ON INVERTING HEGEL: THE RELATIONS OF HEGEL'S AND MARX'S ACCOUNTS OF ALIENATION

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I DECLARE THAT THIS THESIS IS MY OWN ORIGINAL WORK.

[Signature]

David Campbell.
ABSTRACT

This work evaluates the fruitfulness of the central theme of *Capital* for the understanding of modern society. This evaluation is carried out by discussing the relationship of Marx's thought to Hegel's, for not only is this relationship of the foremost importance in the, as it were, internal fashioning of Marx's thought, but it is through this relationship that the wider social theoretical stature of that thought is developed. Hegel posits the fundamental project of the critique of existing alienated conditions which faces modern society and social theory as its principal task. But he does so in an ineradicably theological manner which prevents the fully rational grasp of the requirements of fulfilling this project. In Marx, the refashioning of this project in a social scientifically corrigible fashion is attempted, and the value of Marx's work is to be measured in proportion to the success of this attempt.

More precisely, one of Hegel's programmatic statements of the method of critique - the introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* - is explicated at length, and the influence of this method on *Capital* is discussed in the rest of the work. The core theme of this discussion is the vexed interpretative idea of Marx's having "inverted" Hegel. Marx's materialist account of social change is said to have been developed by inverting
Hegel's idealist scheme of history as the realisation of self-conscious Spirit whilst retaining a common dialectic form.

I conclude that Marx is broadly successful in rendering the critique of alienation in a rationally corrigible fashion. His critique of political economy and the capitalist mode of production are of a form which is essentially able to win intellectual conviction. This is indeed an inversion of Hegel. It has been claimed that such an inversion would carry implications of serious weakness, for Hegel's dialectic is too thoroughly idealist and theologically determinist to allow of its being rationally appropriated. But in fact Hegel's thought is far more sensitive to, and richly appreciative of, the most pressing social issues, and is far more encouraging to a materialist epistemological reworking, for Marx's work to suffer from this inversion. However, a problem of transposing the dialectic from idealism to materialism remains to trouble Marx, and indeed trouble him because of the directness of his inversion of Hegel. For in respect of the crucial issue of determining the proletarian establishment of socialism, Marx's materialism so directly opposes idealism as to collapse into naturalism. Marx's argument on this issue is expressed in a very close analogy with what Marx takes to be the laws of natural science; and is thus seriously deficient in describing what Marx himself in the best
parts of his work insists is a movement of social self-consciousness.
This thesis is dedicated to my parents Ian and Vera Campbell.
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PART 1

INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM OF MARX'S "INVERSION" OF HEGEL

Marx as the "Inverted Hegel"

In the next part of this thesis I will present a commentary, based on the 'Introduction' to the Phenomenology, of Hegel's mature objections to classical epistemology and a summary account of critical epistemological consequences. I do not think it possible to doubt that these arguments, not only as present in the Phenomenology but also as subsequently developed in the Science of Logic and in the Encyclopaedia Logic, were the basic resources upon which Engels and Marx continually drew in reaching their own positions on these fundamental epistemological matters. Engels and Marx overall held to the essential knowability of the objective world, and the essential incorporation of human subjectivity within it in a fashion categorically indebted to Hegel.

Establishing this there is, firstly, their own direct testimony in this respect. This is consistent on this point from the time of the writing of Marx's thesis (1) to that of Engel's Ludwig Feuerbach (2). Secondly, of course, there is the very substantial weight of those interpretations of Marx's marxism, amongst which we must
again count the later Engels' work, which have in fact been marxism's knowledge of these parts of its intellectual history up to well into the latter half of this century (3). These have pictured that history as Marx's taking over Hegel's winning of the possibility of truth but "inverting" Hegel's subsequent theocratic constructions in order to give the materialist - or sociological, or humanist, or historical, or economic, etc. - construction of the class struggle. One might peremptorily single out, apart from Anti-Dühring (4) (and works to which this and other of Engels' later writings rather directly gave rise such as Plekhanov's The Development of the Monist View of History (5)), Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks (6), Lukács' History and Class Consciousness (7) and Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy (8), Gramsci's Prison Notebooks (9), Stalin's Dialectical and Historical Materialism (10), Marcuse's Reason and Revolution (11) and Lefebvre's Dialectical Materialism (12) as perhaps, after their different fashions, particularly significant expositions of these interpretations. Despite its length, this list, as a list, is certainly indefensible, but it does serve to illustrate a point crucially at issue here. These are obviously diverse and divergent, indeed in many respects explicitly opposed, interpretations, containing reading's of Marx's marxism as the bases of such a wide variety of historical marxisms that it seems illegitimate to join them even in this clearly collective noun. Nevertheless,
when taken, as I think it legitimate to do on these matters of intellectual history, as a whole, they represent a common crisis in the understanding of Marx's marxism and its relation to Hegel.

**Criticism of the Metaphor of Inversion**

For as it is now able to be recognised, a Hegel inverted or a Hegel with the rational kernel of materialist method extracted from within the mystical shell of idealist system is nonetheless still Hegel, though now to be called by another name - Marx (13). If I may again be allowed a merely illustrative list, I would link Della Volpe's *Logic as a Positive (Historical) Science* (14), Althusser's *For Marx* (15), Zeleny's *The Method of Marx* (16), and the second part of Colletti's *Marxism and Hegel* (17) with the successful criticism of the representation of Marx's relation to Hegel as a mere inversion or change of subject. Indeed these writings and others have firmly established the necessity of a radical discontinuity of method between Hegel and Marx were the latter to have laid even the foundations of a science of history and of a marxist politics which is informed by that science.

**Hermeneutic Difficulties in Rejecting the Metaphor of "Inversion"**

We are clearly faced with a conflict of interpretations
around the notion of "inverting" Hegel, and a conflict which involves a special hermeneutic difficulty (18). For if we accept, as I think we must, the criticisms of the adequacy of the metaphor of "inversion", then this conflict amounts to a paradox in respect of two figures who put forward this metaphor - Engels and Marx themselves.

Firstly, consider the position of the later Engels. The difficulty in assessing the significance of Engels' later contributions has already been registered above by these writings being, as it were, counted twice. There are immediate obstacles to any attempt (19) to deny or severely restrict Engels' authority to speak for Marx, which is certainly necessary if Marx is to be separated from the metaphor of inversion, since these efforts of Engels to systematise marxist philosophy involve the guiding idea of Marx and himself having inverted Hegel. There is, brought to mind by the explicit links spanning more than fifty years of the preface to On the Critique of Political Economy, the foreword to Ludwig Feuerbach, and The German Ideology (20), and between Socialism: Utopian and Scientific and The Holy Family (21), the extent to which Engels' efforts were the explication of work, particularly philosophical and overt political work, of the period up to 1847 upon which, after Marx, Engels was uniquely privileged to comment. And further there is Marx's continued support for the later Engels' work,
which is exemplified by the former's interest in, assistance with, and approval of Anti-Dühring.

This leads by a circular route to the second figure who presents especial difficulty to the rejection of the metaphor of inversion; the figure of Marx himself. Not only did Marx unto his death repeatedly affirm his debt to Hegel, but furthermore he did so in the very terms which have made the inversion metaphor of central importance. He famously expressed this debt in this way in the afterword to the second German edition of the first volume of Capital (22). Furthermore, he saw fit to reproduce this rare published methodological explication of his principal achievement as an explicit commentary, though allowing the omission of the metaphor of kernel and shell, in the last edition of volume one he saw in print, the French edition of 1873 (23).

**Theoretical Difficulties in Rejecting the Metaphor of "Inversion"**

I do not believe that these hermeneutic difficulties will allow of resolution if treated in a basically negative fashion, as largely a problem of determining when Marx was able to free himself from Hegelian influence. In so far as their interpretations involve a Marx at his best when wholly opposed to Hegel, this is the problem for both Althusser and Colletti. The former has devoted most
attention to this.

It is not merely that if posed in this way these difficulties must, as we have seen, on the direct testimony of Marx himself be flatly denied a resolution before the mid- to late-1870s; indeed, this has compelled Althusser to withdraw his claim of an epistemological break with Hegel not merely from 1845 but behind Capital itself to the critique of the Gotha Programme and the notes on Wagner (24). It is that such a retreat leaves substantially unanswered the vital question of how did Marx accomplish his own development in work earlier than that which is approved? (25), and in fact presumes, on the basis of Althusser's own rejection of Hegel, that Hegel's presence in Marx's later writings can be treated as an incidental survival (26). After the achievement of his preliminary indication of the necessary existence in Marx of a fundamental departure in method from Hegel, particularly in 'Contradiction and Overdetermination' (27), Althusser seems to have proceeded to evaluate Marx's work to determine how far they measure up to the conclusions of that essay. It is wholly incorrect to treat this as an investigation of how Marx himself accomplished the indicated departure, and in fact to do so necessarily involves misunderstanding the character of Marx's own intellectual development. Hence Althusser's interpretations of, and even detailed commentaries on, Marx's writings contain perhaps the most fantastic
infelicities that can be found in any reading at all sympathetic to Marx (15). Althusser's contributions do, I believe, cast light on certain of the basic thrusts of Marx's work in an interesting way (28), but by no means explain the genesis or fully describe the significance of these within Marx himself, and thus in the end are inadequate even to what is approved within those writings. That is to say, as has often enough been said (30), that Althusser's substantive accounts of ideology and capitalist institutions fall far beneath the positions won by Marx himself. As Althusser would be the first to insist, it is only within an entire body of thought that any particular aspect of it may be fully understood, and this tells us a great deal about the replacement of the metaphor of "inversion" with that of "break". It is clearly the case that Althusser's marxism requires that Hegelian influence be eradicated. But it is only if this is quite falsely presented as Marx's marxism that the critique of the Gotha Programme, one of the principal sources of Marx's developed political formulations of alienation and its transcendence (31), and the notes on Wagner, the most extensive of Marx's defences of the method of volume one of Capital especially in respect of its debt to Hegel (32), can be said to be totally free of Hegelian influence. Equally, it is only upon this basis that the section on "The Fetishism of Commodities and Its Secret", which is the key to Marx's political economy in its summary of the
critique of value as the critique of the alienation of capitalist production (33), can be regarded as a flagrant and harmful Hegelian survival (34). But this is to seriously violate the boundary between critical exposition and independent criticism, and Althusser can, I think, be severely censured for not paying sufficient attention to this.

Much the same could be said of what I am afraid appears to me to be Colletti's wholly arbitrary, from the point of view of interpretation, attempt to link Marx and Kant to the exclusion of Hegel. Having suppressed the Hegel in Marx, Althusser was driven to seek the philosophical sources of Marx's thought in other antecedents, and alighted upon Spinoza (35). Colletti's recasting of Marx's intellectual ancestry is more explicit, though the direct evidence of Marx's indebtedness to the figure chosen is even more slight than in the case of Spinoza. It seems as if, at whatever cost of violence to Marx's own clear testimony with respect to his evaluation of German idealism and the English and French sources of his materialism, Colletti felt compelled to press on with the challenge to the heuristic value of the metaphor of inversion until he had completely bridged Hegel. He thereby directly connects Marx to the materialist intent in Kant's defence of phenomenal knowledge. The epistemological result is indeed hardly an advance upon Kant, and it certainly cannot represent Marx (36).
There is a further paradox here, though I think a more instructive one than the earlier. I can find but little trace of Marx's ever complex conjunctural analyses in the simple functionalism (37) of 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' (38), nor of Marx's materialism in the irremediably idealist method (39) set out in Colletti's introduction to Bernstein or in his essay on 'Marxism: Science or Revolution?' (40). One is lead back to Marx because there is a clear gap between the departure from Hegel in Marx which has been indicated and the explicitly anti-Hegelian marxisms which have been put forward as rigorous marxism fully cognisant of this departure. This is particularly important because the gap shows to the detriment of the latter. But in recognising this, it is vital to retain the positive contributions which have been made. We must now begin with the recognition that it is fruitless to regard Marx's relation to Hegel as that of a simple inversion. In so far as it fails to do this, Timpanaro's valuable defence of, and building upon, the significance of the philosophy of the later Engels (41) tends to merge with complete acceptance of or even accentuation of the mechanistic tone of that philosophy (42), and is thus in severe danger of returning to certain of the positions of the Second International which least merit revival. For marxist philosophy to have to free itself from these positions once again would indeed be a farce (43).
Outline of theComing Argument

This seems to me to lead to further consideration of what it exactly meant to "invert" Hegel. There stand as the conclusions of earlier investigations that this metaphor cannot be discounted as merely a figure of speech, and nor can it be accepted at face value. But it may be investigated again, drawing upon the instructive successes and failures of these earlier contributions in order to move towards some resolution of their opposing insights. This is indeed something of a necessity. For if criticism of the metaphor of inversion threatens our lines of theoretical supply from Hegel and Marx (41), the threat arises principally because the criticism exposes serious existing weaknesses. At issue now must be, for all responses other than the unproductively dogmatic defence of established positions, the fundamental issues in the interpretation of Hegel and Marx.

I would like to use the idea of Marx's "inversion" of Hegel as the guiding thread of a commentary upon both of these figures and their relation in order to address these issues. I think this will be a fruitful tack, more so than has I think been hitherto imagined, because of the strong and strongly self-conscious way in which both Hegel and Marx did wish, as the central aim of both of their works, to actually invert contemporaneous social
consciousness. The whole issue remains vital in that both Hegel and Marx demonstrate the inestimable importance of the project of inversion they set out; but the project remains to be realised.

Firstly, then, as Althusser has suggested in calling for further work on the idea of inversion (45), a little more light on Hegel himself; which involves us in turning to the 'Introduction' to the *Phenomenology.*
PART 2

HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY: THE OVERCOMING OF ALIENATION
THROUGH RECOGNITION OF THE ABSOLUTE TRUTH
CHAPTER 2

HEGEL'S CRITICISM OF THE CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROJECT

The Impasse of the Classical Epistemological Project

In the opening paragraphs (1) of what is now known (2) as the 'Introduction' to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel distinguishes his aims in the Phenomenology from what he quite properly regards as the classical project of modern European epistemologies (3). He criticises the very idea of the attempt, in its modern form begun by Descartes (4), to gnoseologically establish the fundamental foundations of, and boundaries to, potential knowledge prior to the achievement of any substantial knowledge as such.

Hegel identifies in the classical epistemological project two conceptions of cognition, as either the instrument by which knowledge is produced or the medium through which it is perceived (5). Though Hegel wants these metaphors to stand as characteristics of classical epistemology, it is in fact particularly Kant which he has in mind here. This is so not least in that Hegel does not think it necessary to consider the plausibility of epistemologies of direct perception. That is to say, he presumes Kant's firm establishment of what may be
regarded as the fundamental implication of the classical epistemological project, that cognition is a creative process. By this I mean not merely that knowing can be predicated only of a subject (which Kant recognises as the transcendental unity of apperception (6)), but further that the subject contributes an active interpretation to the formation of knowledge (7). Given that cognition involves this moment of interpretation, Hegel does not deny the justified scepticism which the classical epistemological projects directs at the effectiveness of the cognitive instrument or the transparency of the cognitive medium. Rather he argues that the cognitive use of an instrument or medium indeed necessarily must in someway affect the to-be-known or cognition itself would be redundant. However, this means that the positive intentions of rigorously pursued scepticism must ultimately collapse into a total rejection of the possibility of gaining knowledge, at least of the properly true kind of unmediated acquaintance with the to-be-known envisaged at the beginning of the epistemological effort.

Following this line of argument, Hegel notes that the paradox of the epistemology in the knowledge, such as conceptual thinking in infinite truth (8), of argument, Hegel notes that the complete eschewing of considered epistemology in the name of the achievement of true knowledge, such as Jacobi's intuitionist criticism of conceptual thinking as an obstruction to belief in God's infinite truth (8), is immanent in Kantian epistemology
For if the employment of the instrument or the medium prevents the achievement of the desired result, why bother with it at all? Is it not better to just intuitively grasp the result? Unfortunately, of course, the beliefs adopted through such hasty manoeuvres are open to the basic scepticism of the classical epistemological project, which the "philosophy", of those beliefs denies but cannot answer (10).

Hegel next considers a possible solution to this impasse, which may lie in examining the qualities of the instrument or medium of cognition and then in subtracting these from the products of cognition to leave unmediated knowledge. Hegel would seem to have in mind here a reference to Reinhold's post-Kantian attempt to neutralise the seemingly unfortunate consequences of the subjectivity of thinking (11). Reinhold's proposed method of coming to terms with an acknowledgement of the existence of ineradicable presuppositions in all cognition, by successively holding to different ones in order to lay every one potentially open to inquiry (12), undoubtedly exercised an influence on Hegel, and particularly upon the form of argument of the Phenomenology, somewhat beyond Hegel's own acknowledgement. However, rather than take this up in what I believe would be rather unrewarding detail for the purposes of evaluating basic epistemological positions, I think it more fruitful at this point to consider the
implications of Hegel's argument for an evaluation of the analogous case of the constructive aims of empiricism.

Locke's account of the sensationalist ground of the simple ideas of the human understanding (13) aims to provide a sure foundation of unmediated knowledge on which the creative contributions of the understanding to more complex ideas may be based. Hegel stresses, against such an approach, that if the results of cognition are subtracted from knowledge, then, given the recognition of creativity in cognition which motivates the epistemological effort, this amounts to a return to a position prior to knowledge. The isolation of the subject's contribution can never leave a residue not affected by that contribution, because, of course, we must know what that residue is. That is to say, the residue must be subjected to the cognitive effort. Even within its own terms, the greatest contribution which Locke's approach can really make is a reduction of certain aspects of cognition to other perhaps more fundamental ones (14). With regard to these latter, the basic epistemological inquiry cannot be pursued with any other result than a complete scepticism (15). Hegel indeed observes that immanent within this procedure is a thoroughgoing agnosticism with regard to true knowledge and a concession of the redundancy of epistemology. When Hume followed Berkeley's exposure of the wholly arbitrary nature of Locke's distinction between primary and
secondary qualities (16), rigorously cutting away such restraining inconsistencies, he moved the basic destructive potentialities of Lockean empiricism on to a completely nihilistic conclusion (17).

The Self-Contradictory Form of the Classical Epistemological Project

Having consistently pushed forms of classical epistemological doubt through to ineradicable scepticism about their own ability to reveal a valid cognitive approach to gaining any substantive knowledge, Hegel proceeds to extend his questioning to their formulation of their own basic project. He demonstrates that in depicting cognition and the object to-be-known as radically separate and in assuming that the former is an instrument or medium through which the latter is to be grasped or is to be perceived, this project in itself is making a presumptive knowledge claim about the character of cognition itself. Furthermore, whilst the argument of the Phenomenology must be regarded as undeveloped on this point, Hegel certainly shows elsewhere that the project must make such a claim. He argues that whilst it may be possible to test other instruments or media by means other than setting them to their intended tasks, this is not so in the case of cognition. One cannot search for truth with spears and staves; the very examination of cognition must itself be necessarily conducted through an
act of cognition. Or, as Hegel also says, one cannot hope to swim before one ever enters the water. In sum, any possible epistemological scrutiny of cognition's adequacy to provide true knowledge must itself involve established knowledge of cognition (18).

For example, let us return (though Hegel does not do so until a later passage and in a somewhat different connection (19)), to the attempt to subtract from the results of cognition the qualities of the cognitive instrument or medium. Such an attempt, we can see, could possibly proceed only from an initial possession of absolute knowledge of the character of cognition. This immediately involves a circular argument from indefensible assumptions, as Berkeley and Hume observed with regard to Locke's primary qualities. Or, if an attempt is made to provide a defence of the knowledge of cognition, it will decay into an infinite regression of argument, since it is necessary to inquire into the cognitive distortions of the earlier knowledge of cognitive distortions and so on.

It is, Hegel contends, as a consequence of its own particular characterisation of potential knowledge that the classical epistemological project yields only scepticism. Proceeding as an inquiry into what cognition does, this project, in setting the to-be-known apart from
any possible cognition, from the outset ensures that true knowledge is rendered unavailable. For as cognition must accomplish something if it is necessary for the attainment of knowledge, yet the to-be-known is wholly separate from this act of knowing, then, nonsensically, any true knowledge can be only knowledge not arrived at through cognition.

Hegel acknowledges the possibility that after reaching the sceptical conclusion of classical doubt one may consign true knowledge to some unreachably distant area and then accept some sort of knowledge, if this is the correct word, which has eschewed claims to being true. Indeed, the common-sense necessity of this is at the root of Hume's insincerity in distinguishing between the philosophical and the vulgar standpoints, the latter necessarily embracing natural beliefs (20). Hegel remarks, however, that this position again posits the necessity of epistemological investigation renewed at this new level if other than an unacceptable and, in fact, ultimately unsupportable total relativism is to be professed. This may be read as an allusive account of Kant's aims in the first Critique (21), where Kant accepts Hume's theory of causality but nevertheless tries to bring science and not merely natural beliefs into the realm of possible standpoints (22).

Hegel insists that this position is at root a compound of
absurdities. If the essential characteristic of knowledge is that it strives to be true, then what can be the status of this other knowledge which does not do so? The vocabulary of epistemology - knowledge, truth, adequacy, etc. - cannot be simply duplicated for this new level but must take on new meanings expressive of untruth. The Kantian attempt to answer scepticism with regard to knowledge of noumena by claiming possible knowledge of phenomena (23) must fail, because it proceeds from an acknowledgement that there cannot really be a sure foundation for this knowledge. Acceptance of the unknowability of the thing-in-itself destroys the truth of even phenomenal knowledge (24).

The Unknowability of the Thing-in-itself

I want now to turn to a further, and, in the narrow sense of criticism, final observation which Hegel makes on the classical epistemological project. This concerns Hegel's particular formulation of the most common theme of immediately post-Kantian epistemology - the rejection of the thing-in-itself. This is not to be found in the 'Introduction', though Hegel had already made the argument in 'Faith and Knowledge', because in this 'Introduction' Hegel is not so much concerned to bury the classical epistemological project as to develop from it more fruitful positions, and in seeking to put forward his thought on the point most fully we must consider the
If the separation of the to-be-known from cognition vitiated the possibility of true knowledge, what then, Hegel demands, is it possible to say with regard to the to-be-known? What is it possible to know of it? Clearly the answer is absolutely nothing. If knowledge is rendered always flawed by the assumptions of the classical epistemological project, then, equally, the to-be-known is rendered unimportant. If it is inaccessible to cognition, then it is also purely abstract in the bad sense, as it is impossible to have knowledge of it by which it might be known. Playing on one of the most famous of Kant's many neologisms, Hegel points out that the thing-in-itself, as it cannot be available for knowledge, is, precisely, merely in-itself.

Whilst I am unsure as to the extent to which Hegel himself presses the point, it seems quite permissible to extend the above argument on to an exposure of the basic contradiction inherent in the concept of the thing-in-itself which emphatically underlines the shortcoming in the characterisation of knowing in the classical epistemological project. This is that in claiming that it is impossible to know the thing-in-itself one is, of course, in fact claiming to know something about it; at least that it exists and, perhaps equally certainly, that it delimits the
respective areas of true knowledges and of other "knowledges". The assumptions of the classical epistemological project thus completely disrupt the project itself. Hegel's arguments against the thing-in-itself may certainly be seen as exposing this (26).

In fine, the thrust of Hegel's argument so far is not only to point out the general frustrations which follow from the idea of the thing-in-itself, but more than this to destroy the very quality of being in-itself which shields that idea from criticism. Accepting that the thing-in-itself is actually given, one must accept the frustrations to which it leads as the frustrations of philosophy or even of human life as such. Hegel, I believe, shows that the in-itself actually arises from a specific philosophical position. Rather than the in-itself being a given with which we must come to terms, it is now explained as being given by the alienation of the power to know within a specific epistemology.

Truth and Absolute Truth in Hegel's Criticism of the Classical Epistemological Project

To summarise: Hegel argues that it is ultimately nonsensical to presume an object to-be-known wholly unconnected to the procedure by which it might be known. Not only are such presumptions completely indefensible
according to the criteria of the epistemological project in which they are made, but from the outset they further involve this project in an inevitable failure to achieve its goals and ultimately ridicule these very presumptions themselves. The positive moments of epistemology are undermined in its classical formulation. The eradication of possibly recognisable deficiencies in knowledge is clearly a valuable undertaking which is of the essence of cognition. However when flatly posed in terms of an empty cognition and a separate but equally empty to-be-known, this undertaking becomes that of the eradication of some unspecifiable inadequacy between knowledge without content and an unknowable. It is thus a hopeless and absurd task.

As should be made perfectly clear, Hegel's critique of classical epistemology through this defence of the possibility of truth is carried out in order that Spirit might be recognised as the Absolute. However, expressed in his particular procedure is a profound and important departure from intuitionism such as that of Jacobi (21). For it is Hegel's profound intent to bridge the gap between knowledge and faith (25) and to establish a knowledge of God which is not merely constituted of the assumptions of faith but which is subject to and is confirmed in reasoned cognition. Hegel regards Philosophical Truth as the highest form of the knowledge of God, higher than that which he shows to be in art and
in religion (24), because of the manifest clarity of, precisely, Philosophy (30). Taking Hegel seriously entails recognising this fundamental motivation in all his mature work (31), however critical it might prove necessary to be with regard to his attempts to realise it. This involves acknowledging that the critique of classical epistemology is not an intuitionist eschewing of philosophy but is itself firstly epistemological (32). As it is developed, this critique involves an attempt to deny the possibility of a project of epistemology at all separate from a universal theocracy. But the necessity of this is to be argued within epistemology, broadly conceived as the reasoned investigation of knowledge. Hegel grounds his identification of the Absolute as the moment of self-knowledge of Spirit upon, properly speaking, a prior, polemical demonstration of the possibility of any such identification. Now, whilst I believe that this identification contains a number of fundamental mistakes, it is only after Hegel has opened up the possibility of truth, through the criticism of dominant epistemological approaches which deny this possibility in advance of any particular attempt to realise truth, that is conceivable to characterise his theocratic ideas as actually having the quality of being in error.
CHAPTER 3

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT AS HEGEL'S PROOF OF ABSOLUTE TRUTH

Introduction

In the order of the exposition of the 'Introduction', after having exposed those characteristics of the classical epistemological project which necessarily render any cognition as flawed, Hegel goes on to consider the possibility of dispensing with the inevitably bleak positions of this project and independently developing knowledge of the to-be-known. This developed knowledge is, once established, to make its claim to truth perfectly clear through the then possible comparison of itself with classical epistemology (1).

Hegel is here situating the Phenomenology with respect to contemporaneous philosophy, referring in particular to Schelling's flat contraposition of objective idealism to subjective idealism as developed from Kant by Fichte. This nexus is certainly the crucial one for a philological understanding of the development at Jena of the mature thought of Phenomenology (2). This is so, however, in the peculiar sense that its full significance is to be found in its treatment as a subject of Hegel's thought. For not only was the contemporaneous philosophic milieu
an obvious influence on the character of Hegel's thought, but furthermore he made his attitude to that milieu a vital component of his views.

Hegel sets out the aims of the Phenomenology in the context of contemporaneous philosophy by insisting both that objective idealism is true and that this may be demonstrated in accord with the reasoned examination of subjective cognition as in the critical philosophy.

Hegel on Fichte and Schelling: The Necessity and Possibility of Winning Conviction in the Absolute

Hegel questions whether, whatever may be the rights of the matter, an inadequate conception might just come to accept true knowledge, even when, as Schelling's procedure envisages, directly confronted with such knowledge. The very problem is, of course, precisely that such a conception is not able to recognise truth. Were a true knowledge to merely insist upon its own truth and urge that is should be believed because of its insistence, then clearly it could be equally met by a similar insistence made on behalf of the inadequate conception, and any one such bare insistence is as good as any other. The upshot could be only an unseemly haggling between rival "truths" (3), for why should any belief obey what is virtually a demand that it stand on its head and accept its opposite? (4).
Whilst he had, as is well enough recognised, the greatest regard for the intent of Schelling's earlier philosophy and for the substance of its positions (5), Hegel's raising of these difficulties marks the extent of his departures from Schelling (or at least from positions readily identifiable with Schellingian philosophy (6)) at the time of the writing of the *Phenomenology*. Schelling insists that true knowledge is quite different from ordinary beliefs (7), but identifies the gaining of that knowledge with a basic intellectual intuition of the supreme principle of the identity of subject and object (8). Schelling's transcendental deduction of empirical consciousness explicitly presupposes and moves from that intuition (9), which he comes to locate in an almost unconscious moment of aesthetic production (10). This moment, it seems, represents an acquaintance with the highest truth specifically because it is mysterious and not able to be fully and explicitly understood. Schelling's transcendental account of empirical consciousness gives a sophisticated development of the principle of objective idealism into ostensible forms, and in this respect is hardly comparable to an intuitionism of Jacobi's type which contents itself with the all encompassing and, therefore, completely featureless truth of God's infinite being (11). However, in respect of the ground of these intuitions there seems to be little more to secure Schelling's philosophy than
Jacobi's anti-philosophy. Hegel insists that Schelling's method of grasping true knowledge avoids the difficult but indispensable work of the reasoned establishment of itself as true (12). The effect of this, we can see, is that Schelling's position seems to be based on an unwarranted assumption because it eschews coming to terms with the philosophic milieu which is its audience. Hegel's attempts to restore the possibility of truth through criticism of the classical epistemological project do not, by contrast, involve him in outright rejection of reasoned cognition as such. He is unable to accept neither a simple intuitionist grasp of truth nor a basic statement of assumed truth even though accompanied by the most sophisticated philosophical development because when it comes to establishing their vital basic truth they are indifferent to reasoned criteria of proof.

Truth, Hegel says, must actively turn against inadequate conceptions and destroy their belief in their own truth so that those conceptions might come to recognise the genuine truth as such. He insists that the full sense of such destruction, rather than the sense conveyed by suppression (or its synonyms), can be accomplished only if it is effective within the inadequate conceptions (13). This full sense of destruction is realisable only when the assertion of their own untruth has been accepted by inadequate conceptions in a fashion which is initially secured on a ground which those conceptions can recognise.
and understand. The recognition of truth from this starting point becomes a process of developing enlightenment, not an imposition from above which can never achieve its aims as its method contradicts those aims (14). Unless it is initially secured within inadequate conceptions and organically develops from there, any change in the acknowledged truth will not properly speaking be an acceptance of truth, even if the new belief is the truth, but a failure to win such acceptance. In so failing, though it might force an acknowledgement of its dominance, the truth will not gain recognition of its truth (15).

For Hegel, the works of Fichte, and Schelling represent the final opposition of equally necessary aspects of truth, the overcoming of which opposition will establish the philosophical statement of truth. His early comparison of their works refers to *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, the use here of "system" in the singular and not the plural turning on Hegel's conviction that these two writers represent moments in the overall development of the true philosophy (16). He will not allow Schelling's simple identification of truth through an intuition which will, because it is an intuition, remain unclear and powerless to win conviction. Equally he will not, recalling his initial polemic against classical epistemology, allow Fichte's conflation of the point of
view of the self-positing ego with the elimination of the sense of objectivity in truth (17), and indeed he makes a rare direct statement to this effect in the 'Introduction' (18). Rather he takes these as both being constitutive of the point where truth is basically known, but awaits its full and clear demonstration as true, which can come only through the deliberately explicit awareness provided by philosophically reasoned cognition. He aims to enrich not only Fichte's empty subject but also Schelling's paradoxically equally empty object.

**Hegel's Conviction that Truth is on the Scene**

Hegel's arguments against Schelling certainly have a biting tone, and the issues of difference between them are important, as I have said. But these arguments also articulate Hegel's fundamental sympathy with positions which Schelling had brought to public attention, and we must not lose sight of this because in this polemic there are contained the definite beginnings of Hegel's posing of the problem of gaining truth in his own fashion, as the prelude to his own solutions. Though it is perhaps eventually unhelpful, Hegel's own metaphor of content and form (19) may be used to provisionally describe his attitude to Schelling. Hegel endorses the basic content of objective idealism, but is critical of the merely objective form of its presentation. Hegel's close links to Schelling make it clear how closely there must be an
analogy here to Hegel himself (20), to his own earlier "theological" (21) and objective idealist (22) opinions. The Phenomenology must be read as an attempt at an adequate form of presentation of views already worked up in detail in the Jenenser system (23). Truth, Hegel is saying in response to Schelling, is on the scene, and the task of contemporaneous philosophy is to realise that truth (24).

Now there is a very interesting sense, one which Hegel does much to formulate, in which any important intellectual effort must be able to relate itself to its past, because in the past lies its own origins. Schelling's objective idealism must, unless it actually is arbitrary and unfounded in the most random way, potentially be communicable through dialogue with the classical epistemological project since, whether Schelling himself acknowledges this or not, the significance of his work lies precisely in the way it stands as a development from that project. Not only will Schelling's work have roots in preceding philosophy, because this is necessarily the soil in which his thought will have grown, but the philosophic importance of that thought lies in its relation to its own past. It would be to deepen Schelling's self-consciousness and consequently the foundations of his philosophy were he to be dissatisfied with intuition and directly attempt to ground that philosophy in the reasoned fashion of public
dialogue. One cannot conclude these observations without mentioning that Schelling's painstaking efforts to relate his thought to the development of Fichtean philosophy continually internally challenge his reliance upon intellectual intuition (25).

We must be aware that Hegel's argument to this point contains elements that are neither entailed in nor justified by putting the above case against Schelling. For whilst Hegel has developed the point that the conceptions of classical epistemology are inadequate and in advance of any specific consideration could not recognise or allow of truth, in the argument we are now discussing he sets up an opposition between those conceptions and the truth which can proceed only from the basis of his own identification of Absolute Spirit as Truth being true (26). What this means we will of course have to consider shortly. However, we must preface our consideration of Spirit with a recognition of the way Hegel himself prefaces his own setting out of Spirit with an assumption of Absolute Spirit as Truth. Hegel does not find in Schelling an interesting explicit response to classical epistemology but a blunt statement of the truth of the identity of subject and object, and that particular truth is from the outset taken by Hegel to be the culmination of philosophic development from classical epistemology. Hegel in fact moves from criticising the foreclosure of the possibility of truth in classical
epistemology to a presumptive possession of truth after the fashion of objective idealism. Thus, the problem of gaining truth is subtly but extensively changed to that of the recognition of the claims to truth of a certain position, which are presupposed to be correct. Hegel's way of speaking in this passage of the 'Introduction' seems rather strange. The Truth, he claims is on the scene, and it must be established as such. This would be senseless, unless, as is actually Hegel's belief, the truth is already fixed as he writes the *Phenomenology* and we must recognise this state of affairs. As Hegel puts it a little later (27), his project is that of relating Truth to inadequate knowledges so that the Truth may be seen as true (28).

It is necessary to examine Hegel's elision of his polemic against the empty foreclosure of the possibility of truth and his assertion of a fixed truth in order to see how intuition, in fact, plays a very important role in the *Phenomenology*. There is no source, epistemologically speaking, for Hegel's conception of Absolute Spirit other than intuition (or its synonyms) (29). The radical shift in the most basic aims of the project of "phenomenology" in and after Husserl, although by no means always providing a contrast unfavourable to Hegel, does speak of the total impossibility of generating the Hegelian Spirit from any possible human analysis of being (30). Efforts to reintroduce Hegelian themes into post-Husserlian
phenomenology have perforce involved a substantial reconstruction of those themes. From the opposite point of view, as it were (31), Kierkegaard's so completely negative (32) evaluation of Hegel explicitly relocates Christian religious belief in the specifically incomprehensible leap of faith that is its only element in individual experience (33). Hegel elsewhere says that he writes the *Phenomenology* in order to provide the ladder which it might be reasonably requested be made available in order to climb to the Absolute (34). Even were one to accept this claim, it would leave unanswered the rudely obvious question about Hegel's own ladder (35).

The way in which Hegel has managed to involve his own conception of Truth in his argument so far becomes clear as he moves on to setting out his own position. He develops his consideration of the procedure of confronting inadequate conceptions with the Truth by further arguing that it is not open to the latter to demonstrate its truth by means of bluntly claiming that the former contains intimations of truth as the beginnings of movement towards it, the latter's, own self. Initially, it may be noted that this procedure clearly again turns on true knowledge being recognised as such in order that presentiments of it may be seen as leading to the Truth, and that therefore this is a subordinate argument to the earlier objections Hegel has
raised rejecting one particular form of the overall procedure. Hegel allows that such an appeal might be made, his objection to it being that it will not succeed not that it is unfounded, and this further confirms his identification of this relation between these beliefs as that of the true and the false and also begins to reveal how he precisely conceives of that relation. Hegel insists that this procedure must be unconvincing because the Truth will not be demonstrating its truth in an adequate fashion but will merely be statically and dogmatically appealing to an untruth which precisely cannot express or recognise truth. However, though critical of the simple assertion implicit in this approach, it is certainly along these lines that Hegel thinks that an adequate demonstration of Truth will be achieved.

For Hegel closes his discussion of the blunt opposition of inadequate conceptions and the Truth by declaring that it is because the static appealing to earlier intimations of Truth will not win the recognition of truth that the Phenomenology is to undertake the exposition of the process by which Truth came to appear. This exposition will actually illustrate the dynamic movement from inadequate belief to Truth and not just flatly claim this relation to be the case (36), and will thus show exactly how justified was an appeal to intimations of Truth in earlier inadequate conceptions.
This is to say that Hegel directly locates the possible achievement of the recognition of Truth in his proposal of giving an exposition of how Truth makes its appearance. Why this should be successful is by no means immediately clear. It is open for any belief to try and show how it is, in a sense, the result of earlier beliefs, and to the extent that this is so the later belief will win recognition of its own importance. It will stand as the furthest development of what was most valuable in earlier thought. Obviously the use of words such as "result" in this connection rather stretches the point. The sense of development involved is teleological to the extent that later thought can consciously direct itself to the development of earlier resources, but there is nothing necessary, in a strong sense, about this. But Hegel here wants to use "result" in a strong way. For him the fixed Truth which is now on the scene is a necessary result of earlier thought. In fact, Hegel's arguments here articulate the critical themes of his conception of Spirit, and further understanding of his procedure of winning recognition of Truth requires some account of these themes which are the basis of all his mature work.

Hegel's Notion of Spirit

In the briefest outline: Hegel holds that Spirit posits
the appearance of its own finite limitation in the initial estranged form of Nature, and that human History is the progressive recognition, or realisation, of Spirit's own Absolute Self. Spirit's real struggles travelling this route are the necessary means by which it comes to be aware of its own infinitude. Let me try to make this more clear, in part at least, by showing how it is to constitute a source of productive development over Schelling's positions.

Hegel believes that this conception of Spirit allows an answer to his own criticisms that Schelling fails to pay attention to the winning of conviction in the Truth because it has, at its heart, a crucial role for just such an effort. It is Hegel's basic contention that it is radically insufficient for God to be understood merely as objective, even were He all infinite objectivity, for even such all embracing omnipresence, though it is certainly a characteristic of God, is meaningless unless God knows himself to be omnipresent. In part, this is an argument of logical entailment. On occasion Hegel seems to be saying that, for example, infinitude can have no meaning unless it is contrasted to finitude. For God to be the infinite unity, He must have overcome the limitations of finite individuality, otherwise His infinity cannot have any sense (37). However, such logical arguments obviously turn upon adopting an epistemologically subjective standpoint in the assessment
of the requirements of certain types of knowledge, and it is Hegel's point more generally that God must see his own constitution of all objectivity if He is to know it in a full sense (38). That is, God must come to know this from the position of subjectivity. He must be not only object but also subject (39). It is only by becoming aware of His own presence in objectivity and thus, in an important sense which follows from the conterminity of what God may know and what He Himself is, overcoming the distinction of subject and object (40), that God may recognise His own omnipresence. God thus has to posit finite subjectivities (41) within an initially independently objective realm (42) as the vehicles through which He may come to know His own infinitude. Human History as the overcoming of the alienation of lack of self-knowledge is central to Hegel's Spirit. Hegel does not shirk from accepting the positions to which this account of God's reliance on the World must lead. The core of the argument is that God may recognise His character only by striving after the realisation of it. That is, the very comprehension of the existence of both human beings and God turns on recognising in God some of the characteristics - particularly characteristic needs - of personality (43). These lead to an understanding of God needing to posit Human History as fulfilment of the requirement of subjectively coming to know himself. History is, in essence, God's autobiography (44). In sum, Hegel argues that God must be conceived not only as
objective substance but as the subjective realisation of His own constitution of objectivity (45); that is to say, as Spirit (46).

This conception of Spirit gives us the principal meaning of Hegel's use of "alienation" in his philosophy. In saying this, I must make it clear that alienation has further senses in his thought, and that this is particularly so in the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right (47). However, what I want to draw attention to is the way in which Hegel unites two German words - "Entäusserung" and "Entfremdung" - which can certainly be separated, in order to give a single idea which it is therefore quite correct to translate by the single English term of "alienation". Entäusserung refers to alienation in the sense of relinquishing a power to hold or do something, a legalistic sense used to betoken the economic alienation or sale of a commodity (including human power). For Hegel, Spirit alienates its being in this sense in that it externalises itself in what seems at first a distinct otherness (48). Through his use of Entfremdung Hegel narrows down this idea of otherness to stress a particular characteristic of Spirit's externalisation of itself. Entfremdung denotes the making strange or even antagonistic of a person or a situation, a possible English equivalent being "estrangement". Spirit's externalisation of itself is specifically an estrangement in in that Spirit does not
immediately know itself in its externalised form of Nature and History (49). Entäusserung and Entfremdung are convolutely intertwined throughout the Phenomenology mainly because in his idea of alienation and its overcoming he is driving at the abolition of otherness in Absolute self-knowledge in a way wholly dependent on his conception of Spirit.

The obvious - but nevertheless very forceful - critical response to all this is to insist that there is absolutely no reason to accept it in its own terms. Let us allow that there is great interest in Hegel's conception of Spirit. This idea indeed is surely one of the most striking and fruitful allegories of human existence in modern thought. Let us even further allow (though I think this is to go too far) that this conception of alienated Spirit may serve as a coherent understanding of God and His creation of humanity which overcomes the traditional theological conundra associated with these matters. Even so, this formulation remains purely speculative, a mere spinning of ideas. As it stands, it is merely an ingenious construction of God's image.

Now, attempts to entail God's existence in the very possibility of conceiving of Him have of course played a major part in the history of theology. Such attempts are particularly strong forms of a more general argument
which in one form or another is more or less coeval with western philosophy but which has as its modern statement the idea that existence is a predicate whose denial is absurd. After Kant's insistence upon the synthetic character of knowledge of existents, his argument that existence cannot be regarded as a predicate amply provided a convincing refutation of the ontological argument (50). I do not think it is now for us or was then for Hegel an issue that such attempts could be regarded as in themselves successful. Hegel, as is well known, did defend the ontological proof against Kant, but, as we shall eventually see, this defence comes, so to speak, at the end of his own proof of Absolute Spirit rather than at the beginning; for Hegel certainly did not think that the ontological argument could be just re-asserted in even its best (51) pre-Kantain forms (52).

I have said that as he writes the Phenomenology Hegel holds that the Truth is on the scene, and that it is the task of Philosophy to demonstrate this. This demonstration is to follow from giving an account of how truth was developed. Bearing in mind what we now know of the place of History in Hegel's conception of Spirit it is clear why this should follow. Let us start from any inadequate belief. Merely by following where pursuit of this belief will lead we will necessarily arrive at Truth. This is so because the development of the Absolute must lie in such inadequate belief; or, to put
this the other way round, such inadequate belief must have its place in the development of the Absolute. For when the exposition of how truth makes its appearance is of the Absolute Truth conceived in the fashion of Hegel's Spirit, the exposition must locate inadequate belief within his infinite Truth and must equally recognise the germs of the Absolute within such belief. No particular inadequate belief can be outside of Spirit, nor can (merely here to establish Hegel's argument) any external guide to Truth from outside Spirit be provided. The development of Absolute Spirit must take place in and through the flow of inadequate belief only, because such belief and the directions in which it leads are the very stuff of that development (53). The Phenomenology will be able to start from any inadequate position and follow the implications of that position right up to the Absolute because the development the book is to chart is in and of inadequate positions.

Later, at the end of the 'Introduction', Hegel affirms what was the original title of the Phenomenology (54). The Phenomenology is to be the "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" because the Truth of that Experience is Absolute Spirit. The Truth will appear for all inadequate belief, and inadequacy revealed for what it is, by the locating of such belief in its place within the development of Absolute Spirit.
The Method of Phenomenological Proof: The Empirical Study of Beliefs.

That the Phenomenology will establish Truth in this way constitutes a remarkably interesting form of proof. We should note firstly that the starting point(s) Hegel envisages satisfies one of his conditions for winning truth. To start with inadequate beliefs secures Phenomenology in those beliefs in the way Hegel feels essential. What of the development from these beliefs which will lead to recognition of the Truth? There are two points I should like to discuss at length.

Firstly, this development is to furnish an essentially empirical, as opposed to merely speculative (in the bad sense), proof (55). It is to win conviction by taking any inadequate conception and, by analysis of it, revealing that at its heart is a moment of the development of Absolute Spirit. The understanding of such a conception will, on an, in principle, corrigible empirical truth claim, be shown to require the location of the conception within this development. Beginning from the point of view of this conception, Hegel is to be able to show by analysis of it that it is part of the realisation of Absolute Spirit (56). The form of this analysis, the famous Hegelian Dialectic, will involve showing that any inadequate conception expresses an internal contradiction which can be resolved only by moving on to a new, more adequate conception - one in which the contradiction is solved - until the overall
contradiction between all inadequate conceptions and the Absolute Truth is overcome. I mention this briefest outline at this point - rather ahead of it proper place - in order to stress that this is not understood by Hegel as a question of a "dialectical approach" which can be adopted and taken to the analysis of various conceptions. It is rather the analysis which will generate the Dialectic. Hegel's claim is that it will prove necessary, in order to understand any inadequate conception, to place it within History understood as the development of Absolute Spirit.

It is this theme which allows us to identify what Hegel meant by the project of "phenomenology". This term was actually not Hegel's own (57), and he included it in the title of his book only mid-way through writing it (58), replacing what I have already mentioned was the original title: "Science of the Experience of Consciousness". "Phenomenology" was in fact coined in 1764 by J.H. Lambert, a distinguished elder friend of Kant, to describe, through an obvious Greek derivation, his doctrine of mere appearance (as opposed to true essence) (59). Kant himself is known to have envisaged, in correspondence with Lambert and others, a similar project - a purely negative (60) exposure of the limits of sensibility (61) as a propaedeutic to the examination of the pure reason (62). This project was not carried out, but of course it has its echo in the dialectic of the
Critique of Pure Reason. The main difference between Kant's envisaged phenomenology and his accomplished dialectic would seem to be that the former would have amounted to little more than the professed clearing away whereas in the latter certain inadequate beliefs are explained as mistaken, but nevertheless inevitable, functions of reason (63). Linked to his wider criticism of the place of "phenomena" in Kant's philosophy, Hegel greatly extends this reincorporation of inadequate belief back into philosophy in his project of Phenomenology. Though retaining the sense of the examination of inadequate conceptions, this project turns on the conviction that it is profoundly mistaken to treat such conceptions as just obstructive of truth. Classical epistemology decays into unrelieved scepticism because its demonstration that our beliefs are all necessarily phenomenal is taken to mean that those beliefs are thereby separated from truth. For Hegel, it is precisely through inadequate beliefs that we can be led to the Absolute because such beliefs must be of Spirit.

Typically, attempts to demarcate a boundary of truth/falsehood (or science/ideology, etc.) consign that latter to a category whose very purpose it is to contrast with the former. Bacon's use of "idols" represents this very closely (64), and this of course set a pattern for many further such attempts. Subsequent rediscovery of the plausibility of, say for example, the phlogiston
theory or pre-Copernican cosmologies merely confirms what we would hermeneutically expect to be able to say about these attempts. The rigid demarcation of claims to truth from their past, ignoring the circumstances of those claims' production, marks their own lack of self-comprehension, not any actual absolute break with that past. We have seen Hegel stress this point against Schelling, and the way in which he presents Phenomenology as an open commitment to an empirical encounter with a History of inadequate conceptions which will, if Hegel's own belief is right, lead to recognition of Truth articulates it again. The thrust of his argument is that we must be able to trace in its past the development of any valuable position, though of course any point in that past will not, if we care to put it this way, be fully adequate to the eventual position. By Phenomenology, Hegel hopes to find a proof of Truth by genuinely casting himself into inadequate positions.

The Method of Phenomenological Proof (Continued):
Reflexive Re-comprehension

Let us consider the place of "Phenomenology" understood in this way in Hegel's entire mature philosophy. That the Phenomenology was written at the time, as Hegel holds, of the accomplished development of Absolute Spirit would mean that the Phenomenology could have been a presentation of the complete System of Absolute Spirit -
"The True in its True Shape" as he himself put it (65). However, though Hegel undertook to provide this in his published System (66), this is not the form of the Phenomenology. It is the task of the Phenomenology to describe how Truth came to be on the scene as a way of leading up to recognition of the Absolute, which can then be set out in the System. The book is, then, in an important sense, to be a persuasive introduction to the System.

Hegel has, it might be said, come full circle to providing a prolegomena to the truth. But I think he can legitimately claim not to be subject to the strictures which he himself levelled at classical epistemology because of the peculiar way in which we can take the Phenomenology to be an "introduction" (67). To be sure, posing this function for the Phenomenology raises a complex of problems, which I will pursue because their resolution makes clear a further important aspect of phenomenological proof.

Bearing in mind Hegel's criticisms about accepting a truth that is not ultimately thought to be true, what can we think about the Phenomenology? Hegel himself recognises here (68) that in so far as the Phenomenology differs from the System this must raise a question about the truth of the Phenomenology itself. Hegel initially designated the Phenomenology "the first part of the
"System"; but in the second edition of the book, on which he had begun work when he died, he omitted this (69). This latter placing of the Phenomenology out with the System, in so far as it registers the important difference from the System, seems to be the more correct position (70). However, the Phenomenology is connected to the System, and is not an introduction which falls under Hegel's own criticism of being out with the truth, because the movement of inadequate conceptions is of Spirit, and thus the Phenomenology comes to cover much of the same ground as the System. Hegel's final thought on the truth of the Phenomenology as an introduction to the System would seem to be that they articulate Truth in two different, complementary ways. We are not really dealing with a change in subject between the Phenomenology and the System, but with a change of viewpoint. The former follows the movement of inadequate beliefs from their own viewpoints. The latter reorders this from the point of view where the later knowledge specifically denied to inadequate beliefs is now available. Making clear what is precisely meant by this change in viewpoint brings me to the second point I would like to discuss in the notion of phenomenological proof.

The possibility of setting out a System of Truth which has a different form to the Phenomenological following of inadequate conceptions is predicated upon those who held inadequate beliefs, in the very act of coming to
recognise the Absolute, being thereby enabled to reflexively recognise the development of their own recognition as such. The winning of recognition of the Absolute involves those who are now enlightened looking back upon their own earlier conceptions and seeing them in their true light, that is to say, as overall inadequate conceptions. This they could hitherto not do, since they first experienced the development of which they were part not as such a development but as "truth" itself, the "truth" of belief in inadequate conceptions. Hegel will gain the goal of convincing those who hold inadequate beliefs by showing that those beliefs both lead to the Absolute and, from this, how earlier beliefs were incorrect. There is a necessary critique of earlier experience involved in the Phenomenology (71), a critique which provides a double sense of enlightenment (72). There is the recognition of the Absolute initially, but also a further securing of conviction by the implication of a critique of the earlier experience through the very locating of that experience in the development of Absolute Spirit. Such location casts a new rearward - that is, reflexive - illumination on what was experienced in the movement forward. In the Phenomenology, nothing can be presupposed, we merely go forward where we are lead. In the Encyclopaedia and in his later lectures, Hegel reorders his material guided by a hindsight which has as its principal feature knowledge of the character of earlier beliefs which was denied to those who held
those beliefs (73).

This second moment of phenomenological proof expresses the key sense of Absolute Truth. In following the Phenomenology one is not lead to some transcendent truth such as a proof of the existence of God as a distinct being. The Absolute is only (if this is the right word to use) what has gone before in order to reach the Absolute, but now understood (74). The Absolute is the whole externalisation of Spirit, but now recognised for what it is, that is to say, understood as the externalisation of Spirit (75).

The progressive expansion of what was involved in Hegel's efforts to show this in the Phenomenology during the writing of the book have left major obstacles to the reader. I do not mean here the troubled circumstances of Hegel's life in 1806-7, though the shortcomings these were instrumental in introducing into the book are well known (76). I mean a fundamentally unplanned-for increase in the scope of the book which produces a confusion expressed in the extraordinary table of contents (77). As originally conceived the book was to include only the first three of its final six sections, and that the 'Introduction' was strictly speaking written for these first three sections only seems incontrovertible (78). Hegel's initial idea of the Phenomenology would seem to have been of an account of
the subjective development within cognition of the Truth of the identity of subject and object through the stages of Consciousness, Self-consciousness and Reason. Such a project has as its counterpart in the System only a section of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, and Phenomenology was rendered in this more narrow way in the Propadeutic and in the Encyclopaedia (79). We must ask, then, why the Phenomenology of Spirit itself embodies so much more material than this?

The massive enlargement of the book whilst it was being written testifies, I would say, to Hegel's mounting acknowledgement of what reflexive proof of the Absolute by Phenomenology entails. Within Absolute Truth must be found (to use the terms of the Encyclopaedia (80) which Hegel had come to clearly envisage as a development from the Jenenser System by the end of the Phenomenology (81)), Objective Spirit and Absolute Spirit as well as Subjective Spirit. The System presents Spirit in its Absolute development. I have tried to say why the Phenomenology is not intended as the same sort of effort. But certainly, if the Phenomenology is to introduce the Absolute it cannot leave out areas of Spirit. That it is to say, it must, in its own way cover as much ground as the System. Hence Phenomenology is but a moment of subjective Spirit from the point of view of the System; but the actual conduct of this moment will cover the whole area of the System from its own point of view (82).
And within its completed structure the Phenomenology displays stages of reflexive illumination.

I suggest that the book in its finished form can be understood to be divided into three main parts. There is the first moment, which Hegel at first saw as exhausting Phenomenology, of coming to know Spirit's subjective constitution of objectivity - sections, A, B and C. In section 88, Spirit's constitution of the ethical world is demonstrated in a similar way. Finally, in sections CC and DD, Hegel charts conscious attempts to grasp History as Spirit in Religion, Art and finally Philosophy. There could be little satisfaction of Hegel's demands of Phenomenological proof if he rests with the conviction that subject constitutes object. He must go on to show how this constitution is present in the ethical world, and then on to the way Spirit has, prior to the revelation of the Absolute, attempted to know itself. In this light, the very shortcomings of the riotous profusion of thought that is the Phenomenology, especially in its latter half, inform us eloquently about the aims of the book's composition. Hegel's acceptance of these shortcomings, despite his own admission of the book's weaknesses (83), speaks of the compulsion which he felt to go beyond the Truth of subjective cognition and provide by stages of reflexive illumination a complete phenomenology of the spiritual realm. The book is therefore a Phenomenology of Spirit and not merely a
Phenomenology of Mind.

I want to close this section with a few words on the problem of translating the German verb "aufheben" and associated forms. This word is often given as "transcend", "sublate", "supercede", etc. But such renderings are usually accompanied in diligent translations by a note to the effect that they do not capture the crucially two-fold sense of aufheben (84). This sense is on the one hand one of abolition of what went before, but on the other hand of preservation of aspects of an earlier state of affairs. The necessity of such textual comments is enforced by Hegel's having himself stressed the important duality to the German meaning of aufheben. In the Science of Logic Hegel describes moments of the process of becoming as "sublating" (to follow Miller) earlier moments, going beyond them but incorporating aspects of them within itself (85).

The sense of the term is certainly difficult to grasp, and in the absence of such a grasp the use of aufheben to reconcile apparently contradictory elements of Hegel's (or Marx's) attitude to an institution or belief and the possibility of improving upon it (86) seems a casuistic word play in a more than usually large gap between languages left by translation. To say that Hegel's (or Marx's) attitude with respect to a certain belief is that
it must be rejected but also that the better position must incorporate the rejected belief is hardly clear, and clarity is not achieved by referring to a German sense of aufheben not really available in English. To say that the sense of a philosophic terms is not renderable in a particular language is to admit that that sense is deficient in philosophic rigour.

On the basis of what I have said of Hegel's ideas of phenomenological proof, I hope it is clear that what is at issue here is not a problem of translation, narrowly understood, but of philosophic comprehension of a difficult concept. The "annihilation" and yet simultaneous "preservation" of the existing can make sense only after understanding Hegel's (and Marx's) views on the possibilities of re-comprehending alienated conditions. In the Logic Hegel is using aufheben to show how the presence of Spirit in Becoming takes the form of a succession of mediations of Being and Nothingness, each mediation being posited by, that is to say is the determinate negation of, each previous one. Though the German meaning(s) of aufheben no doubt lent themselves to the economic expression of Hegel's idea here, indeed they may have played some part in suggesting it, this is not to say that the meaning of that idea can be considered to be available though etymology rather than philosophy.
Intuition and Its Absolution

I would like to conclude this outline of the type of proof Hegel seeks to provide in the Phenomenology by directly asking what success can be achieved by him upon the basis of what we have seen so far. It has been argued that Hegel can do no other than take up this position intuitively. It must be allowed, however, that the import of this sort of objection, the ascertaining of whether it is merely embarrassing in the light of Hegel's failure to be explicit about his position or is destructive of his entire project, does depend on his success in establishing his position through the demonstration proposed. For, were this demonstration successful, Hegel's intuitive taking up of his position would not be able to be posed as a criticism. Hegel's opinion of intuitions, it will be recalled, is that they recognise the Absolute but are powerless to establish their Truth. Should that Truth be otherwise demonstrated, then the intuitions will be shown to be intuitions of that Absolute Truth. The proof of the Truth will imply that the characterisation of the intuitive position as an intuition of Truth was indeed correct, for the demonstration of the Absolute will locate the intuition within itself. There is an unmistakable theme of the completely circular character of Truth here upon which Hegel insists. This is certainly true in the System. The Science of Logic
contains an expression of this in so many words (87), and the naming of the complete presentation of the System as an "Encyclopaedia" Hegel considered a deliberate evocation of this motif (88). It is just this sense of circularity which also characterises the Phenomenology.

The logical criticism of a circular argument rests on the demonstration of an unjustified foreclosure of alternative possibilities by the effective presumption of a conclusion. This involves a basic claim that such possibilities are real alternatives whose outright rejection is, precisely, unjustified. Now, such an objection cannot be made to the intuitive impulse of the Phenomenology without considering a strength Hegel claims for his argument. If the circular argument is shown to be really circular in the sense that free Phenomenological development did lead to the Absolute, then, as I have indicated, the intuitive position will be retrospectively justified. Indeed, the problem of taking a particular starting point would be seen to be immaterial, in that wherever a start is made it would lead to the same conclusion. The Phenomenology's presuppositions would no longer be able to be properly regarded as such, for they would dissolve into the movement described (89). "The Absoluteness of the Absolute absolves itself", as Heidegger says (90).

This is the, as it were, retrospective fashion in which,
because of the nature of the Truth it is trying to establish, the **Phenomenology** may provide a proof of its case despite, or perhaps rather because, Hegel's initial position contains its conclusions. It is a fashion which would certainly negate any deleterious effect of Hegel's own assumptions, and provide a defence against the allegation that such assumptions are illegitimate which has been continually levelled against epistemologies of essence. At least this would be so if it works. To ascertain whether it does or not it is necessary to explicitly consider the Hegelian Phenomenological Dialectic.
CHAPTER 4

DETERMINATE NEGATION AND THE CRITICISM OF INADEQUATE CONCEPTIONS

Introduction

Hegel's own intentions of winning conviction in Truth clearly must involve the criticism of inadequate conceptions, and he does not shrink from emphasising that to follow the progression of the Phenomenology will entail continuously recognising that what were formerly held to be satisfying truths were not so (1). The Phenomenology follows, as he puts it, the way of despair. But, recalling the nihilistic criticism put forward in the classical epistemological project, Hegel is at great pains to distinguish the type of doubt this will involve from that which he identified in that project. He does this by advancing two arguments which mount complementary attacks upon that project's notion of doubt. For the sake of exposition, I will substantially merge these in the following discussion. What I want to discuss is Hegel's aim of formulating a method of constructive, rather than entirely negative, doubt.

The Emptiness of Classical Epistemological Doubt

Hegel affirms, drawing upon his argument at the outset of
the 'Introduction', that it is senseless to regard doubt as a wholly negative procedure. Once a conception has been shown to be inadequate, it is the way of classical epistemology to consign it to a bottomless abyss of untruths. The contribution to knowledge of this indiscriminate scepticism is to pronounce a blanket condemnation upon whatever conception is put forward. To his opinion that this situation is completely unsatisfactory, Hegel now adds that it is simply fallacious to regard the classical epistemological project as actually establishing the total emptiness of all claims to truth. The full comprehension of its bleak results turns on seeing that these results are the results of that very project and not the results of epistemology as such. The emptiness left by the classical epistemological project is fully understood only when seen as being left by it.

Hegel preceded this point with an inquiry into the nature of that emptiness, disparaging the authenticity with which it is professed. He concedes the value placed upon doubt and its stress that all beliefs must pass the test of reasoned personal conviction. His whole idea of philosophy turns, as I hope it is now clear, on precisely this attitude. However, in classical epistemology doubt is not, in fact, identified with inquiry into the value of any particular conception, but with scepticism about the fruitfulness of cognition as such. Epistemology is
reduced to gnoseology since cognition and the object
to-be-known are rendered as wholly separate and the
possibility of truth is identified with that of absolute,
unmediated knowledge. After setting the to-be-known
apart from cognition in this way, the very admission that
knowledge is a project of active cognition is enough to
debar it from being true. Thus the gnoseological enquiry
might well be continued forever without it contributing
in the slightest to knowledge, for discussions about the
character of such a delimited cognition do not say
anything about its relation to the to-be-known, which is
the crux of the epistemological problem. However, if the
basic doubt is in this way made irremediable, what can be
the result of the initially valuable resolve to examine
everything? The result is nothing. What is being
criticised is not a particular conception whose merits or
lack of them it would be rewarding to know, but rather
the faculty of cognition as such, in an empty, abstract
fashion without concrete content. No specific conception
is examined on its merits; all are condemned with their
fellows simply because they are acts of cognition.

The consequences of this can amount to little more that a
mere display of criticism whose bad faith Hegel
chastises. The result of such empty criticism is that it
will in effect lapse into a mere preliminary which is
gone through before in fact coming back to the initial
set of beliefs.
Hegel's allusions to this fate of classical epistemology bring at once to mind Descartes' basic aim to submit all beliefs to personal test. It is, indeed, to do more than follow received opinion to make that opinion genuinely one's own (2). However, it is not of itself a great deal more, in so far as gaining truth is concerned, for the truth of an opinion does not reside in the fashion in which that opinion is held (3). Descartes in fact examined only his own capacity to believe as such, his ability to believe irrespective of content, and, furthermore, did so with the express intention of rebuilding the beliefs with which he started after satisfying himself that he might believe in them (4). Not only do the endemic shortcomings of the narrowed conception of cognition involved mean that this renewed belief can never be convincingly demonstrated from the intended position of doubt (5), but more fundamentally this sort of effort does not improve, because it does not even consider, the substance of the belief at all. It is as if Descartes begins with truth and has only to convince himself of this. Even if the unwarranted assumption of truth is dropped in respect of many particular beliefs, what is left does not contribute to the substantive evolution of any specific conceptions involved (6).

The culmination of modern philosophy's attempt to rid
itself of rationalistic assumptions such as those of Descartes is perhaps to be found in Hume. Here we find, as we might expect from what we know of the classical epistemological project, that such an attempt cannot stop short of complete philosophical scepticism. In saying this, however, we must add that this is so because Hume's position is not fundamentally different from that of Descartes. It is perhaps the essential theme of Hegel's position here that he is fully convinced that to claim to dispense with philosophy (understood as the reasoned explicit examination of ideas) is ridiculous. In so far as he makes this claim, I do not know of any sensible way of now evaluating Hume's epistemology other than to affirm that in the employment of the notion of natural belief he is simply avoiding the problem. It is inconsistent to demand of a true knowledge that it be other than an act of cognition, for after doing so one then necessarily proceeds to commit just such acts and to evaluate them after the fashion which motivated the initial epistemological effort. Hume therefore has, of course, to allow that knowing involves confidence in statements about the real, but this is hardly to his credit as it is made against, indeed in defiance of, his own philosophy (7). Hume does not recognise in the unacceptable scepticism of his philosophy a shortcoming of that particular philosophy, but rather claims to have exposed a sad result of philosophy as such. The consequence is that philosophy is essentially pointless,
and Hume moves on to himself accepting natural beliefs (8). Even Hume's famous contrast of the ridiculous errors of philosophy and the dangerous ones of religion at the end of the first book of the Treatise (9) involves, of course, just the sort of causal claim he thinks he has demolished. It is then difficult to see what was the point of this demolition (10).

If we further consider the implication of these arguments of Hegel's for assessing Kant's attempt to dispell Humean scepticism, we can see that to the degree that this attempt becomes confined to purely subjective categories it is rendered quite powerless to realise its goal. That Kant sought to remedy the destructive effects of Humean scepticism and to show how natural science was possible does not mean that he will make fundamentally constructive developments when we see that he was concerned basically with a narrowed cognition and not the relation of cognition to the to-be-known. Furthermore, epistemological efforts circumscribed in this way cannot provide a ground for evaluating particular conceptions in the vital respect of their relation to the to-be-known (11).

If I might, after Hegel's fashion, try to sum up this argument and the lesson of these illustrations aphoristically, then I would say that it shows that if every conception of truth must be criticised, then none
can be. The evaluation of the potential fruitfulness of any particular conception is paralysed by a rejection of the possibility of truth at all. Paradoxically, then, the adoption of a truly critical attitude becomes extremely difficult. For on what grounds could this stance be justified if any alternative is just as bad?

**Empty and Determinate Negations**

The very intelligibility of epistemological criticism, Hegel argues, turns upon recognising the determinate significance of any such criticism. The negation, as he puts it, of any inadequate position must not be conceived as a completely negative procedure, but rather as an effort to learn from what has earlier been done by seeing its particular contributions and shortcomings (12). Though one form of what we can now see as an inadequate conception of knowing, the classical epistemological project, reduced all cognitions to nothing by an, as it were, empty negation, we should learn from the specific consequence of this type of epistemology that we must treat criticism of this and other inadequate conceptions as determinate negations.

By this point, Hegel's argument has amounted to saying that foundationalism is an absurd project and that we must begin with the subject's ability to know. Accepting this, the question of "how can we know?" shades into that
of "what do we know?" If it is impossible even to give a meaningful answer to the first question which can rejoin sundered cognition and to-be-known, answers to the second can be very fruitful in telling us how we can improve what we know. It is not that Hegel accepts philosophical scepticism but then concludes that this position cannot be maintained even though it should be. It is rather that he destroys the foundation of unrelieved scepticism. As I shall go on to argue, the consequence of this is that he is able philosophically to ground knowing, and not lapse into the bad faith of positions such as phenomenalism. These are continually haunted by their inconsistency in allowing that we can know, and consequently construct knowing in terms which are studiedly hesitant about making clear the fact that knowledge certainly includes making claims about the real.

Hegel's stress upon the determinateness of criticism finally renders untenable the two position - the identification of truth with absolute truth and the identification of epistemology with gnoseology - which characterise the classical epistemological project. It does this by giving a philosophically persuasive account of how epistemology not only finds it impossible to proceed from foundationalist positions, but also how it nevertheless does proceed. The first position is shown to be not only inevitably frustrating and, in fact,
unsupportable, but also in itself contradictory. The second, which follows from the first, is shown to be wholly misdirected. Forced into the examination of a narrow notion of cognition separated from the to-be-known, it can, of itself, contribute nothing to epistemology, which is directed at, precisely, the relation of cognition to the to-be-known. In declaring that the only plausible evaluation of a particular conception must be one which assesses its adequacy to potentially reachable truth, Hegel makes epistemology fully aware of what it must do, and thus able consciously to direct its efforts towards this. This is essentially the criticism of epistemological alienation: The power to know is not created, it is made apparent by being recovered from the obfuscated form in which it had hitherto been exercised. Conscious reflection on knowing and knowing itself are to be reunited in a way which makes redundant any separation of philosophical scepticism and practical belief.

In sum, the position which Hegel has reached here is this. He has recovered the possibility of the valid use of "truth" and associated terms within discourse about our beliefs, and has thus established the possibility of direct (that is to say, not equivocatory) epistemological criticism. He has not done this by altering in some way the meaning of these terms, but, indeed, has stuck rigidly to their most immediately forceful meanings. He
has shown that the dominant understanding of their use, which makes them completely redundant or, more usually, a meta-language in the negative sense of being outside possible discourse on knowing, is an alienated position; that is, a position which, by its construction of the process of knowing, itself estranges us from our power to know (13).

Having carried out this (still) essential preliminary, we might expect Hegel to go on to construct his idea of knowing in order to fashion a non-alienated epistemology. This would be, to draw on the terms of a later phenomenology, an epistemology of knowing being-in-the-world, rather than an epistemology which seeks to establish knowing being-in-the-world and necessarily fails (14). In fact, he does nothing of the kind. In what we have discussed, he has again begun to elide his own view of the form of the process of knowing with a view of what there substantially is to know under the ostensible aspect of a polemical clearing away of obstructions to truth, and we must now examine this issue.

**Determinate Negation and the Realisation of the Absolute**

Hegel's summing up of these arguments through the use of the term "determinate negation" is a play on the Spinozist maxim that "determination is negation" which it
will prove fruitful to pursue further. By this maxim, Spinoza drew it to the attention that the act of defining a thing implies the exclusion of possible attributes of the thing other than the ones affirmed in the definition. To recognise that a thing has the specific determination of possession of a particular quality involves the exclusion, or negation, of alternative qualities. Hegel wants to reverse this maxim in order to aphoristically conclude his arguments at this point of the 'Introduction'. He affirms the positive side of epistemological criticism by claiming that negation is determination. He argues that once the determinate consequences of any particular claim to knowledge are recognised, it is then possible to see even in the criticism of that claim a movement towards truth. Seeing the unrelievedly sceptical outcomes of classical epistemology as the results of that epistemology enables one to avoid what are thus revealed as its mistakes. In this fashion, then, Hegel comes to ally the demonstration of the emptiness of the scepticism of classical epistemology to the progressive movement to be undertaken in the Phenomenology. As on the earlier occasion when he effected such an elision between criticism of others' positions and the establishment of his own, Hegel here covers a very considerable distance in the matter of a very few lines. To follow the course he takes more carefully, it is necessary to inquire in some detail into Hegel's intention in reversing Spinoza's famous maxim.
Hegel regards this maxim as the central principle of Spinoza's philosophy (15), and we must be clear exactly why this is so. The formulation "determination is negation" is known from one of Spinoza's important letters in explication of his doctrines (15), and is not as such present in his metaphysics as they are given in the *Ethics* (17). Yet the principle articulated in the maxim is continually present in the metaphysics, and indeed it is possible to construct them from this principle without forcedness. The principle affirms that the particular determination of the possession of a quality implies the negation of all other possible alternative qualities. Finite things as defined by their particular determinations must, in a sense, be the negation of other finitudes. Regarding God as being absolutely infinite, it follows that he must contain the negativity of all finite things. That is to say, that as a finite thing negates the infinite number of all other determinate finitudes, God, as that infinitude, must embrace every particular finite thing. Having, in fact, immediately understood finitude quite rationalistically as a matter of logical construction, Spinoza unproblematically treats all this (which is quite unobjectionable, but also in itself quite trivial - a mere exercise in logical implication) as an analysis of the ontology of finitude. If we can for our purposes of exegesis allow this translation of logical into
ontological statements, then it occurs that finite things' negating others becomes the very constitution of those things by their negations. The importance of this is that God's infinitude is seen as the ontological ground of every finite thing, for the existence of the thing does not in this metaphysics inhere in itself but in its partial negation of God's infinitude. This treatment of determinate finitude renders God's infinitude not as something beyond and outside of finitude but as conterminous with it, as the omnipresent ground of each and every finite thing. This is, as Spinoza says in another letter (18), the "actual infinite". Arrived at in rather a different fashion, to which I will return, this position, to the effect that finite things are inessential modifications of one infinite substance which is God, is the basic conclusion of the Ethics. In an initial sense, then, the maxim of "determination is negation" can be seen to be at the centre of the Ethics in the sense that it expresses the crucial principle of the treatment of the relation of the finite and the infinite at the heart of Spinoza's philosophy.

Hegel is extremely enthusiastic about the potential of this representation of God's infinitude to ground an understanding of Spirit, even going so far as to declare Spinozism to be the source of all truth in modern philosophy (19). However, in Spinoza the consequences of this representation are ambiguous. All determinate
finitude, in being shown to be part of the one infinite, is denied actual substance. Its lack of substance is its truth. But if this is so, what reliance can be placed upon a proof of God's infinitude which begins with the acceptance of that finitude as a sound basis from which to start? The end point of Spinoza's argument involves the destruction of his fundamental presumptions. In making this argument, I would like to distinguish it carefully from the way in which Spinozism has been accused of having illegitimate presuppositions, in a rather trivial sense, virtually from the time of the publication of Spinoza's "posthumous works".

The Ethics is presented after the fashion of a Euclidean geometrical deduction, and begins with a series of definitions which amount to a statement that God is all substance from which the subsequent arguments are said to be deduced (20). Whilst Hegel is certainly critical of this form of presentation, arguing that it fails to provide any proof of the initial definitions (21), it is not really the presumptive character of the definitions, narrowly understood as a matter of mere presentation, to which he objects. The full meaning of these definitions emerges only as one goes further into the Ethics, and it is quite possible to begin from almost any point, in the first part at least, and to recapitulate the initial definitions. The definitions themselves could surely also be reformulated. We have ourselves seen in the
previous pages an alternative way of constructing Spinoza's metaphysics. It is probably both inaccurate and unhelpful, then, to attempt to closely identify any of these definitions as such as the fundamental illicit presumption upon which Spinozism rests. Hegel's criticism of Spinoza's presumptions, which I have here reconstructed from his interest in the idea that determination is negation, is far more profound than this. For to reject an indefensibly close association of a particular formulation in the Ethics and Spinoza's presuppositions is not to say that he does not have any such presuppositions. He has, and they amount to this; he allows finitude into his metaphysics and thus generates his contrast of finite modes and infinite substance. The full significance of this is, of course, that this is no arbitrary, removable assumption. The attempted destruction of finitude in Spinoza founders on the rock that finitude is the given material of the human intellect.

Hegel's conception of Spirit in many ways takes its form from the attempt to avoid these difficulties in Spinozism. This conception, it will be recalled, involves Spirit positing its own finite limitation and being brought full awareness of its own infinitude through the progressive development of that awareness in human history. Hegel's Spirit is not to destroy finitude, but is to rise from it and incorporate it.
Hegel will show finite limitation to be not a mere modification of actual substance but an inadequate stage in the development of Spirit which is nevertheless an integral moment in the progression to the Absolute. This is so in a narrow sense in that Hegel pursues the concept of finitude through to its, as he claims, own dissolution into self-consciousness as a specific stage of the Phenomenology (22). More widely taken, it is clearly the case that any particular conception which has not grasped the Absolute is to be a moment in Spirit's positing of its own finite limitation, which the Phenomenological progression will show to be such. In summing up his earlier insistence upon the determinate consequences of criticism, Hegel as we have seen terms each such criticism a determinate negation. It is a sequence of determinate negations which is to constitute the progression of the Phenomenology (23). Bearing in mind that finite limitation understood in the way Hegel has taken it over here is a partial negation of the infinite, the theologically positive result of the sequence of determinate negations is captured in Hegel's presentation of its sum elsewhere as the "negation of the negation" (24).

Let us be clear how Hegel has run together his insistence upon determinate criticism and the progressive realisation of the Absolute. In Spinoza, the maxim "determination is negation" has a compelling modal
logical force in respect of recognising specific determinations. To attribute to a thing a particular quality does allow the negation of all alternative possibilities, though this is indeed a rather trivial point without Spinoza's rationalistic understanding of finitude. This is to say, "determination is negation" establishes a particular quality as a logical necessity. Now, the reversal of this to give "negation is determination" does not have the same form (25). The negation of one possible quality does not thereby identify a particular quality, but leaves us with a range of possibilities. Furthermore, to say that we might characterise a thing by saying what it is not, obviously, is to envisage an infinite task. The progression Hegel will chart has, of course, a particular content, but this can only come by the presumption of a delimited field within this infinite range of possibilities (26). The Phenomenological sequence of determinate negations is given its content not by logical identification of specifics but by being immediately incorporated into Hegel's own scheme rather in the way as was his earlier stress on the possibility of gaining truth; the criticism of inadequate epistemologies being conflated with the project of establishing Hegel's Truth. What Hegel has in mind is that his relation of finitude to the infinite will reproduce the sense of necessity (though certainly in a different way) that this had in Spinozism in order that he might claim the circular proof which we have seen
is offered by Phenomenology. We can see then that at the outset of the Phenomenological movement Hegel immediately establishes for it a necessary character.

