TOWN DEFENCE IN THE FRENCH MIDE
DURING THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR c.1337-c.1453

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Author's declaration (University of Edinburgh Postgraduate
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I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself
alone, and that the work is entirely my own.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the organisation of defence in the towns of southern France during the Hundred Years War, and contributes to the debate on the part played by the non-combatant civilian population in late-medieval warfare. The construction, maintenance, funding and architecture of the fortifications, which were at the centre of the defensive effort, are dealt with extensively, although equal emphasis is placed on the human aspects; on the obligations of guet, arrière-guet, garde, corvées and service in the militia, incumbent on every citizen. The wartime government of towns by consuls and syndics, complemented in some cases by special war committees, and the often uneasy relationship between the municipality and its seigneur, the king, the king's officers and other towns and villages in the area, form an important part of the study. The broad chronological limits are 1337 and 1453, although the greatest attention has been paid to the thirty years after 1355, which were the most crucial of the war in the Midi. The impression emerges that, for all its flaws, town defence was in most instances efficiently and conscientiously organised, and the larger conclusion drawn is that, while there were limits to the ability of the towns to protect themselves against the garrison warfare of the 1370s and -80s, the greater preparedness of the towns of Languedoc in the later fourteenth century probably discouraged the English from attempting again the kind of chevauchée undertaken by the Prince of Wales in 1355.
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 6

PART I THE MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT OF DEFENCE 15

1 Local defence and royal government 16
   i) Defence and the ordinary royal administration 16
   ii) Defence commissioners 27

2 Defence and Town Government 39
   i) Municipal rights 39
   ii) Consuls, syndics, councils 44
   iii) Special committees 63
   iv) A special administration: the 'Œuvre de la Commune Clôture' at Montpellier 67
   v) Town captains 77

PART II THE POPULATION MOBILISED 96

3 Obligations 97

4 Defensive organisation inside the town 110
   i) 'Guet', 'arrière-guet' and 'garde' 110
   ii) The general mobilisation 119
   iii) Non-military duties: 'corvées' and prestations 124
   iv) 'Badas', 'messatges' and 'espia's' 132

5 Town militias 143
   i) Recruitment and organisation 143
   ii) Town militias and local defence 149
   iii) Urban militias and royal armies 157
PART V  DEFENCE AND FINANCE  343

13 Paying for defence  344

i) The costs of defence  344

ii) Direct taxation  351

iii) Indirect taxation  356

iv) Exemption and evasion  374

Conclusion: the effectiveness of the defensive effort  381

BIBLIOGRAPHY  385

APPENDIX OF DOCUMENTS  407

TABLES

I  Corvées at Millau, c.1353  129

II Indirect taxation at Millau (i). Receipts from the sestaynal and commun de la Paix, 1370–1385  349

III Direct taxation at Millau, 1355–1367  354/5

IV Barage grants to the consuls of Millau, 1364–1439  360/1

V The barrage at Alès, 1357  363

VI Indirect taxation at Millau (ii). The soquet, 1367–1392  367

VII The soquet at Rodez, 1352–1440  370/1

MAPS

I Southern France showing principal towns mentioned in the text  436

II Messengers sent to and from Nîmes, 26–29 December 1363  437

III The defensive ressort of Aigues-Mortes in 1359  438

IV The defensive ressort of Roquemaure in 1356  439

V Villages of the defensive ressort of Férigueux in 1406  440
Abbreviations

AC    Archives communales
AD    Archives départementales
B.N.  Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris

Measures

The most common unit of linear measurement in medieval Languedoc was the canne. The value of the canne varied from place to place. In the eighteenth century the canne measured approximately 1.987 meters at Montpellier and 1.796 meters at Toulouse. The canne was divided into six, and sometimes eight, palmes or pans.

Money

Unless otherwise stated, money is expressed in livres, s(cus) and d(eniers) of Tours.

Dates

All dates are given in the New Style, the years being counted from 1st January.
INTRODUCTION

This thesis takes as its point of departure the remarks of two eminent historians of the Hundred Years War. H.J. Hewitt, in the preface to his pioneering work on the organisation of war under Edward III, commented: 'I think the new and wider conception of the field of study will no longer be the army-at-war, but the people-at-war. It may therefore cover the work of all whose lives are affected by the war'.¹ In a rather different context, P.J. Lewis, reviewing the literature on towns in his magisterial study of later medieval France, observed that 'institutional studies of towns abound; rarer are those which deal with men and how they dealt with their problems'.² This then is an investigation of how the townpeople of southern France dealt with the problem of war, and, in particular, of how they organised their defence.

Dr. Hewitt's call for a broader approach to the study of the Hundred Years War has to some extent been met. Recent research has been concerned with some of the social implications of the war and with its effect on the civilian, or non-combatant, population.³ Non-combativity is a concept which must be treated with caution. Townpeople, and other civilians too, were non-combatant only in the

sense that they were not professional fighting men. But by manning
town walls against the king's enemies they were not only defending
their own homes and property but playing an important strategic role
in the war as well, for the fate of the kingdom depended as much on
the survival of the cities and towns as of the great fortresses.
And so town defence has to be considered part of what Dr. Hewitt
calls the 'Home Front', an active part of the war and just as
significant as the great battles and sieges which have more readily
attracted the attention of historians.

The study deals with the civilian war in just one part of
France. What has rather loosely been termed the 'Nord' means
roughly that quarter of the medieval kingdom of France to the south
of a line running through Blaye, Périgueux, Saint-Flour and Le Puy,
broadly corresponding to the fluid 'toutes les parties de la Langue
d'Oc' of the royal lieutenancies of the Hundred Years War period.
It comprises the three royal sénéchaussées of Beaucaire,
Carcassonne and Toulouse, the provinces of Périgord, Quercy and
Rouergue, and the great ecclesiastical lordships of Gévaudan, Velay
and Vivarais. To the north, the towns of Aurillac and Saint-Flour
have been included, even though they should properly be considered
as part of Auvergne, for in many ways they were southward-looking
and shared a common culture and traditions with their neighbours in
Languedoc. The English duchy of Guyenne, with its important towns,
has also been examined, but not to the same depth, and some of the
conclusions drawn in the course of the study, particularly with
regard to the royal administration and the relationship of the towns
to the king, do not necessarily apply to the duchy.
The towns of the Midi varied enormously in size and importance. In the first rank were the great regional capitals, Montpellier, Toulouse and Bordeaux. Montpellier, the largest city in Languedoc, probably had a pre-Black Death population of 40,000 and enjoyed political and economic precedence until in the fifteenth century it gradually lost that position to Toulouse. In 1335 Toulouse was a city of about 30,000 inhabitants. Bordeaux was probably of the same size, but, being the centre of the English administration in Guyenne and of the lucrative wine trade, exerted considerably more influence over the duchy than did either Montpellier or Toulouse over Languedoc. Next in importance were the ancient Gallo-Roman cities of the plain of Bas-Languedoc, Narbonne, Béziers and Nîmes. As a Mediterranean trading city Narbonne was the constant rival of Montpellier, and at its apogée in the early fourteenth century its population may have been upwards of 20,000. In the same period Béziers numbered about 15,000 citizens and Nîmes, rather smaller, perhaps 7,000. Further west, in the narrow valley of the Aude that links the southern coastal plain with the basin of the Garonne, stands Carcassonne, to most eyes the epitome of the medieval walled town. Carcassonne,

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like many other places in the Midi, was in fact two towns. The ancient Cité, famous in legends and history since the age of Charlemagne, was complemented in the thirteenth century by the construction of the Bourg, or lower town, on the other side of the river. The Cité, with its magnificent enceintes, gives a deceptive impression of the appearance of the average southern town in the Middle Ages. Standing close to the frontiers of the kingdom and guarding a vital line of communication, it was also the seat of the royal sénéchaussée of Carcassonne, and an important military and administrative capital. The Cité should therefore be considered not so much as a town but as one of the great castles of France. Much more typical of the urban world of the Midi were towns like Albi, Cahors, Périgueux, Montauban, Rodez, Mende, Saint-FLOUR or Le Puy, medium-sized places with populations of between 4,000 and 10,000 people, local capitals for a diocese or province. Below them was an infinite gradation of smaller places; market towns, towns which had grown up around a castle or religious community, bastides, or new towns, founded during the great period of urban expansion in the thirteenth century, places no bigger than villages sharing the same pattern of political organisation as their much larger neighbours.

All towns, large or small, faced broadly the same problems of war, and in this study no distinction has been made on the grounds of size or importance. If the bigger towns like Montpellier, Toulouse, Narbonne, Mimes, Albi and Rodez figure more prominently, it is simply that they are better documented.

The impact of the war in the Midi was felt in different ways at different times. The first campaigns in the south, between 1337
and 1345, were confined to Agenais and Bordelais and took the French armies to within a few miles of Bordeaux. ¹ Henry of Lancaster's expedition in the summer and autumn of 1345 brought a sudden reversal of fortune. Between August and November of that year the English captured the two important towns of Bergerac and La Rèole, as well as many other places in Périgord, Quercy and Agenais, defeated a French army at the battle of Auberoche, and sent fear and consternation far into Languedoc. ² At the end of 1349, after a second campaign by Lancaster in 1346 and fresh advances in the following years, the English were raiding as far as Toulouse. ³ Disastrous as these years were for the French, the war was nevertheless still confined to the westward-looking areas drained by the Garonne; but Languedoc and the upland regions to the north had hitherto been spared. The Black Prince's great chevauchée in the autumn of 1355 changed all that. Edward led his army up the Garonne, past Toulouse to Carcassonne, and then down the Aude as far as Narbonne, from where he threatened Béziers, Montpellier, Nîmes and all the coastal plains, even as far as the Rhône. ⁴ The panic which followed the raid was general, and from that date onwards the whole of the Midi was to be involved in the war.

² Ibid, pp.54-61.
³ Ibid, pp.86-87.
The years from 1355 until the end of the century were the darkest of the war in the south. The Treaty of Brétigny in 1360 brought a few years respite in the fighting, but the cessation of hostilities released thousands of unemployed soldiers who, organizing themselves in routes and companies, poured into Languedoc from Auvergne and down the Rhône, capturing many towns and castles from which they terrorised the local populations. The war started again in 1369 with the return into French allegiance of the provinces ceded to the English in 1360. The duke of Anjou led a highly successful army of reconquest down the Garonne, reducing English Guyenne to the region immediately around Bordeaux and a narrow coastal strip. But although the main campaigns of these years were restricted to the traditional battle-zones of Agonais and lower Périgord and Quercy, the survival of scores of routier garrisons, many of them in English pay, in the uplands of Auvergne, Rouergue, Velay, Gévaudan and Vivarais, the constant movement across the countryside of regular and irregular troops, the periodic flaring of the conflict between the counts of Armagnac and Foix, and the brigandage connected with the tuchin revolts in the 1380s meant that in this period war was a daily reality for most of the Midi.

In the later 1380s the situation in most parts of the south began gradually to improve. Local campaigns against enemy fortresses

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1 For the political, military and social history of the Midi, and the course and impact of the war, see C. Davio & J. Vaissotte, Histoire générale de Languedoc, Toulouse, 1872-1904 (cited as Histoire de Languedoc), IX, X, corrected and complemented by local studies such as F. André, L'invasion anglaise en Gévaudan: notice historique, Mende, 1882; J. Roncet, Les Grandes Compagnies en Velay 1358-1392, Paris, 1928; J. Rouquet, Le Rouergue sous les Anglais, Millau, 1887.
and, after 1390, a systematic policy of buying out the remaining garrisons ensured the disappearance of the English and routiers from most parts of Languedoc by the end of the century. Thereafter there were brief incursions by routier captains like André de Ribes, operating in Toulousain and Albigeois in 1426-1427, and Rodrigue de Villandrando, who caused a good deal of alarm in Rouergue and Albigeois in the 1430s, but the last campaigns of the war were fought along the gradually shrinking frontiers of English Guyenne.

The town administrative documents, which are the main source for this study, record the effects of the war on the urban community. The alarms, the defensive preparations, the construction of fortifications, the raising of taxes are chronicled day by day and week by week in the voluminous registers of consular accounts and deliberations which have survived from many towns. But only rarely do we get a glimpse of what the war meant in terms of personal hardship. Raymond de Roilhac, abbot of Conques in Rouergue from 1369 to 1389, left a short account of his life and abbacy during this difficult time. Such were the dangers and evils of war, he comments, that he and his monks grew weary of life itself. For four whole years and four months he ventured no further than a bowshot from his castle of

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1 Histoire de Languedoc, IX, p.954ff.
2 Ibid, pp.1092-1094.
Lunel (Aveyron), save on two occasions to travel the thirty or so miles to Rodez with an armed escort. A royal pardon granted to a certain Arnulf Masconia of Annonay in 1381 relates how he, returning one day from a pilgrimage to the nearby church of Saint-George, was approaching the town gates when he heard the familiar cry of alarm, 'ad arma, ad arma, ecco gentes armorum'; he spurred his horse forward to enter the town by a postern, but found his way blocked by a flock of sheep, and in trying to force his way through them he accidentally knocked down and fatally injured Menue, wife of Jean Dauphin. Small personal tragedies of this kind were commonplace. In the 1380s the people of Saint-Flour and the surrounding countryside suffered the depredations of several English garrisons. An investigation carried out after the evacuation of the English into crimes committed by the garrison of Allauze produced a harrowing catalogue of atrocities. From Saint-Flour itself 24 citizens were reported killed, from Langesac nineteen, from Neuvéglise ten men and three women; at Sérries five men and a woman were burnt to death. Hardly a village escaped its tribute of men, livestock and victuals. Further west, in the frontier country of the lower Dordogne, Bergerac was a town which suffered throughout the war from the same kind of punitive garrison warfare. In February 1379 the desperate citizens began to compile a Livre de vie in which they entered daily

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2 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr(euvos), cols. 1652-1653.

3 AC Saint-Flour, chapitre IV, article 6, no.7.
every single act of brigandage in the forlorn but touching hope that some day the wrongdoers would be punished 'par que no porten aquels pocatz en infern'.

The experience of the towns during the war, and especially in the disastrous thirty years after 1360, was that they had as much to fear from soldiers nominally in French allegiance as from the English. Troops travelling to and from the front, ill-paid and indisciplined garrisons forced to live off the country supposedly under their protection, mercenaries in the employ of magnates like the counts of Armagnac and Foix, even mercenaries hired by the towns themselves murdered, pillaged and plundered without distinction, and in the course of the entire war undoubtedly caused more bloodshed and damage in the Midi than the destructive but brief campaigns of the duke of Lancaster or the Black Prince. Thus the towns counted as their enemies not only the 'Ingles' - however widely and loosely the term was employed - but all gens d'armes, whatever their loyalties. In this sense town defence might be considered not only as an important element in the national war against the English, but as part of a wider struggle between the people, the laboratores of medieval social theory, and the bellatorres, the men of war.

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PART I

THE MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT OF DEFENCE
CHAPTER 1

LOCAL DEFENCE AND ROYAL GOVERNMENT

Town defence was primarily a municipal responsibility. But because of their importance to the national war effort, towns could not be allowed to manage their military affairs in complete independence, and while the day-to-day administration of the watch, the maintenance of the fortifications, mustering and equipping the militia and raising war taxes remained under municipal control, from the mid-fourteenth century onwards town defence came under the increasingly close supervision of the crown. The king himself, his lieutenant in Languedoc, sénéchaux, baillis, viscounts and special defence commissioners constantly intervened to ensure that towns were properly guarded, and that public security was not prejudiced by incompetence or indifference. Town defence cannot therefore be treated in isolation, but must be considered in a rather wider administrative and military context.

1) DEFENCE AND THE ORDINARY ROYAL ADMINISTRATION

In the military sphere, the king was the final authority in the land, answerable to God for the safety of his realm. He was commander-in-chief of the army, and ultimately responsible for the nation's defence. But France was so large and the theatres of war so widely separated, that the kings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries could only exercise general control from the centre, while delegating responsibility for the conduct of the war in the more
distant parts of the kingdom to lieutenants or captains-general, in whom they vested considerable power. Languedoc rarely enjoyed the king's personal attention; Philippe VI visited the south twice, Jean three times, Charles VI once and his father never, and although the central organs of government, especially Parliament, dealt with a constant flow of southern business arising out of the war, the administration of Languedoc, both civil and military, lay in the hands of the lieutenant. The lieutenanty of Languedoc had originally been an occasional appointment, but after 1337 there were lieutenants in virtually unbroken succession as the existing style of regional government based on the sénéchaussées proved unable to cope with the strains of continuous and widespread war. In the early part of the war lieutenants had sometimes been chosen from royal counsellors and civil servants of the second rank, but in the difficult years after 1355 it became clear that only men of recognised status, whether of rank or achievement, could enjoy the confidence of the population, and only commanders of proven ability, such as Arnoul d'Audrehem and Louis de Sancorre, princes of the blood, notably Charles VI's brothers, the dukes of Anjou and Berry, or great feudatories, like the counts of Foix and Armagnac, were considered worthy of the office.


