RESPONSIVENESS AND RULES:
PARENT-CHILD INTERACTION IN SCOTLAND AND INDIA.

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If it can be said after all this evidence to the contrary, I state that this work is of my own construction.

Vandeni Reddy
This thesis was initially intended to be an intensive study of expressions of child dependence and independence and their correlates in parental behaviour in the two cultures. The essential justification for the study lay in the reportedly different evaluations of these attributes in Indian and Western societies. Based on the assumptions that cultural values influence parental behaviour towards their children, and result in differences in child behaviour, I attempted to explore the manner in which these values might correlate with parental and child behaviour. Two major problems disrupted this rather simplistic effort. Firstly, I had to accommodate the fact that these different evaluations were not merely different on a uni-dimensional quantitative scale: the evaluations reflected deeper conceptual differences which did not reflect the same definitions of dependence and independence which were to be found in the psychological literature. Secondly, the problem of definition of these constructs led to the realisation that not only was it impossible to define these 'variables' in the abstract, without considering the cultural context of the definer, but that even within Psychology in the West, the ideological conceptions which supported the varied definitions were clearly visible, inconsistent within themselves, and changing.

The first chapter is an attempt to analyse this problem of ideologies or value orientations in relation to the psychological constructs used. From these realisations, the study developed into an analysis of those aspects of
parent-child interaction which I believe are central to these ideological differences: positive interpersonal behaviour, and structure in social interaction as represented by the use of conceptions of 'order' in everyday life.

*I use the terms 'Indian' and 'Western' to refer to Hindu and Western European Protestant cultures respectively. While this rather broad usage is convenient, I recognise the limitations on any generalisations I make from my data — viz., that my samples are selected from microscopic portions of these areas. However, the general terms are used primarily in discussing ideological/philosophical differences and psychological literature which thus far makes no further geographical subdivisions.
Abstract

This study analyses interaction between seven year old children and their parents in India and Britain. Sixteen families were selected in Hyderabad, India (of middle- and working- classes), and seven families in Edinburgh (also of both social classes). These families were studied intensively, and ten hours of natural interaction were recorded in each, during the evenings. The analyses focussed on essentially two broad (and conceptually interlinked) areas of interaction: i) parent-child responsiveness, positive affect and sharing, and ii) representations of structure as analysed through sequences of directives and compliance, and references to rules.

In the analyses, two essential arguments were focussed upon: a) that families in the two cultures differ in the significance of various patterns of behaviour in line with ideological trends of the culture (eg., the salience of regulations and order, and the importance of interpersonal means of managing interactions rather than the impersonal means of regulation. ) and b) that Social Learning Theory and Piagetian Theory are essentially inadequate in their generality across cultures.

It was concluded that Psychological theories which are ideologically contradictory to the cultural context are inadequate for explaining behaviour in meaningful terms, and that the two cultures showed patterns of behaviour which were significantly different in the relevant respects.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The comparison of parent-child interaction in Hyderabad and Edinburgh raises for its substance one basic dichotomy which captures several aspects relevant to the comparison. This is the dimension of holism vs. individualism.

1) It is reflected in the different ideologies and metaphysical models of the two cultures, where the Hindu model reflects holism and the Western one individualism.

2) It is revealed in a shift within the social sciences in the West from individualism towards holism; and

3) it forms the basis of two fundamental aspects of interpersonal relations which are of crucial interest to the analysis of parent-child interaction: viz., the question of the affective separation or fusion of individuals, and the question of the structural* unity or distinction between the individual and the society (or in this case between the child and the parent).

The intrinsic relevance of this dimension will be explored in the following sections, with reference to the question of ensuring the compatibility of social scientific models with the models present in the subject of study. The

* Structure here refers to the constitutive (descriptive) and regulative rules which form the substance of 'culture'; the question of interest here focusses on the extent to which these rules are shared. [See p. 54].
affective and structural aspects of interaction as related to this dimension will be discussed in their historical development, and possible ways of measuring them will be explored.

The problems of structure and lack of structure, paradoxically, are both of relevance to fundamental problems in the development of Indian societies towards, as many would have it, an industrial model of Modern Man. Structure as seen in the tendency to preserve hierarchy in society; and the lack of structure as the seeming inability to maintain impersonal regulation. Similarly, the Indian value of fusion has presented the problem of being anti-thetical to Modern independent Man. Neither have the details of the processes which are involved in fusion, structure, and its lack, been clarified, nor have realistic appraisals of their changeability been made. To some extent the present thesis proposes to study those processes. In the context of the specific topics of interpersonal fusion and structure, a clear understanding of the actual contrasting processes in Indian and Western societies is crucial both to plans for change in India and to an understanding of such processes in themselves. The following dimension will be discussed first with relevance to affective and responsive closeness between individuals; secondly, in relation to the existence of this dimension in the social sciences; thirdly, as it relates to rule structure in society in relation to the individual.
Holism and Individualism

"(In quantum physics)...the individuality of the elementary particles is the more attenuated the more they are engaged in interaction. As, on the one hand, there is no completely isolated particle, and as, on the other hand, the bonding of the particles into a system is practically never sufficiently complete for something of their individuality not to remain, it can be seen that reality seems in general to lie somewhere between the concept of autonomous individuality and the concept of a completely fused system." (de Broglie; from Dumont '72, p.77).

Dumont ('72) uses this analogy of particles and systems to illustrate conceptions of the individual in society in different cultures. He sees a fundamental difference between modern Western and more traditional societies as to whether they use conceptions of the particle as distinct from the relations it engages in, or of the system which is considered as "the product of the network of relations" rather than of the particles which engage in the relations.

This cultural difference in conceptions of the individual in relation to his society is paralleled within the social sciences, where conceptions range across both poles of the dimension. These conceptions are responsible for determining the focus of interests within the various social science disciplines. The Western emphasis on the particle rather than on the relations it engages in, has resulted (up to the recent past) in two basic assumptions which have characterised research:
1) that man and culture are separate entities; and culture is somehow outside of man; and following from this,
2) that this split between man and culture either results in, or is accompanied by, an antagonism between the two.

Dumont's analysis of the difference between traditional and modern societies in their considerations of the individual as a separate entity is supported ideologically in the case of Indian societies, which Dumont takes as a particular example. Kakar ('78, p.34): "The essential psychological theme of Hindu culture is the polarity of fusion and separation." He sees the ideological choice of Hinduism as lying, not in the balanced middle of the dimension, but at the extreme pole of fusion. In spiritual life, fusion or 'moksha', which is described as "the state in which all distinctions between subject and object have been transcended" (ibid., p.16,) is the ultimate ideal. "Even when forgotten in the mundane cares of daily living, or banished from awareness at certain stages of life, moksha persists as the main element in the 'ideology of the superego', providing an unconscious ethical direction to the course of life."(ibid., p.30). The dominant thematic content of art in India has reflected this ideal in those aspects of human experience it chose to dramatise or depict: "Man, not as a discrete presence but absorbed in his surroundings; ego, not in opposition to the id but merged with it; individual, not separate but existing in all his myriad connections" (ibid., p.32).
In Indian social life, too, fusion is the ideal. Kakar uses Schopenhauer's analogy of the hedgehogs trying both to find warmth in contact and to avoid the prickles which contact brings, to illustrate the essential tension between the two idealised alternatives for social interaction, and describes the Hindu solution to the problem as lying in a state of closer contact. "If the concept of moksha incorporates the ideal of fusion, implicitly it also defines the Hindu's personal and cultural sense of hell, separation from others and from the 'Other'. Any inner shift towards, or desire for, autonomy arouses the most severe of the culturally supported anxieties: the fear of isolation and estrangement that are visited upon the completely autonomous human being" (ibid., p.36).

In stark contrast to this ideal is the emphasis on the autonomy of the individual in Western cultures. According to Dumont "this individualistic tendency... became established, generalised and popularised from the 18th Century to the age of romanticism and beyond... the ideal of the autonomy of each person became established among men who were dependent on one another for material things to a much greater extent than all their predecessors." (Dumont '72, p.45). Dumont quotes De Tocqueville describing the origins of individualism in democracy. De Tocqueville contrasts aristocratic and democratic societies in respect to the relative evaluation of the individual in each. This contrast is, indeed, akin to Dumont's description of the demands of hierarchical stratification as seen in the caste system in
India, as opposed to the de-emphasis on hierarchy in modern societies.

"Men living in aristocratic ages are... almost always closely attached to something placed out of their own sphere, and they are often disposed to forget themselves. It is true that in those ages the notion of human fellowship is faint, and that men seldom think of sacrificing themselves for mankind; but they often sacrifice themselves for other men. In democratic ages, on the contrary, when the duties of each individual to the race are much more clear, devoted service to any one man becomes more rare; the bond of human affection is extended, but it is relaxed" and further, "Aristocracy had made a chain of all members of the community, from the peasant to the king; democracy breaks that chain and severs every link of it... They owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands. Thus not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants, and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back for ever upon himself alone, and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart." (ibid., pp.52-53).

The theme of fusion-separation is thus shown in the perspective of politico-economic development to be inextricably linked with the theme of hierarchical vs. egalitarian organisation of society.

That this theme of fusion-separation is a salient one in psychology is shown by the amount of research devoted to it. This emphasis reflects also the psychological relevance of the theme as a live conflict. Both intra-cultural and cross-cultural studies of the implications of fusion-separation have so far focussed solely on the issue
of the emotional dependence of individuals upon one another. In at least one approach, the theme of hierarchical vs. egalitarian stratification has been incorporated in this issue (Hsu '63). However, these approaches originate through essentially Western individualist conceptions of human nature, and are therefore biased in the psychological framework they impose on the Indian system. The alternative emphasis would undoubtedly bias the psychological framework in the opposite direction. Qualitative changes within Western Psychology begin to reflect an emphasis on an intermediate position of balance. The possible ethno-centrism within even this new position will be discussed later. Before exploring the ideological bases of these concepts, however, it will be necessary to describe the cross-cultural research in this area, and the theories motivating them.

**Unilateral Dependence**

F.L.K. Hsu's ('63) analysis of the psychological aspects of fusion in Hindu culture considers social as well as religious relations to be organised on a hierarchical theme of unilateral dependence. This one-sided dependence means essentially that the individual need feel no resentment at being a recipient, nor need he feel obligated to reciprocate what he has received. The balancing of obligations is maintained because the givers and recipients need have no direct reference to each other; the ultimate responsibility
for their actions is found in 'dharma'*. If givers give because of 'dharma', and recipients take, also because of 'dharma', then human beings need not be indebted to each other at all. This non-reciprocal relationship is also posited to exist in the supernatural centred orientation to life: "While the world is dependent on Brahman (the Ultimate Reality or Spirit), the latter is not dependent on the world." (ibid.)

Hsu does not raise any comparisons with other religions to support the posited uniqueness of such unilaterality in Hinduism. The contrary idea, furthermore, is hard to envision in any other world religion; it would need to imply that eg., in Christianity, not only is the world dependent on God, but God is dependent on the world. Such an implication is contrary to most main-stream Christian theology which claims that God created the world out of his magnanimity, and Christ suffered for the world out of love, but there is no possibility of God needing the world. Creation is primarily conceived of as a gift to mankind. In Hindu mythology on the other hand, Brahma (the Creator in the Trinity,) is often conceived of as creating the world for his pleasure. There is, in the mythology, a much greater implication of interdependence between the gods and the mortals in Hinduism than there is in Christianity.

* having no direct equivalent in English, 'dharma' has been variously translated as 'right action', 'law' or 'morality'.
Hsu's conclusion that social relations are also organised along a dimension of unilateral dependence is better interpreted by the alternative explanation that unilateral duties and not unilateral dependencies are the crucial organising factor in the culture. (Parameswaran '78.) In one sense, both these explanations are compatible and their relative validity untestable. That is, the prescription of unilateral duties can be seen to give rise to, and coexist with, the relations of unilateral dependence. However, 'principal psycho-cultural tendencies' such as 'unilateral dependence', 'mutual dependence' or 'self-reliance' are seen by Hsu to "encourage in each culture the elevation and domination of some ideas over other ideas.... In this way, behaviour patterns associated with the dominant ideas are taught to the young and honoured, while those rooted in other ideas are reduced, changed and generally shown as undesirable."(underlining added).

Hsu clearly associates these principal tendencies with definite value orientations held within the society. And this is where the alternative explanation of unilateral duties proves more credible; the non-reciprocity of actions which are sanctioned by dharma is the dominant theme of the Bhagavad Gita. To "renounce the fruit of all thy action" (Chapter XII; p.70,) is its most constant message. "Sacrifice is pure when it is offered by one who does not covet the fruit thereof, when it is done according to the
commands of scripture, and with implicit faith that the sacrifice is a duty." (Chapter XVII; p.86) To act without consideration of the reward for the act is emphasised as a prime virtue, and is probably the most commonly taught and known tenet of the Gita. The relations which Hsu describes, symbolised by the parent who gives, and the child who takes, are indeed seen to be valued and encouraged in Hindu thought and social relations; but it is the parent's duty to give which is valued and indeed idealised; not the child's duty to seek and take. It is incorrect, therefore, to postulate unilateral dependence as a value. In the light of this it would be inappropriate to consider the concept of unilateral dependence as representing a 'meaningful tendency' in the organisation of social relations in Hindu societies.

Furthermore, Hsu's concept of dependence is restricted to a material relation of dependence upon others, where 'material' includes not only objects, necessities or gifts, but also acts and services, essential or not. He is talking, therefore, not so much of a psychological relation of dependence, as of an economic/material dependence. The psychological aspects of dependence have generally been studied within the frameworks of Social Learning Theory and Psychoanalysis. These frameworks have been applied in the cross-cultural studies reviewed below.

Dependency: a combination of Social Learning Theory and Psychoanalysis
The construct of dependence was expressed initially as a "drive for succorance" (Murray '38) and then as an acquired drive for dependence stimulated by frustration (Whiting '44). Sears et al ('53, '57) elaborated and tested this construct. Dependency is assumed to be acquired in association with the satisfaction of bodily needs - feeding, warmth and maternal nurturance - whence develops the need to rely on others for nurturance and attention. Once this secondary drive has been acquired, according to Whiting's conflict theory of acquired drives, non-nuturance and frustration serve to strengthen the drive. Therefore the "mother's socialisation task...is to gradually modify the form of expression - not to bluntly eliminate it." (Seymour '71). Gewirtz ('72) dispenses with the necessity for assuming drives, needs or motives, by defining living organisms to include their capacity to respond and act in response and explains dependence and independence as "learned response tendencies". Reinforcement by care-takers in infancy conditions the child to expect care and nurturance and he therefore acts accordingly.

Similarly, independence is explained by some Social Learning Theorists as the association between the child's 'initiated' reactions to internal tensions and the positive responses that they evoke from the environment (eg., spontaneous crying in response to inner tensions - responded to by attention; Beller '55). Therefore independence as a drive is acquired through positive reinforcement for self-initiated actions. Some theorists have done without the
concept of drive for independence by explaining its development in terms of "collative" properties of the environmental stimuli which induce curiosity and exploratory or information-seeking behaviour in the child (Berlyne '60), or that the novelty of certain stimuli produce in the child a state of uncertainty that motivates him to act and thus encourages independent behaviour (Hunt '65).

Regardless of the theoretical stance on the origin of dependency - as an acquired drive (Social Learning Theory), as a learned response (Gewirtz), or as an innate drive (Psychoanalysis) - the concept of dependency as it was accepted at the time, may be described, in Hartup's words: "Whenever the individual gives evidence that people, as people, are satisfying and rewarding," (as opposed to people as means to an instrumental end,) "it may be said that the individual is behaving dependently." (Hartup '63; p.333).

Independence, similarly, refers to the relatively infrequent dependence upon people as people (i.e., seeking nuturance from people,) as well as the manifestation of 'initiative' (generally undefined) and 'achievement-striving'. Social Learning Theory's explanation of independence as acquired through positive reinforcement to initiated actions, virtually excludes the possibility that independence is anything but a different form of dependent behaviour. This is in keeping with the exclusion of anything other than 're-actions' in the organism in behaviourism (Koestler '67; Riegel '76; the 'reactive' vs.
"active' model of man).

Studies of Dependency in India

The structure of Indian society is frequently described as contributing to the predominance of "such dependent qualities as submission, passivity, obedience and duty in the child and de-emphasising such independent qualities as initiative and individualism." (Seymour '71). Numerous ethnographic studies contribute to this analysis: Taylor ('48), Murphy ('53), Carstairs ('57). There have however, been few studies which explore the behavioural and contextual bases of these descriptions. Minturn and Hitchcock ('66) report their observations of scant training by parents for physical self-reliance in the children. They report that the apparent lack of self-reliance is very striking to the Western observer - not only in children, but also in adults. Dependency, both in physical reliance and in problem solving is reported to be prevalent in children's behaviour and verbal reports, and not discouraged by the parents. Parents are reported to accept children's help-seeking requests with the justification "What we have we give."

Seymour ('71), studying urban working-class and middle-class families, observed this lack of emphasis on self-reliance to be true only of the middle-classes. Working-class children were more self-reliant and less dependent on help, although given to negative forms of
attention seeking such as teasing, biting, destroying. She also noted that help seeking in tasks was more prevalent in middle-class than in working-class children, but was a sign of parental interest in the child.

Parental behaviour to children is reported to be directly inhibiting of expressions of independence. From verbal reports "mothers place primary emphasis on obedience and the training of passivity, begun in infancy." Obedience, politeness and peaceableness were reported to be the most emphasised virtues, although in practice disobedience was easily tolerated. Independent behaviour in tasks was observed to be inhibited by a deliberate lack of praise from the adults, and adult impatience with ineptness, due to judgement on standards too high for children.

The studies which report a discouragement of initiative in Indian children are generally of an anecdotal rather than observational nature. As a result, the idea of initiative is undefined in behavioural terms. This lack of initiative is generally attributed to the hierarchical nature of Indian social structure. Carstairs ('57) and Taylor ('48) trace the cause to the caste system's emphasis on conformity at the cost of personal qualities, initiative and self-assertion. Murphy ('53) traces the causes to the reliance upon a fixed order encouraged by the hierarchical system. Sisht and Sinha ('81) trace these results to the effects of the joint family system, and predict a difference in nuclear families. Seymour ('71), in her report of working-class children's
self-reliance, responsibility and almost adult status in terms of sharing household duties, says that these qualities do not lead, as would be expected, to the use of initiative outside the family. Such behaviour is oriented toward coping within the household rather than improving its external position. Early physical self-reliance is reported to be associated in this case with intra-family responsibility and inter-dependence and not with independence.

Although 'taking initiative' has been used as a category of independence (Beller '55), it is described as a pre-condition for independent action, but not diagnostic of it. While in behavioural terms an initiated act is neither defined nor considered to be indicative of independence, in broader, undefined terms, the taking of initiative is accepted as equatable with independence. Independence is generally (Seymour '71; Ames and Randeri '65,) coded only in terms of behaviours which are self-caring (i.e., independent performance of care-taking tasks for the self), or self-entertaining. That is, 'emotional' independence is measured through solitude! In this manner, Seymour's categories exclude the possibility of the occurrence or measurement of independent behaviour in interaction with others.

In general the conclusion of most such studies, whether anecdotal or observational, has been that children in India are actively, rather than passively, dependent, demanding attention or care, and generally receiving it. Further there
is agreement that independence in terms of problem-solving, and in terms of self-assertion in conflict, is discouraged (Ross '61). None of these studies have much to say about emotional dependence - other than that expressions of positive affect are discouraged (Minturn and Hitchcock '66) and rare (Carstairs '57). Seymour ('71) supports Taylor's hypothesis that there is a household emphasis on cooperative and interdependent qualities rather than on personal initiative and independence. She speculates that the crucial attitude that the child is not a unique individual who should be attended to (Minturn and Hitchcock '66,) and whose development should be carefully watched and moulded, but is simply a member of the group, and the absence of praise and recognition of the child's individual competencies and uniqueness - tends to de-emphasise the individual's identity so that as a result, there is no strong sense of personal identity distinct from the group. This lack of separate identity may then lead to dependence on the group for emotional security and satisfaction or to an unwillingness to survive outside the primary group.

There is no evidence for emotional dependence in the parent-child relationship in India. The conclusion of emotional dependence derives mainly through extrapolation from observations of attachment in adult life. Further, the nature of the processes which inhibit independence of opinion (a confusion of the oft-claimed emphasis on conformity), is unexplained.
The process by which value-based labels such as submission, passivity, dependency, lack of initiative, independence, etc. become reified and come to signify more than the transient judgement of specific behaviour made by the original labeller, is the chief danger of ethno-centricity in psychology. Labels such as the above have the power through their ideological connections to convince the audience and blind them to the criteria underlying the labels.

There have been few studies of parent-child interaction in India which do not adopt Western value labels, or which, if they are based on specific behavioural criteria, question the assumptions underlying the superordinate labels. The restriction of independence to non-interactive behaviour (in Seymour's study eg.,) is a good example of a bias in categorisation. What is observed are factors believed to discourage independence; what is discussed is the lack of independence. The following sections trace the ideological bases of dependency to Western Individualism, and describe the change that has taken place within the West to show more positive evaluation of the behaviour that has signified emotional dependence. An attempt is made to show that the use of labels such as 'dependency' is inappropriate in the Indian context. The development of alternative psychological constructs such as responsiveness and cooperation is pursued in this study instead of the dependency construct.
Ideology and Social Science Research

A recognition of the ideological bases of research in the social sciences has a long history. Called the sociology of knowledge, the study of this phenomenon "began in its modern form during the 19th Century when European social thinkers such as Karl Marx, Max Scheler, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim attempted to interpret the radical social transformations associated with the rise of capitalism, science and democracy." (Buss '75). While there were differences between these thinkers in the extents to which they took the thesis of the social determinism of knowledge, and they variously emphasised different aspects of the social situation, they were essentially agreed that social existence may determine social consciousness.

In Psychology alone, of all the social sciences, this recognition of the influence of extra-scientific context upon the science has had a very unwelcoming audience. Nevertheless, psychology has its sociologists too; ranging from Riesman's 1964 assertion that "social science can no more be divorced from values than from other contexts" and his subsequent plea for a re-consideration of individualism in opposition to the then current groupism in America and American social science; to Gergen's 1973 view that social psychology is itself a historical venture, because the dialectic between psychology and its subject/audience ensures the constant influence of each upon the other; to modern
sociologists of knowledge who claim that the dialectic begins even prior to the influence of the discipline upon its audience; that is, that the nature of the audience (in this case both the subject and the scientist,) influences the approaches of the discipline to start with.

Following Weber, a distinction can still be made between the influence of the social context on the selection of scientific problems vs. on the treatment of the same. Buss (’75) describes one point of view which abandons the idea of the absolute to a greater extent than does Weber, thereby placing all knowledge unconditionally in the context of its theoretical framework.

"... There are no absolute truths in the social sciences, where the "facts" are embedded in a particular theoretical framework which in turn rests upon certain epistemic and metaphysical presuppositions. In short, there is an intimate relationship between statements of value and statements of fact; what "ought to be" the case may condition what "is" the case and vice versa; normative statements do have implications for existential statements and vice versa. Thus, the practicing scientific psychologist and his research and theories are of necessity tied to specific human values, beliefs and ideologies. ...Eg., research within a mechanistic, deterministic, atomistic frame of reference is based upon and entails a certain view and value of man and society, while a holistic, humanistic, free-will view of man entails different research strategies and different kinds of psychological knowledge. Thus, by formulating a specific conception of man and his nature, prescription leads to a specific kind of description and knowledge. (Buss ’75)."

Metaphysical conceptions of man determine the criteria and terminology in which description is undertaken; they put
definite limits to our conceptualisation of the phenomena and processes we study, thus determining with an ultimate though loose control, the knowledge which we profess to glean.

To date, such analysis has eg., traced the philosophical roots of Kohlberg's model of moral development in Liberal Social Science Ideology (Sullivan '77), Sampson ('77) discusses the individualistic perspective underlying the conceptual opposition of 'egoism' and 'altruism'. Hogan ('75) and Riegel ('76) also analyse the ideological bases of the Kohlberg-Piaget formulations. Sampson ('77) discusses the growing psychological construct and ideal of androgyny as reflecting the American worship of self-contained individualism. The stark opposition between the philosophies of western scientific rationalism underlying Piagetian models of Cognitive development and the non-causal models of intellectual development implicit in Indian philosophy are another interesting example.

As a case in point, the Dependency construct in particular, and Social Learning Theory in general will be discussed in the context of the ideological climate in which they developed.

Implications of Individualism

Social Learning Theory and most of its supporting research flourished essentially in North America. The dominant ideology, as has been amply reported, has been and still is,
that of Individualism, (Gergen '73, p.312; Pepitone '76, p.643; or what Sampson '77 calls self-contained individualism;) whatever transient changes of shape it may undergo. As Hogan puts it, "It seems clear that the dominant temper of American Psychology, particularly in those branches that deal with the whole person, his development and his social behaviour, is wedded to an individualistic perspective ... To the degree that this is true, much American Psychology can be plausibly described as thoroughly egocentric."(Hogan '75, p.534). The ideology of individualism needs for its scientific support beliefs in, and demonstrations of, the uniqueness and internal validity (or internal determinism) of individuals. In contrast, the ideology of socialism requires evidence of the shared aspects of individuals in a group; of similarity implying equality rather than of uniqueness implying differential status. While the former ideology is therefore more comfortable with a nativist view of man, the latter is compatible only with an empiricist. Ideology has implications not only for views of the determinants of human nature, but also for its specific nature. That is, it necessitates conceptions of man in terms of the qualities it desires to promote, encourage or discourage.

American individualism ought on these grounds, to have fostered a psychology which contained nativist beliefs, and to have explored constructs of man which reflected the qualities of enterprise, free-thought, non-conformity and pioneering progress, which it so valued. However, American
society was founded very firmly on a social ethic which, rejecting the static aristocratic heritage of European societies, idealised a spirit of opportunity for all. In contrast to the nativist spirit which was a part of the European brand of individualism, nativism would have been anathema to the spirit of progress in America. The tenets of Behaviourist Psychology were, on the other hand, far better suited to it. But there is an essential tension between the acceptance of empiricist explanations of origins, and the belief in individual uniqueness.

Socialism, on the other hand, cannot theoretically tolerate nativism at all. Nativism is more fundamentally opposed to socialist doctrines than empiricism is to individualist. It is not a surprise that in Russia, Pavlovian Psychology was the only accepted school of psychology, since it was most closely compatible with Marxist ideas of the socio-economic bases of thought.

In America it was predictable that the tension between the empiricism which was so attractive to its spirit of development, and the individualism which demanded uniqueness, was bound to cause swings in the relative emphases given to each in psychology. One such swing is well depicted by Riesman in his "Individualism Reconsidered" where he shows conflicts within psychology due to conflicts in the ideological bases of their subjects of study. It is clear that the thesis of the social determinism of knowledge is itself antithetical to the beliefs in uniqueness and the
Protestant ideal in America, to which Sampson ('78) attributes the attraction for what he calls Paradigm I science.

The conflict between the attraction of empiricist theories of development and conceptions of the uniqueness of the individual in America were partially resolved in alleging the infinite variability of experience, thus allowing the possibility of individual uniqueness. This tension was unresolvable, however, in one avenue of thinking in which empiricist and capitalist ideas took psychology; viz., that of uni-dimensional cognitive tests (what Buss '75 refers to as white-achievement-oriented intelligence tests,) which developed strongly in the U.S.A.

The resolution of this uniformity of evaluation was a strong resurgence of humanist ideas, which rejected quantitative measurement and achievement-oriented evaluations and attempted to resurrect an organismic, qualitative, and what has sometimes been called a 'mystical' model of man.

Parallels between American Individualism and Psychological Constructs:

Emphasis on Individual Conscience → studies focusing on internalised super-ego, on individual responsibility.

Emphasis on Uniqueness and Individuality → studies focusing on dependency, independence (attitudinal as well as emotional), conformity/non-conformity,
assertiveness, consistency (as defining the individual identity; Zimbardo '69), and individuation; definition of the moral ideal as independence from group pressure, i.e., the individual's "capacity to remove self from group embeddedness" (Sampson '77).

Emphasis on Progress, Development -> studies of differentiation, mastery and competence and the achievement motive.

Emphasis on Rationality and Science -> curiosity, exploration, abstract thinking (Piaget), consistency in reasoning (Piaget) and disembedded thinking (i.e., objectivity).

In the light of these illustrations the argument that psychology studies and thinks in the language of what is of cultural interest seems too obvious to be of any significance. The question of interest then turns to the validity of the constructs which can be, and is, assumed to be untouched by their ideological selection. It can be seen, however, that psychologists' evaluations of the behaviour they study extend not only to the labels they give it (and which will be shown can change, as in the case of dependency), but also to the theories and interpretations of the labels. Even if the validity of a construct is untouched by evaluations attached to it, the very existence of these values in the formation and evaluation of theories shows us that we are not dealing with absolute entities. The influence of ideology upon the retention and rejection of one particular psychological construct, dependency, is now
pursued. The purpose of this argument is not to assert that the value bases of constructs and theories undermine their validity, but to show that the presence of this link implies an inevitable subjectivity in the development, demarcation, measurement and application of psychological constructs.

The origins of Western Psychology in an individualist tradition are of special relevance to this study because of the contrary phenomenon existing in India; i.e., a holistic conception of human nature. Sampson (’77) posits a thesis of Interdependence as an alternative to the strong cultural ideal of Self-Contained Individualism which describes the "individual as the possessor of all the valued qualities of the culture or (sees) collective endeavours as thwarting individual self-realization." (p. 774). The ideal of the androgynous person; the model of the academic who is both teacher and scholar; the demand for individual responsibility for possessing all traits that are good and desirable for mental health - are all described as examples of individualist conceptions. In the Indian context especially, the thesis of Interdependence is a perhaps more fitting paradigm than that of Self-Containment, for the development of psychological constructs. In relation to this, the change away from thinking of positive interpersonal behaviour in terms of dependence/independence, to thinking in terms of responsiveness and cooperation admits of a shift towards Interdependence. But even these constructs, if measured as quantities in individuals rather than in relations, is, methodologically speaking, based on
individualist principles. As a first step, however, it is the conceptual concession to Interdependence rather than Self-Containment that will be explored.

**From Dependency to Responsiveness**

At the height of Social Learning Theory and large scale investigations into the construct of Dependency, i.e., in the 50's, the following behaviour was identified as indicating the strength of a dependency drive: attention seeking, praise seeking, reassurance seeking, help seeking, proximity seeking and physical contact seeking. Both when directed by children to peers and when directed to adults, these behaviours (and increasingly so with higher frequencies,) were interpreted to indicate a need for emotional contact, recognition and support which constitutes Murray's n.Succorance, or the need for another individual as an end in itself rather than as a means to some other instrumental end. High frequencies of these behaviours were seen as problematic and indicative of a clinical condition in the individual.

In the last decade, the same behaviours are being interpreted as indicating the social responsiveness of the individual towards another individual, whether a peer or an adult. Foot, Chapman and Smith ('77), studying interaction between children in humour situations measured social responsiveness by the following behaviours: laughing, smiling, talking, looking at, and touching. These behaviours
were interpreted in the light of previous research to indicate social arousal, intimacy and strong attention. By virtue of their 'sociability' and affiliative characteristics they were interpreted as seeking to initiate or maintain positive social contact with the other.

Cantor and Gelfand ('77) and Cantor, Wood and Gelfand ('77) studying the effects of child responsiveness on adults, focussed on behaviour very similar to that used to measure child dependency upon adults. Responsiveness was inferred from the following behaviours: looking at, smiling when praised, asking for feedback, asking for help, responding enthusiastically to questions and talking spontaneously. Smiling when praised, and asking for feedback are directly translatable in terms of dependency to mean showing pleasure in, and seeking, praise; asking for help is again one of the dependency categories. All the other categories, as are most of Foot, Chapman and Smith's categories, are based on the assumption that behaviour which is expressive of the desire to initiate and maintain social interaction, such as spontaneous talking, enthusiastic responding, etc., is better called 'responsive' than attention-seeking and therefore 'dependent'. While the implication of dependency is not entirely lost from at least some of these behaviours in the implicit conceptions of today's psychologists, such implications are almost entirely ignored, and certainly not used in the discussion of these behaviours in the literature.
The reasons for this drastic change of interpretation are complex. No one would claim that they have discovered the absolute meaning of any behaviour even within a social context. And yet the shift in interpretation is such as to imply to the lay observer that the very meanings of behaviour have changed in accordance with some new scientific truth. That no new piece of information has actually surfaced to change their meanings is clear. The changes that have occurred within psychological theories are not directly related to the meanings of behaviour. Rather, they concern new knowledge about the origins of various behaviours, their process of development, and the processes of influence in the interaction between man and society.

Psychologists have discovered that individual relations of attachment are crucial to the physical and emotional well-being of infants and children (though not adults). (Harlow '63, Bowlby '53, Rutter '71 etc.) This led to a view of relationships of emotional dependency as being necessary and providing primary gratification as the Object Relations school of psychoanalysis had asserted, rather than as providing secondary gratification as Social Learning Theory believed. Furthermore, the nature of positive interpersonal behaviour in infants was re-interpreted to imply neurological pre-wiring for such interpersonal functions.

There is no immediate logical reason why these changes should reject interpretations of 'dependency' and adopt the label of 'attachment' and then of 'cooperation',
'responsiveness', etc. Such labels seem to be more dependent upon a process of ideologicalevaluation than on the demands of empirical analyses.

Essentially, the rejection of the dependency construct has been justified in terms of its multi-dimensionality (Sears et al '65, Ainsworth '72, etc.,) and the lack of clear relations to predicted antecedents in parental behaviour. The fact that each response has to be considered on its own rather than as part of an integrated index of dependency, is not in itself sufficient to invalidate the construct. Even if the 'responses' called 'dependent' are not correlated, there is no reason why the posited 'dependency motive' cannot be considered to express itself in diverse ways. The chief reason for the rejection is more that the dependency construct with its pejorative overtones has lost its value and usefulness for explaining human behaviour. At least a part of this value lies in the fact that regardless of the direction of influence, this construct is incompatible with the gradually pervading humanist conceptions of man and of interpersonal relations. In talking about the origins of behaviourism and shifts in psychology over the turn of the century, O'Donnell says, "From the consciousness of man to the behaviour of man: surely this marked if somewhat schematised shift of focus represents more than the process of cumulative empirical inquiry." (O'Donnell '79). In the same spirit, the present argument claims the gradual rejection of the dependency construct in psychology was due to a) a rejection of Social
Learning Theory, and b) a shift in value orientation which supports a more child-centred-constructivist and humanist approach; this is implied in Bell's rejection of uni-directional influence in traditional Social Learning Theory. Further, a more group oriented approach developed, and was reflected in the progressive underplaying of individualism in modern developmental psychology, and its replacement with greater focus on cooperative action.

To some extent the growing positive evaluation of positive other-directed behaviour could be attributed to empirical evidence showing the necessity of such behaviour for 'healthy' development. But most of this evidence comes from extreme studies of deprivation. Even prior to these studies there had been no denial of the necessity of attachment to that extent.

Eg., "emotional dependence on a mother figure is a normal aspect of human development. Indeed there is reason to believe that children who grow up under conditions which fail to develop such motivation will have asocial personalities of the kind described as psychopathic. They lack both conscience and the capacity to affiliate with other human beings. Only rare instances of such developmental mishaps have been reported, however, and the virtually universal sequence is for a child to become warmly affectionate and dependent in his early years and then gradually to become less so as the socialisation process is invoked." (Sears, Maccoby and Levin '57).

In their actual observations of infant social behaviour, those made in 1957 were not very different from those made today. Eg.,
"A newborn baby is not very social. For a brief time after he is born, he is quite unresponsive to external stimulation. He sucks on appropriate occasions, blinks his eyes to the light, and makes gross muscular reactions to forced changes in posture. But not until he is in his second month does he show much indication of responding to people as people. Then he begins to make rapid strides towards becoming a social being. He learns to turn towards his mother when she approaches, to clutch her, to smile at her. And eventually when he is three or four months old he begins to 'call' her when he is hungry or cold; by six months he has learnt to lift his arms towards her when she reaches for him. In a sense, he has passed from the receptive stage to become a social person in his own right, not only responsive to others but actively seeking, controlling and manipulating them." (ibid.).

Except for one modern observation regarding the immediate post-natal activity of the infant (i.e., that the neonate withdraws into unresponsiveness a few hours after birth while showing smiles and other interactive behaviour in the first few hours,) neither the factual information nor the interpretation of the meanings of specific behaviour has changed very much eg., wants mother, rejects strangers, reaches for her, etc. It is merely their long term desirability and undesirability that has changed. Additionally, the shift could be attributed to an 'is-becomes-ought' fallacy; i.e., it is innate, therefore it ought to exist, and therefore it is good. Why then does this fallacy not operate in respect to such avowedly innate tendencies as human aggression? There is no escaping the fact that the psychologist has pre-conceptions about behaviour, motives, their usefulness and their value prior to investigating them. This can hardly be avoided unless psychologists were to be excluded from their culture.
The argument can very easily become a chicken and egg one. To avoid this, the present discussion will be limited to describing the simultaneous changes in metaphysical assumptions regarding human nature and the changes in psychological constructs and theories, which are logically interlinked. All that this will show is that the process of social science research is closely entwined with specific cultural values and pre-conceptions. To this extent, cross-cultural application of such concepts is even more fraught with bias.

**Shifts in Assumptions in Theories of Development:**

1) The identity of the individual as related to his society; i.e., from separate to interlinked.
2) The relationship between the process of becoming social and the process of becoming cultural; i.e., from separate to unified.
3) The relationship between the individual and his society; i.e., from antagonistic to protagonistic.
4) The direction of influence between man and society; i.e., from unilateral (in either direction), to reciprocal.

The first assumption will be dealt with in the second half of the chapter, in relation to the development of structure within individuals. Suffice it now to say that psychologists have traditionally assumed that man and society are distinctly separate entities. From this initial assumption followed the views that man and society were
invariably in conflict; and that culture was an imposition upon man, therefore man became human as a matter of development, but only became a member of a culture by force. Further, that it was society which moulded man and influenced him. This last assumption, while following from the assumption of antagonism, does not sit comfortably with other aspects of these assumptions. It assumes too passive a model of man for that implied by the notion of man in antagonism. However, these assumptions did indeed variously and simultaneously hold sway in psychology upto the present decade.

An analysis of the models of man underlying psychological theories, by Overton and Reese ('73), depicts a much sharper dichotomy between their two basic models, which are the Mechanistic (reactive organism) model and the Organismic (active organism) model. The structural (methodological) implications of the models are shown in oppositional choices which are similar to the changing assumptions described in the preceding paragraph. These choices are:

1) Holism vs. Elementarism
2) Structure-Function vs. Antecedent-Consequent
3) Structural vs. Behavioural Change
4) Discontinuity vs Continuity

The Mechanistic Model logically necessitates a position of elementaristic analysis, where the whole is "predictable from its parts" and where "physically identical elements have the same 'meaning'." The assumption of holism
represents the organism as a totality, "a system of parts in interaction with each other, such that each part derives its meaning from the whole." This assumption "proscribes the conclusion that behaviours have identical meanings solely because they are physically identical; it prescribes that behaviour be assessed in terms of its function in the whole or context in which it is embedded, i.e., according to the function, ends or goals of the organism." Holism, therefore, implies a Gestaltist, anti-reductionist approach at the same time as it logically necessitates an assumption of contextual, internal and relative 'meaning' as opposed to positivist 'objective' criteria for analysis. (A holistic assumption is, therefore, necessary for relativistic cross-cultural analyses of psychological phenomena).

Following from the assumption of elementarism the mechanistic model focuses on specific causes and effects, i.e., Antecedent-Consequent relations between particles, and on change in the specific particles, i.e., Behavioural change. It assumes that all change is continuous, in that any state is reducible to and predictable from, earlier states.

The Organismic model on the other hand, focuses on teleological analyses of psychological structures and functions in the organism. Purpose is assumed as a basic and explanatory category. In the Mechanistic model purpose is a category derived from other basic elements, and itself needs to be explained. (Eg., S.L.T needing to explain the
derivation and causal factors of positive interpersonal behaviour, as opposed to Attachment theory or Trevarthen's assumption of the need for positive interpersonal behaviour, attachment, or cooperation as itself a given.) Consequently the Organismic model focusses on Structural rather than on Behavioural change, and assumes Discontinuity rather than Continuity in the explanation of changing states and structures. (But Discontinuity is a limited assumption - i.e. - limited to the psychological field. The ultimate aim of all present theories is still to causally explain, and in continuous fashion, psychological phenomena, even if by retracting to neurological changes).

When considering Developmental Psychology, or in particular, explanations of the development of individuals in social groups, over the last 40 years, it is probably quite accurate to say that the first four assumptions which were held (in various combinations) in the 40's and 50's are now almost entirely rejected. The following three major developmental theories present a simple and condensed picture of this change: Social Learning Theory in the 40's, 50's and early 60's; Attachment Theory in the 60's and 70's; and modern developmental theory with the particular example of Trevarthen's 'Intersubjectivity' in the 70's and 80's. These theories and the assumptions they typify have co-existed across time; the change over time is in the movements of the discipline as a whole toward greater or lesser appreciation of their various aspects. These three theories are used to illustrate ideological shifts
accompanying theoretical changes, and the temporal direction of these shifts.

Social Learning Theory made the assumption of the unilateral influence of the environment upon the individual, and with it the assumption of man and society as distinct wholes, though not necessarily in conflict. The assumption of antagonism was made by those who rejected the functionalist emphasis on individual adaptation to the environment, and stressed, instead, individual control of the environment (Sites '71 in his Control Theory).

The traditional view of child development and socialisation has seen the problem as a dual one: the process of becoming 'social' or 'human'; and the process of becoming a member of a culture. This view implies and perhaps derives from, a rigid externalised approach to culture as a concrete set of rules alone. It allows the rejection of moral order without seeing that it diminishes from the rejecting individual's social-ness.

Overton and Reese refer to White's and Kessel's work on the assumptions underlying S-R theory. They quote Kessel as concluding that "presuppositions (model implications) tend to ensure the generation of empirical evidence which supports the basic theoretical position", giving the example of Spence's work on S H r and D, where he considered higher mental processes as interfering with the formation of habits and therefore controlled for the non-occurrence of the former. Kessen introduced the concept of "constrained
analysis", which refers to the "limits imposed on psychological analysis by premises that are not fully explicit and often not testable." (O + R '73).

The examples given by O and R show that within the implications of the mechanistic model, S-R theory could go on ad infinitum explaining and developing constructs such as dependency. It is clear that what has changed in developmental psychology is the underlying model of man. With this change, the 'mechanism' of Social Learning Theory can only be rejected in its entirety.

Attachment Theory makes two crucial breaks from Social Learning Theory in 1) asserting the fundamental nature of positive other-directed behaviour, and its necessity and positive value for mental health, and 2) attempting to reject the uni-directional model of influence which Social Learning Theory had erected. Further, the theory combines an adaptation and control orientation in their view of infant-environment interaction. Although Ainsworth and Bell('74) view infant behaviour patterns as adapted to an environment (i.e., the mother,) whose responsiveness is, to quite a large degree under the control of the infant's behaviour, Attachment Theory still falls short of developing a complete model of reciprocity. "An infant's competence rests, in most essential respects, upon the cooperation of the mother figure. This defines an infant's competence as his effectiveness." - the degree to which he can "through his own activity control the effect that his environment
will have on him." (Ainsworth and Bell '74). In infancy the major part of the infant's effectiveness can be seen only in the mother figure's responses to him. Attachment Theory posits no reciprocal responsiveness at this stage of mother-infant interaction. Further, it fails to answer the question of why the controlling infant with its responsive mother ever begins to be responsive to its mother and to external demands. Attachment Theory's answer is environmental adaptation from an evolutionary/ethological perspective. However from the point of view of motive, this explanation is inadequate. The theory can be developed to argue that the infant needs at some point, to respond, in order to be able to control. This is, in fact, the line of reasoning adopted by Control Theory. However, it implies Machiavellian knowledge by the infant, of the effects of its responsiveness, if the argument is applied to an explanation of motives.

Some modern developmental theorists, eg., Trevarthen ('74, '79), seek to remedy this inadequacy by positing an innate motive for cooperation in the infant. Such a position assumes a genuinely reciprocal process of responsive interaction in the mother-infant dyad. Further, it does not separate the process of becoming social from the process of becoming cultural. It posits, in addition, a protagonism between individual and society. In addition to carrying the humanism of modern developmental approaches to its psychological completion, the present state of developmental theory completely reverses the pejorative implications
attached to positive interpersonal behaviour and motives.

Psychological Constructs in Cross-Cultural Studies

From the preceding discussions of:
1) the metaphysical assumptions involved in psychological theories;
2) the ideological bases of psychological constructs and theoretical beliefs;
and 3) historical changes in ideology, metaphysical and theoretical beliefs,
it is evident that:
a) aspects of reality are differentially emphasised and constructed in theory and research depending on their ideological relevance;
and b) the meanings attributed to the focussed aspects of reality change over time, not only due to empirical discoveries but also due to changing orientations and ideological needs.

Given that any psychological construct or piece of research only has meaning in its specific social context, i.e. if there is already ground for assimilating the construct or the information, cross-contextual generalisation of such constructs would seem inadvisable. In the study of positive interpersonal behaviour it has already been shown that there is a different ideological background in Indian culture to that which exists in the West. Interpersonal fusion is seen as a highly desirable state in
Hindu culture. In the West, Protestant culture views fusion ambivalently, and as almost irrelevant to its main concerns. In interpersonal relations in the latter, autonomy of individual action is prized; dependency is seen at best as disabling human achievement, and at worst as bondage. In India, as in most traditional cultures, dependency between individuals is an irrelevant side issue to fusion. The Western idealisation of self-containment within individuals is seen as a foolish illusory pursuit, as is excellently summarised by Tagore (1913): "O Fool to try to carry thyself upon thy own shoulders! 0 beggar, to come to beg at thy own door!"

In such an ideological context what meaning could an investigation into emotional dependency in children have? When the construct has no internal relevance, what justification does its use possess? The essential point is that with such contrasting ideologies there is no basis for comparison; behaviour cannot be considered motivationally equivalent in the search for developmental patterns.

From Overton and Reese's ('73) discussion of the manner in which underlying structural-theoretical models of man "differentially affect the research process" a third conclusion can be drawn, viz., c) that these often implicit models determine the results obtained. As an issue in itself, this is larger than can be discussed here. However, its implication for cross-cultural studies lies in the question of the ethno-centricity of
implicit models which we may inevitably be imposing upon another culture. The main reason for seeking to understand and avoid this ethno-centricity is to ensure that the psychological analyses and interpretations have meaning for the people studied (Serpell '77, below).

This problem of the non-equivalence of meanings across cultures has been much discussed in cross-cultural psychology and anthropology in terms of the emic-etic dilemma (Pike '54). One solution to this problem is, as Berry '69 and Brislin '76 have proposed, the attempt to achieve 'etic' or universalistic constructs by dealing at increasingly abstract levels of analysis. Such a goal requires for its completion a vast amount of knowledge about the actual differences between the cultures in the areas being dealt with. The approach which Serpell suggests, and which, to an extent, must precede the attempt to derive universals, is to obtain 'emic' constructs in non-comparative research in terms of the indigenous 'constitutive rules' of a culture. Essentially this involves "paying attention to indigenous conceptions of psychological phenomena" in order that the interpretations and insights of the scientists have meaning for the people studied (Serpell '77, p.288).

J.B.P.Sinha in a plea for genuine partnership between Third World and Western psychologists describes some of the practical ill effects which an ethno-centric imposition of Western concepts can have on psychology in the Third World.
The obsession with a universal picture of 'Modern Man' caused Indian and Western psychologists to blindly apply this model to a context where its implicit values found few indigenous roots, and were often explicitly contradictory to local values. Triandis' description of this model Modern Man ('71) reveals the extent to which the definition centres around the individual as agent and recipient of social change (Sinha '82): "Modern Man is apparently open to new experiences; relatively independent of parental authority; concerned with time and planning; willing to defer gratification; he feels that man can be the master over nature, and that he controls the reinforcements he receives from his environment; he believes in determinism and science; he has a wide cosmopolitan perspective, he uses broad ingroups; he competes with standards of excellence, and he is optimistic about controlling his environment." (Triandis '71). Such implicit theories and evaluations of Western origin "either determined the range of our research and did not allow us to go very far or distracted us from the core issues which might have otherwise provided greater impetus to our research activities." (Sinha '82).

As Sinha succinctly puts it, most psychological research in India reveals a negative self-image, a tendency to "list 'what-we-are' in terms of 'what-we-are- not'." Research into personality, developmental and industrial psychology was always implicitly aimed at altering the given Indian condition to develop that which was absent - as
defined by the very Western perspective which they were trying to disown. "For example, studies on dependency were meant to fashion strategies to cultivate autonomy and competence. Nurturance of a superior was to be utilised for fostering a fraternal type of participative relationship. Studies on the socialisation of the Indian child reflected our concern for the growth of competence, autonomy, etc. or were directed to relate the patterns of family interactions to the psychological differentiation of the child". (Sinha '82).

The dependency construct isolates the emotional dependency of the child upon the adult in a social context where "most mothers... soon begin to look on this emotional dependency as something changeworthy" and where emotional dependency "has a little the quality of something infantile, of something that must be put away in favour of more mature kinds of expressed affection. The child should love his mother, to be sure, but with a less embarrassing degree of openness. He should want her attention, but not hound her for it, nor insist on it as a complete gratuity. The ultimate aim of the socialisation process as it relates to dependency, is for the child to be fond of the mother rather than passionately attached to her, to be pleased by her attention and interest, but not incessantly to demand it." (Sears, Maccoby and Levin '57). The understanding of the particular evaluative implications revealed in this quotation does not, from one point of view, invalidate the extrapolation from child behaviour in contrary social
contexts, the interpretation of changeworthy emotional dependency.

However, to the extent that this construct is unavailable in another social context, its application in the latter is redundant and unproductive. In pursuit of psychological constructs to analyse positive interpersonal behaviour in the Indian social context it was decided to develop categories of 'responsiveness' rather than of 'dependency'. The former has the advantage of attributing positive value to such behaviour, consistent with the Indian evaluation (Kakar '78). In addition, this construct allows the theoretical incorporation into it, of a larger behavioural and motivational area. Further, it is evident that the construct is equally valid in the present day context of Western psychology.

In terms of Overton and Reese's Organismic vs. Mechanistic models, the model of man in Hindu philosophy and psychology (deduced eg., from Kakar '78,) reveals a definite holistic, non-causal, structural rather than behavioural, and discontinuous rather than continuous change orientation. Responsiveness, therefore, would appear to be a more valid theoretical imposition on the Indian context than is 'dependency'.

Until research examines the meanings of the construct at grass-roots levels in both social contexts, however, we are still dealing in the dark in trying to understand the internal relevance of the construct and its psychological
patterns. The present study is an exploration of the construct in terms of patterns of behaviour, and its relevance to other behavioural dimensions, viz., that of rule structure.

**Structure and the Individual**

The question of the atomism or holism of the individual in his society has so far been considered in terms of the positive interpersonal relations which individuals engage in, and the manner in which they have been and can be analysed. This question can be approached from another angle, viz., that of the extent to which individuals are constituted by, or independent of, the social structure of their groups.

This question touches the heart of the problem of individual autonomy. The traditional approach of psychologists of the atomistic persuasion has been to assume an independence between man and society, which has led, generally, to studies of "the mechanisms by which the society exercises its dominion over its component individuals and enforces conformity to its norms, i.e., its values." (E.A. Ross as quoted in Cook-Gumperz '73).

The assumption of structural independence between the particle and the whole necessarily assumes a duality of interest between the two. This duality arises from what Wrong ('61) describes as the Hobbesian problem of social control, and has led to two lines of research: One which
emphasises the individual's adaptation to the demands of society, and another which emphasises the individual's control of society. The emphasis on the individual's adaptation to demands or necessities led to an over-socialised concept of man, and to the tradition of studies of socialisation which view man as a passive learner, sufficiently internalising the norms of his society in order to adapt to his environment (Wrong '61); and this adaptation/internalisation has been seen as the sole factor leading to the continuity of that society over time.

The Freudian view of socialisation - though in no sense viewing the individual as a passive learner - also sees the process of becoming a member of a particular culture as consisting of the (relatively straightforward) acceptance of its norms, and their internalisation into the superego for the purpose of resolving personal conflicts.

The omissions of these and following approaches lie in two areas:
a) They have ignored the constituent nature of society within the individual, and have seen society as an external regulator.
b) They have ignored the interpersonal factors such as need for sharing beliefs/constructs/values/rules which contribute to the creation and continuity of social groups.