Hegel's Idea of Necessity

What exactly is to be understood by "necessity" in Hegel's philosophy is a both controversial and rewarding issue. In turning to it, we are fortunate in being able to draw upon a polemical clarification of his views which Hegel provided in 1802 (27) and repeated in 1827 (28). In response to the claim that a completely adequate philosophical system would be able to deductively derive all existents (which I am sure he had a warrant to think present in Schelling (29)) one W. Krug, a distinguished contemporary of Hegel's (he was to succeed Kant at Konigsberg), challenged such a system to deduce the pen with which he wrote his criticisms (30). Hegel's response to this sarcasm is to turn its intended thrust against itself. The task which Krug would wish to see performed is a trivial one indeed, and therefore Krug must wait until far more pressingly important matters have been dealt with before he can really hope to see his pen glorified by being placed within a system of true philosophy. It seems quite clear from his replies that Hegel allowed that, in principle, Krug's pen could be found such a place, and I do not think there can be a retreat from such a belief without misrepresenting
Hegel's intentions. For Hegel's proof of the Absolute sets requirements for itself which would certainly involve just such an all-encompassing sense of necessity as is obviously envisaged here, and I think that this vital aspect of Hegel's project would become incomprehensible if this sense in his philosophy were unduly weakened (31). However, although Hegel retained the use of the word "deduction" in 1827 despite having quibbled about it earlier, I do not think this at all conveys the way in which the necessity involved in being able to philosophically locate Krug's pen is actually understood by Hegel in his own post-Schellingian positions. It is precisely a strong necessity (expressed in terms other than those of a formal deduction) that constitutes the peculiar endurability of Hegel's claims to Absolute Knowledge (32).

For formal deduction in Philosophy is, I am sure, thought quite pointless, or rather counter-productive by Hegel. (I have implied this in my remarks on Hegel's opinion of Spinoza's Euclidean form of presentation, and we shall see him make similar comments on Kant's, Fichte's and Schelling's treatment of triadic dialectic). In the very formality with which it is conducted, the deduction is emptied of the real significance which it should hope to claim as Philosophy - the significance of actually expressing the Absolute. It is Hegel's belief that the pattern of the setting out of Philosophy should be one
which captures the way in which the Absolute has actually come to pass. When we have grasped the Absolute, the representation of this will perforce have the form which we have grasped. Spirit's externalisation in phenomena must be portrayed in the way in which it actually has been found to have been developed. I hope it is clear that it is of the essence of this that the pattern of this portrayal cannot be specifiable in advance, neither as a deduction nor in any other way. This portrayal should be the result of Philosophy, not its presupposed way of proceeding (33).

The description of the pattern of Truth is, then, for Hegel a task of comprehension and not of deduction (34). Hegel attempts to generate an idea of necessity in his accounts of events by claiming that it is possible ultimately to comprehend everything within Spirit, not by presuming that everything is deductively relatable. The relation of phenomena which is to be discovered will be presented in Philosophy. In this sense, to hold out the hope of Krug's pen being Philosophically explained is not, I think, a fanciful one. Though we are under no obligation, of course, to accept Hegel's construction of such an explanation, which will take the form of glorifying the pen by consciously exposing its location within Spirit; to hold out the possibility of this explanation seems, in principle, to be as valid as holding out the possibility of other explanations which

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we might easily envisage. It must also be said, this explanandum seems as little worthy of the effort for those who would put forward other explanations as it appears to Hegel himself.

Within the System Hegel works with a number of forms of this all-encompassing comprehension which necessarily locates the phenomena comprehended; each form, it is important to note, corresponding to a different object the study of which, Hegel says, generates the forms.

One such form, brought directly to mind by Hegel's comments on Krug, is that set out as the Philosophy of Nature, and noting this allows me to attempt to clarify another aspect of the use of deduction in the interpretation of Hegel. I have mentioned that in attempting to turn the trivial character of the task Krug sets Philosophy against Krug himself, Hegel suspects that no philosopher could be bothered to carry out this task until other, far more important tasks have been carried out. Whilst the solar system itself remains to be comprehended - and this therefore faces philosophy as its most sublime and supreme task - Hegel says Krug will have to wait. Hegel used a very similar locution when describing his own earlier attempt to perform this supreme task (35). His dissertation on the orbits of the planets is most often remembered for Hegel's explanation of the relatively (by comparison to the distance between
the orbits of the inner planets) vast emptiness between Mars and Jupiter, which was put forward just at the time when the discovery of asteroids in this space was being made. However, Hegel is not really guilty of speculatively deducing a necessary emptiness which outlawed and thus was ridiculed by the discovery of these asteroids (36). Using the extant empirical evidence, (the astronomical discovery of the asteroids was not available to him), Hegel tried to furnish an explanation of this relatively vast distance. His explanation not only strenuously tried to fit the facts but actually did so in polemic against the idea of presuming there to be a strict arithmetical relation between the planets (37). Of course, this acceptance of given data as ineluctable is almost as little scientific as would be imposing deductive constructions against such data, but it nevertheless remains that Hegel's Philosophy of Nature purports to be an attempt to comprehend a system in nature and not to be an attempt to impose a deductive one on it (38). It doubtless goes without saying nowadays that we are not obliged to accept either the specific pattern of comprehension advanced or the very idea that such an attempt is a feasible project.

The system set out in the Philosophy of Nature is one of flat, exteriority which exhibits no internal dynamic of a dialectical (or evolutionary in any sense) form (39). I mention this in order to stress that Hegel is quite
prepared to find, as he says, a philosophic form in nature quite different to that which he sets out in his Philosophy of Spirit (40). Even when he does not treat of these two concrete sciences of Spirit, but turns to Logic (41), this is not a formal logic whose shape is determined extrinsically to the subject matter described, but rather a logic intended directly to represent the principles of Spirit's externalisation (42). This is to say that this logic is an ontology, but an ontology of the externalisation of a universal subject and the process of its self-recognition.

The subtlety of this idea of necessity is perhaps best shown by stressing the existentialist (as it were) themes it is able to embrace through allowing Hegel to discuss contingency itself. Recalling the way in which Hegel set up his conception of Spirit, we might expect that if there is to be a sense of necessity in Hegel's Philosophy, then there would have to also be contingency, as the one (dare I say necessarily? (43)) implies the other and can be manifested only in opposition to it (44). As I have described Hegel's intentions in his conception of Spirit, it emerges that this turns on a commitment to braving an uncharted openness in order to realise Spirit's true nature in a way now most celebrated in existentialist thought. Spirit is to commit itself to the test of overcoming the appearance of limitation which arises from its externalisation, and the result will be,
Hegel seems to claim, whatever the result is. Spirit proves to be the rational acknowledgement of necessity (45), but this is found to be so only after passing through stages of arbitrariness, caprice and inadequate reason in both Nature (46) and History (47).

It is certainly part of the meaning of the realisation of the Absolute that Historical events at least should be increasingly brought within the freedom that arises from the rational recognition of necessity (48). I mention this here only to contrast it to the sense of necessity evoked by the general setting out of the Philosophy. For the claim for the present existence of the rational state does not mean that contingency is removed from Spirit's development. Contingent events are ineluctably part of the course of that development, but the sense of necessity present in Philosophic comprehension remains covering even these, for it does not involve denying their contingency. From the point of view of actually going through the development of the Absolute, an infinite number of contingent events are found to happen and to have been embarked upon. It is quite essential to grasp the openness which Hegel means to include in Spirit's commitment to its own realisation. From the position of the realised Absolute, Spirit knows itself to be rational necessity. That is to say, Spirit knows its own nature and in doing so is able to bring its actions into accordance with that nature. The rational
acknowledgement of this necessity is Spirit's self consciousness and making actual of itself. This state is, I think the argument demands, an achievement rather than a pre-ordained conclusion. However, looking back from the Absolute, we can study the course for what it is. We can distinguish the developments which furthered Spirit's rational acknowledgement of necessity and developments which were contingent to this. This is not to say that these latter are inexplicable. From the point of view of the Absolute we can now explain them as contingent, as being performed outside of Spirit's self-consciousness. Contingent events, I would say, are very plausibly retrospectively explicable on the quite empirical lines which Hegel envisages in the Phenomenology. These events are not thereby robbed of their contingency - it is precisely this which is now attested to by their comprehension.

Nevertheless this reflexive comprehension does express something akin to a necessity. Absolute Knowledge of Spirit must allow us at least in principle to give the final, authoritative account of all events. That is to say, the comprehension which is the goal is potentially total. In his reply to Krug, Hegel makes it clear that his may not be expected all at once, and yet although some phenomena may seem too trivial for anyone to ever both giving an account of them, all phenomena must be held to be potentially open to their finally correct
explanation. Hegel certainly thinks that the glorification of Krug's pen by making clear its place within Spirit is possible. We can, I think, generalise this and say that Hegel must hold it possible that we can give an account of all phenomena in such a way that, although we cannot claim that particular events had to happen, we may come to know, with a necessity that arises from having given an unsurpassable explanation, why they did happen. "The Truth", Hegel famously declares, "is the Whole" (49), or "the Totality" (50).

The System, I hope we can now see, carries on in this respect what I have called the empirical character of the proof to be furnished in the *Phenomenology*. The following of inadequate conceptions to the point where they have lead us to see their location within Spirit turns on the necessity which stems from the potential ultimate comprehension of all such conceptions through Absolute Truth. The necessity which is to give force to the Phenomenological proof is a necessity following from locating the ultimate truth of any conception by having to place it within Spirit. As one sees immediately from reading any of the studies in the *Phenomenology*, this location is no vulgar reduction but a wonderfully varied and sympathetic account of the forms of consciousness. However, linking these studies, in ways which often seem irremediably forced, is a necessity which is insisted upon. All conceptions will be brought
within Spirit, and the truth of their character ultimately settled by this. Is even this sort of necessity acceptable? (51).

The End of History?

Having I hope made clear the way in which Hegel sets about proving the Absolute, I would now like to examine this closely and identify what I think is objectionable about it. Intrinsically bound up with the stress on the specific enabling conditions of knowledge in the idea of determinate negation is, as the other side of the same thing, an emphasis on the specific limitations to the potential knowledge which can be generated within any set of conditions. Recognition of the limitations, which are the statement of the exhaustion of the possibilities of any particular enabling resources, is what motivates criticism in determinate negation. The corollary of the stress on the positive side of criticism in determinate negation is, then, Hegel's famous insistence that no philosophy could adopt views ahead of its time (52) (though we can see that for Hegel all previous philosophies contain views which make their own time obsolete). But in a manoeuvre which at first seems incredible given its basis in this position (53), Hegel's Absolute is founded by a twist of the argument which essentially nullifies for this Absolute the appreciation of historical relativity which is so central to the idea
of determinate negation. For Hegel's principal belief is that he lives and writes at the birth-time of a new era quite unlike any other. His is the time when Absolute Truth is on the scene, when the key principles of understanding all phenomena are now known and wait only to be applied. Obviously more can be known, but this is now a question only of extending the margin of knowledge, of bringing more and more things (even Krug's pen) within knowledge, rather than fundamentally improving our knowledge (which can change even our perception of events previously explained rather after the fashion in which Hegel presents the impact of the Absolute).

This belief, of the completion or end of History (54), has been treated as ridiculous, but this is hardly a correct response. Hegel is by no means denying that new events can or will take place - he makes it plain even in so famous a text as the introduction to the lectures of the Philosophy of History in reference to North America as the land of the future that this view cannot be attributed to him (55). Rather he is arguing that the basically rational forms of social organisation and the fundamentally correct truth of knowing have been developed and no fundamental improvement on these principles will ever be possible. The making actual of these principles may remain to be done, to a greater or lesser degree, but nothing radically new will ever arise again (56).
As we now have ample historical testimony to show, this conviction is not so much ridiculous as terrible in the power of the dogmatism it can generate (57). We must register the essential dogmatism of the claims made for Hegel's Absolute. Awareness of historical relativity lapses when the historical location one grants oneself transcends history (58). The point emerges most clearly in Hegel's attitude to previous philosophies, for in dealing with this it is possible to abstract from the differing forms of privilege he claims for philosophy over other than philosophical beliefs, and I will initially state my point with respect to the lectures on the History of Philosophy. The tone of these lectures is principally formed (59) by Hegel's rising above narrow criticism, it is the positive contribution made in all philosophies which is Hegel's concern (60). However, this in itself is intolerably condescending (61) because, and this introduces profound contradictions into the History, the positive contributions made are all to Hegel's Truth (62). That there is truth in all philosophies is a tautology for Hegel; a necessary condition of a belief being a Philosophy is that it is part of the development of Absolute Truth (63). As they stand, these lectures can be read with profit only if read obliquely to the overall pattern they portray, that is to say, not as history at all.
We must be quite precise here. As his usual restriction of information about social context to a few biographical notes preceding each discussion shows, nothing could be further from Hegel's intention than to give an actual history of the social practice of philosophy. His is an effort which we might preliminarily identify as an intellectual history of philosophical thought - though I stress that this is only a provisional manoeuvre. The division of the time spent in the lectures on each period is given by his assessment of its internal intellectual significance in Philosophy (64). Now, not only is such a reconstruction of the internal rationality of the discipline valuable in itself if the history of the discipline is to be consciously utilised as a resource for contemporary undertakings, but furthermore such an effort is necessary for an actual history of philosophy. For grasping the internal significance of any contribution enters into those truth claims about the real philosophical significance of particular episodes (as blind alleys, as productive lines, as politically induced deviations, etc.) which an actual history must make. But even bearing this in mind in our evaluation, Hegel's lectures are invalid history. For they force the internal rationality of the discipline into the mould Hegel requires.

At any period in the history of philosophy it is in principle possible to look back and to sum up what seems
to be the most important issues, and to genetically comprehend one's own position in this light. Such a procedure is itself inextricably historically bound, that is to say that the truth claims about what is most valuable in philosophy are historically relative. These judgements do not have to be considered completely relativist if the genetic location of the contemporary viewpoint is sympathetically exploited. If we do not simply impose contemporary categories but enter into self-conscious dialogue with the past, intellectual history, far from having special hermeneutic problems, has hermeneutic privileges (though of course remaining subject to the interpretative conditions of all dialogue). However, in Hegel it is precisely this dialogue, remarkable to say, that is militated against, because the standpoint of the Absolute is merely the other side of relativism. In the way it subsumes all other philosophies beneath itself it is dogmatic. Like the relativist, Hegel does not derive his present from its past. From the point of view of the Absolute Hegel is not making a (debatable) claim about what constitutes the most important issues, he is claiming that philosophy has always been directed by what he regards as its most important issues, and that those issues are Philosophy. It is, I submit, a mistake (65) to accept that the lesson of these lectures is that philosophy is no more than its history. From the point of view of the Absolute, the history of philosophy is given by its one Truth.
Hegel had, of course, to learn his philosophy, and no doubt he learned his in a wonderfully erudite engagement with the history of the discipline. He first gave his lectures, and indeed wrote them out, before he wrote the *Phenomenology*. It is the thrust of his initial formulations of determinate negation in the *Phenomenology* to make such an engagement an open dialogue, sure in the conviction that it is the site on which philosophic truth may and must be built. When these formulations are linked to the erected structure of a Truth which is Absolute in that it recasts the past as an approach to itself, then this possibility is sacrificed to a dogmatism. This is the dogmatism of a final truth appended to determinate negations as the negation of the negation. This absolute is in fact susceptible to historiographical criticism. Any actual history of philosophy, even a narrowly intellectual one, that utilised Hegel's reconstruction of the internal core of the discipline, would find so little of philosophy's past explicable that it would be quite easy to devise a new reconstruction which would lead to much greater explanatory power. (To the extent that one allows that Hegel's is the most important intellectual contribution to contemporary social and political understanding this is, perhaps, a remarkable thing to have to say). However, this is to appeal to history, and Hegel, I believe, does not do this.
This complex of unacceptable positions represented by the Hegelian Absolute - of a claim to have the ultimate key to explanation of all phenomena which makes further extension of knowledge purely a matter of bringing other things under interpretation by this key (66) - is, I think, displayed quite as much in Hegel's other mature works as in his history of philosophy. I leave it to the reader to consider the implications of ordering material in this supremely confident way in the Philosophy of Right (67) and the Philosophy of History (68), and will take them up in respect of the Phenomenology below. In sum, it is the break with historical dialogue, even in the midst of the most interesting historical studies, which is in the end the fundamental characteristic of the Hegelian Absolute, and this pushes Hegel's studies quite to the periphery of any concern to understand how we might develop real understanding through historiographical hermeneutics (69).
CHAPTER 5

SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN HEGEL'S REPRESENTATION OF KNOWING: THE UNITY OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT

Introduction

We are now faced with the issue of assessing the character of the phenomenological method. We have discussed Hegel's idea of Truth and how he thinks such Truth may be substantiated. The fashion in which the substantiation may be undertaken remains, however, to be explained. In order to begin this, let us now turn to that point in the 'Introduction' where Hegel himself declares that he intends to add to the foregoing remarks about the necessity of the Phenomenological inquiry to be undertaken and about the nature of the undertaking, something further on the method of carrying out this inquiry (1).

Hegel on the Necessity of a Criterion of Truth in Epistemological Criticism

Hegel at this point recapitulates some of the earlier problems he has emphasised in classical epistemology in order to subject them to the power of a solution which he now proposes. He focuses his discussion on the problem of the necessity of a fixed criterion of truth in
epistemological criticism. If Hegel's project is an investigation of what is actually carried out in cognition and an indentification of inadequate conceptions and their relation to truth, then, he continues, that project would seem to require a criterion by which specific conceptions can be evaluated. To say this immediately runs us into difficulties which we have already encountered, especially in respect of Hegel's attitude to Schelling. For on what ground could such a criterion be justified if it is to demarcate inadequate conceptions and truth. Obviously such a justification requires an agreement on truth, and this is what is sought by the employment of the criterion. If we say that such a criterion is unavailable, it remains difficult to see how the examination of particular beliefs can then take place.

Natural Consciousness and the Possibility of a Criterion of Truth

Hegel prefaces his response to the paradox he has formulated with an exposition of the nature of knowing consciousness. By this he aims to show on what basic conception of knowing the demand for such a criterion of truth could arise. Hegel's use of "consciousness" at this point is to refer to a type of belief which he elsewhere in the 'Introduction' calls, more precisely, "natural consciousness" (2), and by which he means the

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representation of subject and object in the common understanding. In the epistemology of this consciousness there is envisaged a knowledge of objects distinct from the subject by a subject who is aware of the act of cognition. This consciousness distinguishes itself from objects by simultaneous attempts to relate itself to them in order to make the objects available for itself. However, an object's being-for-consciousness in this way is also distinguished from an object's being-for-itself, and an object's being related to a subject in knowing is also distinguished from the object's being outside of this relationship. It is this being-in-itself that is the essential to-be-known, and it is knowledge of this that is truth. I think it is clear enough that what Hegel has done here is given an account of natural consciousness which identifies it with the positions of the classical epistemological project, in which we have already seen him expose an untenable indentification of truth with knowledge uncontaminated by cognition. Now, as a beginning, this characterisation of the then (and now) dominant epistemological explications of natural consciousness, is acceptable; indeed it shows something of a remarkable aptitude for synopsis. However, Hegel, in referring to this as "consciousness", identifies it as the epistemology of knowledge of objects distinct from the subject. I do not say this in criticism of Hegel, for this identification was surely correct when he wrote (3). However, we are able to hold this open for.
consideration in a way in which Hegel did not. Bearing this in mind, let us turn to the fashion in which Hegel relates this representation of consciousness to the demand for a fixed criterion of truth in epistemological criticism. In advance I will say that having argued for determinate negation on the basis of the criticism of the classical epistemological project, Hegel proceeds here to explore the possibilities of immanent development from that epistemology.

If we inquire into the truth of a particular knowledge in the ways made possible by this consciousness, the inquiry becomes the determining of what that knowledge is in-itself. From what we have already seen, we can hardly expect such a project to be practicable. All that can be discussed is the subject's cognition of this knowledge, and this cognition is, of course, thereby vulnerable to the scepticism which this consciousness levels at any cognition whatsoever. Hegel insists that any unfavourable evaluation of a particular knowledge can be seriously doubted by those holding to the criticised knowledge as not capturing the truth of their belief.

Hegel claims that the problem, or as he says the semblance of the problem, of the dissociation of subjective knowing and objective truth is overcome by virtue of the object of the inquiry we are considering, an inquiry into particular forms of knowledge. This
dissociation seems to render impossible the reaching of an acceptable criterion of truth because the subject is apparently restricted to only one side of epistemological relation of subject and object, that of the former. However, in this inquiry consciousness can be pushed to the point of recognising that it provides its own criterion, for it is necessarily within consciousness that both particular cognitions and the object to-be-known are available for knowledge. Hegel is here attempting to turn what appears to be the pernicious consequences of the dissociation of subject and object to his own advantage. He stresses, on the basis of his earlier discussion of classical epistemology that there is no simple grasp of objects but they are available for knowledge only in active cognition. Consciousness must be the site not only of every subjective cognition but also of every possible grasp of the object. Putting the argument this way, it seems that the object is still only an object for-consciousness and there is still left the difficulty of knowing the object in-itself. The solution of this difficulty is to be found in the fact that consciousness may ever know an object at all. Accepting, as I do, Hegel's criticism of positing an in-itself which is in principle unknowable, the only meaningful in-itself must be one which is for-consciousness. It is the evaluations of particular knowledges that arise in consciousness that are the only valid criteria of truth, for a criterion based on knowing the in-itself is absurd.
Knowledge and the improvement of knowledge take place within consciousness. This is to say, as Hegel puts it in a typically paradoxical fashion, in knowing something is for-consciousness the in-itself. Thus in consciousness there is a particular cognition, and also the criterion of truth by which the cognition can be evaluated, the criterion which takes over the role of being-in-itself.

**Summary of Hegel's Position on the Availability of a Criterion of Truth**

At this point, I should like to take stock of Hegel's argument so far. In order to do this, I shall enlarge upon what Hegel has here called the problem of dissociation as it applies to Kant. In order to sustain his transcendental deduction against empiricist scepticism, that empirical knowledge involves being informative about objects distinct from the subject (4), Kant argues that there are two sources of knowledge united in synthetic judgements. These are, of course, the *a priori* forms contributed by reason and the empirical substance contributed by the object (5). If we accept this as the broad thesis of the *Critique*, then we can say that in outline Kant fails to overcome the problem of dissociation. For though we seem to be given both sides of consciousness in the sense Hegel has used his term so far, in fact we are not because the object
remains a brute object, external in the unreachable sense of being in-itself. Kant, in this summary rendering of his argument, fails to challenge the epitomically empiricist identification of objectivity. The problem still remains of unifying these irreconcilably separated sides of what, it is stressed, is a relation. I am sure that the predominant Kantian reply to this problem is to distinguish phenomena and noumena. Unable to link subject and object, Kant, as we have seen, attempts to make the subject's knowledge of object more or less play the role of noumena (with the caveat, however, this knowledge is really only of phenomena).

How is Hegel's argument, as we have taken it so far, different to this? I believe that it is different in the particular way in which it displaces the thing-in-itself from epistemology. Truth is located within consciousness in the sense that what is in principle outside of consciousness cannot be relevant to knowledge. This provides an initial uniting ground of subject and object in consciousness. In Kant, to repeat, there is of course an emphatic criticism of direct perception. However, Kant's epistemology even after this remains subjective in the bad sense that its criterion of truth remains identified with such perceptions. What is so interesting about Hegel's response is that though - and there should be no mistake about this - his argument is, as we shall see, put forward as part of an attempt to establish a
most radical idealism, it is not, as it goes so far, a specifically idealist argument. (In fact I will argue that it cannot support his idealism). In uniting subject and object in consciousness Hegel is making an unexceptionable statement, but he separates that statement from the sceptical conclusions which had hitherto been held to inexorably follow from it. What his argument so far does support, I submit, is a realism, for it makes epistemology realise knowing's commitment to being informative about objects necessarily distinct from the subject but which are also in principle knowable in consciousness.

Perhaps the best way to stress the particular fruitfulness of Hegel's solution to the problem of dissociation is to contrast it to Fichte's and Schelling's attempts to also dispense with the thing-in-itself after Kant, which we can here take up again. Schelling's predominant tack was, in effect, to allow a form of direct perception in intellectual intuition. (Though a perception of a radically different content to empiricist perception). Fichte substantially does just the opposite of this. In Fichte, the ego posits otherness in an apparent non-ego, and although the otherness of non-ego is in fact held by Fichte to be immutable as it is a condition of consciousness (6), the full sense of distinctness from the subject which originally characterised objectivity is clearly lost.
which consequence Fichte himself welcomed (7). It is perhaps worth stressing in regard to Fichte that his epistemology, in attempting to alter the status of objectivity, is just as much as Schelling's erasure of subjectivity a withdrawal from the epistemological problem as Kant presents it (8). Hegel's efforts to, as he himself believed, reconcile this opposition begins with the uniting of subject and knowable object in consciousness whilst not destroying the distinctness from the subject of the object. Both Fichte and Schelling in the end respond to Kant from within their own developed positions. In Hegel, however, there is a profound restatement of the content of consciousness which stands on its own merits in advance of Hegel's account of that content.

It might be responded that Hegel has not provided the link between subject and object which is sought by the foundationalist project of classical epistemology. Let me repeat in this new context, however, that he has emphatically refuted both the necessity and the possibility of forging such a link, and has therefore destroyed the ground of unrelieved scepticism. I see no fundamental difficulty, once we have distanced ourselves from what have seemed inevitable empiricist presuppositions, in accepting this outline epistemological groundwork by Hegel. Subject and object constitute the domain of consciousness. Of course some
ontological account of this domain now arises as a pressing demand. However, we can say in advance of trying to satisfy this that Hegel's arguments were necessary to open up the possibility of any such satisfaction (9).

Hegel's achievement is, let me say again, the exposure of epistemological alienation. He reveals the possibility of truth by criticism of its foreclosure by the, for him and for us, dominant currents of epistemology. In an important sense there is not, and cannot be, a convincing reply to foundationalism which accepts its terms, because the obstacles to truth which it erects are internal to its formulations. Hegel's thrust is to explicitly site truth, cognition, objectivity, etc., in the only possible area where they can have a ground - that of human knowing. Epistemologies which demand that knowledge go beyond itself and secure its own foundation elsewhere are shown not merely to demand the impossible and to display bad faith by their professions, but further to be themselves the authors of their difficulties by making contradictory demands upon knowledge to know that it cannot know.

Acceptance of Hegel's position so far is not, I insist, to be committed to an idealism. Following Hegel's use of "consciousness" up to this point, our discussion can quite legitimately be restricted to epistemology, that is
to say, to an examination of thought. His insistence that objects external to the subject must be available in consciousness can be allowed, I think, because it accomplishes much whilst leaving the ontological understanding of the objectivity involved quite open. However, we have united subject and object, particular belief and the standard by which any such belief can be criticised, in recognising the knowability of objects in consciousness. It is within Hegel, I believe, that there is the historical foundation of philosophically coherent realism in modern epistemology.

Hegel's Solution of the Problem of Dissociation

If my interpretation of Hegel's argument so far be accepted, it remains of course the case that his negative achievement of a convincing criticism of the barriers to a workable realism in classical epistemology requires much development before it can itself claim to be such a realism. Amongst the number of ways in which this is so I would like to mention one in particular. If, as I suggest, we accept a restricted sense of "consciousness" as corresponding to Hegel's usage of this term so far, as a reference to only epistemology, then further development must surely raise questions about the ontological sources of the character of this consciousness. Indeed, the full understanding of the alienated positions which have been criticised must
involve some reference to this, in the form of a grasp of the non-alienated conditions which give counter-factual sense to the explanation of the classical epistemological project as alienated. Now some such developments are put forward by Hegel, but in a fashion the peculiarity of which it is vital to grasp. Hegel does not broaden out epistemology into an empirical investigation of the acquisition of knowledge, neither in the sense of the general transcendental ontology which I have argued he makes possible, nor even in the more restricted sense of an examination of the subjective psychological processes involved in coming to know. In failing to take up even the latter, Hegel does represent a regressive step from the psychological efforts of empiricism and Kant. He does not proceed in these ways because he is attempting to develop a most radical idealism in which the objects of knowing can be directly predicated of consciousness. Hegel does not even seek to pursue a line such as that of Descartes when the latter attempted to divorce subjectivity from the materiality of the body (10). The idealism which Hegel envisages is one in which epistemological statements about consciousness can also immediately stand as ontological statements about the objects of consciousness. Obviously a Consciousness in which not merely all knowing but also all being is grounded is a rather different consciousness to the one we have so far discussed, and we must look into the difference between these more deeply.
After having located within consciousness the criterion by which specific cognitions may be judged, Hegel sums up this argument which we have just discussed in the following way. If knowledge is designated as the Notion, he says, and the true as the Object in-itself, then examination of the truth of a cognition does indeed turn on whether Notion corresponds to that Object. We have seen that such a procedure yields nothing. However, Hegel now proposes in opposition to this fruitless project, call the Object in-itself the Notion, and with this call the Object for-consciousness as established in any particular cognition the Object. Now examination of the adequacy of cognition consists in seeing whether Object corresponds to Notion. It is evident, Hegel claims, that the two are the same.

Hegel's way of putting his point is extraordinarily difficult, and I have thought it best, as far as I can, to initially simply put forward his own statement and then try to explain it. For the first thing we must note is that he does not even convey what he wants his readers to believe. If the two ways of setting up the examination of the adequacy of a cognition were the same, having argued that the first one is fruitless, there would seem to be little point in Hegel's turning to the second. What he is, in fact, claiming is that the two procedures describe the same state of affairs, only the
second, unlike the first, allows us to see what that state of affairs is.

Hegel is suggesting that as an object for-consciousness is the only criterion that can possibly be relevant to the assessment of a particular cognition, this amounts to saying that objectivity is constituted by consciousness. His use of the term "Notion" or "Concept" ("Begriff") here arises from his thinking of this issue within the framework of his idea of Spirit. Here the place of the Object in-itself is taken by Absolute Truth, or the adequate notion of Spirit's self-consciousness. In calling the beliefs of particular cognitions Objects, Hegel is immediately representing these beliefs as concrete externalisations of Spirit, particular forms of Objectivity being given by particular stages in the development of Absolute Spirit. Understood in this way, Object must have to correspond to Notion because the Truth of all Objectivity is Spirit's self-consciousness. This is the basis of Hegel's solution to the problem of dissociation. Subject may know Object because both are of Spirit (11). In Hegel's vocabulary, the Object in-itself is Absolute Spirit, and hence will be known by Spirit. We can, however proceed to Absolute Knowledge through Objects for-consciousness because these are also of Spirit. The consideration of a succession of Objects for-consciousness will lead to Absolute Truth because far from such truth being unreachable for the Subject, it
will be found to be only the Notion, the Subject's own presence (12). The dissociation of Subject and Object is to be shown to be Spirit's self-alienation, and this will be overcome as Spirit is progressively revealed as the foundation of Objectivity.

We can, at this point, return briefly to an earlier passage in the 'Introduction' (13) where Hegel, having preliminarily outlined the development of the Phenomenology, says that the goal of this development is as necessarily fixed as the development itself. This goal is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where Notion corresponds to Object and Object to Notion. The sense to be made of such a goal is, I hope, now apparent. It is Hegel's explicit statement of the situation in which he envisages the solution to the problem of dissociation in the complete identification of what were earlier thought to be separate (14).

The force of Hegel's solution of the problem of dissociation, if I may stress the point, is to lie in the way that the stressing of the grasp of an object for-consciousness can, within the framework of Spirit, amount to the same thing as grasping the object in-itself. That is to say that, to all intents and purposes, the object in-itself in the Kantian sense must lose all relevance because the brute objectivity which it
registers is made a product of the subject. To be sure, a certain difference between object for-consciousness and Object in-itself remains in the 'Introduction' in that Hegel notes their difference at this early stage of the Phenomenological investigation. But the recognition of their difference is now split from the initial understanding of them in consciousness as separate categories, the former denoting being and the latter being that is known (15). Hence the possibility of their reconciliation through complete mutual identification is opened.

Hegel’s Writings Elsewhere in the 'Phenomenology' on the Solution of the Problem of Dissociation

The key to understanding Hegel’s own solution to the problem of dissociation lies, I would say, in recognising that this solution contains a great deal more that requires detailed scrutiny than the brevity with which it is expressed would lead us to believe. I note this further instance of this stylistic feature of Hegel’s writing in full awareness that the first three chapters of the Phenomenology purport to argue the movement from perception of objectivity to self-consciousness. Let us consider the relevant aspects of these three chapters.

The notion of Spirit positing Objectivity and eventually realising in this the Subject obviously owes a great deal
to Fichte (16). What can be identified as characteristically Hegelian about the discussion of this in the Phenomenology is the manner of the development of self-consciousness. For when, by the end of the chapter on 'Force and the Understanding', Hegel declares the Truth of consciousness of Objectivity to be Self-consciousness, this position has been argued in the most intimate, if allusive, relation to Kant as the first stage of the Phenomenological movement. Hegel's argument in the section on 'Consciousness' has a form very substantially set by an attempt to immanently develop, to use the Kantian terminology, intuition into understanding and then on into the unity of apperception. That is to say, Hegel tries to move from perception of objectivity (intuition in Kant) to conceptual comprehension (understanding in Kant) to the fact that all knowing is predicated of a subject (the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant) (17), these three being related by the last being the immanent truth of the first. The difference of the form of Hegel's response to Kant from that of Fichte's similar response is enormous. It was a principal, and eventually somewhat notorious, claim of Fichte's, that the content of his philosophy was but the Kantian categories set out in a coherent deductive relationship to the basic principle of human knowledge - the absoluteness of the Ego (18). Of course Kant encouraged this, one of the first post-Kantian "completions" of the critical philosophy, by setting out
the categories in seemingly arbitrary manner (19), and Hegel certainly agreed with Fichte upon the necessity of some proper linking of (again to use the Kantian terms) the unity of apperception to the specific categories of experience, such as Fichte had provided (20). However, Hegel found the deduction by which Fichte claimed to have accomplished this (21) to be wanting (22). It is in the very movement of Spirit itself - in this case in Kant's and his successors' thought as the philosophic expression of natural consciousness - that Hegel sought to locate self-consciousness as the truth of objectivity. One need only read these brilliant first three chapters to see the power this Phenomenological method grants to Hegel's arguments (23) - though of course this is not to say that one must agree with them, merely that one must register their marked superiority to presentations such as Fichte's.

The progress of the first part of the Phenomenology is recapitulated in the System (24), in line, of course, with the wider character of Hegel's relation of Phenomenology and System proper. This particular moment of Absolute Truth has its place in the System because Hegel is trying to argue that there is a necessity in encountering the problem of dissociation, in that it is in the very overcoming of this that the self-awareness of Spirit begins to emerge.
In sum, in all these passages we have discussed Hegel is locating the form of (natural) consciousness as a moment of Spirit, with a profound change in the meaning of "consciousness" being effected. As opposed to facing a distinct objectivity, Consciousness as a moment of Spirit has to face, essentially, only its own self.

An Evaluation of Hegel's Own Solution to the Problem of Dissociation

It would seem, then, that what is required in order to evaluate Hegel's full solution to the problem of dissociation is to turn to the first section of the *Phenomenology*. However, I do not propose to do so, for I believe that for the purposes of a deeper understanding Hegel's own thinking on this point, it is crucial to realise that the basis of this solution is to be found in the passages of the 'Introduction' which we have preliminarily discussed. It goes without saying that I do not by this mean to imply that there is nothing of interest or lasting value in that first section. (There is, for example, a refutation of the possibility of descriptions of singular sensations that, in my opinion quite adequately, more than one hundred years before this episode took place, covered the important issues in the collapse of logical atomism or logical positivism under the acknowledgement of the public interpretative framework upon which even natural scientific discourse is
I have claimed that Hegel's criticisms of classical epistemology lead towards an examination of the character of subjectivity given in relation to real, distinct, objectivity; and yet he himself has summed up his argument in a fashion which undoubtedly expressed one of the most thoroughgoing idealisms in modern philosophy. If my understanding is correct, Hegel has again run his polemic against the classical epistemological project immediately into the broader setting out of his own conception of the gaining of truth without acknowledging that he has done so. What is vital here, both for assessing the strength of Hegel's eventual position and for gauging the felicity of my interpretation of this position, is that, as I will now argue, what Hegel accomplishes in this surreptitious way is not defensible under open scrutiny.

In the shift in the meaning of "consciousness" on which Hegel's conclusion of his argument rests, an essential characteristic of natural consciousness is, without any warrant, simply eliminated by not being carried on into Consciousness as a moment of Spirit. It will be recalled that from the very outset Hegel's discussion of classical epistemology has turned on showing how it is unable to ground truth once it has recognised the creative contribution of cognition to knowledge. Hegel's solution
to the problem of dissociation turns on making this essentially synthetic understanding of cognition redundant by identifying subject and object. Hegel claims not only to have shown that any potential criterion of truth must be found in consciousness, but also thereby to have shown that there is no distance between what is found in consciousness and objectivity. Or rather, there is the illusory show of distance created by the alienated form of Spirit's externalisation which must be overcome. In Kantian terms, what Hegel is doing is reducing the effect of the categories on judgements to the unity of apperception, reducing the cognitive contributions of the subject to the mere fact of subjectivity.

Hegel makes this quite clear when he says that the point arising from these observations which we must grasp in understanding the method of Phenomenological proof is the following. As particular cognitions (being-for-another) and the object as criterion (being-in-itself as it is for-consciousness) fall within knowledge, it is just when we abandon all our presuppositions and simply follow the developments of successive cognitions we will eventually reach an exhaustive, an Absolute, knowledge of being.

This idea of knowing exhausting being makes sense given the way in which, on Hegel's understanding of Consciousness as a moment of Spirit, objectivity itself
drops out of consideration. As there is no object, there can hardly be the category of subjective contributions to synthetic judgements. The subject constitutes all there is to "judgements", and to have Truth we must immerse ourselves in the subject. Hegel is here advocating a kind of optimistic direct perception (I hope this vocabulary is not misleading) in which the source of epistemological problems is nullified at the point of the object rather than the subject.

Taking up the problem of knowing in the light of subjective contributions to cognition has, however, another side to it than the one which in the classical epistemological project leads to the positing of the thing-in-itself. This is the registering of, again to use Kant's terms, an intuition of materiality as the recognition of objectivity distinct from the subject. Whatever difficulties there may be in understanding knowing after registering this intuition, there is no sense in which the original setting up of the problem ever conceives of knowing actually breaking down the distinctness of object from subject. Knowing in the light of this distinctness is the epistemological problem. Hegel's solution to this problem is to dissolve the very distinctness, as we have seen. However, there is no warrant for this outside of understanding natural consciousness as Consciousness as a moment of Spirit. In shifting from one to the other, Hegel fails to translate
the ineradicable sensation of materiality which, certainly for Kant, identifies natural consciousness. His argument that in Kant this sensation becomes posited as an absurd thing-in-itself is, though correct, not nearly sufficient to dispose of the underlying sensation, even when absurdly conceptualised (26). Of course, were Hegel's argument in the first section of the Phenomenology successful, then he could claim his identification of subject and object to be the solution of the epistemological problem. But I think we can see that here, in the 'Introduction', he has prefaced this nullification of objectivity with a shift in the meaning of "consciousness" that makes the nullification possible. Instead of thought and being standing as ontologically distinct, Hegel now construes the latter as predicated by the former. In his discussion in the first three chapters forms of objectivity are always considered to be completely exhausted through treatments of ways of knowing them. Hence by merely following successive cognitions without making any contributions of our own to the process, Hegel is able to make subjectivity the foundation of objectivity, and thus claim this the Absolute Truth of Being (27).

Hegel's Re-statement of the Ontological Proof

Earlier I have argued that Hegel is sure that the ontological proof in the form given to it by Anselm
cannot hold against Kant's attack upon it. His acceptance of this is always coupled with the reservation that there is a fundamental truth indicated by the proof which can and should be recovered in a more adequate formulation. In this light Kant's thoroughly critical dismissal of the proof constitutes a mistaken rejection of a most valuable philosophical resource (28). Not only did Hegel famously try explicitly to revive this truth after Kant (29), but, as I think we can now see, his attempt was based upon the principal thrust of the whole of his fully developed response to Kant (30).

For natural consciousness, Hegel concurs, the concept of God and His existence are radically different. However, he manages to turn even this to own ends. He argues that Kant's refutation of the proof acquired a rather flawed brilliance by being given in a polemic against the weakest possible rendering of the proof, that given to it most famously by Mendelssohn (31), in which existence certainly is thought of as a formal logical predicate and in which, therefore, "the identity of Idea and Reality was made to look like the adding of one concept to another" (32). Hegel's revival of the proof seeks, as we might expect, to break with consciousness' way of treating knowledge itself, this being a way of securely defending the proof against attacks such as Kant's which are based on consciousness' categories. Hegel's reply to Kant takes the tack of stressing that the proof is not
referring to consciousness’ concepts but to the Notion of God; and, he says, there is a greater difference between these two types of "concepts" than between thought and being (33). Taking Consciousness to be a moment of Spirit, it becomes quite open for Hegel to claim the fundamental truth of the ontological proof (34), because the essence of Consciousness understood in this way is that it is part of a movement in which knowledge of existents is to be shown to be itself the ground of existence. What remains ineluctably formal in the proof, and therefore seemingly sophistic, is its logical predication of existence. However, for Hegel this can be recovered and entirely vindicated in its essentials by being made part of a full argument which sets out the role of Consciousness in the development of the adequate Notion of Absolute Spirit (35). If this overall argument is successful, then the empirical sensitivity to materiality which stands behind Kant’s rejection of the proof can be of no consequence, for it is this materiality itself that is to disappear.

Summary of Hegel’s Views on the Unity of Subject and Object

My own understanding of the rights of the matter has lead me to argue that Hegel’s conception of the unity of subject and object contains a central and yet indefensible elision of two senses of "consciousness"
which makes crucial epistemological problems dissolve by being artificially integrated into a theocratic scheme. However, we must remember that this elision comes at the end of a determined polemic made not expressly against objectivity but against the thing-in-itself. Here we must draw on Hegel's valuable arguments, and not attempt to return to the genuine, but nevertheless inadequate, materialist aspirations in Kant for the advance of realist, empirical epistemology. This can be seen quite clearly by considering one of the principal ways in which Kant's philosophy also shades into theocracy. When Kant sets out his doctrine of faith in God, one ground for it is his belief that God's existence is necessary as a postulate of practical reason in order for happiness and morality to be in harmony (36). That is to say, Kant's faith figures in the solution to that disjunction between duty and the validation of duty as good which parallels his disjunction of phenomena and noumena, the former disrupting the second *Critique* as the latter does the first (37). There is, then, no productive fashion in which we can simply return to Kant as a response to Hegel's arguments.

I think that again Hegel leaves us with problems arising from his coupling of a successful description of aspects of what epistemology can and must do to an unacceptable depiction of the character of the operations which he tends to think are thereby also established. Not least
in its contribution to the unacceptable character of Hegel’s depictions is the way he entails their specific forms in the earlier, quite open and general, often merely negative, arguments. In this instance, criticism of the demand that the thing-in-itself be the criterion by which particular cognitions be judged, which grounds a compelling realist commitment to the knowability of objects in consciousness, is summed up in such a way that it seems to entail the disappearance of objectivity distinct from the subject. The issues of true philosophic interest left by Kant, those of coming to terms with the distance between subject and object known to be mutually constitutive moments of knowing, are, in the end, of no concern to Hegel (38).

Hegel centrally argues the idea of shunning all preconceptions in order to absolve epistemology of any distance from the essence of objectivity. In the way in which cognitions’s contributions to knowing are thereby rendered meaningless as they are now all of knowing, Hegel is putting forward a construction of the unity of subject and object which is a simple break with the basis of classical epistemology and his criticisms of that project. There is no immanent development here, merely the erasure of what had earlier been the starting point of productive development.

What is more, the identity thinking at which Hegel
thereby arrives can have only pernicious epistemological consequences. There can be no corrigible check upon Hegel's conduct of the Phenomenological progression, because when treating cognitions as objects he is now claiming to directly represent them. Absolute presuppositionlessness is the methodological injunction arising from his doing away with an effective moment in knowing of objectivity. When we reject this injunction, indeed reject its very possibility and restore the essential sense of the subject making contributions to knowing, then Hegel's construction of Phenomenology must be seen as giving far too much licence to his own representations of those cognitions. The check on speculation provided by respect for the object is removed, and the overall implausibility of the Phenomenology as a history to which disregard of this check leads finally refutes Hegel's Phenomenological method.

In sum, Hegel leaves us with a paradox. We are, I think, shown by him to be committed to the knowability of objects in consciousness. We can also see from him that this knowability cannot be on the grounds of an assumed identity of subject and object. The task that remains, then, is one of comprehending knowability, which posits the unity of subject and object, in the knowledge of the perpetual non-identity of these two moments of knowing, that is to say in the knowledge of the "untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived" (39).
CHAPTER 6

SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN HEGEL'S REPRESENTATION OF KNOWING
(CONTINUED): THE STRUCTURE OF LEARNING

Introduction

Having united subject and object in a ground of potential knowledge and thereby having secured the possibility of knowing, Hegel now turns to the problem of their relative, but not absolute, dissociation and to the means of resolving that dissociation. That is to say, he turns to the problem of learning. For subject and object are not entirely as one - bring them closer together is of course a perennial task. It is to bring this within his overall uniting of subject and object that Hegel now turns.

The Testing of Particular Cognitions and Their Objects

Not only, says Hegel in continuation of the argument we have just discussed in the previous chapter, is the contribution of a criterion by us superfluous or even harmful, but we need not even stage a testing of specific claims to truth (1). For since both claims and objects are, as we now recognise, for-consciousness, it is this very consciousness that knows their comparison. Consciousness itself is the awareness of any discrepancy
between claim and object, or, to put it this way, is the assessment of the adequacy of the former by use of the criterion of the latter. Here Hegel is continuing to press home his criticism of epistemological alienation by showing how the basic epistemological impulse distorted in the classical project is actually grounded. Determinate negation is explicated, partially at least, as a process of progressive evaluation of cognitions by the only criteria that can be available for this, the objects they establish in consciousness. Consciousness of the inadequacies of knowledge claims even to the objects they postulate spurs investigation through improved cognitions.

Hegel had previously argued, as we have seen, that to regard the thing-in-itself as the object of knowledge, and therefore as the criterion by which particular cognitions must be judged, is an absurd epistemological position. The objects that can be of pertinence to knowing must be for-consciousness. He is now trying to set out the way in which these objects may serve as criteria for the testing of cognitions in the development of knowledge. Knowing consciousness is composed of cognitions and the objects they postulate. We are now discussing consciousness, and this identification of two elements in knowing, which amounts to the distinction of subject and object, must be justified without reference to an object-in-itself. This can, I think, readily be
done, though I must point out that here I am more adding to Hegel's position than directly interpreting it for he is very brief indeed on this point. Knowing consciousness "layers" its constituent beliefs, distinguishing by degree of relative certitude attached to these beliefs between the relatively new and on into more or less settled beliefs. These latter take on more the status of objectivity as they have gained a relatively large degree of corroboration in earlier investigations, and new cognitions are undertaken to address issues which arise within the broad framework of these existing objects for-consciousness. These objects are, then, the criteria by which new cognitions are assessed. As opposed to this objective inner core of knowing consciousness' set of beliefs, there are graduated belts of relatively fragile contributions to knowing which are therefore, precisely, subjective.

Though Hegel's argument in fact depends upon some such layering of subject and object in consciousness as I have set out, he devotes virtually all of his attention to a subsidiary position. This is the shift in the pattern of the objective which follows from the evaluation of any cognition. Should a belief fail the test of comparison to its object and be rejected, it must of course be regarded as inadequate. But, Hegel says, so too must the criterion be rejected. For the criterion is the framework in which the belief arose, and when that belief
is shown to be inadequate, so this must call into question the criterion. This seems sophistic, but again it is the extreme economy of Hegel's manner of expression which more or less conceals a valuable point. When a belief's being revealed as inadequate has lead to the rejection of the belief and perhaps also to that of its object, certainly to the rendering suspect to some degree of its object, then, Hegel says, this is not only a testing of what we know but of what knowing is.

Hegel rather over-emphasises the degree to which patterns of objectivity can be called into question, as it is very doubtful whether the rejection of one particular belief can of itself ever be crucial for the general framework in which that belief arose. Hegel is himself concerned with major shifts in belief and organisation of ethical life, and his studies of the later parts of the Phenomenology tend to have this acute form as a corollary of the way they focus down to what are said to be the crucial issues for Spirit's development that arise out of each historical episode discussed. However, the underlying commitment to openness in all our beliefs is a valuable one, as is the indication of how relatively settled structures of objectivity can be called into question. When these structures lead to the framing of new subjective conjectures that are found to do little or nothing to improve our knowledge in the areas they cover, then the possibility of a major shift in our
understanding as a precondition of such improvement has to be countenanced. In this sense, earlier objects may become changed, for radical alterations in our understanding through reflexive reassessment of hitherto developed knowledge refashion even relatively stable sets of beliefs. They call, as we have just noted Hegel say, our very ideas of what knowing is in these areas into question.

It is the characteristic motif of dogmatism that such a call goes unheeded. Inadequacies are treated not so much as requiring explanation but as requiring to be explained away in terms which preserve the original core ideas of the character of objectivity in the area of inquiry. Hegel's own criticism of the classical epistemological project exemplifies authentic determinate negation which refuses to leave even the most apparently ineluctable beliefs inviolable. Hegel's particular contribution is to insist on the complete unacceptability of denying philosophic adequacy to cognition, and to go on to have the good faith to call into question the fundamental standard of knowledge that can yield only inadequate cognition. Hume's attitude to natural belief is, in my opinion, by contrast lacking in true philosophical spirit, and a readiness to work within the absurdity of Hume's position has characterised British epistemology in this century. A failure to go so far as Hegel renders even avowedly post-empiricist philosophy's explanations
of the actual processes of (scientific) knowing subject to a guilt which is based on fundamental acceptance of foundationalism, and makes this philosophical current's name an irony at its own expense.

With these comments Hegel details, as he now says, the Dialectical movement which is given its content in experience. What characteristics of experience as Hegel depicts it are brought out by this discussion of the form of movement by which it develops? One above all is emphasised. Consciousness is the ground of its own development. Consciousness embraces both claim to knowledge and object and is their comparison. Attempts to close this distance are the very essence of dialectical development. Of course the dialectic does not have to be progressive, but it can be so in as much as it is possible to draw upon the lessons of the past. Knowing then becomes teleological in the sense that it is consciously guided. It is in pursuit of the improvement of knowledge that consciousness must spoil the limited satisfaction which attends acceptance of any belief. In search of development, consciousness suffers the violence of the exposure of inadequate beliefs at its own hands (2).

**Hegel's Attitude to Triadic Dialectic**

Though an issue of genuine pertinence to Hegel's own work
is raised by broaching this issue, it is particularly interpretations (3) and avowed developments (4) of Hegel's philosophy subsequent to his death that make it necessary for us to now turn to the assessment of the hermeneutic value of attributing a triadic form to his dialectic.

It was Kant whom Hegel correctly identified as having initiated the modern revival of triadic dialectic - an infinite merit of the Kantian philosophy as Hegel believed (5), but not of course acceptable to him in the form in which Kant left it. Kant's transcendental dialectic is, as I have mentioned earlier, an attempt to account for those illusions which arise when the understanding, driven beyond those empirical bounds within which it may comprehend by those perenially pressing speculative conundra which we can all immediately call to mind, undertakes purely conceptual ratiocination. We can see that though Kant may revive an ancient form of argument, he does so in order to contribute to the polemic against speculation by which modern empirical thought explicitly distanced itself from its past. However, unlike, for example, Bacon's use of the concept of "idols", Kant does not aim at the complete removal of these questions. Rather their persistent presence is to be transcendentally explained; that is to say, they are given a fixed place in human reason (6). Their presence is thereby to be rendered harmless,
because it is now able to be rationally explained. Kant's transcendental analysis cannot, by its very nature, seek to dispell what it reveals, but nevertheless Kant can claim that these are false questions in the sense that the understanding cannot make a coherent response to them in their own terms. Kant tries to show this by demonstrating that attempts to make such a response must decay into one of three types of inextricable confusion (7). The second of these as he sets them out, the antinomies, is of most interest to us here. An antinomy is a set of two propositions, each of which is required for speculation and indeed have in one form or another been continually put forward. However, these propositions are mutually antithetical, which of course precludes any consistent satisfaction of the need to hold them both (8).

The conclusion that the understanding by which we comprehend only finite things will fall into contradiction when grappling with speculative truth is, when subtly re-interpreted, one Hegel is prepared to celebrate (9). But of course he is hardly prepared to conclude further that such truth is therefore unreachable. That Kant did so, Hegel attributes to an excess of tenderness for the finite things of the world (10). Though we can be sure from such expressions that Hegel's intent is ultimately speculative, and though the dialectic is, notwithstanding the revulsion it inspires
in much of contemporary analytic philosophy, one of the most explicitly empirically minded parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we must initially allow that Hegel, and other post-Kantians notably Fichte, are on familiar and secure ground in attacking the Kantian dialectic of antinomies.

In so far as Kant is unable to restrict his attribution of an antinomical character to archaic cosmologies and the like, but carries this over into his description of what remain the fundamental problems of epistemology, then the essentially derogatory nature of an antinomical description cannot be maintained. It is quite literally true that in the antinomies Kant more or less gives the form not only of problems he would regard as fruitless, but also of ones he would regard as crucial. The feature of the antinomies which Kant takes to be the mark of incomprehensibility is the mutual antithesis of the propositions involved. It is very difficult indeed to base a sound rejection of the speculative issues discussed here on this ground, for the overall impression which Kant gives is that he has just not made a sufficient effort to resolve or synthesise this antithesis. Not only is his own epistemology built on a notion of synthesis, but when he actually describes the categories of reason they themselves have a form very like that set out in the antinomical dialectic, only expanded to the third term missing in the antinomies.
His presentation of the categories is of triplicities in which there is a mediate term formed by the combination of the other two (11), and there is no reason of form why this syllogism could not be extended to the antinomies and their speculative problems. It is, Hegel believed (12), and he was surely correct, more a matter of the way in which Kant sets out the account and proofs of the antinomies that blocks off their mediation, rather than any profound dislocation between their form and that of categories; a point Hegel proves by resolving the antinomies in arguments which are as sound as Kant's description of the categories (13).

In Fichte a solution to the antinomies, or rather the problems they take up divorced from Kant's particular formulations, is linked to the fundamental comprehension of the self-positing Ego (14), and this solution is expanded throughout the Science of Knowledge as the explication of Ego. Having looked at the fundamental substance of this explication at a number of points earlier, we are now concerned with the form. We find that the flat opposition of antinomical thesis and antithesis in the Critique of Pure Reason is to be overcome by Fichte's expanding of these to a mediated third term of the synthesis of the two. We run here into Fichte's more general response to the scheme of the categories which we have already discussed. The form of the self-positing of Ego is conceived in a triadic
fashion as a mediation of Ego and posited non-Ego. This essential form of Fichte's explanation of knowing (15) is incidentally - for I do not intend to further discuss this point as the treatment is derived directly from Fichte though of course subjected to a change of object - also found throughout Schelling's early philosophy (16).

Now, as we have seen Hegel to be in broad sympathy with the aims of Fichte and Schelling, we can expect him to more or less endorse their responses to the Kantian dialectic. Though this is so (17), we can equally expect that the formalism of this application - and this is the right word - of thesis-antithesis-synthesis would be anathema to him (18). Hegel is indeed withering in his criticism of the use of this scheme by Fichte and Schelling as a "monotonous formalism" (19). This criticism must, I think, be accepted without reservation, for in its formalistic use this scheme repeats a dry reduction of all moments of determinateness to moments of synthetic mediation which is as abstract and barren as the Spinozist reduction of all finitude to inessential modes. It must be categorically stated that one cannot even begin to successfully interpret Hegel's own writings through the employment of the heuristic of a stiff thesis-antithesis-synthesis template (20). For one thing, these terms are but very rarely to be found in Hegel's writings (21), other than where he takes them over in commentary, and never, subject to this proviso,
to my knowledge together (22). More importantly, if one forces the text into the mould of this syllogistic scheme, then the very vivacity, in the fullest sense, that distinguishes the Hegelian Phenomenology from the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling (23) is thereby lost to view. Hegel's Dialectic of determinate negations is to proceed, as we have seen, by following the self-movement of Consciousness, and is in no way to impose a pattern upon this development. Its mechanism of movement, immanent critique structured by the moment of subjectivity and objectivity, in no sense resemble a fixed pattern of theses and antitheses, much to the embarrassment of attempts to criticise Hegel for not providing a clear enough triadic pattern to his dialectic such as the critic's formalistic understanding requires (24).

We are not, however, entitled to conclude from this that Hegel's Dialectic displays no intimate connection with a triadic form. The essentially approving character of Hegel's comments on Kant's revival of this form should alert us to this, as should the marked literary predilection for overall triadic arrangements which he displays throughout his work - as a brief perusal of any table of contents which he provided would reveal. The fundamental reason why the triad has an important role is that the Dialectic is set within the scheme of the realisation of Spirit. This is to say that, as much as.
with Fichte or Schelling, Hegel sets his overall solution to epistemological problems with a broad triad, for Hegel composed of oppositional or contradictory characteristics of Spirit and their progressive mediation. The relation of the course of the Hegelian Dialectic and the Hegelian conception of Spirit is essentially described when Hegel asserts that all that is rational is syllogistic in form (25), and when he sets out Determinate Being as the mediation of Being and Nothing in Becoming (26). The sequence of determinate negations that makes up experience can be only a progressive synthetic mediation of contradictions of Spirit, for it is this mediation which is the whole aim of Hegel's Philosophy. Of course there is very little here to do with a formal triadic scheme. I am trying to draw attention to a subtle forcing of his materials throughout Hegel's Phenomenological treatment of forms of consciousness. As the plausibility of Phenomenology as proof of the Absolute ultimately turns on this point, I must now consider it in greater detail.

Evaluation of the Triadic Dialectic

We are now hard up against the crucial problem of Hegelian Phenomenology. It must fulfill certain requirements if it is to demonstrate Absolute Truth, and yet it is to secure conviction by being wholly given in a presuppositionless following of the development of
consciousness. The point is of course that there is to be no contradiction between these two aims, which is why the latter will prove the former. Dialectic, to focus upon this, is to be given by a series of determinate negations which follow from the immanent criticism of forms of consciousness. Here we have the vital question: is it possible for Hegel to sustain his essentially empiricist treatment of forms of consciousness and yet bring them within his overall theological scheme? This question has been present throughout this commentary. However, I think I may safely say in defence of this that this very question is present throughout the Phenomenology, particularly in the 'Preface' and the 'Introduction'. Hegel's opinion is clear - following the Dialectic reveals it to play out the pattern of Absolute Truth, and it is this discovered quality which admits of overall triadic formalisation in a Logic that is descriptive of the structure of Being. There is really only one way in which one can judge the veracity of this opinion in a way sufficiently sympathetic to Hegel's profoundly important way of setting out his argument and to the extraordinary interest of the substance of that argument. This is to read his works; but most especially, for reasons with which we are familiar, to read the Phenomenology of Spirit.

However, I do not feel that anything is to be gained for the appreciation of Hegel's achievement by failing to
state my opinion that it is absurd to regard the Dialectic of the Phenomenology as successfully bearing the enormous weight placed upon it (21). It is enough to say, from the epistemological point of view taken in this commentary, that it is trivially easy, and in itself unrewarding, to insist upon the many discontinuities, and unfounded elisions that paper over these, in the book's movements through and transitions between forms of consciousness and ethical life. (Such elisions are equally present in Hegel's other writings). This response to Hegel must be made if one is to assess his work in the light of his own evaluations of and professions about his philosophy. But this response had served its purpose as soon as Trendelenburg first made it in 1840 (24), and a positive way to approach these continual break-downs in Hegel's argument is to recover from them the resources they obscure.

On one point we must be particularly careful. The arguments of the Phenomenology may follow in a literary sense as internal to the book. I personally do not find this to be so, but opinion to the contrary is available (29). This is, however, an issue quite distinct from taking those arguments to be empirically and necessarily secured in the way that Hegel requires for the public winning of conviction. Though the studies are without doubt of the utmost interest as allegories on more or less all characteristic features of modern society and on
certain basic issues of human existence, it is simply unwarranted to regard them as succeeding precisely at the point where Hegel needs them to stand not as allegory but as explicit truth (30). Those qualities of rational, empirical openness which Hegel identifies as the essence of what is valuable in philosophy must, in the end, be seen to be lacking in the Phenomenology, and certainly so in respect of the terms of necessarily compelling circularity which he seeks for proof of the Absolute. What in fact goes on throughout the book's remarkable combination of forms of argument is a most massive effort to continually force his basically empirical materials into the presumptive speculative mould in which they then play their part. Much more than forms of consciousness showing themselves to need to be understood within the framework of Hegelian Spirit, the reading of Hegel's work, at least after his death, has continually testified to the need to draw out what is valuable in his treatment of these forms from the encumbrance of that framework.

We must note the indefensible elisions which this forcing introduces into the book, not because they could be removed, but because they could not. Hegel's dissatisfaction with the 1807 edition of the Phenomenology has already been mentioned. Presumably the revisions he began shortly before his death would have involved significant changes. (Though, interestingly enough, in that part of the 'Preface' which he did revise
he did not make other than trivial alterations (3%). This was, on the other hand, that part of the book written with most knowledge of where the argument was going). However, such an effort of revision is irrelevant to the point I am trying to make. The Phenomenology combines erudition, philosophic ability and substantive philosophic and social theoretical illumination, all of the highest degree, in a way that make it, in my opinion, the greatest work of modern human studies. Nevertheless, as an attempt to dominate its enormous material in a way that satisfies Hegel's theological claims, it is naive, breaking down at just about every point. This contradiction, which might be expanded to that between the speculative-objective demands of Hegel's theology and the empirical-subjective demands of his philosophic proof, the latter continually ridiculing the former, is stopped from splitting the work apart by a continous forcing that is an astonishing effort of dogmatic conviction and style.

An important consequence of this contradiction in the Phenomenology is that the motive power of the movement described becomes impossible to understand coherently. I have mentioned that it is essential to the concept of Spirit that its externalisation be a commitment to open self-discovery. Equally the open character of the progression of forms of consciousness is of the essence of Phenomenological proof. Despite the depth of Hegel's
setting out of the ways in which forms of consciousness can be seen to be their own ground of development, it proves impossible for him to ultimately ward off the impression that the Phenomenological progression is teleologically directed. I do not mean this in the acceptable, indeed important, sense that new forms of consciousness may direct themselves by learning from the past. I mean that Hegel's representation of forms of consciousness gives a direction to the movement which stands as an outer teleology, a direction outside of the movement itself. One should not make too much of this. There could hardly be a more determinedly anti-theological theocracy than Hegel's, nor an account of consciousness that does more to make an unobjectionable sense of teleology available. However, in the end it is the impossibility of presenting God's externalisation of the world in ways which both do and do not convey his omniscience, and the consequent incomprehensibility of even Hegel's attempt to do so, that makes this shortcoming one we could very confidently expect to find (32).

In his later writings, Hegel attempts, from the point of view of the System, to extol as a virtue just that ambiguity which we have seen in the Phenomenology. The empirical following of History's own movement is to reveal the process of the externalisation of Spirit (33), and Spirit's method of realising itself through the
alienated conduct of human beings is shown to be a work of absolute cunning - the ruse of Reason (34). The essential Truth of the System is that in striving for their own goals, human beings actually act out the purposes of Spirit.

It is not, of course, by any means impossible that (in alienated societies) the behaviour of men and women is influenced by social forces they do not comprehend. Adequate explanation of that behaviour reveals those influences and hence those forces. The recognition of this possibility of unacknowledged social determination is indeed, in my opinion, the most important achievement of modern society. This is not to say that we must accept Hegel's specific understanding of the issues involved, which explains them through the scheme of the externalisation of Spirit. This is surely a separable matter (35). What is more, if we do not so separate the general possibility of the penetration of alienated consciousness from Hegel's specific construction of it, then when, as we must eventually do, we come to regard that construction as an ultimate failure, we stand threatened with losing the entire possibility of the critique of alienation. We must allow ourselves the hope of rebuilding the ground on which we can claim the epistemological privilege of penetrating alienated consciousness after seeing in Hegel why this task is indispensable and why it cannot be performed in the way he imagines.
CHAPTER 7

HEGEL'S INVERSION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Introduction

Having set out the aims and method of Phenomenology, Hegel makes certain observations at the end of the 'Introduction' which directly raise the idea of inversion, and it is to these that we must now turn (1). If we are to understand Marx's purported "inversion" of Hegel, a first task, one we can now address, is to see the way "inversion" figures in Hegel's own thought.

Hegel's Requirement of an "Inversion" of our Knowledge of Experience

The instructions Hegel has just given on how to follow the course of Experience contain, he now allows, a moment which does not seem to follow from what is ordinarily understood as experience, and thus, I should like to add, can only with difficulty be said to be directly derived from the study of experience. This moment is the transition from immediately undergoing experience to the comprehension of what Experience actually is. Let us take the course of any episode described as a determinate negation as it is actually experienced. It is understood as a change of some sort no doubt, and perhaps elements
of comprehension of the immanent criticism of existing positions are available to the participants. But it certainly is not understood as a point in the progressive realisation of the Absolute. This can come only afterwards, when we may look back upon and reflexively re-comprehend Experience with the privileged hindsight of knowledge of the realised Absolute. What we are dealing with, says Hegel, is an inversion of consciousness' normal perspective (2).

We can recall Hegel's rejection of what he described as Schelling's asking of inadequate belief to stand upon its head, to invert itself when faced with its opposite in the Truth and thereby to rise to the Truth by assuming what that belief must regard as a quite unwarranted posture. Obviously, we must ask in what crucial way Hegel's Phenomenology is different to this. We are familiar with the claim of compelling circularity in Hegel's idea of Phenomenological proof, a circularity which will integrate any starting point into the scheme of the Absolute. Let us for the moment bracket our doubts about the power of this proof. In remarking here on the necessity of an inversion of perspective at the beginning of the Phenomenology, Hegel is, I suggest, trying to come to terms with the necessity of his taking a specific starting point from which all else follows. This is the point of view of the Absolute, a point of view which guides the treatment of each specific form of
consciousness subsequently discussed. As I have tried to point out, recognition of Hegel's comments being informed by this viewpoint need not vitiate even his claims for the presuppositionless nature of his studies, because the viewpoint can be dissolved within those studies. However, as I will now argue, examination of the very way in which Hegel takes up this viewpoint makes the Phenomenological effort impossible to coherently sustain.

The Contribution of Hegel and his Audience to Phenomenology

Hegel says that this inversion of consciousness' perspective on experience is something contributed by "us", by Hegel himself and his readers. He explains "our" ability to contribute this inversion in the following way. He claims that the entire progression of Spirit does not amount to nothing, it amounts, as the summation of determinate negations in the negation of the negation, to our knowledge of what Experience actually is. The awareness of this reveals patterns of consciousness as moments of Spirit, and in this awareness we have a deeper knowledge of Experience than those who initially made that Experience. We can, of course, agree with this, which is but a resume of Hegel's conception of Phenomenological proof, and allow that it can explain how an inversion in consciousness' perspective on Experience may come about. However, it is also necessary to say
that it cannot explain this in the way Hegel requires, for the chronology of the contribution to Phenomenology that is made when "we", as Hegel says, adopt this inverted perspective, is all wrong. We must look more closely at the position of the "we" who are able to make this contribution (3).

Let me dispose of an ancilliary point first, Hegel imposes exacting requirements upon those who would follow his argument, requirements of, as has been seen, being prepared to follow a way of despair as the cost of adopting an open-minded stance. It is necessary to be dissatisfied, or at least not content, with one's present positions, and being ready to undergo the arduous task of reaching the Absolute through intellectual effort (4). (The extreme labour of reading the Phenomenology manages to even exaggerate this latter condition). In an interesting convergence with later phenomenology's fundamental requirement for breaking through the natural attitude, what Hegel firstly needs his readers to be is engaged in intellectual criticism of existing reality; that is to say, to be engaged in philosophy (5).

If this condition is both recognised and allowed, it is still clearly an insufficient qualification for reaching the position of Hegel's "we". In my opinion, there remains an irremediable difficulty in ascertaining who it is that will be able to contribute to and who will
receive Phenomenological enlightenment. If, as it has centrally been argued, the Phenomenology is written for those whose beliefs constituted the earlier, inadequate conceptions, then there are surely major confusions involved. For the Phenomenology is written to demonstrate that the Truth is on the scene, and could be written only after this was so. Ordering the material in the light of knowledge of the Absolute is, precisely, "our" contribution. But to say this is to say that the progression outlined in the Phenomenology has been completed. The reflexive commentary and the enlightenment it is to bring becomes rather pointless if the possibility of making this commentary turns upon the Truth it is to reveal having already been realised. In so far as Hegel locates the possibility of this enlightenment in the complete identification of the Absolute and the form of its progressive realisation, then I contend that he makes the function of the Phenomenology either redundant or indefensible in the terms of the sought after Phenomenological proof.

Now it might be thought that this conclusion is unacceptably harsh. The ready availability of a common-sense construction of Hegel's position would seem to make the contradiction in the Phenomenology at which I am aiming hard to identify. It could be said that Hegel is putting forward his account of the realisation of Spirit as an explanation of world History, and he is
seeking to win acceptance of the Truth by gaining acceptance of his explanation. Though I have rendered it in what to Hegel would be an extremely banal fashion, I think this is what he thought he was doing. However, this cannot be what he actually does. The strength of the Phenomenological proof is to lay in the complete identification of the Phenomenological account and the course of the development of Spirit. Philosophy may paint its "grey in grey" only when "a shape of life has grown old" (6), and the shape of Absolute Spirit is, amongst other things, consciousness in the shape of realised Absolute Knowledge, the shape which Hegel would have "us" both contribute to and find in the Phenomenology. There is difficulty in understanding exactly in what sense the Truth can, in Hegel's terms, be both on the scene and yet require actualisation.

Hegel's Philosophy has what is perhaps its most important shortcoming at just this point. Hegel's statements of actualised rationality have to have an ambiguous form. For the reason I have just mentioned, one finds that they contain statements which both affirm the rational character of the world and also set out changes necessary for the actualisation of that rationality. As Hegel bases his arguments on the ultimate dogmatism of cognisance of the Absolute he must find realised rationality in the world, and yet the fact that realisation is incomplete is the rationale of the
Phenomenological effort. I do not mean to argue that there is no, as it were, middle ground possible here, of identifying the potential of rationalisation in the existent. My point is that for Hegel to put things this way is impossible because he continually draws upon achieved rationality as the Absolute justification of his Philosophy. The consequence is of course that identifying rational potentials and ways of actualising them is, remarkable enough to have to say, the greatest lacuna in Hegel's thought. From one point of view it seems as if Hegel thought that as he set out the rational in thought this served to make the rational truly actual. This is so, but it is really only a partial account of Hegel's weakness here, a weakness which emerges from the Absolute justification which he seeks for an attempt to move to the Absolute. Hegel's inversion of consciousness is an unacceptably abbreviated statement of what is in fact a task, both for him and for us. This task is the actualisation of the rational, a task we must approach, though he did not, in the knowledge that there is no available Absolute to justify our conduct.

Responding to Hegel in the Light of Criticism of His Inversion of Consciousness

With this conclusion we would seem to have come right round to the very beginning of Hegel's mature project. However, in doing so we have not arrived at the promised
conviction in the Absolute but at a rejection of the essential aims of that project. Instead of compelling belief by a wholly self-justifying argument, Hegel's Phenomenology is, I think, completely unsatisfactory. It is ridden with a contradiction between its theological ends and its philosophic means, and this contradiction is summed up in the very way Hegel himself adopts the perspective of an inverted consciousness which in the end he can only hortatively say he would have us also take up.

Though coming to an essentially unfavourable conclusion about Hegel's project's ability to satisfy its own aims, I have meant to do so in a radically different way than has characterised recent marxist criticisms of Hegel. The interpretative paths through Hegel taken by Althusser and Colletti which lead them to try to separate Marx from him completely show a most interesting similarity. Though dealing with different aspects of Hegel's thought - Althusser with the teleological structure of the Dialectic, Colletti with its idealist formulation - they both insist on an extremely strong coherence in Hegel's work. They do this in order to successfully criticise what they characterise as the naive extant attempts to borrow from the Dialectic and develop it in a non-teleological, non-idealist fashion. We cannot dispute their conclusions about such naivete. However, beneath this ostensible criticism, they both introduce a
far stronger claim, and it is this claim that makes their positions ultimately unacceptable. This is the claim that any attempt to link Marx and Hegel must be naive. What they at first seem to be arguing, for example against Engels, is that his attempt to make this link is weak. But rather they are claiming that this is so as a result of another argument, that any such an attempt must be weak. They give to Hegel's arguments such a degree of internal coherence that any such link becomes impossible. His thought is so monolithically consistent that one must take all or nothing from him (7).

Now this is very dubious in a number of ways. Firstly, their choice of the alternatives they establish - to take nothing from Hegel - is hardly rationally defensible in their own terms. The internal consistency they find in Hegel is surely a strong ground for belief in any opinion. It would be so with regard to Hegel especially, for reasons with which we are familiar. What is more, this would be so particularly for Althusser, who adheres to a pure coherence criterion of truth. We know why they turn away from Hegel, but their own interpretations tend to remove the rational ground from what is thereby exposed as a political decision in the bad sense. Secondly, on general hermeneutic grounds into which I will not go here, the attribution of such a degree of consistency is quite simply illusory and off the point of any interpretation.
Thirdly, we must see that in this specific case there is indeed a profound fissure running through Hegel's thought which not only allows but demands a creative utilisation of elements of that thought if the enormous significance of Hegel for social theory and its development is to be recovered. As justification for saying this I can only refer the reader to what has gone before, and in summary of this say that recognising the contradictory composition of Hegel's thought is necessary both for understanding Hegel's work and, because that work is of the first philosophical importance, for the setting out of a principal resource for contemporary philosophy in full knowledge of the difficulty of utilising it.

It is in this context that I would like now to turn to the work of Marx, and particularly to *Capital*. I make no secret of my belief that rather than having to distance himself from Hegel's thought in order to make his own work valuable, such is Hegel's stature that it is in the ways in which he might make Hegel's insights philosophically and scientifically corrigible that Marx's importance will lay. I want first to set out an account of what we can reconstruct as the philosophy of Marx's way of going about social scientific explanation. I want then to look at the major instance of the use of that philosophy in explanation, *Capital*. 
PART 3

MARX'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORICAL EXPLANATION
CHAPTER 8

MARX'S MATERIALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORICAL EXPLANATION

Introduction

In the remainder of this work I want to turn to Marx, and particularly to an exposition of the arguments of Capital. I will reserve this exposition for Parts 4 and 5. For the present, I should like to give an account of what we can identify as the broad social philosophy informing Capital. This will obviously be in a very strong sense a preliminary to the subsequent comments on Capital proper. It will also be, in almost as strong a sense, a continuation of our evaluation of the possibilities of separating the rational-philosophical from the speculative-theological elements in Hegel, for I will claim that the main influence upon Marx's social philosophy is his own intention to effect this separation. To put this the other way around, I look to Marx in order to gauge the extent to which he makes (social) scientifically corrigible the potentially invaluable resources that are to be found in Hegel.

As has been widely enough lamented, Marx's social philosophy is directly available to us in what are really only fragments; and this places a particular premium upon
indirectly elucidating that philosophy from his longer polemics and from his substantive empirical work (1). However, whilst acknowledging this, I believe that it is possible to directly relate such an elucidation to the text of those fragments, and I shall do so. More precisely, as Marx's social philosophy in its direct expressions is very largely articulated through a number of dualisms, I would like to draw these together and support them with other material where necessary. In so doing I intend to coherently link the ways in which Marx explicitly put forward his social philosophical thought.

**General and Specific Elements of Production**

Amongst these dualisms there is, to take this first, that between *general* and *specific* elements of production. This dualism emerges in that a specified mode of production can be seen to display some characteristics common to it and all other modes, some peculiar to a restricted number of modes, and further some peculiar to itself (2). The contrast of generality and specificity here has a modal logical tone which would be rather misleading. Marx's classification of phenomena according to this contrast is by no means carried out by simple factorial isolation, enumeration and distribution analysis after a mathematical model (3). Having an ultimately qualitative rather than quantitative basis, it is only partially constituted by such operations. Such
operations have only a subsidiary role to play because the classification of phenomena as general or specific involves a great deal more than distribution analysis; it involves at least a substantial contribution to the explanation of the phenomena in question.