2 Ibid, p.345ff. for the role and development of the lieutenanty in Languedoc.

The lieutenant was locum tenens, the king's representative whose brief was to do those things which the king himself would do if present in person. His chief object was the protection of that part of the kingdom entrusted to him, and his competence was greatest in military matters. The count of Poitiers was placed in office in 1356, as his brother's letters expressly stated, 'pour la garde tutelle et défense de toutes les pays de la Langue d'oc', and while he was not allowed to appoint officers of the ordinary regional administration, seigneurs, receivers or judges, he had free reign to recruit and dispose captains, castellans and other military personnel. The commission restoring him to the lieutenancy in 1380 renewed these powers, and further defined his right to summon barons, prelates and knights and lead them against the enemy. The lieutenant replaced the king as commander of the army, and Berry played an active personal rôle in the war against the routiers in the 1380s, just as his brother had captained the French army of reconquest in the successful Giscon campaigns of the previous decade.

The lieutenant was responsible for the broad lines of defensive strategy. It was on his initiative that towns and castles were...

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1 See for example the commission given to the archbishops of Auch and Sens, the bishop of Noyon and Pierre de Paludes, lieutenants in Languedoc, in August 1340. Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols. 867-868.

2 Ibid., col. 1134.

3 Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race, Paris, 1723-1849, VI, p. 531.


5 Histoire de Languedoc, IX, pp. 775-879.
fortified, armies raised or truces concluded with the enemy. In
the critical months during and after the Prince of Wales' great raid
of 1355 the coordination of resistance and the placing of the southern
provinces on a war footing fell to the lieutenant Jean I d'Armagnac.
A more systematic defensive policy was initiated. Only those
fortresses capable of resistance were to be fortified and munici-
tioned, all others destroyed or made unusable by the enemy and their
inhabitants forced to take refuge in defensible places. Sénéchaux,
baillis, viguiers and other officers were commissioned to inspect
fortresses and evaluate their defensive potential, and visitation
by special commission became the mainstay of defensive organisation
from this period onwards. Armagnac toured Languedoc personally,
seeing that his ordinances were put into operation. On 5 January
1356 he was at Lunel inspecting the fortifications and ordering the
villagers of the surrounding plat-pays to take shelter within the
walls of the town. On the 8th he was at Narbonne, on the 11th
at Caupèstang whence he dispatched the sénéchal of Carcassonne to
inspect the defences of Pézonnas.

Armagnac's policy of consolidation and retrenchment is echoed
in defensive ordinances of the same period introduced in other parts
of the kingdom. This raises the question whether decisions affect-
ing Languedoc were in fact reached by the lieutenant alone, or
ultimately by the king. Probably the issue never presented itself

1 AC Lunel, EE 1, no. 1971.
2 AC Pézonnas, Roseguier no. 951.
3 Ibid, no. 952.
as such. The lieutenants of the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Charles V's brothers in particular, were key figures in the royal council, who would play a major part in framing national war policy as well as implementing it at a regional level. Thus in January 1404 ordinances for the fortification and munitioning of all the frontier fortresses of the country were approved by the royal council among whose leading members was the duke of Berry. The decision having been taken, Berry, in his capacity as lieutenant, transmitted it to his sénéchaux and special commissioners to be implemented in Languedoc.¹

During the reign of Charles VI there were clear signs of an attempt to centralise military planning and decision-making which is not entirely attributable to the king's minority and subsequent bouts of madness. Before the 1390s, defence ordinances concerning Languedoc, insofar as their source can be traced with any consistency, tended to emanate from the lieutenant, and there is no evidence that ordinances issued by the king himself for Languedoc, such as those of November 1368,² were intended to be implemented in the Midi as well. But after Berry had been removed from office in 1390, when for a decade Languedoc was administered by a commission of réformateurs-généraux, and then by Louis de Sancerre, who, as captain-general, was an army commander rather than an omnipotent


governor, defensive ordinances were issued by the king in council straight to the sénéchaux and other royal officers in Languedoc, and this trend continued after Berry was restored to the lieutenancy in 1401.1 From that date until his death he never again set foot in the south, and his continuous presence at court and in the council accelerated the tendency towards centralisation. From this period, and most markedly in the reign of Charles VII, the military rôle of the lieutenant diminished. Even allowing for the lower intensity of the war in Languedoc in the fifteenth century, one of Charles VII’s most trusted and successful lieutenants, Jean de Grailly, count of Foix, for all his sixteen years in office, left hardly a trace in the town archives, certainly nothing to compare with the volumes of ordinances, grants and other letters touching military affairs dating from the lieutenancies of Armagnac, Anjou and Berry, the most active of his fourteenth-century predecessors. This trend reflects a policy begun by Charles VI, and continued more successfully by his son, of removing from the lieutenants some of the massive powers they had assumed during the emergencies of the mid-fourteenth century, and which had been regularly and spectacularly abused, most notoriously by the duke of Berry.2

Within the general policy framework, decisions affecting particular places were made by the lieutenant or the king, and in the

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2 Tognon, Institutions politiques, pp.345-360.
fourteenth century there was no very clear division of competence between them. The same sorts of matter could come to the attention of either. For instance, in May 1356 the consuls of Millau appealed to Armagnac to order the destruction of the Franciscan convent and other buildings lying outside the town walls and which, they argued, were a security risk, whereas at virtually the same time, and on the same sort of issue, the consuls of Narbonne thought it preferable to approach the king. Towns decided for themselves what was expedient. The king's letters might be more authoritative, but the lieutenant was nearer at hand and could act more rapidly, often with a personal knowledge of the problem. The consuls of Agen, it has been observed, appealed to the king when their privileges were threatened, and to the lieutenant and sénéchal when they needed immediate help.

Somewhat inferior in status, and with more restricted powers than the lieutenant, was the captain-general. The title was used loosely in the fourteenth century to designate either the lieutenant himself, or his own lieutenants and subordinates, or an officer charged specifically with the active prosecution of the war, whether in all Languedoc, the frontier or a single sénéchaussée. Two of

1 Bouquatte, Le Rouergue sous les Anglais, p.453.
2 AC Narbonne, EE.69.
the most important captains-general of the fourteenth century, Arnoul d'Audrehem and Louis de Sancerre, were marshals of France, an indication of the essentially military nature of the office. Since the chief business of the captains was offensive war, they did not generally immerse themselves in the details of local defence, although in 1358 Aymeri IX, viscount of Narbonne, describing himself as captain-general and governor in Languedoc, took an active personal part in co-ordinating the defence of Nîmes and the surrounding region. Arnoul d'Audrehem ordered the fortification of towns and castles, authorised local subsidies to be raised for these works, dealt with individual cases of complaint, dispensed pardons, in short performed all those functions associated with the lieutenan;; which he was, even though he was appointed and consistently styled himself captain-general. His is an exceptional case which illustrates the fluidity of the royal administration in the fourteenth century.

The rule of the lieutenants of Languedoc, like that of the king himself, was personal in that they could act at first hand, as John I of Armagnac toured the towns and fortresses of the south after the debacle of 1355. But personal intervention of this kind was rare. Languedoc was too vast, and anyway the lieutenants had interests at the centre of the kingdom which kept them absent for long periods. Therefore in defence, as in other areas of government,

the general lines of policy and strategy, whether determined by the
king himself or his lieutenant, were implemented by a hierarchy of
subordinate officers who made the decisions which most affected the
lives of ordinary folk. Whether a particular town or village was
fortified or razed, whether the inhabitants mounted watch night
after night or were allowed to stand down, whether they were
permitted to make truces with the enemy to save their fields and
flocks, were questions decided not by the king or the lieutenant,
but by the sénéchal, viguier, and other officers on the spot.

The lieutenanty of Languedoc was an extraordinary appointment,
superimposed on the existing structure of government which had
proved inadequate to meet the strains of war. The ordinary royal
administration of Languedoc, created in the thirteenth century, was
based on the sénéchausées. The heartland of Languedoc comprised
the three sénéchausées of Beaucaire (and Mimes), Carcassonne (and
Béziers) and Toulouse (and Albigois), flanked by those of Agmais,
Quercy, Périgord and Rouergue and, in the Pyrenees, the tiny royal
sénéchausée of Rigorre. Géwondan, Velay and Vivarais were
administered, subject to pariage agreements with their ecclesiastical
seigneurs, by baillis over whom the sénéchal of Beaucaire held a
watching brief.¹

Whatever other administrative, legal and financial duties were
incumbent upon them, and they were considerable, the sénéchaux were

¹ Dognon, Institutions politiques, p.32ff.
first and foremost military officers. They were responsible for mobilising and leading the feudal armies of their sénéchaussées, although the recruitment and financing of mercenary armies lay outside their control. Chosen exclusively from men of a knightly caste, principally among the lesser noble houses of the south, they were active soldiers who saw constant service. Agout des Beaux sénéchal of Toulouse was among the leaders of the French resistance to Henry of Lancaster's invasion in 1345 and was captured at the battle of Auberoche. Jean Louvain of Beaumaire suffered a like fate at the hands of the companies in 1361 and his successor, the unfortunate Jean Sylvain, was killed defending Font-Saint-Ésprit. In wartime the most immediate concern of the sénéchal was the organisation of defence in his sénéchaussée. Directives from the king or the lieutenant ordering the fortification of towns and castles were addressed to him in the first instance.

Where practical, the sénéchal would supervise the organisation of defence personally, visiting the more important fortresses and prescribing the measures to be taken for their protection. The sénéchal of Toulouse inspected the walls of Albi in 1360.


2 Dupont-Ferrier, Gallia Regia, III, p.470, no.13667.

3 AD Hérault, A.5, fo.114.

4 Histoire de Languedoc, IX, p.719.

5 Comptes consulaires d'Albi, 1352-1360, ed. A. Vidal, Bibliothèque méridionale, 1re série, V, Toulouse, 1900, p.28.
sénéchal of Beaucaire, accompanied by Pierre Scatisse, the royal treasurer, carried out an inspection of the fortifications of Nîmes on 27 May 1363.¹ A long-serving sénéchal would acquire a detailed personal knowledge of the area he administered and would work closely with its inhabitants, particularly the consuls of the larger towns. The consuls of Nîmes, the seat of the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire during most of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, maintained an amicable relationship with the majority of their sénéchaux, and in 1361, on learning that the incumbent Pierre-Raymond de Rabastens was to be transferred, they wrote to the lieutenant to protest their confidence in him and their fear that his successor, Pierre, alias Le Bègue, de Villaines of Carcassonne, would be "minus rigorous."²

But there was a limit to the ability of a sénéchal to deal personally and directly with all the affairs of the region he administered. The chief constraints were the size and geography of the sénéchaussées. Rouergue was relatively small and thinly populated, but hilly and difficult of access.³ The sénéchaussée of Beaucaire, on the other hand, stretched from the Mediterranean to within eight leagues of Lyon and posed exceptional problems of administration and defence.⁴ The hinterland was rugged and remote, the lowlands densely settled; to the south was the coast, to the

¹ Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pr. p.254.
³ A. Molinier, 'La sénéchaussée de Rouergue en 1341', Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes, XVIV, 1883, p.452.
⁴ Dognon, Institutions politiques, p.10.
east the sensitive Rhône frontier. However often and extensively he travelled, a sénéchal could hardly hope for a first-hand acquaintance with every town, village and castle in his circonscription. Moreover sénéchaux, even during the exercise of their office, did not remain constantly resident within their sénéchaussées. As military captains of proven experience they were often called upon to campaign in other parts of France. Some were outsiders whose private interests kept them absent. In 1426, for example, the consuls of Nîmes were forced to make a seven-day journey into Dauphiné to the castle of their sénéchal, Guillaume de Neullon, to point out to him the parlous state of his sénéchaussée.¹

So while sénéchaux exercised overall responsibility for the administration of their sénéchaussées, subject to the possibility of direct intervention over their heads by the king or the lieutenant, the implementation of their decisions devolved upon their subordinate officers, juges-maîtres, viguiers, baillis, captains and castellans of towns and castles, and, in the specific area of defensive planning and organisation, to special commissioners, as often as not these same officers delegated for the purpose.

ii) Defence commissioners

Special commissioners of one kind and another, usually with judicial attributions, were an intermittent feature of royal government in Languedoc long before the war.² Defence commissioners

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¹ Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, III, pr. p.222.
charged with the inspection of the fortresses of a particular region first appeared in numbers during the emergencies of the 1350s, and from then on were an essential, if unpopular, feature of defensive organisation throughout the country, in Languedoc as in the north. A commission was an ad hoc affair, conferring upon its recipient powers to act in accordance with given instructions for a given assignment. Some defence commissioners were appointed direct by the lieutenant. Faced with the enormous task of placing the south on a war footing after the disasters of 1355 and 1356, Jean I d'Armagnac and the king's son, Jean de Poitiers, each made numbers of such appointments. In the spring of 1360 Gilles, bishop of Thérouanne, was acting as the latter's deputy 'sur tout qui toucherait la tuition et securité de la senechaussée de Beaucaire', a function he shared with the treasurer, Pierre Scatisse, the governor of Montpellier, Raymond de Ruppe, and Jacques de Beaudour, castellan of La Tour Carbonnière near Aigues-Mortes. A year later Poitiers charged his secretary, Cermin Bestor, with the inspection of fortresses in the two sénéchaussées of Toulouse and Carcassonne. The more usual practice, however, was for the lieutenant to instruct the sénéchaux to provide for the defence of their areas, upon which they would commission their subordinates or local knights to put the measures into effect.

The instructions given to defence commissioners, whatever their provenance, varied little. They rested on the principles of

1 AD Hérault, A.4, fos.406vo-407.
2 Ibid, fos.404vo-406vo; A.5, fos.49-49vo. AC Alès, 1315, no.XXXIII.
3 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.1259-1260.
rationalization and retrenchment applied throughout the kingdom from the 1350s onwards. Typical are the letters by which in July 1359 Jean Bernier, sénéchal of Beaucaire, appointed Raymond de Nogaret his lieutenant and captain with special responsibility for defence. The duty of resisting the king’s enemies, Bernier explained, must take him into Auvergne, and not wishing the sénéchaussée to be harmed during his absence, he enjoined Nogaret to inspect its towns and castles, accompanied if necessary by men-at-arms. He was to evaluate the defensive requirements of those places he judged to be capable of resistance, and to see that they were adequately armed and victualled. Settlements which could not be defended were to be destroyed, and their inhabitants forced to take refuge with whatever possessions they managed to rescue inside the fortified enclosures. Compliance with his ordinances was to be enforced by arrest, distraint and whatever other judicial processes he considered appropriate.  

The unusually detailed orders transmitted by the bishop of Thérouanne to Godefroi de Ageno his commissioner in the viguerie of Alès and Anduze and the ensuing procès-verbal of the inspection of Alès show more clearly how these general precepts were applied. First the commissioner was instructed to visit the fortresses of his area in person. This was a point of some significance, because the proliferation of commissioners and the abuse of the system were caused as often as not by the absence of the responsible officers.

1 AD Hérault, A.4, fos.374-375.

2 AC Alès, 1315, no.XXXIII. Ageno’s commission is dated 14 March 1360, the procès-verbal of inspection 26 March 1360.
The measures recommended by the commissioner were to be recorded in writing. Although there is no mention in this instance, and the proceedings were recorded by a notary from Alès, commissioners were frequently accompanied by their own notarial staff, and the transcripts of inspections used for future reference. The fortresses which Agreno considered capable of defence were to be repaired sufficiently to resist any attack, and the rest placed in such a state that they would be unusable by the enemy. The criteria by which a place's defensive capacity was assessed are not precisely spelt out here, although other documents mention the availability of water, the age and condition of the fortifications and their size and complexity relative to the number of defenders. This last was crucial. Agreno had to satisfy himself that there were sufficient able-bodied persons inside every fort, and, if necessary, make up the numbers from outside. He was to muster the inhabitants, record their number and quality, and ensure that each was armed according to his estate. Every inhabitant found deficient would be compelled to equip himself properly and at his own expense. Every fortified place was to be victualled sufficient for a year, or more if he

1 In 1403, Jean Champion, maître des eaux et forêts, in the sénéchaussée of Carcassonne was instructed by the seneschal to inspect the fortresses of the viguerie of Albi, taking with him Amelin de Puymiroi, notary, who was reputed to have had considerable experience of this type of work and to have in his possession numerous relevant acts and processes. AC Albi, EE.15. Cf. AC Agde (EE.77); AC Albi, EE.7.

2 The commissions inspecting the viguerie of Albi in 1355 asked about the size of each fortress, whether there was a spring or well within, how many men there were and whether they were willing to defend it. AC Albi, EE.7.
judged necessary. Supplies from abandoned castles and villages were to be transferred inside the fortresses within twelve days. Those who refused to comply with instructions would see their property confiscated or burnt. From the stocks of food amassed in fortified places a weekly distribution was to be made to the refugees from outside. Finally, the commissioner was to consult with the inhabitants of each town and castle and select a competent person to take command.

Armed with this commission, Agreno arrived in Alès on 26 March 1360. He assembled the consuls and the representatives of the co-seigneurs, his letters were read out, translated 'in lingua materna' and then the party adjourned for lunch. In the afternoon the commissioner inspected the fortifications and then reassembled the notables of the town in the chapter house of the Franciscan convent. Having first received from them an affirmative reply to the question whether Alès was capable of resisting the king's enemies, he deliberated with them on the best way of achieving this end and then made known his recommendations. The town ditch, he ordered, should be deepened and extended and the work performed by the inhabitants themselves, 'pro solido et libra', under the direction of prud'hommes appointed by the consuls. The wall was to be completed as it had been begun, and strengthened by forty houards (cadafalo). The Portes de Boca, du Pont-Vieux and Saint-Vincent were to remain open under the guard of armed men, the gates near the Franciscan and Dominican convents each restricted to a postern wide enough to admit a single person at a time, and the other gates and openings walled up. Every night fifty armed men were to be assigned to the watch.
in the streets and on the walls. Twelve cannons, 'aive garots' and twelve dozen quarrels were to be purchased and no strangers admitted into the town for more than a day.

