but also turned it adroitly against him, as in the following amusingly trenchant exchange:

EUPHRANOR. Your several arguments seem to centre on this: that vice circulates money and promotes industry, which causeth a people to flourish. Is it not so?

LYSICLES. It is.

EUPHRANOR. And the reason that vice produceth this effect is, because it causeth an extravagant consumption, which is the most beneficial to the manufacturers, their encouragement consisting in a quick demand and high price.

LYSICLES. Without doubt.

EUPHRANOR. Say, Lysicles, who drinks most, a sick man or a healthy?

LYSICLES. A healthy.

EUPHRANOR. And which is healthiest, a soberman or a drunkard?

LYSICLES. A sober man.

EUPHRANOR. A sober man, therefore, in health may drink more than a drunkard when he is sick?

LYSICLES. He may.

EUPHRANOR. What think you, will a man consume more meat and drink in a long life or a short one?

LYSICLES. In a long.

¹ One other paradox occurs in the phrase "no truth is so palatable as a fable" if "fable" is taken to mean "lie" and works here as a witty rejoinder with an almost wildean sting to it for present-day readers. If there is any value in making such a laboured observation on such a minor play of wit, it is in noting that Berkeley was not incapable of using paradox with Mandevillian playfulness.
EUPHRANOR. A sober healthy man, therefore, in a long life, may circulate more money by eating and drinking, than a glutton or a drunkard in a short one?

LYSICLES. What then?

EUPHRANOR. Why then it should seem that he may be more beneficial to the public, even in this way of eating and drinking.

LYSICLES. I shall never own that temperance is the way to promote drinking.

EUPHRANOR. But you will own sickness lessens, and death puts an end to all drinking? The same argument will hold, for ought I can see, with respect to all other vices that impair men's health and shorten their lives. And, if we admit this, it will not be so clear a point that vice hath merit towards the public.¹

As Mandeville himself complained,² Euphranor undoubtedly misrepresents Mandeville's views about the alleged efficacy of vice in promoting prosperity but even if Euphranor's opening statement is unfair to Mandeville, yet Mandeville's famous paradox about "private vices, public benefits" is here taken at its face-value and shown to be nothing but erroneous sophistry. The Fable of the Bees unravels the paradox very differently but it is certainly a tribute to Berkeley's dialectical ingenuity, and grasp of Mandeville's technique of rhetorical paradox, that he allows the paradox to generate a very


2. See Mandeville's A Letter to Dion, ed. by Eonany Dobrée (Liverpool, 1954), pp.3-4. Also see Dobrée's introduction, pp.vii-ix. The Letter was first published in 1732. Among other things, Mandeville protests that "if Dion had read the Fable of the Bees, he would not have suffered such lawless Libertines as Alciphron and Lysicles, to have sheltered themselves under my Wings; but he would have demonstrated to them, that my Principles differ'd from theirs, as Sunshine does from Darkness." "Dion" is the narrator of the dialogues comprising the Alciphron.
different dialectic which puts Mandeville's view in a highly
unfavourable light; moreover, Lysicles' statement about temperance
even allows Berkeley to introduce an effectively rhetorical paradox
of his own.

Berkeley also goes so far as to juggle with the paradox of the
ultimate compatibility of "popery" and "free-thinking," so as to
make it seem only an apparent one:

SUPERNATUR. I have another scruple about the
tendency of your opinions. Suppose you should
prevail, and destroy this protestant church
and clergy: how could you come at the popish?
I am credibly informed there is a great number
of emissaries of the church of Rome disguised
in England: who can tell what harvest a clergy
so numerous, so subtle, and so well furnished
with arguments to work on vulgar and uneducated
minds, may be able to make in a country
despoiled of all religion, and feeling the want
of it? Who can tell whether the spirit of free-
thinking ending with the opposition, and the
vanity with the distinction, when the whole
nation are alike infidels: who can tell, I say,
whether in such a juncture the men of genius
themselves may not affect a new distinction,
and be the first converts to popery?

LYSICLES. And suppose they should. Between
friends it would be no great matter. These
are our maxims. In the first place, we hold
it would be best to have no religion at all.
Secondly, we hold that all religions are
indifferent. If therefore, upon trial, we
find the country cannot do without a
religion, why not popery as well as another?
I know several ingenious men of our sect,
who, if we had a popish prince on the throne,
would turn papists to-morrow. This is a paradox, but I shall explain it. A prince whom we compliment with our religion, to be sure must be grateful.

EUPHRANOR. I understand you. But what becomes of freethinking all the while?

LYCICLEUS. Oh! we should have more than ever of that, for we should keep it all to ourselves. As for the amusement of retailing it, the want of this would be largely compensated by solid advantages of another kind.

EUPHRANOR. It seems then, by this account, the tendency you observed in the nation towards something great and new proves a tendency towards popery and slavery.¹

Ironically enough, when Berkeley goes this far in his use of paradox, he allows himself to be open to the same charge which his spokesman, Crito, earlier made about the "freethinkers'" rhetorical use of paradox:

Light in itself is good, and the same light which shews a man the folly of superstition might shew him the truth of religion and the madness of atheism. But to make use of light only to see the evils on one side, and never to see, but to run blindly upon, the worse extreme—this is to make the best of things produce evil, in the same sense that you prove the worst of things to produce good, to wit, accidentally or indirectly: and, by the same method of arguing, you may prove that even diseases are useful; but whatever benefit

seems to accrue to the public, either from
disease of mind or body, is not their genuine
offspring, and may be obtained without them.¹

Hendeville's motives, including his advocacy of religious toleration,²
in short, are consistently judged in the worst possible light and
distorted either into untenable paradoxes or reformulated into
apparent paradoxes dammingly shown not to be such at all. This
is not to suggest that Berkeley's use of paradox in the Alciphron is
more "unfair" than Hendeville's in the Crisyn of Honour but only
that while Berkeley did not use rhetorical paradox as often as
Hendeville, he was every bit as dialectically skilful in his
deployment of it. Unlike the Crisyn of Honour, however, Berkeley's
Alciphron cannot adequately be discussed solely in terms of its
technique of rhetorical paradox. As a work of Christian apologetics
rivaling Joseph Butler's Analogy of Religion in literary conception,
if not in popularity and influence, its method of dialogue is,
in fact, far more complex than either that of the Crisyn of Honour
or of the Three Dialogues.

Before dealing with the Alciphron in the next chapter, however,
it is necessary to point out that paradox continued to be an
important component of many a philosophical dialogue in the later
eighteenth century and perhaps the most famous in Diderot's
Paradoxe sur le Comédien (1773). In Diderot's dialogue, to put it
at its simplest, a "first interlocutor" and "second interlocutor"
argue out the paradox of actors being most emotionally convincing
in their roles when they have greatest control over their

¹ Berkeley III, 79.

² Hendeville's advocacy of religious toleration is especially
evident in his Free Thoughts on Religion, the very title of which,
with its suggestion of "free-thinking," Berkeley would have
perhaps found to be suspiciously ambiguous.
More relevant in terms of the influence of Berkeley and Mandeville on the dialogue form in the later eighteenth century is David Hume's A Dialogue, a minor masterpiece in dialectical and paradoxical tour-de-force. Hume's aim is to demonstrate the relativity of moral standards and he does so not merely by comparing the customs of one nation with another but by letting paradox generate dialectic. One such paradox is a traveller's insistence on the considerable civility and intelligence of two nations despite their savagery and moral blindness, which the traveller himself describes in detail. One of the nations, for example, enthusiastically approved the assassination of a man by his most trusted friend. As a result, the following exchange develops between the traveller and his friend, who is also the narrator of the dialogue:

To be sure, said I, you were but in jest. Such barbarous and savage manners are not only incompatible with a civilized, intelligent people, such as you said these were, but are scarcely compatible with human nature. They exceed all we ever read of among the Mingrelians and Topinambous.

"Have a care, cried he, have a care! You are not aware that you are speaking blasphemy, and are abusing your favourites, the Greeks, especially the Athenians, whom I have couched, all along, under these bizarre names I

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1. It is interesting to note that Diderot's definition of "paradox" in the Encyclopédie not only illuminates, as pointed out by Ivon Belaval, the dialectic of Diderot's dialogue but is also applicable to Mandeville's dialectical use of rhetorical paradox in the Origin of precon: "C'est une proposition absurde en apparence, à cause qu'elle est contraire aux opinions reçues, et qui, néanmoins, est vrai au fond, ou de moins peut recevoir un air de vérité." See Ivon Belaval, L'Esthétique sans Paradoxe de Diderot, third ed. (Paris, 1950), p.168.
employed. If you consider aright, there is not one stroke of the foregoing character, which might not be found in the man of highest merit at Athens, without diminishing in the least from the brightness of his character. The amours of the Greeks, their marriages, and the exposing of their children cannot but strike you immediately. The death of Usbek is an exact counterpart to that of Caesar.¹

The paradox here, in fact, is both dialectically all-embracing as in Berkeley’s Three Dialogues and rhetorically playful, as in the Origin of Honour. It is dialectically all-embracing in that throughout the dialogue, and this excerpt contains the essence of its dialectical strategy, the reader is forced to choose between two alternatives by deciding on whether a fixed standard of morality is a hopelessly paradoxical notion or whether moral relativism is actually so. The paradox is also rhetorically playful in that it does not entirely rely on logic but on a kind of rhetorical trick; indeed, a well-laid trap, and one which accounts for the traveller’s mock-warning and obvious glee at his friend’s discomfiture. Thus, it is very possible that Hume borrowed from Berkeley and Maneville in his use of paradox in A Dialogue.²

1. David Hume, Hume's Ethical Writings, ed. by Alasdair MacIntyre (London, 1965), pp.160-1. A Dialogue was published originally in the first edition of the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). Hume’s footnote adds, "The laws of Athens allowed a man to marry his sister by the father. Solon’s law forbid paederasty to slaves, as being an act of too great dignity for such mean persons." Hereinafter to be cited as Hume.

2. From a broader perspective, it is evident that paradox generates dialectic in much earlier dialogues, such as Plato’s Parmenides and Castiglione’s The Courtier. For the role of paradox in both these dialogues, see Colie 22-3 and 33-4. Perhaps the earliest example is the Book of Job (barring some sections of the Hindu scriptures) and it is probably not entirely coincidental that the only book in the Old Testament that resembles a philosophical dialogue memorably generates dialectic by dealing with the theological paradox of good and evil.
It is interesting to note in this connection that both Berkeley and Hume used similar metaphors in their respective dialogues to describe what is basically their justification for the philosophical principles they espouse, but which can also be considered as metaphors for the dialectical use of paradox. To begin with Berkeley, Elyas concludes the Three Dialogues with this metaphor:

You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks and falls into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent as well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation. Just so, the same principles which at first view lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to common sense.¹

The metaphor of gravity here could just as appropriately refer to the dialectical workings of paradox in that immaterialism at first seems to be a paradox because it really does strain the limits of reason, but is not actually so because it does not ultimately break the bounds of reason but returns to its solid basis in common sense. Hume’s metaphor, as expressed by the traveller’s friend, is also that of gravitation: "The Rhine flows north, the Rhone south; yet both spring from the same mountain, and are also actuated, in their opposite directions, by the same principle of gravity. The different inclinations of the ground, on which they run, cause all the difference of their courses."² The twist in Hume’s metaphor, however, is that it does not immediately strengthen his own position but at first seems to work against it. It is adduced by the friend,

in fact, as a possible objection to Hume's, and the traveller's, conviction of the relativity of moral standards. The objection implied is that different customs can still spring from different ways of applying the same absolute standard, based on social utility, to differing social circumstances. As the traveller's friend elaborates,

"It appears, that there never was any quality recommended by any one, as a virtue or moral excellence, but on account of its being useful, or agreeable to a man himself, or to others. For what other reason can ever be assigned for praise or approbation? Or where would be the sense of extolling a good character or action, which, at the same time, is allowed to be good for nothing? All the differences, therefore, in morals, may be reduced to this one general foundation, and may be accounted for by the different views, which people take of these circumstances."¹

The undermining of this position begins as soon as the traveller points out that the metaphor is applicable only to natural phenomena, not to the artificialities of human behaviour. As he puts it,

"What you insist on ... may have some foundation, when you adhere to the maxims of common life and ordinary conduct. ... But what say you to artificial lives and manners? How do you reconcile the maxims, on which, in different ages and nations, these are founded?²"

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He elaborates by explaining that by artificial behaviour he means behaviour dictated by either philosophical moral codes, as in the case of the ancient Greeks and Romans, or religious ones, as in modern times. As an extreme example of the former he takes Diogenes, and Pascal as an extreme example of the latter. A comparison of the moral views and practice of both, which are directly opposite, produces an impossible paradox that militates against the existence of an absolute moral code recognized by mankind. Thus, the traveller concludes that

In such a remarkable contrast do these two men stand: Yet both of them have met with general admiration in their different ages, and have been proposed as models of imitation. Where then is the universal standard of morals, which you talk of? And what rule shall we establish for the many different, nay contrary sentiments of mankind?

In *A Dialogue*, then, the paradoxes arising from the presupposition of an absolute standard of morality behind the actual existence of various opposing modes of moral behaviour is resolvable in terms of whether one talks about man governed by reason, which dictates that morality should be based on social utility, or man dominated by a religious or philosophical moral code. For Hume, however, man dominated by reason was little more than a speculative abstraction, and this is ironically confirmed by the last words of the dialogue.


spoken by the friends:

An experiment ... which succeeds in the air will not always succeed in a vacuum. When men depart from the maxims of common reason, and affect these artificial lives, as you call them, no one can answer for what will please or displease them. They are in a different element from the rest of mankind; and the natural principles of their mind play not with the same regularity, as if left to themselves, free from the illusions of religious superstition or philosophical enthusiasm. 1

The irony here lies in the fact that the reader is forced to ask himself whether man's behaviour can ever, like inert material phenomena, be in a vacuum or entirely free from "the illusions of religious superstition or philosophical enthusiasm." There is nothing in man's moral behaviour, in short, equivalent to the force of gravity in the natural world, except reason, which is rarely the principal determinant of moral actions.

It only remains to be noted that, as far as more recent dialogues are concerned, there have been at least two in which paradox generates dialectic in an interesting manner. The first, which is somewhat Mandevillian in dialectical technique, is Oscar Wilde's The Decay of Lying. It consists of a series of paradoxical statements by the flamboyant "Cyril" which provoke the staid "Vivian" into challenging them. The paradoxes, however, are only apparent, and purely rhetorical, as can be seen from the following exchange about the paradoxical notion that "Nature imitates Art":

CYRIL. The theory [i.e. that Life imitates Nature] is certainly a very curious one, but to make it complete you must show that Nature, no less than Life, is an imitation of Art. Are you prepared to prove that?

VIVIAN. My dear fellow, I am prepared to prove anything.

CYRIL. Nature follows the landscape painter, then, and takes her effects from him?

VIVIAN. Certainly. Where, if not from the Impressionists, do we get those wonderful brown fogs that come creeping down our streets, blurring the gas-lamps and changing the houses into monstrous shadows? To whom, if not to them and their master, do we owe the lovely silver mists that brood over our river, and turn to faint forms of fading grace curved bridge and swaying barge? The extraordinary change that has taken place in the climate of London during the last ten years is entirely due to a particular school of Art. You smile. Consider the matter from a scientific or a metaphysical point of view, and you will find that I am right. For what is Nature? Nature is no great mother who has borne us. She is our creation. It is in our brain that she quickens to life. Things are because we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, depends on the Arts that have influenced us. To look at a thing is very different from seeing a thing. One does not see anything until one sees its beauty. Then, and only then, does it come into existence. At present, people see fogs, not because they are fogs, but because poets and painters have taught them the mysterious loveliness of such effects. There may have been fogs for centuries in London. I dare say there were. But no one saw them, and so we do not know anything about them. They did not exist till Art had invented them. ...

Here, it is evident that, in a manner similar to the "paradoxical" statements in the Origin of Honour, what first appears as a paradox

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is actually no more than a dialectically deceptive and vividly rhetorical way of pointing out that works of art, because they are inevitably selective, can influence one's perception, which is itself selective, of the outside world.

The second relatively recent dialogue to use paradox in an interesting way is the painter Piet Mondrian's *A Dialogue on Neoplasticism*. Because of the austerity of its dialectic, its technique resembles more that of Berkeley in the *Three Dialogues* than that of Mandeville in the *Origin of Honour*. In it A ("A singer") and B ("Neoplastic painter") begin their discussion with what at first seems to be a paradoxical statement of the painter's consistent intentions in both his earlier, representational compositions and his later, abstract ones:

\[ \text{A:} \] I admire your earlier work. Because it means so much to me, I would like to understand your present way of painting better. I see nothing in these rectangles. What are you aiming at?

\[ \text{B:} \] At nothing different than before. Both have the same intention but my latest work brings it out more clearly.¹

That, in turn, generates a discussion in which the paradox is shown to be only apparent because "A" has misunderstood the real intentions of "B":

\[ \text{A:} \] And what is that intention?

\[ \text{B:} \] The plastic expression of relationships through oppositions of colour and line.

C: But didn't your earlier work represent nature?
B: I expressed myself by means of nature. But if you observe the sequence of my work carefully, you will see that it progressively abandoned the naturalistic appearance of things and increasingly emphasizes the plastic expression of relationships.
A: Do you find, then, that natural appearance interferes with the plastic expression of relationships?
B: You will agree that if two words are sung with the same strength, with the same emphasis, each weakens the other. One cannot express both natural appearance as we see it and plastic relationships, with the same determinateness. In naturalistic form, in naturalistic colour and in naturalistic line, plastic relationships are veiled. To be plastically expressed determinately, relationships can be represented only through colour and line in themselves. In the capriciousness of nature, form and colour are weakened by curvature and by the corporeality of things. To give the means of expression of painting their full value in my earlier work, I increasingly allowed colour and line to speak for themselves.
A: But how can colour and line in themselves, without the form we perceive in nature, represent anything determinately?
B: The plastic expression of colour and line alone is to establish oppositions by means of colour and line; and these oppositions express plastic relationship. Relationship is what I have always sought, and that is what all painting seeks to express.¹

¹. Kandirian, 118.
One could do worse than to consider Mondrian's quest for truth to nature in terms of "the plastic expression of relationships" as a useful analogy for the way that philosophical dialogue rejects concrete dramatic incident in favour of a more abstract play of opposing ideas, and the relationship between them. Keeping this in mind, what paradox often succeeds in doing is to intensify such a clash of abstractions and make it all the more, paradoxically, "dramatic" in terms of the expression of emotion if not of dramatic incident.
CHAPTER VII.  INWARD COLLOQUY AND THE DIALECTIC OF "GENIUS" IN SHAPTEBURY'S THE MORALIST

Or that bright Image to our fancy draw,
Which Thoecles in raptur'd vision saw,
While thro' Poetic scenes the Genius roves,
Or wanders wild in Academic Groves;
That NATURE our Society adores,
There Tindal dictates, and Silenus snores.

Alexander Pope in The Dunciad
(ed. of 1743, ll. 487-92)
More than any dialogue by Berkeley or Mandeville, Shaftesbury's *The Moralists*, A Philosophical Rhapsody\(^1\) seems, at first sight, little more than a direct imitation of Plato's dialogues, especially the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*. Before establishing whether, like Berkeley and Mandeville, Shaftesbury borrowed from other genres and utilized Augustan rhetorical devices to suit his own needs in the modification of an ancient genre, it is necessary, then, to examine how *The Moralists* can be said to follow Platonic models of philosophical dialogue.

There are two basic models of Platonic dialogue that must be kept in mind in relation to *The Moralists*, the "eristic" and the "rhapsodical." The "eristic" model includes such early and middle-period dialogues as the *Ion*, *Laches*, *Gorgias* and *Protagoras*. In these Socrates demolishes whatever concept is maintained by an opponent by repeatedly asking him the kind of questions that force him to eventually contradict his original position. What Socrates conducts, in other words, is an "elenctic duel" or "eristic match" for the purpose of exposing the logical inconsistencies of a conceptual opinion defended by the opposing side.\(^2\) The purpose, then, is a negative one. In later dialogues, however, "elenctic duelling" occurs far less frequently and for the positive purpose of leading to other, more fruitful concepts. In

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1. The title-page also includes the informative phrase, "Being A Recital of certain Conversations on Natural and Moral Subjects."

2. As Gilbert Ryle puts it, "The questioner has to try to extract from the answerer by a series of questions an answer or conjunction of answers inconsistent with the original thesis, and so drive him into an 'alerchus'. The questioner has won the duel if he succeeds in getting the answerer to contradict his original thesis, or else in forcing him to resign, or in reducing him to silence, to an infinite regress, to more abusiveness, to pointless yammering or to outrageous paradox." See Plato's Progress (Cambridge, 1966), p.105.
some of these later dialogues, such as the Symposium and the Phaedrus, Plato is at his most rhapsodical and rhetorically sublime. Although the Phaedrus contains very complex disputation, what is important about it in relation to the dialogue style of The Moralists is that the dialectical argument about the nature of rhetoric is eclipsed by Socrates' poetically rhapsodic description of the "sublime" concept of Love. As for the Symposium, it is almost devoid of dialectical exchange. Its speeches on the nature of Love are hierarchically arranged and end with Socrates' rhapsodic "encomium of Love." 1

Although, as will be seen, it is the "rhapsodical" model of the Platonic dialogue that The Moralists actually emulates, it does contain some elenctic argument. An early example occurs when "Philocles," who is a sceptic 2 and narrator of the dialogue, claims that true friendship does not depend on love of mankind by either party. "Theocles," who is a "sociable enthusiast" (in the sense of "inspired philosopher") 3 and Shaftesbury's spokesman throughout the dialogue, counters Philocles' view by asking: "Do you, then, take bounty and gratitude to be among the acts of friendship and good-nature?" This is the beginning of an elenchus because Philocles is not left much room to manoeuvre. Whatever the actual words used, Philocles' answer can


3. The early manuscript version of The Moralists presented to Lord Somers was entitled The Sociable Enthusiast. See Hayman, 728.
only be basically "yes" or "no." When Philocles answers in the affirmative, "Undoubtedly, for they are of the chief," more elenctic questions follow until finally Philocles is driven to contradict his original position:

... And as to bounty: tell me, I beseech you, is it to those only who are deserving that we should do good? Is it only to a good neighbour or relation, a good father, child, or brother? Or does Nature, reason, and humanity better teach us to do good still to a father because a father, and to a child because a child, and so to every relation in human life? I think, said I, this last is rightest.

O Philocles, replied he, consider then what it was you said when you objected against the love of mankind because of human frailty, and seemed to scorn the public because of its misfortunes.  

The relative unimportance for Shaftesbury of such a rational refutation, however, is made evident in that soon after Philocles confesses that

As for a plain natural love of one single person in either sex, I could compass it, I thought, well enough; but this complex, universal sort was beyond my reach. I could love the individual, but not the species. This was too mysterious, too metaphysical an object for me. In short, I could love nothing of which I had not some sensible, material image.

1. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. by John K. Robertson and introduced by Stanley Green, vol. II (New York, 1964), pp.37-8. Hereinafter to be cited as Characteristics I or II. The Characteristics, which is a collection of Shaftesbury's treatises, was first published in 1711. The Robertson edition was first published in 1900. The Moralists was first published in 1709.

It is not enough, in other words, for Philocles to be merely convinced that love of individuals necessarily entails love of mankind but to learn how to feel love for mankind. In terms of the dramatic situation of The Moralists this means that Theocles must convert Philocles to his own "enthusiasms" for philosophical truth and not merely gain his intellectual acquiescence.