The change in theories of human nature and socialisation has been accompanied by a different understanding of 'culture' and 'structure' within social
groups. The assumed duality and/or conflict between man and society has changed largely to a non-Hobbesian view of human nature in which man and society are actually seen as protagonists in the same battle. In attempting to refute the necessity for the Hobbesian question which Wrong states as "How is social order possible?", sociologists have adopted the Durkheimian position that the social order is constitutive and not merely regulative, of the individual*.

Further, the assumed difference between the process of becoming cultural and the process of becoming social has collapsed, and taken with it the old rigid and externalised view of culture.

Durkheim's view of social control avoided in these respects the dualism of the Hobbesian tradition. "Children cannot choose to be socialised: they are born into an already existing social world in which they have a position described by others. In this sense it can be said that 'society transcends' the individual, it is there before him and continues after his death. But during the lifetime of

* Wrong describes the modern sociological conception to be that "human conduct is totally shaped by common norms" (ibid.,) and that "action follows institutionalised patterns ...opposition of individual and common interests has only a very limited relevance or is thoroughly unsound" (Sutton '56, p.394, quoted in Wrong '61, p.71). However, the psychological mechanisms by which this 'constitutive' nature of order is made possible, have been rather naively attributed either to conformity to norms, motivated by mutual approval seeking, and "the desire to achieve a positive image of self by winning acceptance or status in the eyes of others" (Wrong '61, p.71,) or less commonly to the internalisation' of social norms which is used in a non-Freudian way (Wrong) to refer to the individual's affirmation of, as well as conformity to, the social norms.
each component individual it is this individual's activities that make up the social order which can be seen to exist." (from Cook-Gumperz '73).

Control theory (Sites '71) has gone to the other extreme in rejecting the dualism between man and 'culture' (though not between man and his social group) and in rejecting the functionalist emphasis on adaptation to the exclusion of conflict and control. "Functionalism's fundamental premise is that culture and society are theoretically prior and use the individual for the sake of the system which in turn (hopefully) gratifies the needs of the individual which have been internalised from the culture." (Sites '71) Control theory on the other hand views the individual as theoretically prior to culture and society; the "individual's most fundamental orientation to his environment is to attempt to control it in order to meet his needs." (ibid) and that he therefore uses and produces culture for himself. While recognising that culture is not a static system given to the individual and passively accepted as a set of rules and ethics, Sites seems to ignore those aspects of 'culture' which contribute to the development of the cognitive and emotional tools and processes which actually enable the individual to attempt autonomous control of his environment. He sees the individual as autonomous by virtue of his driving needs, and somehow untouched by the culture he is actively developing.

This view is part of the 19th Century individualist tradition which removes autonomy from the exclusive domain
of the whole (society) and gives it to the exclusive possession of the part (the individual). While saying that "culture must be viewed as a continuous creation or re-creation immediate to the interaction process", largely acceptable though he is, Sites ignores the fundamental truth of Durkheim's statement that "the social order is a moral order, and as such is constitutive, not merely regulative, of the individual." Or Dumont('66,p.6): "Man acts as a function of what he thinks, and while he has up to a certain point the ability to arrange his thoughts in his own way, to construct new categories, he does so starting from the categories which are given by society; their link with language should be sufficient reminder of this." Dumont traces the resistance to this non-dualist view of man and society to the individualist value of uniqueness, a need to imagine that experience is unique in order to recognise it as one's own.

The essential flaw of much of the research into child social development has been the sharp divorcing of man's "need for control" from his "need for affiliation". Research tended to press these two different 'needs' into the opposite poles of a very much value based dichotomy, where the control orientation led supposedly to autonomy, growth and development, while the affiliative tendencies led to dependency and partial stagnation (eg., the many studies correlating dependency with the lack of incidental learning, with suggestibility, etc.).
Apart from reflecting a value orientation which is already being rejected in psychology, this dichotomy also prevents the unified consideration of these areas of motivation and behaviour. Ainsworth and Bell ('74)'s analysis of person-relevant competence and Hess ('74)'s analysis of system-relevant competence suggest that the processes involved are the same in both areas. Hess makes the distinction between the two areas of behaviour: "acts and feelings through which persons are related as individuals to one another and to small groups - are patterns of interaction which might be called person-relevant behaviour." There "is another category of social activity which, following Dennis ('68), might be called system-relevant behaviour - referring to attitudes and beliefs, feelings and acts which relate individuals to institutions and to political and social systems." Hess's description of social competence in the individual can be compared to Ainsworth's analysis of the factors which contribute to the facilitation of social competence in the infant in relation to its mother. Social competence is "the ability of the person to elicit the cooperation of others." "Maternal responsiveness provides the conditions for a normally functioning infant to influence what happens to him by influencing the behaviour of his mother. This, we believe, fosters a general "sense of competence" (White '63), and a sense of competence - or confidence - influences the development of increased competence in other realms, whether viewed in age relevant or absolute terms." Extending
this to system-relevant behaviour, social competence could be described as the ability to elicit the cooperation of social institutions. The infant's social competence is developed out of the sense of his effectiveness, his sense of being able to influence and control what happens to him, through controlling the actions of his mother. Similarly, his system-relevant social competence must be something which develops out of interaction between the child and the system. Those aspects of the system which the child is confronted with, which might be called structural, can be conceptually separated from the interpersonal aspects described by Ainsworth. For example, the system as represented by its rules, restraints, demands, values, ethical and moral judgements etc., as separate from sensitivity to needs, responsiveness to signals, effective communication and positive affect. Yet, if we accept that the mother and other significant interactors, whose sensitivity, responsiveness and cooperation are essential for the infant's person-relevant social competence, are the same individuals who are representatives of the system to the infant, then the development of competence in the one area, or interaction in the one area cannot really be distinguished from interaction in the other. The processes must be simultaneous and undistinguishable. Having rejected an externalised model of culture, and having accepted that infants become members of a culture at the same time as they become 'social', it is impossible to entirely separate the process of an individual's interaction with people as people
from his interaction with people as agents of culture.

Similar to Ainsworth's combination of control and attachment as crucial in the development of the infant, Trevarthen ('79) sees little polarity between the control and cooperative orientation in the infant in the process of developing culture through human interaction. In trying to isolate the factors that make the highly cooperative interaction of humans distinct from that of most animals, Trevarthen points to an intention to control and be controlled. "The secret weapon in this kind of development and in its evolution seems to be an ability to perceive intention in others and to act to communicate with that intention, to control and be controlled by it." (Trevarthen '79).

Though conceptually separable, in practice the two areas of interpersonal behaviour and structure-relevant behaviour are inextricable within a particular interaction process or relationship. However, an attempt to separate the two when dealing with groups which have been separated a priori for their differences in structure is more conceivable. In this regard, the contrast between Hindu social structure and that in Britain, as it is seen in interactions between children and parents is likely to be of particular interest.

It is an oft quoted observation that Hindu society is structured in such a manner that its basic nature is very stable and tends to continuity and only very gradual change.
Dumont contrasts the ideal of collectivism in Indian culture and in other traditional societies with the liberty and equality based individualism of modern societies. In the traditional societies "the ideal derives from the organisation of society with respect to its ends (and not with respect to individual happiness); it is above all a matter of order, of hierarchy; each particular man in his place must contribute to the global order, and justice consists in ensuring that the proportions between social functions are adapted to the whole." (Dumont '72)

There would appear to be a great deal more urgency with regard to maintaining order and ascertaining the compliance of individuals in such societies as India is composed of, than in cultures which tend to see society almost as "a non-human residuum: the tyranny of numbers, an inevitable evil running counter to the sole psychological and moral reality which is contained in the individual"; a view which forms "an integral part of the current ideology of liberty and equality." (Dumont '66).

The comparison between the structure-relevant interaction of parents and children in India, with that in Britain would seem to give us one culture which is strongly and minutely structured, and one which is both less structured, and less convinced about the maintenance of that structure. In terms of the relation between such structure relevant behaviour and person relevant behaviour, this contrast ought to provide useful information. However, there
is strong evidence to suggest that in childhood, the interaction between parents and children in India is, to say the least, not conducive to the maintenance of the order which is presumed to be essential to Indian culture. (Minturn and Hitchcock '66, Minturn and Lambert '64, etc.). Order, it appears, is maintained in the long run but not in observable short term instances. The processes of such interaction as related to attempts at control are studied in Chapter 4, and as related to long term rules in Chapter 5. The analyses concentrate not on the specific behaviour learnt or manipulated, or the specific rules accepted or rejected, but rather on the interaction patterns between adults and children when dealing with aspects of order, control and rules. They seek to explore the processes which compose the individual's relationship with order, and, according to the hypothesis, differently in the two cultures.

* 'Structure' in common use generally refers to the manner in which, or component parts of which, a whole is constructed. In this sense structure is used in Chapter 3 to refer to the organisation of interaction patterns. It is this same meaning of structure that is used to refer to the divisions of society, thus providing support for the use of the word when referring to the manifestation and construction of order in a group or an individual. In the broadest sense of the term structure refers to categories of perception and meaning (constitutive rules), and to preferences and obligations for action (regulative rules). In this sense structure is a prerequisite for interaction. In this thesis, however, only regulative rules are focussed upon. Following from this emphasis, structure is used to refer not only to the actual rules, but more broadly to conceptions of and attitudes towards regulations and order. This use of the term thus includes the patterns pertaining to the maintenance of rules and compliance as well as to the process of questioning and justifying. The assumption is that argumentation is a structural process similar to the process of developing rules.
Chapter 2: Methods

A variety of methodological tools were selected for use, with the main emphasis being laid on naturalistic observation of parent-child interaction. The advantages of the latter over methods such as the interview and the questionnaire have been well documented (Hutt and Hutt '70; Danziger '71; etc.,) and need not be gone into here. In brief, these advantages pertained to
1) the difficulty of ensuring the similarity of meanings across cultures in questions in interviews and questionnaires;
and 2) the problems of reliability of information obtained from interviews which is heightened in a cross-cultural context where the conceptions and attitudes of the respondents can be different from the interviewer's, with crucially distorting effects. (Eg., Minturn and Hitchcock ['63] report that in interviews with the Rajput mothers in their study, they found that when faced with questions about the age at which their children acquired self-reliant and physically independent functions, the mothers were not concerned to present a picture of early self-reliance. As a result, any distortions found in the responses went in the opposite direction to the distortion to be expected from a Western parent. In the present study, an interview version of the Winterbottom ('53) questionnaire yielded similar results. Unconcern as to the age at which children developed independent functions was patently obvious in the mothers'
responses, where they were at best vague as to the ages, and more often than not stated ages which were far later than were later discovered to be the case. Similarly, in response to questions about the household work that children did in the home, parents minimised the amount through a different definition from the interviewer's as to what constituted work, and through a conviction that unless the tasks carried out by the child were entirely the child's responsibility they did not count as work.)

In order to supplement the naturalistic observations, an interview with both parents was designed, consisting of:

a) a value scale which was a modification of Rokeach's scale of Instrumental Values, where the parents were asked to rank and rate thirteen ideal values which they might desire their child to exhibit; and

b) a list of questions pertaining to their present interaction with the child in question, which was constructed from the Interview Schedule of Sears et al ('65), and Winterbottom's questionnaire of pressures for independence ('53). The whole interview including the Value Scale was timed to last for approximately one hour for parent, or one and a half hours if both parents were interviewed together.

In addition to the parent interview, a child interview schedule was constructed to consist of a modified (i.e., twelve questions) Locus of Control Questionnaire (from Lefcourt '76), and hypothetical situations to which their
choices were elicited in the third person to questions aimed at understanding their view of authority and obedience. (From Damon '78). Futher, a structured observation situation was conducted, where the parents and child were involved in the cooperative playing of two games, viz, a set of odd shaped blocks for building, and the Koh's blocks for arranging patterns as seen on a card.

However, since none of these supplementary methods are actually discussed in the present thesis, they will not be described in detail.

**Procedure for the Naturalistic Observations.**

Three families in Edinburgh were studied over a period of three months, consisting of five to six evening visits per family as part of a pilot study intended to aid the construction of a procedure for the home observations. Both the semi-structured observation situation and the naturalistic observations were to be carried out in the home because in India it would be difficult to get the families into a laboratory for the games, and in both cases it would be impossible to obtain long periods of observation of normal interaction when outside the home.

**The Influence of the Observer**

The general principles in use for most observational studies is

1) that the 'observer' attempts to habituate the individuals
being observed to his/her presence before collecting the data; and

2) that the observer remains throughout the procedure, a non-interacting individual, thereby minimising the effects of the abnormal presence upon the subjects' behaviour. Both these principles are aimed at alleviating the problem of keeping the 'naturalistic' behaviour 'natural'.

There has been a considerable amount of literature challenging the assumption that the observer can in fact remain separate from the subjects under study. The criticisms attack the neglect of the fact that in studying interaction in a social situation the observer is him/her self a social entity in the interaction. (Shotter '75). To ignore this aspect of the observer creates an artificially blinkered situation, and limits the extent to which the presence of the observer can be made natural use of. These are the advocates of the participant-observer method.

This problem is to a large extent merely academic. In practice it is very evident that the presence of the observer does influence interaction, but the influence varies with the situation in which the observation is being made. The real test of the choice lies in the extent to which the influence is disruptive; and if so, in the actual possibilities for using the presence of the observer as a 'variable' in the observations.

In nursery school observations it can be seen that the influence of the observer is likely to be minimal, and the
classical situation of the 'invisible' observer is best realised. However, with home observations this is not possible.

In working with the families in the pilot study I attempted at first to maintain a strictly non-interactive role in the family, by not encouraging any conversation beyond that which was strictly necessary with the parents. The effects were comical. The complete lack of a relationship with the family before the attempts at observation were begun, made them uncomfortable and unsure of how to react to me. On one occasion, the family's attempts at treating the situation (and me) humourously, without being able to address the humour to me, turned rather disturbingly onto the child being observed. The discomfort and uneasiness affected me equally strongly, and made the observations both meaningless and difficult to continue. After a few such initial attempts, the withdrawal was abandoned.

A procedure for getting comfortable with the family was worked out with the pilot families. This included complete participation as a (rather unusual) visitor with the family, in the mother's and the children's normal activities and play. This friendliness was uninterrupted for the short introductory visit, and the first evening spent with the family. On the second full visit, observation was initiated in short periods during the evening, but not used as data. Contrary to the traditional wisdom that withdrawal is the
more unnatural and stressful, the more previous interaction there is between the observer and the observed, these initial interruptions were far easier to maintain without stress for either side. The problems it caused were more in the nature of the children not believing that I was seriously intending to keep writing rather than play with them. However, by the third visit, these periods of 'work' or 'study' as both the parents and the children soon got to look on them, convinced most children of their seriousness. They soon learnt to ignore me when I turned to writing.

The plan, therefore, was to relegate the brief introductory visit, and the next two full evening visits to familiarisation. The actual observations were begun from the third full visit. This plan, however, had to be altered during the course of the study because the children varied enormously in their reactions to me. Some were extremely shy and seemed to be deliberately avoiding me. In such cases it was necessary to spend more than just two days trying to play games with them. Even in the playing of games it was necessary to be very careful to not make it too obvious to the child; that is, some children were unable to let the fun of the game overcome them if they sensed that the purpose of the game was at all unnatural. It was a case of feeling the way out anew in each family. Attempting to stick to a tight plan of two introductory visits of a few hours each, with some trial recordings (not used for analysis) on the second day, just did not work. In one case - the second working class family in Hyderabad - the plan was followed through,
only to show that the child was doing all he could to avoid talking or doing anything noticeable when I was in the room. Once he even pretended to be asleep until he thought I had gone! At this point the previous recordings were abandoned, and another two visits were spent on informal interaction and games. With children who were very outgoing and friendly, the problem ran in the other direction; the amount of initial interaction with them had to be curbed. The more I played with them, the less they accepted that even when I was busy writing I would not play with them. Generally, however, the barrier of the notebook was a very useful means of inhibiting unwanted attempts at initiating interaction, without it appearing rude, or letting it disrupt the personal relationships established by then. This withdrawal from the scene was worked out and established during the second visit. It was, in each family, a delicate and difficult balance between creating rapport and friendliness on the one hand, and playing down the observer's conspicuousness and discouraging excessive interaction on the other, which had to be struck and constantly maintained. At the end of the naturalistic observations the 'game' (i.e., the semi-structured observation situation) was held. Following that, the interviews with the parents and the child (separately,) were conducted on subsequent visits.

In all cases (except for one Edinburgh family where I remained on rather formal terms with them,) my relationship with the family was relaxed enough for them to behave as they would before a regular visitor. Undoubtedly certain
aspects of interaction such as extreme anger and physical aggression by the parents were somewhat curbed in my presence. However, these behaviours were not of interest to this study. In fact, the occurrence of extreme disruptions of the interaction in a few cases prompted me to terminate the session because it was too unusual to yield reliable information. The fact that moderate expressions of anger and hostility occurred regularly in all families despite my presence, is clear evidence of the extent to which constraints of formality were abandoned in all families.

The Observations: Lengths and Times

It was initially intended to collect sixteen hours of naturalistic interaction per family in order to sample a wide range of time periods, and minimise the influences of transitory moods on the analyses. It was decided that the evenings were the only times when it would be even conceivable for an observer to be present in the household (at least in the Edinburgh families). The evening was sectioned into four periods distinguished by activities relevant to the child. These were:

a) a half-hour after the child returned from school; in cases where both parents were working, and returned home after the child, this period was taken as the first half-hour after at least one of the parents returned home. This period was selected as important because it was the first period of interaction between the parent and the child after a long absence.
b) half-hour of mealtimes; this period involves the whole family in Edinburgh, but is variable in Hyderabad. In the latter, sometimes all the children eat together, sometimes the whole family, and sometimes the child eats alone. Furthermore, while mealtimes invariably occur around the same time in the evening in Edinburgh, they are infinitely variable in Hyderabad. From the pilot study, where the observations were focussed on mealtimes as crucial periods of interaction involving the whole family, it was decided that they were not, in fact, so crucial. Often the conversation was limited to mundane "Pass me the salt please" type of details, or else was mostly between the parents. The original intention of using only mealtimes for intensive recording was therefore abandoned.

c) a half-hour before bedtime; once again, this period was easily distinguished and fairly regular in the Edinburgh families, but was irregular as to time of occurrence in the Hyderabad families. In the latter, children sometimes fell asleep during the evening if they were tired, whereupon they might be woken up to be fed before going back to sleep, be left to sleep till the morning if they were deeply asleep, or alternatively stay up till the adults went to bed. In such instances, therefore, the pre-bedtime period was not recorded; observations of this period were limited to relatively normal instances of the child going to sleep once at the end of the day - regardless of how late it was.

d) periods of interaction between child and parents which do not fall into the above categories.
With the Hyderabad families, the variability of the evening's schedule often meant that a strict distinction between these four periods was not possible. For example, it was often the case in some families that the child ate a full meal as soon as he/she returned from school, regardless of whether anybody else was at home. In such cases, the child often ate again, late in the evening, just before going to bed. In recording interactions, therefore, the distinctions between periods were obscured, and left for separation during the coding.

It was intended to collect four hours of interaction per period. This was done in four families. The gross enormity of this quantity of data then became apparent, and the target was reduced to ten hours in total. When working with the working class families in Hyderabad, the task of keeping the child in the house for potential interaction was so difficult that it was not possible to be choosy about the periods recorded. In these families, the only feasible goal was simply to be there before the child returned from school, until the child went to sleep, and record whenever possible.

In the first family visited, the child stayed at home a lot during the first two visits, out of curiosity and a desire to play with me; but from the third visit onwards, she started reverting to her normal routine. After the fourth visit, I tried to get the parents to persuade the child to stay in because there was insufficient recording
getting done. But this made the child's behaviour at home (when the parents did manage to persuade her to stay), slightly unnatural. Whereas the interaction with parents (when analysed for compliance etc.,) might be quite representative of normal interaction, the child's activities within that enforced period of staying in would in no sense be typical. It was then decided not to force the child, however tactfully, to stay at home, but to put in extra visits wherever necessary, to make up the recordings to the required number of hours.

This meant, however, that in some families (more so if they were girls,) where the children tended to stay at home more, the recording could be completed in fewer visits than in other cases. Whereas for some families the recording continued throughout the evening, apart from the regular rest breaks for the observer, in other families the recording consisted of one period at the beginning of the evening, some short sequences of interaction during the evening, and another period of interaction at the end of the day. There are likely to be differences due to this difference in sampling times of interaction recorded, and this should be taken into account during the analyses.

Criteria for Recording Interaction

The emphasis of the study was on parent-child interaction rather than on child-peer interaction. The criteria for recording interaction were that the child should be within seeing and easy hearing distance of at least one parent or
significant adult in the home (such as grandparent, aunt or adult sibling).

The recording was interrupted if the child or the parents left the house for longer than it took to perform a short errand. If the parents were in separate rooms, involved in separate activities, but within hearing distance of each other, recording was continued. Non-interaction in such a situation had a significance which would not exist in a situation where interaction was physically impossible. In such cases, (i.e., when the parent and child where in separate rooms,) the observer attempted to sit, if possible, in a position between the two rooms. This was not very difficult in the Indian setting where doors between rooms are not shut, and it is customary to sit on the floor. If it was not possible to sit in a position where both the parent and the child could be observed, the observer chose the child rather than the parent, but tried to maintain physical and social distance from the child (i.e., by sitting just outside or just inside, the door from where the child could be seen, and by writing continuously). The intention was that the observer should not be a social presence for the child, and especially so when there was a pause in the interaction between parent and child. If the child did see the observer as a possible social presence, this would be likely to decrease the possibility of interaction with the parents. Lytton ('73) states that his observers found that if child and mother were in separate rooms, and the observer stayed near the mother, it was more likely to make the child
approach the mother than if the observer stayed with the child. Whether the mother, the observer, or the combination of both, were the cause or focus of the approach was undetermined. As I wished neither to increase nor decrease child approaches to the adult by my presence, I attempted to maintain an intermediary physical, and a neutral social location.

In the working class houses, the situation very rarely arose, of there being several rooms for the family to sit in. Often there was only one room and a kitchen, and a verandah-of-sorts in front of the house. But in all cases it was possible to maintain a position beside the doorway between the two rooms, so as to look into both rooms. Following the child around the house, and out in front of the house, therefore, was not too difficult to do unobtrusively, because of the small area for movement in these houses.

Method of Recording

There were essentially three methods of recording possible; one was video taping the interaction, the second was audio taping the interaction and/or the third, which was hand written recording. The first option was not possible because of a) the cost of sufficient video tapes as would be required for such long periods of observation; b) the difficulty and virtual impossibility of getting video cameras into homes especially in India; and c) the tenfold
increase in problems of relaxation and familiarisation with the families, if video cameras were introduced. The second option, i.e., the use of a tape recorder, can be handled in two ways: firstly, as Lytton and his co-workers have done: Using two observers in the home, each with a microphone leading into two separate channels on the same tape, they spoke into the microphones recording what they saw continuously. This method was considered impracticable because there was only one observer available for the present research, and because the audibility of the observer's speech would distract the family, and would also prevent the observer from hearing clearly while she spoke. This study is different from Lytton's in that there is far more conversational interaction than there was with the two-year olds he studied. Secondly, there was the possibility of merely using the tape recorder to record verbal interaction, and to supplement it with hand written records of non-verbal interaction. This was the option chosen. Following a crash course in teach yourself Pittman (i.e., shorthand,) I tended to rely almost as much on the written records of conversations as on the taped. The written records had the advantage of course, of taking far less time to transcribe than the taped records. The latter often took up to two hours to transcribe five minutes of intensive taped interaction. The former took about two and a half times the length of the record; that is, a written record of half an hour took about one and a quarter hours to transcribe on the average. The initial plan was to tape the
most intensive periods of interaction and record in shorthand the less intensive periods. In the first few families studied in Edinburgh, it was often necessary to use only the shorthand when the television or some other noisy electrical equipment was on, or when the only electrical input in the room was needed for something else by the family. In India, the same procedure was followed for the first two families studied, which were all working-class families. The use of the tape recorder was much more difficult here than had been the case in Edinburgh. After the second family, it was decided to abandon the use of the tape recorder (except for the semi-structured games situation,) for the following reasons: The use of the tape recorder meant introducing it to all the families in the neighbourhood. The normal procedure had been to let the family get accustomed to it on the second and possibly the first visit, by using it (though not for later use), and letting them play with it and listen to replays if they wished. If I tried to minimise the presence of the tape recorder by not letting anybody else become involved with it, the resultant effect was to make it into a mysterious curiosity of which everyone was intensely conscious. In trying to de-sensitise the family to it, as the lesser of two evils, I found in the working class families in India, that I then had to de-sensitise the neighbourhood, by letting everyone and their sons and daughters talk and sing into it. It was extremely wasteful of time. The families never really got over the novelty of it while I was there.
In addition, with the exception of the first family who lived in a secluded area, i.e., in the grounds of an institution, all the other Hyderabad working class families lived in hutment areas which were close to a road, bringing a lot of extraneous traffic noise. There was, furthermore, a lot of noise in the neighbourhood, which was magnified by the large numbers of huts clustered closely together, and by the fact that none of the huts was a closed unit in itself; the doors and windows were always (and of necessity) open, and people were always walking in and out of each others' houses. The recordings were of very poor quality due to all these sources of noise. The use of the tape recorder also necessitated it being carried around with me wherever I went. The people, both adults and children tended to move around a lot, and following them about the hut and hut-front area, not at a discreet distance with a note-book, but at close range, with a microphone held out, was too obtrusive. It was found that after a few families, the speed of my shorthand had increased to the point of making it totally adequate in the working class families. In some families where rapid verbal interaction was very pronounced, the shorthand recordings often failed to be adequate. In such instances, sequences were missed out, and were marked as such for being taken into account later.

Transcription of the Observations

In all cases except with the taped records, transcription was done the morning after the observation, while the memory
of the unwritten or abbreviated details of the evening were still very clear.

Observer Reliability

During the visits to the first family in Hyderabad (W-cl 1,) it was decided to conduct a reliability test of the observation recording. This was possible in Hyderabad for two reasons: 1) because of the availability of a friend who was also a postgraduate in Psychology, and who was free at the time; and 2), because the particular style of life makes Indian households generally more open to visitors than is the case in urban homes in Britain.

The major problem with conducting a test of observer reliability in the home is that the subject family has to become familiar and relaxed with two strangers. The strangeness of the observers is multiplied because the two are present together, and quite obviously have a prior and stronger relationship than either has with the family. While the relaxation with a single visitor is relatively easy, the presentation of a 'group' to the family is a rather difficult undertaking.

In the case of the family with whom this reliability test was carried out, more than two days of familiarisation had to be allowed. Nevertheless they were still never at ease in the presence of both observers. Two hours of fairly intense interaction was recorded by both observers. These hand written records were in the form of acts of interaction
between the child and any other member of the family, and acts of the child alone. For the test of reliability, both records were analysed for agreement on the occurrence and nature of an act. The number of agreements taken as a percentage of the total frequency of acts recorded by me yielded a reliability coefficient of 69%. When the number of agreements was taken as a percentage of the total acts recorded by the second observer, the reliability was 95%. This is clear evidence that due to the speed I acquired in using the shorthand, I was able to record more acts than the second observer, who had no training in shorthand but had a relatively good speed of longhand writing. Because it was not possible to train another person in shorthand to test the resultant reliability of observation, the reliabilities yielded above were accepted as fairly satisfactory.

The Samples

Following the dictum in cross-cultural psychology that if only two cultures are being sampled, at least two different groups must be selected from at least one of the cultures being compared, it was decided to select social class related samples from each of the cultures. Social class was chosen as a critical variable for the following reasons: both common observation and the child rearing literature indicate that there are significant attitudinal and behavioural differences between different socio-economic groups within a particular culture, which have serious implications for child development. It is conceivable that
socio-economically differentiated groups within a culture may have more disparate 'world views' than do similar socio-economic groups across different cultures. Such a hypothesis has been adopted in cross-cultural studies of child rearing with some empirical support (Whiting and Child '53). The actual differences between class groups tend to be self-perpetuating, as has been shown by Bernstein ('72). The focus of the present study is on the influence of these 'world views' on adult-child interaction. Social class, therefore, was adopted as an important variable.

From the literature it was expected (Sears et al '53, Seymour '71,) that working-class sub-cultures were generally more permissive, and brought their children up with less control, than the middle-class. From the Whitings' conclusions it appeared that the mother's work load was the critical variable in determining the degree of household responsibility and self-reliance which children were encouraged to undertake. Seymour's ('71) study concluded that working-class mothers in India were more (and necessarily so) encouraging of self-reliance and responsibility in their children than were the middle-class mothers. She did observe, however, that some middle-class mothers tended to train for independence more, in line with modern ideas.

However, in Seymour's sample all the working-class mothers were employed outside the home, and all the middle-class mothers were housewives. The following
questions, then, arose from this study: Was the factor of availability of time the chief determinant of maternal demands for self-reliance and responsibility? Or do working-class and middle-class ideologies and behaviour differ regardless of the time and work pressures on the parents? It seemed necessary to control for (if not to compare,) the effects of employed mothers vs. housewives across the two social class groups.

However, 'Social Class' is neither an easily definable nor an easily distinguishable variable. It is, according to Ivan Reid ('77) "a multi-dimensional concept involving not only the identification of what are partly invisible categories in society, but also an understanding of the effects of these on the people involved." After considering various distinguishing criteria such as income, education, area of residence etc., Reid among others concludes that "social class is a grouping of people into categories on the basis of occupation."

The difficulties in dealing with vaguely defined criteria in order to separate two intangible groups were apparent in the present study. The task, however, was much easier in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh. The reasons for this will be discussed with a description of class distinctions and the procedures adopted in Hyderabad, and will then be followed by a similar discussion of procedures of sample selection in Edinburgh.
I: Hyderabad:

Ease of class identification:
Firstly, there is less rapid upward mobility in India, because the disadvantages of the working-classes are much more self-perpetuating, and opportunities to overcome them are fewer. Education is the chief area where inequalities of birth are felt and reinforced. Secondly, there is the additional factor of caste, which makes it easier to trace the upward or downward social movements of particular families over long periods of time, and easier to spot anomalies (i.e., from the classical distinctions).

The variable of caste was not specifically studied, as the research was conducted in a large metropolitan city, where caste tended not to create the most obvious social divisions. It was, however, implicit in the sampling, as it was interwoven with the economic variables, varying almost linearly with them. Because the sample to be selected was so small, it was possible to eliminate all 'doubtful' cases, and choose only those families which satisfied the specified criteria (i.e., were not anomalies in any specified criterion).

The criteria chosen were:
1) Occupations (i.e., white collar vs. blue collar types of jobs) of the father and mother.
2) The age (i.e., in the eighth year) and sex (i.e., half of
each group being boys and half girls,) of the child.

3) Income of the parents
4) Educational levels of the parents
5) The caste group of the family.
6) The area of residence of the family.
7) 'Unofficial' criteria such as dress, habits and accent of the family.

Each of these criteria will be discussed in greater detail in the descriptions of the samples in each class.

Generally lower-income groups tend to consist of people belonging to the lower end of the caste hierarchy (either 'Scheduled Castes' which are the lowest group in traditional terms, being outside the classical 'varna' grouping of four castes, and are considered untouchables; or the 'Backward Classes', which could generally be placed approximately on the lowest of the four traditional divisions, and being superior to the 'Scheduled Castes'). The middle-income groups tend to consist of people from the middle and upper castes. The upper income groups, again, tend to be people who chiefly come from the 'middle' castes. While the Scheduled and Backward Caste groups are noticeably under-represented in the middle and upper economic class groups, there appears to be an even mixture of the middle and upper castes in the middle and upper economic groups. The Brahmins, who are the highest caste group in traditional terms (the priestly caste) are not wealthy communities. They rarely have private income or lands, and tend to occupy middle-income jobs. They are generally well educated, both
traditionally and in India today.

It was decided to select families which were roughly equal (or 'normal') in their caste-class standing. That is, to select working-class families coming from the lower end of the caste hierarchy, and middle-class families belonging either to the middle or upper castes. The emphasis of the sampling was on socio-economic status more than on caste.

Size of income was obviously not the main factor for distinguishing between working- and middle-class jobs. It is quite common to find that working-class occupations such as Cooks, Chauffeurs, Bus-drivers, Factory workers etc. pay more than clerical and other middle-class jobs. School teachers are often paid the same as, and frequently less than factory workers. In India, family wealth and income from lands has to be taken into account. Occupation remains the most important variable, but the frequent incidence of private income creates several exceptions.

The Working Class

An arbitrary upper limit for income per family was fixed at about Rs.700 per month (equivalent to about L44.00 sterling). This is quite a high figure for working class salaries in India, but it enabled the inclusion of factory workers, who would otherwise have had to be misleadingly categorised as middle-class families. Such semi- and un-skilled manual labour, though very well-paid in big institutions and industries, can only be classed as
working-class, even if an 'upper' working-class.

The distinctions between the classes are made less significant by the marked distinctions apparent within the classes. At least three clear groups are distinguishable in the working-class in India. The first, with the father earning a good salary (between Rs. 450 to Rs. 700 per month,) at a steady job as a semi- or un-skilled worker in a large institution; eg., machine operators, assembly-line workers in factories, drivers, cooks, gardeners, etc. The wife generally does not work outside the home. The children are almost always school-going.

The second group would be one where the father works in a medium to large sized institution, at a not so well paid, but steady job, doing unskilled work with a salary ranging between Rs. 200 and Rs. 450 per month. For example, watchmen, factory labourers, etc. The wife is usually employed in a part-time or full-time job outside the home, or doing caste-occupational work in the house, eg., washing and ironing clothes. The children are generally school-going, but the percentage of non-school-going children is higher than in the first group.

The third group is one where the men are employed as daily labour, an unsteady occupation yielding from Rs. 200 to Rs. 400 per month if paid everyday. The women are employed either as domestics, or in the same labouring jobs as the men. The children often go out to work in houses, or else just play in the streets until dark, rarely going to school.
There is a fourth group, where the families live in temporary shacks, and are really migrants from rural areas, either attracted by the wage-labour situation in the cities, or brought in by big contractors as a cheap source of construction labour. Husband and wife together can make up to Rs.400 per month if they are needed each day. But they tend to consume alcohol regularly, and not save enough money to move out of the 'shack' colonies on the outskirts of the city. Their children never go to school; they run around all day playing or looking after younger children. As soon as they are old enough they join their parents at work. They know no other form of living than manual labour. The parents return to their villages when they are too old for manual work. The younger people continue at the same work. It would make an interesting study to observe the impact of such a social world on the developing child. But, apart from the fact that the great physical freedom the children possess would make it difficult for an observer to keep any track of them, there appeared to be a minimal amount of contact between the parents and the children, this occurring very early in the morning and late at night.

The third group of working-class families would have been have difficult to study for the same reasons. They lived in more permanent huts and colonies than the fourth group, and were not migrants from rural areas. But they also tended to leave their homes early, leaving the children to play in the streets until dark. Their return home was often
followed by drinking bouts which made it difficult for a female observer to stay in their homes after dark.

The first two groups of families, therefore, seemed the most suitable for intensive research. It was decided to select only school-going children, as the majority of the children in these families did go to school anyway, and as it would keep that one variable constant between the working-class and middle-class samples in India and those in Britain.

Selecting and Approaching the Families:

There appeared, initially, to be two avenues open for selecting and approaching working-class families. One way was through approaching a large institution and obtaining lists of employees and selecting from there. The other way was to obtain lists of appropriate (according to child's age, sex, and occupation of father) children from schools in working-class areas, and thereby approach their parents.

One family was obtained through the first method. The father was called a 'tennis-marker' and was in charge of the tennis courts of a large institution. The family was given living quarters on the premises of the institution. The mother was not employed outside the home.

Addresses were also obtained from one school in a working-class area. Before they could be used, however, a more suitable method of approach turned up. This was to find
a contact who lived in a slum area, eg., a servant in a known household, who would be willing to introduce me to any families in her area whom she was familiar with, and who she thought had children of the right age. She acted, initially as a sort of guarantor for the researcher and for the purposes of study. Once the initial contact was made, my interest and purpose was explained to all neighbours of the initial contact family. (The explanation of purpose will be discussed in greater detail later.) After the initial contact, recruiting lists of volunteers and their particulars, and then selecting appropriate families was a relatively easy task. Selecting all the families from one hutment area was not considered a good idea, as it might have further limited the representativeness of the sample in unknown ways. Three different working-class areas in the city were thus sampled.

Eight working-class families were selected, four from the first group (i.e., mother not employed, father at a well paying job) of families, and four from the second (i.e., mother employed, father earning a moderate income). The children were equally divided for sex in each group.

The first group was an aspiring middle-class group, though they were distinctly working-class in their style of living, area of residence, dress and habits of the children, the activities of the family, and the people they associated with at home. The fathers were mainly factory workers who moved in a slightly different circle of society, because of
their good salaries, and perhaps because of the effectiveness of trade unions. In this group, it was considered beneath their dignity for women to work outside the home. The women did the housework, chatted with neighbours, and generally spent a fair amount of time with their children.

The second working-class group had less well-paid fathers, and the women usually worked as domestics in nearby houses, working in two shifts during the day. They were normally at home during the evenings when the children were at home, but would then be doing the housework they were unable to do during the day. This appeared to be a fairly stable group in economic terms, with not much hope for noticeable upward social movement in the next generation.

**Description of the Living Arrangements:**

Working-class families in Hyderabad tend to live in 'colonies', slums, or just clusters of a few huts, over almost all sections of the city. It is quite common, eg., to find a slum right behind a middle-class residential area. Nearly always, however, the huts are not isolated from each other; they are part of a closely knit social group, the families generally being of the same sub-caste. Families do not often move out of a particular area unless they have to, for unavoidable reasons. If their financial situation improves, they tear down their mud hut and rebuild a better structure with, perhaps, cemented asbestos sheets for a roof
instead of tin or thatched roofs. It is quite common to see slightly differing economic levels among the huts in a single slum. Criteria of a better economic position are electricity in the house, a tap for running water inside the house, an inside toilet, and perhaps the amount of furniture in the house - i.e.- whether they have a bed, a chair or several chairs, etc.

Despite different levels of wealth, however, all the women mixed together, with the exceptions of cases of individual antagonisms. All the children play together, or in different groups, but not limited by different economic positions of the fathers.

In the first working-class family studied, the family were living in a one and a half roomed house in the workers' quarters of the institution. The father, mother, and six children, ranging from five years to eighteen years, all slept in the large inner room. There was a single bed which was used by the father. The small outer verandah was used for cooking, bathing, washing and sitting.

The second and third families lived in one colony, and had built up houses like a few others in their row of houses. The second had three small rooms and an inside toilet with running water and electricity; these were lived in by two grandparents, two brothers and their wives, and two children. The third had a similar number of rooms for two brothers and their wives, and nine children between them, ranging from six months to ten years.
The fourth family also lived in the same colony. They belonged to the Washerman's sub-caste or 'kulam'; this caste is labelled a 'Backward Class', and has a higher status than all the other families in the colony who were 'Mala's and were classed as a 'Scheduled' (i.e., originally untouchable) caste. They were, however, much poorer than the other families in the colony, having a less regular income, and many more mouths to feed. They lived in a 10' × 10' × 6' square hut with mud walls and a tin roof supported by loosely placed wooden beams. There was a small covered area outside the hut with a tiny enclosure made of jute sacking for a toilet. The family consisted of father, mother and eight children ranging from ten months to fifteen years in age.

The fifth, sixth and eighth families lived in another colony. All had houses, converted from mud huts into stable, fairly drain-proof structures. The fifth family had two rooms and a tiny kitchen-cum-washing area. The parents and four children between seven and fourteen years lived in the house. The sixth had three rooms and a very leaky verandah. The family consisted of the two parents, four children between four and eleven years of age, and a ten year old female cousin who helped with the house-work, and helped support the income of the family by going out to do part-time work as a domestic. In one of the three rooms, an aunt, uncle and their baby lived and cooked separately. The eighth family lived (and cooked, ate and slept,) in one 8'
of the 12' room and washed and bathed in a partially covered outer room. The family consisted of the two parents and seven children aged between six months and thirteen years. The father had a reasonably good job, but they were waiting and saving up to move to a better house soon. All three families had to use a communal toilet area behind the slum.

The seventh family, who lived in another colony, had two well-built rooms and a small kitchen-cum-bathroom. They had to use the communal toilets for that slum. The family consisted of father, mother and five children aged between four and fifteen years.

Enlisting the Families:

The families were, without exception, willing to cooperate with me, even though they later admitted to unexpressed fears about what might be done to them or their children when first approached. They were told that the research was part of a University degree, and was like the 'practical' part of a course; that it was being undertaken to study children at home, in real life, as they actually were, in order to understand them better, rather than only read about them in text-books. The methods to be used were described to them. Regarding the observations, and what the observer would record, the parents were told that all verbal and non-verbal behaviour of the child would be recorded (they were asked not to emphasise this to the child). The behaviour of all persons whom the child interacted with
would also be recorded, especially adults in the family. This explanation satisfied most people initially, though when they became better acquainted with the observer, they probed deeper into what the research actually sought to understand. In the interview which was conducted at the end of all the observation sessions, the questions of interest to the observer were put directly to the parents, and their views and opinions sought. They did not totally understand why someone would need to study what parents thought and felt about bringing up their children. Some of the questions in the interview were, to them, irrelevant and ludicrous. They did, however, admire what they felt was my effort and patience in working so hard for the sake of my studies, and frequently used me as an example to incite their children to study well! It was, in any event, useful for maintaining their cooperation through all the visits.

Problems during the research:

The problems encountered here, therefore, were not with regard to maintaining cooperation, but mainly with regard to overcoming my strangeness and conspicuousness in each family and locality.

As with the Edinburgh sample the first two visits were spent interacting informally with the family. There was, fortunately, no distrust or suspicion of my motives after the preliminary visit; and even then, the reservations were not apparent.
There were two factors, however, which interfered with my efforts to break down the barriers of unfamiliarity with the family. The first factor was that not only had I to explain the research to the family itself, but my presence in the neighbourhood had to be explained to every neighbour who passed by the house, saw this obvious stranger doing weird things like sitting and writing silently, or using a tape-recorder, and came in to ask what was happening. Each time this happened, it created a fresh, though minor, disturbance in the house. It was decided, therefore, to spend at least an hour on each of the first two visits, sitting in front of the house and chatting with the other women so that my presence would be noticed and accepted sooner by all the neighbours.

The second factor was that I was from an obviously educated and comfortably-off family. In a society where social differences are so marked, and where they influence all aspects of social interaction between the different social groups, it seemed likely that the families would behave in a respectful and formal manner to me showing how much they were aware of my presence. A breaking of the barriers, therefore, had to be attempted right from the start.

One of the attempts in this direction was for me to refuse to sit on a chair, often borrowed from a neighbour for the purpose, or else the only one in the house, but to sit on the floor with the rest of the family. Insisting
(truthfully,) that I was more comfortable on floors, met with a lot of resistance, because allowing a 'lady' to sit on the ground in their house upset their ideas of respect and hospitality. It was a choice between offending their sentiments initially in order to lessen their constant awareness of me, and avoiding the initial conflict but continuing through all the sessions to be a distinctly conspicuous figure sitting high above the level of everybody else. It was decided to insist right from the start, on a non-maintenance of class distinctions as much as possible, between myself and the families, therefore preferring initial resistance to continued emphasis of differences. One other method of easing these class distinctions was to eat with the families on occasion. In one case it was even possible to help with cooking once when the mother was unwell; this caused more amusement than acceptance, but did serve to help relax the formality. Eating with the family was a very necessary step in this process. This was especially so with the working-class families because of the traditional rules prohibiting, eg., the drinking of water in a Harijan's (untouchable's) house. The families in the sample seemed only peripherally concerned about these rules. They did mention them when they first offered food, saying "Oh but I don't suppose you would eat in our house", etc. But they did not seem concerned about maintaining the rule, nor did they seem to believe that it should be.

The women in the house very soon got accustomed to continuing with their chores (i.e., even on the first visit)
while I either sat with the children or sat chatting in the kitchen while they worked. The determined informality seemed to pay off in the amount of informality it evoked in the family in subsequent visits.

The chief difficulty arose with regard to keeping the children within the space permissible for recording interaction - i.e. - within or just in front of the house. The chief area of play for the working-class children was the nearest large open space where the children of the immediate neighbourhood gathered. The children joined their friends at play almost as soon as they got back from school and ate their food. They then returned to their houses, either when it got dark, or when their mothers called them in to do their home-work. The solution to this particular problem has already been described in discussing the lengths of times of the observation sessions, viz, that the children were not forced to stay in, but I stayed there all evening in wait for the children to come home of their own accord.

The Middle-Class

For approaching the middle-class families, addresses were obtained through two schools which had students of a fairly wide variety of backgrounds, but who were predominantly middle-class. It was anticipated that problems would be encountered with eliciting the cooperation of the middle-class families due to greater needs for privacy. Almost all the families were contacted in person rather than
through telephone calls, as the latter are less likely to inspire trust of the investigator's motives and character. The two families contacted by telephone showed a lack of interest and refused. All the families contacted in person accepted willingly, seemed interested in the research, and pleased at being chosen. Only one family withdrew after three visits, due to some change in personal circumstances.

The problems of overcoming the novelty of the observer situation were much the same as in the working-class families, except that here there was not the whole neighbourhood to, as it were, de-sensitise to my presence. There was also not the marked difference in social status between the families and myself. This lack of difference was quite obvious and helped, in one case explicitly stated by the parents, to remove any mistrust.

Selecting the Families

In the middle-class population, as in the working-class, several subgroups could be distinguished. One could find working wives at almost all levels of the men's pay scales. The reasons for women's employment outside the home were as frequently economic ones as expressive of a desire for active involvement in life outside the home.

In the selection of the sample the following criteria were used:
1) Education: the father was required to be a graduate or with equivalent academic education after high school. The
mother was required to have studied at least until high school (whether or not she graduated from high school). This criterion was selected as representing the most common or 'normal' pattern on the basis of the details gathered from the large sample initially approached.

2) **Occupation**: The parent or parents' job(s) were required to be of a non-manual nature, those which are typically described as 'white-collar jobs'.

3) **Income**: If the father was the sole bread-winner, his income was required to be between Rs.1000 and Rs.1600 per month (working out approximately to between £55 and £85 sterling). If the mother also worked, the limits fixed for sampling were between Rs.800 and Rs.1400 for the father, with a joint income of between Rs.1000 and Rs.1800 for the family.

4) **Area of Residence**: The family was required to be resident in a reasonably middle-class or mixed area. This criterion is not as difficult to apply in India as it is in Edinburgh. It was not defined other than intuitively, and as there were no problems with its application, it was not pursued further.

5) **Caste**: As described before, any of the middle or upper castes qualified for selection as middle-class families.

**The Sample Selected**: Similar to the working-class sample, eight families were selected from the thirty or so families initially approached, on the basis of the families which best filled the criteria listed above. Of these eight, Families 1,2,3 and 4 had non-working mothers; Families 5,6,7
and 8 had working mothers. As it turned out, the fathers in the first group of middle-class families - i.e. - the group with non-working mothers - had higher incomes than the second group, although the joint incomes of the families with working mothers were roughly equivalent to the fathers' incomes in the first group. This was not strictly necessary by the criteria mentioned above. There was not much difference in the educational levels of the fathers in both groups. The working mothers, however, tended to be better qualified than the non-working mothers. In terms of caste, all the families in the second group were Brahmins. The families in the first group were of varying castes: one Brahmin, two Kshatriyas (Rajus), and one of a caste roughly equivalent to the third caste division (Naidus).

The fathers in the first group had jobs which were of slightly higher status than the fathers of the second group. In the first group (non-working mothers) all the fathers except one were employed in steady jobs in large institutions. The one exception (Family 2) was a lawyer who had his own practice, and, in addition, a regular private income from hereditary lands. The father in Family 3 had the most creative job - he was design assistant in a large engineering firm. The father in Family 5 had a strong and long-standing interest in the stage and theatre, and spent a lot of his extra time (i.e., he was employed in a clerical capacity) acting in or helping to produce stage plays. The father in Family 7 was the only one who ran a small private business in addition to his regular job. Three of the
employed mothers were teachers in primary and middle schools. The fourth mother (Family 8) was employed as a teller in a large bank; she was the best paid of the four.

The Living Arrangements

The houses or flats of both groups of families were roughly similar. Families 2 and 6, which were both joint families with two earning brothers, had small houses of their own. Family 2's house had five rooms and a courtyard and lots of open space in front of the house. It was occupied by a grandmother, two brothers, their wives and the three children of the elder brother. Family 6's house had five rooms and a courtyard and garden, with two brothers, their wives, two children each, a grandmother and an unmarried aunt living in it. Although they would count as a joint family, the second brother and his family (not the parents of the child being studied,) cooked separately. All other activities, however, were conducted jointly. Family 1 had a house with five rooms and a large upstairs terrace, with two parents, a grandmother, an uncle and a young servant boy living in it. Family 3 had a tiny flat with with a small terrace, with three rooms and just the parents and three children staying in it. Family 4, consisting of the parents and four children, lived separately on the first floor of a family house, and had four rooms and a terrace. Family 5 had five rooms, a garden and a quiet lane in front of the house where the children played, for the parents, two children, a grandmother and an uncle. Family 7 had a
four-roomed flat for the parents, four children, a grandmother, and aunt an uncle and their baby. The flat was part of a small colony of houses and flats enclosed by a compound wall, in which most of the resident families were related, and all were Brahmins. There were altogether about fifteen children who lived there, and children and adults of all the families were continuously walking in and out of each others' houses. Family 8 lived in the upstairs portion of their house (the ground floor flat being rented to an unrelated family,) with a small garden and five rooms, for two brothers, their wives, two children each, and a grandfather. Here too the children from both flats often played together in the evenings.

Except for Family 7, these middle-class houses did not afford the same close daily contact with neighbours which existed in the working-class families. Many more of the middle- than the working-class families, however, were joint or supplemented nuclear families. In Families 1 and 3 the children did not play with neighbours' children, but played on their own, inside the house. Both sets of parents felt that the neighbourhood (which, incidentally, was the same one, although the families were not acquainted) was not a very good one, and that there were no 'nice' people to play with. The sons in Families 2 and 5 were the only ones who were allowed to play outside with actual neighbours' children. In all the other families, there were plenty of children in the building, or relatives' children living nearby for them to play with. There were no problems with
the observations in the middle-class families.

II: Edinburgh

Criteria for selection on the basis of social class:
Distinguishing between social classes in Edinburgh was a far more difficult task than was the case in Hyderabad. The Registrar General's Social Class Index distinguishes between five classes primarily on the basis of occupation of the father:

Class I: Professional (doctors, lawyers, chemists, clergy, etc.)

Class II: Intermediate (managerial and senior administrative occupations, sales managers, authors, M.P.'s, senior government officials, teachers, nurses, farmers, physiotherapists.)

Class III: Skilled Occupations: [N] (Non-manual: typists, clerical workers, sales representatives, shop assistants.)

[M] (Manual: cooks, railway guards, plasterers, bricklayes, foremen, etc.)

Class IV: Partly-Skilled Occupations: (barmen, bus conductors, canteen assistants, telephone operators [not supervisors, who are Class III [N]].)

Class V: Unskilled Occupations: (Office cleaners, stevedores, lorry drivers' mates, labourers.)

The General Household Survey distinguishes 6 classes by differentiating between professional, managerial and intermediate occupations, where the Registrar General's Index has only professional and intermediate.
1) **Occupation** was the only variable used in this study for class distinctions in Edinburgh. Classes I and II of the Registrar General's classification scheme were to provide the middle-class sample, and Classes III, IV and V the working-class sample.

2) Income was not asked at all in Edinburgh because of its associated values of privacy - an association which was not strong in the middle and lower classes in Hyderabad.

3) Education was also not specifically asked for the same reasons.

4) Area of residence was indistinguishable between the classes because all were resident in central Edinburgh. This factor casts doubt on the extent to which the working-class families in Edinburgh are representative of the Working-class in general. Undoubtedly, there would be greater differences between the middle- and working-class samples if working-class families were chosen from those areas in Edinburgh, usually in the suburbs, which are only working-class areas. However, this was not possible.

**Approaching and Selecting the Families**

Three avenues of initial approach were used:

1) The Psychology Department's nursery records yielded the ages and addresses of children who had previously been at the nursery, and their parents' occupations.

2) One school in central Edinburgh allowed me access to the addresses of children of the appropriate age.

3) Personal contacts were used for approaching families with
a child of the right age.