A number of similar procès-verbaux, some more, some less detailed than the one at Alès, have survived in the town archives of the Midi and they provide valuable information on the organisation of defence generally and the topography of particular towns and castles. Unfortunately there does not exist a full record of a tour of inspection by defence commissioners to compare with those for the northern bailliages of Melun in 1367 and Caen in 1371. These two documents follow the progress of the commissioners day by day and fortress by fortress and, while the account of each place inspected is summary, being merely a note of the nature of the fortification and whether the place was to be repaired or abandoned, they provide a complete picture of the defensive resources of two important areas.


There could be no doubt of the need in times of emergency and imminent invasion, in the recurrent crises of the 1350s and -60s especially, to impose a coherent defensive strategy on a sluggish and often complacent civilian population. Given the nature of the royal administration in the provinces, special commissioners were probably the most efficient means of doing it. At least the system was flexible for it allowed the lieutenant and sénéchaux to co-opt both officers with a detailed local knowledge, and technical experts such as the masters of royal works. 1 But as is inevitable when any arm of government reaches more deeply and effectively into the lives of the governed, complaints of interference, exploitation and abuse became increasingly vociferous. Of course, there were disagreements about individual decisions: the inhabitants of the undefended plateaux were reluctant to abandon their homes if there was a chance of saving them, while townspeople contested the recommendations of unsympathetic commissioners, like the syndics of Le Vigan (Hérault) who protested to Audrehem in 1363 that the viguier, who was responsible for their fortifications, had worked to a ludicrous plan which provided for the suburbs to be enclosed while leaving the centre of the town completely unprotected. 2

More serious, however, were the allegations touching on the operation of the system itself. Invariably they pointed to venality

1 In December 1369 Pierre Brunel, "l'Intre des œuvres royales de la senechaussée de Beaucaire et de Nîmes", was commissioned by the duke of Anjou's council to inspect the fortifications of Villeneuve-lès-Avignon. *Histoire de Languedoc*, X, pr. cols. 1418-1420.

and extortion as the chief abuses. Defence commissioners were a
development of the public works commissioners responsible for roads
and bridges, who were already causing annoyance in the 1330s and
-40s before the war had spread to the heartland of Languedoc. In
1346 the representatives of the sénéchaussée of Beauce complained
that even though the repair of works was properly the concern of the
permanent royal officers, commissioners were appointed who could get
round ten or twenty places a day and demand as much as they could
from the inhabitants.1 Exactly the same accusations were levelled
at the defence commissioners. In May 1358 the Estates-general of
Languedoc insisted that in future fortresses were not to be
inspected by visatores but by two knights or other experts in each
sénéchaussée.2 In July they modified this to a demand that only the
permanent officers should carry out inspections, and that excessive
sportule collected by extraordinary commissioners should be returned
to the towns and castles from which they had been extorted.3 But
any improvement was temporary and the familiar grievances were still
being aired into the fifteenth century and until the end of the war in
the south. Indeed, it seemed that as the threat from the enemy
receded, attention to the defences was redoubled. In 1401 the
consuls of Nîmes testified before an enquiry established by the duke
of Berry that every year for the last twelve at least defence
commissioners had toured the countryside accompanied by large numbers

1 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. col.990.
2 Ibid, col.1148, art.8.
3 Ordonnances, IV, pp.189-194.
of retainers in great pomp and arrogance. Their inspection of towns and castles had been summary in the extreme; they noted the absence of a stone here, a window there, condemned the inhabitants to enormous expense, and then rode off. For their services they demanded food and wine for themselves and cats for their horses, none of which they deducted from their official salaries, and they had been able to visit six or eight places in a day, from each of which they had taken their full daily expense allowance. As the cabochienne ordinance of 1413 put it, 'ils s'en retournent sans aucune chose faire bien joyeux afin d'y retourner une autre fois pour ladite cause'. In November 1428 the Estates-general of Languedoc took up the same cry in their cahier de doléances, declaring that sénéchaux and viguiers made incessant tours of inspection, the chief purpose of which was 'pour enlever et exiger grans sommes de deniers et non pas pour le proufit du roi ne de la chose publique'. The king accepted their petition and ordered that no more inspections were to be carried out until new commissions had been issued, which would be valid for one tour only, and that commissioners would claim only reasonable expenses. But like others before and after it, the reform was short-lived, if it was ever applied at all. Two years later the Estates of Valençinois, Viennois and Vivarais were again complaining about the exactions of commissioners, while in 1439 the

3 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. col.2087.
4 AD Narault, A.10, fo.163.
representatives of Languedoc declared that sénéchaux, baillis, viguiers and other officers, supported by a train of notaries and sergeants, appeared in force 'tantost que audit pays se fait bruit d'aucunes gens d'armes et autrement par petit occasion'. This time they could only obtain from the king the non-committal assurance that the inspections would cease for the remainder of the year only.¹

While there is no reason to question the basis of persistent and widespread allegations of abuse, little other information survives against which to check them. In particular evidence is scanty about payments to commissioners and whether they really were made legitimately or exacted from the civilian population under duress. In October 1355 the sénéchal of Carcassonne fixed the wages of Bernard-Raymond de Durfort, Guillaume de Villepassant and Bernard Bone, juge-criminal of Carcassonne, his commissioners in the pays Albigeois and Castraïs, at four florins a day between them, out of which they had also to meet the expenses of their notary. The money was to be raised from the towns and castles visited, each paying an equal proportion of the daily total.² Of the commission appointed to inspect the bailliage of Melun in 1367, the bailli himself was to receive 30s. parisis daily in addition to his ordinary salary, while the two knights accompanying him got 40s.³ The same sums were allowed the bailli of Caen and his commissioners in

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¹ Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.2151, 2161-2162.
² AC Albi, EE.7.
³ 'Procès-verbal de visite du bailliage de Melun', p.307.
1371. In the first case, the commissioner, Taupin du Flessis, claimed a total of 74 livres for a tour of 38 days, in the second, Jean Dubois and Roger Lemansnier between them 140 francs for 35 days. These are, of course, only the official expenses submitted to the Chambre des Comptes. The local records tell a rather different story. In 1360 one Jean de Sidirac, commissioned by the sénéchal of Carcassonne, quit the consuls of Agde of eleven florins for his trouble in attending to the fortifications of the town.

While the details of his visit are not recorded, it is unlikely that he spent nearly six days in the town, if he was being paid at the standard rate, and if he did then it lends substance to accusations of over-zealous and unnecessary inspections. At Risole in 1442 the consuls incurred expenses of 17 sous 14s, as a result of a visit by commissioners of the count of Armagnac. If commissioners could get round six or eight fortresses a day – and the Melun and Caen accounts show that this was perfectly possible – and raise from each a tenth of what Sidirac was paid at Agde, they would be doing well for themselves. It was precisely because officers stood to gain from it that the system of inspection by special commissioners endured, notwithstanding the complaints of the civilian population, until the end

1 'Relation de la visite du bailliage de Cuen', p.190.
2 'Procès-verbal de visite du bailliage de Melun', p.319.
4 AG Agde, CC.1, fo.33.
of the war, and indeed at least until the end of the fifteenth century.

1 See, for example, the commissions issued for the inspection of Cordes in 1459 and 1465, AC Cordes, EE.5, 39; and Narbonne in 1477, AC Narbonne, EE.1907.
CHAPTER 2
DEFENCE AND TOWN GOVERNMENT

Beyond seeing that towns were properly fortified and guarded, the crown interfered very little in internal municipal affairs. In wartime, towns were administered in much the same way as in peacetime. New institutions and practices developed, some to meet unfamiliar wartime problems, but many from a natural process of evolution quite unconnected with the war. Radical innovation was rare; indeed, it may be argued that the war actually fostered administrative conservatism, since it forced reliance on proven structures and strengthened the hand of ruling classes with a personal interest in their preservation. The captaincies, special committees and other bodies created in some towns supplemented but did not replace existing urban institutions which, though strained, continued to function as effectively as the system and the men who sustained it would allow. There is no evidence of the evolution in any town of a distinct war administration.

1) **Municipal rights**

The executive responsibility for town fortifications and the organisation of defence was generally delegated to the municipality. The degree of authority which the consuls or syndics enjoyed varied from town to town. Their rights were usually enshrined in the customs or franchises of the town. Town charters vary widely in the amount of information they provide; some specify only a right to the fortifications, others a right to the watch without mention
of the fortifications, while the majority are completely silent on the question of military rights and duties. Even within a small area there could be enormous local variations. Of the charters of some thirty towns and villages in the Lauragais region, only those from Avignonet (1463), Castelnau-d'Aray (1356 and 1366), Revel (1342), Saint-Félix-Lauragais (1463) and Villefranche-de-Lauragais (1280) mention the municipal responsibility for the fortifications, and only those from Avignonet (1463), Castelnaudary (1333) and Revel (1342) a right to the watch.¹ This is not to say that the other places had no such rights, for charters like these often dealt only with issues which had been in dispute. The privileges granted to Pigeac by Philip V in 1318 probably summarise the powers exercised by most consular administrations in respect of town defence. The consuls were charged with the upkeep of the town walls, gates, towers, turrets, ditches and other fortifications which they held of the crown. They were to maintain them in a proper state of repair, protecting them from damage and encroachment. To meet the cost of these and other public works, the consuls were allowed to raise taxes from the inhabitants. To police the town they could appoint up to ten guards, armed or not as they should see fit. The keys of the town would be held by the consuls.²

Keys, being a sign of lordship and authority, had an importance which was both symbolic and real, and the custom and ceremonial with which they were sometimes surrounded expressed the relationship of

² Ordonnances, VII, p. 655ff.
the town to its seigneur. The consuls might be invested with the town keys on taking office and surrender them to their lord when their term of office expired. It was usually the practice for the keys to be offered to the king or to the seigneur on their first entry into a town. Some lords took more practical steps to protect their interests against the possibility of insurrection. At Alsonne (Aude) each gate had two keys, one held by the lord and the other by the consuls.

The crown was readier on the whole than either lay or ecclesiastical lords to entrust to its towns complete responsibility for the organisation of defence. Here, as elsewhere, the interests of

1 At Albi an agreement concluded in 1269 between the bishop and the consuls provided for the keys to be entrusted to six prud'hommes chosen annually by the bishop. They were to open the town gates whenever they were so requested by the bishop or the consuls. C. Compary, Études historiques et documents inédits sur l'Albigois et l'ancien diocèse de Castres, Albi, 1841, pp.162-163.

2 At Aurillac the keys of the town were surrendered by the consuls to each new abbot. R. Grand, Les 'Paix' d'Aurillac. Études et documents sur l'histoire des institutions d'une ville à consulat XIIe-XVe siécle), Paris, 1945, p.43. In royal towns the presentation of keys to the king became surrounded by elaborate ritual. For example, the entry of Charles VII into Le Puy in 1424: 'Le roy Charles et sa femme étant venus au Puy, François de Bournas et autres consuls vinrent au devant de lui et après lui avoir fait convenablement la reverence ils lui offrirent les clefs de la ville. Le roy voyant leur bonne volonte les leur rendit en disant "Gardes-les vous"'. 'Documents de l'histoire du Valay: inventaire qui contient les titres et privileges de la maison consulare de la ville du Puy', ed. A. Aymard, Annales de la Société d'Agriculture, Sciences, Arts et Commerce du Puy, XV, 1850, p.752. Cf. the entry of Louis XI into Toulouse in 1463: Les entrées royales françaises de 1328 à 1515, ed. E. Queneé et F. Leboux, Paris, 1962, pp.171-184, passim.

the towns and those of the king coincided. Townspeople had an immediate concern for their own protection while the defence of the kingdom depended upon the existence of a large number of fortified towns whose maintenance was far beyond the resources of the crown. If town defence was locally administered, then it was also locally financed. On the other hand, many seigneurs were reluctant to abandon the responsibility for town defence. This was particularly true of the ecclesiastics, and just as the prelates of the Midi were hostile to the spread of municipal liberties generally, so they struggled to retain military control of their towns against the increasingly vociferous demands of their temporal subjects. At Mende an attempt to form a syndicate was scotched by the bishop in 1262 and the inhabitants forced to give up the keys and chains of the town and abandon all claims to the watch. Likewise at Le Puy, after the collapse of the rebellion in 1276, the bishop deprived the town of the keys and chains, of responsibility for the fortifications and the right of the citizens to bear arms. In the episcopal towns of Lodève and Viviers the military attributes of the syndics were very restricted.

As the war spread through Languedoc from the mid-fourteenth century, towns insisted upon clarification of their military rights.

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1 Le consulat et l'administration municipale de Mende des origines à la Révolution, ed. C. Forès, Paris, 1901, p.viii ff.


and privileges, and struggled to organise their defence free of
seigneurial control. In general, charters of privilege dating from
the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries define the responsi-
bilities of the municipality much more precisely. Of the Lauragais
charters by far the most detailed in this respect is the one granted
to Avignon by Louis XI in 1463, which specifies the right of the
consuls to organise the watch, to prohibit building near the town
walls, to compel the inhabitants to contribute according to their
means to taxes imposed for defensive purposes and to force masons,
bricklayers and carpenters to work on the fortifications. 1 In
confirming and extending the privileges of Cahors in 1344 the duke
of Normandy recognised the rights of the consuls over the town walls
and ditches, their right to the watch and their right to raise taxes
for the repair of the fortifications. 2 Among the new privileges
granted to Saint-Antonin in 1369, was the recognition of the consuls' 
rights to the watch. 3 In 1415 the consuls of Le Puy obtained
letters from Charles VI confirming them in their right in peace and
war to hold the keys of the town, to organise the watch and to
appoint a captain. 4 Their exclusive responsibility for the fortifi-
cations was recognised in 1436. 5 The widespread concern felt by
the towns on this score is indicated by the appeal made to the duke

2 B.N. Dast, 119, fos.148vo-149vo.
4 Un inventaire inédit des archives du consulat du Puy,
5 'Inventaire de la maison consulaire du Puy', p.703.
of Anjou by the Estates of Languedoc in January 1373 that all privileges hitherto granted for fortification and defence should be maintained and respected.¹

11) Consuls, syndics, councils

The characteristic model of town government in Languedoc was the consulate.² The earliest consulates appeared in the first half of the twelfth century; by the mid-fourteenth almost all the largest towns, and many communities of village and castle size too, had consuls. In English Guyenne Bordeaux, Bayonne and the other more important towns were governed by a mayor and échevins or jurats on a northern pattern.³ Périgueux was unusual in having both mayor and consul.⁴ Not all towns enjoyed a full measure of self-government. In the east, along the Rhône and in mountainous Velay and Gévaudan, consulates were fewer. For most of the period under consideration even such notable places as Beaucaire, Lunel and

1 AC Albi, CC.77.


4 R. Villepolet, Histoire de la ville de Périgueux et de ses institutions municipales jusqu'au traité de Bretigny (1360), Périgueux, 1903.
Tournon were denied the privilege of electing consuls, and their business was conducted by syndics exercising more restricted powers.\(^1\) Ecclesiastical seigneurs were hostile to the extension of municipal liberties, and episcopal towns like Mende, Lodève and Le Puy were long kept at a primitive level of political development.\(^2\) There were infinite local variations. The number and title of the town officers, their attributions, the way in which they were selected, their social standing, their relationship to the seigneur and the other inhabitants, in fine the whole political and administrative structure, were determined by the constitution or custom of each town; 'autant de villes, autant d'exemples'.

And yet, in the present context, it would be misleading to emphasize the particularities, fascinating as they have proved to generations of local and administrative historians, for they are far outweighed by the points of resemblance. In wartime towns, whether they styled themselves consulates or syndicates, were linked in a common purpose of self-preservation, and their activity reduced to a few stark essentials: the construction of fortifications, the mobilisation of defenders, the raising of taxes. The average southern town was a relatively uncomplex political unit, and within the constraints imposed by custom and practicality there were not

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\(^2\) Le consulat et l'administration municipale de Mende, p. v ff; Martin, Histoire de Lodève, pp.59-75, 158ff; Delombre, Le consulat du Puy, pp.1-47.
many ways in which its government could be organised. So not surprisingly there was a marked similarity of approach between towns of comparable size and status in the conduct of their affairs and in their response to the special situations and difficulties created by the war.

In consular towns the consuls acted as a board of management exercising legislative and executive powers. Consul originally designated one who gave advice, and the first consuls were counselors of their lord. As towns moved out of the seigneurial orbit, the chief business of consuls became the making and implementation of statutes for the community of inhabitants. Their judicial powers were limited to the areas and activities covered by the statutes: supervision of trades, weights and measures, public works and the like; and it was rare for a consulate to enjoy full criminal and civil jurisdiction. Syndics did not generally have more than an executive function. In its original sense syndic meant one chosen to represent the community in a specific affair, as often as not a lawsuit. Syndical powers were usually synchronous with the task in hand, although by the mid-fourteenth century in many towns syndics were annually elected, like consuls.