For Theocles, then, elenctic argument is an inferior mode of reasoning that blocks the way to higher truths; indeed he prefaces one round of elenctic argument with "Take demonstration then ... if you can endure I should reason thus abstractedly and drily." At a later stage of the dialogue, when Philocles has already been converted to Theocles' "enthusiasm," Theocles significantly introduces an elenchus when Philocles, on finding himself unable to follow Theocles' rapturous mode of argument exclaims: "Hold! hold! ... good Theocles, you take this in too high a key above my reach. If you would have me accompany you, pray lower this strain a little, and talk in a more familiar way." Thus, elenchus in The Moralists is a "more familiar way" of argument subordinate to "sublime" ideas arrived at by other means in which, as will be seen, "enthusiasms" play a large role.

The relative unimportance of elenctic argument in The Moralists becomes especially evident when contrasted to Berkeley's use of elenchus in his dialogues. Elenchus is especially prevalent in the first two dialogues of the Three Dialogues where Philonous sets out to prove that "there is no such thing as what philosophers call 'material substance'".

2. Characteristica II, 111.
and does so by a series of elenctic arguments, the purpose of which is to demolish Hylas's view to the contrary. It is precisely because of Philonous's subtle handling of elenctic argumentation that, as has been seen in chapter six, Hylas is always forced to acknowledge his own views as paradoxical and contrary to common sense.

In the Alciphron, elenchtion is a satirical weapon as well as a mode of argument, as in the following exchange:

**EUPHRANOR.** You say, if I mistake not, that a wise man pursues only his private interest, and that this consists in sensual pleasure; for proof whereof you appeal to nature. Is not this what you advance?

**LYSICLUS.** It is.

**EUPHRANOR.** You conclude, therefore, that, as other animals are guided by natural instinct, man too ought to follow the dictates of sense and appetite.

**LYSICLUS.** I do.

**EUPHRANOR.** But in this do you not argue as if man had only sense and appetite for his guides, on which supposition there might be truth in what you say? But what if he hath intellect, reason, a higher instinct and a nobler life? If this be the case, and you, being man, live like a brute, is it not the way to be defrauded of your true happiness, to be mortified and disappointed? Consider most sorts of brutes: you shall perhaps find them have a greater share of sensual happiness than man.
LYSICLES. To our sorrow we do. This hath made several gentlemen of our sect envy brutes, and lament the lot of human-kind.

CRITO. It was a consideration of this sort which inspired Erytylus with the laudable ambition of wishing himself a snail, upon hearing of certain particularities discovered in that animal by a modern virtuoso.

EUPHRANOR. Tell me, Lysicles, if you had an inexhaustible fund of gold and silver, should you envy another for having a little more copper than you?

LYSICLES. I should not.

EUPHRANOR. Are not reason, imagination, and sense, faculties different in kind, and in rank higher one than another?

LYSICLES. I do not deny it.

EUPHRANOR. Their acts therefore differ in kind?

LYSICLES. They do.

EUPHRANOR. Consequently the pleasures perfective of those acts are also different?

LYSICLES. They are.

EUPHRANOR. You admit, therefore, three sorts of pleasure: pleasure of reason, pleasure of imagination, and pleasure of sense.

LYSICLES. I do.

EUPHRANOR. And, as it is reasonable to think the operation of the highest and noblest faculty to be attended with the highest pleasure, may we not suppose the two former to be as gold or silver, and the latter only as copper? Whence it should seem to follow that man need not envy or imitate a brute.

LYSICLES. And, nevertheless, there are very ingenious men who do. And surely every one may be allowed to know what he wants, and wherein his true happiness consists.1

The dialectical function of the elenchus initiated by Euphranor here is to demolish Lysicles' position that the pleasures of sense are the highest good. Lysicles' view, however, is not entirely based on reason but on a temperamental whim he is forced to reveal when cornered in elenctic debate. As Crito's remark makes clear, then, the whole elenctic duel is not so much a dialectical out-and-thrust of opposing opinions as a rhetorical device for directing satirical contempt against Lysicles' position.

If elenctic argument is not at the heart of Shaftesbury's dialectical strategy, as it is in Berkeley's dialogues, neither is the expository and open-ended mode of argument, with its emphasis on dramatic repartee and conversational banter, of Mandeville's dialogues. Like elenctic argument, however, dramatic repartee does play a minor role in The Moralists, especially in Part I, which sets the stage for the later appearance of Theocles, the "virtuoso" Philosopher. The two protagonists of Part I are the sceptical Philocles, and Palemon, who is disillusioned with the world and of a melancholy temper. The Moralists, in fact, is in the form of an "epistle" to Palemon.

Philocles begins by remarking on the contrast between his recent conversations with Theocles and that of "polite" circles: "All must be laid before you and summed up in one complete account; to remain, it seems, a monument of that unseasonable conversation so opposite to the reigning genius of gallantry and pleasure."¹ He goes on to reflect on the impossibility of philosophical dialogue in his own age because of the low quality of conversation in general:

We need not wonder, therefore, that the sort of moral painting, by way of dialogue, is so much

¹. Characteristica II, 4.
out of fashion, and that we see no more of these philosophical portraiture nowadays.
For where are the originals? Or what though you, Palemon, or I, by chance, have lighted on such a one, and pleased ourselves with the life? Can you imagine it should make a good picture? ¹

A second, related reason adduced by Philocoles for the decline of dialogue is the general preference for dogmatism in philosophical matters:

You know, too, that in this academic philosophy I am to present you with, there is a certain way of questioning and doubting, which no way suits the genius of our age.
Men love to take part instantly. They cannot bear being kept in suspense. The examination torments them. They want to be rid of it upon the easiest terms. 'Tis as if men fancied themselves drowning whenever they dare trust to the current of reason. They seem hurrying away they know not whither, and are ready to catch at the first twig. There they choose afterwards to hang, though ever so insecurely, rather than trust their strength to bear them above water. ... ²

Philocoles' plea for scepticism here has, as in the case of Dryden's and Purd's theorizing on dialogue, ³ to do with an attitude of tolerant impartiality. Although both conversational decorum and sceptical impartiality play a role in The Moralists, these do not comprise, ⁴

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¹ Characteristics II, 7-8.
² Characteristics II, 7-8.
³ The views of Dryden and Purd are discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation.
however, as in the dialogues of Berkeley and Mandeville, the essence of what makes it a philosophical dialogue. This is one important reason why the conversation between Philocles and Palemon, though on a supposedly higher level than that of the "Beau-monde," leads to no philosophical conclusions but merely paves the way for Philocles.

The dramatic situation of Part I consists of Philocles' attempt to coax Palemon out of his melancholy misanthropy:

... What foreigner (the inhabitant, suppose, of some near planet) when he had travelled hither, and surveyed this outward face of things, would think of what lay hid beneath the mask? But let him stay awhile. Allow him leisure, till he has gained a nearer view, and following our dissolved assemblies to their particular recesses, he has the power of seeing them in this new aspect. ... Here he may behold those great men of the Ministry, who not an hour ago in public appeared such friends, now plotting craftily each other's ruin, with the ruin of the State itself, a sacrifice to their ambition. Here he may see too those of a softer kind, who knowing not ambition, follow only love. Yet, Philocles, who would think it? ...

Philocles assumes this to be the harangue of a thwarted lover and acts as a friend attempting to dispel Palemon's melancholy through rallying philosophical discussion:

1. If Mandeville's dialogues do not always display conversational decorum, they are at least highly conversational in terms of prose style and dramatic effect.

2. Characteristics II, 13. The punctuation within the quotation is the same as that of Robertson's edition of the Characteristics in Green's reprint, so that the quotation is complete and no omissions are implied. It is interesting to note that Palemon contemplating society contrasts very sharply with Theocles contemplating Nature.
... At first I looked on you as deeply in the spleen, but now I concluded you in love, and so unhappily engaged as to have reason to complain of infidelity. "This," thought I, "has moved Palemon thus. Hence the sad world! Here was that corruption, and those disorders he lamented!"

After I had begged pardon for my rude mirth, which had the good fortune however to make some change in your humour, we fell naturally into cool reasoning about the nature and cause of ill in general: ...  

There is, then, a promise of romantic intrigue but its purpose is to draw the reader's attention to the different kinds of love, ranging from "love of the fair sex" to an anticipation of Theocles' "enthusiasm" for Nature.

Although the promise of romantic intrigue is never fulfilled, even in their serious discussion of the nature of evil, Philocles is really rallying Palemon. Thus, at a point when Palemon becomes convinced that evil in Nature is only apparent, Philocles suddenly switches sides:

For here I took up your own part against you, and setting all those villainies and corruptions of human kind in the same light you had done just before, I put it upon you to tell where possibly


2. The hints of romantic intrigue of a courtly kind also includes brief mention of popular novels of love-intrigue such as, presumably, those of Aphra Benn and Madame de Scudéry: "You damned even our favourite novels; those dear, sweet, natural pieces, writ most of them by the fair sex themselves" (Characteristics II, 11).
could be the advantage or good arising hence, or what excellence or beauty could redound from those tragical pictures you yourself had drawn so well after the life. 1

Philocles attributes his decision to his own scepticism on the question but Palemon is not amused and accuses him of pyrrhonism. Philocles' reaction is to admit that his rallying mode of argument can easily be misconstrued: "... by this loose way of talking, which I had learnt in some fashionable conversations of the world, I had given you occasion to suspect me of the worst sort of scepticism, such as spared nothing, but overthrew all principles, moral and divine." 2 It is at this point, in fact, that Philocles reveals that he is no longer a sceptical railleur as a result of spending two days of leisurely conversation with Theocles, an "enthusiast" who "had nothing of the bigot." 3 As this ends Part I, and Palemon does not appear again, even the sceptical raillery between Palemon and Philocles, then, is not quite the kind of discussion that Shaftesbury considered suitable for philosophical dialogue; indeed, this is how Shaftesbury describes his motives for including the rallying exchanges between Palemon and Philocles:

Palemon the man of quality, and who is first introduced as speaker in the piece, must, for fashion's sake, appear in love, and under a kind of melancholy produced by some misadventures in the world. How else should he be supposed so serious? Philocles his friend (an airy gentleman of the world and a thorough railleur) must have a home charge upon him, and feel the

anger of his grave friend before he can be supossed grave enough to enter philosophical discourse.

When ascertaining to what extent the "rhapsodic" element in The Moralists derives from Plato, one must be careful to distinguish between the "rhapsodic" element as a technique of rhetorical lyricism and as the expression of Plato's doctrine of Eros. Martin Price's analysis in To the Palace of Wisdom of the "rhapsodic" element in The Moralists concentrates more on how closely Shaftesbury follows Plato's philosophical doctrines and how far he departs from them than on dialogue technique as such. This leads him to imply that the Platonic model for The Moralists was The Symposium" ... in The Moralists. Palemon's melancholy proves to be disappointed love of a kind not at first envisaged, "but a nobler love than such as common beauties inspire"; and Philocles' discussion of love shows the same pattern of ascent as the speech of Diotima in Plato's Symposium.² It is true that Theocles' "enthusiasm" for Nature is similar to Socrates' rhapsodic outbursts on Love and that there is a kind of "pattern of ascent" in The Moralists from the railery between Philocles and Palemon, to the sublime discussion between Philocles and Theocles, which is formally analogous to the increase in sublimity between the initial speeches on

1. Characteristics II, 335-6. These remarks occur in the Miscellaneous Reflections, which were first published in 1711 as the third volume of the Characteristics. Robertson notes that Shaftesbury has "raillery" for "railleur". Shaftesbury's intention to have Part I deal with "fashionable" topics before serious philosophical argument begins is confirmed by the fact that, as Hayman points out, the discussion of romance literature (Characteristics II, 11) did not appear in The Sociable Enthusiast but was one of the additions to The Moralists. See Hayman, 729-30.

Love in the *Symposium* to Socrates' eloquently "rhapsodic" one. In terms of dialectical and rhetorical structure, however, the *Phaedrus* seems a closer model for the *Vorēlistēs*. This is mainly because the relationship between Socrates and *Phaedrus* is very similar to that between Theocles and Philocles. Socrates' subject is the nature of true rhetoric and his way of showing *Phaedrus* what it consists of is by examples of it in his oratorical descriptions of Love. *Phaedrus* is to reject false rhetoric not just on rational grounds but because of an emotional conviction induced by Socrates' rhapsodic speeches. Similarly, Theocles does not merely argue in favour of the harmony of nature and the human soul but lets his "enthusiasm" in the form of apostrophes to Nature induce a similar feeling in Philocles.

Another way of putting it is that the relationship between Philocles and Theocles is not so much a dramatic framework for dialectical argument, as in the dialogues of Mandeville and Berkeley, but a dramatization of complementary states of mind. The complementary relationship between Philocles and Theocles is perhaps best encapsulated by Philocles' poetic description of his own role:

> I fini, then, said I (rousing myself from my musing posture), you expect I should serve you in the same capacity as that musician, whom an ancient orator made use of at his elbow, to strike such moving notes as raised him when he was perceived to sink; and calmed him again when his impetuous spirit was transported in too high a strain.  

1. As Adam Smith put it, "Theocles in his *Rhapsody* is exactly copied from Socrates. But as Socrates' humour is often too coarse and his sarcasms too biting for this age, he has softened him in this respect and made his Theocles altogether polite, and his wit such as suits the character of a gentleman." See Adam Smith, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, ed. by John N. Lothian (London, 1963), p.55. The Lectures are extant only in the form of notes by an anonymous student, who reported them in 1762-63 at the University of Glasgow.

Philocles' role, then, is to succumb to Theocles' "enthusiasm" but the question remains what precisely Shaftesbury meant by the word if it was not merely a Platonic borrowing.

The first thing to note about the word "enthusiasm" is that it referred to a mode of feeling considered to be totally incompatible with rational discourse of any sort and usually associated with religious fanaticism. As Susie Tucker points out in her monograph on the term, "Anabaptists ... Mystics, Puritans, Quakers, Methodists, and Papists were all enthusiasts in the technical and derogatory sense of the word. "The standard of judgment may be Deism or Anglicanism, and there are naturally degrees of disparagement in proportion to the commitment of the critic." It is this kind of "enthusiasm" that Shaftesbury, as a Deist, attacks in the Letter Concerning Enthusiasm and considers as being due to "melancholy" and "ill-humour." In the same Letter, however, he distinguishes between "divine" or "noble" enthusiasm, made possible by a "good-humoured" temperament, from "enthusiasm" in its disparaging sense. Shaftesbury's analysis of what separates ordinary "enthusiasm" from the "noble" variety derived from Plato's doctrine of "divine inspiration" is a subtly psychological one and, especially as it is highly relevant to his method of dialogue in The Moralists, needs to be quoted in its entirety:

Something there will be of extravagance and fury, when the ideas or images received are too big for the narrow human vessel to contain. So that inspiration may be justly called divine enthusiasm; for the word itself signifies divine presence, and was made use of by the philosopher

whom the earliest Christian Fathers called divine, to express whatever was sublime in human passions. This was the spirit he allotted to heroes, statesmen, poets, orators, musicians, and even philosophers themselves. Nor can we, of our own accord, forbear ascribing to a noble enthusiasm whatever is greatly performed by any of these. So that almost all of us know something of this principle. But to know it as we should do, and discern it in its several kinds, both in ourselves and others; this is the great work, and by this means alone we can hope to avoid delusion. For to judge the spirits whether they are of God, we must antecedently judge our own spirit, whether it be of reason and sound sense; whether it be fit to judge at all, by being sedate, cool, and impartial, free of every biassing passion, every giddy vapour, or melancholy fume. This is the first knowledge and previous judgment: 'To understand ourselves, and know what spirit we are of.' Afterwards we may judge the spirit in others, consider what their personal merit is, and prove the validity of their testimony by the solidity of their brain. By this means we may prepare ourselves with some antidote against enthusiasm. And this is what I have dared affirm is best performed by keeping to good-humour. For otherwise the remedy itself may turn to the disease. ¹ (italics added)

Plato's doctrine or "divine inspiration."\(^1\)

The genuinely "divine" quality of Theocles' "enthusiasm", in any case, reveals itself in his sociability because he treats Philocles with unfailing courtesy and "good-humour"; so much so that Philocles is drawn into the same state of "enthusiastic" feeling. As Philocles reports to Palemon, "For though I was like to be perfectly cured of my scepticism, 'twas by what I thought worse, downright enthusiasm. You never knew a more agreeable enthusiast."\(^2\) Philocles is also open to Theocles' "enthusiasm," however, because just as Theocles is the "sociable enthusiast," he is the "sociable sceptic," so that both share the temperamental trait of being "good-humoured" in their philosophical attitudes. As Theocles puts it, about Philocles' mode of argument: "Your wit allows you to divert yourself with whatever occurs in the debate; and you can pleasantly improve even what your antagonist brings as a support to his own hypothesis. This, indeed, is a fairer sort of practice than what is common nowadays. But 'tis no more than suitable to your character."\(^3\)

That the "good-humoured" attitude to philosophical argument is an important trait shared by Philocles and Theocles becomes especially evident when they confront the inquisitorial dogmatism and taciturnity of an "old gentleman" who is one of Theocles' dinner-guests. During

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1. For the philosophical and theological implications, derived mainly from the Cambridge Platonists, of Shaftesbury's notion of "enthusiasm" see Stanley Green, Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics: A Study in Enthusiasm (Ohio, 1967), pp.19-36. Hereinafter to be cited as Green.


3. Characteristics II, 75.
a discussion on miracles, for example, the "old gentleman" berates the "young gentleman," his companion, for letting Philocles' arguments influence him too much: "And are you so far improved then, replied the severe companion, under your new sceptical master (pointing to me) that you can thus readily discuss all miracles as useless?" Philocles' "stage directions" are a sufficient indication of the "old gentleman's" atrocious manners, which reflect the dogmatic crudity of his orthodox thinking. The discussion with the "old gentleman" takes a sinister turn when Philocles proposes to argue, though still against the possibility of miracles, in Theocles' Deistic vein:

But now, continued I, since I have been thus long; the defendant only, I am resolved to take up offensive arms and be aggressor in my turn, provided Theocles be not angry with me for borrowing ground from his hypothesis.

Whatever you borrow of his, replied my antagonist, you are pretty sure of spoiling it; and as it passes through your hands you had best beware lest you seem rather to reflect on him than me.

The "old gentleman" here insinuates that Theocles himself may be tainted with Philocles' supposed infidelity. He is, thus, obstinately opinionated and not given to "free and impartial" debate. He is a representative of the intolerant mode of argument of a religious bigot, and in this he may well be a precursor of Hume's much more subtly-conceived "Demea" in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

Although Theocles does give an after-dinner "sermon" on the

2. Characteristics II, 92.
evidence of divine design in Nature, he is hindered from the full expression of his "enthusiasm" in Part II by his debates with the rallying Philocles and the hostility between Philocles and the "old gentleman." Once Philocles' "good-humoured" mode of argument and that of Theocles' is firmly established and contrasted to the bigotry or "false enthusiasm" of the "old gentleman," the scene is set for Theocles to give free rein to his "enthusiastic" raptures in the face of Nature. Before relating Shaftesbury's dialectical strategy to Theocles' "enthusiasm," however, it should be noted that Palemon represents yet another species of "false enthusiasm." This is because Palemon's melancholy temper blinds him to the sublimity of Nature. His "disease" is diagnosed in the following striking manner by the newly-enlightened Philocles:

This, Palemon, is the labour of your soul, and this its melancholy when, unsuccessfully pursuing the supreme beauty, it meets with darkening clouds which intercept its sight. Monsters arise, not those from Lybian deserts, but from the heart of

1. According to Shaftesbury's own gloss on The Moralist in the Miscellanea Reflections, he had to make Theocles a "feigned preacher" in order to amuse his "polite" audience, who could not tolerate philosophical discourse otherwise. As Shaftesbury put it, in the third person, "he finds these subjects (as he confesses) so wide of common conversation, and by long custom so appropriated to the school, the university chair or pulpit, that he thinks it hardly safe or practicable to treat of them elsewhere or in a different tone. He is forced therefore to raise particular machines, and constrain his principal characters in order to carry a better face and bear himself out against the appearance of pedantry. Thus his gentleman philosopher Theocles, before he enters into his real character, becomes a feigned preacher." One must give due allowance to satirical exaggeration in this passage but it does confirm Shaftesbury's belief in the "impossibility" of philosophical dialogue in his own age. See Characteristics II, 334-5.
man more fertile, and with their horrid aspect cast an unseemly reflection upon Nature. She, helpless (as she is thought), and working thus absurdly, is condemned, the government of the world arraigned, and Deity made void.  

Palemon's "false enthusiasm" is not that of the religious bigot but, as Philocles insinuates, of the potential atheist with his "melancholy" worship of matter.

It is in Part III of *The Voralists* that it becomes clear that Philocles' "sociable scepticism" is only a stage in an argument that leads to ecstatic affirmation of Nature. This is especially so when an exchange like the following is kept in mind:

... And now, good Thoccle, that I am become so willing a disciple, I want not so much to be convinced, methinks, as to be confirmed and strengthened. And I hope this last work may prove your easiest task.

Not unless you help it in yourself, replied Thoccle, for this is necessary as well as becoming. It had been indeed shameful for you to have yielded without making good resistance. To help oneself to be convinced is to prevent reason, and bespeak error and delusion. But upon fair conviction to give our heart up to the evident side, and reinforce the impression, this is to help reason heartily. And thus we may be said honestly to persuade ourselves. Show me then how I may best persuade myself.

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2. In the Letter Concerning Enthusiasm, Shaftesbury links atheism and ill-humour: "I very much question whether anything besides ill-humour can be the cause of atheism" (Characteristics I, 17). Also see Grean, 36. Grean shows that Shaftesbury's notion of atheism as being encouraged by ill-humour and melancholic states of mind is derived from Henry More.

Philocles, in other words, is taking part in a process, beginning with a sceptical, impartial attitude, and ending with "enthusiasm" for Nature, that Theocles had already experienced, but entirely on his own. What Theocles is describing, in fact, is what Shaftesbury called the "inward colloquy" and his relationship with Philocles is, as will be seen, a dramatization of it.

As Shaftesbury describes it in *Soliloquy or Advice to an Author*, the process of "inward colloquy" or self-analysis consists of dividing the self into two dramatic "characters," as it were, one of which is the rational self and the other is the irrational part of the self prey to fluctuating desires and passions. The end-result is the triumph of the rational self because the person undergoing such a process is thereby able to recognize his own moral weaknesses and thus fulfil the Delphic injunction "Know thyself" or, as Shaftesbury terms it, "recognize yourself." His most succinct description of the process, despite its overblown rhetoric, is the following:

And here it is that our sovereign remedy and gymnastic method of soliloquy takes its rise; when by a certain powerful figure of inward rhetoric the mind apostrophizes its own fancies, raises them in their proper shapes and personages, and addresses them familiarly, without the least ceremony or respect. By this means it will soon happen that two formed parties will erect them--


2. Although Shaftesbury's notion of "inward colloquy" implies much more than Hugh Blair seemed to be aware of, the excessive verbosity by which it is described tempt one to agree with Blair when he complains that "Self-examination, or reflection on our own conduct, is an idea conceived with ease; but when it is wrought into all the forms of 'A man's dividing himself into two parties, becoming a self-dialogist, entering into partnership with himself, forming the dual number practically within himself;' we hardly know what to make of it." See Hugh Blair, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (London, 1823), p.120.
selves within. For the imaginations or fancies being thus roundly treated are forced to declare themselves and take party. ... 1

He especially recommends such a "gymnastic method" to writers: "He who deals in characters must of necessity know his own, or he will know nothing" 2 and strongly implies that it is impossible to be a genuine philosopher without it: "'Tis the hardest thing in the world to be a good thinker without being a strong self-examiner and thorough-paced dialogist in this solitary way." 3

The process of "inward colloquy" dramatized in The Moralists is one at the advanced stage of self-reflection when inspired "enthusiasm" develops out of rational self-knowledge. To see what this consists of in terms of dramatic technique, it is necessary to return to Shaftesbury's words linking "enthusiasm" to divine inspiration and "inward colloquy" near the end of the Letter Concerning Enthusiasm:

"For to judge the spirits whether they are of God, we must antecedently judge our own spirit, whether it be of reason and sound sense; whether it be fit to judge at all, by being sedate, cool, and impartial, free of every biasing passion, every giddy vapour, or melancholy flame." 4

1. Characteristics I, 123.

2. Characteristics I, 124.

3. Characteristics I, 112. Shaftesbury's notion of "inward colloquy" goes some way in explaining his apparent dislike of the conversation of "polite" circles and why The Moralists, despite his emphasis on "good-humoured" sociability, is much less "conversational" in style than the dialogues of Mandeville and Berkeley: "But 'tis a certain observation in our science, that they who are great talkers in company have never been any talkers by themselves, nor used to these private discussions of our home regimen" (Characteristics I, 111).