The initial approach was made through a letter which explained to the parents that I was conducting a study of children of age 7, and that I needed subjects. If they thought they might be interested, I said that I would be glad to meet them at their convenience and explain the details of the study before they decided. A stamped addressed envelope was sent with the letter. It was decided to select four middle-class and four working-class families. Accordingly, about 40 letters were sent out to appropriate families. Of these only seven families replied indicating interest. Of the seven only five were willing after hearing that the study involved home observations. Two other families were approached and recruited through personal contacts. Not being spoilt for choice as in Hyderabad, all seven families who expressed willingness were accepted. Unfortunately I was unable to find an eighth family. There were thus four middle-class families and three working-class families studied in Edinburgh. The selection of families in Edinburgh was likely to have been biased in the direction of those who were willing to risk the intrusion into the home of a total stranger. The non-randomness of this selection could not really be helped. In Hyderabad because almost all the families approached were willing to participate, the selection was less biased in that direction.

The Middle-Class Sample:

The fathers of the four middle-class families were
employed in the following jobs: 1) lawyer; 2) Teacher in Technical College; 3) Administrative job in institution; 4) Meteorological Officer. Of the four families, only one of the mothers was employed outside the home – M in Family 1, who was also training as a lawyer.

The Working-Class Sample: The fathers in this sample were employed in the following jobs: 1) Head Joiner in a large institution; 2) Bus Driver; 3) Servitor in an educational institution. Of these families M in Family 2 had a part-time secretarial job.

Description of the Living Arrangements

Family M-cl 1 had a large three bedroomed house with a sitting-room, dining-room, and play room. The family consisted of the parents, two children and a tenant. Family M-cl 2 had a large three bedroomed flat with a separate sitting-room and dining-room. The family consisted of the parents and four children. Family M-cl 3 had a large four bedroomed house with a sitting-room and a play-room; the family consisted of the parents and four children. Family M-cl 4 had a large detached house with four bedrooms, two sitting rooms and a dining room. The family consisted of the parents and three children. Family W-cl 1 had a small two bedroomed flat with a small sitting room. The family consisted of the parents and two children. Family W-cl 2 had a three bedroomed flat with a sitting-room; the family consisted of the parents and two children. Family W-cl 3 had a small semi-detached house with three bed-rooms and a
sitting-room. The family consisted of the parents and two children.

**Familiarisation Procedures**

These were similar to the procedures described with the Hyderabad families. There were no real problems with most of the families, except that in the W-Cl families the fathers were rarely present due to overtime work schedules. Most of the families had a generally tighter time schedule than the families in Hyderabad.

As with the Hyderabad families there were no tensions between the family and myself (except in one case, ), and there was a genuine feeling of liking from both sides. With most of the families social contact was maintained after the completion of the study.

**Catgorisation**

The categorisation schemes for the various aspects of the interaction analysed were developed in the year following the data collection. The coding was done on computer sheets and mainly analysed by means of the SPSS. The categorisation schemes will be described in detail in the relevant chapters with their purposes and defining criteria clarified.

**Coder Reliability**

The reliability of the coding schemes was tested separately
for each scheme, with separate second coders. High reliability coefficients were obtained for most of the categories. Because in most cases the second coders were postgraduate students of Psychology, using similar coding in their own work, the high coefficients probably testify more to similar pre-conceptions in both coders' minds, than to the adequacy of the defining criteria. The reliabilities for each scheme will be presented in each relevant chapter.

Samples of data selected for coding:

It was decided to select three hours from the ten hours of interaction recorded in each family. This was felt to be more than adequate for the analyses in view of the large frequencies of most of the variables within this time period. Coding of three hours of data per family (sixty nine hours in total,) took between five and six months of intensive work.

Working with half hour samples, the most intensive periods of interaction in each family were selected, with two samples from the period immediately following the child's return from school, one sample of mealtime interaction, one sample immediately preceding bedtime, and two samples from other periods in the evening not covered by the previous three categories.
Chapter 3

RESPONSIVENESS

From the discussion of divergent approaches to the analysis and interpretation of positive other-directed behaviour it is clear that strict definitions of concepts have to be maintained, with their theoretical bases explicated. This chapter discusses and explores two broad approaches to the study of social responsiveness: namely, structural analyses of openness or adaptedness to the other in particular contexts, and functional categories designed a priori to indicate affiliation and warmth towards the other.

Two essential theoretical questions are studied in the context of social responsiveness:
1) The question of reciprocity vs. unilaterality or complementarity within child-adult dyads.
2) The question of cultural differences in the importance of structural over interpersonal aspects of interaction.

Question 2) has been explored in Chapter 1. Question 1) will be introduced before a discussion of the category schemes. The results will be discussed in the context of these two questions.

Reciprocity in the Interaction Process

The question of reciprocity within the parent-child
relationship can be studied from two angles: 1) The question of 'socialisation' as an intrinsically two-way process, as shown in the communications between parents and children; and 2) the question of reciprocity in the interaction process itself, between parents and children as opposed to children and peers.

1) Since Bell ('68)'s revolutionary paper challenging the existing assumptions regarding the direction of effects in studies of socialisation, it has become an accepted fact of psychological research that children influence parental behaviour as well as vice-versa. There has been a steady stream of research emphasising these bi-directional effects. However, the conceptual ease for analysis which a uni-directional framework affords the researcher cannot easily be disregarded, nor the framework dismissed.

With a view to emphasising two-way communication in parent-child interaction, the Newsons ('76) stress the communication of intentions and sensitivity to the other's intentions as being a crucial requirement for the well-being of the relationship when children are 7 years old. Almost unwittingly, however, they lay greater emphasis on the parent's success in communication. "The nub of socialisation is that the mother should, one way or another, succeed in communicating to the child what behaviour is acceptable and what is not; and this demands at least a minimal receptivity in the child." ('76,p.35). If, as is asserted, 'socialisation' or the process of interaction in the
child-adult relationship is indeed a two-way process, not only in the sense of bi-directionality or mutual influencibility, but also in the sense of dual intentions for communication - dual agency in the process of interaction - then it must be recognised that the process cannot be described or explained solely from the angle of the mother's attempts to communicate norms of acceptability to the child and the child's receptivity to the mother and/or to these attempts.

However, if this is to be more than a mere conflict of the definitions of socialisation, then the question to focus on is: what intentions may the child be seen to have within, and for, the interaction/relationship? In studies of mother-infant interaction it has been adequately shown that not only do infants of less than two months of age appear to have communicative intentions of a 'sociable' nature, but that these intentions appear to change with age (Trevarthen '74). There has been little documentation or theorising about such intentions in children after pre-school years, other than psychoanalytic and Eriksonian theories.

To categorise such communicative intentions two aspects of interaction were roughly separated: a) the 'interpersonal' communicative aspects such as Sharing Self with the other eg., narrating stories, previous events; Seeking to share in the other's activities or interests; Positive Affect and demonstrations of Affection and Attachment; Responsiveness in the structure of Interaction;
and b) structure relevant communicative aspects such as the use of Justifications for one's own or others' actions; the seeking for reasons of actions, intentions, events; the creation and invocation of Rules, their manipulation, acceptance or rejection.

2) Reciprocity vs. Unilaterality:

Social Cognition theorists of the Piagetian tradition consistently make the assumption that in interaction with adults the child is, and has every encouragement to be, essentially ego-centric; and that it is only in interaction with peers that the child is forced to socially decentre. To support their thesis of social ego-centrism extending into the early school years, it is necessary to make the assumption (Atkinson '82) that adult-child interaction is unilateral and non-reciprocal in nature, while peer interaction is essentially reciprocal and therefore intolerant of ego-centrism. The Newsons' approach to defining socialisation - though it rejects the assumption of uni-directional causality of the 'Social Learning Theory' approaches - fits in somewhat with the Social Cognition Theorists and their underlying Piagetian assumptions that adult-child interaction is essentially a non-reciprocal process which does not demand or show true mutuality in the child, and consists of didactic rather than genuinely interactive processes.

Social Cognition Theorists

Youniss and Volpe ('78) adopt a position drawn from Piaget
(132) and Sullivan (153) and posit that "child-child and child-adult relations are not simply different, they may be the sources of two types of social understanding with each serving a distinctive developmental function ... children see themselves as living in two types of interpersonal relations.... two social worlds of childhood." (Youniss and Volpe '78) The nature of these differences is described in the following passage:"... relations of unilateral constraint or authority, serve an educative function that aids children in seeing social reality as lawful and helps them get along with other people. Relations between equals, founded on reciprocal procedures, serve to make children sensitive to other persons and are the main source of mutuality. They become the basis for interpersonal affection and love." (ibid. p.6 underlining mine)

"Procedures" are "general forms of exchanging behaviour" , in which children discover order. Sullivan and Piaget identified the two afore-mentioned procedures of unilateral constraint and reciprocity. Reciprocal procedures refer to "collaboration based on cooperation or co-construction" (Youniss and Volpe'78) in opposition to unilateral procedures which occur when "someone with controlling power imposes a procedure on the child. The child, who attempts to get along with this more powerful person, eventually adopts the appropriate part in this procedure."(ibid.)

One debatable assumption underlying the theory of
procedures is that all adult-child interaction proceeds on the basis of learnt rules (or, in the case of child-child interaction, co-constructed rules) pertaining to how the interaction should proceed. Evidence for doubting this assumption comes eg., from Trevarthen's observations of the inter-subjective and innately originating nature of the infant's initiations in early interactions with the mother. It is not clear from their discussion whether their analysis of 'procedures' refers only to rules pertaining to the interaction, as "general forms of exchanging behaviour" would imply, or more generally to rules pertaining to the child's interaction with the world. Although it is unarguable that in both senses of the term, the child does adopt or learn rules from its parents, there is no reason to believe that the perception of these rules is a process which occurs prior to the interaction on what must be an interpersonal basis. Youniss and Volpe go on to explain Piaget's description of the nature and effects of constraint. "When the rules are presented to them by means of constraining imposition - which includes cases where adults offer verbal explanations - a peculiar result obtains...children think they understand the other person, but they do not. Children simply cannot understand the thousands of interactive rules and reasons that adults present and children adopt(Piaget '32:p.89). The result of constraint is an illusion of mutual understanding (ibid p.36) which is actually a mystification. In other words, ego-centrism is a result of role-taking that occurs in
relations based on constraint. In contrast to the illusion of mutuality, interactions grounded in reciprocity lead to shared knowledge. Peers actually co-construct rules and procedures which become the gist of their relation." (Youniss and Volpe, 1978). The conclusion that co-construction of rules forms the basis of peer relations does not warrant the further conclusion that the absence of co-construction is the basis of adult-child relations - an implication which Youniss and Volpe seem to draw.

The assumption that the child's perception of the adult's greater power automatically makes the adult-child interaction a unilaterally constraining one, implies that the child perceives the adult primarily as a representative of power, and not primarily as a person.

Another implication of Youniss and Volpe's discussion of the difference between adult-child and child-child relations is that in peer relations rules are never presented by means of constraining imposition. However, Piaget ('32) makes it quite clear that this is not the case. "...the pressure exercised by older children on younger children is assimilated...to adult pressure." Piaget does not see all peer relations as cooperative. The use of rules by children at the ego-centric stages is mystical and respectful, because it is fashioned as a representation of adult constraint. Adult constraint leads to a mystical respect for rules in general, which leads to a similar respect for rules in games, where pressure from older
children is incorporated in the same manner as adult constraint. Equality and cooperation on the other hand, lead to a genuine acceptance of the rules, with no attendant beliefs of mystic authority. The "..action of older children is still constraint, for cooperation can only arise between equals." (ibid.)

Piaget's conclusion that child-adult interaction results in an illusion of mutual understanding, is an essentially untestable one. To the extent that the child cannot fully share all the adult's personal and social knowledge, it is obvious that the child's understanding of the adult's intentions is incomplete. To draw from this truism the conclusion that the child cannot genuinely understand any interpersonal intentions of the adult, and nor therefore be able to genuinely cooperate with the adult seems unwarranted. If the child is possessed of the illusion that he understands the adult, is there in fact any actual difference in the manner in which he is motivated to reciprocate and cooperate with the adult and other peers? If the "illusion of mutual understanding" is merely an external judgement of the child's knowledge and is not reflected in the child's own perception of his activities with adults vs. peers, then this "illusion" cannot result in effective social ego-centrism, nor be non-reciprocal from the child's point of view. Generally, however, Piaget is not talking of cooperation as a social phenomenon. He means literally cooperation, where operations are cognitive conceptions of actions and their consequences upon the world. It is in this
sense that the "illusion of mutual understanding" is said to exist. It refers to knowledge of the 'right' bases of rules, of social operations that frees a child from mysticism and ego-centrism. It is not actually the intention to share or cooperate which is in question for Piaget. In his terms, therefore, adult constraint can only be said to encourage childish ego-centrism if adults actually encourage mysticism of rules, and prevent the child from "establishing a genuinely mutual contact" with the adult.

It would be an error, therefore, to challenge the Piagetian argument about adult-child unilaterality on the grounds of social intention to reciprocate and cooperate. The cognitive aspects of the "illusion" are not open to analysis in this study, if at all.

Youniss('78), however, is more explicit about the procedures of unilateral relationships which might be amenable to further testing.

"Social, interpersonal knowledge... is achieved by putting oneself into an orderly relation with another....In addition, continued operation on their relation allows each subject to develop conceptions of one another as persons who are related through a particular bond....The need to posit penetration to another's inner workings is an unnecessary encumbrance. Logically, one person can never know for sure the details of another's private self. Any self can reserve parts from the public and purposely deceive. And of course it is not clear that a self can come to grips with its own inner workings fully."

Inner workings, according to Youniss, seem to refer to motivations and the psychological mechanisms underlying
motivated actions. If it is the case that in all relationships there is no real knowledge of the other, there is only assumed knowledge, and if it is the case according to Piaget, that it is true knowledge of the 'right' bases of rules and intentions that dispels the illusion of mutual understanding, then it must be the case that all relationships are based on this same illusion, for all relationships are based on perceived and possibly incorrect knowledge of the other's motivations. On what bases can the child's understanding of the adult be differentiated from other relationships?

In answer to the question "On what grounds...can persons know one another adequately?", Youniss' answer is in terms of the 'relations' in the relationship. "...one answer is that persons can know each other in terms of their relation and conceptualise one another accordingly. They look upon their interactions as affecting each other as persons in so far as the interactions produce effects on their relation." ('78 p.218). If one accepts this criterion of interpersonal knowledge, or knowledge of the other as a person, then there is no justification for assuming that the child has only an illusory understanding of the adult. For, "both parent and child can conceptualise their relation and agree to interactive rules predicated on it and designed to keep it intact."

However, as stated earlier, the illusion of mutual understanding in Piaget's terms is irreducible to
operational definitions in terms of knowledge of the other. It is an a priori judgement of the external positions of the interactors. The relation of unilateral constraint, on the other hand, is more amenable to operationalisation. Accepting Youniss' analysis of interpersonal knowledge and his assertion that both adults and children can adequately conceptualise each other in terms of the rules in their relation, it is clear that unilateral constraint does not refer to the extent or quality of knowledge of the other, or knowledge of the procedures in interaction, but rather to the content of the interactive rules themselves.

The essential interactive rule with which Youniss illustrates the unilaterality of the parent-child relationship is that "the parent has the right to stop and start action in the child. The parent has the privilege of interrupting whatever the child is doing and redirecting the child irrespective of the coherence between the child's ongoing and the requested activity. As members of the relation, children have the right to act according to the parent's stated wishes. When children order themselves as recipients with respect to parents' impositions, they are drawing a reasonable conclusion about the general form of their interactions." (p.218).

In such an analysis there appears to be no alternative to the child-adult relation except one where both adult and child perceive these complementary 'rights'. If the child does not perceive the relation in such a manner then he is
not drawing a 'reasonable conclusion' about the form of the interactions. However, if it is conceivable that these rules need not be present in this form in the adult-child relationship, then it is inappropriate to decide a priori on the reasonableness of the child's perceptions of the relations. Since the argument about unilaterality is in fact the question in point for the present analysis, and since Youniss ('78) states this quite clearly, "the authority aspect of parent-child relations refers to rules about the method by which parents and children interact," it is justifiable to assume the possibility of an alternative to the rules Youniss describes.

Youniss outlines specific procedures which are testable in terms of the unilaterality they reflect: "who may initiate interaction; how it can be initiated; who has the right to interrupt ongoing activity; how one goes about changing the current flow; who has to react to another's request; and so forth."(ibid.)

Such unilateral procedures can be translated into operational hypotheses in the following way:

If adult-child interaction does occur according to unilateral procedures then:

1) The initiation of interaction in the parent-child dyad should occur in an unequal manner. That is, a) initiation within dyads should be more frequently shown by adults than by children overall. In addition, b) initiations should be differently distributed between adults and children,
depending on the topic or area of initiation.

2) The manner of initiation in the parent-child dyad should be different for adults and for children. That is, adults should have a more arbitrary manner of initiation than children. This could be reflected in a) Unadapted * changes of topic should be more frequent in adults. b) Adapted * changes of topic should be more frequent in adults. c) Topic initiations overall should be more frequent in adults. d) Topic initiations of adults should refer to the activities of the other less frequently than do the topic initiations of children.

3) Responses to requests: Taken in a limited sense to refer to directives, adults should have a lower ratio of compliance to directives than children. Also children's responses to adult non-compliance should be less insistent than adult responses to child non-compliance. Taken in a broader sense, if requests are interpreted as requests for or in interaction, children should have a higher ratio of responding as called for, than adults. That is, frequencies of side-tracking and responsive contradictions and rejections, as well as unresponsive rejections etc. should be higher in adults than children.

* Adaptedness is taken to refer to the extent to which an other-directed act takes into account and acknowledges the context preceding the act. Unadapted changes of topic therefore occur within an ongoing interaction when a new topic is introduced without adequately responding to the other's previous act or utterance.
In "Language and Thought of the Child" ('26), Piaget distinguishes briefly between structural and functional cooperation. In analysing children's interchanges he observes dialogues and discussions at age 4, where the discussions are often based on different assumptions in the participants, thereby preventing any real exchange of viewpoints; but where, however, an effort towards mutual understanding and the sharing of viewpoints is clearly made. He concludes "...thus, if there is still ego-centrism structurally, cooperation is already present functionally." (p.248).

Piaget identifies the effort towards discussion, trying to present and convince the other about a viewpoint, and trying to seek and understand or challenge the other's viewpoint as functional cooperation.

Children's discussions with adults, however, are less developed, according to Piaget, primarily because the adult is seen as a "powerful and wise being, (and) there can only be acceptance of a superior judgement or refusal to give in." (p.248). And this is the primary basis for the conclusion that the adult-child relationship is one of unilateral constraint.

Ethological Perspectives on Reciprocity

Hinde defines reciprocal interactions as those in which "the participants show similar behaviour, either
simultaneously or alternately" (Hinde '76) and chiefly in contrast to complementary interactions in which "the behaviour of one differs from, but complements, that of the other."(ibid.) Jackson ('59; see Hinde '76) classified relationships (as distinct from interactions) into complementary, symmetric and 'parallel' - where the latter referred to relationships where "the relative parts played by the participants changed, with either often initiating, controlling or taking decisions in particular types of interaction."

Reciprocity appears to be analysed from two angles:
1) from the point of view of reciprocal or complementary control of the interaction, which gives rise to the following more specific questions:
a) the extent to which the behaviour of each determines the course of interaction sequences. In one sense it is perfectly clear that both child and adult do this; i.e., both express active intentions for the interaction by initiating (interaction itself, topics, angles etc.), by rejecting, modifying, etc. And the intentions of both do have an effect on the interaction sequence in that they influence the responses/actions of the other.
b) the extent to which differences in the behaviour of both members of the dyad determine inter-dyad differences in interaction sequences. Both members of the dyad can be seen to have different intentions from other dyads; i.e., it reflects the presence of independent 'personality' or individual differences in both children and adults.
c) the behaviour of both members of the dyad can be seen to have long term effects on the behaviour of the other.

d) the rate of change in the relationship can be seen to relate equally to change in the behaviour of both - or more to change in the behaviour of one than the other.

The last two points are relevant only to longitudinal studies.

2) From the point of view of functional similarity of acts in interaction - i.e. - similar frequencies of various behaviour categories within each parent-child pair, or conversely, a complementary distribution of various behaviours which can be theoretically viewed as complementary. Examples of such functionally complementary behaviours are: directing and complying; seeking contact and giving contact; initiating and responding; etc.

There is no allowance in this scheme, however, for such functionally linked behaviours to occur in a negatively complementary way. Eg., directing and non-complying; initiating and rejecting; seeking and refusing; criticising and ignoring; etc.

A Developmental Approach to Reciprocity

Equating reciprocity with similarity can present restrictions for analyses within such interactions as between adult and child. When conceived of broadly, the latter obviously fall into a category of complementarity. When one seeks to ignore or compensate for, the
physiological etc., limitations, in an attempt to approach the presence or absence of reciprocity in such interactions from a psychological perspective, the criterion of similarity is unhelpful. An alternative to this approach can be seen for example, in the work of Brazelton ('74), where reciprocity is defined as mutual influencibility, i.e., flexibility or responsiveness to contrary intentions of the other in interaction. To follow such a definition it is essential to look at sequences of behaviour and not at behaviour frequencies alone.

If such flexibility can be shown to exist in child as well as adult behaviour at age seven, it is an argument against the Piagetian/Social Cognition idea of imbalance and asymmetry in the adult-child relationship.

Operational Hypotheses for the analysis of flexibility in interaction sequences:
1) Flexibility in Directive Sequences:
a) Dropping issue with due respect to other's intentions when other is non-compliant, as opposed to Insistence. Hypothesis: the above ratios should be similar between child and adult within dyads.
b) Temporary dropping of issue following other's non-compliance. Hypothesis: this relative frequency should be similar within dyads.
c) Modification of directive in response to other's contra-intention.
Hypothesis: this relative frequency should be similar within dyads.

d) Modification of self's contrary intention by counter-suggesting.
Hypothesis: this should be similar within dyads.

2) Flexibility in Non-Directive Sequences:

a) Dropping issue or changing subject following other's unreponsiveness.
Hypothesis: Ratios should be similar within dyads.

b) Following other's intentions by continuing other initiated topic.
Hypothesis: this should be similar within dyads.

c) Initiating interaction related to the activity of the other.
Hypothesis: this should be similar within dyads.

d) The lengths of sequences initiated by each.
Hypothesis: these should similar within dyads.

The analysis of responsiveness and cooperation will be attempted in 3 ways: First, a categorisation scheme which was developed for the analysis of interaction as a sequential process will be explained, with a view to measuring responsiveness as a structural/formal process. This scheme also allows the measurement of initiations in interaction. Second, positive and negative affect will be analysed. Third, the concept of interpersonal cooperation is defined as 'Sharing' and categorised in ways appropriate to the interaction of children of seven years of age.
Responsiveness in the Interaction Structure

The category scheme for analysing initiations and responses in the interaction is based on a view of interaction in which responsiveness is defined as the extent to which a member of a dyad explicitly acknowledges or takes account of the intentions of the other member; and where the responsiveness of one is judged by relating it to the inferred demand in the immediately preceding act of the other. Adopting such a perspective, i.e. one in which the interpersonal responsiveness of an act is judged in the context of the act it follows, is necessary for any analysis of interaction as a sequence or process. It might be argued that the demands underlying acts are essentially unknowable, and therefore that such an analysis is open to inaccuracies and is thus unscientific. If we are to approach any analysis of context for the interpretation of individual acts, however, it is absolutely necessary to interpret the demands and requirements that the context puts upon the individual. This is especially the case in studies of responsiveness and sensitivity in interaction; for, if sensitivity or responsiveness mean to perceive and act upon one's perception of the intention of the other, then the meaning and classification of one's act must depend on the observable meaning of the other's preceding act. Because the analysis is largely structural, and because the expressing of demands for interaction generally occurs according to recognisable rules, the difficulties presented by having to
infer intentions from not always explicit utterances are not insurmountable.

Child('78) in her analyses of interaction among pre-schoolers mentions similar procedures, whereby the 'task' a child undertakes when he engages in social interaction can be judged, according to specified criteria, to have succeeded or not. A demand is therefore implied, which may or may not be fulfilled. Using a slightly modified form of Piaget's criteria for Adaptedness, Child makes a useful distinction between 'monologue' in Piaget's sense, which is not addressed to anyone, and 'unadapted statements' in her sense, which may or may not be addressed to someone, but are "expressive of the child's own emotions, thoughts or activities, and unrelated to the other person's point of view."(ibid.) Child categorises other-directed utterances which do not bear reference to a previously mutually affirmed context as unadapted. This criterion heavily weights adapted behaviour to responses rather than initiated actions, and thus categorises too wide a spectrum of initiated actions as unadapted to be useful.

The Piagetian concept of adaptedness refers to the extent to which an individual alters his thoughts, acts or speech, after taking into account his context (i.e., including the acts, speech or known intentions of any other individual in whose presence he may be). When analysing responses according to this criterion, a response which considers the preceding act, speech or intention of the
interactor, and acknowledges it in action, is an adapted one. In the case of initiated acts, those which are modified according to the known feelings/knowledge/perceptions of the other may be called adapted. In the latter case, however, if the feelings of the individual towards whom the initiation is being directed are not known, (as they often are not,) the only criteria for adaptedness are perceptual cognitive ones. A categorisation as Unadapted using these criteria would imply a cognitive perspective or ego-centrism, while a categorisation of responses eg., 'ignoring', implies more a social intention - or responsiveness. Because ego-centric initiations of this sort are rare in seven-year-olds' interaction with their parents, and because ego-centrism is not the focus of this analysis, other-directed initiations were not further analysed as adapted and unadapted.

Further, it became necessary to go beyond categories of adaptedness and unadaptedness in order to approach responsiveness in interaction from the point of view of social intention rather than solely from the cognitive perspective. In addition to 'acknowledging and taking account of the intentions of the other', responsiveness has, underlying it, the assumption that the individual is motivated to (and acts in a manner to indicate an) attempt to create or maintain understanding with the other. Behaviour which is 'adapted' in the Piagetian sense need not fulfil the criterion of attempting to maintain understanding. For example,
A approaches B with a request for help; B says "No", and turns away without any attempt to explain his reasons, or to see that A understands why.

B's "No" is 'adapted' to A's request, in that it acknowledges and responds appropriately to it; but B is not being 'responsive' in his refusal of A.

The category scheme described below and shown on p.&& combines both aspects of responsiveness. In addition, this scheme categorises various forms of initiations in interaction without differentiating initiations and responses sharply. Such an absolute distinction would a) prevent the coding of initiated elements within responses, and b) obscure the distinctions between forms of initiations in terms of the attentional clearance for them existing prior to their occurrence. The different forms of initiation and response, with the latter categorised for adaptedness and responsiveness, are presented below with definitions and examples.

An Other-Directed Act was coded whenever an individual made an attempt to engage the attention of the other; and when this attempt was visible or audible to the other. Acts which were not judged to be intentional attempts to engage the other, even if they did in fact attract attention and serve to stimulate interaction, were recorded, but not coded as other-directed acts in the interaction analysis. For example,
INITIATION - RESPONSE STRUCTURE

Other-Directed Act

Continuing Ongoing Interaction

Initiating Interaction

(1)

When explicit call for response

When no explicit call for response

Responding Other than as called for

Responding as called for

Brkg. Int.a.

Turning away

(16)

Initg. ref.to Ongoing Topic

Contg. Int.a. by Initg.

New Topic

(3)

Contg.int.a.

No further move to cont.int.a.

(8)

(7)

With ongoing angle

(5)

With a new angle

(4)

Unadapted Response

Adapted Response

With no response

By side-tracking

(6)

Refusing to meet demand

Unresponsively

(10)

Responsively

(9)

With Other Act

With attn.

Unresponsive

(15)

(10)

With attn.

(11)

(15)

Add'l response ignoring content of other's act

Reptty.response ignoring content of other's act

Changing topic (unrelated response)

(12)

(14)

(13)
Prabhaker: alone in a corner of the room, playing with a candle.
Mother: "Don't Prabhaker. You'll burn yourself."

Although it was Prabhaker's initial act which stimulated M's act, which latter might in one sense be considered a response, Prabhaker's act was not directed to M, nor judged to be attention-seeking and therefore not coded as interactive. It was M who initiated the interaction.

It is often difficult to draw the line between non-verbal acts which are other-directed and those which are not. One difficulty arises in cases where an individual actually performs a bodily action upon the other, or upon parts of the other such as hair, clothing, etc. For example,

M: feeding the baby
C: comes into the room, having washed her face, goes up to M and reaches from behind for her sari, and wipes her face on it.
M: does not look up.

C's act would not be coded as other-directed in this instance. If C's act had actually interrupted or restricted M's activity, however, it would be coded as other-directed.

To some extent distinguishing other-directedness in such cases depends not on the perceived intention of the actor as is normally the case, but upon the response received by the actor. In the following example, C's act is coded as other-directed:

Mother: at kitchen sink, tap running, washing
lentils, talking to neighbour through window. Sharada: comes and stands beside M; after a while puts her hand in the flow of water, blocking it from M. Mother: looks down annoyed.

In this case, however, no matter what M's reaction to C's act, C's act would have been coded as other-directed, because it was judged to be attention-seeking. Further problems arise with borderline cases when actions impinge on the consciousness of the other, with the full intention of the actor, but do not restrict actions, or otherwise require any response. For example, combing/plaiting the hair, wiping a spot on the face, etc. These are coded differently depending on specific contexts.

The issue of what constitutes an act is obviously one which is open to a multitude of interpretations. While the choices of boundaries will undoubtedly influence frequencies built up through them and the psychological interpretations laid upon them, the theoretical arguments regarding the definition of acts and actions would be beyond the scope of this study. (See Marsh, Rosser and Harre '78, for a good discussion of this problem). The best practical solution to explaining the definitions used in this analysis would be to begin with a discussion of the essential problems in their classification. These are of three broad sorts: Firstly, the question of distinguishing between those movements which constitute acts and those which don't. Facial expressions were not counted as separate acts, unless they were obviously directed toward the other as crucial on their own. For example:
Mona: telling her mother about incident in school
(Mother: listens wide-eyed and amazed)
Mona: finishes narrative
Mother: expresses surprise and questions Mona further.

The mother's expression while Mona was talking was not coded as a separate act. If the mother had made no response to Mona after the latter had finished her narrative, however, the mother's earlier attentiveness would be coded as a response. Another exception to the non-simultaneous coding of facial expressions was the occurrence of positive or negative affect, even if occurring during the other's act. Such expressions of affect were considered significant elements of communication for the purposes of the present analysis. All facial expressions which occurred after the termination of the other's turn even if they constituted the total response, were coded as separate acts. Facial expressions which occurred during an act by the self were coded separately if they expressed positive or negative affect, or otherwise were crucial for imparting a response.

Secondly, the problem of distinguishing between acts in turns which involve long utterances or a combination of acts. Within long utterances, this problem involves the delimiting of 'meanings' and 'subtopics' and 'topics'. Theoretically there can be no arbitrarily fixed distinction between 'meanings'. There can be as many levels within which to distinguish 'meanings' in, as one wishes to explore. Nor is it possible to define limits in a generalised or abstract way. It is only possible to explain the limits used by
specific examples. In this case the specific examples are constituted by the specific categories employed in the analysis, for it was decided that the only feasible solution to establishing limits between 'meanings' in long utterances, was to depend on the categories of content required in the analyses, which already possessed a reasonable amount of meaningful segmentedness. In analysing utterances, some categories used were 'Assertions', 'Narratives', 'Questions of various types', 'Directives', 'Criticisms', 'Justifications of various types', 'Evaluations', 'Contradictions', 'Agreements', etc. In the following extract we have an example of two syntactically separate elements being coded as one semantic unit on the basis of the semantic categories listed:

Nicky: "Orlando and I had a fight in school today. He clouted me something on the forehead."

Both sentences would be regarded as one act, coded as a narrative. If within the narrative was included a justification or a narrative with a different content, etc., then it would have counted as two acts.

Some combinations of non-verbal acts were also compacted into single acts, even though, if occurring separately, the two acts would both have been significant. For example,

C: looks up at M and smiles.

Whenever a look occurred in conjunction with a more expressive facial expression, the look was not additionally
coded. Part of the rationale for this decision was based on the inadequacy of the recording technique for capturing facial expressions when combined with utterances or other acts.

Acts were sometimes double coded with reference to their semantic content even when their syntactic content was unitary. For example, justifications implying rules, etc.

Thirdly, continuous acts, i.e., acts which go on for varying lengths of time, are not conducive to frequency counting, but may nevertheless have to be modified for this purpose. For example, physical contact or proximity seeking. These are counted on their initial occurrence, and then only when the action is interrupted and repeated, or changed. Therefore, the frequency of proximity maintenance is no indication of total time spent in proximity, but only of the number of initiations towards proximity. Since the focus of the analysis is towards other-directed acts between adults and children, it would be misleading to create arbitrary time segments to code such acts, implying repetition of an act when in fact the act is merely a continuing one of inactivity. For example:

Mother: sitting with her legs stretched out, talking to Eb.
Ponna: lies back on M's legs.
Mother: talks to O; notices C's legs stretched out towards O, some two feet from her. "Mustn't stretch your legs! Akka (i.e., O)'s sitting there." (to C).
Ponna: draws her legs in, still lying on M's legs.

Ponna's initiation at contact in this example is recorded as
one discrete act. In the following example on the other hand,

Urmila: comes up to M and sits half on her lap.  
Mother: continues talking to F, not restricting C.  
Urmila: listens to M and F for a few seconds, then puts her arms around M and kisses her.

Urmila's attempts at contact were coded twice, because the form of the contact changed. Putting her arms around M and kissing her were, however, coded as one act.

Other-Directed acts were subdivided into four types:

- Non-verbal acts: all acts not involving vocalisation.
- Mono-syllabic utterances: "Yes"/"No" type utterances.
- Short utterances: Utterances consisting of three words or less.
- Long utterances: Utterances of over three words.

Interaction sequences were analysed essentially according to what Collett and Lamb ('82) describe as Type Two analyses. This involves an assumption that interaction occurs in relatively ordered sequences where interactors take 'turns'. Each 'turn' may consist of a variable number of acts. Admittedly, the underlying assumption of turn-taking is unreal to the extent that actors are acting even during others' turns, and it is erroneous to assume complete passivity during non-turns. However, for the purposes of the present analysis, the information that would be yielded by the coding of less active turns is unnecessary, besides being very unwieldy. The following extracts illustrate the identification of turns in
interaction; each speaker marks the beginning of a new turn.

1  Ramesh: returns from school; comes into the house grinning, and sits beside M.
3  Mother: looks at C. "Hey! Go and wash yourself!"
12 Ramesh: continues sitting; starts showing M a box in his hand, "Here...this..."
12 Mother: interrupting, repeats "Go and wash your hands and legs -- Go!"
12 Ramesh: talks of the box and how he got it.
6  Mother: "You go and wash yourself. You can show me that afterwards."
7  Ramesh: goes inside.

Or:

1  Mona: looking out from the balcony, "Mummy, Mummy, look at that girl dancing..."
8  Mother: comes up to C and watches with her, "It's a girl from your school."
4  Mona: "She's Muslim."
9  Mother: "No -- she's that X's (a Hindu name) daughter."
7  Mona: "Um...Yes".
16 Mother: moves away and talks to ys.

Responses which consist of 'ignoring' also constitute turns, even though they do not count as normal acts.

Initiating Interaction vs Continuing Ongoing Interaction: Interaction was defined as an existing mutual focus of attention. When the participants were within easy conversational distance of each other, - eg., in the same room, just in the doorway of the same room, or in the next room when conversations often occur between the rooms - if there was no existing interaction for more than five minutes, any subsequent interaction was coded as an interaction initiation. If less than five minutes it would be coded as a topic initiation.
When the participants are not within an interactive distance, and an initiation is made following a bridging of this distance, there is no time limit for such an initiation to be coded an interaction initiation. All interaction initiations (Code 1) were topic initiations as well.

**Topic and Angle Initiations:** As mentioned earlier in the delimiting of acts, there can be no absolute or generalisable distinction between topics and subtopics or angles. Because any interaction sequence can involve references to general 'meanings' or aspects of reality, the interaction can be extended on to one of the aspects previously mentioned, while ostensibly changing the topic of the sequence in most respects. The problem arises in deciding what aspects will count as sufficient of a change to be a new topic if repeated, and what aspects will not. Any decision about what constitutes a change of topic has of necessity to be made independent of a definition and depending upon subjective judgement in particular instances.

Similarly, subtopics refer to the particular aspects referred to within the topic. Again there can be no general definition of criteria used to distinguish these aspects. The only alleviation of this unsatisfactory situation can be had through examples of the implicit criteria used in coding in this study.

Krishnapriya: returning from school, comes into the sitting-room where M is sitting. "Ammal Ammal"
Mother: "What happened?"
Krishnapriya: "Phew!" dumps her bag on the ground.
"Amma - today they gave us a lot of books." shows M some books and tells her what they are.
Mother: "Did you write your English exam today?"

M's question regarding the exam can in one sense be said to be enlarging on the broader topic of C and her school work. In another sense it is a very clear change from the specific topic of the books given to them in school, which C had talked about. It was coded as a topic initiation (Code 3).

On the other hand,

Kp: "Amma..."
Mother: "Hmm?"
Kp: "Stitch up that skirt for me ammal..." (requesting tone)
Mother: "I'll press another one and give it to you."
Kp: "Press it nicely, then, and give me."
Mother: "O.K."
Kp: "If it's dirty teacher will ... throw us out!" referring to a school function the next day).
Mother: silent
Kp: "Eight o' clock we've got to be there!! Otherwise out!"

C's mention of the necessity for punctuality, although different from the previous talk of the skirt, was still concerned with the topic of the function in school the next day, and the precautions to be taken for it. It was therefore coded as an initiation of a new angle within the ongoing topic. In the following sequence there are two clear examples of initiation of new topics:

Mother: "Christopher, would you like some more fish pie?"
Christopher: "No thank you."
Mother: continues talking to F about a legal case.
Christopher: "Mummy, are you going to finish that game of Pontoon?"
Mother: "I doubt it."
Christopher: looking at M; "Ohh.."
Mother: looking at C, half smiles.
Christopher: "Mummy, can I have a bath tonight?"

C initiated two new topics within the ongoing interaction; regarding the game of Pontoon, and regarding the bath. In the following example,

Nicky: "Mum...you didn't screw the lid on and I didn't know - and it fell down and smashed. And it was your fault!" (referring to flask given for school lunch.)
Mother: "Oh..?"
Nicky: "Yes! And I didn't notice until ......and......all over the floor before I saw!"
Mother: "Oh dear... Are all the pieces in with it?"
Nicky: "What?"
Mother: "Are all the pieces in it?"
Nicky: "Yes - they're all in the flask."
Mother: "Oh dear ... I am sorry about that .. Was it the cup or the bit inside?"

While responding to the topic initiated by C, M's "Are all the pieces in with it?" is coded as a new angle, as is M's "Was it the cup or the bit inside?" C's additional piece of information "I didn't notice until .... all over the floor before I saw!" was coded as being an initiation on the same angle. In this particular case, it would be coded 8 rather than 5, because M's previous "Oh..?" would serve as seeking for further response.

Explicit call for response vs not: When there is an existing mutual focus of attention by virtue of there being an ongoing interaction, or having recently been an interaction, the context for the coding of an individual turn varies between presenting a demand for a further turn, and not presenting such a demand. Although very necessary for the
coding, this distinction was the most difficult one of the whole scheme. Initially it was decided to err on the side of caution and code as having an explicit call for response only those acts or utterances whose form was clearly directive or interrogative or argumentative. However, this would exclude all comments within sequences. In long sequences of interaction it is misleading to code non-interrogative utterances as not calling for a response. Within long sequences, therefore, an arbitrary decision was made to code clear responses as having been explicitly called for even if the previous act could not strictly be so coded. The only confusion this might cause in the logic of the scheme, is between the coding of initiated elements as sought, and as unsought. However, both are taken into account as being initiations. This decision was made essentially to stop the limitless expansion of codes that would be necessary for totally accurate classification. When there is no such demand any active turn by the individual counts as an unsought initiation. If such an initiation occurs when a topic has already been 'cleared', the initiation may refer to a new angle on the topic (Code 4), or to an ongoing angle (Code 5). If the initiation refers to a topic which has not already been cleared, it is coded as a new topic initiation (Code 3). Examples of these are the following:

- Mother: feeding the baby
- 1  Child: reaches to M with his hand
- 3  Mother: looks at C "Hey! get up and sit" smiles
- 15 Child: doesn't sit up.
Mother: "Hey Rajanna - get up and sit. Enough of your fuss."

Child: does not sit up.

Mother: "Hey, what's this - even after bringing you your food you fuss such a lot!"

Child: sits up.

When the topic has been 'cleared', and requires completion, the demanded response of the individual may take the form of responding as called for or responding other than as called for. When responding as called for, the individual may initiate a further reference on the same angle (Code 8), or may not (Code 7). The coding of category 8 does not depend upon whether the initiation actually sought a further response. Rather, it refers only to a response plus reference to information which was not explicitly asked for. For example:

Extended Responses:

Nicky: "Dad, how'd you like my revolver?" goes up to F with his drawing.
Father: looks at it - "It's pointing right at me! And the bullets are coming right at me."

F's response to C's question is coded 8. On the other hand, Adequate (Non-Extended) Responses:

Nicky: "Mum - supposing someone decided to make spaghetti, and they forgot to cut it up, and the ended up with a long, long spaghetti - a mile long..."smiles.
Mother: "Hmm." turns and talks to F.

M's response here was coded as 7. Further examples of this distinction are:

Mother: "Mona - your slipper is upside down."
Mona: looks - "Oh dear!" laughs. goes over and turns it up.
C is here contributing her surprise and agreement with the rule, in addition to complying with the implicit directive, so her response is coded 8. On the other hand,

Mother: sees C sharpening a pencil with a blade: "Where did you get that blade from?"
Mona: "I took it from there."

C's response here is coded 7, because it contributed no further element to the interaction than what was explicitly asked for.

In one set of instances, the code 8 was given as a solution to a problem. These were cases when the interaction was initiated in one step, and the actual topic was initiated in another. Eg.,

Mona: "Amma, Ammal"
Mother: "Um - what happened?"
Mona: "The oil went in t-r-k, t-r-k, t-r-k. When the cotton came, it madde a funny sound . . ." (referring to oil in her ear)

Here, Mona's initial call for M is coded 1 i.e., an interaction initiation. M's response to it is coded 7. C's further utterance is explicitly called for following M's response/question. However, it is more of C's own initiation than following M's. C's response is coded 8 because that is its structural placing. It is, however, slightly misleading when compared to the general application of Code 8. However, in terms of frequency counts, nothing has been lost because the initial code 1 does attribute the topic to C.
Responding other than as called for: These may take, in the first place, the form of Adapted responses or of Unadapted responses. The criterion for this distinction is the Piagetian one of determining whether a response recognises and acknowledges the intention of the other in the previous act. All responses which are as called for are adapted responses.

Unadapted Responses are further distinguished into those which take the form of another act, and those which are classed as no response. Of the latter there may be two types: those which involve attention but without a response when it is required, (Code 11), and those which completely ignore the call for response (Code 15). The following are a few examples of categories 11 and 15:

Nicky: "Mum - you're too fat anyway. You're too fat anyway, Mum!"
Mother: glances briefly at C, doesn't respond; turns away.

M's response is here coded as 11. In the following example, however,

Raju: asking about dental programme on T.V., "What are they doing, Ma?"
Mother: "Polishing."
4 Raju: "What will happen?"
15 Mother: silent, watching T.V.

M's response is coded 15.

Unadapted response with other acts can take three forms:

Unrelated Act where the response is entirely unrelated to the previous call for response referring to a different
topic altogether. For example:

Ramesh: "Amma - give me a piece of cloth, na?"
12 Mother: "Ramesh- go and tell your aunt to come here a minute."
12 Ramesh: "Amma - I need a cloth- give me!"

Here M's response is coded 12. But M having initiated a new topic, C's further response to M is also coded 12 because both completely ignore the content of the other's previous utterance.

Unadapted Repetition of previous act on the same theme, and ignoring other's act (Code 13). Examples of this are:

Ponna: "I want some of this."
9 Mother: "Not just now, beta. It's not ready. Leave it now."
13 Ponna: "I want some of this."

Ponna's repetition was coded 13.

Ignoring with additional response on same theme: (Code 14). These referred essentially to threatened tantrums in addition to a code 13 response. Both categories 13 and 14 refer to responses which are relevant to the ongoing topic, but ignore the specific content of the other's previous act.

The class of adapted responses which are other than as called for, are further subdivided according to the manner in which they do not meet the content of the other's demand/expectation. One means of doing this was called side-tracking (Code 6) - whereby the response initiated a new angle on the same topic, or counter- suggested, etc., without actually refusing to meet the demand, or completely
contradicting the content of the other's utterance. This category included most Whys and questions for further information before going on to either fulfil the demand, agree, refuse or contradict. The following are a few examples of category 6:

Father: "Dress up, Mona."
6 Mona: "Why? I'm coming with you?"
7+5 Father: "No - you're not coming, but dress up."
6 Mona: "Why?"
6 Father: "You're so slow. Like a goods train. You're a goods train!"
7 Mona: smiles

Here, both Mona's "Why's" are coded 6; in addition, F's response to Mons's second Why was also coded 6 because it did not ignore the Why, but avoided giving a reason by teasing. Or:

Mother: "Could you get me the salt, Christopher?"
6 Child: "Could Johnny get it?"

Refusing to Meet the Demand was further categorised into a Responsive Refusal and an Unresponsive Refusal. This distinction was based on the second aspect of responsiveness which was defined earlier in addition to the aspect of adaptedness, as 'Attempting to create or maintain understanding'. Refusals and contradictions which were given justifications or pleas or any other attempt to make the other understand the reason for the refusal were coded as responsive (Code 9). Some examples of this category are:

Father: (1): signals to C to remove visitor's coffee
cup.

9  Urmila:(1): "She hasn't finished yet", peeping into the cup.
Visitor: "I've finished."
Urmila: "No - there's half left."

4  Father:(2): "Never mind - take it away."

10 Urmila:(2): "But it's not empty", moves away and sits down.

5  Father:(3): "Take it away."

10 Urmila:(3): "It's better if she finishes it" settling down.

16 Father:(4): turns away.

Here, Urmila's first response to F was coded 9. Her second and third responses might also have been coded 9, for they are quite responsive in the explanations they offer for her actions, if it had not been for the fact that, following the visitor's statement that she had finished her coffee, i.e., that the cup was not needed anymore, Urmila's further explanations and refusals are quite definitely not attempts to explain her refusal, but are revealed as semi-defiant play in order to avoid complying with her father. Her second and third responses were therefore coded as unresponsive -i.e., category 10. Other examples of category 10 are the following:

Es: "Come on, Urm, eat. You wanted it, now eat."

10 C: "No."

Or:

Mother: "Why are you playing with that blade, Mona?" sharply, and reaches to take it away.

10 Mona: moves her hand holding the blade out of M's reach.

In addition, some codes were combined in cases where
more than one content element was identified in one turn, when both elements could not be given the same code. Common combinations were 7+3, 7+4, 7+5, 8+3, 8+4, when the latter initiation was distinct from the 7 or 8 occurring before.

**Reliability Coefficients:** Overall reliability coefficient = .89, when the proportion of agreements between two coders was taken from the coding of one hour's data from three children. For the specific categories, the following coefficients were obtained: Code 1 = .95; Code 3 = .99; Code 4 = .82; Code 5 = .70; Code 6 = .83; Code 7 = .92; Code 8 = .99; Code 9 = .88; Code 10 = .99; Code 11 = .78; Code 12 = .99; Code 15 = .99.*

Most of the disagreements centred around two distinctions in the coding scheme. 1) When the difficulty lay in distinguishing between old and new angles. The reliability coefficient for these two categories (4 + 5) was .76 - the lowest of all the categories. However, this was irrelevant since in the analyses, the two were not separated. 2) When the difficulty lay in distinguishing between explicit call for response and no explicit call for response in the previous act. Although the responsive/unresponsive nature of the acts were agreed upon in all cases, the coding of the demand in the previous act was problematic. However, the coefficients in all cases were relatively strong.

* Codes 13 and 14 were too infrequent to yield reliable coefficients.
Responsiveness as Functional Categories of Behaviour in Interaction

In addition to the structural/contextual aspects of responsiveness described in the previous section, there has been a long tradition of viewing interpersonal responsiveness as analysable in a functional sense, quite apart from the immediately preceding context it occurs in. Some recent studies using this aspect of responsiveness are Foot, Chapman and Smith '77; Cantor and Gelfand '77; Cantor, Wood and Gelfand '77. The definition underlying all these categorisations of responsiveness is that it is essentially manifested in positive affect towards the other.

Foot, Chapman and Smith ('77) selected the following measures of social responsiveness based on previous research, which "cover a range of potential interpersonal functions": Laughing, Smiling, Talking, Looking at and Touching. Laughing and Talking are strongly attentional; Laughing often being taken to reflect social arousal. Looking is a sign of awareness that can be interpreted as affiliative in certain contexts. Touching is generally interpreted as a sign of "mutual intimacy or interpersonal closeness" (Foot et al '77). Smiling is in most situations interpreted as a highly sociable and positive affiliative behaviour. Foot et al ('77) report a high degree of covariance in their study between Laughing and Smiling, thus ruling out the possibility that the two responses are
"simply reciprocal forms of the same underlying dimension of intimacy or sociability." Basing their conclusion on sex differences in response to situations of intimacy, they suggest that there are "differences in the arousal functions of smiling and laughing." While smiling "most directly reflects the level of felt comfort", laughing was postulated as being bifunctional: "It serves to gain or maintain the companion's attention in situations that are experienced as too low in intimacy, and to break attention in situations that are experienced as too high in intimacy." Laughter, as is suggested, also "provides an opportunity to withdraw attention" from the other, thus reducing the other's "psychological presence" when the level of social arousal is felt to be too high.

The interpretation of these various measures of social responsiveness is very subject to the situation they are being measured in. Foot et al.'s emphasis on non-verbal measures of responsiveness is a function of the situation they employed, viz., pairs of children watching a humorous film.

Cantor and Gelfand ('77) studied the effects of children's responsiveness on adult behaviour. They used a situation where the adult was asked to help the child build a model and copy designs. Children were trained to be responsive or unresponsive. Criteria for responsiveness in this situation were Looking, Smiling whenever praised, Asking for feedback, Asking for help, Responding
enthusiastically to questions asked by the adult and Talking spontaneously (i.e., other than directly in response to adult initiations). Criteria for unresponsiveness were very low frequencies of the above behaviours.

The adult-child interaction situations of the present study were more akin to the Cantor and Gelfand set-up than to the situation used by Foot, Chapman and Smith. For this reason, it would be necessary to include the verbal categories that Cantor and Gelfand use. However, the fact that the latter's adult-child pairs consisted of strangers made the non-verbal categories such as touching, redundant in their study. In the present study, the intimacy of the parent-child dyad makes touching a very relevant category.

In adapting previous measures of social responsiveness to the present study, two sets of categories were distinguished: 

Firstly, categories of **Positive Affect** which included all expressions of pleasure and affection; these are outlined in the following codes:

- Smiling
- Laughing
- Joking
- Teasing
- Verbal demonstrations of Affection
- Physical demonstrations of Affection
- Giving Reassurance, Solicitude
Seeking/maintaining Physical Proximity

The last category was not included in all joint indices of affect, for although expressing attachment, it was not really a display of affect. Categories of Negative Affect were also differentiated through the following codes:

1) Frowning, expressions of irritation, annoyance with the other.
2) Derogation of the other, hostile sarcasm and hostile teasing.
3) Anger, as shown by raised voice and facial expression, extreme hostility directed to the other verbally.
4) Hostile physical assault.
5) Threats of physical assault.

Criticisms were not included in the combined measure of negative affect unless they were accompanied by paralinguistic indicators of anger or annoyance.

Reliability Coefficients for the measures of affect were .83. The positive affect categories had higher reliability than the negative affect categories.

Secondly, categories of Sharing, were derived directly from an assumed motive for members of long-term dyads to want to cooperate and seek cooperation, to share thoughts, feelings and experiences with the other, and to seek to share in the other's thoughts, feelings and experiences. These are described in the following three categories:

Cooperation Seeking: this category referred to requests for the other's participation in joint activities, tasks or
play. This did not refer to instances where the other's participation was needed as help in the completion or performance of a task, these were separately coded as help-seeking. Examples of such behaviour are typified by demands or invitations to play, suggestions for joint performance of tasks, or other activities which are neither play nor strictly tasks, eg., "Let's go there together", or C: "Would you like to play a game of Pontoon now, Mum?" or C: "Shall we go and see if we can mend that bench, Dad?"
Reliability Coefficient = .99.

Offering to Share Self with Other: this category refers to a voluntary 'revelation' of the self to the other, in terms of experiences, ideas, interests, feelings, etc. It includes all instances of narratives, some conversational assertions descriptive of ongoing events or self's acts, or internal states which are unrelated to any other demand of the situation, and appear to be uttered primarily with the intention of sharing the self with the other. It includes also instances of offering help, and most instances of joking. Eg.,

C: in bathroom, washing, observes remnant of bar of soap. "Mummy...." turning to M with a smile, "it's so light - see - this soap's become a light green."
or C: talking about a programme on T.V., "There's a family of 6 generations still living.. there's a baby with a great, great, great, great, grand mother still living."