A consulate consisted of between two and twelve consuls. Larger towns could seldom manage with fewer than six; in small

1 Dognon, Institutions politiques, p.92ff.
2 Ibid, p.96.
3 Eyssette, Histoire administrative de Beaucaire, I, p.98; Le consulat et l'administration municipale de Mende, p.xxii.
In the latter half of the fourteenth century depopulation, the fiscal and moral bankruptcy of municipal governments and popular clamour for reform forced a reduction in numbers. In June 1378 the consuls of Narbonne petitioned the duke of Anjou to cut their number from twelve to five with a comparable pruning of their councillors. Not all the inhabitants could agree on the new constitution and after further deliberation it was decided that there should be seven consuls and eighty councillors. Change of this kind was not always voluntary.

Charles VI's ordinances of the winter and spring of 1389-90 uniformly decreed that no town should be governed by more than four consuls. However, the measure had only a marginal impact. The crown was in no position or mood to enforce administrative reform in the towns, and while there was not a complete return to the old situation, many towns successfully prevailed upon the king to allow them more than the statutory four consuls.

It is debatable whether the war hastened the creation of consulates and syndicates in towns where previously there had been no municipal organisation. The emergence of a syndicate at Mende

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4 In March 1392 Toulouse was granted the right to elect eight capitouls and Montpellier six consuls. Ordonnances, VII, p.460; AC Montpellier, Louvet no.3061. Narbonne likewise had six consuls from August 1393. Inventaire sommaire AC Narbonne. Série BB, BB.105.
in the mid-fourteenth century was a direct result of the need to raise regular taxes for the war and to maintain the town in a state of constant defensive readiness, tasks which were beyond the competence and inclination of the episcopal officers.¹ Doubtless influenced by the developments at Mende, the inhabitants of Marvejols, the only other important town in Gévaudan, successfully petitioned Charles V for the creation of a consulate, on the grounds that the town's affairs would be more efficiently managed than by the existing syndicate.² Generally, however, the great movement towards municipal enfranchisement which had characterised the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had lost most of its momentum by the later fourteenth century, and now creations of this kind were confined to the less developed upland areas, and to villages and small communities which saw advantage in emulating the political organisation of the larger towns. In fact, the pendulum had by then begun to swing in the opposite direction, and Charles VI's ordinances of the 1390s marked the start of a new policy of bringing the towns under tighter royal control, and of eradicating at least the more flagrant abuses of the very extensive powers which the war had conferred on some municipal governments.³

The constitutional history of most towns of the Midi was of continuous conflict between different groups: knights of Les Arènes

¹ Le consulat et l'administration municipale de Mende, p.xxii. A full consulate was not established at Mende until 1469. It lasted only until 1493, when opposition from the bishop forced the crown to revoke the privilege. Ibid, p.xxv.

² Ordonnances, IV, pp.674-679. The consulate was created in July 1366.

³ Dognon, Institutions politiques, p.178ff.
and merchants of La Place at Mines,\(^1\) rich and poor at Castres,\(^2\) a wealthy oligarchy and the popular métiers at Le Puy.\(^3\) Where the consuls and their councillors predominantly represented a single class or group, their motives must be suspect, especially in the delicate area of taxation. Accusations like those brought against the consuls of the Bourg of Carcassonne that they had used the town revenues to the advantage of themselves and of their wealthy friends have far too authoritative a ring to be dismissed, as the consuls tried to dismiss them, as the fabrication of their political enemies.\(^4\) Nevertheless, the bulk of the evidence is that when it came to defence, town administrations generally acted in good faith, to the benefit of the community at large, if only because sectional and majority interests were dissolved in a common instinct of self-preservation.

While executive responsibility was concentrated in the hands of the consuls, decision-making was more broadly based. Matters of exceptional public interest were submitted to assemblies of house-holders or heads of families. On 11 November 1369 a meeting of 215 capes d'ostal of Millau was called to ratify the decision of the consuls and general council to recognise the overlordship of the

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4 *Histoire de languedoc*, X, pr. cols.1799-1808.
king of France. At Périgueux on 8 September 1390 the inhabitants were summoned 'ad scum cymbali, ut moris est' to hear the consuls explain the situation of the town. The English, they said, were advancing from Auvergne, and yet the defences were in a poor state of repair. They proposed that to make good the defects the emoluments of certain taxes currently being raised should be reallocated to the fortifications. The people consented. The consuls of Montréal-du-Gers assembled their jurats and the other inhabitants ('tot l'autre poble') to deliberate upon the refusal of the nearby village of Juliac to pay its share of the cost of garrisoning a lance of troops in the town. But large assemblies of this sort were exceptional. They were too unwieldy, and perhaps too unpredictable, to play a continuously useful part in town government. In most instances they were used not to make policy but to make known to the other inhabitants decisions already taken by the consuls and their counsellors.

In consular towns the consuls were surrounded by at least one formal council. There were generally two elements: an inner core, the conseil sécret and the full conseil général. At Millau, for example, the conseil général consisted of a restricted inner council


augmented by the coassalh de l'esquilla (literally the 'council of the bell').

1 Agen, Bergerac and most of the towns of English Guyenne had a fixed number of jurats rather than secret councillors, although their function was essentially the same, to assist and advise the consuls in the administration of community affairs.

The size and composition of councils varied from place to place.

At Agen there were twenty-four jurats, chosen by the consuls in office, and consisting for the most part of ex-consuls. At Albi there were twelve councillors, two from each ward (gachet), elected, like the consuls, until 1400 by all the citizens over fourteen years of age.

The coassalh streoch or concilium per scalas of Béziers consisted of the seven consuls and two councillors from each of the seven échelles; for the general council the number rose to ten per échelle.

To these statutory councillors could be added ad hoc advisers and specialists. Town captains were called in to discuss defensive arrangements. W. Vassal, royal captain of Martel, was present at many of the council sessions in 1352-53. At a meeting


2 Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.vii; Les jurades de la ville de Bergerac, ed. G. Charrier, Bergerac, 1892-1904, 1, p.vii.

3 Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.vii.


5 'Quatre délibérations municipales de Béziers en 1366', ed. E. Martel, Bulletin de la Société archéologique scientifique et littéraire de Béziers, IVe série, 1, 1933, pp.35-36.

6 AC Martel, BD.5, fo.71ff.
held at Agen on 6 October 1352 to consider the town's defence, there were present, in addition to the consuls and jurats, forty-three notables and the royal proctor and juge-mage.¹ As part of the reform measures imposed on the southern towns in 1389-90 Charles VI ordered that no town council meeting should be held in the absence of a royal officer.² The fifteenth-century deliberations of the council at Albi show that the meetings were consistently attended by the royal judge or his lieutenant.³ However, there were the inevitable exemptions; the syndics of Beaucaire, for instance, were authorised as early as April 1390 to assemble freely as in the past without a royal officer being present.⁴

The minutes of council meetings, where they have survived, offer a valuable insight into wartime town administrations. As evidence, even the most prolix, those from Albi, Béziers or Toulouse,⁵ which record the opinions of individual councillors as well as the final decision of the whole council, have the serious limitation that without additional supporting material, such as the consular accounts, there is no means of knowing whether the decisions were implemented or not. Nonetheless, they lucidly illustrate the interests and preoccupations of town governments and,

¹ Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.296.
² Dognon, Institutions politiques, p.473.
³ AC Albi, ES.18, 19, passim.
⁵ 'Délibérations du conseil communal d'Albi', passim; 'Quatre délibérations municipales de Béziers', passim; AC Toulouse, ES.1-8, passim.
incidentally, the mentality of the population.

At Martel in the four months from the beginning of September to the end of December 1346 there were 29 recorded council meetings.\(^1\) It was a time of emergency; the duke of Normandy had raised the siege of Aiguillon in August and the English and their allies were raiding into Poitou, Saintonge and Quercy.\(^2\) Martel was certainly threatened directly during these months, for on 28 November the council resolved to send to the royal lieutenant, Armagnac, for permission to make a truce (pati) with the enemy.\(^3\) A consular ordinance of 1352 compelled all consuls and councillors to attend a regular Friday meeting,\(^4\) but in 1346 the council seems to have met as the occasion demanded. In the last ten days of October there were six meetings, but only three in the last fortnight of December. The meetings were attended by the four consuls, as many of the 21 formal councillors as could be present and a variable number of other notables.

Defence was the constant theme of the Martel deliberations during this period. On 2 September it was decided to appoint two captains in each town ward, to organise the inhabitants into companies and

\(^1\) AC Martel, BB.5, fos.24vo-27vo.

\(^2\) Fowler, The King's Lieutenant, pp.66-70.

\(^3\) AC Martel, BB.5, fo.27.

\(^4\) 'Ordenat fo que cascus del cosselh deca venir al divenres ses negu mandamen dins lo tertz duna candela arden en pena pol sagramen e de v s. t. los quals se pagaran ses tota merce e que se dota als muro bastir. E als otros jorns que venho dins la candela arden quan sera mandats en las penas dessus'. Ibid, fo.67, deliberation of 4 May 1352.
to hide the town privileges and relics. On the 12th Arnaut Debessa was chosen as 'captain' to supervise work on the ditches; on the 17th a distribution of quarrels was made to the inhabitants; on the 22nd the council agreed that all contractors who had successfully tendered for work on the walls and ditches should complete the work without delay or forfeit payment, and that the people who had contributed their labour should have their taille reduced. The fortifications were the topic of discussion again on the 25th and 26th. Thereafter there were only two meetings in almost a month, but towards the end of October the situation appears to have taken a turn for the worse. On Saturday 21 October the council met and decided to destroy all the houses obstructing the palisade and to see that work on the defences continued unremittingly, on holidays.

1 'Ordenat fo que hom fassa capitanis, ii en cada barri, lhiual venho als mandamens dels cossols per far gach de muschs e que aquelh establises dezinies o xii o vinthenies que sio obedients als capitanis e aquelh mando aquels que deuran velhar la nooch. Ordenat fo que ii cossols am ii dels cosselhs causissa loc a metre secretamen las reliquas els privilegis per la temps quar es tan perilhas e que juro a tener secret ii prohomes en loc del cossell'. Ibid, fo.24vo.

2 'Ordenat fo que Ar Debessa sia capitanis de la vela a repara las murs elas autras besonhas dels valat que tuch aquels habitans de la vela lhi presto obedienza elh fasso sagramen quan per lhi o per los cossols seriau requirit'. Ibid, fo.24vo.

3 Ibid, fo.25.

4 'Ordenat fo que dimerque hom fassa oridar publicamen que tots aquels acui hom a endich a curar los valats e bastir los murs velhs e nools per brassas da des en ades comenso e el cas cuaquels que no serau obedients no paguru so que lor sera endich; que aquelh que aurau bastit o curat sia rebatuts delor talba e so que aurau despendut lor tenha loc'. Ibid, fo.25.

5 Ibid, fos.25-25vo.
as well as working days. A strict watch was to be kept at night, and chains placed across the streets. On the following Monday, the 23rd, families living outside the new walls were ordered to evacuate their homes and take refuge inside the town and R. Marti was appointed chief captain of the watch. On the 24th the council recommended that the old walls should be strengthened with machicolations and watch-towers and the old ditches deepened.

The building programme placed a severe strain on the town's resources, and the council was at pains to find the means of raising the necessary monies. On 26 September it was suggested that a large forced loan (gros prest) of seven or eight livres should be imposed on the inhabitants. Probably this loan was not raised, at least not at this heavy rate, but the question came up again on 13 November, when it was decided to raise a loan of 2¾d per denier of taille assessment from each inhabitant. Two days later the council decided to impose a fouage (sic) of 4d in the livre, presumably in addition to the loan, in accordance with the letters obtained from the count of Armagnac. The ordinary revenues of

1 'Ordenat fo que hom fassa bel gach a noch que totas manieras de gens velho la una partida dala noch el autra partida la autra per la paort que lo jom presen aven agut dels enamix edels Angles que dizia hom que so pres dinas per donor dampatge e que elh noch hom tenda las cadenas e que hom no cesse de jorn ni de noch, sia festa or jorn obrau, de reperar los murs'. AC Martel, BB.5, fo.25vo.

2 Ibid, fo.25vo.

3 Ibid, fo.25vo.


5 Ibid, fo.26vo.
the town had already been pressed into service; on 31 October the emoluments of the barrage and public weights were diverted to the fortifications.¹

The Martel council minutes, like those of the majority of town councils, only report council decisions; they give no clue as to how those decisions were reached or whether there was any serious conflict of opinion. The Albi deliberations are rather more informative in this respect. The divergent views are summarised; unanimous decisions are prefaced by the formula 'tots tengro que ...' and majority decisions by 'volgro la major partida ...',² although the 'greater part' is not necessarily the numerical majority but the 'senior pars', those whose judgement was most respected. The fragmentary Béziers deliberations from 1366 and 1435-36 illustrate more clearly than most the process by which decisions were reached. In each case the notary of the consulate has presented the debate in the same way: the issues are enumerated by the consuls, the most influential councillors beginning with the chief members of the first échelle give their opinion, followed by the other councillors whose views are expressed either as a simple 'id' of agreement with one or other of the principal speakers, or as a separate point.³ In the councils of 1435-36 the leading voice

¹ AC Martel, BB.5, fo.26.
² 'Délégations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit., XLVI, introduction, p.48 & passim.
was that of Raymond Rubey, doctor of laws, deferentially addressed by his colleagues and the notary as 'honorable et magne circumcisionis vir'. On 17 December 1436 the consuls called a general council to discuss the defence of the town against Rodrigue de Villandrando, who was reported to be leading a large army into the region. Present at the meeting were Bernard Agelli, lieutenant to the royal viguier, and Pierre Simon the bishop's vicar. Rubey, as always, spoke first and longest. Fifty or sixty good men, he urged, should be selected among the inhabitants to guard the town with a person who could command respect as their captain; he suggested Ayméric Barbat. A committee of two men from each schelle should be constituted to assist the consuls in organising defence, and they should get down to work that very afternoon. The defence of the cathedral should be discussed with the chapter. Great care must be exercised in opening and closing the gates, which should be adequately guarded at all times. The other councillors all agreed with Rubey's proposals. Those who spoke after either emphasised particular aspects of his speech or added details. Estève Vasserie approved Rubey's choice of captain and his suggestion of a defence committee. Pierre Delpuech called for a guard on the mills; Maître Pierre Pinet for the expulsion of vagabonds. Benoît de Vite thought the watch should be changed at midnight. Finally, after every councillor had expressed his opinion, Ayméric Barbat was sworn in as captain and Rubey closed the session by requesting him and the consuls to attend diligently to the defence of the town, and to show particular vigilance during the forthcoming
Christmas festivities.  

Rubey’s exhortation is a reminder that however closely councils were associated in the administration, their function was essentially consultative. Executive responsibility devolved upon the consuls or syndics, and it was they who in the end were answerable for the security and good government of the community. The competence of consuls varied from place to place. In the larger towns there were few areas of life, except criminal justice, which did not come within their ambit. Arguably their chief rôle in wartime was a financial one, for not only did they collect and administer the considerable sums required for the fortifications and other municipal necessities, but they were also responsible, in the fourteenth century at least, for raising royal aids voted by the Estates. Indeed, in one case, that of Le Puy, the very emergence of a consulate in the fourteenth century can be attributed to its usefulness to the crown as a fiscal agency.  

An examination of almost any of the many surviving consular accounts of the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries shows the range of duties incumbent on consuls in wartime. The published accounts for Rodez Cité for 1355-56 are typical. The predominant concern in those years was the fortifications, for at Rodez, as elsewhere, a panic construction programme had been

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1 'Registre de la maison consulaire de Béziers', pp.312-315.

2 Dalombre, Le consulat du Puy, p.28; Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.940-943.

3 Comptes consulaires de la Cité et du Bourg de Rodez, 1re partie, Cité, ed. H. Bousquet, Archives historiques du Rouergue, VI, XVII, Rodez, 1926-1943, I, pp.172-377.
initiated in the wake of the Black Prince's great raid. The function of the consuls as custodians of the defences is underlined by the insertion at the beginning of the accounts, as in other years, of a detailed inventory of the town walls, gates, towers and barbicans.\(^1\) The consuls contracted with masons and carpenters, engaged labourers, organised the inhabitants in corvées and arranged for the supply of building materials.\(^2\) To pay for these works they raised two gabelles, three tailles, a series of loans and a cash fine on those inhabitants who chose to commute their corvées, in addition to the ordinary town revenues.\(^3\) Quantities of arms were bought, some of these were distributed to the bowmen sent on the initiative of the consuls to help their colleagues the consuls of Villefranche.\(^4\) Under the heading despessa ... de tramettre los vaylets e las espías are listed the spies and messengers dispatched by the consuls throughout Rouergue and as far as Toulouse for news of enemy troop movements and political developments.\(^5\)

In Rodes, Cité and Bourg, the day by day organisation of the watch and other defensive services was delegated to salaried captains.\(^6\) Elsewhere this was considered an obligation falling on

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1 Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, I, pp.174-177.
3 Ibid, pp.184-203.
5 Ibid, pp.222-228.
6 Ibid, p.239, II, p.118; AC Rodes, Bourg, BB.2, fo.73, deliberation of 26 Oct. 1373.
the consuls themselves as a burden of office. At Agen in 1351 the jurats decided that the consuls should continue to patrol the streets and walls at night personally as in the past.\textsuperscript{1} At Saint-Antonin two consuls were on duty every night in 1363.\textsuperscript{2} Even where captains were appointed, the consuls would generally take personal command if the town was threatened directly. Captains were sometimes appointed at Millau, but when one night in October 1356 news reached the town of an impending English attack, it was the consuls themselves who mobilised the inhabitants and supervised the defensive organisation.\textsuperscript{3} Leadership of the town militia had in many towns once been a consular duty but by the later fourteenth century the job usually fell to a specially chosen captain, who might or might not be one of the consuls. The consuls retained responsibility for selecting and equipping the contingents.