Divinely-inspired "enthusiasm" is precisely what is presented for judgment in The Morals. Theocles personifies this kind of "enthusiasm" and it is the extent to which he convincingly refutes Philocles' objections which enables the reader to judge whether his "enthusiasm" is truly inspired, irrespective of the fact that Philocles succumbs to his "spell." ¹

There is another aspect by which "enthusiasm" and "inward colloquy" are intimately connected and that is Shaftesbury's definition of "enthusiasm" as a "divine presence": "... inspiration may be justly called divine enthusiasm; for the word itself signifies divine presence, and was made use of by the philosopher whom the earliest Christian Fathers called divine, to express whatever was sublime in human passions." ² The "divine presence," in fact, is very much connected with the concept of the "genius loci" or "genius of place," which, apart from its application to landscape gardening, ³ and derivation from classical literature and mythology, ⁴ also occurs in the Phaedrus:

1. According to Green, The Morals "represents Shaftesbury's major attempt to describe the character of true enthusiasm. It is his answer to the charge, implied in the common use of the term 'enthusiast' in his time, that a religious enthusiast must and could only be a fanatic." See Green, 23.

2. Characteristics I, 38.

3. As in Pope's lines in the "Epistle to Burlington" (ll. 57 ff.), "Consult the Genius of the Place in all;/That tells the Waters or to rise, or fall" and so on.

4. William Blake's definition of the "genius of place" as understood by the classical Greeks and Romans is especially succinct: "The ancient Poets animated all sensible objects with Gods or Geniiuses, calling them by the names and adorning them with the properties of woods, rivers, mountains, lakes, cities, nations, and whatever their enlarged & numerous senses could perceive." Blake's remark is in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.
Soc. ... And now, dear Phaedrus, I shall pause for an instant to ask whether you do not think me, as I appear to myself, inspired?

Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, you seem to have a very unusual flow of words.

Soc. Listen to me, then, in silence; for surely the place is holy; so that you must not wonder, if, as I proceed, I appear to be in a divine fury, for already I am getting into dithyrambs.

Phaedr. Nothing can be truer.

As it happens, the "holy place" is a plane-tree by the banks of the Ilissus "sacred to Achelous and the Nymphs." Thus, there is a kind of "divine presence" that stimulates Socrates' rapturous speech on love. Something similar happens in The Nouralists when Theocles is about to begin his final, and most sustained, apostrophes to Nature:

Here, Philocles, we shall find our sovereign genius, if we can charm the genius of the place (more chaste and sober than your Silenus) to inspire us with a truer song of Nature, teach us some celestial hymn, and make us feel divinity present in these solemn places of retreat.

Theocles here is veering Philocles away from his earlier pastoral playfulness in the Virgilian mode, hence the reference to the god of wine, Silenus, who appears to give a rhapsodic speech in the sixth


3. Characteristica II, 97.
Eclogue of the Bucolics. He is, in addition, invoking the "genius of place" and inducing Philoclus to do the same in order to fall into an "enthusiastic" mood. Thus, like Socrates, Theocles is also inspired by a "divine presence" and enchanted by the place in which he feels it. Philoclus' response to Theocles' invitation confirms that the place is "holy"; indeed, as will be shown, a Virgilian "sacred grove":

Haste then, I conjure you, said I, good Theocles, and stop not one moment for any ceremony or rite. For well I see, methinks, that without any such preparation some divinity has approached us and already moves in you. We are come to the sacred groves of the Hamadryads, which formerly were said to render oracles. We are on the most beautiful part of the hill, and the sun, now ready to rise, draws off the curtain of night and shows us the open scene of Nature in the plains below. Begin: for now I know you are full of those divine thoughts which meet you ever in this solitude. Give them but voice and accents; you may be still as much alone as you are used, and take no more notice of me as if I were absent.

1. That Philoclus' awakening "enthusiasm" should reveal itself in pastoral playfulness is in keeping with Shaftesbury's views on a good-humoured attitude as a prelude to "noble enthusiasm" but its dramatic effectiveness, even to those who enjoy pastoral poetry, seems questionable again, as so often in Shaftesbury, because of the excessive rhetoric: "My jealousy and love regard you only. I was afraid you had a mind to escape me; but now that I am again in possession of you, I want no nymph to make me happy here, unless it were perhaps to join forces against you, in the manner your beloved poet makes the nymph Aegle join with his two youths in forcing the god Silenus to sing to them" (Characteristics II, 96).

2. Characteristics II, 97.
Philocles' response is a key one because it makes clear that, though both Socrates and Theocles are inspired by a "divine presence" in a specific place, the relationship between Philocles and Theocles is not quite the same as that between Phaedrus and Socrates. Phaedrus's reaction to Socrates is much more restrained, and tends to be so throughout the Phaedrus. Philocles, on the other hand, is not merely receptive to what Theocles has to say but also echoes Theocles' "enthusiastic" rhetoric. Where Socrates requests silence from Phaedrus, Theocles finds Philocles almost demanding that he be ignored. What results is that Theocles and Philocles are so complementary to each other that Philocles' individuality almost disappears, so that Theocles' soliloquies hold the stage. It could be said that Socrates' speeches similarly dominate the Phaedrus but Socrates and the youthful, and somewhat conceited, Phaedrus are much more highly-individualized than Theocles and Philocles. The relationship between Theocles and Philocles, in any case, is within the framework of a dialectical strategy rather than a series of rhetorical speeches, as in the Phaedrus.

It is especially in Part III, Section I that Theocles' basically rhetorical descriptions of Nature begin to turn into dialectical argument in which "enthusiasm" for Nature becomes a higher form of reasoning. Theocles begins with a lengthy and rapturous strain on the immensity of Nature, which includes the following observation: "Thus having oft essayed, thus sallied forth into the wide expanse, when I return again within myself, struck with the sense of this so narrow being and of the fulness of that immense one, I dare no more behold the amazing depths nor sound the abyss of Deity."¹ Here,

¹. Characteristics II, 98.
Theocles' sense of a "divine presence is not only the result of an "inward colloquy" in the face of Nature but begins to imply an argument about the existence of God. This is especially so when it is recalled that in the immediately preceding exchange, Theocles talks of seeking "our sovereign genius."

Theocles' rapture, in any case, leads to an exchange where Philocles expresses doubts about the argument implied:

I only wish, said I, that you had been a little stronger in your transport, to have proceeded as you began, without ever minding me. For I was beginning to see wonders in that Nature you taught me, and was coming to know the hand of your divine Artificer. But if you stop here I shall lose the enjoyment of the pleasing vision. And already I begin to find a thousand difficulties in fancying such a universal genius as you describe.¹

Philocles, in other words, is more than willing to share in Theocles' "enthusiastic" raptures but is somewhat sceptical that they can prove the existence of God ("universal genius").

At this stage, Theocles abandons his rhapsodies and, instead, argues in a neo-Platonic vein for the individuality of all natural phenomena. It is the individuality of a tree or a human being (or a place for that matter) which Shaftesbury, following a quasi-religious concept derived from the Greeks and Romans, calls its "genius." He gives no actual proof that all things are individual but strong indirect evidence, at least in the case of human beings, when

¹. Characteristics II, 99.
Philocles challenges him on the point:

What you philosophers are, replied I, may be hard perhaps to determine, but for the rest of mankind, I dare affirm, that few are so long themselves as half seven years. 'Tis good fortune if a man be one and the same only for a day or two. A year makes more revolutions than can be numbered.

True, said he; but though this may happen to a man, and chiefly to one whose contrary vices set him at odds so often with himself, yet when he comes to suffer or be punished for those vices, he finds himself, if I mistake not, still one and the same. And you, Philocles, who, though you disown philosophy, are so true a proselyte to Pyrrhonism, should you at last, feeling the power of the Genius I preach, be wrought upon to own the divine hypothesis, and from this new turn of thought admit a total change in all your principles and opinions, yet would you be still the self-same Philocles, though better yet, if you will take my judgment, than the present one, as much as I love and value him. You see, therefore, there is a strange simplicity in this you and me, that in reality they should still be one and the same, when neither one atom of body, one passion, nor one thought remains the same.¹

As the multiplicity of psychological states in Philocles are all experienced by him, this not only proves to Philocles his own individuality but hints at the nature of Theocles' argument, for he

is about to demonstrate that one's own individual "genius" is affected by the "genius of place" due to a "sovereign Genius" who accounts for the unity in all the multiplicity of Nature.

Later a subsidiary argument develops about whether evil is actually illusory.¹ The argument is an elenctic one and Theocles proves to Philocles' satisfaction that "there is but ONE"² overall active principle in the world to which all others, including apparent evil, are subordinated. It is at this point that Theocles begins a long series of rhapsodical effusions which culminate in deducing that the "inward colloquy" induced by the "genius of place" must be the result of a "sovereign Genius."

As Samuel H. Monk points out, these passages anticipated the later eighteenth-century vogue of the "sublime" because they "served as an incentive to the appreciation of the wild and savage in nature."³ The consistent implications of an infinite deity, in any case, makes such passages both rhetorical and dialectical in aim. Dialectically, such passages consist of describing "sublime" prospects from which the universe, and the earth can be surveyed. It should be noted at this point that for Shaftesbury the "sublime" was not primarily a rhetorical device but a state of mind related to "enthusiasm." As Marjorie Nicolson points out,

¹. Characteristics II, 106-10.
Shaftesbury's "Sublime" was not Longinian. Indeed Longinus' name appears in his works so infrequently that a modern editor did not find it necessary to include it in his index. To Shaftesbury the true "Sublime" was not a rhetorical principle. Its source was not in Style, but in God and in the manifestations of Deity in the superabundance and diversity of His cosmic and terrestrial works. Rebelling against a word that was coming to cast a hypnotic spell upon his contemporaries, Shaftesbury like Dennis deliberately chose terms that were even more dangerous: "enthusiasm" and "enthusiastic."¹

Nicolson's observation implies a kind of dialectic in the "natural" (as distinguished from the "rhetorical" or Longinian) sublime because the experience of the "natural sublime" reveals a Deity and if this process is to be dramatized in a written description (that is, in a rhetorical way), it must also include a dialectic in order to reproduce the revelatory aspects of the process.²

1. Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite (Ithaca, New York, 1959), p.295. What Nicolson says about the "aesthetics of the infinite" inherent in the "natural sublime" confirms the dialectical nature of such an aesthetics and also serves, broadly speaking, as a good description of the dialectical process dramatized in The Moralists: "From Infinite God through vast Nature to the soul of man; from the soul of man through vast Nature back to Infinite God — here is the process that was becoming characteristic of 'The Aesthetics of the Infinite!'" (p.315). Hereinafter to be cited as Nicolson.

2. For the distinction between the "natural" and "rhetorical" sublime see R.S. Crane's review of S.H. Monk's The Sublime in Philological Quarterly, 15 (1936), 165-7. He points out about advocates of the "natural sublime," including Hume, Burke, Akenside and, presumably, Shaftesbury, that "Though their vocabulary was borrowed in part from Longinus, their essential preoccupations separated them sharply from that ancient rhetorician and his modern disciples; their characteristic subject-matter was not compositions and authors but 'the pleasures of the imagination' — the varied responses of men's feelings to stimuli from the outer world; they were psychologists inquiring about the emotions, not critics investigating the sources of high excellence in art."
Shaftesbury’s descriptions of sublime prospects, in any case, can be divided into two stages. In the first, and more rhetorical one, the vastness of the universe is described, as in this excerpt:

... What seats shall we assign to that fierce element of fire, too active to be confined within the compass of the sun, and not excluded even the bowels of the heavy earth? The air itself submits to it, and serves as its inferior instrument. Even this our sun, with all those numerous suns, the glittering host of Heaven, seem to receive from hence the vast supplies which keep them ever in their splendid state. The invisible ethereal substance, penetrating both liquid and solid bodies, is diffused throughout the universe. ...  

The first stage, however, does not provide a convenient prospect for reasoning about divinity and, indeed, Philocles objects to Theocles' rhetorical flights: "... you might well expect the fate of Icarus for your high-soaring."  

It is in the second stage that Theocles provides a "prospect" or framework for reasoning. Thus, the following (an "interruption") is a key exchange:

... I could wish you would go a little further with me in the map of Nature, especially if, descending from your lofty flights, you would be content to

1. Nicolson points out that "Shaftesbury's journey in The Moralists follows the structure of the 'cosmic voyage' he had inherited from the seventeenth century and anticipates the 'terrestrial excursion' of poets like David Wattle and James Thomson (Nicolson, 293).  
2. Characteristics II, 117.  
3. Characteristics II, 118.
pitch upon this humble spot of earth, 
where I could better accompany you, 
wherever you led me.

But you, replied he, who would 
confine me to this heavy earth, must 
yet allow me the same wings of fancy. 
How else shall I fly with you through 
different climates, from pole to pole, 
and from the frigid to the torrid zone?

Oh, said I, for this purpose I will 
allow you the Pegasus of the poets, or 
that winged Griffin which an Italian 
poet of the moderns gave to one of his 
heroes; yet on this condition, that you 
take no such extravagant flight, as his 
was, to the moon; but keep closely to 
this orb of earth.

Since you will have it so, replied 
Theocles, let us try first on the 
darkest and most imperfect parts of 
our map, and see how you can endure the 
prospect. ¹

By making his "prospect" more earthbound here, Shaftesbury is making 
his rhapsodical descriptions more subject to human reason and, at 
the same time, comes much closer to the "genius of the place" where 
Theocles and Philocles are discoursing. Each succeeding "prospect," 
in fact, focuses on a smaller area of space and time until, at last, 
the sharpest focus is on the "sacred grove."

At first, in any case, Theocles' earthbound and imaginary "prospect"

is on top of a mountain\(^1\) from which humanity and the wonders of Nature can be surveyed, and at different seasons:

... The sea, which elsewhere is scarce confined within its limits, lies here immured in walls of crystal. ...\(^2\)

............... 

... But let us turn our eyes towards these smaller and more curious objects, the numerous and devouring insects on the trees in these wide plains. Now shining, strong, and lasting are the subtle threads spun from their artful mouths. ...\(^3\)

............... 

... Innumerable are the dubious forms and unknown species which drink in the slimy current; whether they are such as, leaving the scorched deserts, satiate here their ardent thirst, and promiscuously engendering, beget a monstrous race; or whether (as it is said) by the sun's genial heat, active on the fermenting ooze, new forms are generated and issue from the river's fertile bed.\(^4\)

1. That mountains could induce "sublime" feelings was only a recent development in Shaftesbury's time and, indeed, the whole of Marjorie Nicolson's Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory is devoted to the question of how the revolutionary change in attitudes to mountains, when up to that time they were considered mainly as ugly protuberances on the face of the postlapsarian earth, came about. Nicolson considers, among other works, Thomas Burnet's Sacred Theory of the Earth (1684) and the writings of the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More, who strongly influenced Shaftesbury, as key documents in attitudes to mountains and the emergence of the "natural sublime." As for Shaftesbury's "mountain rhapsody" in The Moralists, Nicolson speculates that it was probably based on notes he might have made while crossing the Alps during his Grand Tour in 1686 (Nicolson, 289).


3. Characteristics II, 120.

Rhetorically, these descriptions are all contrived to engender "enthusiasm" for the vastness and variety of Nature and culminate in the numinous mystery of the "sacred grove."

The "sublime prospect" of Nature, in other words, is especially intensified at the "sacred grove" described by Theocles:

... But here, mid-way the mountain, ... a different horror seizes our sheltered travellers when they see the day diminished by the deep shades of the vast wood, which, closing thick above, spreads darkness and eternal night below. The faint and gloomy light looks horrid as the shade itself; and the profound stillness of these places imposes silence upon men, struck with the hoarse echoings of every sound within the spacious caverns of the wood. Here space astonishes; silence itself seems pregnant, whilst an unknown force works on the mind, and dubious objects move the wakeful sense. Mysterious voices are either heard or fancied, and various forms of deity seem to present themselves and appear more manifest in these sacred silvan scenes, such as of old gave rise to temples, and favoured the religion of the ancient world....

1. Characteristics II, 123. Cecil A. Moore's gloss on this passage in his essay entitled "The Return to Nature in English Poetry of the Eighteenth Century" is an interesting one because he compares it to the "mood of Wordsworth" and, by implication, links "inward colloquy" to Romantic poetry: "Instead of the humanistic love of solitude as merely a retreat favorable to examination and discipline of self, one finds much more frequently in Shaftesbury an express statement of nature's spiritual power over man. Instead of being objects of hatred, mountains are the special dwelling place of the Great Spirit." See Cecil A. Moore, Backgrounds of English Literature: 1700-1760 (Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1953), p. 74. Hereinafter to be cited as Moore.
Echoes of Virgil's "dark wood" of the Aeneid, Book VI (11. 179 ff.), and perhaps even Dante's, abound here. As Curtius points out, Virgil's "dark wood" leading to the underworld "trembles with rumen, the pervading presence of deity; it is the way to the other world, as it is in Dante ..." The same can be said of Shaftesbury's "sacred grove" and, although what Theocles describes to Philocles is an imaginary scene, its numinous "genius" cannot be much different from the "sacred groves of the Hamadryads" in which Theocles' discussion with Philocles takes place. The "divine presence," in other words, is felt strongest in the "sacred grove." In terms of the dialectic of The Korists, Theocles' "inward colloquy" searches deepest where "space astonishes" and "silence itself seems pregnant, whilst an unknown force works on the mind."

It is at this point, when Theocles gives the strongest hint that the "sovereign genius" is at his most numinous in the "sacred grove," that Philocles suddenly reveals what has finally made him succumb to Theocles' "spell": "Your genius, the genius of the place, and the

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2. Characteristics II, 97. When Philocles first meets Theocles on his own, he finds him reading Virgil: "To return therefore to that original rural scene and that heroic genius, the companion and guide of my first thoughts in those profounder subjects; I found him the first morning with his beloved Mantuan Lise, roving in the fields, where, as I had been informed at his house, he was gone out, after his usual way, to read (Characteristics II, 27)."
Great Genius have at last prevaild. "¹. What has happened, in other words, is that Philocles has experienced "genius" in all its traditional meanings as defined in classical mythology and medieval rhetoric.

Theocles' "genius" is his "higher self. "² The "genius of the place" is the "divine presence" evident in all places, but especially so and in an intensively numinous way in the Virgilian "sacred grove." The Great Genius is, for Shaftesbury, the Creator himself but the word "Genius" capitalized also refers to the goddess of Nature, "that spirit of nature which produces all things, from which generative power has its name."³ Strictly in terms of the dialectic of "genius," then, and laying aside the vexed question of Shaftesbury's apparent pantheism, it can be said that the "Great Genius" refers to the "personal

1. Characteristics II, 125. Philocles continues with, "I shall no longer resist the passion growing in us for things of a natural kind, where neither art nor the conceit or caprice of man has spoiled their genuine order by breaking in upon that primitive state. Even the rude rocks, the mossy caverns, the irregular unworked grottos and broken falls of water, with all the horrid graces of the wilderness itself, as representing Nature more, will be the more engaging, and appear with a magnificence beyond the formal mockery of princely gardens." Such passages have had much influence on English landscape gardening in the eighteenth century and this one, in particular, is widely-quoted by students of the period as an example of how the notion of "genius of place" was applied to the kind of landscape-gardening, especially approved by Pope, which avoided the strict formality and geometrical design of Continental ones. See Edward Balch, English Landscaping and Literature 1660-1840 (London, 1966), p.20 and Christopher Hussey, The Picturesque: Studies in a Point of View (London and New York, 1927), p.54.

2. As C.J. Lewis notes, "Mr. W. Harnd Fowler (in his Religious Experience of the Roman People, p.74) finds the origin of the 'Genius' of early Roman belief in the world-wide conception of a man's spiritual double or external soul which constitutes his higher self." Lewis's indirect reference is from his article on "Genius and Genius" in his Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature, collected by Walter Hooper (Cambridge, 1966), p.169. Hereinafter to be cited as Lewis.

God" perceived in Nature by those who are "enthusiastically" aware of the divinity inherent in all its manifestations.

To sum up, the dialectic of The Moralists consists of Theocles re-enacting the process by which he fully discovered his "good genius" or higher self and, by doing so, becomes a model for Philocles to do likewise. This inevitably involves recognition of Nature as the "sovereign Genius" which the "good genius" must follow. Thus, when Theocles compliments Philocles with "You do well ... to give me the midwife's part only," he is certainly alluding to his Socratic role but his method of "inward colloquy" also includes the conversion of the concept of "genius" into a dialectical argument. It is the "dialectic of genius," and its Virgilian echoes, in fact, that make The Moralists peculiarly sui generis and not merely Platonic as a philosophical dialogue.

The Moralists also contains Horatian allusions but these are not quite as important as the Virgilian ones because they lead to no dialectic but, rather, serve the purpose of showing that Theocles' love of Nature, though "enthusiastic," is that of a polished gentleman.

1. Without going into the question of Shaftesbury's "pantheism" in great detail, it is worth noting that, according to Green, Shaftesbury does not always distinguish clearly between "God" and "Nature" because of his "stress on the divine immanence" but, especially in the Characteristics, "usually makes a distinction between the two" (Green, 66). Although Green does not agree with Leslie Stephen, the qualifications he makes about Shaftesbury's identification of "God" with "Nature" suggest that Stephen's inconclusive remarks about Shaftesbury's "pantheism" are accurate and judicious: "Though at times Shaftesbury uses language which would fit into an orthodox sermon about a 'personal God,' his teaching seems to adapt itself more naturally to the pantheism of Spinoza." See Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Nineteenth Century, third ed., vol. II (London, 1902), p. 25.

with philosophical inclinations; hence the famous Horatian tag about the "groves of academia" as an epigraph for The Moralists: "Inter silvas Acedemiae verum" (Hor. Ep. II, ii)\(^1\) and, also, this interesting exchange between Philocles and Theocles, where Shaftesbury seems to be somewhat on the defensive:

... he showed me his poet, and looking pleasantly, now tell me truly, said he, Philocles, did you not expect some more mysterious book than this? I owned I did considering his character, which I took to be of so contemplative a kind. And do you think, said he, that without being contemplative, one can truly relish those diviner poets? Indeed, said I, I never thought there was any need of growing contemplative, or retiring from the world, to read Virgil or Horace.

You have named two, said he, who can hardly be thought so very like, though they were friends and equally good poets. Yet joining them as you are pleased to do, I would willingly learn from you whether in your opinion there be any disposition so fitted for reading them as that in which they writ themselves. In this, I am sure, they both joined heartily: to love retirement; when for the sake of such a life and habit as you call contemplative, they were willing to sacrifice the highest advantages, pleasures, and favour of a court.\(^2\)

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1. In the Everyman's Library translation, this is rendered as "... and to seek for the truth/Among the groves of Academia." See Horace, Collected Works, trans. by Lord Dunsany and Michael Oakley (London, 1961), p.278.