Reliability Coefficient = .95.
Seeking to Share in the Other: i.e., behaviour indicative of intentions to share the other's experiences or activities. It includes attempts to join in the other's conversations or ongoing activities. There is a difference between attempting to share in the other's ongoing activities or experiences, and attempting to offer the self's ideas/suggestions etc. regarding the other's activities; the former would be included in this category, and the latter in the previous category. This category includes questions and conversational initiations leading to an exploration of the other's activities, past or present, experiences, thoughts and emotions, etc. Not all questions seeking information about the other could be coded in this category. They are distinguished by the inferred intention to share in the other, without other situational demands. Critical questions regarding motives or challenging, etc., would not be included. Eg.,

M: "That's lovely - that black background. How did you get that nice black background?" referring to C's painting brought home from school.
or
C: "Mum, have you ever had a fracture?"
or
C: listening to M and F talking - makes a suggestion with relevance to their conversation," Why don't you go in X's car?"

Reliability Coefficient = .99.

Also coded separately were those behaviours which have been traditionally included under the rubric of dependency or need succorance. These were:
Attention/Praise Seeking: This category did not include name-calling. It referred essentially to verbal or non-verbal acts which were interpreted as directed to the other with the intention of eliciting praise or attention. It included a few cases of what Sears et al ('65) describe as negative attention seeking - i.e. - provocative and disruptive behaviour which is clearly aimed at being noticed by the other. The following examples were all included in this category:

C: "I'm the best in football in my class."

C: "Don't you think that's very good ... for a first try?"

C: teasing the baby, making it cry.
M: scolds C and turns away.
C: does it again, looking at M.

C: "Mum!!" Appears with a strange object worn as a hat.

The inference of attention/praise seeking was made only in cases as explicit as the above. Sears et al's definition includes in this category acts such as "defiance or oppositional behaviour (eg., opposing and resisting direction, rules, routines and demands by ignoring, refusing or doing the opposite," (ibid., p.33), and "seeking to join an in-group by inviting cooperative activity, or actually interrupting a group activity in progress." In this study such instances were not considered to justify the inference of attention seeking.

Reassurance seeking: The definition of this category was similar to Sears et al's definition "Apologising, asking
unnecessary permission, or seeking protection, comfort, consolation or guidance" (ibid), with the exception that seeking help formed a separate category called "Help Seeking" and seeking guidance formed a separate category called "Directive Seeking". Examples of the present category are:

C: after being snapped at by the puppy, goes crying to F, puts her head on his lap "I wasn't going to do anything - just play with him, and he bit me."

or

C: goes to M, whimpering, "Mummy - my stomach - it's aching - uhu, uhu."

Help Seeking: A distinction has been made between Instrumental Help seeking and Emotional Help Seeking - i.e., seeking help when a real difficulty is present which requires assistance, and help-seeking when help is sought for contact with the other person. This distinction is a very difficult one to make, and it was found that clearly distinguishable examples of emotional help-seeking were very rare in children of this age. The two were therefore clubbed together. All instances of help-seeking were also coded as directives. Further classification of help-seeking directives can be seen in Chapter 4.

Proximity Seeking/Maintaining: This referred to all instances of physical contact which were not hostile, and not used to serve some other functional end; eg.,

M: "Go and get that pot for me, Bujji, go" puts her hand on C's shoulder and turns her lightly in appropriate direction.
This was not coded as proximity seeking. This category also included instance such as sitting on the lap, leaning on/against, standing/sitting very close by. Such continuous acts were coded only at their initial occurrence, or at their continuation if interrupted. The frequencies of proximity seeking, therefore, are no indication of their total duration.

Demonstrations of Physical/Verbal Affection: This included all instances of hugging, kissing, and verbal statements clearly expressing affection.

Directive Seeking: All cases of seeking for a directive or for advice such as "What shall I wear?" or "What should I do now?" The frequencies of this category were too low to be calculated but were included in the overall dependency score.

The overall reliability coefficient for these categories was .88. Reassurance Seeking, Help Seeking, Proximity Seeking and Demonstrations of Affection all had reliability coefficients of between .95 and .99. Directive Seeking had a reliability coefficient of .86 and Attention/Praise Seeking of .78.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Group Differences:

Responsiveness in the Interaction Structure

Table 3.1 shows the frequencies of interactive acts averaged per person in each group in three hours of interaction. There was altogether more interaction between children and parents in the Edinburgh families than in the Hyderabad families. This is despite the fact that in Hyderabad, there were often other adults in addition to the parents, with whom interaction was recorded. This could be seen as indicative of less intensive contact between children and parents in Hyderabad. Demographic reasons do not account for this difference. It was customary in all the Hyderabad working class families, and in seven out of eight of the middle-class families, for the children to spend a part of the evening in play with neighbours etc., outside the house. In Edinburgh this was not so common. The measure of interactive acts was taken, however, only when the child and at least one parent or familiar adult were in interactive distance of each other, i.e., most commonly when both were in the same room. It is, therefore, not overall frequency of interaction that is being measured, but intensity of interaction during periods of potential interaction. The differences between children and adults in each group are non-significant. A class difference is suggested, with the middle-class families in both cultures,
Table 3.1: Freqs. of Acts* per person in 3 hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
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<td>265</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>395</td>
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<td>370</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rounded to nearest integer. * not including non-responses
Ads: p< .02; Chn: p< .09;
Ads> Chn: n.s. in all groups.
and in both children and adults, showing higher act frequencies than the working-class families.

Table 3.2 shows the absolute frequencies of 'turns' per person in the same amount of time. The differences between adults and children in each group were predictably small, being a difference of one or nought in any sequence. The distribution across culture and class groups was similar to the distribution of act frequencies.

Table 3.2: Freqs. of Turns per person in 3 hours*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
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<td>448</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* including non-responsive turns.
@ The four groups will henceforth be referred to by these abbreviations: HM (Hyderabad Middle-Class), HW (Hyderabad Working-Class), HYD (Hyderabad [including both classes]), EM (Edinburgh Middle-Class), EW (Edinburgh Working-Class), EDIN, (Edinburgh [including both classes]).
### Table 3.3: Relative Freqs. of Types of Acts by Chn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-vbl. Acts</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mono-syll. Utts.</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Utts.</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Utts.</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

@ three words or under.
M-W U Test: Non-vbl Acts Hyd>Edin; n.s.
Long Utts Edin>Hyd; p<.02

### Table 3.4: Relative Freqs. of Types of Acts by Adults

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mono-syll. Utts.</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Utts.</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Utts.</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Test: Non-vbl acts Hyd>Edin; n.s.
Long Utts Edin>Hyd; p<.002
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the relative frequencies of structural types of acts in each group. The only differences between groups lay in the proportions of non-verbal acts and long utterances. Amongst both children and adults, relative frequencies of non-verbal acts were higher in the Hyderabad groups, and those of long utterances were higher in the Edinburgh groups. In the Hyderabad Children, the proportion of non-verbal acts was actually higher than the proportion of long utterances. Adults in all groups had lower frequencies of non-verbal acts and higher frequencies of long utterances than the children. There were no class differences. The fact that this relative preference for non-verbal acts in Hyderabad is not confined to the children alone, rules out a possible interpretation of differential linguistic competence. Nor are there any class differences among the adults in their use of long utterances, which might have supported such a view. The difference can only be interpreted in terms of a preference, the reason for which is not immediately apparent.

Table 3.5 shows the absolute and relative frequencies of topic initiations in each group. In the absolute frequencies there were no differences between the groups of children or adults, with the exception of the Edinburgh middle-class children, who had a markedly higher frequency than the other groups of children. Similarly, in all groups except the Edinburgh middle-class where it was reversed, adults initiated topics much more frequently than did
Table 3.5: Absolute Freqs.* of Topic Inits. in 3 hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>61.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* averaged per person.

M-W U Test: Topic initiations relative to total turns
Children: Edin>Hyd; n.s.; Adults: Hyd>Edin; p< .01 (2 tailed)
M-cl>W-cl; n.s.; M-cl=W-cl.


(The implications of all adult-child differences will be discussed in greater detail in the section on Reciprocity further in this Chapter). When topic initiations were considered as proportions of total acts, there was no significant difference between the groups of children; in the adults, however, the Hyderabad adults showed a significantly higher proportion of topic initiations than the Edinburgh adults. In the light of their lower act frequencies, this suggests that the Hyderabad adults initiated topics of shorter sequence length.

Table 3.6 shows topics analysed according to their content and presented as proportions of their total topic initiations. Among the adults, by far the highest proportions of topics were directives. Among the children,
Table 3.6: Contents of Topic Initiations *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chn.: HM</td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.008</td>
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<td>.31</td>
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<td>.12</td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>EW</td>
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<td>.007</td>
<td></td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ads.: HM</td>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<td>.03</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
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<td>.18</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children</strong></td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* relative to total topics

M-W U Tests:
Drctvs.: Chn: H > E, p<.05; Ads: H > E, p<.02;
    Ads > Chn: HM p<.001; HW p<.0008; EM p<.01; EW n.s.;
Crits: Ads > Chn: HM p<.008; HW p<.0008; EM p<.02; EW p<.05;
Q's and Conv'l Talkg.: Chn: E > H, p<.02; Ads: E > H, p<.001;
    Chn > Ads: HM p<.001; HW p<.001; EM p<.05; EW n.s.;
Posaff/Proxim.: Chn: H > E p<.02
the highest proportions of topics were conversational initiations. There were no group differences in these results. In both children and adults, topic initiations with directives were strikingly more frequent in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh; Topic initiations with questions and conversational talking were more frequent in Edinburgh; Topic initiations with demonstrations of positive affect and proximity seeking were more frequent in Hyderabad, but in this case the difference lay only among the children.

Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show the lengths of sequences of interaction initiated by children and adults, and the mean length of sequence in each group. There was no difference among the adults between cultures or classes. Between the children, however, the Edinburgh children's sequences were longer on average* than the Hyderabad children's. In some sense, there is an implication of responsibility for the length of sequence on the person towards whom the sequence is directed. This suggests either or both of two explanations for the lower sequence lengths of the Hyderabad children:

a) The Hyderabad children did not attempt to maintain long sequences of interaction.

b) The Hyderabad adults did not respond or attempt to continue interaction sequences initiated by their children. The latter explanation is supported by two factors:

i) 25% of Hyderabad children's initiations are ended at S.L.1(Sequence Length 1), i.e., the Hyderabad adults ignored or did not continue a very large proportion of their

*though non-significant
Table 3.7: Reltv. Freqs. of Seq. Lengths Init'd by Chn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.L.</th>
<th>S.L.</th>
<th>S.L.</th>
<th>S.L.</th>
<th>S.L.</th>
<th>S.L.</th>
<th>S.L.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.21</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td>HW</td>
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<td>.21</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
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<td>.27</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
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<td>.40</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>EDIN</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
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</table>

Table 3.8: Reltv. Freqs. of Seq. Lengths Init'd by Ads.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>S.L.</th>
<th>S.L.</th>
<th>S.L.</th>
<th>S.L.</th>
<th>S.L.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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</thead>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>.34</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW</td>
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<td>.35</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>.36</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDIN</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

r between Adult and Child Mean Seq.L. = .50, p<.01
M-W U Tests: n.s. in all groups.
children's initiations. This was not the case with the Edinburgh children's initiations, or the adult initiations in either culture, where the proportions of immediate termination of sequences was relatively small.

ii) a consideration of two turn sequences where it is largely the initiator's unused turn to continue the sequence does not show a similarly higher proportion among Hyderabad children than among Edinburgh children; it is, in fact, the reverse. Two turn sequences initiated by adults, however, show a much larger frequency in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh.

It can be seen, therefore, that Hyderabad adults more than Edinburgh adults fail to respond at all to a quarter of their children's initiations (including initiations which do not absolutely require a response); and Hyderabad adults more than Edinburgh adults do not continue their own initiations after a single response from the children. The shorter sequences of the Hyderabad children, therefore, are due more to the adults' lack of response than to any lack of attempts at maintenance on their part.

On the subject of continuation of sequences of interaction, it is relevant to look at some categories which were directed specifically at this point:

Table 3.9 shows relative frequencies of unsought initiations within an ongoing interaction, (excluding topic initiations). There were no differences between cultural or class groups among children or adults. In each group, however, adults have a higher proportion of these
Table 3.9: Relative Frequencies* of Initiations of New Angles within Ongoing Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
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<td>.09</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Proportions of total turns.
M-W U Tests: culture and class differences n.s.
Ads > Chn: HM p<.001; HW p<.001; EM n.s.; EW p<.05.

Table 3.10: Proportions of Child: Total Unsought Initiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratios</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Absolute frequencies.
@ see p.134 for definition.

Table 3.11 shows proportions of Extended to Adequate Responses when a response is required. (i.e., Proportions of Category 8 to Categories 7 + 8 in the Initiation-Response Structure Category Scheme on p.123). Despite the findings on
the lengths of sequences, the Hyderabad children like the
Edinburgh children, show far fewer extended responses when
other than merely one or two step sequences are considered,
than the adults. Further, in both children and adults, the
Edinburgh families show higher proportions of extended
responses than the Hyderabad families.

Table 3.11: Propns. of Extended: Total Positive
Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Test:
Children: Edin>Hyd, p<.03; Adults: Edin>Hyd, p<.003.
No class differences.
HM: Ads>Chn., n.s.; HW: Ads>Chn., p<.004;
EM: Ads>Chn., p<.02; EW: Ads>Chn., n.s.

Table 3.12: Propns. of Responsive: Total Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
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<td>.87</td>
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<td>.77</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Test:
Chn: E>H p<.001; Ads: E>H p<.02;
Ads> Chn: HM n.s.; HW p<.02; EM n.s.; EW n.s.
Table 3.12 shows Responsiveness and Unresponsiveness when considered as proportions of total responses required of the individual. Amongst both adults and children, proportions of responsiveness were significantly greater in Edinburgh than in Hyderabad. In Hyderabad, adult responsiveness was higher than child responsiveness. The difference in Edinburgh was in the same direction although not significant.

When responses were analysed for Adaptedness as shown in Table 3.13 significant differences were found for cultures in the same direction as for Responsiveness. That is, greater Unadapted responses in Hyderabad, among both children and adults. There was, however, no difference between adults and children in any group.

Table 3.13: Propns. of Unadapted: Total Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
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<td>.26</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.09</td>
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<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Test:
Children: Hyd>Edin, p<.002 (2 t); Adults: Hyd>Edin, p<.01 (2 t).
No class differences. No differences between adults and children.
Expressions of Affect in Interaction

Tables 3.14 and 3.15 show absolute and relative frequencies of combined measures of positive and negative affect.

### Table 3.14: Abs. and Reltv. Freqs. of Positive Affect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Abs.</th>
<th>Reltv.</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
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<th>EDIN</th>
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<td>12.1</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
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<td>13.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>34.6</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Test: Proportion of positive affect:
- Children: Edin > Hyd, n.s.; Ads.: Edin > Hyd, p < .006;
- HM: Chn. > Ads., p < .02; HW: Chn. > Ads., n.s.;
No class differences.

### Table 3.15: Abs. and Reltv. Freqs. of Negative Affect

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Abs.</th>
<th>Reltv.</th>
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<td>.02</td>
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<td>16.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Test: Proportions of negative Affect:
- Children: Hyd > Edin, n.s.; Ads.: Hyd > Edin, p < .0008;
No class differences.
affect in each group. There were marked differences between cultures in adult expressions of positive affect; the difference was significant when considered as proportions of total act frequencies as well as absolute frequencies. Among the children, there were only minimal differences between cultures, with the direction of the difference similar to that in the adults. However, the only cause for the difference was the low frequency of positive affect in the Hyderabad working-class group. The difference was not significant. Negative Affect (both as proportions and as absolute frequencies) was significantly higher in the Hyderabad adults than in the Edinburgh adults. Amongst the children, there was no difference among the cultures on either measure. In both cultures, however, the working class children showed lower absolute and relative frequencies of negative affect than the middle-class children. In both Hyderabad groups, the children showed more positive affect than the adults. In the Edinburgh middle-class group, this trend was reversed; and in the Edinburgh working-class group, there was no difference at all. When considered as proportions of total acts, the Hyderabad children still had a higher proportion of positive affect than the adults, while there was no difference in the proportions of positive affect of the Edinburgh adults and children. In all groups, however, adults showed more negative affect than the children. These differences were very marked in all except the Edinburgh middle-class group. It is clear therefore, that the only group differences lie between the cultures
among the adults. Further, these differences are mainly caused by Hyderabad adults, as shown by the fact that there were only very small differences between children and adults in Edinburgh.

Responses to Positive and Negative Affect

Responses are shown in categories of positive, negative and neutral response. Table 3.16 shows responses to positive affect as proportions of total positive affect received. Neutral responses were by far the largest proportion of responses in all groups of adults and children. Amongst the children, however, the Hyderabad children showed higher proportions of both positive and negative responses than the Edinburgh children. Amongst the adults, the Hyderabad adults showed lower proportions of positive and higher proportions of negative responses. When positive responses were considered as proportions of affective responses, (i.e., omitting neutral responses,) as shown in Table 3.17, the differences between the groups of adults showed that the Hyderabad adults of both groups had lower proportions of positive responses than the Edinburgh adults of both groups. Among the children, while the cultural difference was in the same direction, the differences within the groups, i.e., between the classes, was higher than between cultures. The middle-class children of both cultures had exactly the same proportions, while the working-class children in Hyderabad showed markedly lower, and the working-class children in Edinburgh markedly higher proportions of positive responses.
**RESPONSES TO POSITIVE AFFECT RECEIVED**

Table 3.16: Responses as Propns. of Posv. Affect Recvd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses by Chn.</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive Responses</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Responses</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Responses</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses by Adults:

| Positive Responses | .23 | .29 | .26 | .44 | .39 | .42  |
| Negative Responses | .09 | .10 | .10 | .07 | .06 | .07  |
| Neutral Responses  | .70 | .62 | .66 | .58 | .54 | .56  |

Table 3.17: Propns. of Positive Affective Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Propns. of Positive: Total Responses:
Chn: H > E n.s.; Ads: E > H p<.02
The differences between children and adults was not consistent across groups.

Table 3.18 shows responses to Negative affect. As was the case with the responses to positive affect, the largest proportion of responses to negative affect consisted of neutral responses in all groups. The differences between groups in the proportions of negative responses was not very marked; in both adults and children, there was a slight trend towards higher frequencies of negative responses in the Edinburgh groups. In the light of the previous results regarding the relatively greater proportion of negative affect shown by the Hyderabad adults, whether initiated or in response, the present reversal is rather surprising. In all the groups, the adults reacted to children's negative affect with a higher proportion of negativeness than did the children to adult negative affect.

Table 3.19 shows negative responses as proportions of affective responses to negative affect. There are no marked group differences, except for the absence of any positive responses at all in the Edinburgh working-class adults. Again, the adults showed higher proportions of negative responses than the children in all groups.
RESPONSES TO NEGATIVE AFFECT

Table 3.18: Responses as Propns. of Negv. Affect Recvd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses by Chn.</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive responses</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative responses</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral responses</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses by Adults:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses by Adults</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive responses</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative responses</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral responses</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.19: Propns. of Negative Affective Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: no group differences
Table 3.20 shows the categories of sharing, Cooperation seeking, Offering to Share Self with Other and Seeking to Share in Other in each group of children and adults. There were minimal differences between the groups of children except in the category 'Offering to Share Self', where the Edinburgh children (and mainly the Edinburgh middle-class group) had higher frequencies of this category than the Hyderabad children. Among the adults, there was a difference in the same direction in this category, also mainly contributed to by the Edinburgh middle-class. There was a similar difference in the category 'Seeking to Share in Other', where the Edinburgh adults had higher frequencies than the Hyderabad adults. The most striking result in these categories was, however, the difference between the adults and children in the mode of sharing that they chose in all the groups. Adults tended to seek to share in the children's activities more than the children sought to share in the adults' activities, and children offered to share themselves with the adults more than the adults offered to share themselves with the children. The implications of this for the complementarity of the sharing between adults and children will be discussed in the section on reciprocity.
Table 3.20: Abs. and Reltv. Freqs. of Sharing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHILDREN</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coopn.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offrg. to Shr.</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shr. Self</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shr. Other</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ADULTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>.25</th>
<th>.5</th>
<th>3.2</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coopn.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skg.</td>
<td>.0007</td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offrg. to Shr.</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shr. Self</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shr. Other</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mann-Whitney U Tests: Combined Sharing:
- Chn.: E > H, p < .01; Ads.: E > H, p < .01;
- HM: Chn. > Ads., p < .003; HW: Chn. > Ads., n.s.;
- EM: Chn. > Ads., p < .02; EW: Chn. > Ads., n.s.;
- Cooperation Seeking: Chn.: E > H, n.s.; Ads.: E > H, n.s.;
- Offering self: Chn.: E > H, p < .01; Ads.: E > H, p < .0004;
- HM: Chn. > Ads., p < .0008; HW: Chn. > Ads., p < .01;
- Seeking Other: Chn.: E > H, n.s.; Ads.: E > H, p < .01;
- In all groups, Seeking Other: Ads. > Chn., n.s.
Table 3.21: Responses to Share Requests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses by Chn.</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsive</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprn. Respns.</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses by Adults:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsive</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprn. Respns.</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* excluding ambiguous responses.

M-W U Tests: Proprn. Respns.:
Chn > Ads : Hyd p<.05; Edin p<.003;
Chn: E > H n.s.; Ads: E > H n.s.;
Hyd Chn: M-C1 > W-C1, p<.02
Table 3.21 shows the responses to Share requests as proportions of the total share requests received. In both adults and children, the Edinburgh groups were more responsive to share requests than the Hyderabad groups. However, this difference was caused mainly by the very low proportion of responsiveness of the Hyderabad working-class group among the children, and the very high proportion of responsiveness by the Edinburgh middle-class group among the adults. When omitting the category of ambiguous responses, and noting the proportions of actual 'ignoring' and 'refusals' of share requests, the most striking result here as in the distribution of the types of sharing, lay in the differences between adults and children. In all groups, the children were more responsive to the adults' share requests than were the adults to the children's share requests.

Cooperation
An attempt was made to combine the categories of Sharing and Positive Affect, in a category called Interpersonal Cooperation. It was defined as including the three share categories mentioned above, and the categories of Teasing, Joking and Helping. Table 3.22 shows that children had higher frequencies of Cooperation than adults in all groups except the Edinburgh working-class. In both children and adults, the Edinburgh
Table 3.22: Interpersonal Cooperation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Abs.</th>
<th>Reltv. HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All categories of Sharing, Teasing, Joking and Helping. M-W U Tests: n.s.

families had higher frequencies than the Hyderabad families.

Dependency

Table 3.23 shows the five behaviours commonly taken to indicate dependency: Attention/Praise Seeking, Seeking Reassurance, Seeking Help, Seeking Proximity, and Seeking Physical Contact. When taken as a joint measure of Dependency, there was no significant difference between the cultural groups, although the trend was in the direction of higher dependency in Edinburgh. There was no consistency between the distribution of various categories of dependency across groups. Reassurance and Attention/Praise Seeking were higher in the Edinburgh children, while Proximity, Help and Physical Contact Seeking were higher in the Hyderabad children. This differentiation does not exactly follow the active vs passive dependency distinction suggested by Seymour ('71), where Attention, Praise, and Help Seeking were grouped as active behaviours, and Proximity, Reassurance and Physical Contact Seeking were called passive behaviours. There were no consistent class differences in Edinburgh, but in Hyderabad the middle-class children had higher frequencies of dependency in all categories.
Table 3.23: Dependency behaviour in Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attn.</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praise Skg.</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasurance</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skg.</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skg.</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxi-</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imity Skg.</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contact Skg.</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Measure</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Attn/Praise Skg.: E > H p< .002; Reas. Skg.: E > H p< .01; all other measures n.s.

Table 3.24: Attachment behaviour in Children*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical/ Verbal Affection</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(giving) Solicitude</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teasing</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxi-</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imity Skg.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined measure</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* relative to total acts.
M-W U Tests: n.s.
Attachment

Table 3.24 shows a measure of Attachment behaviour consisting of Physical/Verbal Affection, Giving Solicitude, Teasing and Proximity Seeking. The Hyderabad children showed higher frequencies of the joint measure, but this difference was mainly due to the difference in Proximity Seeking. The implications of these group differences shown above will be discussed in Chapter 7 after showing the results of the individual behaviour correlations and the adult-child behaviour correlations in each group.

Dyadic Reciprocity

The child's intentions for/in interaction with its parents:

The main question addressed in this section is the one raised in connection with the importance of both child and adult intentions in the process of interaction. Are the child's intentions significant in altering the nature of the relationship? In talking about mutual intentions in 'socialisation', if 'socialisation' refers to becoming a member of a culture in its structural aspects, the method of determining the degree of mutual influence is clearer. That is, in referring to rules and values, the analysis should explore the mutuality with which these are discussed, cited, accepted or rejected. The greater the child's interest in dealing with them, the greater the mutuality. This will be discussed in the chapter on rules.
If, in addition, 'socialisation' is taken to refer to more than structural enculturation - i.e., if it refers to becoming part of a social group through sharing, affection and attachment, rather than only through interacting responsively with its rules and values - then the child's expression of intentions to share with the adult is a significant reference to the part that the child plays in building the relationship with its parents. The results of the analyses of Sharing and Talking in the interaction, show that children display higher frequencies of conversational Talking than adults, in all groups; similarly, children show significantly higher proportions of Narratives than adults in all groups. Interestingly, adults show a preference for involving themselves in their children's activities, rather than seeking the children's involvement in the parents' own activities. Overall children in all groups are more cooperative in the interpersonal sense (that is, sharing, teasing, joking, and voluntary helping), than are adults. Moreover, children in all groups are more responsive to the adults' share requests than are adults to their children's.

What can we conclude from these results about the question of mutual intentions in 'socialisation'? It is quite clear that the child has very definite intentions for sharing its psychological sphere with the adult. These intentions are expressed in different ways from the adult's, and cannot be reduced to imitative, unintentional support seeking. The process of 'socialisation', therefore cannot be described from the point of view of the mother's intentions and the
child's receptivity to these intentions. The crucial question here is whether the socialisation of rules and values can occur in the absence of the child's attempts to integrate itself with the adults, outside of (and in addition to,) the area of rules and values; that is, in the area of affect and sharing. This question is not easily testable, but few psychologists would hesitate in answering it in the negative. The heart of the controversy is likely to lie in the extent to which the interpersonal aspects of 'socialisation' (in which the child has already been shown to take a leading role,) dominate over the regulatory.

Reciprocity vs Unilaterality

The hypotheses derived from Youniss ('78) regarding the unilaterality of procedures in adult-child interaction, and listed on p.112, will now be discussed.

1) The initiation of interaction in the parent-child dyad, should occur in an unequal manner, with parents i) showing higher frequencies of initiation than, and ii) on different topics from, children. There was no difference between the children and adults in their frequencies of initiating interaction in any of the groups. There were differences, however, in the frequencies of initiating topics within ongoing interaction. In Hyderabad, adults had significantly more topic initiations than children in both the middle-class and working-class families. In Edinburgh, however, there was no such difference.
### Table 3.25: Abs.* Freqs. of Initiations@

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children</strong></td>
<td>126</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adults</strong></td>
<td>183</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Freqs.: averaged per person.* @ Including inits w/i responses.  
M-W U Tests: Chn: E > H p < .03; Ads: E > H p < .01  
Ads > Chn : Hyd p < .0008; Edin n.s.

### Table 3.26: Propns. of 'Unsought': Total initiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>.65</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.61</td>
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<td>.56</td>
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<td><strong>Adults</strong></td>
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<td>.72</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.59</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: n.s.

### Table 3.27: Abs.* Freqs. of Unadapted Topic Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children</strong></td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adults</strong></td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: n.s.
Table 3.25 shows frequencies of initiations (including initiations occurring within responses). Adults in all groups had higher frequencies than children.* Table 3.26, however, showing proportions of unsought to total initiations, showed very marginal and inconsistent differences between adults and children. According to the Youniss and Volpe hypothesis one would have predicted higher frequencies of unsought initiations in adults than in children. This hypothesis was unsupported. Topics were differentially distributed between adults and children, on the basis of their content. In all groups, adults began topics significantly more often than children with directives and criticisms, while children began topics more often with conversational talking, and in the Hyderabad groups alone, with positive affect or proximity. There were no differences between adults and children on any of the other topics most frequently chosen. What does this indicate? The finding is not of any great significance in itself. A differential focussing on topics is only to be expected between adults and children. Since a large part of their interaction is to do with the business of organising daily life, the finding that adults focus on such business more than children is not surprising. The question, then, is not "Are there differences?", but "Are there differences in particular topics such as sharing, helping, etc.?" (these topics being of relevance to the question of interpersonal intentions in the interaction.) This question has been partially discussed in the previous section, and is subsumed under the following* though the difference was significant only in Hyderabad.
Table 3.28: Abs.* Freqs. of Adapted Topic Changes

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>HW</th>
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<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Children</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: n.s.

Table 3.29: Propns. of Adapted: Total Topic Changes

<table>
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<th>HW</th>
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<th>EM</th>
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<th>EDIN</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.56</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
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<td>Adults</td>
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</table>

M-W U Tests: n.s.

Table 3.30: Propns. of Negative: Total Responsiveness

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<th>EM</th>
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<th>EDIN</th>
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<td>.25</td>
<td>.24</td>
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<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.38</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Frequencies averaged per person

M-W U Tests:

Ads > Chn: HM p<.001; HW p<.0001; EM n.s.; EW p<.05
2) The manner of initiation of topics and interaction should be different in adults and children; adults should have a more arbitrary manner of initiation than children.

a) Unadapted changes of topic should be more frequent in adults: This was not the case. As can be seen from Table 3.27 there was no consistent trend among the groups in these frequencies.

b) Adapted changes of topic should be more frequent in adults than children: As seen in Table 3.28, this was not the case in any of the groups.

Table 3.29 showing propensity of adapted to total topic change show inconsistent differences between children and adults, non-significant in all groups.

3) Responses to requests:

a) Adults should comply with children's directives less than vice versa: This hypothesis was supported, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

b) Adults should respond less as called for than do children, in non-directive topics: Table 3.30 showing the propensity of negative to total responsiveness in children and adults in each group, shows that the adults in each group are, in fact, more negatively responsive than are children. Overall, however, adults are more responsive than children. The evidence therefore was equivocal. There was no clear suggestion of greater responsiveness by children than adults.

Piaget's distinction between structural and functional cooperation allowed the extrapolation of the hypothesis that * n.s. only in Edin M-Cl.
children should be less likely to engage the adult in a
discussion of issues, where there was a difference of
opinion, than vice versa. Table 3.31 shows propns. of
responsive to total negations (responsive being
defined by the attempt to negate in a manner which seeks to
make the other understand the reasons for the negation; this
was exactly Piaget's criterion for describing functional
cooperação, and this was what was asserted to be absent in
the child-adult relationship, because "there can only be
acceptance of a superior judgement, or refusal to give in",
in each group. There are striking differences between
adults and children. Adults were more responsive than
children in all groups. The hypothesis was strongly
supported thus showing that children are, in fact, less
functionally cooperative than adults. When unresponsiveness
was considered as a proportion of total turns (rather than
as a ratio of responsive negations,) children were more
unresponsive than adults in all groups except the Edinburgh
middle-class.

Table 3.31: Propns. of Responsive : Total Negations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Children</td>
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<td>.22</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests:
Ads > Chn : HM p<.02; HW p<.01; EM n.s.; EW p<.05
Children were not less responsive than adults, but were less responsive in their negations. The majority of this difference lay not in unadapted negations, but in adapted, yet unresponsive negations.

Table 3.13 showed the proportions of Adapted to Total responses in children and adults in each group. According to Piagetian theory, although the percentages of ego-centrism in peer interactions are on the decrease by ages 7 and 8, these percentages are likely to be higher in interactions between child and adult, and still present at these ages, as mystification of the adult's authority by the child, which results in an inability to challenge or genuinely discuss with the adult, are still present at this age, and do not start to disappear until after the age of 10, when autonomy begins to replace heteronomy. The ratio of Unadapted responses, therefore, is an approximation of the ratio of ego-centrism (only within responses). There was, however, no difference between the adults and children in any group.

Piaget's hypotheses regarding the main functions of the child's interactions with the adult asserted that at age 4, the answer was 'Questions seeking information or theoretical explanation.' Table 3.32 shows Information seeking questions as proportions of the total utterances classified. It is clear that in all groups, adults issue a higher proportion of information seeking questions (as distinct from the information-seeking content of critical questions, suggestive questions, all forms of whys, repetitive and
Table 3.32: Relative Freqs.* of Info. Skg. Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Relative to Total Utterances
M-W U Tests:
Ads > Chn: HM p<.001; HW p<.001; EM p<.04; EW n.s.

Table 3.33: Relative Contents@ of Info. Skg. Q's.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q's re Self</th>
<th>Q's re Other</th>
<th>Q's re Both</th>
<th>Q's re 3rd</th>
<th>Q's re Obj/</th>
<th>Q's re Cult'l</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S+O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>person</td>
<td>Env.</td>
<td>Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM Chn.</td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.23</td>
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<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.24</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM Chn.</td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW Chn.</td>
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<td>.44</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Chn.</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>HM Ads.</td>
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<td>.70</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.005</td>
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<td>HW Ads.</td>
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<td>.17</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>EM Ads.</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW Ads.</td>
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<td>.78</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Adults</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

@ Relative to Total Questions
clarificatory questions,) than do children. This certainly refutes, on the face of it, any extension of the hypothesis that questioning (i.e., from the child to the adult,) is the prime function of the child's conversation with the adult, to this age of child. However, it says nothing about the content of these questions in children and adults. Table 3.33 shows the subject of chief importance referred to in the questions as proportions of total information seeking questions in children and adults. There is a clear tendency for the contents of children's and adults' questions to be differentially distributed in a Piagetian manner. That is, children's questions are weighted towards seeking information about objects and the environment, while adults' questions are weighted towards seeking information about the child. However, while this distribution of question contents supports the Piagetian hypothesis that the child's questions to the adult largely seek theoretical explanations, it does not support the hypothesis that questions as compared to other expressions of conversational interests, are the most important. As Table 3.34 shows, Assertions/Descriptions and Narratives form a far larger proportion of children's conversation than do information seeking questions. The analysis of Whys will be discussed in a later chapter. The evidence, then is equivocal with regard to reciprocity vs unilaterality in adult-child interaction.
Table 3.34: Abs.* and Reltv. @ Freqs. of Types of Utterances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Children</th>
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<td>HW</td>
<td>HYD</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>EW</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
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<td>.07</td>
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<td>.07</td>
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<td>Assn. or Descr.</td>
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<td>13.4</td>
<td>43.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| * Averaged per person  @ Relative to Total Utterances

M-W U Tests:
Asn./Descr. : Chn > Ads : HM p<.001; HW p<.008; EM n.s.; EW n.s.;
Nartvs. : Chn > Ads : HM p<.006; HW p<.04; EM n.s.; EW n.s.;
Reciprocity vs Complementarity

There is some evidence for complementarity in the very strong negative correlations found between the proportions of initiations of children and of adults across all groups. Proportions of initiations are the frequencies of all initiations, whether unsought or within sought responses, as a proportion of the total turns of each individual. [Although an initiation and a response may be conceived of as mutually exclusive, and their frequencies therefore confounded in their interdependence, these categories preclude this possibility to some extent, by allowing the possibility of coding initiations plus responses in response to initiations. The confounding may not be entirely avoided when, eg., one member of a dyad has an extremely high proportion of initiations, limiting the other's time for response plus initiation.]

It can be argued, therefore, that these high negative correlations reveal an inhibitory effect on the initiations of one member of the dyad upon the other. It is still an open question as to the direction in which the inhibition works. This question can be answered by studying the correlations between the initiations of one and other behaviours of the other. When looked at across all groups, (Matrix 3.1 in the Appendix,) adult initiations correlate moderately positively with child unresponsiveness, negatively with child sharing and child whys. Child initiations correlate highly positively with adult positive affect; highly negatively with adult negative affect;
positively with adult attachment, sharing and responsiveness; and negatively with adult criticisms, directives and new topic initiations. In other words, adult initiations seem to correlate negatively with most positive other directed behaviours, and positively with negative other directed behaviours of the child. Child initiations on the other hand seem to correlate positively with positive behaviours and negatively with negative behaviours of the adult. This suggests an inhibitory effect of adult initiations rather than child initiations, because while adult initiations have a similar relationship with other positive behaviour of the child, child initiations correlate differently with other positive behaviour of the other adult. Assuming that initiations are an expression of positive other-directedness, the effect of adult initiations on child initiations and other positive behaviours is consistent, while the effect of child initiations on adult initiations is not consistent with its effect on other positive behaviour of the adult.

When looked at separately in the two groups, (Matrices 3.2 and 3.3 in the Appendix,) adult initiations in Hyderabad are related negatively to child sharing and responsiveness, new topics and whys; and strongly positively to child unresponsiveness. Child initiations in Hyderabad are related positively to adult positive affect and unresposiveness, and negatively to negative affect, criticisms and directives of the adult. In Edinburgh, adult initiations are related negatively to child negative affect, dependency, sharing and
new topic initiations, and positively to unresponsiveness. Child initiations are related positively to adult unresponsiveness and whys. In both groups, then, the direction of effects seems similar, except for the very few correlations between child initiations in Edinburgh and positive behaviour of the adults. In Hyderabad it would appear that adult criticisms and directives are also very inhibitory of other child behaviours. Criticisms are negatively related to child positive affect, dependency, responsiveness (and positively to unresponsiveness), and new topic initiations. Similarly, directives are negatively related to dependency and responsiveness, and positively to unresponsiveness. In Edinburgh, both adult criticisms and directives are related negatively to child responsiveness and positively to child unresponsiveness, but unrelated to child affect, sharing, dependency, etc.

In Hyderabad, the inhibitory effect of adult initiations upon positive child behaviour is clearer than in Edinburgh, and extends partially to adult criticisms and directives, while this is not the case in Edinburgh.

Complementarity of initiations in adult-child dyads would not imply that initiations inhibit positive behaviour of the other. Since this is the case, such a complementarity is not a straightforward one of roles, as most speculation would predict. It is more appropriately called an inhibition than complementarity.

Other than in the case of initiations, however, there
is little evidence to suggest complementarity rather than reciprocity in adult-child interaction. If looked at in other than a global way, that is if looking at specifics in the interaction process rather than at the relationship as a whole, reciprocity seems predominant. Matrix 3.1 showing the correlations between adult and child behaviour across all groups, and Matrices 3.2 and 3.3 showing the same in Hyderabad and Edinburgh separately, show that there are many more positive correlations of similar behaviours between adult and child in each dyad, than there are negative correlations. Adults and children within dyadic relationships tend to be similar in the frequencies of similar behaviours. What is most interesting, however, is that the similarity lies in positive behaviour alone; negative affect and unresponsiveness are unrelated within dyads. When considered in the two groups separately, an interesting difference emerges: in Hyderabad, positive affect is highly positively correlated between adults and children, but responsiveness is not. In Edinburgh, it is exactly the reverse. In the light of the earlier discussion of a possibly greater emphasis by Edinburgh adults than Hyderabad adults on structural responsiveness, this finding of reciprocity of affect in Hyderabad and reciprocity of responsiveness in Edinburgh is interesting. The findings support a thesis of greater emphasis of structure in Edinburgh.

There is some evidence of negative complementarity in the negative correlations between adult frequencies of
directives and child compliance, both in Edinburgh and Hyderabad. Also suggesting negative complementarity are the correlations between adult initiations and child Responsiveness and Unresponsiveness:

In Hyderabad: a negative and non-significant $r (-.35)$ with child responsiveness;
a positive $r (r= .71, p<.001 )$ with child unresponsiveness.

In Edinburgh: a positive and non-significant $r (.39)$ with child responsiveness.

and a positive $r (r=.60, p<.07)$ with child unresponsiveness.

Correlations between child initiations and adult responsiveness and unresponsiveness:

In Hyderabad: no $r$ with adult responsiveness.

A positive $r (r=.57, p<.01 )$ with adult unresponsiveness.

In Edinburgh: a positive but non-significant $r (r=.28)$ with adult responsiveness.

A positive, non-significant $r (r=.42)$ with adult unresponsiveness.

In all relationships, there were positive $r$'s between the initiations of one and the unresponsiveness of the other. This negates complementarity in Hinde's sense. This is not conclusively negative complementarity, however, because initiations do not require responsiveness in the same sense as directives are thought to require compliance. Nevertheless, these correlations do cast doubt on the hypothesis of complementary interactions.
Reciprocity as Flexibility

According to the hypotheses listed on p.118, if flexibility in response to the other's intentions is taken as one measure of reciprocity, then as per the Social Cognition Theorists, adults should be more flexible than children. The present study, on the contrary, predicted no difference.

Flexibility in non-directive sequences:

Table 3.38 shows Propns. of Insistence to Insis. plus D.i.* following unresponsiveness received, by children and adults in each group. The propns. of children are very similar in all groups, and similarly, the propns. of adults in all groups. There is a striking difference between the propns. of children and adults in all groups. Contrary to the Social Cognition prediction, however, children are more flexible (less insistent) than adults. If such acceptance of unresponsiveness can be interpreted to reflect a degree of allowance/tolerance for the other's intentions, then this facility is higher in children than in adults. It can be argued, however, that flexibility in such instances is merely a reflection of inability to pursue the subject.

Table 3.39 shows propns. of responsive to total responses to topic initiations by the other. The differences lie essentially between cultures. In both children and adults, the Edinburgh groups are more responsive to other's initiations than the Hyderabad groups.

* Dropping of Issue
Table 3.38: Responses to Unresponsiveness: Proportions of Continuation of Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R's by:</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Ads > Chn: HM p<.05; HW p<.01; EM p<.05; EW n.s.

Table 3.39: Responses to Topic Initiations: Propns. of Resp.: Total Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R's by:</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: between chn. and ads. n.s. in all groups

Table 3.40: Propns. of Activity-Related Initiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests:
Ads > Chn: HM p<.01; HW p<.01; EM n.s.; EW n.s.;
Spearman's r between Children and Adults = .07 (across all groups)
Table 3.40 shows proportions of Activity Related Initiations. Children are very similar across all groups, as are adults. Adults uniformly have higher proportions of activity related initiations than children. This result supports the Social Cognition hypothesis of greater other-adaptedness in adults. There is no correlation at all between adult and child proportions of A.R. Initiations.

Lengths of Child and Adult Sequences: There was a correlation of .50 between child and adult sequence lengths, thus indicating a reasonably high degree of similarity within dyads.

Clusters in Individual Behaviour Patterns

The purpose of these analyses is to isolate clusters of highly positively and negatively correlated behaviours that exist in the behaviour patterns of various groups of adults and children previously distinguished on the basis of culture. If these clusters are different in different groups, it would indicate differences in behaviour that may be crucial for one group and not for the other. It is essentially an attempt to uncover 'conflicting' and 'associated' types or patterns of behaviour in each group.

The method of isolating these clusters was initially to list all the significant correlations, (or, in the case of the smaller Edinburgh group, all correlations over +/- .35) for each variable being considered, and then to include in
clusters those variables (if any) which were frequently associated or opposed.

Children

The clusters for the Hyderabad and Edinburgh children (from Matrices 3.4 and 3.5 in the Appendix, ) are presented below, with positive associations presented downwards, and negative associations presented opposite. The sets of clusters in each group show a distinct similarity.

**Hyderabad Children:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Affect</th>
<th>Proportion of Unrespvns.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharing</td>
<td>Proportion of non-extendd. to extendd. positive responses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of respvns.</td>
<td>Proportion of negative respvns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of negative respvns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>Proportion of extendd. positive responses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of extendd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Attachment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Hyderabad children's behaviour, there were two opposing clusters, in which Positive Affect, Sharing, Responsiveness and Attachment were all positively related to each other. Negative Affect was not significantly clustered, nor was it related at all to Positive Affect. Responsiveness and Unresponsiveness, on the other hand, were significantly and negatively related to each other.

**Edinburgh Children:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Affect</th>
<th>Proportion of unrespvns.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>Proportion of non-extendd. to extendd. positive responses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing</td>
<td>Proportion of respvns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment</td>
<td>Proportion of respvns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of extendd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
positive responses.

The two opposing clusters in the Edinburgh children's behaviour were very similar to those in the Hyderabad children. Once again, Negative Affect was not significantly clustered, nor related to Positive Affect. Responsiveness was negatively related to Unresponsiveness. Positive Affect, Sharing, Dependency, Attachment, and Responsiveness were all positively related to each other.

**Adults**

Contrary to the similarity of correlations in children's behaviour, adult behaviour clusters (from Matrices 3.6 and 3.7 in the Appendix,) were very different in Edinburgh and Hyderabad.

**Hyderabad Adults:**

Cluster 1:
- Positive Affect
- Sharing

Proportion of narratvs.
Proportion of negv. respvns.

Cluster 2:

Proportion of respvns.
Proportion of unrespvns.
Proportion of new topics

In the Hyderabad adults there were two sets of opposing and entirely unrelated clusters. Positive Affect and Sharing formed one cluster which was opposed to Negative Affect, but all were unrelated to the second set of clusters which consisted essentially of Structural responsiveness opposed to unresponsiveness.
Edinburgh Adults:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Affect</th>
<th>Negative Affect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharing</td>
<td>Dependency (only related to Affect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>Unresponsiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Edinburgh adults, there was only one set of clusters, in which Positive Affect, Sharing and Responsiveness were positively correlated with each other, and each was negatively correlated with Negative Affect and Unresponsiveness.

In the Hyderabad adults, therefore, it seems clear that Affect and Structural Responsiveness are two unrelated sets of variables, while in the Edinburgh adults, all forms of Affect and Structural Responsiveness are related, and lie on one dimension. There are two essential conclusions to be drawn out of these correlations of individual behaviour variables.

i) Cultural differences seem to be manifested only between groups of adults, and not children; and,

ii) 'Structural' forms of positive/responsive behaviour are on a different dimension from more 'Functional' forms in the Hyderabad adults.

Cultural Similarity/Diversity in 7 year-olds and Parents

Children were found to be more similar across cultures than adults. There were no significant differences between the groups of children in any of the categories of positive or negative affect. The differences lay essentially in the structural categories of responsiveness and initiations;
Edinburgh children were significantly more responsive, less unresponsive, and initiated new topics and angles within the interaction more than the Hyderabad children. There were also significant differences in frequencies of sharing, attention/praise seeking and reassurance seeking; the Edinburgh children showed higher frequencies of each. 'Dependency' as a compounded variable, showed no difference at all between the groups, thus rejecting Hsu's hypothesis.

Between the groups of adults, there were significant differences in the same direction as for the children in the above mentioned categories, but also in the categories of positive and negative affect. The Hyderabad adults showed significantly higher proportions of negative affect and significantly lower proportions of positive affect than the Edinburgh adults.

The interpretation of these differences in the adults is difficult. Firstly, the greater similarity between children across cultures than between adults could lend support to the nativist position that interpersonal affect and some related motives are innate and similar across cultures, and that differences between cultures are in the form of superimposed demands that show effect later in childhood. Both nativist and learning theories would, however, predict divergence between cultures as increasing with age. Learning theory could explain the present result by appealing to broad experiential similarities for children of this age, which
override cultural variations. The present finding about similarity in affect is especially interesting, however, because it is found as late as seven years of age.

Secondly, the finding that between the groups of children, while affect shows a similar distribution, the structural categories of responsiveness and initiation show very distinct and significant differences suggests that either:

a) affect is less open to cultural influences than are the more structural aspects of dyadic interaction, and/or

b) there is a differential demand in the two cultural contexts for expressions of affect as opposed to maintaining certain structural forms of responsiveness.

Whatever such a cultural demand for expressions of affect as opposed to responsiveness might be, it cannot be deduced from these results. There appears to be no evidence to suggest that in Hyderabad there is a context which demands more unresponsiveness from children; nor is it psychologically plausible. On the other hand it is more plausible to suggest that the demand for maintaining responsiveness is stronger in the Edinburgh context. This suggestion is consonant with the emphasis on structure in terms of compliance and in terms of rules which is postulated to exist more strongly in Edinburgh than in Hyderabad. If structure is viewed as "procedures for or in interaction" (Youniss and Volpe '78), then it becomes easy to view structural responsiveness as a procedure or form of interaction that can be more strongly emphasised and demanded in certain cultural contexts. Without accepting the
implication that all interaction is bound by these procedures, it is still possible to assume that particular procedures may be more or less emphasised than others. Thirdly, the differences between adults in terms of the greater responsiveness, sharing and positive affect in Edinburgh than in Hyderabad cannot be directly reduced to any cultural beliefs or values that would predict such a difference. Further, the implications of these differences for interaction in each group are difficult to understand.

At first glance the results appear divided clearly into a pattern of positive affect, sharing and responsiveness in Edinburgh, with significantly less of the same in Hyderabad. On the face of it, this difference can be interpreted to signify inadequacy in the interaction process in Hyderabad, assuming that a high degree of warmth, sharing and responsiveness from the adult to the child is a necessary and positive aspect of the interaction. The justification for the above assumption, however, is not a clear cut one. As the previous discussion of the change from dependency to responsiveness will have shown, the motivational and moral implications attributed to particular behaviour patterns by psychologists changes over time in the same culture. One cannot, therefore, claim absolute understanding of the implications of any behaviour, especially when arguing from the viewpoint of a different culture. What internal meaning and significance does the greater negativeness of the Hyderabad adults have? Does, for eg., negativeness in Hyderabad arouse a different response from that in
Edinburgh? And does this negativeness correlate differently with the interactor's behaviour in Hyderabad and in Edinburgh?

As the responses to Negative Affect in each group showed, adult responses to child negative affect were slightly (though non-significant) less negative in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh. This suggests a slightly greater tolerance for received negative affect in Hyderabad adults. There was no difference between groups in the children's responses to negative affect from the adults; children's responses were in each group more tolerant than adults' responses.

This trend in the adults' responses does not, however, hold for responses to received Unresponsiveness. There are no differences between groups either in children or in adults in the ratio of insistent to dropping-of-issue responses.

The correlations between child and adult behaviour in Edinburgh and Hyderabad separately, reveal the following differences: In Edinburgh, adult Responsiveness/Unresponsiveness is related to as many child behaviour variables as is adult Affect. But in Hyderabad, adult Responsiveness/Unresponsiveness is related to very few child behaviour variables. This is interesting in the light of the adult behaviour correlations, where Responsiveness/Unresponsiveness was distinct from Positive/Negative Affect in Hyderabad but not in Edinburgh.
The correlations between these and child behaviour variables suggests that Responsiveness/Unresponsiveness is less important a differentiating variable in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh. Child Responsiveness/Unresponsiveness shows similar correlations with adult behaviour; child R/U is related to adult Affect in Hyderabad, but to more variables in Edinburgh. Further, correlations with child R/U are much less strong in Hyderabad, even when significant. This once again suggests the greater salience of R/U in Edinburgh than in Hyderabad.

Further support for such a conclusion comes from correlations in child behaviour of adult Criticisms. In Edinburgh the latter is unrelated to child Affect, but strongly related to child R/U. In Hyderabad, on the contrary, adult Criticisms are related (negatively to) to child Affect, but unrelated to child R/U.

Having reached the tentative conclusion that structural responsiveness is less salient in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh, we can assume its unimportance there. However, we still have no understanding of the implications of the greater negative and less positive affect, and less sharing by Hyderabad adults. The finding that adult affect, while related to child positive affect, is unrelated to child negative affect, suggests that while children in Hyderabad may be more or less positive, varying with adult proportions of positive and negative affect, the incidence of negative affect in children is uninfluenced by either positive or
negative affect of the adult. In Edinburgh this is not the case. Child negative affect does covary negatively with adult positive affect, and positively with adult negative affect (and similarly with adult R/U respectively). In conclusion, the greater negative affect of the Hyderabad adults does not influence the proportions of negative affect in their children, unlike the case in Edinburgh.
Chapter 4

COMPLIANCE AND DIRECTIVES

INTRODUCTION

Child compliance has been implicitly or explicitly assumed by psychologists and sociologists over the years to be the focal issue in the process of the child's becoming a member of society. Its actual study has been generally limited to research investigating the consequences and effectiveness of different kinds of parental disciplining or 'socialisation' procedures. Three assumptions have characterised this research: i) that compliance to parental and societal norms is in fact a necessary pre-condition for becoming a member of a society; ii) that compliance is something to be elicited from children through careful psychological reinforcement and rigorous training; and iii) a perhaps less obvious assumption that the compliance and non-compliance of children is reflective of the extent to which they have absorbed the rules of their society, i.e., the extent to which they are 'socialised'. This last assumption treats compliance to rules primarily, if not solely, as a structural dimension.

