THE EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MERCENARY TROOPS IN THE FRENCH ROYAL ARMIES—1415 — 1470.

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In the early years of the fifteenth century, the impact of English invasion, civil war and military defeat forced the French monarchy to seek military assistance from its allies abroad. Large numbers of men from this source served in French armies throughout the century, and this thesis sets out to examine this rather neglected phenomenon. The first part is a chronological survey of the history of this involvement, which can be divided into three phases. In the first, large foreign armies operated as separate units alongside the French and were involved in the major battles of the period such as Bauge, Cravant and Verneuil. After the siege of Orleans, these armies broke up into a host of smaller companies without any close central organisation and only under very limited royal control. After the reforms of 1445, the system of Compagnies d'Ordonnance restored this and tied the soldiers into the royal patronage network, giving the king a theoretical monopoly of organised military force. In the second half, various themes are studied in more detail; the close involvement of French diplomacy with matters of recruitment, the origins of the soldiers and the potential rewards and problems which service of the French crown might bring them. It then studies the alternatives to royal service, the problems of discipline and the political dangers which these posed. A re-examination of the actual effects of the 1445 reforms leads into an attempt to comprehend the realities of the life of soldier and captain on a day to day basis, concluding with an examination of the relationship between the soldiers and the native French population. The thesis concludes that the role of foreign troops in sustaining the Valois dynasty was considerable and their experiences illuminate the realities of military service in the later middle ages.
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## PART II

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Introduction

In some fields there has never been any shortage of writings on the fifteenth century half of the Hundred Years War. The bibliographies of work on French history produced annually show a very considerable volume each year. Most of this, however, is concentrated on a few of the more picturesque aspects. French production tends to concentrate firmly on Jeanne d'Arc at all levels (serious, popular and plain lunatic fringe) while English language studies have been rather thin on the ground and concerned more with the glories of Agincourt or the problems and diplomacy of the Lancastrian government in France than with its French enemies. Part of this is due to the state of the sources; from 1415 or to the 1440's documentation is very disorganised and sparse. Part, one suspects, is due to an understandable distaste on the part of French historians for a period when France came as near as she was to for many centuries to losing most of her political identity to a foreign invader; the general diversion of French historical endeavour from the narrowly political and diplomatic to social and economic fields, perhaps combined with a certain bias against a century when France was anything but "One and indivisible" on the political front has seen to it that, while splendid social and economic studies of individual regions and provinces exist, surprisingly little seems to have changed on the political front since Beaucourt was producing his still-fundamental work on the reign of Charles VII in the 1870's. Many areas of the actual conduct of the war which occupied so much of the time of royal government, and which is the ever-present backcloth to so much of the social and economic change of the period still remain obscure. One of these has been the role and activities of the very
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considerable numbers of foreign soldiers who served in the French royal armies in this period.

Certainly they have never quite been completely forgotten; any reader of Sir Walter Scott who read "Quentin Durward" would be aware of the existence of Scottish units in France, and to a certain extent the mythology of the "Auld Alliance" remains potent on both sides of the North Sea (I myself, while working in France, found it alluded to (in conversation) by Frenchmen of no historical training.) Detailed studies of what it actually meant in the fifteenth century (one of the periods when the Franco-Scottish diplomatic alignment was at its most conspicuously effective), as well as ones on the role of other foreigners in France have, however, been notable by their absence. Certainly they appear on the fringes of other subjects. P S Lewis notes the grants of considerable lands and titles to favoured foreign soldiers but never digresses from his main subject to pursue the matter in detail. Foreigners appear on the edges of Vale's biography of Charles VII, but again his main interests do not lead him into a closer examination of their role. Even Contamine in his fundamental study of the French armies of the later middle ages seems, to my mind, to rather underplay the importance of the foreign element in these armies. The section on the Kingdom of Bourges, which was the time of greatest involvement by such elements is comparatively short and devotes much space to the collapse of French military administration which makes the careers of all soldiers in this period so hard to follow. His attitude to the foreigners seems to be that they are in themselves a symptom of the collapse of royal control; a fair enough conclusion as far as it goes but by no means the last word which can
be said on the subject. Indeed, the only major work on the life and career of one of the leaders of such foreign troops dates back some hundred years - Jules Quicherat's biography of the spectacular and perhaps atypical career of Rodrigo de Villandrando. This sparked off quite a Villandrando industry in the columns of French learned journals with local archivists and antiquaries combing their localities for traces of the passage of the great Ecorcheur (one sometimes gets the impression that some areas in the south of France were really rather disappointed if they failed to find any) - perhaps the first time in history that Villandrando had ever been positively welcome anywhere. Other nineteenth-century writers like Francisque-Michel and Forbes-Leith produced works on the Scots in France, but their interpretations are often at fault and their statements of fact downright misleading; the former in particular has an irritating habit of not quoting his sources and a determination to find Scottish ancestry for large numbers of noble families in France, even where the evidence, to say the least, is thin.

Nevertheless, this generally untilled field is potentially a fertile one. Henry V was to die raving that he could not escape from the Scots; a Scot became briefly Constable of France and perhaps the greatest Anglo-Scottish battle between Bannockburn and Flodden was to be fought in France. This suggests very considerable armies and an important role for Scots and other foreigners in the French armies. It is the purpose of this study to examine just how substantial a role they did play. Because of the limited state of knowledge at the present (especially given that military history has been unfashionable until within the last twenty years and has tended to be left to retired military men of limited historical training) it has to operate on at
least two levels. The first half is largely a narrative history which attempts to trace the fate of foreign troops from the beginning of their large-scale employment in the aftermath of Agincourt to the reign of Louis XI when a new orientation begins to appear as far as such recruitment was concerned. It is largely a tale of battles fought (often major ones; Verneuil, the greatest battle in which foreigners were to be heavily involved, was one of the main battles of the war if one of the most neglected) and troop movements, though with much to say about the diplomacy of recruitment, the importance of non-royal directed warfare and, after 1445, the organisation and operations of the compagnies d'ordonnance. The second half is more analytical in its aim; foreign troops are used as a group in the light of whose careers one can examine certain problems not peculiar to them in addition to trying to look at them more in their own right. In this section we shall examine such matters as recruitment, the reward and problems of service, the difficulties which they caused in the matter of discipline, their style of life in the army after 1445 and their success or failure in adapting to French society. This format permits one to examine wider issues concerning the French royal army as a whole, the actual effects of the 1445 reform on the lives of those, both soldiers and civilians involved in it, the old debate over the profits of war to those involved in it, the actual role of Écorcheur companies in French warfare and their relationship with the crown. In addition, the operations of French diplomacy in the 1420's are bound to come under examination.

It has not always been easy to produce a coherent narrative; the sources for this period are highly disjointed, since the Revolution
destroyed much of what were always at best fragmentary official records, and the largest of the foreign groups, the Army of Scotland, was almost completely cut off from the mainstream of French military administration. This means that some questions are always likely to remain unanswerable. For instance it becomes almost impossible to make any estimate worthy of serious consideration of the actual numbers of foreign troops engaged outside very vague limits. Chronicle accounts do not always record the presence of foreigners in the armies engaged in the battles they report, and involvement must often be guessed at rather than firmly proven. Town records, especially in the case of Tours, are invaluable in reconstructing the relationship between towns and the armies of the day while giving information on movement of forces too humble to attract the attention of other writers, while the letters of remission in the JJ series of the Archives Nationales are invaluable for information about daily life in the ordonnance companies with a few glances back to earlier days. With the kind of comprehensive aid which Quicherat was able to inspire, it might be possible to find out much more about the activities of foreign soldiers at a local level, but a lifetime could be spent combing the archives of large and small towns alike without anything of very great moment coming to light and it seemed better to place the results of my researches to date on record, patchy though the picture which they give sometimes is, in the hope that if there are radical deficiencies they can be corrected by other researchers. There are other problems as well; as a Scot working from a Scottish university, I have always been conscious that there is a real danger that the Scottish element in the story will come to blot out the others. If there seems to be a heavy concentration on the Scots,
this is not because I have been unaware of the problems of balance but rather because the evidence itself commands this bias. There can be little doubt that the Scots were by far the most numerous of the foreign groups in France and their compatriots certainly maintained a deep interest in their exploits overseas; indeed the two Scottish chronicles which cover the 1420's concentrate so deeply on the events in France that purely domestic Scottish affairs are relegated to a very inferior position. This did not happen either in Spain or in Italy. In addition, the official record in France seems to be much more concerned with the Scots than with other nationalities because of their greater numbers and military importance in the context of the royal armies (the picture may well have been rather different in the more independent companies, but there is far less material on their internal organisation).

Inevitably a work of this kind could not have proceeded without a considerable amount of assistance and encouragement from very many people; far more than I can hope to mention here. First should come my parents, who have supported me through the three years of my researches in every possible way with great generosity. In many ways, it was my father who initially inspired a youthful interest in military history from the experiences of his own life as a regular soldier in war and peace. I hope this study will be an adequate product of this interest. I would also like to thank the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, whose grant of a scholarship enabled me to pay the bills on both sides of the Channel during my travels and researches. The study itself owes a vast amount to the aid and council given by my supervisor, Professor Kenneth Fowler of the University of Edinburgh, whose guidance has often been crucial in setting me on the
track of source material which I might otherwise have missed. I should also like to express my gratitude to all the staff at both the universities which I have attended. The department of Mediaeval History at St. Andrews has aided my work even after I left its fifteenth century precincts for the 1960's concrete of Edinburgh University Department of History; my thanks go to all in both departments who have helped me, especially Miss A J Kettle, Dr. G Parker, Mr. A Goodman and Dr. M G Dickson. In France, I obviously owe much to the staffs of the Bibliotheque Nationale, Archives Nationales and the various Archives Departmentales and Municipales who have guided me on the various stages of my travels through the records of fifteenth century France. My special thanks go to Professor Pierre Capra of the University of Bordeaux for his very generous hospitality and help during my visit to his most beautiful city during one of the coldest Easters on record, and to Miss Laura Hamson, then of the University of Alberta and student of mediaeval Bourges for fascinating discussions about this city, its contacts with foreigners, and the realities of France in that period. Indeed, I should like to record my thanks to my various friends, both professionally interested and purely amateur, who have had to put up with my sometimes curious interest and concerns and have done so with amazing tolerance; thanks especially to Sue Willdig and Sarah Hardy for their much-appreciated friendship both during and after the sometimes rather lonely months in Paris and above all to Lesley Pattinson for her deep and abiding concern for and interest in my doings at all times. Finally, specially large thanks are due to my aunt, Miss May Hunter for her near miraculous transformation of a very messy typescript indeed into its present splendid state. I can only hope that the resulting
thesis is worthy of the great amounts of help and friendship which the author has received from these and many more besides too numerous to mention by name in the course of its creation.
It would be very difficult to list all the books which have in some way influenced my approach to this subject; in this bibliography I have confined myself to those which have been in some way of direct relevance either for information or for comparative material. In the text, the following conventions have been used. All manuscript material, unless otherwise identified, comes from the Bibliothèque Nationale, while in the case of local archives, the name of the Département or municipality concerned prefaces the call numbers of the document. The following abbreviations are used:

A H - Archives Historiques (followed by the name of a region, e.g. Poitou or Gascogne)

A N - Archives Nationales

Arsenal - Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal

Clairambault - Bibliothèque Nationale Fonds Clairambault

Doat - Bibliothèque Nationale Fonds Doat

Dupuy - Bibliothèque Nationale Fonds Dupuy

FF - Bibliothèque Nationale Fonds Français

FL - Bibliothèque Nationale Fonds Latin

Contamine GES - P Contamine Guerre État et Société à la Fin du Moyen Age

NAF - Bibliothèque Nationale Nouvelles Acquisitions Françaises

PO - Bibliothèque Nationale Pièces Originales

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Chapter 1. The Beginnings - Foreign Troops in France to 1418.

"Depuis XXXIII anz ença et des devant a eu plusieurs divisions civiles en ce royaume, soubz umbre et par le moyen desquelles les seigneurs ont leve et mis sus plusieurs gens de guerre avecques lesquels se sont mis gens de peuple et y sont venus a cause de ce plusieurs estrangiers, tant Escossoys, Espagnos, Lombars Arragonois et gens de toutes nacions estrenges" (1). Jean Juvenal des Ursins, lamenting the state of the nation at the Estates of Orléans in 1439 was in no doubt as to the date and cause of the beginnings of the employment on a large scale of foreign troops in France. Civil strife was to blame in his eyes and that had begun on a serious scale around 1406.

As so often in the thunderous pronouncements of Jean Juvenal and other sermonisers and moralists of his ilk, this admirably straightforward explanation, while it has much to commend it, is nevertheless rather misleading as far as foreign soldiers are concerned. Such figures were no strangers in France well before the suggested date. The kings of France had for many years filled the gaps in their traditional armies with specialists hired beyond the boundaries of the kingdom. The unfortunate Genoese crossbow-men slaughtered on the slopes of Crécy in 1346 are merely the most conspicuous representatives of their type, and this failure did nothing to discourage the early Valois from using their services (2). Cazelles (3) records the careers of several foreigners in the

(1) BN Fonds Francais (hereafter FF) 2701 f8ro
(2) Contamine has suggested that the majority of them were not in fact professional soldiers at all, but rather oarsmen and other sailors for the royal galleys pressed into service (P. Contamine La Vie Quotidienne Pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans Paris, 1976 p. 248-9.
service of Philip VI, and the reorganised armies of Charles V under
du Guesclin and Clisson showed an overwhelming majority of foreign-
ers (Genoese, Spaniards and others) amongst their infantry forces (4).
Even the mounted (and thus more noble) men at arms could boast their
foreigners, most notably the Welsh exiles Owen de Galles (Owain
Lawgoch, last descendant of the Princes of Gwynedd) and Jean Wyn
and their Welsh followings as well as isolated foreigners in other
companies (5). This essentially traditional mixture of specialist
companies and smallish groups of political exiles and more or less
chivalrically-inspired foreigners entering the French service for
longer or shorter periods continued into the early years of the
fifteenth century (6).

The disorders which began in this period, however, certainly
stimulated recruitment as well as producing conditions in parts of
France reminiscent on a smaller scale of the days of the great
companies of the 1370's. Most of the princes involved in the
fighting were to recruit troops from abroad. John the Fearless
bolstered his armies with strangers to his Burgundian dominions
particularly freely; Highland Scots in 1411,(7), Savoyards, Lombards
(a band headed by a Lombard and three Savoyards was very active on
his behalf in 1416-7), (8) and Spaniards (the later-notorious

(4) P. Contamine Guerre, Etat et Societe à la Fin du Moyen Age;
Etudes sur les Armees des Rois de France 1337-1494 Paris and

(5) id p. 154. For individual careers, see id p.576-7, 592-3 and
AD Carr 'Welshmen in the Hundred Years War' The Welsh History
Review Vol. IV No. 1 p.31-5.

(6) 4-5000 Genoese crossbowmen served at the siege of Calais in 1406
(Enguerrand de Monstrelet Chronique ed. L Douet d'Arcq Paris 1858
Vol. 1 p. 135), and other foreign nobles like the Earl of Crawford
served with the French at around this time (J. Balfour Paul The


"Ecorcheur" Rodrigo de Villandrando was to begin his French career in the company of the Burgundian Villiers de l'Isle Adam) (9). He was not alone. A Lombard Knight was prominent amongst the Armagnac forces deployed against John in 1411 (10), while the town authorities of St. Jean d'Angély held a German called "Anequin de Constances", the servant of a Lombard man at arms in the company of the Bastard of Bourbon in prison accused of the theft of four cattle from one Guillaume Raoul de Poursay. He, however, failed to appear in court, so Anequin was duly freed on 30th November 1413, chivalrously pardoning the injuries he had suffered out of concern for the honour of his captain (11).

At this point, however, much the most numerous of these foreigners were the English; as yet neutral in the wars and able to intervene easily from Calais. Again, the Burgundians were the biggest hirers. Duke John began hishirings in 1411 (12) and English forces helped to take him to victory in 1412; many quittances issued to English soldiers at the end of this year when they were freed to go home survive (13). There were, however, Englishmen in the Armagnac armies as well; a circumstance not without its dangers for their paymasters; according to Lefèvre de

(9) J. Quicherat Rodrigo de Villandrando Paris 1879 p. 8-11.
(13) eg. BN Clairambault 49 no. 147 (Thomas Fox), 85 no. 136-7 (Nicole Peythole) and 100 no. 30 (Alixandre Sadrahan - though in this case there seems to be some doubt as to whether he was English or Scottish)
St. Rémy, Soissons was betrayed to the Armagnacs by an English soldier in 1414 (14). On a much grander scale was the attempt to involve a large English army under the Duke of Clarence in the summer of 1412; an expedition which in some ways foreshadowed the Agincourt campaign and ended with the Duke being bought off by his nominal hirers (15). Large-scale foreign intervention in French affairs was in the air at this time; John the Fearless was to make a formal treaty with the Earl of Douglas when the latter was in considerable embarrassment in Flanders and in danger of a spell in prison for unpaid debts. Douglas agreed to come to help John when required with no less than 4,000 men (16).

In the case of the English, one can indeed speculate as to what might have happened had Henry V not chosen to fish in the troubled waters of French politics on his own account. It is possible to imagine a situation in which England could have acted as a major supplier of mercenary forces to one side or the other (whether on an official basis or not) without attempting any formal conquest of France - a role similar to that fulfilled by Scotland vis-à-vis the French after 1420. No doubt, though, she would have driven much harder bargains about advantages to be conceded by the French faction thus aided in return. Instead of this potentially advantageous semi-neutrality, however, Henry V was to decide in favour of asserting his highly dubious claims to the throne of France, a decision which was to lead to a marked quickening in

(15) Vaughan p. 97.
(16) id p. 260.
the pace of foreign involvement on the French side as well. The shattering defeat of Agincourt on 25th October 1415, with its consequent effects on the military capacity of the French aristocracy combined with the continuing civil war against the Duke of Burgundy stimulated the need for allies and military aid. Indeed, even during the campaign leading up to the battle, foreign troops can be found; one Jehan de Seville with a company of mounted crossbowmen under the Comte de Vendôme appears in the Caux area in September 1415 (17). The aftermath of defeat encouraged efforts to increase this involvement; according to a rather later royal ordinance, it was at about this time that Scotland was first looked to as a possible source of aid (18). More immediately, an embassy consisting of Hugues Comberel, councillor of the Chambre des Aides and Antoine Grielle, clerk of the Chambre des Comptes went to Genoa in the winter of 1415-6 to recruit crossbowmen (19). This was a rather delicate operation, since Genoa was technically in revolt against France, but a generous distribution of money succeeded in raising 660 crossbowmen under six captains, including such famous Genoese names as Jacques Doria and Franco Spinola. They were to reach Aigues~Mortes for official mustering on 7th May 1416 and march northwards from Genoa and Castile to retake Harfleur and entered Paris two by two in good array according to Jean Juvenal des Ursins, who noted with surprise that there were only three or four horses in the whole troop (20). He put their numbers at a

(17) Clairambault 103 no. 99, 100.
(19) The accounts of the embassy are to be found in Fonds Latin (hereafter FL) 5414A f59ro-61vo.
thousand and had them commanded by nine captains the chief of whom was one Baptiste Grimaldi. It is at least possible that other men could have been recruited by the ambassadors, and Baptiste Grimaldi indeed appears at the head of 157 crossbowmen with eight subordinate and unnamed captains in the garrison of Lisieux in August of the following year (21); equally well, Jean Juvenal could have confused the year. The monk of St. Denis manages to boost their numbers to 5,000 with the addition of Spanish auxiliaries (22). These certainly existed and were not restricted to the traditional Crossbowmen. Recruitment was eased by the 1406 treaty with Castile which allowed Castilian subjects to serve in the French forces without penalty (23) but the exact scope of such recruitment is very hard to judge in the absence of any detailed recruitment accounts. Some can be identified from musters which have survived; the forces of the Constable reviewed in Paris in January 1416 included such figures as Diego de Madrigal with twelve esquires, and the probably Catalan company of Jaimet de Peyrussa (24) while other Spanish groups are to be found in the ranks of Arnault de Barbazan's men (Jehan de Salcedo and Sanzo de Laredo (25)) or operating apparently independently (Alphonso de Caumont (26)).

(21) Clairambault 165 no. 67.
(23) G. Daumet Etude sur l'Alliance de la France et de la Castille au 14e et 15e Siecles Paris 1898 p.70.
(24) Clairambault 68 no. 33, 85, no.78.
(25) Clairambault 65 no.22, 100 no.131.
(26) Clairambault no. 146 no. 76-81.
The majority of these men probably served either on board the combined Franco-Castilian fleet attempting the blockade at Harfleur or in the land army co-operating with it during the unsuccessful siege (27). Others were put into Norman garrisons during this campaign, such as Pierre de Bilbao and his twelve esquires at Montville, in the Caux in June 1416 (28).

Again, the winter saw recruitment abroad (it is perhaps to this general period that the assertion of Hughues d'Arpajon, appearing before the Parlement and giving a review of his career in June 1423, that he had been sent to Lombardy by the Constable to assemble men to the number of 3,500 and bring them to France, should be dated (29)) and the spring and summer of 1417 was full of the movements of men from the south towards the seat of the war. In July of that year, the consuls of Montferrand had to cope with the onset of some 1500 crossbowmen under Louis de Giustella (perhaps Guastella, near Parma) marching from Genoa to serve the king. His men were so spread out along the road that the column took from the 22nd to the 24th to assemble fully in the town. When they were all present, the captain went before the consuls to demand aid from them as a royal town against the garrison of "Nonette" which had captured some of his men. He wished the help of the town in effecting an armed rescue. The consuls, highly embarrassed by the whole affair, begged him to move on because of the dangers his men were bringing to the town, and in the end were forced to bribe him.

(27) For an account of these operations, Rel. de St. Denis Vol.VI p. 36-41, 66-7, 98-9.
(28) Clairambault 14 no. 182.
(29) Archives Nationales (hereafter AN) X2a f2vo-3ro.
to go, captives apparently unredeemed (30). It may have been the same troop which passed through Orléans in August (though the captain there is called the Seigneur de Castelle) whose commander had to be given presents of food and tuns of wine to keep his men from pillaging (31). Such troops were widely distributed round France; Genoese soldiers entered the garrison of Péronne in the north about this time (32) and Jean Juvenal records another group on guard at St. Jacques gate in Paris against the Burgundians (33), whilst a Spanish group can be found serving under the Sénéchal of Poitou in November 1417 (34). Slightly later, the guard of Lyon against Burgundian attack was entrusted to such people as Mathieu de Palme (Palma ?) and Bartelemy de Savoye with other constables of troops of crossbowmen of equally foreign origins (35). Significantly, in the light of what was to follow, the Scots begin to make an appearance on French battlefields at this time; the Parlement of Paris found itself sitting on the case of a Scot contesting the Prévot's jurisdiction over a prisoner he had taken in Paris itself; he claimed that whatever the regulations concerning prisoners taken in walled towns might be for the French, he, as an ally, was only bound by the normal rules of war (36). This foreshadows the kind of relationship which later Scottish soldiers were

(31) Archives Départementales (hereafter AD) Loiret, Town Accounts of Orléans, CC 546 f13vo.
(33) Juvenal des Ursins p. 536.
(34) FF 25766 no. 740-1 bis.
(35) FF 7858 f332ro-3vo.
(36) AN X1a 4791 f210ro, quoted in M Keen The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages London 1965 p. 18.
to have with their allies and nominal superiors; it also displays very early the kind of attitude with which many Scots were to participate in the war in France.

The absence of complete royal accounts for this period makes any guesses about the fate of such soldiers very hazardous; even identification is an uncertain business and most of the information comes in a very fragmented form split up amongst collections made for genealogical purposes or otherwise preserved by chance from the destructive impulses of the Revolution. Their generally humble origins confuse the situation still further; such men rarely figure in chronicle accounts and when they do, only appear as a kind of anonymous mass. One can hypothesise a little about the destiny of the Genoese, but they remain largely elusive. Many, no doubt, were taken by the English in Normandy during the course of the English advance during 1417-18 and were sent back to Genoa (37) by Henry V; when Rouen eventually fell in 1419 one Luca the Italian was expressly excluded from a general measure allowing foreign troops to depart (38). The Genoese in Paris were much less fortunate; when the city fell to the Burgundians on 29th May 1418 they were slaughtered in the streets as the upholders of a government well-hated by many Parisians. Jean Juvenal records his sorrow for these essentially innocent victims "Mais ce fut grand pitie des pauvres Genovois qui n'estoient que soudoyers" (39). This was by no means the end of such companies, as we shall see in the next chapter, but their relative importance was never to be the same again and they slowly disappear from the records (if not perhaps

(38) id p. 667.
(39) Juvenal des Ursins p. 541.
from real life; who can tell how many groups of Genoese crossbowmen or their Spanish equivalents served peacefully in garrisons well away from the main theatres of war?). Isolated ones can be found surprisingly late; as late as 1445 a Genoese called Jehan du Chasteau who had come to France some thirty years earlier to serve in the wars appealed to the king for letters of remission concerning a murder committed after his release from an English prison in which he had spent some time. He, however, had settled in France, judging by the fact that he stated in his appeal that he had a wife and three children (40). It would perhaps be too much of a coincidence to identify him with another Genoese called Jehan du Chastel who was favoured with the aid of St. Katherine de Fierboys in a trial by battle in 1428 (41). On the whole though times were changing as far as the employment of foreign troops went. The defeat of Agincourt, which put such a large quantity of the French aristocracy out of the military reckoning, the continuation and intensification of the parallel wars against the English in Normandy and the Burgundians in the north and round Paris, which progressively reduced the areas loyal to the king (and, when mad King Charles fell into Burgundian hands, loyal to the Dauphin Charles, as Regent of the kingdom) and the considerable confusion as to who had the right to represent the crown in France, with the consequent confusion and uncertainty as to loyalties - all of these were to lead to a much increased military role for foreign troops. The three parallel musters on 24th June 1418 in Bourges of the Spanish companies of Guille Hersart, Jaime de Perussa and Antoine de

(40) AN JJ 177 no. 175.

Pronnente (42) suggest that some kind of Spanish company of men at arms may have been being organised, while the Italian Luquin Ris went into garrison in Melun in July 1418 with no less than 46 men at arms as against 29 crossbowmen (43). The real shift probably came in this summer, when the Dauphin was trying to establish his administration in Bourges and organising his armed forces on the basis of the much-truncated kingdom still left to him. From this moment on, foreign troops were considerably more than the essentially auxiliary forces they had been in the past; they were to become, for the next decade and more, a major, and at times, preponderant element in the French royal armies. It is this development to which I shall now turn in the next chapter.

(42) Clairambault 59 no. 163, 85 no. 76.
(43) Clairambault 95 no. 105.
Chapter II. The Time of the Great Armies - Mercenaries 1418-1429.

The summer of 1418 found both parties in the Burgundian-Armagnac confrontation looking for foreign aid and reinforcement. Perhaps predictably the first potential source of this aid to be looked to was that traditional ally of France, Scotland. Both Armagnac and Burgundian embassies crossed the seas in 1418 (1) and, while the Armagnac one was to be crowned with success, this did not mean that contacts between the Regent Albany, uncle of the captive James I, who was at that point still in English hands, and Burgundy were automatically broken off. Indeed it was by no means a foregone conclusion that Scotland would support the claims of the Dauphin to be the true head of the French kingdom; one should not forget that until the disastrous assassination of Duke John at Montereau in the late summer of 1419 there was no Burgundian alliance with England to simplify the issue and the royal family itself was totally split on the question. It is even possible that the Scots made some effort to encourage the French factions to patch up their differences in the face of English attack; the truce negotiated in the summer of 1419 may have had as one aim the easing of Scottish military intervention.

The Armagnac embassy, however, did yield immediate results. Not much is known about it or its composition beyond the presence of the governor of La Rochelle, the Sieur de Plusquallac on it (2) or about the arguments and inducements used to persuade the Regent and the Scottish Estates to agree to the requested aid. Perhaps they

(2) D d'Aussy La Saintonge pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans La Rochelle 1894 p. 31.
were fairly similar to those used by the parallel embassy which went to Castile on a similar errand in September 1419(3). Here the French ambassadors asked for an army to be sent against the English, ancient enemies of France and Castile as soon as possible "for the great honour of the King of Castile" under a commander of the highest rank. The troops thus requested would be paid for six months. The ambassadors were to go on to give a full account of the needs of France and remind the Castilians of past French aid to Castile. One could imagine a fairly similar line being used in Scotland; apparently the appeals to honour and gratitude were more appreciated in Scotland since, while the Scots responded, Castile remained deaf to entreaty. Before we consider the forces voted by the Estates, however, it is worth looking at what may well have been a parallel activity of the ambassadors. This was the recruitment of companies which were prepared to set out for France straight away to bolster the Dauphin's forces in the lands which were coming to be known as the Kingdom of Bourges. Certainly Scottish forces begin to appear in quite substantial numbers in this period, and it seems logical to assume that the ambassadors in Scotland were largely responsible.

In this summer of 1418, the Dauphin was fully occupied consolidating his hold on a kingdom riddled with disaffection and doubtful loyalties. It is doubtful if Charles, as Dauphin or king, was ever to draw fully on the potential military resources of the areas which remained nominally loyal to him in the dark days of the 1420's, and at this period his hold over much of the country was highly uncertain. Foreign troops were badly needed to fill the gaps and recruitment from all quarters proceeded rapidly. Traditional

(3) FLat 6024 f12
companies of Italian crossbowmen were still recruited (Guillaume Rain and Luquin Brisol both from Piedmont with a combined force of some 146 men were retained at Villeneuf-lès-Avignon on the 11th November 1418 (4)) but more and more they yield place to the Scots in increasing numbers. Michel de Normanville, Captain of a hundred Scottish archers was retained at Loches on 22nd November and elements of his company to the number of 29 moved on to take part in the siege of Burgundian-held Tours in December (5). One Jehan Stewart, also captain of a hundred archers was retained from the 7th October at Niort, which suggests that he had arrived at La Rochelle or another port loyal to the Dauphin in that area shortly before. (6). Other Scottish troops were sent to reinforce garrisons. On 3rd November Loys d'Escrouilles, commander of the Scots in the garrison of Mélun, issued a receipt for no less than 102 tuns of wine from the Sieur de Milly out of a total of 200 in his possession (7). These were to be distributed, it would seem, amongst the troops under his command.

The following year, well before the much-awaited Scottish army reached France, this process continued. Their numbers were sufficiently noticeable for Jean Juvenal des Ursins to note the arrival and activities of two Scottish knights, Thomas Quelsatry and Guillaume du Glas (8) at this time. They are no doubt to be identified with Guillaume Douglas and his chief lieutenant Thomas Kilpatrick who appear at the head of 150 men at arms and 300 archers

(4) FF 7858 f339ro-vo.
(5) id. f346vo.
(6) FF 32510 f355ro.
(7) Clairambault 43 no. 138.
(8) Juvenal des Ursins p. 546.
on 27th May at Méhun-sur-Yèvre (9). A full list of subordinate commanders is given, but the totals of troops fall short by about a third of the stated total company strength; perhaps several of the "chambres" or subordinate sub-divisions of these companies were posted elsewhere and missed review at that point. They reappear at Puiset-en-Beauce in August 1419 after a summer of heavy fighting at the western end of the line of English advance in Lower Normandy and Mainé centring on the Sarthe round Fresnay-le-Vicomte which Jean Juvenal recorded (10). This may form the basis of Francisque-Michel's typically garbled account of the flight and loss of banner of a Douglas of Drumlanrig at Fresnay (11). Certainly we find Douglas and his men passing review at Montereau fault Yonne on 4th September 1419; no doubt they formed part of the forces covering the Dauphinist side of the fatal bridge before, during and after the meeting (12). Several other Scottish companies entered the Dauphinist forces during 1419; Guillaume Bel, captain of 30 men at arms and 80 archers entered service at Sancerre on 22nd February and moved to Gien with 13 of his Esquires (men at arms) in March, while Thomas du Seton with 38 men at arms and 120 archers and another Guillaume Douglas (there were two men of that name in France; they lie buried together in Orléans Cathedral) with 100 and 200 respectively recently come from Scotland appear in the accounts of Mace Heron, one of the Trésoriers de Guerre for the period 18th August 1418 - 20th October 1419 (13). Seton is presumably to be

(9) FF 32510 f360ro, 7858 f361ro.
(10) Juvenal des Ursins p. 546.
(12) FF 7858 f361ro.
(13) FF 32510 f362vo.
identified with the Thomas Deston, captain of slightly smaller forces in May and June of the year (14). In May, too, Jehan of Liborne (perhaps Lorne) was paid for the services of his company of 18 men at arms and 56 archers fighting in Normandy, Maine and Perche under the Vicomte de Narbonne (15); an interesting example of Scottish forces being mixed with French ones in action (and indeed with other foreigners, since at the end of the same month Emilio de Plaisence (Piacenza) and his 19 men at arms are paid for their service in the same company) (16). There is even an ancestor to the later Scots bodyguard of the king in the form of the company of James Colbourne and his 38 mounted archers in the Dauphin's own company in September (17). Perhaps he can be identified with one Jehan Kocbourg (Cockburn ?) reviewed at Bourges in October (18).

By October, however, the situation was to alter drastically. The days of piecemeal reinforcement by the almost random arrival of individual Scottish companies to be plunged into the fighting in Lower Normandy and the west were to be superseded by intervention on a very different scale. The Armagnac embassy in Scotland, which we left in the summer of 1418 organising the passage of the companies we have been discussing, were looking for something much grander. This they obtained from the Scottish Estates, which assented to the sending of a force of some 6,000 men under the Earl of Buchan, Chamberlain of Scotland and son of the Regent by his

(14) Clairambault 40 no. 122-3, FF 24000 p.61.
(15) Clairambault 65 no. 86.
(16) Clairambault 86 no. 103.
(18) Clairambault 33 no. 31.
second marriage (19) and the Earl of Wigtown eldest son. of the Earl of Douglas and Buchan's brother-in-law. How many Scots actually went to France is very hard to say. The Dauphin claimed that 6,000 men had actually gone (20) but this seems an improbably high figure given the resources of Scotland (a subject to which I shall return later) and the probability of exaggeration in morale-boosting letters. Whatever the numbers, such a substantial force posed transport problems which could only be solved by Castilian help. Negotiations for this began on 22nd March 1419 and were successfully completed on 28th June; Castile was to provide a fleet of forty ships, each of at least 150 tons and manned by 4,000 sailors and crossbowmen and 200 men at arms to repel English attempts at interception on the way to Scotland. Wages of 119,000 francs d'or were paid in advance. The fleet was to assemble off Belle Isle and wait there ten days before sailing on to Scotland (21). Amazingly, Daumet believed that the fleet never sailed; in the light of events an incredible blunder. Preparations on this scale were impossible to conceal and by August the government of John, Duke of Bedford in England was becoming seriously concerned. On the 12th the Earls of Devon and Cornwall were instructed to set out to intercept with their own fleet of twelve ships and "balingers"(smaller, barge-like vessels). When it became obvious that these forces were likely to be inadequate, one John Hunt was ordered to requisition ships all over the south-western ports if necessary (22). By 5th September, with the Spanish fleet off Belle Isle, Henry V, campaigning

(20) FF 25710 no. 3.
(21) d'Aussy p. 31, Daumet p. 73-4.
in France, was concerned about the possibility of a combined Franco-Castilian attack on Bayonne and other parts of English Gascony (23). In fact the fleet went north as planned, evading interception and loading its cargo of troops in September (One of the Scottish commanders, John Stewart of Darnley, was still in Scotland on the 21st of the month) (24). The return voyage was less peaceful; off La Rochelle, the English did manage to make an interception but were defeated and the fleet came safely to harbour late in October (25). The Spanish ships remained in the area for some time; on 19th November the town council of St. Jean d'Angély found itself having to entertain a Spanish knight come to seek provisions for the fleet. These were not necessarily always forthcoming, since two more Spaniards came back later with a letter from the admiral complaining that supplies had not been delivered.

There were other comings and goings between the town and the fleet; the admiral's minstrel and his companion had also to be entertained (26).

News of the victory reached far; in Lyons on the 1st January 1420 the Dauphin himself ordered payment to "Sance de Saudry" a Spanish squire for his services in the defeat of the English and the damage done to his ship (27). It is possible that some of the troops who served on the fleet may have been tempted into more permanent service; certainly, despite the lack of formal Castilian aid, Spanish troops can be found in France at this time. The inevitable crossbowmen appear in large numbers in 1418 with four companies some 1260 strong passing review at Nanteuil on 3rd September and some passing from there to take part in the siege of Tours (28). Alongside them

(23) Rymer id p. 794-5.
(25) d'Aussy p. 32.
(27) FF 25710 no. 5.
(28) AN K59 no. 20, 12-15, 45-6.
one finds Rodrigo de Alarice and 17 men at arms in the company of the Count of Vertus (29) and through the summer of 1419 a steady drift of smallish Spanish companies parallel to that of the Scots (though much less numerous) can be observed. Jehan d'Avila, knight bachelor, and four men at arms entered service on 13th November at Méhun-sur-Yèvre (30). Some Italians can also be found in addition to the one alluded to above fighting in Normandy; Bartelmy le Lombart and his 18 men at arms passed review at St. Brisson on 24th February 1419 (31) and Luqin Ris, already a veteran of French warfare, with 19 men at arms was near Le Mans on 24th October 1418 (32) after leaving his crossbowmen in Mélun.

It was, however, the hour of the Scots. The Dauphin informed his supporters of their arrival with joy and issued their leaders with gifts. The stable accounts illustrate this; on 31st November three coursers were bought and one given later to the Earl of Wigtown. Thomas Seton received a similar present shortly afterwards (33). By no means all the French nobles were totally convinced of the real military utility of the Scots and the Scottish chroniclers record some sneers behind their backs (34). The Dauphin, who needed them too badly to be able to afford to heed this

(29) FF 7858 348vo.
(30) id 360vo.
(31) id 345ro.
(32) FF 25766 no. 759-60.
(33) AN KK53 f2,5
criticism ignored it, and indeed before the end of the year was preparing the ground for further recruitment in Scotland. As early as 27th December he was considering sending Buchan and Wigtown back to recruit further and two days later, another letter was sent to the Earl of Mar who had expressed an interest in joining the expedition to encourage him to come himself and recruit as many other lords as he could for the same purpose (35).

The Scottish forces now available first had to be deployed, however. The army was split up; one portion into the garrisons facing the Anglo-Burgundians in the Seine valley upstream of Paris and in Maine and Anjou in the west (36) while another, perhaps larger, set off with the Dauphin on a tour of Languedoc in early spring 1420 aimed at neutralising the last flickers of Burgundian support in the south and assuring the loyalty of the towns and nobility of the region (37). Traces of these men can be found in the surviving records; Marc Balize with his trumpeter, 17 men at arms and 78 archers at Carcassonne on the 12th March (38) and Andro Banantin with a company which fluctuates between 15 and 25 archers moving from on 16th May to Toulouse on 16th June to finish at Cha teau de-sur-Loire on 25th July (39). He is referred to at times as forming part of the Dauphin's bodyguard (40), and he remained in this function at least until September, serving alongside other foreign forces in this unit. Christin Chambre, a man with a long career before him

(35) NAF 1001 11ro-14vo.
(37) Raoulet p. 171.
(38) Clairambault 9 no. 28.
(39) Clairambault 10 nos. 185-9, 11 nos. 1-4, 17 no.16.
(40) Clairambault 11 no. 1-4.
received the substantial sum of 1066 livres 4 sols tournois for the services of his company in the same role for April 1420 (41) and Jehan Gonsalle was paid for his company of 24 mounted crossbowmen in February and March (42).

On the whole, however, the Scottish forces who formed the bulk of the foreign troops in France remained inactive in 1420. The fact that their commanders were absent for much of the campaigning season in search of reinforcements may have contributed to this. Buchan and Wigtown, in obedience to the orders of December, went home some time in 1420. The dating is rather uncertain; Buchan was probably still in France at the end of May when he was given a horse out of a group purchased on the 27th of the month (43). By the 28th July he was back in Scotland where he presented his accounts as chamberlain in person rather than by deputy (44), only to be back in France by the end of August when he, with Wigtown and Darnley were again given horses, this time from a batch purchased on 12th August (45). How many men this brief visit produced and the exact date of their arrival is uncertain; Beaucourt places the number at 4-5,000 and makes them arrive in 1421 (46) but there is very little documentary evidence to back this up. Beyond noting that the embassy did take place, and accepting that some reinforcements may have followed from it, however, there is very little that one can say with certainty about it. Even before this reinforcement, however, some of the Scottish forces

(41) Clairambault 28 no. 25.
(42) Clairambault 54 no. 23-4.
(43) AN KK53 f8vo.
(45) AN KK53 f11ro.
were involved in action; those in the garrisons of the river towns upstream of Paris. Henry V with his new Burgundian allies laid siege to Melun which had quantities of Scots in its garrison. That Henry was aware of the Scottish role in the French armies opposing him is apparent from his production of the rather sad figure of the captive King of Scots at Melun in an attempt to persuade the Scots to surrender (47). The stratagem was a failure; the Scots fought on and when the town surrendered on the 17th of September, the surrender treaty specifically handed English deserters and Scots over to the mercy of the English king (48) (a clause to be repeated at all later surrenders even when it is less certain that any such were present (49)). Henry's reaction was simple and brutal; he hanged twenty Scots out of hand as traitors to King James (50).

There are other signs that the English king was becoming concerned about the reinforcement of the French army by Scots; the flurry of safe conducts granted to Scottish nobles wishing to see their king from this time on testifies to a hope that James could influence them against taking French service (51) and even perhaps divert some to the English side. Indeed, on 30th May 1421 the Earl of Douglas (Wigtown's father) was to swear on the gospels to serve Henry from the following Easter with 200 men at arms and the same number of archers (52), and it is possible to argue that the negotiations for

(50) Scotichronicon p. 462.
(51) e.g. Rymer Vol.X p.18-9, 99-100, 127-8, 153-4 etc.
(52) id p. 123-4.
James' ransom were only begun seriously at this time in the same hope of stemming the flow of Scottish aid to France. The surprising thing is, perhaps, that such a supposedly brilliant strategist as Henry V never attempted to cut off the supply in the most concrete way by attempting to take La Rochelle, by then the only port safely in French hands instead of resorting to such doubtfully effective diplomatic means. The failure of his efforts to open an effective front in the south-west no doubt militated against such a move, but it is also likely that his forces were at full stretch in the Seine valley already; hardly a good augury for the future strength of English rule in France.

Certainly, these diplomatic moves in London did not affect the Scottish troops in France. The loyalty of their commanders had been fortified by a generous distribution of lands by the Dauphin; Châtillon-sur-Indre to Buchan, Langeais to Seton (who appears thus titled in an undated quittance of the period)(53), Dun le Roi to Wigtown and Concessault to Darnley (54). The army itself had been reorganised too, it seems, with the birth of what the French were to refer to as the "Army of Scotland". By August 1420, Darnley is referred to in the Stable accounts as Constable of Scotland (55) which means constable of the Scottish army in France. Other signs of this improved internal organisation are evident as well. On 12th September, the two William Douglases and Thomas "Corpatrick", the latter now called Marshal of the Army of Scotland appear in the accounts being paid for their services (56). This

(53) Clairambault 103 no. 90.
(54) Pluscarden p. 354 AD Cher C793 17vo.
(55) AN KK53 f11vo.
(56) Clairambault 41 no. 143.
also illustrates the integration of the men who crossed earlier into the main Scottish army. The administrative consequences of this reorganisation were considerable, and, for the historian trying to trace the activities of the army, very annoying since the Army of Scotland, which presumably had its own administration was kept almost totally separate from the rest of the French military administration. While not all Scots belonged to the Army of Scotland, and the central administration was in a state of some chaos at this point anyway (57), the effective separation of the Scots from the rest of the army means that all records have vanished long ago. The records of some of Buchan's recruiting ventures, which survived until the 18th century would have cast some light on the actual organisation of the Scottish army, but they, like so much of the archival material of this period went up in flames at the Revolution (58). Given this detached position, it was perhaps predictable that the Scottish commanders were given privileges with regard to payment of their troops. In November 1422, John Stewart of Darnley as Constable in command of all Scottish forces was paid various monies for his men "non obstant que le nombre des gens d'armes et de trait...ne soit declaree es dittes lettres" and indeed in early 1423 when he was ordered to take his men to the Nivernais and Auxerrois against the Burgundians, in order to be sure that his men would march he was paid 30,000 livres tournois in advance for two months wages "sans ce que de lui ne des Ecossois il feust tenu de faire...aucunes montres ni revues". (59) This obviously left much scope

(59) Stuart p. 396-9, giving transcriptions of documents now lost.
for embezzlement on the part of the commanders; it also means a
desperate shortage of documentary evidence about the strength and
movements of the Scottish forces in France for most of their life
as an independent unit.

For 1421, however, one has little trouble in following their
progress from the chronicles, for this was to be the year of their
greatest victory. Henry V had left France early in the new year,
leaving his brother, the Duke of Clarence to campaign in the west,
where the Army of Scotland was operating along with French forces
under the Sieur de Lafayette. In March the armies faced each other
near Bauge. With Easter coming on, a truce was apparently arranged
until this holiest weekend was past (60), though the English had
issued a formal challenge to battle (61). Clarence, however, break-
ing the truce, decided to surprise the allied army (that, at least is
what the Scottish chroniclers claim) on the Saturday before Easter
and advanced with such rapidity to accomplish this that he left his
archers behind (62) and caught the unsuspecting Scots playing ball
on the banks of a stream behind which their main army lay (63). A
hastily assembled group of some hundred Scots archers held the only
bridge under the command of Sir Hugh Kennedy and Robert Stewart of
Railston against the full weight of the English assault until the
main Franco-Scottish army had time to organise. When Clarence and
his men broke through, it was only to find themselves faced with even
harder fighting against the dismounted allied army. The English
slowly crumpled under mounting pressure and the death of the Duke of

(60) Pluscarden P. 354.
(61) Juvenal des Ursins p. 564.
(62) Pluscarden p. 354, Perceval de Cagny Chronique ed. H Moranville,
      Paris 1902 p. 119.
(63) Pluscarden p. 354.
Clarence, which the Scottish chroniclers try to make the result of a single combat with Buchan, though in a rather confused form, which perhaps suggests the real confusion of the duke's death, with several Scots (and others - Chastellain has him killed by a Frenchman) hacking at him before he died, turned defeat into disaster. The defeated English had to pretend to be French to cross the Sarthe safely (64). It was a disaster for the English - a windfall for the Scots. The Earl of Somerset was taken by Laurence Vernon, the Earl of Huntingdon by Sir John Sibbald and other noble captives were made. The Scottish commanders, writing to the Dauphin on the evening after the battle, sent Clarence's banner with their dispatch and his coronet passed from hand to hand in the Scottish army to settle debts (65). English losses were heavy (Cousinot's estimate of 1050 dead and 600 captured seems reasonable) (66) and the news of French victory spread widely; in Italy Antonio Morosini received garbled reports which claimed that the English had lost 6,000 men (67).

For the Dauphin, it was a vindication of his recruitment of the Scots. If the Scottish chronicles are to be believed, the French tried to steal the glory of victory from the Scots and were only found out when it became clear that the latter had the majority of the prisoners; Charles is reputed to have scolded his nobles for having described the Scots as "Mangeurs de moutons et sacs de vin" in the past. Certainly the profits flowed to the Scottish leaders.

Vernon sold the Earl of Somerset to the Dauphin for 40,000 ecus and, in addition to receiving the lordship of Montreuil-Bonin in Poitou, was still being paid on money owed thirty years later (69). In more immediate terms, he and Sibbald were treated to a meal by the Dauphin (70). Buchan too, reaped his rewards, being made Constable, the highest military officer in France, at some time in the year (clothing for the ceremony was ordered in May) (71). Victory even called the Dauphin forth to take the field in person. With the army's staff work improved by the posting of the distinguished astrologer Germain de Tibouville to Buchan's military household (72), the combined forces struck into Perche, taking Montmirail on the way (73). According to Chastellain, the army, six thousand strong attacked Alençon. The garrison, hard pressed, called for relief from the Earl of Salisbury, the senior English commander in France at that moment. He raised an army only by dint of calling out all the garrison troops in Normandy and even then when the armies actually faced each other he did not feel strong enough to offer battle and withdrew northwards losing some 300 men from his rearguard as it was harrassed by the advancing Franco-Scottish army; hardly an encouraging sign for the English if one defeat left them too weak to risk battle (74). The process of mopping up now isolated towns continued. Gaillardon was stormed with great slaughter

(69) For size of ransom, see Arsenal 4522 f18vo. Lordship in Poitou, see H Filleau Dictionnaire des Familles de l'ancien Poitou Poitiers 1843-54 Vol.II p. 791, for continual payment, FF 3251 f140tro (account for 1451) also AN K168 no. 21.

(70) AN KK50 f2vo.

(71) id. f9vo.


(73) Perceval de Cagny p.121, Juvenal des Ursins p. 566.

as the advance towards Chartres continued; in this town, while English prisoners were spared for ransom, Burgundian supporters were murdered (75). The anonymous Bourgeois of Paris complains of Scots raiding round the city in this period (76). In this campaign too, one finds a receipt issued by Wigtown, now elevated to Count of Longueville as his reward for victory, for a linen banner and a four wheeled cart from the master of the artillery (perhaps to carry his share of the plunder ?) (77). These days of easy campaigning were to end abruptly before Chartres was reached with the return of Henry from England with fresh troops. He pushed down as far as Chartres but the allied armies evaded battle and Henry settled down to recapture positions lost in the course of the disastrous summer. By 15th August he in his turn was besieging Dreux and the feudal landholders of the Dauphiné as well as the town militias were called out to relieve the place. They were ordered to assemble at Blois, with the Lords of Scotland and other captains assembling at Vendôme (78). There is no record as to whether any such expedition took place, though the Scottish army was apparently engaged on successful campaigning around Beaugency in September which was reported by royal letters to the Consuls of Lyons (79). By the winter of 1421, as the Scots settled into winter quarters (Darnley's brother with 17 men at arms at Rochefoucault, for instance (80)) the Dauphin was yet again casting around for further foreign reinforcement.

(76) Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris ed. Tuetey Paris 1881 p. 139.
(77) Clairambault 41 no. 144.
(80) Stuart p. 120.
Certainly, more troops had been acquired during the course of 1420-1.

In autumn 1420, the Spanish in the Burgundian army had deserted to the Dauphin en bloc, including Villandrando. In his case the transfer of allegiance could be more nominal than real; in February 1421 he was to help his old commander L'Isle-Adam to escape from the Vicomte de Narbonne in the Gatinais (81). This did his career with the Dauphin no apparent harm since on 2nd April he and his 19 men-at-arms were paid 320l to as part of Amaury de Severac's company (82). Other Spaniards flit through the fragmentary records; Diego de Sales with 19 men at arms in Jehan de Torcy's company at Beaugency on 12th September 1420 and Pierre de Seville with 14 in the same place on 10th October of the same year (83).