Within the town, the basis of defensive organisation was the ward (gacha). Indeed the same word gacha is used in Occitan to denote both a ward and the watch (guet).\textsuperscript{4} It was often the practice, especially in the larger towns, for each consul or jurat to take charge of the arrangements in his own ward. At Toulouse a late-fourteenth century ordinance gave to each capitoul the responsibility of mustering the arrière-guet in his gacha, supervising the placing of chains across the streets at night, and

\textsuperscript{1} Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.267.
\textsuperscript{2} Comptes consulaires de Saint-Antonin du XIVe siècle (1325-1363), ed. R. Latouche, Nice, 1923, p.62.
\textsuperscript{3} Documents sur la ville de Millau, pp.102-103.
\textsuperscript{4} Dognon, Institutions politiques, p.103.
looking after the keys of the gates.\footnote{1} A similar ordinance issued by the jurade of Bordeaux in 1415 instructed the citizens, in the event of an effort, to assemble before the jurat of their ward and await his orders.\footnote{2} In most towns the daily defensive duties of gate and garde, as well as occasional direct-labour corvées, were organized by gachas. A register of the watch at Nîmes, compiled by the consuls in 1361, groups the citizens into companies and platoons (cinquantaines and dizaines) made up by quartiers.\footnote{3} At Alès in July 1360 the consuls selected fourteen captains to supervise the watch, two in each ward.\footnote{4} In 1351 the work of repairing the palissade of Agen was shared among the gachas.\footnote{5} Likewise at Albi responsibility for the maintenance of the town wall fell on the individual wards.\footnote{6}

\footnote{1} Inventaire sommaire AC Toulouse, Série AA, AA.5, no.296.

\footnote{2} Archives municipales de Bordeaux. IV. Registres de la Jurade, délibérations de 1414 à 1416 et de 1420 à 1422, Bordeaux, 1883, p.144.

\footnote{3} 'Et primo in quartone Bocarie pro custodia muro rum est quingenarius Joh. Fredoli', etc. AC Nîmes, JJ.2, fo.1, & passim.

\footnote{4} A. Bardon, Histoire de la ville d'Alais (Alès) de 1341 à 1461, Nîmes, 1896, pp.xx-xxi.

\footnote{5} 'It, que hom repare lo pal e la barradura de la vila a qui on mestes e necessari serra e cada conselh en sa gacha fossa enbarra a cada singural en sa garda als despens del singurals e que la gacha on menha aura a far sia ajudar e ajud e a l'autra gacha que mais aura mestes reparacio'. Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.237.

\footnote{6} 'E sus aquo totz tengro: quant a la clausura que se repre e que ca uncen gacha fossa reparar sa cota'. Deliberations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit. XLVII, p.554, 7 July 1381.
The men who governed towns in wartime, whether as consuls or councillors, were in the main civilians. The nobles who had been a vital force in southern towns in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had, as a class, largely disappeared from urban politics by the fourteenth. They had been replaced by merchants and lawyers, men with no military training and no personal experience of war except as non-combatants. Specialist military advice about the construction of fortifications and the deployment of forces was chiefly obtained from seigneurial and royal officers, in particular the defence commissioners. While there is no denying the widespread resentment at the excessive interference of these officials, it would be wrong to take all the complaints at face value. Probably in the majority of cases their advice was willingly accepted and respected. In fact towns often went for expert counsel to local seigneurs and knights and masters of works, exactly the kinds of men who served on royal defence commissions. The consuls of Millau enjoyed a very close and profitable relationship with Arnal de Roquefeuil, seigneur of Combaret. On 1 October 1356 the conseil général urged that he be requested to come and inspect the town walls. He arrived two days later 'am grand e bela companha'. There is no record of an immediate inspection, but on the 17th the consuls reported to the council that Roquefeuil had sent word that the English were massing for an assault and that he placed himself at their disposal. They decided to avail themselves of his

services. On, or shortly after, that date he returned with a band of his troops and in the company of the royal judge of Millau, the consuls and inhabitants, among them four knights and two squires, he made a number of recommendations for the fortifications, offering, if necessary, to send to Combaret for his master carpenter to direct the operations. The following year the consuls were able to obtain the advice of a somewhat more imposing figure, Jean-Ferdinand de Heredia, Grand Prior of Saint-Gilles, who had been responsible for the walls of Avignon, and who was in the town for a chapter meeting of the knights of St John. Similarly the consuls and councillors of Nîmes decided in February 1359 to send for 'quendam alterum superintendantem super reparations fossatorum commorantum apud Avinionem', as well as two local knights, Bertrand de Montpezat and the seigneur of Rochefort to inspect the city defences.

iii) Special committees

Considering the diversity of business with which they had to deal there was little specialisation of function among the consuls and in most towns they were collectively responsible for every aspect of the administration. However, in a few of the larger towns small war committees were formed, either to advise and assist the consuls or to take upon themselves the burden of defensive

1 AC Millau, CC.348, fos.xx vo-xxiii vo.
3 AC Nîmes, LL.1, fo.246vo.
planning and organisation. In November 1355, after the siege by
the Black Prince during which the Bourg had been entirely destroyed
and the Cité almost lost, the consuls and conseil privé of Narbonne
elected twelve of their number to draw up a scheme for the recon-
struction of the defences. The council as it stood had been unable
to reach a decision 'because of the multitude of persons and diver-
sity of opinion' and it was thought that 'a few could more easily
agree than the many'. The initiative was a success. By
26 November, six days after their constitution, the twelve
'deputies', as they are styled, had produced a comprehensive five-
year plan for the fortification of the Cité and Bourg and an equit-
able share of the costs between the two communities.¹

No more is heard of this particular committee. It must be
supposed that its brief was only to prepare the plan; the actual
raising of the funds and the implementation of the project would
fall to collectors and clerks of works directed by the consuls. A
smaller war committee with full executive powers was created the
following year. On 10 May 1356 the viscount of Narbonne announced
to an assembly of the consuls, conseil général and other inhabitants,
about one hundred and fifty in all, crowded into the lower hall of
the maison consulaire, that the count of Armagnac had sent word
that the English were attempting to break across the Garonne and
repeat their invasion of the previous year. As he must himself
join the count immediately, he exhorted the consuls to provide for
the security of the town. The consuls, again recognising that

¹ AC Narbonne, EE.1309, & below, appendix III.
decisions could most effectively be made by a small number of men, selected six prud'hommes of the town, including the consul Bertrand de Montpellier, to coordinate defence. Their decisions would be binding on the consuls and other inhabitants. If they were unable to agree among themselves the viscount or his lieutenant could be asked to intervene. Their powers were to last until 18 October and not be rescinded before that date unless on the orders of the king.¹

Defence ordinances from Villefranche-de-Rouergue also recommend selection of six 'progens de bon cœur' to oversee the military organisation of the town.² At Toulouse in March 1416 the capitouls picked a commission of twelve men, including three of their own number, from a list of twenty-four, two per coche, to put the city on a war footing.³ Likewise at Béziers the advisory committee formed on the recommendation of the council in 1436 consisted of two men from each of the seven échelles.⁴

As far as the evidence allows to judge, there was little permanence or consistency to these committees or commissions. In some cases they were probably no more than experiments in government designed to tackle a particular situation but not revived

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¹ AC Narbonne, EE.1647.
² B.N. Doat, 147, 'Ayssi es la ordonnansa cum una viela se deu fermar et claure et armar contra sos enemics, laquel trames Aristotial a Alexandre per fermar la sicutat Dussifali et las vielas que amava', fo.282.
³ AC Toulouse, BB.2, fcf.s 118vo–119vo.
⁴ 'Registre de la maison consulaire de Béziers', p.313.
subsequently. Only at Montpellier can it be shown that a war committee became a regular feature of the municipal administration. Charles VI's letters of January 1412 confirm the custom in Montpellier and its suburbs

'en temps de peril, guerres et quant gens d'armes sont et guerrent audit pays de trois ans en trois ans escrire et ordonner quatre notables hommes de la ville lesquelz leur appelle les députés qui sont charge, doivent et ont accustume avoir cure, diligence et entendre sur ladite garde et police de nostre dicté ville et des forabours dicelle et sur ce ordonner ce qui est besoin, proufitable et nécessite pour la garde dicelle et depuis ce qui a este ordonne par eulx faire orier et publier par ladite ville et quarfours dudit Montpellier'.

Defence deputies at Montpellier are first mentioned in April 1356, in letters from the royal lieutenant Armagnac to the royal bayle of the city, Pierre Texier, ordering him to see that all the inhabitants abided by any ordinances made by six prud'hommes elected to supervise the organisation of defence. In June 1356 the bayle confirmed the appointment of six deputies, and there were fresh confirmations in February 1359, September 1364, October 1372 and January 1412, although it is by no means clear that there were

1 AG Montpellier, Louvet no.224.
2 Ibid, nos.230,2393.
3 Ibid, no.229.
deputies continuously in office for every three-year period between these dates. From 1359 there were four deputies instead of the original six.

The powers entrusted to the deputies were wide. The 1356 confirmation specifies their right to build and repair the walls, gates, ditches and other fortifications, and to destroy property adjacent to the walls, to ensure that the walls were kept stocked with artillery and ammunition, and that the inhabitants were properly armed; if necessary by compelling armourers, smiths, masons, carpenters and other craftsmen to work exclusively in the service of the city, to mount armed guards at night and to victual the city to be able to withstand a siege. The confirmation of 1372 adds that their powers extended to the palissade and suburbs, and included the right to arrest offenders and apply the fines to the fortifications. The extent of their responsibility is best illustrated by the very detailed ordinances published by the serving deputies in 1418, and which are published in extenso below.

iv) A special administration: the 'Œuvre de la Commune Clôture' at Montpellier

Montpellier was unique among the southern towns in having, in addition to the deputies, a permanent branch of the administration solely devoted to the management of the fortifications. The Œuvre de la Commune Clôture was one of the most privileged and

1 AG Montpellier, Louvet no.229.
2 Ibid, no.226.
3 Ibid, no.670; & below, appendix VI.
prestigious of the city's institutions. It was administered by seven ouvriers who, while deriving their authority from the consuls, were separately elected and enjoyed considerable independence of action. Ouvriers (operarii) were, it is true, appointed in other places. Their task was to supervise public works, raising the funds and allocating them as the pace of building dictated. They combined the roles of collectors and clerks of works, and exercised their functions only for the duration of the construction programme under their supervision. They are therefore most appropriately examined below, in the context of building organisation.¹ The ouvriers de la Commune Clôture, on the other hand, were an integral part of the civic government of Montpellier. They were elected annually, in years of war and peace alike, and were responsible not only for the organisation and funding of new works, but for everything concerned with the improvement, preservation and management of the walls, gates, ditches and other defences of the city and suburbs.

The Commune Clôture, the 'Common Wall' of Montpellier, was constructed during the second half of the twelfth century. The institution of the Ceuvre may have been contemporary with the start of building, probably before 1152,² but its first formal charter dates from 1196, when Guilhem VIII, seigneur of Montpellier, promised to ratify all ordinances made for the Commune Clôture by

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¹ See below, pp.249-250.
² M. Viglié, 'Des enceintes successives de la ville de Montpellier et de ses fortifications', Bulletin de la Société languedocienne de géographie, XXI, 1898, p.139.
eight administrators and quit them of all obligation to render account for their work. 1 This undertaking was confirmed by his daughter, Marie, who succeeded him, and her husband Peter, king of Aragon, and respected in spirit by all the later lords of the city, including the kings of France. 2 A grant of 1206 refers to the ouvriers as 'cosols de la commune olauzura', 3 and in fact the Oeuvre, like the Consulat de mer, which dealt with commercial affairs, was a parallel self-contained administration, virtually a smaller, specialised consulate in itself. And both the ouvriers and consuls de mer challenged the supremacy of the consuls of the city, the cossus maiors, and claimed equality with them. The latter argued that they represented the most ancient of the city's institutions, and that the ouvriers and consuls de mer derived their authority from them. In 1478 it was established that the ouvriers and consuls de mer should stand respectively second and third to the consuls maiors in order of precedence. 4


2 Montpellier comprised two separate lordships, Montpellier itself and Montpellierêt, also known as the Part antique. The former, after passing via Marie, countess of Montpellier, from the Ouilhem line to the royal house of Aragon, was bought by the French crown in 1349. Montpellierêt, the episcopal town, was ceded by the bishop of Maguelone to Philippe IV in 1293. A. Germain, Histoire de la commune de Montpellier depuis ses origines jusqu'à son incorporation définitive à la monarchie française, Montpellier, 1851, I, pp.450-451.

3 AC Montpellier, Thalamus des Ouvriers, fos.63-63vo.

4 Thalamus Parvus, Le Petit Thalamus de Montpellier, Montpellier, 1840, pp.196-197.
The seven ouvriers were, like the consuls majeurs, chosen by a
college of electors representing the seven échelles. The election
took place on the feast of All Saints. The ouvriers were served
by one or two clavaires, or treasurers, their own notaries and a
staff of inspectors known as messatges. Their chief business was
the maintenance of the fortifications, repairing and extending them
where necessary and protecting them from encroachment and accidental
or wilful damage. They were responsible for making periodic
inspections of the walls. Statutes for the reform of the Oeuvre
drawn up in 1284 provide for a messenger to make a weekly survey
and report any defects or damage to the ouvriers. More formal
solemn visits were made by the ouvriers themselves, often in the
presence of the consuls and other dignitaries. For instance, on
10 and 11 November 1411, shortly after their election, the new
ouvriers accompanied by the consuls, deputies and a number of royal
officers, toured the walls and determined that the 'muralhas,
portals, avant-portals, torres et torretas' of the vila antíqua
numbered 1757 merlons. The extent of the ouvriers' concern is
revealed by bans and statutes proclaimed from time to time for the
governance of the Oeuvre. Among the offences proscribed by the

1 Petit Thalamus, p.116; 'Archives de Montpellier', I, p.91.
2 Petit Thalamus, pp.168, 176-177; AC Montpellier, Thalamus des
Ouvriers, fos.18vo-19 & passim; Renouvier & Ricard, 'Des
maîtres de pierre', p.240.
4 Petit Thalamus, p.457.
statutes of 1284 are the dumping of slops, rubbish and building materials on the walls and in the ditches, the removal of earth from the revêtements, piercing the walls with windows, drains, gutters and latrines, and allowing water and sewerage to flow from gutters and drains into the ditches. Since the ouvriers themselves had no rights of justice, their proclamations were made in the name of the seigneurial court. Penalties for more serious offences could be severe. In 1340 a man was sentenced to be whipped for stealing bolts from the wall, while in 1375 the hand of a murderer who had crossed the palissado while escaping from the scene of his crime was severed and exhibited outside the Porte Saint-Salvayre.

The ouvriers supervised new building projects although, as far as may be judged, decisions about the extent and pattern of the work to be undertaken were made in consultation with the consuls and deputies. Annual accounts of construction and repairs appear intermittently in the Thalamus des Ouvriers, the cartulary of the Oeuvre. For example, the major works recorded in 1365 were the completion of the reduch (retreat?) del Carme, roofing two towers in front of the carré vacaria, sealing most of the gates opening

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1 Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents. XII. Série EE, Fonds de la Commune Clôture et affaires militaires, ed. M. Cudot de Dainville & M. Couron, Montpellier, 1974, EE.25–36, 46, 57, 58, 60, etc.; AG Montpellier, Thalamus des Ouvriers, fos.42vo, 121–121vo, & passim.

onto the douze palme,\textsuperscript{1} construction of the talus\textsuperscript{2} (revetement) de Saint-Jacme and works in the ditches outside the Porte de la Barbotte and the church and convent of Saint Germain, beginning the walls of the palissade and the addition of a parapet to the wall between the Tour de Pozara and the Porto des Carmes.\textsuperscript{2}

Custody of the gates and keys of Montpellier was also the responsibility of the ouvriers. Upon their election they solemnly swore to the consuls to open and close the gates at the appointed hours - and never at night without the express authority of the consuls or deputies - and to guard the keys faithfully, never allowing them to fall into the hands of people who could not be trusted.\textsuperscript{3} The sentries at the gates were provided, under the supervision of the ouvriers, by each of the seven \textsc{échelles} in turn.\textsuperscript{4}

The interests and activities of the ouvriers actually extended a good way outside the sphere of defence. As custodians of the fortifications they were in charge of lands and buildings covering a substantial area of the city and which, though primarily intended for its protection, could be turned to its profit. The towers were leased to private individuals as stores and even dwellings, the ditches and revêtements as building plots or for commercial use.