There are of course no directly empirically available general elements of production; these are established by an abstraction from the peculiar features presented by specific modes of production which is guided by a comparative analysis of these modes. Such analysis indicates the generality of certain phenomena; but it is only when these are understood to be conditions of human existence as such, that is, to constitute a natural structure, that they can be taken to be general elements of production in Marx's sense. Isolation of these elements both provides some of the materials for, and requires the formulation of, what is most often called a philosophic anthropology of human existence. Marx clearly felt this necessity during the writing of Capital, and provided such an, as it were, existential analysis of the production of use-values in the first section of chapter seven of volume one. This is a section which, it is worth pointing out, is unique in the whole work by virtue of the general, philosophic form of expression which it maintained through two published versions (4). One must refer here to the more extensive existential analysis of production to be found in those
early writings which Marx very largely did not publish himself but upon which the discussion worked up in *Capital* unquestionably strongly draws (5).

In the identification of general elements of production, Marx is trying to reveal a metabolism with the natural environment in human production and consumption which emerges from the natural character of human beings themselves (6). A commodity, for example, is a specific form of use-value, but it shares with the products of all other modes of production the character of being a use-value, an object of utility (7). Human beings must engage in material intercourse with their natural environment because they are themselves natural beings (8) whose stance towards that environment includes an element of need (9) to win from it their means of existence (10). Human beings cannot conjure their objects of utility from nothing, they must fashion them from the physical properties of natural objects (11). The materiality of these objects is given for human beings (12), and they must recognise the qualities of natural objects (13) as the precondition of work to actualise the potential utility of those objects for themselves by adapting those qualities to useful forms (14). The labour-process understood in this way, as human beings recognition of the properties of external nature and adaptation of these to satisfy their own fundamentally natural needs (15), is a summation and explanation of the
general elements of production found in all epochs (16).

Obviously, phenomena found to be more specific cannot be explained along these lines (17). Given the existential account of the ontology of general elements of production, it is the very specificity of such phenomena that is itself the initial problem. In advance of explaining each such phenomenon, it is, to put the point paradoxically, the general existence of specificity that demands explanation. Marx's solution to this problem is given as the principal conclusion of his existential analysis. It is the natural characteristic of human beings which distinguishes them from other animals that they are able to self-consciously examine and conduct their lives, reflexively assessing earlier examinations and actions in the conscious formulation of intention, and are able to take a transformative rather than only passively adaptive stance towards nature as a consequence (18). There is an emergent level of effective determination on the conduct of human life bound up in the exercise of these natural characteristics (19), for the self-conscious formulation of conduct gives human being a unique distance from immediate natural conditions by which they are enabled to exercise important influences which cannot be understood if reduced to those conditions (20). On one of Marx's more common usages, this level of determination, in which human beings are seen to be the ontological foundation of the specific
characters of themselves, is called "history" (21). Specific elements of production are to be accounted for as historical (22). This injunction initially is, it is important to stress and I therefore repeat, a general one. It must be established at the general, that is to say with Marx the natural, level, as an ontological structure identified by explanatory requirements (23). I think that, in outline of course, Marx, with Engels, attempted to do this in their criticisms of contemplative or mechanistic tendencies in earlier materialistic accounts of civil society (24), of the productive line in which their views are arguably the highest development (25).

In sum, the dualism of general and specific elements of production can be seen to run into that of the natural and the historical. The former dualism is in fact an approximation to the latter, a way of coming to recognise the distinction between the natural and the historical by grasping one of its most readily visible aspects. This aspect was continually emphasised by Engels and Marx as it is the crucial foundation of the plausibility of their politics. It is that whilst directly natural phenomena are conterminous with human existence, historical phenomena have been relatively unenduring, indeed, relatively ephemeral (26).
The text in which Marx outlined the dualism of general and specific elements was an introduction which he drafted in 1857 to the planned political economic work of which the *Grundrisse* are the notebooks but of which was completed only the 1859 *Critique*. In this 1857 introduction, some account of general elements was envisaged as the beginning of the planned political economy (27), and I think we have just seen why this should have occurred to Marx. But not only was this not given in the 1859 *Critique*, but the introduction was itself replaced by a new preface, these changes being partially explained by Marx's thinking it best to begin with the specific (28). And in turning to the explanation of particular specific elements of production, as Marx did himself of course to the capitalist mode of production, there is a profound change in focus.

Marx insisted upon shifting consideration from the general character of human beings which has been our object so far, to specific human natures as modified in each epoch (29). The self-determination of human beings that is history may not be understood as a simple development of human nature in general, for that nature grounds a radical openness in self-consciousness, not the closure of fore-ordained lines of development. Bearing
this in mind, we can see that as it is of the essence of specific elements that they differ, the peculiarity of particular ones can hardly be explained by what is common to them all. "Self-consciousness" (or its near synonyms) are in themselves as little an explanation of particular phenomena in history as is "causality" in itself an explanation of phenomena in nature. Particular specific elements of production can be accounted for only by distinguishing between human nature in general and specific human natures, and recognising that though the latter have their ontological ground in the former, they are not deducible epiphenomena of it. Though Marx's existential analysis of human nature in general does underpin the attitude he takes to specific phenomena, and must do so to give the latter a sound foundation, there is undoubtedly a profound change of focus between the Paris Manuscripts and The German Ideology, in which Feuerbach becomes less important for Engels and Marx as they move to study specific phenomena in a science of history (30). For such study, they centrally affirm in 1845, cannot be derived from consideration of the general human essence (31). This is, and was developed by Marx at least as, itself an understanding of the character of that essence, but one that founds a break with essentialism.

What is so far lacking is, of course, a statement of the conditions in which the now uncovered agency operates.
There are, Marx seems to indicate, two ways of making such a statement; either to undertake a complete history of production or to say, at the beginning of work of more limited intent, that one's concern is with only a specific mode of production (32). Marx undertook an instance of the latter as his life's principal work, but it has been seen that the isolation of such elements involves comparison, and Marx certainly carried out a number of researches into earlier modes of production (33). Not only were these researches used to make points of historical comparison between capitalism and earlier modes of production (34), but also to put forward the substantial account of primitive accumulation (35) and an outline of capitalism's location in a universal historiography (36). Discounting the study of primitive accumulation since it is directly pertinent to capitalism, the only other more than fragmentary work in this vein actually completed by Engels or Marx was, however, the former's *Origin of the Family*... All shifts between specific human natures can in principle be explained in such a universal history as is envisaged here, and this if of course a way of describing the overall task of historiography. Though such an account of course aims at complete unity, this is a unity arrived at though the completeness of the projected history and not by a simple reduction to general human nature.

What does the statement of the conditions of a specific
mode of production involve? Marx placed great importance on recognising that human beings may exert historical influences only within determining conditions bequeathed by the past (37). In specifying particular historical periods, Marx's tack was to refer to a set of social relations as the conditions of individuals' conduct which constitute the historically specific structure (38). Marx's existential analysis lead him to the conclusion that human beings are by nature social (39), though, as with any other aspect of their naturally given being, this is open to their historical mediation. Marx did not conceive of these social relations as "inter-personal relations" reducible to the individuals who make them up, much less to those individuals' consciousnesses or wills (40). He is not consistent in his use of "society" to cover both individuals and their social relations (41) or just the latter (42), but in both usages the sense that social relations must be granted an ontological status irreducible to individuals is present. For though social relations do not have an empirical existence independent of their actualisation in individuals' conduct (for material manifestations of those relations, in statutes, forms of architecture, etc., are not the relations themselves), they are not explanatorily reducible to those individuals (43). Accounting for individuals' conduct leads to the necessity of recognising social determinations on will and action (44). Structures of social relations are posited by Marx as an ever pre-given
I have tried to show the way in which Marx depicts social relations as an emergent and in itself effective level of human nature. His explicit comments on social relations are typically made, however, in the context of an emphasis placed upon human relations with nature which Marx famously acknowledged to be the "guiding thread" of his historical studies (46). The peculiar materialism of this guiding thread, a materialism substantially defined in opposition to earlier materialisms, can make little sense unless one recognises the emergent level of history as integral to that materialism, and I am sure that it is right for the purposes of exegesis to present this level first. Nevertheless, against a background of human studies which Engels and Marx characterised as dominated by accounts which gave an explanatory primacy to forms of consciousness, Marx stressed an, as it were, materialist hypothesis in his historical explanations (47). I want now to look at the character of the materialism of Marx's guiding thread, and then to examine the way in which that materialism guided Marx in historical explanation.

Though historically self-determined, human beings' conduct remains bounded by the natural conditions in which it is exercised. There is a primary level of this determination, of the given biological character of the
human being and the given geological, climatic, etc., character of external nature (48). Marx, I believe, thought the input of these into historical explanations would be very limited, contributing only to the statement of the general conditions of productions which in an important sense precede historiography proper. All historical writing must begin with knowledge of such of these primary determinations as are relevant of course, but the actual history lies in the human conduct formulated with respect to, but not immediately set by, these determinations (49).

However, these primary conditions do not exhaust the natural influences upon historical action. For Marx, the most important set of primary natural givens is that which imposes the very necessity of a human metabolism with nature, and in recognising this we move to a secondary level of natural conditions which is of continuous importance in history. I do not mean to again go over Marx's description of the labour process, but to draw out one of the implications of that description. Human beings must recognise the qualities of natural objects in order to utilise them for their own ends. Accordingly, the potentialities open to them by those qualities and their knowledge of those qualities constitute a determining, as it were secondary, natural influence upon their specific historical conduct (50).
Recognition of this secondary natural influence constitutes a materialist position, but in a peculiar sense. As human work within nature is expanded, nature itself is increasingly (51) humanised (52), increasingly subjected to humanly effected alterations (53). Human beings may expand their knowledge of nature, but they do not do so only theoretically. They do so practically, objectively; and in changing their relation to nature they change nature itself. The conditions of historical action are composed of a mutually mediated society and nature, in which natural structures influence what historical actions may be undertaken, and those actions form the resource of altered social practices and altered natural conditions upon which subsequent historical action is based (54). In this sense, in historical explanation Marx has in mind the merging of the intertwined development of natural science and social science, in one natural history of human beings and their world (55).

This recognition of social and natural conditions is a position in historical explanation which follows rather directly from the realist epistemology which we have seen Marx take up in his philosophic anthropology of labour (56). Historical explanation cannot make direct reference to natural givens without negating its own specific objects. However, after recognising history as an emergent effective level involving its own social
conditions, accounts of events at this level cannot forget the materialist truth of realism, that the given character of nature exerts its influence on specific human conduct, even when human beings are engaged in transforming nature most radically. Against either of what Marx identified as non-historical materialist (57) or idealist (58) currents in historiography, his historical accounts are to stress the totality (59) of the conditions influencing the specific conduct of naturally located, historically effective human beings (60).

**Forces and Relations of Production**

This rendering of Marx's philosophy of historical explanation as involving primarily a regard for the totality of the conditions affecting historical action would seem to be inadequate to the way in which he undoubtedly places an emphasis on materialism in his formulations of the guiding thread of his studies. We should be clear on three points here. Firstly, as we have seen, Marx's materialism includes social determinations and thus has a far broader scope than what he calls mechanistic materialism. Secondly, we should not place too much weight on the construction of phrases such as "the materialist conception of history" or "historical materialism", for these phrases constitute Engels' interpretation of Marx's
outlook and their veracity must be put to the test. Marx himself wisely refrained from giving his guiding thread any definite name (61). And thirdly, as is evident even in 1859 (62), Marx's materialist emphasis partially follows from the often extremely unfairly polemical way (63) in which he and Engels distanced their view of historiography from young hegelian positions they had themselves earlier occupied by calling those positions deficient in that they were idealist (64). However, even after acknowledging these three points it remains that there is an issue of the greatest importance for the interpretation of Marx and the evaluation of his legacy bound up in the role of materialism in his guiding thread. This is an issue which, I will say, follows from, and is by no means in contradiction of, regarding Marx's view of historiography as initially drawing attention to the totality of determinations upon historical action.

Let us consider one implication of Marx's description of material production as a social activity. To produce in a specific way entails a form of social organisation which enables that production to take place (65). Changing the methods of production will involve alterations in the social relations of production (66), and equally the possibilities of adopting new methods of production will be affected by the character of the prevailing social relations (67). The dualism here,
between the forces and relations of material production, is the main component of Marx's guiding thread. For through use of this dualism, accounts of modes of production are to be intimately tied to the historical changes in and between those modes. This is to be so much so, in fact, that it is to be impossible to give a statement of the character of a mode of production in terms other than those of its historical genesis and developmental tendencies (68).

Marx thought that the major transitions between specific modes of production could be explained in the following way. At a certain stage in their development, the productive forces established in a mode of production would come into conflict with the social relations of production of that mode. Having earlier been developed more or less compatably with those social relations, the productive forces now find those relations to be a fetter. Hence a pressure to change those relations is built up, and a period of social revolutions begins (69).

As Marx himself says (70), this framework for explaining shifts between modes of production is a dialectic of forces and relations of production. Very often, indeed typically in the interpretation of Marx's thought, the use of "dialectic" here has been merely a convenient way of holding to either of the sides of dualistic perspectives on social change - social
influence/technological determinism, individual action/social determinism, etc. - whenever seemed necessary (71). What I want to argue, however, is that this dialectic has a coherent sense (72), based on its being a rather direct borrowing from the structure of the Hegelian Phenomenological Dialectic (73). In essence, the forces of production are distinguishable from amongst the totality of determinations influencing the form of material production because these forces occupy the position of the object in human beings' continuous appraisals of the adequacy of their ability to work in nature.

The forces of production are, in the first instance, tools and raw materials of whatever type (74). Behind this, however, the real force of production is the knowledge of how to produce that lead to the fashioning of, and animates the objectifications of that knowledge in, tools and raw materials (75). Marx's analysis of the labour process quite rightly separates the labour expended in a specific act of production from the antecedent labour which provided the means of production employed in that specific act (76). But it remains that in the forces of production we are dealing with objectifications of human knowledge of nature, shaping nature to a form which aids in the production of final use-values (77). Such knowledge can display a number of qualities which Marx takes as his warrant for introducing
themes of historical development and progress into his characterisation of modes of production.

Marx typically writes of "stages in the development" of productive forces when referring to these forces (78). His ability to do so turns completely on whether or not in the assessment of human ability to work in nature there is a meaningful criterion by which we are able to really evaluate particular sets of forces of production. I think that Marx is right to hold that it is possible to speak of a higher or lower stage in the development of forces of production, gauged by the ability to effect transformations in nature and/or the ease with which these can be carried out. The actual use of this criterion to evaluate forces of production allows us to define a pattern in history, for not only can specific modes of production be located along a continuum of the power of their forces of production, but the actors within those modes evaluate their own relations with nature in this way. Against the criterion of the enabling powers of relations with nature, specific modes of production may be, and are by the actors within them, judged (79). It is this (80) which allows us to speak of human history rather than an unconnected set of relativistic episodes (81).

What I am trying to show is that changes in forces of production are changes in consciousness. This may seem
an extraordinary thing to say, but Marx, in fact, closely identifies the state of the connection of the forces and relations of production and the overall attitudes of members of a society towards that society. It is when existing relations of production hamper the potential development of the productive forces that the members of a society may adopt a perspective essentially critical of that society (or of specific fundamental social relations) (82).

Crucially, however, this is a practical consciousness established by the attempt to know the real qualities of nature and of the adequacy of a specific set of abilities to manipulate those qualities. This is a consciousness generated in activity regulated by the external objectivity of nature, and hence has a fixity which allows this consciousness itself to serve as the objective component of the general scheme of social change which Marx is trying to set out in the dialectic of forces and relations of production.

Any set of productive forces has its ramifications in sets of social relations of production and equally any set of those relations will allow of only a certain type or area of productive forces to be developed. It may seem quite nonsensical to try and separate out productive forces and production relations (83), and it is certainly my opinion that attempts to distinguish them as distinct
structural sectors of a social formation have in the end amounted to nonsense (84). However, I think the distinction is both possible and valuable, because to dispense with it, or to so weaken it that it really loses its sense, flatly cuts out the base of understanding, and hence of properly utilising, Marx's ideas on social change (85). In any productive activity it is, I believe, quite possible to distinguish between the body of practical knowledge informing the activity and the consciousness of the social relations in which that activity takes place. It is open for us to distinguish between, for example, the employment of a certain production process and the social deployment of labour and labour based resources in that process. Of course, in employment the two cannot be separated - the latter simply describes the organisation of labour in which the former is at that time actualised, and why, in the light of this, we should want to make such a distinction is unclear. The reason can emerge only by discussion of Marx's ideas on alienation and class struggle, and will hopefully emerge when we turn to these issues. For the moment, however, I want to stress the mere possibility of this distinction, and this can, I submit, be allowed.

From this distinction it follows that a determinate production process or set of processes can be seen as being facilitated or as being limited by a set of social reactions of production. A certain level of the
development of productive forces may be aided by or handicapped by those social relations. This level may be greater than was possible under other relations of production, and, if the shift to the newer relations was ultimately guided by assessments of the ability of those relations to foster the development of productive abilities, it will be. Developing a certain level of productive forces will inevitably posit an even higher level, as the limiting case of such development is an absolutely adequate knowledge of nature. There is, then, an immanent critique of existing productive forces bound up in every progressive development. This critique will extend to relations of production. Some extent of change in the level of productive forces will be able to be embraced within existing relations of production. That is to say, the fundamental character of those relations will be able to be still recognisable amidst the smaller changes that any change in the employment of productive forces must bring about. But, as I say, each such change posits others, and thus ultimately even the fundamental character of the given relations of production must be called into question. As the result of the new productive resources potentially available, and as the cumulative result of earlier smaller scale changes in the relations of production, the fundamental structure of those relations may come to be seen as exhausted of significant productive potential. The judge of "significant" here is the potential which seems available
under other possible relations of production which could carry on the process of facilitating productive developments which is already at work on, in fact undermining, the fundamental structure of the existing relations.

The question of whether social relations or productive forces have a determining privilege in this scheme of social change is a misplaced one. There is no doubt that this scheme requires a recognition of the facts both that social relations determine the form and pace of the development of the productive forces and that those forces must exercise an influence on those relations. Productive forces are designated by Marx as the location of the overall direction of social development, but this is not because those forces exercise a more powerful determining influence but because they have the position of object in the overall consciousness of productive activity. Those forces are developed in relation to an external nature which human beings cannot alter, only transform according to its own structures. To develop productive forces thus requires social relations of production to accommodate productive forces whose power of production is objectively settled. What development of productive forces can take place is clearly determined by the relations of production; and, what is more, the speed of that development will be completely determined by the place given to such development in the overall social
system. Nevertheless, it is impossible for social relations to actually wrest a truly objective position in the development of material intercourse with nature from the productive forces as those forces are the seat of the knowledge of nature which is at issue. This structure of the consciousness of material production is the key to Marx's scheme of social change.

Marx is trying to describe what he imagines is the united process of the development of, as it were, material consciousness, that is the consciousness of the adequacy of forms of productive intercourse with nature and reflections on social systems or social practices informed by this consciousness. It is a scheme of immanent critique ordered through a layering in which knowledge of nature is the objective element of material consciousness upon which is then based a structure of the critique of social forms. This scheme involves a central element of determinate negation, and thus can embrace ideas of evolution, progress and of stages of development, in that it is always possible, though not necessary, for the evaluation of existing forces of production and existing relations of production to draw on past experience and set itself the aims of improvement. To draw attention to the power of social reflexivity to lead to improvements in human material powers is not be thereby lay it down as the absolutely necessary pattern of social development, and we shall see
that Marx goes on to identify other influences on that development which tend to contradict the pattern of reflexive assessment central to his guiding thread.

**Base and Superstructure**

The way in which I have set out the bounds of the sensible application of the dialectic of forces and relations of production has turned upon stressing the historical restrictions of those bounds. It clearly remains the case, however, that this applicability is both, to put it this way, intensively and extensively enormous.

In saying that this applicability is intensively enormous I mean that even within its bounds only the most massive shifts between historical modes of production can really hope to be directly subsumed under Marx's guiding thread (86). Marx himself, I would say, made no stronger claim than this. However interesting and fruitfully provoking it may be, his scheme of ancient, asiatic, fuedal and capitalist modes of production is obviously cast at the most general level of historiography (87). That even this scheme is open to question (88) paradoxically shows the Marx's guiding thread is able to generate worthwhile issues at this most general level.

If it is, in the first instance, only these wide-ranging
observations which the scheme of determinate negation of forms of material consciousness in Marx's dialectic can produce, this does not mean that all other history does not require this fundamental level of historiographical understanding. Obviously not all the details of the capitalist development of the labour process which Marx described in, say, his later journalism are required for the account of the production of relative surplus value in Capital, nor are such details by any means wholly explicable through such an account. This is in no sense a point which arises due to some formal method of abstraction which Marx takes to his subject (89). It is rather merely an explanatory protocol arising from contemplation of the subject and the particular aims one has in addressing it. That the only overall methodological injunction involved here is fidelity to the empirical seems to me to be immediately obvious from the very tone - a tone expressive of years of arduous factual research carefully distinguished from a familiarity with "practical details which lie outside the sphere of the actual science of political economy" (90) - of those works which Marx thought made up his science (91).

In considering the extensive dimension of the ground covered by Marx's guiding thread, I would argue that its bounds are set by the pre-history of mankind. If my representation of Marx's dialectic of forces and
relations of production has so far stressed its indebtedness to the structure of that of Hegel, I would now also like to claim that the field of the applicability of that dialectic is also set by Marx's adoption of strongly Hegelian themes. Though Marx's dialectic involves, as I have tried to argue, certain ontological commitments, it is not, I believe, itself intended to be an ontological analysis of social and/or material being (92). It is rather a scheme of social changes within definite historical limits; that is to say, limits of a historical and not a directly natural character. It is these limits which both give sense and plausibility to the structure of Marx's dialectic and to his raising it to the position of a guiding thread for historical study.

Let us return to the idea of distinguishing forces from relations of production. Though, as I have attempted to show, it is conceivable to separate out two elements of the practical consciousness of productive activity to obtain this distinction, it might be wondered why we should do so. At first glance it would seem that the social relations of production could well be entailed by the simple adoption of a certain production process or, to put more or less the same thing the other way around, that certain production processes could be regarded as located within an overall distribution of labour in a given mode of production. What, I believe, Marx is
trying to do in drawing this distinction is to show that historically there has been a fundamental contradiction between human knowledge of nature and ability to transform it and human social organisation. This contradiction lies in the very fact that relations of production have had a principle of ordering which is their own, which separates them from being informed by direct recognition of the requirements of the established level of the forces of production. On the basis of an inadequate apprehension of the character of natural properties in general, it has been historically impossible to generate a social organisation of production adequate to the development of productive forces. What Marx is driving at, I would say, is that the historical development of the relations of production has been in alienation from nature as a whole, and the increasing knowledge of nature furnished by the development of the productive forces has thus always either found only partial support from production relations or has actually found them to be a fetter.

The characteristic which Marx regards as unifying the pre-history of humankind is that, though related of course, the forces and relations of production have distinct internal logics during this period which may mutually engender or contradict one another. I have discussed the internal logic of forces of production, and repeat that this is an "objective" logic set by the given
qualities of nature as human beings come to know them. Freed from other influences, social relations of production would be the direct consciousness of the requirements and potentialities of the forces of production subjected to ends determined in social awareness. Marx's claim - which I shall examine at length in a short while - is that it is precisely the absence of self-consciousness of material life that characterises all the social relations of production in pre-history. These relations have their own logic just because they are not developed in social self-consciousness of the organisation of labour.

All these comments are, I think, the necessary preliminary to trying to make sense of a further famous dichotomy in which Marx expressed his philosophy of historical explanation. I mean the topographical metaphor of the economy (mode of production constituted of forces and relations of production) as base and of politics and ideology as superstructures. This dichotomy has proven quite as difficult to even understand - let alone utilise - as has the dialectic of forces and relations of production (93). The very same problems attend this dichotomy as we have seen attend the other. As manifestly political institutions arguably, and elements of consciousness certainly, partially constitute the material life of all societies together with any economic phenomena narrowly defined, there seems to be no
coherent principle for distinguishing between these areas and no real reason for wishing to do so. I think it will prove ultimately disappointing in terms of explanatory productivity and ultimately frustrating in terms of theoretical coherence to regard the issue bound up in the dichotomy of base and superstructures as the description of the actual structure of a social formation. I do not say this, let me quickly add, because I want to flatly deny that there are no potentially recoverable explanatory resources bound up in the topographical metaphor, for it is merely fair to note that it has on numerous occasions been sensitively used to valuable effect in hands other than Marx's (94). However, I do want to argue that these resources are not in essence generated by an, as it were, morphology of social structure (analogous to Durkheim, Parsons, etc.), and attempts to capture them through such an idea cannot be successful. Put the other way around, attempts to refine the topographical metaphor as if it turned on such a morphology are, in my opinion, bound to decay into merely conceptual ratiocination without any real object which is its justification (95).

What I think is actually guiding Marx's recourse to the base and superstructure metaphor is his wish to address other perspectives on social theory from the point of view of his own materialism. Having in his materialism arrived at a specific understanding of history which
grants an explanatory privilege to grasping the pattern of material intercourse with nature, Marx, I believe, attempted to set out the ramifications of this understanding not so much for other sectors or institutions of society rigorously structurally demarcated from the economic but for other approaches to social issues. When Marx says: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness", he is clearly challenging a form of explanation and not segregating sectors of social life. That Marx wrote these words in the preface to his first published attempt to come to terms with an economy which he insisted was reproduced through the alienated consciousness of those labouring under it means that to read them as contributing to such a segregation would be, I suggest, absurd. Now, I believe that we can see that saying that it is through the pattern of social life, in which material life has the influential position we have described, that forms of consciousness are developed is to say something significantly different from the reverse. (Though the polemical point has rather lost its force through its subsequent general acceptance). Furthermore, depending upon how much value we find in Marx's claims for his materialism, we might think the difference important, for if the central claim that this materialism describes the fundamental dynamic of social development is accepted, then we have some apparatus for
explaining forms of consciousness. Whether we are dealing with something important here really turns on whether we accept Marx's hierarchy of explanatory privilege, in which material life certainly is the basis of historical accounts, or whether we do not. However, recognising this does not commit us to an attempt to strictly demarcate (a basal structural level of) economy from (a superstructural level of) consciousness, and I do not see how any ultimately coherent support for such an effort can be derived from attempting explanations along the line of Marx's guiding thread.

In one particular sense, this attitude towards the explanations of consciousness has a special importance for Marx. This sense is the development of critical consciousness, of critical attitudes towards existing social arrangements. We have seen how the dialectic of forces and relations of production describes a pattern of determinate negations of forms of material consciousness. The overall cast of common attitudes towards given social arrangements turns, Marx says, on whether those arrangements facilitate or hinder the development of the forces of production, an essentially critical attitude being generated when the forces and relations of production stand in contradiction. On the basis of this fundamentally critical attitude, the ramifications of criticism can be explored in other spheres of existence and from other points of view of social inquiry than the
material (96). Something important is being said here, and I would put it like this: that the ultimate determinant of the possibilities of critical consciousness are determined in pre-history by the level of the material accomplishments of society, for the forms of socio-political life and of thought in pre-history are based on forms of material life that are alienated and out of conscious control. In my opinion, none of this can be made any clearer by being expressed though a strict language of base and superstructure.

Why Marx should make clear his reversal of the explanatory background of consciousness and material life against a background of Hegelian philosophy is obvious. That Marx should also designate the political and legal as superstructures in a similar way is, I suggest, almost equally easy to understand. There is no great precision of institutional demarcation involved here - Marx runs together legal and political practices in a way which would seem frustratingly careless were he to be thought to be attempting such demarcation. However, that understanding given forms of legal and political institutions and assessing the possibilities for legal and political reconstruction turn upon grasping the peculiar determinations of a specific level of material life is obviously an interesting idea. To say this involves a much wider idea of social theory than narrow description, an idea which embraces the effect of social
understanding on political organisation and on value judgements on extant beliefs. Such was undoubtedly the idea of social theory which Marx held, and which locates his work within properly classical social theory (97).

When interpreted in the fashion I suggest, the base and superstructure metaphor does not commit us to any pre-ordained position on the relation of all political and ideological issues to material life. Just as the explanatory power of the dichotomy of forces and relations of production neither possibly could nor needs to embrace all details of material life, so the explanatory claims bound up in the topographical metaphor need not extend to all details of social life to be an interesting and valuable claim. It is only on the mistaken understanding that this is so that saving degrees of autonomy from the economy need to be invented as terminological - if nothing else - devices for dealing with those instances where the distinguishing of base from superstructure patently leaves an infinite number of political and ideological phenomena with no economic explanation.

Of course, as I have mentioned, if Marx's materialism is to be our guide in historical explanation, then the ultimate, or indeed, basal explanation of all historical events must have recourse to the form of material life. What we can say of political or ideological forms merely
by referring to the overall form of material life is, in itself, of the most general character. It is, however, well worth saying. In the pre-history of alienated forms of production, socio-political arrangements and social consciousness will also be alienated, for reasons to which I shall turn in a moment. An in itself equally general observation, though leading to historical specification, is that the particular form of alienated material life will overall determine the particular character of the politics and consciousness of the society of which it is the mode of production. That is to say, in the last instance the character of a society is given by the development of the dynamic of material life (98).

It is only to put the obverse of the points I have been making to note that it is only when material production has progressed to the point where a non-alienated intercourse with nature may take place that non-alienated forms of political life and consciousness might be practically projected. I take up the reasons for this in a short while. For Marx himself this contemporary lesson of his materialism was the main fruit of its insights into history, and we shall see, his account of capitalism articulates exactly this double insight into past alienation and the possibility of the end of pre-history.
Class and Classless Societies

In the 1888 English edition of the Communist Manifesto, Engels qualified the famous slogan that "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" with a note to the effect that this applied only to written history (99). In the early 1880s Marx began studies in the ethnology of pre-class societies, and though he did not work these up himself (100), they were given some expression in Engels 1884 Origin of the Family (101). The qualification of the famous words of 1847 represents a deepening of the elusive sense of these words in the light of the strides forward in ethnology made between 1847 and 1888 which Engels and Marx were trying to assimilate within their broad outline of history. I will try to set out the meaning of the at first glance absurd idea that all history is the history of class struggles by approaching the ideas of 1847 equipped with the hindsight of their later qualification. I hope thereby to show the role of the important dichotomy of class and classless societies in Marx's guiding thread of historical understanding.

Given the conception of communism as classless society (to which I will return), the position of Engels and Marx in the early 1880s seems to have been to contrast class societies to two forms of classless society - the post-class form of communism and the pre-class form of
primitive communism. Primitive communism is distinguished by the common property holding by family units within tribes of more or less sufficient means of production for subsistence production. Engels and Marx clearly have in mind here - at a certain depth of ethnological sophistication - the "early and rude state of society" of "natural man" common to the historical imagination of the contributors to the classic beginnings of social thought (102). They certainly share the main concern of that thought to contrast such early society to civilisation, and to explain the latter's origin in the former.

Engels' and Marx's thought on this fundamental problem seems to turn on linking the production of surplus with the division of labour and private property, though the link is by no means clearly established (103).

The limitations of subsistence production begin to be broken down with the realisation of a potential increase in productivity innate in the almost immediately natural division of labour within the family. The normal production goal of the family as an economic unit is self-sufficiency within a rather narrow time horizon. The failure to provide against inevitable breakdowns in production by building up a hoard through surplus production will eventually certainly lead to the most fundamental deprivation. The commitment to the
production of surplus by each family member working long enough to actualise a greater amount of the potential productive power of the familial division of labour in order to build up a surplus against more difficult times is, then, the first step in human beings emerging from the subservience to nature which they must endure unless they develop their powers of conscious fore-thought.

With the formation of hoards, a system of rather simple exchange between families may develop, allowing the extension of each family's range of goods. There may be established a common hoard, which both requires and allows the release of certain members of the tribe from direct productive activity, permitting the extension of certain common tribal functions. Bound up in such developments is the emergence of social ranking, for we have the growth of social life but inevitably not based on general social perspectives but on the, as it were, extraneous association of hitherto distinct units.

The accumulation of a certain surplus within the family unit allows the possibility of employing outside labour resources, extending the division of labour and thereby increasing surplus. The first such resources were provided by the captives of tribal war, that is to say by enslavement.

From the very outset, then, the development of the
potential for surplus production and the extension of the social life is characterised by being based on the fundamental economic principle of the control of the means of production resting with the ownership of private property by units within the society. The differentiation of a class of owners of the means of production and those whose labour is directed by them, and within the class of owners ranking essentially based on the size of holding, mark the final elements of the process by which we can see primitive communism dissolving into private property owning civilisation (104).

I do not want to attempt to elaborate this rudimentary ethnography of the distinction between pre-class and class societies (105). Rather I wish, as I said at the outset, to look at what this ethnographic deepening of Engels' and Marx's thought can tell us about the core ideas of their earlier formulations, and for this purpose I think we have discussed enough of their later elaborations. We have to come to terms with the essence of the idea that all history is the history of class struggles, and I want to say that this is in fact an important idea expressing a substantial historical truth in the materialist fashion Engels and Marx sought.

Human development from the position of familial-tribal subsistence production fundamentally involves the
production of surplus through realisation of the productive powers of an initially familial division of labour. This surplus can serve as the basis of the employment of outside labour. This is to say, this surplus is the basis of the relative concentration of the means of production in a restricted number of hands and thus the creation of private property. The nexus of surplus - division of labour - private property is then, of course, the basis of the further production of surplus.

The essential feature of this outline of the basis of social improvement is its recognition of the necessity of private property (106). It was not possible to move from general subsistence production to general command of material intercourse with nature by whole societies. The resources which make such general command plausible simply were not available. This plausibility had to be established by a gradual extension of knowledge and command of nature through a material life based on production units which segment the entire society; that is to say, private property. The nexus of surplus - division of labour - private property leaves the last as the necessary result (and not the cause) of the only possible way in which the increase of productive powers expressed in the first could be accomplished.

Private property certainly represents the alienation of
those who do not own the means of production from their own material life (107). It is a principle giving effect to that aspect of the division of labour which Marx felt constituted the essence of alienation - the division of manual and mental labour (108). The direction of the use of the means of production is fundamentally a function of the ownership of private property. This is so not so much in that ownership and control are identical, but that the framework of control options must embody respect for the particular form of private property as this social form is understood as the form of means of production as such. The other side of this position is that those who labour under designated positions in the division of labour are quite disenfranchised from the control of their own material life. Private property and the division of labour hence articulate two aspects of the alienation of labour - the former in respect of the product of labour which becomes private property and the latter in respect of the labour process which is under class based direction (109). This, let me repeat, is a necessary alienation. Private property does not create the shortcomings of the alienated labour process but stems from them, though of course once established it reproduces that alienation (110). The forces of human material productivity could not be improved on any basis other than of successive forms of private property. It is this alienated pre-history that is the field of application of the dialectic of forces and relations of
production.

For we are now in a position to clearly grasp the inner logic of the social relations of production that sets them apart from, and in varying relationship to, the forces of production. This logic is class struggle based on various forms of private property.

We have seen that Engels and Marx clearly intend to link the production of surplus as an essential indicator of the productive powers of labour to the division of labour. The division of labour can, initially, be carried out only through the disposition of sectors of the means of production as private properties. Though the owners and controllers of these individual properties will certainly lack an overall perspective on the material life of their society, the identification of their social position will involve recognising their mutual standing as a class, and their mutual distance from those who do not own the means of production. This is not fundamentally a matter of the description of ostensible stratification but rather an attempt to identify the central pivot of the character of a society by drawing attention to the specific social form of its alienated political structures and the location of these structures within a particular form of alienated material life. The (infinite) potential classification of various sectors of society by, for example, types of revenue
received (111) can be of value in this scheme only in so far as it contributes to knowledge of this - for Marx - crucial element of historical explanation. To put this the other way round, the social classification which Marx's guiding thread can directly generate may well be empirically limited. However, an empirically adequate picture must necessarily rest on this broad outline.

The conduct of political life under these class divisions cannot but be alienated. Those who do not own the means of production are immediately disenfranchised. Those who do own them - and here we come to the nub of the dichotomy of forces and relations of production - are always eventually faced with the contradiction between expanding productive forces and maintaining the arrangement of material life that supports their own class position. Expansion of production beyond the limits of the requirements of the unproductive consumption of the owners and controllers of the means of production will always ultimately call into question that ownership and control (112). The class of owners is itself alienated - its very class position dictates an attitude towards other classes and ultimately to social improvement which can only be described as a reactionary commitment to a partial position unable to rise to general social perspectives. This is in an important sense a moral criticism, and we must also recognise that it is to some extent a moralistic criticism in that it
would be pious to expect the owners of the means of production to relinquish the power which confirms their privilege in circumstances where that privilege seems to be the discrimination of God or nature amongst men. By contrast, the class position of those who do not own the means of production would seem to be more open to embracing change, for those in this position find only the confirmation of their own relative material and political deprivation in existing social arrangements, and may well therefore have a progressive interest in potential social improvement.

Marx's overall scheme of explanation will refer the actual disposition of social classes to the degree of criticism of existing social relations of production which the productive forces are positing, for this is the, as it were, objective resource for taking up social criticism. Nevertheless, the sense in which Marx's guiding thread requires history to be the history of class struggle is that in alienated societies the actualisation of social change in order to accommodate improvements in the forces of production must go through the mediation of struggle within class divided social relations of production. It is this struggle which is the proximate location of the social dynamic which Marx more fundamentally explains in terms of the dialectic of forces and relations of production. I think it is fair to claim that in this way Marx's guiding thread contains,
in a principled fashion, a moment of crucial mediation of the consequences of the contradiction of forces and relations of production (113).

It is, I think, Engels' and Marx's claim that when we look at the institutions of the governance of class societies - the state as they typically put it - we will find that they represent the class divided character of these societies. These institutions will typically embrace a system of right which guarantees the existing disposition of property, and will politically govern the society in accordance with this system and the policy imperatives it dictates. It is the social fragmentation implied by private property as the fundamental economic unit that makes the existence of socially separate institutions concerned with maintaining the society as a whole necessary - this cannot be a function of the common society as this commonality does not actually exist. The very existence of separate state institutions marks, then, the alienation of the society, and the class biased conduct of those institutions is a subordinate aspect of that alienation.

Progressive social movements will, given this account of the state, involve a challenge to the existing pattern of state power. We may expect to find that in the attempt to guarantee the given social relations of production the state is itself pushed into internal political
contradiction. In so far as it must guarantee the social relations of production in which the forces of production have been developed to the extent where they criticise the fundamental structures of the existing mode of production, the state has to contain both the progressive and the reactionary forces whose antagonism builds up with the development of a mode of production. It is the struggle over the direction of the resolution or containment of this contradiction that we may term the political struggle of materially based classes, our heuristic emphasis shifting from the disposition of material life to explicit problems of governance and political participation.

As I have mentioned, Engels and Marx envisaged a second form of classless society - post-class or communist society. Capitalism represents the potential for the end of human pre-history in that it makes plausible the construction, through a rather ill-defined transitory period of socialism, of communist society. The only political characterisation of communist society worth making is that it will be genuinely mass democratic. To now specify the institutions of such a society and the actions taken through them is an absurd contradiction of the freedom which that society is to embody, and Marx displayed a principled understanding of this point in his typical refusal to describe communist society (114). The freedom sought here is not freedom to do a certain sort
of act but to rationally decide to do any sort of act at all. What we should be told, and what indeed we must be told, is how communist society is to facilitate this open freedom, how it is to allow this rationality.

In accord with his materialism, Marx's fundamental statements on this point are of the reorganisation of production. Given what we have seen of Marx's attitude to the division of labour, it would seem that the overcoming of alienation would require the abolition of the division of labour. It has often been argued that Marx would seem to have at one time thought this a plausible goal (115). I think it is certainly the case that this attitude to the division of labour is most dubious - indeed it is rather hard to see quite what Marx could mean by it. It is not perhaps worth the effort of trying to press on to a clear understanding both because the accuracy of attributing this position to Marx's early thought is suspect and because he certainly did not hold to it later. In some of his later writing Marx unequivocally and explicitly concedes that the securing of material existence is a realm of necessity, and presumably this means that the requirements of division of labour for efficient production must also be considered as necessary. The realm of freedom is to be secured by extending free-time as far as possible (116). This idea does not turn on the quality of the activity undertaken in either necessary or free labour time.
Material activity cannot be play, but free activity can certainly be very hard work (117). The issue is that the former is objectively directed by natural need; the latter is self-directed towards as Marx puts it, "the development of human powers as an end in itself".

What is more, the question of the relative size of necessary and free labour times is, in my opinion, important but quite secondary to the main issue in the overcoming of the alienation of material life.

This issue is rather the achievement of the subordination of that life to social self-consciousness. What we are dealing with here is an end to the confusions of the natural and the social which obscure a socially self-consciousness disposition of labour by the subjection of material life to conscious social planning. It is only in this socially conscious position that rational decisions to expand output, or to hold output steady and increase free time, etc., can be possible. In my later account of Marx's analysis of the capitalist mode of production, I will try to show why Marx thought this achievement conceivable with the development of that mode. For the moment, I want to see what we can say about political life in communist society that would be necessary for this social self-consciousness.

Firstly, of course, it is clear that all obstructions to
taking the general perspectives necessary for knowledge of the interests of the whole society must be removed. In other words, all partial class influences on the conduct of material life must be abolished. The rationality of the determination of social policies can lie only in that they are genuinely democratically formulated, for the only adequate form of genuinely non-alienated political life is a mass democracy which fully expresses the control by the whole society of its own destiny.

What of the fate of the state in this idea of communism? If we take the state to be the alienated form of political life, then we can boldly state that the truth of the state is democracy (118). But what of the alienated form after its truth is grasped? There can be no doubt that institutions of governmental policy are an absolute necessity for any form of civilised life. However, it is a mistake - logically simple but socially extremely difficult to detect - to run together administration and oppression. If we recognise the state as the form of political life of class society, we must then posit the absence of the state from communist society when the administration of things is not conflated with the dominance of people (119). To put this another way, the very existence of separate institutions over and above the rest of society must end when the institutions of government are an integral part
Science and Ideology

It is obvious that Marx's guiding thread is constituted of a complicated set of statements. One particular complication is that it involves statements at two ontologically discrete levels, but that the character of the guiding thread substantially turns on running these together. Marx in effect distinguishes the level of given nature from history, and then puts forward propositions about history which stress the influence exercised by humanly mediated natural determinations. Nature in fact figures twice in Marx's materialism. The significance of recognising this in attempts to understand Marx's guiding thread can hardly be overstated. For whereas the way in which nature first figures can be discussed in the most general terms, the way in which it figures secondly - in the dichotomies of forces and relations of production, base and superstructure and class and classless societies - can be discussed only after the specific historical bounds of that discussion are made clear. The uses of nature at this second level are intelligible only when their location within the human pre-history of alienation is recognised. Outside of this context, and especially when posited at the same level of generality as the first use of nature, these employments of nature in Marx's guiding
thread are unintelligible. It is in claiming to make clear these essential bounds of alienation and of the ways of discussing it that Marx's guiding thread takes up the position of claiming an epistemological privilege through a dichotomy of science and ideology.

The way in which Marx sets about identifying beliefs as ideological or scientific is coloured by the general attitude towards consciousness which we have seen in his guiding thread. By this attitude I mean his emphasis on the location of phenomena within the totality of social determinations (121) ordered by his materialism (122). The implications of this attitude for the overall explanation of the character of forms of consciousness are clear. The possibilities for understanding elements of human existence are set by the resources available for such understanding at any particular historical time (123). Attempts to specify the method of determination of consciousness which is involved here, that is to say to specify what explanatory power this attitude to consciousness does precisely possess, have proven extremely difficult (124). Though Marx himself acknowledged this difficulty upon occasion (125), its theoretical solution would seem to have held little interest for him. We have already seen that, even rudimentarily expressed, his attitude to consciousness embodies important specific explanatory claims, and Marx seems to have been content to work out more precise
formulations in specific empirical circumstances connected with a particular study.

If we take Marx's idea of "ideology" to mean the above stress on the immersion of forms of consciousness in patterns of life, then clearly this ideology involves no sense of epistemological privilege (126). To relate the character of a belief to its social background when one is centrally claiming that all such characters are determined in such a relation obviously, of itself, does not involve denigration of any particular belief. Even beliefs accredited as true must be related to the social conditions of possession of a true belief. However, to take this epistemological neutrality as characteristic of Marx's main or most useful sense of ideology is a mistake, a mistake necessarily represented in the stretching of the texts which such a view requires (127). For the very intelligibility of Marx's overall use of ideology turns, I believe, upon recognising the specific historical bounds within which he uses it, bounds which immediately imbue that use with a sense of the discussion of issues related to a particular claim of epistemological privilege.

We have seen Marx's guiding thread sketch out a view of history which fundamentally turns on the explanation of social alienation from the point of view where humankind has set itself the task of abolishing that alienation.
The proximate locus of alienation, though crucially for Marx not the fundamental basis of it, is consciousness. In a very important way, the central issue of Marx's guiding thread is the explanation of alienated consciousness. It is social life alienated from its own true character, and hence moving through a material dialectic of forces and relations of production which can operate only in so far as it is not subject to conscious social determination. The identifying characteristic of pre-history is, then, in the first instance the existence of alienated consciousness (128).

A sense of ideology undoubtedly present in Marx's writings uses the term to describe this overall form of alienated belief. This sense is typically established through a contrast with "science" as the penetration of alienated beliefs and the establishment of self-consciousness. The effect of alienation is present in the disjunction between the phenomenal appearances of the social world in the normal consciousness and the true character, or essence, of that world (129). It is not that these appearances are ephemeral illusions, it is that they do not grasp the social production of the world. Alienation is certainly present at the level of essence, for it is only because the essential truth of human social power is inadequately actualised that appearances which obfuscate that power can exist. Science, in this sense of a contrast to this ideology, is
necessary because social life is alienated. If everyday conceptions actually expressed the true character of social life, then science as the penetration of alienated phenomenal appearances would be superfluous. But it is not (130).

This implies that two characteristics are to be found integral to the scientific attitude. Firstly, that attitude is immanently critical. Its aim is the displacement of the dominant understandings of social life, because in pre-history these understandings are alienated and therefore inadequate. Secondly, though not such a direct implication, a politically critical attitude to given social institutions follows from such science, for as the explanation of alienated consciousness does not reside in consciousness but in alienated social life, the conquest of alienation cannot be a work of pure science (131). Rather science's enlightening conclusions can be actualised when employed to material effect (132). It is not that science serves pre-determined political conclusions but that political action is the corollary of science, given that the effort of scientific understanding is made with an awareness of social responsibility and is not regarded as merely an academic, in the bad sense, exercise. Science must draw its resources from given social practices. It must also, for the reasons we have just discussed, hope to carry its conclusions through to practical interventions in the
social (133) if the emancipatory logic of these conclusions is to be actualised (134). Science which rested at the level of theory would be pointless, for the full achievement of the goals of science must go further, must go on, in fact, to the abolition of the idea of theoretical science as a self-sufficient enterprise (135).

This all, of course, immediately raises the issue of the distinguishing of science from ideology, but not, it is essential to appreciate, as an internally philosophical one for Marx, but as a historical one. From what we have seen of Marx's attitude to consciousness, it is clear that, as I have mentioned, science as much as ideology is a product of social location. That is to say, both science and ideology are "ideologies" in the first sense of Marx's use of this term which we have discussed. It is essential to ask how, on this basis, Marx felt able to state a claim to the possession of scientific knowledge in the sense of knowledge epistemologically superior to ideology. In a few words, he identified the potential for social self consciousness as a product of the development of the capitalist mode of production, and he identified the social actualisation of this potential as socialism moving into communism. The assessment of this claim is the task of the next part of this work. For now, it is apposite to bracket the question of the plausibility of Marx's claims to possession of scientific
knowledge, and to examine how these claims work to set up the distinction of science and ideology. Given what we have seen of the method of Hegel's Phenomenological proof, what needs to be said in exegesis of this part of Marx's work can be said quite briefly.

The first and fundamental characteristic of these claims by Marx is that they are based on belief in their own empirical adequacy. Marx tries to explain the character of material life of bourgeois society, and it is the character of his subject, empirically ascertained, which he claims leads him to the labour theory of value as a statement of capitalist economic principle (136). Marx has to argue that the typical bourgeois attitude to material life, which involves economic ideas which are opposed to the labour theory, is mistaken, is in fact a form of alienated belief which he calls commodity fetishism. For Marx, the establishment of the plausibility of his argument and in particular of its superiority to commodity fetishism is a matter of establishing his argument's explanatory power and that that power is far greater than that of commodity fetishism. Marx accordingly is at great pains to claim that superiority against the academic expression of commodity fetishism in what he calls vulgar political economy (137). There is a further dimension to this process for Marx. Commodity fetishism is the everyday understanding of material life in bourgeois society, that
is to say, it is an integral element of that society and not a mere spurious mistake. It is the consciousness engendered by the capitalist form of economy. The full extent of Marx's claim to be in possession of a superior understanding than that of commodity fetishism is expressed in his eventual claim to explain commodity fetishism better than it can explain itself. This power of reflexively expanding our knowledge takes us into the second element of Marx's method of distinguishing science and ideology which I want to discuss.

The scientific penetration of alienation which Marx believes is possible in bourgeois conditions allows of the reflexive reassessment of all alienated history, both in bourgeois society, as I have just mentioned, and in all epochs prior to the bourgeois one, about which I should like to now say a few words. From the position of social self-consciousness represented by the scientific apprehension of the truth of bourgeois social structure, a reflexive re-comprehension of pre-history as such, that is as the historical work of human beings but of human beings alienated from knowledge of their own historical powers, is possible. It is not that the past is found to be identical to bourgeois society, but that the uncovering of the historical ontology of bourgeois society can illuminate the different historical circumstances of earlier societies. It is the riddle of history that is essentially solved (138).
As I have mentioned, the assessment of the adequacy of these claims of Marx's will be attempted in the following parts of this work. For the present I merely want to myself claim that what I have said is an accurate presentation of the method by which Marx intended to demarcate science from ideology. The idea of empirically claiming an end of pre-history analogous in its historico-empistemological privilege to the end of history in Hegel is, I am sure, clearly present here.

What is most remarkable about the idea of critique which informs Marx's way of distinguishing science and ideology is the degree of necessary sympathy with the beliefs identified as ideological. Ideological beliefs are the antecedents of science, and this is to say that they must contain the potentials that make the science possible. Any practical claim to be able to make any sort of productive development must have roots in conditions which, after the development is accomplished, will be commonly held to be inadequate (139). The issue is to locate the potentials in the inadequate state of affairs, not to bluntly counterpose a better state to the given (140), for this would make the aim of productive development uptopian. This applies as much to the critique of ideology as the political critique of the given social world of which it is part.
Marx is dealing in an importantly Hegelian way with a problem he identifies in a—rather less importantly—Hegelian fashion. This is the problem of the inversion of the true character of an alienated world in ideological consciousness, and the necessary re-inverting of these beliefs through science (and more generally through political action). There is no point in insisting upon the letter of the metaphor of inversion or of trying to generate any sort of precise (even if defective) mechanism of distinguishing science and ideology from this metaphor (141). But what the presence of the locution of inversion and its synonyms—from the mention of the camera obscura in *The German Ideology* (142) to the allusions in *Capital* to the common understanding (143) and vulgar political economy (144) having reversed the true character of the capitalist economy in their understanding of it—does testify to, I believe, is that Marx was thinking these problems through in a way intimately related to Hegel.

This locution expresses an overall intellectual debt which Marx's attitude to history owes to Hegel. We are not faced with a question of the borrowing of certain discrete ideas when we turn to Marx's relation to Hegel. It is misleading to ask whether Marx used dialectic, or recognised alienation, etc., in his work, for this implies that these are self-contained notions which Marx could either incorporate in his work or not. What we
have to recognise is that Marx's guiding thread is situated within an intellectual field whose boundaries were set by Hegel. To even attempt to speak of the application of certain of the ideas of Marx's guiding thread outside that intellectual field - to move the dialectic forces and relations of production outside of the context of the alienated material life of pre-history, for example - is to reduce those ideas to absurdity. More than this, the way in which Marx approaches historical developments draws upon an idea of progressive critique that again is so essentially Hegelian that we are talking about the Hegelian background to the basic character of Marx's thought. The key, I have tried to argue, to understanding Marx's guiding thread is to see it as a restatement of the entire form of Hegel's Phenomenological Dialectic. We have already seen why such a restatement was necessary. When Marx takes on the broad task of inverting the given, his improvements - if any - upon Hegel turn upon the extent to which he is able to base his science in that given. For Marx, the given is the capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois society and forms of thought which are based on that mode. It is this attitude to this given which we must now examine.
PART 4

MARX'S RELATION TO FORMS OF BOURGEOIS ECONOMIC THOUGHT
CHAPTER 9

USE-VALUE AND EXCHANGE-VALUE IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE COMMODITY

Introduction: Use-value and Exchange-value

In Marx's presentation of his political economy of capitalism, the first dichotomy into which the commodity is shown to resolve itself is that of use-value and exchange-value (1). First, let me say that from what we have seen of Marx's philosophy of historical explanation, what is at issue in this dichotomy is the analytic separation of the natural or material content of a good that is its use-value from the social form of the production of that good as a commodity with exchange-value. On this basis, Marx will argue that in order to explain exchange-value it is necessary to make reference not only to the natural properties of commodities but to those properties as grasped through a historically specific social organisation of production (capitalism). This involves a criticism of bourgeois political economy as a form of alienated consciousness in which social powers are obscured by being conflated with naturally given qualities (2). I shall argue that Capital is essentially an elaborated discussion of those themes which I have identified in his general philosophy of historical explanation. In saying this, I wish to stress
that such an elaboration is a condition of the adequacy of the account and of the understanding to which it can give rise. The issue really is whether Capital's description of modern society can render its derived Hegelian concerns in a way which can carry social scientifically informed conviction beyond the point where the Phenomenology of Spirit cannot do so. To put this another way, can Marx's "guiding thread" as actualised in Capital push the criticism of alienation beyond Hegelian limits?

I shall order my account of Capital around the dichotomy of use-value and exchange-value not only because this is clearly central to the analysis of commodity, but also because, as I will claim, it is the pivot of the overall account of capitalism. My case will be that this dichotomy is the nexus of the connection between the character of Marx's political economy and his philosophy of social explanation. This is so because the dichotomy of use-value and exchange-value is the capitalistic form of the dichotomy of forces and relations of production.

The Commodity

Marx's argument for this separation of the material content and the social form of a good is given through his analysis of the commodity in his statement of the first positions of the labour theory of value. Let us
begin, then, with Marx's beginning, the commodity.

Adapting, as he so often does, one of Hegel's famous observations. Marx allows that selecting a point at which to begin any science is difficult (3), and tells us that in his science the commodity is chosen as the economic cell form of bourgeois society (4). Leaving aside the rather sweeping analogy with the entire history of western science by which Marx arrives at this metaphor, we are, I think, led quite directly to the reasons for his choice of beginning by this hint. Though we can now see from the Paris Manuscripts and the Grundrisse that Marx did not begin his own investigations in this way, he was surely justified in believing that this presentation of those investigations has as its beginning the simplest element of contemporary economic life as it appears (5). Two senses of "simple" are played upon here. The commodity does at every moment in the vast majority of transactions present itself as the unit of economic life, and this is a simple, easily recognisable beginning. But, as it is to be argued throughout Capital, it possesses this character only because it is simple in that it is the unit (the cell, we might agree bearing the biology of Marx's time in mind) of bourgeois wealth (6). To look at everyday economic transactions would reveal a great number of possible common determinations: the use of money, the motivation of utility, etc. Furthermore, the commodity can itself
be analytically broken down - Marx himself proceeds to do this. However, it is the commodity that is the end point of any heuristic abstraction or simplification which would preserve in their unity the specific characteristics which identify the capitalist mode of production (7). The commodity is, in a phrase, the fundamental element of generalised commodity production and is, therefore, the proper place to begin an explanation of capitalism (8). Marx's choice of beginning is, then, one which is intended to direct our attention to the fundamental unit of capitalism as a specific mode of production (9).

This is a beginning which can be justified only by the explanatory power of what follows from it, for the identification of capitalism as a particular mode of production obviously must underpin, after being shown to be demonstrable from, the singling out of the commodity as the fundamental element of a specific form of production. It is our grasp of this specific form that will enable us to understand the peculiar characteristics of a historical type of production. This would not be possible if we took an element to be found in all economic transactions, say the element of utility, as our starting point in explaining specific transactions. Indeed, a counterpoint between the two sense of simplicity we have discussed here, between the commonplace character of the commodity as it appears and
the peculiarity which is uncovered in it as it is shown to be the element of specifically bourgeois wealth, is a persistent ordering theme of the three volumes of *Capital*, as Marx sets about explaining the former simplicity by means of the latter (10).

Marx's tack of selecting the commodity as his starting place is one about which we should be clear. He is trying to establish a real social structure, of specifically capitalist social relations of production, as necessary for the explanation of the features of a specific set of economic transactions. The structure is posited through explanatory requirements which it is to subsequently satisfy. Marx undoubtedly has a certain realist confidence in the presence of this structure as an actually existing determining influence on empirical human conduct which he will pit against alternative, including the most common, understandings of that conduct which tend to deny the influence, or indeed existence, of that structure.

**Regular Exchange and Generalised Commodity Production**

The use-value and exchange-value of a commodity are distinguished by Marx under the dualisms of quality and quantity and substance and magnitude. The particular use-value of a commodity rests in the peculiar qualities which it possesses by virtue of its intrinsic natural
properties. Though, as we have seen, Marx was well enough aware that such properties may constitute a use-value only though being recognised as useful, he emphasises the intrinsic character of the use-value (11) by, in line with classic philosophic usage, denoting this quality as the commodity's substance. Equally in line with this usage is the problem which arises immediately upon turning to the exchange of these substances. It is precisely the qualitative differences between use-values that is the reason for the exchange of commodities, but how might the exchange of different qualities be proportionally regulated when those qualities constitute different, incommensurable substances?

Certainly when first taken up in this way, any such exchange would seem to be purely arbitrary in this respect; the quite accidental exchange of various proportions of commodities which may turn on any number of reasons, such as we can both easily imagine and recall, specific to the given exchange and not involving any proportional regulation at all (12).

Indeed, as the purposefully comic examples of exchange given in the 1859 Critique (13) indicate, and as Marx observes in so many words in Capital (14), the idea that such regular exchange could take place, according the commodity an inseparable exchange-value, seems absurd. Nevertheless, Marx proceeds to investigate how it is that
such regulation can take place, taking it from the outset of both this section of *Capital* and the latter, more detailed discussion of the elementary or accidental form of value, that exchange-value expresses some regulated commensurability (15). On what grounds did he do this?

These grounds are by no means readily apparent. Marx's overt argument for taking this course is that two different qualities can be exchanged only after they have been reduced to quantitative differences of the same unit, that is to say, after they have been rendered commensurable. He gave in direct support of this logical case analogies drawn from geometry (16), physics (17) and chemistry (18). But we can readily see that the whole argument which Marx formulates itself presumes the proportional regulation of exchange, and being an inquiry into how it can take place can hardly prove that it does. It is not correct, however, to imply that Marx provides no argument which is pertinent to his taking of this course. The brief comments on Bailey which are found at points within the section on the elementary form, to the effect that he paid insufficient attention to the very form of value because he exclusively focused only upon the quantitative aspects, seems very promising, but these comments were only written up fragments of *Theories of Surplus Value* and any longer discussion was therefore denied to *Capital's* readers before Kautsky. We can, of course, turn to the manuscript, where we are lead to the
quite long section in which Bailey's particular contribution to the disintegration of the Ricardian school is considered (19). From this, together with the discussion of the anonymous Observations on Certain Verbal Disputes etc. (20), which Marx thought Bailey closely followed on these points (21), we can see the whole writing up of the presentation of capitalist exchange according to inseparable exchange-value as it began.

Bailey's polemic against the entire Ricardian attempt to determine a measure of value took the form (22) of an accusation that there were really only an infinite number of accidental equations of the relative value of various commodities, and that therefore a theory of value such as that aimed at by Ricardo illegitimately attempted to render absolute that which was purely relative. The cause of this scholastic illusion on the part of Ricardo was a misunderstanding of money's role as a universal mediator of exchange. That money could play this part did not mean, as Bailey alleged Ricardo took it to mean, that it was an absolute, invariant measure of value, for it could and did vary infinitely in value. It could nevertheless be a universal mediator, as its variations did not of course effect the relative magnitudes of commodity values expressed in it as these would vary uniformly. Money thus in fact expressed the essential relativity of value (23).
Marx recognised that Bailey had in this way cast a valuable light on the manner in which money could function as a measure of value, and he evidently drew to some degree upon this (24) when reaching his own conclusion that money must have a variable value (25). But as Marx's ability to incorporate this within the labour theory of value testifies, Bailey's disposal of the idea of an invariant measure hardly secures the position that value was thereby only relative. Drop the requirement that value be invariant (and Ricardo's commitment to this is by no means as clear cut as Bailey assumes (26)), and the argument against an "absolute" value formally falls. This cannot, I think, be shown more clearly than it was by Marx himself in criticism of the use of such an argument by Broadhurst, who would seem to have been taken as an exemplar in *Capital* only because of the economy of his formulations as he is not discussed elsewhere in Marx's economic writings and as he obviously was not the first to state the case. I therefore quote; firstly, the passage from Broadhurst:

> Once admit that A falls, because B, with which it is exchanged, rises, while no less labour is bestowed in the meantime on A, and your general principle of value falls to the ground... If (Ricardo) allowed that when A rises in value relative to B, B falls in value relatively to A, he cut away the ground on which he rested his grand proposition, that the value of a commodity is ever determined by the labour embodied in it; for if a change in the cost of A alters not only its own relation to B, for which it is exchanged, but also the value of B relatively to that of A, though no change has taken
place in the quantity of labour needed to produce B, then not only the doctrine falls to the ground which asserts that the quantity of labour bestowed on an article regulates its value, but also that which affirms that the cost of an article regulates its value. (27);

and, secondly, Marx's comment on this:

Mr. Broadhurst might just as well say: consider the fractions 10/20, 10/50, 10/100, etc. The number 10 remains unchanged, and yet its proportional magnitude, its magnitude in relation to the numbers 20, 50, 10 continually diminishes. Therefore, the great principle that the magnitude of a whole number, such as 10, is "regulated" by the number of times the number 1 is contained in it falls to the ground. (28).

The exposure of such an error in itself is of much less significance than noting the step in the direction of vulgar economics which allows it. Bailey's writings of the 1820s were part of a polemical attack against the Ricardian theory of value's inability to square with certain immediately available characteristics of the capitalist economy such as the equalisation of the rate of profit, and it was spurred on by Ricardo's frank but nonetheless increasingly disingenuous admission of exceptions to his theory (29). Clearly Bailey's efforts, and those of others at the time, were aimed not at developing Ricardo but at doing away with the core of his work, dismissing as a scholastic invention the very basis of any investigation of regular exchange. Bailey's political economy was to end with relative exchanges of commodities, the values entering those relative exchanges accordingly being regarded as naturally given properties (30). This result was used by Marx in Capital to illustrate the nadir of the fetishistic confusion of the
natural and social (31).

Obviously an explanation of exchange-value, given Marx's establishment of the necessity of social explanation, must go further at precisely the point where Bailey breaks off and would have Ricardo break off (32). Time and again Marx insists that the point is to examine how regular proportional exchange can take place, and that there must be a qualitative equalisation of different use-values into commensurable quantities for it to do so. The argument worked up in Capital, even down to a version of the analogies with geometry and physics (33), is given many times in this section of the Theories, and Marx had little difficulty in formally refuting the logic of Bailey's attempt to relativise value. But the acceptance of the plausibility of Marx's particular explanatory tack and the formal arguments for this, cannot be secured without explication of why that tack is necessary (and possible, as we shall see later), and why it allows convincing formal arguments to be marshalled to its aid. However, the display of the conviction that Bailey is fundamentally diminishing political economy's explanatory power, which emerges far more clearly from the Theories than from Capital, gives us all the lead we need in this respect.

In arguing about what is necessary for exchange to take place, Marx is not giving a second-order rationalisation
of exchange, but an, as it were, first person account of what goes on in the capitalist mode of production. We can conceive rationales of certain acts of exchange which are certainly specific to those acts, and recognising this would seem to cut out the power of Marx's argument to ground the necessity of undertaking his projected explanation. But he is directly drawing our attention to an actual process of reduction to qualitatively equalised units and quantitative commensuration of the magnitudes of these units that does, as a matter of fact, take place, allowing the generalised exchange of innumerable use-values in regular, definite proportions that is the principal characteristic of bourgeois economic life (34). He is, in a phrase, trying to describe the real social structure of capitalist exchange (35). This becomes rather more clear in later passages of Capital (36), where Marx describes the actual historical development of the specific form of proportionally regular exchange which he wants to investigate (37). This interpretation of Marx's taking regular exchange as given is directly confirmed by certain passages of the Grundrisse and the Theories (38) and it is also supported by following up the textual links between such passages and Marx's writings of the early 1840s. This reveals that Marx initially took up these themes in an ethical evaluation of capitalist universal exchange as constituting the universal venality of bourgeois society (39). It is a requirement of the explanation of capitalist production
that justifies Marx's criticism of Bailey for neglecting the qualitative aspects of exchange (40).

The Common Denominator of Exchange

As we have seen, Marx gives a number of logical arguments and natural scientific analogies in order to demonstrate that for proportionally regulated exchange to take place there must be a reduction of the qualitatively different objects to be exchanged to commensurable quantities of the same unit. Though these devices cannot, as Marx seems to think they can, establish proportional regulation as essential for exchange, once we accept exchange in this sense as taking place they do show, and Marx wants them to do this as well, that some quantitatively mensurable common denominator is necessary (41).

Such a conclusion can claim realist support as it is arrived at by the use of formalised argument to deepen given experience, in this case of capitalist exchange. Everyone knows, as Marx later says, that distinct from their various shapes as use-values, commodities have such a quantitatively mensurable denominator - money (42). Let us note here only the force of the observation of the denominator; to consider money itself at this point is to run rather ahead in the argument.
Use-value and the Common Denominator of Exchange

In turning to the examination of this denominator, Marx's first conclusion is that it cannot inhere in commodities' use-values. Two related arguments to this effect may be found in *Capital*. Firstly, as it is the qualitative differences between use-values that motivate their exchange, this aspect of the commodity does not have the essential uniformity which allows of their quantitative comparison - one bed is equal to two chairs is an absurd statement (43). This again is a formal explication of the experience of capitalist commodity exchange, making clear what goes on in the typical obliteration of the qualitative differences of use-values when commodities are assessed in respect of exchange-value; when £100 worth of anything is equivalent to £100 worth of anything else (44).

From this argument we reach a second. If we bring two different use-values together, though we may well express their worth in relative amounts of each other, this cannot be done by actually equating them themselves, but only through the mediation of a third quality, one which is common to, but distinguishable from both. Thus one bed can equal two chairs because both constitute the same amount of their denominator. The thing to note in this context is that the denominator cannot be the actual object of the exchange but must be a third quality (45).
Now, for some purposes this denominator can, as Marx's analogies infer, refer to the natural characteristics of the commodity which go to make up its use-value. A bed and a chair can be equated in terms of mass, volume, analysis of composite materials, etc. But it is the unique configuration of an object's properties that makes it desirable as a specific use-value, and thus resolution into these properties, though perfectly possible, cannot lead to the common denominator we are seeking for as a regulator of exchange.

The aim of this argument is to criticise the direct attribution of exchange-value to the intrinsic qualities of natural objects, so that a commodity seems naturally endowed with a certain worth. We will take this up in detail later. At this point I would like to mention that it is the making of such an attribution in the earliest formulations of marginalism, (apart from Gossen of course) that draws Marx's only comments on this then nascent current of economic thought. In the 1859 Critique he briefly observes, and in the first edition of Capital he repeats, that the sorts of information that are gathered in attempts to relate worth directly to natural properties belongs only in commercial catalogues (46), and not, by implication, in political economy. Against such blunt attempts to derive value from inner worth, Marx's arguments show that what attempts to explain exchange-value as a natural property rest upon is

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not acceptable as such a residuum. Explanation of exchange-value calls for some further account of how the purported equation of different qualities can take place. To put this another way; it is no explanation of exchange-value to tautologically ascribe it to an intrinsic worth of the commodity when not only has natural science never revealed exchange-value in a natural object (47), but when even if it did so it would remain to be understood how judgments of worth based upon it can be made in a proportionally regular fashion. It is even less of an explanation when in fact such judgments seem quite impossible on the basis claimed. How can one bed equal two chairs?

Marx so far concludes that such an equality cannot inhere in the natural properties of commodities as it is impossible to see how a proportionally regular equation of them is to be constructed out of these properties. The thrust of such direct attributions of worth to natural properties is to remove the distinction between use-value and exchange-value, but I believe that Marx has successfully demonstrated that explanation of the latter calls, at least at an initial stage, for their analytic separation (48).

**Labour and Value**

If then, continues Marx, we disregard use-values, only
one property is left common to all commodities - that of being the products of labour. Once we have abstracted from use-value, all commodities tell us is that they are congealed quantities of human labour. It is as units of this social substance that they have value, the common denominator of their exchange (49). We have reached the first expressions of the labour theory of value. I should like to leave aside for the moment the description of "human labour" by which Marx tries to show how this is to play the part of the quantitative denominator which we are seeking and consider the very plausibility of the basic idea of the labour theory of value as so far expressed.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to note a shift in the subjects of our discussion. Labour is put forward as the constituent of value and value as the basis of proportionally regulated exchange. Though the entire argument so far would lead one to expect that value is directly related to price, Marx, although not sufficiently clearly, leaves the character of this relation quite open and in fact he will argue that it cannot be one of direct proportion. Recalling the earlier argument that the common denominator cannot be either of the objects to be exchanged but must be a third quality, we can see how Marx leaves a space for his later distinction. An exchange-value, strictly speaking, is a relational term expressing the proportional exchange of
two or more objects. One bed is equal to two chairs is an exchange-value. But this is only the form of the expression of the denominator which sets the proportionality and mediates the exchange. What is actually going on in the equation of the bed and the chairs is the recognition that these things may be mediated by a common denominator, which is value. This is all one can say so far. It would be wrong to move immediately on to saying that a bed has twice as much value as a chair because this would presume that exchange-value is a direct expression of value, and we do not yet know whether or not this is so. Exchange-value is then, to be quite precise, the form of expression of value (50), which form will be subjected to detailed investigation later in *Capital*. The commodity is now shown to be analytically resolvable into a dichotomy of use-value and value, not use-value and exchange-value, and in the development of this third term of "value" Marx gives a name to the real social structure at which he is driving in his comments on Bailey. As Marx says, initially treating exchange-value and value as equivalent could do no harm so long as we are aware of the problem of the value-form, and doing so did give us a certain purchase on the immediately accessible characteristics of the commodity from which we could begin (51). At the moment we must be sure in our grasp of value as that component of the commodity other than its use-value; as that component which is the ground of exchange; and as
that component which represents the labour expended in realising the use-value of the commodity.

What we have of course to immediately ask is whether this presentation, stated generally in order that we might avoid qualifications which could as yet only obscure the main point, is correct? There are at first glance some anomalous cases which run counter to the constellation of the concepts of commodity, use-value, exchange-value, value and labour which Marx has now presented (52), and in explanation of those concepts he takes up such cases (53).

A thing can be a use-value and be a product of labour without being a commodity. We have, I trust, already dealt sufficiently with the identification of capitalism as generalised commodity production to see that this case is not really an anomaly but directly follows from and strongly supports the depiction of capitalism as a specific mode of the general production of use-values. However, a number of further points of importance follow from this case and these will be discussed in a moment. Rather of the same theoretical consequence as this first case is a second, which arises when a commodity is a product of labour but has no value as the commodity produced has no use-value and thus cannot be exchanged. Again this case can be easily seen to fit in with what Marx has said of the dichotomy of use-value and value
rather than to pose problem for that dichotomy, though again some interesting corollaries remain to be discussed.

Amongst the anomalous cases which Marx sets out, the one we are about to discuss is distinguished from the other two in that it by no means easily falls into place in Marx's analysis of the commodity (54). A thing, Marx observes, can be a use-value without being a value. This is a rather imprecise way of putting the case, for if we quite properly regard value as the representation of labour in commodity production, then this anomaly merely restates the first which we have discussed, where labour is present in a form other than value in a different mode of production. But as is made quite clear by a brief look at the list of things which Marx considers to fall under this case, a list including air and natural meadows, this case is one of the possession of value by objects which are not the products of labour.

Even with this made clear, there are still difficulties in seeing what is meant by Marx. Considering the two examples of air and natural meadows which have been mentioned, it would seem that including both in the same list is to ignore important distinctions. Air, let us allow, has never appeared as a commodity, and thus regarding it as a use-value presents no difficulty for the labour theory of value. Indeed we might say that air
is a use-value but not a commodity because it has no value. This would however by very rash, because natural meadows, which may also have a use-value not produced by labour, do of course appear as commodities. I have given a reference to Marx's noting of this problem in 1859, and in fact he had before this set out the essentials of its solution (55), a solution which he had drafted in expanded form in volume three before this list in volume one which we are discussing went to press (56). We can be sure, then, that we are not dealing with some terrible slip (57); and, bearing in mind the earlier distinction between value and exchange-value, it is possible to look forward to Marx's thoughts on rent and such matters without being convinced beforehand that they are casuistic. Indeed it transpires that Marx has, in fact, chosen his words rather carefully in this particular respect. He does not deny that natural meadows may have an exchange-value, rather he denies that they have a value, and he believes that rent is based upon and determined by the basic structure of value in commodity production though the meadows themselves have no value. We must then suspend our judgment until we have considered his account of the distance between value and its expression in exchange-value, of which the theory of rent is an important part. However, some general comments on the character of this distance are in order at this point, for we are not pursuing the knowledge, uninteresting in itself, that exchange of use-values
unmediated by labour is reconcilable with the labour theory of value, but rather Marx's claim that we need this theory in order to explain even these exchanges. Natural meadows have use-value; they also can be commodities. Now, there can be nothing in their use-value that makes the meadows necessarily commodities, for that use-value can be realised without the meadow entering economic life as a commodity at all. We need one further account of why the potential to be commodities which the meadows' use-value affords them is realised. This way of putting the issue here sets out one explanatory aim of the labour theory of value (58), the aim which concerns us here.

Let us take a rather simple model of commodity production (59). Goods are produced and are to be exchanged. They have no use-value for their producers, who wish to realise their exchange-value in order to purchase other goods which do have a use-value for themselves. Such producers produce independently, or rather individually, for they require each other for the full satisfaction of their needs. In the production of commodities for exchange, deliberate regulation of this social interchange is typically absent. Individual decisions about what to produce and what to exchange in what proportion for what other goods can only be arrived at in the market place. That is to say, after the act of individual production. Such decisions are obviously made
with reference to the use-values of the commodities, but we must note that investigation of this reference is theoretically subsequent to recognising that these decisions are situated at a distinct ontological level of the social relations of the division of labour (60). We can recall Marx introducing this labour theory of value by saying that if we abstract from their use-values, commodities are congealed labour, and that it is as units of this social substance that they have value. This formulation immediately runs together private labour and social exchange in a way which in retrospect reveals that we are dealing with the set of social relations which govern even the individually undertaken labours of commodity production. That is to say, we are dealing with the social relations which form the division of labour in commodity production, social relations which posit seemingly independent individual producers. In so far as these relations are mediated through the value which appears intrinsic to the commodity when the commodity is brought to the market place and the exchange of commodities takes place, then value is the social component of the commodity.

I have mentioned that it is rather stretching a point to say that a commodity's use-value is inherent in it. However, so long as we remain aware that the specific relation between a commodity's natural properties and its use-value is a product of use, this way of speaking
provides a useful contrast with which to address value. For looked at in this way, use-value is distinguished from value in that it has ontological foundations directly in the natural properties of the commodity which are quite absent from the social relation of production which make that use-value present itself as a commodity. The difference is not so much that labour is present in value. This is a misleading way of putting the point, as we can see from noting that labour is usually present in use-values as well. It is that labour is the object of the social relation of value, whereas utility is the object of use-value. If it is human relations with nature that are described by use-value, it is the social relations of production which govern those relations with nature that are described by value. The distances between natural properties, use-value and the social relation of value are opened up by the separation of use-value and value. Examination of these distances can, as they must, now follow. But any such examination will necessarily be inadequate if it does not start from the knowledge that what are at issue are the social relations of the direction of labour. Moving from positions where we (necessarily of course) begin with the phenomenal appearance that value is a natural property of commodities, we must first show that labour is the principle of the social direction of labour in capitalism. When accomplished this task becomes the preliminary to the explanation of why labour is socially
directed through the mystified form of value, which is the real crux of the identification of capitalism as generalised commodity production.