The purpose of this chapter is to challenge all these assumptions as being theoretically unnecessary and empirically not entirely accurate. First, an examination of theoretical developments in the area of parent-child
interaction will be used to question the appropriateness of these assumptions, and secondly, an analysis of compliance related sequences of interaction in two cultures will be used to present alternative explanations of the meaning of compliance.

Social Learning Theory.

Arguments from Social Learning Theory centre around the basic assumptions that compliance is elicited from children by parents, through the reinforcement of specific child behaviours, or through the child's imitation of specific behaviours, motivated by identification with a parent, and through compliance itself expressing a motive to obtain reinforcement. Because compliance in specific behaviours as well as compliance as a motivated act is based on parental reinforcement, variations in child compliance are directly traceable to variations in patterns of parental reinforcement. Some patterns of parental behaviour are identified as being more effective reinforcers than other patterns. Positive reinforcement has been shown by research in learning to be more effective than negative reinforcement, and negative reinforcement to be more effective when used by normally positive individuals. Through a series of hypotheses relating to the effectiveness of discipline which is consistent, firm and controlling in a manner which allows the child to perceive the invariance of the reasons behind the controlling, Social Learning Theorists formulate the hypothesis that parents who are both
non-permissive and nurturant will make better reinforcing agents, and will obtain more compliance (Baumrind, '67). This hypothesis can be framed in the following sub-hypotheses:

Child compliance should be positively correlated with:

a) parental consistency in enforcing directives - insistence following non-compliance

b) parental refusal to yield to the child's 'nuisance value' - i.e., to pleas, threats and bargaining by the child

c) adapted responses by the parents to the child's directives - i.e., an absence of ignoring responses

d) parental use of reinforcements - such as praise, bargains, threats

e) parental use of justifications in directives

f) parental use of justifications generally

g) parental acceptance of child's non-compliance when accompanied by justifications

h) positive response by parents to the child's support and attention seeking

i) parental praise as a proportion of praise and criticism

j) parental demonstrations of affection - indicative of nuturance.

These hypotheses will be tested in the present study by means of correlations of ratios of child compliance with frequencies of the adult behaviour listed above. This will be presented in the section on adult-child correlations on pp. 265-266.
CONSCIENCE DEVELOPMENT

The chief exponent of learning theory and psychoanalytic theory constructs in the domain of moral development, has been Hoffman ('63) and Hoffman and Saltzstein ('67). In essence he argues against the use of love-withdrawal and power-assertive techniques of disciplining and for the use of induction (reasoning) on the basis of the following arguments:

First, any disciplinary encounter generates a certain amount of anger in the child. Power assertion is likely to arouse the most anger because it frustrates the child's need for autonomy by stressing the limits of its freedom.

Second, a disciplinary technique provides the child with a) a model, and b) an object against which to discharge his anger.

Third, power assertive and love withdrawal techniques direct the attention of the child a) to the consequences of his act for himself, and b) to the external agent producing these consequences. Induction is more apt to focus the child's attention on the consequences of his act for others, thereby identifying rules with the harmful consequences of their transgression.

Fourth, a technique must "enlist already existing emotional and motivational tendencies within the child" in order to be effective. One such resource is the child's need for love which has been shown to be important in the consistent correlations obtained between parent-child affection and the
The need for love may be aroused too strongly through emotionally threatening techniques such as love-withdrawal, thus obscuring the cognitive content of disciplining. Inductions are likely to arouse neither too much anxiety nor too much anger. The second emotional resource, empathy, if aroused through induction, adds to the aroused need for love an awareness of, and sorrow for, the pain caused to others through the consequences of his acts.

From the above arguments Hoffman suggests that while power assertion is the least effective technique for the development of an internally focused moral orientation, induction is the facilitative technique, and love-withdrawal stands midway. Although compliance to directives is a behavioural measure which is not directly comparable to measures of guilt and conscience, there is some justification for extending to compliance with parental rules, the theoretical arguments regarding the development of internal controls.

If parental rules are assumed to be internally adopted by the child, through whatever mechanisms, such adoption when expressed in action must take one of three possible courses: a) following them without reminder, b) complying with them when reminded, or c) not following them or not complying with them, with subsequent experience of guilt. Since most of the rules likely to be relevant to the daily interaction of a seven-year-old child will most probably have been referred to before the period of observation, the
most frequent reference to rules will therefore be made upon
the occurrence of transgressions or on the non-occurrence of
required actions. The responses to such reminders ought,
therefore, to fall into the patterns predicted and reported
by Hoffman, if the arguments regarding their causal factors
are justified. In cases where rules are referred to for the
first time, as well as in cases of directives without direct
reference to a rule, one can similarly predict that those
accompanied by induction should be more likely to obtain
compliance than those not so accompanied. Partial support for
relating compliance to internalised controls obtains from
the correlations shown by Lytton ('77), Lytton and Zwirner
('75) between these two variables, in two year olds.

If, following Hoffman's theorising, parental rules have
not been internally adopted by the child, one must expect to
find in the parents' behaviour, the following pattern of
disciplining: this lack of internalised controls, reflected
in high non-compliance to rules, and non-compliance to
induction, would be caused by an earlier and present use of
non-inductive techniques of disciplining such as
love-withdrawal. That is, the lower the proportion of
parental use of induction, the lower should be the
proportion of the child's non-compliance to induction. Power
assertive techniques, however, would be expected to reflect
high compliance and high negative affect in the child.
Therefore, the relationship of compliance to these three
kinds of parental disciplining would be expected to be in
the shape of a U curve:
High parental induction --> high child compliance and high child compliance to induction;
Low parental induction with high withdrawal of love --> moderate compliance and low or moderate compliance to induction;
Low parental induction with high power assertion --> high child compliance with no difference in compliance to induction;

It is very clear from the didactic nature of Hoffman's arguments (as it is from much of the literature of social learning theorists) that the recommended styles of disciplining are all recommended for a specific goal which is assumed to be desired by the parents. Namely, the development of an internally focused conscience, which is independent of external sanctions. According to the theory, the predicted relationships should occur even in the absence of the parents' desire for the specified goal. An opportunity to compare the occurrence of predicted relationships on the basis of the actual preference orientation of the parents occurs in the present study, where the two cultural groups being sampled differ radically in their cultural orientations to manifestations of conscience. (Kakar '78).

Attachment Theory

There is only one relatively recent study by Stayton, Hogan and Ainsworth ('71) that challenges the social learning and psychoanalytic models of the development of
compliance in children. They isolate three theoretical assumptions common to both the learning and identification models, and present alternative assumptions from an ethological-evolutionary perspective. In presenting an alternative model for the origins of compliance in infancy, they pose challenges to the basic implications of 'socialisation' models of development.

The three assumptions common to the learning and identification models are

i) that the child acquires a set of behaviours, attitudes, ideas, etc. from his environment either through learning due to reinforcement, or through imitation due to identification; and this acquired set of behaviours, etc., is not differentiated from the willingness to comply supposedly acquired through the same processes. Stayton et al do make this distinction, and postulate that the infant develops a willingness to comply, which is more important than and independent of specific learnt or imitated behaviours.

ii) that the central problem of socialisation is seen as intervening with the givens in an infant in order to make him socialised, implying that children become normally socialised only as a result of these strategic interventions. Stayton et al's focus is rather on the question of 'what must be done to a child to estrange him from his society?', implying that to be 'socialised' is the natural 'predictable outcome of development in the 'ordinary
iii) that there is a fundamental conflict between man's natural behavioural tendencies and cultural constraints. Alternatively Stayton et al suggest that man has evolved as a social species; infants are genetically biased toward certain social behaviours; they are preadapted to an ordinary expectable social environment; and thus children are social from the beginning. Furthermore...mothers are biased toward responding to infants' signals", thus implying a "fundamental compatibility" rather than conflict.

Stayton et al view compliance as a naturally developing "disposition for obedience -- and indeed a disposition to become socialised" which does not require for its development a specialised training programme. In testing these alternative assumptions in 12 month old infants, Stayton et al show clearly that infant compliance is unrelated to parental disciplining techniques such as frequency of directives, or force of intervention, but is rather related to affective variables in the interaction such as the mother's sensitivity, responsiveness and acceptance.

Towards Hypotheses

It is possible to extend the attachment theory argument about the independent development of dispositions for compliance in infancy, to hypotheses regarding the relation between parental attempted disciplining procedures and
compliance in older children. Epstein's ('64) dictum in relation to studies of learning that "evidence of the modifiability of a response provides no explanation of its origin", makes it clear that there are two distinct theoretical questions being raised by attachment theorists in connection with child compliance. The first is the question of the origins of compliance which they show to be independent of adult attempts to elicit it; and the second is the unexpressed question of the continuing significance of child compliance in parent-child interaction, i.e., the modifiability of compliance, and its structural and/or interpersonal implications for the child. If, in infancy, the disposition to comply develops independently of maternal attempts to train for control, it seems reasonable to assume that even in middle childhood the child's tendency to comply is not governed entirely by 'socialisation techniques'. The arguments against assuming that compliance originates in infancy through training and imitation, are equally applicable to the assumptions in much social learning theory literature, that children are increasingly (with age) controlled by environmental effects. Such assumptions would imply that the seven year old child is a modelled product of his environment, and that individual dispositions in children are now traceable to the accumulated differences in their experiences. No matter how one argues regarding specific causal influences on child behaviour, social learning theory still makes the central assumption of passive malleability in the child, and of a distinct lack
of organisational or directive capacity in the child. This assumption is no more valid than the now falsified assumption of passive malleability in the infant. It cannot be argued, however, that even in infancy, the developing disposition to comply is entirely independent of all environmental influence. Stayton et al argue that humans are adapted to developing in a responsive and cooperative environment. And the more sensitive, responsive and cooperative the interpersonal environment is, the more responsive and cooperative (compliant) will the infant be. However, it is not learning, imitation or training that is the psychological process of environmental influence which they isolate, but a process of reciprocity; of reciprocal responsiveness and cooperation.

In extending these arguments to older children, we are left with the following hypotheses:

i) Child compliance should be positively related to parent compliance, general responsiveness, and expressions of positive affect.

ii) Child compliance should not be related as strongly to parental attempts to control or train for compliance, such as frequency of directives, strictness of enforcement and various techniques of reinforcing compliance such as praise, criticism, threat, bargain, force of directive, or induction.

However, there is, as yet, no research evidence on which to base speculations regarding the direction taken in
later years by the relationships reported in infancy by Stayton et al. It is unknown whether these early correlations between maternal responsiveness and child compliance become stronger and more pronounced with the developing relationship, or whether they become submerged with the emergence of new processes in the relationship, involving the use of justificatory reasoning etc. In no way is it being claimed -- nor can it be claimed -- that environmental attempts to foster valued behaviour in children are irrelevant. The crucial shift in modern developmental psychology lies in the assumption that children are already social, empathic, and actively seek culture; they do not need to be trained to do so. However, evidence from cross-cultural psychology and anthropology shows that environmental philosophies do influence the specifics of culture, as well as the general modes of being social, of complying, of conforming to the cultural specifics, etc. Given this influential interaction with the environment, which we can assume is more demonstrable in older children than in infants, we are led to examining the relative influence of environmental effects upon the individual dispositions of children.

In accordance with the specific philosophical orientations of Hindu and Western cultures (discussed elsewhere: namely, a) the West is more insistent on control of the environment and on order; b) the West is more influenced by individualist values of non-conformity; c) Hinduism places more emphasis on tight social order; d)
Hindus are more given to accepting failures of desired order
and less anticipatory of stringent control over their
environment) the following hypotheses arise:

iii) in Scotland adults attempt to maintain a less
intrusive, but strict control over child behaviour.

iv) in India adults attempt to maintain a wider ranging,
but less strict control over child behaviour.

These and the hypotheses mentioned earlier will be described
in operational terms after the description of the category
scheme.

CATEGORISATION

The Identification of Directives

There were three basic problems present in the coding
of an act as a directive: a) The first problem arises in
the selection of directives from a continuum of acts ranging
from acts seeking attention to acts explicitly seeking the
modification, performance or restriction of actions. In one
sense, every other-directed act which requires a response
or, at the very least, an audience, is a directive. However,
the directive properties of all other-directed acts are too
broad to be useful in the present analysis, but are recorded
instead, in the analysis of interactive initiation and
response. It was decided to include as directives only those
requests which seek explicitly to modify the other's bodily
(including speech) actions, and not those requesting merely
a shift in, or focusing of, attention. Eg.,
Child: "Look at my funny hat, Mummy"

would be coded as a request for attention but not a directive. On the other hand,

Child: "Come and see our trampolining act, Dad"

which requires an explicit alteration of physical actions, would be coded as a directive as well as a request for attention/praise. Questions were in no case coded as directives. The only exception to the criterion of bodily actions are those instances where the question/request has explicit directive force, perhaps in addition to information seeking properties. Eg.,

Mother: "What marks did you get in the test?"
Child: grinning, "I don't know"
Mother: "Hmm?"
Child: no response
Mother: sternly, "Rajul Tell me!"

Here the mother's first two acts would be coded as questions, but her third act would be coded as a directive. It is only when the directive component is emphasised, as in this example, that a "Tell me ..." would be coded as a directive. In most cases they are coded as questions.

b) The second classification problem is related to the first one. Requests for help which are information seeking questions are coded as help seeking questions and not as directives. Eg.,
Child: "Dad, should I use the shorter or longer piece of wood for this?"

would be coded as a help seeking question. But

Eg., Child; "Could you hold this while I join these two?"

would be coded as a help seeking directive.

c) The third problem refers to those directives which specify more than one action to be performed or restricted. Such directives are coded as two separate directives only when the two actions referred to are meaningfully distinct, and there is a possibility for complying with one and not the other. Eg.,

Mother: "Wash your hands and come and eat"

would be coded as two directives. Both the specified actions are separately meaningful and there is the possibility of complying with one and not the other. On the other hand

Mother to child who is already sitting at the dining table: "Get up and wash your hands"

would be coded as only one directive. Although there is the possibility of the child's getting up but not washing his hands, the first action is specified only as subsidiary to the main one, which is washing the hands. If a directive is repeated immediately, without a reasonable pause where the person spoken to might comply, it is coded only as one directive.
Eg., Mother: "Raju go and wash your legs—look how dirty they are! You should have washed them when you came in—go and wash them."

II: The Form of the Directive.

Directive force can be initially analysed from essentially three possible structural forms that a directive may take: Suggestions, Requests and Imperatives.

a) Suggestions:
These are "in the form of a declarative or an interrogative rather than an imperative" (Lytton et al (a)). A suggestion is a mild directive involving a specification for action, but with little 'directive force', Eg.,

"Why don't you go and play with your ______?"

where the option for alternative action is clearly permissible.

b) Requests: These are directives specifying an action without a permissible option which are, however, softened by a gentle tone, an interrogative intonation, an endearment or affectionate term, or an explicit please—unless the please is a merely formal gesture in a definite imperative, eg., when accompanied by stern tones, annoyance or criticism. Examples of requests are,

Father: "Christopher, could you pass me the salt?"
Mother: "Mona, get me the needle and thread, 'beti'" (literally, 'beti' means daughter, but can be used as an endearment)
Mother: "Please don't bang on the table, Johnny, I've got a headache."

c) Imperatives:
These are categorical directives, offering essentially no option for responding in any way other than that specified (PACIC), but without the mildness of tone or phrasing, and with clearly more directive force than is present in requests.

d) Offers: These are generally a mild form, as are suggestions. However, they do not always allow refusals or alternative actions. Offers of food, eg., can be seen to often carry as much salience as do imperatives. Offers cannot automatically be assumed, therefore, to lack force.

Problems in the classification of offers occur eg., in coding

"Would you like some more ham?"

as opposed to

"Have some more ham."

The former would be coded as an offer, while the latter would be coded as a suggestion or a command, depending on extra contextual information. It is a debatable question, however, as to whether mere phrasing of sentences can indicate a difference between imperatives and offers. In all cases, it was the inferred intention of the person issuing the directive, which was coded.

e) Permission Seeking:
* See Lytton et al (a)
(Requests for permission and Demands for permission)

These are directives aimed at creating a possibility for the speaker's own actions. Requests versus Demands for permission were distinguished by essentially the same criteria used for distinguishing requests from imperatives. Eg.,

Child: "Please Mummy, I'll play just one more game and then go to bed"

would be coded as a request for permission, while a sullen

"No -- let me play one more game!"

would be coded as a demand for permission.

Problems with the identification of permission seeking arise with instances where the request or demand is not phrased in an explicit "May I ...?" form, but in the form of an assertion of intention. Assertions of intention which end with a questioning intonation are quite clearly requests for permission for the specified action, or for the approval of the intention for the specified action. The problem arises in the absence of the rising intonation or of adequate information regarding it. In such cases recourse must be taken to subsequent events to categorise the intention behind the doubtful statement. Eg.,

Child looking at mother: "I'll just go to my friend's house and come back"
Mother: "No -- not now -- it's late."  Child: "Oh -- please I won't be long --"
The child's first statement must be understood to be a permission request rather than merely an assertion of intention because of the subsequent request following the mother's refusal. On the other hand,

Child doing her home-work in the sitting room; Mother and younger sister playing nearby; C: stands up, "I'll go upstairs and get a ruler so I can draw it straight and do it four times." Mother glances briefly at C and then continues playing with ys.

This was coded as an assertion of intention, and was interpreted in context, to be more of an attention-seeking nature than a permission request. This example illustrates, however, the thin line between assertions of intention and permission seeking, and the heavy dependence upon other contextual information for their categorisation.

f) Prohibitive vs. Positive Directives:

Following the distinction made by Lytton et al (a), requests and imperatives were further categorised as to whether the action specified was to be performed or to be inhibited. Eg.,

"Christopher -- please don't spoil the papers!" (to child who was playing with rolls of wrapping paper),

or, "Get off that now, Johnny, it's not your turn"

or, "Don't put your finger in it, Caroline".

are all prohibitive directives; on the other hand,

"Could you get some water for your Daddy, Mona?"
or, "Sit properly, Debbie -- what would your father say?"

were coded as positive directives.

Cases where the directive was aimed both at the inhibition of an action as well as the performance of an action were coded as prohibitive or positive, depending on which was judged to be the main focus of the directive.

g) Critical Directives: Directives with a critical component - i.e. - clearly expressing criticism of the other's action or inaction which the directive is aimed to correct, were distinguished from directives which are not invested with criticism. This distinction was considered useful for the purpose of separating directives in terms of their salience for the person issuing the directive. Some examples of critical directives are:

Mother: "Nicky! Stop that. If you want one go and get it yourself."

or:

Father: "What is this Kishor?! Sleeping again? Come on do your home-work!"

or:

Mother: "Everyday it's the same story. I give you tiffins, and they come back full. If you don't eat it tomorrow, you're not getting any lunch anymore!"

or:
Aunt: "Krishnapriya what is this?! Is that the way to behave with a roti?! Stop that!"

h) **Physical Pressure accompanying directives:** This referred to cases when directives were accompanied by physical pressure for compliance - eg. - M: "Why don't you go and play upstairs." with her hand on C's shoulder, gently pushing him towards the stairs. This was considered an important aspect of directing because previous studies (Manning '78) suggest that it differentiates more authoritarian styles of controlling. Directives which consisted solely of gestures or were accompanied by gestures, such as holding out a glass for refilling, would not count as physical pressure.

i) **Persuasion Accompanying Directives:** (described in Chapter 6 in the section on Persuasions.)

**III: CONTENT OF DIRECTIVES:** the behavioural area referred to:

Directives regarding:

a) Other's entertainment:

b) Joint activity: not play

c) Joint activity: play

d) Child's school work

e) Care-taking

f) Self-care

Directives suggesting or commanding manner of other's play

Directives related to the performance of the child's school home-work.

Directing the other to permit care-taking by self or third person: Eg., "Come I'll comb your hair."

Directing the other to perform
h) Object and environment related behaviour

Directives related to the other's actions upon objects or the environment: Eg., "Don't stand on the settee."

i) Interpersonal behaviour

Directives related to the other's actions to other people or the self. Eg., "Don't hit your brother" or "Say hello to Aunty".

j) Food related behaviour

Directives related to food and eating, including requests for food, offers of food, requests for behaviour according to table manners, etc.

k) Other individual behaviour

Directives concerning the other's behaviour which have not been included in the above, Eg., references to bedtime.

Directives seeking help in:

l) School work

All household chores, ranging from setting the table, cleaning the house to gardening.

m) Household work

Eg., fetching and carrying, holding, etc.

n) Minor acts

Other than l) or m) including play objects or musical instruments, etc. Non-verbal refers to actual physical assistance required, while verbal refers to verbal solutions to problems or the seeking of information regarding problems, etc.

o) Tasks -- non-verbal

Seeking ideas or actual help from other for own entertainment. Eg., seeking intervention in conflict between self and third person etc.

q) Entertainment of self

Seeking help in acts such as washing, dressing or combing the self.

r) Interpersonal relations

s) Care-taking

Responses to Directives:

Responses to directives were classified into essentially three categories - Compliance, Non-Compliance, and Neither, where:

a) Compliance was defined as the performance of actions in the manner and at the time specified by the directive.
b) **Non-compliance**

was defined as the performance or non-performance of actions in other than the manner or at the time specified by the directive.

c) **Neither** referred to those responses to a directive where a compliant or non-compliant response was made unnecessary or impossible due to the intervention of different circumstances after the issuing of the directive. Eg., Mother to child "Could you just get me my glasses, Caroline?" Before C could move, F passes the glasses over to M. Here the child's response to M's request would be coded as 'Neither'. 'Neither' refers also to those cases where although there was no extra circumstantial intervention or change, the response of the individual was not known or could not be known, because the directive specified a time in the future: Eg., M to child who had handled a record, "Don't ever put your hands on the record..." ; If the child had explicitly agreed, the response would be coded as compliant. Because no response was immediately necessary, a lack of response would be coded as 'Neither'.

The categories of 'Compliance' and 'Non-Compliance' were further sub-divided into the following:

**Compliance**
- Agrees and Complies
- Complies (without further utterance)
- Protests/ Refuses/ Challenges but Complies
- Complies and justifies Compliance
- Gives Permission
- Accepts Offer or Help given

**Non-Compliance**
- Non-complies (without further utterance)
- Non-complies with persuasion for non-compliance
Protests/Refuses/Challenges and non-complies
Protests/Refuses/Challenges and non-complies with persuasion
Counter-suggests and non-complies
Counter-suggests with persuasion and non-complies
Agrees but non-complies
Refuses permission
Refuses permission with persuasion
Refuses offer or help
Refuses offer or help with persuasion

The only sub-category needing clarification is the following:

Counter-suggestions

This refers to attempts to modify the other's directive in some specification, eg.,

Mother: "I would like the playroom tidied up before supper, Christopher!"
Christopher: "Ask Johnny to do it."

or:

Mother: "Would you like some orange juice?"
C: "Some apple juice."

or:

Mother: "Time for your home-work, Mona."
Mona: "Ohh...I'll just finish this comic and then do it."

or:

Child: "Could you open my hooks Mummy?"
Mother: "Wait a bit. This rice is burning."

It is obvious from these examples that counter-suggestions can range from extreme attempted
modifications of the directive to very minor modifications such as small delays. Some counter-suggestions would be more appropriately classed as compliance than as non-compliance. However, for ease of analysis all counter-suggestions were clubbed together as non-compliant responses.

Problems with coding responses to directives were few. One problem lay in cases where the directive was not followed by any response. Normally such a lack of response would be coded as Non-complies with no further utterance. But in those cases where the individual appeared to be thinking about the directive rather than ignoring it, it would be misleading to code it non-compliant. In such cases the speaker's interpretation of the pause was often taken as the clue to its coding. If the directive was repeated as if following non-compliance, then the lack of response was coded as non-compliance. In some cases it was coded as 'Neither'. Such problematic cases were, however, very rare.

V: RESPONSES TO NON-COMPLIANCE

Responses to the other's non-compliance by the person who issued the directive were classified into three alternatives:

a) 'Repeats Directive': These would then be classified as to the form and content of the directive in the manner described in sections II and III.

b) 'Modifies directive': these refer to cases where the directive was altered in response to the other's non-compliance. These were not coded further as to form. Eg.,
Anu: "Mummy, we're going to play hide and seek..."
Mother: "No -- it will be too noisy, Anu, we're busy."
Anu: "Ok -- we'll go outside and play then?"

or:

Mother: "Come on, Kishor, it's late; come and do your home-work."
Kishor: "Ahh... no.. we're playing."
Mother: "Ok. Finish your game and then come."

c)'Drops Issue': these referred to cases where the directive was dropped following non-compliance.

Eg., Mother: "Ramesh -- carry your brother-- I've got work to do", trying to pass the baby over to Ramesh
Ramesh: looks at M, grins, and runs away.
Mother: looks at Ramesh briefly, then turns away and continues talking to neighbour.

or:

Child:" Amma, give me food na, I'm hungry", going up to mother and pleading.
Mother: "Umm. In a little while.." continues cleaning the rice.
Child: turns back to her play.

In cases where the directive appeared to be dropped only very briefly before it was brought up again, i.e., for less than thirty seconds, the pause was not recorded, and the response was coded as repeats or modifies directive. A distinction was made between temporary dropping of issue and permanent dropping of issue. 'Temporary d.i. referred to cases where the directive was dropped, and then repeated from between thirty seconds to fifteen minutes after the
non-compliance. 'Permanent d.i.' referred to cases where the directive was dropped for longer than fifteen minutes.

VI: PROBLEMS OF REVERSAL IN DIRECTIVE SEQUENCES

When dealing with sequences involving permission seeking or counter-suggesting, it is often unclear as to who is doing the directing and who the responding. A refusal of permission can sometimes take the form of prohibitions, and responses to such refusals are often seen more appropriately as compliance or non-compliance than as repeats request for permission, or drops issue. Similarly, counter-suggestions sometimes become fresh directives. Eg.,

C: "Mummy - can I just go to my friend's house and get that book.."
M: "No why do you need it now - you can get it tomorrow."
C: "No - I won't be a minute...it's just here...I want to copy the home-work we have to do."
M: "No it's not necessary."
C: "Ohh Mummy please."
M: "No Mona you're not going."
C: "I'll come back quickly."
M: "No Mona! Stop it!
C: "Please Mummy."

M's responses soon become prohibitions while being refusals of permission at the same time. Equally, C's responses to the prohibitions can be seen as non-compliance. Or:

C: "Mum - come and play with me"
M: "I'm busy just now ..play with Anne."
C: "No I don't want to play with her."
M: "That's not very nice ...go and play with Anne."
C: "No"
M's counter-suggestion can equally be seen to become a new directive. However, in all cases it was the first initiation of the directive sequence which was taken as the first directive. And although such a choice obscures the presence of the 'leading' element at some points in the sequence, this was the only economical way of coding sequences.

Summary of Hypotheses:
In this study it was predicted that

Group Differences:
1) Child Comply Ratios in the Hyderabad groups should be lower than in the Edinburgh groups.
2) Among both adults and children Frequencies of New Directives should be higher in the Hyderabad groups than in the Edinburgh groups.
3) Directives of Greater Force should be more frequent in the Hyderabad groups, and Directives of Lesser Force should be more frequent in the Edinburgh groups among both adults and children.
4) Hyderabad adults should have a larger range of Behavioural Area covered by their directives than the Edinburgh adults.
5) Edinburgh adults should show higher Proportions of Insistence in response to child non-compliance than do Hyderabad adults.

Correlates of Compliance:
6) Child Compliance should be positively correlated with Adult Compliance, Adult Responsiveness and Adult Positive Affect.
7) Child Compliance should be more strongly correlated with the above than with Adult Frequency of Directives, Forcefulness of Directives, Insistence, Praise, Criticism, Threats and Bargains, and Justification of Directives. In addition to these hypotheses, the specific hypotheses derived from Social Learning Theory and Hoffman, which are contrary to the predictions of the present study, have been described previously on pages 205 and 209.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results will be described and discussed in each of the following sections:
I: Group Differences in Frequencies and Sequential Frequencies of the various categories;
II a: Individual Behaviour Correlations for children and adults separately;
II b: Individual Behaviour Correlations in different groups;
III a: Correlations between child and adult behaviour;
III b: Correlations between child and adult behaviour in different groups.

I: Group Differences

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the frequencies of directives issued by adults and children in the four sample groups. While there are significant differences between the Hyderabad and Edinburgh groups among the adults in all the measures of directives, there are no differences of any significance among the children. In the children, the differences appear to be predominantly on the basis of social class rather than culture. As predicted, the frequency of directives is significantly higher among the Hyderabad adults than among the Edinburgh adults. The frequency of directives in all groups is significantly higher among the adults than among the children. There appears to be no
## FREQUENCY OF DIRECTIVES

### Table 4.1: Abs. and Reltv.* Freqs. of Directives by Adults

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
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<tr>
<td>Abs.</td>
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<td>102</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reltv.</td>
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<td>.31</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs.</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs.</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 4.2: Abs. and Reltv.* Freqs. of Drctvs. by Chn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reltv.</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs.</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


* Abs. Freqs. are averaged per person. Reltv. Freqs. are calculated as proportions of total acts by each group.

A connection between the distribution of directive frequencies of adults and children in the four groups. Correlations between child and adult proportions of new and repeated directives also show the lack of relationship between these
variables. A Spearman's r of adult and child proportions of new directives = .21, p < .30; the r between adult and child proportions of repeated directives = -.02, p < .47. Amongst the children there is an unpredicted result of higher frequency of directives issued by middle-class children in both cultures than by working-class children.

**FORM OF DIRECTIVES**

Table 4.3: Percentages of Total Drctvs. in Adults

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suggns./Offers</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprtvs</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Propn. Suggns.: E > H , p < .001;
Propn. Reqs.: H > E , n.s.;
Propn. Imprtvs.: H > E , p < .006

Table 4.4: Percentages of Total Freq. of Drctvs. in Chn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suggns./Offers</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
<td>66.1%</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprtvs.</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Propn. Suggns.: E > H , p < .06
Propn. Reqs.: E > H , p < .02;
Propn. Imprtvs.: H > E , p < .01

* The remainder of the percentage is taken up by directives repeated with modified content whose form was not coded.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the relative use of directives of differing force by adults and children in the four groups. Mann-Whitney U Tests show significant differences between the two cultural groups among these forms of directives. In both children and adults there is a significantly higher use of directives of greater force by the Hyderabad groups, and a significantly higher use of directives of lesser force by the Edinburgh groups. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that there are implicit rules permitting the use of more frequent as well as more forceful control attempts in the Indian families. That the latter is significant for children as well as for adults is of interest.

Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the use of various forms of persuasive accompaniments of directives. The use of physical pressure is significantly higher among the Hyderabad adults than among the Edinburgh adults. Amongst the children, the Edinburgh groups show a higher frequency of directives with justifications, and the Hyderabad groups a significantly higher frequency of interpersonal appeals.

Table 4.7 shows the Comply Ratios of children and adults in the four groups. As predicted, higher compliance is shown by the Edinburgh families, though the difference is significant only for the children. Seen in the light of the higher frequencies of directives by the Hyderabad adults, the significantly lower compliance of the Hyderabad children presents a picture of greater attempted but less effected
## Accompaniments of Directives

### Table 4.5: Percentages of Total Freq. of Drctvs. in Adults

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prohibitive Drctvs.*</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs. w/ Phys. Pressure</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs. w/ Justifications</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs. w/ Int.pers. Appeals</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Drctvs. w/ Phys. Pres.: H > E p<.05; rest n.s.

### Table 4.6: Percentages of Total Drctvs. by Chn.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prohibitive Drctvs.*</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs. w/ Phys. Pressure</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs. w/ Justifications</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs. w/ Int.pers. Appeals</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not including critical directives.

M-W U Tests: Drctvs. w/ Int.pers. Appeals: H > E p<.01; rest n.s.
Table 4.7: Comply Ratios* of Chn. and Adults

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Comply Ratios = Comply/Comply + Non-Comply
M-W U Tests: Children: E > H, Z = -2.20, p < .02
Adults: E > H, Z = -1.40, n.s.
Chn > Ads: n.s. in all groups.

Table 4.8: Eventual Comply Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Children: E > H, p < .03 (1 tailed test)
Adults: E > H, n.s.
Chn > Ads: n.s. in all groups.

control by the Hyderabad adults. This is contrary to the notions of authoritarian control which are often attached to traditional societies. One point remains to be clarified: the lower compliance ratios of the Hyderabad children might be a function of the significantly higher proportion of repeated directives issued by the Hyderabad adults. To
clarify this, the eventual outcomes of directives were used to calculate an Eventual Comply Ratio for each group.

Table 4.8 shows that even the Eventual Comply Ratios are significantly higher among the Edinburgh children than the Hyderabad children, thus showing that the differences in compliance are independent of differences in adults' repeating of directives.

Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show the forms of non-compliance shown by each group.

Tables 4.11 and 4.12 show comply ratios received in response to various kinds of directives. The only noticeable difference in children's compliance was in response to directives without any persuasion; the Edinburgh children showed a higher CR to these than did the Hyderabad children. This same difference occurred with adult compliance.

Tables 4.13 and 4.14 show that there are clear similarities between the two cultures in their tendencies to respond to non-compliance with insistence, modified insistence or dropping of issue. There are non-significant class differences, however, showing that middle-class adults of both cultures tend to insist more and drop issue less than working-class adults.
## NON-COMPLIANT RESPONSES TO DIRECTIVES

### Table 4.9: Child responses as %ages of total Non-compliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ignores and non-complies</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-suggests</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-compl. w/justification</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Counter-suggests: n.s.  
Non-complies w/ justification: E > H, p<.003  
Ignores and n.c.: H > E p<.01

### Table 4.10: Adult responses as %ages of total Non-compliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ignores and non-complies</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-suggests</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-compl. w/justification</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Counter-suggests: n.s.  
Non-compl. w/ justification: E > H, p<.02  
Ignores and n.c.: n.s.  
N-C w/ Justin.: Ads > Chn: HM p<.07; HW p<.03; EM p<.02; EW n.s.;  
Counter-sugg.: Ads > Chn: HM p<.0008; HW p<.01; EM p<.08; EW n.s.
# RESPONSES TO DIRECTIVES WITH PERSUASION

Table 4.11: Child Comply Ratios in response to Adult Drctvs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D's w/ justification</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D's w/ Appeals*</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D's w/o persuasion</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D's w/ Internal Justns.</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D's w/ External Justns.</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: n.s.  *unreliable for Edin low frequencies

Table 4.12: Adult Comply Ratios in response to Child Drctvs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D's w/ justification</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D's w/ Appeals*</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D's w/o persuasion</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D's w/ Internal Justns.</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D's w/ External Justns.</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: n.s.

*significant but unreliable because of low freqs. in Edin.
RESPONSES TO RECEIVED NON-COMPLIANCE

Table 4.13: Adults' Responses to Child Non-Compliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repeats Drctv.</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifies Drctvs.</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drops Issue</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: n.s.
@ Including both temporary and permanent dropping of issue

Table 4.14: Children's Responses to Adult Non-Compliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repeats Drctv.</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modifies Drctv.</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drops Issue</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: n.s.

The lack of difference between the Edinburgh and Hyderabad adults in their proportions of dropped issues is contrary to the prediction that greater strictness will be shown by the Edinburgh adults. However, this figure includes temporary as well as permanent dropping of issue (see definitions on pp. 228-229). When the two were separated out, the Edinburgh adults were found to show a larger proportion of
temporary dropping of issue, and the Hyderabad adults a significantly higher proportion of eventually dropped issues (M-W U Test p<.03, 1 tailed test). The hypothesis of wider but less strict control in the Indian adults thus seems supported. It is still unclear, however, what underlies the wider control attempts, and what underlies the more frequent dropping of issue following non-compliance. Is the dropping of issue a fairly immediate response to non-compliance, showing some degree of unconcern as to the outcome of the directive, or does it occur only after prolonged insistence, as a forced compromise? The latter would indicate the presence of flexibility following confrontation, rather than in the sense of an easy readiness to be 'flouted'. To answer this question, dropping of issue was examined in relation to the length of the sequence at which it occurred.

Tables 4.15 and 4.16 show the proportionate frequencies of various lengths of directive sequences initiated by children and by adults in the four groups. The mean directive sequence length was significantly longer in the Hyderabad adults than in the Edinburgh adults. There was no such difference in the sequence lengths of directives initiated by children. In the adult initiated directives there was a non-significant trend towards higher frequencies of short sequences in the Edinburgh groups, and higher frequencies of longer sequences in the Hyderabad groups. There was no consistent trend among the children. It would appear, then, that far from dropping issue readily, there
Table 4.15: Sequence Lengths of Adult Initiated Drctvs.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,4,5</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,7,</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,9+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ads > Chn: HM p<.001; HW p<.0008; EM p<.04; EW n.s.

Table 4.16: Sequence Lengths of Child Initiated Drctvs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,4,5</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,7,</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,9+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Scores are proportions of total drctvs. issued by each.
@ Sequence Lengths are counted in pairs of turns i.e., 1 = 1 pair (eg., drctv. and response or no response). A sequence length of 1 refers to a sequence which was terminated at pair 1 whether compliantly or non-compliantly.
are more sequences of prolonged insistence shown by the Hyderabad adults than by the Edinburgh adults. These figures, however, show these lengths as proportions of the total frequency of directives.

Figures 1 and 2 show smoothed* curves of the frequencies of dropped issue at each sequence length as proportions of the non-compliance received at each sequence length. These show quite clearly that the tendency to drop issue, while fairly similar across all groups of adults at initial non-compliance, tends to decrease steadily following repeated non-compliance (up to sequence length 5). That is, if the adults have insisted upon compliance twice, the likelihood that they will drop the issue following a repetition of non-compliance is lower than if they had insisted only once; and the likelihood of dropped issue following non-compliance after three repetitions of the directive is even lower than after two repetitions and so on. However, while the increasing insistence of the Edinburgh adults ends in moderate sequence lengths with a high proportion of achieved compliance, the increasing insistence of the Hyderabad adults flattens out and then falls sharply (i.e., the rate of dropping issue rises sharply) in the longer sequences ending.

* Smoothing was done by the normal procedure of getting the mean of the preceding score, the following score, and the score in question to represent each score. For the first and last scores on the graph the mean of two scores was taken. This procedure was considered necessary for ease of reading. As Figs. 1 and 2 (Raw) in the Appendix show, the extreme angularity of the original graphs show the same trend, but make it difficult to grasp at first glance.
Figure 1: Smoothed curves of Frequency of Adult Dropping issue at each Sequence Length.

Figure 2: Smoothed curves of Frequency of Child Dropping issue at each Sequence Length.
in increasing tendencies to accept non-compliance. Figure 1 shows clearly that the differences between the Edinburgh and Hyderabad adults lie not in an unconcern regarding the outcome of directives, but in an acceptance of persistent non-compliance versus a firm insistence until compliance has been achieved. Figure 2 showing child dropping of issue shows a mildly decreasing tendency to drop issue, with longer sequences maintained by the Hyderabad children than by the Edinburgh children. The eventual rise in dropping of issue occurs, however, only in the middle-class groups of both cultures.

The increasing tendency to insist in longer sequences shown by the adults raises a question regarding the children's tendency to comply after early non-compliance. If the increasing tendency to insist is accompanied by an increasing tendency to comply one might conclude that the longer sequences show that parental insistence is perceived by the children as being serious. If, however, the children's tendency to comply decreases with increasing sequence length, the picture is one of increasing confrontation between adults and children.

Figures 3 and 4 are smoothed curves showing the frequencies of child and adult compliance as proportions of directives received at each sequence length. The clear U curves of child compliance show that it is in fact a process of increasing confrontation preceding eventual increase in compliance in all groups. For the Edinburgh children this
Figure 3: Smoothed curves of Propns. of Child Compliance at each Sequence Length.

Figure 4: Smoothed curves of Propns. of Adult Compliance at each Sequence Length.

\[\text{Compliance as a proportion of trials at each S.L.}\]

\[\text{Sequence Lengths}\]

\[\bullet \text{ = HM; } \square \text{ = HW; } \sigma \text{ = EM; } \sigma \text{ = EW}\]
eventual compliance occurs much earlier than for the Hyderabad children. Figure 3 also shows quite clearly the higher compliance ratios at each sequence length of the Edinburgh children. The rates of adult compliance in Figure 4 show a very gradual decrease in tendency to comply in longer sequences; but whereas this tendency eventually rises at the end of the longer sequences in the working-class adults of both cultures, the decrease continues and ends in non-compliance in the middle-class adults.

The parallels between tendencies to drop issue and the tendencies of the other to comply are consistently dissimilar between children and adults. That is, in adult initiated directives, Edinburgh adults are increasingly insistent, and Edinburgh children increasingly non-compliant until the children eventually comply in the longer sequences; Hyderabad adults are increasingly insistent, but tend to drop issue in long sequences, and the children are increasingly non-compliant until the longer sequences, when their compliance rises. However, in child initiated directives, Edinburgh middle-class children are increasingly insistent until they accept non-compliance in the longer sequences; the adults are increasingly non-compliant and do not change even in the longer sequences. Edinburgh working-class children increase slightly in insistence all through, and their parents, while decreasing in compliance upto a point, accept the directives in the longer sequences. This class difference occurs in exactly the same manner in the Hyderabad groups. The resulting picture appears to be
one where the Edinburgh middle-class adults appear to be the
most successful both in maintaining their own non-compliance
to children's directives as well as in achieving eventual
compliance following initial non-compliance from the
children. The Hyderabad working-class adults appear to be
the least successful in both these respects. Table 4.17
showing the proportions of initial non-compliance which
eventually changed to compliance in each group, shows that
in terms of the actual proportions of altered non-compliance
the Edinburgh middle-class group is no different from the
Hyderabad middle-class group. The difference between them
lies in the point in the sequences at which changes in
non-compliance occur. Although averaged across all
sequences, the frequency of changed responses is the same,
the Hyderabad middle-class adults tend to have higher
proportions of compliance if the children persist for longer
than sequence length 6; in the Edinburgh middle-class adults
there is only a continuing drop in compliance.

Table 4.17: Propns. of Event'1 Comply after Initial Non-Comply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above results open up several questions - all to do with reasons for the adults' dropping of issue. Is there a difference in response to non-compliance in different issues? Can salience of issue be deduced from responses to non-compliance in various issues and in response to various forms of directives? Could the higher rates of eventual dropping of issue shown by the Hyderabad adults be explained by a stronger differentiating effect of issue salience and the presence of more numerous non-salient directives?

To answer these questions the data were analysed in the following ways: Firstly, immediate compliance and immediate dropping of issue to initial non-compliance were looked at in relation to the directive force of the initial directive in the sequence; Secondly, immediate compliance and immediate dropping of issue were compared between critical and non-critical directives; Thirdly, the behavioural areas of the directives were compared for their rates of immediate compliance and immediate dropping of issue. If any group did differ significantly in their responses in any or all of these comparisons, it could be assumed that for that group there was an effect of salience of issue.

Tables 4.18 and 4.19 show the proportions of immediate compliance received by adults and by children in response to directives of increasing force. Child responses show: no differences in the Hyderabad middle-class; lower immediate compliance to requests in the


Table 4.18: Propns. of Imm. Comply to Varying Drctv. Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Adults</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suggns.</td>
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<td>.14</td>
<td></td>
<td>.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reqs.</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td></td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprtvs.</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td></td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.19: Propns. of Imm. Comply to Varying Drctv. Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suggns.</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td></td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reqs.</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td></td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprtvs.</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td></td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hyderabad working-class families, with the highest immediate compliance to suggestions; in the Edinburgh middle-class, very high immediate compliance to requests and the lowest to imperatives; and little difference in the Edinburgh working-class, though with higher immediate compliance to requests.

Adult responses show a rough similarity between the response patterns of the middle-class groups of both cultures - with the highest immediate compliance to suggestions and lowest to requests. The Hyderabad working-class group showed a completely reversed pattern with lowest compliance to
suggestions and highest to requests. The Edinburgh working-class group had no occurrence of child suggestions, but the relationship between requests and imperatives was similar to the middle-class groups.

If the modal pattern of response by children to adult directives was highest compliance to requests (Edinburgh _ both groups; Hyderabad middle-class group - no difference); and the modal pattern of response by adults to child directives was highest compliance to suggestions and lowest to requests - the Hyderabad working-class group showed exactly reversed patterns for children and adults. This could be significant in the light of the earlier observation that the pattern of control in the Hyderabad working class was such that the parents had the least success in controlling the children.

According to the hypothesis of salience, it could be argued that the higher the force of the directive, the higher its salience for the individual issuing the directive; and the higher the salience the less likely should they be to drop the issue immediately following the first occurrence of non-compliance. Therefore, in all groups, the proportion of immediate dropped issue should decrease from suggestions to requests to imperatives.

Figure 5 shows the patterns of adult immediate d.i. in relation to child immediate compliance in each group. The prediction from salience is clearly suggested in both the Edinburgh groups, but not in the
Figure 5: Propns. of Child Imm. Comply and Adult Imm. D.i., follg. Non-compliance to Suggns., Requests, Imperatives.

- **Hyd. M-Cl.**
- **Hyd. W-Cl.**
- **Edin. M-Cl.**
- **Edin. W-Cl.**

---

Child immediate Comply
Adult immediate d.i.
Hyderabad groups. It appears, therefore, that salience as attached to directive force can be argued only in the Edinburgh families.

When critical directives are considered as to the difference between rates of insistence upon them as opposed to non-critical directives, it can similarly be predicted that the critical directives should be dropped less overall and less immediately than the non-critical directives. Tables 4.20 and 4.21 show proportions of immediate d.i. and eventual d.i. for critical and non-critical directives. In both respects the Edinburgh middle-class adults were the only group who showed a sharp distinction in their responses to non-compliance to critical and non-critical directives.

Table 4.20: Propns. of Imm. D.i. by Adults Critical and Non-Critical Drctvs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Critical</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Diff. bet. conditions: EM p<.05; rest n.s.

Table 4.21: Strength of Insistence by Adults on Critical and Non-Critical Drctvs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Critical</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drctvs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Diff. bet. conditions: EM p<.01; rest n.s.

Strength of Insistence: All repetitions of a drctv.

Opportunities to repeat at each point
The areas of behaviour associated with high and low insistence might clarify further the nature of salience for each group of adults. Do the various groups show differences between issues in their insistence upon compliance? Figures 6 and 7 show proportions of immediate compliance by children and immediate d.i. by adults to various issues in adult directives. From Figure 7 it can be seen that Mean Deviations from the base-line of adult d.i. are much higher in both Edinburgh groups. Similarly the Mean Deviations in Figure 6 are higher in Edinburgh than Hyderabad. These results indicate that issues seem to be more differentiated with regard to the ease with which they are dropped or accepted in Edinburgh than in Hyderabad. This differentiation is interpreted to imply salience. For the Edinburgh adults of both classes, 'self-care', 'object-related behaviour' and 'interpersonal behaviour' had high salience*. Help-seeking had very low salience for the Edinburgh middle-class, but high salience for the working-class. In the Hyderabad middle-class help-seeking, care-taking and object-related behaviour had high salience. In the Hyderabad working-class only food behaviour had any salience.

In two ways then it appears that salience of issue is irrelevant to the behaviour of adults in the Indian

* Salience was defined by proportions of d.i. or comply which ranged more than 10% below the base-line of d.i. or comply calculated for each group.
Figure 6: Imm. Comply by Children to various issues in Adult Directives.

- **Hyn. M-cl.**
  - Mean Deviation = .08

- **Hyn. W-cl.**
  - Mean Deviation = .08

- **Edin. M-cl.**
  - Mean Deviation = .18

- **Edin. W-cl.**
  - Mean Deviation = .11
Figure 7: Imm. D. i. by Adults to various issues

HYD. M-CL

Mean Deviation = .11

EDIN. M-CL

Mean Deviation = .16

HYD. W-CL

Mean Deviation = .10

EDIN. W-CL

Mean Deviation = .21
families: Firstly, there are fewer differences in the Hyderabad adults' rates of immediate dropping of issue between a) critical directives and non-critical directives, b) various behavioural contents of directives, and c) directives of varying force. It can be argued from these results that whereas the Edinburgh adults tend to drop issue differently for different issues and for differing initial force, the Hyderabad adults' tendency to drop issue or insist seems unrelated to the form or content of the directive, and this implies that whereas for the Edinburgh adults the directive sequences and their outcomes are closely related to the structure/order that they are trying to create, for the Hyderabad adults the directive sequences which involve conflict (i.e., non-compliance), appear to signify a process of interaction which is separate from the process of ascertaining the maintenance of order. In other words, the structural process (of ensuring order) seems to be subordinate to a more interpersonal process of dealing with conflicting intentions.

Secondly, in the Hyderabad families, the higher eventual d.i., is not a result of higher immediate d.i., but a sharply increasing proportion of dropped issues at the end of long sequences. That is, while in the Edinburgh adults the highest d.i. occurs in the initial stages of sequences, in the Hyderabad adults the rate of d.i. first decreases and then increases. It is neither the salience of the issue nor an immediate acceptance of opposing intentions that prompts Hyderabad adults to drop issue, but rather an eventual
giving in to confrontation.

On the whole, responses to child non-compliance seem definitely to form different patterns in the two cultural samples studied. In the Indian groups fewer issues seem to possess the salience needed for strict enforcement. Possibly this is related to the prevalent philosophy of not putting too many hardships upon young children, and may change as the child grows older. Alternatively, this may be a style of interaction which is typical of, and necessary for, the peculiarly sponge-like adaptedness which has often been noted as characteristic of Indian culture. This will be discussed in Chapter 7.

II a: Correlations between individual behaviours

This section is aimed essentially at uncovering possible clusters of behaviour which characterise styles of directing and complying. Matrix 4.1 in the Appendix shows the significant correlations within child behaviour. There is a strong negative correlation within children between proportion of imperatives and proportion of requests. \( r = -0.82, p < 0.001 \). In adults, Matrix 4.2 in the Appendix shows there is a similar negative correlation between proportion of imperatives and proportion of suggestions. \( r = -0.71, p < 0.001 \). There is a significant group difference in the proportions of these forms of directives. In children the tendency to issue frequent directives is correlated positively with the proportion of imperatives in children \( r = 0.37, p < 0.05 \). This \( r \) is stronger with repeated
directives ($r = .44, p < .01$). These $r$'s are even stronger in adults, and they also show a strong negative $r$ between suggestions and imperatives. This is also a group difference in adults, but not significantly so in children. The proportion of imperatives is positively correlated with negative affect ($r = .51, p < .01$); Requests are negatively correlated with negative affect ($r = -.51, p < .01$). These $r$'s are the same in adults, except that the difference is much clearer and stronger between positive and negative affect and between suggestions and imperatives (rather than with requests, which are uncorrelated). There is a positive correlation in children between compliance and requests ($r = .49, p < .01$), and a negative correlation between compliance and imperatives ($r = -.36, p < .05$). In adults, there is a positive $r$ between compliance and suggestions ($r = .37, p < .05$), no $r$ with requests, and a negative but insignificant $r$ between compliance and imperatives. Compliance is again significantly different between cultural groups for children but not for adults.

In summary, two remarkably similar clusters appear in child and adult behaviours. Clusters were drawn from the correlations according to the procedure described in Chapter 3, p.194. Positive associations read downwards and negative associations across.
CHILDREN:

High freq. of Imperatives
High freq. of new Drctvs
High freq. of rep'd Drctvs
High freq. of Negv.Affect
High unresponsiveness

High freq. of Requests
High Compliance
High responsiveness
High freq. of Sharing
High freq. of rule ref.

ADULTS:

High freq. of Imperatives
High freq. of new Drctvs
High freq. of rep'd Drctvs
High freq. of Negv.Affect
High unrespvns. (r only with Compliance)

High freq. of Suggns.
High freq. of requests
High freq. of Posv.Affect
High Compliance (r only with suggestions)
High responsiveness
High Attachment (r only with Drtvs)
High freq. of Sharing (no r with Compliance)

Referring to the Mann-Whitney U Tests on the differences between cultural and social class groups in the behaviours in these clusters it becomes clear that they are largely divided on the basis of culture. This adds conviction to the results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests in that these behaviours can be seen to be not only differently distributed across cultural groups, but the various distributions appear significantly related to each other in a continuous manner as well. What these results do signify is the similarity between children and adults of clusters of behaviour related to forms and frequencies of directing and complying. The next question to be answered is: Do these correlations and clusters exist within each cultural group in the same manner?
II b: Individual behaviour Correlations in different groups

Tables 4.22 and 4.23 show the child behaviour correlates of child compliance separately in Edinburgh and Hyderabad. An approximate separation of correlations above .30 and/or significant, shows the following pattern of related variables:

**HYDERABAD:**
- High unresponsiveness
- High Negative Affect
- High Attachment
- High Compliance
- High freq. of Requests
- High freq. of d.i.
- High freq. of Whys
- High freq. of Narratives
- High Responsiveness
- High freq. of initiation of new topics

**EDINBURGH:**
- High freq. of Imperatives
- High freq. of Justifications
- High Unresponsiveness
- High Compliance
- High freq. of Suggestions
- High freq. of Rule ref.
- High freq. of Sharing
- High freq. of Posv. Affect
- High freq. of Negv. Affect
- High Attachment
- High freq. of initiation of new topics

The clusters do not appear very similar. The only similarities lie in the negative correlations between compliance and unresponsiveness, and the positive correlations between compliance and the initiation of new topics. One rather interesting difference between the two groups is that attachment is a negative correlate of compliance in Hyderabad (supporting Lytton's '77...
For rules, see Chapter 5. For challenges, see p. 325.