By revealing Theocles' allegiance to Horace and Virgil, Shaftesbury perhaps indicates that the urbanity of the former is not incompatible with the sublimity of the other and thus undercuts any criticism that Theocles is a mere "enthusiast" of the Platonic persuasion. Horace's urbane love of Nature, in any case, is appealed to when, in *Advice to an Author*, Shaftesbury recommends "some thick wood" or "some high hill" as the best places for authors, especially poets, to practice "inward colloquy": "Scriptorum chorus omnis amat nemus et fugit urbes" (Hor. Ep. II, ii). By quoting Horace here, Shaftesbury emphasizes the practical rather than the luminous aspects of the process. The "thick wood" is more of a quiet retreat than a "sacred grove" and, in less "enthusiastic" moments, the same is true of the "sylvan scenes" in *The Koralists*.

Although Diderot's *Le Neveu de Rameau* and *The Koralists* are very different in their styles of dialogue, it is interesting to note that in both, though much less so in Shaftesbury's dialogue, mime plays a significant role. Just before and after one of Theocles' rhapsodical outbursts, for example, Philocles makes the following observations:

> Just as I had said this, he turned away his eyes from me, musing awhile by himself; and soon afterwards, stretching out his hand, as pointing to the objects round him, he began:

> ……………………. 

> Here he stopped short, and starting as cut of a dream: now, Philocles, said he, inform me, how have I appeared to you in my fit? Seemed it a sensible kind of madness, like those transports which are permitted to our poets? or was it downright raving? 

1. *Characteristica I*, 107. This is rendered by the editor as "The whole band of authors loves a wood and shuns a city."

Hero, evidently, the workings of the "sovereign Genius" in Theroles
involve a gestural manifestation of "enthusiasm." Diderot, however,
takes such gestures much further, as in the nephew's mime of artistic
genius in the following description by "Koi" doubling as narrator:

Il pleurait, il riait, il soupirait, il
regardait ou attendait, ou tranquille, ou
furieux; c'était un malheureux livre à
tout son désespoir; un temple qui s'élève;
des ciseaux qui se taient au soleil
couchant; des eaux ou qui murmurent dans
un lieu solitaire et frais, ou qui
descendent en torrent du haut des
montagnes; un orage, une tempête, la
plainte de ceux qui vont périr, mâle ou
ciètement des vents, au fracas du
tonnerre. C'était la nuit avec ses
ténèbres, c'était l'ombre et le silence,
car le silence même se point par des sons.
Sa tête était tout à fait perdue.

Far from being inspired by a divine "genius," however, the nephew's
frenzied gesturing hero is only, as Otis Fellows points out, a poor
substitute for the process of artistic creation which properly belongs
to the true "genius" — a word whose meaning for Diderot was much closer
to the modern one as applied to a human being with highly exceptional

1. Quoted in Otis E. Fellows, "The Theme of Genius in Diderot's
Le Neveu de Rameau," Diderot Studies, 2 (1952), 193. Hereinafter to
be cited as Fellows.
2. See Fellows 193-5. Fellows maintains of Le Neveu de Rameau, as
a whole, that "through the medium of the nephew Diderot has
presented us with a brilliant pantomime of the inspired artist,
but it is still and only pantomime."
There is, nevertheless, a hint of pathos, and much philosophical and dramatic interest, in the fact that the nephew's mime is genuinely (if not "divinely") inspired in that it does convey something of the "enthusiasm" of artistic creation. The technique of describing gestures to convey "enthusiasm" in philosophical discussion, in any case, becomes a much more complex and sophisticated one in Diderot's hands than it ever does in The Moralists.

That Shaftesbury's apostrophes to Nature had a considerable influence on later nature poets, including Thomson and Akenside, and on Romantic poetry has been a critical commonplace at least since the publication of Cecil A. Moore's "The Return to Nature in English Poetry of the Eighteenth Century" in 1917 and needs no elaboration here, except to suggest that the "dialectic of genius" in The Moralists strongly anticipates the Romantic attitude to "genius." This is because just as in The Moralists, Theocles is a kind of "poetic genius" inspired by the "genius of place," so do many Romantic poems, as Geoffrey Hartman points out, exhibit a relationship between the

1. As Herbert Dieckmann points out, Diderot follows Edward Young in equating "genius" with "original" but Diderot's analysis, which is scattered throughout many of his critical and literary works and not always consistent, of the "original genius" is intimately connected with "enthusiasm" as a psychological and even physiological process rather than a divinely-inspired one. In Edward Young's Conjectures, on the other hand, the "original genius" is similar to Shaftesbury's "higher self" and, indeed, at times takes part in a kind of "inward colloquy," albeit a far more egocentric one than Shaftesbury's: "Therefore dive deep into thy bosom; learn the depth, extent, bias, and full forth of thy mind; contract full intimacy with the Stranger within thee; excite, and cherish every spark of Intellectual light and heat, however smothered under former negligence, or scattered through the dull, dark mass of common thoughts; and collecting them into a body, let thy Genius rise (if a Genius thou hast) as the sun from Chaos; ..." See Herbert Dieckmann, "Diderot's Concept of Genius," Journal of the History of Ideas, 2(1941), 151-82, and Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition (London, 1759), p.53.


3. It is available in Moore, 53-103.
"poetic genius" and the "genius loci."¹ In Romantic poetry, where "genius" has the more restricted meaning of referring to an isolated individual of outstandingly "original" imagination, however, this relationship is not entirely harmonious but often with at least a hint of "demonic" tension.² Shaftesbury's more harmonious version, which conforms to his older and more protean notion of "genius," nevertheless, does anticipate the characteristic presentation of landscape and persona in Romantic poetry. When Blake gives a polemical definition of "genius" in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell on evidently historical principles, at any rate, he comes close to giving an exact description of the "dialectic of genius" in The Moralist:

The ancient Poets animated all sensible objects with Gods or Geniuses, calling them by the names and adorning them with the properties of woods, rivers, mountains, lakes, cities, nations, and whatever their enlarged & numerous senses could perceive. (sic.)

And particularly they studied the genius of each city & country, placing it under its mental deity:

Till a system was formed, which some took advantage of, & enslav'd the vulgar by attempting to realize or abstract the mental deities from their objects: thus began Priesthood;

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² As Hartman points out, even in one of the greatest of Romantic poems, Wordsworth's Tintern Abbey, the "genius loci" is not entirely harmonious but haunted by a hermit: "Tintern Abbey, the perfect instance of a meditation on English landscape as alma matter, still shows Wordsworth's mind moving toward a ghostly figure, that of the Hermit" (Hartman, 311).
Choosing forms of worship from poetic tales.

And at length they pronounc'd that the Gods had order's such things.

Thus men forgot that All deities reside in the human breast.¹

The merging of "genius loci" and the "deities residing in the human breast" described by Blake here is equally applicable both to one of the central concerns of Romantic poetry and the direction of Shaftesbury's "dialectic of genius" in The Moralists.²

The uniqueness of The Moralists as a philosophical dialogue becomes especially evident when contrasted to Dialogue IX of David Fordyce's Dialogues Concerning Education, which deals with subject-matter very similar to Shaftesbury's in The Moralists.³ As in Shaftesbury's work, a rapturous apostrophe to Nature plays a very important part in the dialogue. There is no sense of "inward colloquy," however, because "Hiero's" soliloquy, far from overwhelming the dialogue with "sublime" rhetoric, is just an incident in it. The dramatic situation,


² Blake's tone in the passage also echoes both Shaftesbury's militant deism and the "revolutionary" political attitudes of the Romantic poets at the beginning of their careers.

³ Fordyce was Professor of Philosophy at Marischal College, Aberdeen and his work is a veritable compendium of eighteenth-century styles of dialogue. In its combination of gravely-polite disquisition and rigorous reasoning, it is reminiscent of Berkeley's dialogues but it also contains (notably in Dialogue IX) rhetorical effusions in Shaftesbury's vein. Thus Chalmers' Biographical Dictionary describes the Dialogues as "of very considerable merit, but somewhat tinged with the fopperies of the school of Shaftesbury, although entirely free from its more injurious notions." See Alexander Chalmers, Biographical Dictionary, revised edition, vol. 14 (London, 1814), pp.468-70.
in fact, is not one where the solemn "enthusiasm" of a Theocles causes Philocles to emulate him but the somewhat amusing one of a "Simplicius" spying on "Hieroo' and taking down his soliloquy.¹

Theocles' soliloquies induce a sense of the numinous but that of Hieroo, though it displays "enthusiasm" in the face of Nature, seems more like a series of doctrinally orthodox statements eloquently stated, as in the following excerpt:

... But whence this Quickness and Range of Thought? This Flight of Imagination and Divinity of Reason? Hence but from the Source of all Intelligence and Wisdom? But a while since, his minister, the Sun, spread a cheerful warmth through my mortal divine Sensations pervading my immortal Part. Who then kindled this celestial Fire? Who lighted up this Consciousness of my higher Relation, and taught my Bosom to beat with inexpressible Joy? Who but God, inspiring God, that kind and gentle Being, whose supreme Delight is to diffuse Happiness for ever, and whose Bounty extends to all, without Partiality or Envy?²

"Hieroo" modestly treats his "rhapsody" as an "enthusiastic" outburst which is "rhapsodical" precisely because, when the then prevailing pejorative meaning of the word "rhapsody" is taken into

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account, of its incoherence: ¹

I MUCH doubt, Gentlemen, that the Rhapsodist is not a little obliged to the Reciter "Simplicius" who is reciting Hiero's soliloquy to a club of debaters, for the Distinctness and coherence of the Rhapsody. I am afraid the Heat of an extempore Transport would scarce have produced a piece of Reasoning, which seems to hang together, and which does not want in Colouring and Imagery, unless it had been laboured and wrought up by the cool Touches of the Closet. ²

"Sophron," on the other hand, assumes, in his reply to Hiero's doubts, that a "rhapsody" need not necessarily be incoherent:

... nor do I think it, with my Friend's Leave, quite polite, to assert positively, that a warm Imagination kindled to an uncommon Degree, by the mild Splendour of a morning Sun, and a full Prospect of Nature, in its most verdant Dress and amiable Attitudes, amidst the consenting Chorus of the Animal Creation, may not have cast off a beautiful and well-connected Rhapsody. ³

In this exchange, in fact, Shaftesbury's rehabilitation of the word "rhapsody" can be seen at work.

1. Dr. Johnson's definition of "rhapsody" as "any number of parts joined together, without necessary dependence or natural connection" was a meaning often applied disparagingly to literary works by such diverse figures as Addison, Defoe, and Horace Walpole, the best-known example being, according to Pat Rogers, Shakespeare's usage in Hamlet's phrase "A rhapsody of words" (III.iv.48). Rogers maintains that "this shade of meaning dominated all others for a long time." See Pat Rogers, "Shaftesbury and the Aesthetics of Rhapsody," British Journal of Aesthetics, 12 (1972), 246-8.

2. Fordyce, 247.

3. Fordyce, 247.
Shaftesbury, himself, explained his motives for subtitling his work a "philosophical rhapsody" in the following manner:

"... our author himself ... to conceal ... his strict imitation of the ancient poetic dialogue, has prefixed an auxiliary title to his work, and given it the surname of Rhapsody. As if it were merely of that essay or mixed kind of works, which come abroad with an affected air of negligence and irregularity. But whatever our author may have affected in his title page, 'twas so little his intention to write after that model of incoherent workmanship, that it appears sorely against his will if this dialogue piece of his has not the just character and correct form of those ancient poems described."

Although in the above remarks from the *Miscellaneous Reflections* Shaftesbury repudiates any notion that *The Moralists* is actually a "rhapsody," but only labelled so to avoid alienating aristocratic readers uninterested in deep philosophical speculation, yet these remarks are a footnote to a statement which implies that the dialogue does contain a certain "rhapsodical" element in the now obsolete sense of the term:

"... it attempts to unite the several personages and characters in one action or story, within a determinate compass of time, regularly divided and drawn into different and proportioned scenes; and this, too, with variety of styles; the simple, comic, rhetorical, and even the poetic or sublime, such as is the aptest to run into enthusiasm and

extravagance. So much is our author, by virtue of this piece, a poet in due form, and by a more apparent claim than if he had writ a play or dramatic piece in as regular a manner, at least, as any known at present on our stage.¹

The unified structure of The Moralists that Shaftesbury insists on, then, is the dramatic unity of philosophical dialogue as an ancient genre; otherwise there is a diversity of styles which makes it a "rhapsody" in the obsolete sense but, since the "poetic or sublime" element Shaftesbury refers to is the dominant style,² it is a "rhapsody" in the sense almost discarded by Augustan writers and rehabilitated later in the eighteenth century.

At this point it should be evident that Shaftesbury's method of dialogue is radically different from that of Berkeley and Mandeville and, basically, for three reasons. These are, the dialectical function of the setting as "genius of place," the dominance of the rhetoric of the "natural sublime" over logical argument, and the dramatization of complementary states of mind rather than irreconcilable attitudes. Put another way, dialectical argument is


2. According to Ernst Cassirer, "The style of Shaftesbury's 'Moralists' is not abstract and dialectical, but rhapsodic and hymnic; and in this hymnic style the original force of the Platonic doctrine of Eros was revived for modern times." Cassirer, however, lays too much emphasis on Shaftesbury's "enthusiastic" rhetoric, so that Leibniz's evaluation of The Moralists, though equally favourable, is a more balanced one: "The turn of the method of arguing through questions, but, above all, the grandeur and beauty of the ideas, their luminous enthusiasm, the apostrophe to deity, ravished me and brought me to a state of ecstasy." See Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, trans. by James P. Pettegrove (Edinburgh, 1953), p.198 and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, Vol. II, trans. and edited by Leroy E. Loemker (Chicago, 1956), pp.1029-30.
subordinate to rhapsodical feeling in *The Moralists*. It looks forward, in fact, to the decline of philosophical dialogue in Britain after reaching its apex in Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. Seen in this light, Shaftesbury's true English heir may well be Walter Savage Landor in his series of *Imaginary Conversations*. This is especially true of Landor's "expository" Conversations, such as "Rousseau and Malherbe," a political discussion, and "Epicurus, Leontion and Ternissa," a dramatization of Epicurean ideas. These are distinguishable from his more strictly dramatic ones such as "Tiberius and Vipsania," which focuses on the emperor's tragic love-affair, and "Peter the Great and Alexis," a melodramatically fatal confrontation between the Czar and his son.

As in *The Moralists*, close dialectical argument is never very strong or long sustained in the expository Conversations. Even more than in the case of Shaftesbury, however, rhapsodical prose is Landor's forte. In "Epicurus, Leontion, and Ternissa," for example, Landor dramatizes the Epicurean state of mind by allowing Epicurus to become rhapsodical at appropriate moments, as in this exchange:

**TERNISSA.**

O what a thing is age!

**LEONTION.**

Death without death's quiet. But we will converse upon it when we know it better.

**EPICURUS.**

My beloved! we will converse upon it at the present hour, while the harshness of its features is indiscernible, not only

to you, but even to me, who am much nearer

to it. Disagreeable things, like disagreeable

men, are never to be spoken of when they are

present. Do we think, as we may do in such

a morning as this, that the air awakens the

leaves around us only to fade and perish?

Do we, what is certain, think that every

note of music we ever heard, every voice

that ever breathed into our bosoms, and

played upon its instrument the heart, only

wafted us on a little nearer to the tomb?

Let the idea not sadden but compose us.

Let us yield to it, just as season yields

to season, hour to hour, and with a bright

serenity, such as Evening is invested with

by the departing Sun. ... 1

Landor here evokes an elegiac mood which has its philosophical

implications but is further removed from dialectical argument than

Shaftesbury's "rhapsodies." Landor's dialogues, then, can be

classified as Romantic versions of philosophical dialogue, the

salient characteristics of which are already found, to a large extent,
in The Moralists.

Although William Gilpin's A Dialogue Containing a Description of

the Gardens of the Right Honourable the Lord Viscount Cobham is better

known as one of Gilpin's early treatises on landscape gardening; than

as a philosophical dialogue, 2 yet it is one of the most felicitous

1. Walter Savage Landor, Imaginary Conversations of Greeks and


2. Excerpts from Gilpin's dialogue, for example, are anthologized

in a recent collection of excerpts from treatises on landscape
gardening. See John Dixon Hunt and Peter Willis, eds., The Genius

of the Place: The English Landscape Garden 1620-1820 (London,

examples of the genre in the eighteenth century, with the added interest that its use of the "genius of place" is similar to Shaftesbury's and arguably more successful as a setting for discussion and enthusiastic rapture. Part of Gilpin's advantage over Shaftesbury is that the "genius" he invokes is that of a real place, Cobham's famed garden at Stowe which Pope admired as "a place to wonder at."¹

On the whole, Gilpin is less solemn than Shaftesbury, as can be seen in the following exchange induced by an "artfully" contrived "genius of place," the Temple of Contemplation at Stowe:

... This Building stands retired in a thick woven Grove upon the Banks of the Serpentine River. Here Callophilus, sitting down, begged his Friend would excuse him one Moment; for he had an Inclination, he said, to tempt the Genius of the Place. An agreeable Retreat, says he, always inspires me with a Kind of Enthusiasm - I must indulge the thrilling Transport. Come, my Friend, sit down; and tell me if you do not admire the Taste of these buzzing Insects, retired from a glaring Sunshine into this peaceful Shade? - Nay, said Polyphont, if you are in this Strain, I'll leave you to invoke your Egeria alone; I never interrupt Lovers - Callophilus protested he should not stir: You mistake, says he, the Nature of my melancholy. It is not of the sequestring Kind. It never disqualifies me for the Conversation of a Friend: How indeed should it? it is not the result of a sowered Humour, but of the utmost Self-enjoyment - Take care,

take care, reply'd Polyphantn, how you dally
with such self-enjoyment. ... \(^1\)

With its polished liveliness and desultory banter, the above exchange suggests that Gilpin is far more interested in the dramatic effect of the scene than in infecting the reader with "enthusiasm." It is almost as if Mandeville had a hand in subverting the "sublime" purpose of the invocation of the "genius of place."\(^2\)

While Gilpin's dialogue, despite some similarities of technique, tends to subvert Shaftesbury's method of dialogue, Shaftesbury's influence as a dialogue writer is much more direct not in any English writer but in J.C. Herder's God, Some Conversations.\(^3\) Herder's dialogue is basically a defense of Spinoza and an exposition of his own theological views.\(^4\) It is somewhat more systematic in its presentation of ideas than The Moralists but, as in Shaftesbury's dialogue, rhapsodic enthusiasm plays a large part. Herder, himself,

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1. William Gilpin, A Dialogue: Containing a Description of the Gardens of the Right Honourable the Lord Viscount Cobham, at Stow in Buckinghamshire, third ed. (London, 1751), p.12. The "Noria" refers to a nymph-like goddess of water, as described in Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford, 1966). She is also mentioned by Philoecoles, but not invoked, in Characteristica II, 27. According to legend, as described in the Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, she regularly met King Ruma beside a sacred spring at night and inspired him with her counsels. It is this legend that Philoecoles (as well as Polyphant) alludes to when he mentions how his dream of being inspired by an unseen Theocles reminds him of the "Roman sage" and his Fgeria.

2. As Barbier, who relates Gilpin's dialogue to The Moralists, puts it, "As for Shaftesbury's 'enthusiasm,' Gilpin was too well balanced for this notion to boil him over ..." See Carl Paul Barbier, William Gilpin, His Draminae, Teaching, and Theory of the Pictorean (Oxford, 1963), p.23.

3. Shaftesbury's technique of dialogue is also evident in the dialogue sections of Herder's Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews. An English translation of these sections, entitled Oriental Dialogues was published in London in 1801.

4. See the translator's introduction in Johann Gottfried Herder, God, Some Conversations, trans. by Frederick H. Burkhardt (New York, 1949), pp.3-11. Herder's work was first published in 1787. From hereinafter to be cited as Herder.
alludes to Shaftesbury's work at the end of his Preface to the second edition of the Conversations and calls it "those amiable dialogues."¹ In addition, the fifth and last conversation ends with Shaftesbury's "Hymn to Nature," which is one of Theocles' rhapsodic outbursts in the last part of The Moralists.

Each conversation ends and is interspersed with "hymns" about the nature of God but, unlike Theocles' rhapsodic outbursts, the hymns are culled from poets. The hymns are the result of argument which develops into enthusiastic rapture, as in the following excerpt:

THEOPHRON: ... I at least, my friend, feel so enervated by every philosophy which plays with that type of symbolical words without ideas and without objects, that I cannot soon enough return to nature, to existence, just to become aware again that I am alive. We, too, Philolaus, in our discussion have often had to use the name of God as a mere symbol. How would it be if we interrupted it now, and you played to me, in your expressive way, a gentle song or a hymn by which our soul might be refreshed again?

PHILOLAUS: I desire the same.²

At this point Philolaus sings a hymn by Ewald von Kleist (1715-59) and, at the end of it, Theophron is moved to say: "Thank you, Philolaus. Through your harmonious singing you have inwardly refreshed me with Kleist's thoughts. I should like to say of music what Vanini said of his straw. 'If I were so unfortunate as to doubt of the existence of God, and had music, then it alone would be

¹ Harder, 71.
² Herder, 147.
proof enough for me."\(^1\) This exchange, in fact, is a more sophisticated version of Theocles' manner of interrupting rational argument to rhapsodize about his own intuitions induced by a contemplation of Nature. Theophron here implies that rational argument can be too abstract for discussing the nature of God and that, sooner or later, one must rely on an outburst of feeling adequately represented only by poetry. Whereas Herder is more subtle than Shaftesbury in his technique is in his fine gradations of "enthusiasm," for what causes Theophron to request a hymn from Philolaus is not a fit of "divine enthusiasm" but his sense of an emotional gap in philosophical discussions of God, and this leads him to become "enthusiastic," as a temporary, but defiant, reaction against rational argument.

Another Romantic dialogue, which is much more of an "inward colloquy" than The Moralists, makes up a section of the German philosopher J.G. Fichte's The Vocation of Man. Although it is Fichte's own popularization of his idealist philosophical system,\(^2\) highly abstract argument prevails over literary technique. In style, nevertheless, it has some affinity with Shaftesbury's soliloquizing mode of writing in the Characteristics, especially Advice to an Author, Miscellaneous Reflections, and The Moralists.

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1. Herder, 149.

2. Fichte remarks in the Preface that "This book is ... not intended for philosophers by profession, who will find nothing in it that has not been already set forth in other writings of the same author. It ought to be intelligible to all readers who are able to understand a book at all." See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Popular Works, fourth ed., Vol. I (London, 1889), p.321. The Vocation of Man was first published in 1800. Hereinafter to be cited as Fichte.
The Vocation of Man makes no attempt at creating characters to represent different states of mind, as in The Moralists; instead, the reader is confronted with an "I" who converses with a "Spirit" in a dream. As the "Spirit" hints at, the conversation is a process of self-questioning:

... I bring thee no new revelation. What I can teach thee thou already knowest, and thou hast but recall it to thy remembrance. I cannot deceive thee; for in every step thou thyself wilt acknowledge me to be in the right; and shouldst thou still be deceived, thou wilt be deceived by thyself. Take courage; - listen to me, and answer my questions.¹

Elsewhere, the "Spirit" reiterates that "Thou hast well understood me, or rather thyself."² and "I say nothing in my own name. Examine, - help thyself!"³ and, as his final words, "I leave thee alone with thyself."⁴ Inward colloquy in The Vocation of Man, however, finally leads to self-deception, in which the "I" finds that the only conclusion he can reach is that "All reality is transformed into a strange dream, without a life which is dreamed of, and without a mind which dreams it; - into a dream which is woven together into a dream

¹. Fichte, 355. In the Preface, Fichte exhorts the reader, in a manner highly reminiscent of Shaftesbury’s promotion of the "gymnastic method" of "self-converse," to "rally and truly hold converse with himself, deliberate, draw conclusions and form resolutions, like his imaginary representative, and thus, by his own labour and reflection, develop(sic.) and build up within himself that mode of thought the mere picture of which is presented in this book." See Fichte, 322.