I would like to sum up what I have just said about value. Value emerges as a mystified principle of the social direction of labour, which principle remains to be investigated. It is basically only a presumption, then, to imagine that value is the directly proportional measure of labour. Such a presumption has no relation to actually understanding what value is as a given social structure. Marx continually urged this point against the utopian socialism of especially Proudhon, which sets its desired measure of labour against what, because they do not conform to this ideal standard, are the defective measures of capitalistic value (61). Marx continually stresses that what he is dealing with is value as it is actually present for empirical investigation (62), dealing with understandings and assessments of value as they have become, as a matter of fact, cemented by custom (63). Value might be a perfectly irrational measure of labour, or it might measure it with complete precision. We do not yet know. Though we have to come to some opinion about the validity of value's representation of labour in order to understand that representation, what we must not thereby do is simply give a moralistic pronouncement based on that opinion without understanding why that representation has actually become socially
dominant. However, I must say that Marx continually allows some determinations of the relation of value and labour which belong to this latter part of the investigation to enter into his presentation at far too early a stage, giving the erroneous impression that he himself conceived of value as some precise measure of labour by the use of which he will recalculate capitalistic assessments of labour's just economic desserts (64) in precisely the way he regarded as utopian.

Bearing the substance of Marx's idea of value in mind, we can now see our anomalous cases in another light. Marx can, we recall, allow that something may be a product of labour but not have a value because it cannot be exchanged. This obviously could not be so if he regarded value as his own measure of labour, for then an input of labour would constitute value irrespective of other conditions. But equally obviously Marx can allow this denial of value to some labour if we take value as the given principle of the social direction of labour under generalised commodity production, a principle which is quite prepared to negate any amount of labour if that labour's product has no use-value which will lead to its exchange. This is to say in fact that the labour's product has no socially endorsed use-value. It is the production of goods not merely for the use of someone other than the producer but for exchange understood as
this oblique general social direction of individual producers that distinguishes commodity production.

Natural meadows can of course be said to have a use-value which is in no way the product of labour. But if we regard value as the principle of the social direction of labour under commodity production and not as a substance composed of labour, then the possibility that the utilisation of the use-value of the meadows should come under that principle, irrespective of that use-value's not initially being a product of labour, clearly emerges as one it is important to pursue. For we see that this case certainly falls under what we are trying to understand; the direction of labour. Natural meadows may have an exchange-value because their, as it were, original use-value can be ultimately utilised only through labour, and that labour is organised through the structure of value. Air, by contrast, has not been regulated by value or any other form of economic organisation because its utilisation in breathing defies the mediation of labour. Or, more specifically with regard to capitalism, defies subordination to the position where it is utilisable only through such mediation, that is to say, being rendered private property (65). Air is a gift of nature as much as natural meadows, and yet its economic position is significantly quite different (66). If it should be quibbled that in some special cases air is rendered
subject to commodity production, then this quibble, which certainly turns on the provision of air through the mediation of labour, surely reinforces the belief we have reached that with value we are dealing with an ontological structure of the social which must be distinguished from the given natural, which we must allow an effective place in the determination of specific form of human relations with nature (67).

Abstract Labour

In claiming that when we disregard the use-values of commodities only the common property of being the products of social labour remains, Marx observes that our view of the commodity has radically altered. Its sensuous characteristics and the use-value which is based upon these are removed; it remains only as a product of labour. Having grasped this dual character of the commodity itself, we are able to recognise that the labour involved in its production must also have a dual character, a new side to which character has now also emerged. For labour is no longer to us a specific act or type of work. If the sensuous characters of commodities no longer interest us, then neither do the particular types of work - tailoring, spinning, metalwork, etc. - which realise those characters as use-values. As opposed to these, as it were, concrete labours, what Marx is now trying to drive at is the idea of abstract labour (68).
If we abstract from the characters of concrete labours, we are left with just the simple fact of the expenditure of human effort. Marx's argument certainly makes it seem that he conceives of arriving at abstract labour through some reduction of different labours to a common index of biological energy expanded or some such physiological quanta. Now, such a reduction from tailoring to amounts of energy is impossible, as has often enough been pointed out in criticism of the idea of abstract labour (69). However, not only does such a reduction speak of the kind of materialism which Marx thought mechanical, thereby contradicting the way Marx posits conscious intention as integral to the labour process, but Marx himself is in fact here affirming this impossibility. As there can be no reduction of qualitatively different use-values to a common denominator, there cannot be such a reduction of the labour which produced those use-values. And even were such a reduction possible, the resulting physiological quanta would remain in the realm of the natural, and we know that the common quality of the commodity which we seek is social.

Indeed, the peculiarity of the dual character of labour lies in the necessity of concrete labours being different, for their products must have different use-values in order to exchange (70). We are in fact dealing with the social interdependence of specialised
individual labours that is the division of labour (which is of course a condition of commodity production although, as Marx tells us (71), the converse does not thereby follow). The abstract side of labour's dual character is the mechanism of social or mutual command of labours in commodity production; the analogue in wage-labour of value in the commodity.

If commodity exchange is in essence proportionally regular, as value is determined by the amount of capitalism's resources of productive labour needed to realise the use-values of particular commodities, it follows that the social side of the dual character of labour must equally render labour quantitatively calculable. This is the specific quality of abstract labour. In it all types of labour and all degrees of skill displayed in labour are reduced to the exercise of a general labour capacity or labour power, whose measure is duration in time.

Marx immediately tries to leave no doubt as to what he means by abstract labour by saying that if the value of the commodity is determined by the quantity of labour needed for its production, then it would seem that the less able the worker who produced it the more valuable would be the commodity, as that commodity would then take a longer time to make. This is not so, however, because we are dealing with socially necessary labour-time, that
is, "the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the conditions of production normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labour prevalent in that society" (72). In bourgeois society this average is rigorously enforced. The law of commodity production is that anybody whose productive activity chronically falls beneath the average may not be able, due to competition, to valorise his product as a value proportionate to the time he or she spent on it. And in developed capitalist production this necessity is felt by wage-labourers through factory discipline (73) in what Marx called the real subsumption of labour to capitalist production (74). By the same social token, the degree of productivity in use-value terms of this average or simple labour will vary with changes in productive resources. Or, put another way, what counts as simple labour at one point may well be below average after a rise in the general level of productivity.

The dichotomy of concrete and abstract labours is by no means an ideal way of describing the social direction of labour at which Marx is trying to drive with this dichotomy. In this respect a better, and seemingly more natural, dualism might well be that of individual and social labours (75). But we must be careful not to extinguish an important shade of meaning in abstract labour, for by this term Marx means not only social
labour, common to all modes of production, but the specifically capitalist form of social labour. This specific form is abstract in the sense of being based on a quantitative abstraction from qualitative forms of labour, and the confusions this no doubt puts in the way of grasping the sociality of labour follows from the capitalist form of social labour. If, as I would say is the case, the social character of abstract labour emerges more clearly in the 1859 Critique because of the direct social locutions Marx uses there, this is because in Capital's various editions the term becomes increasingly intimately bound up with the statement of specifically capitalist conditions. (I do not, let me repeat, deny that nonetheless Marx's way of presenting his idea is unsatisfactory, and I will turn to this in the next chapter).

Though we have arrived at abstract labour as the social denominator of individual productive effort which allows of their mutual command through exchange, this is not to say that we have discovered some easily realisable socialist truth of capitalism. Capitalism certainly does rest on an essential sociality which it denies, and the significance of knowing this is impossible to exaggerate. But it does this by resting on a sociality which denies itself. Formulating the labour theory does not socialise capitalism, because ultimately the sociality it reveals is one which obstructs the conscious grasp of its own
existence (76). In abstract labour what is missing is precisely the recognition of the fundamental equality of all labours, as exercises of human power, which would stress their mutually interdependent, social character and would allow of their common, conscious, planned direction. Such conscious regulation recognises all labours as instances of an essential human activity, conterminous with human life, mediating human existence in nature. Any conceivable conscious economic planning requires the recognition of human equality as a minimum condition. If it takes one day to build a wall, and two days to make a coat, then planning must take note of this of course, and such recognition involves some commitment to being able to place both labours under the plan. But in abstract labour we have the quantitative equalisation or equation of labours, which is something quite different, a perverted form of equality. We say that a coat is worth twice as much as a wall. But this is absurd. It is in itself meaningless and really comprehensible only through a distanced commentary. Such expressions are, however, the only bourgeois way of grasping the social equality of labours.

This may seem a nice point; but rather it is of the very greatest importance. The difference of worth and planned allocation of labour emerges most clearly when we consider that plans could embrace criteria of production - say organisation of labour to maximise enjoyment of
that labour or to minimise environmental damage - which are externalities when judged by their worth. And here we come to what is peculiarly capitalist about abstract labour as a specific form of social labour. Abstract labour is the abstraction of concrete labours down to a unit expenditure of effort. It may be retorted that there is no way of doing this, and indeed there is no defensible way. But it is, as Marx says, an abstraction that is performed every day in capitalist society (77). It is a suppression of the concrete individualities of labours and skills in performing labours (78) in order to make them available to a production that is interested in their contributions to quantitative value only (79), the measure of that quantity being time (80). With the commodity being assessed in this way, so is the labour which makes it up. Abstract labour is not labour shown to be mutually social, but rather labour reduced to quantitative units. Value is the necessary quantitative measure of the proportional exchange that is the social bond of bourgeois society. Labour which constitutes value can be socially relevant for production only in so far as it can be reduced to quantitative value components. This reduction is a real process conterminous with capitalist production, though of differing significance at different periods of capitalism's development. It is a process often called de-skilling, a name which captures the abstraction in abstract labour most neatly (81). This abstraction is at
the root of the instrumentality of working class attitudes to labour (82). As such, abstract labour is a very substantial political-economic fleshing out of Marx's early characterisation of capitalist wage-labour as an alienation of the quintessential human activity of conscious, productive work (83).

If we have found labour to be the content of value, we must be clear that it is not the labour of individuals who overtly unite their efforts but abstract labour that leads to value; the labour which is given as wage-labour. In uncovering abstract labour, we uncover the ground of value. It is not a form of labour which makes clear the social ground of the individual giving of labour, but rather socially unites individual labours in a mystified way, by reducing them one-sidedly to their duration in time (84). This reduction is to the quantitative, mechanical side of labour, and this militates against the development of other sides. Paradoxically, then, abstract labour's suppression of its social dimension has the direct result of extinguishing individual satisfaction in the giving of labour.

Value and Its Expression in Exchange-value in the Criticism of Fetishism

So far my account of the first chapter of Capital has basically moved from the immediately available
characteristics of the commodity to the labour theory of value, following I trust the development of Marx's own argument in the first two sections of the chapter. A quite crucial element of this argument is that Marx intends it to refute what he identifies as the fetishistic ideology through which the commodity's characteristics are normally understood. Let us now turn to this part of his case.

The Value-form

Marx sets out from the simple, isolated or accidental form of value (85), in which the single statement x commodity A is worth y commodity B describes the principle of the exchange of two goods. What we have here is a description of the historically earliest and thereby equally the most intrinsically simple form of exchange, in which isolated acts of exchange take place in a context of basically non-exchange (though with various sizes of subsistence unit) economies (86). These exchanges will be almost accidental initially, but with increasing volume of exchange a proportional regulation develops in custom which cuts against this accidental quality and begins to develop all the essential characteristics of value. For the proportions are, with development of the volume of exchange and of competition, fixed not by traditional assessments of merit in the work or its just price but by evaluations of necessary
labour-time established through what, in increasingly a context of competitive selling, the commodity will realise in exchange (87).

The simple form automatically passes into a distinct form with expansion of the volume of exchange. This is the total or expanded form (88), in which a whole series of goods find commodity expression in equivalents of each other. Thus x commodity A is worth y commodity B, z commodity C, etc. Instead of being brought into relation with one commodity in an isolated act of exchange, each commodity is known to be in proportional relation to a large number of others, these relative valuations being established through a large volume of exchange. The possibility of this attests, as we have seen, to the real existence of some denominator of the social exchange of these naturally distinct goods, and with the existence of the expanded form of value we have reached the position where value is the medium of a large amount of economic activity. The bringing of commodities to market in enough volume to form this expanded idea of a good's worth testifies to value's supplanting traditional organisations of labour (89).

This expanded form clearly does not meet the requirements of generalised exchange, and it has itself passed into a further form with the development of this level of exchange, the general form (90). In the expanded form,
no commodity can really be said to have a clear, definite exchange-value, for that value is given in a virtually infinite and ever-changing set of relative expressions. General exchange on this basis is impossible, for the form speaks of production that is still linked to specific acts of barter, though increasingly barter conducted according to calculations of value, and not to the mere possibility of exchange as such, to exchange with anything. In the general form, one commodity is singled out as the general equivalent, and all other commodities have a quantitative value relative to the general equivalent. From the point of view of social relations of production, any commodity could of course stand as this general equivalent. In pre-capitalist modes of production, the development of a large volume of exchange may lead to the singling out of the commodity in most general demand as the general equivalent. Here again we see that it is basically the resolution of the demands of barter with a developing volume of exchange that orders the development. Another form of development from the general form is possible, however, the money-form (91), and this form is essential for (though not of course unique to) capitalism. For in the money form, it is not the common utility of the general equivalent commodity that is its most important property. It is rather, we might say, its lack of direct utility (92). For the commodity functions as the repository of exchangeability as such. It is set apart from all other
commodities by virtue of being the general equivalent. It is the mark of the well developed possibility of exchange, for possession of money does not itself afford any utility (or very little) to the owner. Rather, through possession of money the owner has a special command on all other commodities. The money form can be distinguished from the general form as such because of the clear representation in the former of exchangeability as such in a well developed commodity economy. The precious metals have conquered the position of money in bourgeois societies, and amongst the reasons why this is so are their ability, because they are so difficult to come by, to encompass a great social value in relatively little bulk; their ability as metals to be divided into precise quantitative units by weight; and their ability to be made into a form which will facilitate circulation (93).

The most important thing to understand about Marx's discussion of the value-form is the great distance he means to travel in moving from value to price. We can see from the Grundrisse that he arrived at his most sophisticated views on the fetishistic character of money in a critical dialogue with what he thought were utopian attempts to make money directly represent labour-time (94), as part of what we have already discussed as his general attitude to Proudhonism. The large time spent on this in the Grundrisse is written up only briefly in the
Critique (95) and appears merely as footnotes in Capital (96). The fruits of this contraction are that the heart of the issue of the difference between price and value is available in very brief form in Capital. Why money does not directly represent labour-time, Marx says in the last of his footnotes on the point, "comes down simply to the question why, on the basis of commodity production, the products of labour must take the form of commodities". For money, or any medium of circulation, to directly represent labour-time, labour itself must be undertaken through a general social plan. In such a plan, a certain amount of labour-time might well be directly credited to whoever performed it by its meriting a certain amount of medium of circulation. For the labour is socially credited as deserving the reward of that amount of the medium before the labour is carried out. Such social recognition is precisely what is absent from commodity production, and money is a development of commodity production. As we have seen, labour in commodity production is invested in a commodity for sale, and that labour is socially credited only through the sale of the commodity. It is not the labour which is the subject of sale, it is the commodity. We know that the very possibility of proportional exchange involves recognition of labour-time, and that it is the social bringing together of individual labours invested in commodities that is the real issue in an economy of general division of labour and commodity production.
Nevertheless, these social relations are established only through the exchange of commodities. It is commodity exchange that is the object of this exercise, not the direct representation of labour-time.

It follows from this that there is the possibility of quantitative divergence between value and price bound up in the very existence of a developed money form (97). Of course, a commodity may not be bought because it has no use-value, and therefore the labour in it is not socially rewarded at all, but let us leave this aside and consider the following. Two people produce the same desired use-value. It may take the first one day and the second two. If price directly measured exchange-value, the latter product would exchange for twice the former product. But of course such an exchange is not what would take place. The former person would be able to sell his or her product and expand his or her production if he or she so wished, whilst the latter typically would be unable to sell his or her product at all. It may be thought that price is therefore an imperfect measuring device. But rather we should not regard the equitable planning, measure and reward of labour as leading to the development of money price, but rather see the exchange of commodities as the peculiar basis of general money. When the issue is the buying and selling of commodities, and when the production of commodities will be open to continuous competition in methods, money's diversions
from value are an absolute necessity. In capitalism, competition will constantly alter the rewards for different labours according to the changing of the socially necessary conditions of production that is endemic to the search for surplus value. Indeed, Marx thought that competition between capitals for commodity sales realising the highest possible profit would always, as it were, redistribute surplus value. Because greater amounts of capital would be attracted to areas of higher surplus value, commodities would more or less never sell at their value under capitalism but at a production price set by the effect of supply and demand on the profit of different branches of production (98).

To regard Marx’s labour theory of value as a direct quantitative account of price is, then, a mistake. Not only is money fetishistic in that it allows of the understanding of social relations only through a mystifying material form, making all commodities and especially money itself seem to have an intrinsic natural value, but also money is necessarily not a direct quantitative measure of labour-time, giving a real distance between price and value. The foremost results of social scientific analysis of the capitalist mode of production reveals the recognition of value, however, both to qualitatively describe the real social structure of that production, and then quantitatively to orient the account of price to an influential starting point which
we can consider supply and demand as modifying (99). Of course the political economy of capitalism must be able to explain price, and perhaps even, given enough boundary data, specific prices (100). However, the ability to calculate price in itself, without extension backwards into the understanding of the specific relations of production, can make virtually no contribution to political economy (101). With such extension, the thereby modified calculations can obviously be of the greatest service in rendering a complete account of the capitalist mode of production (102).

We can mention one further point at which a distance between value and price can be seen. Money is a command of social labour through its ability to be exchanged for all other commodities. It takes this position through a process which is predicated upon value. Once having gained the social pre-eminence of being the general equivalent (103), however, money can of course be used to buy things which do not have a value, and, to put this the other way around, things which do not have a value can have a price. For those who sell the thing without a value will thereby gain a command over almost all other products through possession of money. What is involved here is merely the impinging on other social relations of the economic relation at the heart of the capitalist production.
The rent or purchase of land from land owners whose private property in that land is of pre-capitalist origin is the most economically, in the narrow sense, important such case. The very structure of Marx's explanation of rent shows his overall conception of value most clearly. He makes it explicit that he is investigating the particular capitalist influences upon the rent paid to non-capitalists, and not any other form of land charges (though some extension into other forms are, and could further, I think, be made) (104). Marx certainly believed that the explanation of this rent required the labour theory of value. He accounted for it as being paid out of the super profits available to investment in agriculture due to the typically relatively low organic composition of agricultural capital. The volume of rent is clearly delimited by the size of the deduction from super profits which is possible before agricultural profit to the capitalist declines below that which would be available from industrial investment (105). Such an account of the source of rent obviously does require the labour theory, and as such is to describe the incorporation of pre-capitalist land-holding into the developing value economy.

Perhaps a more generally socially significant social consequence of the dominance of money over other than value relations is the possibility of purchasing human qualities, such as conscience, honour, etc. These might
even come to have a fixed price through custom. With this observation, we have returned to a central theme of Marx's early works - the universal venality of money. This is now an ethical condemnation backed by an unparalleled understanding of the capitalist economy that makes this venality not only possible but to be expected. If, under planning, some unit of circulation was provided which was directly representative of judgments of labour-time, in its inability to ground these consequences of money in other than terms which would overtly condemn the planning authority, this unit would be money only by the most forced stretching of the term (106).

The fundamental conclusion of Marx's analysis of the commodity is that capitalist production engenders a pervasive social alienation represented in the ideology of fetishism. The reworking of Hegelian themes within a new context is, I submit, quite clear, and may stand by itself as it emerged in the foregoing discussion. We must now consider, however, how Marx sets about explaining and defending his own penetration of contemporary alienation.
CHAPTER 10

MARX AND MARGINALISM AS THE SUCCESSORS OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Introduction

Having followed Marx's account of fetishism, I want in this chapter to ask upon what basis he claimed to penetrate this necessary concomitant of capitalist production. If we can regard Marx as having to re-work Hegel's idea of alienation in order to use it in his political economy of capitalism, we can now see that on this fundamental point he must rather more radically depart from Hegel. For the truth which Hegel drew upon to penetrate the alienation of Spirit is, I have argued, and Marx certainly believed, indefensibly grounded. If Marx is to succeed in making his account of modern alienation plausible, he must furnish it with a much firmer ground. I want to look at whether we can regard him as having done so.

The most obvious, but nevertheless the best, way to do this is to explore the ways in which Capital's arguments for the labour theory actually work as a critique of classical political economy. This critique, as we have seen, is Marx's dialogue with the body of bourgeois thought through which he developed - having to start with
this thought but hoping to change it - his socialist account of the capitalist mode of production.

I shall also examine, in what I hope will be an illuminating comparison, the ways in which the classicals have been represented in the subsequent rejection of the labour theory in neo-classical marginalist economics.

**Marx and the Formulation of the Labour Theory in Classical Political Economy**

There is a difficult manoeuvre at the heart of Marx's critique of classical political economy which I want carefully to describe. This manoeuvre involves, firstly, separating out the historically specific elements from the general elements of capitalist production, and showing how bourgeois political economy commits serious mistakes in failing to do this. Secondly, just as importantly but far less widely recognised, Marx has to show how the scientific resources for his critique of political economy are generated by capitalist conditions. For scientific illumination as well as ideological fetishism can both only spring from the given social life.

Let us consider the first part of this manoeuvre by examining in detail one of Marx's criticisms of Ricardo. I have in mind that place in *On Protection to Agriculture*
in which Ricardo contrasts the economics which will hold "as long as society is constituted as it now is" to that which might apply to "Mr. Owen's parallelograms" (1). Marx regarded this passage as testimony to the poverty of Ricardo's imagination of society other than as presently constituted. Indeed, when Ricardo, himself, with reference to Smith's "early and rude state of society" in mind, illustrates his analysis of the magnitude of value by descriptions of the economic conduct of primitive hunters and fishermen (2), one finds, as Marx says in the 1859 Critique (3), that these primitives calculate the value of their tools and labours as if "in accordance with the annuity tables in use on the London Stock Exchange in 1817". Other than Owen's parallelograms, Marx concludes, bourgeois society is the only society Ricardo seems to have been able to countenance. That Ricardo could not even conceive of non-capitalist forms of economic calculation and organisation has the direct consequence that in his political economy the form of value is nowhere examined. Value is regarded as the principle of economic life, and therefore neither requiring nor indeed permitting social investigation (4). Even Ricardo, Marx says in Capital recalling this passage of the 1859 Critique, has his Robinson Crusoe stories (5).

All this is, of course, very familiar. However, the status of Marx's opinion of Ricardo's idea of value
contains, I submit, a number of more complex shades. There is, to begin with this, the way in which Marx insists on the quantitative power of Ricardo's analysis. In the footnote of *Capital* just quoted, Marx says "even Ricardo" because it was of course his opinion that though the explanatory power of Ricardo's writings is bounded by the limitations of historical imagination that identify bourgeois political economy, those writings were the highest achievement of that body of thought. Ricardo's work was the culmination of the productive lines of classical political economy because of both - related points - its firm commitment to labour as the content of value and the quality of its analysis of the magnitude of value (6). Of course, Marx had to recognise the inadequacies of Ricardo's analysis. In the period between Ricardo's death and the writing of the *Paris Manuscripts* exposure of these inadequacies had, as I have mentioned, almost buried the basic labour theory (8). That Marx himself moved from an initial rejection of the labour theory to his eventual characterisation of the disintegration of the Ricardian school as a large regressive step into vulgar economics (9) was possible only because he spent an enormous - but unfinished - effort on completing Ricardo's reconciliation of the influence on price of differing organic compositions of capital and of competition with the labour theory (10). Now, we can hardly say that these considerations on price are external to the labour theory as they are crucial to
the determination of cost price (11) and, therefore, to
the adequacy to the theory as such. However, I would say
that Marx added nothing to Ricardo's determination of the
magnitude of value itself, value rather than price.

Marx mentions Ricardo's Robinsonade because, as political
economists are so fond of these stories, he wants to give
one of them himself (12). We are shown Marx's Robinson
organising his economic life in a way which is intended
to make clear the basic labour theory of value, even to
the least penetrating economist. As anyone who compares
the relevant pages of Capital and of The Principles will
see, there is no difference in method between the
calculations of Ricardo's primitives and Marx's Robinson.
The basic assessments of value according to, in a phrase,
the rarity of the use-value and therefore the amount of
labour needed to actualise it in so far as possible the
desired quantities, or in a word, scarcity, remain the
same. What I believe Marx thought he was doing here was
simply taking over the evaluations of the expenditure of
labour, the various forms reduced to a common
denominator, which he found in the tradition which he
identified as classical political economy, certainly as
he considered it to culminate in Ricardo (13). At least
with respect to Ricardo, we can understand this taking
over quite literally. Marx merely on occasion repeats
some of the basic evaluations for his own purposes (14).
One should stress the obvious, direct intellectual debt here. Marx thought that in classical political economy, in its examination of the determination of the values of different durations and intensities of labour for example (15), there were the most refined reflective contributions to the fixing of values through competitive commodity production that was of the essence of the development of capitalist relations of production. All the principal works of at least English classical political economy display something of the essentially pragmatic tone which emerges so clearly from The Wealth of Nations. Even Ricardo's Principles was written up from a polemic against the corn laws, and this shows throughout the book. In the directness of his borrowings in respect of the labour theory of value from, as he knew well enough (16), cynically bourgeois works, we can see that Marx learned the principles of his political economy in a most important sense from capitalism.

Capitalism, then, provides an historically unique resource for understanding. But in adequately grasping that resource as, precisely, historically unique, it is implied that one moves from using the resource only quantitatively to using it qualitatively. In Capital, Marx comments on Aristotle's inability to develop a theory of value. Though Marx himself draws upon an insistence to be found in Aristotle that exchange requires equalisation of the goods to be exchanged (this
is discussed in Appendix 17), he moves on to giving an explanation of why Aristotle was himself unable to explain this equalisation. Marx's argument is essentially this (17): the key to the solution of the commensurability of different use-values lies in their being common expenditures of human labour and therefore subject to social equalisation (whether in value or in other ways). However, the slave labour of ancient society involved an ideology of the essential inequality of people and their labours which prevented such a theoretical insight. It is only, Marx says, after the event of the social equalisation of labour powers that the theoretical comprehension of the content of value is possible, a resource obviously denied to Aristotle. Of course Aristotle could not explain value as an overarching social structure when it did not exist (or perhaps, though I doubt whether it is correct to say this, when it existed only in vestigial form). More than this, however, Marx is trying to refer to a facility for the understanding of general production provided by value, or more precisely by abstract labour. Classical political economy expresses the quantitative elements of value quite clearly in its labour theory. However, on this basis, because it is possible to clearly set out the quantitative side, it must also be possible to develop the qualitative side of value. The former may be accomplished only when the latter is possible, for the carrying out of the latter - even without full
consciousness of what one is doing (18) - is a condition of the former. It must be possible to equalise labours in order to quantitatively assess them. The assessment can, then, be pushed on to explication of the equalisation.

Production for exchange-value accumulation is fetishistic, but in subjecting nature and all traditional practices to the demands of even a fetishised expansion of productive powers, capitalism makes essential human material intercourse its object (19). By disruption of all traditional impediments to the most technical-rational disposition of productive forces (20), that is to say, human labour-power, capitalism constructs for the first time the potential for social self-consciousness of the organisation of that intercourse. Co-operation is itself the fundamental productive resource (21). A mode of production whose historically unprecedented social spirit is the judgment of all human effort in terms of its production of value, and which is prepared to direct and redirect that effort according to those terms, lays the foundation of the comprehension that not only is labour the substance of value, but that the fundamental issue of economic life is the social organisation of labour.

In recognising this potential for understanding, we must immediately add, as is immediately added by capitalism
itself, the limitations on this potential. It remains a long way from seeing labour as the content of value to actually grasping what value is in its historical specifics. It makes all the difference in the world that Marx's Robinson, who is unique amongst the pantheon of heroes of such economic fables in that he emphasises rather than extinguishes the period features of Defoe's character (22), could at least plausibly and without anachronism conceive of calculating according to annuity tables. What is really at issue here is Marx's insistence on clearly situating bourgeois knowledge with reference to its past, present and future. We have seen how describing value in terms of the bourgeois present, which is its ground, is central to Marx's criticism of fetishism, and from this position we can set about relating value to the past and the future without committing anachronistic category mistakes.

With respect to the future, there are of course fetishistic influences just as intrinsic to capitalism as are enlightening ones, and one crucial strand of Marx's conception of socialism is altering the balance between these. That the possibility of enlightenment be bound up in capitalism is essential to Marx for two reasons. One, obviously, is that without this possibility socialist aspirations would be utopian (23), for those aspirations would have no ground in the present, which is of course the only possible resource for their development. This
point, I think, can be stated more strongly. The very possibility of conceiving of socialism can arise only when the conditions for that effort of imagination are present. Socialism, in other words, must be a task mankind can solve from the position of the bourgeois world as a condition of the formulation of the project of socialism. This is to put the point rather too dogmatically. Marx must continually show by the adequacy of his socialist account of capitalism that socialism is on mankind's agenda, or his notion of socialism falls into utopianism. On the other hand, however, the adequacy of that account will tend to justify the socialist goal. Socialism is depicted as the realisation of capitalism's potential for social self-consciousness against the restrictions on this realisation equally bound up in its mode of production, a depiction made perhaps most clear in Marx's insistence upon realising the liberatory potentials of large-scale industry against its appalling capitalist consequences which he did so much to document (24).

All epochs are distinguished by their historical features, features irreducible beyond a social to a directly natural ontology. What is absolutely unique about capitalism is that it creates the potentials for the socially self-conscious recognition of this, the promise bound up in its being the end of mankind's prehistory. The unique feature of socialism is to be its
actualisation of capitalism's promise of general self-consciousness of social self-determination. This future potential can also be used to illuminate the past. Once we have grasped the limits of bourgeois knowledge and have thereby broken its typically ahistorical perspective, that knowledge can be applied to earlier societies.

For clearly the uncovering of the social organisation of labour is, if it is truly the key to understanding economic life, going to prove most informative about earlier epochs. Marx's opinion, it is quite clear, was that a reflexive application of bourgeois knowledge to earlier societies allows us a clearer comprehension than was available to those who lived in them (25). With the advantage of hindsight and a distance from the prevalent ideologies of modes of production alienated from consciousness of social organisation, Marx envisages a privileged dialogue with the past. Of course, some problems of hermeneutic understanding remain; but I think we can allow this and yet still recognise the privilege of reflexive re-comprehension at which Marx is trying to drive.

Marx's main concern in setting out this re-comprehension is to distance it from the platitudes which result unless the historical character of bourgeois knowledge is kept in view; even when, and this is the vital point, that
knowledge is of general elements of production. If the understanding of value leads to the recognition of the social organisation of production that is a general element of production, this is not to say that in all epochs this organisation takes the form of value (26). In my opinion this is the heart of the difficulties surrounding Marx's treatment of value.

Let us look at an example of this application of bourgeois knowledge to the past in detail; the use of the distinction of productive and unproductive labour in Smith (27) in this way by Marx. There is no doubt that Marx drew on this distinction in reaching his conclusion about the general requirement of a degree (itself historically variable) of necessary labour in all modes of production, above which surplus labour time might be available for various purposes (28). But he equally recognised that the narrow idea of productive as opposed to unproductive labour itself has an intrinsically and ineradicably bourgeois meaning. What was in question in this dichotomy was not the production of use-values but the production of surplus value (29). Now, productive and unproductive labour is that form of the distinction of necessary and surplus labour time which Marx is able to use to gain knowledge of the general distinction, but it is not the general distinction itself. It has specific characteristics and Marx, indeed, argues that it is a contradictory expression of the general distinction.
Accordingly, Marx heaps scorn upon the bourgeois conceit of the likes of Senior who took exception to the distasteful consequences of Smith's admittedly cynical evaluations of productive and unproductive labour. Against the cynicism of judging everything from the bourgeois standpoint of the production of surplus value it is spurious of Senior to argue that even the lawgiver of the Hebrews would be an unproductive labourer according to Smith (30). Senior is certainly more arrogantly bourgeois than Smith, for he wishes to hold on to bourgeois judgments and to extinguish the bourgeois limits of their applicability which permeate every word of Smith's economic and social studies. As Marx observes, Senior would hardly get the grateful response he expects were he able to acquaint Moses with the honour of being a labourer, even a productive one (31).

Equally the idea that productive labour should receive in full its product under socialism makes the provision of social services in that society impossible (32). We might add that it makes very difficult to see how socialist justice can begin to be extended to women. This idea that productive labour should receive its product is a socialist conclusion which, as with the comparable bourgeois ones, follows from the plethora of category mistakes in the use of historically specific terms. That labour is productive of surplus value is by
no means directly connected to the ethical character of the labour and judging the latter by the former is unacceptable (33). A great deal of rather worthless casuistry intended to make plausible Marx's seemingly arbitrary distinction between the moral worth of various employments could have been saved if this arbitrariness had been recognised not as his but as capitalism's (34). And really, that Marx strains to distinguish ways in which the exclusive pursuit of surplus value can contradict optimum use-value productions should alert us to his true position.

I would like to make a general statement of what I understand Marx's position on the use of bourgeois knowledge to understand earlier modes of production to be. The key point is that value is a unique form of the social organisation of labour, one that marks the end of the pre-history of mankind, in that it offers the possibility of social self-consciousness of that organisation. The question might well then be to investigate that organisation in earlier epochs. It is, however, at best pointless to attempt to work out value calculations for the economic conduct of those epochs. This is not because value is itself still a mystificatory form of economic organisation. Even planning cannot be retrospectively applied. These forms of economic principle are simply irrelevant to those pre-capitalist epochs, though they indicate the existence
of some economic principle in them. Attempts to impose value on those epochs because value is thought the only comprehensible principle of economic organisation has the immediate effect of making the economies of those epochs incomprehensible because the first thing that emerges about them is that they were irrational. It is this issue in historical understanding that informs Marx's insistence upon the inner rationality of mercantilism (at a time of burgeoning trade and merchant capital but of limited, pre-industrial production of wealth) against the scornful dismissals of it in bourgeois political economy ultimately pointing to free trade (35). We might add that the regarding of pre-capitalist economics as irrational is a necessary consequence of the application of more or less value criteria to them in the foremost sociological underpinning of neo-classical marginalism - the later writings of Max Weber (36). The very universality claimed for the categories of marginalist understanding (37) implies explanatory sterility.

In all, then, in moving from the grasp of labour as the quantitative content of value, which I would say he thought he inherited in its fundamentals in a more or less adequate form, to regarding value as the capitalistic form of the social organisation of labour, Marx makes an enormous step. This step involves important enough refinements of the qualitative connotations of even the key concepts of classical
political economy. The making clear of the two-fold character of wage-labour was, for example, a development of an idea traceable to at least Steuart (38). But Marx is able to insist upon a substantial originality in his own relatively clear, because informed by a comprehension of the distinction of general use-value and specific exchange-value productions denied to classical political economy (39), formulations of this two-fold character (40).

What Marx fundamentally draws from value is, I would say, this. Basic calculations of utility, scarcity, demand, supply, etc. - however one wants to put it - are made in any mode of production. Marx describes this as general use-value production, metabolism with nature, etc., and I would say his terms are less likely to carry unwanted historically specific connotations. But the point remains that the same subject is to be found in Marx as marginalist thought now makes the whole business of economics. This subject is the general production of use-values in those material relations with nature that are conterminous with human existence (41). But what is valuable to say about those relations for historical purposes is, in the first instance, very limited. For people enter into those relations only, Marx argues centrally to the formulation of his guiding thread, within a further set of social relations, and this further set of relations exercises a determination on the
form of production which is irreducible to any initial set of basically naturally given conditions of human life. Hence there is no point in directly applying one specific form of calculation to all epochs. The distance between even utility in a mode of production which subjugates all of nature to the fetishised pursuit of the seeming intrinsic profitability of things and the analogical considerations of utility in all modes of production is vast - for one thing it is the proper subject of the whole of political economy. The first task preparatory to studying these relations with nature as socially modified is to distinguish general and specific elements of production. The labour theory of value is not so much a quantification of value in amounts of labour as recognition of the social ontology of a mode of production in which such quantification is made the essence of the age (42).

Confusion arises, let me repeat, because we have to understand a general characteristic of human life through the particular specific form in which the general is made a subject open to clear understanding. Marx tries to both make clear the specific location of value, in the capitalist mode of production, and also, as part of identifying what is historically unique about value, show that value has furnished the opportunity of self-consciously understanding the social organisation that is a general element of production. Given all of
this one can understand the difficult, oblique fashion in which Marx goes about identifying value as a mode of the organisation of labour. The crux of this understanding turns on relating his seeming concern with quantitative reduction to its intellectual background in the bourgeois computation of the magnitude of value. It would appear that despite his efforts to make clear what we now have as volume one, chapter one, Marx never succeeded in properly distancing his own social analysis from the historically naive magnitude of value analyses from which it was developed. It is significant that the most directly clear statements of Marx's own positions are to be found at points in the Grundrisse, 1859 Critique and Wages, Price and Profit. In fully working through his position, to some degree in the Critique but especially in the second edition of Capital, Marx was unable to secure a proper position in which his, as it were, first person statements of what goes on in the capitalist mode of production would be understood as historically specific. When Ricardo writes: "If a commodity were in no way useful...it would be destitute of exchange-value..." and Marx puts: "If the thing is useless, so is the labour contained in it..." (43), the historical contextualisation through which Marx intends to give full sense to Ricardo's descriptions does not emerge, and Marx slips into locutions derived from what he himself insists was only magnitude analysis.
In this circumstance, the very radicalness of Marx's critique of the value-form is, in my opinion, all that is needed to push the first part of Capital into an incomprehensibility that yields only to a most determined interpretive effort. To focus, as a final example, on abstract labour. What Marx means to say is that the general equalisation of all labour-powers allows penetration of the mutual sociality of the organisation of labour that is general economic life. This insight into the fundamental equality of all human effort is gained from a mode of production in which all labours are quantitatively equated. But in the form of quantitative equation, the penetrative resources are limited. This is so because, amongst other reasons, this form of equalisation is itself absurd. To repeat a point already made, from the perspective of conceivable economic planning it is one thing to say that a particular use-value takes so long to produce and that that act of production requires a certain prior investment of effort in order to secure the requisite materials, tools and productive skills. It is quite another to say, at the furthest limits of bourgeois comprehension, that a commodity has a price related to so much labour expended in its production. If the first is the rational comprehension of economic activity manifest in its consciously planned organisation, the latter is a mystification so absurd as to be literally meaningless. It takes a distanced commentary to understand the in
itself senseless equation of labour with quantities of money. The way in which Marx’s own presentation is dominated by forms of thought which effect the very transformation of quality into quantity which he wants to criticise is one of the elements that has quite blunted the general comprehension of his work.

We must, then, register some shortcomings when evaluating Marx’s immanent critique of classical political economy. From a dialogue with this body of thought Marx hopes to generate a socialist account of the character of capitalism. The possibility of doing so is in a very important sense the crucial test of his socialist understanding. Without having yet turned to the way in which Marx conceived of the mechanisms of socialism’s determinate negation of capitalism, we can see that there are weaknesses in his attempt to generate socialism as the truth of capitalism.

Nevertheless, these weaknesses are not, in my opinion, essentially destructive of Marx’s project - indeed I would say they are of a character which speaks of an essential strength. If my remarks on Marx’s critique of classical political economy are allowed, it emerges that this critique’s shortcomings are bound up in the way it fails to gain sufficient distance from the forms of expression of bourgeois thought. However, this does mean that it has a ground in that thought and is not a
speculative construction on its objects of critique, and therefore from an epistemological point of view presumptive, position. This is in fact how I would characterise *Capital*, as an essentially sound but inadequately developed critique of capitalist conditions and bourgeois thought.

Let us make no mistake, the inadequacies to which I refer are of great significance, as we shall see when we turn to Marx's account of the development of socialism. However, these are, if I may put it this way, forward looking shortcomings not backward looking ones. By this I mean that whatever weaknesses we may find in Marx's prognoses for socialist development, at least his position, in which socialism is placed upon the human agenda, has its ground. By comparison, Hegel is able to claim a substantially complete evolutionary scheme for Spirit, in which all philosophies are fully evaluated for their truth, but can do so only on grounds which rest their completeness on a dogmatism. The issue really is that whereas Hegel feels able to privilege himself to comment on a completed movement of Spirit, Marx must claim a depth of knowledge open in principle to us all, even to bourgeois thought he criticises, because he is describing a movement in process of which we are all (still, we must say) part. The latter claim is, I believe, in principle, more defensible.
We must hold it open, of course, whether Marx's specific claim is sound. Applying Hegel's idea of reflexive proof, only the adequacy of Marx's account of capitalism and of bourgeois economic thought can justify his socialist understanding. Preparatory to turning to this question in the next part of this work, I want to argue in the rest of this chapter that Marx's critique can gain strength from its ability to inform us of the character of bourgeois economic thought. I will say something more about Smith and Ricardo, but I also want anachronistically to show how Marx's thought is able to embrace even marginalist developments in economics.

Marginalism and the Interpretation of Smith

If my account of Marx's relation to classical political economy's fundamental treatments of value is correct, then this only underlines the most obvious lesson of the history of economic thought after the publication of volume one of Capital: that Marx relies far too heavily on his opinion that Ricardo especially had essentially won the basic positions of the labour theory of value. We have, as I have mentioned, only sketchy comments - all more or less contemptuous - by Marx on the origins of marginalism in German national economy. But when the initial dissemination of Capital's arguments had to battle against an increasingly intellectually dominant marginalism, a crucial point of the interpretation of the
history of political economy up to Ricardo was at issue. As Jevons put it in 1879: "When at length a true system of economics comes to be established, it will be seen that that able but wrong-headed man, David Ricardo, shunted the car of economic science on to a wrong line" (44). The intellectual history in which this was definitively argued was provided by Schumpeter (45). The picture of lines of intellectual development here is - as always - somewhat confused by the way that some contributions are claimed by both of the alternative interpretations. Ricardo's analysis of differential rent is, for instance, a veritable blue-print for the very notion of marginal returns, and when coupled with an appreciation of the intensive as well as the extensive margin has entered very directly into accounts of diminishing returns on investment in land (46). Leaving such cases aside, I would like to look in detail at the issue of social scientific substance bound up in the marginalist interpretation of classical political economy, or at least of Smith and Ricardo, as a counterpoint to what I have said about Marx's efforts at such an interpretation.

Though for marginalism the shunting of economic science on to a wrong line was the work of Ricardo, the points at which this was done were located in Smith, and it is with Smith that we must start. Let me say in advance that the vital question for the marginalist reading of Smith is, I
believe, the possibility of describing the theory of value in The Wealth of Nations as a circular movement, from an initial rejection of the consideration of utility to an eventual framing of the central parts of that theory through just such consideration.

Before turning to prices, Smith takes up a common theme in contemporaneous broadly political economic literature by noting the distinction of use- and exchange-values. He contrasts the high amount of the former and the low amount of the latter in the case of water, and the reverse situation in the case of diamonds (47). If this is a paradox, Smith shows no interest in solving it; he invokes it to make clear that he is interested in The Wealth of Nations with exchange-value or price alone.

There are, however, two senses of price for Smith. Price as a measure of labour inputs into the production of a commodity he calls real price. Price as a measure of the labour, not the fruits of labour it must be stressed, that may be commanded by the exchange of a commodity he calls nominal price (48). In early societies, what labour was expended in the production of a commodity will be matched by the amount of labour able to be commanded by the commodity's exchange. For at the more or less uniform level of productivity which is implied by general subsistence production, there can be no grounds on which a certain labour input could expect to command more than
an equivalent amount of (similarly productive) labour (49). In improved, commercial societies, there is a difference between real and nominal price, typically that the latter is larger. This is because, consequent upon the vast increase of specialised productive powers by means of the division of labour (50), the cost of production of a commodity is far less to those engaged in that production than is its worth to those who are not so engaged and who would therefore find that particular commodity so much harder to make (51). Smith is perfectly well aware that the accumulation of stock necessary for the division of labour is a matter of private property able to charge a revenue (52). Nominal price is therefore composed of the revenues of labour (wages), stock (profit) and land (rent), the latter two being paid from the excess of nominal over real price (53). It is this excess that is the fund for accumulation and expanded production (54).

Smith's distinction between early and commercial societies clearly involves the impossibility of value in the latter being determined by labour inputs. This is warrant enough for broadly marginalist developments from Smith, which have taken two lines. Firstly, having found nominal price to consist of wages, profit and rent, Smith proceeds to reverse this and to construct nominal price as the sum of the natural prices of each of these three when independently determined (55). This cumulative
mutual determination may be seen as a rudimentary equilibrium theory foreshadowing the younger Walras (56). Secondly, a general utility theory analogy to regarding nominal price as what a commodity is worth established by what will be given for it in exchange presents itself (57). Taking up this latter tack, it becomes natural to suggest that if Smith had been acquainted with a workable marginalist apparatus, he would have been able to recognise the way his ideas of value in commercial societies had worked around to a position where it was the solution of utility/value paradoxes such as the water/diamond one he mentions that was the issue, not the attempt to exclude value in use from political economy (58).

Though these ways of taking up Smith have a ground, and to that extent perhaps represent valid applied readings of his work, they are hermeneutically weak. The interpretation they put forward involves emphasising part of Smith's work which is thought valuable and imputing a rejection of the rest which is regretted. The rejection is clearly that of the interpreters - eager to quash the labour theory at its main source in favour of a militant marginalism - rather than that of the interpreted. As I say, this sort of eclectic borrowing sometimes has its place, but in this case the sacrificing of fidelity to Smith in order to justify later positions means that one falls beneath some very valuable ideas which would emerge
if we try to understand his work as a whole, rather than as anachronistically fractured by subsequent divisions in the history of economic thought.

How in detail does Smith himself account for the difference between real and nominal price? If we take his solution to be that the former is composed only of labour inputs and the latter of the sum of wages, profit and rent, then this is certainly very weak as an explanation of the difference. The natural prices of labour and means of production by which Smith assesses wages, profit and rent is arrived at merely as their average price as opposed to their market prices, which vary according to competition (59). Natural price is thereby no explanation of why these three revenues should enter into nominal price. In respect of wages, Smith of course has such an explanation in the basic labour input theory of value. His explanation of why profit and rent enter into nominal price is very different, not turning on production but upon the exacting of those revenues by those who want to reap where they have not sown and are able to do so. Profit and rent are merely the monopolistic charges able to be imposed after the appropriation of stock and land (60). Those who have private property in stock or land must be paid something for their use or they would not allow them to enter into production. This payment must be in proportion to the amount of their possessions allowed to be utilised in
production as there would be no incentive to put larger resources into productive employment (61).

If Smith's account of why the three revenues enter into nominal price embraces two types of explanation, then we must add that these two types are by no means compatible. His comments on profit and rent involve rather too radical an idea of exploitation for them to be accepted, for its reliance on flat parasitism cannot explain how the excess of nominal over real price is produced in line with the way the labour input theory explains real price. Smith is in fact confusing exploitation in the most vulgar sense and production rather badly. In his description of the economic life of early societies, Smith is not really referring only to direct labour inputs into real price, despite his own opinion that he is doing so. No doubt even his hunters had to reckon the value of their kill not only by the time spent in the chase but also by the time spent in the making of their weapons, though Smith's picture of them glosses over this. What actually emerges from Smith's contrast of early and commercial societies is not that in the former value was determined purely by direct labour, but rather that in these societies the means of production were individually but generally owned. Smith shows production taking place using materials available to everyone (62). So the difference between real and nominal price is not one of the factors entering into the production of a
commodity which it seems at first, because in early societies Smith is including means of production as a labour input. Making this inclusion so quickly as not to see what he is doing, Smith draws the wrong conclusion from his historical contrast. It is the alienation of labour from the means of production as the latter are appropriated as private property which is really illuminated by Smith's contrast. But the economic consistency of Smith's thought is disturbed by the way in which Smith himself understands this illumination. It is not, as Smith thinks, that the labour theory of value must be thought to have ceased to operate in commercial societies, but rather that we must recognise its operation in the provision of labour-dated means of production in early societies. This is a paradigmatic instance of where the labour theory turns on showing the productive place of (constant) capital, and not on its condemnation as a parasitic form of exploitation. (I would add here that Smith carries this immersion of means of production in immediate labour right through his work. In his path-breaking analysis of capital reproduction, Smith always resolves price into merely the forms of revenue. That is to say, he always fails to consider the reproduction of constant capital (63)).

However confused, there is the strongest theoretical interest in Smith's concept of nominal price, a theoretical interest which amply displays the strength of
the social philosophical milieu in which that concept was formulated. Let us ask what is left of Smith's idea of the fund for accumulation in commercial societies, which we have seen him locate in profit and rent, after the above critique of his confusion of ownership and role in production? The excess of nominal over real price would seem to be the very work of exchange, as we have to account for the production of the excess of labour commanded in exchange over labour input when the two components which take up the excess of nominal over real price are presented by Smith not as themselves productive but as only revenue charges. This is in a strong sense what Smith believed. Not that he conceived of surplus as a product of exchange itself - Smith is rather beyond mercantilism in what are thereby the most interesting parts of his work. Surplus is certainly something added in production - "the value which the workmen add to the materials" as he puts it (64). However, his whole account of commercial societies, aptly named by him, turns on making exchange the paramount productive force. Given the division of labour, a great deal more wealth of use-values is of course produced. The division of labour implies the renunciation by more or less everyone of the possibility of subsistence production. Irrespective of the appropriation of stock and rent, specialisation destroys this possibility. The absolute pre-condition for the division of labour is for Smith the exchange economy (65). In this sense, exchange is itself the productive
power of commercial society, which is a most interesting position to take up.

From the vantage point of commercial society, Smith puts the essence of this position in a way which is not immediately clear. Labour, he says, is the real measure of exchangeable value (66). He means here commandable labour, not labour input. It is not only the unnecessary duplication of the meaning of some of his crucial terms which makes his point difficult. When describing nominal price, he says that it is measured by the amount of labour which exchange can command. Now this might seem to be the same as saying the amount of the fruits of labour which exchange can command. These two ways of speaking do amount to the same thing, quantitatively speaking. Indeed the latter might be the better narrowly economic way of putting it, for it describes the fact that some of profit and rent must go to luxury consumption. But what Smith has foremost in his mind is hortatively describing the mechanisms of accumulation, the essence of his pragmatic concern with the wealth of nations. He minimises, indeed staunchly criticises, luxury consumption, more as a policy recommendation than as a theoretical choice, insisting that this is the way to make the best use of the possible fund for accumulation (67). But, in what is no doubt an instance of the advocacy of progressive social development deepening social self-comprehension, there is a most valuable
explanatory benefit which flows from the way Smith speaks. For Smith is able to focus in his account of accumulation on commercial societies on the relations of commandable labours rather than on relations between people and goods. Not only is the organisation of labour through general exchange made the key to understanding commercial societies, but furthermore accumulation is shown to be an issue of the command of new labour by those who gain the revenues of profit and rent. The, as it were, qualitative sociological thrust of Smith's notion of commandable labour is towards making clear the specific social relations of production in commercial societies, and how these ground an historically unprecedented productivity. We should remember that in Smith's pin factory no new technology but merely the division of labour is the cause of the vast increase in pin production (68). And we can add that it was factory organisation that called for the employment of increasingly large-scale machinery and not the other way round.

Much of the sociological content of The Wealth of Nations is to be found common to the other outstanding works of the Scottish Enlightenment's accounts of civil society. No doubt the peculiar elevation granted to Smith's book in large part follows from the way in which it captured the spirit of, and therefore had much of direct practical interest to say to, the rising industrial bourgeoisie.
Indeed Smith's book is unique within this extremely productive tradition in social thought in the way it unreservedly falls into political economy, though Smith was in fact following Hutchison's example in focusing upon economic questions. We must say, then, that the exchange relation of the various types of specialised labours in the division of labour and their command for the purposes of capital accumulation is put forward in The Wealth of Nations together with the first reasonably clear grasp of the capitalist social equalisation of labour at the heart of political economy. However, this unity of social philosophy and economics is very precarious in Smith, and in fact his qualitative account of capitalist social relations of production is put forward in a way which militates against the development of such an account into compatible quantitative accounts of value through the labour theory. Smith's confusion over the factors entering into production and the economic significance of their private ownership ensure this. Let us try, then, to give an overall evaluation of Smith's description of commercial society.

It is clear that in terms of exchangeable value Smith is unable to give any account of the production of the excess of nominal over real price. What he seems to do is take the undoubted increase in wealth, in amount of commodities for use, in commercial societies as immediately an exchange-value category. Smith's
essential set of problems is to come to terms with the historically unique expansion of the production of use-values in the historically unique social relations of commercial society which, as Smith clearly saw, operate through exchange-value. What is absolutely necessary here is a proper ordering of the relation of historically specific exchange-value production, general use-value production and their relation in a specific form of use-value production organised through exchange-value. But of course this is precisely what we may expect to be absent from the ahistorical perspectives of what remains in the end a bourgeois vision, and Smith's attempt to contextualise capitalist economic forms is in the end a failure. One example, on a fundamental point, will suffice. The reason given for the development of the social form of commercial society is a purported natural instinct of exchange (69), a pitifully weak fetishisation by comparison to the social theoretical importance of Smith himself and his intellectual background in the most substantial source of the very idea of social theory. Smith's errors in comparative value calculations for early and commercial societies are, then, of the greatest importance, for they are the nexus of the shortcomings of his attempt to describe the social relations of developing capitalist production and their historic significance.

Smith affords some warrant for marginalist developments
because he is fundamentally concerned to describe new criteria of economic life which inform capitalism, and these criteria essentially are those of the allocation of labour according to scarcity and demand under competitive pressures which are now central to marginalism. For Smith, this is an important point, but one which can be dealt with briefly, for what is the real task, running together the practical need to criticise pre-capitalist relations and the theoretical task to grasp the character of capitalist ones, is to come to terms with the new social form which has brought about these novel types of economic conduct. This is the significance of the labour theory of value. The theory does not dispute the new criteria, but provides the context of those criteria as a new form of the economic organisation of labour. The point remains, however, that Smith develops the fundamental social theoretical content of the labour theory in a way which obstructed its adequate narrowly economic, quantitative development. Let us now turn to the way Ricardo sought to remedy this.

**Ricardo's Corrections of Smith**

Ricardo's *Principles* were of course written in the closest relation to Smith's thought in *The Wealth of Nations*. He draws upon the labour theory of value in *The Wealth of Nations* in the very first section of his book, and more than this we can see that this is no mechanical
borrowing, but that Ricardo deserves to be regarded as the principal carrier of Smith's description of specifically capitalist economics. Ricardo's very first words invoke Smith's distinction between use- and exchange-values, and he adds a most interesting qualification. Ricardo goes on to say that, given that they have a use-value, commodities derive exchange-value from one of two sources; either from scarcity or from the amount of labour required to obtain them. This seems like two ways of saying the same thing, but in fact by "scarcity" Ricardo means something more like "uniqueness", referring to such goods as oil paintings by Rembrandt, the value of which is economically quite arbitrary. As these goods are not reproducible and are therefore not open to determination of value through competitive production, their value boils down to what it is possible to get for them, though given enough potential customers a competition of merely buyers may make their price subject to convention. Without forcing Ricardo's meaning, I think we can say that he is here detailing an instance of the impinging of money on the sale of other than true commodities. For in making this quibble, Ricardo is displaying a keen grasp of the economic conditions which do enforce value. Leaving aside more or less unique goods, Ricardo means by commodities only those which "can be increased in quantity by human industry, and on the production of which competition operates without restraint" (70). This
means, of course, a developed capitalist economy of
generalised exchange and competition. From the outset,
than, Ricardo has his eye fixed firmly on production in
bourgeois society and properly identifies exchange-value
as value fixed by production within these conditions. We
must add, however, that though he clearly has a sound
idea of the features of capitalism as a specific set of
relations of production, we cannot expect Ricardo to
firmly grasp the historical bounds of those relations.

It is the genuine taking up of Smith's standpoint of
social observation coupled with a concern to remedy his
errors in delimiting the applicability of the labour
to theory of value to capitalist institutions that give the
essential shape to Ricardo's book. (Or rather, gives the
shape to the first six chapters in which he puts forward
this theory of value, the theory merely being amplified
or applied in the later chapters). Ricardo, as I have
mentioned, straight away takes the labour theory from
Smith (71), exposes (amongst other shortcomings) (72) the
errors in Smith's restriction of its applicability to
early societies (73), and then takes the main economic
institutions of the developed capitalist economy one by
one and tries to show that they do not contradict, but
are subject to, the labour theory of value (74). Ricardo
essentially argues the mistake in Smith's inclusion of
means of production in direct labour in early societies
which I have - following Ricardo - described. He then
shows that though capitalist institutions based on private property may charge revenues other than, or indeed antagonistic to, wages, their ability to do so is based in their entrance into the production process as labour-dated means of production. Whatever weaknesses are left in Ricardo's quantitative determination of price, it is clear that he here provides the coherent foundation of bringing bourgeois economic life within a single reference to a set of capitalist social relations of production.

Why Ricardo should set out the Principles in this way as a contribution to a political economic science dominated by Smith is obvious, and the approach does, as I say, serve to extend Smith's legacy of the labour theory most directly. However, that Ricardo felt able to present his work in this way, in which capitalist institutions are taken as given and then reconciled with the labour theory, shows the historical explanatory limitations of his whole concept of political economy. One need not agree with Marx that one should begin with the commodity in order to fully explain value and from this capitalist production in order to see that Ricardo begins very substantially with what his political economy should end. In Ricardo, then, we have the paradox of the possibility of bringing bourgeois institutions into a single set of relations of production, coupled with a complete lack of penetration of the historicality of these relations. Let
us look at this paradox more closely.

Ricardo attempts to improve the coherence of political economy's rigorous handling of the distinction of use- and exchange-values. Ricardo understands perfectly well that improvements in setting the forces of nature at work can wonderfully increase riches, but not only does nature create no use-value but also improved use-value production will typically lower exchangeable value per good (75). Ricardo makes this point against Say (76), defending the importance of Smith's distinction of value in use and exchangeable value. But, as his having to add these passages in order to address himself to Say here makes us aware, Ricardo could hardly be thought to be holding to a clear line from Smith. Rather Ricardo is trying to clear up the confusions of Smith's running together of the use- and exchange-value components in his characterisation of commercial society, and he does this by expunging use-value considerations completely. Ricardo includes chapter twenty in the third edition as an expansion and defence of the essential position taken up in the first paragraphs of the book. Its purpose is to make quite clear that the best way to move on from Smith is to restrict oneself to exchange-value. In claiming this he makes substantially the arguments later given by Marx for the necessity for some common denominator of exchange in order for exchange to take place, and makes labour that denominator. This is a
rather pure form of the labour theory, for it is achieved by expunging the use-value considerations on capitalism to be found in Smith in order to leave (on in the end inconclusive quantitative grounds it must be said) labour organised through exchange-value as the sole determinant of value.

Of course, in Ricardo these social phenomena become so extended beyond their proper historical context that they become almost natural in their generality. What I want to point out is that this extinguishing of historical location is linked to the loss of consideration however confused, of use-value. For use-value production is the context of all social relations of production. To some extent what we are dealing with here is the clear formulation of the general production of use-values, and undoubtedly some of Ricardo's fetishisations of capitalist forms could not have taken place with a more clear grasp of this. But the fundamental issue is that capitalism is not just a specific mode of production, production just as a noun or as a disposition of labour, but a mode of production of use-values as process of human metabolism with nature. Comparative studies of forms of production may be rather simple catalogues of differing forms set out in relativistic juxtaposition. This is all that comparative study can amount to without some common thread by which the mutual evaluation that is the essence of real comparison can take place. For Smith
this is use-value production, and by employing this criterion the contrast of early and commercial societies is brought out in a historically significant fashion. Abstraction from use-value to the point where the naturalistic context of all social forms is lost is to destroy the context in which those forms take their shape. There is an interpenetration of the natural and the social in the very identification of the latter, as looking at any attempt to come to terms with the specific characteristics of capitalism, which must involve reference to its historically unique capacity to dominate nature, would show.

Use-value and the Criticism of Capitalist Production

In Smith and Ricardo there is a substantially correct description of the specifically capitalist relations of production, though a grasp paradoxically characterised by an inadequate appreciation of the historical bounds of those relations. What is more, the extension of the unified description of Ricardo is accompanied by a loss of Smith's greatest contribution to the recognition of those bounds, his attempt to come to terms with the specific use-value consequences of capitalist production. In Ricardo, only the social relations of production are examined, in the terms of the labour theory of value describing exchange-value. The labour involved here is a mysteriously spiritual labour, divorced from its material
location and considered only for its disposition. By contrast, labour in its relation to nature and the natural disposition of materials is the very object of utility theory. Despite this, utility theory loses what is specifically capitalist for here, let me repeat, the specific social relations that have made human relations with nature the dominant object are lost to view. I want to say that what Marx attempted to do in Capital was to draw upon the social and natural elements in the identification of capitalism by Smith, re uniting them in a way which overcomes Smith's shortcomings. If he celebrates Ricardo's refinement of the description of specifically capitalist relations, we must also recognise the positive, if partial, advances on the development of the other side of Smith's thought in marginalism. Saying this involves me in taking up two positions: one on the attitude one should take towards utility theory on the basis of a fundamental acceptance of Marx's critique of bourgeois economics (77), and another on the character of Marx's own political economy.

An antagonistic attitude to neo-classical marginalism on the part of those who wish to defend Marx tends in fact to undermine an important prop of Marx's position. For Marx is ultimately trying to say that in value capitalism begins, in however difficultly convoluted a way, to make the key to rational, social self-consciousness of economic organisation available. What we must add is that utility theory is the bourgeois statement of these
rational potentials. It self-consciously wishes to draw on just those observations on value being related to scarcity, that is to say to the amount of labour required to actualise a use-value in as far as possible the required amounts, that Marx finds in Smith and Ricardo (78).

Some errors often displayed in marxist attitudes to utility theory must be cleared up. For one thing, utility theory can by no means be considered to directly fall under Marx's criticisms of fetishism. Neo-classicism is neither content with surface appearances, for it always wants to operate an explanatory regress to utility (79), nor does it consider utility to be an intrinsic property of a good, for it always emphasises that utility emerges in human relations to nature (80). I think that, in fact, the reference to utility takes over substantially the grasp of the principles of rational organisation of labour which Marx considers capitalism to have made available (81). Of course, the tendency of marginalist thought is precisely to forget the specific social relations which have made this rational comprehension available. This both makes the marginalist reading of the classicals on even these points seem very forced (82), but more than this it makes marginalism collapse into a purported general psychology of rational economic behaviour (83). Although in fact we must acknowledge that some insight into rational
use-value is given, this is in terms which allow little or no purchase on specific economic conditions. In particular, this knowledge quite subdues the power of marginalism to give an account of present day forms of the contradiction of rational use-value production by exchange-value.

But even here we must not be too hasty. In especially welfare economics marginalism pushes rational use-value economics through to what is in fact a criticism of capitalist production - albeit a criticism which emerges only after one looks at the distance between the prescriptions for rational utility and employment (84) and the actual capitalist economy. In Keynes this distance is of course made an object. If, as is clear, Keynes' ideas of economic reform are bounded by restricted ideas of the possibilities of social justice (85), nevertheless this reform would be a socialisation of the capitalist economy, adjusting exchange-value's departures from optimum use-value production, though conceived only in terms of the extent of the employment of economic resources rather than the directions of that employment (86). What, I am sure, is fundamentally operating here is the use-value criticism of exchange-value, in however muted a form. The overall socialist response to the recent rejection of broadly Keynesian economic planning by the capitalist economies has been rather disingenuous, now regretting the
disappearance of a system which has more or less suffered nothing other than calumnial socialist hands until regression from it cuts back the socialisation of the economy. Of course, broadly marxist political economy can show how limited Keynesianism is and how nevertheless it is insupportable for the capitalist organisation of production. But this did not have to be a destructive statement of the bourgeois limitations of Keynes, but could have been one of the socialist directions which must be taken even to secure his limited gains and not lose them. This is more a question of the generosity with which one examines social theories than any fundamental change in the evaluation of those theories (87). However, the consequences which could flow from this are, in my opinion, invaluable.

If my argument is accepted it is clear that a broadly marxist intellectual history of marginalism needs to be re-written. This, however, is only the second such task which this argument puts on the agenda. For if use-value consideration in neo-classical marginalism at least presents a muted form of the criticism of exchange-value, I want to argue that Marx himself criticised capitalism in essentially this way, contrasting the use-value potentialities of capitalist production with exchange-value restrictions on that potentiality. The crucial point is that whereas the play of use- and exchange-value components of the description of
capitalism in Smith is confused, Marx is, with his much firmer grip of the general and specific elements of production, able to make this play coherent. For Marx, there is the distinction of general use-value production and historically specific exchange-value production, and then a consideration of the form of use-value production undertaken in those particular relations of production.

The key to this is, as I hope is beginning to emerge, that Marx's account of capitalism is set out in accord with his separation of the natural and the social coupled with a subsequent materialist account of social change. I will argue this fully in the next chapter, when I deal with the account of capitalist development in *Capital.* Preparatory to this, I want to conclude this discussion of Marx's utilisation of the resources of classical political economy by discussing his ideas on the role of use-value in political economy and in Smith and Ricardo's explanations of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.

**Smith and Ricardo on the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall**

Smith quite forthrightly declared that there is a tendency of the rate of profit to fall proportionate to the degree of improvement of commercial society (88); his grounds being the following. Accumulation of course means a growing stock (89), and the greater possibilities
for the productive utilisation of that stock presented by
the expanding market that is of the essence of a society
undergoing improvement leads to an increasing proportion
of profit and rent revenues being productively rather
than unproductively consumed (90). However, there is a
point, Smith says it in so many words, when it becomes
increasingly difficult to convert this growing proportion
seeking productive employment of an in any case
increasing stock into new productive stock (91). Being
able to export a surplus produced when the home market
for a product is satiated is given by Smith as an
important function of foreign trade - "Without such
exportation a part of the productive labour of the
country must cease, and the value of its annual product
diminish" (92). The volume of the carrying trade is
hence a reliable indicator of the wealth of improved
societies (93). Beyond this point, however, Smith seems
to envisage a general difficulty in finding new outlets
for the productive investment of revenue. In this
situation, competition between revenues to secure their
own productive investment must force down the rate of
profit. Each revenue is forced by competition to pay
more for its inputs and charge less for its outputs when
productively utilised in order to be so utilised. In
particular continuously expanding demand for productive
labour must push up wages at the expense of profits (94).

Smith does not clearly identify the cause of either the
partial or general overproduction to which he refers. If the interpretation of Smith's distinguishing of early and commercial societies which I have given above is correct, then what at first glance seems a direct implication by Smith of the satiation of consumption requirements for use-values in specific and general markets would seem to be borne out as the correct reading of the basic reason for the rate of profit to fall. We should not be surprised, then, when Smith's foretelling of England's future in Holland's present lends direct textual support for this reading. In Holland, approaching near to the state of "a country which had acquired its full complement of riches, where in every particular branch of business there was the greatest quantity of stock that could be employed in it", the rate of profit was so small that only those who owned a great volume of stock could live on profit and interest, and more and more owners were having to superintend their own productive workers (95). The unprecedented ability of improved commercial societies to furnish riches is to run into contradiction with the satiation of use-value consumption, the development of which contradiction is manifested in a declining rate of profit returned upon productively invested stock.

Ricardo would, I think, have regarded this last sentence as a fair summary of Smith's ideas on the fall of the rate of profit, but he treats it as an indefensible slip.
rather than as a line of thought which has a ground in Smith's basic theory. Ricardo makes short work of the slip, and because of the shortcomings of Smith's treatment of use-value, of the whole idea as well in *The Wealth of Nations*.

If the problem is of overproduction of specific goods, then, Ricardo says, nobody has shown better than Smith that capital will flow from a sated branch of production where the rate of profit will be declining into a branch where profits are higher. Smith's specific examples were of Britain's production of more corn, woollen goods and hardware than the home market could absorb, and the consequent need to export these products. One would think, Ricardo observes, that Britain was under some compulsion to produce those particular goods. Even if export outlets dried up, the capital could be shifted to other branches of production (96).

When turning to general overproduction and decline in the general rate of profit, Ricardo's opinion of Smith's conclusions is no less critical, but the issue is a little clouded. For Ricardo himself held that there was a tendency for the general rate of profit to fall with progressive accumulation, but he attributed this to the restraint of non-capitalist factors of accumulation, not to a development intrinsic of accumulation through the capitalist production of use-values itself. A few words
firstly, then, on why Ricardo himself thought that the rate of profit would decline.

Though Ricardo was well aware of increases in profits deriving from the development of labour productivity with the improvement of society (97), he identified an increased demand for labour with such improvement, as of course he was historically warranted to do in the midst of primitive accumulation. This demand for labour translates into demand for the necessaries which wages purchase (98), most importantly for foodstuffs - Ricardo focuses upon corn (99). Ricardo of course knew of historical improvements in agricultural productivity (100), but he regarded these as being exceptional occurrences with little prospect for continuous future development (101). There is a historical warrant for this too in the great discrepancies between the degree of real subsumption to capital in Ricardo's time of agricultural as opposed to industrial production, discrepancies which has been only reduced and by no means removed at present. For Ricardo, this intensive margin of increases in agricultural productivity was of little significance, beside the extensive margin of bringing more land into production (102). In what he felt was an acute contrast to the virtually limitless capitalist expansion of the production of industrial goods (103), Ricardo saw corn production being pushed onto decreasingly fertile land, and thus corn rising in value because more labour
would be required to produce a given amount. The consequence of this is that differential rent must rise with increased agricultural production.

I must here give a brief account of what Ricardo understood by differential rent. Ricardo accounted for all rent as a charge on the super profits accruing to agricultural production on relatively fertile land as total demand for corn pushes agriculture onto less fertile land. Prices must allow profitable production on this poorer land, but of course such a level of prices provides great profits for production on the better land, which land can thus charge differential rent (104).

In these conditions of rising demand for corn, to maintain even a minimum standard of living (105) labourers would have to be paid an increasingly large money wage, even if the corn wage which, corn being a large component of necessary consumption, basically set the money wage (106) remained stationary or even declined (107). As Ricardo treated wages and profits as directly competitive shares of revenue (108), then this would imply a tendency for profit to decline (109), or, more precisely, for rent to absorb profit (110). If initially the expansion of capital's revenue would exceed the rate of increase of money wage because of the relative under-utilisation of the better land (111), this could only be so for a limited period which the pressure of
accumulation must eventually end. Ultimately corn production would be pushed on to such poor land that the tendency of profits to decline would predominate as the rate of growth in money wages overcame the rate of growth of capital's revenues (112). Then return to capital investment would be so low that no such investment would take place (113). This would be a position in which - Ricardo's armageddon - the country's whole produce would, after paying wages, be in the hands of the land-owners.

This argument clearly contains a number of errors which basically turn on Ricardo's underestimation of capital's ability to increase agricultural productivity, but it is not really to these that I should like to turn but rather to the overall direction of Ricardo's argument. At one point Ricardo seems to be saying that in a situation when all the world's possible land was brought under corn production, then progress would be halted by a law of nature (114). This is nonsense which exposes the limits of Ricardo's historical imagination rather starkly, for that land can charge a rent to capitalist production has everything to do with forms of land ownership and nothing to do with the volume of agricultural land. Ricardo's vision is much more acute in the short term, as opposed to this fanciful speculation at the limits of bourgeois thought. The whole thrust of Ricardo's argument up to the end of chapter six is against the corn laws in particular and the landed interest in general - showing
the Principles origin in the earlier polemic against those laws. A small but fertile country, Ricardo tells us, "particularly if it freely permits the importation of food, may accumulate a large stock of capital without any great diminution in the rate of profits, or any great increase in the rent of land" (115). Ricardo's overall position is confused by a typical fetishisation of private property, which he seems he could not abandon even when it would serve him to do so, but its thrust is clear. Ricardo can see no internal bounds to capital accumulation, but rather accounts for any such bounds in the survival of pre-capitalist fetters on capitalist production. Ricardo, to return to the main line of our own interest, explicitly argues against there being any such internal limits (116), and does so against Smith.

The attempt to dignify the claim that general overproduction in a capitalist economy is impossible with the title of a law is identified with the name of Say. However, Say's law of markets is characteristically Ricardian, and is so not merely because the formulation of the law owes at least as much to the elder Mill as to Say himself (117). For this law sets out what is quite characteristically Ricardo's fundamentally optimistic attitude to capital accumulation. It is true that as it is given by Say and Mill themselves the law is either a flat tautology, cancelling out the distance between production and valorisation by means of a particular

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definition of sale and purchase, or a failure to distinguish between simple commodity production with use-value production almost immediately in mind and developed capitalist production for exchange-value accumulation. We should not expect to find this sort of thing in Ricardo. When Ricardo approvingly refers to Say he does so - quite in line with the way he generously reads the best into his sources - in a fashion which brings out the point of substance in the law. As Ricardo renders it, Say's law has the form of a proposition that any amount of capital may be productively employed in an economy, because the only limit to demand is production (118). There is no limit to what might be demanded should it be produced, for having sated oneself of a certain product there is always something else which one may wish to have (119). If nature has limited the possible amount of food one may consume (in terms of the value inputs into a given satisfaction of food requirement this has undergone a vast expansion since Smith's and Ricardo's day), there remain an infinite amount of the conveniences and ornaments of life which would be in demand once productive resources had been turned to furnishing these (120).

Ricardo takes this distinction of food and the conveniences and ornaments of life from a passage in which Smith argued there were natural limits to the former but not the latter (121). As with overproduction
of particular goods, Ricardo's tack in dealing with
general overproduction is to turn Smith's own arguments
against themselves. This form of polemic is often
spectacularly successful, but as with all such successes
it is so only by virtue of being hermeneutically weak.
The inconsistencies revealed serve the purpose of he or
she who reveals them only if they stand as flat
inconsistencies which can be explained as, precisely,
inconsistent. That is to say, the production of the
inconsistency cannot be related to the overall text in
which it occurs, whereas such inconsistencies always
represent inadequacies in the overall character of that
text.

Ricardo is here pushing the consideration of the ultimate
consumption of use-values right out of the analysis of
the capitalist economy, and finds his warrant for this in
Smith's inconsistency in undertaking such consideration.
"It follows", says Ricardo, "from these admissions" by
Smith against his own position, "that there is no limit
to demand" (122). That we can conceive of infinite
demand for luxuries or at least refinements, Ricardo is
arguing, means that there is no reason for Smith to think
capital can ever satiate its markets, and thus ultimate
use-value consumption is irrelevant in determining the
course of capitalist production. In a sense - the sense
that makes much of an impossible rigour against the
productiveness of the ambiguities that subsequent reading
must reveal in any text - Ricardo is of course right. Inadequately developed in the terms of the confused mixing up of the specific influences on use-value production of exchange-value production, this consideration of use-value consumption in Smith is certainly inconsistent. As Ricardo himself attributes an exemplary degree of rigour to Smith's distinction of value in use and exchange (123), Smith's departures from this seem to be just lapses. Ricardo's general elimination of consideration of use-value here in fact rules out, as I hope we can now clearly see, a substantial point in the very understanding of the social form of capitalism. I think that a dialogue aimed at expanding our knowledge of Smith's thought (beyond his self-comprehension) rather than outlawing part of that thought, just the opposite to that part outlawed by marginalism, will raise points of great substance.