In the winter of 1421, however, the Dauphin was looking over the Alps for more substantial aid than these Burgundian deserters could give. He wanted Italian troops from his Visconti ally in Milan to break the stalemate which was in some danger of developing with neither side strong enough to win outright victory. Already in 1421 a contingent under "Le Borgne Caqueran" (his real name is hopelessly lost in the mists of French mispronunciation) had come into his service and been used against the Burgundians threatening the communications with Lyon and the south-east; on 20th June he had taken La Charite-sur-Loire from the independent commander in the Burgundian pay Perrinet Gressart, and followed this by the capture of Cosne on 20th August. These successes brought him due rewards;

(81) Quicherat p. 12, 18.
(82) FF 24000 p. 18.
(83) Clairambault 100 no. 119, 103 no.97.
he was made captain of Queyras and Lord of St. Georges l'Esperanche in the Dauphiné (84). Now he was to be reinforced; if 1419-21 had been the time of the Scots, 1422 was to be the year of the "Lombards" (so-called, it would appear, more from their recruiting ground than necessarily their area of origin within Italy). On 26th November the Dauphin was to be found pawning or selling crown lands to raise the 6,000 écus needed to pay for infantry (targons) and heavily armoured cavalry from Lombardy. These were to be recruited by Bertrand de St. Aust and Philippe de Grimault (perhaps a Grimaldi in French disguise) (85). On March 31st the entire revenues of the Dauphiné were devoted entirely to the war effort, with more lands to be placed on sale or otherwise used to raise the money necessary to pay the army, both native and foreign (Scottish and Lombard contingents) (86). In 1422 the promised Lombards had duly come; while Theaulde de Valpergue, another man with a long French career before him, brought his 250 men at arms over the Alps, another French embassy of Jean Cateran and Antoine Dosuen, sent over the Alps in their turn to look for men in Lombardy succeeded in hiring a number of captains with an indeterminate number of lances for one year. These lances were arranged according to Italian custom with three men in them (one man at arms, one "valet", less armoured who could be used as a light cavalryman and a page) and were to be paid 46½ écus per lance for the year (87). Imbert de Groslee, Baili de Macon and Seneschal of Lyon was given pay for his

(86) id p. 159.
(87) Arsenal 4522 f17ro-vo. For Italian Lance structure, see M Mallett Mercenaries and their masters, Warfare in Renaissance Italy London 1974 p. 148.
200 crossbowmen and targons defending Lyons while Jean Van of Lombardy received money for his 130 "enfans a pied" in the garrison of La Charité (88). The general impression is one of great bustle in the south-east and Dauphine; by 5th June the Consuls of Lyons, men with a healthy fear of all troops in passage were in negotiation with Valpergue over allowing his men through the town, stating that they would only let them through in groups of fifty at a time, each following a prearranged route. The Senechal, de Groslee, intervened on the 8th to settle matters and the Lombards duly passed through the town (89).

In the end these much-heralded reinforcements did comparatively little of note (or at least enough note to reach chroniclers' ears). 1422 was a fairly quiet year in military terms. Henry V remained in the Seine valley concentrating on the reduction of remaining Dauphinist strongholds south of Paris. The Scottish army remained in the west where Buchan was to take Avranches (90), while the Lombards seem to have remained in the east opposing the comparatively quiescent Burgundians. Some at least, however, did reach Bourges where they were added to the immediate military household of Charles (91) who, with the death of his mad father had now become Charles VII. The more important death, however, had come earlier; that of the old man's newly designated heir, Henry V of England. The Scottish chroniclers record his final days with some relish; struck down with dysentry (or St. Fiacres's disease) after his troops

(88) Arsenal 4522 f17ro.
(90) Scotichronicon p. 463.
(91) Stuart p. 11.
had pillaged a monastery dedicated to the saint, who was also known as St. Fergus and was the son of a Scottish king, he expired raving about Scots "That is an accursed nation. Wherever I go I find them under my nose. No wonder they are savage and revengeful in life when they wreak such cruel vengeance after death"(92).

Despite this morale-boosting event, and the consequent political reorganisation on the English side to cope with a king who was a child under a year old with John, Duke of Bedford taking over as Regent in France, the beginning of 1423 brought disturbing weaknesses in the position of the new king Charles to light. To break up the continuing English siege operations in the Seine basin, a large combined force of French, Scots and Lombards was assembled under Buchan in February; on 26th January the Sieur de Fontaines was paid for moving his men up to join Buchan (93). On the road north, however, the operation collapsed in confusion and acrimony. According to Cousinot, the army broke up because it was unpaid (94) and the admittedly pro-Burgundian Bourgeois of Paris reports a furious Buchan saying that he had been betrayed by Tanguy du Chaste1 (95) and returning to Scotland in annoyance. On the other hand, the anonymous Chronicle des Cordeliers and Monstrelet report a bitter dispute between Buchan and his subordinate commanders about the order of battle.(96). In the light of subsequent events this division at the highest levels of command has a ring of truth about it; one suspects that the French never fully accepted the idea of a

(92) Pluscarden p. 358.
(93) FF32510 f365ro.
(94) Cousinot p.189.
(95) Bourgeois de Paris p. 184.
foreigner as supreme commander of their armies and did their best to make his life difficult. The question of pay, too, sounds likely, especially since we know that as far back as 25th May 1422 Tanguy du Chastel was lending the king 5415 écus to cover part of the wages of the Army of Scotland (97). With the slow disintegration of the French military administration throughout this period was combined the chronic financial weakness of the Dauphin compelled to run a full-scale administration on the revenues of only part of France. In theory he could hope to extract around half a million livres or more from the lands under his control (and indeed in 1424 was to be voted a total of 1.3 million); the problems of collection were however no doubt severe and his ability to enforce payment limited by the need to maintain loyalty. Military expenses were taking up a vast proportion of the available finance; the accounts of the Tresoriers des-Guerres in Languedoc alone (and they were, in this confused period far from being the only people paying military expenses) for the period December 1422-3 show outgoings of 219,412 £t (98). How much of this went to foreign troops is uncertain, though we know that the Army of Scotland was paid 30,000 £t as the wages for two months which would mean that it was eating up a huge proportion of available funds. The general impression is of severe financial problems and pay often in arrears being supplemented by irregular levies, but this general question will be dealt with in more detail in the second half of this work. Certainly a lack of pay and the collapse of the Seine operations did not mean a break-up of the foreign forces; the Scots helped to chase Salisbury out of Vendôme

(97) Arsenal 18vo.

later in the year (99) and another Scottish force under Darnley helped to repel an English thrust towards Bourges at Issoumdan (100) in the early summer. Nevertheless worrying cracks were beginning to appear in the French military structure and the relationship with its foreign auxiliaries.

Almost from the beginning, for instance, the Scots had shown a distressing tendency to indiscipline. As early as 31st December 1420 the tax officials of the Tours area were paying twelve livres to a deputation sent to the Dauphin's chancellor at Chinon seeking orders which would make Scottish troops pillaging the area round the city move on (101); the beginning of a theme which was to run like a repeated motto through the deliberations of the town administration for the next fifteen years or so. One could count the costs involved in the entertainment of passing Scottish military dignitaries as useful and necessary expenditure to keep them on good terms with the town (and both Tours and Orleans were generous in their gifts); both Darnley's brother and Buchan received gifts from Orleans in 1421 while to improve the reception of certain requests made to Buchan in May 1422 he was presented with wine, armour and plate (102). Other presentations followed more severe pressure and reflect a less pleasant reality. The Countess of Buchan was given the equivalent of a civic reception at Tours in June 1422 with twelve torches burning at her entry as she brought news that her husband was gathering up Scots pillaging Touraine; these stragglers

(99) Cousinot p. 190.
(100) Perceval de Cagny p. 129.
(101) AD Indre-et-Loire EE2.
(102) AD Loiret CC 548 7vo. 8vo. 21vo. For similar gifts presented by Tours AD Indre-et-Loire CC 19 83vo.
from the army had already occasioned another trip to the court at Chinon to complain (103). It would appear that Buchan was not unduly successful; by the following month Scots were to be found laying siege to Montrichard and pillaging in the countryside. Another pair of Scottish commanders, Guille Bell and Colin Descerville were sent to try their powers of persuasion, the latter prodded by his wife who lived in Tours herself and received visits from the councillors (as well, no doubt, as a part of the 300 it which this apparently successful operation cost the town) (104).

By 1423 the Tourangeau had few illusions; when three Scottish commanders visited the town on 7th March they were well entertained in the hope that they could be persuaded to keep their men upstream of the town and move on as soon as possible (105). The expense seems to have been worthwhile; there are no reports of pillage on this occasion.

Nobody was safe from the depredations of the Scots; the Dauphin's household accounts for the first half of 1421 record the loss by the maître de la chambre des deniers of 527 livres parisis stolen by the Earl of Buchan's men operating from his lands at Châtillon-sur-Indre as well as a trip by one of the royal household in early March with one Jehan de Crenat (could he perhaps be the Bishop-elect of Caithness much used in embassies to Scotland at this period and who seems to have acted as some kind of recruiting-agent in Scotland?) to retrieve the accounts and archives of the household stolen along with a horseload of silver. The accounts were

(103) AD Indre-et-Loire CC 19 f84ro, 86ro-vo.
(104) id 86vo, 87ro.
(105) id CC 20 f66vo.
recovered, but the money had to be left to Buchan to enable him to buy a horse; presumably this was his reward for helping in the recovery of the rest (106). Not surprisingly Scots archers of the boydguard seem to have been much used on escort duties when money was being transferred (107). At the other end of the social scale, a partridge-hunter called Jean de Pons of Grand Musnet near Vierzon in Berry was taken along with six other men working in the fields by a party of Scots (who probably belonged to Darnley's army fighting the English around Bourges) on 6th June 1423 and hanged from the nearest tree because the Scots had been having trouble with the local people. Jean, however, prayed to St. Katherine of Fierboys and was saved by her when the rope broke (108).

The trouble which these auxiliaries might cause and the problems posed by their payment did not discourage Charles from wanting to recruit still more. The Scottish archers of his bodyguard were retained: Jehan du Cygne was paid for his 26 men from 3rd January 1423, and recruitment continued (109). Caqueran was sent back to Lombardy in search of more men from there (110). Further efforts were made to tap Castilian resources on an organised basis; the 4r ... of Tours had gone in January 1420 to visit the king and other great nobles to discuss the "great affairs" of the Dauphin (111), while in 1421 efforts were even made to persuade the Castilians to pay some of the costs of the Scottish army (112). Instructions

(106) AN KK50 15ro, 13ro.
(107) id f13vo. 14ro.
(108) Miracles of St. Katherine p. 49 no. 95.
(109) FF 32510 364ro.
(110) id 364vo.
(111) Clairambault 52 no. 78.
(112) Daumet p. 81.
for Ambassadors to Castile were issued in November 1422 which dealt with attempts to hire Castilian galleys, to tempt the Castilians into an attack on English-held Guienne, which they claimed was weakly held, with an army of 5-600 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers. Nothing came of these approaches either. In the end, it was again to Scotland that Charles was forced to look. In the rather confusing entries to Dom Bévy's genealogical compilation (113), one drew Kainzie, noted in 1419 as one of Darnley's men is paid 1,000 livres in 1422 to go and do recruiting in Scotland (114). It is probable that a steady trickle of small groups found their way to France throughout this period, but something rather grander was in the air from late 1422 onwards. On 20th October of that year we find the king making financial arrangements for the transport, feeding and wages of up to 8,000 men with some 9,300écus and a portion of one of the crowns to be pawned for extra money. Some of this was to go to Scotland with an embassy; the rest was scattered around twenty small depositaries in La Rochelle, Niort and other towns in the west (115). Perhaps the appointment of Darnley's brother as captain of the Tower of the "chesne" in La Rochelle generally in control of the harbour area (116) in the same part of late 1422 is connected with this. Certainly the departure of the Earl of Buchan in 1423 was not simply due to annoyance at the failure of his operations; he was to head the embassy to Scotland. On 17th May, the king stated that the Lords of Scotland "de leur grant liberalite se soit gracieusement offers et presentes nous aider et secourir

(113) On this, see Mirot, though he makes a much rosier estimate of the completeness and general useability of this than I would.
(114) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol.III under Kainzie (the volumes are largely unpaginated).
(115) AN J475 no.98, (3,4).
(116) Stuart p. 121.
moyennant que nous leur deussions envoyer certaine somme d'argent, navires, vivres et autres choses". To expedite the organisation of this expedition, the king intended to send an embassy over, and this was to be given the fullest powers to deal with shippers in all matters concerning timing, costs, hiring and all other relevant matters. These powers are backed with repeated promises not to query any costs they might incur in any way, resounding orders to the Chambre des Comptes to pass all bills without any dispute, and if all else failed, "plain pouvoir, auctorite et mandement especial de y obliger et submettre tous et chacuns de nos biens, meuble et immeubles, presents et avenir" (117). Backed by these promises (in themselves a considerable commentary on the operations of the financial office and the dubious nature and effectiveness of royal promises of payment under more normal circumstances), the earl and his fellow ambassadors set forth for Scotland in early summer 1423.

The absence of Buchan certainly did not condemn the Army of Scotland to an inactive role in the summer of 1423. After the operations in Berry, Darnley (now rewarded further for his loyal services by the gift of Aubigny-sur-Nère in Berry, given to aid him in maintaining his estate) on 22nd March 1423 (118) moved into Champagne against the Burgundians. According to Berry Herald, he was supposed to be moving to the relief of Mousson but disobeyed orders to exploit an opportunity which had arisen (119). A Savoyard in Burgundian service, the Bastard of Baume had defected to the

(118) AN K168 no. 20, AD Cher C 1046 39vo-41ro.
French side with some of his men, and after a summer of betrayal and counter-betrayal, was besieging the rest of his former company in Cxavant in the Morvannais (120). Darnley linked up with him despite a lack of cannon which was never remedied (121) and the move seems to have been supported by the king since he was reinforced by a mixture of Spaniards and other more or less undisciplined routier forces under Severac and Ventadour (122) to the number of 400 men at arms. The garrison were at the limits of their resistance when relief arrived with Anglo-Burgundian military co-operation actually being effective for once. To proceed to the relief they had, however, to force a passage of the Yonne against a French army well positioned on a hill overlooking the main bridge. It was a grim battle, the best description of which is to be found in the anonymous chronicle known as the "Livre des Trahisons" written by a man strongly inclined to take as an eye-witness (123). The Earl of Salisbury, commander of the English army, had his men assault the French across the bridge while other sections of his army sought another crossing-point upstream (124); some of them went into the river to wade across in the teeth of Scottish archery, aided by a Lombard contingent "tous armes en harness complet" in holding the bridge against the English. The combination of English archery and cannonfire pushed the Scots back far enough to aid the Burgundians in crossing and to expose the Lombard flank to English archery at closer range which began to expose weaknesses in their armour.

(121) Bouvier p. 369.
(124) FF 23018 f438vo-9ro.
until they fled for the horses (it was noted by all the chroniclers that the French fought on foot in this battle "tous a piet comme les Engles" as the Livre des Trahisons puts it) to the loud curses and insults of the Scots thus left to their fate. The French, now assailed on three sides as the forces which had crossed upstream came into the fight and the garrison sallied out to help, crumpled and collapsed. Their losses in dead and captured were heavy and variously estimated; Martial d'Auvergne puts them at 1,000 while the official English list of enemy slain and taken comes up with the optimistic figure of 8,000 (125). The bulk, both from this list and other chronicle accounts seem to have been Scots (126), perhaps as Waurin says because they were in the vanguard and had the hardest fighting (127). Darnley himself was captured and lost an eye (128) and lengthy lists of more or less recognisable Scottish names can be found in all the accounts (129) as having been killed or captured. Not only the noble and notable suffered; the occasional ferocity which could erupt even among combatants from time to time can be guessed at from the entry in the French accounts concerning the payment of ransoms of twenty Scots archers by the king to save them from hanging (130) and another ordinary Scottish soldier, a 17 year old archer called Peter Forest who was probably captured at this battle lay for two years in an English prison unable to find any way of paying a ransom until, fearing he would

(127) Waurin Vol.II p. 68; he puts losses at around 4,000.
(128) id p. 68, Monstrelet p. 62.
(129) id p.62, Waurin p. 69.
(130) Arsenal 4522 f19ro.
die there, he joined the English army (131). Another Scot
carried an arrowhead about in his head for 8 years from Cravant
until St. Katherine appeared to him in a dream and extracted it for
him (132). The king on the other hand did his best to minimise
the defeat; in a letter which speaks volumes about the ambiguous
situation of foreign troops written to the Consuls of Lyon he says
"Tous voyes n'y avoit il au dit siège que tres peu et comme rien
des nobles de nostre royaume mais seulement Escoz, Espaignaulx et
autre gens estrangiers qui avoient accoustume de vivre sur le pays,
et par quoy le dommage n'en est pas si grant" (133)

However scornful Charles might choose to be, he could hardly
do without these same foreigners. Whether the Lombards who played
such an inglorious role at Cravant were part of the reinforcement
brought by Caqueran is uncertain; if they were to redeem
themselves in September at La Bussière in the Mâconnais when, under
the command of Imbert de Grosliée they defeated the Burgundian forces
threatening Lyon. The 5-600 Lombard men at arms under Caqueran and
Valpergue played a major part in the victory with their heavy armour
and their habit of armouring their horses giving them a big advan-
tage (134). The Marshal of Burgundy was captured and traded for
Darnley (135) (though there must have been a cash ransom as well,
since he was given 500 lt towards it in 1425 (136) and as late as

(131) AN JJ 179 no. 136.
(133) L Caillet Étude sur les Relations de la Commune de Lyon avec
(134) Bouvier p. 370, Cousinot p. 221 on armoured Lombard horses,
Pluscarden p. 361.
(135) Bouvier p. 370, Cousinot p. 221.
(136) Lady Elizabeth Cust Some Account of the War of Aubigny
in France (1422-1672) London 1891 p. 10-11, MGA Vale Charles VII
26th January 1427 was writing to the Lyonnais asking for financial help in repaying 6,000 écus borrowed from Tanguy du Chastel for the same purpose (137). The victory brought the Lombards profit in their turn; on 2nd October the king was to write sternly reminding the Consuls of Lyon that half of the 2,500 livres to be raised in taxes in the town was earmarked for new armour for the Lombard troops and demanding that they cease to hold up payment (138). It is no doubt these men who figure in another set of accounts as having entered service on 26th July under the Count of Valpergue and pass review at St. Laurent de Baigny near Lyon on 1st October with the "Count" (in fact, if this is Theaulde, his claim to the title is highly dubious) and his nine lieutenants named at the head of a force of 200 lances (139). At some time, probably in the following spring the full Lombard force of 600 cavalry and 1,000 infantry (140) moved into the Nivernais and captured Cufy and La Guierche, aided in the former enterprise at least by none other than Villandrando and the Spaniards of his company (141).

During this summer of 1423, the Earl of Buchan was fully occupied in Scotland raising yet another army to support the French cause. His mission gained an added urgency with the start of negotiations with the English over the ransom of King James. One of the main English demands as contained in the instructions to the English ambassadors of 6th July was that the Scottish troops in

(137) Caillet p. 85-6.
(138) Caillet p. 338-9 (No. XXXVII).
(139) FF 32510 f364vo-5ro.
(140) Bouvier p. 370.
in France be withdrawn as well as an assurance that no more would go there (142) and it was a Scottish negotiating triumph that the final treaty contained no such demands when it was signed in December (143). By then, however, the arrangements for the army were well underway. Agreement had been reached at Stirling on 6th October; the French as usual agreed to provide the transports while the Scots allowed French recruitment in Scotland and promised not to aid the English or Burgundians in any way. Scots were to be given full rights in France (144). Arrangements for the hire of ships were well in hand. An agreement with Perruche de la Sau which has survived gives some idea of the terms; Perruche, master of the balinger Sainte Marie, a Castilian Captain, agrees to remain at Dumbarton (where he was apparently moored when the contract was drawn up) or Greenock from the 6th November for a month. He was to be paid 1½ ecus per ton of his 140 ton ship, half to be paid in Scotland and half at La Rochelle a month after the Scots had been landed. A bonus of a thousand crowns was to be split among the twelve Spanish captains involved in ratio to their tonnage, and sundry other clauses covered compensation for the loss of the ship or extra expenses caused by bad weather. The ambassadors solemnly engaged royal property to ensure that he would be paid in time, promised to press the king to honour his debts to Perruche and his fellow-captains and, in the final analysis, agreed to pay themselves out of their own resources if all else failed; at the head of the

(143) id p.302-7 For the provisions expressly excluding the Scots in France from the truce, see p.331.
(144) AN J 677 no. 20.
group of ambassadors we find the Earl of Douglas who had agreed to
cross to France and replace Wigtown, who had returned to Scotland
with the embassy (145). All these transactions are dated 26th
October. Perhaps predictably, payment was late and probably never
made in full; a full list of captains, including Perruche, has
survived. In this, the king asks for more time to pay the debts
in full following a partial distribution (146). Perruche clearly
had little faith in the assignments of local tax revenues distribut-
ed in this partial repayment; his misfortunes are known to us
because he gave all the documents (including the assignment of 433
crowns) to the Abbey of Orbestier as security for a loan of 347
crowns. (147). The very considerable discount which the abbey
charged indicates the problenatical nature of their chances of
obtaining repayment from royal officials. The overstretched nature
of royal finances is apparent elsewhere; Henri de Plusquall as
governor of La Rochelle, was forced to plunge himself deep into
debt to local merchants to finance the transport of the Scottish
army. He had to cross to Scotland personally on the king's behalf:
unable to repay him, Charles granted him the lands of Taillebourg
in February 1424 in the hope that this would enable him to repay
some of the debts (148). Indeed the financial situation was so
serious that in January, Charles disbanded all the companies of men
at arms in the kingdom apart from the Scots, the Lombards and a few
others due to the cost of paying them. Under the circumstances,

(145) Marchegay p. 160-3. On the same day, Douglas formally promis-
ed to cross by 6th December - AN J 680 no. 80.
(147) Marchegay p. 163.
(148) AN J 183 no. 136, 141.
however, this desperate manoeuvre was never effectively carried out (149). Despite these problems, the Scots sailed for France; the fleet was split up by storms with some landing at St. Mahé-de-Fine-Posterne (150) as well as La Rochelle. St. Jean d'Angély, after giving a dinner of fish to a Scottish esquire called Thomas Onel and his five companions in February, found itself called upon to give "good cheer" to Buchan and Douglas in the shape of wine, fish and a torchlit entry with the mayor going out to meet them with the best accompaniment possible (151) on 27th March.

The Scottish army marched towards Bourges immediately. Douglas in his turn was lavishly rewarded for his adhesion to the French cause. He was first named "Lieutenant-General sur le fait de guerre pour tout le Royaume de France" - an unusual title whose precise significance is far from clear. It seems possible to me that it was intended to give him some kind of equal status with Buchan - perhaps as commander of the Army of Scotland - while Buchan as Constable commanded the French forces in some kind of joint command. Following this elevation he was also given the Duchy of Touraine. This had been Charles' duchy before his accession to the throne. The donation included the towns of Tours and Loches and was given in hereditary right as much for the past services of Wigtown as for those which Douglas was expected to perform (152). Donation was made at Bourges on 19th April; the news provoked a flurry of activity in Tours which sent a messenger on the 24th to

(149) Doat 9 p. 279.
(150) Cousinot p. 195.
(152) AN XIa 8604 f45ro-46vo. AN J680 no. 79, F Lat 10187 f2ro-3vo.
find out the truth of rumours concerning the donation (153) and proceeded to begin preparations for the entry of the new Duke (154). In Bourges, the Scottish army was reviewed on the 24th and its numbers put at 2,500 men at arms and 4,000 archers, while Darnley had his own contingent of 150 men at arms (by this point he was out of captivity and had not gone on the pilgrimage sometimes attributed to him in this period (155), although he drops out of the records for most of the year and could have been almost anywhere). In comparison, Arthur of Richemont, the Breton recently deserted from the English camp, had 2,000 men at arms and 1,500 archers (156). Even allowing for some exaggeration, the size of the Scottish army is amazing (especially since there may well have been Scottish companies not included in this review), considering that the population of Scotland for this period was in the half million range and her greatest military efforts rarely produced armies of much above 20,000 men.

This done, Douglas set off to make formal entry to his new duchy. On 3rd May, one of his councillors visited the council of Tours; the next day a deputation set off to meet him at Loches to conduct him to the city which he entered on the 7th at 3 o'clock in afternoon, receiving the keys of the city at the Porte de la Roche (157). It was a splendid spectacle, though how sincere the

(153) Indre-et-Loire BB 22 (Volume unfoliated) deliberation of 24th April CC 21 85ro.
(154) id BB 22 29th, 30th April.
(155) A Grandilhon Ville d'Aubigny-sur-âcre - Inventaire Sommaire des Archives Communales Antérieure à 1790 Bourges 1931 p. 4.
(156) FF 20684 p. 541-2 for all review strengths.
(157) Indre-et-Loire BB 22 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th May.
professions of joy and fidelity of the notables of the city (which
the previous winter had been buying torches and lanterns to patrol
the streets effectively at night for fear of the Scots) could be is
another matter (158). Certainly the honeymoon was brief; by 19th
June the council was sending deputations to Douglas to complain
about the behaviour of his men and to ask him to move them out of
the town, an errand repeated on 5th July (159). Matters probably
only really improved when the army marched out to fight the English
on 4th August (160); all the gifts distributed to Douglas' son
James, Buchan or Adam Douglas, the captain of the town for his
namesake, seem to have made little difference (161).

In the meantime, Charles was still looking for extra troops
from Milan. On 29th June Francesco Maria Visconti agreed to a
treaty at Abiate by which he promised to send whatever troops Milan
could spare in four months. How many troops actually came is un-
certain; perhaps very few given that Visconti was at war with
Venice at this time (although he did inform the captains of the
quarters of Milan of the alliance in February 1425 (162)). The
discipline of the Italians already in France left much to be desir-
ed in any case; the Abbey of Selles-sur-Cher suffered the visitation
of the king and his men in this period during which the Lombards
particularly distinguished themselves in their damage to the monastic
lands and properties. The king had to give 1,500 lt in compensation
to the abbey (163).

(158) id 6th February.
(159) id 19th June, 5th July.
(160) id 4th August.
(161) id CC 21 f94ro-vo.
(162) AN J 505 nos. 5-7.
(163) AD Loire-et-Cher 30 H 32 p. 209.
In August the armies came into action in an attempt to raise the siege of Ivry under siege of Bedford. The Scots left Tours on 4th August to meet up with Narbonne who had most of the Spanish troops and some Lombards in his company (164), while Caqueran and his Lombards passed through Tours on the 13th on the way to the scene of action (165). The army was unable to relieve Ivry but gained something from the expedition by tricking Verneuil into surrender; this was achieved by the ruse of marching a group of Scots who claimed to be Englishmen captured in a great defeat inflicted on Bedford (166). There was an expectation of battle in the air; the notaries of Châteaudun had done brisk business on the march north drawing up the wills of Scottish soldiers and taking their property into safe keeping (167). Bedford moved to face the combined army amid a flurry of chivalric challenges and responses; Buchan challenged Salisbury to single combat which Bedford refused to allow him to accept, then suggested that the two commanders should mediate peace between their respective kings (168). Bedford not to be outdone, sent a herald to invite Douglas for a drink; he replied that he would be delighted since he had been unable to find him in England and had come to France to find him (169).

The battle which was joined on the 17th, however, had little

(164) Cousinot p. 222, Raoulet p. 186.
(165) Indre-et-Loire CC 21 f95ro.
(168) 'Chronique de Gilles de Roye' in Chroniques rel. a la Dom. des Ducs de Bour. en Belgique Vol.I p. 192.
(169) Bouvier p. 371.
of these chivalric niceties about it. It was one of the greatest and least known of the Hundred Years War, and no adequate modern account has been put together from the confused narration of the chroniclers; a confusion which seems to me to reflect a fundamental confusion about the organisation and planning on the French side. It seems certain that there was dispute amongst the French commanders about how the battle should be fought. Whether, as Berry Herald suggests, a reluctant Douglas who wished to stand on the defensive, was pulled into battle by Narbonne (170) who simply began marching with his "battle", or whether it was the Scots in their over-confidence who forced the issue (171) is uncertain and probably lost forever in the recriminations after defeat. The English, drawn up all dismounted with wings composed of archers and baggage and horses in the rear, faced a French army with two cavalry wings, one on the right composed of 500 lances of Lombards with armoured horses (172). It seems probable that the French centre, with the Scots (largely dismounted) and Narbonne's men attacked out of synchronisation and probably out of breath (173) whilst the cavalry wings unleashed their charge. The Lombards certainly seem to have smashed through the English archers opposed to them (one can, I think, discount Cousinot's claim that they fled without coming to grips, since all other sources are unanimous on this at least) (174) but instead of

(170) ID
(174) Cousinot p. 197-8, 225, as against him see, for instance, Basin p. 95, Bourgeois de Paris p. 197, Bouvier p. 372 etc.
remaining to break up the English reserves they scattered to
pillage the English baggage (175) slaughtering horses and servants
and sending fugitives fleeing far and wide, whose tales of disas-
ter provoked a minor revolt in part of Normandy (176). What
exactly the cavalry on the other wing achieved is obscure (though
Cousinot gives them credit for the success of the Lombards); in
the centre the battle rapidly became a grim slaughtering match with
no prisoners taken on the orders of Douglas (177). In the end
it seems that Narbonne's men broke as the English deployed their
reserves to leave the unsupported Scots to bear the brunt of the
defeat as the night fell (178). It was one of the bloodiest
battles of the war; Waurin said it was the greatest he had ever
seen and estimated the French dead at 6,000 while the English had
lost 1,600 (179). Buchan and Douglas were dead on the field with
large numbers of their compatriots (180) (Raoulet estimated 4,000,
which seems more reasonable than the 7,000 of Pluscarden (181)).
After the battle was over, with the English in possession of the
field, the Lombards returned expecting to find the battle won by
the French and had to struggle back across a stream under English
archery to escape, losing a banner in the process - (since a squire

(175) id. On English reserves, see Monstrelet Vol.IV p. 194.
(176) AN JJ 172 no. 629 quoted in Chronique de St. Michel ed. S Luce
Paris 1879 p. 142-3.
(177) Basin p. 97, Scotichronicon p. 463.
(178) Raoulet p. 187.
(180) For some kind of "official" English list see Stevenson Vol.II
Part II p. 395 (from Harleian ms 782); all chronicles give
different lists.
(181) Raoulet p. 187, Pluscarden p. 359
from the Dauphine was killed at this point, one suspects that the other cavalry had reacted in the same way). The following day Bedford advanced to the recapture of Verneuil where the garrison was captured, including 3-400 Scots, some of whom he gave safe conducts to Scotland (183). He at least had not been impressed with the Lombards, whom he accused of killing servants and horses rather than fighting (184).

The only effective French field army was now broken, but the English had themselves been too badly mauled to follow up their advantage. Thomas Basin consoled himself with the thought that the Scots had been planning to take over wide areas of central France for themselves (185); this apparently echoed the feelings of the citizens of Tours who, on hearing of the death of Douglas on the 19th from a Scottish "varlet" had acted by the 22nd to pay the wages of the lieutenant of the now-dead captain to make sure that his Scottish garrison moved out after the castle had been blockaded to make sure that no Scots entered to take over the town (186). Similar methods were used to clear Scottish garrisons out of other castles in Touraine which they had held for Douglas (187). Messengers galloped to and fro along the Loire valley to inform the king (188), who on 21st October granted Touraine to Isabel of Anjou, his sister-in-law (189) (despite the claims of Douglas' widow to a share (190)).

(183) de Roye p. 192-3.
(184) Bouvier p. 372, FF 23018 f450ro.
(186) Indre-et-Loire BB 22 19th, 22nd August.
(187) id CC 21 f95vo.
(188) id f86ro.
(189) AN XIa 8604 f69vo-70vo.
(190) F Lat 10187 f4ro-6vo.
Despite Bedford's expressed confidence that the majority of the Scots had been wiped out (191), the Army of Scotland was far from finished as a serious force. On the other hand, the debacle of Verneuil more or less marked the end of large-scale recruitment abroad. Charles might try to hearten his faithful subjects with the news of fresh reinforcements from Scotland under the Earl of Mar or Italy under the Marquis of Ferrara (192) but none of them ever appeared in France. Nor was there much real likelihood of this happening with Italy full of its own wars and Scotland, exhausted by its efforts, ruled by a newly-freed king walking a difficult tightrope between England and France. Efforts were made to involve Castile more closely again, with embassies in 1426 and again in 1428. The first sought 2,000 men-at-arms, including some two to three hundred light horsemen (homes a la genete), or at least a few hundred men at-arms, to be paid for six months by the Castilians themselves when they entered service in spring of 1427. The embassies of 1428 repeat the now-familiar tale; 2-3,000 men-at-arms and 5-6,000 infantry paid by the Castilian crown with French promises of eventual repayment aided by the Castilian fleet which would operate out of La Rochelle where provisions had been laid in (193). In neither case did the Castilians produce any more than vague promises for the future. In practice, the type of recruitment done in Spain was probably more accurately typified by the surviving contracts concerning Bernard Albert, an Aragonese squire who served under the Count of Foix in Languedoc in 1426-7 with 100 men at arms and the

(191) FF 23018 f451ro-vo.
(192) Beaucourt Vol.II p.79.
(193) F Lat 6024 nos. 18-9, 24, 26, 28.
same number of infantry ("sauquements"). He had a written contract by which he agreed to serve with these forces for four months, being paid 14,100 moutons for this period. He was paid, though the governor of Montpellier had to borrow from local merchants to satisfy him (194); the exact number and importance of such short-term contracts for troops is unknown and probably impossible to discover.

Negotiations with Scotland continued as well, and led to some piecemeal reinforcement. In 1428 a grand French Embassy headed by Darnley went to Scotland to negotiate a marriage treaty between the Dauphin Louis and James I's daughter Margaret (it seems to me that the Scotichronicon account of an embassy in 1425 can be discounted since there is no other reference to it and the few details given fit the 1428 one equally well (195)). During this embassy Alain Chartier made a speech lauding the courage and fidelity of the Scots to the skies and made much of the alliance between the nations (196). The negotiations are well documented; the marriage was agreed in principle on 17th July, with the provision of an escort of 6,000 men for Margaret while she was crossing to France (197); in return the Duchy of St. Andrew was given to James on 10th November (198). While in Scotland where the embassy was lodged at Linlithgow, Darnley received the lands of Torbolton from King James (199) and probably made the gift of ornaments to Glasgow Cathedral which survives in

(194) Clairambault 136 no. 5, AN K 62 no. 33, Pieces Originales, 20 Dossier Albert no. 3.
(195) Scotichronicon p. 484.
(196) F Lat 8757 f47ro-53vo.
(198) AN J 678 no. 27.
French sources (200). A return Scottish embassy went to France to finalise the agreements; the English prepared to intercept it thinking that the 6,000 troops were on board (201) but they failed and it seems unlikely that there were so many soldiers with the embassy. One of the Scottish ambassadors, Patrick Ogilvy of Auchterhouse, Sheriff of Angus and justiciar north of the Forth drops out of the Exchequer accounts in 1428 and remained in France to fight (202).

Very little of this diplomatic activity affected the situation of the troops already in France (except in so far as their commanders were involved as ambassadors). In fact, the period between Verneuil and the siege of Orleans was a notably uneventful one with little real fighting. English attention was drawn away by the strange episode of Humphrey of Gloucester's war in Holland against the Duke of Burgundy while the French had their own internal dissensions to worry about. The appointment of the Breton, Arthur of Richemont was to lead to a severe struggle for influence at court, which spilled over into armed conflict at times (for instance the attack on Bourges by sections of Richemont's army in 1425). Inevitably the foreigners were drawn in; if Richemont's 19th-century biographer, Cosneau, claims that the Scots were with him (203) there seems to be ample evidence that the majority of Scots and Lombards remained loyal to the king first (204) and Richemont himself in a letter to Lyons lamented that his enemies at court had been recruiting men of "étrange langue" against him (205). No doubt in these troubled

(200) FF 26295 no. 881.
(203) E Cosneau Le Connetable de Richemont Paris 1886 p. 150.
(204) Bouvier p. 375.
(205) Caillet p. 91-2.
times the importance of the Scottish bodyguard grew considerably. Jehan du Cygne appears in the accounts as first squire of the body in the accounts from July 1425-6 (206), while by 1427 his position has been taken over by Christin Chambre, who also figures in the earlier accounts, but is stated to be captain of the bodyguard in a lawsuit in this year concerning various lands which had belonged to Buchan (207). It seems possible that some at least of the smallish Scottish companies which figure in the accounts (such as that of Gilbert de la Haye at Bourges) at about this time could have had similar functions (208). Certainly none of the commanders lost their favour at court. Darnley was in this period in steady receipt of money and other favours; a payment in November 1425 (209) was followed in February by 300 l.t to buy armour for his men. In the end, the money which he owed Tanguy du Chastel for his ransom was repaid by the king by allowing him to draw on the mint profits of St. André-les-Avignon in February 1427, and he was even well enough off to lend money to the king in his turn, as a receipt dated 25th July 1428 shows (210). He was further rewarded for his services in March 1427 by the gift of the county of Evreux (a doubtful honour since it was wholly under English occupation); the king could, if he so wished buy it back for 50,000 écus (211). His final reward came in February 1428 with the privilege of quartering the arms of France with his own ones (212).

(206) FF 32510 f370vo.
(207) id f371ro, AN X2a 18 f121vo.-4ro.
(208) FF 20684 p. 546.
(209) FF 24000 p. 478.
(210) PO Dossier Stuart nos. 2-4.
(211) AN K 168 no. 682, AN XIa 8604 f100vo, AN J 216 no. 20, Stuart p. 144.
(212) Stuart id, Cust p. 12-4.
The Lombards too remained in favour; November 1425 found Valpergue in La Marche being paid to keep his men from foraging there, while the following month he was paid for a good horse (213). In 1430 he even had the honour of being selected to represent France in a kind of five-a-side jousting international against Burgundy at Arras (214). His colleague, Caqueran, who remained more on his estates in Dauphiné was also in receipt of royal favour in the shape of payments from the Lyon taille revenue. It is significant that he won this after a lengthy tug-of-war for revenues which may well have been assigned twice over, his main opponent being the Parlement of Poitiers (with Richemont himself another possible contender). The payment of the 1270 francs due took several months from August 1425 to May the following year, but he was paid in full; a striking contrast with the fate of the ship-owners mentioned earlier (215).

The implication is that, to be paid in this period, it helped to be a soldier, especially one reasonably near at hand and with links with the town meant to raise the money (Caqueran had a business factor in Lyon, who was involved with the raising of the money; it is possible that he had money invested in the town (216)).

As far as actual fighting in this period was concerned, the only serious campaigning seems to have been in the west, with an English advance in Maine and on the frontiers of Brittany. In March 1427 Darnley and his men assembled at Méhun-sur-Yèvre for the

(213) PO Dossier Valpergue nos. 2-3.
relief of St. James de Beuvron; in April he was paid 1700 lt at Angers for his services at Pontorson (217). The campaign was largely successful with the dismounted Scottish troops being of considerable use against the English (218), though it was plagued by disputes between Richemont and Darnley's lieutenant Jehan Oulchart (219). The garrison of Pontorson was left in the joint hands of Guillaume Hamilton and Bernard de Comminge (220) and the army advanced as far as Le Mans (221) before having to move back eastwards to raise the English siege of Montargis. There, the English lines of investment were assaulted by the Scottish infantry under Hugh Kennedy (at night according to Raoulet, at lunch-time claims Cousinot) and, after heavy fighting in which the English encampment was burned, the English withdrew before all the siege-works had been taken (222). Darnley himself played little part in the fighting, remaining with Richemont at Jargeau (223).

The armies in the field were not the only troops active in France at this point. It seems likely that the large armies were beginning to split up into smaller companies; certainly the surviving accounts give that impression for the Scottish companies. It is, for instance, in this period that the Scottish company of Thomas Moras first appears in the south (224); this uniquely well-documented

(219) Gruel p. 56.
(220) FF 20684 p. 550.
(223) Bouvier p. 372.
(224) FF 25767 no. 137 etc.
company I shall deal with in more detail in the next chapter. Other wandering groups were rather more formidable. The deliberations of the council of Tours take on an air of near paranoid fear of Scots from this time on. When a group of 100-120 Scots were sent to bolster the garrisons of Touraine in November 1424, a frantic council got the local commanders together to work out the best way of splitting them up to keep them under control (225). In October of that year they had had to delay the departure of their delegation to the Estates at Poitiers until a large enough convoy could be put together for fear of the Scots on the road (226). To tell the full tale of the protracted lamentation which makes up the deliberations for this period would be long and tedious; hardly a year passed without complaint about depredations of the Scots. These took all kinds of forms; straightforward pillage like that conducted by the Lord of "Polloc" (Pollock?) early in 1425 (227), payments to move Scots out of castles in the Touraine area (228) and to stop garrisons plundering (one of the worst offenders in this matter was one Albaron Sabbate, who may have been Italian (229)), extortion of money from the town by a Scottish captain called Tourneboeuf in repayment of damages he claimed had been done to him by people from Tours (230) and straightforward capture of castles which the area had to buy back with extra taxes, as in the case of Langeais in 1428 (231). (It should be remembered that Langeais had had a

(225) Indre-et-Loire BB 23 3ro-4ro. CC 22 96vo.
(226) id CC 22 114ro-vo.
(227) id BB 23 13vo.
(228) id BB 23 20ro.
(229) id BB 24 22ro. 44ro-45vo.
(230) id BB 24 83ro, 87vo.
(231) id EE 2 dated 4th August 1428.
Scottish lord at one point and the pillagers may have considered themselves as defending the legitimate interests of his descendants). In addition, the council of Tours was for much of the 1420's engaged on the lengthy and complex process of persuading somebody to pay the debts left by Douglas and his son, James. Despite all their petitioning both Charles and their new lady Isabel of Anjou, it seems probable that they were never repaid in full (232) (they came to the considerable sum of 2540 lt). The fear of the Scots reached such a pitch that when Richemont's men approached the walls with their lady in July 1425, the prospect of companies full of "grant nombre de gens darmes et detrait estranges coe escossays lombars et autres qui pairroient faire moult demaulx en lad ville si ilz'y entroient ou pais denviron" (233) was so frightening that they ordered a census of all Scots within the walls to be taken and all of them, even including a friar, expelled from the town while the emergency lasted. (The list drawn up runs to eighteen names and shows that the same Lord of Polloc had a house in the town).

The Loire valley was the favourite area of Scottish deprivation, from the western end where in March 1427 the agents of the captive Charles d'Orléans gathering his belongings for his captivity in England from Saumur were compelled to hire a military escort for fear of the Scots on the road (234), across to the centre where it was said that none dared travel from Orleans to Blois for fear of them in 1428 (235). They were not the only foreign soldiers in the area; a couple of Florentines in the garrison of Montilz near Blois

(232) id BB 23 22ro, 26ro. BB 24 16ro. etc.
(233) id BB 23 37vo.
(234) AN KK 269 f52vo.
(235) Bernard Edeine La Sologne Paris 1974 p. 128 note 199 (quotation unattributed)
passed their time in 1428 carrying off a local girl who happened to be the mistress of a Parisian merchant whom they killed when he next came to the area (236). Other parts of France were equally affected by pillage. Villandrando, for instance, was operating in the south on behalf of the Bourbon family and the Counts of Pardiac in private warfare (237). In September 1428 he took St. André-des-Ribes in Languedoc (238); by late October he was near Lyon and pressing the town for money. His demands were too high for the council who showed unexpected fight and were prepared to use the money to hire troops of their own for the Baili to lead against him. The latter, however, was markedly unenthusiastic about the idea (he may have been an old acquaintance of Villandrando) and in the end the town was forced to let him negotiate the cheapest withdrawal he could manage, with a gift of 80 ecus to help him in his task (239). The pillagers did not always have things their own way, however, as the story of Michel Ambilton, a Scot who came to Fierbois in May 1429, illustrates; he and a group of his fellow Scots had been on the frontiers of Brittany the previous Easter and, near Clisson the local Bretons had ambushed them and hanged him. He had been saved by the saint after hanging from Good Friday afternoon until after Mass on Sunday (240).

By then, however, momentous events had occurred. The English armies, reinforced from home and aided by the Burgundians moved to

(236) AN JJ 180 no. 28.
(237) Quicherat p. 30-4.
(240) Miracles di St., Katherine p. 57-60 no. 104.
besiege Orleans in October 1428. They were never strong enough to blockade the town totally, and it is possible that the garrison outnumbered the attackers considerably. At the time of the English attack, there were already foreign troops in the town; an Aragonese knight called Messire Mathias helped in the defence of the Tourelles (241). The first reinforcement on the 25th after the fall of the Tourelles included Valpergue with Lombard infantry carrying big shields (242) and the billeting arrangements made on the 27th include payments for taking on the Scots of La Hire (243). Already there were Scottish casualties; William Douglas of Drumlanrig and his namesake of "Kyrros" were killed in the fighting round the town on the 21st and buried in the cathedral to which they had given cloth and money; perhaps the Scottish bishop John Carmichael conducted the service (244). The relief forces being gathered had a strong foreign element; a group of Scottish captains with combined forces of 169 men at arms and 400 archers were paid in September at Orleans and Chateaudun; for one at least, Jehan Wishart, we can work out his progress to the siege (245). Paid at Chinon in October, he was given armour at Blois and reached Orleans in November (246). Valpergue was involved in a sortie on 6th January 1429 (247); perhaps it was in this that one of his men lost

(243) AD Loiret A 2178 f20ro-vo.
(244) Charles de la Saussey (Carl Sausseyo) Annales Ecclesiae Aureliensis Paris 1615 p. 596.
(245) FF 7858 41vo-42ro. (parallel figures for all references to this source appear in J Loiseleur 'Compte des depenses faites par Charles VII Pour Secourir Orleans Pendant le Siège de 1428' in Memoires de la Societe Archeologique de l'Orléanais t XI 1868) p. 92-3; 164-209.
(246) id.
the horse replaced by the king (248). Another Aragonese knight fought in the next sortie on the 30th (249), whilst both Valpergue and another Spaniard, Fernando da Civile (Seville ?) were sent on embassies to the king to hasten relief forces (250). Out beyond Orleans the armies were rallying. Ogilvy was paid 600 l to assemble his men for the coming battle in January and Darnley was paid 3,900 on the final day of the month to gather his men in all haste to cross the Loire to link up with other captains (251). On 8th February, his brother William entered the town with a portion of the army, only to march out on the 11th to join up with Darnley and the other French captains in their attempt to intercept the English provision-convoy at Rouvray on the 12th (252). The result was a predictable piece of botched staff-work on the part of the combined army, with a bitter dispute over whether to attack on foot or mounted. In the end it appears that Darnley went in on foot with his men supported by a section of the French forces, to assault the English drawn up behind their waggons and went down to bloody defeat (253). The anonymous author of the mystery play of the siege was in no doubt as to who was to blame; his stage directions state that the majority of the French under the Count of Clermont left the Scots and Dunois who supported them to their fate ("n'ont point de secours des Francais du Conte de Clermont ne de ses gens, mais les regardent sans coup ferie") (254).

(248) FF 7858 f47vo.
(250) id p. 117, FF 7858 f45ro-vo.
(251) FF 7858 f46vo-47ro.
(252) Proces p. 117-20.
(254) Le Mistère du Siège d'Orléans ed. F Guerra and E de Certain Paris 1862 p. 341. See also Waurin p. 256 about Constable attacking thinking he was supported by the French.
Darnley and his brother, the last of the major commanders of the original Army of Scotland, lay dead. Darnley, ever-popular in Orléans which he had once promised to aid in case of dispute with the king as if he were speaking on behalf of his own countrymen (255), was buried in the cathedral, followed by his wife, and a special service of remembrance was said for them to the Revolution (256). The Mystery gives him a splendid eulogy spoken by Dunois, himself one of the heroes of the play (257). His death marked the effective end of a period in the employment of foreign troops in France, that of the large, coherent armies operating as separate large-scale units. A new period, that in which many small companies drifting in and out of royal service fought as part of larger armies was about to begin.

(255) Loiret CC 540 f16ro.
(257) Mistere p. 343.
Chapter III. The Time of the Independent Companies.

The defeat and death of Darnley at Rouvray was far from marking the end of foreign, and especially Scottish, involvement in the war in general or the Orléans campaign in particular. There was even some semblance of continuity in the increasingly shadowy title of Constable of the Army of Scotland, since Darnley's son, Alan can be found holding it in the mid-1430's (1). The remains of the army fell back into Orléans and figured in the garrison alongside the other foreigners, where they can from time to time be seen; when the rations were distributed on 21st March, the Scots collected 3½ tuns of wine and the same number of muids of corn; when their total is added to those given to Valpergue and the Aragonese Cernay it appears that foreign soldiers were taking about a third of the rations distributed (2). Other small payments show the town paying for food for Scots or giving assistance to wounded Scots (3) and accounts which show some of the payments to the garrison record Jehan Oulchart with 27 men at arms and 69 archers and Valpergue with 30 and 39 respectively (4). In addition, other foreigners like the Spaniard Alfonso de Partada receive casual mention in the Journal of the siege and elsewhere (5). Some, certainly, marched out with Clermont on the 18th to rejoin the king, but foreign participation in the garrison remained high (6).

(1) FF 32510 f375ro., Stuart p. 165.
(2) Journal du Siège d'Orléans 1428-9 Augmenté de Plusiers Documents, Notamment des Comptes de Ville 1429-30 ed. P Charpentier and C Cuissard Orleans 1896 p. 397 - the documents in question are now lost.
(3) id p. 212, 224, 236.
(4) FF 7858 f47ro.
(6) id Vol.IV p. 130.
Outside the walls too, the army formed to join the provision convoy which was to bring Jeanne d'Arc into the city. Ogilvy with a company of 60 men-at-arms and 300 archers, plus some smaller companies joined the relief force (7); and amongst the supplies to be taken in were seven sheafs of arrows intended to replenish the supplies of some Scots who had shot off all theirs at the English.

The epic of the relief and the raising of the siege has been told too often to require repetition. Hugh Kennedy was prominent in the storming of the Tourelles as his appearance in the Mystery indicates (8), and one of the witnesses of the rehabilitation trial of Jeanne remembered an incident in Orléans when she rebuked a Scottish soldier for looting food, only to be told that she had eaten some of it herself (9). The triumph was as usual exaggerated; Morosini, informed by one Giorgio de Valperga, recorded the death of Bedford and the capture of the Duke of Burgundy (10). The disarray of the English forces allowed an easy follow-up to clear the remaining English forces out of the Loire valley. Valpergue certainly participated in this sweep with his men, who were noted as having taken part in the storming of Beaugency (11). The participation of the Scottish forces in this campaign and the victory over the English army at Patay is less certain despite the assertions of Forbes Leith (12). Certainly Ogilvy was paid 3849 lt as

(7) FF 7858 f48ro.
(8) Mistère p. 500, 527.
(9) Procès Vol.III p.81.
payment for services undertaken in May and June in the aftermath of the siege; there is no indication as to where this actually took place, though one assumes that the Loire Valley is the most likely theatre of operations (13).

Certainly they were mustered with considerable numbers of other foreign troops for the campaign directed at Rheims and the coronation of Charles. One of the irritating copies made by 18th century genealogist of the accounts of the Tresoriers-de-Guerres casts some light on this, though with hardly any figures and in a vague and jumbled way (14). Most of the familiar names appear at least once: Wishart, Chambre, Ferrando de Civile or Tourneboeuf as well as men to become known over the following period, such as Alan Forty or Robert Houston. Some idea of their relative weight in the army can perhaps be guessed at when the figures for payments made in Berry at the end of the campaign are seen; eight captains out of a group of 34 which was paid then (though this was by no means the full tally of captains involved, even going on internal evidence of the same document). They received 230 écus out of 1733, which, making the bold assumption that money was handed out in some sort of ratio of importance, would give slightly above 13.25%. The structure of the distribution suggests that we are dealing with a cluster of small companies; only Wishart has 100, Houston 40 and the rest between ten and twenty (15). These figures should be taken with extreme caution,

(13) Loiseleur p. 200.
(14) FF 20684 p. 556-67.
(15) id p. 565-6.
especially since such notable figures as Ogilvy or de Civile are not included, but they are the nearest to a kind of statistical picture of foreign involvement in a campaign in this period that we are likely to have.

Their presence can certainly be detected from time to time in the chronicle accounts; at the confrontation of Montespilloy, for example, where the hastily scraped together Anglo-Burgundian forces faced the French without battle being joined. What little fighting there was took the form of sharp skirmishes between the dismounted Scottish archers and some Picard troops in which both sides were held to have fought with great courage, the ever-observant author of the "Livre des Trahisons" noting the support given to the Scots by their infantry armed with steel guisarmes (16). Scots from the newly-established garrison in Laigny under Hugh Kennedy raided up to the walls of Paris (17). The accounts themselves permit us to glimpse some Scots under Houston at Senlis when that surrendered (18) and the despatch of Ogilvy and another sizeable group to the siege of La Charité after the main campaign was over (19). The town, back in the hands of Perrinet Gressart resisted the winter siege.