Table 4.23: Correlates of child compliance in Dutch preschool children.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>0.40</th>
<th>0.39</th>
<th>0.38</th>
<th>0.37</th>
<th>0.36</th>
<th>0.35</th>
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<th>0.33</th>
<th>0.32</th>
<th>0.31</th>
<th>0.30</th>
<th>0.29</th>
<th>0.28</th>
<th>0.27</th>
<th>0.26</th>
<th>0.25</th>
<th>0.24</th>
<th>0.23</th>
<th>0.22</th>
<th>0.21</th>
<th>0.20</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For figures in brackets are probablistic, just missing significance. $p > 0.05$; $** = p < 0.01$; $*** = p < 0.001$.

Table 4.22: Correlates of child compliance in Hyderabadi children.
finding), but is a positive correlate of compliance in Edinburgh. In line with the hypothesis that compliance is an affective variable as well as a structural one, this finding shows more of a link with affect in the Edinburgh group than in the Hyderabad. In addition, the expression of both positive and negative affect is positively correlated with compliance in Edinburgh, whilst the expression of negative affect alone is predictably correlated negatively with compliance in Hyderabad. The correlation between compliance and rule reference in Edinburgh lends some support to a structural argument regarding the implications of child compliance, as does the positive correlation between compliance and the frequency of Whys in the Hyderabad children. The positive correlations between compliance and the initiation of new topics in both groups lends support to Lytton's finding that in two year olds, compliance is correlated with initiativeness.

In the adults, the correlations do not fall into clear patterns in the two groups. In Hyderabad, adult compliance is associated positively with responsiveness and negatively with unresponsiveness, but is entirely unrelated to positive or negative affect, sharing or attachment. This suggests that compliance and responsiveness, (or non-compliance and unresponsiveness) are on a different dimension from positive and negative affect, sharing or attachment. The correlates of responsiveness and unresponsiveness - described in the previous chapter - support this picture, showing that they are unrelated to all the affect, sharing, dependency and
attachment variables, which latter are related to each other.

In Edinburgh, adult compliance correlates not only with responsiveness and (negatively with) unresponsiveness, but also positively with positive affect, negatively with negative affect, and positively with sharing.

In Hyderabad, therefore, non-compliance does not relate to negative affect or to lower proportions of sharing; its correlates are limited to structural unresponsiveness. In Edinburgh adults non-compliance is correlated with negative affect and lower proportions of sharing as well as with unresponsiveness.

III a: Correlations between Child and Adult Behaviours

These correlations are of central interest in the light of the controversy between social learning theory and attachment theory regarding the influence of conscious training attempts vs. the affective tone of the interaction upon child compliance. In an attempt to test the hypotheses outlined on p.2195, Matrix 4.3 in the Appendix shows the correlates of child overall compliance in adult behaviour. The results show:

a) a moderate positive r with adult suggestions; (r = .47, p<.01).

b) low negative but non-significant r's with adult requests and imperatives, (r = .27, n.s.,) therefore very partially supporting the predicted direction of the relationship
between adult directive force and child compliance.

c) A moderate negative r with adult negative affect - (r = -0.41, p < 0.05), but a non-significant r with adult positive affect, therefore only partially supporting the prediction regarding affect and compliance.

d) A moderate positive relation with adult overall compliance; (r = 0.39, p < 0.03). This provides moderate support for the Attachment theory argument of reciprocal responsiveness.

e) A negative r with adult frequencies of criticisms; (r = -0.44, p < 0.01). If criticisms are interpreted as mild forms of love-withdrawal, extensions of Hoffman's hypotheses suggested a moderate positive correlation between criticisms by adult and compliance by children. These present results contradict that prediction. If criticisms are interpreted as a form of reinforcement, albeit negative, one would still expect from social learning theory arguments, a moderate positive r with child compliance. Again, this prediction is unsupported.

On the whole there are strikingly few adult behaviours which correlate with child compliance. This in itself presents a strong argument against social learning theory, and supports the essence of the attachment theory argument of an independent disposition to comply. When looked at separately in the two groups, it is clear that although there are still very few significant correlations between child compliance and adult behaviour, the correlations that are present tell a very different story in the two groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EDIN</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th>HYD</th>
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<td>59</td>
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<td>25</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Adult Behaviour Correlations of Child Compliance and Eventual Compliance

100 \* = d > 0.05; ** = d > 0.10; *** = d > 0.20
III b: Correlations between Child and Adult behaviours in different groups

Table 4.24 shows the correlations between child compliance and adult behaviour separately in the two groups. Regarding directive force and compliance, the trend is in an unpredicted direction in the Hyderabad group, with adult proportion of requests being negatively correlated, and the proportion of imperatives being positively though insignificantly correlated with child compliance. In the Edinburgh group, the trend is in the predicted direction, though none of the correlations are significant. So the prediction of greater force being used to children who are essentially non-compliant, and greater compliance being given to directives of lesser force which can be presumed to be non-conflictful, is supported only in the Edinburgh group, and reversed in the Hyderabad group.

Child compliance across all groups is very strongly and negatively related to the proportion of repeated directives issued by adults. This is somewhat predictable from the fact that repeated directives occur only upon the occurrence of non-compliance. What is not predictable is such a correlation between eventual compliance and repeated directives. These measures are independent of each other. The fact that this relationship holds even for eventual compliance suggests that when adults repeat directives following non-compliance, they are largely ineffective in
achieving compliance. There is no suggestion that adults' tendency to issue frequent directives is correlated with child's non-compliance. Although the trend is in that direction, the relationship between proportion of new directives by adults and child compliance is non-significant ($r = -0.22; p < 0.146$).

When looking at these correlations separately in Edinburgh and Hyderabad, the picture of ineffective repeated directives, while significant in Hyderabad, is non-significant in Edinburgh. And the negative correlation between adult frequency of new directives and child non-compliance is true of the Edinburgh group, but reversed (though insignificantly) in the Hyderabad group.

Similar to the results between child compliance and adult repeated directives, the overall correlations show a predictably strong negative correlation between child compliance and adult mean directive sequence length, and an unpredictably high negative correlation between adult sequence length and child eventual compliance. This suggests also that longer sequence lengths are ineffective in obtaining compliance. However, when looked at separately in Edinburgh and Hyderabad, these correlations exist only in the Hyderabad group, and not at all in the Edinburgh group. So in Edinburgh, the child's eventual compliance is unrelated to adult persistence, while in Hyderabad, child eventual compliance is actually negatively related to adult persistence. These correlations lend support to the picture of increasing confrontation in Hyderabad shown by Figures 1.
and 2. This suggests that in the Hyderabad groups, the eventual outcome of adult's directives are predicted reliably by the child's initial response to the directive. Table 4.17 showed proportions of eventual compliance after initial non-compliance in children and adults in the four groups. The proportions of changed responses are highest in the Edinburgh and especially the middle-class children, and are not very different between the various groups of adults, except for the Edinburgh working-class adults who had a very low proportion of changed responses. In all groups, the children showed much higher rates of change than did the adults. In summary, the children were more flexible than the adults in terms of changing initial non-compliance to compliance, and the Edinburgh children were more flexible than the Hyderabad children. The Edinburgh adults were overall, though not strikingly so, less flexible than the Hyderabad adults.

Extending the Attachment Theory argument that compliance originates in infancy through a process of reciprocal responsiveness, I predicted that if compliance continues to be a reciprocal process, and there is no reason as yet to believe that it does not, then child compliance at age seven should correlate positively with adult compliance at the same point in time. This prediction is strikingly supported in the Edinburgh group, but entirely unsupported in the Hyderabad group. (In Edinburgh the r between child and adult overall compliance = .71, p<.05; in Hyderabad, r = .14, n.s.). In addition, the Edinburgh sample showed strong
and significant negative correlations between child compliance and adult attachment, which were absent in the Hyderabad group. This negative correlation seems rather inexplicable, especially in the light of the positive r's between child compliance and child attachment in Edinburgh.

Extending the argument about reciprocal compliance to correlations between child compliance and adult affective and responsive behaviour, similar trends were predicted. Once again, however, the directions of the correlations are reversed or non-significant in the Hyderabad group, while the directions are consistently in the predicted direction, though non-significant, in the Edinburgh group.

The predictions made from extensions of Baumrind's hypotheses listed on page 205, were also tested through correlations of adult and child behaviour. The results showed quite clearly that predictions which were supported in the Edinburgh group were generally unsupported in Hyderabad. Overall, Baumrind's predictions were not supported.

**Hypothesis a)** Positive correlation between child compliance and parental consistency in enforcing directives: Table 4.24 shows no similar pattern between parent tendencies to drop issue or repeat the directive and the child's compliance. The r is significantly negative in both groups.

**Hypothesis b)** Positive correlation between child compliance and parent refusal to yield to the child's nuisance value: r = .42 with overall comply ratio. This provides moderate support for the hypothesis. When considered separately in
the two groups, the r in Hyderabad = .07, n.s.; suggesting that the correlation supporting the hypothesis was not true within the Hyderabad group. In Edinburgh, it was not possible to calculate a correlation because in each family where child 'nuisance' behaviour occurred, parent refusal to yield to it occurred 100% of the time, thereby supporting the hypothesis.

Hypothesis c) Positive correlation between child compliance and an absence of ignoring responses by the parents to the child's directives: r = .88; p < .001 with overall comply ratio. However, correlations in Hyderabad and Edinburgh separately show that this correlation is contributed to mainly by the Edinburgh group, where the r = .93, p < .001; while in Hyderabad the r = .26, n.s.

Hypothesis d) Positive correlation between child compliance and parental use of reinforcements such as praise, bargains, threats: r = -.77, p < .001 with bargains and threats alone; r = -.44, p < .01, when including praise and criticisms. This correlation completely rejects the hypothesis that reinforcement should be positively related to child compliance. In Hyderabad the correlation with bargains and threats alone was = -.37, n.s.; the r including praise and criticisms was -.65, p < .01; in Edinburgh, the correlation with bargains and threats alone was -.14, n.s.; including praise and criticisms r = -.66, p < .05.

Hypothesis e) Positive correlation between child compliance and parental use of justifications in directives: r = -.09, n.s.; in the Hyderabad group alone the r = -.29, n.s.
and in the Edinburgh group, the $r = .18, \text{n.s.}$. These $r$'s reject the hypothesis of the positive effects of induction on obtaining compliance, which was made by Hoffman as well. However, Hoffman makes the assumption that inductions are always in terms of pointing out the consequences of one's acts upon others. This is in no sense the assumption employed in this study. Consideration of the two cultural groups separately shows that the hypothesis is rejected more in the Hyderabad group, where there is actually a negative correlation, than in Edinburgh group where there is a correlation in the predicted direction, though not significant.

**Hypothesis f)** Positive correlation between child compliance and parental use of justifications generally: $r = -.19, \text{n.s.}$ This hypothesis was rejected by these data.

**Hypothesis g)** Positive correlation between child compliance and parental acceptance of child's non-compliance when accompanied by justifications: $r = .35, \text{n.s.}$; in Hyderabad $r = .21, \text{n.s.}$; in Edinburgh $r = -.90, p < .001$. This hypothesis was rejected overall, but inexplicably, much more strongly so in Edinburgh.

**Hypothesis h)** Positive correlation between child compliance and positive responses by the parents to the child's attention and support seeking: $r = .15, \text{n.s.}$ This hypothesis was rejected by the data. In Hyderabad, $r = -.29, \text{n.s.}$; in Edinburgh $r = .74, p < .01$. While the hypothesis was strongly supported in the Edinburgh group, it was unsupported in the Hyderabad group.
Hypothesis i) Positive correlation between child compliance and parental praise as a proportion of praise and criticism: \( r = 0.34, n.s.; \) in Hyderabad \( r = -0.77, p<0.001; \) in Edinburgh \( r = 0.58, p<0.09. \) This hypothesis was rejected overall, and strongly so in the Hyderabad group, but supported in the Edinburgh group.

Hypothesis j) Positive correlation between child compliance and parental demonstrations of affection - indicative of nurturance: \( r = 0.02, n.s. \) The hypothesis was rejected. In Hyderabad \( r = -0.06, n.s.; \) in Edinburgh \( r = -0.64, p<0.05. \) While these two behaviours were unrelated in the Hyderabad group, there was a negative correlation between them in the Edinburgh group.

These results add more evidence for believing that child compliance and non-compliance does not have the same function, either for the child or for the individuals interacting with the child, in India. It seems quite clear that both the Attachment theory arguments, as well as the learning theory arguments seem to be applicable largely, if not solely, in the Edinburgh families. This supports the validity of the question raised in connection with Hoffman's work, regarding the influence of different cultural orientations on the applicability of psychological models of behaviour. By demonstrating that the psychological hypotheses and explanations regarding the interactive effects of compliance related behaviour are not universally valid, these results question the generality of theories in other areas of social interaction as well.
What causes these different patterns in the Hyderabad group? And what could the function or significance of child compliance and non-compliance be in Hyderabad? The chief clue for answering this question comes mainly from the correlations in individual behaviour patterns.

The two different clusters of correlated behaviour that appeared in the Edinburgh and Hyderabad groups, in children and in adults, suggested a stronger separation between affective and structural variables in adults in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh. It is plausible to suggest that compliance is only a structural variable in Hyderabad while it is related to affect in Edinburgh. This implies that non-compliance does not lead to affective disruption of dyadic interaction in Hyderabad, while this would be the case in Edinburgh.

**Summary**

In conclusion, this chapter has discussed theoretical alternatives to the assumptions made by learning theory regarding the origins and significance of compliance. It has presented evidence from interaction between parents and children in two cultures on the patterns of behaviour surrounding the occurrence of compliance and non-compliance. The general drift of the results showed:
da) that the two cultural groups of children and adults were significantly different in the extent to which they stressed compliance, the extent to which they complied, and the manner in which they dealt with persistent non-compliance and
insistent directives, and in the issues which were found to be salient to children and adults. All these differences are partially explicable on the bases of differing value orientations to child development, and differing demands in the social structure.

b) that the correlates of compliance in individual behaviour were remarkably similar between children and adults, largely due to a differentiation between group characteristics. When correlations between individual behaviour variables were calculated separately in the two cultural groups, the patterns were different in the two cultures, and different between children and adults in each culture. In Edinburgh these correlations emphasised a difference in adult behaviour correlations between the close association of compliance and non-compliance with affective, cooperative and responsive variables. In Hyderabad there was a split between compliance/ non-compliance and responsiveness/ unresponsiveness on the one hand, and affective and cooperative variables on the other. Child behaviour correlates showed:

c) that child compliance was overall very little related to adult behaviour. This finding challenges learning theory hypotheses about the effectiveness of various kinds of training on child compliance. It also challenges extensions to older childhood of the attachment theory model of compliance as a continually reciprocal process which is related strongly to affective and responsive behaviour. However, a separate examination of the correlations in the
two cultural groups showed several predicted relationships from Attachment Theory as well as from Social learning Theory to exist in the Edinburgh families, but not in the Hyderabad families. This raised questions regarding the adequacy of present conceptions of the significance of compliance as an indicator of child 'socialisation', in explaining the interaction patterns of parents and children in non-Western cultures. It was concluded that in Hyderabad child compliance was not a significant indicator either of affect (the split between affective and structural variables,) or of structural involvement in the social system (lack of issue salience in enlisting compliance). That compliance is not an indicator of involvement in the social structure in Hyderabad is additionally suggested by descriptions of adult conformity in India. Furthermore, these results suggest that the psychological processes relevant to child compliance and operative in a Western setting are not applicable to other cultural contexts.
Chapter: 5

RULES

The conclusions regarding different approaches to order maintenance derived from analyses of sequences of short term control, will now be extended to the analysis of sequences involving reference to long-term rules. But first, an understanding of the meaning and psychological relevance of such long-term conceptions of order is required.

Introduction:

Changing theoretical approaches to the child's role in his development bring us to the view held widely and with a substantial amount of evidence that children initiate and direct in their interaction with the world of people and objects. Cognitive psychologists postulate that children actively attempt to comprehend and control that which they encounter, because of a need to create and impose order. "Children, even quite young ones, will not let themselves be passively led. They will actively invent and discover, using what we tell them as a starting point." (Donaldson, '78). "Structure-creating activity is natural to man...men are architectonic, that is, makers of structure above all things." (Harre, '78). This assumed need for order must lead children not only to construct hypotheses and/or accept explanations about the nature of events in their
environment, but also to attempt to comprehend and control their own and others' actions, according to some pattern of need or regularity. Faced with a novel task, "Children begin to try to operate systematically and according to rules. They evolve the rules spontaneously - unstated, probably unconscious rules."(Donaldson,'78).

The generation and use of rules or expectations is essential for the maintenance of interaction between individuals*; they form the fabric of 'culture' in the broadest sense of the term. But interaction does not always proceed smoothly on the basis of already existing shared meanings and intentions. Interaction between individuals is always a live process involving separate intentions and fresh materials for solution and understanding, therefore necessitating the constant development of rules by the interacting individuals.

The independent generation of rules by children in attempts to create a structured framework for their and others' activities, is very easily observed among even pre-school age children (Atkinson '81). Where there is not already some structure, children appear to need to create it and add to it. However, what do children do when faced with an already existing structure which

* Structure can be defined as developing patterns of perceiving in particular categories and styles, and patterns of assumptions, preferences and obligations. With this definition structure can be seen as a pre-requisite for interaction. Structure in the realm of perception and interpretation has been distinguished from structure in the realm of regulation of action.
attempts to regulate their behaviour? How do they deal with it, moreover, when their relationships with those who appear to be the expounders of that structure are potentially unequal ones, as, eg., with parents? The question of interest becomes not only the manner in which rules and expectations are generated within such a dyad in order to enhance the sharing of intentions, but also the manner in which the already established rules are responded to, modified or re-invoked in interaction with the other.

One aspect of this topic is the manner in which children attempt to comprehend and control the implicit and explicit regulative rules of their family. The premise here is that children actively participate in the process of their interaction with what can be called representations of their cultural system, because children, like adults, have a need to meaningfully structure their perceptions and actions. Because of their need for active comprehension and control of that which affects them, it is hypothesised that children will actively attempt to grasp, manipulate and question the rules in their environment, rather than just passively accept them or unadaptedly reject them as Piaget (1932) predicts.

In other words, children need rules and order. And therefore, they create it when it is absent, and adopt it or challenge it when it is. Obviously it is true that children also reject order in a seemingly disordered (i.e., unadapted) fashion, as Piaget says. The occurrence of such
rejection implies for Piaget that they are dealing with a static imposed order that has no meaning or relevance for them. It is quite evident that such rejection is not just a phenomenon of childhood; adults do it too. Perhaps it is more appropriate to argue that when confronted with a meaningless (in the sense of incomprehensible) order, individuals of all ages may tend to accept or reject it without genuine involvement. The crucial question regarding Piaget's thesis then becomes - Is the order that adults try to involve their children in, really meaningless for the child? Piaget assumes that it is, and therefore can make the assumptions of lack of cooperation. But the evidence of early active cooperation in the child/infant challenges this first assumption. If the child starts out with active cooperation, what evidence do we have that the relationship then becomes an alienated, and primarily authoritarian one? It is clear that children do show intentions for sharing with their parents as do parents with their children. It is also clear that children do not create rules with parents as much as they do with other children. But is this in itself enough to assume that they do not attempt actively to grasp the rules they confront? This question can be tested by looking at children's responses to rules received from adults.

As shown in Chapter 1 the process of interacting with the 'rules' of the social system cannot really be distinguished from the process of interacting with the individuals in the system. Both must begin from infancy. The
individual's autonomy within the system in middle-childhood is, in a paradoxical way, dependent upon his cooperation with the system. "How the child acquires the ability to make social order each day in cooperation with others is the problem of social control"; and "...the study of socialisation is the study of how the child learns to demonstrate his membership of the society." (Cook-Gumperz '73).

There is a great deal to be learnt from children's responses to rules and different systems' approaches to presenting rules about individual differences in responsibility and autonomy as well as about differences in maintaining cultural stability and continuity. There are two avenues for exploration here:

i) Differences in structuredness between different social groups.

ii) Differences between children in response to or in search of structure.

For convenience, structure will be equated with rules of both interpretive and regulative nature, although only regulative rules will be pursued. Regulative rules are defined as: prescriptions of a long term nature for particular behaviour, attitudes, feelings and evaluations upon the occurrence of a particular situation or a variety of possible situations. This accords with Collett's('76) definition of regulative rules: "If P then Q" in which "the conditions (P) ...render a class of behaviours (Q)
obligatory/permissible/prohibited for a particular person", but only with the second half of Harre and Secord's definition, i.e., not with their pre-condition 'in order to': "In order to achieve A (the act), do a(n) (the actions) when S (the occasion or situation) occurs."

(Harre and Secord '72, from Robinson '76).

Within this definition can be encompassed rules of various sorts: more or less explicit prescriptions with variations in the expectations for their maintenance, variations in the salience of rules for different individuals, and for the degree of 'centrality and facility' of their part in the social process (Collett '76), and the degree to which Hart's 'penumbra of uncertainty' surrounds each rule.

Firstly, then: Do social groups vary in the amount as well in the kind of structuring they possess? Despite the fact that no matter how seemingly unstructured and disorderly a group there is always a definite structure underlying it (Marsh, Rosser and Harre '78), it is clear that this structure may be more, or less, explicit, rigid, regimental and so on. Contrasts between such tightly regimented groups as the army, and less structured ones such as recreational and hobby groups, etc., suggest that variations in amount of structure not only exist, but serve different functions. Apart from differences in such very diverse groups, there is reason to believe that groups which ostensibly serve the same function such as family groups
also differ in this regard. Previous studies report that Hindu families have a high tolerance for disorder in respect to children although they report obedience as a highly valued behaviour. (Minturn and Hitchcock '66, Kakar '78, Carstairs '57). The consensus of opinion seems to be that in Hindu societies generally, very little effort is expended by adults to train or demand conformity to norms from their children.

Paradoxically, the holistic orientation of Indian culture gives rise to a great deal more structuring than in modern societies. Where the society is emphasised as a "collective Man" (Dumont '72), (in contrast with the individualism of modern societies,) and where "each particular man in his place must contribute to the global order" , it would be appear to be a great deal more urgent in such societies to ensure the maintenance of order between the parts. Indeed, when talking of adult conformity to the social order, writers have always emphasised just this quality of structure maintenance.

The explanation of the difference between childhood freedom for disorder and adult maintenance of order has generally only been in terms of psychoanalytic theory which postulates a failure in the development of internal controls, and a consequent development of a 'communal conscience' instead of an individual conscience (Kakar '78). The causes of the "relatively weaker differentiation and idealisation of the Indian superego" are attributed (in the
male only; the female is not discussed for want of information) to the conflicts generated by the 'second birth' and the modal Hindu resolution of the Oedipus Complex, viz., by means of a "submissive, apprentice-like stance" toward elder men and authority figures. The communal conscience, which comprises "from the beginning, not exclusive parental injunctions but family and 'jati' (community) norms," is posited to take care of much of the individual behaviour which in Westerners is regulated by the individual superego. The present argument posits that whatever the source of the injunctions, whether parental or communal, the status of these injunctions within the individual is neither in terms of absolute conviction (which is allowed in Kakar's analysis,) nor in terms of reliance on group norms. Kakar describes succinctly the individual's private touchstone for moral codes: "although Indians publicly express a staunch commitment to traditional moral codes, privately, in relation to himself, an individual tends to consider the violations of these codes reprehensible only when it displeases or saddens those elders who are the intimate personal representatives of his communal conscience." (ibid.) Does this mean, then, that in the absence of the elders who may be saddened, the individual cannot be said to deal at all with moral standards? To be sure, in the absence of these elders and the supporting social context, the particular moral standards may be violated and ignored. But the traditional morality - that which may be said to form the content of the
superego in psychoanalytic terms - is not the only morality which guides the individual. Despite the rejection of the parental/communal codes the individual must continue to think, act and make decisions morally. An explanation of the individual's relation to 'order' is required which does not stop at the point where the keepers of the communal conscience are left behind. The present study offers an explanation based partially on the first part of the previous quote. That is, that violations of norms are considered reprehensible only when they sadden - not just the parents or the primary group, but any later intimate of the individual. This is an important distinction because I believe that the social context and the consequences of individual action upon it, continue, in the Indian, to be crucial in determining action, even when the traditional community is absent. What is developed in interaction at this age is a style of relating to regulatory principles, and to the idea of regulation, which remains in the individual despite change of social context. I propose to show the importance which the interpersonal context has for order maintenance through analysing the use and success of interpersonal appeals.

There is, essentially, an ideological support in India for the de-emphasis on order: while social control is of prime importance in Hindu societies, control in itself, as an orientation towards the world, is not. The latter is explained chiefly by the amorphous relativism of conceptions of morality (dharma) in Hindu thought. Because sva-dharma
individual morality) is unknowable in an absolute sense, not only does this give recourse to a sense of uncertainty in the individual and a consequent reification of social norms as the only dependable things in an uncertain world (Kakar '78), but it results in an attitude of alienation from the very norms being clung to. Further, this alienation is inevitably transmitted to children in the form of an uncertainty about the underlying mechanisms of laws. The child's access to the underlying mechanisms is explored in Chapter 6 through the analysis of Whys, Justifications, and the responses they receive.

The main objection to psychoanalytical descriptions of 'conscience' is the static nature of the transmission of values which they assume. Whether individual conscience or communal conscience, an internalisation of norms implies an adoption of rules-as-they-are, or an adoption of rules-as-they-are under social pressure. A cognitive explanation of the phenomenon allows more room for active development of the rules, implying change and alternative conceptions rather than passive acceptance. Kakar's analysis of the process of dealing with social organisation, and the difficulties felt in India of unprecedented demands for swift change, is in very dynamic terms. But the social organisation is always represented as a static set of norms. The individual's reactions to it and attempts to deal with it are dynamic in the psychological processes involved, but the 'it' being reacted to is a constant in so far as it is represented in the individual. How justified is this model?
Perhaps it is not entirely unjustified to assume a difference in these representations between the Western model of rigid application of rules with structured channels for easy change, and the Indian model of flexible application of rules with deterrence of any but very gradual change of the rules themselves.

The preceding paradox between adult social order and child disorder gives rise to two questions:

1) What is the effect of this undemanding, relatively unstructured and allegedly responsive social environment upon the child's attempts to comprehend and control it in an ordered manner? How does a child respond with attempts to grasp and further structure a structure which isn't there, or rather, is somehow unobtrusive?

2) How does a society which both requires and maintains such strict control over its adult members, and has such historical stability and continuity, effect this control and continuity when it apparently tolerates such excessive disorder in childhood?

From the last chapter it is clear that adults in India are, indeed, less insistent upon the maintenance of order, and are more tolerant of non-compliance from the children. They are not on the whole more responsive to the children than are the Scottish adults, but they are more responsive to interpersonal appeals than are the Scottish adults. It remains to be seen whether this low demand for order and tolerance for disorder extends also to behaviour in which
rules have been invoked. If this latter is the case, how, then, is long-term order maintained?

I suggest that these factors actually serve to maintain greater order and long-term continuity in the following way: the de-emphasis on rules serves to obscure the structure of the group/culture to the child's understanding. (Even the mere citing of rules is an important indication of the 'objectification' and 'de-personalisation' of structure and interaction, as opposed to interaction which proceeds on the level of immediate expediency or of interpersonal desires.) And while the child can actually obtain control far more easily in the short term than he would in a more structured society, he is being denied access to its values and rules and therefore loses the possibility for effecting control in the long-term sense.

To test the validity of this explanation I postulate that lack of access to the structure should be demonstrated in the following ways:

a) less explicit reference to or invocation of rules by the adults.
b) less justification of demand and/or rules by the adults.
c) less tolerance of challenges to rules/ demands etc.
d) less adapted response to Whys.

Some aspects of access to rules

It is possible, however, that obscuring the structure can be a more complicated process. It may not be necesary
that there be less explicit reference to rules. More probably it is the kinds of rules referred to that are significant. Similarly it may not be significant that there are fewer adapted responses given to Whys; the kind of adapted response may be crucial.

Margaret Donaldson's work on teaching rules and tasks may be illustrative of this issue. In an attempt to discover those rules and teaching methods which are most beneficial to the process of learning and discovery, she evaluates the efforts of educators to enforce false simplicity on problems and rules in order to ease the complexity of the task for the child.

"It seems to be widely believed that children must not be told the truth about the system to begin with because they could not cope with such complexities. I believe this to be quite mistaken. What underlies the mistake is, I think, a failure to make a crucial distinction - a failure to see the difference between understanding the nature of the system and mastering all the individual patterns of relationship. It will inevitably take a child some time to learn all the sets of correspondences. The question is simply whether he will do this better if he were correctly informed about the kind of thing to expect." (Donaldson '78).

Continuing the analogy, it is perhaps a similar kind of failure that could lead to the obscuring of the structure of a cultural system. If structure in this sense is the underlying value system of the culture - then an emphasis on the individual patterns of the relationship (the rules) to the exclusion of any reference to the 'nature of the system'
(the underlying values) would serve to discourage a grasp of the system.

Leading on to the question of whether or not to teach young children by revealing the options contained in a system, Donaldson reports evidence that even from the age of three and a half children can understand and use the concept of 'either', and suggests that "Young children are not likely to spontaneously formulate hypotheses that specify alternatives - but that is another matter. All the more reason why, if the system they are dealing with does involve options, we should tell them so."

This brings us to the importance that the presentation of conditionals in general, (by the adult to the child) and conditional rules in particular, might have upon the child. Their significance probably lies in the extent to which they offer choices to the child; i.e., statements of choice with consequences. This is crucial to the development of an autonomous grasp of the rules and values of his culture as relevant to his actions, by the child.

Discussing the work of Lauren Resnick on the teaching of mathematics and the 'problem of finding teaching rules that enhance the probability of discovery'," she stresses that rules which are to have any chance of meeting this requirement must never be rules which obscure the structure of the task."(Donaldson '78). So, the obscuring of structure (in mathematical tasks) serves to inhibit the probability of independent discovery (of solutions etc.). I postulate that
it is through a similar process of inhibition that autonomous control over their culture can be prevented by the obscuring of structure.

It makes an interesting exercise to compare the process of teaching rules that will enable understanding and mastery of a mathematical system, with the process of teaching rules that will enable understanding and participation in a cultural system.

To what extent is discovery of the nature of the system the overt or even the covert purpose of adults' teaching cultural rules to their children? It is probably an irrelevant purpose unless the adults were conscious of their culture in some meta-aware 'objective' manner and were thereby able to see it as one sort of theoretical system out of several, and see it as requiring comprehension and discovery in that sense. This brings us to the possibility that adults are probably not aware in particular day-to-day issues that there is any more true 'nature' to the system which they are obscuring. To what extent is this analogy really relevant in everyday life? Or is it that its relevance and significance pertains to a historical view of the relationship as a whole, but is not necessarily identifiable in everyday instances?

So, in addition to the hypotheses specified on p.288, certain other factors are likely to be important:
1) options, alternatives, conditional rules and the offering of choices.
2) emphasis on mastery of the individual patterns of relationship as opposed to the more general factors reflecting the nature of the system.
3) explanations and assertions which are evasive, or otherwise obscuring the 'truth' of the system.
4) rules which are so framed as to obscure the structure of the task. (A difficult question; probably very close to the question regarding specificity-generality in 2).

1) This refers to the presentation of choice to the child, whether stated in terms of the immediate situation or in terms of the supporting rule. E.g.,

M: "The washing up, Susan...."
C: "Ohh but I want to play this now.."
M: "OK so long as you do it before bedtime."

This is a clear example of reference to a rule with an accompanying conditional regarding action in the immediate situation. The presence of this choice for action leaves the rule untouched: i.e., when it is her turn to do the washing up, Susan must do it before the end of the day. Isolating conditionals which affect the rule itself is far more difficult, and rare in the interaction. Often the conditional may be tacitly accepted but not repeated in interaction. It is unreliable, therefore, to attempt a frequency count of such references. However, this analysis is still important for understanding conceptions of order and needs to be done, though it was not attempted in this study.

2)+4) Specificity-Generality: This refers to the breadth of
the rule or regulatory statement. There are several ways in which one can distinguish between specific rules and general principles. The typical extremes are eg.,

Aunt: "Krishnapriya, you're hitting her with a roti?!"

in effect the rule referred to here is, "You shouldn't use a roti (bread) to hit with". In this sense, the rule may be said to refer to "individual patterns of relationship". To be phrased in terms "reflecting the nature of the system", the rule would have to be, "You should treat food with respect."

There are several examples where the line may be drawn with ease between the specific and the general, i.e., between the specific rule and the underlying value. However, after attempting to make this distinction for a time, it was decided to abandon the pursuit because no matter how clear the statement of specificity or generality, with the present data there was no way of knowing in what terms the rule was actually conceived of, or had been represented in previous interaction. Often even the superficial specificity-generality of the rule reference was difficult to determine.

3) Evasions: From the present data it is difficult to determine what the "truth" of the system is, of which the adult is aware but unwilling to reveal. When an explanation is given in support of a rule it is very rarely without some element of truth in it, regarding the adult's reasons for
enforcing it. To require, first, that the adult be constantly aware of the widest possible supporting reason when referring to the rule, and second, that the adult always use this widest possible reason in interaction, is both unreasonable and undeterminable. The only way in which evasions were tested was through the more obvious 'refusal to give reason' in answer to Whys. Eg.,

Kp: "But why shouldn't I go to her house?"
F: "Come here and sit with me - don't you want to keep me company?"
Kp: "Yes - but you tell me why."
F: "Just listen to me like a good girl."

F's responses to Kp's Whys are clear examples of evasions.

The Analysis of Rules

Rules as structure may broadly be divided into the Constitutive and the Regulative, following Kant, or the Interpretive and the Prescriptive, following Harre. Although the definitions of the two types differ slightly between these two and other authors, the distinction has had widespread and long lasting appeal. Essentially, Constitutive rules are of a definitional nature; they are rules which constitute the meanings of practices, events, etc. They indicate "what counts as what and at the same time" give "meanings to actions which are performed according to that rule" (Collett,'76,p.6). Regulative rules are of a prescriptive nature; directing or regulating action, they "do not constitute social practices. Instead they inform individuals as to what should be done"(ibid.)
There has been some argument regarding the validity of this distinction (Black'62; Gumb'72, from Collett '76), but it must be accepted that although these two types of rule are 'heuristically distinguishable' they are interdependent. For the formation of a regulative rule depends on the definition and understanding of the categories and concepts it pertains to, i.e., the constitutive rules regarding its contents. And, in turn, action according to some regulative rule can alter the meaning or perception of its constituent elements, which can, in turn, alter the regulations for action. As Harre puts it, "Prescriptions presuppose interpretations, but actions on the basis of prescriptions become themselves the subject of interpretation."(Harre '77)

In this study only regulative rules will be analysed. There still remains however, the problem of identifying rules. Collett states three conditions for classification as prescriptive rules:

a) That they can be broken -- this is the condition of breach.
b) That they be capable of change -- this is the condition of alteration.
(and c) A weaker criterion following from the above: that the possibility of alternative solutions be known to and specified by the society.)*

* Winch and Fox. provide an elaboration of the idea of natural rules, and of the logical unfeasibility of certain alternatives to certain rules. (From Collett '76).
However, even given that we know when rules are rules by testing to see if they can be breached and altered, we still do not know how we can spot the rules in order to test them against these conditions. Collett discusses four senses in which an individual may be said to know a rule. These four criteria can be used for the identification of rules in general. They are:

a) **articulation** of the rule by the individual(s) himself (themselves). This is the strongest possible criterion for establishing the presence of rules.

b) **recognition** of infringements of the rule when they occur.

c) the applying of **sanctions** whenever the rule is broken. This criterion is related to the second, in that the application of sanctions depends on the recognition of breach.*

d) observed **behavioural regularity** through which the operation of rules can be inferred.

**Problems with the criteria:**

Collett sees 'recognition' as the best of all four criteria for the following reasons: Observed behavioural regularity is inadequate as a criterion because one could

* : This criterion has been employed by the ethnomethodologists through the procedure of active breach of rules to test for disapproving (sanctioning) responses to them, and thereby to deduce the existence of rules, (Garfinkel,'67). It has also been used by cognitive anthropologists (Goodenough '67, Tyler'69 from Collett '76), but in the reverse manner — i.e., in validating their model of the rules of the community by acting in accordance with them; and the extent to which criticism or sanction is avoided is the indication of his correct identification of the "cultural grammar of that community"(Collett,p.11).
not then differentiate between behaviour which is regular because it is governed by rules, and behaviour which is regular but is not based on any sort of rule, such as habits, etc. Also, one would have to reject the possibility of rules being infrequently followed or not followed. Sanctions as a criterion are problematic because
a) not all rules are linked to sanctions. Permissive regulative rules and constitutive rules are not linked to sanctions. Even if we limit ourselves to prescriptive regulative rules only, it is sometimes not clear what is and what isn't a sanction: the lack of clarity arising both from doubt regarding what the individual receiving the sanction sees as sanction*, as well as from the problem of ascertaining whether sanction was intended in the course of interaction (more of this later).

b) Sanctions are not automatically applied when rules which are backed by sanction are broken@. Therefore, any reliance

*: Collett: "When we speak of sanction we should take care to limit our discussions to those forms of social retribution which are administered by some party or parties (possibly including the violator himself) who act, or legitimately act, solely with the breach in mind", i.e., not including any misfortune that follows rule infringement - although to the perception of some individuals it might be difficult to draw the line.

@ There appear to be separate systems of rules governing the invocation of sanction in the event of a rule being broken. Most of the rules governing applications of sanction appear to be permissive. People repeatedly demonstrate a rather high level of tolerance for infractions of the rules which would appear, at least to the outsider, to be strangely inconsistent with what would be expected given just an understanding of the rules and the sanctions permissible in cases of their contravention. There seems to be a system of socially sustained, almost necessary, thresholds beyond which breaches are commonly recognised and responded to with criticisms or requests for retraction." (Eg., tolerance for language errors.)
upon sanctions to identify rules will fail when the sanctions are not applied. However the presence of sanctions will undoubtedly signify breach - given the following limitations.

c) Even when sanction or criticism is forthcoming, it is sometimes very difficult to say what rule -- if any -- has been broken.

d) People who violate the rules could elicit criticism, not for having broken the rules, but because they are regarded as unsavoury or undesirable for some other reason.

Articulation as a criterion is problematic because there is clear evidence of people knowing rules through recognition but not being able to articulate them independently.

The Identification of Rules in Naturalistic Interaction

With this form of data one is restricted to those rules which happen to require comment or invocation in the course of the interaction either in casual conversation or in anticipation of a breach of rule or following a breach. The basic material from which the presence of rules may be inferred are criticisms, directives and justifications.

Some criteria for inferring the existence of a rule:

1) Evidence for believing that the regulation/injunction etc. was in existence prior to the occasion when it came into conflict or under discussion. (Prior existence implies knowledge of the rule to both interactors.) An exception to this criterion is the rules which are created during the
interaction process under observation; but these tend to be generally more explicit in the language they are expressed in, using words such as 'should', 'ought', 'must' (and 'not's' respectively), referring to situations of similar nature in the future as well as to the present.

2) Rules by definition are regulations for action which apply to events beyond the immediate situation. They are, therefore, to be distinguished from directives and their possible justifications which do not( appear to or claim to) extend beyond the single immediate situation.

   eg., M: get up from here - I have to spread the bedding."

There is no reason to believe that there is any consistent rule or regularity implied in M's directive. A conservative rather than a liberal approach to the identification of rules is attempted, in which there has to be a fair degree of certainty that a regulation is of long-term application before it can be counted as a rule.

3) It must be believed (or appear to be) by the rule-citer that the regulation ought to be followed, despite Collett's statement that expectations are an insufficient criterion for the identification of rules, (Collett p.20, ) '.. where the rule is repeatedly contravened by members of a society, rules will, not as Bierstedt('63) and Schwayder('65) (from Collett '76) suggest, be synonymous with people's expectations. If I know that a rule is repeatedly violated, and if, therefore, I expect you to break that rule, then it makes little sense to speak of a rule as a type of
expectation. Similarly to suggest, as does Schwayder, that a rule only exists so far as it is followed, is to miss the point. Rules need neither manifest themselves in expectations or behaviours." However, the choice of this criterion depends upon the definition of rules that one chooses for specific purposes. If one defines rules as prescriptions within the mind of the individual(s) that one is dealing with, then it makes sense to require that they be expected to be followed. If one is looking at rules for the purpose of "encapsulating cultural notions about correct and incorrect ways of doing things" as Collett is, rather than to represent the individual's notions about correctness and incorrectness, then indeed it is irrelevant to use a criterion of individual expectations. If one defines a rule as "something held (although often tacitly) by all members of a group or community as representations of legitimacy and acceptability" (Marsh, Rosser and Harre '78, 1), then the expectations of each individual in the group are of vital importance.

The definition one chooses in this respect, is inevitably bound to pragmatic reasons. The anthropologist will be interested in the cultural notions; the psychologist in the individual notions - depending on whether he is looking at the individuals in authority or at the group as a whole, etc. For my purposes I require belief by the rule-citer rather than by the one(s) it is cited to. (The expectations and beliefs held by the child regarding the status of particular rules are generally inaccessible
through behavioural data.) The present interest is in the structure imposed by the adults, and in the child's attempts at dealing with - acknowledging, rejecting, or replacing the existing or developing structure.

When we look at the actual interaction records, however, we realise that very little of the information we need, i.e. regarding a) prior existence, b) long-term applicability, and c) belief that it ought to be followed, is actually present in the speech of the interactants. Very rarely do clear statements of, or explicit references to the existence of a rule occur. Due to the general limitation to the concrete and the immediate - a type of communicative shorthand which appears to be typical of intimate relationships - redundancies are generally avoided; references to rules, therefore, are usually only to be inferred.

How then does one infer a distinction between criticisms and directives which are based on rules and those which are not? Most criticisms are phrased in the language of the immediate situation. Even when it is perfectly clear from other sources (eg., observer's knowledge, later discussion with the individuals, etc.) that a directive or criticism is based on a pre-existing rule - the insistence is generally upon the behaviour - not the fact that there is a rule to support that directive or criticism.
So we are faced with the fact that:
We can - 1) identify those instances where one individual
has breached, or is expected to breach, the expectations/requirements/demands of another individual.

We can - 2) also extract from the breach/conflict/anticipated breach, what the expectations /requirements of the sanctioning individual are.

But - 3) we cannot always know from the speech of the interactors whether those expectations have previously been expressed as long-term strictures which demand compliance - or are being expressed as referring to the immediate situation only.

And - 4) even if we do know that they have been expressed before (or are being expressed now) as long-term strictures which ought to be followed - we have no way of knowing to what extent the individual citing the stricture a) expects that it will be (as opposed to should be) followed by the other; b) is serious with regard to believing that it should be followed; or c) knows what the other individual believes of the first individual's intentions, seriousness, and of consequences to himself, etc. Going back to points 2) and 3) it should be made clear that both the extraction from the criticisms/directives etc. of what the expectations are, as well as the inference that these expectations are rules, are only possible on the basis of the coder's knowledge of the group and of the culture. To deny all knowledge regarding the interaction other than that which is explicit within it in objective, physicalistic forms would be to limit analysis to a strictly behavioural level. It would involve the denial of meanings which are common knowledge, and would restrict
sensitivity and progress in the analysis.

In the case of the analysis of rules in interaction, the denial of all interpretation and prior knowledge would leave us with situations like the following:

M: "Bedtime! Haven't you brushed your teeth yet?"

We would be unable to use the knowledge that it is a common rule in certain cultures that one should brush one's teeth before going to bed. Or, eg.,

M: "No – you can't put that (bread) back (in the serving dish) – you've soiled it (touched it with the hand with which one is eating)."

There is a strict rule arising from purity beliefs that one should not so soil any communal food, dishes, etc. It would be impossible to tell from the words alone that there was actually a rule of such a nature, regulating a range of actions under certain circumstances.

However, while it would be unnecessarily restrictive to attempt analyses solely on the basis of the formal/structural properties of events (Harre '77, p.36), there are on the other hand, fairly severe problems that can follow from the use of extra contextual information, which highlight the difficulties with the inference of rules:

a) differential familiarity with and knowledge of subject groups; and

b) unfamiliarity with subtle dyad specific methods of sanction, leading to:

i) possibly different criteria for analysis for different
subjects, and

ii) inadequate recognition of occurrences of sanction etc.

A conservative policy in the classification of rules will, however, do something to curb these dangers. One serious problem remains with regard to the inference of rules: i.e., the problem of 'meaning'. It is unlikely that the inferred regulations actually 'mean' exactly the same thing to all individuals. Constructs of rules in terms of force, power and compulsion could be very different in different individuals. However, apart from observing the variations in emphasis on rules, their maintenance, their mystification, etc., there is little that can be done through this method to analyse this "subjective culture" (Triandis 72). The latter, however, is not the purpose of the present study. It is the practice and process of rule related activity in natural circumstances that is of interest, and for this purpose, the observation of natural interaction is the only appropriate method. Where the ethno-methodologists used the method of active breach to elicit reactions to it and enable inferences of rules, the observational method uses naturally occurring breaches to give an idea of what the commonly occurring breaches are in different groups, and the responses to these breaches to give an idea of their salience and maintenance.

Problems with the Identification of Rules

1) Classification as a rule vs classification as a justification:
A certain amount of formalisation of the justification/criticism is required for it to be classed as a rule. Bedtime rules in India are a good example of non-formalised principles which do not rate the status of a rule. Eg., "It's late" is sometimes used to justify directives to go to bed, but the indicated lateness is an entirely vague concept, which shows no consistency in terms of attachment to a particular time, or in terms of enforcement of a response to the lateness. These justifications were generally not classed as rules, in contrast to bedtime rules which were obviously clearly conceived of as referring to a necessary response within a clearly specified, if variable, margin of time. Formality is not always necessary for classification as a rule: eg.,

C: "(I can't play with her) she's older than me."

There is no apparent specificity regarding this justification, but it is still a clearly conceived of rule regarding age-roles and peer interaction. The following, on the other hand, are examples of criticisms/justifications which are not classified as rules:

M: referring to child's continuous bickering with younger sibling, "Why do you (have to) keep on fighting?"
or:
Nicky: "She hit me first (that's why I hit her)."

It is clear that there is no rule that there is a certain degree of fighting allowed, nor is there a definite rule that if one receives a blow one has to hit back. But in both cases the justifications are legitimate and acceptable
principles which can be stated in the following manner: "Fighting is bad anyway, so if it continues to such an extent it is very bad" and "It is not such a bad thing to hit someone who has hit you first, as it is to hit someone first." Further examples of justifications which do not qualify as rules are the following:

Kp: listening to ys*being caught out in a lie by M, laughs in a sort of triumph
M: "You don't need to laugh. You've told lies several times too."
or;
M: listening to Susan criticise Es for not setting the table properly: "You don't always set the table properly either, Susan!"

In both cases, the mothers are justifying critical prohibitions of the child's actions by referring to a principle of fairness. But they are not using any rule in a specific sense about it. Or, for example,

Kp: "Ohhh! Such a big lump (of a sweetmeat) for her (ys). Give me! (another)."

This is not a rule about sizes of lumps, or even that food must be exactly distributed, but reference to a principle of fairness as a legitimate justification for the demand. Examples of criticisms which refer to clear rules are the following:

Kp and ys are quarrelling while eating their food; Kp hits ys lightly with the roti (bread).
Aunt: "Is that the way you behave with a roti?!"
or, M:"Is that the way you sit when eating?" (with legs drawn up instead of crossed).

* ys is used to refer to younger sibling; Es is used to refer to elder sibling.
Examples of varying explicitness of rules

Explicit statements of rules such as the following are the most easily identifiable rules; Eg.,

M: "You don't have to speak to her while I am." (when C was trying to add to M's criticisms of ys.)

This sounds like a permissive rule when out of context, but in context is a definite statement of prohibition for future occurrences of similar situations. It is similar to the following statement further in the same context:

M: "You mustn't interfere, Nicky (in ys's disciplining)."

They differ from the more common implicit or explicit references to rules such as:

M: after Kishor returns from school: "Have you washed your hands and legs nicely?"

referring to the rule that when one comes into the house from outdoors, and especially if one has been away all day eg., at school, one should wash one's arms, legs and face thoroughly.

Generality of application required before classification as a rule:

Problems arise with parental statements which are stated in sufficiently definitive terms to be considered rule statements, but which apply to single events or situations. Eg.,
M: in reference to C's hint that Bruce (a rather disruptive classmate of C's) might be coming to C's birthday party: "Bruce is coming over my dead body!"

In this case, M's statement was interpreted as a prohibition because it did not really apply to anything beyond the immediate choice.

Areas of Behaviour covered by Rules

These were divided essentially into three groups, and then further detailed as to their content:

Behaviour towards or primarily affecting the physical environment:
This category covered all rules referring to tidiness in the environment, proper manner of dealing with/handling objects, ritualistic and other requirements for the treatment of objects, etc.

Behaviour primarily concerning the individual alone:
This category covered all rules referring to areas such as the individual's dressing, bedtime, posture, personal cleanliness, eating, performance of school-work, etc. Although it is clear that such things as bedtime and table manners are of relevance to others, and can offend their sensibilities, this is the case only indirectly, and it is arguable that these activities do basically concern the individual alone.

Behaviour towards or affecting other persons:
This covers all rules referring to interpersonal politeness,
consideration, aggression towards people, compliance, responsiveness, fairness, etc.

The sub-categories within these groups were further classified into a different scheme of super-ordinate categories. These were:

Rules referring to Order (the maintenance of): which included environmental/object order, procedural order (referring to the manner of doing things eg, the proper way to sit, to eat, to walk, to perform rituals, etc.), and manners, both interpersonal and table manners.

The values referred to in the rules also included categories such as the following:
Responsibility: rules regarding personal responsibility for actions, chores, promises, etc.
Compliance: rules referring to the necessity for compliance from child to adult.
Responsiveness: rules referring to the maintenance of an attentive and responsive mode of interaction eg., "Hey! I'm talking to you - why don't you answer?"
Health and Danger: rules referring to physical safety from minor examples such as: "Watch out - you'll fall." to examples referring specifically to health such as: "Don't keep pulling at that scab - once you've put the medicine you must leave it."

Cleanliness: rules referring to all aspects of personal cleanliness and not covering rules regarding the cleanliness of personal clothes, which is included under object care. This category of rules is very akin to rules referring to
Order. But because they are such a distinct category, they may be separately assessed.

The Reliability Coefficient for the combined coding of rules and sub-categories was .86. There were no particular problems in coding rules - the main difference between the coders arising from differential familiarity with the families.

Hypotheses regarding group differences in rule relevant behaviour.

1) The Edinburgh adults are expected to be more demanding of order and rule following behaviour than the Hyderabad adults. It is therefore predicted that the former will show a higher frequency of initiated reference to rules than the latter.

2) The Edinburgh children are expected to seek to reiterate and create explicit structure more than the Hyderabad children. It is therefore predicted that the former should have a higher proportion of rule reference than the latter.

3) The Edinburgh families are expected to maintain a higher acceptance of rules than the Hyderabad families. It is therefore predicted that the Edinburgh children as well as the adults will show higher ratios of acceptance of rules than the Hyderabad families.

Hypotheses regarding child behaviour across cultures:

4) Expressions of functional cooperation i.e., responsive negations (challenges) to rules should form a substantial proportion of children's responses to rules in all cultures.
5) Children's responses in all cultures should show evidence of acknowledged acceptance of rules.
Results and Discussion.

The data will be discussed first with reference to group results, in the light of the questions and hypotheses outlined in the previous pages. Patterns in clusters of individual behaviour will be discussed later, and will be followed by a discussion of correlations between child and adult behaviour.

Group Differences

Hypotheses 1 and 2: Cultural differences in rule frequencies.

Table 5.1 shows the frequencies of reference to rules in children and adults in the four groups.