Marx's Evaluation of Smith and Ricardo on the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall

These points are, I believe, raised by Marx in the discussion of these parts of Smith and Ricardo through which he arrived at much of the economic detailing of his broad conception of the limitations of capitalism as a historical mode of production. Let us begin to follow Marx's discussion by turning to the passage in the Grundrisse in which Marx notes that Smith's conception of
the falling rate of profit is characterised by the excessive amount of theoretical work which is to be carried out by competition (124). Smith evidently means competition to be the mechanism not only of the levelling of the rates of profit accruing to different production sectors but also of the lowering of the general rate of profit. The actual competitive mechanism is the same in both cases, but acceptance of the former, with its background substantiation in Smith's account of transfers of capital to their most profitable employment, does not imply acceptance of the latter, as Smith seems to think (125). Without some auxiliary theoretical statements about the finitude of potential accumulation the latter case cannot be regarded as substantiated, and we have seen Ricardo demonstrate that Smith does not provide this. Ricardo, of course, uses competition to achieve a general rate of profit (126), but insists, against Smith, that competition cannot lower the general rate of profit (127); and Marx, who also equalises profit rates through competition (128), as always recognises Ricardo's superior consistency (129). However, what for Ricardo are merely slips by Smith are taken rather more seriously by Marx, who claims that at issue in the competitive lowering of the general rate of profit, and in the development of external trade to overcome satiation of the internal market (130), is some comprehension of overproduction as a limit to capitalist accumulation.
For it is Marx's opinion, I think, that in the very consistency of Ricardo's corrections of Smith, in the very purity of the labour theory in Ricardo, something—a productive theoretical resource—is lost. When Ricardo pushes consideration of the consumption of use-values out of the formulation of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and depicts a completely production lead demand which poses no internal limit to capital accumulation, we can hardly say, in initial response, that by such consistency in the distinction of use- and exchange-values we have come any closer to crucial features of capitalist economy. Against the requirement of explaining what legitimately may be provisionally regarded as crises at least grounded in conditions of overproduction (or its broad synonyms), Ricardo's attitude, perhaps with a degree of hindsight available to Marx (131), appears as a restriction on understanding. Maintaining such an attitude would appear to owe much to a pious wish that there were no such crises, and to a consequent effort not to explain these episodes but rather to explain them away (132).

Marx recognises that by comparison to the obfuscatory character of Say's law in Mill and in Say himself (133), Ricardo's formulation of the idea does at least make the point at issue relatively clear. The question of the unlimited potential for capital accumulation is at least brought into focus rather than being completely conjured
away. It is true to say, however, that though Marx spent some time on learning from Ricardo's formulation, his opinion of Ricardo's attitude towards questioning the potential for capital accumulation was that it was very weak - "Could there be" Marx asks, "a more childish argument?" (134). There is of course something to be said for Ricardo's taking ultimate consumption to be infinite (that is to say, limited only by the volume of production), and therefore irrelevant to economics. It has proven possible in bourgeois society to identify virtually all human values with consumption as an end in itself, and if this identification is accepted, as it was by Ricardo and has been by more or less all bourgeois economics, then consumption can have no limit placed upon it even in the imagination. Marx of course violently disagreed with this taking of all human goals to be consumption needs, the diminution of necessary labour time being a far more important goal for him than unlimited increases in consumption. But even so he accepts that there has never been and nor could there be (in other, perhaps, than the very long term future) overproduction in terms of what Marx himself calls "absolute needs" (135). He did not employ this term in order to absolutise the needs in question, but to stress that their existence pushes outside the bounds of the capitalist mode of production in which they arise. But this is to step rather ahead in our argument, and I will reserve my attempt to make that sense of exteriority
clear. For the present it is enough to say that even in these periods which he regards as being ones of overproduction Marx did not for a moment think that absolute needs had been even nearly satisfied, much less over-fulfilled. But what, Marx goes on to ask, has overproduction to do with absolute needs? (136).

That Ricardo's position is impossible to maintain is easily seen. Judging by the criteria of absolute needs, even the relative overproduction of certain goods, which is both an obvious phenomenal characteristic of capitalism and theoretically essential for Ricardo's account of profit (137), could never have taken place. The competitive forcing down of profits in a particular branch of production could not be attributed to the absolute satiation of demand for that product, certainly not in the vast majority of cases (138). Leaving this aside, and moving to the crucial point, in capitalism needs are effective, that is to say have a social command over production, only when backed by money. The creation of absolute needs might well be directly connected to bourgeois standards, but they remain outside of capitalism because needs not supported by money might as well not exist in so far as they are typically recognised by that mode of production (139). Marx spent a great deal of the time in which he learned his political economy describing the capitalist historical form of the distinction of production and consumption (140), against
the attempt to simply elide the gap between production and the valorisation of surplus value connected with Say's law. If we recognise this gap, the question which Ricardo tries to answer definitely in the negative in his formulation of the idea behind Say's law, is whether consumption can, under capitalism, furnish adequate demand for continuously expanding production (141). Marx's opinion is that this is not so, and further that this is intimately bound up with a tendency of the rate of profit to fall. I intend to set out Marx's ground for this opinion at length in the next part of this work as I believe it can easily be expanded to cover all of Marx's account of capitalism, but for the present I would like to sum up these remarks, as it were preliminary to my discussion of this account, by making explicit what is involved in Marx's being able to offer any opinion on this whatsoever.

I do not think that it is an adequate interpretation of the attitude Marx is taking towards Ricardo to say that Marx insists on the historically specific forms not only of production but of consumption, and that Smith is to be congratulated for having, however unclearly, anticipated such an insistence. For this is to dodge the real issue, of why consumption must be considered, and this pushes one into an artificial construction of Marx's relation to Smith. Smith has tried to deal with a whole set of issues relating to the very identification of the
character of modernity - the issues with which we can identify the very beginnings of social science - which are suppressed by the economist Ricardo as a consequence of the way he makes the labour theory a coherent measure of the magnitude of value. Marx tries to take over this coherence, drawing on Ricardo's relatively clear description of the specific structure of value, but then also to return with this to revive Smith's social issues in a more clear way.

For the crux of Marx's argument against Ricardo is not, in the first instance, a historical one. Clearly, when consumption plays a determining role in a mode of production, it can do so only in a historically specific form. However, that consumption has such a role is a natural given, a necessity with which no conceivable historical mode of production can dispense. What is essentially the shortcoming of Ricardo's attitude to overproduction is that it considers production in isolation from consumption (142). It is true that Ricardo gives some account of the character of consumption, but the effect of his account is to make consumption irrelevant to his political economy. Production becomes, to all intents and purposes, an end in itself, for it is not understood as the furnishing of use-values to satisfy consumption demands but as merely production for exchange-value, that is to say, limitless production. It would seem that Ricardo is saying
something like the infinite possibilities of demand are the, as it were, vacuum in which infinite capital accumulation could take place, other things being equal. He denies use-value consumption any theoretical space in the analysis of capitalism. Marx insists that such a theoretical status is unacceptable. Though production and consumption are subject to historical determination, the fact of their intimate relation is not, and the study of historical forms of that relation must begin by registering its ahistorical influence.

This is not a case where use-value components of explanation can be thought to have been added to exchange-value components, because here we have no ground for ever doing other than analytically separating those components. Though their analytical separation is vital, this must not disrupt, in fact it must deepen, our grasp of their real unity. We must grasp the implications of our dealing with a specific form of general material intercourse with nature, that is to say with properties that have a general basis but owe their specific character to their historical form. Nevertheless, the development of that historical form is in conjunction with nature; it is a product of a specific form of work on nature. We are dealing in fact, with an inter-penetration of the natural and social components of explanation, fusing them into one history, because the very understanding of the particular consequences of the
capitalist mode of production for the ahistorical production and consumption of use-values directly enters into the description of the social form itself.

Marx begins Capital by reference to "The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails". Against the background of the use of "wealth" or sometimes "riches" as opposed to "value" in classical political economy, there can be no doubt that Marx is referring to the wealth of use-values in those societies, though he then goes on to say that that wealth "appears as an 'immense collection of commodities'" (143). The very description of capitalism involves historical locutions which can be made only through comparisons with other modes in respect of their wealth, though the identifications of any specific modes of production at all obviously requires historical abstraction to the isolation of those modes in the first instance.

Really, any approach to Capital other than a more purely social interpretation might expect this. For after noting Marx's insistence upon historical specificity as a vital canon of social explanation, then it is time to recall the equally important, perhaps more important for Marx himself, other canon bound up in Marx's materialism. As I have tried to show, for Marx, though it is both possible and necessary to distinguish the ontologies of history and nature, not only are historical
events not thereby granted a complete independence from nature, but very important elements of the explanation of those events emerges only by taking into account the natural context in which they take place. What is more, I think we are now in a position to precisely identify the way in which Marx conceives of this in respect of the capitalist mode of production. The distinction between productive forces and social relations of production which Marx thinks common to all alienated modes of production has its capitalist form in the distinction of use- and exchange-values. Capitalism poses potentials of use-value production, in the organisation of labour through exchange-value, which are historically unprecedented. It also actualises these potentials to an unprecedented degree - in recognising this amongst the horror of primitive accumulation and the production of absolute surplus value Marx shows a remarkable depth of historical imagination. However, on the pattern of the scheme of determinate negation through immanent critique of the social relations of production ordered by productive powers, Marx also tries to argue that capitalism posits socialism. I will, in the next chapter, turn to his account of the limits of capitalism, which I hope to show can be properly understood only on the basis of the dialectic of use- and exchange-values.

Both Ricardo's response to Smith and the marginalists interpretation of this are distinguished by
tendentiousness. An interpretative deficiency is manifest from the very outset in the way they both celebrate Smith's inconsistency in order to discard parts of his work and emphasise others. However, the substantial point is that crucial issues are lost to both attitudes to Smith in the way they seek to be improvements upon him. Marx's position, I would say, would be that both of these responses to Smith are progressive developments, though I do not doubt that in terms of explaining capitalism he would maintain that Ricardo's is the far more valuable contribution. In Smith a jumble of general and specific determinations flows from the inability to maintain his distinction of use- and exchange-values, but in this jumble issues which must involve the inter-penetration of both of these distinguished values is present, and is lost when sorted out by, in their differing fashions, Ricardo and marginalism. Marx's attitude (144) is strong in that it recognises in Ricardo the establishment of the specific historical structure of the captalistic organisation of labour that is described - in an unrivalled fashion - by the labour theory of value. He goes on to insert this, in a rather more clear way than Ricardo himself (though hardly in a fashion beyond improvement), between the given empirical and nature in his account of capitalism, manifestly as a criticism of commodity fetishism. He does not thereby go so far as to deny a theoretical role in political economy to the relation between people and
nature that is the object of marginalism. Some confusion arises here because Marx is, I think, far more critical of the commodity fetishist depiction of relations between people and things than he would have been of a marginalism in which the refinements involved in the concepts of utility and scarcity as opposed to the concept of inherent value were made clear. For it is the distance between the social relations of capitalism and the possible relations between people and nature fostered under capitalism that, I think, Marx identifies as the contradiction of that mode of production that posits socialism. This is the progressive element of marginalism set in an enlightening historical context more or less absent from marginalism itself; and as such is a deepening of this bourgeois criticism of capitalist limits on economic activity. Let us now look at how Marx set out his account of capitalist development in detail.
PART 5

MARX'S EXPLANATION OF ALIENATION AND ITS OVERCOMING IN CAPITAL
CHAPTER 11

MARX'S ACCOUNT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM

Introduction

I want now to set out the main lines of Marx's account of the capitalist mode of production, intending to deepen our understanding of that account by showing how it articulates the dialectical positing of a higher social form in the existing which I have tried to show is central to Marx's philosophy of historical explanation. I will specifically argue that socialism is posited within capitalism as a set of potentialities created by, and also necessary measures in order to deal with, the burgeoning forces of use-value production when these, inevitably, push beyond the social relations of production of exchange-value and capital. A chronic tendency towards overproduction in the capitalist economy which becomes acutely manifest in increasingly profound crises is the signal to the capitalist mode of production that it both contains potentialities which it cannot realise and that the pressures of this containment are bound to accumulate.

I hope, of course, to show how my interpretation of Marx's attitude of Hegel can help us to understand Marx's substantive work. More than this, however, I want to
continue to ask how far that work manages to successfully carry on Hegel's legacy and allows Marx to give an account of socialism that substantially and theoretically solves Marx's and Hegel's, as it were, joint proposals of the overcoming of alienation in modern society.

Simple Reproduction

Marx's account of the limits to capital accumulation has a two-stage form, discussing the problems of simple and then of expanded reproduction, and we shall consider these in turn.

In part three of volume two of Capital, Marx takes up again the concepts of total (C), constant (c) and variable (v) capitals and of surplus value (s) which he used to describe the structure of capitalist production in volume one, and employs them in the context of the examination of circulation given earlier in volume two to ask two questions of the capitalist economy. Firstly, what are the conditions of commodity exchange which would allow a given level of commodity reproduction - simple reproduction - to take place? Secondly, what such conditions would be needed to allow this production to continue and to generate capital accumulation, that is, would allow expanded reproduction to take place?

The ground for Marx's approaching reproduction in this
two stage fashion turn on its theoretical isolation of growth. It is important to see that this is a theoretical fiction in a particularly strong sense. Leaving aside accumulation is to leave aside the very goal of capitalist economic effort. Furthermore, isolating growth involves supposing that the conditions of production remain constant when capitalism typically revolutionises them (1). (On this last point, it will be seen that even simple reproduction, in value terms, of constant capital must call forth accumulation in other spheres of the economy because of the increased productivity of new machinery over old, even though the former may be entirely charged as depreciation on the latter (2)). Marx, of course, insisted on these two characteristics of capitalism as much as anyone. However, it certainly is necessary to grasp the conditions of simple reproduction in order to assess the potential for growth in the whole economy, because any level of expanded reproduction is a surplus over simple reproduction. What is more, analysis of the requisite of simple reproduction in capitalism can allow us to ask whether there is the possibility not only of stagnation in the capitalist economy - no accumulation and therefore no expansion of reproduction - but also of defective simple reproduction? (3). That is to say, we can examine the strength of the capitalist process of reproduction as such.
Marx divides the capitalist economy into two departments, i producing means of production, and ii producing means of consumption, giving the following model:

department i \[ c_i + v_i + s_i = C_i \]

department ii \[ c_{ii} + v_{ii} + s_{ii} = C_{ii} \] (4).

Of course almost any number of departments could be depicted. Marx had himself worked with a four department model in the *Grundrisse* (5), and as he deepens his discussion of the two department model in volume two we are given the materials, such as the distinction between necessary and luxury consumption, for a schema detailing many more departments (6). A two department model, however, constitutes all the theoretical apparatus needed to focus on the fundamental sociological problems of reproduction. A general element of all modes of production is that their production is directed at the satisfaction of the consumption needs of the people within them and is also directed at the provision of the means of production with which new production can take place. It is the ability of capitalism to satisfy this requisite that Marx's two department model of simple reproduction is able to put to the test.
The conditions for commodity exchange in and between departments for simple reproduction are:

\[ c_i + c_{ii} = C_i \]

\[ v_i + s_i + v_{ii} + s_{ii} = C_{ii} \] (7).

To reach these equilibrium conditions, constant capital reproduction charges must equal the product of department i and revenues to the labour force and capitalists (ignoring other claimants upon surplus value), that is wages and profits, must equal the product of department ii (all profits being unproductively consumed as there is no accumulation). These conditions can be determined by the most simple mathematics; mathematics that could get only increasingly complicated due to the multiplication of data and not really intrinsically more complex as one enlarged the number of departments in the reproduction model. A similarly complicated picture to the one presented by such value calculation would emerge were one to attempt, following particularly Leontiev, to chart the material inputs and outputs of decreasingly abstract departmental schemas. But when we turn to the investigation of the means by which equilibrium would actually have to be reached in the capitalist economy, the picture is not merely complicated, but is convolutedly complex as simple reproduction is shown to have to be realised through a number of economic
mechanisms which are by no means in economic harmony.

As I am interested not so much in detailing these mechanisms themselves but in the overall character of the reproduction process they constitute, I will make only a few observations. Though conducted in terms of exchange-values in the capitalist economy, reproduction in that or any other economy is a question of the distribution of use-values. The difficulties inherent in this are not really adequately described by conceiving of the capitalist circulation process as a dual flow of exchange- and use-values (8). There is only one flow, and in it the imperative distribution of use-values can be achieved only through the exchange of exchange-values (9). We should note further that in circulation conducted in terms of exchange-values, even value equilibrium cannot be the object of bourgeois calculation (10). It is in the spaces between values and exchange-values that the rushed destruction of capital that attends the pursuit of surplus profits by productive innovation takes place (11). Much less than even this can the division of the production process into c, v and s as reproductive sectors be made a conscious object, for these sectors are perceived through forms of revenue, forms which obscure the sectors' real productive roles (12).

One could go on, but I would like to merely add to these
obstructions to simple reproduction which we must note when considering the nature of capital as a whole. Some mention of the obstructions which emerge when we consider that the whole capital is necessarily made up of individual capitals. These capitals typically not only lack an overall view of the economy, but conduct themselves in ways which, in their competition between each other, certainly need not even embrace their dim perception of the general economic interest and may well be antithetic to this (13).

Even from this brief list of factors, the conclusion to which recognition of the separation of use- and exchange-values must lead, when that separation is understood not as a sundering but a mediation, is that the possibility of defective valorisation embodied in this real separation is not an isolable malfunction of the capitalist economy but a disproportionality endemic to it (14). This disproportion can be the ground of crises through the multiplier effect of a sufficiently large initial dislocation in the allocation of resources (15). In its characteristically unplanned outcomes (16), capitalist circulation, if not perhaps chaotic as there are certainly determinate influences at work in it (17), has as its first and foremost law that it is conducted as if it were chaotic. That the law of the capitalist economy is chance (18) was one of the first conclusions Marx, following Engels, reached in his political economic
studies (19), and in volume two we have the full development of this central idea.

This link between Marx's earlier and later writings illustrates what I think is the main characteristic of Marx's account of the mechanisms of simple reproduction in capitalism. This is that these mechanisms engender a more or less complete lack of social self-consciousness in the conduct of economic life. At the end of the process of capitalist circulation, very little indeed can be seen of the social organisation of labour that is at the heart of the process. True enough, even the most disparate phenomena of capitalist reproduction are to be explained through the labour theory of value, but this is not to say that those phenomena easily or clearly represent the essential organisation of labour. In a sense, the science of political economy arises in order to penetrate exactly the alienation which capitalist economic mechanisms must create (20), robbing the members of bourgeois society of social self-consciousness of their economic life. The economic phenomena of the capitalist mode of production are the material foundations of alienated social consciousness, and when crises of disproportionality arise they are very strongly grounded in a lack of social self-consciousness.

**Expanded Reproduction**

We have seen that the conditions of commodity exchange in
and between the departments for simple reproduction are:

\[ c_i + c_{ii} = C_i (c_i + v_i + s_i) \]

\[ v_i + s_i + v_{ii} + s_{ii} = C_{ii} (c_{ii} + v_{ii} + s_{ii}). \]

If we eliminate those commodity exchanges which are to take place within departments, that is, \( c_i \) will partially valorise \( C_i \) and \( v_{ii} + s_{ii} \) will partially valorise \( C_{ii} \), then we are left with the following condition of exchange between the departments for simple reproduction:

\[ v_i + s_i = c_{ii} \] (21).

By reducing to this condition I do not of course mean to imply that the other exchanges will take place unproblematically. But this reduction facilitates a change of focus from problems of the very carrying out of reproduction at all in a capitalist economy to some structural contradictions which that economy presents to such a state. How this is so will, I hope, emerge.

Before turning to this we must look at how expanded reproduction modifies this condition of exchange between departments, for we have now to consider accumulation.

I will give some account of aspects of capitalist reproduction at pertinent moments in what follows. At this point we need only consider that what distinguishes
expanded from simple reproduction is that, in the former, part of s is reinvested in the next production cycle, augmenting the capital which enters that cycle with the aim of producing more s which can itself then be a fund for further expansion (22).

Of course all investment for expanded reproduction in this model is, as it were, a saving by capitalists out of the possible fund for luxury consumption. The very expansion of the capital invested involved here means, however, that after a certain point both luxury consumption and investment can expand. It is this position I will consider. We must then divide up s for any capital according to where it will enter into the next cycle of production. If we let s1 be a sum which would maintain luxury consumption at its previous level, s2 be a sum which is used to increase that consumption, s3 be a sum used to increase c in the next production cycle, and s4 be a sum used to increase v in that coming cycle, then we can state the following conditions of exchange in and between departments for the, as it were, dynamic equilibrium of expanded reproduction:

\[ c_i + s_3^i + c_{ii} + s_3^{ii} = C_i (c_i + v_i + s_1^i + s_2^i + s_3^i + s_4^i) \]

\[ v_i + s_4^i + s_1^i + s_2^i + v_{ii} + s_4^{ii} + s_1^{ii} + s_2^{ii} = C_{ii} (c_{ii} + v_{ii} + s_1^{ii} + s_2^{ii} + s_3^{ii} + s_4^{ii}). \]
Again we may reduce these conditions to the requirement of exchange between the departments:

\[ v_i + s^4_i + s^1_i + s^2_i = c_{ii} + s^3_{ii}. \]

This condition is obviously very similar to that for simple reproduction, and indeed will simplify further when we remember that \( v_i + s^1_i = c_{ii} \), as this is the component of simple reproduction that must be accomplished even in expanded reproduction, and that therefore:

\[ s^4_i + s^2_i = s^3_{ii}. \]

The multiple obstructions and detours through which simple reproduction must be mediated can and do enter into contradiction with these exchange conditions, requiring us to regard instances of disproportionality here and in the consideration of simple reproduction as actualisations of chronic latent contradictions. However, a rather stronger notion of contradiction, of contradiction necessarily arising from the very working of the system, is also displayed by the capitalist economies as an obstruction to expanded reproduction.
Consideration of the dynamic equilibrium conditions of exchange between the departments which we have just discussed is a good place to begin in the description of this contradiction. Marx argues overall in *Capital*, I think, that there is a chronic tendency for $c_{ii} + s_{ii}^3$ to rise in value at a greater rate than $v_{i} + s_{i}^4 + s_{i}^1 + s_{i}^2$. If this is so there will be a tendency for a specific disproportion in the economy, of failure to valorise $c_{ii} + s_{ii}^3$, which for capitalist production will mean a breakdown in expanded reproduction (23). This is of course an instance of disproportionality in a sense. However, as I have already intimated, we are not really dealing here with the shortcomings of the very matching of commodity flows in the capitalist economy, but with a specific structural tendency to obstruct expanded reproduction. We are dealing, in fact, with the particular disproportionality which I shall follow Marx's most common - though not completely consistent - usage in calling overproduction.

**The Organic Composition of Capital**

From our discussion of the the way the nature of capital posits an infinite urge to accumulate, we can go on to say of the production cycle examined in expanded reproduction that it is undertaken in order to furnish the greatest possible amount of $s$ (24). Two importantly distinct ways of doing this are open to the capitalist.
One is to increase the mass of $s$ by absolutely increasing $v$. This is the extraction of absolute surplus value that is the very essence of the establishment of developed capitalist production, a process of the increase of the number of wage-labourers (25) and of the amount of time they each spend in wage-labour (26). More important once production has been, as Marx puts it, really rather than only formally subsumed under the capitalist mode (27), is increase of $s$ not through the mass of $v$ but of the rate at which $v$ produces $s$ (28). This is the production of relative surplus value by increase of the rate of surplus value $\frac{s}{v}$ (29). Let us look at how relative surplus value may be produced.

If we assume that (the number of wage-labourers and) the length of the working day is fixed and the possibilities of increasing absolute surplus value are thus exhausted, it remains possible to increase $s$ by increasing the part of the working day in which $s$ is produced. This increase in surplus labour-time means of course a decrease in necessary labour-time (30), that is, a decline in the value of labour-power. It is the reduction in the value of labour-power that is the mechanism of the production of relative surplus value. The value of labour-power is of course governed by the value of the consumption necessary for the reproduction of the labour force (31). Therefore relative surplus value is produced by increases in the use-value productivity of the labour-time spent on
the commodities which go to necessary consumption. We have here Marx's formulation of Smith's insight into the unprecedented use-value productive capacity of capitalism. Marx does not place any reliance on Smith's unacceptable delimitation of the possible capacity of want, however. Marx does, it is true, see this unprecedented increase of use-value productivity as burdened by limits, but these are located in the value consequences of the technical changes required to furnish relative surplus value.

This massive impulse which capitalism gives to the improvement of the productivity of labour is obeyed basically by alterations in the composition of capital itself. The natural character of the labour process, in which use-values are produced by transforming raw material with the aid of tools (32), means that increases in use-value productivity are gained by increases in the amount of raw material which a given amount of labour can transform, which implies an increase in the, as it were, mechanical assistance offered by the tool. This is a shift in the technical composition of the labour process; a relative increase in the means of production over living labour. All such natural considerations on the production of use-values are in themselves quite immaterial to the capitalist, except in so far as they are the technical requisite of reduction in the value of labour-power. But alterations in technical composition
of course alter the value composition of capital, though
of course the two are by no means the same thing (33).
There are a number of ways of assessing the value
composition of capital, but the way which has proven most
fruitful focuses on the amount of $c$ in the sum of $c$ and
$v$, that is $\frac{c}{c + v}$, which is usually designated by $q$ in
discussions of this issue.

On a cursory look at this issue, it would seem that the
pursuit of relative surplus value must raise $q$, for the
technical composition of capital is altered in favour of
c by this pursuit. This conclusion directly follows,
however, only given that the level of technique remains
constant, so that the values of $c$ and $v$ per unit do not
change, only their absolute amounts are increased, let us
say, by differing degrees. But the very point of the
effort is, we recall, precisely to increase the level of
technique and so reduce the value of $v$. Part and parcel
of reduction in the value of labour-power will
undoubtedly eventually be a reduction in the value of the
means of production. The value of $c$ could, then, fall as
much if not more than $v$ in the effort to produce relative
surplus value, leaving net alterations in value
composition quite indeterminate as to overall direction
in changes in $q$ even when we can say that the technical
composition of the labour process will change in favour
of the amount of means of production (34).
Marx was of course quite well aware that reductions in the value of c per unit will follow from attempts to reduce the value of v (35). But he did not seem to regard this as disturbing an unproblematic, virtually tautological, proportionality in the changes in q brought about by alterations in technical composition (36). In volume three, as part of his formulation of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, he implies that there is a basic tendency for q to rise which is only, as it were antecedently, slowed by reduction in the value of c per unit (37). But if we are unable to really say anything about the directions of change in q, this listing of reduction in the value of c as a counteracting force to a basic tendency would be a wholly unwarranted way of speaking (38).

I have so far spoken of the value and not the organic composition of capital as I think the essential requisite of understanding Marx's attitude to reductions in the value of c per unit as they affect q is to distinguish between organic and value composition. In his scripts of around 1863 Marx seems to identify organic composition with technical, not value, composition (39), and a close reading of the passage in volume one where technical, value and organic compositions are defined shows that organic composition is value composition "as it is determined by and mirrors the changes in technical composition" (40). Of themselves such narrow
philological issues are of little theoretical interest, but the distance between value and organic compositions which these passages indicate does prove of theoretical substance. This distance does ground Marx's way of presenting reductions in the value of c per unit as a counteracting force to overall increases in q, and this plays an important role in, to return to our starting point, the explanation of the pursuit of relative surplus value.

At time T the pursuit by capital C of increased relative surplus value by increase of its technical composition will in fact take the form of a, to all intents and purposes, direct increase in its value composition. Though there may well have taken place a change in productivity that will eventually lower the value of c per unit, at time T this change will not have taken place. Even if capital C produces a means of production only remotely related to the production of the objects of necessary consumption this will be so. For the value of c per unit is the social value, and at time T this remains as it was before the change in the technical composition of C. In the distance between the working through of the consequences of the recomposition of C, C will, by its unequalled rate of relative surplus value, be able to win surplus profit over the general rate and may well be able to increase its market by cutting the price per unit of its product. The competitors of C will
have to recompose their own capitals to compete with C, and this will of course generally lower the value of c and v as the increase of productivity and the rate of relative surplus value becomes generalised. Marx uses this very explanation to account for the general rise in relative surplus value by the actions of individual capitals (41). I think taking organic composition as the direct value recomposition (that is, based on old values) of C due to its technical recomposition at T is a requisite of assessing both the short-term behaviour of C and C's effect on the economy and the long-term changes in the rate of exploitation due to the real process described as relative surplus value production. Certainly the effects on q of organic composition and of the net value composition after reductions in c and v per unit consequent upon the multiplier effect of the technical recomposition of C would seem to be open to quantification (42).

Let us turn to the long-term considerations which arise here. The organic composition of a capital will, then, always represent a rise in q. However, this is not to say, to turn to this more important point, that successive organic compositions will tend towards ever increasing values of q, for of course in assessing the overall change in value composition over successive episodes of organic composition we have to take into account the revaluing of c that will take place between
those episodes. But with further consideration it does become necessary to say that successive organic compositions will increase the overall value of q.

At time T the technical recomposition of capital C will give it an organic composition in which value of q has increased, that is, in C c will be larger and v relatively smaller than before the technical changes. Let us allow that the multiplier effect of this alteration as it reflects on the settled new value composition of C at time T' can be only to lower the value of v even further if it has any effect in this area. But what of the value of c? Eventually the value of c per unit will certainly be lowered, the speed of this consequence depending on the location in the economy of C's product. However, I think we can say that whatever this location, the reduction in the value of c per unit will ultimately be lower than the reduction in v. Let us recall that the value of v is the value of the objects of necessary consumption. (Together with luxury consumption about which more later but which for now I will discount) v represents, then, the end point, to put it this way, of the economy, consumption. Now, technical recomposition of even the most insular sphere of production of department i, producing means of production which make parts of new means of production let us say, must ultimately depend on reduction in the value of v, because the ultimate valorisation of the investment in
even these recompositions remote from department II must come from the sale of objects of ultimate consumption. New investment in any sphere of production must ultimately be funded in the capitalist economy by gains in some capital's market for the production of objects of consumption. Lacking this ultimate valorisation, no investment made with the aim of producing valorisable surplus-value will take place. Obviously, for certain capitals, investment in c is so remote from the production of wage-goods that it seems as if there was no relation here, but this speaks of the limitations of an individual capital's grasp of the total economy more than of the true state of affairs (43). The competitive accumulation impulse must eventually work towards reduction in v in order to fund any development in the productivity of c. (Though, of course, given other principles of economic organisation, increases in consumption need not be the pre-requisite of investment in the productivity of the furnishing of means of production. Investment in this area could be undertaken, let us say, simply to reduce, as an end in itself, necessary labour-time in these industries). I would say, then, that c will be reduced in value per unit at a lower rate than v, because the former can typically be undertaken only in order to do the latter. Successive organic compositions will, therefore, take place on the basis of value compositions in which earlier organic compositions had had the effect of raising q (44).
The Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall

The tendency of $q$ to rise with, but typically at a greater rate than (45), capital accumulation was of the greatest interest to Marx, because he gave it a central role in his account of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (46), a law, there can be no doubt, he thought of the utmost importance in the analysis of the historical location of capitalism (47).

I will for the moment exclude other variables and simply set out Marx's way of linking rising organic composition and falling profit rate, and then discuss the strength of this link in the light of the reintroduction of those variables. In this mode of presentation I am following Marx's own way of presenting "the law itself" followed by "counteracting forces", and as the real issue is whether in the light of the counteracting forces the law itself can be said to describe a real tendency this way of proceeding obviously has its shortcomings. I am no doubt betraying my eventual conclusion in the very way I set about the task of examining this law - it is because I do feel the basic law to be valid and that grasping it is a pre-requisite to correctly understanding its counteracting forces as such that I take over this two part way of formulating the law.

The basic point is simple enough - indeed a
(mathematical) tautology (48). Seeking relative surplus value is a contradictory goal, and therefore developed capital accumulation is a contradictory process, for the relative decline in $v$ at which the capitalist aims must relatively reduce the source from which $s$ is produced, for of course $c$ does not produce $s$ (49). Let us calculate on the basis not of the rate of surplus value, $\frac{s}{v}$, but in the terms with which the capitalist is concerned (indeed even cognisant of) the rate of profit, $p$, that is, surplus over total capital advanced: $\frac{s}{c + v}$ (50). It is evident that there is a fundamental proportionality of the rate of profit and the rate of surplus value determined by the amount of $v$ in the sum of $c$ and $v$ such that $p : \frac{s}{v} = v : c + v$ (51). We can see therefore that the capitalist is faced with a relative reduction in that part of the total capital which can produce a surplus. Holding other influences constant, it is obvious that an increasing $q$ must lower the rate of profit, a tendency which will be more manifest with increasing accumulation.

One important difference, of which Marx himself made a great deal (52), between this theory of the falling rate of profit and that of Ricardo is that Marx is by no means committed to the direct opposition of profits and wages which forms the basis of Ricardo's thinking. In Marx's terms, Ricardo does not ever deal with profit. In calculating on the basis of only variable capital and surplus he deals only with surplus value, and not with
surplus against total capital advanced, that is, with constant capital as well. Marx's introduction of c frees the theory of the falling rate of profit from having to rely on direct deductions from profit, the essential shortcoming of Ricardo's formulation (53). This is of the greatest significance, for capital accumulation will involve pressures to increase c, v, s and C. Marx was able to set out the relationship of the rate of profit to the rate of surplus value in the light of changes in isolated aspects of production treated as variables (54). Accumulation will give definite positive directions to the absolute growth of these variables, and by considering these we can assess the specific effect of the accumulation process on the rate of profit. I should say in advance, however, that I do not intend to deal with all the factors treated by Marx as countervailing forces, much less with all the other possible influences on the rate of profit of which one could conceive. Rather I mean to treat of only those which enter into the issue not because of some possible empirical conjunction of factors, but because they are directly related to the basic structure and must therefore be part of any theoretical statement of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Allowing what I have said about q, there remains the behaviour of $\frac{s}{v}$ and of the absolute growth of C.
The Rate of Exploitation

On the first page of the chapter on 'The Law Itself', Marx illustrates the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall by a table in which \( v, s \) and hence \( \frac{s}{v} \) are the same for five capitals but \( c \) is increasingly large, and shows that \( p \) thus decreases over the five capitals (55). It has therefore seemed to some commentators on Marx's formulation of the law that that formulation presupposes a constant rate of \( \frac{s}{v} \) (56). Presupposing this, the law would certainly be proven once one had established that \( q \) must rise, but of course to do this is wholly unwarranted as increases in \( q \) are the very means of increasing \( \frac{s}{v} \). Marx's subsequent listing of "the more intense exploitations of labour" as the first of his counteracting forces (57) would thus seem quite disingenous. In the absence of further argument we have every right to think that counteracting force might quite annul or even reverse, indeed deny existence, to the law itself.

As a matter of fact, it is only this juxtaposition of the first page or so of chapter thirteen and the first few pages of chapter fourteen of volume three that provides textual evidence for this attribution to Marx of a holding constant of \( \frac{s}{v} \). Not only is it rather implausible to imagine that Marx forgot that he had laid
the basis for part three of volume three in part four of volume one, but it is made explicit enough in the rest of chapter thirteen and elsewhere (58) that Marx thought of the law as covering the rising values of $\frac{S}{V}$ which could be expected with accumulation. What is more, it is possible to construct the table in which Marx gives $\frac{S}{V}$ as a constant with quite steeply rising values of $\frac{S}{V}$ and still show $p$ falling (59). Of course, these values are all quite arbitrary, and were one to give even higher values of $\frac{S}{V}$ then $p$ could be shown as stable or even rising. What we have to do, again in the absence of firm empirically derived figures, is try to theoretically assess what is the likely relation of $q$ and $\frac{S}{V}$ with the progress of accumulation. Marx did actually consider this at some length in the Grundrisse, and reading the relevant pages would seem to be – judging by the history of the understanding of Marx on this point – a pre-requisite of evaluating the fragments on this issue in Capital.

The fundamental point is that, as Marx puts it when introducing the importance of the rate of surplus value in determining its absolute mass in volume one, "there are limits, which cannot be overcome," to the compensation for a relative decline in $v$ by a rise in $\frac{S}{V}$. As long as necessary labour has any positive value, the amount of surplus labour must be less than 24 hours in a day (60), and of course the working day is shortened by
political action beneath this absolute maximum (61). Marx seems in *Capital* to have thought this sufficient. In volume three he briefly repeats that there are definite limits to the degree to which rising \( \frac{s}{v} \) can compensate for a relatively declining \( v \), and gives the illustration that "two workers working for twelve hours a day could not supply the same surplus-value as twenty four workers each working two hours", even if the former "were able to live on air and hence scarcely needed to work at all for themselves" (62). The present progress of automation allows of interesting speculations on the basis of what would happen as capital encounters these limiting cases (63). But of course, it was not these cases which Marx had in mind as he attempted to relate these limits to the actual character of the capital of his time. For even us now, for whom total automation still remains just speculation, it remains to be regretted that Marx did not make as clear in *Capital* the relation of these limits to the actual working of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as he did in the *Grundrisse*.

In the *Grundrisse* Marx outlines, through some rather weakly worked out examples in fact, what must mathematically follow from the statement of the above limits, once one had secured, and this is all implied in allowing a rising value of \( q \), the real significance of those limits. Although this is not necessary, let us
follow Marx's numerical examples, though making necessary corrections. Let us take necessary labour time as half the working day. Let us further assume that labour productivity doubles. Necessary labour time is therefore now only one quarter of the working day. However, though the productive force has doubled, surplus labour time and surplus value have grown by only one quarter. "If the productive force is quadrupled, then the original relation (between necessary and surplus labour) becomes one eighth and the value grows by only one eighth". To go even further: "If necessary labour were $\frac{1}{1,000}$ (of the working day) and the productive force tripled then it (necessary labour) would fall to only $\frac{1}{3,000}$, or surplus labour would have increased by only $\frac{1}{3,000}$". What these examples illustrate is that the surplus value of capital cannot increase as does the multiplier of the productive force, and that the disparity here will increase with every previous raising of the level of productivity. The pursuit of relative surplus value must involve diminishing returns in the terms of the improvement of $\frac{s}{v}$ gained by a raising of $q$, and this pursuit must become increasingly difficult with every succeeding effort (64). It is this development of the need to recompose ever-larger capitals, in which $c$ must be growing far faster than $v$, in order to gain ever smaller improvements in $\frac{s}{v}$ as capital accumulation progresses that Marx begins to describe with the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.
In order to avoid confusion, it is important to bear in mind that these statements of a relation do not tell us anything about the absolute amounts of c, v and s involved in any C (65). Marx is speaking of total capital, capital in general, and the outlook for individual capitals of varying absolute sizes can be very different within this overall picture. I will begin to talk about the absolute dimensions of capital in the next section. Before going on to this, however, I would like to complete these remarks on the relation of $\frac{s}{v}$ to q by offering some explanation of how "more intense exploitation of labour" can actually feature entirely as a counteracting force to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. What Marx has in mind here are in fact methods of raising $\frac{s}{v}$ which do not involve a rise in q. This in fact means the intensification of labour, which at one level is just the exceptional case of sweating, and at another level means changes in the general value of labour power, which simply sets new base lines for the developments we are discussing. He feels able to set this out as a counteracting factor because the usual method of raising $\frac{s}{v}$ is, precisely, to raise q, and these other methods which do not raise q are exceptional. They certainly would counteract the basic tendency of the rate of profit to fall because they raise $\frac{s}{v}$ without the usual consequence of this, a further increase in q, following (66), but their relatively exceptional character allows
them to be treated as a secondary consideration.

The Industrial Reserve Army

I intend now to turn to a factor which in a sense does not have a place in a discussion of the rate of profit as it does not directly affect that rate. However, I consider this factor, the possibility of absolute growth in C, indispensable to setting out the context in which the tendency of the rate of profit to fall works. In other words, I would say that the consideration of this factor by "underconsumption theories" which give alternative accounts of crisis to that of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is a mistake, for these two main lines of the explanation of capitalist crises are mutually complementary, indeed are mutually constitutive (67).

A rise in q would have no detrimental effect on the absolute mass of profit, though the profit rate would fall, if the accumulation of C took place at such a pace that the absolute growth or restricted absolute decline of v produces, at the increasing rates of \( \frac{s}{v} \), a mass of s that counterbalances the influence of the relative growth of c on the profit rate (68). A capital will of course seek always to employ as much v (and c) as possible (69), and in fact for larger capitals this mass of v has served very well as the base of continued accumulation (70),
giving these capitals a great advantage over small capitals (71). Though in the absence of firm statistics about increases in q one can really only guess, we might straight away suspect that the rates of growth in C required for this compensatory effect are, after a certain point has been reached in concentration and centralisation, fanciful. However, we can get rather closer to an examination of this possibility by focusing upon what must certainly be part of it, and which is something we might initially imagine to be part of accumulation as such, a tendency to full employment.

An obvious consequence of increasing accumulation would be a growing demand for labour-power. For Ricardo, as we might expect from his conception of the relation of wages to profits, this was a serious obstacle to capitalist progress. But if he saw nature eventually posing difficulties for such progress by the recalcitrance of agricultural production, nature fortunately came to the rescue in this instance. The doctrine of population identified with Malthus' name (72) has a central place in classical political economy largely through that body of thought's reliance upon the doctrine for the restriction of wages to a level commensurate with capital accumulation, a reliance from which Ricardo was not exempt. The argument runs basically thus: as accumulation progresses the demand for labour will rise and wages will increase. This will be an increase in
real as well as money wages. In this position, the market price of labour being above its natural price will represent an improvement in the labourers' conditions. Profits will by this very token be restricted and an obstacle to further accumulation will have arisen. However, the rise in the labourers' conditions will eventually be reflected in an increased labouring population, due to this population's peculiar tendency to (geometrically) expand to the maximum possible given a certain level of provision, which will redress the balance of supply and demand for labour even at the new level of accumulation. This reduces wages to their natural level or even, by a reaction, for some time below that level (73).

Marx's analysis of capitalism clearly required some similar tailoring of the price of labour-power to the needs of accumulation, but this solution given by Ricardo was anathema to him and is undoubtedly that part of The Principles from which Marx gained the least. Looking at the tone of Marx's writings on this issue, it seem that Marx's ability to see the cynicism of Smith and Ricardo in a light which set it off to best effect quite left him in the case of Malthus' population theory (74). However I would certainly place great weight on Marx's own account of why this was so.

Marx unambiguously placed Malthus' general political
economy (75) in the category of a vulgar economic regression from Ricardo, and he saw the population theory not as wedded to the progressive capitalist interests of the time when the bourgeoisie played a historically revolutionary role, but as a reactionary response to capitalism's contradictions as it establishes its historical limits (76). The spectacle of a cleric urging the rich to unproductive consumption in order to maintain in the face of its contradictions an economic system whose imposition of narrow necessity on the labouring population was nonetheless to be brutally enforced was no doubt somewhat hard to bear to a humanitarian who saw in those contradictions the possibility of the end of all domination by necessity (77). However, our judgment must, as Marx would surely have said, turn on our evaluation of the theory of population as a scientific theory. If we can say that Malthus had a brutal (by our standards) disposition and Marx an (overall) generous one, whether Malthus was a cynical reactionary or Marx a utopian idealist turn on whether the theory of population is true.

On this point, Marx's scholarly contempt was profound, exposing through his enormous acquaintance with the political economic and related literature such a degree of intellectual indebtedness on Malthus' part that Marx thought him a plagiarist (78). The basic line of Marx's substantive criticism runs as follows. Malthus's
geometrical reproduction law is, because it sets out to
describe a natural difference between human and other
animal reproduction, not a human law but a natural one.
The theoretical formulation of this law is very shaky
(79), but this shakiness is a necessary result of what is
an attempt to subordinate all the particular historical
forms of the influences on human population which have
obtained to one supra-historical formulation. There are
no doubt real determinations on population growth in all
historical epochs, but they are certainly set by
modifications on the natural basis of population that
must be historically, as they cannot be naturally,
explained (80). In the case of population under
capitalism, Marx has no doubt that Malthus has seen a
real phenomenon of this mode of production - surplus
population (81). In his theory of relative surplus
population or the industrial reserve army, Marx gives an
account of this phenomenon quite parallel to that of
Malthus (82), but an alternative historical account.

Let us consider again the impetus to wage rises given by
capitalists' competition for labour-power during a period
of expansion. Given the expanded scale of reproduction
with accumulation it would seem certain, Marx allows,
that the demand for labour-power would eventually exceed
customary supply, and wages thus rise (83). During this
period of the formal subsumption of production to the
capitalist mode the basic solution to this was expansion
of the number of wage-labourers. Though Marx mentions this in *Capital* (84), it is *Wage-Labour and Capital* (to which Marx refers in the passage in *Capital*) that is the foremost explanation of this process which Marx gives, and an assessment of the arguments of this published speech should bear strongly in mind this context, the speech being given in 1847. In developed capitalist production in which, let us say, the possibility of recruiting wage-labour from non-capitalist sectors of the economy is exhausted, Marx thought the capitalist economy would restrict wage rises to a level compatible with accumulation.

The basic reason for this is that the purchase of labour-power is conditional upon the capitalist's being able to produce a valorisable surplus-value with that labour-power (85). Assuming a rise in wages which makes $v$ dearer for $C$, one of two cases might obtain. The price of $v$ may continue to rise because this rise does not interfere with the progress of accumulation. Though the increasing cost of $v$ may be a deduction from possible profits, if it is the side effect of continuing accumulation, the desired effects of that accumulation might easily outweigh this unwanted one. What we are essentially dealing with here is the mass of profit accruing to large capitals compensating them for declines in rates of profit. The second possible case is that the wage rise does interfere with accumulation. To the
extent that it does so, the profit incentive for accumulation will be lessened and accumulation will slow down. But in slowing down, the cause of the wage rise, the disproportion between the demands of expanding capital and the labour force, will tend to disappear. The price of labour will again fall to a level corresponding to capital's requirements for self-valorisation, whether this level is the same as or lower or higher than before.

For Marx it is this characteristic of the accumulation process to remove the very obstacles it temporarily creates that explains the cyclical character of capitalist accumulation, or to put this the other way around, capitalist crises. It is not, as the population theory has it, fluctuations in population that affect accumulation, but rather the reverse which is the case (86). Marx not only was quick enough to observe that the real crises he had seen were describing a cycle of far too short a period to be linked to generational population shifts, but also that the range of capitalist responses to these difficulties were by no means limited to passively waiting for population growth, but embraced actively changing the pattern of accumulation (87). Fundamentally, however, what he stressed in his foundation for an explanation of the cyclical character of capitalist accumulation is that such a movement was historically impossible before the establishment of the
developed capitalist economy. The possibility of bringing great productive resources to bear in a short time is the requisite of an equally rapid contraction. This is quite unimaginable without the development of the economic mobility that is the essence of ever-accumulating capital and ever fluid wage-labour (88). The, as it were, reflected consequences of accumulation for the labour force cannot have a directly natural cause. They are inconceivable without a specific historical structure of production - capitalism.

The relinquishment of the population theory in later economic explanations of the industrial cycle has resulted (disregarding the biological criticisms) from the evidence of the persistence of that cycle in a capitalism socialised to the point where the clear correlation of labour force changes and economic growth can by no means be linked to the mortality rates of the entire working class. Marx grasped this point the other way around. Were capital to wait until, to speak bluntly, enough workers had starved to death to make accumulation profitable again, capital might find that its dominance of the production process had been wrested from it by those who wanted to work in order to live even when they could not work in order to make a profit (89).

It might be thought that this foundation for a theory of crises can allow of only a very limited degree of
accumulation before any further capital expansion would necessarily run into labour shortage. However, this is not to take into account those consequences of accumulation which free it from a direct tie to the labour force. Leaving aside the consequence of concentration and centralisation that they would allow expanding capitals to absorb the labour forces of now liquidated other capitals, what I am speaking about is of course the accumulative spur to productivity. Accepting a rising value of q and a rising rate of $\frac{S}{V}$ as bound up in accumulation, there will be, Marx says, the tendency for relative surplus population, or an industrial reserve army to be built up with capitalist progress (90). Although aware that the English and Welsh birthrate was steadily falling (91) (a phenomenon we can now say is common to all the advanced bourgeois societies), Marx evidently thought that such was the rate of rise in organic composition and exploitation that the production of the industrial reserve army would continue. In this Marx followed Ricardo's change of mind over the possibility of labourers who were "set free" from one branch of production never having an opportunity to be re-employed in another branch - the compensation theory as it was called (92). Instead of this constant smooth redeployment, the aftermath of each capitalist boom and slump would be a recomposed capital in which q was higher and the relative surplus population greater. This population serves as an industrial reserve army, the
especially fluid labour resources that are needed to undertake the great new venture of the boom and which by their expansion of the available labour force at these times lower the pressures for wage rises. Marx distinguishes three forms of existence of the relative surplus population - the floating, the latent and the stagnant - depending on their place in the industrial reserve army determined by the distance from taking up employment (93), but this need not concern us here.

What is fundamentally different between Marx's idea of relative surplus production and Ricardo's eventual rejection of the compensation theory is that whereas the latter is, as it were, an adjunct to a doctrine of wages and relies on an avowedly biological theorem extrinsic to political economy, the former is an integrated whole. The ground of Marx's tying of wages to the requirements of accumulation and of the formation of relative surplus population to the progress of capital accumulation is his basic characterisation of the capitalist mode of production. We are dealing here with the relation of paid to unpaid wage-labour as it develops in the mode of production predicated upon wage-labour (94). When in a boom period the unpaid labour extracted from the labourers would require too much paid labour in order to be reconverted into capital, that paid labour will be curtailed to a degree which re-establishes the dominance of unpaid labour. Equally when the reconversion of
unpaid labour into capital with ever increasing amounts of $c$ relative to $v$ takes place, the consequence is that paid labour will again be curtailed to the best situation for the unpaid labour (95). In the industrial reserve army, Marx's critique of the alienation consequent upon capitalist production reaches its most developed point. When the products of labour have been given such a form that living labour is subordinated to them, and not the other way around (96), then and only then is it possible that the development of productive power will be carried out in order to augment the size of the productive forces as an end in itself and not, for example, to diminish necessary labour. The ultimate result of the vast expansion of productivity through capital accumulation is not that necessary labour is reduced for all, but that some population becomes relatively surplus. And every working day can only increase this domination of the fetishised products of men and women's work over their living labours (97).

Unlimited Production and Restricted Consumption

The competitive raising of wages is not the only, indeed it is not the most fundamental, obstacle to an absolute growth of production that would provide for large individual capitals a mass of $s$ that would always compensate for relatively low values of $v$ and $p$ (until the limiting case of complete automation would have to be
taken into consideration). A truly basic difficulty in
the way of this possibility arises with the establishment
of the capitalist form of the relation of production and
consumption itself.

Let us again consider the position of capital C as it
seeks to accumulate. There can be no mistake about the
strength of the intention here - the aim is an infinite,
because purely quantitative, growth. Recognition of this
consequence of the very nature of capital does not only
tell us a great deal about the absurd fetishism of
capitalist production as such, it is also of the first
importance in understanding specific acts of capitalist
planning. When C expects to expand, it will typically do
so with unlimited ambition. C's aim is not to satisfy a
certain need for a use-value to a required degree. It
cannot with any reliability know of such needs, for we
are specifically not dealing here with the pre-planned
allocation of resources, and in any case such knowledge
is not what is most important to it. If C can expand its
market for a relatively frivolous use-value it will do
so, even if this is at the expense of the existing volume
of consumption of another capital's relatively essential
use-value. C will attempt to expand its market as far as
possible, and under the pressures of competition so must
C's rivals. The form of capitalist growth is, then, to
seek the infinite expansion of each individual capital.
If it could, capital C would all at once produce an infinite surplus value (98). But of course we are dealing here with a form of general productive intercourse with nature, and though C's aims may be posited in the terms of only quantitative value, it may realise those aims only through the production of specific commodities with specific use-values. These commodities must be valorised if they are to serve the purposes of C's accumulation (99). With the vast increase in productivity that characterises capitalism, very soon indeed in the history of that mode of production this means an expansion of consumption (100). Extrinsically, Marx thought the construction of a world market for goods as much part of the dynamic establishment of capital's domination as the creation of general wage-labour (101). Intrinsically, Marx took the historical expansion of needs through the creation of the means by which those needs may be realistically conceived, to be a most important part of capital's unprecedented civilising influence (102). Such expansions of consumption must ultimately be of wage-goods or luxury goods, for as I have mentioned in another context, investment in, and we can now say consumption of, the means of production is limited in the capitalist economy by the final sale of consumption goods.

There are definite limits, however, to consumption under capitalism, limits which contrast rather starkly with the
ideology of infinite want which accompanies the capitalist form of efforts to expand production. I will assume that luxury consumption by capitalists and necessary consumption by wage-labourers are the only forms of consumption, and that the fund for accumulation is a deduction from the possible fund for luxury consumption.

The in some respects characteristic capitalist attitude to luxury consumption has, as is well enough known, been as abstemious one (103), an attitude representing a time when individual capital formation did in fact substantially depend on the personal savings of a capitalist. Of course, to treat this as an act of abstinence by the capitalist which is paid for by profits, the capitalist's wage for renunciation (104), is apologetic nonsense. But if the source of profits in this idea is fictitious, the abstemiousness which the idea rationalises was not. The temptation to invoke such a useful defence of the very existence of capitalists prolonged the abstinence theory's life beyond the years in which it retained its phenomenal referent in initial capital formation, and the defence was still used when capitals were yielding volumes of such that luxury consumption and the fund for accumulation could both increase spectacularly. This shift in the behaviour of capitalists from that described in Weber's 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism' to that of
Veblen's *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (the latter in fact written before the former) was enough for Marx to dismiss the abstinence theory (165). Certainly, without the greatest widening of the sense of "abstinence", the fact that large capitalists after a certain point in the history of capital formation did not consume all surplus-value is hardly abstinence, and absolutely not to be compared with the sacrifice of labour as described by Smith, which comparison Senior intended. Such is the volume of s that really the whole language of "savings" was virtually redundant for large capitalists when Marx wrote - virtually unlimited consumption could accompany accumulation. In so far as luxury consumption can still adversely affect a specific capital's expansion by depleting the necessary fund for accumulation, we can say that for any continuing capital, the use of s for luxury consumption will be fitted (hardly, I repeat, curtailed) to allow of accumulation at a competitive level (106).

Part of Marx's scorn for the abstinence theory stemmed from his displeasure at the lack of consistency of capitalists' rejection of abstinence - except in the very widest possible sense - for themselves when coupled with their enthusiastic advocacy of the salutary effects of privation on the industry of wage-labourers, a privation which they, the capitalists, enforce in a sort of vicarious abstinence (107). As it is obviously the case that wage rises are a deduction from possible profits
(108), the typical capitalistic attitude to wages must be one of minimisation. I say must be, because wages are a cost open to competitive reduction at least as much as the price of any element of constant capital (109).

Fundamentally, wages will be driven down to the minimum by capital because from the point of view of capitalist production the livelihood of the majority of the population is a cost (110). This is not, I think, to say that the progress of capital accumulation will involve the driving of wages down to an absolute minimum. The attribution to Marx of a "theory of immiseration", by which is meant the progressive reduction of wages to the lowest physiological point compatible with the reproduction of labour-power (111), is very dubious indeed. Not only did Marx emphatically reject this idea in his replies to Weston (112) and to Lassalle's "iron law of wages" (113), and make the struggle for wage increases an integral part of his political ideas (114), but he also thought that the determination of wages, though requiring knowledge on the value of labour-power based on the cost of worker's reproduction, could not be found through a physiological minimum alone (115).

However, there are no doubt some passages in Marx which can be marshalled in support of an immiseration reading, and what is really at issue in this reading, as in all such problematic interpretations, is the elucidation of the broad context, in this case theoretical context, which is the background against which the full meaning of
isolated passages can emerge. I would like therefore not to turn so much to Marx's explicit comments on wages, principally in 'Wage-labour and Capital', 'Wages, Price and Profit' and volume one of Capital, but to draw on what I have already said about Marx's overall analysis of capital in order to put forward the context of these comments. (A more internal examination of the immiseration thesis will be put forward in a little while and in the next chapter).

In a period of significant expansion fundamentally due to an increase in relative surplus value gained by the organic recomposition of an influential amount of total capital, wages may rise due to competition for labour-power. When the new level of productivity is generalised if not before, the value of labour-power will have fallen. As a result of these compound movements, wages will have risen above the value of labour-power. In the slump, wages will tend to fall. One can imagine a number of possibilities here, but let us first assume that money wages return to their original level. Of course in this case though the money wage has not changed, the real wage has risen. Depending on the reduction in necessary labour-time that has occurred in the raising of relative surplus value, money wages might fall and yet real wages rise (116). In both of these case, there will have been a rise in profit, surplus value having risen and the money wage not having
increased. The money wage can increase and profit still rise either if, because of increased productivity, the number of workers falls to such an extent that wage per worker will not increase \( v \) for the capital, or if \( v \) rises but at a level which still yields a larger profit to capital out of the increased surplus value. Here there is a maximum level to which wages can rise. It is the level at which accumulation is profitable, and thus the settling of the market value of labour-power after a boom will, we see, also set the new value of labour-power (117).

There are obviously common themes in all of these possible outcomes of alterations in wages with periods of capital accumulation. Marx, however, left it open as to which specific outcomes would follow. This was because although we can say that capital will seek to reduce wages to the minimum possible, what this minimum is is fixed by an indeterminate "historical and moral element" (118). This element is that of the "traditional standard of life" which enters a social moment into what is the accepted livelihood of the working population which is not really connected to any physiological minimum. Or at least, efforts to determine this livelihood by reference to a physiological minimum are negations of the civilising achievements bound up in the exercise of historical and moral considerations on the setting of wages. For Marx, what exactly wages would be as a result
of changes in the value of labour-power—the unpredictable result of struggle between capital and labour in any period (119). This element of indeterminacy is obviously explanatorily regrettable in so far as it seems to be theoretical and not merely an empirical indeterminacy, and the predominant developments of this issue in marxist writings have made the situation worse by celebrating "class struggle" as a variable which can be used to make the basic ideas fit any situation. I will return to this below, when I hope to go some way to remedying the theoretical indeterminacy at least. For the present, however, I think it is sufficient to note the limits within which wage rises may vary within a period of capital accumulation and to say that this by no means precludes, in fact it may lead us to expect, real wage rises with accumulation.

In view of this, is there, we might ask, any fruitful way in which Marx's linking of wages to the progress of accumulation might be described as a theory of immiseration? There are, I think, two such ways, the first rather dubious and of secondary interest, the second very strongly supported by and indeed of the greatest importance to Marx's analysis of capitalism. Firstly, this analysis as it stands in Capital must postulate, and does so in so many words, that accompanying the rise in relative surplus value that allows of real wage increases will be a growth of the
relative surplus population, and these people will participate less than the working population in the general increase in wealth. This argument, though there is something in it, cannot really be stretched very far, not perhaps far enough to be linked to an idea of immiseration. In so far as the floating and latent sections of the relative surplus population make up an industrial reserve army which is periodically taken into employment, then to that degree they will share with the more permanent working population the benefits of any wage rises. But what is more, these sections of the relative surplus population together with the stagnant section might be expected to reap the benefits of the political action by which the working population seeks increases in real wages, in the form of the social security benefits that have been an important aim of working class politics. Of course, the real poverty of these people will remain, but the idea of absolute immiseration is inappropriate here because poverty is a relative (though not thereby somehow worthless or meaningless) term.

It is this theme of the relativity of the terms we are necessarily using here that brings us to the second sense in which Marx's ideas on wages might be a theory of immiseration. Wage rises are, we have seen, fundamentally the working class' share in the proceeds of the general growth of wealth that is accumulation. This being so, the amount of wages cannot tell us everything
about them - there is the further consideration of the relative size of this share in the general enrichment. It is very easy indeed to conceive of values of the increase in relative surplus value that will confer to the capitalist a relatively greater share of the increase in social wealth than accrues to the working population even with a wage increase (120). This can be interpreted in material terms as a vast improvement in the livelihoods of capitalists which the relatively tiny improvement in the working class' living standards very poorly emulates. But I do not think this is principally what Marx had in mind in this idea of relative wages. This was really the working class' production by its labours of the social power of capital that grows ever more relatively strong with accumulation. Many of Marx's comments on wages, including his criticisms of Weston, show that he did not identify struggle over wages with the pursuit of narrow material gain (121), confirming the impression one receives from his earliest critiques of wage-labour. It is this theme, of the self-production of an alien power that is, I think, the central one here. This is certainly the only sense of immiseration that can fairly be said to emerge from the most common place at which the theory of immiseration is located - chapter 32 of volume one on 'The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation' (122).

It is the collision of strategies of the expansion of
production which can know no internal limit and of expansions in consumption which are either so small as to be almost irrelevant to the system or are only grudgingly won from that system that Marx regarded as further developing the possibility of crises in the capitalist economy (123).

I have mentioned earlier that Marx saw this possibility, at the most abstract level, as contained in breakdowns in the circulation circuit of capital - money - enlarged capital, and we can now see that a dislocation between the production of surplus value and its valorisation for the purpose of further accumulation is subject not merely to chronic disproportionality but to acute contradiction due to the capitalist forms of production and consumption. I will sketch out a form of the actualisation of this possibility in crises in the next section, but for now I would like to return to the scheme of expanded reproduction in order to detail the position we have now reached.

Recalling our statement of the condition of exchange between departments for achieving the dynamic equilibrium of expanded reproduction, that is $v_1 + s_{41} + s_{11} + s_{21} = c_{ii} + s_{31}$ we can pinpoint the contradiction we have found in the capitalist economy. Given rising organic compositions and the inability of capital to offset, through various compensations, the tendency which
these give to the rate of profit to fall, we will find this tendency manifested in a growing difficulty of the valorisation of the accumulating constant capital of department ii by the relatively slowly growing variable capital and surplus value of department ii. This means, in essence, an unsaleable mass of consumer goods (124). We can see two reasons for this.

Firstly, the rates of expansion displayed by the two departmental sectors are different, so that $s_4 + s_2 \neq s_3$. For $s_4$ will relatively fall as a result of increases in $q$, and $s_2$ will also relatively decline as $s_3$ takes an increasingly dominant share of $s_i$. By contrast, $s_3$ will participate in the general relative rise of $c$ in the entire production process. (The relationship between $c_i$ and $c_{ii}$, and particularly between $s_3$ and $s_3$, need not detain us here, but of course determining this will be of great value in the further setting out of the relations contained in the scheme of expanded reproduction).

Secondly, however, the growth of $c_{ii}$ is incremental in a way which the growth of $v + s_1 + s_2$ is not. These revenues, I have assumed, make up the consumption fund (any departure from this assumption can only strengthen the case I am about to make). They may grow, but being consumed in any production cycle, each cycle can contain only a specific revenue sum. However $c$, given simple
reproduction, will always enter into the cycle with an existing value, and the reproduction of that value is the starting point of accumulation. And after a period of accumulation, it is the reproduction of the now increased value of \( c \) that is the new starting point of further accumulation (125). I am not speaking here of the fact that fixed capital will typically yield only part of its value to each turnover period of capital (126). I am referring to the reproduction of already existing constant capital values that is the starting point of accumulation. This is a crucial issue.

I have argued that Smith was forced to conclude that the labour theory of value did not hold in commercial societies because his idea of the labour involved was defective. He included the costs of the generally individually owned means of production in the revenue accruing to labour in early societies. When noting that the means of production in commercial societies were the property of a restricted number of owners, he drew the erroneous conclusion that labour no longer accounted for the price of commodities. What happens is his analyses of reproduction is that constant capital in capitalist societies disappears, and I have noted that Marx tried to remedy this in his own analysis of reproduction. It is not, however, the narrowly quantitative matters that concern us here, but the description of the form of reproduction under capitalism. In making any new value,
the worker, by the very nature of the labour process' utilisation of tools and raw materials, must embody in that new value the value of these means of production. The production of surplus value is a question of the workers being able to produce goods of more value in a working period than he or she requires to support him or herself over that period. But in the production of these goods, the value of the utilised means of production is also transferred (127). For capital, the labour process will accomplish the reproduction of the existing value of the means of production in the same moment as new values are created. The size of capital is thus increased with every cycle of accumulation. By its labour, the working class in the capitalist form of productive relations with nature produces historically relatively vast forces of production. But under this form, those forces are an alien power which stands against its producers. Beyond a certain extent of development, Marx is however arguing, the continued production of this power will involve increasingly severe disruptions in productive relations with nature whilst they remain subsumed to the capitalist form. Let us now turn to Marx's detailing of these disruptions.

**Overproduction - Crises - Breakdown**

We are now able, I trust, to sum up Marx's analysis of capital through the crucial concept of overproduction.
The way I would like to do this is to directly address some passages in his economic writings which at once seem replete with very important material but which have been very resistant to interpretation.

The first of these passages is the following immediately striking (128) section of the *Grundrisse* in which Marx is discussing the inherent limits of capital:

...there is a limit, not inherent to production generally, but to production founded on capital... It is enough here to demonstrate that capital contains a particular restriction of production - which contradicts its general tendency to drive beyond every barrier of production - in order to have uncovered the foundation of overproduction, the fundamental contradiction of developed capital... The inherent limits have to coincide with the nature of capital, with the essential character of its very concept. These necessary limits are:

1. **Necessary labour** as limit to the exchange value of living labour capacity or of the wages of the industrial population;
2. **Surplus value** as limit on surplus labour time; and, in regard to relative surplus labour time, as barrier to the development of the forces of production;
3. What is the same, the **transformation into money**, exchange value as such, as limit of production; or exchange founded on value, or value founded on exchange, as limit of production. This is:
4. Again, the same as restriction of the production of use values by exchange value; or that real wealth has to take on a specific form distinct from itself, a form not absolutely identical with it, in order to become an object of production at all. Hence overproduction: i.e. the sudden recall of all these necessary moments of production founded on capital... (129).

It is, I am sure, correct to read this passage as the initial outline of what we have discussed in its more developed form - Marx's characterisation of capitalism as subject to chronic, incremental crises of overproduction.
Firstly, then, necessary labour is, if not the limit of the exchange value of living labour capacity, at least a constant limitation placed upon that value. We have seen that from the point of view of production, capital regards living labour as a cost, as indeed follows from labour-power's position as a commodity like any other. Wages will therefore be restricted as far as possible to the minimum set by necessary labour. Rises in real wages can typically be achieved only through political action to expand the historical and moral content of the minimum standard of the reproduction of labour-power.

Secondly, surplus value is the limit placed by capital on the amount of surplus labour time that will be worked. For capital will withdraw from production if it cannot valorise the surplus value produced by surplus labour. In so far as the main impetus to the development of the forces of production under capitalism is the pursuit of relative surplus value by the reduction of necessary labour time, the condition of valorising surplus value must stand as a potential barrier to such development.

Thirdly, the possibility of the transformation of capital into money, the possibility of the valorisation of surplus value, will limit production if it is subject to difficulties. There is a double transformation here, of capital into money by the transformation of the
use-values produced by capital into the exchange-value which is capital's aim. This latter transformation is ultimately dependent upon the volume of final consumption, and within this on the volume of the consumption of wage-goods. That is to say, the demands of valorisation predicated upon increases in the value of necessary consumption will contradict the essential thrust of capitalist production which is to drive this value down relative to constant capital costs.

Fourthly, we are thus fundamentally presented with the restriction of the production of use-values by the form of exchange-value. I want to expand this thesis greatly in the next chapter, but we can say now that the form of production in which exchange-value, that is to say commodity production, is generalised, capitalism, will eventually posit the continuation of its own form - of value and surplus value - as a barrier to the expanded production of use-values.

Hence overproduction; because at certain points in the progress of accumulation the continued expansion of production founded upon this contradictory basis will experience the effects of those contradictions in the breakdown of the accumulation process. The distance between capital and money will widen so far as to be a breach, and this breach will be materially represented in an unsaleable mass of consumer goods, which mass will.
have an, as it were, reverse multiplier effect on even sectors of the economy producing means of production. Of course, this is not absolute over-production, but it is certainly overproduction on the basis of capital. The term "over-production" might be replaced by, for example, under-consumption or over-accumulation, the latter of which perhaps does more to show the specifically capitalist nature of these episodes. But on reflection over-production brings out this historical peculiarity of these episodes more fully in my opinion. Capitalist crises are historically unique in that they result from superabundance and not from scarcity (though the latter type can occur exceptionally); and in having this form they declare that human beings have only to consciously dominate their own social life in order to end their domination by nature.

The second rather difficult passage which I would like to try and explain is to be found in chapter fifteen of volume three, the third chapter on the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall entitled 'Exposition of the Law's Internal Contradictions'. This chapter is really the conclusion of Capital as Marx left it - what follows in volume three are substantially addenda to the theory of industrial capital (financial capital and rent) and sociological sketching out of the character of capitalist production (revenues and classes). In this chapter Marx draws his depiction of
the immanent contradictions of capitalist production together in order to explain their most obvious manifestation - crises. Having begun to explain his idea that the capital accumulation process contains a contradiction, Marx continues:

To express this contradiction in the most general terms, it consists in the fact that the capitalist mode of production tends towards an absolute development of the productive forces irrespective of value and surplus value considerations, and even irrespective of the social relations within which capitalist production takes place; while on the other hand its purpose is to maintain the existing capital value and to valorise it to the utmost extent possible... The methods through which it attains this end involve a decline in the profit rate, the devaluation of the existing capital and the development of the productive forces of labour at the cost of the productive forces already developed. The periodical devaluation of the existing capital, which is a means, immanent to the capitalist mode of production, for delaying the fall in the profit rate and accelerating the accumulation of capital value by the formation of new capital, disturbs the given conditions in which the circulation and reproduction process of capital takes place, and is therefore accompanied by sudden stoppages and crises in the production process (130).

Let us consider this passage in some detail.

Capital must, Marx is I believe saying, drive beyond all barriers to production and is able to posit only the absolute development of the productive forces. Though it does this as a result of the competitive enforcement of its own intrinsic nature, capital will find that this development will eventually contradict its nature. Nevertheless, capital will continue to pursue this development even when it threatens capitalist social
relations of production - value and surplus value - because each individual capital must do so even at the expense of the interest of capital as a whole. The specific acts through which the development of the productive forces is brought about are cycles of individual capitals' expansion involving the production of surplus value, its valorisation, and its subsequent use as a fund for accumulation. The paramount method of the production of surplus value for developed capitalism is the production of relative surplus value, but this is the very process by which capital is brought into conflict with the future expansion of the productive forces. For in creating relative surplus value, capital also creates a tendency of the rate of profit to fall and a restricted (by comparison to the growth of the productive forces) market in which that tendency will be actualised in crises.

Crises are in fact periodical devaluations of capital which allow of the cyclical reproduction of the contradiction laden process. After a significant organic recomposition of capital, a certain amount of capital will be producing at above the hitherto existing socially average level of productivity. The volume of output will probably expand because the recomposed capital will attempt to enlarge its market at the expense of its competitors and those competitors will not have altered their behaviours as they are not as yet aware of the
challenge. Given the finitude of markets which the capitalist distribution of income effects, any improvement in productivity of real significance will eventually result in unsaleable stocks of consumer goods. The degree to which this will follow, and to which this glut will affect the whole economy, will of course depend on numerous factors, but I hope that I have shown that no distinction in principle can be drawn between over-production of specific goods and general over-production. If this is so it requires only certain assumptions about the size and range of the increase in productivity in order to generate a model of general crisis. I do not think these assumptions are capable of theoretical elaboration; they are too embedded in specific empirical conjunctures. However, it is consonant with the massive disproportion Marx clearly believes develops in capital between the growth of the productive forces and the growth of consumption to postulate that after a certain point in the accumulation of capital further accumulation must tend towards production of general crises. That point is determined by capital's pushing of productivity up to the level where the value of labour power can absorb wage goods output. From this point the system is chronically prone to crisis.

Faced with the impossibility of selling all of their commodities, certainly at their prices of production,
capitals will compete with one another for market shares. Marx here, we can see, provides some account of the conditions in which competition will lower the rate of profit, effectively reversing the thrust of Smith's explanation (131). This competition will reduce the value of commodities towards levels compatible with the new level of productivity. Of course this will amount to the devaluation of commodities produced by the older methods, commodities which now perhaps simply cannot be sold or can be sold only below their price of production or below even their cost price. All forms of future undertaking calculated on the basis of the old values are thereby thrown into confusion as promissory notes on production in various forms are also devalued. (It is well to note that in so far as the credit apparatus both speeds up the introduction of major new means of production and prolongs the time at which capitals using old methods may continue production, then this apparatus will deepen the extent of the eventual devaluation). Ultimately the devaluation of capital will be added to by the liquidation of capitals which are unable to succeed in the competitive struggle over the now far too small market (or are unable to speculate, hoard, etc., and thus survive in this way - as good as any other to the capital itself). The assets of these capitals will either simply cease to enter production, or will be radically devalued by being offered to other capitals at well below their value, their market price in the depressed conditions
being abnormally low. Even many of the capitals which survive will have to undergo a stagnation if not a devaluation of their capital, because they will be unable to invest all of it in production, and thus will not be expanded during this period.

Such crises certainly involve some physical destruction of means of production and the physical waste of potential labour-power which cannot be productively utilised. But what is of the essence is the destruction of capital values, of which physical waste of capital is just a material expression. For crisis is in fact healthy (though such words slip into absurdity through their use in this connection) for the capitalist economy. Over-production is probably halted by the gross stagnation of the economy in the trough of the crisis, by both variable and constant capital being withdrawn from (by those capitalists who can invest elsewhere) or pushed out of (the capital which is driven out of business) production. However a fundamental disproportion between the amount of capital invested in production and the market for the product remains, and any start up of production would simply bring this to crisis point again. Or rather, whilst this disproportion remained there would be no start up. This is why the forcible destruction of capital values is healthy for the economy. By nullifying a certain amount of capital, the market becomes somewhat unconstricted, and the effect for surviving capitals is
rather as if some entirely new market has been opened. For this fundamental reason, as well as because in the crisis the costs of expanding production are abnormally low, the crisis can expect to end. It produces its own conditions for ending when it has proceeded so far with the destruction of existing capitals that it produces viable markets for the remaining capitals. To this basic point, the lowering of capital costs (both variable and constant) is a subordinate point. Crises of over-production tell us that capital needs no help to assault production, only to be released from its own fetters.

Crises are the expression of the capitalist economy's inability to smoothly cope with increases in productivity of anything like the size and range which it continually seeks. The dynamic equilibrium of our model of expanded reproduction can be only a statement of the conditions deviation from which will produce the crises characteristic of the real economy. For instead of the assimilation of the levels of productivity being a smooth process, it is rather an abrupt switch from the old to the new. If we reflect on what we already know of the nature of capitalism as generalised commodity production then we can see why this is so.

New levels of productivity are at first the guarded province of only some capitals. They will typically use
these new levels in order to enlarge their market. In the capitalist form of restricted consumption this is tantamount to saying that they will use the new levels to provoke a crisis; for other capitals they intend, but beyond a certain size of change the reverse multiplier effect of their behaviour must reflect on them though to a much lesser extent than on others. Finding their commodities unsaleable at their prices of production, their capital devalued, and perhaps being driven into liquidation, is the way the market informs capitals with older methods of production that they are now wasting labour - the social average level of productivity has risen above their level of technique. The social judgment on their production is made clear to these capitals in the way in which the social relations of capitalist production must be made clear, after the event of production when they try to valorise their surplus value. Hence the appalling waste of the market system - waste which simply would not arise if the introduction of new methods were planned for the whole economy beforehand. Consciousness of what is going on is specifically what is absent from the capitalist economy.

Though this is so, even this general statement of the causes of crises cannot, let me emphasise, be thought to describe merely a type of disproportionality. There are specific features of the nature of capital which necessarily work in contradictory directions which bring
about the realisation of the anarchy of capitalist production in crises as well as in other ways. It is in the nature of individual capitals to seek virtually infinite expansion of their own means of production, to seek to valorise their surplus value and to enter into production only if they feel they will gain what they seek, to increase the value composition of capital, and to restrict the market to the point where the alteration in the level of productivity will provoke a crisis. Hence I have felt it possible to give the above outline of the structural reasons for crises - this would be impossible if crises were simply the outcomes of specifically arbitrary behaviour.

The third and final passage from Marx's economics on which I would like to comment is the following, again from the Grundrisse, again in which Marx is discussing capital's contradictions:

These contradictions, of course, lead to explosions, crises, in which momentary suspension of all labour and annihilation of a great part of capital violently lead back to the point where it is enabled to go on fully employing its productive powers without committing suicide. Yet, these regularly recurring catastrophes lead to their repetition on a higher scale, and finally to its violent overthrow (132).

This passage contains two distinct propositions, the first of which follows directly from what we have already seen of Marx's account of capitalism. This is that crises are not only merely temporary solutions to
capital's contradictions, they in fact leave the situation worse than before. The devaluation of existing capitals will, in its destructively wasteful fashion, be the harbinger of renewed accumulation. And that accumulation will take place with the same intent, for capital can set no limit to its own purely quantitative growth, but in a situation where accumulation faces a more difficult prospect. For now the productive forces have been increased, and the lower rate of profit on larger investments and the increased relative paucity of consumption which this increase entails sets even greater obstacles to further accumulation. We have gone over this before, and I have thought it necessary only to put the point into its proper place here. It leads, of course, to what Marx has in mind in the second of the propositions of the above passage; the eventual violent overthrow of capitalism. This is so large a topic that, after noting how it comes at the end of Marx's analysis I propose to leave it for treatment separately in the remainder of this work.
CHAPTER 12

THE CONTRADICTIONS USE-VALUE/EXCHANGE-VALUE AND CAPITALISM/SOCIALISM IN MARX'S DESCRIPTION OF CAPITALISM

Introduction

In this chapter I want to draw out the central historiographical ideas in Marx's account of the development of capitalism. This chapter is, in effect, a summary of my argument about Marx so far. I am sure that Marx's own statement of the guiding thread of his studies is the indispensable key to Capital, but Marx has substantially left us the task of properly grasping the meaning of that statement so that we may use that key. Therefore I have felt it necessary to set out that meaning at length - which is as much a task of reading Hegel as of reading Marx - prior to discussing Capital. My aim now is to, as it were, reverse the direction of the foregoing study of (Hegel and) Marx, summing up the interpretative results of that study by explicitly discussing the way Capital articulates the themes of Marx's guiding thread.