². Fichte, 387.

³. Fichte, 398.

⁴. Fichte, 382.
It is no accident, then, and, indeed, an adroit literary touch, that the dialogue takes place in a disembodied dream with no recognizable setting or "genius of place." Where in The Moralists Philocles' broadminded scepticism leads to enthusiastic rapture, in The Vocation of Man, "I"'s willingness to examine his own basic assumptions only leads to pyrrhonism.  

Viewed as a Romantic dialogue, it is appropriate that this section of Fichte's work should end on such a note because philosophical dialogue does not really lend itself to an emphasis on the subjective but on ideas that can be discussed within the sociable environment of an animated conversation. In Shaftesbury's dialogue, conversation still plays an important part, if only as a necessary prelude and dramatic foil to enthusiastic rapture induced by soliloquy in the face of Nature. In Fichte's, however, the whole emphasis is on the subjective consciousness which finally "surrenders" to faith in Book III of The Vocation of Man. It participates in dialogue not as a social activity but as a dream of inward colloquy leading to self-deception. Since the Romantic dialogues of Landor and Fichte are the two logical extremes of different elements in Shaftesbury's style of dialogue, it is not surprising that his influence is much more important in Romantic poetry than in philosophical dialogue.

1. Fichte, 402.

2. This is more explicitly stated in Fichte, 410.
CHAPTER VIII. DIALECTICAL CHOREOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL DRAMA
IN BERKLEY'S ALCIPHRON

"... an attentive reader will find that there is scarcely a single argument that can be urged in defence of Revelation but what is here placed in the clearest light, and in the most beautiful diction: in this work there is a happy union of reasoning and imagination. The two different characters of the two different sorts of free-thinkers, the sensual and the refined, are strongly contrasted with each other, and with the plainness and simplicity of Euphranor."

Joseph Warton in An Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope (1782)
Berkeley's Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher is not only one of the greatest philosophical dialogues of the eighteenth century but a work of Christian apologetics; indeed, a bold and aggressive defence of Anglican Christianity. He is almost unique in combining the "disinterestedness" of argument and dramatic flair essential to the genre with the polemical aims of an apologetic work. The tradition of "the defence of Christian faith on intellectual grounds by trained theologians and philosophers," in fact, does not include many formal dialogues. There are, nevertheless, some distinguished ones in the corpus worth mentioning. One of the earliest is Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, in which the "Apologist," a converted philosopher of the Platonic persuasion, either records a genuine conversation or fictionally recounts his own arguments in favour of Christianity against Trypho the Jew. Although Louis Vives' De Veritate Fidei Libri V includes discussions between a Christian and a Jew and a Christian and a Mohammedan, among medieval scholastics perhaps only Abelard's unfinished Dialogue inter Philosophum et Christianum can be considered as a true philosophical dialogue in an apologetic vein. The very title of Abelard's dialogue hints at a philosophical broadmindedness in that he finds no difficulty in having a Christian discourse with a Jew and a philosopher instead of dealing


2. The definition comes from The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church.

with them separately, as Vives does with the Jew and the Mohammedan. 1

Berkeley, in any case, is admirably successful at sublimating polemical bias into a lofty and vigorous drama of ideas. His target is every variety of Deist and enemy of Christianity of his day. As he puts it in the "Advertisement," "The author's design being to consider the free-thinker in the various lights of atheist, libertine, enthusiast, scorrer, critic, metaphysician, fatalist, and sceptic, it must not therefore be imagined that every one of these characters agrees with every individual free-thinker, no more being implied than that each part agrees with some or other of the sect." 2 In his apologetic attack on the Deists Berkeley was not alone, for Deism was the chief philosophical opponent of Christian orthodoxy in the eighteenth century. 3 As Deism was not entirely anti-Christian but a kind of rationalistic belief in a remote God responsible for the "mechanical" laws which govern the universe and an advocacy of morality for its own sake, rather than in terms of future rewards and punishments, the many apologetic works of this period emphasized the "reasonableness of Christianity," itself the title of Locke's defence of it. The most distinguished of these works, however, such as Law's The Case of Reason (1731) and Butler's Analogy of Religion (1736) were not in dialogue form. Especially when one considers Berkeley's impeccable philosophical credentials, his Alciphron, then, is unique in demonstrating, as will be seen, the "reasonableness of

1. According to J. Ramsay McCallum Abelard's Dialogue "exhibits a penchant for religious reconciliation that must have been as unusual in the Middle Ages as it has been until very recent years." See Abelard's Christian Theology (Oxford, 1948), p. 2.


Berkeley's concern for dramatic presentation is almost immediately apparent in that "Dion," the narrator of the seven dialogues which make up the Alciphron, is, much like Hume's "Pamphilus" in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, a very self-effacing presence but one which gives us essential information about the interlocutors as characters within the dramatic context of the dialogues, which may be more dramatically direct but seem somewhat less dramatically self-contained because he is forced to provide information about the interlocutors in the prefaces. "Dion"'s descriptions, in any case, vividly recreate the scenes, and that because he wants to "entertain" his friend "Theages" with some "amusing incidents" rather than dwell on the failure "of the affair which brought me to this remote corner of the country."  

Dion's carefully-detailed description of the protagonists in the discussions prepares the reader for the mode of argument each will adopt. To begin with Euphranor, he is the host of the discussions and an independent landowner. Dion's description of him is basically that of a thoughtful and retiring person who, to paraphrase Voltaire, "cultivates his own garden" and is not much affected by fashion: "He hath read much, and thought more; his health and strength of body enabling him the better to bear fatigue of mind. He is of opinion that he could not carry on his studies with more advantage in the

1. One of the chief Deist works attacked by Berkeley in the Alciphron, Matthew Tindal's Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730), is in the dialogue form. It contains, however, very little attempt at dramatization and little of conversational style. Tindal's representative, in fact, tends to be assigned long, expository paragraphs unrelieved by any enlivening hint of character.

2. Berkeley III, 31. This is a thinly-disguised allusion to the failure of Berkeley's Bermuda project which, in fact, resulted in his writing the Alciphron.
closer than the field, where his mind is seldom idle while he prunes the trees, follows the plough, or looks after his flocks. This is in great contrast to Alciphron, a jaded and widely-travelled aristocrat: "Alciphron is above forty, and no stranger either to men or books. I knew him first at the Temple, which, upon an estate's falling to him, he quitted, to travel through the polite parts of Europe. Since his return he hath lived in the amusements of the town, which, being grown stale and tasteless to his palate, have flung him into a sort of splanetic indolence." What is perhaps most damming in the contrast between Euphranor and Alciphron is that the former is no mere contemplative but a highly-productive man in his farming activities. Alciphron, on the other hand, has the unproductive social role of a consumer of pleasures. Crito is simply described as "a neighbouring gentleman of distinguished merit and estate, who lives in great friendship with Euphranor." One can infer from such a description that Crito is much more of a man of the world than Euphranor, though, as his friendship with Euphranor suggests, one not corrupted by it. It should be noted at this point that the description of Alciphron is not a direct one of Dion's but a report of Crito's description of him. This enhances the fictive illusion that Dion is a lively letter-writer faithfully reporting every detail of the discussions in which he was a modestly marginal participant. By doing so, Berkeley keeps his distance from all the "dramatis personae," whether Christian or otherwise, and that, in itself, tends to reinforce a reading of this dialogue as a kind of dramatic presentation. As for Lysicles, Crito describes him as "a near

2. Berkeley III, 32.
kinsman of mine, one of lively parts and a general insight into letters, who, after having passed the forms of education and seen a little of the world, fell into an intimacy with men of pleasure and free-thinking, I am afraid much to the damage of his constitution and his fortune. Although both are anti-Christian, Alciphron's "splenetic indolence" and Lysicles' contrasting "lively parts" make, as will be seen, a great deal of difference in how each one argues his case against Christianity.

Before investigating the dialectical structure and polemical aims of the Alciphron, however, it is interesting to note that Berkeley often makes argument scintillating in its effect by including subtly dramatic touches distinct from, yet not unrelated to, the treatment of the interlocutors as well-defined characters. In the Third Dialogue, for example, Euphranor alludes to the chair Alciphron is sitting on to make a complex point about aesthetics in a simple and clear-cut manner:

**EUPHRANOR.** ... Could the chair you sit on, think you, be reckoned well proportioned or handsome, if it had such a height, breadth, wideness, and was not so far reclined as to afford a convenient seat?

**ALCIPHRON.** It could not.

**EUPHRANOR.** The beauty, therefore, or symmetry of a chair cannot be apprehended but by knowing its use, and comparing its figure with that use; which cannot be done by the eye alone, but is the effect of judgment. It is, therefore, one thing to see an object, and another to discern its beauty.

**ALCIPHRON.** I admit this to be true.

Euphranor's example could not be more dramatically appropriate as it reminds the reader that this is a "tea-table" discussion, as described by Dion at the beginning of the Third Dialogue when he informs Theages that Alciphron was at his ease "reclining in his chair." It is almost as if Alciphron is paying for his indolence in assuming that he does not have to be on his guard against Euphranor's arguments.

Generally speaking, Euphranor and Crito reinforce each other's arguments. Alciphron and Lysicles, on the other hand, actually undermine each other despite their alliance against the Christians. This makes for a very lively and complex dialectic based on a highly-charged dramatic situation; moreover, there is nothing arbitrary about Alciphron and Lysicles undermining each other because, whereas Alciphron represents the more idealistic free-thinkers of the Deist persuasion, such as Shaftesbury and his followers, Lysicles represents the more cynical and, in Berkeley's eyes at any rate, atheistic freethinkers, Man eville being apparently considered one of the most notorious. Berkeley's concern with both of these kinds of infidelity in the same work strengthens the case for considering it, in common with Joseph Butler's far more famous *Anatomy of Religion*,


2. The Third Dialogue, for example, is a sustained and, at times, satirical attack on Shaftesbury's ethical and aesthetic ideas and conducted mainly between Alciphron and Euphranor.

3. As has been noted in chapter six of this dissertation, this is especially evident in the Second Dialogue, which attacks Man eville's ethical and philosophical ideas and is conducted mainly between Crito and Lysicles.
as a definitive work of Christian apologetics for its age.¹

Berkeley's "Advertisement," at any rate, wastes little time in striking a polemical note which hints at the nature of the dialogues to follow:

Whatever they pretend, it is the author's opinion that all those who write either explicitly or by insinuation against the dignity, freedom, and immortality of the human soul, may so far forth be justly said to unhinge the principles of morality, and destroy the means of making men reasonably virtuous.²

Berkeley's aggressive tone here leads one to expect a kind of "strawman" situation in the dialogues to follow, such as Mandeville himself wittily complained of as a basic defect of the *Alciphron* as dialogue:

No Mortal ever saw such Disputants before; they always begin with swaggering and boasting of what they'll prove; and in every Argument they pretend to maintain, they are laid upon their Backs, and constantly beaten to Pieces, till they have not a Word more to say; and when this has been repeated above half a Score times, they still retain the same Arrogance and mal-à-part Briskness they were made to set out with at first; and immediately after every Defeat, they are making fresh Challenges, seemingly with as much Unconcern and Confidence of Success, as if Nothing had pass'd before; or

¹. As Jessop points out about the relative obscurity of the *Alciphron* in relation to Butler's *Analogy*, "This disparity of reputation is not altogether just to Berkeley. Both works are magisterial, each in its own way - with the striking difference that the one is plainly literature and the other plainly is not." See Berkeley III, 7.

they remember'd Nothing of what had happen'd.
Such an Undauntedness in assaulting, and
Alacrity in yielding, as you have made them
display, never met in the same Individuals
before.  

Mandeville's criticism is just to the extent that Berkeley's
essentially "apologetic" or polemical purpose leads him to systematic
refutation of every idea advanced by Alciphron and Lysicles.
Berkeley's dialectical method, however, is not as simplistic as
Mandeville implies and this is because Berkeley's polemical purpose
is far subtler than the Advertisement would lead one to expect.
His polemical subtlety, which also affects his dialectical method,
consists not merely in forcefully demonstrating the falsity of the
freethinkers' anti-Christian ideas but dramatically showing that
their very mode of thinking is logically and even psychologically
deficient.

The process by which Berkeley's polemics are simultaneously
directed against allegedly false notions and a specific mode of
reasoning is a highly complex one but it is possible to isolate it
for purposes of analysis in a few "sections" where the flow of
argument tends to be more purely polemical. This is true, for
example, of sections sixteen to eighteen of the Fifth Dialogue in
which Alciphron argues with Crito against Christianity on the grounds
that its lofty principles were originally a cunning device to gain
political power:

1. Bernard Mandeville, A Letter to Dion, ed. by Bonamy Dobree
   (Liverpool, 1954), pp.52-3. It was first published in 1732.
   Hereinafter to be cited as Dion.

2. These are Berkeley's own, which he enumerates and captions in the
   "Author's Table of Sections." See Berkeley III, 25-9.
ALCIPHRON. ... But it is the observation of one of our great writers, that the first Christian preachers very cunningly began with the fairest face and the best moral doctrines in the world. It was all love, charity, meekness, patience, and so forth. But when by this means they had drawn over the world and got power, they soon changed their appearance, and shewed cruelty, ambition, avarice, and every bad quality.¹

Crito's reaction is to rephrase Alciphron's answer so that its logical fallacy becomes apparent:

CRITO. That is to say, some men very cunningly preached and underwent a world of hardships, and laid down their lives to propagate the best principles and the best morals, to the end that others some centuries after might reap the benefit of bad ones. Whoever may be cunning, there is not much cunning in the maker of this observation.²

It would seem here that Alciphron is guilty of blaming the early Christians for the faults of later ones who were Christian in name only. Crito's deflation of the logical implications of Alciphron's observations also includes a heavy tinge of sarcasm as he echoes Alciphron's disparaging use of the word "cunning" to show up his deficiency in logic. Alciphron, however, is not stung by this as Crito is referring to what Alciphron called "the observation of one of our great writers";² indeed, far from being offended, he adduces another point which seems to be considerably more substantial: "And

2. According to Jessop's footnote to the passage, the writer alluded to is either Shaftesbury or Tindal.
yet ever since this religion hath appeared in the world we have had eternal feuds, factions, massacres, and wars, the very reverse of that hymn with which it is introduced in the Gospel: — 'Glory be to God on high, on earth peace, good-will towards men.'

Crito actually admits the validity of this point but in such a way as to demonstrate that it is no argument against Christianity as such:

CRITO. This I will not deny. I will even own that the Gospel and the Christian religion have been often the pretexts for these evils; but it will not thence follow they were the cause. On the contrary, it is plain they could not be the real proper cause of these evils; because a rebellious, proud, revengeful, quarrelsome spirit is directly opposite to the whole tenor and most express precepts of Christianity: a point so clear that I shall not prove it. And, secondly, because all those evils you mention were as frequent, nay, much more frequent, before the Christian religion was known in the world. They are the common product of the passions and vices of mankind, which are sometimes covered with the mask of religion by wicked men, having the form of godliness without the power of it. This truth seems so plain that I am surprised how any man of sense, knowledge, and candor can make a doubt of it.\(^1\) (italics added)

Crito's rejoinder is not so much a denial of Alciphron's assertion as a refutation of its applicability to the worthlessness of

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2. Berkeley III, 190-1.
Christianity. This is so on one level but on the level implied by the italicized phrases a polemical edge is discernible. The implication, in other words, is that Alciphron's arguments are not entirely sincere. As a philosophical dialogue, then, the Alciphron may best be described as a polemical drama of ideas.

Although one may accept that there is a genuine polemical drama of ideas in the Alciphron, the question still remains whether it is "impartial" enough to be considered a true philosophical dialogue. Considering that neither Alciphron nor, especially, Lysicles are intended to be honest inquirers after truth, the inevitable answer seems to be firmly in the negative. Such an answer seems even firmer when one recalls that in Mandeville's dialogues the opposing interlocutor is usually naive and misguided rather than morally or intellectually corrupt. Bearing this in mind, it seems appropriate that Mandeville had the following complaint to make about the Alciphron:

I know, Sir, that in drawing those Characters, you design'd them for Monsters to be abhor'd and detested; and in this you have succeeded to admiration, at least with me; for I can assure you, that I never saw any two Interlocutors in the same Dialogue or Drama, whose Behaviour and Principles I execrate more heartily, than I do theirs. 1

Despite the way that Mandeville's thinly-disguised petulance at the way his ideas were treated in the Alciphron confirms one's suspicions about its lack of impartiality, it is, nevertheless, a distortion of

1. 

Berkeley's dramatic technique.

The main thrust of Berkeley's attack, in fact, is not so much on Alciphron and Lysicles as persons to be abhorred (Euphranor and Crito have, after all, stimulating discussions with them) but an investigation into their mode of thinking. The keynote of this aim is struck at the very beginning when this exchange occurs between Crito and Euphranor just after Lysicles and Alciphron depart from the scene:

They were no sooner gone but Euphranor, addressing himself to Crito, said he believed that poor gentlemen i.e. Alciphron had been a great sufferer for his free-thinking, for that he seemed to express himself with the passion and resentment natural to men who have received very bad usage. I believe no such thing, answered CRITO, but have often observed those of his sect run into two faults of conversation, declaiming and bantering, just as the tragic or the comic humour prevails. Sometimes they work themselves into high passions, and are frightened at spectres of their own raising. In those fits every country curate passes for an inquisitor. At other times they affect a sly facetious manner, making use of hints and allusions, expressing little, insinuating much, and upon the whole seeming to divert themselves with the subject and their adversaries. But, if you would know their opinions, you must make them speak out and keep close to the point.1

The above exchange is an important one because it makes it evident that the discussions to follow are going to be conducted in a spirit

of ill-concealed hostility, as the opposing set of interlocutors do not merely disagree about certain doctrines but even about how one is to conduct an argument. One of Berkeley's important aims, in short, and one fully consonant with Christian apologetics and philosophical dialogue, is to reveal the method of reasoning of the freethinkers.

In the four-way discussions, it is Euphranor and Alciphron who are most philosophically "disinterested." Euphranor, however, is "disinterested" in a very different way from Alciphron, as can be seen in this exchange from the Third Dialogue on whether the "moral sense" is a useful philosophical concept:

ALCIPHRON. I tell you, Euphranor, we contemn the virtue of that man who computes and deliberates, and must have a reason for being virtuous. The refined moralists of our sect are ravished and transported with the abstract beauty of virtue. They disdain all forensical motives to it, and love virtue only for virtue's sake. Oh rapture! Oh the quintessence of beauty! Methinks I could dwell for ever on this contemplation; but, rather than entertain myself, I must endeavour to convince you. Make an experiment on the first man you meet. Propose a villainous or unjust action. Take his first sense of the matter, and you shall find he detests it. He may, indeed, be afterwards misled by arguments, or overpowered by temptation; but his original, unpremeditated, and genuine thoughts are just and orthodox. How can we account for this but by a moral sense, which, left to itself, hath as quick and true a perception of the beauty and deformity of human actions as the eye hath of colours?
EUPHRANOR. May not this be sufficiently accounted for by conscience, affection, passion, education, reason, custom, religion; which principles and habits, for aught I know, may be what you metaphorically call a moral sense?

ALCIPHRON. What I call a moral sense is strictly, properly, and truly such, and in kind different from all those things you enumerate. It is what all men have, though all may not observe it.¹

Both Euphranor and Alciphron here are philosophically "disinterested" in that both are genuinely concerned with how the value of virtue is to be defined. The flaw in Alciphron's disinterestedness, however, is that he refuses to be consistently rational, and this, in turn, is a flaw in his character, for he is impetuous and wilful. Thus, when he rejects any rational definition of virtue and, instead, professes a quasi-mystical belief in its value as a kind of aesthetic beauty, he is entirely consistent with his wilful mode of argument.² Euphranor, on the other hand, is a solid reasoner who is very sceptical of the notion that virtue has an aesthetic dimension divorced from its social and moral utility. He rejects Alciphron's formulation not so much because he considers it false but because he prefers arguments based on meticulous reasoning rather than impulsive rhetoric. Thus, in the exchanges between Euphranor and Alciphron there is not only dialectical opposition but dramatic clash of character as well because the confident solidity of one is contrasted to the nervous obstinacy of the other.

¹ Berkeley III, 120-1.

² Alciphron's arguments are derived from Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. According to Jessop, the term "moral sense" "was introduced to express the view that moral distinctions are apprehended neither by revelation nor by reason, but by a natural sensibility analogous to aesthetic taste" (Berkeley III, 120 n.). Needless to say, Berkeley makes the doctrine of "moral sense" seem to be as irrational as possible.
Lysicles is generally wittier than Alciphron but his wit is often at Alciphron’s rather than the Christians’ expense. He serves both a dramatic and dialectical function. Dramatically, his witty sallies enliven much of the serious discussion. Dialectically, his undermining of Alciphron is no sheer whim on Berkeley’s part but a way of dramatically showing that Peist principles, as such, are logically inconsistent and a pale echo of Christianity which unwittingly confirms the truth of it. This is perhaps most felicitously done in the Fifth Dialogue where Lysicles berates Alciphron for attempting to assert the validity of natural religion independently of that of Christianity. As Dion reports it,

Lysicles, instead of answering Crito, turned short upon Alciphron. It was always my opinion, said he, that nothing could be sillier than to think of destroying Christianity by crying up natural religion. Whoever thinks highly of the one can never, with any consistency, think meanly of the other; it being very evident that natural religion, without revealed, never was and never can be established or received anywhere, but in the brains of a few idle speculative men. I was aware what your concessions would come to. The belief of God, virtue, a future state, and such fine notions are, as every one may see with half an eye, the very basis and corner-stone of the Christian religion. Lay but this foundation for them to build on, and you shall soon see what superstructures our men of divinity will raise from it. The truth and importance of those points once admitted, a man need be no conjuror to
prove, upon that principle, the excellency and usefulness of the Christian religion. And then to be sure, there must be priests to teach and propagate this useful religion. And if priests, a regular subordination without doubt in this worthy society, and a provision for their maintenance, such as may enable them to perform all their rites and ceremonies with decency, and keep their sacred character above contempt. And the plain consequence of all this is a confederacy between the prince and the priesthood to subdue the people; so we have let in at once upon us a long train of ecclesiastical evils, priestcraft, hierarchy, inquisition. ...  

In spite of his evident hostility to Christianity, the points Lysiclea makes actually reinforce the Christian side of the debate, even to the point of being a summary of Berkeley’s arguments in favour of the Anglican Established Church, and this for the highly ironic reason that it is Alciphron who has made all the concessions which Lysicles claims can only strengthen the arguments on the Christian side.