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{1}] The path about 1.50m wide running each side of the wall for its entire circumference and intended to ensure access to every part of the wall.
\item[\textsuperscript{2}] AC Montpellier, Thalamus des Ouvriers, fos. 50vo-51. For the topographical details see Vigis, 'Des enceintes de Montpellier', passim.
\item[\textsuperscript{3}] Petit Thalamus, p. 260.
\item[\textsuperscript{4}] Ibid, pp. 95-98.
\end{itemize}
The arbalétriers enjoyed the use of the ditch between the Tour de Barbotte and the Porte de Lattes as a practice ground. In October 1375 Arnaut Costa, carpenter, Jean Prieurel and Jaume Salas, labourers, leased the ditch between the Portal de la Blanquerie and the Portal de Saint-Gilles at a customary annual rent of 28s, just one of many similar baux à accapte granted by the ouvriers to individuals and companies. In fact the greater part of the surviving archives of the Oeuvre consist of leases, recognitions, building permits and associated documents concerned with the 'estate management' side of its business and with the administration of the several capelariar, chantry chapels of which the ouvriers were patrons.

Leases, supplemented by fines, bequests and a standing tax on outsiders owning property in Montpellier provided the Oeuvre with a regular income, probably enough to cover maintenance expenses but insufficient to meet the emergency building programme of the 1350s and 60s. For this Montpellier, like other towns, had to fall back on tailes, loans and indirect taxes, chiefly the acoquet on wine. As the right to raise extraordinary taxes was vested solely in the

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1 Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents, XII, EE.224.

2 *Archives de Montpellier. III*, p.164.


consulate, the ouvriers depended upon the consuls for funds. But the consuls, who were hard pressed themselves, were not always ready to make over to the ouvriers even the monies specifically granted by the crown for the fortifications. In February 1358 the consuls and ouvriers agreed that the Oeuvre should be allocated just half of the soquet on wine for that year, and in addition, perhaps by way of compensation, the more modest income from muloture and the town weights. In 1379 the ouvriers settled for a grant of 1100 florins from the consuls, which represented one third of the sales tax of 12d per livre, and one third of the soquet. And the Oeuvre had to fight for even these reduced sums. In November 1361 the ouvriers formally protested to the consuls that in refusing to proceed with urgent repairs to the walls, for which a soquet had been authorised by the king and approved by the inhabitants, the consuls had acted in clear contempt of their duty and the public good. Appended to the document is a memorandum to the effect that half of the soquet revenues of 8000 florins had been employed to pay off the debts of the consulate.

The disputes over the annual budget of the Oeuvre bely a deeper tension between the consuls and the ouvriers, of which a symptom is the periodic insistence of the consuls that the ouvriers had no independent basis of power but derived their authority from the

1 'Archives de Montpellier. III', p.154.
2 Ibid, p.155.
3 Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents, XII, EE.66.
Ordinances for the reform of the Oeuvre in 1368 and 1411 stipulated that the ouvriers and their clavoirs should account to the consuls and their auditors at the end of each term of office. Arguably the financial supervision was as much designed to prevent the Oeuvre assuming too much freedom as to check malpractice and fraud. Accusations of maladministration were mutual; just as in 1361 the ouvriers reproached the consuls for refusing to face their responsibilities, so three years earlier, in October 1357, the consuls had alleged that the ouvriers had neglected their duty, in particular that the walls were of insufficient height, not properly maintained and lacking artillery and ammunition. Allegations of this kind are difficult to validate at this remove. The accounts of the Oeuvre have not survived, and the leases, which form the bulk of its remaining archives, give a distorted impression of its activity. The intermittent reform measures in themselves suggest that all was not well, but there is no reason to suppose that there was significantly more corruption and inefficiency in the Oeuvre than in any municipal administration, in Montpellier or elsewhere.

At the heart of the issue was the change in the function and status of the Oeuvre in the century and a half since its inception. From an organ designed to maintain the defensive apparatus of the city it developed during the long peace of the thirteenth century

1 Petit Thalamus, pp.184, 196-197.
2 Ibid, pp.168, 176-177.
3 Archives de la ville de Montpellier, Inventaires et documents, XII, EE.71.
into a kind of city property board. Admittedly the *ouvriers* never abandoned their primary role. The regular bans and ordinances relating to the walls reveal at least an outward concern for their preservation, and in leasing or renting parts of the wall or ditch the *ouvriers* almost always insisted on their right of free access and inspection, and, in wartime, of requisitioning or destroying structures which hindered defence. But pressure on land and the pace of encroachment had been such that by the 1350s, when Montpellier was first directly affected by the war, a considerable part of the fortifications had become effectively neutralised by civil constructions, chiefly private houses, erected with the authorisation of the *ouvriers* in the *chemin de douze palmes* and leaning against the walls. The situation was the same in other towns, but at Montpellier the *ouvriers*, being uniquely responsible for the upkeep of the fortifications, necessarily took the blame for their insufficiency. And while there is no clear evidence to prove the link, it does seem likely that the creation of the deputies, whose powers explicitly included the construction and repair of the fortifications, traditionally the preserve of the *ouvriers*, was a reaction to the apparent failure of the *ouvriers* to meet the needs of the hour.

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1 Archives de la ville de Montpellier, Inventaires et documents, XII, EE.101ff.

2 AG Montpellier, Louvet, no.229.
v) **Town captains**

In the majority of towns, even in those where there existed committees of deputies or similar bodies, the daily organisation of the watch and other wartime duties which were beyond the competence or inclination of the consuls were delegated to a town captain. In this connexion a distinction must be made between captains appointed internally by the municipality or the seigneur and those appointed by the crown to command a garrison. The two functions could be combined in the same appointment; for example, the three captains of Martel appointed by the royal lieutenant in November 1346 had specified powers over the citizenry as well as the regular troops under their command. But generally garrison captains were outsiders over whom the town authorities had no direct power, and who had no permanent place in the town administration.

Charters of franchise dating from before the start of the war rarely touch on the question of the town captaincy. This was because in most towns the post was an extraordinary one, filled only in wartime, which had fallen into disuse during the long peace of the thirteenth century. A royal ordinance of March 1317 directed that permanent captains be established in the towns of the king's domain, but there is no evidence that it was ever implemented in Languedoc. The inclusion of clauses elaborating the role and status of the captain in two important fifteenth-century charters shows that after more than a century of war the

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1 AC Martel, AA.1.

office had come to be considered a necessary and integral part of town life. The royal instrument of 1463 by which the consulate of Beaucaire was restored confirmed the rights of the consuls in wartime, or at such other times as they should judge appropriate, to elect a captain of the watch, empowered to supervise the defence of the town and to coerce the inhabitants into diligent service by fines or distraint. The consuls of the Bourg of Carcassonne were granted the same faculty in almost identical terms among the privileges granted by Louis XI in 1466.

The right to appoint the captain of a town or fort was fundamentally a seigneurial prerogative, which was abdicated to the citizens wholly, partially or not at all depending, as in the case of the rights to the watch and the fortifications, upon the size and status of the town and the will of the seigneur. In smaller towns, the seigneur usually retained direct control of the appointment.

The syndics of Comigne and other townships and castles belonging to the abbey of La Grasse near Carcassonne had to request their lord the abbot to designate captains 'to protect them from the English and preserve them in the allegiance of the king of France'. The consuls of even such a sizeable place as Ales had to go cap in hand

1 Eyssette, Histoire administrative de Beaucaire, II, p.335. The original consulate, founded at the beginning of the thirteenth century, was dissolved after the Albigensian wars and the town administered by syndics. An abortive attempt to restore the consulate was made in 1364. The syndics had the right to appoint a captain, subject to confirmation by the seneschal, at least from 1381. Ibid, I, pp.173-174.

2 Cartulaire de Carcassonne, VI(I), p.29.

to the baile of the common court each time they thought the town needed captains of the watch, and then the appointments were made for a strictly limited period, and only on condition that no encroachment was implied on the rights of the co-seigneurs. ¹

Townspeople were understandably anxious to have as captains men of their own number or choosing, while seigneurs and the king were concerned that the defence of towns should not be entrusted to men whose motives were frivolous or mercenary, or who were merely incompetent. In 1381 the bishop of Albi complained to the consuls that the town was poorly guarded, and urged them to employ an effective captain. The town council, however, was adamant that the existing scheme of election from among the citizens should continue, and flatly dismissed the bishop’s suggestion that they should bring in an outsider lest he prove ‘trop rigoureux’. ²

But the anxiety to retain, or acquire, the right of appointment was not always disinterested. Municipal offices became inexorably incorporated into the net of venality and patronage that surrounded the king and every magnate, and while town captaincies were small beer, they were nevertheless used to reward service. One of the chief causes of the bitter conflict between the consuls and viscount of Narbonne in the 1370s and 80s was the appointment by the viscount of one Pierre de Castelpor, ‘scutiferus et familiaris suus’ as captain of the town. ³

³ AC Narbonne, EE 538.
made captain of Gourdon by Jean IV d'Armagnac in 1425, and the nature of the appointment can be judged by the absence in the commission of any specific mention of his duties, and the stipulation that he was to enjoy all the comital revenues in the town. The cabochienne ordinance had insisted that captains should permanently reside in person in the towns and forts to which they were appointed, that they should be prevented from holding office in plurality, and that they should be paid a realistic salary of not more than 100 francs, except in frontier fortresses.

In the event, things probably got worse rather than better in the fifteenth century. At the centre of a lengthy dispute between the consuls of Le Puy and Charles VII, was the king's grant of the town captaincy to his favourite, Pierre de Louvain, with the right to take as salary the lucrative entry tax on wine. It was later claimed that the appointment had been made because the town was so laxly guarded that brigands were able to enter at leisure, but Médicis, the sixteenth-century chronicler of Le Puy, while partisan, is probably nearer the mark in claiming that Louvain had secured the post on his own initiative, for, as a native of Velay with distinguished service in the royal wars, he 'moult desiroit

1 AD Tarn-et-Garonne, A.44, fo.22vo.
2 Ordonnances, X, p.82. L'ordonnance cabochienne, p.131ff.
3 On this whole affair see Belombre, Le consulat du Puy, pp.124-127.
4 Ibid, pièces justificatives, no. XXIII, p.42.
retourner d'ou il estoit parti en felicite, honneur et gloire. 1

The case of Le Puy in fact shows that the pretended right of
the king to nominate his own men as captains could be successfully
resisted. In 1388 Jean de Neuville, the royal candidate, was
removed from the captaincy by the duke of Berry after concerted
opposition from the consuls, the cathedral chapter and the bishop,
who, with the king, was co-seigneur of Le Puy. 2 In 1413 another
royal nominee, Jean de Rochebaron, suffered the same fate, and the
consuls were confirmed in their right to appoint their own captain
and to hold the keys of the town. 3 Pierre de Louvain was a tougher
nut to crack. He was named captain by the king on 24 March 1443
and shortly afterwards given the tax on wine. On 16 April the
consuls appealed to the Parlement of Paris against this double
injustice. Louvain used his favoured position to get royal letters
annulling the suspensive effect of the appeal and confirming him in
office. At this, the consuls appealed a second time to Parlement,
but the sénéchal of Beaucaire, for Louvain, cited them before the
Grand Conseil. There were thus two royal jurisdictions simulta-
nously involved in the affair, acting tangentially, if not in
outright opposition. In August 1443 the Grand Conseil provisionally
judged in favour of Louvain, but sent the parties back to Parlement
to plead in the following January. Louvain tried to prevaricate

1 Etienne Médicis, Le Livre de Podio ou chronique d'Etienne Médicis,
bourgeois du Puy, ed. A. Chassaing, Recueil des Chroniques du
2 Delcambre, Le consulat du Puy, p.123.
by failing to appear before Parliament, but misjudged the mood of the court, for instead of the expected adjournment it decided to remove him from office there and then and place the captaincy in the hands of one Pierre d'Avignon, burgess and consul of La Puy, to hold it on behalf of the king until the case had been decided finally. But the Grand Conseil retaliated by quashing the sentence and ordering the bailli of Velay and the sénéchal of Beaucaire to reinstate Louvain. This time the consuls appealed direct to the king, citing the precedents of 1388 and 1413, a strategy which paid off, for their privileges were confirmed and Pierre d'Avignon recognised as captain. Louvain's star at court seems to have been in the descendant, or perhaps he was compensated elsewhere, but even the Grand Conseil deserted him and refused to accept his appeal. Thereafter the right of the consuls to choose their own captain appears never to have been challenged.1

In towns where royal authority was direct and undivided, the crown was generally sympathetic to local interests, and allowed the inhabitants to select their own captains subject to royal veto. The captains of Beaucaire and Montpellier were chosen by the consuls and submitted to the sénéchal of Beaucaire for approval.2 In 1363 the sénéchal had tried to go further and create his own nominee captain of Nîmes without reference to the consuls, but this encroachment was vigorously resisted and the rights of the town

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1 Peloncambre, Le consulat du Puy, pp.124-127. The royal letters, given at Tours on 23 March 1449 n.s.t., summarise the whole case, ibid, p.11, no. XXIII, pp.41-55.

2 Ersette, Histoire administrative de Beaucaire, I, p.174.

1 Montpellier, Louvet no.225.
This kind of compromise was also to be found in many seigneurial towns. At Albi the captains were chosen by the consuls and confirmed and invested by the bishop's viguier, although, as has been seen, the bishop was not always happy with the system. In the treaty bringing to an end the feud at Narbonne it was agreed that the viscount would choose the captain and that the consuls would ratify his choice. In the exercise of his functions the captain would be assisted and monitored by a commission consisting of four prud'hommes from the Cité and four from the Bourg, elected equally by each party. At Lunel the syndics put forward two names to the lord's viguier who picked one as captain.

There is little to suggest that the crown seriously attempted to undermine the rights of seigneurs to appoint captains in their own towns. Certainly there was no hint of royal interference at Narbonne, except to endorse the real or pretended rights of the viscount. In 1360 the sénéchal of Carcassonne had authorised Aymeri IX to make Luger de Villespassants captain of the Bourg of Narbonne, because of the parlous state of the country. In June 1365 the consuls, having discovered in the meantime that their new captain was something of a martinet, appealed against the

1 Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pr. p.276. AD Hérault, A.5, fos.31-33 for the confirmation by Arnoul d'Audrehem, 5 Jan. 1364.

2 AC Albi, EE.6, B.N. Doat, 104, fos.63-66.


5 AC Narbonne, EE.1453.
appointment, declaring, significantly, that if at first they had agreed to obey him, it was because they thought that he had been placed in office by the king. However, in October 1369 Charles V confirmed the right of the viscount to appoint captains, whose orders the consuls and citizens must obey. Seigneurial rights could nevertheless be by-passed. At Agde, where royal influence was stronger than in most other ecclesiastical lordships of the Midi, the consuls refused to accept a captain appointed by the bishop and appealed to Charles V, who in this case upheld the municipality against the seigneur. He recognised the right of the consuls to appoint the captain, but subject to the veto of the sénéchal of Carcassonne and the viguier of Béziers. Later a face-saving formula was found whereby the bishop admitted the consuls' privilege, providing that any ordinances and proclamations relating to the watch and defence of Agde were made in his name, and with the prior approval of his court. In this sphere, as in so many others, each case was judged on its merits, in the light of the actual situation, and not according to any consistent royal policy.

The conflict between towns and seigneurs for control of the captaincy, as well as being part of a wider struggle for civic liberties, was partly inspired by the inhabitants' fears that the office would be abused by the unscrupulous or mercenary. The

1 AC Narbonne, EE.1479.
2 Ibid, EE.538.
3 AC Agde (EE.46).
4 Ibid, AA.2, fos.81-86vo.
cabochienne ordinance suggests that their fears were justified, at least as far as garrison captains and castellans of royal castles were concerned. Captains of towns and fortresses, it was alleged, had compelled the populace to mount watch more frequently than was customary or necessary and had extorted heavy fines from defaulters or had composed with whole towns and villages for a single cash payment in lieu of service. Moreover, they were paid excessive salaries and often held several captaincies simultaneously. At the town level this suspicion of the motives of captains is revealed by the agreement made in April 1361 between the consuls of Nîmes and their capitaneus seu director, Bertrand de Montpezat, lord of Fons. The consuls were at pains to insist that they intended no alienation of their own powers and that his decisions were subject to their veto. He was to serve in person, unless absent from the town on legitimate business, in which case the consuls would choose his lieutenant. The consuls would retain the keys of the town, and the captain would not be permitted to let soldiers into the town without their approval. He would be responsible for the organisation of the watch, and for the construction of new fortifications, but again only with the consuls' approval. His appointment would initially last one month.

At Nîmes, and probably the majority of other places, the captaincy was not a regular office. Captains were appointed or

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1 L'ordonnance cabochienne, pp.129-131.
not according to the needs of the moment. Bertrand de Montpezat was made captain because the enemy were active in the region, but outside such times of emergency the Nîmes records make no mention of captains. At Alès the consuls were allowed to appoint captains 'propter pericula yminentia guerrarum latronum et omicidarum qui octidie patriam discurrent'. The Béziers deliberations show that the captain there was very much an emergency appointment. The same was true even of those towns where the right to appoint captains was most hotly disputed. There is no evidence that at Le Puy the captain was anything but an intermittent office, while at Narbonne the agreement of 1388 specified that a captain would only be appointed in wartime ('quosciensoumque erit guerra in presenti patria'). Likewise, the duration of the appointment varied. The captains chosen at Alès in July 1360 were initially authorised to serve until the feast of the Circumcision following, but on 28 December, the situation of the town being just as dangerous, the appointments were confirmed until Whitsun. In November 1346 the council of Narbonne resolved to enlist the services of E. Marti as captain for 'as long as it should seem pleasing to the consuls'.