Capital as Alienation

The first and foremost characteristic of Marx's description of capitalism is that it is a description of
a state of social alienation. Marx discusses forms of alienated consciousness—principally commodity fetishism and elements of vulgar and classical political economy. But more than this, his discussion of these forms refers to the alienating character of the fundamental social relations of material life. Commodity fetishism arises because the production of commodities is specifically an unplanned activity. It is the way in which social relations are obscurely represented in the material bodies of goods that creates fetishism (1). Marx goes on to extend his initial explanation of the form of material life that leads to the fetishism of money into an account of capital (2). That account shows capital to be the product of labour certainly, but a product which takes on a life of its own, to the extent that the aim of the economy is the augmentation of capital rather than the welfare of people, because the process of production which creates capital is not under the conscious control of the producers. In detailing an economy which is dominated by the increase of the means of production as an end in itself, which treats human beings only as instruments to carry out this end, and can even lead to the creation of a surplus population when certain people are unable to be used as such instruments, Marx is detailing an economy whose principal features are the disfigurements of the alienation of social powers (3). In an initial sense, capital is merely a form of means of production; but it is capital in that it is the form of
means of production which directs the economy for its own growth (4).

**Use-value and Exchange-value as Forces and Relations of Production**

Standing as a form of alienated material life, capitalism is subject to the dialectic of forces and relations of production. Marx's stated aim is to describe the laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production (5), and the dynamic of this motion is the capitalist form of the dialectic of forces and relations of production, which is the changing relation of use-value and exchange-value. The material productivity of capitalism - its ability to produce objects of utility with a given expenditure of labour - is represented by use-value productivity. The specifically capitalist relations of production under which this use-value productivity is developed are the relations of generalised exchange-value.

Marx's overall account of the relation of use- and exchange-values follows the scheme outlined in the 1859 Preface most directly. There is a stress on the way in which the imperatives of exchange-value accumulation initially facilitated - indeed facilitated in an historically uniquely powerful fashion (6) - the development of human powers of furnishing use-values (7). However, it is the continuation of production along these
lines that eventually brings use-value and exchange-value into contradiction, in the sense that, from initially furthering the development of the forces of use-value production, the social relations of exchange-value production eventually increasingly stand as a fetter upon such development (8). This change in the relation of use- and exchange-values, a change in the relation between the development of the forces of production and capitalist economic relations, is the result of the inner motion of capitalism - it is capitalism's own immanent critique (9).

The most palpable expressions of this critique are crises (10). However, the more fundamental expression, present in and underlying the crises, is the chronic tendency toward overproduction and economic stagnation in established capitalism (11). The result of the pincer grip of relative restrictions upon consumption and declining profit rates (12) spells out the fundamental obsolescence of capitalism's social relations of production once they have developed in the forces of production the weapons of their own criticism (13).

In capitalist terms, it is the growing contradiction between use-value productivity (as this is necessarily reflected in calculations of exchange-value) and exchange-value (and capital as the principle of economic organisation which aims at the infinite accumulation of
exchange-values) that constitutes the dialectical critique of given economic relations. Marx was certainly at pains to separate the historically specific economic relations of capitalism from the general, natural pursuit of utility - and hence use- and exchange-values are initially distinguished. But use-value does not thereby fall from Marx's political economy. Indeed, use-value production as given historically specific forms in relation to exchange-value but nevertheless retaining a natural objectivity is central to that political economy. The way in which exchange-value production increasingly fails to live up to its objective measure in use-value eventually calls the whole identification of production with commodity production into question. Without at all stretching the point, we can say that fundamentally Capital describes the changing position of use-value production within the unfolding capitalist mode of production (14). It is just this criterion that historically contextualises the account of exchange-value.

**Bourgeoisie and Proletariat: Bourgeois Society and Its Class Divisions**

As an alienated form of material life, capitalism begets a class divided society. Marx famously characterised bourgeois society as being progressively polarised into two classes - bourgeoisie and proletariat (15). The
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former are identified by their ownership of the means of production and the latter by their having to labour with those means which stand against them as the private property of others. This is to say that these two main classes are formed by the essential characteristic of capitalist economic life - concentrated private ownership of capital and its antithesis in the existence of mass wage-labour (16).

Some qualifications of this picture of bourgeois society is obviously necessary to push this basic two class schema on towards phenomenal empirical adequacy, and this can in many cases be readily admitted to this schema (17). Let us briefly mention some of these cases. Marx identified landowners as another major class of bourgeois society (18), but a class whose existence as such was not generated by the capitalist mode of production but by the persistence of feudal tenure of land in bourgeois society (19). He also recognised subdivisions of capital into, for example, those sectors that are not actually concerned with industrial production but operate only within the sphere of circulation, that is to say, finance capital (20). Equally, Marx distinguishes continuously employed proletarians from the members of the three strata of the industrial reserve army (21), and these in turn from the lumpenproletariat (22). Lastly, let us mention the petty-bourgeoisie, who are continuously being stripped of their ownership of a small capital by the
competitive struggles leading to centralisation (23). Other refinements - such as public sector employment - which may well be thought necessary cannot be so readily admitted into Marx's basically two-class description of bourgeois social structure, and I will mention these in the conclusion of this work. For the present we must note that Marx's concentration on the bourgeoisie and the proletariat follows from the central place which private property has in his guiding thread. He places an emphasis upon these two classes because that emphasis serves his aims of historical explanation. This emphasis must be explanatorily defensible in terms of what it reveals of capitalism, and, as I have just mentioned, I will turn to this in concluding. But we must note that there is a specific explanatory strategy involved in Marx's class schema, and not some purely quantitative division of society into theoretically arbitrary stratification models (24). Bearing this in mind, let us look at the class positions of the bourgeoisie and proletariat as these are generated by the developing capitalist economy.

The existence of the bourgeoisie as a class obviously turns on the persistence of capital as such. The economic imperatives of production for exchange-value accumulation are subjectively adhered to by the bourgeoisie (25), and indeed are fetishistically conflated by them with the given nature of material life as such (26). As this form of life does constitute the
existence of the bourgeoisie as a privileged class, it typically is a source of subjective satisfaction to the members of that class (27). However, there should be no mistaking the essential alienation of the bourgeoisie under capitalism. Lacking self-consciousness of the character of social life, the bourgeoisie is just as much subject to the domination of estranged social institutions as is the proletariat (28). The capitalist may bear the power of capital and money in his or her person (29), but he or she can do so only so long as he or she serves the accumulation of capital (30) and observes the rules of capital which are made known in the distorted, coercive form of competition (31). Perhaps in one important sense this is no real coercion, as the bourgeoisie identify with the maxims of competition which they must observe, regarding them as inexorable standards and regarding success judged by these standards as confirming the justice of their own privilege. In this lack of a critical distance towards even the condition of their own alienation, the bourgeoisie are, in a sense, more alienated than the proletariat (32).

As capitalist economic relations enter into contradiction with the development of the forces of production, there is the inevitable corollary that the bourgeoisie come to stand in a reactionary position towards that development. The distance between the contradiction of forces and relations of production and the actual degree to which
the latter are called into question is constructed by the adherence of the bourgeoisie to those relations. This is not really a question of self-interest, for the bourgeoisie understand the true character of their position at least as poorly as the proletariat, but rather of an inability to gain any distance from given social relations in which any stance other than adherence would be possible. If the contradiction of forces and relations of production is to be overcome, then it is necessary to overcome the fundamental resistance of the bourgeoisie to progressive change (33).

Before turning to the proletariat, we must note that there are trends central to capitalist development which must weaken the reactionary position of the bourgeoisie in class struggle (34). Let me initially deal with one point. The centralisation of capital will lead to the bourgeoisie, always of course a minority, becoming relatively very small indeed, thereby making the solution of many practical problems in the abolition of their class position easily envisageable as a social task (35). Of course, whether these problems could ever be posed is the crucial question, but there again the development of the capitalist mode of production would seem to undermine the class power of the bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie - in the fundamental position of capital owners - also begins to cease to have an economic
function, for, with the massive scale and complexity of concentrated and centralised capitals, individual, idiosyncratic, personal direction of business becomes quite impossible and the functions of management and the ownership of capital become split (36). Of course, one person can embrace both positions, but in doing so he or she is recognisably filling two distinct positions and not one (the latter) which entails another (the former). The economic rationalisation of the privileges accruing to ownership thereby becomes increasingly difficult (37), but far more important is the real obsolescence of private ownership which is developed here. The massive enlargement of the scale of capitalist production - both of individual capitals and in their interconnection as capital as a whole - requires massively expanded horizons in the production process. It is increasingly a generalised power of production - of co-operation in the production process and in the stages of preparation for that particular production process - that is seen to be the real force of production. Against this, production directed for what seems to be the profit of individuals is a laughable anachronism (38). Production is no longer production which can meaningfully be said to be under the control of individuals. It is rather, in effect, production on a generalised social scale, and this is demonstrated in the fantastic implausibility of any individual's efforts to direct it to his or her own will in ways which seem, precisely, bizarrely idiosyncratic.
For Marx, the apogee of this development was the joint stock company, a form even of the ownership of capital which is based on the admission that treating the means of production, even allowing that these are capital, as the property of individuals is farcical (39).

The fundamental theme of the reasoning behind Marx's idea that the proletariat will put the class impetus behind the development of socialism which will overcome bourgeois resistance to such a development is that the members of the proletariat can essentially improve their conditions of life only by a general criticism of capitalism. Marx describes the conditions of the proletariat as miserable (40), and the process of their immiseration is so intrinsic to the subordinate position of that class that it can be overcome only by the abolition of that subordination. But as it is the direct result of the most central social characteristics of the entire bourgeois society, this subordination can be abolished only with the abolition of that society (41).

As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, ascertaining the proper meaning of this process of "immiseration" has been as vexed a problem in the interpretation of Marx as any other issue. This is no doubt substantially due to Marx's way of using this term in a number of different ways, and it is certainly to be regretted that he did not
coordinate these ways. However, it is clear that the inconsistencies here have often been gleefully seized upon as parts of readings directed at denigration rather than interpretation, and, as I have implied, I think a more fairly sympathetic reading can find some rather valuable sense of immiseration. To correlate these senses one must recognise two different axes on which they turn, and let us recapitulate and expand on these.

The first of these axes is that Marx had some ideas about the early stages of capitalism which do not necessarily have to apply to the established capitalist mode of production. Marx would certainly seem to have believed that the conditions of the initially assembling urban proletariat were inferior to those which had prevailed in the earlier peasant lifestyle. The production of free wage-labour was accompanied by an absolute decline in the standard of living of those compelled to populate the towns and work in factories (42). Whether this was so or not is a question it is difficult to even pose properly, much less to answer, and has generated much impassioned debate (43). I do not propose to say anything further upon it - Marx's view is surely at least credible but this would not repay discussion here as the whole issue clearly related to primitive accumulation and I would like to discuss the proletariat within established capitalism.
In turning to this, we come across the second axis on which Marx's various views on immiseration turn, for I think some discussion of Marx's views on the condition of the proletariat under established capitalism will show that an early moral criticism of the wretchedness of those conditions is scientifically deepened to a large - if not in the end adequate - degree by being placed within an economic account of the determination of the living standards of the proletariat as wage-labour.

The theme of absolute immiseration which is to be found in Marx's comments on the initially forming proletariat is, it has been argued (44), present in Marx's ideas about what would happen to the living standards of the proletariat in the course of the development of capitalism. Were this Marx's view, then clearly he is incorrect, and in a most serious way; but I rather doubt whether we are able to simply dismiss Marx's thought in this area as an unfounded and worthless prediction (45). Marx certainly does argue that the economic tendency of capitalism is to push wages down to the minimum, for of course wages are treated as a cost. This is hardly to say that the minimum must absolutely decline or that the tendency for wages to be pushed to this level must have effect. I have already allowed that perhaps it is possible to produce isolated quotations from Marx which seem to show this, but by this sort of method of interpretation anything is possible. On the basis of an
overall look at Marx's ideas on wages, such as I have attempted below, it is obvious that the central theoretical trend of those ideas is that they are much more flexible than Ricardo's. Not only are they far more precise about the changes in wages during the industrial cycle, but, due to Marx's distinguishing of surplus value and profit, they can very easily allow for a continuing rise in the standard of wages.

What Marx does in detail say here is that the value of labour-power will fall, and that treating this as the minimum (though obviously it features in competition as the average), money wages will tend to be pushed towards it by certain competitive pressures generated by developing capitalism.

That the value of labour-power will fall is obviously absolutely central to Marx's account of capitalism, for this is the mechanism of the production of surplus value. But what does this mean in terms of living standards? Unless wages fall in proportion to the fall in the value of labour-power, this fall will in fact mean a rise in real wages and living standards. Let us, however, leave consideration of the size of money wages aside for a moment, however, and look further at the interesting idea of immiseration bound up within the fall in the value of labour-power itself, the idea of relative immiseration.
The decline in the value of labour-power is part of the enormous growth in the productive power of labour under capitalism. But this historical achievement has a paradoxical form for labour itself. The value of labour-power falls, but this is not meant as a resource for labour but as a resource for capital, for though necessary labour declines, the capitalist will want to use this decline to increase surplus labour. To the extent that the decline in necessary labour is used to produce surplus value, the result will be that the expanded production of capital itself will take place. At more or less any conceivable ratio of necessary and surplus labour under capitalism, the labour of the proletariat will lead to a relatively far greater production of capital than of fruits for labour itself (46). Moreover, at virtually any conceivable volume of luxury consumption in established capitalism, this will involve a far greater accumulation of real wealth by the bourgeoisie than the proletariat (47). A conviction that the very act of labour under capitalism produces the subordination of labour to an ever deeper extent which Marx held from 1844 (48) is thus extended to an explanation of relative immiseration and its generation of a proletarian attitude critical of capitalism in the development of his economics (49). This sense of relative immiseration does not turn, let me repeat, on the absolute size of wages (50) - it is an idea of a relation and only thus is adequate to a real social
Having seen that Marx is committed to predicting a fall in the value of labour-power, and that this involves an idea of relative immiseration, let us return to the other part of what Marx would have to say were this idea to be extended on into any sort of absolute immiseration - that a fall in money wages proportional to the fall in the value of labour-power would overall (i.e. ignoring fluctuations in the industrial cycle) have to take place. Marx undoubtedly did think an economic tendency for this to happen did exist in capitalism (52). This tendency is fundamentally composed of the effects on wages of the growth of the industrial reserve army, for this growth will increase the competitive advantage of capital as a whole over wage-labour as a whole in the determination of wages (53). Two types of absolute immiseration can conceivably result from this tendency. One relates to the fate of chronic pauperism which awaits the stagnant element of the growing relative surplus population (54). This shades - through the other forms of existence of the relative surplus population - into the second conceivable type of absolute immiseration. This is a general pushing down of the money wages of even those in full time work to the declining value of labour-power (55).

This is indeed Marx's statement of the economic laws of motion of capitalism in this area, but it is not his
entire statement on the issue. He locates at precisely this point the main impetus of proletarian class struggle, and this struggle specifically moves beyond those laws, positing their abolition. Faced with economic pressures on their money wages, Marx did not counsel acceptance of economic inevitability but class based politico-economic resistance of those pressures. This is the entire theme of the polemic against Weston in *Wages, Price and Profit* (56). To be sure, Marx does not say that such actions can consistently hope to counter the economic tendencies of capital, but they can succeed in gradually positing the abolition of those tendencies.

The area of this proletarian class struggle is that of what Marx calls the historical and moral element in the determination in the value of labour-power. The economic tendency of capitalism is to treat labour-power as a commodity and therefore ultimately to determine wages by determining the value of labour-power as a commodity (57). However, labour-power is a unique commodity in that the object of valuation is itself an active subject, labour itself. Here we have the nub of the alienating pressures of capital, that human labour be reduced to a commodity, to variable capital, and here Marx locates, in the struggle over wage levels, the fundamental class impetus to the rejection of that reduction. Abstract labour is to be challenged in that there is always an element in the settling of the value of labour-power.
which resists strict economic calculation (58). This is a social element furnished by the power of human beings - even wage-labourers - to reflect on their situation and to (to various degrees) consciously alter that situation. This is an historical and social element in that the power of the proletariat to realise a creative increase in the standards of their life turns, of course, upon social resources such as the traditional standard of life and therefore of legitimate expectation (59).

The historical and moral element in the determination of the value of labour-power may be relatively large or small (60). During a period of boom the proletariat may increase it (61) and conversely during slumps the bourgeoisie will contract it. This of course is a matter of the differing competitive situations in the labour market produced by the cyclical character of accumulation. But, overall, Marx thought the economic tendencies of capitalism - essentially the growth of the industrial reserve army - would, as I have mentioned, increasingly favour the bourgeoisie. The point is, however, that the logic of the proletariat's situation must push them into critique not of a particular competitive situation but into critique of this sort of economic determination of living standards at all. The varying extent of the historical and moral element is, precisely, itself an historical issue. The economic tendency of capitalism is to extinguish it altogether.
Resistance of this tendency, if it is to be coherent, cannot quibble about the economics, for the economics are internally correct. It must reject such economics. Defence of the historical moral element is ultimately criticism of the alienation of the capitalist economic calculation of the value of labour-power at all, and of the fundamental treating of labour as a commodity on which such calculation is based.

It is sometimes argued that Marx did not allow of the possibility of conceiving of a purely physical minimum standard of consumption which would allow of continued bare existence but no more (62). The evidence for this is constituted of two main points. Firstly, there is a general observation that Marx's materialism so inextricably intertwines historical and natural influences that his conceiving of an ahistorical, physical standard of human existence was impossible. Secondly, it is noted that Marx was specifically scathing in his criticisms of explicit attempts to formulate such a physical minimum, not only by such as Malthus but even by the leading socialist Lassalle. I would say that the first point is unarguably correct and that consistently Marx would have to rule out the possibility of coherently imagining a purely physically determined minimum standard of existence. Many of his statements on the value of labour power can easily be read as supporting this (63). But to say this is rather to miss the real issue here.
Capital certainly is seeking to push wages down to a purportedly physically ascertained limit, and Marx notes a number of attempts to fix this limit (64). That capital is hereby pursuing a goal which is simply impossible given the historical character of human beings should neither surprise us nor prevent us from recognising the real economic force pushing wages down to this limit in capitalism. It is pious sentimentality to wish to reject this sort of fixing of living standards given the existence of wage-labour (65); only the abolition of wage-labour will abolish this standard which is intrinsic to it. And it is at this point that Marx disagrees with Lassalle. This disagreement arises not because Lassalle argues that there is a pressure towards physically minimum wages, but that his argument follows the population theory in incorrectly identifying this force as an "iron" natural law and not an economic product of capitalism (66). There is certainly a very real issue bound up in the idea of conceiving of a physically minimum standard of living, and that this idea is internally absurd because it stems from the alienated position of labour in capitalism does not detract from the reality of the issue whilst capitalism continues.

Marx's hope would seem to have been that initial struggles over pressures to reduce money wages - which are simply part of the competitive determination of wages and the value of labour-power (67) - would lead, as
proletarian awareness of the fundamental reasons for these obvious pressures develops, into explicit struggles over the preservation and extension of the civilising presence of the historical element of the determination of the value of labour-power and hence into rejection of determining living standards by the value of labour-power. Whilst proletarian action focuses only on money wage levels it restricts itself to surface phenomena (68). The only plausible goal of a conscious proletarian struggle (69) over wage levels can be the very abolition of wage-labour, the abolition of the proletarian class position itself (70). In this way Marx tries to locate proletarian class struggle over wage levels and, relatedly, over non-wage (welfare) provisions for the relative surplus population within a scheme of the fundamental economic laws of capital and a class-based movement to abolish those laws. I presume that it cannot be argued in favour of interpreting Marx as holding to a thesis of inevitable absolute immiseration that he thought this struggle would inevitably be resolved against the proletariat. From what we have seen it is clear that rejection of this inevitability is in a very important way the central theme of Marx's life work.

By saying this I do not mean to completely disparage the attribution to Marx of an idea of inevitable absolute immiseration, for a profound difficulty in the understanding of Marx is certainly brought up by it. Let
us recapitulate on the way Marx's account of capitalism articulates the themes of his guiding thread. There is a contradiction of forces and relations of production described in the contradiction of use- and exchange-values, and there is a class struggle described in the conflict of bourgeoisie and proletariat. I think it has emerged that Marx has extreme difficulty - so extreme in fact that he does not properly see the problem himself - of running these two elements of his account of capitalist development together. His statement of the laws of motion of capitalism posits the historical obsolescence of exchange-value internally to those laws, and carries a very strong explanatory power in doing so. But his statement of the proletarian struggle over wages does not have this form. This struggle is initially internal to capitalism as is it explained as part of a necessary competition arising from the very positing of labour as a commodity. But the laws of motion as Marx describes them do posit absolute immiseration as the general law of capitalist accumulation. Marx obviously had faith in the proletariat's ability to overcome this law, but this is a rejection of the law, not its internal working out. His account of the proletariat's class struggle explicitly eschews the internal consistency with which he describes the obsolescence of exchange-value. Now, we have seen that Marx in a principled and defensible way sets class struggle at a distance from the contradiction of the relations of production. However,
there can be no doubt that he does virtually nothing to essentially relate the two, and bring proletarian class struggle within his explanatory framework, when he describes them in their capitalist form.

Perhaps the fundamental difficulty in ascribing to Marx a belief in inevitable absolute immiseration lies in the obstacles which this places in the way of seeing how a proletariat subjected to this process could rise to the position of assuming class dominance. Absolute immiseration might explain discontent, but a class reduced to universal wretchedness could hardly be conceived of as the realisers of the potential for universal wealth posited by capitalism. Such wretchedness could hardly be the background of a conscious critique of existing conditions and the positing of the revolutionary development of those conditions into socialism. Apart from through the influence of previously bourgeois people who have been proletarianised (71) or of those bourgeois who grasp the historical position of the proletariat and support it (72), it is difficult to see how socialist aspirations could be generated amidst such a wretched mass. But for Marx these were certainly marginal influences on what he thought should be the essentially self-emancipatory struggle of the proletariat (73). It is not enough to show why the proletariat should posit socialism as a class goal; Marx must show how they are able to do so,
and for that ability to be imported from outside that class would simply flatly contradict his analysis of capitalism.

The normal class based competition over wages leads to the proletariat uniting to improve their bargaining position as a whole (74). For Marx, the real fruit of these associations was not the victories in wage competition which they can on occasion bring but the way in which the lesson of such victories becomes ever clearer simply by virtue of the united struggle: that proletarian unity is a strength which reaches to the heart of modern production (75). To the extent that trades unions are the immediate product of capitalist wage struggles, trades union aims may tend to be restricted to the illusory goal of continuous success in such struggles (76). But the evidence of class based power furnished by the trades union experience is invaluable (77). The real issue here, an issue which can be resolved only by the closest study of the penetrations and limitations bound up in working class actions (78), is the formation of a general critical attitude to capitalism and a general conception of the plausibility of socialism amongst the proletariat.

One of Marx's ways of discussing this issue was to employ Kantian terminology in a distinction between a class "in-itself" and a class "for-itself" (79). The
proletariat as a class of human beings subject to a specific set of most significant social determinations of subordination and exploitation is identified in Marx's political economy of capitalism. We can, at an initial level, social scientifically defend the existence of this class if its existence is posited by explanatory requirements. But so far we are discussing only a class in-itself, for the very powerful reason that its existence may be recognised only in social science and may not be recognised by the members of the class themselves. It may be well argued that some shared consciousness, and perhaps even some consciousness of shared position, are necessary characteristics of any identifiable real social class, and I myself would accept this point. Marx, however, was not really interested in mapping out the consequences of proletarian class position for the culture of members of that class except in two respects. One was the basic ideology of fetishism, and the second, more peculiar to the proletariat, was the extent that that culture grasped the fundamental historical determinants of its own production. A culture which did involve such a grasp would constitute a proletarian class for-itself, a proletarian class-conscious in the very important sense that it recognised its own class existence and social position.

Marx clearly thought that he had essentially set out the
genesis of the proletariat as a class in-itself in his political economy. From this position, he had then to go on to say that the proletariat had to develop self-consciousness by bringing to active political fruition the latent strength of its class position (80). There is a serious difficulty here for Marx, one which is linked to the earlier difference between his depiction of the contradiction of use- and exchange-values and the development of class struggle. This is that the full development of his account of capitalism must include an explanation of the progressive elements of proletarian class consciousness. I can see no principled ground on which this can be denied. To talk of *Capital* as a purely economic work - as opposed to say *The Class Struggles in France* or *The Eighteenth Brumaire* which study political forms - is irrelevant here. There is surely a difference in focus between these works, but not one based on a rigid topographical metaphor but on the generality of the explanations attempted in the different works. Marx was ready enough to bring the general determinations of fetishism within *Capital*, and indeed he had to do so was *Capital's* account of capitalism to be adequate. But at this general level, it is equally necessary for Marx to provide an account of the generation of proletarian class consciousness as part of the generation of socialism; but no equivalent explanation of this is really put forward. What we are forced to recognise is an unacceptable theoretical indeterminateness in the area of proletarian
class struggle and the development of socialism out of capitalism.

I want to discuss this indeterminateness in detail as the conclusion of this work. But for now I would like to acknowledge that as I have made this criticism so far, here and in the previous chapter, it is rather ungenerous. There are some elements of Marx's explanation of capitalist development that do link the class position of the proletariat to the innermost development of the forces of production under capitalism. We have seen in our discussion of the guiding thread that Marx held an idea that the possibilities of taking a critical attitude towards a mode of production depends on how far the forces and relations of production developed in that mode were in contradiction. He makes some effort to utilise this idea in a capitalist form by making the developing contradiction of use- and exchange-values a basic resource for the proletarian adoption of a strategy of conscious class conflict.

Co-operation is the fundamental relation of production in capitalism. It is the extensive division of labour throughout society in generalised commodity production and the intensive division of labour in the factory in the production of particular commodities (81) that allows of the massive development of the productive forces under capitalism (82). As all social forces are brought under
the requirements of production, and production is resolved into its component parts on which those forces can be concentrated, an ability to adopt the strategy of increasing productivity by enlarging the scale of the employment of means of production in detailed branches of production is present in capitalism in a sense in which it can be said to be more or less absent from previous modes of production (83).

Of course, as it is developed within capitalism, co-operation has a capitalist form. This is most obviously so in the coercion exercised in the capitalistic supervision of the labour-process (84), but more essentially all the powers fostered by co-operation are alienated from the producers as they appear to be a quality, indeed a property, of the capital which brings workers together (85). However, all this cannot alter that co-operation is a specifically social production relation, for it is a relation that makes its sociality its object in that it is precisely by virtue of that sociality that co-operation fosters the development of productive forces. And this sociality expands as the scale of production in all its facets is increased as the means of pursing relative surplus value (86). Production is undertaken on what is increasingly a society-wide basis within an interdependent world economy, and that interdependence undercuts the atomism of commodity production. Accumulation on the basis of private
property in capital thus expands the self-consciously social dimension of production.

It is this inner socialisation of capital that Marx tries to establish as the basis of the positive development of proletarian class consciousness (87). We have discussed how exchange-value is pushed into reactionary absurdity by the expanding powers of use-value production, and here we have, in the distanced dimension of class struggle, the principal ramification of this. This is the absurdity of private ownership - and of conducting economic life for the purpose of private accumulation, when the means of production have been developed by, and can only be employed by, the powers of social co-operation. As the bourgeoisie becomes productively redundant, so it falls to the proletariat to actualise that redundancy. The proper utilisation of the forces of production to fulfill relative and absolute material needs depends on the degree to which the socialisation of the forces of production is pushed through, and the necessity of this process faces the proletariat as a resource and a task.

Particular co-operative developments have an important role. They are, as we have seen when discussing the bourgeoisie, the actual proof of the redundancy of that class. Their success can be only limited, however, for as they are particular they are open to localised
destructive efforts by the bourgeoisie and, more than this, are simply inadequate to the task of the socialisation of the entire economy which becomes every more pressing (88). It is the political organisation of the proletariat to wrest what is seen as the reactionary residue of bourgeois domination of production that socialisation makes a clear objective.

Capitalism - Socialism - Communism: The Determinate Negation of the Given

Marx's account of capitalism has, as we have seen, the form of a penetration to the inner dynamic of that mode production which is shown to be one which posits that mode's inner critique and breakdown. Though Marx's terminology on this issue is by no means always consistent, I think we can identify his idea of full actualised, non-alienated society as "communism" (89), and his idea of the social form which capitalism immediately posits as its own critique as "socialism" (90). Socialism is the initial stage in the actualisation of non-alienated society. It is a society in which the tendencies towards the supercession of alienation generated by capitalism are dominant (whereas in capitalism these tendencies are subordinate to alienating influences) but the alienating residues of capitalist forms are by no means overcome. When they are fully overcome, this is communism (91).
Let me stress that not all of Marx's uses of "socialism" and "communism" fit in with this rendering of their meaning, for the consistent use of these terms in this way certainly owes more to Lenin than Marx. The rendition is defensible only in terms of the overall fit with Marx's thought which it very arguably possesses, for even when Marx says "communism" in precisely the fashion that "socialism" should be used given the above distinction, the essential idea of stages in the movement from capitalism to completely non-alienated society remains (92). But allowing such a fit does not of course guarantee the coherence of the distinction, and its terminological niceness can have a real ground only if it describes a real issue. What does it mean to so attempt to demarcate capitalism, socialism and communism? Does this demarcation describe an actual issue?

It would seem that there is an in principle defensible criterion for making this demarcation, which lies in specifying the balance of alienating the non-alienating social influences as this enters into consciousness and is given political effect in the area of class struggle. If Marx was to gauge the development of the contradiction of forces and relations of production in capitalism through assessment of the extent to which use-value contradicts exchange-value, then his attempt to assess the extent to which this fundamental contradiction calls
into question the capitalist mode of production, the extent to which mankind has actually consciously set itself the problem of creating non-alienated society, may be presented as the assessment of the politically effective projection of socialism.

Of course it is possible to use socialism to describe a stage in the development of the contradiction of use- and exchange-values as such, a stage when the relations of production have become reactionary. But I think that initially we might say that this would be a pointless duplication of terminology. (I do not say that Marx was never guilty of this). More than this, however, the most important sense in which is it possible to gauge the way in which the contradiction of forces and relations of production is proceeding under capitalism is precisely through the proletarian positing of socialism, for class conflict is, according to Marx, supposed to issue from, and actualise the liberatory potential of, this contradiction. In this sense, then, the contradiction capitalism-socialism serves as an accompaniment to the contradiction of use- and exchange-values, the former being the area in which the political ramifications of the latter are developed through the degree of formation of class self-consciousness in the proletariat.

Marx accordingly stresses that socialism is the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat (93). The
proletariat seizes political power and uses this to push through the socialisation of capital against bourgeois resistance, in fact to negate the political powers of reaction of the bourgeoisie (94). Marx's idea was that this particular dictatorship would be qualititatively different to all preceding forms of political domination. The proletariat comprises the vast majority of people (95) and the forces of production it is trying to free from the restraints of capitalist relations are so intrinsically social that they demand general social control (96). The implications of this are that the proletarian dictatorship in fact posits the end of all classes. With the abolition of bourgeoisie, all class partiality will disappear as the proletariat subsumes all of society, that is to say, it abolishes itself as a class (97). When this merging of class and society is quite complete, this will be communism.

The issue of the distance between socialism and communism has of course been a most important one in this century. I am quite sure, however, that this was no issue at all for Marx as he addressed the central thesis of *Capital*. The reasons for this are, firstly, the obvious temporal one. More than this, however, though developing from it, is the complete reversal of attitude which addressing the distance of socialism and communism implies by contrast to Marx's project in *Capital*. Socialism is the determinate negation of capitalism - its very
Plausibility turns on identifying the bases of socialism in capitalism and regarding those bases generously from the point of view of grasping their productive potentials. From the point of view of the would-be communist, socialism is not a statement of promise but a statement of limitation, for socialism is communism's past as capitalism is socialism's. The necessary presence of capitalist elements in socialism, necessary if socialism is to be developed at all, is a problem of unwelcome survivals for the communist, and the issue is the purging of these unwelcome residues. That anyone could claim to take up this communist point of view on other than dogmatic grounds seems to me to impossible, but I do not want to argue this here. I want only to stress that is obviously the antithesis of the way Marx has to conceive of socialism in *Capital*. Marx could recognise, of course, that socialism is not communism, and this when explaining socialism. But for Marx as he addresses the central problems faced in *Capital* the necessity is not to deride capitalism but to grasp its productive elements. This is essentially a productive rather than a destructive critical attitude, the attitude of immanent critique and celebration rather than denigration of determinate negations. It is an attitude quite absent from purported communist readings of Marx (98).
With the above ideas we have come, I think, to what is properly the end of Marx's thought on the capitalist mode of production. It is an end in that it postulates the end of capitalism by attempting to postulate the beginning of socialism-communism. The truth of capitalism is revealed by moving on to its future, for that future penetrates the alienated present. Truth, Marx is arguing, is on the scene, is potential in capitalism, and socialism begins the process of its actualisation, the full realisation being communism. In saying this we are returned to the essential problem which I attempted to set out in my discussion of Hegel. How can a claim about truth such as Hegel's or Marx's be substantiated? I do not believe that it is open to doubt that the whole intellectual character of Marx's approach to capitalism was that of a dialectic very strongly influenced by Hegel's but the Hegelian Phenomenological Dialectic was, as we have seen, crucially flawed. Can Marx claim to have overcome this shortcoming? Two things must, I think, be said.

Much of what I first wish to say is merely repetition of parts 2 and 4 of this work. This concerns the defensibility of the dialogue with existing beliefs which Hegel and Marx had to carry out to develop their own ideas. I will only restate my earlier conclusions; that
upon examination the Phenomenology is brilliant but essentially indefensible whilst Capital is often weakly expressed but essentially correct. The reasons for this are, at this first level, internal to these specific dialogues, to their peculiar characters, and I cannot with profit go over the earlier detailed discussions. I leave them and their conclusions to stand on their own. But if these conclusions are valid, then there must be some difference in the principles of critique put forward by Hegel and Marx, and it is to the clear elucidation of this difference that I should like to turn. It is this second level of addressing the problem of the difference of Hegel's and Marx's dialogues that can be undertaken by looking at the overall status of Marx's critique of political economy.

Both Hegel and Marx display as probably the foremost characteristic of their writings an intense concern to situate those writings in their intellectual-historical context. The results of this are displayed most clearly in Hegel's histories of aesthetics, religion and philosophy and in Marx's uncompleted history of political economy (99). More than this, even a cursory reading of Hegel's and Marx's substantive works will reveal how intimately these works are related to their intellectual ancestors. Marx of course included the designation "Critique of Political Economy" in the title of his published economic works. If we are to identify a
difference between Hegel's and Marx's ideas of critique, it can hardly be at the initial level of awareness of intellectual context, for the quality of Marx's awareness is inferior to Hegel's, at least in an extensive if not in an intensive sense. Both awarenesses are also certainly characterised by a sense of their own privilege and of their potential for reflexive reconstruction or recomprehension of the truth of earlier thought which was but dimly grasped by that thought itself. But there is a difference of the qualities of the senses of privilege here, a difference of principle of critique.

There is an essential dogmatism in Hegel's critique and an essential openness in Marx's. I have tried to show that Hegel's critique is indefensible in that it is ultimately an hermeneutic failure. It rests on a presumed acquaintance with the true which allows Hegel to recast earlier thought - and indeed by extension all of the world - in the pattern which fits the initial idea of the true. I have also tried to show that this is not the case with Marx, and that his critique of bourgeois economic thought displays a genuine relationship of learning. It is hermeneutically defensible, and if it claims a peculiar privilege, it does so because it sets up a corrigible - and that it is essentially corrigible is more important that that it is completely correct - understanding of earlier thought as alienated. In the conditions of alienation and consequent distorted
communication, the privilege Marx claims is not only
defensible but, because it is defensible, it (or
something like it) is necessary. This cannot be said of
Hegel's idea of critique (100).

This is a crucial point to make for the final sense in
which Marx's dialectic of critique is indebted to Hegel's
is in claiming an, as it were, circular but
non-tautological justification. Marx's account of
history and especially of the history of capitalism has
lead him to posit capitalism's abolition, a point of view
obviously non-capitalist in a very important way, and is
in fact a point of view which in this sense is often
described as the point of view of the proletariat.
Marx's given theoretical materials are those of bourgeois
political economy, but his conclusions about capitalism
disrupt that thought, developing from it a superior
political economy (101). There is certainly a sense of
the scientific critique of ideological views here.
Hegel's Absolute Truth has a similar distance from
alienated views and is just as much the abolition of the
"truth" of such views.

Both Hegel and Marx claim, however, to generate their
necessary distance from materials furnished by the given,
and it is in the possibility of doing so that the
justification of their critiques - if any - must lie. I
have claimed that Hegel fails to secure such
justification - his critique cannot in the end be said to be a determinate negation of the given but rather has the distance from the given that attends the presumption of the correctness of one's positions. I hope it is now clear that I do not think that this is true of Marx. Marx generates his socialist comprehension of capitalism from the critique of political economy. When we seek the epistemological justification of the comprehension we are circularly referred back to the critique. However, this is not a tautology but the fundamental circularity of all hermeneutics. That Marx's critique can be thought to be a species of this circularity - notwithstanding in this respect the peculiar criticism that it has to undertake as part of its subject being alienated conditions which distort all dialogue - is, I think, its fundamental intellectual justification.

If all this is accepted, then Marx's account of capitalism must be recognised as the indispensable core of the social scientific understanding of modern society. We can be sure, however, that this intellectual justification is not the one that fundamentally mattered to Marx. The practical justification of his science lies in its informing political critique; and the effectiveness of political work to actualise socialism is the ultimate test of his thought.

It is typical of commentaries on this point that the
relationship of science and political action here is left quite open. Marx has presented the science and the work now remains of actualising its conclusions. This is wholly unacceptable. The critique of bourgeois political economy has been carried out, and yet the formation of proletarian political power can be left unspecified. But of course the latter is the mechanism of the full accomplishment of the former, and we cannot rest with an acceptance of theoretical indeterminacy, an indeterminacy whose disruptive effects within core sections of Marx's thought we have already noted. It is a comic irony that writings which make such a great deal of the unity of theory and practice happily accept disunity at precisely the point where the world is to be revolutionised (102).

As I have said, it is exactly here that Marx seeks the final productive result of his account of capitalism, and there is no ground on which we can leave that result unspecified and yet accept the ultimate adequacy of the account. In so far as it treats of the economic characteristics of capital, this account would seem to be essentially correct, and yet though it moves towards the positing of the abolition of capital, it cannot properly specify the way in which this is to be done. Having raised this issue I am in the correct position to conclude this work. To draw together the themes of my discussion of Hegel and Marx into a final evaluation of Marx's attempt to rework Hegel I shall have to return to the vexed idea of "inversion".
PART 6

CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 13

MARX'S REVISION OF HEGEL'S IDEA OF CRITIQUE BY INVERSION

Introduction

I now want to summarise my account of Marx's relation to Hegel, and my consequent evaluation of Marx's thought, through a final assessment of the heuristic value of the metaphor of inversion. I intend to: firstly, recap on my explication of the phenomenological method described in the 'Introduction' to the Phenomenology of Spirit; secondly, set out the resources and the difficulties which this method presented for Marx, and how successfully he dealt with these; and thirdly, show how, as I believe, the metaphor of "inversion" is a crucial interpretative key to this episode in the history of ideas and, more importantly, to the issues that episode poses for the contemporary tasks of the social sciences.

The Phenomenological Dialectic

Hegel's epistemology is dominated, as of course was that of all his contemporaries, by an awareness of the shortcomings of the first Critique, shortcomings which most obviously disrupt Kant's thought at the point of the concept of the thing-in-itself. Though Hegel was by no means unique in disposing of this concept, he did so in a
uniquely productive fashion. In criticism of what he goes on to show to be an unsupported presupposition of the radical dissociation of subject and object, Hegel unites these sundered moments of knowing by giving them a common ground in consciousness, by which he initially conveys a sense of the domain of cognition, that is, of all potential human experience. By doing this, he takes a distance from Kant's aims as they exemplify the classical epistemological project, and is able to show those aims to be self-defeating ones which themselves alienate our power to know. The identification of the basic problems of philosophy with foundationalism which has proven so absurdly destructive of the whole philosophical enterprise is thereby broken, and epistemology freed for more valuable work.

The essential work Hegel sets it is the construction of a rational awareness of the inadequacies of present beliefs by a scheme of progressive critique. This scheme is the dialectic of determinate negations, about which three characteristics are particularly important. The first is its sensitivity to any given belief. Hegel insists upon immersing critique in the phenomenological character of such belief, and thereby gaining access to one's audience by the empirically adequate fashion in which one addresses it. The second is the way movement from any such belief takes the form of developing the belief's productive potentials to the point where they exhaust the
core of that belief and call for a radical change of viewpoint. Hegel, in effect, "layers" determinate critique. A new, relatively subjective, line of development is contrasted to the wider, more entrenched, relatively objective framework of belief which generated that line. The exhaustion of the ability of that framework to generate new and valuable subjective conjectures calls for a shift in even our most settled beliefs. This is a negation of given belief, but it is a determinate negation for it issues from the empirical character of that belief. Phenomenology is the pursuit of that character through to its eventual self-criticism. The third point I should like to mention follows from this determinateness. The dialectic of determinate negations is potentially progressive because it may incorporate awareness of earlier errors.

It is in an awareness of the futility of foundationalism that the idea of determinate negation is itself based. Thus this very idea is itself an example of the application of the principle involved. This method is, then, given in a critique of a specific alienation, the alienation of our power to know by the classical epistemological project. But this method also addresses alienation as such more widely. Hegel treats of all history as the movement of self-estranged Spirit, and attempts to cast a reflexive illumination on that history from the position when, as he has it, the truth of Spirit
is on the scene and alienation is essentially overcome. The dialectic of determinate negations is to culminate in the negation of the overall negation of the self-awareness of Spirit that characterises all previous history. This is obviously a different idea of negation, but it is to be generated as a determinate negation. Rigorous phenomenological pursuit of present beliefs is to lead to an appreciation of the possibility and necessity of the totality of comprehension which emerges from seeing history as Spirit.

Hegel's project is, in his own terms, the "inversion" of contemporary consciousness, for, in the widest sense, he feels that understandings which are marked by the alienation of Spirit present the opposite of correct comprehension of the essential character of History. However, this inversion cannot be considered to be successfully accomplished in the Phenomenology, in fact Hegel ends up asking his readers to effect an inversion in their perspectives themselves, as a requisite of then grasping the dialectical progression. The break in what should be the continuous flow of determinate negation is marked by a number of unfounded elisions in the way Hegel sets out the Truth, perhaps the most important of which is that between two distinct notions of consciousness. Having secured knowability in consciousness, Hegel goes on to speak of this consciousness as mere natural consciousness, and the phenomenology is carried on
through a Consciousness in which knowledge exhausts all being. His explanation of History as the externalisation of Spirit involves a conterminity of knowing and being which follows from the way Spirit's self-knowledge embraces, indeed constitutes, all phenomena. But the ideality which allows this explanation is not secured from within the phenomenological position constituted by the classical epistemological project. Though Hegel shows the idea of exteriority in that project to be an absurd one; he does not, as he seems to think, thereby immanently negate exteriority as such. At this point, the point where Hegel's own theocratic aims are to be realised, the Phenomenology breaks down, and the complex of positions that is to demonstrate the Absolute Truth - such as the end of History and the necessity this can give to Hegel's explanations - collapses.

Marx's Philosophic Anthropology

Marx's relationship to these central issues in Hegel's thought is rather complicated, as we have seen; but of his essential intellectual indebtedness to many of them there can be no doubt. Initially we must note that Marx takes the unity of subject and object as a given and as no issue for his own work. Rather than thinking this unity through a rather ambiguous consciousness, Marx sets out a philosophic anthropology of knowing, in which that activity is grounded by placing human beings and their
objects within a common ontological - because common natural - domain. In this materialist anthropology, foundationalist epistemological problems are dissolved within an analysis of being-in-the-world that centres on the process of objectification by which human beings develop themselves through their labour within a natural objectivity. The Paris Manuscripts are the main location of this anthropology, and what is most obvious from their tone - which calls to mind much that is best in existential phenomenology - is that they are concerned with explicating, not establishing, being-in-the-world. That philosophy can undertake the former task and disregard the latter is simply accepted by Marx. That human beings can know the natural world is clearly essential to all Marx says on labour; but that they can do so is no real issue for him.

Marx's procedure in the Paris Manuscripts is to very substantially directly draw on his German theoretical resources in order to furnish a general groundwork for his already contemplated renewal of political economy's analysis of specifically capitalist institutions. This, I would say, is immediately revealed by the structure of Marx's account of alienated labour, where a fact of political economy is incomparably deepened by being re-interpreted through a general anthropology of labour (1). It is, of course, to Marx's credit that he felt this philosophic necessity; but this is not to say that
he himself contributed a great deal to the background anthropology. Marx presents an understanding of the formation of human character as the expressive result of conscious social action in the natural world. This is quite directly a radical humanisation of Hegel's depiction of the realisation of Absolute Spirit (2). The thrust of the humanisation is to emphasise the objective natural location of species (i.e. socially)-conscious human activity in a way which draws heavily on Feuerbach (3). An interesting parallel is provided by Godwin's *Enquiry* - a work which completed, almost fifty years before Marx failed to do so, a programme rather like the one announced in the preface to the Paris Manuscripts. Godwin felt compelled to preface his studies of political institutions by a number of general philosophic anthropological arguments to the effect that "the characters of men originate in their external circumstances" in order to ground the very possibility of the improving aims set out in his book (4). Against the background of a dominant English - not Scottish - individualism in political theory (though, in fact, perhaps foremostly expressed by Hume), Godwin's first chapters necessarily have an overall polemical tone. The tone of the Paris Manuscripts is of learning and assimilation on these background anthropological concerns.

Rather less should be claimed, in my opinion, for the
originality of Marx's anthropology (5). Though there is a wide recognition of its overall Hegelian cast, this is typically coupled with a statement of the thorough reworking these Hegelian elements received at Marx's materialist hands. The reworking, however, is certainly more properly studied in Feuerbach, from whence it was certainly derived by Marx. The appreciation of the state of philosophy after Hegel (6), the placing of the critique of foundationalism in a materialist context (7), the description of the naturally located human species (8), and the critique of religious representations of human powers (9) are all better done in Feuerbach than in Marx, and are far more properly regarded as the latter's work. Marx's own criticisms of Feuerbach have done much to disguise this, and it is as well to see why.

From Philosophic Anthropology to Historiography

In the intellectual autobiographical remarks which he included in the 1859 preface, Marx dates his theoretical concern with economic interests from late-1842, and certainly this concern dominates the Paris Manuscripts. The philosophic anthropology set out in these scripts is only background, though, as Marx is quite certain, essential background. This general level of addressing human problems recedes in Marx's work from this point. Having established a philosophic anthropology to his own satisfaction, and that satisfaction is determined by an
interest that in 1844 is already clearly primarily historiographical, Marx did not productively engage with issues at only this level again. The remarks on the general elements of the labour process in Capital are virtually repetitions of remarks made more than twenty years earlier. We can in this sense say that Marx's materialism is non-ontological (10), for although that materialism must incorporate ontological positions, there is an essential historical focus of the rest of Marx's thought in which nature and society are studied in their specific inter-relations. Instead of concern with the character of existence as such, Engels and Marx move in 1842-5 exclusively into historical problems, a radical shift which is most clearly demonstrated in The German Ideology. (Engels' last works, of course, contain a retrospective attempt to give an ontology for the historical works).

Perhaps the radicalness of the shift here goes some way to explaining the unfavourable tone of the comments on Feuerbach in The German Ideology (and by extension, to the left-Hegelian movement as a whole in this and other works). These comments are grossly unfair, but for Engels and Marx in 1845 Feuerbach's work was entirely exhausted of productive potentials. To the extent that Feuerbach's thought remained cast at a broad existential level - and the 1850s saw him merely extending the lessons of The Essence of Christianity to other religions, its utility
for addressing the social problems with which Engels and Marx were now concerned was virtually nil. In the period of The German Ideology Marx seems to think that failing to move on to address such problems was a dereliction of duty by Feuerbach (11), and perhaps this was so. Certainly the respective statures of Marx and Feuerbach testify to the former's taking up the more pressing issues. But really Feuerbach's existential anthropology does not require more than an abstract recognition of humankind's historical power for its own purposes, and it contains this; indeed this was taken over by Marx and used as the basis of his concrete historiography.

There can be no doubt that Feuerbach thought that his work essentially turned on a re-inversion of the inverted representation of thought and being present in Hegel's philosophy (12), and in theology (13) and contemplative philosophy (14) generally. There can also be no doubt that Marx took this inversion over quite directly (15), as he himself makes clear (16). But, of course, the essential character of Hegel's and Marx's work - its historicality - is not really touched by this inversion. Feuerbach's inversion addresses only the most bare propositions of Hegel's philosophy - its textual object is the Logic, to which the Phenomenology is regarded as quite subordinate (17). Valuable work can be done at this basic level, but there is a whole dimension in Hegel's thought to which such work can never aspire.
Marx addresses Hegel at this historical dimension, and attempts a second inversion guided by this first one of Feuerbach's.

Is there a break in Marx's intellectual development here, in which he distances himself from a simple metaphor of inversion by developing a critique of Hegel far more sophisticated than Feuerbach's? One of Althusser's more plausible arguments has been to show how Feuerbach's materialism cannot begin to sustain Marx's programme of social inquiry, and to claim that therefore the inversion in Feuerbach cannot adequately describe Marx's relation to Hegel (18). All this is, I would say, true; but, of course, it is not enough to justify Althusser concluding that therefore there is no relation, just a discontinuity between Hegel and Marx. Althusser, in fact, makes two false representations. He has to sever Marx from even Feuerbach's broad existential concerns, lest a relation to Hegel slip by in this way; and of course a complete anti-humanism is central to Althusser's thought (19). This simply does not describe the way Marx draws on Feuerbach's inversion of Hegel. It is precisely through
a philosophic anthropology that Marx generates humanity's potential to create specific historical structures. Althusser also has to suppress the way in which Hegel's philosophy cannot be considered exhausted by a few bare formulae on the idealist construction of existence, but has a historical content of enormous intrinsic worth. Althusser has put forward a reading of Hegel's other works which reduces them to the Logic (20), and in this his work at least bothers to address an interpretative problem. Colletti also cannot afford to deal with Hegel at other than the barest levels of ontology; but he does not go on to consider whether this sort of treatment is adequate (21). My opinion on this issue is, I am sure, clear, and I will not bother restating it here. For what is obvious - and for exegetical purposes this is enough - is that Marx did not share Althusser's and Colletti's opinion as to the essential uselessness of the dialectic in historiography, and he went on to address it at the level of history.

Marx's Reworking of Historical Dialectic

Marx's guiding thread clearly adopts the central themes of the Phenomenological Dialectic. (Leaving aside the particular substantive themes which Marx takes from the Phenomenology and dealing only with method) critique understood as immanent, determinate negation is at the core of the guiding thread, which works out a broadly
progressive development within states of social alienation. Marx grants a privilege to consideration of material life in accounts of alienated conditions. In so doing he is taking over Feuerbach's inversion, but re-locating it within a specific context of alienated conditions identified by historiographical explanatory necessity rather than the general context of existence as such. Marx's dialectic of social change also has something of the subject-object structure of Hegelian Dialectic, but this is very substantially altered. The dialectic of forces and relations of production is within consciousness certainly, but this is a consciousness which possesses more than merely internal criteria for judging particular social forms, for it has an ultimate practical reference to the objective natural world. By extension, those other dualisms which constitute the rest of the guiding thread - base and superstructure, class and classless societies and science and ideology - mediate the influence of his ultimate materialism as we take up other ways of addressing other areas of social life in different projects of historical explanation.

In a very important initial sense, then, Marx's guiding thread is an inversion of Phenomenological Dialectic. Whereas in Hegel the status of consciousness is vague, and this vagueness is exploited so that consciousness can embrace the entire dialectic, in Marx consciousness is situated in a social 'materialist context against a
materialist philosophical anthropological background. Marx's dialectic reworks in detail many of the historical themes of Hegelian Dialectic, and does so in a way informed by the direct Feuerbachian inversion of Hegel's philosophy at the barest existential levels. Marx's thought thus contains many more determinations than Feuerbach's, being sensible to a great range of specific historical issues that really have no integrated place (nor need they have) in Feuerbach's existential anthropology. But awareness of the real historical presence here of the intellectual event of the (as it were, double) inversion of Hegel does allow us to understand Marx's thought more clearly, and I would defend the use of the metaphor on this ground. Marx may "coquette" with Hegelian terminology', but, as he himself says, this is a sign pointing to substantial intellectual indebtedness (22). The directness of the metaphor does rather conceal what is the real strength of both Hegel and Marx - the complex richness and consequent felicity of their explanations, which the one-dimensionality of describing these explanations as ideal or material cannot capture. However, the inversion can stand as a way of helping us comprehend the irreducible detail of this complex relationship.

What is more, having used the metaphor is this (double) sense in an intellectual history, it perhaps is more important to recognise how the problem of inversion still
figure as a contemporary task. Let us turn to this now.

Inversion and the Project of Critique of Alienation

Both Hegel and Marx set themselves the project of inverting contemporaneous consciousness through critique of existing alienated conditions. Both establish their particular contributions - in epistemology and political economy - by critique of rival theories which shows these to be alienated. Both conceive of the given world as having as its core a mistaken self-understanding - or, to put it this way, an absence of self-understanding - which they are trying to correct. They themselves often describe this as the inversion of present understandings. Taking a lead from the common metaphor allows us to focus on the shared essential aims of Hegel's and Marx's project; and, as I have tried to show, it is these that are the key to Marx's work.

More than this, however, the inversion metaphor should still be the object of investigation because such investigation can point out contemporary tasks. For what is most obvious about both Hegel's and Marx's projects of inversion is that they have not succeeded in the ways envisaged. Any properly self-critical appraisal of projects which fail to satisfy the criteria they pose must eventually turn its attention to the core framework of those projects - this is a principal lesson of
dialectic. But what, then, of the dialectic as it sets itself the task of "inversion".

For Marx, of course, Hegel's thought in many ways exemplifies the consciousness that requires inversion. To use Hegel's method, Marx, as we have seen and as he himself put it, had to carry out a (double) inversion of that method. But let us turn our attention to a related but significantly different problem; how Hegel and Marx were able to hold themselves to be in a position to regard past and present consciousness as alienated. There is a common theme of the present holding the potential for the end of (pre-)history. I have argued that Hegel is unable to secure his claimed position beyond history in a rationally corrigible manner, and that consequently a number of the especially strong forms of proof to which he aspires - basically a circularity of necessarily compelling totality of explanation - collapse into dogmatism. I have also argued that, by contrast, Marx's stance is secured in an, in principle, defensible dialogue with the present. Marx can, then, be thought to have done much to bring the power of Hegel's critique of alienation within a rationally defensible domain, the domain of social science. But, as I have said, this, though certainly important to Marx, was subordinate to what he regarded as the real confirmation of his work - the proletarian establishment of socialism. If Hegel's project is a failure in terms of the
rationality to which it aspires, then Marx's has, surely, been overall a political one. I have tried to locate Hegel's failure within his work; but have been rather less explicit about Marx. In taking this up, we run into the crucial issues of "inversion".

The peculiar degree of dogmatism which is ultimately displayed by Hegel's dialectic involves him in arguing that the essential framework for all future historical events is now settled. There can no longer be the radical changes central to the dialectic; all future developments can merely extend the margin of now basically determined history. Hegel here commits himself to a position which seems absurd, but which in fact follows quite easily from the way he conceives of alienation. Spirit embraces all of the world, and therefore so too does its alienation. Once Spirit recognises itself, it is the peculiar characteristic of this subject that all objectivity becomes thereby, in principle, known. Nothing really new can emerge, because when Spirit potentially knows itself, all is potentially known.

Marx dramatically departs from this. Humanity can overcome alienation, and know the social world, but rather than all that is to be known being thereby essentially known, a whole new openness thereby emerges with reference to what self-conscious sociality can do.
For finite human beings, the self-knowledge of the social world is capable of infinite deepening, not to speak of the social changes consequent upon deepening our ability to work in nature. What Marx does it to refuse to bring all being under the ambit of alienation, or, to put it this way, he refuses to identify the realm of potential objectification with the realm of present alienation (23). A vast domain of a still opaque world in which we can - in various senses - still work remains after alienation is overcome. In the end, though there can be no doubt that freedom is the central goal of Hegel's thought, a greater idea of radical transformative potential persists in Marx than does in Hegel. The freedom of self-consciously directed objectification is the reward of the critique of alienation for the former; in the latter the distinction of alienation and objectification simply cannot obtain. Marx takes a position only at the end of pre-history, rather than Hegel's stance at the end of history. An omission is perhaps the best evidence of the strength of Marx's position here. In stark contrast to Hegel's sometimes bathetic identification of the rational state, Marx repeatedly refused (though there are, perhaps, some early exceptions) to specify communist institutions, for to do so would be to close off precisely the potentials for freedom which he sought to actualise by removing present restrictions upon them. Obviously, more can be said of socialism, indeed more must be said to make socialist
developments consciously acceptable. But in what Marx actually did say here, crucial shortcomings emerge.

In what I have just said, it is implicit that there is a common idea of the negation of the negation of absence of self-consciousness, a common inversion of this absence into presence. But Hegel can rather strictly invert the given, for the given contains the pattern of the True, only the relationship of the True and the given is inverted. Marx gains strength from following the project of inversion so far, but he cannot carry that project through in this rather literal way. When Marx inverts the absence of self-consciousness, he can produce presence, but he cannot invert a presently given pattern, for the inversion of alienation as Marx presents it is to lead only into openness. Put in this way, this seems an extremely nice point, but the fact that Marx never realised the full implications of this openness has had major implications for his understanding of socialism and how the proletariat is to achieve it. This is to say, this issue has had major implications for the way in which Marx sought the final justification of his work.

I have tried to show how the proletarian struggle for socialism remains very seriously theoretically indeterminate in terms of the thrust of Marx's account of capitalism. The main reason for this can now, I think, be set out. Marx can in *Capital* go so far as to describe
those economic laws of motion that internally disrupt capitalist production and create the productive potentials for socialism. He can even go so far as to give economic reasons for the proletariat's dissatisfaction with capitalism and for its engaging in combinations and struggles against the bourgeoisie over wages. He cannot proceed with explicating the proletariat's struggle for socialism within a similar framework of economic law, for as the proletariat actually becomes class conscious and actively takes up socialist aims, it is integral to the whole idea of emancipation that it does so as a conscious decision. This is what is specifically socialist about the proletariat - it is the first class which carries the banner of social self-consciousness.

This is not to say that the proletariat's struggle cannot be brought under explanation, but the explanation needs to be of a completely historically novel form. It is the explanation fit for social actors who are increasingly aware of what they are doing. It cannot have the form which is needed to account for the actions of those labouring under alienation. The accounts of their own actions which members of the proletariat themselves put forward must become increasingly self-sufficient as explanations; but this can ever be the case for all earlier social actors.
Marx would certainly seem to have missed this important point. His programmatic expressions all indicate a tendency to explain socialism more or less along the lines of a necessity derived from his account of capitalism (24), with the consequence that when he turns to the political elements central to proletarian class struggle, this appears to be merely a manoeuvre to save his essentially economic explanations when they are no longer of great value.

One reason for this shortcoming, commonly adduced (25) and no doubt correct, is the influence of the background intellectual climate of scientistic positivism against which Marx wrote. In his aim to, for example, give accounts of economic crises purely in the terms of self-sufficient mathematics (26), Marx gives ample testimony to the effects of this background. Of course, we must be careful over this point. Marx put forward explicit polemics against what he called mechanical materialism, and parts of his most directly economic theses contain polemics against the naturalism of, to take this example, Malthus' population theory. What is more, by extension we can fairly say that appreciation of historical effectivity is central to Marx's work. Recognising all of this, a plausible attitude to take would be to regard what seem to be Marx's confusions of the natural and the social to be marginal to his work. I am sure that this is the best stance on this particular
issue, but to treat of Marx's difficulties in this area as turning on the distinction natural/social reflects, I think, more the preoccupations of later social science than Marx's own concerns. Answering objections about Marx's treatment of the natural and the social does not answer the objection I am trying to raise about his conception of socialism, so I shall try to be more precise about his specific concerns.

In the Dialectics of Nature Engels tries to locate the guiding thread against development in natural science in a peculiar way by subsuming the latter under a dialectic which was claimed to already have generated the former. The guiding thread is to be placed within something of a cosmological context by being located, along with contemporaneous science, within a purportedly dialectical scheme based on some of Hegel's comments on nature and logic. As we have nothing like a detailed statement by Marx on the point, we cannot say with any confidence how far along this line he would have gone with Engels. We have a number of direct statements which show his broad sympathy with a dialectics of nature (27), but, on the other hand, I personally find it difficult to believe that, should he have undertaken any such dialectics, Marx would not have registered internal difficulties with it that certainly escaped Engels. What I want to argue is that such a project could appear plausible to Marx because he held an aspiration which rather cross cuts the
division of natural and social. He works with an idea that he can give an account of the development of socialism that follows essentially the same line as the account which he gives of capitalism; that is to say, he treats of socialism in the same law-like way in which he treats of capitalism. Now, if this is the case, it cannot matter that Marx's laws of capitalism are properly formulated with respect to recognising social determinants, for the determinants they properly describe are those of an alienated society, and socialism cannot be subsumed under any such laws (28). Non-alienated action is its own conscious law, and the dialectic cannot be extended to cover it. Marx does not seem to have come properly to terms with this particular implication of his guiding thread, with the result that the proletariat's class struggle is expressed either in terms that are not apposite or remain intractably vague. There can be no inversion of the capitalist present to reveal the socialist future, for it is not a given form but a radical openness which the actualisation of socialism posits, and not merely for an established socialism but increasingly in all stages of socialism's development.

I do not feel, however, that this is the right note on which to conclude. The task which I have, in effect, assigned to Marx is to posit the abolition of his own work; to contemplate the redundancy of Capital and incorporate that into its composition. This is an
onerous task indeed, one which it seems churlish to accuse Marx of not completing in an orderly fashion. Of course, disorder is to be avoided, and the indeterminacy of Marx's accounts of class struggle is unacceptable. But in addressing this problem, we must not underestimate the inner strength of Marx's position which is registered even in this weak area.

Two broad responses to the political failure of Marx's science and to his writings on the class struggle where that failure seems particularly theoretically destructive have, I would say, been made. One is simply to regard later events as overtaking Marx's writings, which are thus regarded as obsolete (29). The other is to hold to the core of those writings, and try to defend them by introducing other variables to take into account the political failure of Marx's programme. An at least conceptual sophistication of the rigid base and superstructure metaphor to allow of a greater independent (or relatively autonomous) effectivity of the political level is one variant of this (30). Rather more valuable is that variant which takes cognisance of real social changes but claims that Marx's economic (31) or more general social theories (32) are still essentially applicable. One may see both of these broad responses ranged on either side of the debate over whether the post-war western world is post-capitalist (33).
The latter of these responses is clearly concerned to defend Marx, and one may suspect a dogmatism in the way it marginalises very significant social developments in order to do so. But if there is a dogmatism here, it is a very peculiar one, for it is one which willingly surrenders the most defensible elements of its central position in order to support the least defensible ones. The essentials of Marx's class analysis are not lost by admitting change; indeed it is only change that can in the end support that analysis. The defence of Marx has very often been taken up by those who forget this. They continually insist on the undoubted vestiges of narrow capitalist economic necessity which still thwart the socialising thrust of such changes. But it is in the socialist elements of the change that the future lies, as does the spirit, but thereby not the letter, of Marx's thought.

This is just the opposite error to taking social improvement to be a direct refutation, or rather, a rendering obsolete, of Marx's work (34). His analysis does not posit such improvement as being won against capitalism but as an increasingly pressing potential within it. Of course, unless we clearly recognise the necessity of consciously politically working to actualise those potentials, sentiments such as the one I am expressing can lapse into quietism - instead of waiting for the inevitable movement of the proletariat to abolish
capitalism, we wait for capitalism to abolish itself. What happens here is that freedom is even more directly subsumed under the laws of alienated economics.

Though Marx does not specify the peculiar quality of the true politics of self-consciousness, we must now do so. Taking this step allows us to view developments in the capitalist economy in a progressive, rather than a merely negative, light. Those developments within capitalism, such as planning, welfare state provision, the growth of a public sector of employment, etc., which are taken to be the mark of Capital's basic inadequacy, in fact, by their narrowing the area in which capitalism's narrow economic necessity can prevail, do much to confirm Marx's most important theses, which posit just such a narrowing. What Marx is insufficiently clear about is the way that this does entail the increasing obsolescence of Capital, for we cannot invert its description of capitalist determinations to produce socialist ones. What presently faces us is the complete rejection of this idea of inversion and the comprehension of self-conscious politics which can politically utilise the resources for socialism that have been - though substantially unself-consciously - produced.

The paradox here is that the socialising developments within the capitalist economy which confirm the essential thrust of Marx's work do by making it increasingly
inapplicable, and especially in respect of proletarian action. This, however, is the essential openness which I have tried to argue must lie at the heart of an in principle corrigible treatment of alienation, and the correct point on which to end is to register this strength. Consider the implications of Strachey's argument (35) to the effect that capitalism's life has been extended by those changes wrought by the working class which have made that mode of production more tolerable. Strachey's case for democratic socialism is weakened by the way he puts this, for though he recognises that, of course, these changes are not illusory (35), he does not grasp the full potential of those changes, revealed by seeing that a capitalism that embraces them is to that extent no longer capitalism. These changes are the mechanism of the revolution. It is not to go against Marx but to go with him to insist on the overall socialising character of such developments in the capitalist economy. However, it is just to the extent that socialisation proceeds that the sway of alienated economic forces gives way to that of nascently socially self-conscious planning, and statements of progressive improvements and what should be done in response to these cannot be made in the old economic ways. Marx suggests that the issues in proletarian struggle are political ones, and this is correct, for the politics involved are actually ones of conscious decision making, than Marx's own work can incorporate, for that
work seems tied to the explanation of alienated conditions. The consequence is that Marx either represents these politics in wrong, because basically economic, ways, or leaves them indeterminate. There is no longer any excuse for this. We must radically shift our focus from the realm of alienated necessity to that of self-conscious removal of the present restrictions on free development. We should no longer stand under the thrall of the metaphor of inversion, seeking to find socialism by inversion of alienated determinations, but recognise the limits of the applicability of the dialectic. For the real lesson of Marx's dialectic is that the supercession of economic law gives an entirely different set of determinations - those of self-conscious sociality and freedom.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1

HISTORICAL REPETITIONS IN MARXISM'S SELF-COMPREHENSION

The most disappointing - indeed I find it depressing - aspect of these attempts to recast marxism's intellectual ancestry is the prejudices of Althusser's and Colletti's knowledge of marxism's own intellectual history. Let us consider the following quotation from Labriola:

A return to other philosophers is nowadays also suggested by some socialists. The one wants to return to Spinoza, that is, to a philosophy, in which the historical development cuts no figure. Another would be content with the mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century, that is, with a repudiation of any and all history. Still others think of reviving Kant. Does this also imply the revival of his insoluble antinomy between practical reason and theoretical reason? Does it mean a return to his fixed categories and fixed faculties of the soul, of which Herbart seemed to have made short work? Does it include his categorical imperative, in which Schopenhauer had discovered the Christian commandments in the disguise of a metaphysical principle? Does it mean the theory of natural rights, which even the Pope does not care to uphold any more? Why don't they let the dead bury the dead? (1).

To anyone conversant with Althusser and Colletti and the sort of response to them exemplified by Timpanaro, that Labriola wrote this in 1897 is startling. However, reflection on the ideas of, for example, Plekhanov (2), Dietzgen (3) and Adler (4) confirms the picture drawn by Labriola, and gives the turn taken by the most important debate in marxist theory over the last twenty years a rather hackneyed aspect. Althusser and Colletti are not,
of course, unaware of their predecessors, indeed for Althusser Plekhanov's thought is mechanistic (5), and for Colletti Adler's is idealist (6). It is, I would say, a dogmatism which is the only way either of these authors can reconcile their hermeneutically indefensible attitude to Hegel with their claim to be laying bare Marx's own thought that prevents them from seeing their own shortcomings in earlier writings and learning from these. In Althusser this dogmatism is elevated to a principle. In Colletti it would seem to stem from the very derivative (from Della Volpe) way in which he has ever understood Marx.
It has been claimed (1) that at the outset of the 'Introduction' to the *Phenomenology* the difference between Hegel and the classical epistemological project might be considered to lie in that Hegel takes the paradox of learning in the *Meno* seriously (2). Socrates formulates the paradox thus: "...a man cannot try to discover either what he knows or what he does not know... He would not seek for what he knows, for since he knows it there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he does not know what he is to look for". Hegel is said to have put forward a response to this in a particularly serious fashion and to have been able to make a uniquely positive response to it. This is not, I think, directly so.

Hegel does not begin with blank ignorance and ask how would it be possible to move from that state and come to know? It is not only that, in fact, he criticises this blank beginning for its blankness, but that this claim about Hegel's position misses the way he links his criticism of classical epistemology to his conception of Absolute Spirit? He does not ask how is it possible to know, but rather he presumes what is to be known is fixed and, as he writes the *Phenomenology*, is known. To miss
this elision will seriously handicap the reader gaining any critical distance from Hegel's arguments in the *Phenomenology*. In searching for a Platonic root of Hegel's project as set out in the 'Introduction', it is far more accurate and helpful to draw attention to the tale of the guide to the beautiful itself in the *Symposium* (3), or to the metaphor of the philosopher in the cave in the *Republic* (4), where the problem is the dissemination of truth.
Bradley's derivation of an idea of the absolute from Hegel centres on the following notion. Every element of experience is related to the others, and therefore the full truth of experience would be found only by grasping the character of the all-encompassing unity in which all of these elements stand. Such knowledge is, of course, unavailable to the finite human intellect (1).

Criticism of this notion of, as Moore renders it, an "organic whole" was a central theme in the rejection of the Hegelian and other speculative-rationalist elements in late-nineteenth century British thought that was an essential part of the establishment of the ascendancy of analytic philosophy. Wanting to address the ways in which the ethical value of a whole can be different from that of (the sum of) its parts, Moore had to clear away the absolutist meanings which philosophers "who profess to have derived great benefit from the writings of Hegel" had attached to the idea of a whole (2). There can be no doubt about the strength of Moore's criticisms of such virtually mystical renderings of Hegel's arguments as Bradley's. But in saying this I do not want to allow that these criticisms exhaust the original arguments. That British philosophy of this century has more or less
regarded this as being, so has been, in my opinion, a serious mistake.

When Russell, for example, takes over Moore's criticism of the supposedly Hegelian whole (3) and goes on to say that he rejects the pure coherence criterion of truth which follows from Hegel's panlogistic holism, then an unfortunate situation quickly develops. As part of this rejection, Russell moves on to the position known as logical atomism which asserts that there are irreducible and self-contained units of experience as the foundations of knowing (4).

Russell's position is indefensible in the light of the subsequent appreciation upon the hermeneutic frameworks within which even scientific descriptions must be formed. We can add that it is a retrogression from the awareness of the fluidity of our knowledges under changing (including improving) frameworks of interpretation that can be clearly derived from Hegel's *Phenomenology*. I have mentioned below that the *Phenomenology's* first chapters contain a well-worked out criticism of logical atomism (if I may be allowed to use this anachronism), and have also taken up both Hegel's idea of the whole and his outline of the method of the discovery of new knowledge at more apposite points. I will not go into these again, but just say a few words about why the more plausible and productive lines in Hegel have been missed.
The fault, of course, is that of Bradley (and McTaggart, Stirling, etc.). His treatment of the absolute is of a far more Spinozist than Hegelian character, repeating the desirability, but also the impossibility of the human intellect grasping the relations of all things under the aspect of God's eternal and infinite view (5). We should of course, suspect any attribution of Hegel of an absolute beyond human understanding. As we have seen, it is over the necessity of philosophically winning conviction in the Truth that Hegel principally diverges from Spinoza. This conflation of Hegel and Spinoza is a principal feature of nineteenth century British studies of Hegel (except for his political philosophy) and of the twentieth century criticism of these. Certainly Russell's *History of Western Philosophy* contains major failings here, which would emerge, I am sure, from the briefest reading of its treatment of Hegel.
I think that the central argument of Kemp Smith's book on Hume is a mistaken one, though I do not in saying this mean to deny that this remains perhaps the best commentary we have. Against what he identifies as the then dominant interpretation of Hume, established by Reid, Beattie and Stewart and carried on through to J.S. Mill and Green (1), Kemp Smith argues that the idea of natural belief constitutes a positive teaching by Hume to which the scepticism is subordinate (2). I have mentioned that Hegel himself was well enough aware of this positive side to Hume, and Kemp Smith cites (3) a passage from Wallace's Prolegomena (4) in support of his argument.

However, I am sure that Kemp Smith misses the point of Hegel's recognition that Hume allowed this positive side into his work, for Hegel is arguing that Hume had to do this in order for his work to be at all plausible, but that this has nothing to do with his philosophy. It is true to say that Hume is able to ridicule absurdly rationalist claims about the world and elevate over these a respect for natural belief in a way with which we should now sympathise (5). But, I cannot see how he does this other than by claiming that all philosophes have
unsupportable pretensions, and I do not think Kemp Smith shows how he does so. The main point is that when all philosophies come to be criticised in this way, even the healthy scepticism which Hume seems to engender must lapse. Kemp Smith by the end of his book seems to restore, in defence of Hume, the very same natural beliefs with which he started. Of course at the end we are no longer able to claim all sorts of philosophical justifications for those beliefs such as were initially claimed. But this is, in a really positive sense, not even interesting, because we have to go on adopting those beliefs just the same. Hegel does not accept this conclusion. He sees it as a serious shortcoming of philosophy that it is ineffectual, and sets himself to recast a philosophy of significance to all our beliefs, in which doubt is of value (6).
APPENDIX 5

ANAMNESIS AND ITS RESOLUTION

I have earlier argued that it is inaccurate to regard Hegel as having taken the *Meno* paradox of learning seriously. Having precisely formulated it, Socrates, of course, went on to locate the possibility of knowing in anamnesis (1). That a rejection of this mystical solution does not leave us floundering before the paradox is certainly, however, due to Hegelian arguments, or at least to arguments first formulated by Hegel (2). These arguments show that the paradox is insoluble because it is misleadingly formulated.

For what is stultifying about the paradox is the complete lack of determinations in its depiction of knowing. How is it possible to learn? (or to know? etc.) is the question. It is clearly impossible to *learn*; it is possible only to learn something. There must be a set of determinate cognitions as resources and aims of cognition if any such question is to really have a meaning. That is to say, there must enter into epistemological inquiry some statement of the conditions and requirements of actual cognition of a to-be-known. The unbridgeable gulf between radically separated cognition and the to-be-known is the product of the wholly artificial severing of these every mutual constitutive moments of the process of knowing by which the paradox is formulated at all.
APPENDIX 6

POPPER AND THE REFUTATION OF SCEPTICISM

The importance of the idea of determinate negation can, I think, be brought out by some comments on the discussion of Hegel in Popper's 'What is Dialectic?'. In the famous criticism of Hegel's broadly social philosophy which he wrote at about the same time, Popper, in virtually his first words about Hegel in The Open Society and Its Enemies, gives his opinion that Hegel would have been a fit subject for psycho-analysis (1). (This seems particularly harsh as Popper seems to have substantially reached his unfavourable conclusions about that discipline at that time). In 'What is Dialectic?' we are presented with what is presumably another aspect of Hegel's pathology - his notion of truth is utterly absurd (2). Now, although Popper's paper is as shot through with coarse misrepresentation of Hegel as is his book (3), there is doubtless a very important sense in which Hegel's Absolute is absurd. But I will try to show that this sense is hardly akin to flat incomprehensibility but is rather that of the unsatisfactory resolution of some very real issues, to ignore which means that one falls beneath the level of Hegel's thought.