As far as Berkeley’s portrayal of Alciphron as a Deist is concerned, there is one grave inconsistency in that in the First Dialogue he actually proclaims himself to be an atheist:

Atheism therefore, that bugbear of women and fools, is the very top and perfection of free-thinking. It is the grand arcanum to which a true genius naturally riseth, by a certain climax or gradation of thought, and

without which he can never possess his soul in absolute liberty and repose. For your thorough conviction in this main article, do but examine the notion of a God with the same freedom that you would other prejudices. ¹

Taking into account the general hostility towards atheism at the time, including legal sanctions against it, it is possible that some self-professed Deists were disguised atheists. Alciphron, in fact, goes on to remark that

This is all, take my word for it, and not mine only but that of many more the most ingenious men of the age, who, I can assure you, think as I do on the subject of a Deity. Though some of them hold it proper to proceed with more reserve in declaring to the world their opinion in this particular than in most others. And, it must be owned, there are still too many in England who retain a foolish prejudice against the name of atheist. ²

Alciphron's words fulfil Berkeley's observation in the Advertisement to the effect that "A gentleman in private conversation may be supposed to speak plainer than others write, to improve on their hints, and draw conclusions from their principles." ³ It is not likely, however, that Berkeley shows Alciphron to be an atheistic "Deist" for purely polemical reasons. The dramatic process by which Alciphron develops from a nominal Deist, which is indicated by his disagreements with Lysicles, to a Deist almost Christian in outlook, as indicated by

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¹ Berkeley III, 208-9.
² Berkeley III, 44.
³ Berkeley III, 23.
his gradual assent to almost all of the arguments emanating from Euphranor and even Crito, is the result of dialectical and dramatic requirements. Dialectically, it is necessary to refute the most extreme form of "infidelity," atheism. Dramatically, however, Berkeley also found it necessary to show that atheism is not only morally repugnant but a kind of illogical fanaticism as well. Thus, the more "reasonable" and idealistic atheist, Alciphron, soon leaves it behind, whereas the cynical Lysicles steadfastly remains one.

Crito differs from Euphranor in his acerbic wit which, as has been seen in the observations on the Second Dialogue in chapter six, is more than a match for that of Lysicles. Furthermore, where Euphranor at least seems to be curious about the ideas of the freethinkers, Crito barely hides his contempt for them and dismisses their mode of argument in this manner: "Your free-thinkers, without offence be it said, seem to mistake their talent. They imagine strongly, but reason weakly; mighty at exaggeration, and jejune in argument!" Often, as well, he proceeds not so much to develop an argument as to make a stinging rhetorical assertion, as in the following interruption to the aforementioned discussion on the "moral sense":

CRITO. To hear Alciphron talk puts me in mind of that ingenious Greek who, having wrapped a man's brother up in a cloak, asked him whether he knew that person; being ready, either by keeping on or pulling off the cloak, to confute his answer, whatever it should be. For my

part, I believe, if matters were fairly stated, that rational satisfaction, that peace of mind, that inward comfort, and conscientious joy, which a good Christian finds in good actions, would not be found to fall short of all the ecstasy, rapture, and enthusiasm supposed to be the effect of that high and undescribed principle. In earnest, can any ecstasy be higher, any rapture more affecting, than that which springs from the love of God and man, from a conscience void of offence, and an inward discharge of duty, with the secret delight, trust, and hope that attend it?¹

What Crito is hinting at is that Alciphron's "enthusiasm" for the aesthetic beauty of virtue is rather hollow and not even worth arguing about. This reinforces, and is in vivid contrast to, Euphranor's painstaking attempt to make Alciphron recognize the inadequacy of his notion of "moral sense" but it does so rhetorically rather than dialectically.

The consistency of dialectical counter-thrust and characteristic mode of argument of each interlocutor suggests that a common dialectical thread runs throughout the Alciphron. It is, in fact, the dramatic presentation of the "minute" way of arguing. It is Euphranor who proposes to call Alciphron and Lysicles "minute philosophers" rather than "freethinkers" which, according to Euphranor, connotes a freedom of argument which he, as a Christian, does not object to. Crito agrees and adds that

¹. Berkeley III, 122. Needless to say, Berkeley here seems to make Crito adopt the lofty, high-minded tone of a bishop's sermon.
... the modern free-thinkers are the very same with those Cicero called minute philosophers, which name admirably suits them, they being a sort of sect which diminish all the most valuable things, the thoughts, views, and hopes of men; all the knowledge, notions, and theories of the mind they reduce to sense; human nature they contract and degrade to the narrow low standard of animal life, and assign us only a small pittance of time instead of immortality. 1

Alciphron agrees to the use of the term but only because he gives it a very different meaning:

... As to what you observe ... of those we now call free-thinkers having been anciently termed minute philosophers, it is my opinion this appellation might be derived from their considering things minutely, and not swallowing them in the gross, as other men are used to do. Besides, we all know the best eyes are necessary to discern the minutest objects: it seems, therefore, that minute philosophers might have been so called from their distinguished perspicacity. 2

The burden of Berkeley's overall dialectical strategy, then, is to demonstrate that the non-Christian freethinkers argue only in the


2. Berkeley III, 47.
first, disparaging, sense.¹

By the end of the Sixth Dialogue, the exposure of the freethinkers as very slack ones is turned into the paradox of freethinkers being not merely defective in their mode of argument but positively bigoted and prejudiced rather than open-minded and rational:

CRITO. ... But it has often been remarked by observing men that there are no greater bigots than infidels.

LYSICLES. What! a free-thinker and a bigot — Impossible!

CRITO. Not so impossible neither, that an infidel should be bigoted to his infidelity. Methinks I see a bigot wherever I see a man overbearing and positive without knowing why, laying the greatest stress on points of smallest moment, hasty to judge of the conscience, thoughts, and inward views of other men, impatient of reasoning against his own opinions, and choosing them with inclination rather than judgment, an enemy to learning, and attached to mean authorities. How far our modern infidels agree with this description, I leave to be

¹. In sections 19-25 of the Fifth Dialogue the issue of "minute reasoning" is merged with a discussion of Scholastic abuses of learning and logical hair-splitting. Both sides accuse each other of being the true heirs of all that was worst in Scholasticism. It is interesting to note, however, that, in refuting the Deist claim that Scholasticism was still flourishing in the universities, Crito offers a definition of its deficiencies very Baconian in wording and attitude: "There was indeed a time when Logic was considered as its own object; and that art of reasoning, instead of being transferred to things, turned altogether upon words and abstractions; which produced a sort of leprosy in all parts of knowledge, corrupting and converting them into hollow verbal disputations in a most impure dialect" (Berkeley III, 203). Thus, even in such a minor but striking stylistic detail, Berkeley makes sure that his attack on Deistic "minute reasoning" is not liable to be construed as a bigoted hostility against any kind of empirical reasoning, especially that of the natural sciences.
considered by those who really consider and think for themselves.

LYSICLES. We are no bigots; we are men that discover difficulties in religion, that tie knots and raise scruples, which disturb the repose and interrupt the golden dreams of bigots, who therefore cannot endure us.¹

Crito's reaction to Lysicles' retort justifying his own mode of argument is to propose an alternative mode which is not solely negative in its effects. It needs to be quoted in full as it is both an eloquent summing-up of the broad scope of Berkeley's dialectical strategy in favour of Christianity and a justification of it as exemplified by the arguments of Crito and Ruphranor in the Alciphron:

CRITO. They who cast about for difficulties will be sure to find or make them upon every subject; but he that would, upon the foot of reason, erect himself into a judge, in order to make a wise judgment on a subject of that nature, will not only consider the doubtful and difficult parts of it, but to take a comprehensive view of the whole, consider it in all its parts and relations, trace it to its original, examine its principles, effects, and tendencies, its proofs internal and external. He will distinguish between the clear points and the obscure, the certain and uncertain, the essential and the circumstantial, between what is genuine and what is foreign. He will consider the different sorts of proof that belong to different things, where evidence is to be

¹ Berkeley III, 283.
expected, where probability may suffice, and where it is reasonable to suppose there should be doubts and scruples. He will proportion his pains and exactness to the importance of the inquiry, and check that disposition of his mind to conclude all those notions groundless prejudices, with which it was imbued before it knew the reason of them. He will silence his passions, and listen to truth. He will endeavour to untie knots as well as to tie them, and dwell rather on the light parts of things than the obscure. He will balance the force of his understanding with the difficulty of the subject, and, to render his judgment impartial, hear evidence on all sides, and, so far as he is led by authority, choose to follow that of the honestest and wisest man. Now, it is my sincere opinion, the Christian religion may well stand the test of such an inquiry.¹

The "comprehensive view of the whole," at any rate, is what Euphranor and Crito try to achieve and evidently it is not a dogmatic view but one based on a logic of probable argument very similar to Locke's notion of the "balancing of arguments" described in the Conduct of the Understanding.²

By an interesting twist of dialectical irony, it is Alciphron and Lysicles who are shown to be the real dogmatists, as they refuse to weigh and balance the probability of various arguments in favour of Christianity. This is especially clear in an exchange like


2. As has been described in the first chapter of this dissertation, the Lockeian notion of the "balancing of arguments" is one of the key characteristics of the philosophical dialogue in the eighteenth century.
the following from the Sixth Dialogue:

ALCIPHRON. After all, say what you will, this variety of opinions must needs shake the faith of a reasonable man. Where there are so many different opinions on the same point it is very certain they cannot all be true, but it is certain they may all be false. And the means to find out the truth! When a man of sense sets about this inquiry, he finds himself on a sudden startled and amused with hard words and knotty questions. This makes him abandon the pursuit, thinking the game not worth the chase.

CRITO. But would not this man of sense do well to consider it must argue want of discernment to reject divine truths for the sake of human follies? Use but the same candour and impartiality in treating of religion that you would think proper on other subjects. We desire no more and expect no less. ¹

Alciphron here shows himself unwilling to test the basis of any argument in favour of Christianity. His reason for such an attitude is the inadequate one that some of the arguments in favour of Christianity are necessarily and self-evidently false, which betrays close-minded dogmatism and an unwillingness to test the truth of any set of arguments in its favour. A close investigation of the dialectical role of each interlocutor, then, reveals that, in spite of Mandeville's ironical strictures, there is a genuinely dialectical development of ideas in the Alciphron, and one closely integrated within a dramatic context.

¹ Berkeley III, 275.
Significantly, much of the subject-matter dealt with in the Alciphron had already been investigated years earlier by Berkeley in Steele's Guardian. As A.A. Luce puts it, "The connection in both thought and phrase between Berkeley's Essays and his Alciphron is close, and there can be no doubt that the work done for Steele opened out later into that fine defence of Christianity."¹

Berkeley's essays, in fact, were attacks on the freethinkers and written in a very lucid style of exposition and argument. Although no essay in the Guardian corresponds exactly with any specific section of the Alciphron, fruitful comparisons can be made between Berkeley's methods of treating similar subjects in essay and dialogue. His last contribution, "The Bond of Society," is especially instructive. The essay is an excellent piece of expository reasoning in the analogical mode. What Berkeley sets out to demonstrate is that just as the Newtonian "laws of attraction" account for the order of the universe, so does the "force" of benevolence hold society together.

Although most of the essay develops such a demonstration, its real importance seems to lie in the "corollaries" to the demonstration, as developed at the end. At the beginning, however, the reader is only prepared to anticipate the development of an analogy between the order of the universe and that of morality, as in the opening paragraph:

If we consider the whole scope of the creation that lies within our view, the moral and

¹. A.A. Luce, The Life of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (London, 1949), p.63. Also see p.132 of Luce's biography where he observes that "his copy of the Guardian must have been at hand, I think, and in use when Berkeley penned the Alciphron." Hereinafter to be cited as Luce.
intellectual, as well as the natural and corporeal, we shall perceive through a certain correspondence of the parts, a similitude of operation and unity of design, which plainly demonstrate the universe to be the work of one infinitely good and wise Being; and that the system of thinking beings is actuated by laws derived from the same divine power which ordained those by which the corporeal system is upheld. ¹

Berkeley, indeed, goes on to develop the analogy and though it is a traditionally Christian one, he develops it in effectively Newtonian terms, so that this part of the argument ends on an eloquently assertive note:

And as the attractive power in bodies is the most universal principle which produceth innumerable effects, and is a key to explain the various phenomena of nature; so the corresponding social appetite in human souls is the great spring and source of moral actions. This it is that inclines each individual to an intercourse with his species, and models every one to that behaviour which best suits with the common well-being. Hence that sympathy in our nature whereby we feel the pains and joys of our fellow-creatures. Hence that prevalent love in parents towards their children, which is neither founded on the merit of the object, nor yet on self-interest. It is this that makes us

inquisitive concerning the affairs of distant nations which can have no influence on our own. It is this that extends our care to future generations, and excites us to acts of beneficence towards those who are not yet in being, and consequently from whom we can expect no recompense. In a word, hence arises that diffusive sense of humanity so unaccountable to the selfish man who is untouched with it, and is, indeed, a sort of monster or anomalous production.

The repetition of prepositional phrases ("hence," "it is this ...," "in a word ..." etc.) in the assertive mood is rhetorically effective not only because it lends an air of excitement to the demonstration, almost as if it were a blinding "revelation," but also because it has a certain formal similarity (but one stripped of pedantry) to the "Q.E.D."'s of irrefutable logical demonstration.

The last sentence of the "demonstration" is especially interesting in that it suddenly introduces a note of censure, and one which leads directly to the "corollaries," the first of which is that "in promoting ... the common good, every one doth at the same time promote his own private interest." Though on the surface the first "corollary" seems to follow from the demonstration in a manner analogous to Euclidean reasoning, the note of censure makes acceptance of the first corollary not merely a matter of deductive reasoning but of "conscience" as well. Otherwise the reader has the unpleasant task of reflecting on whether he himself is "a sort of

monster or anomalous production." The process, in any case, is almost unconscious as Berkeley's sentences have great fluency and clarity. The second corollary is much more striking and ingenious:

Another observation I shall draw from the premises is, That it makes a signal proof of the divinity of the Christian religion, that the main duty which it inculcates above all other is charity. Different maxims and precepts have distinguished the different sects of philosophy and religion: our Lord's peculiar precept is, "Love thy neighbour as thyself. By this shall all men know that you are My disciples, if you love one another." 1

This second corollary, in fact, is a theological point reached with the aid of philosophical reasoning; and it leads naturally into a concise summary of the main intent of Berkeley's virtuoso reasoning:

I will not say that what is a most shining proof of our religion is not often a reproach to its professors; but this I think very plain, whether we regard the analogy of nature, as it appears in the mutual attraction or gravitation of the mundane system, in the general frame and constitution of the human soul, or lastly, in the ends and aptnesses which are discoverable in all parts of the visible and intellectual world, we shall not doubt but the precept which is the characteristic of our religion came from the Author of nature. 2

2. Berkeley VII, 228.
This is not, however, the end of the essay. It ends with an attack on the freethinkers:

Some of our modern Free-thinkers would indeed insinuate the Christian morals to be defective, because (say they) there is no mention made in the gospel of the virtue of friendship. These sagacious men (if I may be allowed the use of that vulgar saying) "cannot see the wood for the trees." That a religion whereof the main drift is to inspire its professors with the most noble and disinterested spirit of love, charity, and beneficence to all mankind, or, in other words, with a friendship to every individual man, should be taxed with the want of that very virtue, is surely a glaring evidence of the blindness and prejudice of its adversaries.

Although the freethinkers have not been mentioned previously, the attack is neither surprising nor out of place as the essay is the last in a series of contributions to the Guardian whose main purpose is to undermine the ideas of the freethinkers. Apart from this, however, this parting-shot is brilliantly placed because it disposes of one objection to Christianity as an afterthought to reasoning which is so broad in scope that the objection of the freethinkers is made to seem too trifling to be dealt with centrally. That, at any rate, is the overall polemical impression that the essay leaves. In "The Bond of Society," then, Berkeley already shows himself adept at his distinctive mixture of high-minded reasoning and sharply polemical rhetoric.

In order to determine how Berkeley achieved a similar result in

the Alciphron, but one suited to the dramatic requirements of philosophical dialogue, it is instructive to compare the second half of section 16 of the First Dialogue with "The Bond of Society." Alciphron at this point decides that he is going to argue in favour of the individual "pursuit of happiness";

ALCIPHRON. ... the individual happiness of every man alone constitutes his own entire good. The happiness of other men, making no part of mine, is not with respect to me a good: I mean a true natural good. It cannot therefore be a reasonable end to be proposed by me, in truth and nature (for I do not speak of political pretences), since no wise man will pursue an end which doth not concern him. This is not the voice of nature. O nature! Thou art the fountain, original, and pattern of all that is good and wise.\(^1\)

Alciphron's point, in fact, is the negative of the first "corollary" in "The Bond of Society." Because the philosophical dialogue, unlike the periodical essay, is much more of a potentially dramatic form, it seems appropriate, in preparing for the subsequent discussion of the parallels between the natural and moral orders, for Alciphron to begin with a point which can be taken as a possible sign of his propensity for defending outright selfishness. As one's suspicions are aroused, one is immediately involved with what Alciphron, as a character, has to say. As for Alciphron's apostrophe to "nature," it is an adroit move on Berkeley's part because it makes it possible to introduce into the discussion the

\(^1\) Berkeley III, 62.
parallel between moral order and natural order which he had previously expounded on in "The Bond of Society." It also exposes the manner in which Alciphron's reasoning tends to degenerate into Deistic "enthusiasm."

Euphranor, in any case, soon forces Alciphron to continue in the mode of strict reasoning:

EUPHRANOR. You would like then to follow nature, and propose her as a guide and pattern for your imitation?
ALCIPHRON. Of all things.
EUPHRANOR. Whence do you gather this respect for nature?
ALCIPHRON. From the excellency of her productions.¹

This, in turn, gives him the necessary opening to expound on the parallel between the natural and moral orders. He begins by establishing the order of nature:

EUPHRANOR. In a vegetable, for instance, you say there is use and excellency; because the several parts of it are so connected and fitted to each other as to protect and nourish the whole, make the individual grow, and propagate the kind; and because in its fruits or qualities it is adapted to please the sense, or contribute to the benefit of man.

ALCIPHRON. Even so.
EUPHRANOR. In like manner, do you not infer the excellency of animal bodies from observing the frame and fitness of their several parts, by

¹ Berkeley III, 62.
which they mutually conspire to the well-being of each other as well as of the whole? Do you not also observe a natural union and consent between animals of the same kind; and that even different kinds of animals have certain qualities and instincts whereby they contribute to the exercise, nourishment, and delight of each other? Even the inanimate unorganized elements seem to have an excellence relative to each other. Where was the excellency of water, if it did not cause herbs and vegetables to spring from the earth, and put forth flowers and fruits? And what would become of the beauty of the earth, if it was not warmed by the sun, moistened by water, and fanned by air? Throughout the whole system of the visible and natural world, do you not perceive a mutual connexion and correspondence of parts? And is it not from hence that you frame an idea of the perfection, and order, and beauty of nature?¹

The order of nature meticulously propounded here from the particular example of the vegetable to the general variety and diversity of examples in the natural world is along more traditional lines than that in "The Bond of Society" where the emphasis is on the Newtonian "laws of attraction" but the direction of the argument is the same, which is to establish the parallel. One significant stylistic difference, however, is that whereas in "The Bond of Society" there is, apart from the conclusion, a dominant tone of coolly placid rationality, Euphranor's assertiveness in the form of rhetorical questions achieves the effect of heated controversy.

¹ Berkeley III, 62-3.
After Alciphron's brief capitulation to Euphranor's barrage ("All this I grant") he goes on to establish the aforementioned parallel:

EUPHRANOR. And have not the Stoics heretofore said (who were no more bigots than you are), and did you not yourself say, this pattern of order was worthy the imitation of rational agents?

ALCIPHRON. I do not deny this to be true.

EUPHRANOR. Ought we not, therefore, to infer the same union, order, and regularity in the moral world that we perceive to be in the natural?

ALCIPHRON. We ought.  

Euphranor establishes the parallel, in other words, by arguing that if it is desirable for morality to be based on reason then the parallel must exist, as the order of nature is evidently rational. He mentions the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius because, presumably, he was respected by the freethinkers and to show, albeit in a highly combative way, that the parallel between the rational order of nature and that of morality can be agreed to by all reasonable men without the aid of Christian doctrine. In "The Bond of Society," however, Berkeley relied neither on polemical assertiveness nor classical authority to implicitly establish much the same point about the parallel.

Euphranor's next deduction corresponds to the first "corollary" in "The Bond of Society:"

EUPHRANOR. Should it not therefore seem to follow, that reasonable creatures were, as the philosophical Emperor observes, made one for another; and, consequently, that man ought not to consider himself as an independent individual, whose happiness is not connected with that of other men; but rather as the part of a whole, to the common good of which he ought to conspire, and order his ways and actions suitably, if he would live according to nature?

Unlike the "corollary," however, the similar point made here is not clearly distinguished from the mainstream of a homogeneous argument. It is instead, the culmination of a long, sustained and dramatic exchange of ideas in a polemical vein.

If one compares the essayistic style of "The Bond of Society" and the dialogue style of the Alciphron, then, it becomes evident that though the former is superior in the elegance of its almost Euclidean reasoning, the latter is superior in dramatic and polemical effectiveness. The former is static and probably designed for a passive "coffee-table" reader; the latter is dynamic and designed for a reader whose wits and capacity to visualize dramatic argument are constantly on the alert.

The overall effect of the Alciphron is to give a sense of the philosophical grandeur of Christianity, an effect which is already there in embryonic form in the opening paragraphs of a Guardian contribution entitled "Minute Philosophers" (no.70):

As I was the other day taking a solitary walk in St. Paul's, I indulged my thoughts in the pursuit of a certain analogy between the fabrick and the Christian Church in the largest sense. The divine order and economy of the one seemed to be emblems set forth by the just, plain, and majestick architecture of the other. And as the one consists of a great variety of parts united in the same regular design, according to the truest art, and most exact proportion; so the other contains a decent subordination of members, various sacred institutions, sublime doctrines, and solid precepts of morality digested into the same design, and with an admirable concurrence tending to one view, the happiness and exaltation of human nature.

In the midst of my contemplation, I beheld a fly upon one of the pillars; and it straightaway came into my head, that this same fly was a Free-thinker. For it required some comprehension in the eye of the spectator, to take in at one view the various parts of the building, in order to observe their symmetry and design. But to the fly, whose prospect was confined to a little part of one of the stones of a single pillar, the joint beauty of the whole or the distinct use of its parts were inconspicuous, and nothing could appear but small inequalities in the surface of the hewn stone, which in the view of that insect seemed so many deformed rocks and precipices.

Berkeley here strikingly conveys the narrowness of outlook of the freethinkers, and in such a way as to anticipate the eloquent reasoning and rhetorical spaciousness of the Alciphron. The dialectic in this passage consists of the manner by which Berkeley concludes, after an elaborate process of analogical reasoning, that freethinkers are too narrow-minded to appreciate or understand the largeness of spirit of the Christian religion. This train of dialectical reasoning, however, is inseparable from Berkeley's rhetoric, which conveys, with its emphasis on grandeur and impressiveness, the architectural space of the interior of the Church to the reader.

It is, in fact, highly appropriate that Berkeley should have chosen Wren's masterpiece for his train of analogical reasoning rather than a Gothic cathedral, such as Westminster Abbey. As is well known, St. Paul's was built during the Restoration and after the Great Fire of London to replace the charred ruins of medieval Old St. Paul's. It was therefore more likely to appeal to the architectural tastes of Berkeley's readers, and undoubtedly his own, than any Gothic church, as the adjective "gothic" itself represented all that was wildly irregular and undesirable to the Augustans. At the same time, however, it represents the continuity of Christianity in Britain, as it was built on the same site as Old St. Paul's and according to conservative, High Anglican specifications. St. Paul's, nevertheless, is more "classical"

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1. One of Jessop's footnotes in the Alciphron points out that "Berkeley's knowledge of architecture came from his travels in Italy, as well as from books ..." Berkeley's fondness for classical architecture is, in any case, amply confirmed by the discussion of architectural principles in the Alciphron (Berkeley III, 123-8).