The main theatre of campaigning was now transferred to the Champagne-Brie region and the areas round Paris. The counter-stroke was to be largely in the hands of the Burgundians to whose control Bedford had been compelled to transfer the area. His control over Paris was far from secure; early in 1430 a plot was

(18) FF 2068\* p. 562.
(19) id p. 567.
uncovered to capture the city by smuggling a troops of Scots disguised as English into the city; they were then to open the gates of the city after dark to the French (20). On the other hand, Charles seems to have been almost unable to raise adequate forces to counter the threat, pressed for money as he was and with the available armed forces near anarchy (illustrated by a case before Parlement which opposed two French commanders who had fought a kind of private war into which the Scots of Guillaume Hameston in garrison near La Lude in Anjou had been drawn when one of the parties stole some of their horses) (21). No doubt we can interpret the complaints from Orleans that Scots were ravaging in the Sologne (22) and the familiar lamentations from Tours about the activities of Scottish raiders (this time the company of a Thomas Blaye which was stealing such quantities of livestock that nobody dared pasture animals in the area); this being in May (23) there are signs that forces were being moved towards the theatre of war. Eight out of the 28 captains noted in the accounts as crossing the Seine to the "pays de France" to fight the English were foreign (24), while Kennedy was given wine when he and other captains passed through the town on 4th May (25).

The heart of the campaign was the siege of Compiegne, into which were sent reinforcements including Jeanne d'Arc and some at least of

(20) Stevenson Letters and Papers Vol.I p. 41 (the Bougeois of Paris gives an account of a similar plot which he dates in 1433; perhaps a confusion on his part or a sign that the ploy was regarded as too effective to be abandoned after the first failure).
(21) AN X2a 18 f186vo.
(22) Loiret CC 700 piece 47.
(23) Indre-et-Loire BB 24 f256vo.
(24) FF 20684 p. 570.
(25) Loiret CC 701 piece 15.
Valpergue's Italians (his own participation is somewhat uncertain); if he did, he avoided capture in the disastrous sortie made towards Pont l'Evêque in which some of his men took part (26) and other chronicle evidence which shows him raiding round the siege lines to relieve the pressure suggests that he never in fact entered the town (27).

To counter-balance this disappointment, in another area of the Franco-Burgundian confrontation things went very much more the way of the French and their allies. The Prince of Orange, a Burgundian vassal, following up a quarrel with the town of Lyon mustered a Burgundian army to take the city and follow up by invading a Dauphiné drained of troops by wars elsewhere and defended largely by the fifty Lombard lances of Caqueran and Giorgio Bois sent to this normally quiet area after their debacle at Verneuil (28).

In this moment of crisis, the Baili of Lyon, Imbert de Groslié took the bold step of hiring Rodrigo de Villandrando, who had passed 1429 raiding Languedoc and causing the citizens of Brioude to go to law with the churchmen of the town over their participation in the defence arrangements (29). On 21st May his men had crossed the bridge at Vienne and embarked on a campaign to clear out Orangist strongholds with the Baili and his Lombard troops (30)

(28) Quicherat p. 40, 49.
(29) AN XIa 9199 f145vo.
before the main enemy offensive could develop. On 10th June the Orangist army advancing through the woods between Anthon and Colombier to attempt the relief of the latter (which had already fallen to the combined forces) was ambushed while deploying before Colombier and completely routed losing heavily in dead and captured. Villandrando's personal profit was immense, both in terms of ransoms (31) and the gift to him of land taken from the enemy, by the king early in 1431 (32). The victory was followed up by a devastating invasion of Burgundian territory, culminating in the capture of Orange itself (33). The following year, however, after a brief attack into the same area (34), he turned back to the perhaps more congenial business of fighting private wars in Languedoc and extracting money from Millau by threatening to pillage the town under letters of marque to recover debts he claimed were owed to him by a merchant of the town (35).

Villandrando's switch may well prove an inability to pay on the part of the part of the royal government (though he figures in the accounts for 1431)(36), which seems to have been general in both camps if one judges from the apparent lull in military activity. There was some limited fighting in the west where Richemont, effectively in exile from court was helped in the fighting round Pouancé by Scottish forces (37) and spasmodic fighting round Paris, but

(32) id p.55, p.216-8 (PJ VI).
(33) id p.52-4.
(34) id p.61.
(36) FF 20684 p. 571.
little large-scale campaigning. Such important units as the royal bodyguard were paid, naturally, but it may be significant that Chambre only received a pay dated as being due on 22nd August 1431 in the following February (38). A soldier in favour like Valpergue could also maintain his income with gifts, often taken from royal taxes; he had by 1434 managed to associate his brother Antoine in his good fortune and this appears to mark the arrival of the tentacular clan of Valpergues into the French service (39).

The most notable fighting of this period came in the summer of 1432 when Bedford moved to attack Lagny, one of the French garrisons dangerously near Paris. The garrison included Hugh Kennedy and his Scots, whom Basin described as being skilled at holding fortified places (40). It was a hard and bitter siege which burned itself into the memories of those who had been in the garrison, such as one veteran of the royal bodyguard who nearly thirty years later remembered how he had eaten his horse there (41). To head the relief forces including the Lombards of George Boys, Villandrando came back from his pillagings in the south and in blazing August heat they fought their way through the Burgundian forces sent to intercept them to run the convoy of food in by the river gate as the garrison sallied forth (42). The main body of the army, however, bypassed the siege lines to threaten Paris which

(38) Clairambault 219 no. 39.
(39) FO 2924 dossier Valpergue nos. 4–8.
(41) AN JJ 190 no. 125.
(42) Chartier Vol.I p. 144–5; for detailed account of campaign, see Quicherat. For the Lombards JJ 179 no. 27 p. 72–8.
drove Bedford to raise the siege in haste, leaving his camp to be plundered at leisure.

This was to be very nearly the last campaign in which French and Burgundian forces clashed. Negotiations, which had never quite been broken off at any point, culminated in the great diplomatic occasion of the Congress of Arras, in which the Papal legates tried to conclude a satisfactory peace for all the parties. Valpergue is listed as one of the French negotiating team for the conference (43), which ended with the English walking out and France and Burgundy patching up peace; this left the English, already facing severe unrest in Normandy, to fight on alone against the combined Franco-Burgundian forces. It also threatened to leave a large number of soldiers unemployed and looking for employment in a large number of what might be called "parallel" wars, to which I propose to turn my attention now.

It may seem rather curious in a thesis which is supposedly about men who served in the royal armies to spend as much time as I shall be doing in this chapter to the activities of soldiers engaged in private war or simply involved in the most persistent of the parallel wars - that which set soldier against civilian in town and country alike. The problem is that to exclude such activities would give a totally misleading picture of the actual course of events as well as of the life and careers of my chosen subjects. A man could have many roles at one time or another in his career; Villandrando is the outstanding example of this, by turns royal captain, supporter of the interests of La Tremoille or the Bourbon family, hired sword of the papacy or a claimant to the see of Albi (43) Chartier p. 186, Perceval de Cagny p. 198.
and straightforward brigand without seeing any contradiction and without losing any of his honorific titles and credit at court (at least until 1437 and his overstepping the mark by a direct affront to the king). The chaotic state of royal finances encouraged the trend; it is doubtful if the king could pay anything like the number of men he might at times need for periods of active campaigning on a regular basis, so for much of the 1430's he was compelled to turn a blind eye to pillage and a search for alternative employment in the private wars which he was unable to prevent. The surviving blanket remissions given not for individual incidents but for a whole range of offences usually refer to lack of pay as a major excuse for the damage committed (44).

This alternative employment had never been hard to find even in the days before the Treaty of Arras. As far back as July 1424 the enemies of Georges de la Tremoille accused him of filling up his castles in the Auvergne with foreign troops and stated roundly that "des gens de Tremouille (were) pis que les Angloiz" (45). Plenty of cases can be found where parties are accused in Parlement of hiring troops to assist their chances of winning a dispute "par voie de faicte", and the spectacular affairs which involved full-scale armies whose commanders could become figures with their own policies and alliance systems in their own right (such as Villandrando) are only the tip of an iceberg of violence. To give one example, in 1430 the monks of the abbey of Absie in the Gâtinais elected Bernard d'Appelvoisin as abbot despite the claims of Louis Rouault. The

(44) See, for instance JJ 176 no. 18, JJ 179 no. 15,27 (the former in Quicherat p. 271-2 PJ XXXVIII.)

(45) AN X2a 18 f26vo-7ro.
disappointed candidate hired a group of soldiers about eighty strong - the majority of them Scots - who, under the command of his brother-in-law stormed the abbey and installed him as abbot. The case, which went to Parlement, was only settled five years later in fines all round (46).

Certainly more reputable employment could be found; a semi-independent magnate like the Duke of Brittany was in the market for soldiers, and the ducal accounts for 1430-1 show a Scottish company under James Bron and Thomas Marshall coming to offer their services, which seem to have been accepted since Scots figure later amongst the ducal troops (47). Even Villandrando seems to have considered the idea of Breton service at this time (48). The real profits probably remained in fighting private wars, and the Spaniard well placed as he was to become by his marriage to an illegitimate daughter of the Bourbon family, did especially well out of this. It is not my intention to give another exhaustive account of the exceptional career of this already well-studied (perhaps over-studied to the extent of over-shadowing other interesting and perhaps more typical figures) captain, but a rapid glance at his activities before the conclusion of peace at Arras shows both how far he was set on the ways which became typical of the so-called Écorcheur captains and how successful he was in finding employment for his men. In 1431, we find him acting as La Tremoille's man in the south, in autumn 1432 fighting the Anjou interest in the west in the same service (an enterprise which ended for once in his defeat at the Ponts de Cé by Jean de Bueil, who in his highly

(46) AN Xl.a 9199 f327ro-vo, 328vo, 415vo. printed in 'Recueil des Documents concernant le Poitou' ed. P Guerin in Archives Historiques du Poitou XXIX 1898.
(47) FF 11542 p. 15, 16, 26.
(48) id p. 22.
highly fictionalised memoirs-cum-book of advice for young soldiers was to remember his exploit with pride (49)), 1433 spent fighting for the pope in the Comtat Venafro around Avignon and 1434 passed in a ferocious ravaging of Burgundian lands (50). This itinerary should show just how hard it is to split the pillage and private warfare from the periods of royal service. It will be remembered that he was fighting for the king at Lagny before the adventure in Anjou in 1432; and after his defeat when he had spent a period pillaging the countryside with his usual ferocity, he was given his promotion to royal councillor and chamberlain (51); a symbol of Tremoille power at court, no doubt, but also a proof that what counted as "royal" war was not as simple as it might at first seem. On the other hand, his attacks on Burgundian lands in 1434, despite being aimed at nominal royal enemies seem to have been little more than plundering expeditions with comparatively little purely military purpose. Indeed it is very hard to tell "legitimate" war from this kind of plundering affair given the prevailing structures of war; a war without fronts where isolated garrisons glared at each other from behind their walls or sallied out on expeditions to pillage a countryside which nobody "held" in a modern sense. The effects of such tactics are illustrated by the accounts of a Burgundian official in the Nivernais during Villandrando's attack in 1434 where he is to be found paying people to check the woods round the town of Decise to see if raiders were hidden there (52). That the troops thus engaged could be regarded

(49) Jean de Bueil Le Jouvencel ed. L Lecestre Paris 1887 p.XLV-LII.
(50) For this period, see Quicherat p. 66-112.
(51) id p. 84.
(52) Flamare Vol.II p. 108±9;
as a menace even to their own side emerges clearly from the accounts of Troyes in the heart of the war-zone, where much effort was expended in 1433 moving men away from the country round the town; a task not made easier by the fact that the billets assigned to the men in question had been stolen by Italian troops under Antoine Baretta (53).

This suggests that to many, even in the actual areas of fighting, the real war was not against the nominal Anglo-Burgundian enemy but rather the obscure, little recorded war between soldier and civilian. This seems to have been the accompaniment to any military activity; a necessary concomitant of irregular pay and a high degree of dispersal on the part of companies on the move. On the whole, the towns were safe behind their walls (often repaired at the onset of pillaging soldiers as at Millau in 1431 and Albi in 1433 when Villandrando passed near (54)); on the other hand as Albi also indicates, the normal way of shifting these unwelcome neighbours was to pay them to go away (55). Tours, better placed to gain royal aid made a practice of writing to the king or his favourites to invoke assistance in moving pillagers. This could have some effect; in May 1433 Charles sent two members of the royal bodyguard to persuade a group of Scots to go away (56). No doubt


(55) id p. 43 (CC 183- August 1431).

(56) Indre-et-Loire BB 25 166ro, CC 25 105ro.
this kind of diplomacy involved the distribution of money from royal resources as an added persuasion during the negotiations; it may even be that pillage of an area close to royal concerns was a calculated way of pressurising the government into paying arrears of pay owed. On the other hand, in July of the same year, Tours had to pay itself for a most curious document which survives copied into the council deliberations; a protection agreement drawn up in the style of a treaty between independent powers concluded with a captain who called himself the Bastard of Scotland and was not above using a royal style in his pronouncements. This agreement began "We James Stewart, Bastard of Scotland" and went on to lay down rules; none of his captains was to claim lodgings within five leagues of Tours or damage property; if any did so he would deal with them himself. All travellers were taken under his protection. Tours paid him 6,000 écus for this agreement which was to last for three months (57). Perhaps this sort of thing was common form; certainly it says much about the state of affairs even in central France, near the heart of royal power. Some kind of modus vivendi could often be worked out between captain and town; Villandrando seems to have enjoyed fairly good relations with Lyon, whose citizens gave him presents and where he invested his money (58) (though at the same time they were sending deputations to the king to complain about the damage done in the countryside by his men, and the Duchess of Bourbon was living in fear in a convent in the city which

(57) id BB 25 172vo-3ro.
had to be locked in case his men came for her (59)), but the
norm was hostility and suspicion on the part of townsmen, brutality and rapacity on the part of the captains.

Much of this brutality was in fact inflicted on the countryside rather than the defended towns. Some impression can be drawn from the letters of remission, though these are rare for the 1430s since the series only takes up in 1440 and for an earlier period one relies on people seeking pardon for old offences. The picture is one of petty oppressions followed by petty vengeance, a fierce little war waged in anonymity. It is a cardinal mistake to assume from the lamentations put into the mouths of the "poor peasants" by sympathetic members of other orders in society that they were poor humble and defenceless, bearing exaction in helpless patience. If no peasant army could have stood up to soldiers in the open field, the picture is very different for isolated soldiers or even small groups caught, often at night, moving through a hostile environment where every man carried a weapon. Sometimes the exploitation of the population by the soldiers can be seen being organised in a systematic way; one case is recorded in the Auvergne of a local man acting as a kind of sub-contractor of terror and pillage on Villandrando's behalf and aided by some of his men. He passed captives on to Villandrando to arrange the purchase of their freedom until the local population rose against him in April 1432 and killed him and some of his gang. On his body was a list of men of Villandrando's company authorised to pillage in that particular area (60). This level of sophistication is rare, however; the


(60) AN JJ 191 no. 45 - Printed in A Chassaing Spicilegium Brivatense-Recueil de Documents Relatifs au Brivadois et à l'Auvergne Paris 1884 p. 524-6
normal pattern is of small thefts and individual brutalities followed by individual vengeance on whatever soldiers were to hand and vulnerable (61) (sometimes followed by the sale of their property).

The major companies which fill so much space in the records of the period were not the only military forces around in this period; by some accident of survival the records of a small, obscure company survive for a reasonably lengthy time. The company of Thomas Moras has left records of musters from 1426 to 1439. This was a largely Scottish affair operating as part of the Count of Foix’s army in the south, and we shall have much occasion to return to it for such matters as turnover and length of service; for the moment it suffices to point out that, unlike so many of the grander companies which took the attention of historians, this group of men remained operating in a limited geographical area. Their musters (62) cover a kind of circuit in which Carcassonne, Béziers and Montpellier recur frequently, while the personnel remain very stable, with only a curious drop in numbers from thirty to twelve and in status from 'écuyers' to archers in 1437 marking a major upheaval (63). This is an almost unique opportunity to look at the basic unit of war in this period, though alas we know nothing at all about the activities of the company.

There was thus plenty of precedent for what was to mark the post-Arras period most strongly; the activities of the free and semi-free companies known as the Écorcheurs. In fact, the famous

(61) AN JJ 179 no. 76 (Quicherat p. 266-9 PJ XXXVI) See JJ 190 no.22 for more organised resistance.
(62) Handily listed in chronological order in Contamine GES p. 615.
(63) This will be dealt with in more detail in a later chapter.
accounts of the great meeting of the various commanders in danger of unemployment in the Loire Valley, as given and repeated by people like Tuetey and Quicherat (64), if not perhaps complete inventions, perhaps exaggerate the novelty of the occasion. The sequel, in terms of activities of the companies, differed in hardly any particulars from what had gone before. They continued to move round France with great rapidity fighting local private wars and plundering by turns when not recruited to fight the king's own wars. These will be dealt with later in the chapter; an artificial division but necessary to avoid this work turning into a mere account of the various paths cut by different companies as well as providing some kind of back-cloth against which the constraints imposed on royal military activity can be understood.

The relationship of the Écorcheurs with the king was in fact rather ambiguous. Villandrando, as so often, is our best documented example. In 1438 he could be regarded as sufficiently the king's man for the latter to send him orders commanding him to respect friendly Burgundian lands (65) or to move his men away from Tours in 1435 and 1437 (66), the latter case permitting him to make some appropriately chivalrous remarks about his respect for the Queen and Dauphine. On the other hand, only shortly after these compliments, he was to draw down on himself the full wrath of the king (and indeed available royal military strength) when his men proceeded to imprison members of the royal household as part of a

(65) Tuetey p. 39.
(66) Indre-et-Loire BB 25 f300ro-vo, BB 26 f177vo; cc 26 48ro, 112vo-printed Quicherat p. 274-5 PJ XXIX, p. 287-90 PJ XLVIII.
Bourbon plot against Charles and was forced to flee to imperial territory (67) leaving his garrisons to the fury of the populace in many places. The most that can be said is that Villandrando was always very reluctant to confront either the king or the Dauphin directly, even though this did sometimes limit his ability to operate effectively as in 1439 when the presence of the king in the south restricted the area he could pillage (68). Less immediate royal interference, however, cut very little ice; when the inhabitants of Albi tried to save the town during the quarrel over the bishopric, into which Villandrando was drawn to provide military backing for one side, by placing it under royal protection, he simply demolished the fleurs de lys on the walls (69).

Under these circumstances, the areas of operation of the companies had to work out their own salvation. Normally this meant paying them to go away. When in November 1438 he returned from fighting the king's wars in English Guienne the Bas Pays d'Auvergne promptly assigned a proportion of the taxation revenue to him to make him move his men away. In April 1439 it was the turn of Toulouse (70). On a more humble level, the small town of Montréal-Gers had to do much the same during this same campaign being squeezed for 71 écus and considerable amounts of provisions. The town accounts for the following year are full of repayments of the money borrowed to meet the demands (71). Less commonly, the local

(68) Quicherat p. 169-70.
(69) id p. 130.
(70) PO 3002 dossier Villandrando nos. 3,5.
communities were prepared to spend money on resisting the onset. The aid raised by the estates of Languedoc at Béziers in November 1436 had this purpose (72). In its turn, these occasions were an opportunity for soldiers to find alternative employment, as the accounts of Thomas Moras' company demonstrates: he was paid to defend Languedoc in May 1437 (73). On the other hand, this was a dangerous affair for the hiring communities since the defenders could be as big a hazard as the routiers they were meant to be fighting as the Estates of Rouergue discovered to their cost in 1437 (74) and some of the funds raised by such men as the Count of Foix should not be taken too seriously as payments for defence but rather as a kind of protection-money for him.

Villandrando indeed shows signs of having recognised the potential profits to be made in this area and at one point opened negotiations with the Estates of Rouergue in 1438, to become the accredited protector of the area for a certain fee and thus supplant the Armagnac family in that role. This would have made some sense since they had signally failed to protect Rouergue from him and the Estates were prepared to make the agreement until the Armagnacs intervened (75). It was an interesting experiment, which along with the use of legal and quasi-legal excuses for extortion (the recovery of debts owed to his men, for instance), suggests that the Écorcheur captains had rather more sophistication in their methods than the rather crude pillaging generally attributed to them.

(72) FF 26062 no. 3024.
(73) PO 2043 dossier Moras no. 28.
(74) A Thomas (RODRIGO DE VILLANDRANO EN ROUERGUE, ANUA.C., no. 562), p. 82.
(75) id p. 216-8.
Certainly Villandrando had at his command sufficient forces to make him quite a considerable force in the land. In 1436, for instance, when he entered the Albi affair as the military arm of Robert Dauphin, one of the claimants to the see of Albi in a dispute which appears at length in the Parlement records and was still exercising the minds of the royal council some twenty years later, he is supposed to have mustered some 7,000-8,000 men (76) in an international company which included Scottish troops (77) but seems to have had a hard core of fellow-Spaniards. With forces on this scale, it is hardly surprising that the crown was limited in its military capacity, especially since there are very strong suggestions that the Écorcheurs, when they served in the royal armies, were their strongest element.

The concentration on Villandrando is regrettable, though forced by the sources. Where they permit one to follow the activities of the other captains, the picture which emerges is very similar, if on a smaller scale. Needless to say, the foreign companies were heavily involved in this activity, to the extent that the term "Rodrigues" became synonymous with Ecorcheur in some regions and a couplet in the anonymous "Complaint ou le helas du pouvre commun et des pouvres laboreurs de France" runs -

"Car s'ilz pensoient bien en Rodrigues
Et Escocois et leurs complices" (78)

With this kind of reputation, it was hardly surprising that the 6,000 men promised in the 1428 marriage agreement between Scotland

(76) Devic and Vaissiéte Vol. IX p. 1122-4, AN X2a 22 f34ro-vo.
(77) AN X2a 22 35ro.
(78) Quicherat p. 138-9.
and France were never sent. When the fleet was prepared to carry
the Dauphine Margaret of Scotland to France in 1436, their servic-
es were politely declined by the French ambassadors due to the
"grans charges sur les pays et subjectz dudit Roy de France" (79)
and the escort was limited to that necessary to beat off the pot-ential threat of English interception. The citizens of Tours,
still plagued by Scots, would no doubt have heartily approved of
royal policy in this field. In August 1436 they had called out
the town guard to make sure that the men of Guille Stewart did
not approach too close to the town, and the council paid one of the
men charged with guarding the gate for his wounds and the loss of
a hat during a scuffle with Scots trying to enter the town after
foraging in the surrounding countryside at this time (80). The
Italian companies were equally involved in the world of pillage.
In summer 1438 the men of Baretta and Boniface de Valpergue
(Theaulde's brother and a notable Ecorcheur) defied royal orders
and joined Floques and other French captains in a devastating att-
ack on the Avallonais in Burgundian territory which was only con-
cluded when plague broke out in the area (81).

It would be tempting to see a clear-cut ending to this period
of chaos and disorganisation in 1439 with the withdrawal of Villan-
drando to Spain with many of his men and the recruitment of his
principal lieutenant, Salazar, into royal service (82) to fight the

(79) FF 17330 f£123ro.
(80) Indre-et-Loire CC 26 f£47vo, 112ro.
(81) E Petit 'Les Écorcheurs dans l'Avallonais' in Bulletin de la
Société d'Études d'Avallon Vol. VI 1864 p. 108.
(82) Quicherat p. 174-8 MBoudet St. Flour et sa Prevote pendant
les Révoltes Des Armagnacs et des Bourbons au XVe Siécle
Paris 1909 p.4, A Courty 'Cet Inconnu Jehan de Salazar,
Sire de Libourne 1462-79' in Revue Historique et Archéologique
du Libournais Vol. 33 no. 117 1965 p. 73.
noble rebels of the Praguerie. Certainly one modern scholar has seen Villandrando's departure for Spain as a recognition that the days of the free companies were numbered, due to increasing royal concern about the military situation (83) and thus a sign that the times were changing. I do not myself think that this explanation is tenable; Villandrando seems to have intended to return to France and only abandoned the idea when it became apparent that his future lay in Spain, fighting as a pillar of monarchical authority there (84). Garrisons were still holding out in his name in France over a year after he crossed the Pyrenees. On the other hand, Écorcheur activity continued pretty well unaffected by royal interference for several years, with Salazar well to the fore; indeed it would have been very hard to suppress it, as is suggested by a letter of remission granted to Jean of Novara, an Italian engaged in such activities who finally bought remission in 1446. His appeal was eased by the support of Theaulde de Valpergue, now risen high in the royal administration as Bailli of Lyon but with a family, many of whose members were heavily involved in Écorcheur activities (85). The interplay between the different levels of military activity was complex and this should be remembered as a constant backdrop of war against the English from 1435 to the truces of 1444-5.

Neither in the northern nor the south-western theatres of war was this marked by any great and memorable battles. In the north, in the valley of the Seine and the Île de France, the war bogged down

(84) Quicherat p. 189-90.
(85) AN JJ 178 no. 77, also published in Tuetey Vol. II p. 476-7.
down into a slow dislodging of English garrisons from positions occupied in some cases for more than twenty years. As Capitaine Belotte noted for another area at a slightly earlier period, it was essentially a struggle of comparatively small forces in which treason and bribery were as essential as purely military strength in gaining the surrender of positions (86). The English willingness to recruit Scottish captives and deserters into their forces could cost them dear in these circumstances. In February 1436 the castle of Vincennes commanding the eastern approaches to Paris was betrayed to the French by one such Scot, who was paid 500 écus as a reward (87). The largest operations were a series of sieges of major English garrisons for which a large proportion of the forces available to the French crown were mustered together.

By great good fortune, reasonably complete figures of the besieging armies have survived for two of these affairs, which allow us to calculate their structure and especially the importance of foreign contingents in them. In 1437, from August to October, the royal army laid siege to "Montereau fault Yonne." In its numbers were the men of the Scots Jehan de Montgommery, David Haliday and Alan Forty along with the Spaniard, Ferrando da Civile (the latter now captain of Villeneuve le Roi at a wage of 600 lt per year); their combined forces added up to 266 men-at-arms and 90 archers or 18.2% and 18.9% of the army respectively (88). At Meaux two years later the number of companies was greater (six instead of


(87) Bouvier p. 392, Bourgeois de Paris p. 311.

(88) FF 32510 £381vo.
four) though they were generally smaller in what was a larger army. The total for the foreigners came to 222 men at arms and 392 archers plus 17 "guisarmers" - the latter a group of rather uncertain functions. This gave percentages of 15.2 for the men at arms, 13.4 for the archers and 34.6 for the very small group of guisarmers. The largest single company was that of the Italians Boniface de Valpergue and Jehan Baretta who supplied over half the men at arms (126) and a high proportion of the archers (140); the other companies were Scottish under Montgommery, Forty, Haliday, Turnbull and Rannequin Kennedy (89). A Scot was given the lands of Gournay for being the first man in the city when it was stormed (90). There was a certain continuity in command; the same commanders appear on the list of those paid for "Entertainment" during subsequent operations in Normandy and Bar (91). This last was drawn up as part of the abortive attempt at reform of 1439 since the companies thus recorded and hired for royal service were supposed to be reformed and purged of their disruptive elements. In practice it illustrates rather better the importance of Écorcheur captains in the royal forces; we have already met Baretta in Champagne and he operated in traditional Écorcheur fashion in Quercy in 1432 where some of his men fought a pitched battle with the inhabitants (92). Kennedy had fallen foul of Tours due to his pillaging in 1433 (93) as had Turnbull in an earlier period. It

(89) id f383ro-vo.
(91) FF 32510 f384vo.
(92) AN JJ 190 no. 22.
(93) Indre-et-Loire BB 25 f133vo-4ro.
is evident that when there was severe fighting in prospect, the royal armies were forced to turn to those who had made their entry into the military life in the ranks of the Ecorcheur bands; they were the most effective soldiers available. The chronicle accounts tend to reinforce this appearance. In the sieges of Louviers and Pontoise in 1440 and 1441 respectively their role is noted, with Salazar and Valpergue particularly well recorded. Salazar, reported as having 300 lances under his command at the latter, was supposed to have made a considerable profit in terms of captured Englishmen after the final assault (94). In fact the order of assault has survived, and serves to underline the importance of the ecorcheurs even in an army under immediate royal command. After assigning various sections of the wall to different captains, including such French leaders of the Ecorcheurs as La Hire and Etienne de Vignolles, the area around the gate was given to those under the royal banner along with the troops of Boniface and Salazar who were supported by the royal bodyguard of Scots organised in two groups to attack in relays (95). Bouvier notes the role of the latter in guarding those making the assault (96). The fact was that the king simply could not do without the services of those who at other times pillaged and murdered his subjects at will, and all schemes for military reform were to be weakened by this fact. A certain degree of turnover among the commanders of the foreign companies did not affect the realities of the situation. Amongst


(96) Bouvier p. 416.
the Scots, for instance, Ogilvy disappears at about this period (he was, it seems sent to Scotland about 1430 on an embassy (97) and, according to Balfour Paul drowned at some later date on similar diplomatic business (98)) but his place in the Scottish ranks was filled by the rather obscure Jehan de Montgommery without there being any real change in the level of Scottish activity in France at this time.

The close identity between "royal" warfare and Écorcheur activities is especially clear in the south west where one could say that the king was normally simply another employer hiring such men as Villandrando for his own purposes to wage war in their own way. Villandrando's attack in 1438 on English Gascony was, apart from the fact that it carried royal approval and was undertaken partly to recover favour with the king after the banishment of the previous year, very little different from any other pillaging raid. Even the financial arrangements had a very similar look; the payment raised by the royal officials to pay his men had rather the look of other amounts raised elsewhere, to pay him to go away (99). From the point of view of the inhabitants of English Gascony the exact status of the invaders mattered little as they swept with fire and sword past Bordeaux and into the Medoc (100). The Écorcheur army was reinforced by troops under Albret as well as a Scottish contingent under John Stewart, younger

(97) FF 20684 p. 574.
(99) PO 3002 Dossier Villandrando no. 2.
(100) Quicherat pl. 152-60, H Ribadieu La Conquête de la Guienne par les Francais Bordeaux 1866 p. 128-9, Map in MGA Vale English Gascony Map III.
son of Darnley and lord of the French lands of the family in succession to his brother Alan (101). At the same time as Villandrando was extracting food and money from Montréal-du-Gers,'Jehan Stuart, cappitayne deu Scots' was being given his share of gifts by the consuls as well (102). Even with this reinforcement, the limitations as well as the strengths of this mode of warfare were well illustrated in this raid. While those involved made considerable personal profits and the economy of the enemy territories was badly disrupted, the real military gains were small. Despite a limited victory in the field over the local forces, the invading army lacked the strength to assault Bordeaux itself, and without cannon could only think in terms of a long siege which the very devastation they wrought in the countryside made impossible. Much of the territory captured was lost over the following years when the army assembled for the invasion had dispersed (103). The scale of the operations had spread panic along the Pyrenees; the Kingdom of Navarre was expecting invasion itself at any moment; a worry amply justified when Villandrando tramped through the country on his way back to Castile doing the damage one might expect and causing much disruption. No less than six years later, the Navarre crown was still paying for wine requisitioned for the garrisons which watched his march (104).

In the matter of suppressing rebellions, too, the crown acted

(101) Stuart p. 165-7.
(103) Quicherat p. 152-60.
in a manner very like that of its subjects when they chose to pursue their private claims by military means. Perhaps the most important military factor in the suppression of the Praguerie was the adhesion of Jehan de Salazar to the royal side. The story makes interesting reading. He had been operating in defiance of the royal ordinance on military reform which was itself one of the factors in sparking the revolt (105), in Languedoc despite promises of good behaviour made to the Dauphin in early 1439 (106) and the consuls of Albi feared that he would launch an attack on that city in collaboration with the Bastard of Bourbon (107). Royal forces had indeed been assembled to suppress him when the rebellion intervened and the king opted to buy his support for 6,000 l. plus the lands of Issoudun (108) and the honour of being made an esquire of France. This was a severe blow to the rebel cause, since the long-standing connection between Villandrando and the Bourbons should have made the support of Salazar for the latter almost automatic. The receipt of royal pay and favour did nothing for the behaviour of Salazar's troops; in April 1441 the consuls of Montferrand were faced with an embarrassing problem concerning a prisoner taken during the rebellion while pillaging the area. He had been taken for a supporter of the Duke of Bourbon but it now transpired that he belonged to Salazar's company and was thus on the royal side and had to be released with his expenses paid (lest, no doubt, his captain use the affair as an excuse to make trouble

(106) Baudet p. 4.
(107) Jolibois Inventaire; Albi p. 46.
(108) Quicherat p. 188, Courty p. 73.
for the town (109). Certainly the defection of Salazar had proved very profitable to him; in addition to his immediate rewards from the king, he received the lands of Chaudesaigue from the Count of Armagnac (110) as well as a rash of gifts ranging from whole sheep to candles from the still-nervous consuls of Montferrand in May 1442 (111).

In fact the rebellion helps to illustrate the close involvement of military force and political power and jockeying for position at court. Many soldiers, less spectacularly strong than a Villandrando were very closely tied into the patronage systems of the great houses and were affected by their fate. Alan Forty was arrested, along with other captains, apparently as a blow against the Bourbon grouping, at an early stage in the rebellion (112), and a close examination of the list of defaults in the Parlement records of this period perhaps illustrate certain alignments among foreign soldiers. On 1st March 1442, for instance, one was granted to the Infirmière of the Abbey of "Bourgeois-deboils" against the Abbot of St. André-les-Avignon (another Bourbon illegitimate son) and sundry others including a Jehan Fueum alias the Bastard of Scotland (113). Salazar's own men helped in the arrest of Guillaume de Menhi-Penhi (no doubt the Scot Guillaume Monnypenny, to become such a notable diplomat in the 1450s and 60s) an esquire of the stable of the Dauphin on the way back from

(109) Teilhard de Chardin Inventaire ... Clermont-Ferrand, Fonds de Montferrand p. 454.
(110) Courty p. 74.
(111) Teilhard de Chardin p. 455.
(112) Vale Charles VII p. 79.
(113) AN X2a f145vo-6ro.
pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostella (114). On the royal side, Montgomery can be found with Pierre de Brézé in 1440 and he, along with Boniface de Valpergue, was on the list of captains to be retained as part of the abortive reform (115).

Those who had already established themselves in royal favour were far from neglected. Christy Chambre, whose role as captain of the bodyguard became especially crucial at time of political disturbance was, from the scattered evidence, paid regularly in this period for the services of his men (116) and a Nicolle Chambre, perhaps a younger brother or even a son, appears in the accounts at this period (117). Theaulde de Valpergue progressed in royal favour as well. In March 1435 he was appointed Bailli of Lyon and Senechal of Mâcon despite a certain unwillingness on the part of the town to make him captain as well (118). He remained in control thereafter, using his office to gain him the maximum profit for himself and incidentally for his family; one of his biggest clashes with the town council came over several shipments of grain which he wanted to run through the city free of toll to help towards the payment of the ransom of a brother who was held by the English. After much dispute, the council was forced to give way (119). There were other conflicts during his term of office as well; at one point he sent troops into the cloister of St. Jean in the course of a quarrel with the canons (120).

(114) Quicherat p. 328 PJ LXXVII.
(115) FF 32510 f372vo.
(116) PO 659 Dossier Chambre nos. 3-7.
(117) FF 32510 f373ro.
(119) Guigue p. 446, Deniau p. 599.
(120) Deniau p. 600.
Normally, though, the town saw little of him since he was away serving the king in the wars. The entry in the town accounts for 18th April 1436 which records the arrival of his herald to tell the citizens of the fall of Paris is much more typical of the contacts he had with those he was supposed to govern (121). His non-residence did not impair his favour at court or his ability to find places for his relatives in royal military service. A Louis de Valpergue appears in the aftermath of the 1439 reform at the head of one of the companies paid to suppress the remaining groups of pillagers (122). Other captains flourished in rather more obscure areas; the Spaniard Martin Garcia, later to spring to prominence, was paid 160 l.t on 8th August 1441 as 'viguiet et garde' of Pont St. Esprit in Languedoc (123).

The largest single campaign of this period of slowly diminishing military activity before the truces came in 1442 with the major royal campaign in the south west to relieve the English siege of Tartas; the last of the gains of 1438 to remain in French hands and of far more importance to Charles' position in the fluid politics of the area than of real military importance. The royal army had to be raised in a hurry to meet the deadline set for the handing over of the town to the English by the garrison commander if relief failed to appear. This in turn would have meant the defection of much of the Albret family to the English. In the event the campaign was a complete success; the English were too

(121) Guigue p. 458.
(123) FF 20583 no. 53.
weak to risk battle and Tartas was saved. If one can believe
Leseur's muddled chronology, the companies of both Martin Garcia
and Robin Pettylow (Fetillot) were engaged in fighting at Dax and
St. Sever after the actual relief (124). The latter, Scottish in
origin and of very obscure background (this is the earliest refer-
ence to his activities, though according to Francisque-Michel and
Forbes-Leith he had served with distinction in the south for many
years (125)) was to become a figure of major importance later but,
given the known muddle of Leseur's chronology, it would
perhaps be rash to be too certain of his participation at the
"Journee de Tartas". Another important captain who was to claim
involvement in this operation on rather dubious grounds was Salazar
himself. Many years later, while defending himself against a murder
charge, he gave a summary of his career which included service at
Tartas but, while he had certainly been in the south in January
1442 (the accounts of Albi show a gift to him in January of that
year (126)) by the time of the campaign he seems to have been fully
occupied reaching an alliance with the Duke of Burgundy at the
other end of France (127). Even leaving these dubious cases aside,
there was certain foreign participation in the campaign, and again
it is best proved from the accounts of the long-suffering consuls
of Montreuil-du-Gers. On 23rd August 1442 they had had the honour

(124) Guillaume Leseur Histoire de Gaston IV Comte de Foix ed.
(126) Jolibois p. 44.
(127) Courty p. 70, Quicherat p. 194.
of a royal entry after the successful conclusion of the campaign (128); whether this made up for the exactions of the captains he left behind to defend the ground won is a matter for speculation. Certainly they were soon having to support the troops of Jehan Estoart (Stewart) who were based in the countryside around and the following year one Boniface (probably Valpergue) arrived on 7th April with a royal sergeant to collect money from them for the garrison at Bazas and to summon them to send representatives to Condom to hear royal orders (129). He was apparently captain of Labarrière - the beginning of another association with the south west which was to last many years.

On the whole, however, despite the Dieppe campaign of 1443, the war was running down to a series of local truces which would build up into the full-scale one of Tours in 1444. This in turn posed its problems; what to do with the armies now in the field to maintain their capabilities to wage war should the truce fail, but also to prevent them from becoming a danger to order in the kingdom. One royal expedient in this area had already been tried in the winter of 1438-9. At this time Charles had aided his brother-in-law René of Anjou in his struggle to gain possession of the Duchy of Lorraine by allowing him to recruit troops from the ranks of those more or less permanently in the royal service. René himself was far away pursuing his dreams of the Neapolitan inheritance, and his regency council was hard pressed to maintain his claims in Lorraine against the Count of Vaudemont until the


French military aid arrived. As well as the French captains like La Hire, the main foreign commanders such as Montgommery and Boniface de Valpergue were able to find employment for their men in Lorraine.

The accounts of the ducal receiver Othin d'Amance suggest that this was a fairly lucrative affair. Valpergue was paid 467 livres for a month's service plus part of the down payment made on hiring him, followed by 662 livres 13s 4d for the following two months. This was only part of the money he was due, but it is not certain whether he was paid the rest of the money recorded as being due to him in the accounts (a sum amounting to as much again) (130). Montgommery and Baretta received similarly impressive sums (131), all for service periods running from mid-November 1438 to mid-February 1439, when the companies presumably returned to French royal service. Another member of the Valpergue clan makes an appearance in these accounts; a cousin called Jeannot who seems to have shared command with Boniface and provides additional proof of how far company leadership could be a family affair. He figures as Boniface's lieutenant in Bévy's compilation, though without much in the way of dates to give a bearing on his career (132).

From the point of view of King Charles this experiment of exporting violence by lending troops to allies and relatives in need of military aid had been a real success. It aided a relative


(131) id p. 144.

(132) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. IV 'Valpergue'.
in his hour of need, reinforcing the close links between the
house of Anjou and the king, solved the problem of coping with
unemployed troops during the winter by finding them employment at
no cost to the exchequer, spared those of his subjects who would
otherwise have suffered from the depredations of these men and
returned the companies in fighting trim to face the English in the
coming summer's campaign. It is even possible that he may himself
have received some money for allowing the transfer of the men in-
volved, though there is no proof for this.

As the prospect of an uneasy general truce began to bulk
larger on the horizon, this kind of solution to one of the perennial
problems of late mediaeval governments, how to cope with the dis-
bandment of large numbers of armed men after their services were no
longer required, took on increasingly attractive tones. As early
as 1441 men disbanded after the capture of Pontoise had created
problems around Tours (133). In addition, the discipline of the
forces still in royal pay was little improved on what it had always
been. In April 1443 the consuls of Montferrand were again exercis-
ed by the exactions of foreign troops. In this case money had to
be found to gain the freedom of men held by Turnbull ('Tournaboule')
because one of his men had had (or so he claimed) a steel crossbow
stolen in the town the previous Sunday (134).

In addition, the dangers of the political connections between
the military captains and the great magnates of the realm was again
underlined by the rebellion of Jean IV Count of Armagnac. The main

(133) Indre-et-Loire CC 28 f118ro.
(134) Teilhard de Chardin p. 456.
military force on which he was relying was that of Salazar, whose service he had secured by the gift of the lands of Chaudesaigues in 1441 (135) and who had been a consistent Armagnac supporter thereafter. Indeed the first hostile acts of the count had been performed by Salazar attacking royal lands in Rouergue (136). A royal army was assembled to chastise him and the revolt crumbled rapidly. Salazar, trapped at Rodez, surrendered rapidly to the Dauphin in early 1444 (137). According to Bouvier, he lost his command to Martin Garcia at that point, but this seems unlikely since he made his peace very rapidly with the Dauphin (with whom he seems to have enjoyed generally good relations). In December his troops were allowed to pass through the town of Albi because the Dauphin ordered the councillors to let him through instead of forcing him to skirt it by the 'chemin des molins' (138) and indeed he allowed himself to be bought over to the royal side in time for his men to participate in the siege of L'Isle Jourdain (139). Nevertheless, several of his men were still buying their individual letters of remission for their misdeeds during the rebellion several years later, so perhaps forgiveness was not as complete as this suggests (140). There are suggestions that Armagnac had sought other sources of potential military aid in similar ways. In March 1444, during the siege of Sévérac, the

(135) Courty p. 74.
(136) id p. 75.
(137) Bouvier p. 424-5, Courty p. 75-6.
(138) Jolibois p. 47.
(139) Courty p. 77.
(140) eg AN JJ 177 no. 104.
Dauphin wrote to safeguard Jehan Stewart in his possession of the lands of Courbarrieu which Armagnac had given him lest the Senechal of Quercy confiscate them in the general takeover of Armagnac lands (141). Stewart had remained loyal to the crown when the crisis broke, but it is not unduly imaginative to see the gift in the context of a quest for military support from such men as the apparently hard-up Stewart (142).

The downfall of Armagnac was to bring its own profits to other foreign soldiers. Theaulde de Valergue went south with the royal armies and was rewarded for his efforts not merely by his membership of the commission which interrogated the Count at Carcassonne (143) but in a more concrete fashion by being one of those placed in charge of the administration of the confiscated lands (144). This post perhaps illustrates a tendency for him at least, and perhaps other commanders later to become more royal administrators and less soldiers as their careers progressed.

At the end of that campaign, however, the question of alternative employment for the companies was becoming acute. It was to be solved by two separate campaigns - one in the familiar territory of Lorraine to aid René again, this time against the town of Metz - and a second one under the command of the Dauphin undertaken at the request of Frederick of Hapsburg to aid Zurich against the Swiss, and especially Basle. Certainly there was a growing need to relieve the pressure on the kingdom as complaints about the behaviour of the troops continued to flow in; in February, the

(142) Stuart p. 165, Cust. p. 22.
(143) Mathieu d'Escouchy Vol. III p. 139.
(144) Bouvier p. 425.
citizens of Orleans were complaining about the ravages of Scottish soldiers in the suburbs and surrounding countryside (145). In a fit of considerable optimism they even sent a herald to the Scots themselves to demand the cessation of such activities and the restoration of the plunder, which included church property. Whether this piece of municipal enterprise was rewarded with any success is unknown, though the fact that they were reduced to the time-honoured expedient of sending letters to the nearest royal officials to complain and look for help suggests it was not. At much the same time, the Seneschal of Poitou's lieutenant had 2,000 men to lodge in his jurisdiction, and one of their number, a German, distinguished himself by persuading a compatriot, the daughter of a German merchant settled in France to learn the language, to run away with him. For this, he was killed by one of the members of the garrison sent after them by the abbot in whose charge she had been left (146).

Certainly the gathering of the armies for the campaigns beyond the boundaries of the kingdom was a great success, with a huge gathering of very disparate forces especially for the Dauphin's army. The armies assembled even included a considerable English contingent released by the truce and a government operating under similar pressures. Most notable amongst these was a company under Matthew Gough (147). The Dauphin's army, however, was largely a drawing together of all the Écorcheur forces for what was to be the last

(145) Loiret CC 657 £40ro, 41vo.
(146) AH Poitou XXVI 1896 p. 177-85 (Publication of AN JJ 176 no.213)
(147) Tuetey Vol. II p. 518.
of the great Ecorcheur pillaging campaigns, with the foreign element especially notable. The list of the commanders drawn up by the Commander of the Order of St. John's priory of St. Antoine de Viennois d'Issenheim for the benefit of a rightly worried Strasbourg council gives some illustration of this (148).

The Scots are represented by three names: the 'Sieur d'Azay', Pettilot and Montgommery. In fact, Montgommery himself was the Lord of Azay, having acquired Azay le Rideau by marriage to the lady of the place at some point before April 1442 when he is recorded as holding the place in his wife's right (149). Pettilot we have a little more certain information about; according to the Bévy compilation, he was at Pontoise at some time in 1444 with 37 men at arms and 64 archers (150) and his company was certainly in the Nivernais in February of that year when one of the members was involved in a dispute over billets (151). The 'Lombards' include Boniface de Valpergue, whose company had just returned from pillaging in the Auvergne (perhaps on the way from the campaign against Armagnac to the assembly point for the Swiss expedition) in which individual members had committed murders for which they were to seek remission later (152) and a certain Lord Galias who is unknown unless he is the Galias Jambe who appears in various records of this period and who certainly commanded some men who had

(148) For this, see id p. 517.
(149) Abbe C Chevalier 'La Ville d'Azay-le-Rideau au XVe et XVIe siècle' in Bulletin de la Société Archéologique de Touraine 1873 p. 464 and PJ III.
(150) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. IV 'Pettelow'.
(151) AN JJ 176 no. 226.
(152) AN JJ 177 no. 146.
served in Italian companies at other points in their careers (153). Finally, the Spaniards included Salazar, Conques and Gonsalvez; the Spanish contingent was of considerable size and importance and Salazar high in the overall command of the army (154). Indeed, the Spaniards provided the bodyguard for the Dauphin in the shape of a group four hundred strong under Chausse de Savac (155).

This ill-organised, chaotic army only set forth on the campaign late in the season, beginning its march on 9th August (156). The tale of the campaign has been told fully by Tuetey and hardly needs repeating here. The Burgundians, too often the victims of Ecorcheur raiding in the past, mobilised their forces in case of invasion; the town of Montbeliand found itself forced to let the army in lest it be stormed, relations with the nominal hirer, the King of the Romans, became strained but in the end the army reached its objective at Basle. Beneath the walls of the city a ferocious battle was fought against a fairly small Swiss force, which, though wiped out itself, inflicted severe losses on the Ecorcheur army in the process. The Spanish seem to have suffered especially heavy casualties in this battle of St. Jacques, or the 'Journée des Suisses' as it was remembered by those who had been involved in it. (157). One pilgrim to Fierboys recounted the fearful wounds done

(153) For instance the soldier seeking remission in the previous note was by the time he gained it, serving under Galeas Jambe.


(155) Id p. 159.


to him in this battle; they ranged from an elbow smashed by a halbard to seven wounds on one thigh, but Gachie de Blazon (perhaps himself a Spaniard) lived to tell the tale alone of his company (158).

In fact, the immediate aftermath of the battle produced a complete reversal of alignments and the dispersal of the attacking army. Louis was in a difficult position despite his victory; he hardly dared to assault Basle (still headquarters of what remained of the now-schismatic church council and thus a claimant for the spiritual leadership of Christendom) with his army of Écorcheurs, for fear of the diplomatic repercussions of a full-scale sacking of the city. An advance into Swiss territory would be most hazardous with winter coming on, and Louis had seen the potential value of Swiss infantry in the battle. He opened negotiations with the Swiss and left the Hapsburgs effectively in the cold, while his army broke up into its component companies and dispersed across Hapsburg held Alsace pillaging as they went. The diplomatic side of the campaign was duly brought to a conclusion in late October 1444 with a treaty of friendship and alliance between Louis and the Swiss by which he undertook to settle their quarrels with the Austrian Hapsburgs in return (or so Escouchy claimed) for promises to supply him with 4,000 troops when he might need them (159).

By then, the army which had set forth that August had broken up into a series of loosely-connected companies spread over much of Alsace and Lorraine fighting local wars with the authorities, whether local feudal landholders or the cities, whenever their pillages were opposed. The Dauphin, nominally still in command


of these scattered forces did nothing to prevent this behaviour; indeed he was well to the fore in the fighting which this occupation of Alsace entailed and was wounded during the siege of Dambach (160). Part of the problem was, no doubt, a lack of payment to the troops by the notoriously impecunious Frederick, compounded by his amazing folly in agreeing to a temporary occupation of Alsace by the army in the initial treaty; most, one suspects was a simple desire to plunder relatively undamaged lands while the opportunity was there.

Montgomery, for instance, moved off into the Breisgau and would probably have pushed further into Germany proper had the routes through the Black Forest not been blocked against him (161) so he joined the rest of the army in the Alsace region. Pettilot's Scots remained with the Dauphin, and his brother was killed at the siege of Dambach as well (162). The Spaniards, about a thousand strong in this area, were assigned the Dambach area when the territory was more or less divided up amongst the companies for their own purposes (163).

This occupation lasted throughout the winter of 1444-5 with more or less continuous fighting as a consequence. The Italians were mostly engaged in fighting against the city militia of Strasbourg, which resisted the assault of the Écorcheurs with some success. Indeed, their tactics of using fire to burn the occupying forces out of their bases in the countryside round the city were so effective that Amé de Valpergue (evidently another member of the

(161) id p. 238.
(162) id p. 286.
(163) id p. 293.
clan commanding a section of the Italian troops in Alsace) was moved to send a herald to the city carrying a letter in which he complained bitterly about this way of waging war and threatened dire retaliation if it was not given up (164). This curious tribute to the grip of ideas about what constituted "bon Guerre" on the mind of at least one hardened professional, despite its Latin formulation, did Amé little good; he was captured by the city militia at Blaesheim in January 1445 and had a ransom of 4,000 florins set on him (165). Indeed despite their considerable numbers and military experience, things did not by any means go all the way of the invaders (whose numbers were perhaps inflated by a contingent of camp-followers, abnormally high even for this period) (166). In a fight near Ebermunster, for example, between some 800 Scots and the same militia, Montgommery was killed (167). His body, rescued from the field, was returned to Scotland, preserved in a mixture of oil and wine - this pickling being done apparently at royal expense - since an entry in the accounts of Jehan Xaincoins for the year ending in September 1446 refers to a payment of 600 l to Nicolle Chambre for the purchases of spices and other materials necessary for the packing and preservation of the body of Jehan de Montgommery on its journey home to Scotland (168). Memories of Montgommery as a notably wealthy man survived his death: in April 1449 two soldiers in Pettilot's company in Guienne came to blows after a quarrel which began with

(164) id p. 311-2.
(165) id p. 316.
(166) Gaussin p. 32.
(168) FF 32511 f102ro.
a reminiscence of how Montgommery had left his wife a dress worth 2,000 écus (169) and ended in a murder. It seems from this that Pettilot may well have inherited the command of what was left of Montgommery's company. He himself was to have a narrow escape from the same fate when the final contingents of the army began to withdraw from Alsace in the first two weeks of March 1445. One of the last groups, including the Scots, was ambushed by local troops in the Val de Liepire on the 18th of the month and heavily defeated. Pettilot was badly wounded in the battle and his life was despaired of, but he lived to fight again and even to exact compensation for his losses from the French taxpayer (170). How many of the 3,000 Scots who went into the campaign returned from Alsace is unknown, but it is possible that casualties among all the companies were heavy (171). Whether this was a deliberate objective of the campaign is a matter for speculation; it certainly aided royal plans for reform.