Popper's own work provides, I think, a case in point. It is Popper's claim to have solved the problem of induction
in the philosophy of science, that is to say understanding the movement from particular statements (of events) to general ones (of a law-like form) (4), by adopting what he called a deductive system (5). In this system the issues are the criteria of the falsification or refutation of theories in science understood as the continuous replacement of theories (6). Typically Humean scepticism based on objections to the possibility of induction are thereby rendered immaterial as science is to proceed without recourse to that operation (7). Now, as Popper himself says (8), his basic shift in the focus of the philosophy of science did not really involve nor require a notion of truth. We can agree with him that the displacement of scientific theories by others does not of itself necessarily imply a movement, intended or actual, towards truth. However, when we invoke a general philosophy of science based on agnosticism on this point, then "science" can retain few of its nobler connotations of the valuable provision of knowledge, and becomes merely an academic, in the bad sense, enterprise. Popper gives an analogy between his envisaged process of continuous criticism and a game (9), and I would say that this is uncomfortably true. For all its overt polemic against inductivism, indeed probably because of this, Popper's philosophy of science is readily assimilable to the basic problematic of Humean philosophy of science, and as such stands, despite Popper's quibbles, as the twentieth century rationalisation of technical rational
science's eschewing of all social goals but its own (10) practical (11) ones.

Popper has frequently characterised science as a process of progressive discovery (12), and the inconsistency of such a characterisation, involving as it does some idea of truth, speaks of his reluctance to grasp the rigorous conclusion of his own philosophy (13). Relatively recently he has openly admitted both his earlier inconsistencies and the absence of a motivational rationale for a science without truth, and has tried to set both right by involving in his work some idea of truth having a necessary regulatory function in scientific development (14). His aim is to be able to describe his philosophy as setting out the process by which we may actually learn from our mistakes (15). Though in my opinion this is a valuable direction for Popper to take, it is instructive to see why he is unable to establish any real regulation of criticism of truth.

There is obviously going to be a forcedness about such a saving development in Popper's representation of science, for if this representation could be formulated without use of a notion of truth, then the later inclusion of some such notion to save the representation from certain criticisms is not the actual involvement of truth in the core formulation. This is the crucial point. Popper's tack when faced with scepticism about induction was not
to refute that scepticism (16) but rather to accept it, give up the aim of verification, and set criteria for falsifying theories (17). On this basis, to recognise that truth is needed even as a motive for falsification and therefore to include it in such a role does not allow Popper to claim, as he does (18), that his description of science is now of an approach to truth. Having failed to reject an inductivist understanding of truth, truth, for Popper's philosophy, remains above human authority (19). Despite Popper's use of some picturesque metaphors which conceal this (20), he cannot come to terms with Hegel's criticisms of the idea of being in possession of approximations of truth when what is properly true is unreachable. Perhaps the clearest indication of this is that Popper's idea of the way in which we might speak about truth, which he purports to derive from Tarski, is an attempt to make this possible through discussion about the form of linguistic statements and their implication of correspondence to facts (21). That is to say, it is hopelessly trivial in respect of, indeed eschews consideration of, understanding how we may claim to know real states of affairs.

Now, I think Popper falls beneath Hegel's demonstration of the possibility of knowing through critique of those epistemological positions which terminate in unrelievable scepticism. Indeed, there arises a rather peculiar situation in Popper's understanding of Hegel. I would
say that the closest Popper comes in all of his writings on the topic to a representation of Hegel's views that is not wildly inaccurate is in the first section of 'What is Dialectic?' - section two is at the same level as Popper's claim that the dialectic of lordship and bondage is a defence of slavery. This happy coincidence with respect of the critical features of the dialectic is not, unfortunately for Popper, repeated in its positive aspects.

What is best about Popper's own work in respect of establishing a philosophy of science against scepticist philosophy is presaged, indeed rather better done, in Hegel. I cannot leave this without a few words about Lakatos. Lakatos thanks Popper for help in breaking from Hegel (22), and yet Lakatos' extensions of Popper are, I would say, basically correct in so far as they repeat Hegel's directions of thought. I do not mean by this to refer to the strong Hegelian cast of some of Lakatos' ideas, of which the rational reconstruction of intellectual disciplines is the outstanding example (23). I mean that when, having pushed Popper's work to its sceptical conclusion, Lakatos makes a plea for a whiff of inductivism (24), the way he does this directly recalls the positive side of determinate negation. Having immersed ourselves in science and presumed science's ability to know, Popper's philosophy, Lakatos argues, gives us many valuable reflections on how to judge the
value of now criticised theories. Of course, it is quite unprincipled to ask for a whiff of inductivism within Popper's philosophy, which is founded in the rejection of just such a possibility. In fact Lakatos does not really want the return of inductivism but of the sort of confidence in truth to which it aspired. Despite Lakatos' lame attempt to close the distance between wishing for something and achieving it (25), it would seem that we have no recourse other than to return to Hegel for a sound basis on which to rest the achievements of twentieth century philosophy of science.
APPENDIX 7

RUSSELL'S REFUTATION OF HEGELIAN NECESSITY

Though it is perhaps the principal characteristic of McTaggart's entire work of interpretation that it gives to formalised logic a crucial role which it simply did not have in Hegel's philosophy, one is lead by the speculative aspirations of Hegel's concept of necessity to think of him. In saying this I no doubt go some way to making clear my opinion that with these aspirations we are faced by one of the aspects of Hegel's thought that it has proven difficult to discuss in other than the condescending tone in which are recalled ideas now remembered only for the quaint charm of their absurdity. Simply the effort which McTaggart's expositions must have cost is ample testimony to his belief in the worth of his subject. But even when it was still possible to write a three hundred page study of Hegelian cosmology, Hegel's claims for the totality of his philosophy had to be rejected (1). It is Hegel's position, I believe, to have set himself theological aims which closely link him to pre-enlightenment speculative philosophies, but to have attempted to realise these using critically rational apparatuses which ultimately ridicule the very idea of such aims. In the case of Hegel's effort to generate a strong sense of necessity by philosophical and especially phenomenological comprehension this is certainly so.
There is no defensible sense, for diluting the strength of the requirement of necessity destroys the power of the intended phenomenological proof, in which Hegel's requirement of totality can be satisfied or be thought to have been satisfied. In Appearance and Reality, for example, Bradley more or less demolishes his own identification of truth with grasp of the absolute whole in the first part of the book by having recourse in the second part to wholly implausible devices for allowing some degree of truth when the goal of grasp of the absolute is seen to be quite unrealisable (2). Hegel's criticism of unrelieved scepticism is, then, run on into an argument where approximations to truth are established through an ultimate standard of an absolute, total comprehension which seems quite absurd. Having argued this, I have nothing more to add in this vein. The important points lie in adopting another tone.

When Russell repeats McTaggart's interpretation (which he had indeed some hand in fashioning), it is in a history of philosophy which can find no real philosophical interest in Hegel (3). On Hegel, Russell's comments are certainly a failure in historical understanding, but their more important failure is in the account of the contemporaneous resources and programme of philosophy to which the History of Western Philosophy leads. On my reading, the role of truth which Hegel shows is an indispensable part of critique is played by an absolute
or literal totality to which successive determinate negations are approximations. This truth is an absurd one - but in recognising this we are not thereby entitled to disregard the problems of epistemological criticism to which it is an unsatisfactory solution. It was, of course, Russell's conviction that Hegel (and Kant) held rationalist beliefs which were pre-Humean in the sense that Humean criticism could virtually destroy them (4), however unpleasant it then was to be subsequently left with Humean scepticism (5). Russell's programme was, in the light, to give up hope of rapid speculative success in philosophy, a hope nurtured basically by theological modes of thought, and to be content with the slower and ultimately restricted progress available through scientific thinking (6). Who can disagree with Russell's circumspection? But this admirable attitude is, I hope it is now clear, itself one which it is quite impossible to realistically, practically or common-sensically hold. It is precisely the unavailability of even these limited comforts on the basis of anything like a consistent Humean position that puts (Kant and) Hegel at the centre of the contemporary programme of epistemology and philosophy of science. The collapse of Russell's various attempts to provide an idea of truth which dodges around the fundamental scepticism of his epistemological position does much, in my opinion, to confirm this.
ADORNO ON THE STYLE OF HOLISM

Adorno has made the most arresting response this century to the dogmatism of the Absolute in Hegel's thought: a piece of sarcasm which is the more telling for being derived from Hegel's own famous words: "the whole is the false" (1). More than half a century of critical theoretical work on Hegel's legacy, exposing the Absolute as the thwarting of determinate negation at the point of its consumation in Hegel's philosophy (2), is given its best expression in Adorno's writing and, in fine, in this reworked aphorism.

Moreover, the very style of Minima Moralia is formed by eschewing any possible claim to an absolute system (3). However, we can see that this renunciation has been transmogrified by a most wide and profound pessimism (4) into a rejection of confidence in truth at all. The anti-system of (only) negative dialectics (5) is a tragically unbalanced notion, one which (perhaps intentionally provocatively) tends to cut away the ground of even a sense of truth which seeks self-awareness of its historicality in its urge to criticise absoluteness. Adorno's commitment to negative thinking and immanent criticism is not intended to be a disavowal of truth, but it is hard to see on what grounds it can stop short of
being such. This is one of the aspects of Adorno's work that pushes it away from certain constructive themes that are otherwise found to be quite characteristic of critical theory.

Having shown the possibilities of determinate negation, Hegel immediately closes these by moving to the negation of the negation in an Absolute that in fact contradicts critical thinking. Adorno's way of re-opening these possibilities overall fails to recover the full sense of actualisable truth which is given an unacceptable form in the Hegelian Absolute. This sense must, however, be conveyed even by a militantly non-absolute truth if the promise of determinate negation, the securing of the power of the negative in the sureness of its positive contribution, is to be realised. There is an extant formulation of this requirement in critical theory (6) which, by its paradoxical construction, testifies to the difficulty of the condition's satisfaction: "the whole is the true, and the whole is false" (7). There is a very important way in which critical theory has been formed by the gross falseness of the totalitarian social whole which has contradicted the triumph of reason proclaimed by Hegel (8). However, I think that critical theory has principally shown that any totality must be false. The problem remains to restructure the condition of truth which this idea of totality illusorily satisfies in a way which criticises the goals of absoluteness.
APPENDIX C

ON SOME MARXIST ATTITUDES TOWARDS SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE MATERIAL WORLD

In some comments about what I believe to be a set of fundamentally mistaken attitudes to Kant's epistemology, I would now like to make more clear my claim that there is in Hegel a more sound foundation for empirical knowing than is to be found in the certainly more empirically minded Kant.

I will first take up Lenin's famous location of a profound ambivalence between idealism and materialism in Kant's epistemology (1). Lenin's admittedly brief remarks set up a metaphor of Kant's thought being poised on a knife-edge between idealism and materialism, with the possibility of its being tipped over to either side. Hence in addressing himself to Kant's ambivalence, Lenin simply criticises him for not being enough of a consistent materialist (2). But in reaching this conclusion Lenin's interpretation seems to take over the understandings which motivated the oppositional, because equally tendentious, responses to Kant which I have traced through Fichte and Schelling and which Lenin himself identifies as "idealism" and "mechanical materialism", with the novel factor that Lenin mentions both. In doing this there is the immediate benefit of
pointing out a tension in Kant, but holding that this tension could have been resolved simply by Kant's taking a more staunch materialist line is hardly adequate to Kant's thought. There can be no doubt about the strength of the materialist impulse of the critical philosophy, and the ambivalent way in which this is ultimately maintained in that philosophy arises from Kant's being sensitive, in a way in which Lenin clearly was not, to the obstacles to workable materialism.

Lenin's own materialism is founded upon a criticism of the possibility of granting the thing-in-itself even a wholly negative place in epistemology, and then running this denial of its noumenal status into a declaration of its being phenomenally available. But though I would say that this is the correct way in which to move, of itself it can amount to only a covering up of the fundamental problems of the distance between the to-be-known and creative cognition which lead to Kant's positing of the thing-in-itself in the first place. Lenin's basic idea that Kant is a materialist when he assumes that the thing-in-itself corresponds to our ideas is vague enough to lend itself even to a broadly pragmatist epistemology quite different from the position he wants to take up. Lenin gives no indication of what it is, if anything, that distinguishes his disposal of the thing-in-itself from the similar efforts made by either the idealist or (especially) the mechanical materialist oppositional
currents of the interpretation of Kant which he identifies. Furthermore his later acquaintance with the sources of Hegel's contributions to this issue seem to occasion no valuable change in this respect (3). All this, then, leaves a great void just at the point where a new development is needed, and into this void almost anything can be put. If these remarks seem harsh, it is because Lenin's simplistic confusion of an interesting preliminary comment with a fully worked out position must be opened up if new developments in this area of the study of (Hegel and) Marx are to be made.

For example, it was quite open for Della Volpe to deepen Lenin's examination of Kant (4) and insist that there is a strong materialist reference present in the critical epistemology which in the history of the development of empirical (social) science suffered profound suppression in Hegel (5) and was revived only in Marx (6). But when Colletti rather insensitively took over the same broad thesis with reference to Lenin (7), but without Della Volpe's awareness of Kant's limitations in making materialism workable (8), the result of the ensuing attempt to directly link Marx to the materialist intent in Kant is - a Kantianism. Though derived from Della Volpe to a pronounced degree, Colletti's intellectual history of Marx's epistemology is a regression and not a development from Della Volpe. What for Della Volpe are positions requiring improvement are taken by Colletti to
be statements of a practicable materialism.

For Della Volpe, the "materialism" of Hume is as important as that of Kant, and this speaks volumes of the acute historical sense informing his account of Marx's epistemology. Della Volpe's discussion of Kant rather unusually - at least to British readers - attempts to outline the fundamentals of the critical philosophy by focusing upon Kant's attitude to Leibnizian rationalism, which in contemporaneous German philosophy was known through Wolff. Della Volpe stresses that the vigorous empirical impulse in Kant which inspires his attack upon Wolff is derived from Hume (9). The materialist intent of the thought of both Hume and Kant is made clear, but coupled with an acknowledgement that a material reference in epistemology is very substantially vitiated as a resource for empirical science without a clear understanding of how that reference is available for and determines knowledge.

Bearing this in mind, I should now like to mention the antipathy to Bhaskar's recent attempt to give a transcendental realist basis to science (10) displayed in Ruben's Marxism and Materialism. I am concerned here with only the first of a number of arguments which Ruben marshals against Bhaskar's transcendental mode of argument (11). I should perhaps make it clear at the outset that I think Bhaskar's efforts are an example of
just the sort of ontological inquiry that might be made on the basis for realism which Hegel provides, and that I regard it as important that such efforts be recognised as developments from a position fundamentally far more sound than that taken by Ruben. This latter is a position we will recognise.

Ruben believes, with Lenin (12), that the possibility of a materialist epistemology turns on the strength of a necessary presumption of an objectivity distinct from the subject. Given what is common-sensically known about human beings, Ruben says, sceptical empiricist epistemology is literally incredible. In order to forestall the sceptical retort that such common-sense belief is open to doubt, Ruben argues that though this point can certainly be successfully made, this means that the whole project of foundationalism must not be answered but rejected. He is quite blunt; objectivity cannot have a philosophical justification (13). But it is, I submit, quite unacceptable that an argument should be rejected because it is successful, and actually this is not what Ruben does. Beneath his blunt statement of presumption he is in fact offering a challenge to empiricism based on common-sense experience's philosophical significance and empiricism's characteristic inability to come to terms with this. His argument as such is stunted - and Ruben offers no criticism of scepticism which can even be compared to that of Hegel (14) - because it is couched in
what he takes to be self-sufficiently blunt terms. For Ruben, philosophy is reasoned thought, but reasoned though can be dismissed as merely academic when it conflicts with being-in-the-world. The better way of putting this is, of course, to argue for the reason in being-in-the-world.

That Ruben's case take this form at first glance appears to be because he identifies philosophical defence of objectivity with an argument which is non-circular in the sense of in no way having its conclusions bound up in its premises (15). As Haskar himself retorts (16), this stipulation is rather unclear in that it would seem to rule out not only what are generally taken to be illegitimately circular arguments but also, certainly distinguishable from these, a great range of broadly deductive arguments, including aspects of mathematics and logic, and transcendental deductive arguments involved in the philosophical task of revealing and clarifying the bases of given positions. And again I do not think Ruben really says what he means. Since he accepts the possibility of scepticism, in that he allows that as knowledge of objectivity must be founded in knowing and cannot have a ground elsewhere it is open to unrelievable doubt, Ruben's tack is to found objectivity upon a blunt presupposition. I think we can see that he is forced to do this by his paradoxical acceptance of the unassailability of the argument he wishes to dispute.
Though couched in marxist terms and taking its inspiration for a strong presumption of materialism from Lenin, Ruben's argument is in fact none other than a repetition of Moore's attempt to common-sensically ground our belief in the external world (17). We should be familiar with the weakness of this position because Moore's defence itself is, I would say, in substance no improvement on Hume's doctrine of natural belief. This would certainly explain Ruben's readiness to give up the idea of a philosophical defence of materialism, preferring to argue his case non-philosophically, a contradiction in terms which can be understood only within a Humean context. However, in the light of Hegel's discussion of these matters, I believe that we are able on the one hand to pay empiricism more respect than does Ruben, in that we can discuss its positions, and on the other hand have less respect for its conclusions. For we can say that it is going too far to allow that there is an irremediable element of indefensible presumption in materialism when the point makes sense only in the discredited terms of the criterion of truth demanded by empiricism. Thus we are no longer hindered by the sort of scepticism which Ruben, in his own defence, has in the end to insist can be levelled at materialism.

The course of the full development of Ruben's position from his initial failure to properly confront scepticism...
is, I hope, easily recognisable to us. As he allows scepticism he cannot defend any particular understanding of the ontology of knowing, and hence his rejection of the very idea of work such as Bhaskar's and his believing it necessary to flatly assert common-sense, intuitive understanding. If, however, we follow Hegel to the establishment of determinate negation, we find opening up a whole area of debate which Bhaskar enters, which Ruben tries to close, and, with regard to the interests of this particular study, where, as we have seen, Marx's commitment to the premise of real men in empirically perceptible conditions involves his uncovering a range of discussable properties of human beings which becomes one of the principal grounds upon which he then departs from Hegel. It is not that the existence of objectivity is mediated by consciousness, but our knowledge of even its independent existence obviously is. Ruben is in error if he supposes that the acceptance of materialism will be guaranteed by surrendering philosophic explication of consciousness, the only ground upon which this acceptance may be won.

I feel sure that Ruben would agree that it is at best an unavoidable shortcoming of Marxism and Materialism that its statement of materialist presumptions tends to have a dogmatic form which is not entirely sanctioned by the literal incredibleness of the scepticism they are intended to displace. The whole tradition which I have
called the classical epistemological project, and the thought of Hegel as well, is ultimately dismissed by Ruben on the grounds that it articulates a bourgeois understanding (18).

Whilst this may be so, such a point is hardly directly pertinent to the truth of the beliefs thus criticised. In the face of accepting the strength of empiricist scepticism, to reject the consequences of this because they stem from a bourgeois understanding in opposition to the presumptions needed to underpin marxist materialism is, to put the point strongly, a rather poor recourse to name-calling in the absence of a workable criticism. If, as I argue, Hegel, who we have seen had to face in Schelling similar intuitive approaches to establishing truth as that of Ruben, makes possible rational debate in this area, then I feel that this should be welcomed. But, perhaps more than this, the possibility of Ruben's materialism being at all convincing (outside of the Humean miasma which still clings to British studies in epistemology) turns on this. If it is the characteristic of modern epistemology that we must begin with subjectivity, then Hegel has shown that this must and can be the ground of philosophically defensible realism.
DIALECTICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND NATURE

In the light of certain developments of avowedly Hegelian dialectic, it is important to stress, on the basis of what has been revealed about the structure of dialectic, that this process can be one of only consciousness. Hegel depicts a process of developing understanding, change in belief and therefore also of change in object, this latter being understood in the only meaningful epistemological fashion as an object for-consciousness. We must affirm that it is only as change in an object for-consciousness that a dialectical alteration of objects can be at all comprehensible, for it is the very differentiation of object and object for-consciousness that Hegel makes his fundamental contribution to the understanding of knowing. Change in an object for-consciousness is both comprehensible (though not fully worked out from a materialist point of view) and helpful to epistemological studies.

By way of contrast, it is quite unintelligible to suppose that such change could actually take place in a natural object. Except at the most broad analogical level such as is given in the general meanings of "movement", "development", "change", etc., that is to say precisely where the specificity of "dialectical" peters out, the
labelling of natural change as dialectical is untenable. Whereas we are informed by being referred to the actual process of knowing as one of dialectic, no such information about natural changes is passed on by a similar reference. In the light of this, the dialectics of natural objects can amount to only trivial, indeed misleading, redescriptions of changes whose actual mechanisms are incomparably better described and explained in other terms. Dialectic understood as covering natural objects is metaphysical in a literal, and in this case thereby derogatory, sense. It is only by, in fact quite vulgarly, replacing consciousness with materiality without concern for what it is about consciousness that makes it open to be informatively described as a dialectic that one can arrive at the dialectics of nature (1).

There undoubtedly are passages in Hegel that encourage the extension of dialectic to cover nature (2). However, there are two responses which I believe a sympathetic interpretation of Hegel's philosophy must make to such passages. One is to note, as we have already noted, that it is of the greatest importance to Hegel's overall conception of Spirit that the Philosophy of Nature describes a flat exteriority and not a dialectical movement. Following from this is a second point. Though I do not think that on balance one could claim that Hegel's conception of the Philosophy of Nature is of a
dialectic, even if one could do so it would constitute a closing off of the positive resources of his description of consciousness. Of course, one should not guide interpretations by what one wants to find in the text. However, one should also not fail to take into account the way in which what can reflexively be seen to be a shift from a strong to a weak argument can be an invaluable guide to interpretation. In this respect Engels' view of the dialectic is certainly strongly influenced by persistent cosmological interests in the wider philosophic culture of his time. My own interpretation is guided by a rejection of these and an overall concern with broadly hermenutic problems. However, after Hegel I do not think this has to be a statement of the relativism of interpretation but can be one of a process of learning. Of course, whether it is or not cannot be settled other than by discussion of the issue.
APPENDIX

MEPHAM ON IDEOLOGY AS A CAMERA OBSCURA

In an article which first appeared in Radical Philosophy in 1972 (1), Mepham argues that the concept of ideology which Marx employs in Capital is radically different to that which he and Engels employed in The German Ideology. This latter concept is expressed by the simile of a camera obscura:

If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside down as in a camera obscura, this phenomena arises just as much from their historical life process as the inversion of objects upon the retina does from their physical life-process. (2).

Mepham objects to the directness of the inversion of the true into the false in ideological understanding which this simile implies, for he claims that this relegates the false to realm of spurious illusion. In Capital, an organic connection between the true and the false which the true itself necessarily produces is central to the concept of ideology. I have tried to argue in Chapter 8 that a very broad idea of the inversion of ordinary consciousness is common to more or less all of Marx's thought, so it may seem that I should have to challenge Mepham's argument. This is true, however, only in a very limited fashion. I feel that what Mepham has to say about the requirements of a theory of ideology is interesting and may well be valuable, and I do not propose to dissent from it. There is no need to, for
what we must recognise is that these are Mephams's ideas and not Marx's (though they depart from Marx). Mepham's substantive comments on ideology, whilst claiming to represent Marx's views, are undoubtedly substantially Mepham's own. It is absurd to claim that the two words "camera obscura" can themselves generate the model of ideological production which Mepham ascribes to them, and it is even more so to claim that Capital works with what are clearly ideas of interpolation derived from structuralist semiotics. Of course, I do not deny that validity of the type of effort Mepham is making as independent thought (though indebted to Marx - but whose independent thought is not indebted?). Nor am I claiming that Marx's ideas are better because they are Marx's. But my aim actually is - as Mepham's is not - the elucidation of Marx's beliefs, and this aspect of the simile of the camera obscura and the metaphor of inversion needs an interpretation sensitive to literary nuance and not just to conceptual ratiocination.

Mepham does on occasion seem to almost allow that we may really only be dealing with figures of speech (3), important figures certainly, but not necessarily ones whose importance lies in their ability to be pursued on into coherent theory. But his whole argument turns on challenging "camera obscura" as if it were such a theory, and the debate his article has generated has certainly followed this line (4). This is an instance - all too
typical of Althusser himself - when the structuralist reading of signs runs riot and collapses into self-parody. Not only must a word articulate a problematic, but that problematic must be able to be expressed in the most precise ways, even when it is clear that the precision is being supplied by the interpreter rather than the interpreted. All the possibilities of interpretation revealing literary allusion of various sorts are removed from this type of scientistic structuralism (which thus does much to detract from the best of the structuralist readings of literature). I have tried to argue in this work that there is every reason to think that Marx took over a vocabulary of inversion and its synonyms as a literary expression of a way of thought derived from Hegel. There is, in fact, a particular reason for not holding that Marx thought the particular simile of the camera obscura original to himself, for it is found in the editor's introduction to Feuerbach's notorious Thoughts on Death and Immortality, which, although they do not mention it in their writings, it is very likely indeed that Engels and Marx had read (5).

I cannot leave this topic without mentioning a particularly unfortunate motif of Mepham's Althusserian attitude to the text - extremely selective quotation. As part of his argument that Capital does not work with the direct inversion metaphor of the camera obscura, Mepham
cites the following:

Labour is the substance, and the immanent measure of value, but has itself no value. In the expression "value of labour", the idea of value is not only completely obliterated, but actually reversed. It is an expression as imaginary as the value of the earth. These imaginary expressions arise, however, from the relations of production themselves. They are categories for the phenomenal forms of essential relations. (6).

This is simply disingenuous, for in the edition of Capital he uses, and other translators of Capital and I myself would agree that the rendering is acceptable, this passage is concluded thus:

That in their appearance things often represent themselves in inverted form is pretty well known in every science except Political Economy.

Let me repeat that I am not denying the validity of the criticisms which Mepham makes of the concept of ideology which he identifies as the "inversion" or "camera obscura" concept. But I very strongly object to the passing of these observations off as Marx's own thought. They are nothing of the sort. But pretending that they are makes it impossible to get at the resources to be uncovered by exploring what Marx means by the use of the metaphor of inversion.
THE SEPARATION OF USE- AND EXCHANGE-VALUES IN THE INITIAL INTERPRETATION OF CAPITAL

An appreciation of the distinction between use-value and exchange-value as turning on the separation of the natural and social elements of the commodity was the principal theme of the initial interpretation of Capital. Engels' comments on Capital were, strictly speaking, the first commentary on the book. However, these can hardly be said to amount to a full interpretation of the economic content of the work - the third part of his review, for example, never appeared. By the initial interpretation I mean that body of economic explication and extension of Capital produced around the time of the publication of volume three and the life of the Second International. This includes a range of national and theoretical currents, but these can, I think, be shown to be united in their concern with a number of specific lines in the interpretation of Capital. I refer the reader to Kautsky's textbook on Marx's political economy as perhaps the principal general formulation of the initial interpretation (1).

The issue of separating use-value and exchange-value is particularly to the fore in Hilferding's reply to Böhm-Bawerk (2). For Hilferding and his marxist
contemporaries overt polemic against a focus on general use-values which suppressed conscious consideration of historically specific social relations of production was an even more pressing concern than it had been for Marx. Though Gossen published his book in 1854, it was of course only after Jevons, Menger and Walras published in the early 1870s that marginalism became such an important force. Within two years of Engels' making available the third volume of *Capital*, Böhm-Bawerk put forward his criticisms, in which the discussion of price calculation serves as the occasion for an argument that utility is a far more defensible central concept of economic analysis than is value \(3\). Hilferding himself certainly paid more attention in his reply to this obviously more fundamental issue than to the transformation problem itself \(4\).

The polemical character of this response to marginalism of course embraces an important element of Marx's criticism of fetishism. However, I believe that it also speaks of a partiality in the initial interpretation of the separation of use-value and exchange-value. This interpretation essentially claims that Marx registers the use-value of a commodity in order to relegate this element to a background of the general, ahistorical production of goods conterminous with human life. Against this background, the exchange-values which arises when a good is produced as a commodity is shown to be the
specific element indicating the individual capitalist mode of production. The focus of political economy is upon the latter. Against the characteristic tendency of bourgeois political economy to conflate use-value and exchange-value, the initial interpretation focuses more or less exclusively on the specific social relations of production. Whilst, let me repeat, there is much in this that has made the sense of Marx's concept of fetishism available to us, I think it fails to grasp the way in which Marx tries to explain social relations as definitely linked to a particular level of human knowledge of, and ability to work within, nature.
BOHm-BAWERK ON MARX'S INSISTENCE UPON THE PROPORTIONAL REGULATION OF EXCHANGE

The same point as is at issue in Marx's criticisms of Bailey is at the bottom of his discussion of Aristotle's treatment of value in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1). However, Marx is rather more sympathetic to Aristotle's failure to grasp the importance of the key to proportional regulation of exchange than he is to Bailey's, for important reasons which were discussed in chapter 10. Marx's formal case for the necessity of reduction of equivalence in order that exchange may take place has obvious parallels with Aristotle's similar insistence upon the requirement of commensurability. However, Aristotle was driven to relinquish this argument, and to regard money as merely a makeshift estimate of value fixed on by custom, when faced with the qualitative differences of the articles exchanged. Aristotle's deliberations lapse more into philology than social analysis at this juncture (2), but I will not take up Marx's proffered explanation for this, as I mention the above only to draw attention to part of Böhm-Bawerk's criticism.

The *Theories* were not, of course, available to Böhm-Bawerk as he wrote 'On the Conclusion of the Marxist
System'. With such a lack of the materials of knowledge of what has gone before, remarkable ironies of historical repetition can occur, and one surely does, linking Bailey and Böhm-Bawerk, when the latter criticises Marx's attraction to an equivalence theory of exchange as "scholastico-theological". He attributes this attraction to Aristotle's influence, obviously meaning Aristotelian in the bad sense (3). Böhm-Bawerk leaves no doubt that he thinks this equivalence theory is flatly wrong. Why, he asks, when there is equivalence between goods, should there be exchange? This argument seems to be deceitful, as Böhm-Bawerk appears to be completely overriding the qualitative difference between use-values which Marx gives as the motive for the exchange of equivalent quantities. But it is, of course, precisely this dualism of use-value and exchange-value which Böhm-Bawerk holds to be at issue, referring prices directly to scarcity.

Though there is, to my knowledge, no direct reply to this particular position in Böhm-Bawerk made by any of those contributing to the intitial interpretation, an indirect reply to it is central to their critiques of marginalism, and I should like, to register it here. Capitalistic economic conduct, it is alleged, typically has no reference to utility at all, being conducted purely in terms of exchange-value with an aim to accumulate. The separation of use-value and exchange-value, and the establishment of the pressing reality of the latter, not
least when it obviously contradicts the former, are vital for the appreciation of this principal determinants of bourgeois economic life. The initial interpretation involves a stress, then, on a specifically capitalist construction of exchange-value, distinct from and often in opposition to use-value, as governing bourgeois economic activity. The heavy-handed ridicule to which works of the initial interpretation are able to subject attempts to give marginalist explanations of the conduct of major companies, that is to say in terms of concern for use-value provision (4), is proof enough of the superior productivity of the social explanations put forward by the former.
ON BÖHM-BAWERK'S READING OF MARX ON LABOUR

In his criticisms, Böhm-Bawerk argues that the passages of Capital we have just discussed contain more or less as many errors or even falsifications as words (1). He allows that the basis of exchange cannot be directly derived from the natural properties of goods. He own rather more sophisticated marginalism turns on relating prices to scarcity, scarcity being determined both by natural supply of and individual demand for a good (2). Searching for the error in Marx's political economy from which the shortcomings in price calculation which he believes he has revealed in Capital stem, Böhm-Bawerk attempts to lodge it here, in the adoption of value based on labour as the denominator of exchange rather than allowing scarcity this role, a move which pushed volume three into all sorts of difficulty in order to reconcile volume one with reality (3).

Böhm-Bawerk centrally argues that Marx did not take up the possibility of giving psychological explanations of the worth placed upon commodities which would explain their exchange-value (4). In Sombart, the marxist response to such a claim was to contrast Marx's "objective" treatment of value to this "subjective" one, arguing that the former and not the latter was the proper
one for political economy. Subjective valuations of commodities, even supposing that such data were scientifically corrigible, were still uninteresting unless set in the context of the objective, in the sense of socially rather than individually based, determinants upon those valuations. The very principles by which subjective valuations were reached remain to be explained without the objective investigation. Much of the especially epistemological apparatus of this contrast of social and individual has proven not only inadequate, as is the fate of all ideas, but very dangerously mistaken, reflecting a principal shortcoming in the philosophical explication of marxism after Marx's death, and would not repay discussion. However, I would say that it is an achievement to have even posed this contrast. I will not say it was posed as a problem, for taking what were only the beginnings of analysis as something solidly cemented was a principal reason for the unsatisfactory state of the treatment of the social and the individual by these marxist writers. Nevertheless, they show, correctly I think, that in the psychologistic reconstruction of economic valuation, the boundaries within which the psychology may correctly apply are left quite unexamined, for they are, in fact, the ultimate basis of the explanation of the valuations put forward. That these boundaries themselves call for an explanation which it would seem has to be social rather than psychological is the principal thrust of these marxist criticisms of
marginalism (5).

I would add that if these criticisms are good ones, then remedying the shortcomings of marginalist accounts of exchange-value cannot be a question of adding a social component to a given psychology. For that psychology is arrived by a negation of social determinants, and thus misunderstands its own data. What are social influences on the psychology of the bourgeois individual in his or her economic life are taken to be directly psychological phenomena; that is, as structures of consciousness, structures of nature. Recognition of social determinations on psychological phenomena would have to intrinsically alter our understandings of those very phenomena. The obvious facts of economic life of which Böhm-Bawerk makes so much crumble away from his purportedly commonsensical refutations of Marx's analysis when we see that those facts claim to be "facts" in this absolute sense only because they embody conceptions of their own character which, far from being the arbiters of science, are inevitably condemned as bad consciousness by radical scientific efforts to understand.

Böhm-Bawerk's objections are given in two stages. Firstly, he notes that Marx presents his case as an argument by elimination, elimination of other claimants for the position of denominator leaving value. Bohm-Bawerk quite rightly observes that this type of
argument must satisfy a rather difficult boundary condition if it is to be valid, the condition of considering each and every possibility. This condition, it is claimed, Marx entirely fails to observe. When examining commodities, Marx surreptitiously includes only the direct products of labour in the set of relevant objects, which set is not, as Marx would have us think, the same as the set of all commodities. Examination of the former set may allow value to emerge as the common denominator, but examination of the latter, which includes gifts of nature, certainly would not (6). We have dealt with this point as one of the seeming anomalies for the labour theory of value, and I will not repeat myself. However, I would like to say that as Böhm-Bawerk is approaching these passages of volume one of Capital from volume three, it is a failing that he provides no discussion of Marx's account of the value determination of the commodity exchange of gifts of nature. Though the point is surely not made very clear in the first chapter of Capital, it would be a better reading to relate the many pages of volume three on rent to this first chapter than to imply that they do not exist, their theoretical space being filled in by a piece of dialectical sleight of hand. At the bottom of this failing there is the fact that Böhm-Bawerk does not seem to be able to countenance value as other than a flat measure of exchange-value in terms of a substance composed of amounts of labour. If we were to allow that
value is such a measure, then Böhm-Bawerk would be right, and Marx would look so foolish in holding to such an obviously absurd position that it would seem that could reach his conclusions only through self-delusion at best (7).

It is on this understanding of value that Böhm-Bawerk repeats these mistakes in respect of another of Marx’s anomalous cases, arguing that value cannot be composed of labour because in some cases labour creates no value as its product cannot be exchanged, and concluding that this profoundly embarrasses the labour theory of value (8). Knowing that Marx himself was aware of this case does not alter Böhm-Bawerk’s opinion (9). Such a reading is fashioned by Böhm-Bawerk’s not stepping away from the marginalist concern to rationalise capitalistic assessments of value when turning to a theory which centrally tries to distance itself from and therefore to explain the very idea and the form of such assessments. If marginalism can construct some measure of value which is able to arrive at decisions rather like exchange valuations, it considers itself to have explained the later. Thus for Böhm-Bawerk, Marx’s theory cannot be empirically justified because it is impossible to construct on grounds of impeccable logic and mathematics a scale of value of units of labour which can plausibly recreate exchange valuations. The aim of Marx in the labour theory of value, to try and understand why
economic organisation takes the form of value and what value assessments are, is completely lost. Marx, as we shall see, in an important sense accords to value a great advance in economic organisation; but this is a vast scientific distance away from the presumption that value is (the only form of) rational economic judgement. Indeed, it is the inability to imagine economic judgement in any other form than value that underpins Böhm-Bawerk's marginalism and his submersion of Marx's attempt to open up value for investigation.

At this stage of the argument Marx has, says Böhm-Bawerk, managed to include labour amongst the list of candidates for the position of denominator of commodity exchange, a candidacy which it does not actually deserve. Let us now follow Böhm-Bawerk's exposition of how Marx makes labour the successful candidate, the second stage of the former's objections to the labour theory of value.

Böhm-Bawerk sets out the abstraction from use-values and the conclusion that after this abstraction all commodities have to tell us is that they are congealed labour. The error by which this conclusion is reached, is, according to Böhm-Bawerk, a confusion of abstraction from the genus and abstraction from specific forms in which the genus manifests itself. Thus when we abstract from the use-value of a commodity, this is not to say that we abstract from the category of use-value itself,
which can remain common to all commodities and mediate their exchange, though in this mediation we no longer consider use-values' particular forms. The conclusion that labour is the only common denominator of commodities is therefore wrong (10). However, again Böhm-Bawerk does not grasp what is actually going on in the passages which he criticises. On his own understanding, labour must be the only common denominator of commodities if it is to serve the function of calculating their exchange-values. If we are attempting to construct some such means of calculation, then Böhm-Bawerk's objections again are sound. But Marx is not. Thus, instead of taking it as evidence of a gross inconsistency, as Böhm-Bawerk does (11), that Marx in fact allows use-value in general to be common to all commodities, we can see that Marx can do this and still abstract from use-value as such. The great deal of time which Böhm-Bawerk spends in trying to prove a common quality of use-value in commodities against Marx, though realising that Marx allows this, can count for little, for Marx is able nevertheless to abstract from this quality on ontological grounds for the purposes of explanation. The validity of the abstraction can indeed be proven only by its explanatory power, but such an abstraction cannot be closed off or even really adjudicated by the formal disquisitions on the logic of common properties which Böhm-Bawerk provides. Again, however, I must say that the possibility that value is to be investigated in its form and not just used in its
given form in order to recalculate prices is simply beyond Böhm-Bawerk's attempt to read the labour theory of value, testimony enough to the complete obliteration of these concerns in marginalist thought.

In his reply to Böhm-Bawerk, Hildering shows, far more lucidly than Marx himself does in the relevant passages of *Capital* it must be said, that the issue of value is the social relations of the division of labour under commodity production, relations whose principal characteristic is that they conceal their social character under a naturalistic form (12).
Wicksteed's criticism of the labour theory of value antedates Böhm-Bawerk's essay by some twelve years, and of course therefore was made on the basis of knowledge of only volume one of *Capital*. That Wicksteed looks forward to the resolutions to be offered in the later volumes to the contradictions between obvious economic phenomena and the theses of volume one, and that Böhm-Bawerk considers these resolutions casuistic, obviously makes the latter's criticism the more complete. It is perhaps more apt, then, to compare Wicksteed's paper with the chapter of *Capital and Interest* on Marx which appeared almost simultaneously. However, I want to draw attention to the overall similarity of Wicksteed's arguments of 1884 and those of Böhm-Bawerk of 1896 for this is the more fit standard for Wicksteed.

For, after setting out the argument by which Marx reaches the labour theory of value, Wicksteed identifies the central mistake of that argument as that which we have seen Böhm-Bawerk call confusing abstraction from the genus with abstracting from instances in which the genus is manifested. In short, Wicksteed says that though Marx is right to abstract from individual use-values, he is wrong to think that this means abstracting from the
category of utility, which category must in fact be used in explanations of exchange-value (1).

Wicksteed's application of this to abstract labour goes as follows. Having taken Marx's argument up to abstract labour, he says that he awaits the later volumes of *Capital* in order to set the surprising conclusion that labour is the sole constituent element of value in illuminating context. However, displaying the tolerance characteristic of his article and of his political and academic attitudes more generally, he proceeds to go on to find in Marx a less surprising conclusion on the content of value. This is provided when Marx says that labour which actualises no use-value cannot have a value, into which Wicksteed proceeds to read the whole apparatus of accounts of exchange-value in terms of utility. Not surprisingly, he finds that this other line which he finds in Marx surrenders the previous analysis. Abstract labour, on Wicksteed's new understanding is "abstractly useful work", conferring "abstract utility" on wares.

Despite Wicksteed's constructive tone, there is no doubt that criticism such as this represents virtually the negation of hermeneutics. Obviously Wicksteed's paper collapses into the complete reading of his own positions into Marx's text. My point is that this is the fate of a constructive attitude to Marx that departs from the same positions as Böhm-Bawerk's destructive one, for these
positions are given by a complete inability to hold value up as an investigable form, and consequently to grasp that Marx may not wish to give immediate accounts of exchange-value but to inquire into what exchange-value can mean.

By way of contrast, I refer the reader to the initial interpretation's most substantial understanding of abstract labour, that of Rubin (2). Not only does this remain the foremost explication of Marx's meaning in the concept of abstract labour, but in making this meaning clear it is one of the most important books setting out the specific social relations in which this century has been lived.
ON SOCIALIST EVALUATIONS OF MARX AND MARGINALISM

The way in which the initial interpretation of Capital has stressed the importance of social relations to Marx's conception of political economy, in polemic against what are typically treated as flat distortions in marginalism, has obscured this uniting ground which must of course be grasped in order to understand how Marx's economics actually do - as I am sure they do - constitute an improvement over marginalism. In minimising this admittedly very briefly dealt with element of Capital, the initial interpretation has contributed to a fracture which has been the principal feature of marxist political economy in this century.

A great deal of the marginalist determination of the magnitude of price is of course to be found in Fabianism, certainly the most explicitly socialist development of welfare economics. A particularly clear case is the collapse of Shaw's almost light-hearted scorn for the principle of utility (1) into more or less total acceptance of this principle upon appreciating the place of competition in marginalist theory (2). Perhaps for us now the most important task set by this fact is the assessment of the productive resources of welfare economics as a response to the socialisation of
capitalist production. However, a description of the theoretical positions actually adopted at the time would have to conclude that Fabianism fell very far indeed beneath the social understanding being generated in the initial interpretation, and that the valuably organic conceptions of socialist development which Fabianism maintained remained poorly articulated. One has only to recall the unconvincing optimism by which mysteriously democratised state action is so often invoked to fill in the gaps left by these conceptions. Perhaps the most important characteristic of the Fabian attitude to Marx was, amidst all the admiration, an almost total failure to understand the first part of *Capital*. The consequences of this for the popular comprehension of Marx in Britain are perhaps best displayed in the ludicrous inadequacies of Russell's account of the labour theory of value (3). But even Cole, in my opinion perhaps the best of Fabian intellectuals, though he saw fit to work on an edition of volume one of *Capital*, gave an introduction to the text which contains about as many mistakes as words in respect of all those issues of social analysis illuminated by the initial interpretation (4).

The complete scorn for marginalism in the initial interpretation, most strikingly present in the tone of Bukharin's *The Economic Theory of the Leisure Class*, had then its socialist opposite in a Fabian distaste for
those parts of *Capital* beyond its marginalist comprehension, which Fabianism came to regard as metaphysical or some such positivist synonym for nonsense. Represented here is the fracture in marxist political economy at which I am trying to drive. If central elements of Fabianism had access to relatively popular understanding, they did so by falling far beneath Marx (and Marx's own drawing upon theoretical products of British labour history), and standing on day to day opinions about price which it turned to socialist purposes as far as it could. The initial interpretation accompanied its depth of knowledge by refusing to allow everyday conceptions of value any other place than that of ideology in the most derogatory sense. Standing thereby in opposition to, rather than a development of popular consciousnesses, this most vital area of marxist theory militated against its own popular understanding, even in the in other respects most favourable political situation in which initial interpretation addressed its audience.

Still the outstanding (and here Marx's comments on J.S. Mill must apply) attempt to forge any links between these two stances on common understandings of price and their explanation by the labour theory is Bernstein's *Presuppositions of Socialism*. Bernstein's biography tells of a surely unequalled opportunity to both recognise the necessity of a far better marxist response
to marginalist economics and to provide such a response. When at one point Bernstein quotes a sentence from volume three of *Capital* in which Marx makes consideration of use-values intrinsic to important political economic issues and adds the comment: "This sentence alone makes it impossible to make light of the Gossen-Bohm theory with a few superior phrases", we are given a, to my knowledge unique, attempt of the period to reach some-cross fertilisation (5). Bernstein was in an excellent position to draw on the milieu of the initial interpretation as well as of Fabianism, and the historical failure of his attempt to make any real progress in economic, if not in political, theory must be regarded as being due very substantially to his own shortcomings. For Bernstein himself continually falls beneath the social understandings available in German theoretical marxism into a philosophically naive defence of the given empirical so little theoretically re-worked as to be more or less ideologically reproduced. Given Bernstein's advantages, the character of his articles and book go some way to warranting the contumely with which they came to be held. Unfortunately, this was almost the direct opposite of the reaction which would have been most fruitful.

Rather similar positions, indeed including some directly influenced by Fabianism and by Bernstein, were taken up in what is known as "legal marxism". Certainly the
political economy of the likes of Tugan-Baranowsky (6) bear little comparison with the flat inadequacies found in Bernstein. But equally certainly legal marxism's economic and political theories have been as much the object of polemical attack by marxist orthodoxy as Bernstein himself. Attempts to utilise marginalist insights were rejected as the watering down of marxism (7). As one might suspect, there are far more than merely theoretical questions involved here; but nevertheless legal marxism has been substantially lost to present assessments of marxism's historically developed theoretical resources. As the waning of Stalin's baneful influence has lead to the excellent works of such as Rubin, Pashukanis and Voloshinov being made available in the west, perhaps a waning of those influences of Lenin of similar character will allow of a reconsideration of Struve and others.
There have recently been a number of marxist examinations of the development of neo-classical economics that have shared a similar interpretative tack. Writing against an intellectual background, in economics at least, in which Marx's work is dismissed as ideological as opposed to the science put forward in neo-classicism and its underpinnings in sociology, these works have tried to reverse the labelling. I trust that it is clear that my sympathies are, on the whole, on the side of this reversal, but I must also confess to a certain impatience in reading these works. Though concerned to be historical, they are sadly lacking in knowledge of their own history - of the evaluations of economic theory to be found in the initial interpretation of Capital which they more or less repeat. This would not matter so much were it not that this lack of self-awareness reflects the fact that all the potential productive issues of critique in this area are more or less lost in the repetition of a wholly unsympathetic line, and that the possible dialogue - however limited - between two bodies of thought which seem typically only to swap derogatory epithets is frustrated. I have three books in mind - Katouzian's Ideology and Method in Economics, Fine's Economics and Ideology and Clarke's Marx, Marginalism and Modern.
Sociology (1). I will focus upon the latter, for its particular stress on sociology brings out the essential social issues most clearly, but what I have to say I would say of all three books.

The characteristic themes of the critical — in the derogatory sense — marxist interpretation of the history of late-nineteenth and early twentieth century social thought are virtually all displayed in Clarke's work. His book is set out as something of a purported reply to The Structure of Social Action as a history of ideas (2), and its central thesis is that Parsons, though certainly correct in identifying the emergence of a voluntaristic theory of action, is wrong to identify this as a scientific development (3). Parsons in fact missed the real scientific development in nineteenth century social thought — by Marx (4). Let me repeat that I am sure that there is a great deal that is defensible in this. Indeed, as it is developed into an exposure of the essentially abstract character of the voluntaristic theory (5), it is novel and illuminating. But this valuable defensible element is not made the basis of a generous attitude towards the criticised thought, but is rather only the springboard for intentionally hostile, destructive criticism.

The essential issue is Clarke's attitude towards reform informed by marginalism. This attitude is deprecatory,
focusing upon the undoubted limits which such reform accepts and works within (6). But if it is not difficult to see how this criticism is to work as criticism, it is difficult to see what purpose such criticism is meant to serve.

If it is meant to argue for the superiority of Marx's science, it adopts the unfortunate form of preaching to the converted and reviling the unconverted for their sins. No real effort is made to speak to marginalists on any other basis that they initially reject their own beliefs, so the potential for winning conviction in the superiority of Marx's thought is lost. This hardly suits a book written for a series which proclaims that it "aims to create a forum for debate between different theoretical and philosophical traditions in the social sciences" (7). Of course, the celebration of Marx's correctness may have a ritual function.

If, on the other hand, Clarke's book is meant to help the development of marxist theory, then its form is equally unsuited to its task. An essential correctness of the positing of revolution from which all reform can be condemned for being such is the starting point of Clarke's main thesis. Even if we accept the fundamental correctness of this evaluation on the most general terms, this does not carry Clarke's point. It is surely impossible to argue that twentieth century marxism has
had any real success is specifying the precise mechanisms of revolution in the western (or for that matter, the eastern) world. When assessing real social improvements, the type of revolutionary marxism Clarke seems to have in mind does not have a list of achievements which even begins to compare with the reformism he deprecates. This is not to celebrate the limits of reformism but to draw what I cannot but feel is the obvious lesson here: that the task facing us is to deepen both revolution and social reform. If the limited ambitions (and ultimate frustrations whilst having such ambitions) of the latter can benefit from dialogue with the former, the former, probably to a greater degree, requires some teaching on how to immerse itself, or rather to find itself, in the given social world. A dogmatic stress on their own correctness by proponents of either one or the other prevents this.
In Habermas's relatively recent writings, an explication of Marx's dialectic through an analogy with learning has been put forward in some detail. Historical materialism is shown to involve a core idea of technical learning in the sphere of production, and Habermas wishes to complement this with a more sensitive appreciation of learning in the normative sphere (1). These writings clearly have affinities with the discussion of Marx's dialectic in this work. However, these are not so close as it may initially seem, and in elucidating the differences I hope to make clear my argument on the crucial topic of how Marx's work stands as a critique of bourgeois society.

"Explication" is perhaps the wrong way to describe what Habermas does, whereas I would apply it rather strictly to my intentions in this work. Habermas himself calls his efforts a "reconstruction" (2), and this is certainly more apt. He brings a wide range of ideas from traditions other than hegelianism and marxism into his treatment of historical materialism, and, whilst he insists on the overall marxist location of his thought (3), it is clear that Habermas' historical materialism involves very many elements which are, in the strongest
sense, novel to marxism. This is not, of course, in itself a criticism, for Habermas' mastery of, and ability to productively run together, a great many intellectual traditions has always been a strength in his work and in no small way contributes to the substantive power of his reconstructed historical materialism. But it is as well to be wholly clear about the nature of Habermas' attitude to Marx. The necessity for the eclecticism displayed in Habermas' discussion of historical materialism follows from a motif characteristic of more or less all his work; a consciousness of the shortcomings in attempts to directly use even Marx's marxism (not to mention diamat, etc. (4)) as a critique of contemporary capitalism.

There are two principal components of Habermas' reservations about marxism. One is that he argues that the development of capitalism has produced forms of crisis outside of marxism's sphere of competence to comprehend (5). The other is that Marx's central concept of "labour" shows serious internal deficiencies in that it does far too much social theoretical work, and these deficiencies subvert its aspirations of critique. Of course these internal deficiencies to some extent account for marxism's inability to copy with transformations within capitalism, but I propose to, as far as possible, separate these two issues and deal only with Habermas' internal criticism of marxism.
In *Knowledge and Human Interests* Habermas traces through some of the principal lines of Marx's epistemological, in a broad sense, developments from Hegel. He argues that Marx takes a general idea of active self-constitution from Hegelian phenomenology (6) (which in itself is a reworked Fichtean theme (7)), but that Marx then locates self-constitution in a new existential context. Though labour as such does have an important place in the Phenomenology, Marx's tack in responding to Hegel is to rebut idealism by expanding the role of labour such that it services as the general medium of human existence (8). Habermas goes on to identify a somewhat Kantian motif in Marx's work in the recognition of an irreducible materiality in the nature which faces humanity as an object (9). Labour constitutes an epistemological synthesis in Marx's ideas, for through it humanity carries out its subjective self-constitution in the objective natural world (10). I do not want to bother making clear to what extent I agree or not with this account of the genealogy of Marx's epistemological position, but rather to move on to what, from this basis, Habermas then has to say of marxism as critique.

Habermas is convinced that Marx's idea of labour is too wide. Labour as the medium of synthesis embraces all of human existence (11), and this is a mistake. Habermas argues that Marx makes labour cover what are two (or, in fact, as we shall later see, three) logically separable
ontological elements of human self-formation. These elements can be revealed by considering the results of taking two distinct interests in the pursuit of knowledge. An interest in the prediction of the behaviour and in the control of processes treated as objects leads to the pursuit of the empirical-analytic sciences, whereas an interest in understanding leads to pursuit of the hermeneutic sciences (12). This is not a separation of the natural from the social sciences, for whilst the natural sciences are clearly the foremost exemplar of the empirical-analytic sciences, an interest in control can certainly be part of certain social sciences (13). Habermas is putting forward a distinction between types of stance taken in the pursuit of knowledge relating to two different activities in human self-production. Labour is the ontological domain of that particular human activity which is the object of the empirical-analytic sciences, but it is the radically different domain of communicative interaction that grounds an interest in understanding. Obviously Marx's idea of labour does embrace both of these domains, but in doing so, Habermas argues, it embodies a serious confusion. What should be dealt with as hermeneutic issues tend to fall under the aspect of the empirical-analytical sciences, so that Marx's social materialistic intent tends to collapse into a technocratic, social control approach to social issues (14). This has considerable consequences. Habermas
distinguishes a third ontological element of human self-formation as authority or power, and a critical attitude to given power relations follows from an interest in emancipation. Marx's ability to take such a critical attitude to capitalistic power is hampered as his thought contains more or less a capitulation to the ideology of that power, which is precisely a technocratic consciousness or scientism, a domination of all knowledge and all human effort by the technocratic pursuit of prediction and control.

I am certain that Marx's thought is beset by unwanted naturalistic inclusions, but I do not think that Habermas' way of identifying these can lead to an ultimately productive way of fashioning a better form of contemporary critique. Before going on to say why, let me preface my remarks with the obvious caveat that as Habermas' work broaches the most fundamental issues of social theory in an original way, it is inevitable that that work be subject to criticism, and when I undertake such criticism let this be understood in the most intentionally helpful sense.

Though Habermas of course takes a critical distance from the Geisteswissenschaften and later hermeneutic developments, it is, as a matter of intellectual history, only as a rather direct borrowing from this tradition that we can understand his rigorous distinction of labour
and interaction and with this the empirical-analytic and hermeneutic sciences. For this distinction follows the opposition of erklären and verstehen. To the extent that this is so, however, it cannot be thought that Habermas has, as he himself would probably agree, made a wholly happy theoretical appropriation. As I have mentioned, Habermas does not intend to draw a line between the natural and social sciences by his distinction of the empirical-analytic and the hermeneutic sciences. But he does tend to base his account of the empirical-analytic sciences on an idea of method which is little more than a positivist account of the natural sciences. Habermas always discusses labour in its most technocratic aspects, and in fact he identifies it with that principal object of earlier Critical Theory - instrumental reason (15). He concedes positivism the accuracy of its description of natural science, but then refuses to treat the empirical-analytic sciences he sets up as having this method as the paradigm of all knowledge. This is a crucial flaw in his, and in fact in all Frankfurt philosophy (with the exception of Schmidt). It is only on the basis of this identification of the empirical-hermeneutic sciences that Habermas can propose to demarcate labour an interaction in his strict way.

Only the domination of Habermas' thought by this idea of labour being accurately captured in the notion of instrumental reason can explain, I would say, his rather
Insensitive responses to the criticisms of the narrowness of his definitions of the empirical-analytic and hermeneutic sciences which have been made. Gadamer's thought embodies a central idea of the expansion of *verstehen* from a special historiographical method into the hermeneutic circle as a condition of any sort of communication at all. This provides, in my opinion, a most sound philosophical underpinning to the central thrust of the emphasis on hermeneutic problems intrinsic to the natural sciences in post-empiricist philosophy of science (though of course the significance of Gadamer's work is not limited to this). We can, of course, distinguish a technocratic from an interpretative stance, but it would seem to be just wrong to allow that the former does not always involve interpretative problems, which makes a rigorous separation of labour from interaction quite unworkable. Putting this the other way round, some idea of predictability and control, though certainly in weaker forms than technocratic measurability, is intimately bound up in the intelligibility and rationality of action, for generally shared ideas of appropriate responses in given circumstances are integral to understanding. Habermas, most valuably and correctly, is seeking to completely disrupt the currently dominant identification of potential solutions to social problems in technocratic improvements by locating the real social problems facing us as the expansion of autonomy through mutual public
understanding. To sum up the significance of these two observations, it would seem that, though we can allow Habermas' identification of two different knowledge-constitutive stances, we cannot allow the force of the criticism of Marx's idea of labour. For this turns on demarcating two discrete ontological domains, and the distinguishing of these domains as such seems impossible. Habermas has of course to allow, to mention only this, the universality of hermeneutics, that is to say, the presence of issues of understanding within labour. But he treats this as an instance of mere co-presence, and not as, as Marx centrally argues and as I would say is still more correct, as an instance of mutual constitution.

The whole point of Habermas' stress on knowledge-constitutive interests is the disruption of any claims to the universality of their form of knowledge by either the empirical-analytic or the hermeneutic sciences. These claim are relativised by their forms of knowledge being shown to turn on the taking up of different interests in the pursuit of knowledge, for it is precisely by making such inflated claims as to the universality of their knowledge that positivism (16) or idealist hermeneutics (17) display inflated pretensions. The self-clarification which stems from recognising interests in the pursuit of knowledge immediately leads on to consideration of the third interest in human
emancipation, for in this case we have a paradigmatic case of liberation from self-misunderstanding. It is as the self-reflexive correction of such misunderstanding that Habermas identifies critical theory, a form of knowledge which follows from an interest in expanding self-knowledge and consequently social autonomy. For Habermas, critical theory's object is established power in the form of ideologically distorted communication and its aim is the expansion of self-reflection.

Habermas' setting out of critical theory along these lines has expanded enormously in his successive writings. In *Knowledge and Human Interests*, a presentation of critical theory on an analogy with psycho-analysis was attempted (18). The method of acknowledgement of hitherto unconscious compulsions through therapy was taken as a model for the recomprehension of ideological misunderstandings through critical theory. The common object of psycho-analysis and critical theory which makes this analogy possible is distorted communication (19). Both efforts seek an ideal speech situation in which— in principle wholly undistorted comprehension and expression is possible. But these efforts are necessary because there are unwanted restrictions on generalised communicative competence (20). Habermas has detailed the conditions of an ideal speech situation through investigation of what he calls "universal pragmatics" (21), by which he means the general structures which are
the enabling framework of every possible communicative act. I do not want to say anything about the character of universal pragmatics, except to register my opinion that it constitutes the foremost development of a theory of discourse informed by a genuinely Hegelian insistence on internal reflexivity and as such is of the foremost importance. What I want to go on to discuss is the possibility of formulating an idea of critical theory on the basis of universal pragmatics.

That Habermas' idea of emancipation should take the form of a critical attitude to restrictions on communicative competence follows quite directly from his restriction of labour to instrumental reason and his consequent identification of interaction with communication. As all materiality is located within labour, interaction can have only ideal elements. Existing power has the form of ideology, for this is the fashion of placing distortions within given patterns of interaction. Critical theory removes these distortions, with the goal of making the dialogical character of interaction real in the ideal speech situation, actualising dialogue by generalising communicative competence. I have tried to briefly show that the foundation of this representation of labour, interaction and therefore of critical theory involves some radical ontological mistakes. However, of more importance to the contemporary problems of critique are the historical difficulties into which Habermas'
conceptions now run as a consequence of those ontological mistakes.

Habermas' criticisms of Marx's idea of labour allege that that idea involves certain ontological confusions. Now, as I have tried to say in this entire work, Marx's views on historical explanation necessarily must, and derive strength from the way they actually do, express a certain ontology. But the project of a systematic ontology always remained on the boundaries of Marx's thought, and the way in which he employs the concept of labour stems from specific historiographical preoccupations. The wide sense Marx gives to labour - or, to render this more in Marx's vernacular, to production - emerges because he makes an explanatory claim in his guiding thread about the place of material life in the social determinations of pre-history. Though Habermas is sure that it is a mistake for Marx to treat labour as embracing all the ontological elements of human self-formation (22), he makes virtually nothing of the peculiarly historical themes in Marx's writings, which of course make an other than a directly ontological understanding of Marx's efforts possible. Habermas is, of course, aware of the materialist thrust of Marx's forms of explanation, but I suggest that he is not sufficiently sensitive to why Marx felt he had to adopt this form. That Habermas tries to add a moral element on historical materialism would seem to testify to his
holding the idea that Marx tended to restrict his explanations to a specific social domain. In one sense this is right, but this is not a matter of ontological principle. Rather Marx felt he had to address the social totality in a specifically materialist specific fashion for explanatory reasons, and Habermas does not really come to terms with why.

This means that Habermas fails to incorporate some of the central strengths to be found in Marx in his critical theory. Marx centrally rejects the treatment of ideological problems at only the level of consciousness, but Habermas overall must be thought to do so, or rather to treat of them as of discourse theory. Two things must be said.

One of these is that psycho-analysis is in an important respect inappropriate for contemporary social critical theory. Leaving aside Freud's work on neuropathology, the obstacles to the analysand's self-comprehension are subjective in a sense in which the social facticity of ideology is not, and analyst and analysand are united in the project of therapy in a way that classes are not over the project of emancipation. Habermas has indeed subsequently acknowledged that a greater acknowledgement of entrenched interests (in the more common usage) should have been part of his psycho-analytic model (23), but he does not seem to thereby recognise how profoundly at
cross-purposes the psycho-analytic presumption of an interest in consensus is with the social contradictions which presently beset efforts at emancipation.

The second thing which I would like to say follows on from my observations about the psycho-analytic model, but is perhaps best made in the context of some comments on universal pragmatics. The assumption of essentially united interests in any instance of therapy is generalised in universal pragmatics, and it is, I would say, the very universality of Habermas' specifications of the conditions of ideal speech that is a serious weakness in the critical theory that he erects on this basis. For this universality appeals in fact to a community of all humanity - it is in their interest that generalised communicative competence be realised. This is, in the Hegelian sense, the most real of interests, but it leaves the problem of the connection of this interest to empirical interests in the given world, a connection which is surely necessary if Habermas' work is to have progressive social effect.

Habermas sees critique as being bound up in the, as it were, measurement of ideology in society which can be provided by assessing how far the conditions of ideal speech are absent in that society. Ideology critique is effected by advocacy of the erection of those conditions. Habermas is not here immediately presuming the concrete
existence of an interest in general communicative competence in all societies. He recognises that the potential level of universality in specific societies is bounded by a particular historical context. But he argues that whatever that level is, it can provide critical ammunition against any given conditions (24).

These ideas of Habermas may be thought to constitute a scheme of progressive critique rather after the pattern of determinate negation sought after by Hegel, but in fact it is something rather like the opposite of this. Habermas does not generate critique from given patterns of social conflict, which he may by all means then go on to show as positing the enlargement and ultimate universalisation of communicative competence. Rather he specifies the conditions of that competence and then reconstructs the past with the counterfactual assumption of the existence of those conditions serving as a standard by which to judge the given. The distance between the actual conditions and the ideal speech situation is Habermas' creation, not the actors'.

Let me be precise about why I feel this is not the same as the theme of progression sought after by Hegel. Habermas is quite correct to say that genuine consensus is implicitly the true goal of all communication (25). Consensus is the reality of all dialogue in Hegel's terms. But Hegel seeks to generate the potentials for
universality from the given; Habermas does just the opposite. The counterfactuality of ideal speech is purely retrospective, and who the actual audience for the advocacy role could be remains, in my opinion, irremediably obscure, as does what such an audience would do were they able to listen to Habermas.

This point is the key, I think, to the many rather mundane empirical criticisms of Habermas' work that have continuously been made, which all merge into an allegation that he generalises to too great a degree in the face of inadequate study of the actual conditions which the generalisations are, presumably, to illuminate. I am wary of substantiating these criticisms to any degree at all, because they undoubtedly in large part turn of falling beneath the level at which Habermas pitches his work. But a point of importance does seem to remain, and it is that Habermas' project does seem to actively encourage disregard for concrete circumstances and their detailed comprehension. Perhaps the force of the argument here is best illustrated by noting that even when we allow Habermas' generalisations, such as the typology of crises in Legitimation Crisis, it still remains difficult to see how their explanatory force can be put to use.

These remarks lead, I think, to another common, and often vulgar, criticism of Habermas, one made by marxists who
allege that Habermas' work disregards class struggle. Habermas' personal politics have become increasingly quietist, that this may be thought irresponsible. I doubt whether personal inclination as such plays a major role in the determination of Habermas' politics; rather the gulf between his thought, which aspires to universality, and the brute reactions which presently face western socialism atrophies interest in political tactics, if not strategy. This is, let me make it clear, a criticism; but one that can hardly be pressed too far.

The central theme of Habermas' work is, I would say, that he presumes social universality, and any legitimate criticism of his work as a whole can turn, I would say, only upon disputing whether or not this is a legitimate presumption. The overall plausibility of strictly separating labour and interaction surely relates to the potential domination of objective tasks of work that is within the grasp of humanity, and a consequent ability to theoretically treat all important social issues in terms of communicative interaction. By contrast, though Marx's work points to this position in human development, his concerns are, quite understandably, with the final settling of material issues as the basis for further human development. It is to come to terms with an alienation which he ultimately locates in material life that Marx makes production central to his guiding thread. Criticism of Habermas arises because he pays only
marginal attention to these issues which are crucial to Marx. This may seem like a retraction of just those advances which Marx makes against Hegel, but the social terms of reference which determine the ultimate defensibility of these fundamental stances have, of course, changed since the early nineteenth century. My opinion is that Habermas' stress on interaction is socially premature, and for this reason I both make the criticisms which I have in this appendix and think it necessary to return to Hegel and Marx rather than undertake reconstruction in Habermas' sense. But for self-professed marxists to deprecate Habermas' work is self-defeating to a peculiar degree, for that work is the social theory of the future envisaged by Marx. However, Habermas obviously knows that issues of alienation are by no means redundant, and still continues to face them. His work is, in my opinion, inadequate to this sort of critique, for that work is fit only for critique when all humanity as a whole faces its tasks. Habermas shows us our future, but though his projections are organically linked to the present through being developments of central marxist themes, those projections avoid confronting the present obstacles to their realisation. Ironically, Habermas recognises this problem as it besets Hegel's claims about the rationality of his world, and sees the necessity of Marx's attitude to Hegel (26). The conclusion is inescapable, however, that Habermas' historical imagination suffers from the defects, as well benefits from the strengths, of an attitude to the world somewhat like Hegel's.
NOTES
Abbreviations

Full references are given in these notes, but textual apparatuses of abbreviation are used. These apparatuses include the following abbreviations, which are also mentioned as they arise in the notes:

AD Engels, **Anti-Duhring**

BP Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, Baillie edition

C Marx, 'The Commodity'

C1 Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, published by Penguin


C3, Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, published by Penguin

CHPL Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law'

CHPLI Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law - Introduction'

CJM Marx, 'Comments on James Mill'

CDGP Marx, 'Marginal Notes on the Programme of the German Workers' Party'

CPE Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*

CW Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*

DBFS Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*

DPOP Hegel, *Disseratio Philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum*

EBLB Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte',

EN Marx, *Ethnological Notebooks*

EPM Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts'
FIA Marx, The First International and After
FK Hegel, Faith and Knowledge
G Marx, Grundrisse
GI Marx and Engels, 'The German Ideology'
GW Hegel, Gesammelte Werke
HF Marx and Engels, 'The Holy Family'
I1857 Marx, 'Introduction (81857) to the Grundrisse'
IAFI Marx, 'Inaugural Address of the International Working Men's Association'
L Hegel, Logic
LF Engels, 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'
LHP3 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3
LPEG Hegel, 'Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God'
LPH Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History
MEW Marx and Engels, Werke
MCP Marx and Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party'
NW Marx, 'Notes (1879-80) on Adolph Wagner'
P1859 Marx, 'Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'
PG Hegel, 'Phanomenologie des Geistes'
PM Hegel, Philosophy of Mind
PN Hegel, Philosophy of Nature
PP Marx, 'The Poverty of Philosophy'
PR Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right
PS Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Miller edition
RIPP Marx, 'Results of the Intermediate Process of Production'
SC Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence
SL Hegel, Science of Logic
SW Marx and Engels, Selected Works in One Volume

TF Marx, 'These on Feuerbach'

TSV1 Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, pt. 1

TSV2 Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, pt. 2

TSV3 Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, pt. 3

VF Marx, 'The Value-form'

W Marx, 'Wages'

WLC Marx, 'Wage-labour and Capital'

WPP Marx, 'Wages, Price and Profit'

Detailed references

All references are given in full in the bibliography

Note on German texts

Whenever possible, existing English translations of German texts have been used. However, I have not bound myself to the letter of these translations, and have in cases of difficulty referred to the German of MEW, GS and the Glockner Sämtliche Werke. My alterations of what appear to be minor infelicities have not been individually noted. More directly important references to the German are mentioned in the text.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I


This is most true in respect of the ideas on structure and determination which Althusser intimately binds to his essential criticism of Hegel (vide A. Giddens, 'Contradiction, Power, Historical Materialism', in idem., Central Problems in Social Theory, London, Macmillan, 1979, pp. 155-60; and G. McLennan et al., 'Althusser's Theory of Ideology', in Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, On Ideology, London, Hutchinson, 1978, pp. 77-105).


Vide D. H. Ruben, 'Materialism and Professor Colletti', Critique, no. 4, 1979, pp. 70-1; and idem., Marxism and Materialism, Sussex, Harvester Press, 1979, pp. 147-54.

Colletti, 'Bernstein and the Marxism of the Second International', in idem., From Rousseau to Lenin, op.
cit., pp. 72-6 and *idem.*, 'Marxism: Science or Revolution?', in *idem.*, *From Rousseau to Lenin*, op. cit., pp. 229-36.


(43) Vide Appendix 1.


NOTES TO CHAPTER 2


(9) On this location of intuitionism such as that of Jacobi cf. LHP3, pp. 476-7, 505; L, pp. 15-6; and idem., *Philosophy of Right*, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 2, 4-5 (henceforward cited as PR).


(14) Ibid., bk. 2.

(15) Hegel's assessment of the value of Locke's particular form of this reduction, from complex ideas to simple ideas of primary qualities, is to be found in LHP3, pp. 304-8.


(17) Ibid., bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 1.

(18) For the development of these points explicitly against Kant cf. LHP3, pp. 428-9; and L, pp. 14-5. Hegel's treatment of the metaphor of an instrument is derived from B. de Spinoza, 'On the Improvement of the Understanding', in *idem.*, *Chief Works*, vol. 2, tr. R.H.M. Elwes, New York, Dover Publications, 1955, pp. 11-2; and his parable of the man who would not enter the water before he could swim from Hierocles, *Facetiae* (vide Wallace's note to L, p. 14).

(19) PS, sec. 83.


(21) On this aspect of Hegel's reading of the intentions of the critical philosophy cf. FK, pp. 68-9; LHP3, pp. 428-9; and L, sec. 40.


(25) FK, pp. 76-7; SL, pp. 120-2; and L, sec. 44.


(26) This project is most succinctly expressed in FK, pp. 53-191; PS, pp. 1-45; and idem., 'Hegel's Foreword to H. Fr. W. Hinrich's Die Religion im inneren Verhaltnisse zur Wissenschaft', tr. Miller, in Weiss, ed., Beyond Epistemology, op. cit., pp. 227-44.

(29) This overall relation of art, religion and philosophy is set out in PS, chs. 7 and 8; and idem., Philosophy of Mind, tr. Wallace and Miller, forw. Findlay, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, secs. 553-77 (henceforward cited as PM).


NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

(1) In this chapter I will discuss PS, secs. 76-7, 88-9.

(2) Vide E. Caird, Hegel, Edinburgh, William Blackwood, 1883, ch. 3.

(3) Cf. PR, pp. 2-3.

(4) Cf. PS, p. 15.

(5) Cf. DBFS; and LHP3, pt. 3, sec. 3, sub-sec. D.


(8) Ibid., pt. 1.

(9) Ibid., pt. 3.

(10) Ibid., pt. 6, sec. 3.


(12) Cf. PS, pp. 4, 489-90; LHP3, pp. 522-5, 550; and L, sec. 229 Zusatz.


(14) Hegel knew Rousseau well, and some aspects of the account of the ideal pedagogical relationship in J.-J. Rousseau, Emile, tr. B. Foxley, London, J.M. Dent and Sons, 1911, e.g. p. 19 undoubtedly influenced his thinking on these points.


(19) LHP3, p. 520.


(27) PS, sec. 81.

(28) Vide Appendix l.


(31) Vide K. Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, tr. D.E.


(33) E.g. S.A. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, tr. D.F. Swenson and W. Lowrie, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1941. Kierkegaard's caricature of Hegel's personality has been successfully exposed by such as Kaufmann (Kaufmann, Hegel, pp. cit. pp. 288-90), and Kaufmann has indeed pressed this on to drawing a comparison between Kierkegaard's and Hegel's "anti-theological", as Kaufmann puts it, writings (idem., 'The Young Hegel and Religion', in A. MacIntyre, Ed., Hegel, London, University of Notre Dame Press, 1976, sec. 5). The results of this argument are somewhat ambivalent for Hegel's stature. For if Hegel's personal attitudes are displayed to advantage against Kierkegaard's criticisms, this is at the cost of confirming Kierkegaard's attack upon the whole thrust of the mature Hegel's philosophy. For what is the ground of Hegel's early attitudes? It is a ground certainly closer to Kierkegaard's religion rather than to Hegel's purported reason.

(34) PS, p. 14.


(38) L, sec. 237 Zusatz.

(39) PS, p. 10.

(40) Ibid., p. 103.

(41) PM, sec. 381.


(43) SL, p. 824.


(46) LHP3, pp. 280, 281.


(51) FK, p. 85.


(53) Vide Taylor, Hegel, op. cit., p. 127.

(54) Vide, Mueller, 'The Interdependence of the Phenomenology, Logic and Encyclopaedia', op. cit., p. 23.


(57) Vide Kaufmann, Hegel, op. cit., p. 148.

(58) Vide ibid., p. 413.


(61) Id.; and idem., 'Kant to Herz, 21 February, 1772', in idem., Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, op. cit., p. 71.
(62) _Idem._, 'Kant to Lambert, 2 September 1770', _op. cit._, pp. 59-60.


(65) Cf. _PS_, pp. 3, 22.

(66) I.e. the _Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences in Outline_, in _L_; _PN_; and _PM_.

(67) _Vide Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit', op. cit._, pp. 5-7, 53-5.

(68) Cf. _P.S._ p. 22.


(71) _Vide Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience, op. cit._, _passim._

(72) _Vide Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit', op. cit._, pp. 24-5.

(73) _Vide Appendix 3_.


(75) _PS_, pp. 485-6; and _PM_, p. 302.

(76) _Vide Kaufman, Hegel, op. cit._, pp. 198-75.

(77) _Vide ibid._, pp. 150-2.

(78) _Vide Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit', op. cit._, pp. 3-4.


(80) _Vide Lukács, The Young Hegel, op. cit._, p. 472.

(81) _Vide Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, op. cit._, p. 147.

(83) E.g. Hegel, 'Hegel to Schelling, 1 May, 1807', p. 319.


(85) SL, pp. 106-8.


(90) Heidegger, *Hegel's Concept of Experience*, op. cit., p. 44.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

(1) In this chapter I will discuss PS, secs. 78-9.

(2) Cf. LHP3, p. 223; and L, sec. 84.


(4) Descartes, 'Discourse on the Method, etc.', op. cit., p. 95.

(5) In LHP3, pp. 233-40 Hegel criticises, for example, Descartes' establishment of the existence of God (in e.g. 'Discourse on the Method etc.', op. cit., pt. 4) as resting upon a presumption of the idea of complete perfection and the inability of this idea to involve deception which simply should not survive Cartesian doubt.


(7) Hegel notes this in L, sec. 40.

(8) Vide Appendix 4.


(10) Hegel's comments upon Hume in this regard are to be found in LHP3, pp. 370-4.


(12) Vide Appendix 5.

(13) Vide Appendix 6.


(15) SL, p. 536.


(18) Idem., Spinoza to Meyer, 20 April, 1663', in idem.,
The Correspondence of Spinoza, op. cit., pp. 115-22.

(19) LHP3, pp. 257, 283.


(21) PS, pp. 24-7; LHP3, pp. 282-7; SL, p. 537; and L, p. 286.