2. Among other things, Wren was forced to employ a traditional Latin rather than his favoured Greek cross as the groundplan. See Margaret Whinney, Wren (London, 1971), pp.81-96.
than "gothic" and, keeping in mind its "humanist" architectural proportions, it should be noted that it is not a "divine immensity," such as that of Shaftesbury's "natural sublime," that Berkeley's passage seeks to convey but a humanized one because the "observer," Berkeley himself, is able to grasp this immensity. The "flies" are unable to do so because they are less than human.

As in the passage from the Guardian, Berkeley's Alciphron studiously avoids "enthusiasm" and relies, instead, on eloquent reasoning. This can be especially discerned in an exchange like the following from the Sixth Dialogue:

EUPHRANOR. Tell me, Alciphron, do you not acknowledge the light of the sun to be the most glorious production of Providence in this natural world?

ALCIPHRON. Suppose I do.

EUPHRANOR. This light, nevertheless, which you cannot deny to be of God's making, shines only on the surface of things, shines not at all in the night, shines imperfectly in the twilight, is often interrupted, refracted, and obscured,

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1. The proportions of classical architecture, it is generally agreed, are based on those of the human body. See Geoffrey Scott, The Architecture of Humanism, second ed. (London, 1961), pp.210-39. This is a reprint of the edition of 1924.

2. In the Alciphron Euphranor's classical architectural tastes are especially evident when he maintains that "Those who have considered the theory of architecture tell us the proportions of the three Grecian orders were taken from the human body, as the most beautiful and perfect production of nature." See Berkeley III, 126.

represents distant things and small things dubiously, imperfectly, or not at all. Is this true or no?

ALCIPHRON. It is.

EUPHRANOR. Should it not follow, therefore, that to expect in this world a constant, uniform light from God, without any mixture of shade or mystery, would be departing from the rule and analogy of the creation? and that, consequently, it is no argument the light of revelation is not divine, because it may not be so clear and full as you expect, or because it may not equally shine at all times, or in all places.¹

In an exchange like this the impression is gained that Berkeley barely avoids expressing genuine deep feelings about the wonders of creation in a more "enthusiastic" manner. As it is, Euphranor’s eloquent description of the workings of the light of the sun is strictly subordinated to an analogical argument about the nature of revelation. Even Alciphron’s reaction treats Euphranor’s analogy of the sun as an effective argument rather than a striking description. As, even at their most polemical, the arguments in the Alciphron are generally at this high level of eloquence, the overall effect is one of impressive and all-but-overwhelming dignity unaffected by the two "flies," Lysicles and Alciphron.

Despite the eloquent reasoning and expansive rhetoric, however, Berkeley’s dialectic never merges into "enthusiastic" rhapsody, as

¹ Berkeley III, 235-6.
happens in Shaftesbury's *The Moralists*. This is so because he preserves conversational decorum in the form of an elaborately polished "choreography" of conversation. Such a "choreography" can be discerned in a discussion on duelling in the Fifth Dialogue, at one point of which Alciphron has this to say:

Give me leave to observe that what you now say is foreign to the purpose. For the question, at present, is not concerning the respective tendencies of the Pagan and Christian religions, but concerning our manners, as actually compared with those of ancient heathens, who, I aver, had no such barbarous custom as duelling.

Alciphron's objection is a serious one but instead of stating it in an abrupt manner, as a Landevillian interlocutor would, he observes the punctilio of prefacing his remarks with "Give me leave to ..." Crito's reply is a direct one and invites immediate response from Alciphron:

CRITO. And I aver that, bad as this is, they had a worse: and that was poisoning. By which we have reason to think there were many more lives destroyed than by this Gothic crime of duelling: inasmuch as it extended to all ages, sexes, and characters, and as its effects were more secret and unavoidable, and as it had more

1. Pope's famous couplet from the *Essay on Criticism* (11. 362-363) is especially applicable to the Alciphron: "True Ease in Writing comes from Art, not Chance,/ As those move easiest who have learn'd to dance."

temptations, interest as well as passion, to recommend it to wicked men. And for the fact, not to waste time, I refer you to the Roman authors themselves.

Dramatically and dialectically, however, something more choreographically graceful develops because, instead of yet another objection from Alciphron, Lysicles takes up Crito's point and twists it to suit his own prejudices:

It is very true. Duelling is not so general a nuisance as poisoning, nor of so base a nature. This crime, if it be a crime, is in a fair way to keep its ground in spite of the law and the Gospel. The clergy never preach against it, because they themselves never suffer by it: and the man of honour must not appear against the means of vindicating honour.

Although Lysicles here is being ironic in a Mandevillian manner, he is not quite as blunt and direct in expression as Mandeville's interlocutors often tend to be. Classical grace and decorum thus is preserved and, at the same time, the irony is not allowed to go much further, as Crito immediately deals with it as if it were a plainly-stated objection rather than a veiled insult against the clergy:

CRITO. Though it be remarked by some of your sect that the clergy are not used to preach against duelling, yet I neither think the remark itself just, nor the reason assigned

for it. In effect, one half of their sermons, all that is said of charity, brotherly love, forbearance, meekness, and forgiving injuries, is directly against this wicked custom; by which the clergy themselves are so far from never suffering that perhaps they will be found, all things considered, to suffer oftener than other men.¹

Crito, in short, does not allow himself to be goaded into intemperate language by Lysicles. A nimble "dance of ideas" results and even though Euphranor does not take part in this excerpt, he is "waiting his turn" as it were. Thus, the dialectical grandeur and classical grace of Berkeley's dialogue is reinforced by the way he presents discussion in which all arguments contribute to an overall, unified aesthetic effect where the movement of dialectic is actually subject to an elaborate plan analogous to the choreography of a dance.

When the remarkable combination of expansive rhetoric and choreographed conversation in the Alciphron is kept in mind, it makes even John Hervey's Some Remarks upon The Minute Philosopher (the most effective of the attacks on it) seems misdirected.² This is because it can easily be discerned that the reader's attention is obviously being distracted from the structured coherence apparent beneath the

¹ Berkeley III, 187.

² Hervey's pamphlet and Mandeville's Letter to Dion were not the only attacks on the Alciphron but both are very instructive in their explicit and implicit criticism of Berkeley's style of dialogue. For a description of the contents of the published attacks, see Luce, 163-4. On the whole, however, the Alciphron was, at least initially, well received. As Luce points out, "Within a week of its publication it was 'the discourse of the Court,' and the Queen publicly commended it; a second edition was called for within the year." See Luce, 154.
surface polish and graceful repartee of Berkeley's dialogue. In the Remarks, Farvey, sophisticated and cynical courtier that he is, masquerades as a country clergyman of sturdy simplicity. As far as Berkeley's style of dialogue is concerned, his main points are "That he is monstrously and manifestly partial, with a Profession of Candour; Rhapsodical with a Pretence to Method; Inconclusive, with an Affectation of Argument ..."¹ The sheer sweep of the Alciphron makes it particularly vulnerable to such criticism but, since Hervey ignores Berkeley's deliberately polemical and dramatic aims, it is the kind of criticism far more applicable to a much more typical dialogue in an apologetic vein, the prolific controversialist Charles Leslie's The Truth of Christianity Demonstrated (1710).

Leslie's work is in the form of a dialogue between a Christian and a Deist. It exhibits little attempt at characterization and is more expository than dialectical, as in the following excerpt:

Deist. - By the account you have given, there is but One Religion in the world, nor ever was: for the Jewish was but Christianity in Type, though in time greatly corrupted; and the Heathen was a greater corruption, and founded the fables of their gods upon the Facts of Scripture: and the Mahometan, you say, is but a Heresy of Christianity. So that all is Christianity still.

Christian. - It is true that God gave but one Revelation to the world, which was that of Christ: and as that was corrupted, new Revelations were pretended. But God has

¹ John Hervey, Some Remarks upon the Minute Philosopher (London, 1732), p.6. The Pamphlet was published anonymously.
guarded his Revelations with such evidences, as it was not in the power of men or devils to counterfeit or contrive any thing like them. Some bear resemblance in one or two features, in the first two or three Rules of Evidence that I have produced; but as none reach the fourth, so they are all quite destitute of the least pretence to the remaining four. So that when you look upon the face of Divine Revelation, and take it altogether, it is impossible to mistake it for any of those delusions, which the devil has set up in imitation of it.

Deist. - It is strange, that, if the case be thus plain as you have made it, the whole world is not immediately convinced.

Christian. - If the seed be never so good, yet if it be sown upon stones or among thorns, it will bring forth nothing. There are hearts of stone, and others so filled with the love of riches, with the cares and pleasures of this life, that they will not see; they have not a mind to know any thing which they think would disturb them in their enjoyments, or lessen their opinion of them; for that would be taking away so much of their pleasure; therefore it is no easy matter to persuade men to place their happiness in future expectations, which is the import of the Gospel. ...

"Christian" here seems to make no attempt to meet "Deist" half-way and make his discourse more philosophical. Instead, he alludes to

the devil, the existence of whom he does not attempt to prove, and becomes highly moralistic in his allusion to the parable of the sower. Unlike the interlocutors in the Alciphron, whether Christian or Deist, Leslie's "Christian" is more of a preacher than a cultivated conversationalist. There may be some truth in Hervey's contention that Berkeley is "manifestly partial," but he does, at least, give his Deists good arguments and meets them on the level of philosophical argument, rather than merely that of doctrinaire hectoring. As for Hervey's stricture that the Alciphron is inconclusive and "rhapsodic," its allegedly rhapsodical, or unmethedical, inconclusiveness, which is really nothing worse than the panoramic vista of a philosophic Christian, is far preferable to the "conclusive" circularity of Leslie's arguments. As the Dictionary of National Biography points out about Leslie, "He argues in a circle at every turn, and the monumental and ceremonial evidence which he adduces to prove the authenticity of the scriptures really presupposes their authenticity." Hervey's criticism of the Alciphron, in any case, though it contains some truth, is wide of the mark because it deliberately ignores the fact that it is not merely a philosophical treatise but a semi-dramatic and deliberately polemical work of considerably subtlety in literary conception.

The only dialogue of Christian apologetics that can stand

1. It is interesting to note the great contrast between "Christian"'s observations on the nature of revelation and those of Euphranor, where he uses the sun as an analogy, quoted a few pages earlier in this chapter. By this test, Berkeley certainly seems a far more skilful and generously open-minded dialectician.

2. The author of the article was James McMullen Rigg. He also makes the interesting observation that Samuel Johnson declared about Leslie that he was "the only reasoner among the nonjurors, and a reasoner who was not to be reasoned against."
comparison with the Alciphron is Henry More's Divine Dialogues. It is just as dialectically acute as the Alciphron and perhaps more impartial in the way the discussions are presented. Instead of Berkeley's adroit quartet of protagonists, however, More has a somewhat unwieldy seven. These seven represent many finely-graded shades of opinion and, to that extent, the Divine Dialogues seems to be more convincingly impartial than the Alciphron, but that also tends to slow down the flow of argument and to lessen the dramatic force of it. It is almost as if reading the Alciphron is like listening to a virtuoso chamber-music quartet; the Divine Dialogues, like music excellent in parts but somewhat diffuse in overall effect. Another way of putting it is that the "choreography" of conversation in the Divine Dialogues is somewhat defective.

At his best, nevertheless, More does achieve an impartiality not found in Berkeley's more sharply polemical style, as in the following exchange between "Cuphophron," "Bathynous" and "Philopolis":

Cuph. Well be the future state of things what it will, I doubt not but Cartesius will be admired to all posterity.

Bath. Undoubtedly, O Cuphophron; for he will appear to men a person of the most eminent wit and folly that ever trode the stage of this earth.

Cuph. Why of wit and folly, Bathynous?

Bath. Of wit, for the extraordinary handsom semblance he makes of deducing all the phaenomena he has handled, necessarily and mechanically, and for hitting on the more immediate material causes of things to a very high probability.

Cuph. This at least is true, Lathynous. But why of folly?

Bath. Because he is so credulous, as not only to believe that he has necessarily and purely mechanically solved all the phaenomena he has treated of in his philosophy and
meteors, but also that all things else may be solved, the bodies of plants and animals not excepted.

Cuph. Posterty will be best able to judge of that.

Philop. Cupophron is very constantly zealous in the behalf of the mechanic philosophy, tho' with the hazard of losing those more notable arguments deducible from the phaenomena of nature for the proving the existence of a God: and yet I dare say he is far from being in the least measure smutted with the spoil of atheism.

Cuph. I hope so.¹

The debate at this point centres on whether mechanistic conceptions are adequate to explain the overwhelming evidence of "design" in the universe. The argument is, on the whole, good-humoured rather than polemical, and this despite the intransigence between Cuphophron, who is described by More as "A zealous, but airy minded, Platonist or Cartesian"² and resembles Alciphron, and Bathynous, who resembles Crito and is described as "the deeply-thoughtful or profoundly thinking man." The reason for this is that Philopolio's ("the pious and loyal politician") role here is to defuse a potentially explosive situation by suggesting that Cuphophron's advocacy of the mechanistic philosophy is not necessarily a sign of atheism. Euphranor resembles Philopolis to the extent that he is less combative than Crito but Philopolis is the more genuine conciliator. More, in other words, sets up the argument in such a way that there is no actual


² See More's description of the interlocutors in More, xii.
confrontation between Christians and infidel Deists but, as far as possible, an amicable exchange of views. The force of each protagonist's arguments is left for the reader to judge. The Divine Dialogues, in short, seems to present argument with greater impartiality but the Alciphron is more dramatically polemical and sharply dialectical.

The Alciphron has often been compared with Butler's Analogy of Religion as an apologetic work and with good reason. Both rely on rational argument and the logic of probability to erect an imposing defence of Christianity and both had considerable impact in their time. Unlike the Alciphron, however, Butler's Analogy remained an influential work for a long time and is still, according to Jessop, "remembered with respect in theological circles." Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly because the Deistic protagonists may have seemed anachronistic to subsequent readers. Butler escaped this dilemma by not even mentioning his opponents but confining himself to an attack on their ideas in such a way that they seem, in the words of a Victorian commentator who will soon be introduced in another context, "difficulties which had arisen in his own mind." Another reason, perhaps, that the Alciphron never had the same

1. See Jessop's comparison of both works in Berkeley III, 7-8.
3. More perceptive readers, however, recognize the universality of Alciphron and Lysicles as characters. A.D. Ritchie, for example, remarks that "In Alciphron Berkeley deals with the fashionable idols of the 'bright young people' of the early eighteenth century, who were remarkably like their successors of the 1920's and 1930's. Lysicles and Alciphron could then be found in Staff Commonrooms at Oxbridge, Redbrick and other universities as well as in lower haunts." See his George Berkeley: A Reappraisal (Manchester, 1967), p.130.
popularity as the *Analogy* is that Berkeley's use of dialogue demands more participation from the reader in appreciating the dramatic nuances of the arguments. Considering that it has often been said that Butler is difficult to follow and even obscure, it may be objected that the *Analogy* demands just as much participation from the reader. This is true as far as it goes but it is a participation that involves only the reasoning powers rather than reason and imagination together.

The contrast between Butler's style of apologetics and Berkeley's can perhaps best be appreciated in their respective discussions of free-will and necessity. A comparison of paragraph 69, chapter 6 of the first part of the *Analogy* and section 19 of the Seventh Dialogue of the *Alciphron* is especially instructive. Both Berkeley and Butler seek to demonstrate the fallacy of the doctrine of "necessity" or determinism but their manner of doing so is different in emphasis. To begin with Butler, his emphasis is on the practical consequences of a belief in determinism:

... or suppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, applied to practice, such practical application of it will be found equally absurd; equally fallacious in a practical sense; for instance, that if a man be destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, though he take no care of his own preservation; or if he be destined to die before that time, no care

can prevent it: therefore all care about preserving one's life is to be neglected: which is the fallacy instanced by the ancients. But now on the contrary, none of these practical absurdities can be drawn, from reasoning upon the supposition, that we are free; but all such reasoning with regard to the common affairs of life is justified by experience. And therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of necessity were speculatively true; yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches; that is, to the whole of our present life. For, the constitution of the present world, and the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we are so. But the thing here insisted upon is, that under the present natural government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with, as if we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are or not. Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be ever so true; yet such is in fact our condition and the natural course of things, that whenever we apply it to life and practice, this application of it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to our present interest. ...
belief in the doctrine of "necessity." He never lets the reader keep the practical consequences of such a belief out of his mind, even to the point of painstakingly saying that "perhaps" we are free but it does not matter because even if we act as if we were not, it must yet be admitted that if we do so we are bound to be misled and possibly harmed in our social relations. The rhetorical effect is to convince the reader, especially if he values common-sense, that he is, indeed, himself a free agent whatever the philosophical subtleties of the question.

Berkeley, in the guise of Fuphranor, on the other hand, makes a different point to undermine determinism:

If we consider the notions that obtain in the world of guilt and merit, praise and blame, accountable and unaccountable, we shall find the common question, in order to applaud or censure, acquit or condemn a man, is, whether he did such an action, and whether he was himself when he did it. Which comes to the same thing. It should seem, therefore, that, in the ordinary commerce of mankind, any person is esteemed accountable simply as he is an agent. And, though you should tell me that man is inactive, and that the sensible objects act upon him, yet my own experience assures me of the contrary. I know I act, and what I act I am accountable for. And, if this be true, the foundation of religion and morality remains unshaken. Religion, I say, is concerned no farther than that man should be accountable; and this he is according to my sense, and the common sense of the world, if he acts; and that he doth act is self-evident. The grounds,
therefore, and ends of religion are secured, whether your philosophic notion of liberty agrees with man's actions or no; and whether his actions are certain or contingent; the question being not, whether he did it with a free will, or what determined his will; not, whether it was certain or foreknown that he would do it, but only, whether he did it wilfully, as what must entitle him to the guilt or merit of it.

Unlike Butler, Berkeley here does not insist on the overriding importance of the practical consequences of a belief in determinism but on the more abstract question of whether blame and merit can be apportioned to human actions. Butler, in fact, concedes the theoretical possibility of the truth of determinism, whereas Berkeley first rejects it on empirical grounds, quite distinct from Butler's emphasis on practical expediency, and then only makes a rhetorical concession of its possible theoretical truth in order all the more to demonstrate its irrelevance in ascertaining the guilt or merit of an action. Berkeley, in short, is much more combative than Butler.

The greatest difference between Berkeley and Butler as apologetical controversialists, however, is that Berkeley's style of argument is an intensely dramatic one. This is especially evident in the way that Berkeley is just as concerned with exposing the psychological reasons that Deists favour determinism, as in refuting their arguments. Thus, soon after Euphranor's argument against determinism, the following exchange develops:

ALCIPHRON. But still, the question recurs, whether man be free.

EUPHRANOR. To determine this question, ought we not first to determine what is meant by the word free?

ALCIPHRON. We ought.

EUPHRANOR. In my opinion, a man is said to be free so far forth as he can do what he will. Is this so, or is it not?

ALCIPHRON. It seems so.

EUPHRANOR. Man, therefore, acting according to his will, is to be accounted free.

ALCIPHRON. This I admit to be true in the vulgar sense. But a philosopher goes higher, and inquires whether man be free to will.

EUPHRANOR. That is, whether he can will as he wills? I know not how philosophical it may be to ask this question, but it seems very idle. The notions of guilt and merit, justice and reward, are in the minds of men antecedent to all metaphysical disquisitions; and, according to those received natural notions, it is not doubted that man is accountable, that he acts, and is self-determined.1

There is a note of exasperation on Euphranor's side and obtuseness on Alciphron's; furthermore there is a hint that Alciphron believes in "necessity" because of a kind of intellectual snobbery which refuses to take at face-value what almost everyone else does. For Alciphron, perhaps, the doctrine of "free-will" is held by so many in the lower orders, including obscurantist Christians, that it must be held suspect. Thus, where Butler assumes that the reader himself may be a pest who needs to be handled with tact and earnest reasonableness,

Berkeley invites the reader to visualize the Peists in his own unflattering terms. Though the Alciphron is more of a literary work, then, the Analogy is probably more effective as a work of Christian apologetics because it addresses the reader in a more personal, and less polemical, manner.

It is interesting to note that the Victorian commentator, H.R. Huckin, a clergyman, wrote the highly-entertaining, but now little-read, Dialogues Founded upon Butler's Analogy of Religion. This work, in fact, is not only a commentary on the Analogy but also an attempt to restate its arguments in contemporary, Victorian, terms, which also involves a certain amount of dramatic technique. Thus, in the "Dialogue on the Doctrine of Necessity," which echoes the chapter on the same subject in the Analogy, this lively exchange takes place:

A. I have been telling B. that you and he will not agree.

C. You make us out to be very quarrelsome people, then. I suppose you are tired of the purely peaceful and dispassionate inquiries in which we have been occupied, and want a little excitement for a change? For my own part I prefer to be regarded as a rational animal, and not to be viewed in the light of a gladiator or a bull-dog.¹

"C" is, in fact, a scientist and it is very appropriate that it is he who expounds on the doctrine of "necessity" as scientific determinism

¹ Huckin, 176.
is the closest Victorian equivalent to Neistic "necessity." More than that, by this time natural science, as is well known, seemed to be the chief challenger to Christianity and the cause of many apostasies.

Despite the dramatic touches, however, the dialogue does little more than clarify and simplify Butler's *Analogy*. Thus, the sinuous complexity of Butler's argument about the practical consequences of determinism is reduced to the following short exchange, which only reproduces the bare bones of Butler's argument:

**E.** ... the doctrine of necessity, applied to practice, invariably leads to an absurdity.

**C.** How so?

**E.** Let us take an instance. Let a man suppose that he is fated to live a certain time, and that no effort on his own part will enable him to escape his fate, no rashness will precipitate it; is such an opinion practically reasonable?

**C.** I should think any man a madman who acted upon it.

**E.** Yet it is strictly in accord with the principle of necessity. But if the man who so acts is justly accounted mad, he who acts on the opposite principle is a reasonable man. The result is, that, whether the principle of necessity or of freedom be speculatively true, the former is practically false. ...
Iluckin, nevertheless, is well-skilled in the art of dialogue, as in
the following passage:

E. ... Imagine a society constituted upon the principle that all actions were necessary. Could such men have any idea of justice?
C. Why not?
E. If every motive were of necessity obeyed, it is difficult to see what should cause such an idea to arise, as that certain actions are just and others unjust.
C. Not at all. Man finds by experience that certain actions are advantageous and others disadvantageous. To the former they give the name just, and the latter they call unjust.
E. So that mankind attach no idea of blame to the one or praise to the other.
C. Yes; but they do.
E. Upon what principle?
C. Why, that injury to society merits punishment, and benefits deserve reward.
E. Merit! deserve! Why, what language is this? A necessary action deserving praise or blame! If it were voluntary, you could not use stronger language about it. If there is no freedom, there is no merit or demerit. And equally we must give up any idea of virtue and vice: our actions have no character about them: they are quite indifferent as far as all moral relations go.¹

Here, the scientist falls into a trap which leads him to contradict his own doctrine of "necessity." As such, the exchange has a distinction of its own, independent of any argument in the Analogy.

¹. Iluckin, 189-90.
which has to do with the reader's enjoyment in seeing the scientist confuted within his own premisses—a device favoured by Mandeville and Hume and often used by Berkeley, not to mention many other practitioners of the genre, including Plato.

Berkeley's achievement, in any case, is the result of an elaborate design of exposition and argument hidden by an effortless, and often eloquent, flow of fine conversation. The following exchange not only exemplifies the scintillating quality of conversation recreated by Berkeley but also stands as an apposite analogy for the overall effect of the Alciphron as a literary work in a "neo-classic" mould:

ALCIPHRON. Suppose now a drawing finished by the nice and laborious touches of a Dutch pencil, and another off-hand scratched out in the free manner of a great Italian master. The Dutch piece, which hath cost so much pains and time, will be exact indeed, but without that force, spirit, or grace which appear in the other, and are the effects of an easy, free pencil. Do but apply this, and the point will be clear.