Meanwhile the king himself with many of the main French commanders and their companies not engaged on the Swiss expedition had been involved in an operation of rather less scope but very similar effects, aimed against the city of Metz in its quarrel with René of Anjou as Duke of Lorraine. In this affair as well, the French monarchy had no scruples about hiring English soldiers in time of truce between the countries. That the usual strains involved in joint operations between troops of different national

(169) AN JJ 179 no. 309.
(170) Tuetey Vol. I p. 330-1, P0 2252 Dossier Pettilot no. 3.
(171) For this figure see id p. 293-4, Vol. II p. 520.
backgrounds in the French service were increased by this attempt to make former enemies fight side by side is illustrated by the incident recorded in late November 1444. Three men approached the defenders of the Pont Remond and explained that they were English soldiers who had deserted from the garrison at Servigny after a quarrel with the French there in which they had killed the captain. After a stay in the city prisons until their story was checked, they were released and allowed to join the city's own defenders (172). It is probable that the royal guard participated in this campaign as well; we certainly find payments to Nicolle Chambre, now apparently joint commander of the bodyguard with Christy, for a trip to Germany rather earlier in the same year in search of recruits. He was paid for two men whom he found there, presumably crossbowmen, to join the group of specialist German crannequiniers who figure as part of the guard at this period (173).

All this fighting beyond the frontiers of the kingdom did not completely quieten private strife at home, or even the involvement of professional military forces in private quarrels; we find in the pleadings before Parlement reference to a Spanish captain in a struggle in the west between the Lord of Pons and Pregent de Coëtivy (174) in the spring of 1445. Nevertheless, the expedient of exporting violence had proved fairly successful in clearing the land of the worst of the pillagers. As the

(172) Saulcy and Huguenin, Relation du Siège de Metz en 1444 par Charles VII et Rene d'Anjou Metz 1835 p. 15n.
(173) FF 32511 f82vo.
(174) AN X2a 24 f74ro, 83vo.
battered companies straggled out of Alsace and Lorraine in the spring of 1445, it seems that their numbers had been sufficiently reduced for the royal plans of reform to have a reasonable chance of success, whether their bleeding of the companies had been a deliberate policy or simply a fortunate accident which eased matters greatly.

In addition, the actual arrangements which had been made for the organisation of the truce may well have exercised a considerable influence on what was eventually to happen in the French army. The clauses in the truce arrangements which set about replacing the irregular exactions of garrisons (the so-called "patis") with regular collections in what was effectively a taxation system for the support of the troops involved has considerable similarities with the system which prevailed in France as a whole after 1445; there, too, troops were supported from the proceeds of regular taxation. It is probable that the troops raised from the armies of both sides for the campaigns beyond the frontiers of France came from companies and garrisons not included in these arrangements, which were largely confined to Normandy, Maine Anjou and Perche, though Picardy and Burgundy had the option of setting up a similar system (175). The truce permitted French reorganisation; the patis arrangements perhaps suggested some of the lines which this reorganisation should follow.

Certainly the reform ordonnance which was issued by Charles during this lull in June 1445 was one of the most important events in the history of French military organisation. It has also been one of the most misunderstood, both in its aims and its effects. In the next chapter it is my purpose to examine the fate of the foreign companies in this upheaval, both to see their contribution to the final campaigns of the war and to study the kind of army which the reform actually produced in the light of their experience. This may perhaps permit us to see the intentions and achievements of those who framed it in a more realistic light.
In the summer of 1445, Charles promulgated the ordonnance, the actual text of which has long been lost, by which the companies were reformed, reorganised and placed under closer royal control. The exact details of the structure of the forces thus created are lost as well, and none of the most contemporary chroniclers give much in the way of supplementary detail. Martial d'Auvergne, writing at a time in the 1480s when the whole affair had already slipped into the semi-mythological past golden age of Charles' later years, talks of a simple division into fifteen companies each with a round hundred lances (1). This, however, seems impossibly schematic and over-simplified, especially since Contamine's efforts at reconstruction of the lists of captains have produced a group of some 24 men who can be proved to have held command (2) at this time, with companies of very varying sizes. For some captains it was a disaster; the Écorcheur Antoine de Chabannes appeared before the king clad in deepest mourning to complain that taking away his men was like taking away his life (3). This emotional appeal had no effect; he still lost his command. Laudatory poets of a very much later generation saw this ordonnance as the beginning of a period of military good conduct and even popularity, as the evil men were chased from the companies (4).

(2) Contamine GES p.400, 597.
(3) Histoire... de Chabannes Vol. II, p. 31.
(4) See, for instance, Martial d'Auvergne Vol. I p. 81 or Dit Morale sur le Manti en de Justice of Henri Baude in Les Vers de Maistre Henri Baude, Poete du XVe Siecle Recueilli... et Publies avec les Actes qui Concernent sa Vie J. Quicherat Paris 1856 p. 92.
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while Louis XI is supposed to have regarded it as the start of a new era. What then happened and how were the specifically foreign companies affected by the changes?

The reorganisation did not mean the end of the foreign soldiers in the French royal armies; far from it. No less than four companies specifically for them were set up, each with a foreign commander. Two were Scottish under Pettilot and the previously-obscure Robert Cunningham who was probably the successor of Montgommery, one Spanish under Martin Garcia and the fourth Italian under Boniface de Valpergue. The Scots of the royal bodyguard should perhaps also be counted in this calculation. The total foreign elements were probably around three hundred lances with the two Scottish commanders having fifty each, if the rather vague references in Bevy can be trusted (5) (though Contamine gives Cunningham 40, for which one can also find references in the same source) (6). The commanders thus retained need little introduction: Cunningham, though not appearing in the sources before, may have been related to Montgommery (a letter of remission of rather later date refers to a Montgommery as a relative of his (7)) and Garcia, also known as Enriquez (which can be confusing) seems to have been the illegitimate offspring of a member of the noble Castilian house of Gijon (8). On the other hand, there were definite losers as well. Salazar lost his company to Garcia, as did the other Spanish commanders in Switzerland, such as Conques

(6) Contamine CES p. 400.
(7) AN JJ 185 no. 306.
(8) Daumet p. 86.
and Gonzalez. While the latter two faded quietly from the French scene, Salazar remained in full possession of his lands (9) and was perhaps not completely out of favour if a payment of 300 lt to him in the royal accounts for 1447 is typical (10). He may even have played a certain military role to judge from a later entry in the same accounts in which he is paid sixty livres for his expenses while with the king when the French moved up forces to compel the English withdrawal from Le Mans, as provided by the truce arrangements (11). Another apparent loser is Stewart of Aubigny, despite the claims of the various family historians that he played a continuing role in the army (12); on the other hand, there is a tantalising entry in Bévy which attributes the command of some 25 lances at about this time to him (13). It seems rather doubtful that he could have completely escaped the notice of the various sources in this role, however, and he never appears on the pension lists, so one is forced to suspect a degree of confusion in Bévy (unless he served as a subordinate to one of the other proven Scottish captains). The whole group of minor commanders of the later 1430s have also disappeared; Turnbull and Forty and Baretta and their like.

For those whose position had been confirmed and regularised by the ordonnance, the profits were considerable and equally regular. The captains were given a permanent position on the royal payroll.

(9) Courty p. 77-8.
(10) FF 32511 f124vo.
(11) id f125ro.
(13) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol.I Aubigny.
and, over and above their normal wages as commanders of companies, were in receipt of regular pensions and irregular gifts. In the account of Jean Xaincoins for 1446-7 one finds the four foreign captains receiving their regular 3-400 llt pensions annually (14) with in addition a whole range of occasional gifts. Boniface de Valpergue we find being given payment for travel expenses (15), Cunningham for expenses incurred by living in court at Tours (16) Other gifts were paid out of different sources of royal income. In 1446 the Languedoc aides were made to pay for gifts of armour to Pettilot and Cunningham as well as 275 llt given to Garcia to allow him to visit his relatives in Castile (17). At the very highest level of rewards, Pettilot was given the lands and lordship of Sauveterre-en-Guillenne in August 1448 out of the properties confiscated from the Armagnacs (18).

Naturally the captains and men best integrated into the structures of royal patronage were those of the royal bodyguard, who figure repeatedly in the royal accounts. The Chambre brothers, in addition to their normal pays, collected a whole range of other payments for various services. Their regular wages were high in any case. Nicole was apparently paid 800 llt per month and Christy 600 (19), with such extras as payments for the upkeep of prisoners (20), the customary supplements for living expenses

(14) FF 3251 llt f110ro, 121vo.
(15) id f116vo.
(16) id f125ro.
(17) FF 2325 llt f5vo, 8ro.
(18) AN JJ 179 no. 178.
(19) FF 3251 llt f99ro.
(20) id f108vo.
the maintenance of one's 'état' (21) and the provision of horses, assignments on the salt revenues or Languedoc taxation receipts (22), even the cost of a new wardrobe for Nicole's wife to enable her to play her part at the wedding of Eleanor of Scotland to a Hapsburg prince (23) in 1449.

This kind of royal munificence was not, of course, simple generosity. It was integral to the whole purpose of the reform, the nationalisation of violence to the profit of the king alone, to be achieved, at least partially, by the process of tying the soldier to the fountainhead of royal patronage; a concern which seems to have been of much more concern to those who framed the reform than any hypothetical improvement in discipline. This connection extended below the level of the captains to the ranks of the companies. Naturally the guard, always the unit most closely integrated into the patronage system, were the main beneficiaries. The money was sometimes given to the unit as a whole, channelled through the captains (for such matters as the provision of new clothes or the perennial problem of the upkeep of horses (24) or individually to such as Gilbert de la Haye given 200 lts as reward for loyal service in the guard and for his support in Scotland (25), Guillaume Actuission given 600 as a wedding present (26) or Donot Macasselin given a suit or armour (27). It was not

(21) id f11vo.
(22) PO 659 Dossier Chambre nos. 8, 9.
(23) FF 23259 f17ro.
(24) FF 32511 f109vo, 104vo, FF 23259 f11ro.
(25) FF 32511 f101ro.
(26) id f124vo.
(27) FF 23259 f14vo.
confined to members of the guard, however, one finds payments to Amé de Valpergue to help him pay his ransom to the English (28).

This closer connection with the distribution of royal favours and money undoubtedly helped to make those retained in the reformed companies accept the changed situation. Even ordinary men at arms were able to hope for a share of profits of royal favour if they were fortunate. In addition, the actual effects of the reform at company level were probably less drastic than one might imagine. Many captains lost their commands, but I suspect that relatively far fewer soldiers were disbanded and that the majority found their way into a royal company sooner or later. There were certainly some disbandments; references to safe conducts for such men exist (29), but the majority of those who had followed the profession of arms were probably able to continue in it under the new dispensation. In addition to the companies, there seem to have remained a considerable number of captains of various castles who were outside the new structures and whose garrisons were not drawn from them to provide employment for men unable to keep a place in the companies; the Scot, Alexander McQueen or McCann who figures regularly in accounts of this period as captain of the bridge of Samois (30) is merely one example of a considerable group. While this helped to avoid the nightmare of the creation of free companies by unemployed soldiers, it inevitably affected the new forces. The majority of the men in their ranks

(28) FF 32511 f124ro.
(30) FF 32511 f102vo, 110vo, 111ro, 122ro. etc.
had learned their trade in the days of the Ecorcheurs and their newly-respectable status did nothing to change their attitude to their surroundings. One could get rid of Salazar; one could not get rid of his men so easily. Interpretations of the reform which stress the improved discipline of the companies ignore this fact at their peril.

The documentation which has survived tends to underline this reality. In July 1447 Pettilot was paid 300 lt by the estates of Gevaudan to move his company out and take them to Comminges: a transaction which resembles those to which Villandrando had been given in his prime (31). At much the same time Martin Garcia was being paid to remove his company from Velay and take it to Guienne (32). Despite the optimistic claims of such people as Martial d'Auvergne and Baude, the army was never popular with those who had to endure its presence for any length of time (33). The long-suffering consuls of Montréal d'Auvergne met on 10th June 1447 to discuss the misdeeds of the garrison of Condom and the behaviour of the captain of the Lombards who was ravaging the countryside (probably one of the Valpergues, though this is impossible to prove) (34). This kind of problem is reflected in a court case which reached Parlement in the summer of 1448 between one Cyprian de Montflour and a local nobleman from the Beaujolais called Tastin de la Garde. Cyprian claimed to have lost nine horses and goods worth in total 800écus to Tastin when the latter had attacked him

(31) PO 2252 Dossier Pettilot no. 2.
(32) PO 1277 Dossier Garcia no. 2.
(33) See Solon's article passim for instance.
(34) Comptes de Montréal AH Gironde 32 p. 52-3.
and his men billeted there. Tastin brought a counter-case claiming that Cyprian's Italian troops had done him some 2,000 écus worth of damage in their pillaging, and from the welter of claims and counter-claims a picture of effective warfare between the local nobility and royal troops emerges clearly. The exact date of the matters at issue is obscure and perhaps not very important; the really significant fact is that Cyprian in 1448 was a member of an ordonnance company in the supposedly purged army (35). The burden of supporting the troops was, in addition, met very largely from locally levied taxes; we find payments to Cunningham for his 40 lances in the Montagnes d'Auvergne (36) made in this manner. This provoked little popular rebellion on an organised scale (though much evasion and attempts to move the burden on to other shoulders by administrative means) (37) but the presence of the soldiers whose benefit the taxes were being raised for was sometimes necessary to compel their collection. There was even a momentary attempt at resistance in the Armagnac lands in 1446 when Auch and Vic tried to refuse to accept troops and Lectore refortified its walls. The rebellion was reported by Theaulde de Valpergue to the Parlement of Toulouse, but it petered out ignominiously when Garcia's company appeared on the scene; the town of Riscle, whose accounts preserve the records of the abortive revolt found itself having to maintain two lances (later reduced to one) and in 1448 was paying 22 écus for its own garrison over and above 16 écus and

(35) AN X2a 24 f257vo-9vo., 263ro.
(36) PO 838 Dossier de Conigan nos. 7-9.
(37) Solon p. 80-5, 90-1.
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12 sous of subsidy to Garcia (38).

This role of the army of the French monarchy in the second half of the fifteenth century as a mechanism for converting tax revenue into patronage should not be under-estimated. Nevertheless, the question of what to do with the force thus created remained. Charles looked towards intervention in Italy momentarily; Theaulde de Valpergue was sent to Milan as ambassador (39) and paid 500 l.t for his travel expenses (40). Other negotiations were pursued with the Swiss to make sure of their support, or at least neutrality in the event of such a move (41). The parallel negotiations which saw Eleanor of Scotland married to Sigismund of Austria were conducted by Guillaume Monneypenny, evidently recovered from his misfortunes at the time of the Praguerie and launched on a lengthy diplomatic career (42).

This exploration of potential employment of the reorganised army outside the kingdom in the east was never to come about. On 12th March, 1449, the Aragonese captain in the English service, Francois de Surienne, stormed the Breton town of Fougeres and the new structure was to be tried out against the oldest enemy of all. The beginning of actual hostilities in August brought about a redeployment of companies from their peace-time stations to the two theatres of war in Normandy and the south-west. The former

(40) FF 32511 f127ro.
(41) de Mondrot p. 14-5.
(42) id p. 16-7.
was the first royal objective, and some of the foreign companies participated in this campaign. In fact, the main concentration of foreign troops had been in the south and centre; Pettilot's men had been based in the Toulousain where they had left many traces in the Notarial registers (43), Garcia and the Italians were probably in much the same area while Cunningham's company was still in the Haut Pays d'Auvergne. Their presence was far from universally welcome; in May two of his men were given remission for the murder of an inhabitant of Aurillac after a brawl between a page and a local youth (44). No doubt the withdrawal of his men to fight in Normandy, illustrated by a quittance issued by Cunningham for the payment of his men in the Auvergne and then in Normandy on 5th December (45) came as a welcome relief.

The actual history of the Norman campaign has been often enough told to require no detailed elaboration. Cunningham and his men reached the duchy in time to participate in the siege of Rouen in October (46) and joined in what at times was more like a triumphal progress than a serious campaign through Normandy. They were not the only foreigners involved in the campaign; the diplomatic specialist Monneypenny was knighted by the king when battle was expected at one point in the siege (47), while Theaulde de Valpergue had been with the royal army from the start of the

(44) AN JJ 179 no. 318.
(45) PO 838 Dossier de Conigan no. 10.
campaign serving at Louviers and Chateau-Gaillard (48) and was
to receive his reward after the fall of Rouen where he entered the
city at the head of 300 archers of the royal bodyguard richly
dressed (49). It was not all parades, however, and Cunningham's
company were involved in the one decisive battle of the campaign
at Formigny where the last English field army in Normandy was
defeated. They were apparently in the vanguard of the Count of
Clermont's small but efficient army in what was, for its importance,
a remarkably small-scale battle and seem to have distinguished
themselves in the fighting (50). The mopping up of the remaining
English garrisons followed the victory; at the siege of Bayeux
Cunningham and his men were dug in round the Cordeliers and by this
time had some of the infantry militia of Franc Archiers attached
to them, perhaps in the hope of stiffening these rather unreliable
elements (51). At Caen, where the royal army arrived to reinforce
the siege and which was to have considerable significance in
Cunningham's career some five years later, his men distinguished
themselves in fighting round the church steeple at Barneville (52).
After the fall of the town, one of Cunningham's men was to operate
a highly profitable protection racket with the aid of an English
prisoner before deserting with the profits (53). Meanwhile the

(48) Chartier Vol. II p. 111, 134, Gilles de Bouvier 'Le Recouvrement
de Normandie in Narratives of the Expulsion of the English from

(49) d’Escouchy Vol. I p. 235, Bouvier Recouvrement p. 315, Chartier

(50) Bouvier Recouvrement p. 333, Chartier Vol. II p. 205, Waurin
Reiffenbaur Brusse11s 1823 p. 364.

(51) Bouvier Recouvrement p. 340, Chartier Vol. II p. 205, Waurin

(52) Robert Blondel 'La Leluction Normanniae in Narratives ed.
Stevenson p. 98, Cosneau p. 449.

(53) AN JJ 185 no. 306.
campaign drew to an inevitable conclusion with the taking of Cherbourg, where Cunningham was also involved (54). In the lists of those who had distinguished themselves, Cunningham was mentioned for his valour, while Valpergue, who had remained with the royal party and had taken part in the final sieges as well (55), was among those who had helped administratively, especially in raising money; interesting proof of changed status (56).

To the victors went the rewards: Cunningham was given 570 lt from the revenues of Dun le Roi, of which he was captain, early in 1451 as repayment of monies sent to the Chambre des Comptes (57). Valpergue remained in the duchy on royal business travelling around in an attempt to bring order to the troops now lodged there and suppress pillaging, a service for which he was paid 200 lt in October 1450 (58) - the kind of profitable career in the developing military bureaucracy in which several old soldiers were to spend their declining years. He had also been involved in other administrative functions such as interrogating the captured Osbert Mundeford after the fall of Pont-Audemer (59). Monney penny had his expenses as part of the royal entourage during the conquest paid for him, as well as going on a diplomatic mission to Scotland to tell the news of the campaign (60). There were even payments to a Genoese gunner for making a new type of cart to transport

(57) FF 23271 p. 429.
(58) FF 26079 no. 6261.
(60) FF 23260 p. 3, 7.
artillery at less cost, and, apparently, without horses (61).

In the south the war also seems to have got underway in the summer of 1449. According to the testimony of a member of Pettilot's company at Fierboys, the company had been in action against "brigands" somewhere in the south at this time, and it is at least possible that Gascon supporters of the English are meant by this (62). Certainly as early as 1449 Pettilot appears in the registers of Montal-duc-Gers to recruit crossbowmen, and on 22nd August 1450 he demanded money from the consuls to help his ordonnance troops (63). Certainly in October of that year, after the fall of Bazas, forces under Orval engaged in a large-scale plundering raid across English-held territory towards Bordeaux. The English forces, backed by the town militia came out to intercept the raiders and met them near Blanquefort. There the small French army spectacularly routed their more numerous enemies, inflicting heavy losses in dead and captured (64).

The following year the conquest of the south-west was begun in earnest with a multi-pronged offensive aimed at the remaining English strongholds. Garcia, whose men had moved through the Armagnac lands on the way to the theatre of war (one of them died at Vic, where he left 25écus to the local church for the repose of his soul) (65) with the concomitant extortion as the consuls of Riscle paid to feed him in January as a means of dissuading his men from pillage (66) joined up with Pettilot under the command of

(61) id p.6.
(63) Montal-du-Gers AH Gironda no. 32 p. 75,82.
(64) d'Escouchy Vol.I p. 322, Chartier Vol. II p. 246, Ribadieu p. 175-8
(65) Riscle AH Gascogne 12-13, p.51.
(66) id p. 51.
Foix and Orval at the sieges of Arques and Dax (67). Meanwhile Theaulde de Valpergue joined up with the army of Dunois and was heavily involved with the diplomacy of victory helping to negotiate the surrenders of first Fronsac, then Bordeaux (68) which he was the first man to enter. After this easy success, the entire French army moved south to Bayonne, the last English foothold in the area. Dunois' army now included Cunningham's company; whether this had played any part in the earlier stages of the conquest is uncertain (69). The army was drawn up round the town with Cunningham and Boniface de Valpergue on the Bearn side under Dunois, while Foix's army, including Pettilot and Garcia, were on the Faubourg de St. Léon, with Garcia's men defending a fortified church which they had captured in an early stage of the siege (70). Theaulde de Valpergue, whose attachment to the army is uncertain (he is placed in different commands by different chroniclers) was apparently mostly engaged in the surrender negotiations, which culminated in a peaceful surrender on 14th August (71). This was probably speeded up by the appearance of a white cross (the symbol of the French) in the sky at the hour ordained for surrender, a "miracle" which Dunois was not at all slow to stress in his letters to the king, also stressing that Garcia's Spaniards were among those to see the sight most clearly (72). After the surrender, Garcia was placed in

(72) FF 5028 f183vo.
charge of the town as governor (73).

This should, perhaps, have been the end. In the late summer of 1452, after considerable secret negotiation (74) the region rose against French rule and was given English support in the shape of an army under Talbot which reached the Gironde estuary in October. Apparently Theaulde de Valpergue was still in the area as a member of Clermont's council perhaps conducting similar business to that he had done in Normandy, since there are references to him conducting musters in this period (75). He narrowly escaped capture on the river and was only saved by the efforts of various archers from his brother's company (76). Through the winter Talbot consolidated his hold on the region (though Garcia in Bayonne seems to have been left pretty well undisturbed), while Charles prepared a counter-stroke which would be decisive. Negotiations were even opened with the Swiss to provide infantry reinforcements to bolster the army; pay of five Rhine florins per day was offered, with a month in advance (a great change from the days when Charles had hoped to get his allies to provide men at their expense). The Swiss were, however, at this time, far from keen on the idea of letting foreigners hire their men so the negotiations came to nothing (77) and Clermont's army advanced into Guienne without this aid. As it was, the army was far too strong for Talbot's limited forces, and the English commander was compelled to

(74) Vale English Gascony p. 142-5.
(75) Arsenal 4522 f24ro.
(76) d'Escouchy Vol.I p. 414-5.
(77) de Mandrot p. 26.
wait until the French divided their forces before attacking the smaller of the sections at Castillon, where he was utterly routed. In the French army under Lohéac was to be found Pettilot and his Scots (78). Theaulde de Valpergue, who had spent much of the spring of 1453 engaged in raising troops on behalf of the Count of Foix to serve in the army of the reconquest (79), led them into action at the siege of Cadillac after the battle (80). As the campaign turned into a huge pillaging expedition, the foreign contingents were well to the fore, with Valpergue operating round Libourne and St. Émilion (81) and Pettilot ravaging the Médoc with fire and sword, while the main army was besieging Bordeaux for the second time (82). With the surrender of the capital in October, the war was finally and definitively over. This did not entail unemployment for the soldiers who had been engaged in gaining the victory. Valpergue remained in Guienne to help with the administration of the reconquered province, beginning with the construction of two new castles in Bordeaux (83), while Pettilot became captain of Châteauneuf in the middle of the Médoc he had so convincingly devastated (84).

Nevertheless, the coming of peace did usher in a new period in the life of the military establishment, a period of tranquility and

(79) id p. 328-30.
(80) id p. 21.
(82) Ribadieu p. 329.
comparative stability in the command of the companies and in their
deployment. The Spanish company remained under Garcia and the
Italian one under Boniface de Valpergue until his death, which must
have happened at some point in 1460, since his executors issued a
receipt for his wages in October of that year (85). His successor
is not known for certain, though there was one since the trésorier-
deguerre accounts for 1461 talk of troops under a 'Captain of
Lombardy' (86); perhaps the rather shadowy figure of Galeas Jambe,
who was certainly in the same area at the time and after took over.
The company may, however, have been losing some of its separate
identity by this time. The Scots had a slightly more complex
history. The two companies set up in 1445 survived apart until
the disgrace of Cunningham in 1455, after which they seem to have
been merged under Pettilot. The guard, perhaps predictably, had
much the most complex series of changes. At some time in 1449 the
Chambre family relinquished command; by September payments were
being made to Patrick Folcart and Thomas Halliday who had taken over
the company (87). The Chambres do not seem at this point to have
fallen from favour; Nicolle was still in receipt of various presents
such as money for a new suit of armour (88) as well as a pension
of 600 lt. drawn, it would seem, on the salt revenues of Saintonge
(89) which was still being paid in 1459 (90). There is even an

(85) PO 2924 Dossier Valpergue no. 12.
(86) FF 20692 p. 190.
(87) FF 23259 f22ro.
(88) FF 32511 f142vo.
(89) id f164ro.
(90) PO 659 Dossier Chambre no. 10.
account in a letter of remission of the troubles caused in a village in Poitou by men from what is called "Chambre's company" in 1456; what this actually means is uncertain and there is a severe lack of supporting evidence (apart from another of Bévy's enigmatic entries which has Nicolle Chambre as commander of some troops in the 1450s (91) which might explain the reference (92)). The new joint command of the guard lasted until 1454 when one Claude de Châteauneuf joined the other two, to be joined in his turn by Michel de Beauvilliers the following year. In 1457 the structure changed again, with Helyon de Brouage replacing Beauvilliers and Halliday disappearing. By the following year, however, Brouage had in his turn departed and the Folcart-Châteauneuf combination lasted out the reign (93). Perhaps this continued changing reflects the troubled side of the final years of the reign, with a good deal of tension at court and the vital necessity of trustworthy commanders for the military forces closest to the royal person.

The ordinary ordonnance companies were much less affected by such changes of leadership, as we have seen. Their deployment remained more or less stable in this period as well. The foreign companies were very much concentrated in the south-west, around Bayonne and in other strong points of the Sénéchaussée of the Landes; indeed there is record of Cunningham's men being moved there as well

(91) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. I Chambre.
(92) AN JJ 187 no. 208 (published AH Poitou XXXV p. 9-14.
(93) Forbes Leith Vol. II p. 16, 17, 20-2 (publication of the full muster rolls and accounts of the Guard companies in FF 8000).
at some point in 1453 perhaps as a consequence of the Castillon campaign and continuing worry about English attacks in the region (94). The different groups did not always live in harmony by any means; the same letter of remission which records the movements mentioned above, goes on to talk of frequent brawls in Bayonne between Scots and Spaniards and transfers of the worst offenders to other garrisons in the hope that this would ease the situation (in this particular case the scheme failed because some Spaniards turned up in the town, with the inevitable result of a brawl and a dead Spaniard) (95). All the evidence from letters of remission and the like suggests that Pettilot's men remained spread across the various garrisons of the Landes and even slightly further north for the entire period. In January 1461 the company was reviewed, partly at Dax and Bayonne under Pettilot and partly at Lectore under Geoffrey de Valpergue (probably another member of the family) (96). The Italians are less conspicuous, though the career of their commander suggests that they were probably based in the same region. Certainly a muster of part of the company of Galias Jambe has survived, which was taken at the same time, and probably as part of the same commission, as that concerning Petillot's men. This seems to have a fair mixture of Italians in its ranks, as the strange names recorded suggest, and a few more clearly identifiable ones prove (Bartolomeo Dalixandre, Jehan Lombart or Bartolomeo de Peise, for instance) (97). On the

(94) AN JJ 187 no. 289.
(95) id
(96) AN K 69 no. 42 bis, FF 25778 no. 1905.
(97) FF 25778 no. 1906.
other hand, obvious non-Italians such as Yvonnet le Breton can be found in the ranks, which suggests that the original national composition of the company was beginning to break up. García’s Spaniards were also based in the Bayonne region, though some sections of his company were rather slow in joining their commander there since in 1453 García’s lieutenant had to be paid to move his men out of Riscle, and one of his men who had left the service (perhaps deserted) had his belongings sold in Vic (98). They moved north into the Saintonge on his promotion to the seneschal of that region in 1459. Their presence in the region is well recorded in the volumes of letters of remission concerning them and their pillages in the area (99).

On the whole, then, the companies tended to follow their captains when they were given administrative office outside the strictly military sphere. This duplication of civil and military functions was to become ever more common in later years, and, while it might make sense under certain circumstances, in the long term it was likely to produce absenteeism from some at least of the offices and their consequent neglect. This exercise of office by deputy was deeply embedded in the office-holding system however, and the army was rapidly to become another extension of the same structure.

The career of Pettilot as seneschal of the Landes illustrates one of the problems posed by combining civil and military power in

(98) Riscle AH Gascogne 12-3 p. 58.

the hands of the same man. He was appointed in 1454 and remained there to the end of the reign. Much of his energy seems to have been spent in a very lengthy legal battle with the senechal of Guienne over their respective rights of jurisdiction (with Pettirot trying to avoid subordination to Bordeaux). In the pleadings before the Grand Jours of Bordeaux on the subject (for the battle was well and truly joined when the first of these sessions met in 1456 and was to continue at the second in 1459 without any clear-cut solution) the Guienne side produced stories of considerable misgovernment and oppression by the senechal and his officials which, even though produced in a forum where ritualised vilification of the opposition was common form ring fairly true (100). The proceedings of the ephemeral local estates which flickered into being at this period, combined with the complaints of the Albret family about the violations of their privileges and those of their tenants in 1458, help to amplify the picture. They are especially full of complaints about the behaviour of troops billeted in the region, who were apparently not paying for their accommodation and the other services provided for them by those they were billeted with. Further complaints were made about the damage they caused on the way to and from reviews. The situation was so bad, the towns claimed, that they were unable to pay the taxes levied for the refortification of Bayonne, because of this oppression. Admittedly this can be seen as another familiar and almost ritualised appeal by communities unwilling to pay taxes, but there seems, from

(100) L Cadier La Sénéchaussée des Lannes sous Charles VII - Administration Royale et Etats Provinciaux Paris 1885 p. 22.
other sources, to have been considerable tension at local level between troops and townspeople in the south-west, and such individual actions alluded to as the seizure of 82 beds in Bayonne in defiance of privileges by one of Pettilot's subordinates suggest that there was some concrete reality behind the familiar laments
(101). The royal response, perhaps delivered by Pettilot himself, was placatory; orders would be given to the local commanders to see that payment was made, if need be by stopping the pay of offenders. Since the men claimed that the troops based in Bordeaux did not have to pay for their accommodation and used this as an excuse for refusing to pay themselves, efforts would also be made to see that the Bordeaux men paid as well (102).

How effective these promises were is a matter for pure speculation; it is perhaps worthy of note that in the following year the towns had a new grievance to pursue: they wanted troops billeted in the town to pay local taxes (103). Certainly these local problems did not affect Pettilot's position at court, where he continued to receive favours in the shape of an accumulation of military and quasi-military commands most of which he must have performed largely by deputy. His service on the commission which dealt with a potential pro-English plot in 1454 (104) was understandable in the light of his position in the region, and his holding of the captaincies of Dax and St. Sever also made sense given his command of the companies which held the towns (indeed, his captaincy in Dax

(101) Cadier p. 44-5, 80-1.
(102) id p. 80-1.
(103) id p. 85-6.
(104) Ribadieu p. 380.
preceded his elevation to be seneschal by some three years since he was appointed in September 1451 (105). It also rounded his income out nicely (106). Other captaincies made rather less immediate sense. In August 1457 he was made captain of Montoire in Toulousain; this, however, he lost in January 1459 since he could not perform the functions adequately without pay and the authorities in Toulouse who should have done this had made such trouble that he had been left effectively unpaid throughout his tenure (107). In compensation, perhaps, he was made captain of Maurier in Armagnac and apparently had no problem in collecting his wages in this post (108).

It is reasonable to assume that the other foreign captains had fairly similar careers in this period, though none is quite as well documented. Garcia, for instance, served as mayor of Bayonne at least until 1455 (109), but achieved his promotion to major administrative status in March 1459 when he became seneschal of Saintonge (110) where, despite the occasional troubles caused by his troops, his stay was not marked by any major dispute. He seems to have accumulated fewer extra posts, though he had some of the same problems as Pettilot in extracting his due from those meant to pay him. As early as 1453 the diocese of Mirepoix was refusing to pay its share of the tax revenues intended to support Garcia and

(105) PO 2252 Dossier Pettilot no. 5.
(106) FF 20580 f5ro.
(107) PO 2252 Pettilot nos. 10, 11.
(108) id no. 9.
(109) FF 20580 f5vo.
(110) FF 21405 p. 131.
Pettilot in Bayonne and Dax. As a result their men were not being paid which was to the "tresgrant prejudice et dammaige....de nos dites villes....et de nos pays denviron par faute de garde et deffense". (111)

The Valpergue family was as usual well positioned in terms of offices of profit held. Theaulde, for instance, though fully occupied in the south-west, managed to maintain his connections with (and wages from) Lyon until very late. In February 1459 the king was trying to extract his back pay as captain of the town for him to enable him to pay his debts in the area (112). By then he had been named as governor of Bayonne, a post he had held at least from 1457 when he inspected the privileges of Albret in the region (113). In the period before this, he had been Commis au Gouvernement de la Senéchaussée de Guienne; part of the commission charged with running the conquered territories. In this role he drew his wages in February 1454 (114); in this role also he appears briefly in the record of the 1456 Grandes Jours of Bordeaux (115).

Inevitably, perhaps, he combined this with other offices - as castellan of Séverac from 1451 onwards (116) to October 1461 at least and the captaincy of Lectore which he held in October 1461 as well (117).
By then he was governor of Bayonne, paid from Bordeaux (118) and

(111) PO 1277 Dossier Garcie no. 5.
(113) Cadier p. 74-5.
(114) FF 26082 no. 6649.
(116) FF 26081 no. 6458, FF 26083 no. 6882, PO 2924 Dossier Valpergue nos. 13-4, 16, 19, 20, 22.
(117) id no. 21.
(118) FF 26086 no. 7322.
involved in reviewing and paying the troops at Bayonne and St. Séver in October 1460 (119). His brother was almost as active, though perhaps not quite so highly placed. His regular pension was drawn from Armagnac tax revenues (120) and his main occupations were in the south as well, but he found time to go on an embassy to Geneva on royal business with the Duke of Savoy (121). His main office was probably the mayorship of Bayonne - a post which he held at his death in 1460 (as we saw his executors were concerned to collect wages still owing him) and which he must have taken over at least by 1457 since he was issuing payment orders in that function from that date (122).

The rather cosy world of the post-war commanders, accumulating offices and captaincies to be performed by deputy is, however, only one aspect of the life of the soldier in peacetime. If the rewards for faithful service were considerable, so were the pitfalls posed by questions of loyalty. It was also a dangerous time of intrigue and tension, and the army was far from insulated from the consequences of the quarrels between King and Dauphin. Indeed, the foreign companies were especially affected. The Guard were inevitably at the heart of politics and much affected by them. As early as 1446 the potential problems were well illustrated in the story of the Dauphin's plottings of that year as revealed by Antoine de Chabannes, interrogated in September of that year. Even if the

(119) id no. 7438.
(120) FF 2886 f15vo.
(122) E Delaurens Inventaire Sommaire des Archives Communaux de l'Archives des Archives Communaux de la Ville de Bayonne Anterieur a 1790 Bayonne 1894 Vol.I p. 100-3.
details of his testimony are perhaps suspect, they reveal much about the mechanics of such plotting as well as the prerequisites for success. He alleged that at Chinon the Dauphin had pointed at one of the Scots of the guard and said "See those who keep the kingdom of France in subjection" ("Voyez la ceulx qui tiennent le Royme de France en subjection"), who by their presence prevented people from doing many things which they would otherwise do ("et que se neust estre le garde on entrepris beaucoup des choses que on n'apas fait"). To gain the access to the royal person which was vital to his plot, he planned to buy over Chambre, captain at that point, or if that failed to overwhelm them with his own men whom Chabannes was to aid in recruiting. Despite a certain confidence that he was potentially corruptable, Chambre remained loyal and the whole plot petered out in failure. Nevertheless the story well illustrates the crucial importance of the royal guard and explains why they were such a well treated unit at all times (123).

The failure of this particular plot did not bring tension to an end. The estrangement between Charles and his son lasted through the 1450s until Louis' precipitate flight to Flanders and Burgundian protection in 1456, and indeed beyond. In the period when he was in the Dauphiné, with his own group of followers in effective exile from court, the plotting seems to have continued. This perhaps accounts for the curious case of Robert Cunningham. On 8th August 1455, he, along with several of his subordinates, appeared before royal courts charged with treason. The case went

(123) FF 20427 f3ro-4vo. Vale Charles VII p. 100-3.
back five years to the siege of Caen where, it was alleged, his lieutenant John Campbell with Guillaume Cunningham, Robert Johnston and James Haliburton had entered into an agreement with the Duke of Somerset to capture one of the main French commanders (the list given included such men as Dunois and Jacques Coeur) and guide an English force of 1500 men out of the city. Of these, five hundred were to capture the king himself, while the remaining thousand spread havoc in the French camp (124). For this they were to be paid 4,000 écus and fifty pounds sterling. Campbell was found guilty and executed; his quarters were hung over the gates of Paris (125). The fate of the other conspirators is uncertain, and that of Cunningham, who was apparently involved in the plot as well, was to become a matter for intense diplomatic activity. The truth of the charges can only be guessed at; on the face of it, it seems rather odd that such detailed charges should have been brought at such a distance in time from the alleged plot. There is little background available on the case, so we do not know how it was supposed to have come to light; nevertheless one is left with a suspicion that whatever may have happened at Caen, the actual prosecution had more to do with the tensions at court in 1455 than anything else.

This suspicion is heightened by the diplomatic uproar which the affair provoked and which lasted for the better part of two years until Cunningham was definitively sentenced. Even before the case reached court the royal council was concerned about this aspect. The arrival of Bishop Spence of Galloway on 19th May 1455 at the head of

(124) Dupuy 38 f89ro.
(125) id £88ro.
a Scottish embassy bearing a letter from King James II which demanded that justice be done, while assuring Charles that he would wish very severe punishment if the accusations were true. The case was put to a committee which included Dunois and Folcart with whom the ambassadors had to discuss the matter (126). Five days later on the 25th the council returned to the case and ordered the gathering together of all Cunningham's correspondence for examination, whether it related to the case in hand or not, a significant move which suggests strongly that there were other matters of concern to be dealt with (127). In fact, despite the efforts to allay Scottish concern, the case was to be a matter for diplomatic correspondence for two more years. In January 1457 Charles felt it necessary to include the affair in a letter to James. He regretted the incident but stated firmly that it had been necessary, as the confessions of those involved proved (128). In February of the same year, the confession of Campbell was shown to the Scottish ambassadors to prove that justice had indeed been done (129), and in the end the repeated Scottish petitions irritated Charles enough for him to state shortly that he had done what he had done only after mature consideration and in the light of the confessions of those involved (130). Nevertheless, it appears to have had some positive results since Cunningham was spared the fate of Campbell; on the 15th August he had to beg mercy of the king and submit to whatever punishment he was given. In practice he lost all his

(127) id p. 303.
(129) FF 5908 f87ro.
(130) F Lat 10187 f50ro.
offices, including his command, and was forbidden on the pain of confiscation of all his goods to come within ten leagues of the king’s person for the next three years (131). These provisions suggest again that the real concern was the danger to the person of the monarch, and there is a strong probability that the case had much to do with the Dauphin, especially in the light of Cunningham’s return to favour when Louis came to the throne. It also indicates a very real concern about the loyalty of the soldiers in a period of tension.

The diplomatic negotiations concerning Cunningham reveal that other Scots had fallen foul of the prevailing suspicions at court. By the time of the letter of Charles to James in January 1457, Thomas Halliday, joint commander of the guard, was apparently in prison as well (132). Much less is known about his case, and it is uncertain whether he was ever actually brought to trial. A close look at the muster rolls of the guard, however, reveals something very strange. One of the sub-units of the Guard, a body of about 48 archers underwent a spectacular change in personnel in this period. In the muster records of 1457, eight men are replaced, and in the following year another eleven depart (133). A turnover of nearly 40% in the course of two years is most unusual and the only comparison is the upheaval when Louis came to the throne in 1461. With one of the commanders in prison at the same time, it seems at least possible that political explanations should

(131) FF 5908 f87ro.
be sought here as well. No doubt the peculiarly politically sensitive nature of the unit, whose members slept in the royal lodging as well as mounting guard outside (134) made a close concern for the loyalty of the rank and file as well as the commanders inevitable.

The climate of suspicion persisted to the end of the reign; we find records of two more Scots being arrested in 1459, though their supposed crimes are again obscure (135). Perhaps the strange entry in the accounts of Mathieu Beauvarlet, Tresorier de Guerre, for 1457, concerning a payment to a Thomas Cunningham in order that he might leave the realm as he had been ordered to, indicates another case (136). It even appears that royal disfavour fell on those no longer actively involved in the military establishment. After the accession of King Louis, on 15th August 1461 Katherine Henyne, widow of Nicolle Chambre, appealed to him on behalf of her children to gain possession of certain lands in the Sénéchaussée of Saintonge. The gist of her appeal was that she and her family had suffered for their loyalty to Louis under the previous reign: Nicolle had been "desappointie de tant de bien et honneur" and had ended his days "charge de dettes" (137). The exact truth of this appeal is almost impossible to ascertain. If he fell from favour, it must have been after 1459 since his pension

(134) As illustrated by the purchase of materials which were made up into "paillasses" for members of the guard to sleep on while fully armed, recorded in the Argenterie accounts AN KK 51 f95vo.


(136) FF 32511 p191ro.

(137) FF 20486 f191ro.
was still being paid then, and his previous career hardly suggests a zealous supporter of the Dauphin. On the other hand, in the tense atmosphere of the closing reign he may well have fallen into royal disfavour. Whether Katherine was trying to take advantage of the change to steal a march on local rivals or otherwise not telling the full truth, the fact that she thought it worth her effort to make an appeal in these terms indicates the amount of dispossessing and other punishment for dubious loyalty being meted out towards the end of the reign, and how precarious the enjoyment of royal favour could be.

Indeed, as the life of the old king slowly drew to its close, those who had managed to remain in favour with him to the end had plenty of reasons to be concerned about their future under a new monarch who made little effort to hide his dislike of those who had served his father faithfully. In his Burgundian-financed exile in Flanders, Louis was building up a counter-court staffed with his own men like the Savoyard Jacques de Valpergue (whose relationship with the others of this name is uncertain), another Boniface de Valpergue whom he had made captain of Grane in the Dauphiné (138) and the Scot, Thomas Scuyer or Stuier who appears on a list of his officers in March 1448 (139). These men would seek their rewards when their king came to his own, and one can well imagine the worries of those in place, often men who had spent most of their adult lives in France and had grown old with the king they served; now their careers would be in suspense from the moment he died.

(139) id p. 223. See also PO Dossier Stuyer no. 2.
Their concern about the future was well founded. The scale of the purge of the ranks of the commanders of the ordonnance may well have surprised even the most pessimistic. According to the calculations of Contamine, no less than 75% of the captains in place in January 1461 had lost their commands by the end of the year (140). Even intensive backstairs intrigue could not save those whom Louis had decided to destroy, as the fate of Antoine de Chabannes illustrates. The new king regarded him as a deadly enemy, and such former allies as the Boniface de Valpergue in Louis' entourage not only did nothing to help him, but even considered imprisoning his messengers. It was said that another old associate, Salazar, wanted to arrange for the complete destruction of his position and the confiscation of all his goods (141). No doubt Chabannes, who had more to fear than most, intrigued more desperately than his fellows, but his efforts and their ultimate failure could probably be paralleled for the other commanders. Certainly the foreign companies and their commanders were not immune from the effects of this sweeping purge, the dangers of which were to become apparent. Garcia, replaced by Salazar in command of what had originally been the latter's company and given the princely sum of 120 £t apparently in compensation (142) simply disappears from the records and his ultimate fate is uncertain. It is possible that he may have settled in France since in 1466 one finds payments to a page at court called Grimon Garcia to go to visit his parents in

(140) Contamine GES p. 405-6.
(142) FF 32511 f248ro.
Bordeaux (143). Salazar resumed command on 13th August (144) and one finds payments to him for distribution to ten gentlemen of his company, perhaps the senior men at arms, in accounts for the same year. On the same date, the Scottish company changed hands. Pettilot vanishes from the records even more completely and it is possible that death may have eased the change-over in this case. The new dispensation saw the division of the company into two fifty lance sections again, under Robert Cunningham (appointed on 13th August as well, to complete the transformation of his fortunes with the change of kings) (146) and Thomas Scuyer, Bailli of Caen and an old servant of the new king, who took command at Bordeaux on 24th March 1462 (147). The Italians survived rather better; Theaulde de Valpergue remained in office in the first few months of the reign and may well have died in harness. Louis remained active, though in a diplomatic capacity rather than a military one (148). Indeed the Italian company seems to have disappeared, perhaps assimilated into the army as a largely French unit.

Predictably the major upheaval comes in the ranks of the Guard. There Folcart lost his position on the change of monarch and was replaced by a group of six captains, including Thomas Scuyer and Cunningham (149). The effective commander for day to day administration would appear to have been Scuyer's brother Guille, aided by

(143) id f252ro, FF 20685 f383.
(144) FF 20692 p. 192.
(145) FF 32511 f230ro.
(146) FF 20692 p. 192, FF 6971 f240vo.
(147) id
(148) FF 32511 f253vo. FF 20685 p. 387.
Alexander Barry who had been one of the men at arms of the Guard (150). There was a considerable structural upheaval as well; the group of about 25-30 men-at-arms, which had existed before, simply vanished, while one of the two units of archers received some 23 new members on top of a body of 47 (151). The new format was of two units, an elite of about 25 known as 'Archiers du Corps' and a group of about 75 'Archiers de la Garde', and the 16 German crossbowmen who were attached to the unit in the previous reign vanished as well. The figures are rather difficult to be precise about, since the muster records do not seem to record all the changes which one can deduce from the nominal rolls. For instance, the probable brothers Herbert and Tassin Macsonnel (Maxwell?) who lost their places in the upheaval of 1457-8 return to the ranks without any formal references in the records of comings and goings (152). Whatever the exact numbers involved, the unit's complexion and composition was drastically altered. Folcart, no doubt disgruntled with the turn of events, transferred his services to Charles of France, Louis' younger brother (153) and commanded his bodyguard, which may well have had a Scottish element in it. Of those who had apparently suffered under Charles, Thomas Halliday's fate is the most obscure. One account shows payments to him as a member of the Guard in 1466, but he never reappears on the rolls of any of the companies (154).

(150) id p. 27.
(151) id p. 25-6, 27-30.
(152) id p. 23, 28.
(154) FF 20685 p. 379.
These changes do not seem to have affected the capacities of the companies involved unduly in the short term, and many of them were to be plunged into action almost straight away in Catalonia to support Louis' ally John II of Aragon against the rebellious province (and also exploit the situation to grab the detached provinces of Cerdagne and Roussillon on the French side of the Pyrenees for himself). Cunningham (and possibly Stuyer, who may well be the 'Thom' of Leseur's chronicle account) was part of the army under the Count of Foix which crossed the mountains in the summer of 1462 to carry the war into enemy territory and relieve the hard-pressed John. His troops forced the pass of Salses to aid at the relief of Gerona; both Cunningham and 'Thom' participated in the triumphal entry to the city in July. The Scots were in the vanguard at the Battle of Torreilhas, storming the hill on which the Catalans were drawn up and fighting "merveilles bien et vaillamment" (155). They participated in the rest of the campaign - the abortive siege of Barcelona, the successful one of Tarragona in which they stormed the section of the walls near the Dominican church and the final section of the campaign which ended with the entry to Saragossa (156). Involvement in hard fighting did not curb the flashes of indiscipline and often fatal internal conflict inside the companies; in March 1463, with the company back in France, the king was to issue letters of remission to one member who had killed another 'while in the Kingdom of Aragon' in the course of a dispute about billeting (157).

(156) id p. 177-87.
(157) AN JJ 198 no. 543.
Salazar's men, based in the south as well, were also involved in this campaigning. In mid-July 1462, we find his men advancing on Perthus which they helped to take (158), and they seem to have spent their efforts in the campaigning in Cerdagne and Roussillon. Their behaviour certainly left much to be desired; in December some of his men were involved in skirmishes with villagers in St. Colombe near St. Sever when they set about requisitioning food from the village (159), and other such affairs can be found in this period involving his men (160). This did nothing to affect the favour Salazar enjoyed with the king, who had given him the lordship of Libourne on 1st July of that year (161) (in which capacity he rapidly found himself embroiled in a series of disputes with his new subordinates as to the limits of his authority and jurisdiction (162)). He was made captain of Libourne as well, holding this along with the captaincy of Bourg in the familiar pattern established in the previous decade (163).

By 1464, however, the main French armies were out of Catalonia and the companies had been distributed to garrisons across France. The records left by the reviews, which took place every three months, give some idea of the distribution of the companies. The Scots were back in their old territory of the Auvergne; Scuyer's men were reviewed on the 14th April at Issoire and three months

(159) de Reilhac Vol.III p. 161-3 (letter of remission published)
(160) eg AN JJ 198 no. 445.
(161) Courty p. 65-6, PO 2609 Dossier Salazar no. 50.
(163) PO 2609 Dossier Salazar no. 51.
later in dispersed groups at St. Poursin, Guisset, Escurrolles, Aigueperse, Clermont and Maringues (164). This degree of dispersal was more or less forced on the captains by local hostility to the billeting of troops and perhaps supply difficulties as well. Cunningham's half of the company was almost equally dispersed through the same region; on 1st May his men mustered at St. Flour, on 1st August at Brioude, Lansac and Aleyne (165). It was no doubt the presence of Scottish troops in the Auvergne which explains the presence of Alexander Barry of the Guard amongst the group charged to put the men at arms in that area in order (and, one assumes, to pay them) (166) in the course of 1464. Salazar's men, meanwhile, were reviewed at Vienne in the Dauphine (167).

While the main 'active service' units were dispersed across the country, the royal Guard units were rather differently occupied. The account for royal stables organisation (which include much of the expenditure on the Guard units) for the years October 1463 to September 1465 have survived. In the first year, the total spent on the unit from this account was 3629 lt 12s. This was largely concerned with an annual reuniforming of the Guard for a royal entry to Paris; the equipment was issued at St. Cloud where it had come from Chartres via Paris and Nogent (168) and consisted of the red, white and green jackets familiar from the Adoration of the Magi of the Hours of Etienne Chevalier painted in the previous

(164) FF 6971 f240ro.
(165) id.
(166) FF 26090 no. 452.
(167) FF 6871 f240ro.
(168) AN KK 65 f100ro-112vo.
reign, new plumes for helmets, new arrow-cases and arm-guards with pennons for the units as well. The captains were given superior equipment, as were the 25 archers of the senior unit (169). This splendid equipment was replaced the following year, with the addition of new standards. One of these depicted St. Michael and the Dragon, the other a large sun (the latter motif being repeated on the jacket of the captain) (170). For more normal occasions, the brigandines worn by the men were recovered with white fustian over the course of the year (171). Seven men were issued with new helmets at a total cost of 271 17s 6d (172).