1 Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pr. p.240.  
3 'Registres de la maison consulaire de Béziers', pp.312-315.  
4 Deloambe, Le consulat du Puy, pp.124, 129.  
6 Bardon, Histoire de la ville d'Alais 1341-1461, p.xxii.  
7 AC Martel, BB.5, fo.26vo.
In October 1355 they decided that P. Barraus should be made captain and governor for a probationary period of one month and thereafter as should seem expedient.1

In some towns, however, the captaincy did attain permanence. At Albi an agreement made with the bishop in 1354 allowed the consuls to appoint captains with his approval, and the surviving municipal accounts and deliberations indicate that from then on the office was filled annually.2 At Castres in the 1370s and 1380s a captain was appointed every year, in January, a few days after the consuls took office.3 In the small town of Aniane outside Montpellier a capitanus fortalicii was elected three times a year, in February, May and August.4 In the fifteenth century captains tended to become permanent salaried town officers, even where previously they had been appointed only occasionally. After being granted the faculty in the charter of 1463, the consuls of Beaucaire annually elected a captain from among the town councillors, and from 1465 a captain's register was kept, in which were entered details of sentences, fines and other matters pertaining to the office.5 At Le Puy the consuls decided in 1469 to appoint a captain annually,

1 AC Martel, BB, fo.91.

2 Pouze comptes consulaires d'Albi au XIVe siècle, ed. A. Vidal, Archives historiques de l'Albigois, VIII, IX, Albi, 1906-1911, pp.27, 73, 126 & passim; 'Délibérations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit. XLVI, p.44.

3 AC Castres, BB, fos.3, 24, 52, BB, fo.78.

4 AD Hérault, H-supplément, Aniane, BB, fos.36vo, 37vo, 39, & passim.

5 Eyssette, Histoire administrative de Beaucaire, I, pp.175-177.
and pay him a salary of 50s. 1

The reluctance of towns to regularise the office of captain may be explained partly by their anxiety lest the holder entrench himself too deeply and, more plausibly, by the desire to save money. Knights and squires had to be paid at or about the going rate for men at arms in the royal armies. Louis de Porte domicellus, captain of Alès in 1364, was paid 45 florins for a month and a half's service. 2 P. Barrus received 100 gold écus from the consuls of Martel as their captain in 1355. 3 While the wording of the document is vague, the context suggests that this was a monthly figure, in which case it presumably also covers the wages of troops serving under him, though they are not specifically mentioned; otherwise it seems impossibly high. After all, the cabochienne ordinance, nearly sixty years later, fixed the salary of royal captains at 100 livres, except where already prescribed by custom, or in the case of important fortresses on the frontier. 4 Non-noble captains were less expensive to retain, although their rates of pay varied considerably from town to town. In 1355 B. Loydier, captain of Rodez Cité, was paid 4 écus a month. 5 At Albi in the later fourteenth century the two captains were each paid 2 florins a month. 6

2 AG Alès, 1315, no.XXXVIII.
3 AG Martel, BB.5, fo.26vo.
4 Ordonnances, X, p.82.
5 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, p.239.
6 Touze comptes consulaires d’Albi, I, pp.73, 126, & passim.
In 1363 the villagers of Salelles in Gévaudan contracted with one Anglio Boisson to be their captain at an annual salary of 9 gold florins, for which he had also to collect the parish taille. Statutes reforming the government of Toulouse in 1390 assigned 300 francs a year to the 'man and thirty companions' who guarded the city at night. Wage rates varied seasonally in recognition of the greater burden placed on the captain during the longer nights of winter. In 1369-70 the captain of Rodez Cité was paid 4 florins a month during the winter and three in the summer. At Albi in 1408 the two captains demanded eight francs each as their salary, four francs for one third of the year, and four for the other two thirds 'que no aiguem ta gran trebalh'. Captains were also compensated for work beyond the normal call of duty. For example, Jorda de Saint-Andrieu, captain of Toulouse in 1420-21, was paid an extra 11 livres by the capitouls for his work during the visit of Charles de Bourbon when the watch had had to be doubled.

The wages of captains were usually supplemented by fines imposed on defaulters from the watch. A common arrangement was that half of a fixed penalty was used to hire a replacement, while the captain pocketed the rest. M. Jarousseau has shown in his

1 André, L'invasion anglaise en Gévaudan, p.xxix.
3 Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, II, p.118.
4 AC Albi, EE.16.
5 AC Toulouse, CC.1856, fo.40vo.
6 AC Saint-Affrique, EE.6, fo.50vo.
stimulating article on the watch in Poitou how some royal captains and castellans could bring themselves in a steady income of 70-80 livres a year in fines alone. Sums of this order were probably far beyond the most optimistic expectations of the average town captain. Even so, fines were potentially quite lucrative. In 1350 the salary of the captain of Gourdon was 10s a day; a consular ordinance of 1353 established the fine on defaulters at 10s of which the captain received half. Not many watchmen need have been absent in a week for him to increase his salary two- or threefold. That these extras, whatever they amounted to, were a potent inducement to captains is suggested by a curious case from Beaucaire. In 1363 the inhabitants complained to the sénéchal that in the past the fines from the watch had been divided between the captain and the fortifications. However, Arnoul d'Audrehem had ordered that defaulters be condemned to a day's imprisonment or two days' corvées, as a result of which the captains, thus deprived of an important source of income, did not go about their duty with their old zeal. The royal viguier sent to investigate the case assembled the inhabitants, and in accordance with their majority opinion, decided that a fine of 2 gros should in the future be imposed on defaulters, of which the captain should take his half-share as in the past.

The chief responsibility of captains was the organisation of

2 AC Gourdon, BB.3, fo.11ter vo, BB.4, fo.11vo.
3 AC Beaucaire, EE.1.
the watch. The instrument establishing the two captains of Albi in 1367 empowered them to place watchmen on the walls at night, and, if necessary, by day as well, increasing or decreasing their number as the situation demanded; to open and close the gates and post sentries there; to ensure the participation of the citizens by the distraint and sale of their belongings; and in short to do all those things which properly and customarily pertained to the office of captain. Captains might also be required to see to the building and maintenance of the fortifications. This was one of the specified duties of Bertrand de Montpezat at Nîmes, and in 1345 Ponce de Gourdon, captain of Gourdon, was expressly instructed by the sénéchal of Périgord and Quercy to ensure that the fortifications of that town were completed as soon as possible under his personal supervision. A captain was generally chosen to command the militia when it was called up for service outside the town, though he was not necessarily the captain of the watch. Thus at Saint-Affrique Johan Soler and Bérenger Durant were made captains of the watch in November 1431, but when on 16 December the militia was mobilised the council decided that a new captain should be appointed to command it.

The anonymous compiler of the defensive ordinances for Villefranche considered that the first requirement of a town threatened

1 AC Albi, EE.61 & below, appendix V.
2 Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pr., p.240.
3 AC Gourdon, EE.1, no.4.
4 AC Saint-Affrique, BB.6, fo.56vo.
by the enemy was to choose as its captain 'un homme savi, hardit et loyal', in whom all the defenders could have confidence.¹ This was an opinion shared by Hugues de Cardaillac, military advisor to the consuls of Montauban in the 1340s, who added that if the captain did not enjoy the trust of his men, then 'val fort petit la defensa'.² When there was the prospect of battle or siege, towns turned most readily to professional soldiers to be their captains. In 1431, with the English, so it was rumoured, poised to attack, the mayor and consuls of Périgueux appointed as their captain Fortier de Saint-Astier, knight, because, they said, the proximity of the enemy and the dearth of defenders meant that they could not properly guard the town.³ In 1356, in much the same circumstances, the consuls of Millau appointed Arnal de Roquesfeuil as their captain.⁴ Roquesfeuil was captain of Montpellier in 1361,⁵ which raises the question whether men like him, local knights and squires or soldiers of fortune, found regular employment in the service of towns. The evidence is too fragmentary to provide a satisfactory answer, although that in itself is suggestive. Certainly neither at Montpellier nor at Millau — and in both cases the documentation is very rich — can it be shown that professional soldiers from outside

1 B.N. Doat, 147, fo.282.
3 Recueil de titres sur Périgueux, pp.481-482.
4 Documents sur la ville de Millau, pp. 100, 103.
5 Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents, II, no.ILXX.
were appointed regularly, or indeed, that the captaincy was filled anything but intermittently. Elsewhere captains and men at arms were employed from time to time as the need arose, but never consistently or for long enough for them to establish themselves. Whether or not this was deliberate policy is hard to say; the most immediate and obvious explanation is cost. But the case of the notorious Pierre Louvain at Le Puy shows that towns had good reason to suspect the motives of men of his type who might offer their services as captains. Admittedly, professional soldiers were regularly made captains of frontier towns like Agen, but these royal appointments were largely outside the control of the municipal authorities.

Where the captaincy was an annual appointment, it was normally held by a prominent citizen. Guillaume Balesta of Castres who was re-elected town captain nearly every year from 1373 to 1382 also served as consul des riches in 1372-73 and 1381-82. At Le Puy it became the custom in the fifteenth century to select the captain from among the chief merchants and burgesses. Bernard Estève, described as pelheker, one of the captains of Albi in 1368-69 and again in 1369-70, 1374-75, 1380 and 1381-82, was an active consul and councillor; likewise François de Lagrave who was captain with him in 1368-69 and 1369-70. The advantage of this practice for

1 AC Castres, BB.1, fos.3, 24, 52, 98, BB.2, fo.78.
2 Médicis, Livre de Podio, II, p.35.
3 Douze comptes consulaires d'Albi, I, pp.73, 126, 200, 321,
II, pp.9, 57, & passim.
the towns was that a key appointment did not pass outside the control of the ruling castes. However, it meant that captains were not necessarily the most competent or experienced men for the job, and that sometimes the burden of office was laid on unwilling shoulders. At Albi the two captains chosen in 1360 refused to take up their office until forcibly dragged before the bishop's viguier.\(^1\)

In fact at Albi the system did not always operate smoothly for all the parties concerned, the bishop, the town and the captains themselves. In October 1379 the consuls had become so anxious about the situation that they suggested that Guillaume del Monnao should be appointed captain 'so that the watch should be better organised and the people show more respect'. However, Monnao imposed three conditions: that he be granted absolute power, that he be paid a reasonable salary and that he be compensated for loss or damage to his person or property. The council found these terms unacceptable and in the following July introduced a new system whereby each of the six town wards supplied two men to serve as captains for two months at a time without remuneration.\(^2\) The reform was allowed to operate for a year, but evidently it was far from satisfactory for on 1 July 1381 the council unanimously decided that it should be abandoned, and that two captains should be appointed annually as before, 'e que lor dono gatges razonables afi que siau miels ouroes e diligens en lor offici e en la garda de la vilat'.\(^3\)

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1 Douse comptes consulaires d'Albi, I, p.27.
2 'Délibérations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit. XLVII, pp.545, 547-549.
But the new captains almost immediately fell foul of the bishop; on 7 July the episcopal judge refused to accept them on the grounds that the consuls had not yet been confirmed in office by the duke of Berry, while in November the bishop himself complained that the guard of the city was 'trop simplicis' and urged the consuls to find 'quelque capitani rigoros'. To the first allegation the consuls and council replied that the consulate was 'en possessio e saysina de presentar capitanias' and that custom allowed the bishop to elect no other nominees but their own, and to the second that they adamantly refused to accept an outsider, but would see that the present captains acted more effectively. Presumably the bishop was satisfied, for no more is heard of the affair in the council minutes, and captains continued to be chosen in the accustomed fashion into the fifteenth century. However, the episode, taken at face value, indicates that seigneurs were sometimes justified in refusing to delegate military control of their towns to inefficient and unenthusiastic civilians.

1 'Délibérations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit. XLVII, p.554.
2 Ibid, p.564.
3 Ibid, p.554.
PART II

THE POPULATION MOBILIZED
CHAPTER 3
OBLIGATIONS

Urban military organisation in France during the Hundred Years War was based on the personal obligation of the citizens to defend the community. Strategically important towns and castles, particularly on the frontiers, might be defended by garrisons of royal troops; some of the larger cities employed companies of guards, and even small towns hired soldiers to protect them at harvest times; but normally the defence of towns and villages was assured by the customary, unpaid service of their civilian inhabitants.

The mobilisation of all men in defence of the seigneur or his fief was a feudal notion inherited by the towns. A town was, after all, simply a fief held in common. Town charters, while frequently specifying military services owed to the seigneur, seldom mention the personal obligation of the inhabitants to the community, probably because it was taken for granted. The customs of Lectoure of 1294 are a rare exception in expressly stating the duty of all householders to keep in their homes arms necessary for the defence of the town and to contribute their labour in corvées for the construction and repair of the town wall.\(^1\) At Dix in 1350 it was recognised that the liberties of the town were to be enjoyed by all the inhabitants who paid \textit{taïlles} and performed the service of

More usually personal obligations are recognised only by implication in charter clauses dealing with the rights of the municipality over the fortifications and custody of the town. The charter of Aigues-Mortes, granted by Philippe III in 1279, empowered the consuls to appoint gachias, excugachias and other guards whenever it should seem expedient to them or to the king's officers and to enforce these services by distressing the property of defaulters. Charles IV's grant of privileges to Montauban in 1323 allowed the consuls to appoint capable and trustworthy men to guard the town at night, to see that the charge did not fall more heavily on some inhabitants than on others and to report cases of absenteeism to the royal viguier.

Documents dating from the war years of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are more informative about personal obligations. In 1366 Marvejols was given full consular status by Charles V. The charter defined the right of the new consuls to mount a watch whenever necessary and the duty of the inhabitants to serve in it on pain of a 5s fine. They were only held to guard Marvejols itself, described as being 'maxima custodia', and could not be forced to perform guet or garde in any other town or castle. In 1382 the consuls and jurats of Bergerac decided that P. Guabilhot, pewterer, should be induced to settle in the town by exemption from

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1 Le Livre Noir et les Etablissements de Dux, ed. F. Abbadie, Bordeaux, 1902, pp.144-145.
2 Ordonnances, IV, p.46.
3 Ibid, XII, p.471.
all taxes, but added that on no account was he to be excused watch-
duty. ¹ Similarly a grant of citizenship made in 1430 to Jacques
Godard, a Savoyard locksmith, stated that he was to be exempt for
four years from all tailles and charges except of serving in the watch
and of contributing to the repair of the fortifications.² In
November 1412 the consuls of Nîmes, with the authority of the royal
court in the city, published an order that all persons of whatever
estate or condition were held to serve in the watch by day or by
night when called upon by the consuls or their captains and deputies
or face severe penalties.³ These few examples could be multiplied
indefinitely; there was hardly a real or rumoured crisis which did
not bring from town governments a reaffirmation of the duty of the
citizens to play their personal part in the defence of the
community.

Military obligations were both personal and real. Most
defensive duties were assigned on the basis of the hearth or house-
hold. At Agen the minutes of the jurade insist on every house-
holder taking his place on the walls when so ordered.⁴ At Aigues-
Mortes each cap d'estal who defaulted from the watch was to be

¹ Jurades de la ville de Bergame, I, pp. 75-76.
² Inventaire sommaire AC Narbonne, Annexes de la série BE, no. XVII.
³ On the other hand, exemption from military service was sometimes
granted to new burgesses. At Cahors two bowmakers who agreed to
settle in the town in 1369 and 1370 were excused from the watch.
This may have been because of the military usefulness of their
craft. AC Cahors, Livre Tanné, fos. 81-82.
⁵ 'Cosselh fo que tot senho d'estal guače senes tota excusatio e
se defalhian que fosson punitz'. Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p. 119.
fined. A municipal ordinance from Dax stressed that when several burgesses shared a single hearth they were not all obliged to perform guet and manoeuvres unless the seigneur so insisted. On a householder's death the obligations were transferred to the family. A roll of the watch from Mimes dating from about 1360 shows widows and children serving in place of husbands and fathers. A royal ordinance of 1479 laid down that in the case of death women should not serve and that a family could only be liable for duty if there was a son of eighteen. Obligations could also be discharged by proxy. A roll of the watch from Millau in 1412 shows a man serving in place of Dona Borsessa at her allotted post at the Porte de la Capelle, and a replacement 'per los bes de Joh. de Temeyras'. The cabochienne ordinance of the following year allowed the son to stand in for his father, the servant for his master and 'ung homo pour ung autre' so long as the substitute was adequate for the job. Municipal ordinances also usually permitted reasonable substitution.