EUPHRAKOR. Pray inform me, did those great Italian masters begin and proceed in their art without any choice of method or subject, and always draw with the same ease and freedom? Or did they observe some method, beginning with simple and elementary parts, an eye, a nose, a finger, which they drew with great pains and care, often drawing the same thing, in order to draw it correctly, and so proceeding with patience and industry, till, after a considerable length of time, they arrived at the free masterly manner.
you spoke of? If this were the case, I leave you to make the application. ¹

Berkeley's achievement especially deserves wider recognition when compared with Shaftesbury's *The Moralists*, which, as has been demonstrated in the preceding chapter, is excessively "sublime" in design and insufficiently dramatic.

¹ Berkeley III, 49. There is an intriguing possibility that Berkeley here, in the First Dialogue, is alluding to and refuting Mandeville's advocacy of the realism of Dutch art, as opposed to the idealizations of Italian art, in the opening pages of the First Dialogue of *The Fable of the Bees*, Part Two. Mandeville, indeed, as suggested in chapter five of this dissertation, probably implies a favourable analogy between his own homespun style and the vivid realism of Dutch painting.
CHAPTER IX. CONCLUSION: THE NEO-CLASSICAL MODE OF
PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE

"... it is among the niceties of dialogue-writing to order the
speeches in such a way, as to bring
the conversation naturally to the
point you aim at."

William Gilpin in "On Dialogue
Writing," the introductory essay
to Dialogues on Various Subjects
(1807)\(^1\)

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The significance of Mandeville, Shaftesbury, and Berkeley as dialogue writers is that they revitalized the ancient genre of philosophical dialogue to suit eighteenth-century tastes. They did so either by borrowing from other, more flourishing genres, as in the case of Mandeville, or by adhering to an ideal model of philosophical dialogue based on neo-classical principles, as in the dialogues of Shaftesbury and Berkeley.

Mandeville arrived at his own kind of philosophical dialogue, which is at its best in The Fable of the Bees, Part Two and A Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases, almost haphazardly by exploiting the amorphousness of dialogue as an independent genre—amorphousness due to the fact that dialogue is an important element in the drama, the novel, and the short-story. 1 The Mandevillian kind of philosophical dialogue, in fact, emerged by the modification of other genres. Before experimenting with genres, however, Mandeville first mastered the art of polemical and informally disquisitional dialogue with his contributions to the Female Tatler and his political pamphlet, The Mischiefes That Ought Justly to be Apprehended From a Whig Government. This is why all his dialogues have a strong polemical and disquisitional element derived from the controversial pamphlets and popular periodicals of the time. In his book-length dialogues, however, he borrows from other genres to enliven his presentation of philosophical argument. Each one of them, in fact, combines elements of a popular genre with the depiction of dialectical argument. The Virgins Unmask'd

1. Its amorphousness becomes even more undefinable when it is considered that it is an important element of the epic or any long, narrative poem and even, occasionally, the lyric. It occurs, as well, in satirical prose and poetry.
experiments with novelistic realism and casuistical discussion in the two moral tales that are part of the dialogue. In *The Fable of the Bees*, Part Two, dialectical argument is transformed into the witty repartee and conversational exuberance of Restoration comedy. In *The Origin of Honour* the rhetorical paradox, popular as a didactic device in periodicals, is extensively used to generate discussion.

As for the Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases, it, too, has elements of Restoration comedy but, more than any other dialogue of *Hume*’s, it is a unique example of successful philosophical dialogue in English. This is because its aims of providing a medical guide to the treatment of nervous diseases, a dramatization of the doctor-patient relationship and a discussion of the issues involved in rival theories of medicine are in complete harmony. *Hume*’s modification of other genres to suit philosophical dialogue, in any case, anticipates Diderot’s achievement in *Le Neveu de Rameau* which can be read simultaneously as a novel, a satire and as a play. Needless to say, this makes it very rich as a philosophical dialogue.

Berkeley’s dialogues are neo-classical mainly in their depiction of idealized conversation which has just enough abrasiveness to convey the flavour of real conversation at its most lively. Thus, as has been pointed out by Donald Davie, his dialogues dramatize

1. These aspects of Diderot’s dialogue are all discussed in Herbert Josephs, *Diderot’s Dialogues of Language and Gesture* (Chio, 1969).

two mutually-exclusive kinds of conversational discourse. In the Three Dialogues Between Nysa and Philonous it is discussion at its best and in the Alciphron, conversational debate at its most vigorous. The dominant tone of the Three Dialogues is one of earnestness and candour. Neither amusing banter nor quirks of character are allowed to deflect the flow of argument. In the Alciphron, the opposite kind of argument is presented in which hostile raillery and polemical sarcasm predominate. All parties, however, stay within the bounds of "good-breeding" and decorum. Many of their arguments may be "ad hominem" but, as in parliamentary debate, insults are more often veiled than direct.

As for Shaftesbury's The Moralists, it is neo-classical mainly in the gentlemanly mode of argument or Horatian "fine raillery" that it depicts. The soliloquizing mode of its pattern of dialectic, however, is more akin to the introspection of Romantic poetry than conversational prose. Shaftesbury, in fact, turned philosophical dialogue into a kind of prose-poem which directly influenced Thomson and other eighteenth-century nature-poets who anticipated the Romantics. Where Kandeeville borrowed from other genres for his version of philosophical dialogue, the uniqueness of Shaftesbury's dialogue lies in its poetic element, which influenced other genres more strictly poetic.

While all three authors, faced with the problem of reviving an ancient genre, and going beyond the limits of the highly-popular, but mostly ephemeral, polemical and expository dialogues of the time, solved it in different ways, all the dialogues in question have strong neo-classical elements and most incorporate techniques from
other genres. Thus, Mandeville's dialogues are neo-classical in that, like those of Berkeley and Shaftesbury, they do give a "natural and spirited representation of real conversation," which is one of Hugh Blair's requirements for philosophical dialogue.¹ Mandeville's colloquialisms would no doubt have offended Hurd, whose predilection for a lofty and dignified conversational tone in philosophical dialogue is especially emphasized by his insistence on distinguished historical personages as interlocutors,² but a later neo-classical critic, William Gilpin, was not in favour of such an extreme interpretation of conversational decorum. In his own words, "a dialogue should be natural, easy, and carried on with the unrestrained freedom of conversation."³ The liveliness of conversational banter in Mandeville's dialogues certainly fulfils Gilpin's requirement.

Berkeley's Alciphron shares with Mandeville's dialogues the incorporation of subordinate genres, the most important of which is the "character." The Second Dialogue of the Alciphron is especially rich in "characters," both of the more generalized Theophrastan variety and the individualized ones patterned after those of La Bruyère. The following Theophrastan one of the English "man of pleasure" is especially interesting:

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There is a cast of thought in the complexion of an Englishman which renders him the most unsuccessful rake in the world. He is (as Aristotle expresseth it) at variance with himself. He is neither brute enough to enjoy his appetites, nor man enough to govern them. He knows and feels that what he pursues is not his true good; his reflection serving only to show him that misery which his habitual sloth and indolence will not suffer him to remedy. At length, being grown odious to himself, and abhorring his own company, he runs into every idle assembly, not from the hopes of pleasure, but merely to repel the pain of his own mind. Listless and uneasy at the present, he hath no delight in reflecting on what is past, or in the prospect of anything to come. This man of pleasure, whom, after a wretched scene of vanity and woe, his animal nature is worn to the stump, wishes and dreads death by turns, and is sick of living, without ever having tried or known the true life of man.1

Here there is acute social observation and precise description that rivals the satirical "character" of the "man of honour" in The Fable of the Bees, Part Two.2

The Second Dialogue also contains an entire gallery of "minute philosophers" described after the anecdotal manner of La Bruyère, as in the following moralistic account by Crito of the different "characters" of two brothers:


I have often reflected on the different fate of two brothers in my neighbourhood. Cleon, the elder, being designed an accomplished gentleman, was sent to town, had the first part of his education in a great school: what religion he learned there was soon unlearned in a certain celebrated society, which, till we have a better, may pass for a nursery of minute philosophers. Cleon dressed well, could cheat at cards, had a nice palate, understood the mystery of the die, was a mighty man in the minute philosophy; and having shined a few years in these accomplishments, he died before thirty, childless and rotten, expressing the utmost indignation that he could not outlive that old dog his father; who, having a great notion of polite manners, and knowledge of the world, had purchased them to his favourite son with much expense, but had been more frugal in the education of Chaerephon, the younger son; who was brought up at a country school, and entered a commoner in the university, where he qualified himself for a parsonage in his father's gift, which he is now possessed of, together with the estate of the family, and a numerous offspring. 1

Berkley's technique here is so much like that of a periodical essayist employing the "character" to make a moral point that it serves as a good example of how the incorporation of techniques from other genres is not incompatible with the neo-classical mode of philosophical dialogue.

It should be noted that Mandeville was also adept at applying

the technique of character-writing to political portraits, including Louis XIV in The Virgin Unmask'd, Robert Walpole in The Fable of the Bee, Part Two and Cromwell in The Origin of Honour. What makes these portraits similar to the Theophrastan character is that they are not descriptions of famous historical personalities but generalized analytical descriptions of certain kinds of political men. Thus, Louis XIV is a "character" of the haughtily ambitious monarch with absolute power, Walpole, the consummate politician whose very mediocrity as a statesman makes him fit for the office of Prime Minister,¹ and Cromwell, the politically-ambitious hypocrite. With its mixture of admiration for his political sagacity and contempt for his tyrannical ambition, the character-sketch of Cromwell probably owes something to Clarendon's "historical character" of him.² Thus, Clarendon concludes about Cromwell that

In a word, as he had all the wickednesses against which damnation is denounced and for which Hell fire is prepared, so he had some virtues, which have caused the memory of some men in all ages to be celebrated, and he will be looked upon by posterity, as a brave, bad man.³

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¹ See H.T. Dickinson, "The Politics of Bernard Mandeville," in Mandeville Studies: New Explorations in the Art and Thought of Dr. Bernard Mandeville, ed. by Irwin Primer (The Hague, 1979), pp.88-94. Although Dickinson's article does not concern itself with the "character" as such, it includes some interesting observations on Mandeville's portrayal of Louis XIV and Walpole that illuminate his use of "character."

² For an analysis of how the portrayal of major and minor participants in of the Civil War by seventeenth-century historians and memoirists were often based on the technique of character-writing, see David Nicol Smith, ed., Characters from the Histories and Memoirs of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1963), pp.xix-xxx. Nicol Smith's anthology was first published in 1918. Hereinafter to be cited as Smith.

³ Smith, 140.
Though worded in more secular terms, Mandeville's conclusion to his "character" of Cromwell is basically similar:

... the most enormous of his Crimes proceeded from no worse Principle than the best of his Achievements. In the Midst of his Villanies he was a Slave to Business; and the most disinterested Patriot never watch'd over the Publick Welfare, both at Home and Abroad, with greater Care and Assiduity, or retriev'd the fallen Credit of a Nation in less Time than this Usurper: But all was for himself; and he never had a Thought on the Glory of England, before he had made it inseparable from his own. 1

Even in the portrayal of historical persons (two of whom were his contemporaries), however, Mandeville's use of "character" is never independent of dialectical argument about the nature of politics and society. With both Berkeley and Mandeville, in short, the "character" becomes one of the many rhetorical techniques and dialectical devices of philosophical dialogue adapted to neo-classical taste.

It is especially in their methods of characterization that Mandeville, Shaftesbury and Berkeley follow neo-classical requirements. Basically, what neo-classical critics desired of philosophical dialogue was both convincing portrayal of character and that the characteristic traits of the interlocutors should not distract the reader's attention away from the flow of dialectic. They considered philosophical dialogue, in other words, to be pre-eminently a

semi-dramatic genre, and it is Gilpin who defines this aspect of it most succinctly:

... these characters, whatever they are, should be naturally supported. This, however, appears to be a point of no great difficulty, because much on this head will not be expected. In dramatic writing, the peculiarity of manners must be illustrated by a variety of incidents; and it requires great skill to support a character through all the intricacies of a well-contrived drama. But the object of the dialogue is rather the investigation of truth, than the display of character; and the speaker is introduced chiefly as the vehicle of the author's opinion. 2

Character convincingly depicted in terms of dramatized conversation, in fact, was the neo-classical solution to the problem of the "straw-man" that has always bedevilled writers of philosophical dialogue. As Blair put it, dialogues in which the opposing interlocutor is merely a "straw-man," have "the form without the spirit of conversation." 3 Thus, in the dialogues of Mandeville and Berkeley, even though the opposing interlocutors invariably lose their arguments, dramatic interest and dialectical suspense is nevertheless sustained in that all the opposing interlocutors are interesting as characters and there is genuine dramatization of conversation.

In the later, more neo-classical, dialogues of Mandeville, the

1. See, for example, the observations on Richard Hurd in the first chapter of this dissertation.

2. Gilpin, 8.

solution of the "straw-man" problem takes the form of witty repartee between the two interlocutors, who are also genuine friends and dramatically presented as such, and the characterization of the opposing interlocutor (in the Treatise, or medical dialogue, as well) as the worldly "honnête homme" dominated by the passions, as described in moral treatises and presented in Restoration comedy. Mandeville's dialogues are especially conducive to such treatment of character because the very philosophy he expounds largely consists of an analysis of the behaviour of worldly persons rather than an exposition of ideal morality. In Shaftesbury's The Moralists, Philocles is as much of a gentlemanly "honnête homme" as Horatio in Mandeville's later dialogues but there is a flatness to his character due to the fact that his open-minded scepticism is equally present in Theocles. He is, indeed, an unfulfilled Theocles or unconverted "honnête homme."¹ As a result, the problem of the "straw-man" is not so much solved in The Moralists as entirely eliminated because Philocles' central role is not to be defeated in discussion but to be induced into a state of feeling that can only be expressed in an "enthusiastic" and semi-poetical manner. Berkeley's Three Dialogues has very little characterization but, in Blair's words, it is "an instance of a very abstract subject, rendered clear and intelligible by means of conversation properly managed."²

In the Alciphron characterization is fuller than in either the dialogues of Mandeville or Shaftesbury's The Moralists and is

¹. In Mandeville's dialogues, incidentally, there is no attempt to convert Horatio to anything but to make him arrive at a greater degree of self-awareness, the purported moral aim of Mandeville's philosophy.

². Blair, 501.
reflected in the varying degrees of hostile raillery and sarcasm resorted to by the protagonists. This is because Berkeley's aim is not only to refute the ideas of the Deists but to expose their characters as well. Such a strong polemical element in its style of dialogue would seem to militate against a solution of the "strawman" problem in the Alciphron. Berkeley, however, closely patterns the mode of argument of each protagonist to his own character, so that it is the very method of reasoning of the Deists that is attacked, not merely their beliefs. As a result, the Alciphron is intensely dramatic, and in a manner that illuminates methods of reasoning, including, in the Christian protagonists, two ways of arguing in favour of Christianity. Its characterization, in short, is subordinated to dialectical requirements. It is because the Alciphron contains the maximum of characterization compatible with dialectical argument and conversational verisimilitude that it may well be the most neo-classical of philosophical dialogues in English.

The emphasis on conversational dialectic is so strong in the neo-classical conception of philosophical dialogue that it leaves little room for the function of setting. In his remarks on the "dialogue of the dead," however, Gilpin implies that the function of setting in philosophical dialogue is to unobtrusively enhance the illusion of conversation:

... I cannot say I am much pleased with laying the scene of a dialogue in the other world. The great beauty of dialogue-writing consists in the ease, and probability, with which the dialogue is carried on. But this, in a great measure, is lost, when the scene and characters are both unnatural.

In the dialogues of Mandeville, the setting is always indoors and in the city, thus resembling the Restoration drawing-room in which witty repartee can be conducted. This kind of setting is especially effective in the opening dialogue of The Fable of the Bees, Part Two where a charming lady given to puncturing intellectual pretence joins the two male interlocutors in discussing morality and the arts, with special reference to paintings hanging on the wall. In Berkeley's Three Dialogues the setting is a garden in which the interlocutors take a leisurely walk. As has been shown in chapter six, the fountain in the garden is used by Philonous as a convenient metaphor for the essence of his argument. Otherwise, the setting is rarely alluded to, but when it is, Berkeley's manner of doing so is both strikingly descriptive and dialectically ingenious, as when Philonous exclaims: "What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds, really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves any other form, than that of a dark mist or vapour?"

In the Alciphron and The Moralists, the setting is considerably more detailed than in the Three Dialogues or any by Mandeville. In both cases the setting is rural. In the Alciphron, however, it consists of a well-cultivated countryside, while in The Moralists it is "untamed Nature." As has been seen in chapter seven, the setting, as "genius of place," decisively contributes to the dialectical strategy of The Moralists. In this respect, Shaftesbury's dialogue goes beyond neo-classical requirements for the function of setting because the "genius of place" encourages not sociable

conversation but soliloquizing contemplation. The setting in the 
Alciphron is just as important but its role in Berkeley's dialectical 
strategy is subtler and more in the spirit of neo-classical criteria. 
It is also closer to the role of setting in Mandeville's dialogues. 
This can best be appreciated in the picturesque opening to the Fifth 
Dialogue. It finds the protagonists on top of a hill enjoying fine 
weather, and a variety of pleasing prospects, including Arcadian 
"green pastures, flocks and herds," "fishing-boats and lighters, 
gliding up and down on a surface as smooth and bright as glass," and 
a tumultuous fox-hunt.¹ In the aftermath of the fox-hunt, the 
following exchange occurs, as narrated by Dion:

Now Lysicles, being a nice man and a bal esprit, 
had an infinite contempt for the rough manners and 
conversation of fox-hunters, and could not reflect 
with patience that he had lost, as he called it, 
so many hours in their company. I flattered myself, 
said he, that there had been none of this species 
remaining among us: strange that men should be 
diverted with such uncouth noise and hurry, or find 
pleasure in the society of dogs and horses! How much more elegant are the diversions of the town!

There seems, replied Euphranor, to be some 
resemblance between fox-hunters and free-thinkers; 
the former exerting their animal faculties in 
pursuit of game, as you gentlemen employ your 
intellectuals in the pursuit of truth. The kind 
of amusement is the same, although the object be 
different.²

The implication of Euphranor's raillery is that the search for 
truth of the "minute philosopher" is nothing more than a diverting
game rather than a serious occupation. Because Lysicles betrays his contempt for the healthily-physical diversions of the countryside, however, there is also the implication that Lysicles detests the simple, rural virtues. It is significant, in fact, that both Crito and Euphranor seem to be country-squires, so that the rural setting is no mere arcadian embellishment but Berkeley's oblique way of showing his allegiance, which he shared with Pope, to the simple life and rural virtues as most conducive to Christianity. Keeping this in mind, it is fiendishly ironic that Hervey's merciless critique of the Alciphron is that of a townsman and a polished courtier disguised as a plain-speaking country-parson. It is wholly appropriate, in any case, that the settings of Mandeville's dialogues should be urban and those of Berkeley, rural, because, to a large extent, to contrast the dialogues of Mandeville and Berkeley, both formally and in terms of philosophical content, is to contrast the values of Town and Country, or Whig and Tory in the early eighteenth century.

As has been noted in the first chapter, the "insinuation of truth" advocated by Hurd for philosophical dialogue resembles Locke's dialectic, which consists of the "balancing of arguments" not in the Ciceronian manner of comparing the level of eloquence of each argument but by evaluating the strength of the logic of each one. The dialogues of Mandeville, Shaftesbury and Berkeley all display variations of this pattern of dialectic. In the dialogues of Mandeville, the Mandevillian persona constantly generates argument by initiating paradoxes, or provocative statements, which force the opposing interlocutor into arguing against them. Each
provocative or paradoxical statement, however, is a carefully-laid trap because the logic behind the apparently paradoxical or outrageous statement is invariably shown to be sounder than the logic behind the opposing interlocutor's. Deception, in short, is the essence of Mandeville's dialectical method. In Berkeley's Three Dialogues, there is no dialectical deception. Instead of clusters of paradoxes generating argument, there are two sets of statements. The reader must decide which set of statements is logically consistent throughout and which reduces itself to paradox because of logical inconsistency. In the Alciphron, it is two distinct modes of argument that are contrasted, the broadly open-minded Christian one and the narrow, "minute" one of the Deists. The contrast is made in an explicitly polemical way but this still implies that the logical consistency of each mode of argument must be judged.

In The Moralists, Lockean dialectic occurs only in the rallying exchanges between Palemon and Philocles in Part I where, in a manner similar to Mandeville's version of Lockean dialectic, Philocles plays an elaborate deception on Palemon by pretending to be a Pyrrhonist. Shaftesbury's aim, however, is to demonstrate that while open-minded scepticism is indispensable in the search for truth, as an end in itself it merely leads not to truth but fashionable raillery, similar to that compared by Berkeley to fox-hunting, and atheism. As for genuine debate of ideas between Philocles and Theocles, it occurs in the restricted form of Socratic elenchus rather than the more informal Lockean dialectic. The true source of a dialectic that leads to truth for Shaftesbury, in fact, is not the Lockean "balancing of arguments" but inward colloquy in the face of Nature
or the "dialectic of genius." It is, in short, a dialectic that involves semi-mystical communication between the human mind and the divine rather than sociable discussion. Thus, it is another aspect of the uniqueness of *The Moralists* that it spans a wide spectrum of dialectical argument: the Socratic elenchus of Platonic dialogue, Lockean dialectic, and the inward dialectic of the eighteenth-century and Romantic nature-poet. The effect on the reader, however, is of a unified whole because of Shaftesbury's adherence to the neo-classical requirements of conversational liveliness and decorum.

All that remains to be said is that philosophical dialogues of the eighteenth-century ought not to be read simply as works of philosophy but as dramatic works in which dialectic is turned into urbane conversation. Though not as great, perhaps, as Pope's epistles and Swift's satires, they are, in their emphasis on the value of lucid conversation, examples of an intensely neo-classical genre. It is the emphasis on informal conversation, in fact, that distinguishes them from the dialogues of Plato and Cicero. This is so because classical culture was centred, broadly speaking, on public rhetoric rather than on private conversation. Thus, the Socratic elenchus is more of a device of public debate than a conversational gambit and the emphasis in Cicero's dialogues is on the rhetorical eloquence of the speakers rather than plain-speaking and conversational ability. Gilpin even went so far as to declare about the Platonic dialogues that "In philosophic subjects, the Socratic dialogues are supposed to be masterpieces. I doubt whether they may not sometimes be found captious, uninteresting, and
not convincing."¹ The inherent difficulties in the writing of philosophical dialogue, as observed by neo-classical critics, in any case, were summed up in one apt phrase by Edward FitzGerald: "It is not easy to keep to good dialectic, and yet keep up the disj ected sway of natural conversation."² Though FitzGerald goes on to praise Plato for surmounting such a difficulty, and belittle Landor for failing to do so, yet it is even truer of the neo-classical mode of philosophical dialogue that it transforms "good dialectic" into the "disj ected sway of natural conversation."

1. Gilpin, 3.

2. Letters and Literary Remains of Edward FitzGerald, vol. I (London, 1902), p.244. FitzGerald's phrase is taken from a letter to C.B. Cowell probably written at the "end of 1846." FitzGerald is referring to his difficulties in writing Euphranor (1851), a dialogue which has some of the conversational ease and polemical acerbity of Berkeley's Alciphron.
Although all the works used in this study are listed, detailed bibliographic information is confined mainly to works in dialogue and those which are comparatively rare or by authors that have not been given wide critical and bibliographic attention. In keeping with the aims of this dissertation, all dialogues, whether of literary merit or not, are considered as primary sources.

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