The splendour with which the Guard units were fitted out did not mean, however, that they had become purely parade-ground soldiers, as events were to show. By 1464, the clouds of discontent and rebellion were beginning to loom: tensions between Louis and his brothers (as illustrated by a letter which the king was forced to send in November 1462 ordering his chancellor to take Aubigny-sur-Nere and Concressault into his hands to give them to the rightful owners - the territory in question still in the hands of the Stewart family, had been seized by Charles' officers (173)), tension with the Duke of Brittany, tension with Burgundy, tension with many of the great land owners and the whole compounded by Louis' dangerous creation of enemies in the persons of those whom he had deprived of their offices and positions, especially in the army. In his old

(169) id f100ro-112vo.
(170) id f218ro-24vo.
(171) id f225ro-27vo.
(172) id f231vo.
age, Louis was to admit that such a massive purge had been a serious error of judgement and, implicitly, to admit that there were limits to how far any king dared to manipulate the patronage system for the satisfaction of his personal grudges. There were limits to royal action, lengths beyond which it was dangerous to go and the near-success of the coalition of rebellious princes behind their manifesto in what was to be called the Guerre du Bien Publique was to illustrate graphically the dangers and, perhaps, the weaknesses of the military organisation which Louis was relying on.

The Guerre du Bien Publique awaits its historian, and I have no intention of telling the full story here, but evidence concerning the role of the foreign companies has perhaps been overlooked and is of some interest in illustrating what may have actually happened in some other cases. After all, the Milanese ambassador could write confidently that the coalition of rebels had only the men from their own lands to support them (174) while the king had his army, yet that army was quite surprisingly ineffectual when it came to the crunch. One is tempted to ask why the rebels were not simply crushed by the forces of the royal ordonnance. Some companies certainly took the field; in April 200 lances under Crussol and Salazar moved into Berry against the forces of the princes operating there (175), but in the overall picture the standing forces of the royal ordonnance are curiously hard to find. Indeed, Louis was forced into practices reminiscent of the worst days of the 1420s; Galleazzo Sforza, son of his ally Francesco Sforza,

Duke of Milan, was brought into the kingdom with an expeditionary force. On 27th June he was appointed royal lieutenant in the Lyonnais and Dauphine (176) and fought through the summer in the Maconnais and southern Burgundy (177). This, it would appear to me, is something of an admission that, in the face of a major uprising, the royal army was simply not adequate for its task.

Part of the reason for this inadequacy may be suggested by a letter written as early as 23rd March from a loyal supporter of the king in the Auvergne. This states that the majority of the Scottish company of Cunningham and Scuyer based in the region were simply remaining in their billets. A proportion of the company had simply deserted and marched off to the rebels in the Bourbonnais under Jehan de Roux (who may perhaps be identified with the man of that name, also known as James Ros and probably a Scot called Ross) who turns up as captain of some sixteen lances in the arm1es of Charles of France (178)) while the rest were uncertain as to which side to join and were being further persuaded by Patrick Folcart who had been sent to draw them to the rebel side in turn (179). In this case a company had been effectively neutralised despite the known loyalty of its commanders, and it seems far from unlikely that similar confusions of loyalty and individual desertions, combined with a general pose of passive attentism could have seriously limited the effectiveness of other companies, especially where a former commander could appeal to his old followers.

(176) id p. 321-2.
(177) id p. 351-2.
(178) Stein p. 585 (printing of FF 21477 f2-6).
(179) FF 6971 f161ro-vo.
Certain when the crunch came in the campaigning round Paris in the summer, it was far from certain that the king had an overwhelming military superiority on his side. Charles of France could field quite respectable forces and could even muster under his own Scots guard under Patrick Folcart and George Bannaytin numbering 13 men-at-arms and 34 archers (180), while the Angevin forces of Duke of Calabria were bolstered by a contingent of some 5-600 Swiss who, after the battle, were to be disciplined by their own authorities for aiding a rebellion against a friendly monarch (181). In the key battle at Montlhéry on 16th July the foreign companies on the royal side were well engaged. This sprawling, chaotic battle saw Salazar well to the fore, while the royal guard distinguished themselves engaging the enemy (182) and helped to rescue the king when he was in danger, taking him from the field safely (183). The unit was still far from being a purely parade-ground affair; it suffered its casualties in the heart of the battle, losing four dead (184) (whether the change of captaincy from Guill Stuyer to his brother Thomas is connected with the events of the year is uncertain, though possible (185)). In an interesting sidelight on the events of the year, the newly-made ceremonial uniforms of the Guard seem to have spent most of the summer on the road between Tours and Paris, following a tortuous

(180) FF 23262 p. 33.
(181) de Mandrot RELATIONS AVEC LES SAINTS SAINTS A L’ÉTIQUE
(184) Forbes Leith Vol. II p. 36.
(185) id p. 34, 36.
route to avoid the fighting and rebel troops and only catching up
with their destined owners early in the following year at Rouen
(186). Meanwhile, as the campaign drifted into an unavailing
siege of Paris by the confederate princes, Salazar and his men
were much involved; his men contested the passage of the Seine
by the enemy until driven back by artillery fire (187) and formed
part of the garrison of the city. On October 6th a party of
them sallied out from the bastide St. Antoine in splendid array,
somewhat spoiling the effect, however, when the trumpeter was
thrown by his horse and broke his neck (188). Despite their
prominence in the fighting, not all of Salazar's men were engaged
round Paris; one of the French members of the company spent much
of this period fighting out a personal feud which had merged into
an attempt to enforce a royal confiscation in the south (189).
Nevertheless in a royalist propaganda song about Montlhery both
Salazar and the Scots were much praised (190).

The conclusion of peace, which enabled Louis to break up the
opposition and gather some at least of the rebels back into his
service, saw a certain redeployment of the foreign companies.
Cunningham, now sole commander of the hundred Scottish lances,
presumably restored to strength after the desertions of the year
before, established his forces across Champagne; in October 1466
they were spread across some fourteen towns including Tonneins, Bar

(186) AN KK 65 f236ro-vo.
(188) de Roye p. 126-7.
(189) AN JJ 194 no. 51 (in de Reilhac Vol.III p. 193-6).
(190) A le Roux de Lincy Chants Historiques et Populaires du Temps
sur Aube, Sens and Chablis (191). Salazar and his men were in Berry at the same period, based round Bourges (192); this distribution, which may have had something to do with the grant of Issodun to him (193), is confirmed by the almost inevitable evidence of a letter of remission concerning a member of his company who got himself into trouble during the stay in Berry (194). The foreign companies and their commanders were indeed to participate in most of the major campaigns of the rest of the reign. Cunningham and Salazar were sent to the aid of Liège in the period before the interview of Peronne (195). In 1469, renewed fighting in Spain took them to the south; in July of that year, Cunningham's company mustered at Vabix in Rouergue (196), where another letter of remission confirms their presence (197). On 20th March of the following year they were at Gien in Berry (198) and by July had returned to the Sens, Melun and Montargis area again (199). The company was to remain at a fairly regular strength of 95-100 lances, and Robert Cunningham was succeeded by another Cunningham, a son (or perhaps some other relative), Joachim, Lord of La Roche when he stepped up to take over the command of the guard at some point in the period 1474-5. Joachim is noted as commander of the Scottish company by July 1475 (200). The company was to survive for many years, with the Cunninghams and the Stewarts of Aubigny setting up

(191) FF 6971 f244ro.
(192) id.
(193) Courty p. 79.
(194) AN JJ 202 no. 65.
(196) FF 25779 no. 19.
(197) AN JJ 196 no. 87.
(198) FF 25779 no. 26.
(199) Clairambault 235 no. 133.
(200) Clairambault 109 no. 106.
a quasi-monopoly of its command in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries under such distinguished commanders as Beraud and Robert Stewart (201) who served with such distinction in the Italian wars. One finds a certain Jehan Cunningham in command of forty lances in 1494 (202) and Jacques, Lord of Cherveux (the title which Robert held) paid as captain of Enyat in 1510 (203) but by that time the family was no doubt thoroughly French in all but name.

Salazar was perhaps the most hardy survivor, with his company remaining active deep into his old age. He fought in Catalonia in 1469, where he was excused the normal rules of review by being allowed to collect the pay of men not actually present (204), and his men were involved in much of the fighting against the Burgundians. In 1471 he occupied Amiens, and during this found himself involved in the murder of one of his subordinates by some of his relatives in the company. The case went to Parlement, and, while his guilt was never fully proven, strong suspicions were cast on his behaviour (205) and the case was not fully resolved until after his death. This behaviour did nothing to lower his favour with the king, and he retained his command to play a heroic role in the siege of Beauvais in the following year, where his men made a sortie which wrecked the Burgundian camp and threw their guns into the ditch before being repulsed: Salazar's horse died under him after he had

(201) Contamine GES p. 420, Cust p. 25-35.
(203) Clairambault 154 no. 101.
(204) PO Dossier Salazar no. 62.
regained the shelter of the walls (206). His lengthy career only closed with him nearing the age of eighty, when he was surprised by the Burgundians at Gray during the campaigning against the duchy and county of Burgundy which followed the death of Charles the Bold at Nancy in 1477. In the ensuing fighting, the town was set on fire and he was badly burned. He died at Troyes two years later in 1479, his career under something of a cloud because of this reverse and being unable to command his company again (207). Despite leaving four sons, none of them seem to have inherited his position as commander of the company and they too sank into the ranks of the French nobility. One, Tristan, entered the church and became Archbishop of Sens at the end of the century, building the Paris palace which still bears the name of his see.

Needless to say, the Guard survived as well. Thomas Scuyer combined the captaincy of these units with the Captaincy of Falaise, for which he was paid 190 it in October 1473 for sixteen pieces of artillery (208). In addition, he was Baron of Basoches (209). In his capacity as captain of the Guard, he was paid from many disparate sources, including the taxes of the Dauphine (210). He seems to have been replaced by Robert Cunningham in October 1474 (at least Cunningham was paid his wages with effect from that date (211)) and retired to Normandy where we find him collecting wage arrears early in 1475 (212). He probably died

(207) Courty p. 81.
(208) PO Dossier Escuyer no. 6. See also Clairambault 99 nos. 78-9, 81-2.
(209) PO Dossier Escuyer no. 7.
(210) PO Dossier Stuer no. 4.
(211) Clairambault 34 no. 37, AN KK67 (accounts for the Guard October 1474-September 1475)
(212) PO Dossier Escuyer nos. 8,9.
shortly thereafter since no more is heard of him. One Hector Scuyer, however, was Captain of Falaise in 1483 (213). His brother Guillaume, whom he succeeded as captain of the guard, was Lord of Villereau and Montresson (214) and collected a considerable pension of 1,000 livres annually for the early 1470s (215) dropping out of the records at some time after 1474.

The group of Scots around that perpetual intriguer, Charles of France, remained intact until his death. Patrick Folcart commanded the prince's guards, which may well have formed a kind of parallel Scots guard throughout this period, with the aid of various other Scots such as George Valentine (216) who acted as his lieutenant, James Ross (217) and his cousin James Hoc (or Hogg) (218). The guard unit he commanded was some forty strong, with various groups of supplementary archers, mostly Scots, listed as well (219), while Ross is listed as commanding a company of 18 lances beside this (220). In addition to his purely military tasks, Folcart was made Seneschal of Saintonge (221), acted as ambassador to Rome on behalf of Charles in 1471 (222) and collected lands and captaincies on a considerable scale in the Duchy of Guienne. A full list of his offices has survived and makes

(213) Clairambault 199 no. 80.
(214) PO Dossier Escuyer no. 5.
(215) id nos. 3-5.
(216) Stein p. 623 (FF 21477 f51-9).
(217) id p. 659 (id f8-20).
(218) id p. 797 (FF 32262 f484-93).
(219) id p. 662-3, 780 (FF 21477 f8-20, FF 32263 f484-93).
(220) id p. 586 (FF 21477 f2-6).
impressive reading (223) since in 1471 he was drawing some 4,400 lt
plus gifts and the revenues of his own personal possessions. The
other Scots in Charles' service did well too, though on a rather
more modest scale, collecting captaincies and other lands as rewards
for their services (224). Even after the death of his protector,
Folcart at least managed to keep his position under Louis since he
seems to have held on to his lands and many of his offices. He even
returned briefly to the ranks of the royal guard as one of the
captains by June 1473 (225), though he vanishes from the scene short­
ly thereafter and does not seem to have left any posterity who made
any mark on history.

The various companies whose fates we have been examining sur­
vived for differing lengths of time. Salazar's was the first to
disappear as none of his children succeeded him in the command.
It was, by the end, probably more French than Spanish in composition
and any prospect of it ever acquiring its Spanish complexion again
was to be doomed in the long term by the changing political scene
which was to bring France and the Spanish kingdom into increasing
conflict. No doubt it went the way of other units; given a new
commander, a steady change in the ranks followed, but there is no
concrete information on its fate. The Scottish company was much
more tenacious in its survival serving in Italy and beyond. It
had the advantage of a clear succession of commanders and a very
solid ethnic identity initially (if anything, the company was more
solidly Scottish at least in terms of the names of its men in 1470
than it seems to have been twenty years earlier). By the early

(223) id p. 788-9 (FF 21477 f65).
(224) id p. 793, 802 (FF 32263 f485-93).
(225) PO Dossier Folcart no. 6.
years of the sixteenth century, however, while the names remain very Scottish, it seems probable that their possessors were second or third generation Franco-Scots, the children and grandchildren of the initial men who had entered French service (though it is always possible that some native-born Scots did cross the sea to join it). In the long term, certainly, it was to become simply another regiment of the French army under the Ancien Régime: in the end it was to be the first regiment of the Gendarmerie du Roi until that organisation was abolished in the 1780s. The Guard was destined for an even longer history, and remained a more active link between Scotland and France with the tradition of service in it for children of the Scottish nobility becoming established by the sixteenth century (it was still Scots-speaking, at least in part in the 1550s, if the graffiti which bored members carved in the walls of the Chapel at Chenonceaux are anything to go by). In the course of the years, however, with the increasing estrangement between Scotland and France caused by the closer links with England this ceased to be the case, and by the eighteenth century the Guard was largely a parade unit staffed by very young children of often impoverished southern gentlemen on the way to command positions in active regiments. Even the Jacobite connection did very little to change this state of affairs; exiled Jacobites found positions elsewhere in the French service. The Guard was finally abolished with the fall of Charles X as late as 1830, but by then it was little more than a fossilised survivor of a once-vital tradition.

Indeed, a date around 1470 is probably as good a place as any to draw this study to a close. The tradition of mercenary recruitment which had dominated in the last sixty years was slowly dying
and a new one was about to take its place. Louis certainly took a keen interest in hiring foreign specialists; in 1475 one finds a payment to a Martin de Salzedo, captain of a troop of a hundred genneters or Spanish-style cavalry (226), and further such forces were raised by him under, for instance, the Neapolitan Boffile de Juge (227) who was to rise to very high office in the kingdom. These companies, however, did not gain a permanent place in the military organisation of the kingdom. On the other hand, the increasing reliance of Louis on Swiss infantry in his wars from 1474 onwards was to be of great long-term importance (228), but the tradition thus established, which was to last into the Italian wars and beyond, would require another study, and would take one into a very different world from that which we have been considering here.

As far as Scotland was concerned too, the age of large-scale direct involvement in the military affairs of France was coming to an end. James III might be tempted by offers of territorial concessions in Brittany made by Louis XI in return for the services of Scottish troops, and the question of the Duchy of Saintonge granted to James I by Charles VII back in 1428 remained firmly on the agenda of Scottish diplomatic contacts with France until 1473 at least, but the Scottish nobility and Parliament were far from impressed and refused the co-operation which would have been necessary for these expeditions to have been mounted (229).

(226) FF 20685 p. 678.
(227) Contamine GES p. 284.
(228) id p. 308-10.
Certainly the alliance between France and Scotland remained in force, and was to draw Scotland into wars on behalf of her ally (in 1513, for instance), while French troops were to cross the seas in their turn in the 1540s and 50s to protect Scotland from English occupation, but never again did anything on the same scale and level of intensity as that of the 1420s and 30s occur. The large-scale export of Scottish soldiers was to be directed in different directions in later years - to the lands around the Baltic and especially to Sweden. A foretaste of this connection (though the troops engaged were, in this case, supporting James IV's uncle and ally King Hans of Denmark against Swedish and Norwegian rebels) came in 1502 when some 2,000 Scottish soldiers were sent to Norway, though with limited success (230).

Let us then stop in this period when one tradition of recruitment of foreign troops to fight the wars of the king of France was in the process of fossilising into a limited number of increasingly naturalised units in an organised army, and before a new tradition had formed to replace it. Certainly, if one looks hard at the muster rolls of French commanded companies, one can still find isolated names of foreign, usually Scottish, appearance (as in the company of de Brezé at Harfleur in 1520 where Jehan Stuart, Henry Moquelin and Andre Logan all appear as archers (231), a fact which should serve as a reminder that many foreigners served in the ranks of French commanded companies outside the specifically national

(230) B Crawford 'Foreign Relations: Scandinavia' in id p. 91-3. (231) Clairambault 123 no. 103.
ones, even though they do not perforce appear in this section of this study. One can also find Scots among the criminal elements of the Parisian population, who may well have been deserters from the army (232). By 1470 or so, however, the period which this study has set out to describe and explain is over. In the future very different forms of organisation and recruitment, drawing on different sources of men who were expected to perform different military functions were to prevail.

Conclusion to Part One

Having reached the end of this first, largely chronological survey of history of foreign involvement in the military affairs of France in the period from Agincourt to the middle years of the reign of Louis XI, it is time to pause a moment before going on to consider other matters.

The involvement can be divided into three major phases. In the first, which began with the disaster of Agincourt and developed under the impact of full-scale English invasion and increasing civil strife in France, recruitment of foreigners shifted from the traditional employment of specialist forces to fill gaps in the royal armies to an ever-increasing importation of non-specialist troops of the kind which the resources of the kingdom had normally managed to provide. The importation of what were effectively full-scale foreign (especially Scottish) armies to fight as part of the French forces was made necessary by the slaughter of so much of the French nobility at Agincourt and the loss of such a large amount of territory to English invasion and the defection of Burgundy to an English alliance. This latter heightened the internal political tensions in the kingdom, confused loyalties and made the support of many of the great for the government of Charles, both as regent and as king, highly uncertain. These conditions made the employment of foreigners almost a necessity, and attempts to recruit troops from traditional allies became a major preoccupation of French diplomacy in this period. The very large Scottish forces sent in response to this appeal were of such importance that they formed a virtually
independent force outside the control of the established military organisation and bureaucracy, while Scots held many of the highest military posts in France, despite the problems which this caused in the field.

This phase ended with the final break-up of the Army of Scotland after its defeat at Rouvray. After this, the various foreign companies operated as independent units, drifting into and out of royal service depending on the situation of the moment and the state of the royal finances. In this they were joined by many French companies. This floating armed population, only under the vaguest kind of royal control, formed a constant reservoir of armed men who could be recruited by private individuals with quarrels to pursue and enough cash to pay them. Some of these commanders forged close links with major noble families (most notably Villandrando's alliance with the Bourbons) to the benefit of both sides. The foreign companies were very noticeable in this confusing and chaotic world, whether acting in the royal armies during the campaigns against the English, fighting the quarrels of others or simply pillaging their way across a hostile landscape. With the turning tide of the main war, there was less enthusiasm for further recruitment of foreign troops and concern about the grave dangers which links between the company commanders and the great of the kingdom posed for royal authority. With the coming of peace (or at least some years of uneasy truce), attempts had to be made to solve the problem.

The third phase thus begins with the reform of 1445, which sought to solve the problem by tying the captains and their men to the king by creating a permanent army in which the majority of the
troops available could be employed. The result was to tie the captains and their men into the system of patronage which ensured the loyalty of those who were important for the stability of the kingdom. The foreign companies were included in this system, with three companies of purely foreign lances initially as well as the guard units. These companies served in the remaining fighting of the war and survived well into the times of peace beyond, despite their often doubtful disciplinary record. Their captains collected the fruits of favour in the shape of offices and honours, often held in plurality and exercised by deputy. The main aim of the reforms, to gain a royal monopoly of the sources of organised force, was highly successful, except when an inexperienced monarch like Louis XI threw the system out of balance in the quest for personal revenge and thus made successful rebellion possible. For the foreign companies, however, this was a period of slow assimilation into the framework of the French army and a slow loss of ethnic identity as the ranks came to be filled by men born in France of foreign parents.

It is my hope that this first section has opened the way to a proper assessment of the role played by foreign troops in France in this period, which was greater than commonly realised. Indeed, at times in the 1420s one suspects that the Valois monarchy might have been hard pressed to survive without their aid, while their numbers remained significant until the end of the period studied. In the second half of this study, I wish to turn from the world of high politics, diplomacy and warfare to focus on the soldiers and their captains in their own right. I shall be directing my attention
to such matters as recruitment, the kind of careers which they had, what profits (if any) they gained from their service, the conditions of life in the companies in which they fought and lived; to examine the vexed question of discipline again and examine their relations with the populations amongst whom they found themselves.
PART TWO
Chapter V. The Process of Recruitment.

The examination of the careers of foreign troops in France must, it seems to me, begin outside the borders of France and within those of their homelands. It is necessary for us to find out about the means by which these men (especially those involved in the very considerable armies of the 1420's) were recruited, who exactly they were and by what means they were brought to France.

The means by which the companies were raised is a complex and rather obscure matter, dogged by a lack of clear information and documentation. In the 1410's and 1420's at least it seems to have been fairly highly organised, intimately connected with the wider question of French diplomacy since large-scale recruitment was only possible with the aid (or at least the benevolent neutrality) of the authorities in the states to which France looked for military support. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that, in the case of French relations with such countries as Scotland and Castile, diplomatic relations were dominated for many years by this question.

This becomes obvious from the very earliest period. The defeat of Agincourt prompted a flurry of embassies to traditional allies such as Genoa and Castile with the explicit aim of finding men to reinforce the badly mauled forces of the French crown. This diplomatic effort is recorded by both Jean Juvenal des Ursins and the monastic chronicler of St. Denis (1). Despite what the royal ordonnances might say, one could not rely on the unaided efforts of well-wishers and other volunteers in such matters (2). In fact, it

(1) Juvenal des Ursins p. 531, Religieux de St. Denis p. 12-3.
is our great good fortune that the only full accounts for any of these embassies-cum-recruiting trips which have survived relate to a mission to Genoa in April of 1416 by two members of the royal financial administration. The activities of Hugues Combrel, Conseiller du Roi de Chambre des Aides and Antoine Greelle, Clerk of the Chambre des Comptes were probably fairly typical of other similar missions undertaken at a later date to other places. In addition to their very considerable expenses in the actual negotiations with the captains who were to lead the companies raised, a sum of 2,000 ducats had to be set aside for Thomas de Campo Fregoso, the "Gouverneur de la Seigneurie de Jennes" so that he would "plus diligimment.....indust les citadins et subjes dicelle seigneurie a ottroyer et faire aide au Roy....de gens de trait pour venir en son service en France" (3). Over and above this more or less discreet bribery of the Genoese leader (necessary, perhaps, because of the ambiguous relationship between France and Genoa), more direct efforts were made to encourage Genoese to join the six companies being formed. Among the other expenses of the ambassadors are ones to "plusiers ......dons quilz ont faiz audits lies de Jennes a trompettes (et) menestriers"(4). Evidently some form of advertising was needed to encourage Genoese to serve the King of France; it would be fascinating to know what songs the minstrels sang to this end.

There were undoubtedly special features involved in recruiting men in Genoa; the small size of the political unit, for instance, made direct appeals for recruits to the populace at large possible, while some of the expense was no doubt forced on the French envoys by the

(3) F Lat 5414A f60 ro-vo.
(4) id f61 ro.
simple fact that Genoa was in theory at least in rebellion against the French crown itself. Nevertheless very similar patterns can be detected in what evidence survived about French dealings with other countries.

In Scotland, for instance, the role of embassies in the recruitment of troops was crucial, as the very considerable amounts of time spent by leading Scottish commanders like Buchan as ambassador to Scotland rather than commanding troops in France indicates. As the chronological exposition demonstrated, the period from 1418 to 1424 was one of almost constant coming and going of embassies across the seas between La Rochelle and Scotland. At the Scottish end, the initial army was raised with the consent and probably the aid of the Estates of the realm; indeed it went to France as something very like a full royal army with a member of the royal house and a major officer of the realm as its commander (5). The later reinforcements dispensed with some of these elaborations, but by then a regular treaty relationship had been established which must have allowed French recruitment in Scotland. These treaties were quoted during the negotiations in October 1423 (6) which formally authorised the recruitment of the army which crossed in the winter of that year. The government of the Regent Albany was, apparently, quite willing to allow the recruitment of Scottish troops for France. After the 1419 crossing, the actual mechanics of organising the armies seem to have been very much in French hands. The French court seems to have maintained direct contacts with members of the Scottish nobility who might be tempted to cross to France with reinforcements. It is even possible that some

(5) Pluscarden p. 353.
(6) AN J 677 no. 20.
kind of semi-permanent French presence existed to encourage such movements. The letter sent by the Dauphin to the Earl of Mar on 29th December 1419 from Sauvigny suggests this (7). In this he states that he has heard from "his servant" Jehan de Cernach and others that the Earl wishes to come over to France with a large company and asks Mar to persuade other lords to join him. It is probable that Cernach is to be identified with John Crannath, Bishop of Caithness, who was prominent in diplomatic negotiations between France and Scotland (8) and who seems to have crossed to France himself, since we find one Jehan de Crenat helping to negotiate the return of various papers and other goods belonging to the royal household stolen by Scottish soldiers in March 1421 (9). If he was indeed the "servant" of the King of France, then his role in Scotland may very well have been as some kind of recruiting agent, operating amongst the highest nobility of Scotland. In addition, there is reference in Dom Bévy's compilation to the activities of an Andrew Kainzie who, having crossed with the army in 1419, was paid one thousand livres tournois to return to Scotland on a recruiting mission (10). His activities may well have been concentrated on those of rather lower social origins. It is hard to believe, however, that even he would have gone down to the level of such as Peter Forest, recruited into Darnley's company at the age of fifteen and too poor to pay his ransom when he fell into the hands of the English (11). The actual raising of the armies remains largely

(7) NAF 1001 f13 vo-14 ro.
(8) See, for instance, note 6 above.
(9) AN KK 50 f13 vo.
(10) AN AB NIX 690-3 Vol. III 'Kainsie'.
(11) ANm 79 no. 136.
hidden from us; no doubt they were put together in much the same way as the Kings of Scots had to assemble theirs, by a series of noble contingents raised by the great (and not so great) of the land calling out their followings. Perhaps the French ambassadors agreed terms with the main commanders, but none of these negotiations have survived.

The case of Spain provides an interesting contrast to Scotland, since despite very considerable diplomatic efforts no official Castilian army was ever to march across the Pyrenees (though the English always feared that one might). The records of the requests made by various French embassies to Castile, suggest that the arrangement sought was very similar to that achieved in Scotland. In 1419, for instance, a large army commanded either by the 'Infantes of Aragon' or if not by them, at least by some notable knight, was sought (12). Later embassies continued in their requests for armies of around 2-3,000 men at arms and other forces (which in 1428 amounted to 5,000 crossbowmen (13)), under competent commanders. As in the case of Scotland, what was sought was effectively the military intervention of the full forces of the crown to bolster the French armies; the participation of the members of the royal families was felt to be of some importance by the French as well. It is possible that equally detailed negotiations concerning such matters as payment and the timing of the arrival of the armies in France were entered into in Scotland, but none of the documentation has survived (14).

(12) F Lat 6024 f13vo.
(13) id f27ro.
(14) For the documents, see id f12ro-vo, 13ro-16vo, 18ro-19vo, 26ro-28ro.
addition to the diplomatic activity round the court of Castile, aimed
at encouraging the king to either enter the war or permit very large-
scale recruitment, there are suggestions that some of the French
diplomats may have tried to interest individual Castilian noblemen in
such adventures. In January 1420 the Archbishop of Tours was paid
the considerable sum of 4,000 lt for expenses incurred in Castile for
visits on royal business, not only to the king of that country, but
to various other noblemen (15). As far as can be established, how-
ever, the Castilian nobility was distinctly less enthusiastic than
its Scottish counterpart in following the banners of the king of
France, at least on a large scale and in an organised army.

In Italy the situation was rather different again. There, one
had a highly organised system of already-formed mercenary companies, with
whom it should have been possible to negotiate directly. There are
signs that the French method of recruitment (centred on Lombardy,
apparently since Italian troops are almost invariably called Lombards
in chronicle accounts, despite the fact that not all of them were
from that region; no doubt the traditional connection of the Dukes of
Orléans with the county of Asti helped) consisted of sending small
groups of recruiting agents south of the Alps to collect men. It is
probable that they recruited companies which existed already; perhaps
secondary figures within large companies or the leaders of minor
groups. It is perhaps interesting that Theaulde de Valpergue was
Piedmontese; so was Carmagnola who was at this time in the service
of Filippo Maria Visconti (16). It is fairly certain that Visconti

(15) Clairambault 52 no. 78.
(16) Mallett p. 61-2. I am indebted to Dr. Mallett for suggesting the connection.
an ally of France, tolerated the recruitment of men by the French even though the formal treaty of Abiate in June 1424, by which Milan was requested to send men north was too late to have had anything to do with the majority of the Italians in France (17) since they had been there for years before it was signed. No doubt France provided a useful dumping-ground for men surplus to the military needs of Milan. Certainly there is plenty of evidence for the sending of such French agents; an Ordonnance of 1421 refers to a mission headed by Bertrand de St. Aust and Philippe de Grimault (could he have been a Genoese Grimaldi?) going to Lombardy for this purpose (18) while accounts for 1422 refer to several captains crossing from Lombardy with substantial forces after a recruiting trip by Jean Cateran and Antoine Dosuen (19).

The information about recruitment which we have been examining does not, however, tell the full story. There was undoubtedly a very considerable number of people who participated in the wars in France without ever having had anything to do with the more or less organised and formally recruited companies which the diplomatic record allows one to spot. There were undoubtedly more companies like that of the Aragonese knight Bernard Albert, hired by the Bishop of Laon for a year's service in the army of the Count of Foix in the south in 1426-7, which drifted into and out of royal service on short-term contracts for specific military operations (20). Far more important were the Villandrandos and Salazars; those who drifted

(17) AN J 505 no. 5.
(19) Arsenal 4522 f17vo.
(20) PO 20 Dossier Albert no. 3, AN K 62 no. 33.
informally into France without any summonses, drawn to the seat of war by an irresistible attraction. In the case of Villandrando, this attraction operated as early as 1412 (21), but, he was merely early, he was not unique. The Spanish companies must have been formed almost exclusively in this way, and the Scottish ones maintained their strength in the face of a changing diplomatic situation after the release of James I by similar means. The documents can, however, only allow us to speculate on how this continued. It is possible that a certain level of official recruitment was encouraged on a lower level by the French into the 1440's. One finds references in Bévy again to one Guille Bing being paid in 1441 for a trip to Scotland (22) and Guille Carcy being paid the year before for a similar expedition to Scotland and Ireland (23). Jehan de Montgommery was even paid in 1444 for bringing men from Scotland (24). By then, however, the tradition was well established and there were ample contacts between Scotland and France, both diplomatic and trading (25), so that those who were tempted to join the companies fighting in France could do so without any need for the elaborate diplomatic preparations of the past. In addition, there is evidence that companies came to be recruited increasingly from the children of those who had settled in France after their own careers had ended. By the 1460's, the need for large-scale recruitment to maintain the ranks of the companies established in the French army was gone.

(21) Quicherat p. 7.
(22) AN AB XIX 690-3, Vol. I 'Bing'.
(23) id Vol. I 'Cary'.
(24) id Vol. III 'Montgomery'.
At the time when this large-scale recruitment was common, however, the numbers involved were very considerable, especially in Scotland. Before considering just how considerable, it is perhaps worth considering just what means the ambassadors and recruiting agents of the French crown used to gain the consent of the governments thus approached to the removal of such large numbers of their subjects to France.

Obviously money was the key; as we have already seen, the ambassadors to Genoa in 1416 were not above effectively bribing the ruler of the city to make sure that their mission would be successful. Such blatant use of financial persuasions cannot be documented elsewhere (though since no other accounts for similar embassies have survived it would be rash to claim that they never happened), but financial matters were evidently of key importance in the arrangements and negotiations concerning all attempts to recruit troops. This probably explains why the negotiations with Castile were so unsuccessful. No doubt the increasing financial straits of the French monarchy in the 1420's helped to explain why, after 1419, the French ambassadors were forced to rely on the goodwill of the Castilians, who were expected to pay the forces they were being asked to supply for the first six months of their service (26) with the promise of repayment later. The Castilians, hardly surprisingly, were not particularly enthusiastic about this offer; they had, one suspects, a fair idea of the dubious credit-rating of the French monarchy at a time when even the essential military expenditure of the transport of the Scottish forces to France in 1424 was not being met in full. Even the suggestion made in earlier embassies that the

(26) F Lat 6024 f18ro.
army thus sent could be profitably employed on attacking the weak English forces in the south-west, around Bayonne and in Gascony (27) could not counterbalance the unfavourable financial position, while highflown appeals to the honour of Castile and the ancient alliances between the countries were simply a waste of breath (28).

One is therefore tempted to ask why the Scots were so much more generous to the French when they came looking for help. It seems that Scotland as such gained little in return for the service of its armies abroad, though this may be due to a lack of concrete evidence. Some privileges were certainly dangled before the Regency government of the Duke of Albany; the negotiations in October 1423 apparently dealt with commercial privileges in France since the final agreement promised Scots full rights in France (29). In addition, the French did agree to pay the full costs of transport, and may well have been forced to be more generous to a relatively poor ally like Scotland than they would have been to a richer country like Castile. Nevertheless, the question of why the Scots were so keen to serve in France, and why their government were so willing to let them go remains. The very much more liberal policy of Albany should be contrasted with that of James I after his release; the latter was willing to send men to France but extracted a very much higher price for his aid in the shape of the cession of Saintonge (30). Perhaps he had learned enough to be wary of French promises of financial aid unsupported by any concrete gains. Certainly he was on a more difficult tightrope than his uncle Albany had been, due to the circumstances of his captivity and ransom.

(27) id f13ro-16vo.
(28) id f12ro.
(29) AN J 677 no. 20.
(30) AN J 678 no. 27.
Albany's willingness could indeed be seen in a positively sinister light as a further attempt to disrupt ransom negotiations with England (31) (and there is no doubt that the English did attach considerable importance to this issue as can be seen in the initial instructions to their ambassadors at the negotiations, who were to attempt to gain the withdrawal of the Scots from France (32)). In the end, however, this issue did not unduly affect the outcome of the negotiations, and the final treaty made no reference to the question of Scots in France, who were thus exempt from the truce.

It seems to me that, even though Albany's motives may not have been totally pure, they were not perhaps so simple either. It seems more likely that the provision of mercenary troops in fact fitted the interests of both Scotland and France better than the eternal Border skirmishes which had been the norm in the previous century (33). Granted the existence of a strong pro-French party in Scotland, it was probably better for Scotland to provide its aid to France in the form of at least partially volunteer armies fighting on French soil, rather than engage on raiding England with all the dangers which this entailed (and it should be remembered that despite the activities of the Army of Scotland abroad the truce along the Border Marches was never broken).

The French, on the other hand got much more for the money which they chose to invest in gaining the alliance of Scotland than the "passive and ambiguous" support they had received in the fourteenth century (34).


(33) As described in J Campbell "England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century" in J Hale, R Highfield and B Smalley Europe in the Late Middle Ages London 1965 p. 184-216.

(34) id p. 214.
The Scots avoided the dangers of English devastation, the French the dangers that Scottish aid in the form of attacks on Northumberland and the other border counties would turn out to be of little direct help in easing the pressure in France.

In addition, Albany was not perhaps totally master of the game in Scotland itself. He had to face the attitude of the Scottish nobility as a whole, and it seems probable that lavish French promises were being made to those who were prepared to listen. The embassy of 1423 sailed fully equipped with very full powers to pledge the royal word and royal revenues to make sure that there were no hitches (35). In addition, they brought over with them "certayne somme d'argent" (though not all that was apparently available) (36) "pour faire aucuns prestz a ceulx qui nous volent venir servir" (37). No doubt the funds available were generously distributed and perhaps used to fit out the troops raised. It is probable too that other promises were made and that the considerable distributions of lands in France to the main commanders of the Scottish armies on their arrival had much to do with this process. The Lieutenancy granted to Douglas at some time in 1423-4, along with the grant of Touraine may well have been the price of his aid as one copy of the letter making the grant suggests (38).

Douglas, indeed, despite his great power in Scotland, was apparently in severe financial difficulties in this period and very receptive to offers for his services from any source. His problems probably stemmed largely

(36) id p. 161.
(37) id p. 162.
(38) AN XIa 8604 f45ro-46vo, F Lat 10187 f2ro;3vo.
from his incessant and uniformly unsuccessful meddling in the internal politics of England in the previous twenty years (the ransoms for those captured at Homildon Hill and Shrewsbury, for instance, must have strained his resources badly). Certainly he was in severe difficulties in 1413 when he was nearly arrested for debt in Flanders and even then sought salvation in contracting to serve John the Fearless in his wars (39). In May 1421 he was swearing on the Gospels to enter the service of Henry V (and thus fight against his own son in the French armies) (40); the only surprising thing about his adhesion to the French side in 1423 was, perhaps, that he actually went to France and fulfilled the terms of his contract. He had, one supposes negotiated favourable enough terms for himself both as regards concrete rewards and status. His success in this suggests that the real powers in Scotland, the greater nobility, managed to drive much better bargains for themselves than Scotland as a whole did. Perhaps the failure in Spain was as much a failure to persuade the mighty of the land to serve as it was a failure to persuade the monarchy to let them do so.

The quest for profit was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the main apparent factor encouraging recruitment. This went down to all levels, one suspects even to the humblest; while academic historians of the twentieth century may argue about the actual profitability of war for those engaged, it seems to me undeniable that those who joined armies at the time had the hope, however unreasonable, that they would come out richer. In the more professionalised atmosphere of Italy, the French seem to have used various incentives to encourage this belief as well. They offered longer contracts

(39) Vaughan p. 260.
one year (41) at a time when the Italian states were only beginning to match this (42) and may well have paid more, though comparisons are almost impossible to make due to different currencies, different costs of living and even different structures of units. We know that Italian troops were paid 46½ écus per lance in 1422 (43) but it is uncertain how this would have compared with pay in Milan at this time. Heavy down payments to stimulate recruitment were to be found as well; the Genoese commanders in 1416 were to be given three months pay in advance (to stimulate zeal all round, one assumes) and this added up to no less than 19,548 florins (44).

Even those who never met a French agent or were beguiled by the promises of those working to raise companies were allured by the hope of profit to be made. Men like Villandrando started poor, if noble, and almost certainly looked to the wars to repair their fortunes. Salazar, notoriously came from nothing and sought his fortune in the wars as well; a satirist of the day, Paulin Paris, summed it up like this "Quant il vint d'Espaigne en France il estoit aussi bien garni de biens qu'un singe de queue" (45). There can be little doubt that the men who came to France to aid the French king in his wars were mercenaries in the fullest sense of the word and that they had been recruited very largely by promises of profits to be made in this service.

The lure proved very attractive. Exactly how many were tempted

(41) Arsenal 4522 f17vo.
(42) Mallett p. 82.
(43) Arsenal 4522 f17vo.
(44) F Lat 5414A f59vo-60ro.
(45) Quoted in Courty p. 69.
to seek their fortunes in France will probably never be known.
The only quasi-official figure available concerning the Scottish
armies relates to a muster at Bourges in 1424 when Buchan and
Douglas are credited with 2,500 men at arms and 4,000 archers, with
Darnley's personal company of 150 in addition (46). Even these
figures cannot be regarded as totally reliable, since they come from
an eighteenth-century copy of the original documents made by a
genealogist which is not otherwise very informative about numbers in
the companies listed. Even if the copy is totally accurate, there
is little proof that the muster totals in the original gave any more
than a vague order of magnitude, due to the already-noted administra-
tive independence of the Scottish forces (a situation which in itself
provided an incentive to inflate numbers). On the other hand, even
if this represents the sum total of all the Scots in France, it does
not count those who had crossed in earlier expeditions and had died
in battle, deserted and otherwise left their companies. Chronicle
estimates are, as ever, variable and probably wildly exaggerated.
The Book of Pluscarden claims that the first expeditionary force in
1419 was 10,000 strong (47). Thomas Basin makes the Scottish forces
at Verneuil the same suspiciously round figure (48); Le Fèvre de
St. Rémy claims that 3,000 were killed at Cravant (49); the list of
vague estimates could be extended endlessly. Forbes Leith's account
draws the main chronicle estimates together: 7-10,000 in 1419;
4-5,000 in 1420-1; 6,000 in 1422 (50) though he gives no figure for

(46) FF 20684 p. 541-2.
(47) Pluscarden p. 353.
(49) Le Fèvre de St. Rémy Vol. II p. 78.
1424. The total which this gives is, simply, quite impossible, but the very high estimates suggest a very considerable Scottish presence in France. It would seem to me that a total figure of at most 10,000 would be the maximum possible. Even this was a very considerable effort from a small country whose total population was somewhere between 250,000 and 450,000, with the lower end of the range more likely to be accurate (51); a country which, moreover, had severe problems in raising adequate forces for its own defence at times in this same century (52) and which at full stretch could raise little more than 15,000 men as the Flodden campaign was to illustrate nearly a century later.

As far as the other groups are concerned, there are even fewer usable figures. Basin has 2,500 Italians at Verneuil (53) and claims that in 1423 600 cavalry and 1,000 infantry arrived (54), but this does not take into account the quite considerable numbers who had been coming in since 1416 starting with the 660 whom the embassy to Genoa set out to find (55). The Spaniards are quite simply uncountable until the time of the Swiss campaign in 1444-5. Overall, it seems likely that at times in the 1420's foreign troops made up over half of the forces available to the French crown, with that proportion slowly diminishing throughout the period of this study to stabilise at perhaps the 15% tentatively estimated by Contamine (56). Their

(51) S C E Lythe 'Economic Life' in J Brown Scottish Society etc. p. 67.
(52) J Brown in id p. 40.
(53) Basin Vol. II p. 93.
(54) Bouvier p. 370.
(55) Flat 5414A f59vo.
(56) Contamine GES p. 458
numbers were, then, always significant.

The patterns of recruitment are even more elusive than the numbers involved. Nevertheless a few broad facts do appear to stand out. The Scottish armies were overwhelmingly Lowland affairs. One does spot one or two Highlanders here and there; the MacAusland from the Lennox who was one of the many men credited with the death of the Duke of Clarence at Bauge (57), a James MacKinnon who was in the company of Robert Cunningham at St. Flour in April 1452 when he was involved in a quarrel during which there is an ambiguous passage which suggests that the argument may have been conducted in Gaelic (58), a few apparent Mac surnames in muster rolls, half-buried by French spellings. On the whole, however, the Highlands of Scotland lived their own life unaffected by events in France. If young men in this area felt tempted to seek their fortunes by the sword, they had their own well-established outlets in Ireland (59). Indeed, the armies seem to have been raised very much from the western Lowlands, at least if the overall recruitment reflected the distribution of the commanders. Forbes Leith again provides a handy check-list of these (60). To enumerate all would probably be impossible, but a few individual cases should provide a general idea of the distribution of their lands. Hugh Kennedy and his illegitimate brother Gilbert came from a family whose lands were around Kirkintilloch, Lenzie and Girvan (61), William Carmichael from the family which later produced the Earls of Hyndford (62), Sir Robert Maxwell of Calderwood, Sir

(57) Pluscarden p. 356.
(58) AN JJ 181 no. 82.
(59) J W M Bannerman 'The Lordship of the Isles' in J Brown Scottish Society etc. p. 216. For more on this subject, see G A Hayes-McCoy Scots Mercenary Forces in Ireland Dublin 1937.
(62) id Vol. IV p. 574.
Henry Cunningham of Kilmaurs, not to mention the whole Stewart of Darnley connection (63). Other areas were, however, represented; the Setons from the Lothians (64); John Smale from Aberdeen (65); the Douglas of Kyrros (perhaps Kinross) who died near Orleans (66) and Sir Patrick Ogilvy of Auchterhouse, known to the French as the Vicomte d'Angus, who came from the Forfar area (67).

In addition to this geographical distribution, and perhaps connected with it, one can trace strong links between some of the prominent figures in the early expeditions in Scotland before their recruitment. Indeed one can see some signs of a kind of Douglas connection, much involved in the exploitation of the customs revenues to their own benefit and often closely connected by family ties. The Setons, for instance were involved in the deprivations against the customs revenues in the early years of the fifteenth century (68) and were in addition connected by marriage with the Stewarts of Darnley and the Haliburtons, one of whom is listed among the casualties of Verneuil (69). The closeness of their connection with the Douglas family is illustrated by the fact that the father of the Seton who went to France had acted as a hostage for Archibald, Earl of Douglas while he was engaged in negotiating his ransom (70). Another member

(63) Stuart p. 112-9.
(64) Scots Peerage Vol. VIII p. 574.
(65) Plascarden p. 355.
(66) de la Saussey p. 596.
(68) Exchequer Rolls of Scotland Vol. IV p. LXIII.
(70) Scots Peerage Vol. VIII p. 574.
of this group seems to have been Douglas of Drumlanrig (71), while even the Earl of Buchan, despite his royal ancestry, was very much part of a Douglas connection by his marriage. It might even be possible to claim that the army which served in France was fundamentally a Douglas army, drawing on established connections within the Scottish aristocracy.

On the whole, however, those who commanded in France cannot be found in the reference works on the Scots peerage. This in itself tells something; many of those involved came from comparatively minor families. What, for instance, is one to make of Robert Peltilot? According to Francisque Michel he came from Dundee (72) but there is no real proof of this assertion that I can find. Even Cunningham is a shadowy figure since he does not seem to have belonged to any of the major families of that name, while the pretensions of the so-called Bastard of Scotland, complete with the regal style of address (73) adopted by him for his correspondence, remain tantalisingly obscure. It would appear, from what little we do know about the recruitment of leaders from the families where we do have evidence, that those who went came very much from those traditionally footloose and insecure groups, younger sons and illegitimate offspring. In the case of the Kennedys, Hugh was the third son and his half-brother Gilbert illegitimate (74), Cunningham of Kilmours was also a third son (75) and others who fit this bill can be found. Not all were in this mould

(71) Exchequer Rolls of Scotland Vol. IV p. LXI.
(72) Francisque Michel p. 165.
(73) Indre-et-Loire BB 25 f172vo-3ro.
(the very highest commanders were not, for instance) but it seems that the majority of those who went to France to seek their fortunes were either the cadets of important houses or the representatives of minor families too unimportant to have left much trace of their existence in this period.

The humble, those who served in the ranks, are the hardest to find of all. One can do a little with surnames, certainly. Close examination of the muster rolls of the Guard units for 1455 and comparison with the standard work on Scottish surnames produces some results (76). Most names are either too mangled by the French clerks' misspellings or too common to be of any real help. A few give hints of local connections; Grinot (which is another form of Greenock); Clisdal (Clydesdale) and Atorle (Atholl). The rest give a fairly even spread from the Borders, through Ayrshire and Lanarkshire, into Perthshire via the Lothians and with a scatter as far as Aberdeenshire. Looking at the musters of the Scottish Ordonnance companies of this period a similar kind of fairly even distribution from all over the Lowland areas of Scotland would appear to be the case there as well. It is possible that recruitment had a wider base at the humble level, though it is impossible to produce any statistical confirmation of this.

The problems involved in tracing the origins of both commanders and their men become even more severe in the case of the other nationalities who served in France. The humble crossbowmen who served at the siege of Tours in 1418, for instance, give few clues as to their backgrounds in Castile beyond a few place-names in their surnames.

(76) id Vol. II p. 17-8, G P Black The Surnames of Scotland New York 1940.
(Seville, Leon, Obregon for instance (77)). The Italian men at arms of Luquin Ris reviewed at Le Mans at much the same time are very similar; their names mangled out of recognition by the clerks recording them, they are left without ancestry or genealogy or easily identifiable homeland (apart from one Gaultry de Modeny, who may have come from Modena (78)). Even higher up the social scale there are few clues; the aristocracy of the Genoese Riviera obviously provided a fair number of commanders in their traditional fields of companies of crossbowmen and galleys and the occasional reference in Bevy and elsewhere permits a few glimpses of the regional distribution of the Spanish and Italian commanders. In Bevy there are references to a Knight from Perugia in 1422 (79) and one from Alexandretta in the following year (80); isolated records of payments to a captain from Laredo (81) in 1416, one from Bilbao in the same year (82) and another Perugian in 1418 (83) but nothing in sufficient quantity to enable one to make any real estimates of the origins and social backgrounds of the men involved. It is possible that they were very much hardened professionals of relatively low social origin, but this can be no more than a guess.

Even the commanders of the Spanish and Italian troops are rather enigmatic. Villandrando, certainly, came from an ancient house

(77) AN K 59 no. 20 12-5, 45-6.
(78) FF 25706 no. 760.
(79) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. I 'Abice'.
(80) id Vol. IV 'Vulpe'.
(81) Clairambault 64 no. 22.
(82) Clairambault 14 no. 182.
(83) Clairambault 85 nos. 76, 78.
(with some connections with France in addition), though one fallen on hard times (84), but Salazar's origins are sufficiently obscure to be a source of learned debate (85). As for Martin Garcia-Enriquez, his background was very much more distinguished; he was a son of the Count of Gijon (86) and thus of royal blood. He was also, however, illegitimate and gained his legitimisation for his services to France (87). The Valpergues, the only ones of the Italian commanders of this period to be at all traceable, came from an ancient Savoyard family, but where they fitted into the family is uncertain and it seems probable that they issued from junior branches of the family tree.

On the whole, then, those commanders who remained in French service after the 1420's were probably those who, by birth or fortune, had most need of their military position to make their way in the world. They perhaps came to form, with their French equivalents, that class of minor nobility acting as professional soldiers which was to be the backbone of the French military establishment for many years.

Having been recruited, these foreigners still had to be transported to the actual theatres of the war. This could be a complex operation, involving as much organisation as a military campaign itself. For some, it was relatively simple. The majority of the Spaniards simply walked or rode across the Pyrenees in more or less

(84) Quicherat p. 5-7.
(85) Courty p. 68.
(86) Quicherat p. 195.
(87) AN JJ 190 no. 35.
organised groups looking for employment on the other side. The Italians, too, could generally walk to their destination, conducted by those who had come to recruit them. Again, the records of the embassy to Genoa in 1416 tell us something of this aspect of their recruitment methods. The troops were to assemble in Genoa at Easter, and progress to Aiguesmortes (a ten day march) where, on 7th May, they would be mustered, paid and then would set off for Paris (88). These marches north were not always peaceful; the consular records of Montferrand for the following year record the arrival in late July of a very large group of Genoese crossbowmen. They had straggled badly and took three days to arrive in full, having also had trouble with other forces during their march. The consuls had to beg the commander to move his men on rather than remain to rescue his men who had been captured in the course of these skirmishes, and these entreaties were backed up with bribery (89). Further north, the municipal authorities of Orleans found themselves in a similar situation in August of the same year and distributed food and wine to the captain to make sure that his men were kept in order (90). It was a fairly slow march, though this is perhaps understandable in the light of Jean Juvenal des Ursin's description of the Genoese entering Paris in 1416; they marched in two by two and he was amazed to notice how very few horses there were among them (91). They must have marched the whole distance from Genoa to Paris on foot, a lengthy process which must have guaranteed that troops recruited one

(88) F Lat 5414A f60ro.
(90) Loiret CC 546 f13vo.
(91) Jean Juvenal p. 532.
spring would arrive too late for most of the operations on that campaigning season, and which helps to explain the straggling and disorderly nature of their columns.