(22) PS, sec. A.


(24) LHP3, p. 286; and SL, p. 538.


(28) PN, sec. 250 remark n. This note was added to the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of 1827.

(29) Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, op. cit., p. 74.

(30) W.T. Krug, Briefe über den Neusten Idealism, Leipzig, Muller, 1807, pp. 72-3.


(33) PS, pp. 24-7; and SL, pp. 27-8, 43-59.

(34) Vide Kaufmann, Hegel, op. cit., sec. 17.


(36) Vide Kaufmann, Hegel, op. cit., sec. 15.

(37) DPOP, p. 117.

(38) PN, sec. 246.
(39) Ibid., secs. 247-50.
(40) PM, sec. 381.
(41) SL, p. 29.
(42) Ibid., pp. 43-59.
(43) Vide Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, op. cit., p. 213.
(44) SL, pp. 541-3; and L, pp. 200-13.
(45) PR, pp. 216-23; and LPH, pp. 8-79.
(47) PS, pp. 217-21.
(48) PR, pp. 10-2.
(49) PS, p. 11.
(50) SL, p. 840; and LPH, p. 78.
(51) Vide Appendix 7.
(52) LHP3, p. 547; and PR, p. 11.
(53) Vide Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, op. cit., p. 147.
(54) PS, p. 426.
(55) LHP, pp. 86-7.
(56) Vide Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, op. cit., p. 158.
(58) Vide Mure, 'Hegel: How, and How Far, is Philosophy Possible?', op. cit., p. 22.
(59) Vide Kaufmann Hegel, op. cit., pp. 280-1.
(60) LHP3, pp. 552-3; and L, sec. 13.
(62) Vide A.R. Caponigri, 'The Pilgrimage of Truth

(63) LHP1, p. 18.

(64) Vide Kaufmann, Hegel, op. cit., pp. 278-80.

(65) Pace Caponigri, 'The Pilgrimage of Truth through Time', op. cit., p. 2.

(66) Vide Appendix §.


NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

(1) In this chapter I will discuss PS, secs. 81-4.

(2) Ibid., p. 49.

(3) Vide Marx, Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit', op. cit., pp. 2-3.


(7) Ibid., pp. 11-5.


(9) Vide Appendix 9.

(10) Descartes, 'Meditations etc.', in idem., Philosophical Works, vol. 1, op. cit., no. 8; and cf. the attack upon this as "rational psychology" in Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., pp. A341-405, B399-432.


(13) PS, p. 51.


(15) Cf. the first movement in the Logic, the running together of pure Being and determinate Being. SL, pp. 82-108; and L, secs. 86-8.

(16) Vide Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, op. cit., ch. 2, sec. 3.


(18) Fichte, Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 100.

(19) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 113.
(20) L, sec. 42.
(22) DBFS, pp. 79-82.
(23) Vide Taylor, 'The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology', in MacIntyre, ed., Hegel, op. cit., ch. 6.
(24) PM, secs. 418-23.
(25) Vide Taylor, 'The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology', op. cit.
(26) Vide Ruben, Marxism and Materialism, op. cit., pp. 38-49.
(27) On the way in which the data of empirical knowing are, from the very outset of chapter one of the Phenomenology, understood quite rationalistically, as entirely exhausted by knowledge of phenomena and therefore open to eventual reduction to subjectivity, vide Della Volpe, Logic as a Positive Science, op. cit., pp. 41-9.
(28) FK, p. 67; LHP3, p. 66; and LPEG, p. 353.
(29) SL, p. 708.
(32) FK, p. 85.
(33) SL, pp. 86-90, 705-8; L, sec. 51; and LPEG, pp. 354-9.
(35) L, p. 259; and LPEG, pp. 383-4.
(37) Hegel points this out in his criticisms of Kantian morality in LHP3, pp. 457-64; PS, pp. 364-409; PM, secs. 507-12; and PR, pp. 86-104.
(39) Ibid., p. 5.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

(1) In this chapter I will discuss PS, secs. 85-6, 80.

(2) Vide Appendix 10.


(4) N.b. AD, pp. 15-82.

(5) LHP3, pp. 439, 477-8; PS, p. 29; SL, p. 837; and L, p. 117.


(9) L, p. 77.

(10) Id.


(12) L, sec. 48.

(13) SL, pp. 190-9, 234-8.


(15) N.b. ibid., pp. 105-19.


(17) DBFS, pp. 119-73 passim.

(18) Ibid., pp. 155-60.

(19) PS, pp. 29-31.

(20) Vide Kaufmann, Hegel, op. cit., sec. 37.


(24) Pace e.g. McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, op. cit., sec. 213.

(25) SL, p. 664; and L, sec. 181.

(26) SL, pp. 82-116; and L, secs. 86-9.


(35) Pace Kaufmann, Hegel, op. cit., pp. 262-3. When faced with objections to the idea of the ruse of Reason, Kaufmann's tack is to reduce it to a very general idea of "unintended consequences". This removes what is objectionable about the ruse of Reason, but does so by removing much of what is characteristically Hegelian about it. The ruse of Reason, Kaufmann seems to be saying, is defensible because it involves no more than a wide idea of "unintended consequences" now in general sociological use. One might as well defend a specific natural scientific account of the trajectory of a moving object by saying that the account involves no more than a reference to "motion". Kaufmann's purported defence of Hegel's ideas empties these of all specific content to the extent that the notion of unintended consequences which he claims Hegel is using does not even clearly demarcate between those consequences which turn upon the existence of alienated circumstances and those which do not.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

(1) In this chapter I will discuss PS, secs. 87-9.

(2) Hegel, "Phanomenologie des Geistes", ed. W. Bonspien and R. Heede, in GW, vol. 9, 1980, p. 61 (henceforward cited as PG). Cf. PS, p. 55. Of course, I by no means insist upon the translation of "Umkehrung" as "inversion" as any number of synonyms would do equally as well. But it is more the idea than its precise vocabularic expression with which we are concerned, and the use of inversion to convey this does not, I believe, at all stretch Hegel's meaning. In this I find support from Dove who uses "inversion" here (Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience, op. cit., p. 122). Inversion has also been used in rendering Hegel's parallel discussion of this point, when he is critical of Schelling, in the 'Preface': PG, p. 23; PS, p. 15. Cf. BP, p. 88; and Kaufmann, Hegel, op. cit., pp. 398, 400 (though Kaufmann calls attention to the links with Marx here).


(4) PS, pp. 3, 43; and L, pp. 7-8.

(5) Vide Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, op. cit., p. 94.


NOTES TO CHAPTER 8


(5) N.b. EPM, pp. 273-7; and GI, pp. 31-2, 41-5.

(6) C1, pp. 133:
Labour... as the creator of use-values, as useful labour, is a condition of human existence which is independent of all forms of society; it is an eternal natural necessity which mediates the metabolism between man and nature, and therefore human life itself.
Cf. GI, pp. 41-2.

(7) C1, p. 125:
The commodity is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind.

(8) EPM, p. 276:
That man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.

(9) Ibid., p. 336:
... the objects of (man's) instincts exist outside him, as objects independent of him; yet these are objects that he needs ...

(10) Ibid., p. 276:
Nature is man's inorganic body - nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself human body. Man lives on nature - means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die.

(11) C1, p. 126:
...usefulness does not dangle in mid-air. It is conditioned by the physical properties of the commodity and has not existence apart from the latter. It is therefore the physical body of the commodity itself, for instance, iron, corn, a diamond, which is the use-value or useful thing.

(12) HF, p. 46:
Man has not created...matter itself. And he cannot even create any productive capacity if the matter does not exist beforehand.

(13) Cl, p. 125:
Every useful thing is a whole composed of many properties; it can therefore be used in various ways. The discovery of these ways and hence of the manifold uses of things is the work of history.

(14) Cl, pp. 133-4:
Use-values like coats, linen, etc., in short, the physical bodies of commodities, are combinations of two elements, the material provided by nature, and labour...When man engages in production, he can proceed only as nature does herself, i.e. he can only change the form of the materials.

(15) Ibid., p. 283:
Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his own body...in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs.


(18) Cl, pp. 283-4:
We presuppose labour in a form in which it is an exclusively human characteristic...a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycombs cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of the labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence
already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of form on the materials of nature, he also realises his own purpose in those materials.

Cf. EPM, pp. 275-7; and GL, p. 31.


(20) EPM, p. 276:
The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity... Only because of this is his activity free activity.
Cf. GI, p. 44.

(21) EPM, p. 337:
... man is not merely a natural being: he is a human natural being. That is to say, he is a being for himself... And as everything natural has to come into being, man too has his act of origin - history - which, however, is for him a known history, and hence as an act of origin it is a conscious, self-transcending act of origin.

(22) G, p. 489:
It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic conditions of their metabolic interchange with nature, and hence their appropriation of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a historic process, but rather the separation between these inorganic conditions of human existence and this active existence...


(24) Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach' no. 1 (henceforward cited as TF1, TF2, etc.), in CW, vol. 5, p. 4: The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things, reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively.
Cf. HF, pp. 124-34; GI, pp. 38-41; and LF, p. 597.


(26) Marx, 'The Poverty of Philosophy', in CW, vol. 6,
The same men who establish their social relations in conformity with their material productivity, produce also principles, ideas, and categories in conformity with their social relations. Thus these ideas, these categories, are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products. There is a continual movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction of social relations, of formation in ideas. The only immutable thing is the abstraction of movement - mors immortalis.

(27) I1857, p. 82.


(29) Idem., 'Notes (1879-80) on Adolph Wagner', (henceforward cited as NW): in idem., Texts on Method, op. cit., p. 201:

...my analytic method...does not start out from man, but from the economically given social period...


(31) GI, p. 37:

Where speculation ends, where real life starts, there consequently begins real, positive science, the expounding of the practical activity of the practical process of the development of man. Empty phrases about consciousness end, and real knowledge has to take their place. When the reality is described, a self-sufficient philosophy loses its medium of existence. At the best such a philosophy's place can be taken by only a summing up of the most general results, abstractions which are derived from the observation of the historical development of man. These abstractions in themselves, divorced from real history, have no value whatsoever. They can serve only to facilitate the arrangement of the historical materials, to indicate the sequence of its separate strata. But they by no means afford a recipe or schema, as does philosophy, for neatly trimming the epochs of history.

(32) I1857, p. 50:

...it might seem that in order to speak generally about production we must either trace the historical process of development in its various phases, or declare at the outset that we are dealing with a definite historical epoch...


Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please. They do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.

Cf. GI, p. 54.


Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of labour and means of subsistence of all kinds, which are utilised in order to produce... So say the economists. What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the other. A Negro is a Negro. He becomes a slave only in certain conditions. A cotton-jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It becomes capital only in certain conditions... In production men enter into relation not only with nature. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social relations does their relation with nature, does production, take place.

(39) EPM, p. 299:

...we must avoid postulating "society"... as an abstraction vis-a-vis the individual. The individual is the social being. His manifestations of life - even if they may not appear in the direct form of communal life carried out in association with others - are therefore an expression and confirmation of social life.
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations which are independent of their will...

Cf. GI, pp. 31-2, 35-7, 41-5, 50, 53-4; PP, pp. 165-6; and WLC, p. 212.

...society itself, i.e. the human being itself in its social relations.

Society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand... To be a slave, to be a citizen, are social characteristics, relations between human beings A and B. Human being A, as such, is not a slave. He is a slave in and through society.


According to Weston) If in one country the rate of wages is higher than in another, in the United States, for example, than in England, you must explain this difference in the rate of wages by a difference between the will of the American capitalist and the will of the English capitalist, a method which would certainly very much simplify not only the study of economic phenomena but of all other phenomena. But, even then, we might ask why the will of the American capitalist differs from the will of the English capitalist? And to answer this question we must go beyond the domain of the will...The will of the capitalist is certainly to take as much as possible. What we have to do is not to talk about his will, but to inquire into his power, the limits of that power, and the character of those limits.

...each stage (of history) contains a material result, a sum of productive forces, a historically created relation to nature and of individuals to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and circumstances, which on the one hand is indeed modified by the new generation, but on the other also prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows that circumstances make men as much as men make circumstances.
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here it is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven. That is to say, not of setting out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but setting out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life processes demonstrating the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of these life-processes.

Vide Timpanaro, On Materialism, op. cit., chs. 1 and 2.

The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot go here into either the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which many finds himself - geological, oro-hydrographical and so on. All historical writing must set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men.


C1, p. 283:

(the human being) acts upon external nature and
changes it, and in this way he simultaneously
changes his own nature.

(55) **EPM**, p. 303:
History itself is a real part of natural history -
of nature developing into man. Natural science will
in time incorporate into itself the science of man,
just as the science of man will incorporate into
itself natural science: there will be one science.

(56) *Vide* Lefebvre, *The Sociology of Marx*, tr. N.

(57) **GI**, p. 41:
As far as Feuerbach is a materialist he does not
deal with history, and as far as he considers
history he is not a materialist. With him,
materialism and history diverge completely...

(58) **P1859**, p. 181:
It is not the consciousness of men that determines
their being, but in the contrary their social being
that determines their consciousness.

cit., p. 27; and *idem.*, *Marx's Basic Ontological

(60) *Marx, Theories of Surplus Value*, pt. 1, tr. E.
Burns, ed. Ryazanskaya, London, Lawrence and Wishart,
1963, p. 288 (henceforward cited as TSV1):
Man himself is the basis of material production, as
of any other production that he carries on. All
circumstances, therefore, which affect man, the
subject of production, more or less modify all his
functions and activities, and therefore too his
functions and activities as the creator of material
wealth... In this respect, it can in fact be shown
that all human relations and functions, however and
in whatever form they appear, influence material
production...


(62) **P1859**, p. 181:
My investigation led to the result that legal
relations as well as forms of state are to be
grasped neither from themselves nor from the
so-called general development of the human mind, but
rather have their roots in the material conditions
of life...

(63) *Vide* e.g. Parker's introduction to M. Stirner, *The
Ego and Its Own*, tr. S. Byington, intr. S.E. Parker,

(65) GI, p. 43:
The production of life...appears as a twofold relation: on the one hand as a natural and on the other as a social relation - social in the sense that it denotes the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage...

(66) WLC, p. 211:
These social relations into which the producers enter with one another, the conditions under which they exchange their activities and participate in the whole act of production, will naturally vary according to the character of the means of production.
Cf. PP. 166.

(67) I1857, p. 71:
...production in its one-sided form is also determined for its part by other moments. For example, if the market, i.e. the sphere of exchange, expands, then production grows in extent and is more thoroughly compartmentalised. Production varies with variations in distribution; for example with the concentration of capital, with a different distribution of population between town and country, etc.


(69) P1859, pp. 181-2:
At a certain stage in their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production...From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution.
Cf. GI, pp. 74, 81-3; Marx, 'Marx to Annenkow, 28 December, 1846', tr. P. and B. Ross, in CW, vol. 38, 1982, pp. 96-7; and MCP, p. 489.

(70) I1857, p. 83:
Dialectic of the concept of productive force (means of production) and relations of production ...

575


(74) C1, p. 287:

...the instruments and the object of labour are... means of production...

(75) G, p. 706:

Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, no railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc. These are the products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified.

(76) C1, p. 287:

Although a use-value emerges from the labour-process in the form of a product, other use-values, products of previous labour, enter into it as means of production...Products are therefore not only the results of labour, but also its essential conditions.

(77) Ibid., p. 285:

The worker makes use of the mechanical, physical and chemical properties of some substances in order to set them to work on other substances as instruments of his power, and in accordance with his purposes.


(81) GI, pp. 82:

...in the whole development of history (there is) a coherent series of forms of intercourse, the coherence of which consists in this: an earlier form of intercourse, which has become a fetter, is replaced by a new one corresponding to the more developed productive forces...a form which, in its turn becomes a fetter and is thus replaced by
another. Since these conditions correspond at every stage to the simultaneous development of the productive forces, their history is at the same time the history of the evolving productive forces taken over by each new generation, and is therefore the history of the development of the forces of the individuals themselves.

(82) Id.: The conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each other, so long as this contradiction (between forces and relations of production when the latter are a fetter) is absent, are conditions appertaining to their individuality, in no way external to them; conditions under which alone these definite individuals, living under definite relations, can produce their material life and what is connected with it, are thus the conditions of their self-activity and are produced by this self-activity. The definite condition under which they produce thus corresponds, as long as the contradiction has not yet appeared, to the reality of their conditioned nature, their one-sided existence, the one-sidedness of which becomes evident only when the contradiction enters on the scene...


(84) E.g. Brewster's glossary to Althusser and Balibar, Reading 'Capital', op. cit., p. 317.


(86) Vide Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, op. cit., vol. 1. p.

(87) Vide K. Federn, The Materialist Conception of History.


(90) P1859, p. 183.


(93) Vide Williams, Marxism and Literature, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 75-82.


(95) Pace e.g. Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', op. cit., pp. 129-31.

(96) P1859, p. 181:
At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production... From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.


(98) C3, pp. 927-8:
The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, as this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on it as a determinant. On this is based the entire configuration of the economic community arising from the actual relations of production, and hence also its specific political form. It is in each case the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers - a relationship whose particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of the development of the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social productive power - in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence also the political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the specific form of the state in each case. This does not prevent the same economic basis - the same in its major conditions - from displaying endless variations and gradations in its appearance, as the result of innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural conditions, racial relations,
historical influences acting from outside, etc., and these can only be understood by analysing the empirically given conditions.

(99) MCP, p. 482.

(100) His manuscript pieces are given in EN.


(102) EPM, p. 320.

(103) Vide Plamenatz, Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man, op. cit., ch. 6.

(104) EN; OF; and AD, pp. 222-6, 242-4, 248-53.


(106) EPM, p. 321: Precisely in the fact that division of labour and exchange are aspects of private property lies the...proof...that human life required private property for its realisation...

(107) Ibid., pp. 270-83.

(108) GI, pp. 44-5.

(109) Ibid., p. 46: Division of labour and private and property are, after all, identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with respect to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of activity.

(110) EPM, pp. 279-80: though private property appears to be the reason, the cause of alienated labour, it is rather its consequence...Later this relationship becomes reciprocal.


(113) MCP, p. 482: Freeman and slave, patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant
opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society as a whole or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

(114)

(115) GI, p. 47:
... as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity which is forced upon him and which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood. By contrast, in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind...

(116) C3, pp. 958-9:
The realm of freedom really begins only where labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature just beyond the sphere of material production proper. Just as the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his needs, to maintain and reproduce his life, so must civilised man, and he must do so in all forms of society and under all possible modes of production. This realm of natural necessity expands with his development, because his needs do too; but the productive forces to satisfy these expand at the same time. Freedom, in this sphere, can consist only in this, that socialised man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate and their human nature. But this always remains a realm of necessity. The true realm of freedom, of the development of human powers as an end in itself, begins beyond it, though it can only flourish with his realm of necessity as its basis. The reduction of the working day is the basic pre-requisite.

(117) G, p. 611:
(Smith)... is right, of course, that in its historic forms of slave-labour, serf-labour and wage-labour, labour always appears as repulsive, always as external forced labour, and not-labour,
by contrast, as "freedom and happiness". This holds...for labour which has not yet created the...conditions for itself...in which labour becomes attractive work, the individual's serf-realisation. This in no way means that it becomes mere fun, mere amusement, as Fourier with the naivete of a shop-girl, puts it. Really free work, e.g. composing, is at the same time the most damned seriousness and the most intense exertion.

(118) CHPL, p. 29: Democracy is the solved riddle of all constitutions. Here, not merely implicitly and in essence but existing in reality, the constitution is constantly brought back to its actual basis, the actual human being, the actual people, and established as the people's own work. The constitution appears to be what it is, a free product of man.

(119) Marx and Engels, 'The Alleged Splits in the International', tr. R. Sheed, in Marx, The First International and After, ed. Fernbach, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1974, p. 314 (henceforward cited as FIA): To all socialists anarchy means this: the aims of the proletarian movement - that is to say the abolition of social classes - once achieved, the power of the state, which now serves only to keep the vast majority of producers under the yoke of a small minority of exploiters, will vanish, and the functions of government will become purely administrative.

Cf. MCP, 516.

(120) Marx, 'First Draft of The Civil War in France', in FIA p. 250: The Commune : the reabsorption of the state power of society as its own living forces instead of as forces controlling and subduing it, by the popular masses themselves, forming their own force instead of the organised force of their suppression - the political form of their social emancipation, instead of the artificial force (appropriate by their oppressors) (their own force opposed to and organised against them) of society wielded for their oppression by their enemies.

Cf. CHPL, pp. 30, 120-1.

(121) GI, pp. 36-7: Consciousness (das Bewusstsein) can never be anything else than conscious being (das bewusste Sein), and the being of men is their actual life process...It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness.

(122) P1859, p. 181:
The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.

(123) GI, p. 36: Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms.

(124) Vide Williams, Marxism and Literature, op. cit., ch. 4.

(125) E.g. I1857, pp. 84-7.


(128) GI, pp. 47-8: ...fixation of social activity...consolidation of what we ourselves produce into a material power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting out expectations, bringing to nought our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now.

(129) C3, p. 311: The finished configuration of economic relations, as these are visible on the surface, in their actual existence, and therefore also in the notions with which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to gain an understanding of them, is very different from the configuration of their inner core, which is essential but concealed...

(130) C3, p. 956: ...all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their essence...

(131) C1, p. 167: The belated scientific discovery that the products of labour, in so far as they have values, are merely the material expressions of the human labour expended to produce them, marks an epoch in the history of mankind's development, but by no means banishes the semblance of objectivity possessed by the social character characteristics of labour.
(132) Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law - Introduction', (henceforward cited as CHPLI), in CW, vol. 3, p. 182:
The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses.

(133) TF no. 4, p. 4:
Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-estrangement, of the duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. But that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself as an independent realm in the clouds can be explained only by the inner strife and inner contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must, therefore, itself both be understood in its contradiction and revolutionised in practice. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in practice.

(134) TF11, p. 5:
The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.

(135) CHPLI, p. 177:
(Left Hegelianism's) basic deficiency may be reduced to the following: It thought it could make philosophy a reality without superseding it.

(136) NW, p. 198:
...I do not divide value into use-value and exchange-value as antitheses into which the abstraction "value" splits, rather I divide the concrete social form of the labour-product; "commodity" is, on the one hand, use-value, and on the other hand value...

(137) C1, p. 174, n. 34:
(I distinguish scientific political economy from) the vulgar economists who only flounder around within the apparent framework of (economic) relations, ceaselessly ruminate on the materials long since provided by scientific political economy, and seek plausible explanations of the crudest phenomena for the domestic purposes of the bourgeoisie.

(138) 11857, pp. 78-9:
Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most diverse historical organisation of production.
The categories which express its relations and an insight into its arrangement, allow at the same time an insight into the arrangement of production and the relations of productions of all extinct forms of society... Thus bourgeois economy offers the key to (the economy of) antiquity. However, by no means (is this revealed) by the approach of economists who obliterate all historical differences and see in all forms of society the bourgeois forms. One can understand tribute, tithes, etc., if one is acquainted with ground rent. However, one must not identify them (with each other).

(139) G, p. 159:
... if we did not find concealed in society as it is the material conditions of production and the corresponding relations of exchange pre-requisite for a classless society, then all attempts to explode (bourgeois society) would be quixotic.

(140) GI, pp. 38-9, 49:
... for... the communist, it is a question of revolutionising the existing world, of practically coming to grips with and changing things found in existence... Communism is not for us a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality (will) have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the now existing premise.

(141) Vide Appendix 11.

(142) GI, p. 38
If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside-down as in a camera obscura ...

(143) C1, p. 680:
We may therefore understand the decisive importance of the transformation of the value and price of labour-power into the form of wages, or into the value and price of labour itself. All the notions of justice held by both the worker and the capitalist, all the mystifications of the capitalist mode of production, all capitalism's illusions about freedom... have as their basis the form of appearance discussed above, which makes the actual relation invisible, and indeed presents to the eye the opposite of that relation.

(144) Ibid., p. 677:
In the expression "value of labour", the concept of value is not only completely extinguished, but inverted, so that it becomes it contrary. It is an expression as imaginary as the value of the earth.
These imaginary expression arise, nevertheless from the forms of production themselves. They are categories for the forms of appearance of essential relations. That in their appearance things are often presented in an inverted way is something fairly familiar in every science, apart from political economy.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9


(2) Vide Appendix 12.

(3) C1, p. 89. Cf. SL, p. 67.

(4) C1, p. 90.

(5) NW, pp. 198-9.

(6) CPE, p. 27; C, p. 7; and C1, p. 125.


(9) The procedure of beginning with the commodity in order to identify a specific capitalist mode of production was grasped perfectly clearly in the initial interpretation, and is set out at the very start of Kautsky's commentary (Kautsky, The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx, tr. H.J. Stenning, London, N.C.L.C. Publishing Society, 1936, pp. 2-3). He develops a line of inquiry which, as I have mentioned, was of importance to Engels and Marx by using comparative ethnographic materials to support the identification at issue (ibid., pp. 3-11). The most substantial development given at this time of this line of inquiry, an ethnography of earlier property forms which places in historical context bourgeois property, was that of Marx's son-in-law, Lafargue (P. Lafargue, 'The Evolution of Property', in idem., 'The Evolution of Property' and 'Social and Philosophical Studies', London, New Park, 1975, pp. 1-104).

(10) N. b. C1, p. 163.

(11) TSV3, p. 129.

(13) CPE, p. 28.
(14) C, p. 8; and C1, p. 126.
(15) CPE, p. 28; WPP, pp. 200-1; C, pp. 8-9; VF, p. 136; and C1, p. 127, 140-1.
(16) WPP, p. 201; C, p. 8; and C1, p. 127.
(17) VF, p. 139; and C1, pp. 148-9.
(18) C1, p. 141.
(19) TSV3, pp. 133-47.
(20) Ibid., pp. 110-7, 125-33.
(21) Ibid., pp. 111, 125, 144, 146.
(25) CPE, pp. 70-1; and C1, pp. 192-3. Cf. TSV3, p. 133.
(28) C1, p. 146, n. 21.
(29) N.b. Ricardo 'On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation', op. cit., p. 20 (the addition of "almost exclusively" in edn. 3).
(30) Bailey, Money and Its Vicissitudes in Value etc., op. cit., p. 165.
(31) C1, p. 177.
(33) TSV3, p. 143 and n.
(34) Idem., Theories of Surplus Value, pt. 2, ed.


(37) C1, ch. 2.

(38) E.g. G, pp. 192-3; and TSV3, p. 129.


(40) Vide Appendix 13.

(41) CPE, p. 288; WPP, p. 201; C, pp. 8-9; and C1, p. 127.

(42) G, p. 141; and C1, p. 139.

(43) G, p. 141.

(44) C, pp. 8-9; and C1, pp. 127-8.

(45) G, pp. 143-4; TSV3, pp. 128-9; WPP, p. 201; C, pp. 8; VF, pp. 134-6; and C1, pp. 127, 139-41.


(47) C1, p. 177.

(48) NW, pp. 196-9.

(49) CPE, pp. 28-9; C, p. 9; and C1, p. 128.

(50) WPP, p. 205; C, p. 11; and C1, p. 128.

(51) G, p. 205; and C1, p. 152.

(52) CPE, pp. 61-3.

(53) C, p. 11; and C1, p. 131.

(54) CPE, p. 63.

(55) G, pp. 760-1.

(56) E.g. C3, p. 760.


(59) G, pp. 156-9; 240-5; WPP, pp. 201-2; and C1, pp. 178-83.

(60) GI, pp. 32-3, 44-8, 59-60, 62-8, 72-3, 77-8; G, pp. 156-61, 240-5; TSV3, pp. 268-9; and C1, ch. 2.


(63) CPE, p. 59; and C1, pp. 166, 182.


(65) C2, p. 496 n. 8.


(67) Vide Appendix 14.

(68) CPE, pp. 30-8; WPP, pp. 203-4; C, pp. 13-6; and C1, pp. 129-37.

(69) Vide e.g. Acton, *The Illusion of the Epoch*, op. cit., p. 30.

(70) Marx, 'One the Division of Labour', tr. Dixon, in CW, vol. 16, p. 617; C, p. 12; and C1, p. 132.

(71) 1857, p. 75; G, p. 473; CPE, p. 60; C, p. 12; and C1, p. 132.

(72) C1, p. 204 and ch. 4.

(73) Ibid., ch. 14, sec. 5.

(74) Ibid., pp. 645-6; and RIPP, pp. 1019-38.


(76) C1, pp. 166-7.

(77) CPE, p. 30.


(79) Vide Kay, 'A Note on Abstract Labour', *Bulletin of


(83) Cf. EPM, pp. 270-82; with C1, pts. 3 and 4.

(84) Vide Appendix 14.

(85) C, pp. 21-5; VF, pp. 134-45; and C1, pp. 139-54.

(86) G, p. 204.

(87) Ibid., pp. 192-3, 204-5; CPE, p. 50; and C1, p. 182.


(89) G, pp. 156-9, 163-5.

(90) C, pp. 26-33; VF, pp. 146-8; and C1, pp. 157-61.

(91) VF, pp. 149-50; and C1, pp. 182-3.


(93) Ibid., pp. 166, 183-4, 288 n., 231, 237; CPE, p. 153-7; and C1, pp. 183-4.

(94) G, pp. 115-72.

(95) CPE, pp. 85-6.

(96) C1, p. 161, n. 26, 181 n. 4; and 188; n. 1.

(97) Ibid., pp. 195-6.


(99) Vide Dobb, Political Economy and Capitalism, op. cit., ch. 1.


(103) VF, pp. 1488-9; and C1, p. 162.

(104) C3, ch. 37.

(105) Ibid., pt. 6.

(106) This understanding of the value-form is basically made available in the initial interpretation (e.g. Kautsky, The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx, op. cit., pp. 22-30), and is thus a knowledge which has been available for around seventy-five years. However, it is only recently to my knowledge, that the working up of this into a detailed exposition of the value-form section of Capital has been put forward (C.J. Arthur, 'Dialectic of the Value-form', in Elson, ed., Value, op. cit., pp. 67-81; and Sayer, Marx's Method, op. cit., ch. 2).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10


(3) CPE, pp. 60-1, and TSV3, p. 55.

(4) PP, pp. 162, 174; and C1, pp. 173-5.

(5) Ibid., p. 169 n. 31.

(6) PP, pp. 120-5; CPE, p. 60; and C1, p. 173 n. 33.


(9) TSV 3, ch. 20.

(10) Cf. e.g. WLC, pp. 222-5; and C3, pt. 2; with Ricardo, 'On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation', op. cit., chs. 4 and 30.

(11) TSV2, ch. 10; and C3, p. 305 n.

(12) C1, pp. 169-70.

(13) CPE, pp. 62-61; and C1, p. 174 n. 34.


(16) EPM, pp. 284, 291-2, 310-1; and PP, p. 125.

(17) VF, pp. 141-2; and C1, pp. 151-2.


(23) G, p. 159.


(26) Ibid., pp. 105-6.


(29) TSV1, pp. 152-3; and RIPP, pp. 1038-49.

(30)

(31) TSV1, p. 287.


(33) RIPP, p. 1044.

(34) G, p. 305 n.


(38) G, pp. 779-80; and CPE, pp. 57-8. Cf. J. Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, etc., 2

(39) CPE, p. 30; C, pp. 11-3; and C1, pp. 131-8.


(42) Vide Appendix 15.

(43) Ricardo, 'On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation', op. cit., p. 11; and C1, p. 131.


(48) Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 47-51.

(49) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 65.

(50) Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 1.

(51) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 47.

(52) Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 65-7.

(53) Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 6.

(54) Ibid., p. 71.

(55) Ibid., bk. 1, chs. 6-11.


(60) Ibid., p. 67.
(61) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 66.
(64) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 66.
(65) Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 2.
(66) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 47.
(67) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 71.
(68) Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 1.
(69) Id.


(71) Ibid., pp. 12-3.
(72) Ibid., ch. 1, sec. 1.
(73) Ibid., ch. 1, sec. 3.
(74) Ibid., chs. 1-6.
(75) Ibid., ch. 20.

(77) Vide Appendix 16.
(78) E.g. Marshall, Principles of Economics, op. cit., appendix B.
(80) E.g. Ibid., p. 59.
(82) Vide e.g. G. Myrdal, The Political Element in the


(86) Ibid., p 379.

(87) Vide Appendix "b".


(89) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 71.

(90) Ibid., bk. 2, ch. 3.

(91) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 352.

(92) Ibid., p. 372.

(93) Ibid., p. 373.

(94) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 353.

(95) Ibid., vol. 1, p. 113.


(97) Ibid., ch. 1, sec. 4.

(98) Ibid., ch. 5.

(99) Ibid., pp. 121-5.

(100) Ibid., p. 80.

(101) Ibid., pp. 93, 120.

(102) Ibid., pp. 69-72.

(103) Ibid., p. 120.

(104) Ibid., ch. 2.

(105) Ibid., p. 118.
(106) Ibid., p. 93.
(107) Ibid., pp. 101-2.
(108) Ibid., ch. 6.
(110) Ibid., pp. 128-7.
(111) Ibid., p. 71.
(113) Ibid., pp. 120-1, 122.
(114) Ibid., p. 126.
(115) Id.
(116) Ibid., p. 289.


(119) Ibid., p. 292.
(120) Ibid., pp. 293-4.

(123) Ibid., ch. 2.
(127) Ibid., p. 291 n.
(128) C3, ch. 10.
(129) G, p. 751.
(130) TSV2, p. 525.

(131) Ibid., pp. 497-8.

(132) Ibid., p. 519.

(133) G, pp. 411, 423-4; I1857, p. 63; CPE, p. 96-7; TSV2, pp. 493, 502-4; TSV3, pp. 100-4; and C1, p. 210 n.

(134) TSV2, p. 506.

(135) Ibid., p. 527.

(136) Ibid., p. 506.

(137) Ibid., p. 529.

(138) Ibid., p. 507.

(139) Ibid., p. 508.

(140) G, pp. 147-51; 239-50; CPE, bk. 1, pt. 1, ch. 2, sec. 2; TSV2, pp. 500-5; and C1, ch. 3, sec. 2 and ch. 4.

(141) TSV2, p. 520.

(142) EPM, p. 310.


(144) TSV1, p. 151.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 11


(2) TSV2, pp. 481, 489.

(3) C2, p. 471.


(5) G, p. 441.

(6) C2, ch. 20 passim.


(8) Pace Mandel in sec. 3 of his introduction to C2.

(9) G, pp. 646-7; TSV2, pp. 489, 494; and C2, pp. 470, 505-9.

(10) C3, pp. 1012-3.

(11) Ibid., ch. 10.

(12) TSV3, addenda; and C3, pt. 7, n.b. ch. 4.

(13) G, pp. 650-1.

(14) C2, ch. 20 passim.


(18) CJM, p. 211; and WLC, pp. 77-8.


(20) C3, pp. 956-7.

(21) C2, ch. 20, sec. 3.

(22) Ibid., ch. 21.
(23) Ibid., pp. 595-7.
(24) C1, ch. 4.
(26) C1, pt. 3.
(29) C1, pt. 4.
(30) Ibid., ch. 12.
(31) Ibid., ch. 6. Cf. WLC, idem., 'Speech on the Question of Free Trade', in CW, vol. 6, pp. 450-65; and WPP.
(32) C1, pp. 283-90.
(34) Vide Sayer, Marx's Method, op. cit., ch. 3, n. 11.
(35) TSV3, pp. 364-6; C1, p. 774; and C3, ch. 5.
(39) TSV3, pp. 382, 385, 386.
(41) C1, Ch. 12. Cf. WLC, pp. 222-5; and C3, ch. 10.
(42) Vide I. Steedman, Marx After Sraffa, op. cit., ch. 9 appendix.
(43) C3, p. 420.
(45) C1, p. 781.

600


(49) C1, ch. 8.

(50) C3, ch. 2, n.b. p. 133.

(51) Ibid., ch. 3, n.b. p. 142.


(54) Ibid., ch. 3. According to Engels' editorial note at the end of this chapter, Marx's as yet unpublished scripts for Capital contain graphical plottings of the behaviour of the profit rate under the influence of these variables. Whilst it is of course to be hoped that the new English collected works will make these available, the shape of the graphs is obvious enough from the equations.

(55) Ibid., p. 317.

(56) Vide e.g. Robinson, An Essay on Marxian Economics, op. cit., ch. 5.

(57) C3, pp. 339-42.

(58) TSV2, p. 439; TSV3, pp. 240, 302, 311, 389; and C3, ch. 3 and p. 347.


(60) C1, pp. 419-20.

(61) Ibid., ch. 10, n.b. sec. 1.


(64) G, pp. 333-41.

(65) C1, pp. 774-5.


(67) Vide Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, tr. Pearce,

(68) Ibid., p. 345.

(69) C1, chs. 4 and 24.

(70) Ibid., p. 770.

(71) Ibid., ch. 25, sec. 2; and C3, ch. 27.


(74) E.g. the accusation of "baseness" in idem., Wages, tr. Luhmann, in CW, vol. 6, p. 423 (henceforward cited as W5); and TSV2, p. 117.


(76) Ibid., ch. 19, sec. 2; and TSV3, ch. 14.


(78) G, p. 605; TSV2, ch. 9; TSV3, p. 61; and C1, p. 766, n. 6.

(79) TSV2, p. 121.


(81) C1, p. 787.

(82) Ibid., ch. 25. Cf. C1, pp. 719-37 n. 6, 729-32; and C2C.

(83) C1, p. 763.

(84) Ibid., p. 764 n. 1.

(85) Ibid., pp. 769-70.

(86) Ibid., pp. 770-2.

(87) Ibid., ch. 25, sec. 3.

(88) Ibid., p. 785.

(89) Ibid., pp. 790-1.
(90) Ibid., ch. 25, sec. 3.
(91) Ibid., p. 802.
(92) Ibid., ch. 15, sec. 6.
(93) Ibid., ch. 25, sec. 4.
(94) Ibid., pp. 771-2.
(95) G, pp. 608-10.
(96) C1, pp. 174-5.
(97) WLC; and WPP.
(99) C1, ch. 7, sec. 2.
(100) G, pp. 408-9.
(102) G, pp. 409-10.
(103) TSV1, p. 282; and C1, pp. 739-40.
(106) RIPP, pp. 1044-5.
(107) C1, p. 743.
(108) WPP, p. 223.
(109) C1, ch. 10.
(110) EPM, pp. 235-46; W; WLC; WPP, and C1, pt. 4.
(111) Vide e.g. J. Strachey, Contemporary Capitalism, London, V. Gollancz, 1935, p. 119.
(112) WPP.
(113) COGP, pp. 324-5.
(114) WPP, p. 225.
(115) C1, ch. 6.
(116) WPP, pp. 217-21; and C1, ch. 17, n.b. p. 659.

(117) WPP, p. 223.

(118) Ibid., pp. 222-3; and C1, p. 275.

(119) TSV3, p. 312; and WPP, pp. 216-26.

(120) WLC, pp. 216-9; G, 597; TSV3, p. 419; and WPP, p. 225.

(121) Ibid., pp. 225-6; C1, p. 769; and COGP, p. 325.

(122) C1, p. 929.


(125) C1, ch. 24, sec. 1.

(126) Ibid., ch. 8; and C2, pt. 2 n.b. ch. 8.

(127) Ibid., ch. 10 n.b. pp. 314-5.


(130) C3, pp. 357-88. Cf. Ibid., ch. 15.

(131) Ibid., pp. 361-2.

(132) G, p. 750.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 12

(1) C1, pp. 164-6:
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists...in the fact that the commodity reflects the social character of men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things...this fetishism of the world of commodities arises from the peculiar social character of the labour which produces them. Objects of utility become commodities only because they are the products of labour of private individuals who work independently of each other. The sum total of the labour of all these private individuals forms the aggregate labour of society. Since the producers do not come into social contact until they exchange the products of their labour, the specific social characteristics of their private labours appear only within this exchange. In other words, the labour of the private individual manifests itself as an element of the total labour of society only through the relation which the act of exchange establishes between the products, and, through their mediation, between their producers. To the producers, therefore, the social relations between their private labours appear as what they are, i.e. they do not appear as direct social relations between persons in their work, but rather as material relations between persons and social relations between things.

(2) TSV2, p. 388:
Since living labour...is incorporated in capital, and appears as an activity belonging to capital from the moment that the labour-process begins, all the productive powers of social labour appear as the productive powers of capital, just as the general social form of labour appears in money as the property of a thing. Thus the productive power of social labour and its special forms now appears as productive powers and forms of capital, of materialised labour, of the material conditions of labour - which, having assumed this independent form, are personified by the capitalist in relation to living labour. Here we have once more the perversion of the relationship, which we have already, in dealing with money, called fetishism.

(3) Ibid., p. 390:
...from the standpoint of...the general form of capitalist production...the means of production, the material conditions of labour - materials of labour, instruments of labour (and means of subsistence) - do not appear as subsumed to the labourer, but the
labourer appears as subsumed to them. He does not make use of them, but they make use of him. And it is this that makes them capital. Capital employs labour. Capital is not a means for him to produce products... But he is the means of capital - partly to maintain its value, partly to create surplus value, that is, to increase it, to absorb surplus-labour.

(4) WLC, pp. 211-3:
Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of labour and means of subsistence of all kinds, which are utilised in order to produce new raw materials, new instruments of labour and new means of subsistence. All these component parts of capital are creations of labour, products of labour, accumulated labour. Accumulated labour which serves as a means of new production is capital. So say the economists. What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the other. A Negro is a Negro. He becomes a slave only in certain relations. A cotton-spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It becomes capital only in certain relations... Capital... is a bourgeois production relation... Are not the means of subsistence, the instruments of labour, the raw materials of which capital consists, produced and accumulated under given social conditions... And is it not just this definite social character which turns the products serving for new production into capital... It is domination over direct, living labour that turns accumulated labour into capital. Capital does not consist in accumulated labour serving living labour as a means for new production. It consists in living labour serving accumulated labour as a means for maintaining and multiplying the exchange value of the latter.


(6) MCP, p. 487:
The bourgeoisie... has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former exoduses of nations and crusades.

(7) RIPP, p. 1037:
The material result of capitalist production, apart from the development of the social productive forces of labour, is to raise the quantity of production and multiply and diversify the spheres of productions and their sub-spheres. For it is only then that the corresponding development of the
exchange-value of the products emerges - as the realm in which they can operate or realise themselves as exchange-value.

(8) G, p. 749:
... the development of the productive forces brought about by the historical development of capital itself, when it reaches a certain point, suspends the self-realisation of capital instead of positing it. Beyond a certain point, the development of the powers of production becomes a barrier for capital; hence the capital relation a barrier for the development of the productive powers of labour. When it has reached this point, capital, i.e. wage-labour, enters into the same relation towards the development of social wealth and of the forces of production as the guild system, serfdom, slavery, and is necessarily stripped off as a fetter.

(9) C1, p. 929:
... capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its own negation.

(10) G, pp. 749-50:
the material and mental conditions of the negation of wage-labour and of capital... are themselves the results of capital's production process. The growing incompatibility between the productive development of society and its hitherto existing relations of production expresses itself in bitter contradictions, crises, spasms. The violent destruction of capital, not by relations external to it but rather as a condition of its self-preservation, is the most striking form in which advice is given it to be gone and to give room for a higher state of social production.

(11) MCP, pp. 489-90:
In crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity - the epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation, had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered...
It is the unconditional development of the productive forces and therefore mass production on the basis of a mass of producers who are confined within the bounds of necessary means of subsistence on the one hand, and on the other, the barrier set up by the capitalists' profit, which forms the basis of modern over-production.

The exchange of living labour for objectified labour - i.e. the positing of social labour in the form of the contradiction of capital and wage-labour - is the ultimate development of the value-relation and of production resting on value. Its presupposition is - and remains - the mass of direct labour time, the quantity of labour employed, as the determinant factor in the production of wealth. But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose "powerful effectiveness" is itself out of all proportion to the direct labour time spent on their production, but depends rather on the general state of science and on the progress of technology, or the application of science to production...Real wealth manifest itself...and large industry reveals this - in the monstrous disproportion between the labour time applied and its product, as well as in the qualitative imbalance between labour...and the power of the production process it superintends. Labour no longer appears to be so much included in the production process; rather, the human being comes to relate to the production process more as watchman an regulator...No longer does the worker insert a modified thing as a middle link between the object and himself; rather, he inserts the process of nature, transformed into an industrial process, as a means between himself and inorganic nature, mastering it. He steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is neither the direct human labour he performs nor the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive power...which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth. The theft of alien labour time, on which present wealth is based, appears as a miserable foundation in the face of this new one, created by large-scale industry itself. As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great well-spring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and hence exchange-value must cease to be the measure of use-value.
(14) C3, pp. 359, 368:
If the capitalist mode of production is therefore a historical means for developing the material powers of production and for creating a corresponding world market, it is at the same time the constant contradiction between this historical task and the social relations of production corresponding to it... The development of this productive forces of social labour is capital's historic mission and justification. For that very reason, it unwittingly creates the material conditions for a higher form of production.

(15) MCP, p. 485:
The modern bourgeois society... has not done away with class antagonism. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones... the epoch of the bourgeoisie... however... has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is splitting up more and more into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.

(16) C3, p. 132:
The capitalist... is only a capitalist at all, and can undertake the process of exploiting labour, only because he confronts, as proprietor of the conditions of labour, the worker as a mere owner of labour-power.


(18) C3, p. 1025:
The owners of mere labour-power, the owners of capital and the landowners... form the three great classes of modern society based on the capitalist mode of production.

(19) TSV2, p. 153:
... capital property... is a factor of and fulfills a function in capitalist production; this does not hold good of landed property... because modern landed property is in fact feudal property, but transformed by the action of capital upon it...

(20) C3, p. 379:
Merchant's or trading capital is divided into two forms or sub-species, commercial and money-dealing capital, which we shall go on to distinguish in such detail as is needed to analyse capital in its basic inner structure. This is all the more necessary in so far as modern economics, and even its best representatives, lump trading capital and industrial capital directly together and completely overlook
trading capital's characteristic peculiarities.

(21) C1, p. 794:
The relative surplus production exists in all kinds of forms. Every worker belongs to it during the time when he is only partially employed or wholly unemployed...we can identify three forms which it always possesses: the floating, the latent and the stagnant.

(22) Ibid., p. 797:
...the lowest sediment of the relative surplus population (the stagnant) dwells in the sphere of pauperism. Apart from vagabonds, criminals, prostitutes, in short the actual lumpenproletariat, this social stratum consists of three categories...those able to work...orphans and pauper children (and) the demoralised, the ragged and those unable to work...

(23) The laws of (the) centralisation of capitals, or of the attraction of capital by capital, cannot be developed here. A few brief factual indications must suffice. The battle of competition is fought by the cheapening of commodities. The cheapness of commodities depends, all other circumstances remaining the same, on the productivity of labour, and this depends on the scale of production. Therefore the larger capitals will beat the smaller. It will further be remembered that with the development of the capitalist mode of production there is an increase in the minimum amount of individual capital necessary to carry on a business under its normal conditions. The smaller capitals, therefore, crowd into spheres of production which large-scale industry has taken control of only sporadically or incompletely. Here competition rages in direct proportion to the number, and in inverse proportion to the magnitude, of the rival capitals. It always ends in the ruin of many small capitalists, whose capitals partly pass into the hands of their conquerors and partly vanish completely.


(25) C1, pp. 253-5:
The simple circulation of commodities - selling in order to buy - is a means to a final goal which lies outside of circulation, namely the appropriation of use-values, the satisfaction of needs. As against this, the circulation of money as capital is an end in itself, for the valorisation of value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. The
The movement of capital is therefore limitless. As the conscious bearer of this movement, the possessor of money becomes a capitalist. His person, or rather his pocket, is the point from which money starts and to which it returns. The objective content of the circulation we have been discussing - the valorisation of value - is his subjective purpose, and it is only in so far as the appropriation of even more wealth in the abstract is the sole driving force behind his operations that he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will. Use-values must therefore never be treated as the immediate aim of the capitalist; nor must the profit on any single transaction. His aim is rather the unceasing movement of profit making.

(26) TSV3, p. 514:
The bourgeois... does not perceive that the production relations themselves, the social forms in which he produces and which he regards as given, natural relations, are the continuous product - and only for that reason the continuous pre-requisite - of this specific social mode of production. The different relations and aspects not only become independent and assume a heterogeneous mode of existence, apparently independent of one another, but they seem to be the direct properties of things; they assume a material shape.

(27) RIPP, p. 990:
... the capitalist... has his roots in the process of alienation and finds absolute satisfaction in it...

(28) Id.:
The self-valorisation of capital... is... the determining, dominating and overriding purpose of the capitalist, it is the absolute motive and content of his activity... a highly impoverished and abstract content which makes it plain that the capitalist is just as much enslaved by the relationships of capitalism as is his opposite pole, the worker, albeit in quite a different manner.

(29) EPM, p. 324:
That which is mine through the medium of money - that for which I can pay (i.e. which money can buy) - that am I myself, the possessor of the money. The extent of the power of money is the extent of that power. Money's properties are my - the possessor's - properties and essential powers. Thus, what I am and what I am capable of is by no means determined by my individuality. I am ugly, but I can buy myself the most beautiful of women. Therefore I am not ugly, for the effect of ugliness - its deterrent power - is nullified by money... I am bad, dishonest,
unscrupulous, stupid, but money is honoured, and hence its possessor. Money is the supreme good, therefore its possessor is good.

(30) C1, p. 739:
...the capitalist...in so far as he is capital personified, his motive force is not the acquisition and enjoyment of use-values but the acquisition and augmentation of exchange-values...Only as a personification of capital is the capitalist respectable. As such, he shares with the miser an absolute drive towards self-enrichment. But what appears in the miser as the mania of an individual is in the capitalist the effect of a social mechanism in which he is merely a cog.

(31) Ibid., p. 381:
Under free competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him.

(32) RIPP, p. 990:
To an extent the worker stands on a higher plane than the capitalist from the outset, since the latter has his roots in the process of alienation and finds absolute satisfaction in it, whereas right from the start the worker is a victim who confronts it as a rebel and experiences it as a process of enslavement.

(33) MCP, pp. 495-6:
...the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society and to impose its conditions upon society as an overriding law...Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.

(34) C1, p. 929:
...capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its own negation.

(35) Ibid., pp. 929-30:
The transformation of scattered private property resting on the personal labour of the individuals themselves into capitalist private property is naturally an incomparably more protracted, violent and difficult process than the transformation of capitalist private property...into social property. In the former case, it was a matter of the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; but in this case we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people.

(36) C3, pp. 567:
Formation of joint-stock companies. This involves...
Transformation of the actual functioning capitalist into a mere manager in charge of other people's capital, and of the capital owner into a mere owner, a mere money capitalist... function is completely separated from capital ownership...

(37) TSV3, p. 497:
Capitalist production itself has brought it about that the labour of superintendence walks the streets, separated completely from the ownership of capital, whether one's own or other people's. It has become quite unnecessary for capitalists to perform this labour of superintendence. It is actually available, separate from capital...in the separation between industrial managers and capitalists of every sort. The best demonstrations of this are the co-operative factories built by the workers themselves. They are proof that the capitalist as functionary of production has become just as superfluous to the workers as the landlord appears to the capitalist with regard to bourgeois production.

(38) C3, p. 373:
...the growing accumulation of capital involves its growing concentration. Thus the power of capital grows, in other words the autonomy of the social conditions of production, as personified by the capitalist, is asserted more and more as against the actual producers. Capital shows itself more and more to be a social power, with the capitalist as its functionary - a power that no longer stands in any possible kind of relationship to what the work of one particular individual can create, but an alienated social power which has gained an autonomous position and confronts society as a thing, and as a power with which the capitalist has through this thing. The contradiction between the general social power into which capital has developed and the private power of the individual capitalists over these social conditions of production develops ever more blatantly, whilst this development also contains the solution to this situation, in that it simultaneously raises the conditions of production into general, communal, social conditions.

(39) Ibid., p. 567:
Formation of joint-stock companies. This involves:
1. Tremendous expansion in the scale of production, and enterprises which would be impossible for individual capitals...
2. Capital, which is inherently based on a social mode of production and pre-supposes a social concentration of means of production and labour
power, now receives the form of social capital...in contrast to private capital, and its enterprises appear as social enterprises as opposed to private ones. This is the abolition of capital as private property within the confines of the capitalist mode of production itself.

(40) C1, p. 799:
...within the capitalist system...all means for the development of production undergo a dialectical inversion so that they become the means of domination and exploitation of the producers; they distort the worker into a fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, they destroy the actual content of his labour by turning it into a torment; they alienate from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour process in the same proportion as science is incorporated in it as an independent power; they deform the conditions under which he works, subject him during the labour process to a despotism the more hateful for its meanness; they transform his life-time into working-time, and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the juggernaut of capital.

(41) CHPLI, p. 186:
the proletariat cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society...

(42) C1, p. 380:
experience shows to the intelligent observer how rapidly and firmly capitalist production has seized the vital forces of the people at their very roots, although historically speaking it hardly dates from yesterday. Experience shows too how the degeneration of the industrial population is retarded only by the constant absorption of primitive and natural elements from the countryside...


(44) Vide e.g. Strachey, Contemporary Capitalism, op. cit., p. 119.


(46) G, p. 453:
The worker emerges not only not richer (from the
process of production), but emerges rather poorer from the process than he entered. For not only has he produced the conditions of necessary labour as conditions belonging to capital; but also the value-creating possibility, the realisation which lies as a possibility within him, now likewise exists as surplus value, surplus product, in a word as capital, as master over living labour capacity, as value endowed with its own might and will, confronting him in his abstract, objectless, purely subjective poverty. He has produced not only alien wealth and his own poverty, but also the relation of this wealth as independent, self-sufficient wealth, relative to himself as the poverty which this wealth consumes, and from which it thereby draws new vital spirits into itself, and realises itself anew.

(47) W, p. 422:
The position of the worker relative to the capitalist worsens, and the value of the things enjoyed is relative.

(48) EPM, pp. 271-2:
The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he produces. The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things.

(49) WLC, p. 216:
A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a little house to a hut. The little house shows now that its owner has only very slight or no demands to make; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilisation, if the neighbouring palace grows to an equal or even greater extent, the occupant of the relatively small house will feel more and more uncomfortable, dissatisfied and cramped within its four walls. A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid growth of productive capital. The rapid growth of productive capital brings about an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the state of development of society in general.

(50) C1, p. 799:
...in proportion as capital accumulates, the
situation of the worker, be his payment high or low, must grow worse.

(51) WLC, p. 216:
Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.

(52) WPP, p 225:
...the very development of modern industry must progressively turn the scale in favour of the capitalist against the working man...

(53) C1, p. 792:
The relative surplus population is...the background against which the law of supply and demand of labour does its work. It confines the field of this law to the limits absolutely convenient to capital's drive to exploit and dominate the workers.

(54) Ibid., p. 798:
The relative mass of the industrial reserve army...increases with the potential production of wealth. But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labour-army, the greater is the mass of the consolidated surplus population, whose misery is in inverse proportion to the amount of torture it has to undergo in the form of labour. The more extensive, finally, the pauperised sections of the working class and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation.

(55) WPP, p. 225:
...the general tendency of capitalistic production is not to raise but to lower the average standard of wages, or to push the value of labour to more or less its minimum limit.

(56) Id.:
(given) the tendency of things in (the capitalist) system, is this saying that the working class ought to renounce their resistance against the encroachments of capital, and abandon their attempts at making the best of the occasional chances for their temporary improvement? If they did, they would be degraded to one level mass of broken wretches past salvation...By cowardly giving way in their everyday conflict with capital, they would certainly disqualify themselves for the initiating of any larger movement.

(57) C1, p. 274:
This peculiar commodity, labour-power, must now be examined. Like all other commodities it has a value. How is that value determined? The value of labour-power is determined, as in the case of every other commodity, by the labour-time necessary for the production, and consequently also the reproduction, of this specific article... Labour-power exists only as a capacity of the living individual. Given the existence of the individual, the production of labour-power consists in his reproduction of himself or his maintenance... the value of labour-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner.

(58) Ibid., p. 275:
In contrast, therefore, with the case of other commodities, the determination of the value of labour-power contains a historical and moral element.

(59) WPP, p. 222:
Besides (a) mere physical element, the value of labour is in every country determined by a traditional standard of life. It is not mere physical life, but it is the satisfaction of certain wants springing from the social conditions in which people are placed and reared up.

(60) Id.: This historical or social element entering into the value of labour may be expanded, or contracted, or altogether extinguished so that nothing remains but the physical limit.

(61) C2, p. 486:
...in periods of prosperity, and particularly during the phase of hyper-activity... not only the consumption of necessary means of subsistence... rises; the working class (in which the entire reserve army of labour has now been enrolled) also takes a temporary share in the consumption of luxury articles that are otherwise for the most part "necessary" only for the capitalists.

(62) Vide e.g. Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx's 'Capital', op. cit., ch. 20 appendix.

(63) E.g. C1, p. 275:
...the number and extent of (the worker's) so-called necessary requirements, as also the manner in which they are satisfied, are themselves products of history, and depend therefore on the level of civilisation attained by a country...

(64) E.g. ibid., pp. 808-11.
(65) Ibid., pp. 276-7:
The ultimate or minimum limit of the value of labour-power is formed by the value of the commodities which have to be supplied every day to the bearer of labour-power, the man, so that he can renew his life-process. That is to say, the limit is formed by the value of the physically indispensable means of subsistence...It is an extraordinary cheap kind of sentimentality which declares that this method of determining the value of labour-power, a method prescribed by the very nature of the case, is brutal...

(66) COGP, p. 325:
It is well known that nothing of the "iron law of wages" is Lassalle's except the word "iron" borrowed from Goethe's "great eternal iron laws"...As Lange has already shown, shortly after Lassalle's death (the iron law) is the Malthusian theory of population (preached by Lange himself). But if this theory is correct, then I cannot abolish the law even if I abolish wage-labour a hundred time over, because the law then governs not only the system of wage-labour but every social system. Basing themselves on this, the economists have been proving for fifty years or more that socialism cannot abolish poverty, which has its basis in nature, but can only make it general, distribute it simultaneously over the whole surface of society.

(67) WPP, p. 221-2:
...the periodical resistance on the part of the workers against the reduction of wages, and their periodical attempts at getting a rise in wages, are inseparable from the wages system, and dictated by the very fact of labour being assimilated to commodities, and therefore subject to the laws regulating the general movement of prices...

(68) Ibid., pp. 225-6:
...the working class ought not to exaggerate to themselves the ultimate fruitfullness of these everyday struggles (over money wages). They ought not to forget they are fighting with effects, but not with the causes of those effects; that they are retarding a downward movement, but not changing its direction; that they are applying palliatives, not curing the malady.

(69) C1, p. 793:
The movement of the law of supply and demand of labour... completes the despotism of capital. Thus as soon as the workers learn the secret of why it happens that the more they work, the more alien wealth they produce, and that the more the
productivity of their labour increases, the more does their very function as a means of the valorisation of capital become precarious; as soon as they discover that the degree of intensity of competition amongst themselves depends on the pressure of the relative surplus population; as soon as, by setting up trade unions, etc., they try to organise planned co-operation between the employed and the unemployed in order to obviate or to weaken the ruinous effects of...capitalist production on their class, so soon does capital and its sycophant, political economy, cry out at the infringement of the "eternal" and, so to speak, "sacred" law of supply and demand. Every combination between employed and unemployed disturbs the "pure" action of this law.

(70) WPP, p. 226: Instead of the conservative motto "a fair day's wage for a fair day's work" (the working class) ought to inscribe on (its) banner the revolutionary watchword "Abolition of the wages system".

(71) MCP, pp. 493-4: ...entire sections of the ruling classes are, by the advance of industry, precipitated into the proletariat, or are at least threatened in their conditions of existence. These also supply the proletariat with elements of enlightenment and progress.

(72) Ibid., p. 494: ...in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular a portion of the bourgeois ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.

(73) Ibid., 'Provisional Rules of the International Working Men's Association', in FIA, p. 82: ...the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves...

(74) PP, pp. 210-1: The first attempts of workers to associate among themselves always take place in the form of combinations...the maintenance of wages, this common
interest which they have against their boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance - combination. Thus combination always has a double aim, that of stopping competition among the workers, so that they can carry on general competition with the capitalist.

(75) MCP, p. 493:
...the worker begin to form combinations...against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages...Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies not in the immediate result but in the ever expanding union of the workers.

(76) WPP, p. 226:
Trades Unions work well as centres of resistance against the encroachments of capital. They fail partially from an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally from limiting themselves to a guerilla war against the effects of the existing system instead of simultaneously trying to change it, instead of using their organised forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the working class; that is to say, the ultimate abolition of the wages system.

Trade unions are the schools of socialism. It is in trade unions that workers educate themselves and become socialists, because under their very eyes and every day the struggle with capital is taking place.

(78) PP, p. 211:
Much research has been carried out to trace the different historical phases that the bourgeoisie has passed through, from the commune to its constitution as a class. But when it is a question of making a precise study of strikes, combinations and other forms in which the proletarians carry out before our eyes their organisation as a class, some are seized with real fear and others display a transcendental disdain.

(79) Idem.
Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The domination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class against capital, but not yet for-itself. In the struggle...this becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for-itself.

(80) Idem., 'Inaugural Address of the International
Working Men's Association' (henceforward cited as IAFI); in FIA, p. 80:
To conquer political power has therefore become the great duty of the working classes.

(81) C1, ch. 14, sec. 4.

(82) Ibid., ch. 13.

(83) Ibid., ch. 15.

(84) MCP, p. 491:
Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants...they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker, and, above all, by the industrial bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.

(85) C1, p. 453:
From the standpoint of the peasant and the artisan, capitalist co-operation does not appear as a particular historical form of co-operation; instead co-operation itself appears as a historical form peculiar to, and specifically distinguishing, the capitalist process of production. Just as the social productive power of labour that is developed by co-operation appears to be the productive power of capital, so co-operation itself, contrasted with the process of production carried on by isolated independent workers, or even by small masters, appears to be a specific form of the capitalist process of production.

(86) RIPP, p. 1024:
The social productive forces of labour, or the productive forces of directly social, socialised (i.e. collective) labour come into being through co-operation, division of labour within the workshop, the use of machinery, and in general the transformation of production by the conscious use of the sciences, or mechanics, chemistry, etc., for specific ends, technology, etc., and similarly through the enormous increase of scale corresponding to such developments.

(87) C1, ch. 32.

(88) IAFI, pp. 79-80:
We speak of the co-operative movement, especially
the co-operative factories raised by the unassisted efforts of a few bold "hands". The value of these great social experiments cannot be overrated. By deed, instead of by argument, they have shown that production on a large scale, and in accord with the behests of modern science, may be carried on without the existence of a class of masters employing a class of hands; that to bear fruit, the means of labour need not be monopolised as a means of dominion over, and of extortion against, the labouring man himself; and that, like slave labour, like serf labour, hired labour is but a transitory and inferior form, destined to disappear before associated labour plying its toil with a willing hand, a ready mind and a joyous heart...At the same time...co-operative labour, if kept within the narrow circle of the casual efforts of private workmen, will never be able to arrest the growth in geometrical progression of monopoly, to free the masses, nor even to perceptibly lighten the burden of their miseries...To save the industrious masses, co-operative labour ought to be developed to national dimensions, and, consequently to be fostered by national means. Yet the lords of land and the lords of capital will always use their political privileges for the defence and the perpetuation of their economical monopolies.

(89) GI, p. 81:
Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first time consciously treats all naturally evolved premises as the creations of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjugates them to the power of the united individuals.

(90) Marx, 'The Class Struggles in France 1848-50', in CW, vol. 10, p. 127:
...socialism is the declaration of the permanence of the revolution, the class dictatorship of the proletariat as the necessary transit point to the abolition of class struggles generally, to the abolition of all the relations of production on which they rest, to the abolition of all the social relations that correspond to those relations of production, to the revolutionising of all the ideas that result from those social relations.

(91) COGP, p. 320:
...defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society...In a higher phase of communist society,...the enslaving subordination of the
individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and manual labour, has vanished...labour has become not only a means of life but life's prime want...the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual...all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly...

(92) EPM, p. 306: Communism has the position of the negation of the negation, and is hence the actual phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation. Communism is the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society.

(93) COGP, p. 327: Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

(94) Idem., 'Conspectus of Bakunin's Statism and Anarchy', in FIA, p. 333: so long as the other classes, especially the capitalist class, still exists, so long as the proletariat struggles with it (for when it attains government power its enemies and the old organisation of society have not yet vanished), it must employ forcible means, hence governmental means. It is itself still a class and the economic conditions from which the class struggle and the existence of classes derive have still not disappeared and must forcibly be either removed out of the way or transformed, this transformation process being forcibly hastened.

(95) MCP, p. 495: All previous historical movements were the movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air.

(96) GI, p. 88: In all appropriations up to now, a mass of individuals remained subservient to a single instrument of production; in the appropriation of
the proletarians, a mass of instruments of production must be made subject to each individual, and property to all. Modern universal intercourse cannot be controlled by individuals, unless it is controlled by all.

(97) HF, p. 36:
When the proletariat is victorious, it by no means becomes the absolute side of society, for it is victorious only by abolishing itself and its opposite. Then the proletariat disappears, as well as the opposite which determines it, private property.

(98) I have discussed the issues raised here in 'Rationality, Democracy and Freedom in Marxist Critiques of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right', Inquiry, forthcoming March, 1985.

(99) Rubin can be credited with presenting an, as it were, complete - if abridged - finished version of Theories of Surplus Value in his own history based on the Theories and meant to be read in conjunction with them. Vide I. I. Rubin, A History of Economic Thought, tr. D. Filtzer, aften. C. Colliot-Thelene, London, Ink Links, 1979.

(100) Vide Appendix i.

(101) IAFI, p. 78:
...the Ten Hours Bill was not only a great practical success; it was the victory of a principle; it was the first time that in broad daylight the political economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class. But there was in store a still greater victory of the political economy of labour over the political economy of property. We speak of the co-operative movement...

NOTES TO CHAPTER 13

(1) EPM, pp. 270-1.
(2) N.b. cf. ibid., pp. 326-46; and PS, ch. 8.
(8) Idem., The Essence of Christianity, op. cit., ch. 1, sec. 1.
(11) E.g. GI, pp. 38-9, 57-8.
(12) Feuerbach, 'Principles of the Philosophy of the Future', op. cit., pp. 208-9: The Hegelian philosophy is inverted, that is, it is theological idealism...It posited the essence of the ego outside the ego, that is, in separation from it, and it objectified the ego as substance, as God...in so doing, it expressed - indirectly and in reverse order the divinity of the ego, thus making it...into an attribute or form of the divine substance, meaning that man's consciousness of God is God's own self-consciousness. That means that the being belongs to God and the knowing to man. But the
being of God, according to Hegel is actually nothing other than the being of thought, or thought abstracted from the ego, that is, the thinker. The Hegelian philosophy as turned thought, that is, the subjective being - this, however, conceived without subject, that is, conceived as a being different from it - into the Divine and Absolute Being.

(13) Ibid., p. 199:
...if I...say the deity or, what amounts to the same thing, the absolute being or absolute truth is an object of and for reason alone, then I declare God to be a rational thing or a rational being, and in so doing I indirectly express only the absolute truth and reality of reason. Hence, it is necessary for reason to turn to itself with a view to reverse this inverted self-recognition, to declare itself directly to be the absolute truth and to become, without the intervention of any intermediary object, its own object as the absolute truth.

(14) Idem., 'Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy', op. cit., p. 154:
The method of the reformative critique of speculative philosophy as such does not differ from that used in the Philosophy of Religion. We need only turn the predicate into the subject, and thus as subject into object and principle - this is, only reverse speculative philosophy. In this way we have the unconcealed, pure, and untarnished truth.

(15) E.g. cf. the above quotation with CHPL, p. 23:
Had Hegel started from real subjects as the basis of the state, then he would not have found it necessary to let the state subjectify itself in a mysterious way...Hegel subjectifies the predicate, the objects, but he objectifies them in separation from their true subject. Consequently, the true subject appears as a result, whereas the point is to start with the true subject and deal with its objectifications.


(19) Idem., 'Marxism and Humanism', in idem., For Marx, op. cit., pp. 219-47.

(21) Colletti Marxism and Hegel, op. cit., passim.

(22) C1, pp. 102-3:
...just when I was working at the first volume of Capital, the ill-humoured, arrogant and mediocre epigones who now talk large in educated German circles began to take pleasure in treating Hegel in the same way as the good Moses Mendelssohn treated Spinoza in Lessing's time, namely as a "dead dog". I therefore openly avowed myself a pupil of that might thinker, and even, here and there is the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him.

(23) G, pp. 831-2:
The fact that in the development of the productive powers of labour the objective conditions of labour, objectified labour, must grow relative to living labour...appears from the standpoint of capital not in such a way that one of the moments of social activity - objective labour - becomes the ever more powerful body of the other moment, subjective labour, but rather...that the objective conditions of labour assume an ever more colossal independence...and that social wealth confronts living labour in more powerful portions as an alien and dominant power. The emphasis comes to be placed not on the state of objectified, but on the state of being alienated...the monstrous objective power which social labour itself erected opposite itself as one of its moments belongs not to the worker, but to the personified conditions of labour, i.e. to capital. To the extent that, from the standpoint of capital and wage-labour, the creation of the objective body of activity happens in antithesis to the immediate labour capacity (then) this twisting and inversion is a real phenomenon and not merely a supposed one existing merely in the imagination of the workers and the capitalist. But obviously this process of inversion is merely a historical necessity, a necessity for the development of the forces of production solely from a specific historical point of departure, or basis, but in no way an absolute necessity of production; rather a vanishing one, and the result of this process is to suspend this basis itself, together with this form of the process. The bourgeois economists are so much cooped up with the notions belonging to a specific historical stage of social development that the necessity of the objectification of the powers of social labour appears to them as inseparable from the necessity of their alienation vis-a-vis living labour. But with the suspension of the immediate character of living labour as merely individual...with the positing of the activity of individuals as immediately general or social
activity, the objective moments of labour are stripped of this form of alienation; they are thereby posited as...the organic social body within which individuals reproduce themselves as individuals, but as social individuals.

(24) E.g. C1, pp. 929:
...capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its own negation.


(27) E.g. C1, p. 423:
...the possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a capitalist only where the minimum sum advanced for production greatly exceeds the known medieval maximum. Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel, in his Logic, that at a certain point merely quantitative differences pass over by a dialectic inversion into qualitative distinctions.

(28) Vide Taylor, Hegel, op. cit., pp. 546-58. This formulation must be distinguished from the one put forward in G. Hawthorn, Enlightenment and Despair, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, ch. 3, which does not appreciate the strength of Marx's distinguishing of alienations and objectification, when driving towards a similar criticism.


(31) Vide e.g. M. Kidron, Western Capitalism Since the War, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1970, in which all elements of economic planning are continually evaluated only from the most negative point of view.

(32) Vide e.g. the debate over the class location of the middle class collected in P. Walker, ed., Between Labour and Capital, Sussex Harvester Press, 1979. As the title of the collection indicates, all the contributions remain
commonly rooted in static conceptions of Marx's class analysis, and the, for them especially, difficult issues posed by the growth of the middle are increasingly desperately pushed into these.


(34) Consider the following quotation from the preface to Bell and I. Kristóf, eds., Capitalism Today, London, Basic Books, 1971, p. viii:

Hedonism has never been regarded as one of the bourgeois virtues, yet the economics of modern bourgeois society has more and more come to rest on hedonist premises. A Marxist might say, with the benefit of hindsight, that this "contradiction" was inherent in capitalism from the outset. But, in fact, most Marxist predictions were pointed in quite the opposite direction: the "contradictions" of capitalism were supposed to arise out of progressive immiseration not progressive enrichment.

This idea is at the heart of Bell's whole idea of "post-industrialism", and, incidentally, also runs through Bell, Marxian Socialism in the U.S., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967. Without going so far as to say that Bell may not have a point against "most marxist predictions", his understanding of Marx is risible.

(35) Strachey, Contemporary Capitalism, op. cit., p. 154.

NOTES TO APPENDIX I


(4) M. Adler, *Kant und der Marxismus*, Berlin, Ernst Laub'sche Verlagbuchhandlung, 1925.


(6) Colletti, 'Marxism as a Sociology', in *idem.*, *From Rousseau to Lenin*, op. cit., p. 33.
NOTES TO APPENDIX 2


NOTES TO APPENDIX 3


(5) Spinoza, 'Ethics', op. cit., p. 117.
NOTES TO APPENDIX


(2) Ibid., pp. 129-32.

(3) Ibid., p. 80.


NOTES TO APPENDIX 5

(1) Plato, 'Meno', op. cit., pp. 81-6c.

NOTES TO APPENDIX 6


(3) Vide Kaufmann, 'The Hegel Myth and Its Method', in MacIntyre, ed., *Hegel, op. cit.*, ch. 2


NOTES TO APPENDIX 7


(4) Ibid., p. 646.

(5) Ibid., p. 634.

NOTES TO APPENDIX


NOTES TO APPENDIX a

When Kant assumes that something outside us, a thing-in-itself, corresponds to our ideas, he is a materialist. When he declares this thing-in-itself to be unknowable, transcendental, other-sided, he is an idealist.

(2) Ibid., p. 223.
(3) Cf. ibid., p. 141; and idem., 'Philosophical Notebooks', op. cit., p. 173.
(4) Della Volpe, Logic as a Positive Science, op. cit., p. 25 n. 33.
(5) Ibid., pp. 53-4.
(6) Ibid., ch. 4.
(7) Colletti, Marxism and Hegel, op. cit., p. 84.
(9) Ibid., pp. 35-7.
(10) R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, op. cit.
(11) Ruben, Marxism and Materialism, op. cit., p. 101:
I dispute the legitimacy of producing any arguments of any kind which purport to justify philosophically (i.e. non-circularly) our belief in the essential independence of the world from mind. We do not argue to the extra-mental existence of tables and chairs, as does Bhaskar. On a naturalist perspective we begin with them. It conceals far too much to those who wish to impeach the mind-independence of the external world, or material reality, to think that we could take as premiss that science exists and argue from that to the conclusion that its objects are real. If we begin with science, then we begin with a particular human institution, and human beings are a special sort of physical object. To use Hegelian jargon, Bhaskar takes as immediate that science exists and as mediated by it that real objects exist. In fact, to take science as immediate is to take real object as immediate as well. No argument is necessary.
(12) Ibid., pp. 35, 168.
(13) Ibid., pp. 96-100.

(14) Cf. the scorn poured on the vulgarity of purported refutations of scepticisms by reference to what are presented as the data of sensuous consciousness left entirely to itself in SL, p. 832.


NOTES TO APPENDIX 10


(2) L, sec. 81.
NOTES TO APPENDIX 11


(2) GI, p. 36.


NOTES TO APPENDIX 12


(3) E. von Bohm-Bawerk, 'Karl Marx and the Close of His System', in Sweezy, ed., 'Karl Marx and the Close of His System' by Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, etc., op. cit., ch. 4.

NOTES TO APPENDIX 1


NOTES TO APPENDIX 14

(1) Bohm-Bawerk, 'Karl Marx and the Close of His System', op. cit., p. 69.

(2) Ibid., pp. 74-5. Cf. idem., Capital and Interest, tr. W. Smart, London, 1890.

(3) Bohm-Bawerk, 'Karl Marx and the Close of His System', op. cit., pp. 64-8.

(4) Ibid., pp. 66-7.


(6) Ibid., pp. 70-3.

(7) Ibid., pp. 77-80.

(8) Ibid., p. 65.

(9) Ibid., p. 75 n. 1.

(10) Ibid., pp. 73-6.

(11) Ibid., p. 75.

NOTES TO APPENDIX 15


NOTES TO APPENDIX


(3) Russell, History of Western Philosophy, op. cit., p. 612.


NOTES TO APPENDIX


(2) Ibid., ch. 1.

(3) Ibid., p. 239.

(4) Ibid., p. 240.

(5) Ibid., chs. 6 and 7.

(6) Ibid., pp. 136-45.

(7) Ibid., publishers note inside the front cover of the book.
NOTES TO APPENDIX 14


(4) Ibid., p. 96; and idem., 'Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism', op. cit., p. 143.


(6) Idem., Knowledge and Human Interests, op. cit., p. 43.

(7) Ibid., pp. 37-40.

(8) Ibid., pp. 25-8.

(9) Ibid., pp. 25-38.

(10) Ibid., pp. 27-8.

(11) Ibid., pp. 28-30.

(12) Ibid., p. 195.

(13) Ibid., p. 310.

(14) Ibid., p. 42.


(16) Idem., Knowledge and Human Interests, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

(17) Ibid., ch. 8.

(18) Ibid., ch. 10.


(22) Idem., Knowledge and Human Interests, op. cit., pp. 28-9.


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