Table 5.1: Abs.* and Reltv.* Freqs. of Rule References

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<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>25.2</td>
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<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
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* Averaged per person.
@ Relative to Total long Utterances
M-W U Tests: Abs. Freqs.:
Chn.: E > H, p<.051 (1 tailed); Ads.: E > H, p<.02;
Relatv. Freqs.:
r between frequency of long utterances and frequency of rule references = .76.
When absolute frequencies of rule reference (averaged per person) in three hours of observation time were considered, the two cultural groups of adults were significantly different as predicted; i.e., the Edinburgh adults made more frequent references to rules than did the Hyderabad adults. Among the children the difference between the groups was in the same direction, but was only marginally significant when using a one-tailed test. When rule references were considered either in relation to total acts or to total utterances, there were no significant differences between the groups, either among the children or among the adults. The hypothesis, therefore, is not cleanly supported. It is clear that the significance of absolute frequencies is different from that of the relative frequencies. The strong correlation between adult rule reference and adult frequency of acts suggests that the co-variance of these two variables precludes any interpretation of the group differences in terms of the underlying psychological processes in rule reference. However, the significant differences in the absolute frequencies can still legitimately be taken as an index of the difference in actual quantities of rules in a given time that are referred to by adults and received by children, and vice versa.

In all groups, children's rule references, both absolute and relative frequencies, were lower than adult frequencies of rule reference. This difference was significant in all except the Edinburgh working-class group (when relative frequencies were considered). This difference
is predictable from common sense and poses no real support for the Piagetian hypothesis that children are on the receiving end of a unilateral relationship when interacting with the adult. The point that can be used to test one aspect of this theory lies in the responses that children make to rules they receive. A Propn. of Responsive : Total Negations of Rules can be obtained by measuring the ratio of challenging to rejecting and ignoring the receives rules.

Table 5.2 shows that these ratios are once again culturally differentiated in the children. The Edinburgh children show higher frequencies of challenging to

Table 5.2: Propns. of Responsive : Total Negations

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<td>Adults</td>
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M-W U Tests: Chn: E > H p<.02
Ch- Ad diffs. not testable because low freqs of child rules.

Table 5.3: Propns. of Challenging Responses

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ignoring/rejecting responses than do the Hyderabad children. In all except the Edinburgh middle-class group, the proportion of responsive negations is well below the proportion of unresponsive negations. As Table 5.3 shows, however, there was no difference between the groups of children in their proportion of challenging responses to rules, merely in challenges as a ratio of unadapted negations. These results suggest three things: 

Firstly, the hypothesis that responsive negations (challenges) are present in all groups of children is supported.

Secondly, according to Piagetian criteria of child conceptions of rules, the Edinburgh children deal with adult rules in a less heteronomous manner than the Hyderabad children.

Thirdly, there is some indication that in all except the Edinburgh middle-class group the children are more heteronomous than autonomous. A comparison of children's ratios with adult ratios shows in addition, that in all except the Edinburgh middle-class group, the children are less responsively negative to adult rules than are adults to children's rules. Both these latter statements, however, have limited significance because there are no empirical data of similar nature at higher ages to compare these results with. Comparison of these ratios with adult ratios is also inappropriate because of the very low frequencies of rule references made by children for adults to respond to, and the consequently low reliability of the adult ratios of
responses. Comparison with adult ratios, moreover, is inappropriate from the Piagetian perspective because adults' responses to child rules would not necessarily be an indication of functional cooperation in the adult, given the assumption of didacticism in this relationship.

Table 5.4 shows Propns. of Adapted Responses to received rules. There are two differences of significance here. Firstly, children's responses in Edinburgh were

### Responses to Received Rules

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<th>Responses by:</th>
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*M-W U Tests: Chn.: E > H, p<.02; Ads.: n.s.*

### Table 5.5: Propns. of Accepting Total Responses*

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<th>Responses by:</th>
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<td>Adults</td>
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<td>.46</td>
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*M-W U Tests: Chn.: E > H, p<.05; Ads.: n.s.*

*Not including ambiguous or no responses.

Ch- Ad diffs. not testable because low freqs of child rules.
significantly more adapted than in Hyderabad. There was no difference between groups in the adults' responses. Once again, however, since child rule references were of such low frequency, the latter figures are unreliable. Secondly, in all groups except the Edinburgh middle-class, adults' responses were more adapted than children's responses — although not significantly so. There were no consistent class differences.

**Hypothesis 3**: higher acceptance of rules in Edinburgh than in Hyderabad.

Table 5.5 shows the proportions of accepting to total responses to received rules. Similar to the ratios of adaptedness, the Edinburgh children accepted significantly more rules than the Hyderabad. There was no difference between groups in adults' responses. Class differences were inconsistent. The chief difference lay in the proportions of unadapted responses such as ignoring, rejecting without discussion, etc. The Edinburgh middle-class families form a peculiar case, different from the other three groups. They are the only group where the children are significantly more adapted, more accepting, and more responsively negating than the adults. The Edinburgh middle-class children were also the group with the highest rule reference, although not significantly so.

**Hypothesis 5**: Children's responses in all groups should show evidence of acknowledged acceptance of rules.

Table 5.6 shows that explicit acknowledgement can be
Table 5.6: Proportions of Acknowledged Total Acceptance of Rules by Children

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seen to form a large proportion of children's acceptance of rules in all groups. The hypothesis is therefore supported. While this does not imply that rules are mutually constructed or "co-operated" in Piaget's terms, it does provide some evidence to suggest that children's acceptance of adult rules is not without conscious agreement, nor passive and pragmatic (i.e., merely a function of accepting authority).

Table 5.7 shows The Value Contents of Rule references by adults. When each group's rule references were ranked in order of greater proportionate reference to each value, the rankings across groups were extremely similar in spread. There were interesting group differences, however, in the actual proportions of reference to each value. The only values which showed substantial differences across groups were: **Procedural Order**, **Cleanliness** and **Manners**. Rules based on procedural order were more frequent in Edinburgh than in Hyderabad. In the latter, rules based on cleanliness, responsiveness and health and danger were more frequent than
in the former. This difference does not hold up across total value references. It applies only to the actual rules referred to or implied.

The Edinburgh emphasis on order referent rules is in keeping with the hypothesised difference between cultures in terms of the greater structuredness in Edinburgh. Order referent rules are more indicative of concrete social organisation (or structuring) than rules such as responsiveness, cleanliness, etc., where the implied structuring is of a more diffuse and abstract nature. There were no differences between groups in the behavioural areas referred to by the rules, i.e., Interpersonal, Individual, Object-Related or Food-Related.

Summary of Group Differences in Rules.

The predictable demands for social order and tight complementarity in holistic societies such as in Hyderabad, do not appear to result in greater attempts to emphasise the underlying rules by the adults, or in greater frequency of acceptance of the rules by the children. The results show the contrary. Nor, as was seen in the responses to non-compliance in the previous chapter, are rejections of the attempted ordering tolerated less. Once again, it is the reverse. In addition, the actual content of the rules that are referred to are not more referent to concrete social order in the 'holistic' society as might have been expected. The rules referred to in the latter seem more abstract, vague and varied, indicating a looser organisation of the
concrete aspects of daily social interaction with children. This looseness of social organisation between children and adults is at variance with the tight orderliness predicted and reported in such societies among adults. The overwhelming evidence of the looseness/unstructuredness in child-adult interaction must actually be related to the tightness of structure in later life. The explanation offered earlier was in terms of the access to the reasons underlying the explicit structure that the child has or has not. That is, that the lesser explicitness of the structure at this age in the holistic society should also show less emphasis on Whys and less responsiveness to Whys (i.e., less genuine justification) than in the individualistic society, which leads to a greater tightness to the structure in adult life and less possibility for fundamental change, despite greater flexibility. The question of access to reasons is what the rest of the chapter will explore. First, however, is a discussion of the correlates of rules.

Table 5.8 shows Adult behaviour correlates of child frequencies of rule references. In both Hyderabad and Edinburgh, child rule references are positively related to adult Whys, Positive Affect, and Sharing. In Edinburgh, in addition, child rules are negatively related to adult justifications, adult unresponsiveness and adult Negative Affect. In both cultures child rules are associated, therefore, with positive behaviours of the adults.

Table 5.9 shows Child behaviour correlates of adult
### Table 5.8: Adult behaviour r's of Child Freq. of Rules

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### Table 5.9: Child behaviour r's of Adult Freq. of Rules

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### Table 5.10: Individual behaviour r's of Freqs. of Rules

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* = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001
r's less than -0.11 omitted.
The correlates are very different in the two cultures. In Hyderabad, adult rules are associated with child justifications and sharing. In Edinburgh adult rules are associated curiously with child unresponsiveness and opposed to child sharing and child initiations, and less significantly opposed to both positive and negative affect. In Hyderabad, then, positive and justificatory behaviour of the children is associated with adult rule references. In Edinburgh, only child unresponsiveness is positively related to adult rule references. Assuming, for the moment, a child $\rightarrow$ adult direction of causal influence, it is possible that unresponsiveness in Edinburgh children is the only thing that stimulates adult rule references. And child sharing and initiations definitely inhibit it. In Hyderabad uni-directional causality is not so easy to hypothesise. Regardless of the direction(s) of influence it is apparent that in Edinburgh adult rule references are associated with negative child behaviour, while in Hyderabad, adult rule references are associated with positive child behaviour.

Table 5.10 shows the Individual behaviour correlates of rule references. In both Hyderabad and Edinburgh children, rule references are associated with positive affect. In Hyderabad they are also associated with justifications, whys, contradictions, responsiveness and sharing, and opposed to unresponsiveness. In Edinburgh children they are associated with agreeing and complying, and opposed strongly to contradicting and showing negative affect. In the
Edinburgh children, therefore, rule references seem to fall into a cluster of conciliatory behaviours and opposed to oppositional behaviours. In the Hyderabad children this is not the case; both conciliatory and oppositional behaviours are associated with rule references, and opposed to unresponsiveness.

In the Edinburgh adults, rule references are opposed to both conciliatory and oppositional behaviour, to responsiveness and to unresponsiveness, to positive affect and to sharing. Their only positive associations are with directives and narratives. In the Hyderabad adults rule references are associated positively with the structural variables of justifications and whys, and negatively with narratives.

In Hyderabad, among both children and adults, rules are positively associated with the other structural variables (justifications and whys). In Edinburgh there is no such cluster of structural variables among either children or adults. Amongst the children of both cultures rules are associated positively with one or more variable of positive behaviour, and negatively with negative behaviour. Among the adults of both cultures, rules are either associated positively with negative behaviour or negatively with positive behaviour. Rule references, therefore, indicate positiveness for children and negativeness for adults.

The hypotheses discussed at the beginning of this chapter will be discussed with the results of the analyses of Whys and Justifications from the next chapter in Chapter 7.
Chapter 6

WHYS AND JUSTIFICATIONS

Whys were defined as questions which sought reasons; included as Whys, therefore, were questions which did not actually use a Why, eg., questions such as "For what reason?" or "For what purpose?" or "So what?" or "What for?" etc. Five kinds of whys were identified:

1) **Suggestive Whys** eg., "Why don't you come and sit down?" or: in response to C's "I'll put them away tomorrow (toys)", M:"Why don't you settle them now?"

2) **Critical Whys** eg., M: "Why do you two have to fight all the time?" or C: with a tearful, angry face repeats, "MUM - why don't you come?"

3) **Whys followed by a solution** eg., M:"Why don't you want to eat? Have you eaten something already?"; or: in response to C's questioning regarding when they were supposed to get the 'flu jabs, M:"You don't have to get 'flu jabs. Why - have a lot of people been having 'flu in school?"

4) **Challenging Whys** eg., C: in response to M's directive to be nicer to his brother,"Why should I? He isn't nice to me."

5) **Genuine Whys** eg., C:"Why do they leave it (the Lunar Module) behind?"; or, in response to C's request for a needle, M:"What for?".

It was considered important to distinguish these five

* These were part of the wider category 'Challenges' which were distinguished from 'Contradictions' by the intention to question the validity of, rather than correct or negate, the other's utterances.*
types of Whys because in one way or another all of the first three kinds could be said not to be Whys at all: Suggestive Whys and Critical Whys because they may not really be seeking or expecting to receive a reason at all. Although they may well receive a reason in response, it may not always be intended or expected or even appropriate to supply a reason. Often Suggestive Whys are expected to be responded to with a response to the suggestive component of the question rather than to the reason seeking component. Critical Whys, again, are often not really intended as whys. The Why phraseology can be used to merely illustrate the speaker's puzzlement and essentially express anger at, or criticism of, the other. In such cases a response with a reason would often be totally inappropriate from the point of the intentions of the person asking the Why. Eg., C: with a grin is teasing the baby to tears, after being repeatedly told not to do so. M: exasperated, "Ohh! Leave him alone! Why do you always behave so terribly? Just leave him." M is not really asking the child for a psychological analysis of his actions, nor is the response which she received at all appropriate, C: with a gleeful expression,"Because I'm big and nasty!" Of course, there is no way of separating in the data those critical whys which stress the critical component from those which stress the why component. Together they merely form a separate category of Whys whose significance as Whys, as well as in their responses, must be treated differently from Genuine and Challenging Whys whose purpose is clearly a seeking for
reason.

Whys followed by a solution form a separate category because they have already given the reason they seek. They become, therefore, merely questions requiring agreement or disagreement. However, their initial purpose was for eliciting reasons; they are, therefore, significant as Whys from the point of view of the reason seeker, but not from the point of view of the responder.

The Reliability Coefficient for identification of Whys and distinctions in the five above categories was .90. The categories were found to be very easy to distinguish. All the errors which occurred were between the classification as Challenging Whys and as Genuine Whys. In the analyses these two categories were clubbed together as 'Genuine Whys'.

Further, Whys were classified according to the content of the reason they sought -i.e.- whether for Object-Physical Events/ Rules or Values/ Directives or Refusals/ Acts / Intentions/ Feelings/ Challenges or Justifications.

Whys re Objects/Physical Events: those referring to the nature or function of Material Objects or events: eg., Kp: holding her leg out and watching it, "Amma - why is my leg shaking if I hold it out like this?", M: ignores.

Whys re Rules/Values: those referring to the bases of long-term general principles, values or rules: eg., Christopher, following M's suggestion that he respond to a chain letter (previously discussed), "What is the point of writing a letter just to get into the Guiness Book of
Records?" M: taken aback, "Well - I only said - if you wanted to do it.."

**Whys re Directives/Refusals:** those referring to reasons for short-term directives or refusals: eg., M: "Pour another mug of water (after child had been to the toilet)." Kp: "But I already have." M: "Pour another." Kp: "Why?" M: "Because it will stink horribly otherwise." Kp: "O.K. I'll empty the whole bucket then." or, F: "No you can't go to your friend's house just now." C: "Why not?" F: "You mustn't." C: "Why?" F: "Just listen to me like a good girl." C: "O.K. but you tell me why."

**Whys re Acts:** those referring to the reasons for actions of the other or a third person: eg., following C hitting ys, M: "Why did you hit her?" or M: re elder sibling "Why hasn't Sona come back from school with you?"

**Whys re Intentions:** those referring to the reason for intentions; these are distinguished from reasons for actions: eg., M: asks for, and then takes, C's school book; C: "Why? Why? What are you looking at?" or, C: "Why do you want to go to the hospital today?" or M: "Why do you want to go and see her now?" C: "Because I left my home-work book at her house."

**Whys re Feelings:** those referring to emotional and physical feelings: eg., M: "Ohh Johnny! What's up? Why are you crying?" This category also included feelings of pain, often difficult to distinguish from psychological feelings.

The distinctions among all these categories may be very fine and not necessarily theoretically significant; as, eg.,
the distinction between whys re motives for action and whys re reason for intention. The difference in this case is often one of timing; whys re actions follow the completion of an act, whereas whys re intentions precede the performance of an act. The reason for maintaining this distinction, however, is that sensitivity to the other's intentions may well be an important factor in communication, as distinct from the desire to question the motives underlying actions. The first two groups of whys partially form Piaget's category of questions seeking theoretical explanation, which are postulated by him to form the main component of the child's initiations to the adult in pre-school years.

The Reliability Coefficients for these categories was .89. The only problem with coding lay in distinguishing between whys re intentions and whys re acts. Generally, however, these two categories are combined in the analyses.

Responses to Whys

These were divided into four main groups.

Adapted responses: which included all attempts to respond to the Why with the reason sought.

Don't-know responses: which included all genuine "Don't know"'s. For most of the analyses these were grouped with adapted responses.

Refusing responses: which included all instances of no response, as well as all explicit refusals to give the desired reason, as well as all evasions.
Ambiguous responses: which included all cases where the intention of the responder was uncertain.

Since Whys were classified in conjunction with Challenges, a more complex scheme of responses was actually used, then generally reduced to the above four categories in analysis. This complex categorisation was necessary because the possibility of counter-challenging and compliance and non-compliance accompanying responses to challenges had to be allowed for. It consists of the following categories:

No response (when compliance not necessary)
Ambiguous response
Don't-know response

Agreeing and acknowledging response (to challenges)
Contra-challenging response (to challenges)

Adapted response (to Whys)

The following are additional codes for compliance sought in addition to challenges:

Non-compliance (with no other response)
Challenge and comply
Challenge and non-comply

Acknowledge (the validity of) the challenge and comply
Acknowledge (the validity of) the challenge and non-comply

Comply (with no other response)

Reliability Coefficient = .94.

Hypotheses regarding Whys

1) The Frequency of Whys should be higher in Edinburgh than
in Hyderabad. The difference should be stronger among the adults than among the children.

2) Responses to Whys should be more adapted in Edinburgh than in Hyderabad; the difference should be more pronounced among the adults than among the children.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Hypothesis 1:

Table 6.1 shows absolute and relative Frequencies of Whys by children and adults in the four groups. Differences between cultures just miss significance among the children, where the Edinburgh children had higher absolute and relative frequencies of whys. The Hyderabad adults had higher frequencies of whys (though n.s.) than the Edinburgh adults, thus seemingly reversing the direction of the hypothesis. The difference disappeared almost entirely, however, when, in Table 6.2 suggestive and critical whys were excluded.

Table 6.1: Abs. and Reltv. Freqs. of Whys

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<th>Abs.</th>
<th>Rel.</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<td>5.4</td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
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Table 6.2: Freqs. excluding Critical and Suggestive Whys

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<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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M-W U Tests: n.s.
The Hyderabad adults had a higher frequency of critical whys than the Edinburgh adults. The hypothesis that in both children and adults, the Edinburgh groups should show higher frequencies of whys was not supported. In all groups except the Edinburgh middle-class, the adults had far higher frequencies of whys than the children. (Significant in Hyd.M-cl, p< .04; sig. in Hyd W-cl, p< .001; n.s. in Ed.M-cl; n.s. in Ed.W-cl.) The difference was, however, significant only in the Hyderabad groups.

Hypothesis 2:

Table 6.3 shows Propns. of Responsive to Total responses to whys. Amongst both children and adults, the Edinburgh groups were significantly more responsive to whys than the Hyderabad groups.

<table>
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<th>EM</th>
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<td>.56</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.95</td>
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</table>

M-W U Tests: Chn.: E > H, p<.01; Ads.: E > H, p<.02; (When excluding issues involving compliance:)
Chn.: E > H, p<.05; Ads.: E > H, p<.02;

r between Ch. and Ad. Propns. of Rspvns. to Whys = .24
r between Ch. Freq. Whys and Ad. Rspvns. to Whys = -.18
in Hyd.: r = -.47, p<.05; in Edin.: r = -.39, n.s.
r between Ad. Freq. Whys and Ch. Rspvns. to Whys = -.14

The hypotheses made earlier predicted that the greater structuredness of the Edinburgh groups should manifest
itself in higher frequencies of seeking for reasons as well as higher proportions of tolerance of reason seeking questions. The present results show that there is no difference at all between the cultures in their attempts to seek reasons, but there is indeed a significant difference in their responsiveness to these attempts. The groups with greater structuring are, as predicted, more tolerant of whys.

However, before attributing these differences in responses to whys entirely to structuredness, we need to look at correlations between these and other behaviours in individuals. Tables 6.4 to 6.6 show the Correlates of frequencies of Whys. The frequency of whys is negatively related to responsiveness received to whys; learning theory would have predicted rather, that the frequency of whys (and especially the frequency of children's whys) should be positively related to received responsiveness to whys (especially that received by the children from adults). The rationale behind this prediction would be that perception of tolerance and encouragement for a given activity should act as a positive reinforcer of that activity; however, the data show almost the contrary. There is actually a negative correlation between children's whys and adult responsiveness to whys. This correlation is significant in Hyderabad, but non-significant in Edinburgh. Adult whys are similarly negatively though non-significantly related to responsiveness received to them.
Table 6.4: Adult behaviour correlates of Child Whys

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Table 6.5: Child behaviour correlates of Adult Whys

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Table 6.6: Individual behaviour correlates of Whys

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<td>.56</td>
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<td>*</td>
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<td>-47</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDIN CHN.</td>
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<td>.82</td>
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<td>**</td>
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<td>.18</td>
<td>.16</td>
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* = \( p < .05 \); ** = \( p < .01 \); *** = \( p < .001 \)

R's below +/- .10 omitted
It is clear therefore, that the desire to seek for reasons is entirely independent of responses received; that is, Whys are independent of social factors seen to be permitting or ignoring them. If this non-relation between whys and responses to them extends to relations between whys and other behaviours of the interactor, it would provide strong evidence of the irrelevance of social environmental factors for one aspect of reasoning in children even at the age of seven. Table 6.4 shows us that this is indeed the case. In Hyderabad there is a further curious positive r (though n.s.) between children's whys and adult general unresponsiveness, and a negative r (though n.s.) between children's whys and adult initiations. The inhibitory effect of adult initiations has been discussed in Chapter 3. In Edinburgh, children's whys are significantly positively related to adult whys - thus showing some evidence of reciprocal influence upon the frequency of whys; similar to the r's in Hyderabad, children's whys in Edinburgh are also positively related to adult general unresponsiveness (though non-significantly). Apart from this, however, children's whys are uncorrelated with any other adult behaviour.

The same is not the case, however, for child behaviour correlates of adult whys. Child Justifications, Rules and Sharing are significantly positively, and child Negative Affect significantly negatively related to adult Whys in Hyderabad. In Edinburgh, child Whys, Sharing, Positive Affect and Initiations are positively related to adult Whys; (child justifications, rules and negative affect are also
positively, though non-significantly related). If a
direction of influence upon reason seeking were to be
postulated, the most plausible learning theory
interpretation from the present data would be that adult
reason seeking is encouraged by child positive behaviours.
The implications of the differences in cross correlations of
child and adult whys are difficult to pinpoint. Firstly, the
adult correlates of child whys demonstrate the independence
of children's reason seeking from any adult behaviour,
(except adult negative behaviour). Secondly, the child
correlates of adult whys could imply either: a) that the
frequency of adult whys is influenced by the presence of
structural (justifications and rules) and positive (i.e.,
only positive affect, not Responsiveness/Unresponsiveness at
all) interpersonal behaviour; or b) that such positive
affective and structural behaviour in the child is causally
influenced by the frequency of adult whys. There is no
immediate reason for choosing one or other explanation.

Table 6.6 shows the individual behaviour correlates of
whys. Whereas in the Hyderabad children whys are associated
with all forms of positive behaviour (except affect), in
Edinburgh children whys are associated with structural
variables alone, and opposed to general responsiveness. In
the Hyderabad adults whys are associated with the more
structural variables of rules and challenges, as well as to
sharing, but are opposed to narratives. In Edinburgh adults,
whys are associated with challenges and contradictions and
opposed to justifications, agreeing and narratives.
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**Table 6.7:** Relative contents of MPs in each group.
Table 6.7 shows the Content of Whys in various groups among children and adults. Among the children, the Edinburgh groups more frequently seek causal or mechanistic explanations for physical events and objects (the difference entirely due to the Edinburgh middle-class children,) than reasons for intentions, and for challenges and justifications than do the Hyderabad children. The latter more frequently seek reasons for directives and refusals, and acts than the Edinburgh children. The Hyderabad children, therefore, seem to seek for motives far more than the Edinburgh children. Among the adults, the highest proportion of whys in all the groups are those concerned with the motives for acts. The Hyderabad adults have higher proportions of whys regarding directives/refusals and challenges/justifications than the Edinburgh adults; the latter have higher proportions of whys regarding assertions/thoughts/opinions and regarding feelings than the former.

Table 6.8 shows the content of Whys organised according to Piaget's criteria. The Edinburgh children had higher proportions of Whys of Causal Explanation and Whys of Logical Justification than the Hyderabad children who had higher proportions of Whys of Motivation. Within cultures, the working-class groups of both had higher proportions of Whys of Logical Justification and no Whys of Causal
Table 6.8: The Content of Whys - Piagetian Criteria

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Explanation. Among the adults there were no Whys of Causal Explanation in any group. Whys of Motivation formed the highest proportion of adult whys in all groups. In all groups children had higher proportions of Whys of Logical Justification than the adults. The Edinburgh middle-class group was the only one where this difference was not pronounced. Overall, however, these results challenge Piaget's prediction that Whys of Logical Justification should not be frequent at age 7. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7: Section A.
Justifications

The problems – both conceptual and methodological – associated with the analysis of rules may to some extent be alleviated by turning to an analysis of justifications. When rules are understood in a broad sense they may be construed as the 'reasons' which individuals hold as justifying and motivating their actions and the regulations affecting them. If rules are tacitly (or otherwise) held to be "representations of legitimacy and acceptability", an obvious alternative to references to rules for understanding these representations are the justifications for actions (past, present or future, their own or others'), which individuals tend to hold and offer. It has been asserted by psychologists of varying interests and theoretical persuasions that there is a human tendency to justify one's actions to others. Aronson ('72, p.90): "Most people are motivated to justify their own actions, beliefs, feelings. When a person does something he will try, if at all possible, to convince himself (and others) that it was a logical reasonable thing to do."

The existence of the tendency to justify is also supported by research in Cognitive Dissonance Theory.

* 'reason' has two meanings in common usage: i) 'reason' as motive, argument, cause, justification or explanation; and ii) 'reason' as a logical conclusion drawn from premises. Here it is being used in the first sense, i.e., in the sense of being a cause or justification for action.
as well as by other social psychological research such as that on the justification of unconscious compliance to post-hypnotic suggestions, etc. Cognitive psychologists starting with Piaget report the tendency to justify at all costs as being greatest in younger children; then gradually decreasing with age and with the development of the notion of chance. Piaget focusses more on children's conceptual understanding in their justifications of physical and other environmental events, than on the representations of legitimacy and propriety implied in their themes.

The age at, and manner in, which children begin to (or begin to need to) justify actions in terms of legitimacy and propriety is still an unknown factor. It is known as has been mentioned before, that representations of legitimacy and propriety develop spontaneously in children's groups, in addition to existing prior to the child in the family. From the results of the analysis of rules we saw that at age seven there is little opportunity for children to actually create rules in daily interaction with their parents. There is evidence of rule manipulation by children in interaction with parents, though not in quantities that is statistically quantifiable; there is also clear quantitative evidence of the challenging of rules and justifications by children to parents in daily interaction. There is no evidence, apart from Piaget's and other Social Cognitionists', as to what legitimacy and propriety actually means to children. Contemporary social psychology also contributes to the study of justifications. With their "Account Analysis", Marsh,
Rosser and Harre use actors' justifications of actions as the basic material through which to analyse "individual systems of knowledge and belief about the social world,"...and "the set of rules regarded as operative in each situation." The question of importance for this study is not only the difference in amount of justifying between the two cultural groups, but also an exploration of the kinds of representations which children have and use to legitimate actions, assertions etc.

The use by Marsh, Rosser and Harre ('78) of justifications and accounts comes closest to the manner in which it is used in this study. I use justifications in interaction for access to social rules, in addition to the use of direct references to rules themselves. An individual's justifications/explanations of the need for or rightness of his or others' actions are used as sources for eliciting knowledge of that individual's rules and values regarding specific situations. Harre et al use direct accounts of actions through interviews. I use accounts as they occur in interaction. This method has obvious limitations in that analysis is restricted to 1) those actions which an individual chooses to justify at any particular time, and 2) only those justifications or reasons which the individual sees fit to use to the particular individual he is interacting with. However, this data is valid for the specific purposes of this study; for, in studying the interaction process, the actual behaviour of each to the other is of as much interest as the unrevealed
inner worlds of each. This study attempts to specify that which is important enough for different individuals to warrant justification and insistence. That is, it is an attempt to reconstruct the individual's image of order (albeit an ideal one) as it is invoked by him.

Piaget's work ('26) has been the single outstanding contribution to the study of justifications, even in the fifty years since it was first published. He uses justifications for an analysis of the cognitive 'stage' or level of the reasoning process implicit in them. His categories are based on a theory of lower and higher levels of the process. The categorisation includes, and sometimes confounds, variations on a structural basis (i.e., Pre-logical, Causal and Logical, in that order), as well as on the basis of content (i.e., Psychological motives, Physical objects and Ideas). As Piaget himself says, "the question is so complex that a classification based on content differs from one based on structure, and the different types of causality. Knowledge is not yet sufficient to give a homogeneous classification." (Piaget, '28). Since then, however, there have been few alterations to his basic scheme of analysis. Corrigan ('75), in an experiment on the use of 'because' in three to four year old children, altered the original classification slightly, and instead of the Structure >> Content categories of Pre-Logical (which included psychological motives), Causal and Logical reasoning, she based her categories separately on content: Physical, Affective and Concrete Logical
(referring to ideas and judgements only). She then studied the relations between clauses (i.e., whether two clauses are: merely juxtaposed; one causally related to or leading to the other; one logically related to the other,) to arrive at the Pre-Logical, Causal and Logical use of because with three different contents.

However, there have been few studies of justification and reasoning in natural interaction. This highly complex area is made more difficult to study by the dependence on linguistic information, and the variations in lexical and grammatical form which express similar semantic content. The identification and analysis of causal statements without a 'because', eg., is generally far more difficult than the analysis of those with a 'because' (Hood,'77); and in natural interaction, it is quite normal to find a large proportion of causal statements expressed without a 'because'. Piaget attributes the occurrence of dropped because to be due to a learnt artful way of speaking. It is far more likely, however, that it is due to the same tendency to avoid redundancies in communication between close friends or family members, that was noticed earlier in the analysis of rules. Nevertheless, perhaps because of these difficulties, naturalistic data has been little used.

Nor have justifications been studied much for the purpose of eliciting the individual's representations of legitimacy and propriety. Because rules are so infrequently stated explicitly, and have most often to be inferred from
indirect references, criticisms, negative affect, etc., it is difficult to determine the existence of a mutually accepted law or regulation from natural interaction. It appears far more reliable, therefore, to approach the same analysis from the angle of the criteria used in justifications. These do not imply the presence of a rule, which may or may not be stated in addition. They do imply that the individual views these criteria as valid aspects of the issue under question, (whether genuinely considering them to be so, or using them as expedient in the situation). Similar to the responses to rule invocation, the responses to justifications may be analysed according to the success/failure of the criteria they show.

There are several distinctions to be made between various criteria used in justifications which are important from the point of view of the different emphases on objectivity vs. subjectivity in Hindu and Western cultures. Kakar ('78) talks of a "lack of interest or effort on the part of the mother and the family (in India) to make the child understand that objects and events have their own meanings and consequences independent of his feelings or wishes."

Following from this suggestion and from the evidence of the lack of strict rule-based parent child interaction in early and middle childhood in India, one could hypothesise that:
1) the use of justifications by the child and by the adult,
especially in control and conflict situations are likely to refer more to the individual and to criteria relevant to the individual, than to external 'objective' criteria.

The use of subjective/internal criteria need not reflect - in the Piagetian sense - a lack of awareness of the distinction between self and other, or between self and external social milieu. All it does reflect is the tendency to consider such criteria valid when using them oneself, and/or as valid when someone else uses them. The question of the lack of objective awareness of the self-other distinction is, as yet, a theoretical one, and not reliably approached from naturalistic data alone.

Two theoretical questions follow from these distinctions: the first question is concerned with the development of social reciprocity and social sensitivity; and the second with the use of personal vs. positional rationales in social control (Bernstein and Cook-Gumperz '78).

a) To be able to be sensitive to others one must be able to decentre from one's own point of view, and consider other points of view as being both different from, and equal to those of the self.

b) The constant verbal realisation of individual intentions, motives, etc., in family interaction as opposed to speech which typically makes explicit or implicit references to status requirements, causes "the child's developing self (or self awareness)" to be progressively more differentiated as
opposed to taking on a more communal and less differentiated role (Light '79 regarding Bernstein's theory of personal vs. positional roles).

Both these concepts overlap with the distinction between internal and external criteria in justifications which is being made in this study. The question regarding social sensitivity would imply that to be able to be sensitive to others one must be able to perceive and deal with other persons, objects and events, as phenomena independent of one's feelings and desires. In terms of the criteria underlying justifications, this could imply that the more sensitive individual should either be able to, or tend to, use more objective rather than self based criteria. Perhaps this should be so only in certain types of situations, as eg., in dealing with interpersonal conflict. Perhaps the expectation/prediction of objectivity as opposed to self-based justifications is only valid in instances of conflict or anticipated conflict of intentions, rather than in instances where the issue concerns some physical matter, or where the matter is without conflict; in such situations the preference for one sort of justification over another is meaningless in terms of this dimension. This will be examined by looking at the use of various criteria in Conflict and Non-Conflict situations.

The question regarding the emphasis on personal orientation contributing positively to the development of a more differentiated self-awareness could imply that in the
must present terms there be a greater emphasis on subjective, internal factors such as intentions, feelings, etc., whether of the self or of the other, in order to encourage the development of self-awareness.

There appears at first glance to be a paradox here; on the one hand, emphasis on personal factors would seem to lead to a greater differentiation of the self, and on the other, emphasis on the self implies a self-'centredness', and possibly, a lesser ability to consider the other's point of view. Is the development of self-awareness as a process different from the development of social sensitivity? Or is there some other explanation of this paradox? The confusion probably lies in the difference in shades of meaning in the terms above: 1) Bernstein's use of the word 'personal' is only in contrast to the emphasis on authority relationships and ascribed status, etc. The factor of authority entering into the personal positional dimension differentiates it as a dimension, if not in terms of the actual meaning of the term 'personal', from the dimension of internal-external criteria. 2) The use of internal criteria has different significance when referring to criteria internal to the self, as opposed to criteria internal to (i.e., personal factors of) the other or third persons. Through my data I have access to this question through a) a study of self-oriented justifications, and b) through differentiating between internal justifications referring to the self, and those referring to the other or third persons.
We can assume, therefore, that while an overall emphasis on personal factors leads to a progressive differentiation of the child's developing self-awareness, the emphasis on personal factors of the self only, i.e., as opposed to those of others, and especially so in instances of conflict of intentions, implies a tendency either not to consider or not to accept other points of view.

Categorisation

An act was coded as a Persuasive Attempt when an intention was inferred in the actor to modify the other's acts, thoughts, arguments, etc. through convincing the other of the rightness of/ necessity for the modification, or through appealing to the other's affections, flexibility or personal desires to achieve the modification, i.e., playing on the dynamics of the relationship to achieve the modification indirectly rather than directly. The intention to persuade through convincing was called 'justification', while the intention to persuade through indirect interpersonal methods consisted of 'appeals', 'threats' and 'bargains'.

The identification of persuasions using interpersonal force was fairly simple.

Plea +: positive demands and insistence, with smile +/- or supplicatory facial expression. Eg.,

Mother: "Do your home-work and then read this." holding C's comic book.
Mona: "Oh!!" protests, smiling pleadingly; "I'll just finish this...?" (upward rise of tone.)
Mother: "No. Finish your home-work first."
Mona: "Oh...Mummy... please" smiles, looking at M.

**Plea**: negative demands and insistence, with pouting and petulant facial expression. Eg.,

Mother: refuses C's demand for food at that time.
Urmila: "Ohhh!! Aaaaa..." looks at M with a pitiful/pleading expression; continuing to demand.
or,
Mother: refuses C's demand for money.
Ramesh: pouts, glowers "Umm!! Give me. Uhu...uhu...ummml!!" looking at M.

**Issue related plea**: pleas of either positive or negative facial expression, which referred to the issue in question as justification for the appeal; they were not justifications, however, because they were not based on any principle or justifying factor; they merely constituted attempts to diminish the significance of the other's contra-intention or argument by appealing for exceptions in the particular case. Eg.,

Mother: refuses c permission to go her friend's house, saying it was unnecessary.
Mona: "Ah..Mummy please..I'll go quickly and come back.."

**Threats**: Overt contractual relations using the authority and power in the relationship and essentially unrelated to the issue. These can be of the following different contents:

**Threat of deprivation of privileges**: threatening the deprivation of such privileges as money, playtime, television time etc., in the event of non-compliance of
disagreement. Eg.,

Mother: "I won't take you to the cinema with us if you behave like this Krishnapriyal"

**Threat of deprivation of love:** threatening the withdrawal of affection in the event of non-compliance. Eg.,

Mother: "I won't be your Mummy any more if you don't listen to me."

**Threat of physical punishment:** threatening the use of direct physical force in the event of non-compliance: Eg.,

Father: "I'll hit you, Rajul Stop that!"

**Bargains:** Similar to threats in that they are also overt expressions of contractual relations which are essentially unrelated to the issue at hand. They can be of the following types:

- **Bargain of privilege:** promising the gift or allowance of a privilege (of non-customary nature), in the event of compliance.
- **Bargain of love:** promising affection or praise in the event of compliance: Eg.,

Grandmother: "You'll be my golden mother, come.. drink it up."

An additional form of appeal was the use of trust, which referred to cases of asking the other to take one's word, but which was abandoned because it was used infrequently and
by only one child.

The **identification of justifications** has most generally been based on the sole criterion of the presence of a 'because' or a 'so' connecting two clauses. In most studies, this 'because' or 'so' has been used to analyse the causal or logical nature of the connection between the two clauses. As has been stated before, the emphasis of the present analysis is on the legitimating content of the second clause rather than on the causal/logical nature of the connection. That is, on the analysis of the rule, value, principle or individual desire referred to in legitimating terms in the justification.

One change was made in the usual criteria for identifying justifications. Identifications were made in those cases where a 'because' between two clauses was implied rather than explicitly stated. Such implied 'because' are very common in interaction within intimate dyads, and a limitation to explicit 'because' not only loses an enormous amount of data, but constitutes, furthermore, an arbitrary definition of justifications. If justifications are often made without an explicit 'because', the insistence upon it as a criterion does serve the purpose of establishing certainty upon justificatory intent, but is an unnatural demand upon the normal forms of interaction. In the following example,

*Caroline: opening a packet of crisps rather clumsily.*
Mother: "Right - stop! It'll all fall out."

M's directive is followed by the reason for the directive. The insistence upon an explicit because would imply that in this case there is no way of knowing whether the "It'll all fall out." was intended as a justification of the directive, or was an unrelated additional statement.

While the dangers of inference of intention are a valid concern in categorisation, the point I am making is that the criterion of explicit 'because' is an unnatural and excessively strict requirement. The problem of inferring whether a statement is intended as a justification of another statement can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, the intention can be required to imply a self-justificatory or defensive motive, no matter how non-conflictful the issue. In the above example, for instance, one would have to assume that the mother actually intended to defend her directive; in a sense apologising for it. This interpretation of the intention underlying justifications is unfeasible because it limits the possibilities of inference severely, and because it constitutes a very partial approach to defining justifications. Secondly, the intention can be required merely to explain the reason for something, whether with defensive intent, or with non-defensive. The solution to the problem of inferring justifications which was adopted in this study, was to test the plausibility of an artificially inserted 'because' between two clauses. In the above example it is psychologically quite plausible to do this; i.e., M: "Right - stop, because it'll all fall out."
In some cases where justificatory intent was very obvious, a coding of justification was allowed even when the first clause as well as the because was implied. An example of such a case is given on p. 360.

The following examples of justifications without explicit 'because' illustrate the commonness of their absence, as well as some of the problems of inference they raise.

Caroline: "Ian can't spell 'love' - he spells it 'luve'."  
Mother: "not surprising - he's the same age as them (C's younger twin siblings aged five)."

M is here justifying Ian's error on the basis of the principle that age is related to abilities.

Caroline: "He's not. He's one year younger than me."  (C is 7 years old)

contradiction), in that C could be saying "Ian can't be the twins' age (5), because he's a year younger than me (7)." On the other hand this is a rather pronounced inference, not merely because of the absent clause, but because it is equally plausible that a logical justification of this nature was not intended, but was merely an extension of the contradiction. On the side of caution, this particular statement was coded as a contradiction only.
M is contradicting C. But her utterance could not be further coded because of the missing second half of her sentence.

Caroline: "He's six isn't he?"
Mother: "Yes."
Caroline: "Well it's a year younger than me ...(inaudible)."
Mother: "Um."

If C's "He's six isn't he?" had occurred on its own, without being followed by "Well it's a year younger than me...." it would have been coded as a justifying question. However, in the light of the later utterance, it can be seen that the former question forms a prelude to the statement of the logical justification. The former was therefore coded as a question, and the latter as a justification.

The following examples show evidence of reasoning which cannot be coded as justifications.

Mother: at the sink.
Caroline: goes to the sink and reaches for the tap.
Mother: moves the pan she's holding in the sink, away from C.
Caroline: "Is that hot?"

C appears to have deduced the reason for M's action and is checking it. It could conceivably be coded as supplying a justification for M's act, but such a categorisation would be far fetched, for no intent to actually explain (not to mention justify) can reliably be inferred. There is a problem in differentiating between justifying and
explaining. In cases such as the above, an inference of explanation is far more plausible than an inference of justification. And the distinction between the intention to explain and the intention to justify can be clearly seen. However, in most cases, this distinction is very difficult to make. The easiest criterion to use in making this distinction is one of possible motive. That is, could the individual wish to defend himself, or justify the rightness of an action? Or is the individual merely making a casual observation as to the causal, logical etc. explanations of some event? In cases of seeming self-defense, what validity is there in assuming an actual motive to defend, rather than an unemotional intention to explain? It was decided not to pursue this distinction. However, if justifications are interpreted not as intentions to defend, but as intentions to legitimate, without any necessary personal involvement, then it is easier to draw a distinction between implied explanations and implied justifications. In the following example:

Bujji: returns from the shops having just run an errand for M.
Mother: "Show - how much did they give? - show."

The "how much did they give?" is M's reason for the directive "Show". It could possibly be interpreted as a justification (as explanation) of the directive, but is more plausibly interpreted as an elaborated directive. That is, "Show me how much they gave you." Similarly, all directives accompanied by reasons which could be conceived of as
reasons for the directive, but which did not in any sense legitimate the directive, and could be seen as elaborated directives, were not coded as justifications. The following example presents a similar problem:

Kishor: sitting on the floor eating his food.
Mother: passing by, knocks some food off C's plate with the edge of her sari. She passes on without realising it.
Kishor: hits M's legs twice.
Mother: looks down in surprise.
Kishor: in a petulant tearful voice "You dropped that!" points.
Mother: "Oh...sorry - I didn't see." pauses "Do you have to hit just for that?" (critical tone).

The first problem arises when attempting to classify C's "You dropped that!" It is possible to infer a 'because' here - i.e., "I hit you because you dropped that!" But this is an unlikely interpretation in the context; judging from C's annoyance while saying it, he appears to be accusing and criticising M, rather than even considering justifying his act of hitting M. It is, therefore, coded as a criticism, where the information regarding the illegitimacy of brushing food off someone's plate, as contained in the criticism, is not lost. M reacts to C's utterance as a criticism rather than as a justification of his aggression. M's apology is followed by "I didn't see." This cannot be considered a justification; M is not saying "I am sorry because I did not see that I had dropped it." Nor is she saying "I dropped it because I did not see that I was going to drop it." M's further criticism of C's act as being unjustified - making an implicit reference to a vague norm which states that
which justifies an act of aggression, is coded as a criticism.

A case where the first clause is absent can be seen in the following example:

Mother: "Comb your hair Anupama."
Anupama: "But I've already combed it before."

C's justification is of an unstated protest, where she would be saying "I don't have to comb my hair again because I've already combed it before."

Reliability coefficient for identification of justifications = .79

Further Classification of Justifications:

The classification of the 'representations of legitimacy and propriety' in justifications took the form of the following three broad categories, based on the nature of the 'laws' implied in the justification:

Social Laws: these refer to rules/values or principles pertaining to the organisation of human behaviour (either towards other individuals or towards objects,) with generalised application (i.e., relevant to situations beyond the immediate and/or to individuals other than the speaker.) These Social Justifications were further classified into the various value references they made in the same manner as were the rule references.

Physical laws: these refer to constitutive principles regarding the properties and behaviour of physical objects.
They included as a separate sub-category all references to principles of Health and Danger.

**Logical laws:** these refer to justifications of actions or (usually) ideas based entirely on the logical necessity or consequence of the action/idea.

**Pragmatic laws:** these refer to justifications which use convenience or ease of performance etc., as the main criterion.

**Individual laws:** these refer to criteria whether of a physical (physiological) or non-physical nature which pertain to the individual alone in the particular situation. These were further subdivided into categories based on their main subject of reference:

- **Self-referent (appropriate):** when the reference to the self is a valid concern in the issue.
- **Self-referent (inappropriate):** when the reference to the self in the justification is not appropriate.
- **Other-referent:** when the reference is to the other or a third person.
- **Authority referent:** when the justification invokes the authority of the speaker or of a third person to legitimate a directive or action, etc.

In all cases it was not the physical/social nature of the causal/logical connection that was being analysed, but that of the principle implied as legitimating the second clause. The following are examples of these various types of justifications.
M's "you can go over and play with X" was interpreted as a justification for her initial comment "It'll be nice ...etc." This was, according to the above classification, an Individual Justification; the pleasure that M predicts that C will have from playing with X is the only legitimation of her earlier assumption. The criterion is, clearly, limited entirely to the individual and to the specific situation. It was classified as an Other-Referent Individual Justification. C's response was classified as a justification for an implied contradiction of M's assumption that it will be nice for C, or as a justification for an implied refusal of the same suggestion. The basis for this justification was the child's intentions and desires regarding playmates, but clearly referring to a Social reason, outside his own feelings and preferences, as the basis for his dislike of the suggestion. This social reason is the difference in age; he is not merely saying "I don't like playing with him." M then accepts this reason as a valid one by saying "Not very much older though."

Mother: "Nicky - she asked you awfully nicely - give it to her."

The 'therefore' is implied before 'give it to her'; this justification is based on a form of social interaction which ought to be followed by any of a variety of equally 'nice' responses.
Mother: "Give it to her - she brought it. If you want one you can go and get one from Daddy's desk."

This justification refers to the social rule of possession rights accruing from prior action upon or prior possession of object.

Urmila: says that she will play with tiny dots of paper (collected from punching machines.)
Mother: "Don't do that Urmil, the dots will blow all over (the house)."
Urmila: "They'll look nice."

M's prohibition is followed by a justification whose connection with the thing justified is based on a physical relation, and exemplifies, in Piagetian terms, a relation of physical causality. However, the legitimating aspect of the justification is the physical effect, but the idea that it is undesirable to have tiny pieces of paper blown all over the house. Therefore, it is a Social Justification.

Mother: "Don't touch that - you'll get burnt."

Mother: (telling child who is pulling a piece of wood from M):" Be careful - you'll get splinters in your hand."

Both the above examples qualify as Physical justifications, subclassified as being based on the principle of avoiding danger, and guarding physical health. The example mentioned earlier regarding Caroline's criticism of Ian's inability to spell love, M's subsequent defense on the basis of his age
is another example of a Physical Justification based on physical law alone.

Frances: after practising a tune on the recorder, asks M, "Was that - was that very good for a first try?"

Frances is using a physical reason - namely - the absence of previous practice - to justify her approval seeking. The relation between practice and playing is itself used as a justification.

Caroline: "May I?" (take some of this ointment). Mother: "No - you may not!"
Caroline: "Well - Abigail took some..."
[C is justifying her continuing request for permission with a Social Justification, referring to the principle of fairness.]
Mother: "Abigail took some because she was sore."
[M is justifying her refusal and contradicting C's argument with reference to a physical/health rule, viz., that one takes medicine only when one is ill.]
Caroline: "Can I put it? I'm sore there ", points to her lip.
[C accepts M's reference to the physical principle, but counter argues with a new justification, viz., that she had a physical reason for requiring the medicine.]

Ramesh: asks M for some money again after M had already said she did not have any
Mother: "Where should I get it from?" (angrily) [M is justifying her critical refusal by invoking the logical impossibility of C's request. This is therefore coded as a Logical Justification.]

Ramesh: "No I didn't take the reel of thread; I took just the needle - it had a bit of thread on it."
[C is here offering a justification in support of his answer, as well as proof in the form of a justification of his action, based on a principle of convenience. This is classified as a Pragmatic Justification.]
Mother: "You must make allowances for her - she's awfully weepy 'cause she's been to the doctor's today."

The previous utterance had been "...and she doesn't like it - always gets weepy." M is here invoking the third person's feelings in an attempt to justify the latter's actions. There is no reference to a general principle of being considerate when people go to the doctor's; it refers solely to the specific individual's feelings in the specific situation. It is possible that a much broader principle of consideration is, in fact, being invoked. But it cannot be classified as such in the present system of analysis. This is classified, therefore, as an Individual Justification referring to a third person.

Mother: surprised (pleasant or neutral tone) at C's statement of dislike of Church meeting: "Do you?"
Nicky: "I hate going there (because) there's a six year old prick who ... etc."

This is coded as an Individual Justification referring to the Self.

Ramesh: "Where's the needle?"
Mother: "Why?"
Ramesh: "I want it."
Mother: "Why?"
Ramesh: "I want it."

C's first "I want it." was coded as an appropriate self-referent Individual Justification. His second "I want it." was an inappropriate self-referent Individual
Justification.

Aunt: "If you do that your mother will be angry."

This was coded as an Individual Justification referring to an individual's authority as legitimating the prohibition.

Mother: "Don't Raju!!1!
Raju: "Why not?"
Mother: "I told you not to. Get down!"

M is referring to her own authority as justifying her command.

Reliability coefficient for further classification of justifications = .86

**Summarised Hypotheses**

1) Justifications should be more frequent in Edinburgh than in Hyderabad among both children and adults.

2) The Ratio of Internal to External Justifications should be higher in Hyderabad among both adults and children.

2a) In all groups, the Ratio of Internal to External Justifications should be higher in Conflict than in Non-Conflict situations.

3) Interpersonal Persuasions and especially appeals, should be more frequent in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh among both children and adults.

4) There should be higher rates of acceptance of Interpersonal appeals in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh among both adults and children.
5) There should be higher acceptance of Internal Justifications in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh among both children and adults.
Results and Discussion

Table 6.9 shows the Frequencies of Persuasive Attempts. There is a difference between Edinburgh and Hyderabad among both children and adults: the Edinburgh families have higher frequencies of persuasive attempts (the difference is barely significant between the children, and is non-significant between the adults). There is an interesting though non-significant class difference in the absolute frequencies of persuasive attempts, where among children as well as among adults, the middle-classes attempted more persuasion than the working-classes in both cultures though missing significance in all.

Table 6.9: Abs. and Reltv. Freqs. of Persuasive Attempts

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M-W U Tests: Reltv. Freqs.:
Chn.: E > H, p<.03 (1 tailed); Ads.: E > H, n.s.

In all groups, adults attempted more persuasion upon children than vice versa. These differences were significant in all except the Edinburgh working-class;
and they were significant overall. In the light of the data from the previous chapter, namely, that frequencies of control attempts were significantly higher in Hyderabad than on Edinburgh, one might have predicted that the frequencies of persuasions would have followed a similar trend. But the results show the contrary. Persuasions are distinct from control attempts, in that the former include: a) attempts which may not explicitly demand agreement, and b) attempts at convincing the other which occur in a non-conflictful and non-controlling context. It is possible that these differences may be meaningfully distinct as psychological variables. To examine the difference further, Table 6.15 further on shows the distribution of persuasions in conflictful vs. non-conflictful situations.

Hypothesis 1:
Table 6.10 shows absolute and relative Frequencies of Justifications in various groups. When considering the

Table 6.10: Abs. and Reltv. Freqs. of Justifications

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M-W U Tests:
Abs. Freqs.: Chn.: E > H, p<.05; Ads.: E > H, p<.05;
Reltv. Freqs.: Chn.: E > H, p<.05; Ads.: E > H, n.s.
absolute frequencies, among both children and adults the Edinburgh groups have higher frequencies of justifications than the Hyderabad groups. When considered as proportions of total acts, there is still a significant difference in the same direction between the groups of children; among the adults the difference just misses significance. These frequencies support the prediction that the incidence of justifications should be higher in the Edinburgh families.

Table 6.11 shows the Propns. of Justifications to All Forms of Persuasion. These propns. are higher for the Edinburgh families than the Hyderabad. The differences are far stronger among the children than among the adults.