Despite the inevitable delays and problems which this operation could entail, getting Genoese and other Italian troops (for whom we lack information, though one assumes that they marched across the Alpine passes and went through Provence on their way to the wars) to where they were needed was simplicity itself compared to the operations needed to ship Scottish armies to France. This was a most complicated and costly operation, made a great deal more vulnerable to attack and the hostility of the elements by the fact that the only safely held port on the French coast was La Rochelle. This forced those in charge of the operations to use a west coast route, loading the Scottish troops at Dumbarton (a factor which may in itself have influenced the patterns of recruitment in Scotland) and shipping them through the Irish Sea, past Cornwall and into the Bay of Biscay to La Rochelle. The scale of the enterprise was often beyond the shipping capacities of the latter, which forced the French authorities to make extensive use of Spanish shipping. The first Scottish army was transported by a Castilian fleet recruited by the formal diplomatic means. An agreement reached in March 1419 bound the Castilians to send some forty ships of 150 tons each, heavily manned by troops as well as by the normal crews to a rendez-vous at Belle Isle followed by a voyage to Scotland (92). To make sure that the fleet was indeed raised, some 111,000 francs d'or were paid in advance. After this, it would

(92) Daumet p. 73-4.
appear that the transport fleets were organised more locally, despite further attempts to organise Spanish fleets on a formal basis (93). A heavy burden fell on the shoulders of the Governor of La Rochelle, whose considerable involvement in the business of organising shipping emerges from some surviving documents. At the time of the 1424 crossing, for instance, we find him deeply engaged in the hire of six large ships to join the fleet being organised to bring the Scots over (94). The cost to him was considerable; even before this particular crossing he had gone so far into debt on behalf of the crown that he was given the Lordship of Taillebourg to help him pay back his debts (95). Henri de Plusquallec was not, however, the only man deeply involved in the operation. The ambassadors to Scotland, too, were expected to play their part in the organisation of transport fleets, and indeed a part of their instructions specifically gave them powers to deal with this matter (96).

The kinds of contracts which they made are well illustrated by that of the unfortunate Perruche de la Sau whose case was mentioned in Chapter II. He had been hired in Castile to go to Dumbarton or Greenock, where he was to wait for a month from 6th November onwards. He was paid at the rate of 1 ½ écus per ton of his ship, half to be paid by the ambassador in Scotland, the rest 32 days after disembarking his cargo of Scots at La Rochelle. In addition, there was a bonus sum of a thousand écus which would be split up among the twelve

(93) id p. 75-77.
(94) AN J 183 no. 141.
(95) id no. 136.
Spanish ship-masters pro rata depending on their tonnage. If the voyage lasted longer than expected, he would be paid extra, and his losses would be paid by the king if he lost his ship in the course of the crossing. The ambassadors even engaged royal property to guarantee his payment, as indeed their instructions fully allowed them to do (97). In practice, of course, that was not quite what happened. A list of some fourteen shippers, including Perruche, has survived, drawn up after the stipulated 32 days had come and gone with the king unable to pay the bills for transport. Rather less than half of the 46,620 crowns owed were to be paid in the form of assignations on various unknown sources of revenue (98) (that Perruche felt constrained to dispose of his assignation at just over 80% face value indicates that he had little faith in the likelihood of repayment, at least of speedy repayment (99)). The rest would have to wait, and there is little to allow one to be certain that they were ever paid in full.

Shipping was not, of course, the sole cost involved in this kind of operation. In 1422, we find traces of equally frantic activity in the west of France on the part of various royal financial officers who were engaged in moving considerable sums of money into the area to pay for the wages of the troops and their feeding for a month. One suspects that when there was a shortage of cash, these bills were likely to have absolute priority over the claims of the shippers. In this case, some of the money was to go to Scotland and the rest to

(97) id p. 161.
(99) Marchegay p. 163.
be distributed round some twenty small depositaries in Niort and La Rochelle. The situation was sufficiently grave for part of one of the royal crowns to have been broken off ready to be pawned for hard cash. By July 1424, the list of crown jewels in pawn was very considerable indeed (100).

All this frantic activity on shore to see that funds were available for the operation could well have come to naught in the face of the hazards of transport. The weather was one problem over which the officers of the King of France had no control, and the contracts which they drew up contained provision for delays due to weather which were all the more likely since the fleets tended to sail either early or late in the year in the hope that the troops landed would be able to play a full part in the campaigning season of the following summer. In fact, most of the crossings seem to have gone fairly well, though there seems to have been some trouble in 1424 which lengthened the voyage and increased costs (101) as well as scattering the fleet somewhat; Cousinot reports the arrival of some of the Scots in Brittany rather than La Rochelle (102) and Forbes Leith talks of some ships going down (103). At a later period, the death of Sir Patrick Ogilvy is supposed to have been due to drowning while on the way back to Scotland on royal business (104).

English interception was the other main worry which affected the planning of the crossings. The very considerable numbers of troops

(100) AN J 475 no. 98 3-5.
(101) AN J 183 no. 141.
(102) Cousinot p. 195.
on board the Spanish fleet of 1419 was one consequence of this concern, and those in charge of the financial arrangements in 1422 were still concerned by it (105). It remained a real danger at least until the crossing of the Princess Margaret of Scotland to France to marry the Dauphin Louis in 1436, when a large number of Scottish troops had to be taken over to guard her (106). It was not an unreasonable fear. The English did indeed make attempts to intercept the transport fleets on their way to France; the preparations in 1419 are recorded fairly fully, with much activity in the ports of the west of England to raise an adequate fleet for the purpose (107). On the whole, though, English naval activity was conspicuously unsuccessful. The interception which the English managed off La Rochelle in 1419-20 was unsuccessful, and none of the later fleets seem to have been much troubled by even this level of activity. The main English problem was quite simply that they were unable to raise a strong enough fleet; the twelve ships and balingers which were initially raised in 1419 were hardly going to be a match for forty and more large ships full of soldiers (108). Not surprisingly the English shipowners requisitioned for the purpose and looking for profit rather than trouble had a habit of avoiding battle and leaving their stations to chase rather easier prey. In 1436, for instance, the English fleet which was intended to intercept Margaret of Scotland's ships sheered off in pursuit of a group of Flemish merchantmen instead (109).

(105) AN J 475 no. 98.
(106) FF 17330 f126ro.
(109) Scotichronicon p. 485.
On the whole, the transport of the Scottish troops to France went surprisingly well considering the difficulties involved. The troops which French money and diplomacy had raised beyond the boundaries of the kingdom to fight in the interests of the crown reached their destination at more or less full strength. In the next chapter, we shall follow them into their new environment to examine their careers and how far they were able to fulfil the hopes which had brought them from their homes to fight in a foreign land.
Chapter VI. The Structures and Rewards of the Military Life.

In this chapter, I propose to look much more often at the careers and rewards gained by those of lower rank than those whose names have come down to us as commanders, though inevitably the famous will still have more than is perhaps a fair share of attention, since they tend to dominate the documentation. I intend to address myself to such questions as the length of time that foreign troops remained in French service, how far the possibility of social advancement by military service existed and what legitimate rewards the soldier could hope to gain.

It would perhaps be as well to begin by trying to calculate the normal length of time the man who entered the armies of the King of France could expect to spend under arms. This permits us not only to gauge something of the tone of life in the companies (for one whose personnel changed rapidly was evidently a very different sort of organism from one with a stable membership), but also to resolve the fundamental question as to whether there was such a thing as a military career at all in the fifteenth century, or whether a man might serve a brief time in the ranks of an armed company during his life without becoming anything of a professional soldier. The possible differences between 'foreign' and 'native' companies in this regard should also be investigated.

One certainly gains an impression from such unstatistical sources as letters of remission that foreign troops served in the ranks for quite lengthy periods. Two members of the Garde Écossaise, in a quarrel as late as 1460, harked back to the siege of Laigny-sur-
Marne in 1432 at which both had been present (1), one Thomas Marshall, archer in Antoine de Chabannes' company in 1472, had served in the royal army for thirty years (2) and other appeals refer to lengthy, if uncounted years of service. Fortunately one can make some rather more detailed surveys of actual companies to gain some idea of how far this impressionistic evidence squares with the facts.

The first company which I intend to examine is that of Thomas Moras. This otherwise obscure body was active as part of the Count of Foix's army in the south between 1426 and 1441. It was apparently completely Scottish in its membership and by some accident of survival - a reasonable proportion of its muster rolls have survived spread out over a period of some thirteen years. We first encounter the company on 1st March 1426 at Carcassonne, numbering thirty men including its commander, all described as 'esquires' (3). They continue as a unit until 1st July 1431, when we find them at Beziers having replaced two of their number (4). Another muster at Moissac reveals even more considerable changes by 22nd November 1435, since no less than eleven new names appear on the rolls and the company itself now numbers twenty nine (5). By April the following year, however, the numbers have reached thirty again (6), so it comes as rather a surprise to find them reduced to a total strength of twelve and diminished in status to the rank of mounted archers on 1st June 1437 (7). Including

(1) AN JJ 190 no. 125.
(2) AN JJ 197 no. 279.
(3) FF 25767 no. 137.
(4) FF 25770 no. 611.
(5) FF 25772 no. 1025.
(6) PO 2043 Dossier Moras no. 19.
(7) FF 25773 no. 11(5).
the captain, seven had been members of the company in its grander form of the previous year, one had been among those who entered in 1431 and had left in 1435 to return two years later, and four were apparently new recruits. The overwhelmingly Scottish nature of the company remained despite all the changes in the ranks, and the company survived in its truncated form with only one change until it vanishes from our sight after 1st August 1439 (8).

On the whole, this was a fairly stable organisation, which held together almost completely intact for nearly ten years until it began to break up; a big change in the membership was followed two years later by a complete collapse both in numbers and in status. After this, however, the unit held together in its new shape with little disruption. What happened to cause the changes is, of course, unknown; one can guess that quarrels between members or the lure of higher pay may have played a part (since it is unlikely that combat losses had any role) but there is no way of knowing. The lengths of service which some of the men involved ran up are quite impressive too; three served the full thirteen year period covered by the documents in addition to Moras himself, while no less than twenty-four served rather more than nine years (and, since we cannot say for certain that the company was formed at the time when we first have a record of its existence, these figures may be regarded as minimal) and the rest periods varying from two to six years. One had two separate spells in the ranks, totalling six years altogether; it seems probable that he moved on to other companies in the gaps between his times with

(8) FF 25775 no. 1425.
Moras (thus providing on a smaller scale a parallel to the comings and goings recorded by Contamine for the very much larger company of the Count of Foix himself (9)). This was, however, a remarkably, perhaps unusually stable unit; its national background may well have played a part in this (though there never seemed to be any difficulty in finding Scottish replacements for men who did leave - one can find traces of footloose Scots who served under several captains). Normally the impression which one gathers of the situation in the 1430's and 40's is of rather lax company structures and quite considerable mobility between different groups. This is certainly the picture which letters of remission paint; men like Alexander Gautery, a Scot who had served under many captains (10) or Pierre des Tasches who had fought for fifteen years in the Lombard companies of Giorgio Boys and Boniface de Valpergue as well as several others (11) wandering from group to group at the beginning of the campaigning season in search of a place. There is, unfortunately, no way in which these impressions can be checked to see how far they reflect the realities of the situation.

On the whole, it does seem plausible that this may have been more common than the Moras experience would suggest; the very weakness of royal organisation must have been an encouragement to this kind of nomadic life of temporary attachments to larger units whenever opportunity allowed. The coming of Ordonnance companies should have

(10) AN JJ 178 no. 107.
(11) AN JJ 179 no. 27.
injected a certain degree of stability into this situation, and it is Cunningham's Scottish company which provides my second set of figures on lengths of service. Some of the calculations have already been worked out by Contamine. Taking as his two points a muster taken on 31st July 1469 (12) and another taken in 1475 (13), he produces various figures of the numbers of men-at-arms and archers who figure in both. These are then used to calculate annual turnover and average lengths of service. The results are interesting, especially when contrasted with comparable figures taken from 'French' companies for the same period. On the whole, the Scots served longer. In the case of the archers, eighty out of the 189 who figure in the later muster had served in the company six years earlier. This implies an annual turnover of some 9.6% and gives an average career of eleven years as against an average for all companies of 13% and seven and a half years respectively (14). The men at arms had very much longer careers. Doing the same calculations one finds fifty-nine out of ninety-five remaining, which gives a turnover of 6.3% and a career of a little under fifteen years (the average for the army in this period is 9%, giving a career of rather over eleven years (15)).

It must be said that these figures may, perhaps, be a little misleading. I did calculations on the same company for a period of just under a year (taking a second muster in March 1470 (16) as my

(12) FF 25779 no. 19.
(13) NAF 8609 f105ro.
(14) Contamine GES p. 462, 616.
(15) id p. 470-1, 618.
(16) FF 25779 no. 26.
comparison) and produced wildly different figures, even accepting that all statistics culled from muster rolls are liable to be influenced by problems in identification of hopelessly misspelled names, illegible entries and other such matters. For this period, I found that no less than eleven-men-at arms left between the two musters, and forty five archers were missing as well. This would give an 11% level of departures among the men-at-arms (the strength of the company was 100 men-at-arms and 200 archers in 1469, 96 and 190 in 1470) and 22½% among the archers, or taking the replacements into account and doing the same sort of calculations as Contamine did (i.e. taking them on the basis of those who appear on both lists) figures of 17.7% turnover per annum of men at arms and no less than 45.3% for archers. These figures, needless to say, produce very different average careers indeed (under six years for men at arms and just over two for archers).

How can these very considerable variations be reconciled? It is possible that I may have hit upon a freakishly active year, in which an abnormally high number of changes in the ranks took place. The company had, after all, been in combat in Catalonia and this could have meant a high casualty rate. On the other hand, it is possible that the figures as calculated by Contamine conceal the real situation. By concentrating on the numbers remaining in the ranks over a six year period, and doing all the calculations on the basis that they are typical, he may be ignoring the possibility that they are in fact not so. It is possible that these men constitute a kind of hard core of longish term soldiers who formed the cornerstone of the units with a relatively high turnover going on around them. It
is quite possible that the men who passed through more rapidly may
have gone on to other units, especially since the 1470's were a
period of expansion in the numbers of companies in the French army
and one has ample evidence of groups of Scottish and other foreign
troops in otherwise French-dominated units.

Whether this be the explanation, or whether the figures for
1469-70 are to be explained by losses in battle, a local outbreak of
plague or even an abnormal number of ageing warriors leaving the
company (for it should be remembered that the 1450's and early 60's
had been noticeable for the stability within companies) (17), it is
clear that, for at least some men there was such a thing as a military
career. This obviously was a much more realistic affair for men at
arms, who had relatively better prospects than the archers, but it
seems to have been the case for some at least of the archers. The
career aspect was perhaps especially marked for the Scots (and
perhaps would be for the other foreigners as well if we had any
figures on their companies); the longer average careers for them
produced by Contamine's figures evidently reflect some kind of reality
and he himself was not surprised to find this situation (18). Ten to
fifteen years was, after all, quite a long career in the fifteenth
century terms. It was, however, a career with limited prospects, at
least for the archers of the companies. In the case of the Scottish
companies, there were certainly rather better chances of promotion than
in most French ones; over the six year period studied by Contamine,
fifteen out of the ninety four men at arms of the company in 1475 had

(17) Contamine GES p. 461, 470-1.
(18) id p. 462.
been promoted from within the ranks (19) which was considerably more than the average in most companies. Whether this can be seen as cause or effect of longer periods of service on the part of the Scottish archers is uncertain, and it would be dangerous to draw the conclusion that the Scottish troops were thus of higher social origin than their French equivalents. They may just have been regarded as more 'professional' and their commanders may have favoured internal promotion because they were relatively free from the temptation to favour the children of good family by allowing them to leapfrog the lower ranks in their companies.

On the whole, then, by the time of the Ordonnance companies a kind of military career structure had developed, with the foreign troops among the most professionalised in terms of length of service in the army. It is now time to move on to the consideration of such matters as pay and the other rewards which this service could bring.

In the matter of payment, the 1445 reforms marked a fairly clear watershed. Before, though the evidence is fragmentary and confused, it is fairly certain that pay was both irregular and insufficient; after, it was to become much more regular and adequate for the needs of the troops. If, as seems likely, men were enticed into French service by promises of high pay, then they were as deceived as the unfortunate Castilian and Rochellais shipmen who transported the Scottish army over in 1424. The first month or two may have been paid reasonably fully and rapidly, but after that the problems would begin. In many ways, this was hardly surprising. Well before (19) id p. 465, 618.
Agincourt, the financial resources of the French monarchy had been under severe pressure and warfare had been a luxury probably beyond its means even then. The most recent historian of the royal revenues and expenditure under Charles VI has estimated that it cost about 220,000 l to maintain a thousand men for a year, which meant that the monarchy could only just afford about ten thousand troops (20) out of taxation revenues. The campaigns of 1412-3 against the Burgundians had gobbled up much of the revenues of Languedoc, both present and to come (21). The same writer estimates total taxation revenues at about two million livres (22); the loss of Normandy and much of Languedoc must have at least halved this income, while improved efforts to exploit the rest may well have been cancelled out by the need to maintain loyalty in troubled times by leniency in tax demands and increased, if temporary, strength of local bargaining by estates. Even in an earlier, more solvent period, the habit had grown up of allowing arrears to build up. This seems to have become the norm in Languedoc (where the traditional procedures for keeping track of military expenditure largely collapsed (23)). There is certainly evidence that commanders were expected to maintain their men out of private resources. Grants of land to Darnley repeatedly refer to debts run up in royal service (24) and even the rather unprofitable

(21) id p. 426-7.
(24) See, for instance Cher C 1046 f39vo-41ro, C 793 f17vo.
gift of Evreux contains such phrases as "(il) a entretenu ladicte armee descossoys ou grant partie dicelle par ses moyens" and "entendu mesmement le petit payment que pour gaiges estoit" (25). Some of this may well have been special pleading, but it seems likely that the general picture is accurate enough; well after his death his sons had to be given royal protection against creditors in France (26). The king himself was unable to help them meet their obligations. A similar process seems to have happened in the case of the Earl of Douglas, who died deep in debt to the town of Tours; the matter was still causing debate in the council well after the end of his brief lordship (27). The irregularity of payment was inevitably one of the causes of the pillaging and search for alternative employment so common amongst the companies in France. Indeed, the royal government seems to have recognised lack of payment as a standing excuse for anti-social behaviour and the chancery even evolved a semi-standardised format for letters of remission issued under these circumstances (28).

On the whole, the foreign troops may well have been rather better off than most. When the government of Charles VII hit upon the desperate expedient of disbanding all save a few chosen companies in 1424 to save costs, the Scots and Lombards were exempt (29), while the unusual position of the Army of Scotland, effectively exempt from external financial control certainly allowed scope for considerable

(25) AN J 216 no. 20.
(26) Stuart p. 165, Cust p. 22.
(27) Indre et Loire BB 23 f72vo.
(28) AN JJ 179 no. 27 is an example of this.
(29) Doat 9 p. 279 published in Quicherat p. 211-2 PJ II.
profiteering on the part of the commanders if there was any money to be distributed. For major operations, quite considerable sums could still be assembled; 30,000 lt was paid in June-September 1423 to persuade the Army of Scotland to take the field and join in the siege of Cravant (30). This was supposed to cover the wages for two months, which implies an annual payment to the Scots of 180,000 lt out of a total disbursement of 219,412 lt for the year December 1422-December 1423 (31). One may well, however, doubt whether such a sum was actually paid. These were desperate times, and the majority of companies seem to have led a hand to mouth existence, taking money where they could find it. In any case, pay was far from uniform throughout France, and no doubt the agreements entered into by the various foreign groups contained different rates of pay from company to company. On the whole, pay remained static in terms of money of account, which meant that it declined in value sharply in an age of rapid currency debasement (32); perhaps the irregularity of payment by forcing men to look for other ways of earning money took the steam out of any demands for better rates. In Languedoc conditions were rather better than in Languedoc; the Aragonese Albert was paid the 14,100 moutons due for his year of service, even if the money had to be borrowed (33), while Moras and his men seem to have been paid with reasonable regularity (his men were being given 15 lt per man per month during the period when they were thirty esquires strong, which

(32) id p. 250, 630-1.
(33) PO 20 Dossier Albert no. 3, AN K 62 no. 33.
added up to an annual cost of 5,400 lt for the services of this one fairly small company (34)). The vast majority of the men involved were, however, employed in the north and had to face the problems of irregular payment in increasingly debased currency.

The disastrous state of the royal finances is well illustrated by the surviving accounts for the relief of Orleans and subsequent campaigns. The total sum paid out for this crucial military operation came to 12,000 lt, distributed in dribs and drabs as the money came to hand (35). Even if one admits that there may well have been much more spent which never passed through the hands of the Trésoriers-des-Guerres, it is clear that the King of France was not able to pay the proper costs of military operations and was reduced to reliance on loyalty, loans and the hope of other profits of war to raise armies for him. In this distribution, the foreigners again did comparatively well; nearly a third of the total expenditure went to Darnley to make him collect his troops and join in the operations (36) but this payment of 3,900 lt hardly compares with the 15,000 a month which his men had been due in 1423. Even the apparently slightly more generous treatment accorded to foreign troops may simply reflect the fact that they were less able, even with royal gifts of land, to rely on their private resources to support them in royal service.

On the whole, then, in the earlier period of foreign military involvement in France, it is highly doubtful whether anybody from the

(34) PO 2043 Dossier Moras no. 18.
(35) FF 7858 f41ro-52vo, Contamine GES p. 243.
(36) FF 7858 f47vo.
commanders down to the humblest archer was able to live on his pay, let alone make any profit out of it. Indeed, many of the leaders may have had to go deep into debt to maintain their companies, while the impact of this shortage of pay on the discipline of their men must have been considerable. Even if the foreign companies may have been slightly favoured in the distribution of what little money was available, this hardly made up for the overall shortage of pay.

After 1445, the situation did improve somewhat. Payment became more regular and rather more stable; the man-at-arms in a lance received 15 lt per month out of which he had to maintain two of the non- or semi-combattant servants in the lance while the two archers received another 15 lt between them and maintained the sixth man out of this (37). How adequate this was is rather hard to determine with real precision. Certainly military equipment was highly expensive and a fairly general taste for luxury could run individuals into financial troubles. On the other hand, soldiers were notoriously poor payers for goods and services and probably squared their accounts by refusing to pay debts (38). Certainly the re-organisation did not put an end to abuses; pay was often late (sometimes very late) in arriving and relations with the civilian population were, as we shall see, rarely good (39). It does seem, however, that at least some of those in the ranks of the companies could make some savings out of their pay. We find in the notarial

(37) Contamine GES p. 508.
(38) id p. 510-2.
(39) id p. 504-5.
records in Toulouse several entries concerning members of Pettilot's company who lent out money to local merchants while the company was based in the area in 1448-9. These sums could be quite considerable; on 27th September 1448 Sieur Phineas de Narbona confessed to owing no less than 250 l. to one Thomas 'Vehn' (Bain?) - man at arms in Pettilot's company (40). The money had been lent against security. Normally the sums involved were much more modest - in the 15 - 20 livres range, but they amount to quite important sums to those involved. The exact areas in which we find the Scots investing their money are less certain (though one seems to have chosen to place his money with a couple of carters from Bigorre, probably engaged in the profitable trade in dyestuffs or salt (41)), but the existence of this kind of investment by troops was a rather unexpected discovery and it implies a certain amount of ready cash in the hands of at least the more senior men at arms of the company.

Generally after 1445 the foreign companies are on the same footing as their French equivalents from the point of view of pay. They do not seem to have been specially favoured either in the rate of payment or its frequency. While this was true for the ordinary Ordonnance companies, there was one exception. This was the guard, which did exceptionally well in terms of financial rewards. Under Charles the men at arms (who do not seem to have had any servants to support) were paid 24 l. per month, Archers 'du corps' 18 l. and the archers 'de la garde' 13 l. (again without many of the expenses of

(40) AD Haute-Garonne 3E 1449 f4vo.
(41) id 3E 4468 f7ro. For such carters, see Wolf p. 126-7, 458 etc.
the soldiers in normal companies). Under Louis, the men at arms all but disappear and the pay of the archers goes up to 23 and 18 li respectively (42); later in the same reign the traditional gifts for robes and horses were consolidated into regular annual payments of 68 li 5st and 41 li 5st respectively. This was very high pay indeed, especially since the consolidation did not by any means eliminate extra royal presents, and, unlike the normal companies, much of the equipment was supplied at royal expense as well. It was hardly surprising that men were prepared to go to quite considerable lengths to get themselves into these privileged units, even including bribery and theft (43).

It is also no real surprise to find that members of the guard were able to invest money in land purchases. There are considerable traces of such activities in the region around Azay-le-Rideau in the archives in Tours. In 1462, for instance, one finds Jehan Asquin buying up rents in this area (44), while the land-acquiring efforts of an Andrew Gray can be followed in some detail. In 1473-4 he bought up properties in the parishes of Barbaten and Landerière, various rents in the same parishes and at least three houses for a total investment of 90 écus (45). How exactly he ran his newly-acquired patrimony is unknown, and it is not certain how many other members of this elite unit invested their surplus money in land purchases and other investments, but this activity does seem indicative

(42) Contamine GES p. 633.
(43) AN JJ 182 no. 53.
(44) Indre-et-Loire E 1055, 1069.
(45) id E 1055 nos. 1 - 6.
of a willingness to use their gains to build a position for themselves in France. It also proves that the fortunate could hope to make a lasting improvement in their position from the profits of military service.

Payment, in the strict sense of the term, was not, of course, the only legitimate way in which one could hope to emerge from military service better off than when one entered it. Before trying to calculate the actual position of those who entered French service, we should consider the impact of such matters as royal gifts and pensions, the tenure of offices of profit and the more traditional "profits of war" such as ransoms on the incomes of military men.

Outright gifts from royal sources came in many forms. Some, like payment for one's 'État' (an untranslatable concept implying a recognised style of life which all of a certain rank should be able to support and in which the king was bound to maintain his servants) rapidly became formalised into the regular pensions which bulk so largely in the accounts of the post-1445 period. These were almost an additional element in the regular pay for captains and can be regarded as such rather than as gifts in the true sense of the term, though they formed another part of the patronage system which presents given irregularly for specific reasons helped to create. They could amount to quite considerable sums; it appears that the normal pension for a captain of a company of a hundred lances in the 1450's was 300 l.t per year (46).

(46) FF 32511 f178ro, for instance.
Presents in the proper sense of the term were of considerable importance even after 1445; before they may well have been crucial in maintaining loyalty amongst ill-paid troops. They took many forms. In the early days of the Army of Scotland there was considerable distribution of land to the leaders of the army (47). Not all of this was necessarily undiluted generosity and much may have been intended to make up for an inability to pay wages regularly and in full. Nevertheless gifts of land were still made to those who had deserved well of the king at fairly late dates; the Scot Thomas Houston who had been the first man into Meaux was given the lands of Gournay-sur-Marne as a reward (48), while Pettilot received the lands of Sauveterre-en-Guienne in 1448 as a reward for his services in the wars (49). Presentations of lands on this scale were, by their very nature rare (the land in this case came from confiscated Armagnac territories which happened to be in the royal gift at that time), and it became more normal for favour to be shown by distribution of sums of money or in kind. Presents of money to loyal servants had a very long tradition, and soldiers were easily included. The motives for royal generosity varied widely, from the hundred écus given to one Walter Hervey for the capture of an English supply convoy in 1422 (50) to the fifty écus which Arthur Montgomery received for wounds suffered at the Battle of the Herrings (51).

(47) Pluscarden p. 554.
(49) AN JJ 179 no. 178.
(50) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. III 'Hervey'.
(51) id Vol. III 'Montgomery'
reorganisation of 1445 did nothing to change this; indeed it may well have led to greater royal generosity by providing an organised structure for patronage to operate within, as well as improved financial resources to provide the necessary cash. Certainly there is evidence that money raised in taxation was being assigned directly to individual soldiers for very varied purposes; the war aides in Berry for 1455 were used to pay 100 lt of a total of 700 given to John Simple of the guard as a wedding present (52). Needless to say the guard units did very well out of gifts generally; in 1449, for instance, we find the captains being given some 1160 lt for distribution among them for the festivities of the Jour de l'An (53). Captains of Ordonnance companies also did well out of cash distributions; in 1446-7 Martin García even had the costs of a trip home to Castile to visit his relations paid for (54). Gifts in kind were even more common; horses were especially favoured as presents. They came in all varieties from the expensive ones purchased in 1419 to give to the Earl of Wigtown and the other leaders of the Scottish army down to the small and very cheap ones deemed good enough for such obscure men as a Scottish archer called Sifflet, or another Scot called James Stonard (55) (a good horse could cost anything up to 500 lt, while the common soldiers were riding animals which cost between twelve and twenty livres). The gift of a horse was highly important when one would be expected to maintain several remounts in

(52) FF 2886 f13vo.
(53) FF 23259 f22ro.
(54) id f8vo.
(55) AN KK 53 f5vo, 75ro, 159vo.
case of losses in battle, and a man like Theaulde de Valpergue, who was at times managing to be given money for a new horse by the king annually in the 1430's was particularly favoured (56). Another favourite form of present was armour. The accounts of the Receveur of Languedoc in 1447 and 1449 show considerable amounts of armour being distributed to captains and individual men at arms alike. In 1447, for instance, Garcia was given six suits of armour and Cunningham three plus a gilded brigandine (it is possible that some at least of these suits may have been passed on by the captains in question to their own men; they, too, had a patronage network within their companies), but one also finds single suits going to individuals like Robin Hunter and Ursay (?), Cunningham (57). Royal generosity could cover all contingencies from granting money to a former member of the guard stricken with leprosy (58) to repaying the losses suffered by Pettilot in the disastrous ambush of the Val de Liepire (59).

There was a whole network of services and gifts distributed by the monarchy within the context of the structures set up in 1445; as elsewhere in late mediaeval government and administration patronage lubricated the wheels which made the system work.

Perhaps the most important and potentially lucrative area of this patronage lay in the provision to offices of profit in the administration of the kingdom. There was to be an increasingly large place for soldiers in this area, and the foreign commanders did very well

(56) PO 2924 Dossier Valpergue nos. 3 - 7.
(57) FF 23259 f5vo.
(58) FF 23262 f17ro.
(59) PO 2252 Dossier Pettilot no. 3.
(perhaps surprisingly well, considering the normal mediaeval prejudice in favour of native-born councillors). Most acquired the honourific, if not particularly remunerative titles of royal chamberlain or esquire of the royal stables; some, like Cunningham gained seats on the royal council (though one may well wonder whether he was a particularly zealous attender). These, though they could be useful by virtue of the entry to court which they carried with them, were essentially the small change of the currency of office and carried little in the way of financial rewards. Much more lucrative were the captaincies of various towns which were eagerly sought from an early stage, while seneschalships were the most profitable and therefore most desired of the lot. The real champion in the office-hunting stakes was undoubtedly Theaulde de Valpergue. The details of his career were fully enough followed in an earlier chapter to require no repetition, and he was rather unusual in that he made quite a definite switch from an essentially military career to an essentially administrative one. Nevertheless, he retained an interest in military affairs to the end of his days, and was quite an unblushing pluralist as far as office was concerned. His greatest success was undoubtedly in becoming Seneschal of Lyon and Bailli of Mâcon despite the unwillingness of the town to have him as their captain as well. He proceeded to milk his office shamelessly, since he seems to have performed his duties very largely by deputy and fought vigorously with the city council when he did put in an appearance, using his powers to the profit of both himself and his family (60).

(60) Guigue p. 416, 446 etc.
Despite promises in 1449 that he would live permanently in the city, he in fact finished his days at the other end of France busily engaged on royal business running the confiscated Armagnac lands, on commissions, building castles in Bordeaux, involved in the administration of Bayonne and collecting captaincies of castles to hold as sinecures in addition to his other sources of income.

If Valpergue is an outstanding example of what was possible in the way of accumulating military and civilian functions in the administration, then other foreign soldiers were not very far behind. The great age of multiple office-holding combined with command of Ordonnance companies comes rather later, at a time when there was an increasing tendency to treat companies as offices of profit like any other (61), but some fairly lucrative combinations were made by enterprising captains. Pettilot made a very considerable amount of profit out of his Seneschalship in the Landes. In 1451 he had himself granted a pension of 500 livres per year on the revenues of Dax (62), drew his wages as captain of both Dax and St. Sever in his own territories (63), plus further wages as captain of Maurier in the Armagnac lands (64). He was appointed captain of Montoise near Toulouse as well in 1457 (65), but this had to be recalled in 1459 since the local financial officers evidently unimpressed by the royal grant and unwilling to pay good money to an absentee captain of

(62) PO 2252 Dossier Pettilot no. 5.
(63) id no. 6, FF 20580 f5ro.
(64) PO 2252 Dossier Pettilot no. 9.
(65) id no. 10.
a castle which the royal administration claimed needed well guarded; had made such trouble about paying him that he had not received any of his due (66). The accounts for the sénéchaussée, which have survived for 1455, also help to explain the massive legal wrangle between Pettilot and the Sénéchal of Gascony which occupied so much of the time of the Grand Jours of Bordeaux in 1456 and 1459 (67).

It emerges from the financial records that Pettilot was receiving none of the profits of justice so important to all mediaeval jurisdictions; due to his technical subordination to Bordeaux, all the profits of justice went there (68). This, at least, was the situation on paper; if one is to believe the claims made in the course of the court hearings, there was a great deal going on in the Lannes which escaped the proper control of the Sénéchal of Gascony, so Pettilot may well have made a fair amount from the profits of justice illegally administered.

No doubt other commanders like Boniface de Valpergue and Martin Garcia, both of whom held several offices in plurality, and the latter of whom was to become a sénéchal himself, did equally well out of administrative positions granted by a grateful or careless crown to its military servants. To make some guess at the kind of income which a fortunate soldier could build up from the combination of his military command, pensions, gifts and administrative positions, we have to look to a man who made his money not in the service of the king, but of Louis XI's rebellious brother, Charles of France.

(66) id no. 11.
(68) FF 20580 f5vo.
Patrick Folcart is another whose career we have examined at length earlier. The records of his income for 1471 have survived amid the accounts of his master, and very interesting reading they make. On the military side, he was being paid 800 l. per year as captain of Charles' guard and 300 as commander of ten lances. As Seneschal of Saintonge and captain of St. Jean d'Angely he had 1,000 l. and the same amount as Chamberlain. His wife had a pension of 600 l. and to this had to be added the revenue of 6-700 l. brought in by lordships in the Armagnac, given to him by Charles. He received two velvet robes a year, with the promise of an exceptional gift of 4,000 l. over two years, which he used to buy up a further lordship. This was quite a tidy income for one who probably had very little personal wealth when he started (69). No doubt the possibilities were even better for those who served the king rather than his disgraced and intriguing brother. The amount of personal profit to be gained by loyalty to the crown was very considerable; the patronage game worked precisely because the king was willing to allow an often considerable level of inefficiency in his administration as long as loyalty was guaranteed and was prepared to allow soldiers to accumulate offices of profit outwith the strictly military sphere, to maintain their loyalty.

Other profits did not depend so directly on the vagaries of royal favour; these were the profits of war itself. They were also the most elusive and chancy; one needed a lot of luck. The great chance for many Scots came at Baugé, when considerable numbers of English

(69) FF 20491 f65ro-vo, in Stein p. 788-9.
nobles fell into their hands. The most notable gainer was a Laurence Vernon, who had the immense fortune to capture the Earl of Somerset; he was able to sell his captive to Charles himself for 40,000 écus (70). In practice, 15,000 of this came in the form of the Lordship of Montreuil-Bonin near Poitiers and the rest was repaid in instalments which were still being handed out as late as 1451 at the rate of 500 lt annually (71). Vernon had hit the jackpot; for one afternoon's lucky fighting, he got a prosperous lordship, a fairly assured annual income and probably a massive boost to his social status. He had trouble with his neighbours in Poitou, but his family was to hold Montreuil-Bonin well into the following century (72). This kind of spectacular good fortune must have acted as an inspiration to many in the ranks of the Scottish companies. How many were so fortunate we shall never know; none had quite that level of fortune in capturing a member of a major aristocratic family who could be sold to the French king for exchange with French captives in England. We do not even know what profits the other Scots who took important captives at Baugé made, or how much the Duke of Clarence's coronet fetched when it was eventually sold.

All in all, the profits of war were most elusive and hard to trace; there may well have been much hope but little fulfilment. In fact, all the supplementary sources of income had their drawbacks

(70) AN K 168 no. 21.
(71) FF 32511 f140ro.
and hazards, and it is to these that we must turn before trying to make some kind of estimate of the real chances available of making good in the ranks of the foreign companies in the French royal army.

Obviously the profits of war itself were the most hazardous of the lot. To make money from ransoms, one had first to capture one's man and probably needed some resources to maintain him in captivity until the financial side had been agreed; one suspects that the whole business would be beyond the resources of a poor man who would be forced to sell his rights in the prisoner to someone better placed. In fact, it could be a very uncertain business even for those with resources; the case of the Chateauvillain ransom recorded by Bossuat indicates just how chaotic this could become with litigation concerning the ransom dragging on from 1430 to 1455, by which time most of the principals were dead (73). Admittedly changes of allegiance complicated this case, but in the final period all parties had the advantage of being able to use the same courts; the main problem was simply that the initial ransom demand had been wildly optimistic when the resources of the captive were taken into account. The demands made by Villandrando after Anthon broke at least two Burgundian families (74); if payment was not made the only recourse was to the emotionally satisfying, but ultimately financially ineffective process of organised slander or defamation.

If the rewards were often hard to collect even for those lucky


(74) Quicherat p. 51, 215-6, PJ V.
enough to make a potentially profitable capture, the hazards for those who were unlucky were very real. Capture was, of course, a two-way affair and could be a disaster, especially for foreigners who were often men of limited resources (at least in France). Some of Darnley's troubles may have been caused by his ransom after Cravant, though he was given royal help in paying it (this arrived in 1428, some three years after it had been granted and five after the transactions in question) and was in fact exchanged rather than having to pay a full ransom (75). Royal aid was sometimes available to help in paying these bills, but the king could hardly be expected to intervene in every case, and the concept of ransom went very far down the social scale indeed to include those who can have had very few personal resources. After Cravant, Charles apparently paid 148 écus to save twenty Scots archers from death at English hands (76), (a reminder of the practice of that most chivalrous monarch Henry V and his habit of hanging Scottish prisoners for disloyalty to his captive James I). Others were not so fortunate; fear of rotting in prison for the rest of his days because he had nobody to help him buy his freedom forced Peter Forrest to desert to an English company (77). A German squire, Baudet Lalemant, was rather luckier; he was held and a ransom of 300 écus demanded when he could only pay twenty. He prayed to St. Katherine and vowed to give up wine until he had been to Fierboys on pilgrimage if she would help him to escape,

(75) Cust p. 10-1, Stuart p. 137.
(76) Arsenal 4522 f19ro.
(77) AN JJ 179 no. 136.
and, sure enough, despite being chained up and guarded by twelve men, he got away to tell the tale at her shrine (78). How many men were actually killed because they were unable to meet the demands made of them is unknown, but the danger should be remembered by all those who are unduly impressed by the apparently gentlemanly nature of late mediaeval warfare where soldiers were concerned. Ransoms were a highly vexatious business for those involved; another successful suppliant to St. Katherine was a Genoese member of the garrison of Vendôme who had escaped from English captivity and whose captor demanded that he return to prison, following this by a process of defamation. In the end the issue came to a trial by combat, which the Genoese, with saintly aid, won (79). In the end, it seems safe to conclude that only a handful ever benefitted from the profits of war, at least in legitimate forms. Far more lost all they possessed when they lost their horses and armour to their captors; for every Laurence Vernon, there may have been many like the Scottish esquire begging his way along the Loire valley with letters of recommendation from Georges de la Tremoille who turned up in search of the rather doubtful charity of the councillors of Tours to help him pay an excessive ransom (80).

It is perhaps understandable that warfare should have been a hazardous affair for those who entered it in the hope of making money. The other sources of apparent profit could, however, be equally precarious. Royal gifts, for instance, were not nearly as certain as

(78) Miracles de St. Katherine p. 41 no. 87.
(79) id p. 55-7 no. 104.
(80) Indre-et-Loire BB 24 f66ro.
they might appear. For one thing, there was always the danger that one would be given rights over sources of revenue rather than cash in hand; when one went to collect them the problems began to appear. This was probably especially common in the bad days of the 1420's and 30's, but it never quite disappeared. The most common problem was multiple assignment of the same revenues for different purposes. This became very apparent in one case in Lyon. In 1423, the king ordered payment of half the city's tax revenue to be paid to the Lombard captains Caqueran and Valpergue to provide armour for their men (81). By 1425 it had become painfully apparent that the same revenues had been granted both to the impoverished members of the Parlement of Poitiers and to the Constable Richemont, and a major quarrel broke out over who would actually be paid. In the end the Lombards (or at least Caqueran) received their money, even if the final payment was only made in 1426 (82). They were lucky; Caqueran was, in fact, a close neighbour of the city with contacts within the walls and his troops were at hand to enforce his rights, while Poitiers was far away and Richemont out of favour (even so, the councillors tried to give something to everybody; royal commands were, after all, royal commands even when they were impossible to fulfil). A less well-placed man could well have lost his rights, and a foreign soldier was likely to be especially vulnerable in any struggle caused by this kind of confusion. Even in the far more stable days of the end of the reign and under Louis XI this kind of confusion was

(81) Caillet p. 338-9 PJ XXXVIII.
still possible; the king often had little idea of what he was
granting away and double assignments remained a problem for years
to come. In addition, even in the generally orderly 1450's, local
resistance to royal commands could be effective; as we have
seen a duly made royal gift to an absentee captain could be made
ineffective by an obstinate and ultimately effective refusal to pay
his wages on the part of the local financial authorities. In
addition, the king was apt to hand out more than he could actually
afford in pensions and other presents which could mean another battle
to get payment as well as providing a most useful supplementary form
of control of the patronage system; who was paid and who was not
could be a good way of telling who was in favour. In the ultimate
analysis, everything was in the hands of the king.

This was especially true for the most prestigious of all forms of
reward - the grant of land. Lands granted willingly enough in times
of trouble would be in constant danger of being reclaimed when circum-
stances altered. The fate of the Duchy of Touraine illustrates this
well. Despite all the high-flown phrases in the original grant, Charles
had not the slightest intention of letting so valuable a possession es-
cape into the hands of foreign nobility for long. After the Earl of
Douglas's death at Verneuil his widow claimed her due share in the
duchy. Charles (who, without any concern for the rights of the heir
or the widow, had already handed it over to the Queen of Sicily)
produced feudal law to suit his own case and dismissed the claim.
Whether his claim that apance lands only descended to direct heirs
was true is uncertain; his claim that the duchy was in wardship for
the Earl of Wigtown was on the other hand sheer hypocrisy since the
land had already been disposed of. For good measure, he complained (probably with justification) about the pillaging of Douglas's troops, and claimed (almost certainly without justification) that they had been paid in full. He stated his regret at the death of her husband, but sternly warned her about the consequences if she tried to assert her claims by force (one assumes he was thinking about the reaction of the remaining Scottish troops in the area) (83). What it came down to was that Charles had no intention of allowing her to take possession of any lands in France, and no amount of right on her side would change that fact. In practice, whatever the documents of donation might say, royal gratitude was not eternal, and one had to guard one's gains closely. Wigtown was pushed out of his lands at Dun-le-Roi in 1431 since he was not in France to protect them and they were needed for Richemont (84). In this area the foreigner was much more vulnerable, since he could not rely on the support of his fellow nobles in the way that a native-born Frenchman could. It would appear that to hold on to lands in France, one had to remain close at hand; it is significant that the families which lasted (Vernon, Cunningham, and especially the Stewarts of Aubigny) chose to settle in France for the rest of their lives. Even this did not mean immunity from trouble; Darnley's widow apparently had to go to law to protect her lands after her husband's death (85) and as late as 1462 the family was having trouble with the officers of the Duchy of Berry, from which they had been extracted some forty years

(83) F Lat 10187 f5ro-6vo.
(84) AN XIa 8604 f109vo-110ro.
(85) AN XIa 9199 f191ro.
before (86). The fact that rewards, especially in the later years of this study came very largely from confiscations, posed additional problems. Pettilot's lands at Sauveterre, taken from the Armagnac inheritance, survived the later reconciliation between the Count and the king, but the Stewart grants from the same source seem to have been short-lived affairs (87). Thomas Houston was deprived of his lands at Gournay in 1466 and forced into what was probably an unfair exchange because the king wanted to restore the lands to the Chabannes family as a token of reconciliation (88). The king almost always saw to it that his will was done.

This was the fundamental fact of life at least from 1450 onwards, and it made all rewards contingent on continued loyalty to the crown. This could lead to spectacular reverses of fortune to delight moralists much concerned with the wheel of fate; the career of Robert Cunningham with its progress from favour to the dungeons and back to even higher favour than before at court would have made a fine illustration for such a treatise. In a world where even the greatest of the land were more or less reliant on royal income (and thus continued royal favour) to balance their budgets, the foreign professional soldier, without fortune (at least in France) beyond what he gained as a reward for faithful service, was particularly vulnerable. Patrick Folcart would have been in severe financial straits had he broken with Charles of France; one look at his income shows how much he relied on service for his living.

The appeal of Nicol Chambre's widow to Louis XI, even if one cannot be certain of how far it tells the full story, provided the reverse; she claims that her husband had suffered heavily for his support of Louis while the latter was still Dauphin, had lost much of his income and offices and died burdened with heavy debts (89). To survive, at least at the level of captain or in the guard, one needed a cool head for political manoeuvring. Not all managed this, as the purges in the guard indicate. Folcart himself was a loser, lucky to be able to save his career (and perhaps that of some at least of his expelled colleagues) because there was an alternative source of patronage available. This, indeed was the main internal balance provided by the system itself; Louis' exploitation of it for the purposes of revenge was dangerous and unbalanced the structure until he realised the dangers and reintegrated enough of those he had expelled to restabilise matters.

One could then, make a career out of soldiering for the King of France and even hope to emerge better off than when one went in. For many of those, humble and noble alike, persuaded to cross the seas in the 1420's, however, a more probable fate was debt, poverty and perhaps death in prison, because one could not afford to pay a ransom. Despite the apparently generous distributions of lands to the commanders, many seem to have been in chronic debt (and it should be remembered that some of the most valued rewards which were handed out, like Darnley's right to quarter the arms of France on his shield had absolutely no cash value) (90). Some certainly had money with

(89) FF 20 86 fl91ro.
(90) Cust p. 12-4.
them; the two Douglases buried at Orleans left quite considerable sums of money and gifts in kind to the cathedral, and Darnley, despite his apparent financial troubles, managed to provide for masses in perpetuity which lasted until the Revolution (91). On the other hand, the Scots who made their wills at Châteaudun on the road to Verneuil had apparently nothing of value to leave apart from their horses (92). 

In more settled times the dangers of losing all by picking the wrong political side were rather greater, but some at least managed to thrive; captains like Cunningham with his castles and lands and lordships making him a member of the nobility of France at the top of the scale, members of the guard building up their own landed fortunes on a more modest scale or able to pay fifty écus for letters of naturalisation (93) (though the majority were exempted from this payment) on a rather lower one. Whether the ordinary man at arms and archer did quite so well is harder to tell; as we shall see, the captain and his most trusted henchmen had a lot to do with the distribution of pay and could easily operate many stoppages, while there is evidence that some soldiers at least had trouble living on what eventually filtered down to them. Some at least must have been fairly well off (the men who invested their money in Toulouse, for instance) while the very fact that so many figure in letters of remission, which cost money and were thus beyond the reach of the

(91) de la Saussey p. 596.
(92) Augis p. 118.
(93) AN K 168 no. 9², 10².
very poor (94) suggests that many had some ready cash. By 1470 or so, one can begin to see the start of a military career, with structures and hopes of reward all its own emerging; a career with at least some prospects for advancement.

This chapter has dealt exclusively with the legitimate prospects and profits of the military life. It is time to turn to the other side of the story; the problems of discipline and pillage which bulk so large in the writings of contemporaries and are still so common in the popular view of the armies and soldiers of the later middle ages.

Chapter VII. The Limits of Discipline.

The undisciplined, plundering soldier, along with his close associate, the overmighty subject, is one of the stock figures of mediaeval history; carving a swathe of pillage, rape and murder through the shadows of the late mediaeval twilight, lording it over a cowering countryside of helpless peasants too scared to resist even if they had possessed the arms to do so and extorting vast sums from terrified towns and meetings of estates simply to make him go elsewhere. The stereotype was created early; it can be found in the writings of sympathetic contemporary writers from the privileged classes (usually the clergy) expressing their sympathy for the lot of the poor and trying to awaken their fellows to their Christian duties. How far does this venerable picture actually describe the real relations between soldier and society at all levels? It is the purpose of this chapter to ask this question.

There can be no doubt at all that troops got out of hand (and indeed were out of hand perhaps more often than not). Royal control was weak, royal payment erratic, and there was a tacit recognition in the letters of remission that unpaid troops would plunder at will, without there being anything that the royal authorities could do about it. In any case, there were so many bands of armed men about, drifting in and out of royal service as and when required in the years before 1445 that the actual authority of the crown over them was bound to be limited. Sometimes, it is true, one suspects that the pillaging had certain, clearly defined, functions. It seems probable that fifteenth century pillaging round
sensitive towns like Tours, or the capture of royal goods could perform the same function as mutiny did in the much more highly organised sixteenth-century armies in Flanders or seventeenth-century ones in England during the Civil War; that of putting pressure on the royal government to allocate some of its available resources to the settlement of outstanding pay arrears (1). The theft of the Dauphin's household effects and papers by Buchan's men in 1421 was followed by payments to Buchan himself and probably to his men (2) while the regular plundering of the Tours area (near the court as it was, and thus well placed to make effective representations to the king) seems often to have ended in the delivery of royal letters to the troops ordering them to move elsewhere. One can fairly assume that money changed hands as well; the case in 1433 when two members of the Scots Guard were sent to negotiate the departure of Scottish troops suggests strongly that a genuine negotiation with the king himself was being undertaken. It is perhaps worthy of note that the worst plunderers of the Tours region were men like Kennedy who were in regular employment in the royal forces (3).

Even the much-recorded agreements between commanders like Villandrandando and local estates in the south (which are so useful to the historian in permitting us to follow his itinerary) concerning payments to move his men elsewhere or to maintain them where they were in good


(2) AN KK 50 f13vo.

(3) Indre-et-Loire 68 25 f166vo.
order can be seen as a kind of unofficial tax collection. The companies were down at the grassroots of tax assessment and collection, making sure that their dues were actually collected and reached them without passing through the central royal treasury where they might be appropriated for other purposes. It is clear, to take but one example of the genre, that the payment made to Villandrando by the estates of the Bas Pays d'Auvergne in November 1438 so that he would move his men out of the country, came from money collected as a grant of taxation to the king (4); at this point Villandrando was more or less in royal service but it was still much more effective for him to collect his money at the local level where his men could, if need be, exert pressure to see that the money came in. The conditions of the time probably forced many troops to work out their own conditions of payment directly with the representatives of the tax-granting classes without going through the officially correct channels. It is perhaps significant that, even after 1443 it was not unknown for the monarchy to allow companies to act as their own tax-collectors in places where there was resistance to the levies designed to support them.

In any case, there was another side to this tale of pressure and apparent extortion from the local authorities. Protection was an important side of the activities of Villandrando and his fellows. In Rouergue early in 1438 he was prepared to replace the distant and ineffective Armagnac family as the effective protector of the province. For a price he would undertake to keep the English and other routier companies at bay (5). In the end the deal fell through; the Armagnac

(4) PO 3002 Dossier Villandrando No. 3.
family aroused themselves and renewed their protection (though in the end they were forced to sub-contract much of the actual work to Villandrando who had the effective forces in the area) (6). In practice, the companies were far from being universally detested by the local estates; they could be used as very effective maintainers of law and order in the area if paid enough and could indeed be positively welcome in a time of chaos when the royal structures for maintaining the peace had all but collapsed. This kind of arrangement had a long history in regions of the south where a similar situation had existed in the 1380's; it was perhaps more unusual further north, but even the burgesses of Tours were prepared to make deals with captains to maintain law and order in the immediate area of the city. The treaty between the Bastard of Scotland and Tours concluded in July 1433 was far from just a matter of extortion; he undertook to maintain security in the countryside around Tours for the three months following (7). In a world which seemed to be on the point of collapsing into chaos and where even troops hired to drive out the independent companies looted as badly as the men they were supposed to be keeping at bay, there was much to be said for paying those who actually possessed the strength to enforce some kind of peace to do so.