Table 6.11: Propns. of Justns. to All Forms of Persuasion

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<tr>
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Hypotheses 2 and 3:

Tables 6.12 and 6.13 show the frequencies of various Forms of Persuasion relative to the total incidence of persuasions. The prediction that Internal Justifications should be more frequent in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh is completely rejected among the children, (where E > H, p<.01); among the adults, there is no difference
### FORMS OF PERSUASION

**Table 6.12: Reltv. Freqs. of Various Forms in Children**

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>Appeals</td>
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<td>.16</td>
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<td>.03</td>
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<td>Threats and Bargains</td>
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<td>.02</td>
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M-W U Tests: Int. Justns.: E > H, p<.01
Appeals: H > E, p<.05
rest n.s.

**Table 6.13: Reltv. Freqs. of Various Forms in Adults**

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M-W U Tests: Appeals: H > E, p<.05 rest n.s.
r between adult and child freqs. of appeals = .36, p<.05
between the groups. The prediction that interpersonal appeals should be more frequent in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh was supported among the children, (where $H > E$, $p < .05$), and among the adults, (where $H > E$, $p < .05$). There was no difference in the frequency of use of threats or bargains, either among the adults or among the children.

Table 6.14 shows Propns. of Internal to Total Justifications. Once again, adults in all groups (only marginally so in the Hyderabad working-class, ) had lower ratios than the children. Between cultures, however, the difference was not large among the children, and non-existent among the adults.

Table 6.14: Propns. of Internal to Total Justifications

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M-W U Tests: Between cultures: n.s.
Chn > Ads: HM $p < .05$, EM n.s., EW $p < .05$

Table 6.15 shows Propns. of Internal (to Total) Justifications in Conflict and Non-Conflict Situations. The prediction that the use of internal justifications should be more frequent in conflict than in non-conflict situations was not supported in any group. Among the children there was no difference between situations in the Hyderabad
Table 6.15: Proportions of Internal to Total Justifications in Conflict and non-Conflict Situations

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M-W U Tests: Diff. bet. conditions n.s. in all groups; Diff. bet. groups n.s. in all conditions. middle-class, and a difference in the opposite direction from that predicted in the Edinburgh working-class. The direction of the difference was supported in the Hyderabad working-class and the Edinburgh middle-class, but there was no significance when all groups were considered. Among the adults, the difference was small but in the predicted direction in the middle-classes of both cultures, and larger, but in the opposite direction in the working-classes of both cultures. In both conditions the Edinburgh children had higher ratios of internal justifications than the Hyderabad children. There was no difference between cultures in either condition among the adults.

Table 6.16 and 6.17 show Various groups of External
Justifications as proportions of the total persuasive attempts. Among both children and adults, Physical and Logical Justifications were more frequent in the Edinburgh groups, and Social Justifications were more frequent in the Hyderabad groups. Pragmatic Justifications showed no difference between cultures in the children, and were only slightly more frequent in Edinburgh than Hyderabad adults. In all groups, children had higher frequencies of Logical and Physical Justifications than the adults. In both Hyderabad groups, children also had higher frequencies of Pragmatic Justifications than the adults. Among both children and adults, the proportions of social justifications are higher though non-sig in the Hyderabad groups; and the frequency of physical/logical justifications are higher in the Edinburgh groups though again n.s. In all groups the children used higher frequencies of Internal Justifications than the adults, and higher frequencies of appeals (although the latter were very infrequent in the Edinburgh families). In all groups, adults used a far higher proportion of Social Justifications than the children. The direction of this difference is equally predictable from Piagetian and from Learning Theory positions regarding the role adults play in invoking the values and beliefs of the social group. The consistency of this child-adult difference across all groups suggests that this didactic aspect of 'socialisation' occurs in a similar fashion in both cultures. Furthermore, the proportions of social justifications by the adults is very similar in all groups.
Table 6.16: Kinds of External Justifications in Children*

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*M-W U Tests: n.s.

Table 6.17: Kinds of External Justifications in Adults*

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*M-W U Tests: n.s.*

* Relative to total persuasion attempts.
Table 6.18: Kinds of Internal Justifications in Children*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Referent</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-ref. Inapprt.</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-Referent</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority Referent</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Self-ref.: E > H p<.05; rest n.s.

Table 6.19: Kinds of Internal Justifications in Adults*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Referent</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-ref. Inapprt</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-Referent</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority Referent</td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Relative to total persuasion attempts
M-W U Tests: Auth.-ref.: H > E p<.05 (unreliable: low freqs.); rest n.s.
Table 6.18 and 6.19 show various **Forms of Internal Justifications** in children and adults. Among the children the only difference between groups lay in the greater frequency of self-referent justifications by the Edinburgh than the Hyderabad children. Among the adults, the absolute frequencies showed greater use of self-referent as well as other-referent justifications by the Edinburgh groups; however, there were only marginal differences in these categories when considered as proportions of the total persuasion attempts. There was a substantial difference in the use of authority-referent justifications, however, where the Hyderabad adults, and primarily the Hyderabad middle-class adults used a much larger proportion of these than did the Edinburgh adults. This difference is predictable from the generally described hierarchical nature of Indian family systems.

Table 6.20 shows **Propns. of Acceptance of Persuasion** in children and in adults. In all groups except the Hyderabad working-class, children were more accepting of persuasions than the adults. The Edinburgh groups were more accepting than the Hyderabad though this difference was only very slight among the adults. There were no class differences in Hyderabad, but in Edinburgh the Middle-class children and adults accepted persuasion more than the working-class. These cultural differences in the success/failure of persuasion attempts are very similar to the differences predicted and found in the success/failure of control
attempts described in the previous chapter.

RESPONSES TO PERSUASION

Table 6.20: Propns. of Acceptance of Persuasion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Chn: E > H p<.06 (2 tailed); Ads: n.s.

Table 6.21: Propns. of Challenges to Persuasion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
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<td>.09</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.21 shows proportions of Challenges made in response to persuasion attempts. In all groups, adults issued considerably higher proportions of challenges than the children. Among both children and adults, the Edinburgh groups had higher proportions of challenges than the Hyderabad groups. The Edinburgh families were, therefore, both more challenging and more accepting of persuasions than the Hyderabad families.
Hypotheses 4 and 5:

Tables 6.22 and 6.23 show Propns. of Acceptance to Various Forms of Persuasion in children and adults. Hypothesis 4, that interpersonal appeals should have higher rates of acceptance in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh was supported among both children and adults. Hypothesis 5, that Internal Justifications should similarly have higher rates of acceptance in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh was not supported, and the direction of the difference was in reverse to that predicted. In all forms of justifications the Edinburgh children's ratios of acceptance was higher than the Hyderabad children's. The latter had higher ratios of acceptance of threats and bargains as well as appeals, than the former. In all groups, however, justifications were more frequently accepted than other persuasions by both children and adults.

One interesting class difference lay in the difference between acceptance of Social Justifications and that of Internal Justifications. The middle-class children of both cultures had higher acceptance rates for Social Justifications than the working-class children (and accepted them more than Internal Justifications). And the working-class children of both cultures had higher acceptance rates for Internal Justifications than the middle-class children, and accepted them more than they did Social Justifications. This difference was not present in the adults' responses. Among the adults, there was no
## RESPONSES TO KINDS OF PERSUASION

### Table 6.22: Propns. of Acceptance in Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Justns.</td>
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<td>.39</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys/Log/Pragmatic Justns.</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Justns.</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals*</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: Phys/Log/Prag.: E > H p<.05

### Table 6.23: Propns. of Acceptance in Adults

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HW</th>
<th>HYD</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EW</th>
<th>EDIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Justns.</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys/Log/Pragmatic Justns.</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Justns.</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals*</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M-W U Tests: n.s.

* M-W U Test not calculable because of high freq. of .00 acceptance in Edinburgh. The significance of the difference is self-evident.
difference between cultures in responses to Social Justifications, but responses to all other forms of persuasion showed differences between cultures in the same direction as in the children's responses. Among both children and adults, in all except the Hyderabad working-class group Physical/Logical/Pragmatic justifications received the highest rate of acceptance. The prediction that appeals should be received more acceptantly than in Edinburgh was supported, and the prediction that Internal Justifications should also be similarly spread was not supported.
Chapter 7

DISCUSSION OF STRUCTURE RELATED BEHAVIOUR

A: General Discussion of Correlations

Correlations of structure relevant behaviour with other individual behaviour, and correlations of these structure relevant behaviour variables between adults and children, are discussed with reference to four questions:

1) What degree and kind of correlation exists between various structural variables in different groups?
2) What correlation exists between structural and interpersonal variables within the individual in different groups?
3) What relationship exists between structural behaviour in children and in adults in different groups?
4) What relationship exists between interpersonal and structure relevant behaviour across children and adults in both directions in different groups?

Individual correlations

The 
 Correlates of Structure-Relevant behaviour drawn from the correlation matrices (7.1 to 7.4 in the Appendix,) in various groups are presented below within each group. Clusters are obtained by hand analysis according to the procedure described in Chapter 3. The positive associations are presented downwards, and the negative ones across. In some groups it was necessary to define two sets of clusters.

* The correlates of interpersonal behaviour were presented on pp.194-7.
the details of which are discussed in the description of each group.

Hyderabad Children

1) There is a reasonable degree of positive correlation between Rules, Justifications and Whys. There are also moderate positive, though non-significant correlations between Compliance and each of the above three variables.

2) Also part of this cluster are Narratives, Contradictions, Responsiveness and Sharing. Positive Affect is positively and significantly related to frequency of Rule reference and to Contradictions and Responsiveness. All the variables in this cluster are strongly negatively related to Unresponsiveness.

Hyderabad Children:

| Justifications | Rule reference | Responsiveness | Narratives | Sharing | Contradictions | Positive Affect (Whys) | Unresponsiveness |

In summary, there were high to moderate positive correlations between various structure related variables, including compliance. There were high positive correlations between structure related variables and positive interpersonal behaviour (i.e., between Structure, Sharing, Responsiveness,) and consistent negative correlations between these and unresponsiveness. Negative Affect is
entirely unrelated to any of these variables. Rules and Contradictions are the only structural variables which are positively (or at all) related to Positive Affect.

**Edinburgh Children**

1) There are high degrees of positive correlation between all structural variables except rule reference; i.e., between frequencies of directives, justifications, whys and challenges. Rule references form a separate cluster where they are related positively to Agrees, Compliance and Positive Affect. There is, therefore, a somewhat partial concordance between structural variables, being split into two separate clusters rather than forming part of the same one, as in the Hyderabad children's correlations.

**Edinburgh Children:**

**Cluster 1:**
- Directives
- Justifications
- Challenges
- Whys
- Responsiveness
- Narratives
- (Contradictions)
- Sharing

**Cluster 2:**
- Rules
- Posv. Affect
- Agrees
- Compliance
- Negv. Affect
- Contradictions
- (Narratives)

2) Also unlike the Hyderabad children's correlations is the sharp and definite split between structural and positive interpersonal variables. The major cluster of structural
variables is opposed to Responsiveness, Narratives, Contradictions and Sharing. Neither positive nor negative affect is related to this set of clusters. The second set of clusters, concerned with rule reference form opposing clusters of conciliatory vs oppositional and negative behaviours. This has been discussed before in the section on Rules. In conclusion: rules are unrelated to other structural behaviours, but only to conciliatory behaviour and opposed to oppositional and negative behaviour. Justifications, Challenges, Whys and Directives, on the other hand, form a separate cluster opposed to positive interpersonal behaviour.

Hyderabad Adults

1) Most structural variables are positively related, although not in all combinations, and not very strongly when they are.

Hyderabad Adults:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Narratives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule reference</td>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifications</td>
<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whys</td>
<td>Contradictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directives</td>
<td>Posv. Affect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Agrees)</td>
<td>Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) There appears to be a split between Structure related variables and positive interpersonal variables similar to the split found in the Edinburgh children (and also in the Edinburgh adults, to be discussed below,) although the split
in the Hyderabad adults is not as sharp. All the structural variables are opposed to the positive interpersonal variables Narratives, Responsiveness, Compliance and Contradictions. In a related cluster, Rule reference and Directives are opposed to Positive Affect, Narratives and Sharing. Similar to the Hyderabad children, Negative Affect is entirely unrelated to any of these variables.

**Edinburgh Adults**

1) Whys are negatively related to Justifications, but all the structural variables fall into the same cluster due to very clear and consistent correlations with other variables. Apart from Whys and Justifications, all other structural variables are related to a reasonable degree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edinburgh Adults:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges (Whys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negv. Affect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unresponsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posv. Affect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) There is an extremely clear opposition between structural and positive interpersonal variables. The structural variables are actually positively correlated with Negative Affect and Unresponsiveness, and negatively correlated with Positive Affect, Responsiveness, Sharing and Compliance.

   In all groups, therefore, there are rough but varying degrees of concordance between various structural variables.
In all except the Hyderabad children, there is opposition between being highly structure referent and being positive in an interpersonal sense to the other. This split is clearly present, in addition, when all cases (including children and adults,) are considered together.

**Adult- Child Correlations**

Clusters in Adult-Child Correlations are presented separately for Hyderabad and Edinburgh. The correlations for the eliciting of these clusters are presented in Matrices 7.5 and 7.6 in the Appendix.

**Hyderabad:**

3) The relation between child structure and adult structure:

There are low positive but insignificant correlations between Child Rules and Adult Rules, between Child

|------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|-------------|------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|------------|------------------|

Justifications and adult Justification, and between Child Whys and Adult Whys. However, child Rules correlate with adult Whys, and adult Rules with child Whys; child
Justifications also correlate with adult Rules and Whys. Overall, therefore, there is a clear picture of two opposing clusters of adult-child behaviour. Adult frequency of Justifications is the only structural variable which does not enter the cluster of structural variables at all.

4) The relation between structure and positive behaviour across adults and children: Adult Responsiveness/Unresponsiveness is unrelated to any of the child structural variables. Overall, however, all (except adult Justifications) structural variables of the child and adult, are related positively to positive interpersonal behaviour of both child and adult, and negatively to negative interpersonal behaviour of both.

Edinburgh:

3) The relation between child and adult structure: The correlates of child Whys and Justifications fall into a different cluster from the correlates of child Rules. In a similar fashion, the correlates of adult Whys fall into a separate cluster from the correlates of adult Rules and Justifications. Child and adult Whys are highly positively related. But this is not the case with child and adult Rules or child and adult Justifications. Adult Whys are highly positively related to child Rules and Justifications. And adult Justifications are strongly negatively related to child rules. This leads to a very unclear and weak cluster, where child Whys and Justifications are related to adult Whys, and opposed to child Rules, adult Rules and adult
Edinburgh

Cluster 1:
Child Posv. Affect
Child Sharing
(Child Negv. Affect)
Child Whys
Child Justns.
Adult Whys

Cluster 2:
Adult Respvns.
Adult Posv. Affect
Child Rules
Adult Sharing
Child Rspvns.
Child Posv. Affect

Justifications. Structure in children and adults, therefore, is not clearly related.

4) The relation between structure and positive behaviour across children and adults: Child Positive Affect and Sharing are opposed to adult Rules and Justifications, but positively related to adult Whys; these two sets of opposing variables form the first set of clusters. Adult positive interpersonal behaviour is correlated with child Rules, but opposed to child Whys and Justifications, which are related to adult Unresponsiveness and Negative Affect; this forms the second set of clusters. The inability to form one set of clusters is essentially due to the fact that in the individual behaviour correlations, Whys, Justifications and Rules have similar correlates, but in the cross correlations with the other's behaviour, their correlates are split into two clusters.

The four questions asked at the beginning of this
section will now be summarised.

1) In all groups except the Edinburgh children there are moderate to high positive r's between all structural variables. In the Edinburgh children a significant difference emerges in the meaning (as judged from positive and negative correlates,) that high frequencies of rule references seem to have. They are indicative of conciliation and opposed to oppositional behaviour. This brings us to the next question:

2) What relation does structure related behaviour in the individual have to affiliative and other interpersonal behaviour? In children structure, and especially rules, is indicative of greater positiveness in the interaction. In the adults, the reverse is the case.

3) In Hyderabad except for adult justifications, all child and adult structural behaviours are positively associated. In Edinburgh there is an opposition between child references to structure and adult references to structure, or in some cases no relation at all. The only positive r between child and adult structure is the frequency of whys. This is in concordance with the split between various structural behaviours in the Edinburgh children.

4) Similarly in Hyderabad, child and adult positive behaviours are positively associated with child and adult structure-relevant behaviour (but negatively to adult justifications). In Edinburgh, however, there is no clear association or oppositon between structural and interpersonal behaviour variables. Child rules are
associated with positive child and adult behaviour, and child whys and justifications with negative child and adult behaviour. Adult rules and justifications are associated with negative child behaviour, and adult whys with positive child behaviour.

In summary, the Hyderabad families show generally positive correlations between various structure-related behaviours, and between these and positive interpersonal behaviour. The Edinburgh children, on the contrary, show a difference between rules on the one hand, and whys, justifications, directives on the other; and a very mixed picture of the relations between structure and interpersonal behaviour. However, attempting to club all these variables together into clusters is relatively unfruitful. The most illuminating insights into the relationship between the individual and external order come from specific correlations discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

Essentially, in Hyderabad, among the children and the adults, negative affect is unrelated to any structural behaviour, including non-compliance in the other. In Edinburgh, negative affect is strongly negatively related to structural behaviour and conciliatory behaviour in both children and adults. Secondly, in Hyderabad there is a split between expressions of affect and sharing, on the one hand, and the more structural forms of positive behaviour such as responsiveness and compliance on the other.
B: Reciprocity vs. Unilaterality in Adult-Child Interaction

1) Adult-child differences in frequencies of Rules support a Piagetian view of didacticism in adult-child relations. However, the considerable proportion of Challenges to Rules by children presents an anomaly in this theory. According to Piaget, challenges of rules, etc., should not really be prevalent until the stage of autonomy after 10 years of age. Challenges of directives are more explicable within his theory because they indicate a challenging of intentions from a personal motive, without implying any threat to the authority of rules. Challenging the bases of rules and values, which did occur in children of 7 in this study, show that they did not act towards or with rules in a manner suggesting that they viewed parental rules as imbued with a mystical and inalienable sanctity.

[The evidence of the children's interview, which has not been previously discussed in this study, on its own would suggest that these children's attitude towards parental authority gives that authority a somewhat mystical as well as a pragmatic sanctity. There is, then, a disparity between the children's reported respect for parental rules, and their behaviour in that regard. In their responses to the interview questions there was a similar contradiction between responses which reiterated the almost divine right of parents, and simultaneous responses indicating that parents should also comply with their children if they wanted their children to comply with them, and that children...]

were bound to comply with parents primarily because the parents held all physical power. While the results of the children's interviews in general support a Piagetian hypothesis, the results of the interaction analysis reject such an interpretation. The most obvious explanation of this difference is that children's conceptions of authority are at least partially filled with views that they have been given, and believe are the 'right' views. That they can still assert these views, even when expressing obvious contradictions, is partly an indication of their desire to reiterate that which is socially considered to be 'right', and partly an indication of their inability to resolve the contradictions between their reiterated values, conflicting thoughts, and their behaviour. But this cannot be taken as an indication of their actual attitude towards authority. This latter is best understood by their approach to rules in the actual interaction process. And the evidence in the present study, of rule manipulation and challenging by children strongly suggests that they are not labouring under the yoke of heteronomy and genuine mystical beliefs. The difference between interview data and actual observation suggests that they indicate very different aspects of the child's developing conceptions and actions. To assume one to imply the other would be erroneous.

2) Adult-child differences in frequencies of Whys show that except for the Edinburgh middle-class, adults in all groups have more Whys than children. This would offer some support to a Piagetian view. There is, however, no difference
between children and adults (except for the Hyderabad working-class,) in their responsiveness to Whys.

3) Nor is there any difference between children and adults in their frequencies of Agreeing, Contradicting and Challenging. There is, in fact, a trend towards higher proportions of contradicting and challenging by children than by adults. This would cast doubt on assumptions of unilaterality in such processes.

4) The contents of the Whys and Challenges do, however, differ according to one Piagetian prediction. Children do have a higher proportion of what Piaget calls 'seeking for theoretical explanation' which may be differentiated from other kinds of Whys, and typify the information-seeking component of the child's role in interaction with the adult. Children's Whys regarding Rules/Values/Principles are in much higher proportions than the adults'. This can be interpreted on the one hand as another form of seeking to learn about their culture, thereby implying didacticism; and on the other hand, to mean an active questioning of the reasons underlying attempted didacticism. While supporting the constructivist interpretation of 'socialisation' which is also implied by Piaget, this finding challenges Piaget's view of the child's construction of rules at this age being at the receiving end of unilateral imposition. The child's construction of rules, then, is not merely a cognitive re-construction, but an active social participation in their evaluation/acceptance. Furthermore, when the content of Whys is analysed according to the structural criteria devised by
Piaget (1926), i.e., Whys of Causal Explanation, Whys of Psychological Motivation, and Whys of Logical Justification, the proportions of each in the present study do not support his data. According to Piaget Whys of Logical Justification "are very rare before the age of 7 or 8" (Piaget '26, p.195). "After 7 or 8, however, these questions will probably be more frequent. We have fixed at 11 or 12 the age where formal thought first makes its appearance..." (ibid). Between 7 or 8 and 11 or 12, i.e., between the stage of pure intellectual realism (upto 7 or 8) and the beginnings of formal thought, Piaget then posits an intermediate stage "...in which children try to justify judgements as such, yet without for that matter being able to share the interlocutor's point of view nor, consequently, to handle formal deduction. The presence of 'whys of logical justification' must correspond to this intermediary stage." From the prediction that these whys should increase in frequency between 7-8 and 11-12, it is surprising to see in the present data that at age 7 itself, these whys should form the largest proportion of children's whys. The second largest proportion of children's whys was the class of whys of motivation. Interestingly, adult whys in all groups showed highest proportions of whys of motivation.

5) The frequencies of various forms of justifications offer support for a view of adults as the 'socialising agents'. In all groups, adults have higher proportions (and frequencies) of reference to social values/rules in justifications than do children. Surprisingly, children in all groups have
higher proportions of reference to Physical/Logical justifications than adults. This could be a reflection of the situations in which justifications are used. If children had a higher proportion of persuasions in non-conflict situations, it would be predictable that they would have a higher proportion of Physical/Logical justifications. However, this is not the case. There is no difference in any group in the proportion of conflict- vs. non-conflict persuasions used by children and adults.

6) Responses to Justifications show that children in all groups are slightly more accepting than are adults. This does not clarify the question of unilaterality at all.

The question, however, is not whether adults teach or instruct children in rules/values/actions more than children instruct adults. The former option can be taken to be true as an inevitable function of age and greater experience. The question is, rather, how the children participate in this interaction with the more firmly established rules of the adults. There is, clearly, very little rule creation by children when interacting with adults, in contrast to that to be expected in peer interaction. There is also less invocation of rules and social values by children than by adults. But there is some evidence of active discussion and challenging of these rules and values by the children, as well as manipulation of the same. Also, the mere fact of the voluntary use by children of social principles as legitimations of actions, thoughts, etc., is indicative of a very high degree of cooperation in the 'socialisation'
On the whole, therefore, assumptions of unilaterality in adult-child interaction are not supported. The only support for Piagetian hypotheses of children's structure related behaviour lies in support for the didacticism (as separate from unilaterality in this respect,) that is an unavoidable function of differences in age and experience in the adult-child relationship.

C: Cultural Differences in behaviour related to Structure

The fundamental question in the comparison of structure related behaviour in the two cultures was that of the manner in which order is approached in each. The hypothesis was that in the interaction in the Hyderabad families there would be less emphasis on both the invocation and the maintenance of order than in the Edinburgh families. Broadly speaking, this hypothesis was supported. Chapter 4 showed that although there were higher frequencies of control attempts by the adults in the Hyderabad families, these attempts were less successful than in the Edinburgh families. It was shown that the higher eventual non-compliance of the Hyderabad children was not a result of the immediate acceptance of the non-compliance by the adults. The directive sequences in Hyderabad tended to be far longer than in Edinburgh. It could be seen from this that the process of confrontation was longer drawn out in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh. The predicted tolerance for
non-compliance in Hyderabad was, therefore, not an immediate acceptance of the conflicting intentions of the child on the part of the Hyderabad adults. What, then, is the meaning of this tolerance for non-compliance?

To clarify this, the tendencies to comply and drop issue at increasing lengths of sequences were compared in each group. In both cultures there was a tendency towards increasing confrontation with increasing sequence length. However, in Edinburgh, the confrontation ended sooner, and the longer the sequence the greater was the probability of the adult rather than the child succeeding, in either obtaining compliance or persisting in non-compliance. In Hyderabad, both adults and children tended to give in at the end of longer sequences. The tolerance for non-compliance, therefore, was a delayed phenomenon and could be interpreted as being an acceptance of the unavoidable. The crucial evidence for concluding that the maintenance of order as well as the obtaining of compliance itself, was less important in Hyderabad came from the analysis of salience in respect to the directives, the responses they received, and their eventual outcomes. In two ways, it was seen that these directives or control attempts were not really of significance in their order maintaining aspects for the Hyderabad adults. Firstly, there was no difference in the rates of insistence between critical and non-critical directives in Hyderabad, while there was a strong difference in Edinburgh. Secondly, there was no difference in insistence between more forceful and less forceful
directives, or between directives of different issues in Hyderabad, while there was a difference in all these respects in Edinburgh. Because the process of directing and non-complying was not related to issue salience, it was evident that the attempts at directing or rather, the process of controlling or tolerating non-compliance did not really tap a process of the maintenance of order. That they might have been attempts at maintaining order is clear. However, what happened after the initial attempt was more a process of dealing with confrontation than a process which was related to the importance of the issues. It was concluded that this process of confrontation bore more relation to non-order related aspects of the interaction.

The correlates of child compliance in Edinburgh and Hyderabad show that while the control process in Hyderabad is separate from the maintenance of order, it does not disrupt the non-structural, interpersonal aspects of interaction. In Hyderabad, child compliance was unrelated to adult affect, negative or positive. In Edinburgh, there was a moderate positive correlation between child overall (not eventual) compliance and adult positive affect \( (r = .32, ) \) and a moderate negative correlation with adult negative affect \( (r = -.39). \) Both \( r \)'s were non-significant but this result may still be viewed as suggestive because of the small size of the Edinburgh sample, which allowed only \( r \)'s over .60 to be significant at the .05 level.) Similarly, child compliance was not related in the predictable directions to adult responsiveness/unresponsiveness in Hyderabad, while it was
positively related to adult responsiveness in Edinburgh. In Hyderabad, child compliance was in fact significantly negatively related to adult responsiveness. This suggests not only that child compliance/non-compliance is unrelated to the adults' affective interaction with the child, but that greater adult responsiveness correlates with lesser child compliance. Whichever direction of influence (if not both) one chooses to adopt, we can safely say that although control and compliance is not strictly a process of order maintenance in Hyderabad, neither is it important as an indicator of the positiveness of the interpersonal aspects of the relationship.

I suggest that non-compliance is an accepted and integral part of the parent-child interaction process in India. Its positive function lies in the flexibility in dealing with the intentions of other people that it must involve, and that it must demand, of both the child and the adult.

The results of the section on Rules support the interpretation of disregard for Order Maintenance in Hyderabad. Although the absolute frequencies of references to rules were significantly higher in Edinburgh among both adults and children, rule references were significantly correlated with frequencies of acts, and there was no significant difference between the groups in relative frequencies of rule references. Even though the difference in absolute frequencies indicates that rules are invoked
more per unit of time in Edinburgh, the relative frequencies show that the difference is not indicative of different underlying psychological processes. The prediction that structure is maintained through a greater de-personalisation of regulatory principles and therefore invoked more frequently in the form of concrete rules in Edinburgh, is therefore not entirely supported. The present results suggest that impersonal concepts of rules are present in both cultures.

However, the predicted differences in the treatment and acceptance of these impersonal rules are supported. The Edinburgh children are significantly more accepting and adaptedly responsive to adult rule references than the Hyderabad children (there was no such difference among adult responses; but because the frequency of child rule references was generally very low, the responses to them cannot be discussed with any accuracy). The 'disorder' that was present and tolerated in Hyderabad in the short-term sense of compliance, is therefore present even in relation to longer-term rules.

There were no substantial differences between groups in the behavioural areas which the rules referred to. (That is, whether Interpersonal, Individual, Object-related or Food-related behaviour.) However, although not significant, the Edinburgh adults tended to refer more to Order-based rules of a Procedural nature and to Manners, than did the Hyderabad adults who showed a predominance of rules
referring to Cleanliness, Responsiveness and Health/Safety.

The hypothesis that lesser structuredness in Hyderabad should be reflected in lesser access to structure resulted in two further predictions: 1) that the tendency to seek for reasons in general, and of rules in particular, should be less frequent in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh; and 2) that Whys should be less adaptedly responded to in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh.

The first of these predictions was not supported. There was no significant difference between the groups in the frequencies of Whys although among the children there was a non-significant difference in the predicted direction. Similarly, there was no difference between groups either among adults or children in the relative frequencies of Whys regarding rules, values or principles. The tendency to seek reasons appears, therefore, to be separate from rule following behaviour. Furthermore, the frequencies of whys in children are unrelated to the proportions of responsiveness received to them, or to general responsiveness in the other. In fact in all cases, the correlation was negative rather than positive. This indicates that reason-seeking is independent of environmental tolerance for it, and possibly is inversely related to tolerance. That is, the less the responsiveness received to Whys, the greater the frequency of Whys. In either case, (i.e., whether unrelated or negatively related,) Whys are not inhibited by their being not responded to, and show a tendency at this age, to
persist in adverse circumstances.

The second prediction was, however, resoundingly supported. Among children and adults the Edinburgh groups were significantly more responsive to Whys than the Hyderabad groups. The crucial question of access to reasons (although not specifically in the case of reasons underlying rules), seems to be answered in line with the prediction. There is less access in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh. This is, however, a relatively crude analysis when applied to access to structure. Further research directed specifically at understanding the nature of conditionality in rules, and children's conceptions of this conditionality, is required before the question can be fully answered. In the present data there were insufficient occurrences of Whys regarding rules, and inadequate knowledge of possible previous occurrences of the same sequences, to analyse the responses in depth.

Justifications, spontaneous and requested, were analysed as to their content. The hypothesis regarding access to structure predicted that in Hyderabad both child and adult justifications should reveal greater reference to personal factors as legitimate in themselves, as opposed to impersonal factors such as rules and principles; and that the confirmation of the legitimacy of these personal, or as I called them, Internal justifications, should be reflected in their greater acceptance. Neither of these predictions was supported. Among the children there was, in fact, a
significant reversal of the first prediction: the Edinburgh children had higher frequencies of Internal justifications. This difference was caused primarily by a higher frequency of Self-referent justifications in Edinburgh. Furthermore, Internal Justifications made by adults and children, were more frequently accepted in Edinburgh than in Hyderabad. The differences, however, were not significant. There was no difference in the relative use of internal to external justifications in conflict vs. non-conflict situations between groups.

Also contrary to the prediction, there was a non-significant trend towards higher frequencies of Social Justifications (i.e., the use of impersonal rules/principles as legitimating arguments,) in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh. The use of other kinds of external justifications, such as Logic, Pragmatism and Physical consequences, was higher in Edinburgh as predicted. Acceptance of external justifications was also higher in Edinburgh than in Hyderabad.

From the lack of significant difference between groups in references to rules, and the actual higher frequencies of legitimating reference to Social principles in Hyderabad, it would appear that far from being unaware of impersonal regulating principles, the Hyderabad adults and children are actually more given to referring to them to legitimate their actions or arguments than the Edinburgh groups. 'Order' as a conceptual phenomenon is therefore certainly present in both
cultures.

However, there is a major difference in the control and persuasive attempts between the two cultures, on which hinges the crux of the explanation of how this order actually functions, as opposed to its existence in consciousness of rules and principles. This is the difference in the use of issue-related justifications vs. the use of non-issue-related interpersonal appeals. Among children and adults, the Hyderabad groups used a significantly higher proportion of interpersonal appeals than the Edinburgh groups. Further, among both children and adults, interpersonal appeals were accepted significantly more frequently in Hyderabad. [There was no difference between groups in the use of non-issue related threats and bargains; solely in the use of positive and negative pleas.]

All the above results pertaining to control and structure point to one essential conclusion: viz, that 'social order' as conceived of in terms of commitment to regulation is relatively unimportant at this age for the children or the adults in Hyderabad. Conceptions of such impersonal structure, however, are present and in equal use in both cultures. In Hyderabad order is maintained through interpersonal means rather than by means of impersonal regulations. These interpersonal means do not, however, include legitimation through reference to self; the stress is on the interpersonal, rather than on the personal.

The child in Hyderabad learns that interacting with
adults is a process which involves dealing more with the flexibility possible within the relationship than with pre-formed strictures governing outcomes of conflict. Coming back to Ainsworth's definition of competence, and its application to interaction with persons as well as systems, the present results lead to the following interpretation: if eliciting cooperation fosters a sense of competence, in Hyderabad this occurs through interpersonal rather than structural means. This implies that the developing competence centres around relationships with persons rather than with 'structures' or rules. In Edinburgh there is less of a split between the interpersonal and the structural, and the child's sense of competence - or confidence - in relation to persons is inseparable from that in relation to the structures that the persons possess. Consequently, the child in Edinburgh must grow competent in dealing with the system on structural terms - a conclusion which suits perfectly the ideology of individual control and passion for change which is predominant in the West. Similarly, in Hyderabad the relative absence of structural control and cooperation in both adults and children concurs with the dominant attitude to social and moral structures: 'dharma' is relative to the individual, absolute in the ultimate but unknowable to the individual, and therefore social structures are to a large extent detached from the individual's grasp. This philosophical detachment is confirmed by the evidence of separation between the interpersonal and the structural in the process of
interaction.

These conclusions have considerable relevance for conceptions of social stasis and change in India. To recapitulate: there is a consensus of opinion that Indian societies are highly and tightly structured in a hierarchical manner. There is a strong identification with the immediate community group which contributes to the maintenance of these differentiating structures in society. Furthermore, there is reportedly a general disregard of structure as impersonal regulation in individual behaviour. The latter report is not contradictory to the former if structure is viewed in two different senses: firstly, as structure in the ordering of social groups; and secondly, structure in the sense of commitment to the regulation of individual behaviour according to external norms.

The results of this study support these sociological analyses of Indian societies and describe the psychological mechanisms underlying them. Structure in the second sense is shown to be subordinate to interpersonal factors. This may result in the reification of social norms as the only dependable things in an uncertain world (Kakar '78), or additionally, as is suggested in this study, in the subordination of the social norms to the interpersonal context. It is postulated that social structuring as a divisive force (i.e., in the maintenance of group divisions,) is also maintained primarily by means of the interpersonal context. This follows from the conclusion that
structure in the sense of impersonal rules is not a property of the individual in India. Therefore, if rules, norms or divisions are not in themselves sacrosanct to the individual, their continuing strength must come not from their being accepted as absolute, but from the support they receive from the interpersonal context.

This lack of commitment to rules in themselves can explain the peculiarly sponge-like adaptability of Indian culture. It is a well-documented phenomenon that one of the characteristic features of Hindu culture, as well as perhaps the secret of its survival, is the readiness with which it stretches the concrete aspects of its beliefs and rules to accommodate variations. Gita Mehta ('82) reports a charming example of such an accommodation: "India has always shown an appetite for foreign devils matched only by her capacity to make them go native. When I see, painted today on the walls of 16th Century Rajput homes, images of the god Krishna playing his flute not in a field full of flowers and cows but on the back seat of a Rolls-Royce, I feel reassured that Indian culture is still in business."

This flexibility is due in part to the detachment or alienation from concrete structures, and in part to the consequent subordination of the concrete structures to the interpersonal context. This latter, then, must be a potent weapon for change in the normative structures. This indeed is the key to the phenomenon of rejection reported in Indians abroad, when they are abstracted from the normal
social context (Kakar '78). Within the continuing interpersonal context, the psychological distance between the individual and the rules makes the rules particularly unavailable for change through education. The only answer to social change in India would appear to be a change in the interpersonal context before the structures can be changed.

Having observed the differences in approaches to order between the two cultures, we are faced with another contrast of ideological paradigms. The conclusion that rules and order are not maintained for their own sake but rather are invested with overtones of the influence of persons upon their maintenance is a rather repulsive one for the western individualist who perceives moral rightness in the idolisation of rules and principles in themselves, and will brook no inference that they are not 'objective' choices. The alternative to this view of objective order rejects the absoluteness that is a necessary implication of this 'objectivity'. Absolutes in application to different social contexts, I think few Western individualists would have difficulty in rejecting. What is difficult is the acceptance of the idea that for any particular individual the evaluation of social rules may be subordinate to the evaluation of their social effects. How the individual can still be an individual if he has not a constant attachment to the rules he follows, is still a mystery, if not an impossibility, from the Western perspective. But it is just such a picture that the present study leads us to believe is the case in India: a situation where the rightness of an
action may well be dependent upon its social effects. It is not difficult to see how easily rules may be abandoned in the absence of their normal deleterious social effects. Is this approach of relative rightness necessarily a bad one? It perceives rightness, for all practical purposes, as relative to different realities; and it allows the individual scope for far greater tolerance and flexibility than does the more absolutist conviction.

The usual challenge to the alternative approach is that it reveals contradictions within the individual. But these contradictions are only contradictions if the prior assumption is made that individual action must be consistent to itself. And if one allows that individual action is relevant only to its social context, and essentially separable from individual thought, then action inconstancy is no more a contradiction.

This is fast becoming a defense of an alternative ideology to Western individualism. Its real value, however, lies only in the clarification of the assumptions underlying values which we inevitably hold towards the issues in such research. The point is not to stress the truth value of either, but to recognise that these values and assumptions enormously influence the directions and explorations our research undertakes. Without a recognition of the possible positive value that alternative approaches to order and moral reality might have, this research would have gone no further than to submit the Indian patterns as morally
inadequate on the Western scale, and looked, not for its
different origins, bases and meaning, but for how it fits on
a uni-dimensional scale. I submit that both views of
morality and order are valid and logical within themselves,
and serve importantly different functions.
Chapter 8

Summary

Starting from a discussion of the ideological bases present in the use of psychological constructs, this thesis examines the processes of interaction involved in two main areas where an ideological difference between Hindu and 'Western' culture prevails, and may be said to lead to differences in behaviour and motivation:

Firstly, the area of interpersonal affiliation, which has been previously categorised in terms of dependence and independence; interaction in this area was coded in three separate ways: a) the process of sequences of interaction in terms of the initiation-response structure involved. It was postulated that interactive acts could not be classified solely as initiations or responses, but were generally a complex combination of both. A category scheme was developed to reach variations of these combinations and to include the affirmatory or negating direction of these responses as well as their responsiveness in terms of the extent to which a negating response considered the speaker as a person; b) the positive and negative affective content of other-directed acts; c) the occurrence of Sharing was analysed in terms of seeking to share self's thoughts, feelings and activities with the other, and seeking to share in the other's thoughts, feelings and activities; only sequences which did not serve a more immediate functional purpose such as
control for order, but were judged to reveal an interest in the other as a person, were included in these categories. Secondly, the area of rules and the maintenance of order. Sequences of directing and complying were analysed in Chapter 4, and the use of long-term concepts of order - rule-references were analysed in Chapter 5. The use of and responses to Whys, as an indication of the access to reasons in general, and to those underlying rules in particular, and the use and nature of Justifications as indicative of representations of legitimacy which could not be classified as rules, was analysed in Chapter 6.

The analyses were focussed on two main themes: The question of cultural differences in the areas studied, and the question of reciprocity in adult-child interaction. First, it was predicted from previous speculative studies that family interaction in India should reveal more closeness, attachment and responsiveness, and less emphasis on 'Order' than does interaction in Scotland. Chapter 3 describes the results of various measures of responsiveness.

Contrary to the traditional predictions that expressions of dependency should be more common in the Indian families, there were no differences of any significance, and the trend was in the direction of higher dependency in Edinburgh. There was little consistency in the distribution of the various measures of dependency. Reassurance, attention and praise seeking were higher in the Edinburgh children, and proximity, help and physical contact
seeking were more frequent in the Hyderabad children. This difference does not follow the split between active and passive expressions of dependency suggested by Seymour ('71).

There were minimal differences between the groups of children in the combined index of 'sharing'. The chief difference among the children lay in 'Offering to share self with other', and among the adults in 'Seeking to share in other'; in both cases the Edinburgh groups showed higher proportions than the Hyderabad. Similarly, the Edinburgh groups - both adults and children - were more responsive to sharing requests than the Hyderabad.

With regard to affect, there were marked differences between the groups of adults; the Edinburgh adults showed significantly more positive affect and significantly less negative affect than the Hyderabad adults. There were no differences between the groups of children. Responses to affect were not very different between groups. Responses to Positive Affect showed that Hyderabad adults had lower proportions of positive responses than the Edinburgh adults.

The Edinburgh groups were more Responsive and less Unresponsive than the Hyderabad groups among both adults and children.

On the whole, except for the similarity in proportions and expressions of affect among the children, the Edinburgh groups displayed more positiveness in the interaction than
the Hyderabad groups. This certainly refutes assertions that parent-child interaction in India (at least at this age of child,) is highly responsive and affiliative. What status then, does the high value for interpersonal fusion have, in the face of these results? Either the highly valued fusion is not a dominant part of the reality, or, if it does exist in practice as well as in the ideal, it is of a more intangible nature than the present categories can grasp. In any case it is safe to conclude that in terms of structural responsiveness and sharing, there is greater negativity in Hyderabad than in Edinburgh.

The analysis of individual behaviour correlations of variables related to interpersonal affiliation reveals that while among both groups of children, and the Edinburgh adults, forms of positive and negative behaviour (although negative affect is related only in the Edinburgh adults,) are opposed to each other in distinct 'good'/'bad' clusters, in the Hyderabad adults there is a split between Affective and Sharing behaviour, and Structural Responsiveness. In all other groups, the frequency with which individuals express positive intentions of one kind are positively related to positive intentions of other kinds, and negatively related to negative intentions. In the Hyderabad adults, this is not the case. frequencies of affect and sharing are unrelated to frequencies of Responsiveness/Unresponsiveness. This split indicates a dissociation between affective/cooperative and structural forms of positive expressions in Hyderabad.
Group differences in frequencies of interpersonal behaviour were generally more prevalent between the adults of the two cultures than between the children; this was most strongly seen in the expressions of positive and negative affect. This could be interpreted to support a nativist position that there is a degree of universality in children's affect which is present even at age 7 despite differences in the same in the adults environment. Although both empiricist and nativist theories would predict that with increasing age the differences between individuals in different environments would increase, totally empiricist theories would be unable to account for the fact of similarities at the earlier ages without admitting to some kind of innate structure in the individual. In as far as similarities are limited to 'instinctive' behaviour in infancy, the empiricist theories are generally quite happy to admit innate physiological drives or needs. When it comes to similarities in affective and interpersonal behaviour, especially in older children, we are forced to move further and further away from learning theory because it does not treat affect in the child other than as manipulative of, or modified by, environmental gratification from very early on. However, affective similarity in seven year olds could technically be explained by learning theory in terms of broad experiential similarities for the children in the two cultures despite specific affective differences in the environment.

Apart from the similarities in frequencies of affect
among children, there were other results which indicated a greater similarity between children across cultures than between adults' and children in each culture. Although the differences in proportions between the groups of children were significantly different, the distribution of various forms of conversational and cooperative initiative, for example, were spread not according to culture, but according to age (i.e., whether child or adult). In all groups children initiated far more merely conversational topics, and far more sharing of the self with the other, than did the adults. The latter in all groups initiated largely pragmatic topics, such as directives and criticisms, and when conversational, tended to predominantly initiate attempts at sharing in the child's interests or activities.

Further, the clusters of individual behaviour correlates (in Chapter 3) showed remarkable similarity between the children, while the adult clusters in the two groups were very different. Learning as a mechanism on its own does not account for the specific commonalities and specific stimulus influences. More specific rejections of the S.L.T. hypotheses were provided by the results which showed the independence of child whys from adult responsiveness to them in both cultures, and the adult behaviour correlates of child compliance which did not support predictions from S.L.T. regarding the environmental influences on compliance. As will be discussed later, however, these S.L.T. predictions were reversed in Hyderabad, but partially supported in Edinburgh.
The cultural differences in approaches to order which have already been summarised in Chapter 7: Section C, show essentially that order is de-emphasised in several senses in the interaction in Hyderabad. Firstly the Comply ratios of adults and children in Hyderabad were lower than in Edinburgh. Secondly, from the analysis of directive and compliance sequences it was seen that in Hyderabad the process of obtaining compliance from the child was an interpersonal process of dealing with conflicting intentions and confrontation, and as such, subordinate to the process of ensuring and maintaining 'order', which was the dominant process in Edinburgh. In support of this conclusion was the analysis of the correlates of child compliance; in Hyderabad, child non-compliance was unrelated to adult affect; in Edinburgh there was a non-significant but moderate negative r with adult positive affect, and a (n.s. but) moderate positive r with adult negative affect.

From the analysis of rule references, and references to principles as legitimating arguments (justifications), it was seen that there were no significant differences between the groups either among the children or the adults, in their relative frequencies. Contrary to the prediction in this study, these results showed that explicit conceptions and formulations of principles and rules are present and used in relatively equal frequencies in Hyderabad as well as in Edinburgh. However, the responses to these references to rules and social principles were markedly different between
the groups. The Edinburgh children were far more accepting of the rules and justifications than the Hyderabad children. Similarly, there were no differences between the groups in the frequencies of Whys, but strong differences in the responses to Whys. The Edinburgh adults and children were more responsive to reason seeking from the other than were the Hyderabad children and adults. The most illuminating result in the context of the above, was the difference in frequencies of interpersonal appeals in persuasion as opposed to the use of issue-related justifications. The Hyderabad adults and children used such appeals far more frequently than the Edinburgh families, and were, furthermore, far more responsive to them than was the case in Edinburgh. It was concluded that disorder in Hyderabad was not caused by an obscuring of the rules which serve to maintain order. The rules were very much in evidence in both cultures. Rather, the disorder relates to the relative unimportance in which these rules are held. The structural concepts are neither held in reverence, nor strictly upheld; order is maintained, when it is, through interpersonal rather than structural means. This interpretation was extended to speculations about the possibilities for social change in India. Namely, that change of rule structures is most likely when there is already a change in interpersonal context to sanction that change.

Further, the claim to universality of theories explaining the relationships between child and adult behaviour was challenged through the evidence of the
adult-child correlates of child compliance. Across both
groups there were very few adult behaviours which did
correlate significantly with child compliance—a strong
rejection of Social Learning Theory. Predictions from both
S.L.T. and Attachment Theory, however, were largely
supported in the Edinburgh families, and generally reversed
in Hyderabad. The obvious conclusion that these theories of
compliance are inadequate in the Hyderabad context, needs
further explanation. What is it about the interaction in
Hyderabad that makes certain forms of reciprocity (i.e.,
reciprocal compliance and responsiveness,) and certain forms
of reinforcement (i.e., for compliance,) ineffective? It is
possible that one of the factors responsible for this
difference in the processes influencing 'order' in the two
groups, is the very difference in the salience and meaning
that order has. If order is, first, subordinated to the
interpersonal context such as mutual intentions rather than
maintained as a force in itself, andthereby viewed as a
variable process rather than as a fixed one, it is likely
that: a) there is not a concerted attempt to maintain order
as there is in Edinburgh, and b) the mixture of rules with
interpersonal contexts causes a more complex picture of the
process of order maintenance. This complexity does not
refer to the involvement of affect, as the psychoanalytic
arguments would predict. Rather, it arises from the
difference in the adult environment's conception of order.
Flexible order is inevitably more difficult to trace than is
the relatively straightforward emphasis on salient issues
Secondly, hypotheses derived from Piagetian positions view the adult-child relationship as being based on an illusion of understanding of the adult by the child, on non-cooperation and on unilaterality. The unilaterality which is purported to be expressed in the procedures of the interaction i.e., in the 'general forms of exchanging behaviour', is believed to support the child's ego-centrism. Not being able to co-construct the procedures, as he would with peers, the child is unable to free himself from the illusion of mutual understanding. This position implies: i) that the child perceives the adult primarily as a representative of power rather than as a person - an assumption which is unwarranted, considering the studies which report mutuality and reciprocity in early mother-infant interaction. ii) that peer interaction is always reciprocal (although Piaget himself takes care to mention that interaction with older children is still constraining,) and that without co-construction of procedures ego-centrism cannot be reduced.

Piaget's assumption of the 'illusion of mutual understanding' is an essentially untestable one. It is an assertion made from the assumption of inequality between the child and the adult which cannot be tested either in terms of the intentions to share and cooperate which the child might have, or in terms of the actual functional cooperation that might be seen in adult-child interaction. The
'illusion' itself is a mis-perception which cannot be tested, nor limited to adult-child interaction.

The argument that adult-child interaction is unilaterally constraining was examined in terms of Youniss and Volpe's hypotheses for the interaction process, and in terms of Piaget's predictions that at age 7 the child either passively accepts rules from the adult or unadaptedly rejects them, but is incapable of adaptedly challenging them.

In both areas the argument for unilaterality was rejected, though equivocally. First, it was shown that intentions for interacting, sharing and cooperating with the adult are present in the child, and not attributable to imitation. Second, Youniss's hypotheses regarding adult constraint of procedures were not supported. Adults in all groups did not have higher proportions of adapted or unadapted changes of topic. Third, Piaget's hypothesis that functional cooperation as seen in responsive rather than unresponsive negations should be infrequent in the child of 7 was supported; Adults had higher proportions of responsive negations than did the children. There was, however, no difference in adapted to unadapted responses between children and adults. Fourth, Piagetian hypotheses that the main function of adult-child interaction is didactic rather than cooperative as analysed through content of speech, was rejected. The highest proportions of child speech were not questions, but rather assertions and narratives. Further,
information seeking questions were in all groups more frequent among the adults than among the children. However, the subjects of the questions did support the Piagetian hypothesis. Children's questions tended to be aimed at seeking information regarding objects and the environment, while adults' questions were aimed mostly at information about the child. In the analyses of Whys children tended to ask for theoretical explanation more than the adults, thus supporting the didactic interpretation. However, children's higher proportions of Whys regarding Rules/Values/Principles in all groups indicated i) support for an active constructivist view of socialisation, and 2) a challenge to Piaget's view of the unilateral imposition of rules at this age. Furthermore, contrary to the Piagetian prediction that Whys of Logical Justification (as opposed to Whys of Causal Explanation and Whys of Motivation,) should be infrequent until after the age of 7 or 8, the present data showed Whys of Logical Justification to be the most frequent of children's Whys at this age.

Further challenge to the hypothesis of the unilateral imposition of adult rules came from the evidence that children of all groups do challenge rules mentioned by the adults. If heteronomy - or mystification and absolute acceptance of the authority and the rightness of the rules, even if unaccompanied by constant compliance to the rule - were the dominant mode at this age, challenging the authority or necessity for the rule should not occur.
It was concluded that although a large part of adult-child interaction is concerned with adult initiated directive sequences, and although adults refer to rules far more frequently than do children, this is an indication of inevitable didacticism in the interaction, rather than unilaterality. In essence, therefore, didacticism can exist within a reciprocally operating interaction.
APPENDIX.
Matrix 3.1: r's between Child and Adult behaviour variables related to Responsiveness across all groups.

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Matrix 3.2: r's between Child and Adult behaviour variables related to Responsiveness in Hyderabad.

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Matrix 3.3: r's between Child and Adult behaviour variables related to Responsiveness in Edinburgh.

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Matrix 3.5: Child behaviour r's related to Responsiveness in Edinburgh.

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The table shows correlation coefficients indicating the relationships between various child behaviors and responsiveness, with significance levels represented by * (p < .05) and ** (p < .01).
Matrix 3.6: Adult behaviour r's related to Responsiveness in Hyderabad.

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Note: ** indicates p < .01; * indicates p < .05; *** indicates p < .001.
Matrix 3.7: Adult behaviour r's related to Responsiveness in Edinburgh.

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Figure 1: Raw curves of Frequency of Adult Dropping issue at each Sequence Length.

Figure 2: Raw curves of Frequency of Child Dropping issue at each Sequence Length.
Figure 3: Propns. of Child Compliance at each Seq. Length

Figure 4: Propns. of Adult Compliance at each Seq. Length

Cell sizes given in brackets; • = HM; ■ = HW; ○ = EM; □ = EW
Matrix 4.1: r's between Child behaviour variables related to Compliance and Directives

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Matrix 4.2: r's between Adult behaviour variables related to Compliance and Directives

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r's less than .10 omitted

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Matrix 4.3: r's between Child and Adult behaviour variables related to Compliance and Directives

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Matrix 7.1: r's of Child behaviour in Hyderabad

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Matrix 7.2: r's of Child behaviour in Edinburgh

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