In fact, in all their dealings with such established and organised forms of authority as local estates and town councils the soldiers were usually highly legalistic. The towns might well quiver behind (6) id p. 218-9. (7) Indre et Loire BB 25 f172vo-173ro.
their walls as their surrounding lands were burned up (and no town in this period could ever be totally isolated from its countryside; witness the lamentations in Tours in 1430 as a Scottish force ravaged the area around. "La grant clameur du peuple estant en ceste ville" was caused by massive thefts of livestock and the fact that nobody in the town "Nose mener lez bestail pasturer aux champs" (8)), but on the whole the towns were relatively safe. Precautions were certainly taken, ranging from the near paranoid behaviour of Tours in expelling all Scots from within the walls in 1425 (9) through payments to inhabitants to check local woods and other areas of potential cover lest there be any soldiers hiding there in hopes of surprising the town (10) to a kind of generalised edgy watchfulness as at Millau where the sight of strangers riding through the fields towards the town was enough to provoke the sounding of the alarm even though they turned out to be innocent travellers (11). Normally, though, the passing companies were not particularly interested in storming towns even if they had had the capacity to do so (it seems very doubtful, for instance, whether even Villandrando, the greatest of his type, possessed any artillery). Towns were useful points of pressure on the royal authorities and sources of readily-tappable wealth, whether in the form of protection agreements or in more naked extortion. Even this latter was usually done in due legal form. In 1431, for example, Villandrando chose to extract money

(8) id BB 24 f256vo.
(9) id BB 23 f37ro.
from Millau by claiming (with what level of truth we do not know) that he was owed money by a merchant of the town and would take reprisals against its citizens and the surrounding countryside if he was not repaid (12). All of this was to be done in the proper forms of the time, with letters of marque being taken out. This method was to be repeated twice at Lyon in 1433 and 1435. In the former case, the council did their best to persuade the debtor to pay up lest disaster befall the town (though with less than total success) and the case eventually went before the court of the Bailli. There the consuls had no jurisdiction but put in their plea that justice be done to the captain (since the Bailli was his old employer and comrade in arms, Imbert de Grolee, it seems at least probable that he got his money back in the end) (13). The second case did not involve him personally but one of his men; again the threats of distraint and reprisal (which it should be remembered were fairly standard commercial practices of the time, despite their military nature) were used, apparently with some success (14). In the latter case, it emerged that Villandrando had a kind of permanent business agent in the city; this was not unique, since Caqueran had been similarly served in the previous decade (15). This, I think, should prove finally that such captains were not just simple-minded pillagers but were interested in the commercial side of affairs and willing to invest their money in business ventures. The cities probably were

(13) Guigue p. 352.
(14) id p. 411.
(15) id p. 171, Deniau p. 452.
far from unwilling to see soldiers investing their ill-gotten gains in ventures inside their walls or with their merchants; like their counterparts in Germany during the Thirty Years War, they probably hoped that having a stake in the prosperity of the city would encourage them to keep their men in order and limit their exactions (16). It may well have been a justified hope; Caqueran's relative patience in waiting while monies due to him by the city of Lyon were scraped together can perhaps be attributed to his investments there (17). Even on a rather lower level of operation, the same legalism persisted; the Scot Tourenboeuf (Turnbull ?) chose to extract money from Tours by claiming a debt owed to him by the Archbishop (18).

In fact, the relationship between certain town and individual soldiers could be very good, even warm. Darnley had a very close relationship with Orleans as exemplified by his statement recorded in the town accounts that if the city ever had troubles with the king, he would do for Orleans what he would do for his compatriots (19). This, no doubt, explains the very warm eulogy he is given in the Mystery of the Siege:

"Le plus vaillant dessus la terre....
Qui estoit tant prudent en guerre
On ne pourroit son bruit exquerre
Tant estoit vaillant et hardi" (20)

Even Villandrando, whom one would hardly have expected to have been a popular figure outside his own immediate circle, seems to have had

(17) Deniau p. 452.
(18) Indre-et-Loire BB 24 f83ro. 87vo.
(19) Loiret CC 549 f17ro.
(20) Mistère p. 342.
fair relations with Lyon; the city sent him sweetmeats and other presents at times (21) and when he did visit the place he had enough influence to persuade the cathedral chapter to take back a priest whom he favoured (22). No doubt his very real military strength had something to do with this, but the fact remains that the civic authorities and he found it possible to work together. It was not all a tale of extortion and rapine.

In dealing with such recognised sources of authority as town councils and local estates the companies and their commanders found certain areas of potential common interest. If the relations were always compounded of fear and threats (as witness Villandrando's extraction of provisions from Monté-duc-Gers by threatening to burn the crops and vines around) (23) they could nevertheless be fruitful for both sides. The cities and estates very largely controlled the mechanisms for the collection of the cash needed to keep the companies in being; the soldiers could enforce their own form of law and order, which was better than none and worth paying for. The soldier could even find opportunities to make his money grow by investment with urban-based merchants; a gain, for his enterprises to flourish, he had a vested interest in the continuing stability of the city, and the profitability of the trading contacts. As for the estates, they were largely composed of those who were not subject to taxation themselves and had little compunction in passing the weight

(21) Quicherat p. 255-6, PJ XXVIII.
(22) Deniau p. 569.
of the demands of the companies on to those who did. The companies may have very largely escaped from royal control in the later 1420's and 30's up to 1445, but there were some quite effective constraints on their behaviour as far as dealing with organised and reasonably well-placed bodies with official status was concerned. A mutually profitable arrangement could, as often as not, be worked out.

For those outside these bodies, however, matters were very different. The towns might find their salvation in doing deals with those who controlled their countryside, but what of those who had to live in that countryside? How did those who were outside the society of the time, with no access to the structures of bargaining react to the impositions and invasions to which they were so frequently subject? In a word, what of Jacques Bonhomme, the man who paid for all?

In the countryside, far from the compositions and arrangements which took the edge off the extortions and fear which permeated the relations between armed and unarmed, soldier and non-soldier, the picture was very different. There was waged the forgotten war of this period, a war without any great battles but one which was none-theless very real (indeed it was perhaps the war which affected the bulk of the population most of all); the savage war between peasant and soldier. The small farmer was, after all the man who suffered at every turn; it was his fields which were burned to put pressure on the town oligarchies and provincial estates, he who paid the taxes which the agreements which these bodies reached relied on, his fellows who were ransomed or had their houses burned down and he who bore the brunt of revenge raiding if his social betters defaulted on their
agreements. The extortions in the countryside came in many different forms and at many different levels of sophistication. Perhaps the most complex was that mentioned in an earlier chapter which operated in the Auvergne where a local man, the servant of an absentee lord, after serving an apprenticeship with Villandrando returned to run a reign of terror in the area using his contacts with the notorious Castilian to operate as a kind of sub-contractor of terror, passing his prisoners (and a share of the pillage, no doubt) on to his master who had the facilities to hold them and help with the collection of the ransoms. He even carried a list of those authorised to operate in his area, which suggests that a highly organised operation was being mounted. After terrorising his region for two or so years, he was ambushed by a band of local people, who liberated his prisoners and killed him and several of his henchmen. He was credited with some fifty murders, while others of his band were held responsible for ten and five respectively. Another, who had apparently done no harm himself, was allowed to go free (24).

On the whole, this level of organised extortion, in which a small-scale local tyrant made use of connections with one of the great companies to help him in his operations, is rather rare (though the evidence of highly formalised areas of operation and a kind of almost bureaucratic structure is very interesting). The norm seems to have been smaller scale, almost casual, extortion, interspersed with vendetta-like feuds between a village or group of villages which a company or section of a company fought out over a certain period of

(24) AN JJ 191 no. 145 (Printed in Chassaing p. 524-6)
time. The kind of thefts recorded in the records suggest a fairly limited scale of exaction; often simply the taking of articles of immediate need without payment. We hear of cases of the driving off of cattle (25), the theft of a horse (26) or of bread which was fed to the soldier's mount (27); it is clear that, even though the amounts paid by the estates or towns often included a food element, many of the men in the companies were living off the land and taking what they needed as they went along. Even these apparently minor thefts could be deadly serious matters to a peasant community at a subsistence farming level struggling to pay its dues to legitimate authority; there was, as most economic historians of the age would agree, a very real limit to how much one could extract from such peasant communities, without posing problems, both to the community and to those competing for the surplus. For the more prosperous villager the situation was equally dangerous; we hear of one man who had lost goods to the value of 1,000 л to the raiders (28) and in another case a member of the local gentry saw one of his properties completely destroyed (29), while a similar figure in the Beaujolais claimed in court (admittedly a place where the temptation was to exaggerate one's losses) that he had lost property and livestock worth 2,000 écus plus the devastation done in one of his villages (30) when an Italian company had passed through.

(25) id JJ 177 no. 146.
(26) id JJ 179 no. 16 (Quicherat p. 294-6 PJ LII)
(27) id JJ 177 no. 225 (Quicherat p. 298-300 PJ LIV)
(28) id
(29) id JJ 178 no. 232 (Quicherat p. 301-2 PJ LVI)
(30) id X2a 24 f257vo-263ro.
The response was violent; one should never forget that in any mediaeval village there were large numbers of weapons and potential weapons about which were likely to be as effective as anything which the pillaging troops carried. In some cases the resistance was organised and led by the natural leaders of society; those members of the local nobility and gentry who had themselves suffered at the hands of the companies were quite willing to lead their people into the fray. A man like Mathelin de Cardillac in Quercy (something of a professional soldier and pillager himself) could lead his men (perhaps his own professional company as well as his tenants) into a fierce feud with two of Villandrando's lieutenants, Alonso de Zamora and Alonso de Benavent until the latter's companies were wiped out and they were themselves prisoners (31). A similar fate befell the Italian Cyprian de Montflour in the Beaujolais, where Tastin de la Garde, the local lord mentioned above, resisted to such effect that Cyprian claimed losses of considerable numbers of horses, three sets of armour valued at 150 écus each, silver plate and other property (32). In this case, the conflicting claims of the two sides reached Parlement as court cases which each had brought against the other. Elsewhere the resistance was apparently organised more or less spontaneously by the local community. When the Italian Jean de Baretta's men moved into Quercy, the men of several villages assembled with crossbows and other weapons to resist him, and, dug in at a crossroads, they succeeded in ambushing the company or a section of it and after a fight in which

(31) id JJ 178 no. 232.
(32) id X2a 24 f257vo.
both sides suffered losses, drove the troops off leaving several of their number in the hands of the inhabitants as prisoners. These latter were drowned in the River Dordogne (33). Similar organised resistance can be seen in the Auvergne as late as 1444 when Boniface de Valpergue's men fought pitched battles with the local people when they raided their herds (34).

The most normal form of resistance, however, was on a much smaller and more localised scale. A case, again from the Auvergne (a region much attacked in this period) illustrates this kind of affair perfectly. At Rochefort a company of men at arms was lodged, doing considerable damage locally. Finally a group of some twelve local men, including one who had (or at least claimed to have had) some military experience, in exasperation went out and caught two members of this company out in the countryside. These they drowned in a local pool. Later, the same man took part in the killing of one of a small group of Villandrando's men as they passed through on the way to the Limousin; the victim had a month before passed the same way and threatened to burn the village he was lodged in, after he had stolen a crossbow, lance, cheeses and other goods from an inhabitant (35).

Our first suppliant for remission was, perhaps, exceptional (though in a time of trouble men of some military background were perhaps far from rare in a village community) but in other cases it seems that those involved in the killing of wandering soldiers were fairly normal members of peasant society, although perhaps numbered among its more prosperous

(33) id JJ 190 no. 22.
(34) id JJ 177 no. 146.
(35) id JJ 179 no. 16, JJ 177 no. 96.
and active elements. On the whole, the picture is one of isolated reactions to individual thefts or acts of pillage; those who died were not always, however, those responsible for the original incident. The killers, often confessing to their deeds twenty and more years after they had been committed—(why they bothered at so late a date is a mystery. Perhaps it was a matter of deathbed confession since one hardly imagines that they were in any real danger of legal pursuit by then. The fact that they could afford to purge their consciences thus suggests, again, a certain modest fortune, even if some of the delay may have been due to the difficulties in saving enough money) make great play of the fact that their victims were under sentence of outlawry (36). One suspects, however, that this was but another in the considerable arsenal of optimistic pleas put into appeals for letters of remission, in the hope that they might be believed, rather than a real motivating factor in their deeds. It does not seem to have restrained anybody when this was not the case.

The standard picture, then, of the soldier lording it in arrogant splendour over a cowed peasantry is some distance wide of the mark. A more accurate one would depict small groups of men moving nervously through a bitterly hostile countryside, much of the time in mortal fear. This perhaps explains the savageries which soldiers did perpetrate when they had villages at their mercy. It is clear that the villagers feared reprisals, perhaps in the form of having the whole village burned down over their heads. This fear was expressed in their disposal of the bodies in the nearest river or pond (perhaps in the hope that the deaths might appear accidental as well as the obvious effort to conceal the location of their murders), with the (36) id
sale of the belongings and horses of the dead at the nearest market (a form of war-profit which has escaped the attention of most economic historians). How often vengeance actually descended on the perpetrators is very hard to say. It seems certain that the companies did not travel in large compact blocks in close contact with each other, but rather in small groups of two or three, always vulnerable to ambush (they had to sleep sometimes, after all) and without much way of knowing each other's fate. This fact contributes to the difficulties in calculating the size of Villandrando's army, as well as helping to give him a reputation for ubiquity and very rapid movement (37). It is possible that many claimed to belong to his company to have the advantage of the fear inspired by his name (which might discourage attacks if it also guaranteed hatred all round) whether they actually did or not. It is possible that the core of his company may have moved together in a larger unit, but there would always be men travelling in isolation parallel to, ahead of or behind the line of march chosen by the captain. It is unknown how far Villandrando himself was able to keep track of all those who belonged or claimed to belong to his company; there is no evidence either way as to whether he kept muster records, and it is certainly likely that men could simply disappear without anybody being greatly concerned at their fate. On the other hand, reprisals did happen (though like the peasant vengeance which inspired them, they were often random and struck those uninvolved in the original affairs). As early as 1423 we have the case of a troop of Scottish soldiers in Berry who had been

(37) Quicherat p. 87.
having trouble with the local population hanging a group of local peasants, chosen more or less at random, from the nearest tree (38). No doubt this kind of behaviour was common and went unrecorded unless one of the victims was lucky enough to survive and tell the tale of his miraculous good fortune to the priest of a local shrine. In any case, it contributed to the vicious circle of hatred between peasant and soldier which degenerated into a kind of parallel war. This was perhaps the basic, irreducible level of all late mediaeval warfare - the level to which it always tended to sink whatever the nominal goals of the campaign. It is possible that some at least of the troubles which the English suffered in Normandy came from this source rather than patriotic French resistance; it is clear that the average peasant did not bother overmuch about the colour of the coat worn by his military oppressors since in "French France" the population had little compunction about killing men who were in name at least in the service of their own king. In the end, at the village level, all soldiers and companies merged into one; that of the terrible Spaniard himself. In the mouths of those seeking pardon, all pillagers are always Rodrigois, with the Scots not far behind, as the anonymous 'Complaint et Helas du Pouve Commum et des Pouvre Labourers de France' makes clear. In this, royal and noble authority is bitterly attacked:

'Car s'ilz pensoient bien en Rodrigues
Et Escocois et leur complices' (39)

In fact, the anonymous author (who was, however, almost certainly not a labourer or even an authentic member of the "pouvre commun"

(38) Miracles de St. Katherine p. 49 no. 95.
but most likely a priest) was very near the mark. The companies
thrived not just on the ransoms exacted from town councils and
local estates, nor on the profits of pillage of the poorest and
weakest members of French society, but on the potentially far more
profitable and apparently honourable business of fighting private
wars and acting as the defender of the interests of the great and
powerful. This was the most dangerous aspect of the collapse of
royal control over the sources of military power. After all,
disorder of sorts was endemic in the countryside and the royal writ
ran haltingly as far as the maintenance of peace and order at the
lowest levels of society was concerned; murder at the village level
was nothing new, as the ease with which remission was usually granted
suggests. Had the burden of indiscipline and exaction been confined
to this level, it is doubtful whether the king would have been overly
concerned. On the other hand, the emerging ties between the compan-
ies, their leaders and the leading nobility of the realm was a threat
to the security, not just of individuals but to the whole structure
of royal authority. The results of these ties could produce yet
another crop of parallel wars with all that that could mean in the way
of further exactions and pillages. For much of the period up to
1445, however, this form of alternative employment was to be the main
alternative to royal service, with its own rewards and profits to
tempt the captain and his men into the alliance and patronage systems
run by the great and the powerful. It is to these that we must now
turn our attention and their operations which we must now observe.

Recruitment of men into the service of the major nobility of the
land came in two forms. The permanent private bands, which remained
in being on a regular footing undoubtedly existed at an earlier period (and indeed the whole question of private military forces is one which needs far more study), but they seem to have enjoyed a particularly active life in this period. We hear of La Tremoille's men, largely composed of foreign groups, operating against the lands of his enemies in the long-suffering Auvergne from castles of which they formed the permanent garrisons (40). This was in 1424; seven years later, such forces no doubt acted as the backbone of his army engaged in fighting in Poitou against the supporters of Arthur de Richemont, backed by Scottish companies and commanded by men of such rank as the Sieur d'Albret himself (41). Indeed in the south there seems to have been quite active recruitment on the part of the great families of the area of troops from beyond the often ill-defined borders in Spain. This is suggested by the letter of remission issued to a Castilian squire who had served in the forces of the Count of Armagnac at the time of his rebellion and led something of an outlaw life after this had failed (42). Other similar figures can be found in the same sources (43), and it seems at least probable that the garrisons of many privately-held castles in the south had an element of foreign troops in them, some of whom might well drift into other companies or even into royal service if circumstances permitted.

(40) AN X2a 18 f26vo.
(41) A Bourdeaut 'Un Compagnon de Jeanne d'Arc et du Connetable de Richemont - Pierre de Rieux, Maréchal de France (1389-1441)' in Bulletin de la Société Archeologique de Nantes et du Département de la Loire Inférieure, Vol. 53 1912 p. 120.
(42) AN JJ 189 no. 92.
(43) See, for instance id JJ 176 no. 156.
While such standing private forces were no doubt an irritation to the king, they had a certain tradition behind them, and were not in themselves likely to be strong enough to challenge royal authority openly. The real danger in this period came from a rather different source; the rather more complex and fluid relationships between some noble families and some captains and their men. Some at least of these lasted long enough for it to be possible to talk about real alignments and permanent relationships over and above the almost normal practice of hiring armed men to fight one's quarrels for one. Since these companies could be used to support the policies and ambitions of the families in question, they became useful ways of exerting influence often far beyond the immediate lands of the family and without having to run the risk of open involvement. They could, in theory at least, become important enough to seriously endanger the position of the king and become the military basis of armed rebellion. The traditional armed band/retinue, which could even be of use to the king in providing the nucleus of the companies which the great provided for his armies, was a much more limited and easily controlled phenomenon. Needless to say, there was little shortage of work for these companies to do in a world where even monks would call in soldiers to assert their rights to abbacies, where clerks laid siege to each other and used artillery in quarrels over benefices and in which non-violent legal process was so slow in its application that the famous dispute over the bishopric of Albi, begun in 1436 was still under debate in the royal council in 1455 with no sign that it was anywhere near resolution (44). It should also be remembered that

Charles himself was not above using the captains in his obedience to aid his relatives in a semi-official way, as the case of the war in Lorraine mentioned in an earlier chapter illustrates. Nevertheless, the service of the great, intensely profitable as it could be, was a danger to royal authority admitted by the king himself. There was little, however, that he could do in the conditions of the 1430s when this kind of service was probably more lucrative than its royal counterpart.

Inevitably, we are led back to Villandrando; the most successful and best documented of his breed. While he operated in the interest of others (the Vicomte of Turenne in 1433 (45), La Tremoille in 1432 (46), for instance) his abiding loyalty was to the Bourbon family. This was no doubt aided by his apparently close friendship with his fellow-Ecorcheur the Bastard of Bourbon, despite the fact that the dowager countess was terrified of him and had the council of Lyon take special care to guard the convent she was living in when his men passed nearby (47). This was an exception to his normal relations with the family; indeed after 1433 he was himself a member by marriage to another illegitimate offspring of the duke, his daughter Marguerite (48). He was given the lands of Ussel, plus 2,000 écus and the use of Chatildon until Ussel could be repaired. He also had the right of purchase over further lands when the present holder died (49). In practice Ussel never produced the 1,000 lt

(45) Quicherat p. 244 PJ XIX.
(47) id p. 247-8, PJ XXII.
(48) id p. 90.
(49) id p. 249-51 PJ XXIV.
income which it should have, so he was guaranteed the money in August 1436, along with other revenues (50). He was also to be paid for handing over the fortress of Charlieu which he had repair-ed and strengthened, plus the expenses which that had entailed (51). Meanwhile he was well enough off to buy up lands to round off his properties (52) and lend money both to members of the nobility (53) and to the Duke of Bourbon himself (54). Much of the actual income which he was making in this period came from his military activities often undertaken on behalf of the family as well; which probably profited as much from the connection as he did himself; as in 1436 when the estates of Languedoc at Beziers begged the family to call him off after his involvement in the dispute at Albi (55). It was a useful boost to the prestige and influence which the Bour-bons could wield to have such a redoubtable soldier so firmly attach-to them (indeed, he exempted his allegiance to them from the contracts made with other families (56)). He was a reliable ally on the whole, fighting in their interest at Albi and lending his armed support to their candidate to the see and even aiding them in their conspiracies at the cost of being chased from the kingdom by Charles himself at the head of a major army. He certainly prospered from the connection and retired to Spain a rich man leaving to his son a considerable landed property in France as well as many more or less collectable debts due to him (57). It was a remarkable success for a man who

(50) id p. 277-9 PJ XLI.
(51) id p. 279-80 PJ XLII.
(52) id p. 275-7 PJ XL.
(53) id p. 264-6 PJ XXXV, p. 303-5 PJ LVII.
(54) id p. 261-3 PJ XXXIV.
(55) id p. 131.
(56) id p. 319 PJ LXIX.
(57) id p. 342-3 PJ LXXIV.
had started out as an impoverished youth of gentle birth and small prospects. One suspects that, by remaining largely outside the ranks of the royal armies (except when the terms suited him), he was able to avoid to risk of remaining unpaid rather better than some of his contemporaries. He was probably little concerned by the fact that his name was for many synonymous with extortion and plunder, and that he would figure among the legends of the countryside he had plundered so freely (58).

His successor, Jean de Salazar, did almost equally well from betraying the Bourbon connection during the Praguerie. His career tied in rather more closely with royal service (latterly, after 1461, he was to be a firm supporter of Louis XI), though his initial contacts were with Louis rather than Charles and one can see the Dauphin as another alternative source of favour, reward and influence rather than as merely a subordinate part of the royal system. He nevertheless managed to keep his lands at Issoudun, Chaudesaigues and elsewhere even during the disgrace of his patron and his own fall from favour (59) even if he was to sell the latter to Charles of Bourbon in 1450, perhaps because he was having trouble in exploiting it. Like his old master, he married into the nobility by taking La Tremoille's illegitimate daughter, another Marguerite, as his second wife though this had rather less political overtones than Villandrando's marriage. On the other hand, he did very well in terms of property, collecting lands in Champagne which included the lordship of St. Just which gave him the title by which he was to be known for the rest of his life (60).

(58) id p. 2, for instance.
(59) Courty p. 73-78.
(60) id p. 74-5.
He forms a transitional type between the lofty independence of Villandrando and the much more closely royally-connected careers of the commanders who emerged after 1445.

Villandrando and, to a lesser extent, Salazar are easily the most spectacular and well-documented examples of this very close interplay between captains and important families. One can, however, find traces of others involved in this business on a rather more humble level. In the court proceedings concerning the Albi affair there are references to Scots companies involved in the war (61), while in a blow against the Praguerie and its Bourbon supporters a whole group of captains including the Scot Alain Ferlin (or Forty) and such notable Écorcheurs as Blanchefort and Anthoine de Chabannes were seized in June 1440. The destinies of many of the Écorcheur captains were very closely linked with that of the Bourbon family and the king feared very much that they would provide the military basis for rebellion (62). It was, as the events of 1440 demonstrated, quite a justifiable fear; one of the motives for rebellion in this period had been royal plans for a reform of the military structures of the kingdom which would have placed the majority of the commands in the hands of men who had served the king with reasonable loyalty over the previous years and would have put many of the Écorcheur captains out of the military structure altogether. This was more than just a loss of income and prestige for those involved; it also had considerable impact on the political influence of those who had alliances with

(61) AN X2a 22 f34ro-35vo.
(62) Vale Charles VII p. 79.
these men and would no longer be able to rely on their military support to advance their political schemes and influence. There seems little doubt that the most important reason for the reforms of 1445 was to break up this connection once and for all with the king now able to offer regular pay and a place in the established patronage structures for the professional soldiers whom he was prepared to trust.

It is now time to examine just how far the changes brought in at Nancy in 1445 actually solved the problems which we have been dealing with in this chapter so far. Did they really create a well-ordered and disciplined force above the pillages and robberies, the murders and exactions which have occupied us to date? Was this force free from the influence of the great of the land who might wish to use it for their own political ends? Had its members been placed above temptation to supplement their proper and legitimate pay by unauthorised attacks on civilians, or hiring themselves out to those who had cases to maintain and were not unduly scrupulous about their methods? In a word, had the soldier, that terrible man on horseback, been domesticated at last and turned into a useful and even perhaps popular member of the society of his time, a pillar and support both to the king and to the community as a whole?

Certainly, one might well be led to believe this from some of the panegyrics which were to be lavished on the new force and those contained in its ranks. The poet Henri Baude, for instance, waxed quite lyrical about the changes to be seen —
"Par qui fut-ce qu'on chassa les pillars
Et les courtois mis au lieu des pailiers
Dont le peuple fut tout morne et transy....
Par justice qu'on trouva a Nancy" (63)

Martial d'Auvergne went into detail, putting this eulogy into the mouth of Labur in his Vigiles de Charles VII

"Quant les gens d'armes se passoient
Par les villages pour logier
Au moins qu'ilz povoient se passoient
De poves gens endommager...
Ains pajoent leur loyre et mangier...
Si d'epée ou javeline
Eussent voulu frapper, blesser
Et prendre poulaille au glaive
Il ne falloit que dresser
A leur chef qui eust fait redresser..
Desditz gens d'armes douix parloient
Et taschoient fort a soulagier
Toutes gens et les saluoient
Sans injurier n'oultragier" (64)

It should be remembered, however, that both these men were writing well on in the 1480's and 90's and that it is probable that these verses reflect a belief in a golden age in the already far-past days of Charles VII to be held up as a contrast to the behaviour of troops in their own day; also perhaps as a programme for the future. They do not reflect with any fidelity what the majority of people seem to have thought of the troops in the latter years of Charles' and the early part of Louis' reigns.

On one level, certainly, the reforms were very successful; that of the links between the companies and the potentially dangerous nobility of the realm. Apart from the dangerous period from 1461-5 which I have alluded to so often, the links were never reforged and the royal ordonnance companies gave the king at least the preponderant

((63) Vers d'Henri Baude p. 92.
(64) Martial d'Auvergne Vol. I p. 81.)
possession of organised military power in his realm. Noble military power was slow to die completely and Charles of France ran his own parallel military household until his death, but there was little real danger in these survivals. Charles' army was tiny in comparison with the royal forces, while the ease with which Louis was able to squash the plots of such rebellious nobles as the Count of Armagnac demonstrates where the reality of power lay. The main armed powers in the kingdom had been integrated into the complex network of royal favour and officeholding and were the king's men to command. Some captains may have used their companies in the pursuit of their own private ends (there are suggestions of this in the proceedings of the Grand Jours of Bordeaux (65)), but this was a comparatively limited abuse, almost one to be expected and not, on the whole, unduly threatening to the crown. On the political level, the reforms had succeeded in restoring peace, discipline and order among the captains; all of it to the profit of the crown.

Below this level of high politics, however, matters were rather different. It is possible that the documentation in this area may be a little misleading, since the letters of remission only recommence as a series from the 1440's onwards and the shift of military activity into the towns may have led to more being recorded, but these minor distortions do not alter the broad outlines of the picture. This was fairly unattractive. Some of the worst of the troubles were transferred to the towns, since the new permanent companies were very much more urban in their distribution than the old free ones had been. This transfer was not at all popular with the residents of towns thus (65) AH Gironde (Grand Jours) Vol. IX 1873 p. 26.
honoured; the masses of litigation which places undertook to pass
the burden on elsewhere prove the point amply (66). The fundamental
problem was simple; even in receipt of regular royal wages, it
proved well-nigh impossible to get soldiers into the habit of paying
for the goods and services they used. This was perhaps not so
very surprising. The men who filled the ranks of the new companies
were very much the same men who had served their apprenticeships in
the companies of the Écorcheurs. One could replace Salazar, but
one could not replace his men so easily, when it is certain that the
best troops in the army before reform had been precisely these
Écorcheur companies. As a result, and unrestrained by any effective
military bureaucracy on the model of the Italian 'provvedetori' or
'collaterale' (67) the soldiers went on in their old ways of taking
what they needed when they needed it and paying irregularly if at all.
As a result, unlike the German experience where a permanent garrison
could be popular since its members would pass the money extracted
for its upkeep back to the citizens in the form of purchases (68),
French companies were always bitterly disliked in the towns in which
they were placed. They remained, as we shall see in the next
chapter, an under-employed, burdensome and violent group, in urban
society but not of it, alien and disliked but also feared. Brawls
were frequent; over payment for shoes (69) over women (70) even over
missing pets (71). From the point of view of the townsman, reform,

(66) Solon p. 81-3.
(68) Benecke p. 230.
(69) AN JJ 188 no. 180.
(70) id JJ 199 no. 334.
(71) id JJ 190 no. 75 (Published in Reilhac 'ol. III p. 62-6 PJ CXXXV).
by establishing a permanent military presence within the walls of his town, had made the situation very much worse rather than better. Billeting, never properly organised in this period was just the beginning of a series of troubles for him, over and above the taxes which he was expected to pay for the upkeep of these ill-disciplined and brutal men forced upon him.

The countryside was not spared either. Sometimes troops were lodged in villages as well as in the towns, but the main area of exploitation was the sending of bands of armed men from the town-based companies in search of food. This often, from the dating of the letters of remission which illustrate this practice, happened during winter when the resources of the countryside would be at full stretch in any case and any surplus jealously guarded to see the population through to the end of the season, or in the middle of summer when stocks were at their lowest before the next harvest. In theory, these groups from the companies were meant to purchase the grain they sought, but despite protestations to the contrary, it seems likely that these were much more like old-style pillages than properly conducted purchases. At best, the soldiers may have set their own, very low, price. Needless to say, such procedures could lead to much trouble. Garcia's men in Sainto\textsuperscript{na} were particularly involved in this sort of operation; there is a record of one such expedition where the local blacksmith resisted the troops and was eventually killed (72). Another case in the same area and even at much the same time of year illustrates just how little the reforms had changed the manners of the
rank and file of the new ordonnance companies. In this case, the trouble began with an expedition to the village of Porcheresse where the soldiers forced the local people to cut their oats to feed to their horses (indeed, there is some evidence that the upkeep of the horses in the company, whose numbers, despite a series of royal ordonnances on the subject, always tended to increase, was a matter of at least as much concern as that of the men. In a relatively horseless society, we tend to forget just how much effort and what quantities of food are necessary to maintain even one horse, let alone the several hundred which a company of a hundred lances would have. In the very much less favoured climes of West Africa, it has even been argued that the sheer problems of upkeep of mounted armies had a decisive effect on the development of social and political structures (73); it should come as no surprise, then, that there could be bitter struggles over the efforts by soldiers to maintain their horses, so vital to them in their function). Some of the villagers resisted and in the ensuing struggle, one was killed. This was the beginning of a period of terror for the village, since the soldiers persecuted the place with regularity from then on; the very fact of organisation and stability probably increased the dangers of vengeance being taken on a village which proved recalcitrant since men were going out from a fixed base with a known destination and would be missed if they failed to return). As a result the population lived in fear; "n'osoient bonnement coucher en leurs litz" as they stated later. On 17th March 1460 the final showdown came. A group of six or seven men rode into the village, whose men had all fled since they

were under threat of death, the leader of the group produced a piece of paper which he claimed was an authorisation from the captain ordering him to carry out this sentence. One of the soldiers tried to take a woman of the village; when her pregnant sister tried to stop him, he beat her up so that she miscarried. The troops settled down in the village for the night. Meanwhile, the men of the village, reinforced by their neighbours came back and surrounded the houses occupied by the soldiers, calling upon them to surrender (at least, that is what they claimed). When they did not, the villagers were preparing to storm the buildings when the troops sallied forth and a battle began by the end of which some at least of the troops were dead (74). This, it should be remembered took place in 1460, some fifteen years after the reform ordonnance had been put into effect; the companies were still acting very much as they had always done. It is hardly surprising that some more contemporary writers had different things to say about the troops from the praise of a Baude or a Martial d'Auvergne. To quote one anonymous author cited by Solon -

"Ce ne sont qu'un tas de pillars Meschans, coquins, larrons, paillars" (75)

As he so succinctly puts it, "the relationship between the civilians and military personnel resembled limited but open warfare" (76). It remained in a linear succession to the warfare in the countryside which had been the norm all through the period before 1445.

(74) AN JJ 190 no. 58 (Published Reilhac Vol. III p. 14-9, PJ CXXIII - see also p. 20-4 PJ CXXIV).

(75) Solon p. 87.

(76) id p. 88.
Indeed, in some respects things were, arguably, worse. In place of wide sweeps, terrifying for those who were caught in them but often sporadic and patchy, there was a system of organised exploitation, of semi-permanent harassment and intimidation done by men who could claim to be doing it in the name of the king. In addition, there were the taxes, imposed in time of war but maintained in peace to pay for this disorderly and extortive rabble. Indeed, in the relatively few areas which tried to resist the tax by force, the king was quite prepared to put the companies to collect it by methods which were indistinguishable from those used by the Écorcheurs (77). The king might have solved the problems of loyalty and rebellion by integrating the companies into his established organisation of favours and patronage, but he did so at the expense of his subjects who had to pay the bill and suffer the ravages of the army thus created. It was to be a long and slow process before the situation was to alter significantly, and one should remember that even into the eighteenth century French governments were to use the forced billeting of troops as a form of punishment for towns which had offended in some way. The army was to remain a method of converting tax revenues into patronage for many years to come as well.

As this section shows, the soldier was only partially domesticated and integrated into society. He still retained the very poor image he had to the end; as late as the 1480's towns still feared the onset of troops (78). The reasons why are easy to understand;

(78) Archives Municipales, Bourges AA 13 no. 9, 1483.
we have seen enough of them in this chapter to explain all the hostility they encountered. Nevertheless, it is worth examining the actual contours of life in the companies to see how far there was forged in this period a life-style peculiar to the professional soldier. Indeed, how professional were the men who filled the companies, and how far did their style of life contribute to the tensions between them and those in whose midst they lived? What was the role of the captain in the company? It is to questions like this that we shall turn in the following chapter.
Chapter VIII. The Realities of the Military Life.

As we have seen in the previous two chapters, the population of France after 1445 paid heavily in taxation and in intermittent direct exactions for the upkeep of a permanent army composed of men who were, in theory at least professional soldiers in a recognisably modern sense of the term. They were spread out across the country, billeted with the population at large and subject to regular review by royal officials to check on the standard of their equipment and their physical presence in the ranks. It was, on paper, a very comprehensively supervised life.

Yet, in one very important area, this structure of inspection before payment was surprisingly deficient; at no point was it ever suggested that the men charged with making the reviews try to carry out any checks on the ability of the men they were inspecting to use their arms and equipment properly and effectively. Men might be expelled from a company for shortcomings in their armament (there is a record of several Scots being purged from the company of Antoine de Chabannes for this reason, though no way of knowing just how common this actually was (1)) but not for incompetence in its use. This suggests a certain blind spot in the regulations and poses the question of how far the king's money was actually buying him an army of full-time professional soldiers after all.

Certainly the whole system of musters and reviews was plagued by absenteeism. As Contamine has shown, the permitted proportion of absentees at a given time tended to rise steadily from 1450 onwards, reaching a quarter of the effectives by 1470 (2). In practice,

(2) Contamine GES p. 500-1.
despite elaborate rules governing both the number and length of absences allowed and efforts made to see to it that everybody was present at least for the four reviews annually, it seems probable that a very high proportion of many companies would not be in the ranks at any given time. Authority was virtually powerless to stop this; indeed favoured captains could find it conniving at the breaking of the rules. In 1469, when Salazer's men recrossed the Pyrenees many simply abandoned the company and went off on their own affairs. Despite the fact that he was unable to present his men for review, he was granted letters allowing him to collect their wages; no doubt he pocketed a fair proportion of the money (3). Even the foreign companies suffered from this drift away to other concerns which tended to make many of the men in the French royal armies into part-time soldiers. One hears of a Scottish archer going home to St. Martin-de-Pernac in the Agenais where he found that a neighbour had been annoying his wife, and killed him (4). As we saw, foreign troops bought up land in France and presumably took advantage of the situation to slip away and supervise their properties whenever they felt the need. On the whole, though, they may have been rather less integrated into French society than their French fellows and rather more likely to remain in their billets; since it was usually in these places that the brawls and killings which bring so many common soldiers to the historian's notice happened, this may help to explain why foreigners are probably over-represented in the registers of the royal

(3) PO 2609 Dossier Salazar no. 62.
(4) AN JJ 198 no. 322.
chancery. (There are other, more technical, reasons why they appear so frequently in the lists of letters of remission, but the possibility that a rather better record for staying with one's company could imply a greater danger of committing violent crime - is real enough to be worth noting).

Even when the soldier was present on duty in his company, the curiously part-time nature of his military duties continued. The French monarchy never invented the concept of army exercises (perhaps because they were aware that many companies were permanently below strength) and never even laid down any very formal rules about maintaining the military efficiency of individual soldiers in time of peace by regular training at the company level. Some captains may have taken part in tournaments (5) (though in an increasingly snobbish jousting world how many of them would have been welcome is another matter), but their military training value was doubtful. There are records of men organising competitions for archery in some companies; half a dozen members of Salazar's company staged a crossbow competition at Meung-sur-Loire in June 1471 which ended in murder after a quarrel over tavern bills once the day's shooting was done (6). On the whole, though, this seems to have been an isolated venture, set up by the men themselves on a semi-social basis rather than as part of a well-defined programme of training. The main collective military exercises which the majority of men indulged in were probably the more or less regular pitched battles which took place between rival companies when they were billeted near each other as in Bayonne where

(5) Contamine GES p. 498.
(6) AN JJ 195 nos. 535, 567.
the fights between the Scots of Pettilot and Cunningham and the Spaniards of Garcia became a major problem to the authorities (7).

This lack of professionalism where the actual question of military competence was concerned spilled over into other fields. There was, for instance, no formal system of recruitment. It seems that men in search of a place in a company simply followed it around waiting for a vacancy to occur. It seems that almost any methods went as far as gaining admission was concerned. There is a case recorded of a Scottish cook who wished to join the guard and made contact with one of the archers with a view to bribing the captain to let him in. In the end, the main profit seems to have been reaped by the archer whom he had contacted initially since he it was who collected the proceeds of the theft designed to ease his way into the prestigious ranks of the royal bodyguard. The cook slipped a massive dose of laxative into the meal of his employer and made off with his treasure chest in the ensuing confusion (8). Unfortunately the letter of remission which tells the tale does not say whether the plot was successful in gaining him the entry he sought (one suspects not, or the case would never have come to light in this way). At no point did anybody pause to consider whether the man in question had any military ability; the whole affair was to be settled by a cash payment to those with influence.

Admittedly the weaponry of the period was not so advanced as to be beyond the comprehension of the ordinary man. Indeed the main

(7) id JJ 187 no. 289.
(8) id JJ 182 no. 53 (published in A H Poitou XXXII p. 36-73).
constraint on recruitment was probably the ability to afford the
armour and the upkeep of the horses necessary if one was to pass the
reviews rather than any concept of military efficiency. As we have
seen, a determined group of peasants could succeed in worsting isolat-
ed detachments of soldiers even with such primitive weapons as the
iron fork with which one exasperated villager avenged the attempted
rape of his wife and the destruction of the 'four banal' or village
baking-oven (9) despite the efforts of one of his attackers to cut
him down with a sword; this does not, to my mind, indicate any
very advanced level of military training or even of professionalism
among the men of the royal armies.

In fact, one could argue that the long-suffering French taxpayer
was being deceived. He was paying heavily for an army, which, despite
the regulations surrounding it, was made up of men who were as often as
not part-timers. This close interrelationship between soldier and
civilian should not be forgotten; many "professionals", even in the
rather more professional foreign companies were in fact men whose main
income and interests were outside the ranks of the company in which
they served. This should always be remembered when trying to calculate
the strength of the army at any point in time; even the muster rolls
record paper strength rather than the actual numbers of men available
for service. As so often in late mediaeval France, the structure
looked much more impressive on paper than it seems to have been in
reality. The imposing edifice of the royal Compagnies d'Ordonnance,
on closer inspection turns out to be a collection of largely untrained
men recruited in a hap-hazard way with no real effort made to maintain

(9) id JJ 187 no. 208 (published in id XXXV p. 9-14).
their military efficiency. Either they become something less than full-time professionals or they remained, as we shall see, an under-employed and floating element of the population. Without any of the institutional structures which existed in Italy at this period, there was little that could be done about this. Four reviews per year to check that those who turned up were more or less adequately equipped and present (though presumably with such a large tail of hangers-on always present it was never hard to use the same sort of tricks which plagued the English army under Elizabeth; massive substitutions of men, the presentation of civilians as soldiers for the day and all the other methods used to draw pay for men who were either absent or no longer existed) (10) were no substitute for proper supervision of the companies on a permanent basis. Royal control was never, however, extended with any real effect into the actual workings of the companies on the ground. That remained as much in the hands of the captains as it had ever been; on their shoulders fell the main burden of responsibility for the discipline, organisation and general running of the companies on a day to day basis. The army was an army of captains in the first instance; they formed the crucial link between the royal government and its army.

This situation could be complicated by the fact that the captain might himself be an absentee. As we noted before, there was an increasing tendency towards the combination of civil and military office in the same hands, and also an increasing likelihood that command of a company would be given to the well-born and influential, whatever their

military talents more or less as a right which their status deserved. Even among the more zealous captains who did largely remain with their men, the need to see to their own private properties could lead them away for part of the year at least. In this respect the foreign companies were probably well served on the whole, at least in the first generation; while Pettilot, for instance, combined civilian and military posts, his senechalship was placed in the region where his men were already based and there was probably little real contradiction in function even if it did mean an unhealthy concentration of power in the hands of one man at local level.

When he was present, his power over his company was great indeed. As we have seen, he had more or less complete control over recruitment into it (11) (even if he did not always choose to exercise it at the lowest level), he had considerable influence over the payment of his men and acted as the main source of justice (12) certainly within the company itself. Indeed the company was as much his as the king's. It seems probable that its members wore his colours as well as the white cross of the French monarchy; according to one source, Salazar's men certainly did when a party of them sallied forth from Paris during the Guerre du Bien Publique. In this case it must have been rather splendid, since the 'uniform' consisted of violet camlet hoqueton with the white cross on it, black velvet hats with gold trimmings, silver saddle cloths for the horses and gold chains round the necks of the men (13). This, admittedly, was probably an unusual case; a

(12) id p. 516-7.
party riding forth in their Sunday best, perhaps to cock a snook at the besieging forces. Nevertheless, it does suggest that the captain had considerable control over how the men of his company dressed. This putting on of what could be regarded as a kind of livery could only reinforce the sentiment that one was, in some sense part of the household of the captain in question. There is no doubt that most captains did have considerable households; Pettilot had one staffed largely, as one might expect, by Scots (14) and it seems probable that at least some of his men may have formally belonged to it and served him in a domestic, as well as a military sense (there is evidence for this in other companies) (15). Nevertheless, the whole company could also be seen as part of an extended household to which the captain would have considerable responsibilities. He would, for instance, be expected to help in the provision of places for his men when they became too old to serve in the ranks; the multi-lingual throng which filled the halls of Jean de Chabannes was one expression of this expectation which, one suspects could become very burdensome on a captain of relatively limited fortune (16). He might even be expected to see to the interests of his men after their deaths; in October 1449 one John Ramsay, man at arms in the company (called, interestingly 'société' by the notary) of Pettilot left a substantial sum of money in the care of a Toulousain merchant. Two months later, he had died and his captain came to withdraw the money so that his debts could be paid, his funeral properly seen to, and his will executed (17).

(14) AN JJ 188 no. 5.  
(15) Contamine GES p. 484-5.  
(17) AD Haute-Garonne 3E 176 f48ro,56ro.
It was in life, however, that the pervasiveness of the influence of the captain became most apparent. As letters of remission show, his control over justice within his company was no empty phrase. It becomes apparent that on the slightest provocation men would appeal to him to arrange quarrels between themselves; if a man was having trouble in gaining the repayment of a loan from another member of the company (18), if men fell out over the payment for their lodgings (19), in all the interminable disputes about billets for men and their horses far too numerous to be listed, the captain was expected to judge, cool tempers before matters got out of hand, and produce the kind of compromise which would allow men living in appallingly close proximity for most of the time to endure each other's company. If he failed, the consequences could be disastrous, as the whole corpus of letters of remission (which chronicle such failures) shows. Despite official provisions to the contrary, it was not uncommon for the captain to find himself doing justice even in cases of squabbles between his men and the civilian population. There is, for instance, a case in Dax where the local population tried to arrest a soldier to haul him before the captain (20) (in this case they failed; the man resisted and killed one of his potential captors). One wonders, nevertheless, just how far Martial d'Auvergne's confident statement about the efficacy of a rapid complaint to the captain in such cases actually reflects reality; it seems probable that he would normally tend to identify with his men against the importunities of

(18) AV JJ 190 no. 96.
(19) id JJ 191 no. 7.
(20) id JJ 199 no. 334.
civilians. This is especially probable given that the captain was often the channel through which his men would approach the royal judicial authorities for letters of remission for their various crimes. This is occasionally explicit, as in the case of Jean de Novara who gained his remission at the intercession of Theaulde de Valpergue who had been his captain and may well still have been (21); more often it is implicit as in the case of a group of Garcia's men who, after committing their crime, were hiding in sanctuary in the parish church of St. Jean d'Angély (22), or other cases where the man was apparently in hiding. Certainly there must be a strong supposition that the captain was usually instrumental in shielding his men from the full rigours of justice, since he was the man with the direct connections with the levels of the royal bureaucracy which mattered.

It can hardly be surprising if loyalty, thus nourished, could survive all manner of political disturbance and indeed become a factor in the political equation in its own right. One of the greatest dangers of the wholesale shake-up of 1461 was that the captains thus discarded would either take men from the ranks with them or, more dangerous still, retain a hard core of men still fundamentally loyal to them within the ranks and ready to rise or desert if the conditions were ripe. It is at least possible that the rather mediocre performance of the royal army in the face of this crisis was due to this fact; there is certainly evidence for considerable desertion from the Scottish company and efforts made by the rebellious princes to encourage this further by sending Folcart around the garrisons and billets to talk to

(21) id JJ 178 no. 77.
(22) id JJ 190 no. 167.
the men. His audience may have increased by the fact that it seems likely that some at least of those purged from the guard units which he had commanded had been sent to the less prestigious Ordonnance units (23); this was apparently a form of disciplinary punishment favoured for those who had misbehaved or were regarded as politically unreliable. The level of identification with one's captain is well illustrated by the curious case of two members of Pettilot's company, one a Welshman and the other from "Irlande sauvage", which would seem to mean Gaelic Ireland, who came to blows in an argument about the wealth of their former captain, Montgomery and the wardrobe of his wife. Evidently commanders were a subject of conversation amongst the men in their billets (24).

Of course, the captain was not always necessarily the kind of paternal figure which the previous section might suggest. He could equally well be a tyrant, venting his enmity on members of the company who had done something to displease him. It is possible that many companies had their internal feuds cutting across any sense of community which might have existed, with the captain's favourites and enemies jockeying for position. The most obvious case (indeed, something of a cause célèbre in its day) concerned Salazar's company. In 1471, while the company was based in Amiens, one of the men at arms was murdered by a group of other members who included nephews of the captain himself. The victim's family took Salazar to court charging him with complicity in the murder. He was never actually convicted, though strong

(23) FF 6971 f161ro-vo.
(24) AN JJ 179 no. 309.
suspicion seems to have attached to him, at least as an accomplice after the fact in aiding the killers to escape from the town. The matter was never properly cleared up, as the murderers escaped to Spain and were involved in fighting there; despite the efforts of the Parlement of Paris they never returned to face justice. It is perhaps significant that after Salazar's death his descendants had to pay indemnities to the family of the victim (25). It seems probable that this whole affair should be seen as an example of this potential tension within the company. No doubt the lieutenants (on the whole rather shadowy figures in companies with active captains) were very much the creatures of the captain, and the scope for oppression inherent in the situation was, as we have seen considerable for the ruling group of those in the favour of the captain.

Considering the power that they wielded, one's natural desire to know more about the captains as men is rather surprisingly hard to satisfy. A few things can perhaps be guessed at. The majority seem to have been at least literate (or, perhaps one should rather put it that they were able to sign their names to their pay receipts), though in some cases it seems to have been a literacy painfully acquired and rarely exercised; few could match the relatively fluent signature of Villandrando. The Scots and the other foreigners must have been bilingual to a greater or lesser extent (and indeed, many may have ended more at home in French than in their native tongues after many years of service in France). It seems on the whole very doubtful, despite this, how many of them would have read much in the way of chivalric literature.

Nevertheless, even a hardened professional like Salazar seems to have been influenced by this culture; his sons were called Hector, Tristan, Galeas and Lancelot (26). It is doubtful whether many captains took much part in the great tournaments (many, particularly the hardened foreign professionals, would be rather too old for this sport even if they had been of higher social origin), though as we noted Theaulde de Valpergue did joust for France in a kind of jousting international against Burgundy at Arras in 1429 and this aristocratic sport par excellence can hardly have been unknown to them, and as we saw in an earlier chapter, many Écorcheurs were much attached to concepts of good and bad war with essentially chivalric origins. On the whole the foreign captains were very much gnarled professionals with many years of service between them; Salazar must have been in his seventies at least at the time of his death and the other commanders ran up careers of some thirty to forty years quite regularly. As their depositions in court show, they attached a great deal of importance to their personal battle honours (like their subordinates in their companies), and were not above adding to them to impress a sceptical court with their traditional well-attested loyalty to the crown (27). One can deduce from this, I suspect, a professional pride in their past achievement, and perhaps a real feeling that the profession of arms enabled them. Alas, none of them felt the urge to leave their memoirs or thoughts on warfare for the edification of posterity, unlike Jean de Beuil, and the kind of men that they were can only be guessed at.

These speculations, however, could be prolonged for ever. It is

time to return to the men they commanded; for, however much a
captain might identify with his company and however much he himself
was an integral and essential part of its life, he was never quite
on the same level as his men. He was the dominant figure "At the
same time, tyrant, master and father" as Contamine puts it so
succinctly (28); it is now the moment to examine the kind of life
which those whom he commanded led and which drove them to seek his
arbitration so often.

The worst bone of contention was undoubtedly billeting. Since
there was never any suggestion that troops should be lodged in separ­
ate buildings from the rest of the population, men had to be placed
among the civilian population, a process always bitterly resented by
the towns involved. In theory, there were many regulations laid down
concerning payment for accommodation as well as the quality and nature
of the equipment which was meant to be provided by the local authorities;
in practice, it seems probable that these were as much dead letters as
those forbidding foraging in the countryside (29). Towns tried to
gain exemption from this particular burden, but they were frequently
over-ridden; the main burden of complaints made by the short-lived
local estates in the Lannes concerned this matter. Men were not
paying for their accommodation and the local administrative authorities,
run by the captain of the main company in the area, the Scot Pettilot,
were requisitioning beds even in places which should have been exempt
from such exactions. In reply the soldiers claimed that their comrades
in Bordeaux did not have to pay for their accommodation. Soothing

(28) Contamine GES p. 528.
(29) id p. 493-6.
words were spoken and promises of redress made, but one may well
doubt their effectiveness (30), especially since the Estates General
of 1484 were to hear so many complaints about similar matters (31).
As a result, all billeting was bitterly resented; towns resisted as
best they could, individual interest groups in the towns tried to
 evade their potential responsibility (the clergy were well to the
fore in this), while the unfortunate inn and tavern keepers, upon
whom the burden tended to fall in the first instance, were left com-
plaining bitterly that the presence of men at arms on their premises
simply drove their regular customers away (32). When all else failed,
towns would simply put up the charges for accommodation, presumably in
the hope that this might discourage troops from settling in them, and
that some of those who did at least would pay up. (33)

As a result, soldiers arriving in a town almost always started off
on a bad footing with the local inhabitants. There was probably a
temptation to pack men in tightly, even beyond the statutory two men
per bed laid down by royal edict, in a situation where men were likely
to be isolated islands in a sea of hostility. This simply heightened
the almost claustrophobically closed nature of life in the company
(which must have been even greater in the case of foreign companies).
Perhaps this very tightly circumscribed social life had the effect of
making companies into self-conscious entities and helped to create the
kind of solidarity and "regimental spirit" which the barracks and

(30) Cadier p. 45-7, 74-5, 80-1.
(31) Solon p. 94.
(33) Solon p. 85.
comparative isolation from civilian society did for more modern armies; it certainly seems to have had the effect of heightening disputes between members. The whole matter of finding billets was a fertile ground for bitter dispute, since the machinery for deciding who actually went where seems to have been rudimentary with much left to personal initiative and ties of friendship. Letters of remission for murders committed as a result of quarrels over sharing billets (34), the stabling of horses (35) or claims to priority in billets between different companies (36) abound, and suggest that one of the most troubled times for any company was likely to be if it had to move.

The situation was compounded by the fact that, if a quarrel did begin whether over billets or other matters, it was almost impossible in the prevailing atmosphere to escape from it, and indeed it could easily spread to infect other parts of the body as well. As we saw before, Salazar had several relatives in his company and there is every indication that most companies had a very strong family element in them. This may well have been more pronounced in the foreign cones, since there it might be a matter of tradition within a family. Certainly, even a rapid check of a muster of Cunningham's company in 1469 shows some very considerable concentration of surnames. Not surprisingly, there were no less than thirteen Cunninghams in its ranks, but also five Chambres, five Marshals, four Ramsays and four Jonsons, with many other groups of three and two men with the same surname (37); it seems at least probable that there was a very high

(34) AN JJ 185 no. 267, for instance.
(35) id JJ 190 no. 125 (in Reilhac Vol. III p. 55-8 PJ CXXXIII)
(36) id JJ 196 no. 87.
(37) FF 25779 no. 19.
degree of inter-relationship within the ranks. If this could increase
the sense of identity still further by making the company a kind of
extended family or even confraternity in an age which placed so much
emphasis on such institutions, it meant that there was always a
danger that disputes could spread rapidly among the whole company, in
a kind of spreading family feud. In an age where any dispute could
rapidly turn into a full-blown fight with weapons drawn and a potential-
ly fatal outcome, this was always a case of serious concern; the
poisoned atmosphere had no chance to escape and quarrels could drag on
to disrupt the internal life of the company for a very long time.

The very close proximity in which men lived posed other problems
as well. Many hinged round money. It was natural that those shar-
ing a billet should share expenses, but this could again be a seed-bed
of potential troubles. In one case, for instance, we hear of a
quarrel among members of the guard in Loches, when one of a group
billeted together was suspected of cheating the others and (or so at
least it was claimed), eventually killed while trying to break out of
the house arrest imposed by the captain (38). Money troubles could
manifest themselves in other ways. With pay often in arrears, the
captain and others likely to be taking a rake-off on some occasions,
and a generally expensive life-style to maintain, men could well fall
into debt to their comrades. As we saw, there could be quite consid-
erable variations in wealth within a company and it is possible that
those who might at other times invest their money in mercantile ventures
also went in for money-lending within the ranks of the company.

Whether Pedro de Salamanca, a Spanish archer who lent money to a

(38) AN JJ 191 no. 7.
comrade in Joachim Rouault's company entered this category or was simply an ordinary soldier doing a good turn to a financially embarrassed friend is uncertain; what is not was the outcome when the borrower refused to repay the loan which, by degrees led to a fight in which he was killed (39). Money problems, combined with the cramped social life led by so many, could be a powerful stimulus to trouble and quarrels within a company.

Money, in a rather different aspect, was often at the root of the frequent battles with the inhabitants of the towns in which the companies were billeted. As we have seen, soldiers had a very strong tendency not to pay for goods and services taken. There was, however, another side to the medal; a firm conviction on the part of many soldiers that civilian traders and artisans were trying to cheat them at every turn. The case of one of Pettilot's men illustrates this; he wanted shoes made for him by a shoemaker in Bayonne to replace a pair which were too tight. These were left with the shoemaker, who after about two weeks had not produced anything, and when challenged said he would only make the new pair if he could be certain of being paid. He also refused to hand over the old pair left in his charge, denying having received them. A quarrel not surprisingly broke out which rapidly turned into a full-scale riot as the neighbours joined in on the side of the shoemaker, who was killed in the affray (40). Admittedly we only have the word of the soldier that this was indeed the course of events, but it illustrates the suspicion with which each side regarded the other rather well. There

(39) id JJ 190 no. 96 (in Reilhac Vol. III p. 25-7 PJ CXXV)
(40) id JJ 188 no. 180.
are in any case other references to fights and murders started by quarrels over payment for, and the quality of goods purchased by soldiers; a Savoyard in the garrison of Harfleur, for instance, was involved in a brawl when he went to buy a brigandine (41).

The feuds which were begun by a spell billeted in a particular town could outlive the transfer of the unit elsewhere. There is a case in Beaumarchais, for instance, where a Scot who had been billeted there and had had the almost inevitable bad relations with the people with whom he had been lodged, returned to the town some two years later and met the son of the house by accident in the street; the quarrel was taken up at once and the soldier died (42). It is plain that the situation was at times almost intolerable for both sides; a vicious circle of mutual suspicion degenerating into the occasional savagery common in an age noted for short tempers and violent reactions to insults. In Aurillac, for example, the page of one of Cunningham's men-at-arms, got into a fight with the son of a local inhabitant and was taken to court. The rest of the lance rallied round to support him with a vengeance; reading between the lines of the petition for remission, it appears that they went to the boy's father to terrorise him into dropping the case and, when he resisted, killed him. They asked for remission not just out of fear of royal justice, but also of the anger of the local population (43). It was no doubt at moments like these that internal solidarity within

(41) id JJ 198 no. 122.
(42) id JJ 180 no. 78.
(43) id JJ 179 no. 318.
the company would assert itself most fully, with the members acting almost as a family unit to uphold the quarrel of one of their members (and no doubt it was the company as well as the captain which acted as the military equivalent of the friends and family who appear so often as the petitioners for remission in the normal civilian context). Normally the criminality involved was of the limited, almost elemental nature of most crime in a violent time; tavern brawls, petty cheating on prices or payment, minor extortion, savage quarrels occurring suddenly from words spoken in jest and the like. The more sophisticated potential criminal was as rare in the ranks of the companies as in society as a whole; the most intriguing exception being the Scot who, after the fall of Caen in the Normandy campaign of 1449-50 captured an Englishmen with whose aid he was able to run a very successful protection racket aimed at those who had collaborated with the English authorities. He deserted with the proceeds and, after a series of picaresque adventures (for the Englishman turned out to be something of a compulsive thief as well) was eventually captured (44). His tale makes a refreshing change from the staple fare of brawls and bloody quarrels.

On the whole, however, the level of criminality which provides us with most of our information through the letters of remission was crude and basic, and in this it reflected a crude and basic type of life, marked by a claustrophobically tightly sealed social life, permanent distrust of the population among whom the men lived, occasional money troubles and generally tightened nerves liable to snap at the

(44) id JJ 185 no. 136.
slightest provocation. There was another factor as well - deadly, killing boredom. This was almost inevitable in an army without regular employment at either battlefront or in their billets. Those who had their private concerns to take them away from their companies for at least some of the time were perhaps lucky in that they were spared the worst of this factor, perhaps the most abiding single reality in the life of the early modern/late mediaeval soldier in the permanent armies of Europe as a whole.

What diversions were available to cope with this situation? Very few, it seems, apart from the familiar and dangerous ones; wine, dicing, cards and women, all of them potential breeders of further dissention and quarrels. All of them figure prominently in the evidence, especially wine which predictably appears in conjunction with the rest and seems to have served as the main excuse for and expression of sociability. Sometimes one can catch glimpses of the more pleasant side of life upon which we are so badly informed (only disaster can be relied upon to survive - in the records available to us); the comradeship and companionship and sense of community which must have existed. For instance, one letter of remission begins on a December evening in Bayonne with four Scots sitting in front of the fire and playing cards, two against two with the losers buying the wine(45) (one wonders what they were playing; some kind of primitive bridge perhaps?). Another starts with men dicing together peacefully until the owner of the house caused trouble and started a fight(46).

(45) id JJ 188 no. 18.
(46) id JJ 196 no. 289.
Much of the trouble seems to have been caused by the very considerable trains of camp followers which followed the companies round despite all royal prohibitions. They caused additional accommodation problems and additional resentment among the local population. Some seem to have been more or less simple vagabonds following the companies in the vague hope of finding places in the ranks (or perhaps in the certain knowledge that they could make money at each muster filling the places of those absent without leave), such as the Scot, David Regis, who followed Cunningham's men around and died in a dispute about lodgings (47). Others had more specialised and sinister functions, such as the man called Rodrigon who had attached himself to Garcia's company as a seller of cards and dice. He seems also to have been a professional gambler specialising in relieving men of their pay (indeed it is probable that many of the money problems so apparent with some of the men in the companies were due to gambling losses rather than lack of pay). Finally he came to a sticky end when he tried to cheat a potential victim rather too blatantly (48). No doubt women figured in the motley and multi-lingual crew which could double the size of a company without adding to its military usefulness; certainly there are plenty of complaints to this effect (49). This fact did not prevent continual friction between troops and the local inhabitants over this matter; there is the case of a Scot in Dax who went out with a friend for a night on the town in the course of which he tried to pick up a local woman (despite language problems) and sparked off a full-scale riot (50). As a curious story from

(47) id JJ 197 no. 15.
(48) id JJ 186 no. 50.
(49) Contamine GES p. 451-2.
(50) AN JJ 199 no. 334.
1444 illustrates, however, the military life had some attraction for some women. Here a soldier chose to visit his wife's cousin at Ganache in Poitou and took along a German friend. The population were not at all enthusiastic about admitting them, and the cousin had to take responsibility for their behaviour. Unfortunately, the abbot of Isle Chauvet at Ganache was looking after the daughter of a rich German merchant who had come to France as a kind of mediaeval au pair to learn French; she promptly allowed herself to be carried off by the German soldier (apparently quite willingly) and the unfortunate man who had let them in was compelled to pursue them by a furious abbot. In the end he killed the German and brought the girl back; one suspects that the real story began then (51). It is a curious tale; evidently for one, perhaps romantically-minded and unhappy girl far from home the military life had its attractions.

Normally, however, the civilian image of the soldier was not so favourable. Indeed, the soldiers of the companies were faced all the time with a fundamental contradiction between what they were supposed to be and what they actually were. In theory, all who wrote about such matters would have agreed that arms ennobled the man; this simple statement made all members of the companies (or at least all those who fought) ipso facto noble. They were well aware of the fact; they claimed and obtained tax exemptions on the strength of it (a fact which perhaps rankled as much as anything else with the hard pressed taxpayers) and were quite prepared to use it in their brushes with the law. Nevertheless, it had a rather curious sound when the legal issue in question

(51) id JJ 176 no. 213 (in A H Poitou XXIX 1898 p. 177-85)
was an attempt to gain pardon after knifing a shopkeeper in a dispute over the price of clothes (52). The claim to nobility was often denied more or less explicitly by those who had dealings with soldiers; the Bayonne shoemaker whom we encountered before had no doubt that he was as much a nobleman as his Scottish customer "Villain rigault Escossois, je suis aussi gentil homme que tu es" (53). Certainly these self-proclaimed nobles scarcely lived up to the ideas or the style of life which their alleged status demanded. There was a deep-seated paradox in a situation in which men who claimed nobility spent most of their time living lives compounded of taverns, gaming and general immorality set in a context of an unemployment which did not remind one of the ease appropriate to the noble but rather the shameful idleness of the beggar and the criminal. Indeed the normal style of life of the soldier in this period is very reminiscent indeed of that described for the criminal and marginal population of Paris by the Polish historian, Bronislaw Geremek (54). There may even have been some direct contact between soldier and criminal; one has the case in Paris of a group of Scots who may well have been deserters or expelled members of a company involved in a robbery (55). Whether this was normal or not, there was certainly plenty in the way of life of the soldier to scandalise the respectable population; he had been consigned to a position on the edges of society without any real place being found for him in the structures of the time.

(52) id JJ 198 no. 122.
(53) id JJ 188 no. 180.
(54) Geremek passim but especially p. 93-8, 123-43, 173-8, 278-34.
This lack of external recognition was compounded by the apparent failure of the soldiers themselves to evolve some kind of ideal for themselves to live by. Their main inheritance was the very individualistic and rather anarchic code of chivalric warfare, with its stress on the individual feat of arms. This was of very limited applicability to an army and a style of warfare becoming steadily more organised and less personalised. As a code it had little or nothing to say about a kind of war in which obedience to the captain's commands and the cohesion of the company were very much more important than individual deeds of valour or about a situation in which much of the soldiers' time would in fact be spent miles from any war in a life of crushing boredom. Certainly the proponents of chivalry seem to have tacitly recognised that that code could no longer be expressed on the field of battle and withdrew to the world of the court and the formalised mock-warfare of the joust as illustrated by the refusal of the biographer of Jacques de Lalaing to deal with the final year of his subject's life when he was actually at war. The professional soldier was less fortunate; the nearest to an equivalent statement of his position came from Jean du Buñil in his curious semi-autobiographical fantasy (designed also to teach young men about war), "Le Jouvence". This certainly points to a certain kind of pride in professionalism and service (and, significantly, he had little time for tournaments as military training), but the chivalric overlay is still fairly strong (at no point, for instance, does he query the utility of the ransom business despite its potentially disruptive effects in battle). Certainly a literary genre was to develop late in the century about the servitudes of military life, but one doubts if that was often written by serving soldiers and anyway
it rapidly became another clichéd literary exercise with little relationship to real life. Even in the Italian wars the main literary response to a warfare becoming more complex by the year was to be the life of Bayard, which simply superimposed a knight-errant figure on the warfare of that time and held this archaic ideal up as the one to follow. One is left with a kind of substratum of anonymous lyrics about captains and the problems of life in the army as the nearest approach to a military ethos. Some, like the one quoted by Solon, had grasped a few of the main points of the new situation, like the crucial importance of pay in the maintenance of discipline and efficiency alike, as well as a kind of professional solidarity in bad times -

"Nous n'y porterons plus d'espée
Ne Homme d'armes ni archers
On nous a rongé nos quartiers,
C'est grant pitié
Aux gens d'armes perdre soudée.

Nos lances s'y sont déformées
Nos espées n'ont point de pointe
Nous pillerons les gens partout
C'est grant pitié
Aux gens d'armes perdre soudée.

Nous crions tous là volée
Ha! Noble roy vous avez tort:
Vostre feu père qui est mort
Ne feist jamais perdre soudée" (56)

This, however, hardly constitutes an ideal to which military men might try to aspire. Perhaps the battles between different companies which appear in the sources from time to time constitute some kind of nascent regimental pride (57); there seems to have been little formal attempt

(56) Solon p. 94.
(57) AN JJ 189 no. 69.
to encourage this kind of sentiment, however. Normally the professional soldier was left uncomfortably poised in a hostile world without any real ethos which might explain and justify his position in the hostile world around and this may well have encouraged him to press his claims to nobility by the profession of arms as some kind of substitute. The professional soldier was still an anomaly which the theorists about society had not managed to fit into their categories and who was, by the very realities of his life, placed on the very edge of society to which he did not really belong any more.

This chapter has, I think, adequately suggested that life in the army of the king of France was not particularly comfortable; condemned to live for ever on the margins of an intensely hostile society, packed together in close association all the time, with the only solace available in drink and other dangerous activities likely to shorten already short tempers to a murderous pitch, inadequately controlled from above and subject to the tyranny as well as the paternal feelings of the captain. The list of shortcomings is a formidable one. No doubt there were good times and pleasant aspects which the sources only hint at; comradeship, good cheer, solidarity with one another in what could come to resemble a huge family presided over by the commander. As far as the monarchy was concerned, one may well doubt how far it was getting value for money in strictly military terms from this mass of largely untrained, often part-time and usually detested men scattered across the realm and over which it had only limited control.

As far as the foreign companies were concerned, they had all these problems only in a more exaggerated form; they were, by their
origins, doubly marginalised and more isolated, doubly forced in on their own company and more prone to internal dissension since fewer of them could escape to other concerns for any length of time. It is now time for us to draw to a close by examining their relations with the society of France as a whole in more detail, from the royal court downwards. How were they seen and what was their long-term fate in French society?
Chapter IX. Foreign Troops and Native Reactions.

As the previous chapters will have suggested, the relationship between foreigner and native was frequently highly ambiguous. Certainly our perceptions of the situation are perhaps not the same as those of contemporaries for whom a soldier from the deep south of the country fighting north of the Loire could be almost as much of a foreigner as a Scot or a Spaniard; nevertheless, they, too, had their own ability to discriminate between those born as subjects of the King of France and those not, and applied them in their utterances and writings. Indeed it was at the level of official attitudes and those of the literate elite that the ambiguity and ambivalence became most clearly apparent.

As far as public consumption was concerned, of course, relations were always excellent. This was especially true when it was a matter of set-piece orations delivered at foreign courts, stuffed as they generally were with allusions to ancient alliance and close friendship between the nations involved. Chartier in Scotland, for instance, provided a splendid specimen of the genre when sent to see to the marriage of the Dauphin Louis and Margaret of Scotland. His speech resounds with phrases like "grandis fiduciae inter duos regnas Franciae et Scotia" (1) and praise of the courage and loyalty of the Scottish troops in France at that time. This presumably constituted the official line on the matter, and Chartier himself was to echo it in his own writings. In the 'Quadrilogue Invectif' for instance, he was to allude to the foreign troops serving in France in the following

(1) F Lat 8757 f50vo.
terms "Nous voyons les estrangiers alliez de nostre royaume qui passent les fortune; de mer pour venir a nostre secours et estre par-
conniers de nostre adversite et de nostre peine" (2), though this could be seen as much as an implicit accusation of cowardice and treason against the French nobility for their lack of military activity as simple praise for the brave foreigners who were contributing so much to keeping Charles on his shaky throne. Nevertheless, this apparent royal praise was reinforced by the more material rewards of land and other favours distributed to foreign soldiers.

As we saw in an earlier chapter, however, the reality was rather more complex. The gifts distributed to such men were often more precarious than the resounding declarations which accompanied them would suggest, and their continued retention depended very much on a combination of continued loyal service in France, a continuing family line and luck. As we saw, the Douglas family was pushed out of its Duchy of Touraine after the death of the first duke at Verneuil despite the claims of his widow and sons for at least a share in the inheritance. One suspects that the king would not have been able to act nearly so high-handedly with a native member of the French aristocracy whose friends and relatives would have pursued the cause of his son and widow with vigour. The fact of their foreignness made it harder for foreign soldiers to survive the loss of royal favour or pass property in France on to their descendants if there was any complication in the line of descent; they had fewer allies to press their cause if the situation turned sour on them, and they were much less fully integrated into the structures of French society.

On the other hand, there was little apparent discrimination against those born outside the kingdom in terms of promotion to high office as long as they were prepared to throw their lot fully in with that of the dynasty. Indeed as late as the Estates of 1484, there were to be the familiar mediaeval complaints that foreigners were doing altogether too well in this field (3), and the careers of such men as Theaulde de Valpergue or Robin Pettilot illustrate the situation well. The former in particular was a splendid example of where a foreign soldier could rise if fortune favoured him; Bailli of Lyon (even then one of the most important towns in the kingdom), trusted administrator of the conquered lands in the south-west, architect of the surrender of Bordeaux and Bayonne, loaded with special commissions, he was an object illustration of a man who had made good in a foreign land. Many of the complaints which were made about the success of foreigners in royal favour were no doubt inspired by such careers which limited the amount of patronage and offices left to go round the native French aspirants for high office.

There is evidence that even at the highest level there was some sort of recognition that large-scale recruitment of foreign troops was a temporary measure, and a sentiment that they were a necessary evil rather than warmly appreciated friends in need. The passage already quoted from Charles' letter to Lyon after the defeat of Cravant illustrates this; he could attempt to minimise the scale of the disaster by pointing out that very few actual Frenchmen had died and most of the casualties were mere "Scots, Spaniards and other foreigners" who

(3) Contamine GES p. 419.
normally lived off the land anyway, so the loss was not really so very great (4). This may have been a frantic attempt to draw some crumb of comfort from a desperate situation, it may have attempted to reflect the attitudes of the recipients but it also seems to reflect the actual attitude of the court. It is noticeable that when the military situation began to improve, positive offers of foreign troops were turned down more or less graciously; experience perhaps indicated by 1430 that the potential problems they posed more than outweighed their advantages to the crown. This did not necessarily prevent recruitment on an individual level (and indeed there were no means available to do this) and did not necessarily rule out generosity to those who had amply proven their loyalty (though they might still be more vulnerable to royal pressure than their French counterparts, and more likely to be put under that kind of pressure if the ends of royal policy seemed to demand it), but it meant that they were not likely to be joined by vast numbers of similar figures in the future, and perhaps encouraged them to assimilate into the bulk of the population rather more rapidly than they might otherwise have done.

The literary records tend to echo this royal ambivalence towards these desperately needed but depressingly unruly allied forces. On the one hand, the Chronicle of Mont St. Michel praised Buchan and his men warmly ("qui moult vaillement se portent en gardant leur loyaulté au roy nostre sire") (5) and Basin was to pay warm tribute to the military capacities of Kennedy and his men at the siege of Lagny (6).

On the other, a certain lack of trust of both them and their motives makes itself felt. Basin, for instance, was prepared to find a happy side even to the slaughter of Verneuil by stating that they had planned to take over wide areas in central France for themselves and set themselves up on the lands of many French nobles (7) (a belief which may well have been prevalent in the areas of Touraine and Berry in question, encouraged by the concentration of gifts of land to foreign troops in these areas). A similar attitude seems to pervade chronicle accounts of battles, and especially those of French defeats, where these are often blamed on the rashness, insubordination or even cowardice of foreign troops. The most extreme example of this attitude is Cousinot's totally unsupported assertion that the Italians fled at Verneuil without striking a blow (8) but it can be found recurring in most chronicle accounts. Certainly there are other views expressed; the Scottish writers, perhaps predictably, mirror their French counterparts and give the strong impression that the French were largely responsible for their own troubles and one can find the isolated source like the Orleans siege mystery play which enshrines a very different view and reflects the close and affectionate relationship between Darnley and the city which we have had cause to remark on several times in the course of this study. It is possible that the writers reflect the prejudices of their sources of information as much as their own personal ones, but their accounts are nonetheless revealing for that.

In the longer term as well there seems to have been a certain discomfort felt about the continued employment of a substantial number of

(7) id p. 99.
(8) Cousinot p. 197-8, 225.
foreigners in the reformed Ordonnance companies. The elegy for Charles VII produced by the inimitable Henri Baude claims that he dispensed altogether with the use of foreigners in the army apart from the Scots (who were too numerous and traditional an element to be completely ignored) and 25 German crossbowmen in his bodyguard (9). This, of course, was utterly untrue, but it is interesting that Baude, writing well after the event, should have regarded this as a reason for praise. There was on the whole little echo in French military writings (such as they were) of the controversy which was to exercise so many theorists in Italy and beyond, then and later, as to the respective merits of native and imported mercenary armies, despite the fact that the latter were so prominent a feature of the French military scene. Even at the height of their employment, when a moralist like Alain Chartier was trying to stir the nobility and other natural military leaders into activity by contrasting their sloth with the willingness of foreigners to die for the King of France, there was no real debate about the theory involved. Those who did write were more concerned about the lamentable state of discipline in the armies which existed than about their national composition, and there was no real suggestion from such writers that foreigners were in any way more prone to loot and pillage than native-born Frenchmen. Their remedies for the ills besetting France were comparatively simple and straightforward, as indicated in a section on this subject at the end of a brief chronicle of this period. They ran to such hallowed remedies as ensuring regular payment and effective control of musters as well as the less purely military demand that captains appointed should be God-

(9) Chartier Vol. III p. 130, 135.
fearing men who saw that their troops observed the Sabbath (10) (a kind of moralistic preoccupation which echoes Jeanne d'Arc's attempts to produce a godly army). There is no suggestion that matters would go better if the foreigners were to be sent home. Nor did Alain Chartier, in his comprehensive attack on the behaviour of the various classes in France, including the man-at-arms, have much to say on the matter. Even that hardened professional Jean du Basile has no comment to make on the use of foreign troops in the 'Jouvencel'; since he had so much to say for himself on other matters which he regarded as being of importance to the young and aspiring soldier, one can only assume that the issue ranked very low indeed among the preoccupations of those most closely involved in the organisation of the army. Good discipline ranked far above the national purity of the army in the minds of the theorists of the day, despite certain resentments and a certain level of discomfort at the numbers of foreigners employed which could encourage men like Baude to play down their numbers as far as possible.

These resentments appear clearly among the nobility. The Scottish chronicles report the jibes about the Scottish armies made by the nobles of Charles' court when they first arrived "mutton eaters and wine sacks" was the usual insult (11). It was also claimed that they tried to steal all the credit for the victory of Baugé (and indeed nearly succeeded until the Scots appeared with all the prisoners and plunder). Some of this could be written off as Scottish touchiness in a foreign land, but it seems undeniable that the appointment of Buchan as Constable of

(10) FF 5059 f53vo-55vo.
(11) Pluscarden p. 354
France, the gift of very wide powers to Douglas and the almost complete subtraction of the Army of Scotland from the normal machinery of control did nothing to calm resentments. These seem to have expressed themselves in bitter disputes over the tactics to follow which erupted before Verneuil, and the collapse of earlier operations due to a mixture of inadequate finance and disputes over both battle order and tactics. Indeed, the battle of Verneuil shows severe signs of confused preparation and lack of co-ordination between the various commanders; one suspects that this had at least something to do with the reluctance of such French nobles as the Viscount of Narbonne to take orders from a Scottish commander. The same situation was to repeat itself with Buchan's successor, the almost equally foreign Breton Arthur of Richemont, and there is plenty of evidence to show that foreign troops were at times unwilling to take orders from French commanders and vice versa. The build-up to the Battle of the Herrings with total confusion reigning about who was to attack and how is a good illustration. Foreign soldiers were resented because they were dipping rather too successfully into the distinctly limited barrels of royal favours in the 1420's. To a large extent the situation regularised itself after 1445 with much more patronage available and the foreign element relatively less important in the competition for it, though as we saw earlier their success was still causing complaint as late as 1484. Nevertheless, the worst of the dislike was past as the men in question began to sink by slow degrees into the ranks of the French aristocracy themselves. Any snobbishness about foreigners had never prevented inter-marriage in any case, as we shall see later in this chapter.
Another reason for tension between French and foreign troops, especially the Scots, was caused by the political role of the Scottish forces. The Guard units were especially deeply involved in protecting the king from his less ruly noble subjects, and as early as 1425 an out-of-favour Arthur of Richemont was accusing his political enemies at the court of recruiting foreigners to fight against him (12). Part of this no doubt came from the same kind of sources as the normal recruitment of otherwise unemployed soldiers to help in the waging of private and semi-private wars, but there is the hint underlying the letter that foreign troops are being used to suppress opposition to the faction in power at court as a deliberate tactic (the fact that Arthur was himself quite willing to lead the Scots and other foreigners in his own army against the walls of Bourges where the king himself was, should perhaps make one doubt just how far this was the case). Professor Kiernan has discussed at length the potential role of foreign mercenary troops as a prop to absolutist monarchies in early modern times (13), and it would be tempting to consider the Scots of the Guard in much the same light. One thinks, for instance, of the alleged comment of the Dauphin that they "kept France in subjection" (14) and prevented people from doing what they wanted. Tempting though this is (and it can be hardly denied that for those unhappy with the regime at court and who wanted to bring about a change, even a violent one, in the situation, the high level of loyalty displayed by the Scots of the Guard must have been annoying indeed), I doubt if it will stand up to really close examination. The ordinary Ordonnance units, and even the Guard

(12) Cailliet p. 92.
(13) V Kiernan 'Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy' Past and Present No. 11 1957.
(14) FF 20427 f3ro.
were very closely integrated into French politics; too integrated
to perform the role of totally reliable political policemen which
one might attribute to them. Their commanders, and the rank and
file as well, rapidly acquired loyalties which could cut across
those they owed to the king and the current establishment at court.
They were still vitally useful to the security of a given régime,
but could not be relied upon to stand idly by if it was replaced.
They belonged too much to the existing structures of patronage and
influence to be separate from them, as the large scale purges which
attended each change of régime or time of tension show. This is
underlined by the comparative failure of the Ordonnance army in the
Guerre du Bien Publique and the apparent collapse of discipline in
the Scottish company under the crisis when a substantial section
marched off to join the rebels (15); such a force could hardly serve
as a prop for tyranny and absolutism. On the whole, the Scottish
and other foreign companies were rather too well integrated into the
delicate balances of the French political system of the day to serve
efficiently in this role, and, despite the grumbling of a few noble
intriguers, it is unlikely that foreign troops were particularly dis-
liked for upholding royal despotism.

Even at the worst, however, the foreign soldier of a certain rank
and his French noble equivalent had certain attitudes and modes of
thought in common. Chivalry might wear very thin in actual war, but
it was a common set of values to which all would pay lip-service (at
least) equally; it could provide a certain solidarity between men of

(15) FF 6971 f161ro-vo.
similar rank but different national background. Many of the worst tensions, and most violent clashes, occurred further down the social scale. This point perhaps hardly needs any labouring, since much of the information on this subject has already been presented in previous chapters in some considerable detail, whether in the consideration of the role of plunder or in that of life in the companies on the day to day basis. One hardly needs to repeat the ample evidence for mutual distrust, dislike and violence which marked relations between native and foreigners whether in the action of Tours in expelling all Scots from within its walls or in the unorganised, instinctive violence of the peasant farmer or town artisan. This was not, of course, confined to foreign troops, but all the familiar tensions between soldier and civilian were considerably heightened by the difference in nationalities; the soldier was made even more isolated from normal civilian society by his origins. Yet, despite this amply documented hostility and hatred, can this be the full story? Can one safely reduce a whole society to the tale told by its criminal records? It seems probable that on the human level relations were much more complicated than this picture might suggest. After all, it is fairly plain that the majority of those who served for any time in France tended to settle down there for the rest of their lives (and, one assumes, inject what profits they had made from their military service into the local economy). The lists of those quitting the ranks of the Guard suggest this strongly. Some died in harness, some retired due to old age, some fell victim to the scourges of leprosy and internal quarrels leading to murder, some died in battle,
some were transferred to Ordonnance companies, but only one actually left to return to Scotland (16). The rest probably followed the example of the man we met earlier and built up a small patrimony out of their wages to which they retired in due course. The Ordonnance companies seem to have gone much the same way. The review made in July 1469 of Cunningham's company shows the process at work, with men of the same name being distinguished by their place of residence in France (Jehan Bron of Bordeaux as against Jehan Bron of Bayonne (17)). This was, however, hardly a new situation. The very list of Scots expelled from Tours in 1425 illustrates that there was a small but apparently, at least partially permanent, Scottish population in the town. In addition to a passing friar, there were considerable concentrations in a few houses (four, for instance, lodged with one Norwil, who might have been the Scottish commander of that name), while the Lord of Poloc apparently had a house in the city and one Jehan Bel was stated to be married and resident in the town (18). Probably most had connections with the Army of Scotland in some way or other, and there are hints that some at least of the commanders had begun to buy property inside the walls even at this early date while others had settled down in the city on an equally permanent basis. One can find evidence of foreigners being accepted as part of the community even in judicial records. One finds, for instance, the case of a John Vernon, perhaps a relative of the Lord of Montreuil-Bonin, since he was certainly resident there.

(17) FF 25779 no. 19.
(18) Indre-et-Loire BB 23 f37ro.
While he had probably served in the armies, he had lived quietly in Poitou for a period of some twelve years before becoming involved in a quarrel which led to him killing a man in a fit of uncontrollable rage; a case which had nothing to do with his background at all. He found enough friends and relations to plead his case and see to it that he gained remission, and it would appear that he at least had become a part of local society (19). A parallel case can be found in the Saintonge (20). In other cases again, it is apparent that men who were actually serving in companies nevertheless maintained what they regarded as permanent homes in some towns in France. Thomas Marshall, a Scot in a French-commanded company, gave his home address as Aubigny-sur-Nère when he sought remission for a murder he had committed (21). In both these cases we have discussed, the French towns chosen for settlement by Scots were hardly surprising; both Montreuil-Bonin and Aubigny had Scottish overlords and it is probable that men retired from the armies to the lands held by their old commanders (the paternalistic ethos which surrounded command of men could, presumably, be more effectively stimulated by those near enough to the eye of their former commander to be able to call on his aid in times of need) or to places where others similarly placed had done so, but it is likely that there were small groups of Scots and other foreigners outside the bounds of these lordships and the other concentrations unearthed by nineteenth century romantics and antiquaries.

(19) AN JJ 180 no. 93 (printed in AH Poitou XXXII p. 75-7).
(20) id JJ 176 no. 188.
(21) id JJ 197 no. 279.
This process of integration operated at all levels of society. We have, of course, traced it for the higher ranks of the aristocracy at an earlier point in this study (and it is remarkable just how tenaciously rooted such family trees as that of the Stewarts of Aubigny could become). Often settlement could mean the splitting of a family; the Stewarts were a good example of this with their French lands going to a cadet branch which remained permanently settled in France (as we have seen, the surest way of guaranteeing possession of lands in France). Usually, however, once settled, a family would remain in France. Beyond a semi-mythical account of how Hugh Kennedy came back to Scotland to spend the profits of his campaigning on building himself a position in Scotland (22) there seem to have been very few newly-enriched Scots recrossing the Channel to impress their neighbours with the wealth gained in France. There was no real Scottish equivalent to Sir John Fastolf, though Rodrigo de Villandrando's career in Spain after his return there had certain parallels. He certainly exploited the reputation he had gained outside the kingdom to further his ambitions within it and to aid his allies (and, perhaps slightly surprisingly, his king; it seems a curious paradox that the greatest Ecorcheur of them all died as a pillar of monarchical authority in Castile), and there seems little doubt that he brought considerable wealth back over the Pyrenees with him. As so often, Villandrando is exceptional; the rule was that those who had served for many years in France would settle down in France and spend their profits and plunder on establishing a niche for themselves and their children in French society (unless, that is, (22) Francisque-Michel Vol. I p. 170.
they were ill-advised enough to set themselves up in an area where they had become too notable for their pillaging exploits, like one of Pettilot's men who tried to settle in the Limousin near a church which he had plundered, and found himself taken to court over the affair (23)). Very few of the profits of war actually left France in these cases, and it would be very hard indeed to make any of Macfarlane's optimistic claims about the possible profits of war to England (at least in the fourteenth century) about Scotland's position (24).

The integration process was much aided by this strong tendency for those who had made their pile in France to spend most of it in France and concentrate their efforts on making a position for themselves in France rather than recrossing the seas and mountains home. It was not confined to the very grand; many a successful Scottish or Spanish or Italian man-at-arms seems to have invested his modest gains in lands which would enable himself and his descendants to sink slowly into the ranks of the minor nobility and what one could call semi-nobility of France. The Stud family is a good example. Walter, captain of Avallon and member of the Guard was given land in the Gatinais by a grateful king and left it to his brother who founded a family which endured in the area for many generations, becoming known as the Destutt de Tracy (25). No doubt a comprehensive search of the

(23) AN JJ 179 no. 40.

(24) The standard articles on this debate as far as England is concerned are K B Macfarlane 'England and the Hundred Years War' Past and Present no. 22, 1962 and M M Postan 'The Costs of the Hundred Years War' Past and Present no. 27 1964. It will be apparent that, as far as Scotland goes, I would tend to lean to the latter's interpretation though, of course, individuals certainly did make profits which could have inspired many more to hunt for them.

lists of the minor gentry of provincial France would unearth many more such figures. There was certainly no prejudice against marriage to foreigners; foreign soldiers found wives from amongst the ranks of the nobility without any real difficulty and, while the early commanders like Buchan and Darnley brought their wives over from Scotland, there does not seem to have been any regular importation of wives from abroad on the part of foreign troops (the only case which might indicate this comes in a letter of remission concerning a dispute over a girl who had come over from Scotland to marry a Scot in Dieppe, but there is no concrete evidence that any of the parties involved in this affair were soldiers rather than merchants (26)). This, combined with the well-attested rush to buy naturalisation documents from the royal chancery by foreign soldiers, suggests that by the time such men settled down in France, they had come to regard it as home. No doubt the lack of obvious difficulty in gaining French brides reflects the fact that the foreign soldier, as long as he retained royal favour, was by no means a bad catch. Members of the royal Guard for instance, could look with some hope to the King for very considerable wedding presents; witness the considerable sum of seven hundred livres given to Jehan Simple on the occasion of his wedding (27).

Nevertheless, despite this process of integration, there were still differences, and it could be a surprisingly long time before a Scottish family could be regarded as having become completely French. One sees with some surprise Commynes refer to Béraud Stuart of Aubigny,

(26) AN JJ 199 no. 362.
(27) FF 2886 f13vo.
born in France of a French mother and issued from a family which had served the French crown loyally from the 1420's as being of the 'Nation d'Escoce' in the late 1490's (28). Perception of foreignness lasted well after the real national differences had been very much diminished and the 'Scottish' companies of the French army filled by second-generation Frenchmen with Scottish names.

Slow though this process might sometimes be, it was aided by one fact; foreign troops showed an apparent eagerness to learn the language of their employers. At times this must have been essential, since one should not forget the fact that many foreigners served in mixed companies alongside Frenchmen. They have been rather excluded from this study, since they are impossible to trace except when they fell foul of the law or appear very clearly on muster rolls, but the isolated references which one can find suggest that there can have been very few Ordonnance companies after 1445 without a lance or two of foreigners in their midst, while the Ecorcheur companies prior to that had always been very mixed in composition. Even the foreign companies may have contained some Frenchmen initially (as the roll of part of Pettilot's company taken at Libourne in 1461 indicates; the group was commanded by a Valpergue and several French names appear among the men at arms (29)) - perhaps survivors of the old companies which had been incorporated in the new structure. While the Scottish company tended to become uniformly Scottish at least in the surnames of its members, the other foreigners serving in the ranks of French

(29) FF 25778 no. 1905.
companies remained until well after the end of our period, as the case of Thomas Marshall who gained remission in 1473 for the murder of an Italian member of the company of Antoine de Chabannes to which he also belonged indicates. He had been aided by another Scottish member of this nominally French company (30). Under these circumstances, a willingness to pick up the French language was probably essential. Not all succeeded. Michel Ambleton, who came to Fierbois to tell of how St. Katherine had saved him from death when a group of Bretons hanged him in 1429 must have told his tale through an interpreter since it is clear from his story, that he could not speak French; when recovering from his ordeal in the convent of La Regripiere he was forced to communicate with the abbess by sign language (31). Others were more linguistically active since the anonymous and observant author of the 'Livre des Trahisons' noted the behaviour of the Scottish troops at Cravant after the Italians on their flanks ran for their horses; "La povoict on ouyt les Escochois en leur mauvais franchois, tel que communement le scirent parler" apparently swearing vigorously at the runaways (32). As this passage suggests, ability to make oneself understood in French did not necessarily imply greater harmony with those around. In fact, some of the best evidence for the ability of foreign soldiers to speak and understand French with fair fluency comes from letters of remission for murders sparks off by quarrels which in their turn had been caused by insults flung about between foreigners and Frenchmen. It is

(30) AN JJ 197 no. 279.
(31) Miracles de St. Katherine p. 57-60 no. 105.
likely that the vast majority of those who served in France learned the language with some degree of fluency, a fact which must have helped to integrate them into French society in the long term.

In fact, at the literary level, the foreign soldier was well on the way to integration at quite an early stage. The third tale in the 'Cent Nouvelles/Nouvelles' concerns a member of the Garde Écossais and his courtship of the wife of a burgess of Tours. It is interesting that the noble author (allegedly the Duke of Burgundy himself) should have chosen a Scottish soldier as a major protagonist in what is very much a mocking of the cowardice of the non-noble townsman unable to face the ferocious Scot in battle. Against this ludicrous figure, the Scot emerges as a representative of the martial and noble virtues; his pursuit of the lady is always described in terms like "Grand courtoisie" (33). The general tone is admiring; it may be that it partly reflects a Scottish reputation for ferocity in combat, but on the whole the Scot is a good gentleman and very much a part of the French scene. It is some distance from the shoemaker in Bayonne quoted in the last chapter who thought himself at least as good a man as his Scottish customer, or even the kind of mental attitudes reflected in another letter of remission where an archer, hearing a riot in the street outside his billet, immediately assumed that Scots were responsible (34). The wild foreigner, and especially the wild Scot, was in process of transformation into a French gentleman or, at the very least, into a Frenchman of some sort. The


(34) AN JJ 179 no. 164.
loss of identity might be slow and the possession of Scottish
ancestry might mark a man off from his neighbours even after he him-
self was indistinguishable from them in any very obvious way, but
in the long run the foreign soldier, if he chose to settle in France
to keep a grip on his profits, was fated to merge into the general
population of the countryside. This suggests that attitudes were
less clear-cut than some statements and actions might imply. Cer-
tainly fifteenth century attitudes to foreign troops never reached
the rather simple-minded romantic admiration for "nos alliés fideles
les Écossais" which appeared so often in the nineteenth century and
remain in some books to this day. From the point of view of the
royal government, all foreigners (apart perhaps from a few special-
ist companies) were essentially a necessary evil endured only because
the military situation of the day demanded a major injection of troops
from outside the kingdom to maintain some kind of army in being to
face the English; I doubt whether they ever really believed that
mercenaries were any better trained or more professional than native
troops, but since the latter were not available in adequate numbers
the foreigners had to do. In return, they were rewarded lavishly
when needed but cast aside if possible when their services were no
longer required. The rewards distributed to them certainly caused
resentment among the native French nobility who were displaced from
their place in the royal patronage structure, and their generally
unruly behaviour made them unpopular with much of the rest of the
population. On the other hand, they tended to integrate into the
French population on an individual basis without too much hostility
being directed at them and managed to settle down to a kind of
accepted place in the French scene; one in which they might even become models of chivalry and admired for their loyalty to the crown. Certainly by 1460, the foreigners who were in the French armies mostly belonged nowhere else but in France. The picture is rather confused; no doubt many different and conflicting attitudes prevailed amongst both the foreigners and the French but it helps to place the foreign troops in France in perhaps an unexpected historical slot - that of the first large group of immigrant workers in French society.
Conclusion

We have now reached the end of our survey, which it is hoped has restored the international aspect of the second half of the Hundred Years War to its proper place in the historical record. The employment of foreign troops on a very large scale was perhaps an expedient forced on the French royal government by circumstances rather than a policy deliberately planned, but one is tempted to wonder if the regime of Charles VII at Bourges could have survived the 1420's without their help. Certainly for this period their recruitment was to be one of the major, if not the predominant, theme of French diplomacy as reflected by a whole series of diplomatic missions to potential suppliers of men. These efforts were to be backed by very considerable expenditure, both for advances of pay and other sweeteners to persuade the great in the countries in question to allow recruitment or even cross over themselves, and also for the hire of shipping to see to the transport of the armies thus raised. No doubt they were exceedingly generous in promises of great rewards which would await those who entered the service of the King of France. They were most successful in Scotland, where their efforts drew some of the greatest members of the nobility and where they managed to recruit several quite substantial armies from the resources of the Scottish Lowlands; elsewhere recruitment was rather more patchy and often men headed for the theatre of war without any formal recruitment in the hope of finding places in the French military structures and thus making their fortunes. How far these hopes, often carefully fostered by French recruiting agents, were ever really justified is another matter. Royal generosity to the commanders of foreign
units was often apparent in the shape of considerable land grants, but this perhaps reflected a shortage of ready cash to pay wages rather than anything more elevated in sentiment. There was certainly a severe crisis in military organisation in this period especially on the financial side, which the occasional very large payment to a commander like Darnley cannot disguise. If men pillaged, it was often a means of stimulating the king to pay monies due or, alternatively a method of collecting their dues for themselves before the money vanished into the royal coffers where there would be many other calls upon it. The simple fact was that Charles was for much of the 1420's and 30's trying to maintain armies far beyond his resources to pay them regularly. Perhaps foreign troops did rather better than most in the collection of their payment despite the circumstances of the moment (as witness the mass disbandment decreed in 1424 from which only the Scots and Italians were to be exempt), but there was probably never enough money available to keep all the men involved fully paid all the time, and in any case it could take much time, influence and luck to collect monies due from those charged with collecting them. Since legitimate profits of war were only for the lucky, and far more probably lost than gained on the field of battle, the temptation to move into other areas of activity was immense. There was no shortage of potential employers seeking armed forces whose activities could be used to bolster what might be a rather shaky case in the courts, and at the very highest level close and dangerous connections grew up between the commanders of organised companies and members of the higher nobility who were thus equipped with military forces which could back up their political ambitions as
Further down the scale came the extortion of protection money and simple pillage. Even here matters were perhaps more nuanced than traditional accounts might suggest. For those able to negotiate, those who had a certain position in society, contacts with these companies might not be a disaster after all. Protection could be sought as well as imposed in a period when the legitimate powers of the royal government might be very shadowy and ineffective; any kind of protection was better than none and exactions could be legitimised in a variety of different ways. For those below this rank and outside the city walls, which few captains ever felt tempted to assault, matters were rather different. The kind of prevailing legalism which influenced even such a man as Villandrando to find some kind of justification in law for his threats against town councils did not apply here. It rapidly became a war to the knife; a war whose persistence, savagery and disregard for the allegiance of the troops involved suggests a great deal about peasant society and its response to this kind of pressure. One is tempted to wonder if some at least of the ambiguous resistance at village level to the English occupation in Normandy did not owe more to the same kind of resentment of pillage and military exactions than to loyalty to the rather remote figure of the true King of France; certainly the evidence should make one wary of generalisations about the passivity in the face of suffering of the peasant majority in the population.

In theory at least the royal reform of 1445 should have meant the end of this situation. Pay was regularised, companies were integrated into the royal patronage system via their captains and the close relationship between soldiers and members of the aristocracy greatly
weakened if not totally destroyed. The king aspired to a monopoly of organised military force in his kingdom, and, provided he was careful and did not disturb the balances of the system unduly for his own ends, this he retained until well after the end of our period. It did not, however, do very much for the relationship between soldier and civilian; a massive improvement in the discipline of the companies was never to be achieved if it was even sought. This was partly due to a lack of close supervision; the limited numbers of those royal officials charged with the payment and inspection of the troops saw to that. There were other causes, however. The reform had not purged the ranks to any extent, and soldiers did not change their ways overnight. Pay was often in arrears and the life-style of the majority of them demanded far more money than it could ever have provided. The regular forces were resented by all those who had to pay the taxes to maintain them in idleness, and tensions frequently erupted into open violence. In any case, the army was far from being fully professionalised; many men would leave their billets for greater or lesser periods to return to their homes or see to their own private businesses while the rest had little in the way of military training to occupy their time. They formed a marginalised group, much given to drink, gambling and all the other signs of anti-social behaviour of the times, living a life of intense and claustrophobic sociability under the sometimes paternal, sometimes tyrannical absolute authority of the captain (or his lieutenant, for the captain himself might have many other calls on his time, both in the maintenance of his estates or in the execution of other functions held in plurality). On the whole, foreign troops
suffered from this more than native Frenchmen; they were rather less likely to have alternative occupations to draw them away from the closed world of the billet and the tavern, rather more likely to be resented by the local population. This does not mean that they were to be locked out of French society for ever; the majority settled in France and found integration into French society possible. Those who had money to spare often invested it in land purchases to ensure their position when they retired from the profession of arms or lent it out to local merchants in the hope of increasing their stake. Over the longer term, they slowly sank into the main body of the French population.

What signs of their passage did they leave, either in France or in their countries of origin? It is surprisingly hard to find much tangible information. Contamine, on what evidence he does not say, claims that the transformation of the French lance structure from two men-at-arms and one archer to one man-at-arms and two archers was due to Scottish influence, though it could equally well have been borrowed from the English (1). On a less tangible level, the already close contact between Scotland and France was further reinforced by the service of so many Scots abroad. Scotland, though, did not gain very much from the service of so many of her people overseas in France. The fact that continued residence in France was essential if a foreign soldier wished to retain all the rewards of his efforts made sure that little of the money which the fortunate made was ever repatriated; even the proceeds of plunder would largely be spent within France. Perhaps the most that Scotland gained was the occasional gift to a church like that of Darnley who presented vestments to Glasgow.

(1) Contamine GES p. 272 note 181.
Cathedral on a visit home (2). Even the profits of shipping escaped her; since most of that was done by Rochellais and Castilian vessels. The other suppliers of manpower probably did little better; Castile had to face the influx of many of Villandrando's company when he recrossed the Pyrenees to aid his king. This caused much terror amongst those who had to face the invasion, but it seems likely that most of his men went back to France once the war in Castile was over. If he himself remained to spend his profits in Castile, most of the Spaniards he had led seem to have settled in France. The Italians went the same way. Cultural contacts may have followed in the wake of the closer diplomatic ties which the recruitment of foreign armies and the continuing alliances entailed; it is interesting that Sir Gilbert de la Haye, the first translator of "The Tree of Battles" and other French works in the same vein into Scots, had been at the court of Charles VII as a chamberlain, and, while he seems to have been a university man himself, it is at least possible that he was connected in some way with the man of the same name who served in the Army of Scotland until the early 1430's (3). On a rather different level, the success of the Lombard cavalry and the qualities of Milanese armour seem to have encouraged a fairly regular level of purchasing of equipment from this source for tournaments and also for high-quality suits intended to be used on the battlefield.

Certainly, military service by foreigners provided the only source of outside recruitment to the French aristocracy in this period,

(2) FF 26295 no. 881.
and in many small ways such soldiers helped to rewrite the tenurial structures of some areas with quite considerable numbers of foreign settlers coming in to settle on the land. This created a generation of Franco-Scots and Spaniards and Italians to man future units; perhaps the first group to have a genuine military tradition of service in an organised and full-time professional army rather than as feudal vassals following their lord. Certainly the Scottish units, the most tenacious of all in terms of long-term survival, created traditions of their own which led many younger sons of the Scottish aristocracy to go to France for shorter terms and serve in these units where their French cousins could also be found, a fact which must have had some effect on those who undertook it in terms of culture and outlook.

The foreign companies, then, were important. They matter both for their part in the actual fighting of the war and for the light which their experience casts on the military institutions of the day. It was a period of great change and great events; from near disaster the French monarchy went on to triumph over its ancient English enemy and from conditions of near complete chaos, emerged an army which can, with some use of the imagination, be seen as a remote ancestor of modern permanent forces. In these events and changes, the foreign troops played their full part; their procurement was a major factor in the organisation of French diplomacy, while for fully a decade the problems which they raised as well as the necessity of rewarding their leaders adequately occupied much of the time and effort of the royal administration. Even after the period when foreign troops perhaps comprised the majority (and certainly the most effective, if
least easily controlled element) of the French army was over, they were a significant part of the forces which Charles had available to him and played a prominent part in his campaigns. The reforms of 1445 recognised their place in the military structures of the nation and institutionalised it in the shape of permanent companies whose ranks were to be filled with foreign troops. Their commanders held positions of importance, and even supreme command in this period, finding themselves as a consequence at the heart of the political manoeuvrings and manipulations of the court; as a result, the fate of such units as the Garde Écossaise is a highly sensitive litmus for spotting times of political change and disturbance. As a group, their fate is worth studying for the light which it throws on the ambitions, rewards, problems, and general realities of life within the organised and semi-organised military forces which began to spring into existence all over Europe in the fifteenth century as well as the light it casts on one of the central problems of French society in this period; the relationship between royal government and patronage, and the control over aristocratic society which this government might seek. Without the foreign soldier, fifteenth century France becomes that much harder to understand as a whole.