1 AC Aigues-Mortes, BB.2, fo.117
2 'Note que quant plusors personnes damoren ensembles en augun hostau e tenen ung fug e ung pan no son tengutz de anar a manobra ni a guoeyt sino que autrement fosse ordenat per lo seinhor'. Le Livre Noir et les Etablissements de Dax, p.145.
3 'Ha Bebra cum eiu filio ... A. uxor J. B. condam ...'. AC Mimes, JJ.2, fos.7vo, 15vo & passim.
4 Ordonnances, XIX, p.70.
5 AC Millau, ss.36.
6 L'ordonnance cabochienne, p.130.
7 'Que tot home senhor d'estal gache si no a home tan sufficient coma el que i transeta e que sia a la conoguda de l'estial gach'. Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.161.
The property basis of military obligation in the towns can be seen in the insistence by municipal authorities that all persons with possessions in a community contribute to its defence. The inhabitants of Creissels (Aveyron) conducted an acrimonious dispute with one Guillaume Jaudralh of Millau on this score. They claimed that he held certain properties in the community for which he consistently refused 'afar la garde de nostredit loco coma de portas, bada e autres gueyt de nucyts et de jorns'. On their appeal their seigneur, the count of Armagnac, endorsed an earlier decision of his sénéchal of Rodez that Jaudralh was to be compelled to do watch service on pain of confiscation of his property.1

The regular duties of guet and garde were performed by the householders, but in times of emergency, when a town was directly threatened with attack, all able-bodied citizens were mobilised. In 1358 the consuls of Nîmes directed that the town walls were to be guarded by the head of each household 'et in casu magne necessitatis cum tota ejus familia'.2 This meant men as well as women. Contemporary opinion was generally against direct female participation in war. Honore Bonet, treating the question in the Tree of Battles, considered that women should not be compelled to go to war 'even though they are wise rich and strong', although he did not rule out their participation by substitute.3 But women did

1 AD Tarn-et-Garonne, A.44, fo.134, 11 Jan. 1426.
play their part, albeit in a secondary role. Ordinances for the
defence of Villefranche-de-Rouergue suggest that they be employed
in carrying stones and ammunition onto the walls and in bringing
food, drink and comfort to their menfolk on guard. Children
could also be called up in special circumstances. The normal age
limits for service in the royal host were eighteen and sixty. A boy of sixteen was considered to be 'moult jeune', but following
the Black Prince's invasion of Languedoc in the autumn of 1355 the
consuls of Nîmes drew up lists of all potential defenders over the
age of twelve.

It was axiomatic that defensive obligations extended to all the
people who enjoyed the protection of a walled town or castle. In
June 1356 Jean II wrote to the sénéchal of Beaucaire ordering him
to see that all outsiders who took refuge in Aimargues (Gard) in
time of war performed guet and garde. In 1448 the bishop of
Viviers recognised that the inhabitants of Viviers could shelter in

1 "En això devo ajudar totes las femes persones que siau ben et
alegramen et a fortidamen so es assaber que aporto peyra et
aministro l'aiga bulhen et freia cu la cautz et tot so que am
lor commandara per rigua que sia e que aporto a tots pas et vis
et viandaz sus los murs et lay cu serau en las gardas per lor
cofortar et per que no se parto de lor gardas quan això es lor
moistier'. B.N. Inat, 147, fo.285.

2 P. Contamine, Guerre, État et Société à la fin du Moyen Âge.
Etudes sur les armées des rois de France, 1337-1434, Paris,
The Hague, 1972, p.27.

3 'Huguenin Cloignasse, moult jeune enfant de l'âge de quatorze
a seize ans'. Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. col.1876.


5 AD Hérault, A.4, fos.431vo-432vo.
his castle as long as they agreed to help guard it. 1

The only excuses normally allowed from personal service were illness or legitimate absence from the town. 2 Default, lateness, negligence and misbehaviour on watch or guard were punished by fines. These varied from place to place and time to time according to the seriousness of the offence and the circumstances in which it was committed. At Millau in 1423 the consuls imposed a crushing fine of 10 livres on absentees from the watch because 'sia tot notori la destrucio que es stada facha de la notabla vila de Marsseilha et dautres locs per negligencia de bona garde'. 3 With the French threatening Bordeaux in 1406 the jurats of the city prescribed penalties of up to 65s on citizens who did not instantly obey orders to take up stations on the walls. 4 At Cahors in the late fourteenth century fines for absence from the watch ranged from 2s 6d down to 10d 'per locs comus els mendies'. 5

The fines were usually used to pay for a substitute. 6 Often

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1 'Catalogue des actes de la ville de Viviers', loc. cit. XXVII, p.117.
2 'Tot volgueron que hom gache be e diligentment e que negus no i sia desencausat sino que sia salaus o defforas la vila e que en aquel cas i trameta autres qui valhen aquel'. Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.126.
4 Archives municipales de Bordeaux. III. Registres de la Jurade, délibérations de 1406 à 1499, Bordeaux, 1873, p.7.
5 AC Cahors, Livre Tanné, fo.167.
6 For example, at Saint-Affrique in 1431 half of the fines imposed on absentees were used to pay replacements. AC Saint-Affrique, BB.6, fo.50vo.
some of the money was applied to the fortifications. In 1418 the
defence deputies of Montpellier ordered that all fines imposed for
the transgression of their ordinances were to be paid 'a la
fortificacion et reparacion de la muralha et vezitacion daquella'.
Sometimes fines were used as bait to encourage citizens to denounce
their fellows. At Courdon the council decided in April 1354 that
the 10s imposed on watchmen who turned up late should be divided
equally between the town captain and the person reporting the
offence. At Alès fines up to 5s were shared out among the watch-
men. The system was open to abuse. Captains exacted dispropor-
tionately heavy fines or made private arrangements with citizens to
exempt them from guet and garde. The preamble to the 1451 royal
ordinance of the watch declared that captains, sergeants and
governors of towns had forced civilians to perform more guard duties
than the military situation justified 'ou les ont composés pour
lesdits guets a leur paier par chacun an vint ou trente sols ou
plus avec foings, avoines, poulaillées et autres charges'.
Undoubtedly the most persistent culprits were the captains and
castellans of royal castles, and the evidence that 'compositions'
of this kind were practised in the towns is slender, although by

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1 AG Montpellier, Louvet no.670 & below, appendix VI.
2 AG Courdon, BB.4, fo.11vo.
3 Bardon, Histoire de la ville d'Alais 1341-1461, p.xxi.
4 Ordonnances, XIV, p.185. During the English occupation of
Normandy the garrison captain of Vire collected up to 854 livres
a year in compositions from the surrounding parishes. R.A.
Newhall, 'Bedford's Ordinance of the Watch of September 1428',
English Historical Review, L, 1935, p.43.
their very nature illicit arrangements are unlikely to have been officially recorded. Neither the Millau nor the Nimes watch rolls record such payments. However, the accounts of Castelnaudary for 1363 list among the town receipts sums collected from 'illis qui deficiabant in excubiis', among which several names recur. This suggests that some people may have found it preferable to commute for cash an obligation which even at the best of times must have been irksome.

Military obligations fell uniformly on all citizens irrespective of wealth and station. Comparison of the watch roll from Millau in 1412 with the taille roll of the same year shows that households falling below the tax threshold were nonetheless liable for guet and garde. Some men, such as beggars and foreigners, were exempt from service on security grounds. Others claimed exemption by virtue of their estate or profession. In 1404 Charles VI instructed the sénéchal of Périgord to ensure that nobles, clerics, royal officers and certain other inhabitants of Périgueux who refused 'sous ombre de ce quils se dient et se pretendent les uns nobles et les autres nos officies ou autrement', to pay their municipal taille and perform guet and garde were obliged to do so. The

1 AC Millau, EE.71, 73, ee.36, 37.
2 AC Castelnaudary, CC.49, fo.9ff.
3 AC Millau, ee.36, CC.104.
4 At Toulouse, for example, the council decided in June 1420 that pauperes, ministrales and brasseri should not be permitted to guard the gates. AC Toulouse, BB.3, fo.107.
5 AC Périgueux, EE.14.
participation of royal sergeants and other minor office-holders was generally enforced. The sergeants of the petit soèl of Montpellier tried unsuccessfully to exempt themselves from guest at Le Puy. At Mînes even the king's viguier and his wife were to be found on guard. But the nobility and clergy were less tractable.

The towns of the Midi contained sizeable populations of nobles, although by the mid-fourteenth century their influence as a separate and homogeneous social group had diminished, and the distinction between nobles and non-nobles had blurred. Many people spuriously claimed noble titles to avoid taxation. The law of arms required that knights should live as befits fighting men, but the military profession could be exercised equally well in the service of a town as by following the king on the field. Quite apart from gens d'armes serving in permanent garrisons in towns and castles, nobles were to be found as captains and councillors. In the event of a general mobilisation of all the inhabitants of a town the nobles would take their place with the others, but there were certain tasks which were considered inappropriate for knights. Guest and garde were deemed to be roturier obligations, although town governments did claim that nobles ought to participate in them too. In a case against certain nobles of Lunel in the 1380s the syndics argued that the town was but a single community of nobles and non-nobles and that in times of danger it was the custom for both

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1 Delcambre, Le consulat du Puy, p.131.
nobles and non-nobles to watch and guard towns and castles. How far this principle was applied is not clear. The consuls of Bergerac numbered among their privileges inventoried in 1378 'una letra del due de Lencastro cum los gentils ... fassan lo guach e lo reyre guach'.

In a dispute at Aimargues in 1381 the arbitrators decided that the nobles of the town should be compelled to guard the gates and perform arrière-guet whenever they were ordered by the captain.

The position of the clergy was ambiguous. Their right to take up arms for personal defence was generally recognised, but there was dispute about whether this extended to the protection of their temporal possessions. Honoré Bonet, himself a cleric, discussed the problem at some length, and concluded that although participation in war by men of the church, either personally or indirectly through taxation, was to be condemned, 'for they should be in no wise involved in criminal deeds', they could legitimately take up arms to defend those possessions which were strictly necessary for their life and livelihood. The clergy did cooperate in town defence, albeit reluctantly, by their contribution to the costs of fortification. They also played a personal part, although their

1 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. col.1765.
2 Jurades de la ville de Bergerac, I, p.38.
4 Bonet, The Tree of Battles, pp.140-141.
participation was often difficult to enforce. At Bergerac in 1406 there was a dispute between the consuls and the Carmelites about watch duties. The prior complained that one Vignonnet and his wife who had entered the order had had the doors of their house walled up by the consuls because they refused to do watch duty. The consuls replied that since the couple held property in the town they ought to pay taxes and take part in the watch, and that all monks and religious with houses in the town or who held property in mortmain were under the same fiscal and military obligations as the previous owners. Charles VI used the same argument to enforce the contribution of the clergy of Montauban to guet, arrière-guet and garde in 1406. A few years later his son, the Dauphin, commanded all ecclesiastics resident in Agen to serve in the watch, either personally or by substitute, and contribute to taxes for defence.

As with clerical taxation, it is difficult to see how the principle was translated into practice, but it is clear that priests and religious did play a personal part in the defence of towns and castles. The clergy of Mende recognised that in times of danger they performed arrière-guet, although they claimed that

1 Jurades de la ville de Bergerac, I, p.157.
2 AG Montauban, 3 EE.1.
it was voluntarily and implied no obligation on their part.\textsuperscript{1} An agreement made in 1386 between the abbot and chapter of Saint-Hilaire (Aude) on the one hand and the lay community of the town on the other stipulated that the monks were to perform \textit{guot} in the fort 'in the accustomed manner'.\textsuperscript{2} In 1433 the dean and chapter of Saint Pierre at Burlats near Castres claimed that as the village was so depopulated because of the war they were themselves obliged to guard the walls and gates.\textsuperscript{3} The clergy who scrupled at performing war-like duties could of course have them done by proxy or be allotted defensive tasks less likely to lead to the shedding of blood. At Bordeaux in times of siege the clergy joined forces with the carpenters of the city to man the fire brigade.\textsuperscript{4}

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\textsuperscript{1} 'Tempore discursu Anglicorum universitas dictorum clericorum, seu nonulli ex singularibus dioce universitatis aliquociens, faciebant de nocte in dictis muris repressae et circunvici
dictam muralham excitando gentes dum reperiebantur in dictis excubiis dormientes ... non ex debito sed eorum meru libereralite'. André, \textit{L'invasion anglaise en Gévaudan}, p.lxviii.

\textsuperscript{2} 'Item, que lo senhor els monges fassan lo gayt en la maneyra accoustumada'. B.N. Dom, 71, fo.427vo.


\textsuperscript{4} 'Ordre es que los religios et carpenteyas angues ans fues tant solament et no autres'. \textit{Archives municipales de Bordeaux}, III, p.8.
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CHAPTER 4

DEFENSIVE ORGANISATION INSIDE THE TOWN

i) 'Guet', 'arrière-guet' and 'garde'

Contemporary documents distinguish three kinds of military service performed in wartime by the non-professional defenders of castles and walled towns. Guet (in Ocitan gach or guèx) was the watch mounted on the ramparts. The duty of the watchmen was to keep a lookout and on sighting the enemy to sound the alarm and raise the population. Arrière-guet (reyregach, estialsach) was the patrol of the streets and walls. The arrière-guet had the dual function of acting as a check on the guet and of policing the streets. Garde or garde des portes was sentry duty at the gates. Guet and arrière-guet were usually performed at night and garde during the day. They were ancient feudal duties, revived at the start of the Hundred Years War after lying in abeyance in most towns during the long peace of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. They were designed to ensure surveillance and protection in wartime without too far disrupting the normal life of the community. Guet, arrière-guet and garde were performed by rota, thus sharing the burden among the citizens. Only when the town was in immediate danger of attack was the whole population called to arms. As the internal organisation of defence was in most towns a

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1 Because of the variety of forms and spellings in Ocitan, the standard French guet, arrière-guet and garde have been adopted.
municipal responsibility, the decision whether or not watch and guard should be mounted was left to the consuls or syndics, although in times of national emergency the king could order guet and garde to be performed in all the fortresses of the kingdom.

In the evening the men assigned to the guet and arrière-guet went on duty at nightfall or when the town gates were closed. They were usually summoned by a bell or trumpet and assembled before the captain of the watch or his clerk who checked their names against the duty list (cartel del gag). In the towns of the Midi it was apparently the usual practice to have two watches nightly in both winter and summer, although in some towns of northern France there was only one watch a night from April to September. The watch was

1 'Item, sem comenza lo geyt nobelament a XXV de dezmens ...'. 'Comptes des consuls de Montréal-de-Gers', loc. cit. XXIX, p.299. 'Fuit ordinatum super custodia muri et pertalium quod vigile nocturne cesserat usque quo alius fuerit ordinatum ...'. AC Saint-Affrique, BB.4, fo.164, consular deliberation 12 April 1435.

2 For example, in October 1399, when news arrived of the deposition of Richard II of England, Charles VI ordered guet and garde to be mounted in castles and fortresses south of the Loire, along the coast of Normandy up to six leagues inland, beyond the Somme and along the frontier with the Empire. Ordonnances, VIII, pp.356-357.


4 '(Per) far gag a adobar los cartels del gag compray I man de papier'. AC Millau, CC.410, fo.ii, 12 June 1431.

changed at midnight or at the first hour of the morning.\footnote{1}

The register of the watch at Millau for the year 1412\footnote{2} illustrates the disposition of the guet and arrière-guet in a fairly typical small town. The town wall, which had a circumference of about 1550 metres,\footnote{3} was divided for the purposes of the watch into eleven sectors corresponding to the most important gates and towers. The guet (gag) consisted of 64 men nightly in two watches of 32, those in the first being designated 'dau sera' and those in the second 'sonas de mati'. In each watch there were three men in each of the eleven sectors, except at the 'Eiterella de la Fen Bullieyras' where there were only two. One man cut of each team of three, the section leader, is labelled 'capitani'. The arrière-guet (reverregar) consisted in 1412 of eight men, four in each watch, although by 1426 it had been augmented to ten men, and to sixteen by 1433.\footnote{4} The register contains in all eight separate lists of names for the guet and arrière-guet, and while there is no indication of dates or frequency of service, the arrangement suggests that each householder would have had to turn out once every eight days.

\footnote{1}{'Lo senh de la mega nouch del guah'. Comptes consulaires de Saint-Antoinin, p.63. 'Item, que tot home venha al reyre gauh quan ala meia noyh lor sera om avat sonar'. AC Gourdon, BB.4, fo.9vo, 9 April 1353. At Saint-Affrique the first watch were to be at their posts at nine in the evening and the second at one in the morning. AC Saint-Affrique, BB.4, fo.50vo, 24 Sept 1431.}

\footnote{2}{AC Millau, ee.36, small register entitled 'Essec se lo gag ordenat ian M. IIII', XI (1412 new style) a viii del mes de fabrier el cossaint del son Joh. Dolmeyras e de sos companhos'.}

\footnote{3}{Ray, Les fortifications de Millau, p.6.}

\footnote{4}{AC Millau, EE.73, register of the watch, 21 Feb. 1426; ee.37, register of the watch, 8 Feb. 1433.}
Following the guet and arrière-guet there are two further lists of 
names: the first of the gardes de portal, and the second of the men 
asigned to the guard of the royal castle and who were thereby 
excused guet and gardo in the town. At each of the four town gates 
there were stationed six gardes and two lookouts (badas) daily. 
The register names some 45 castle guards, but gives no clue as to 
where they were posted or how their duties were organised. 

For the guetseuru on the ramparts the nights were long. The 
chief enemies were not so much the English as fatigue, cold and 
boredom. Those who could find a sheltered spot might snatch a few 
minutes sleep, perhaps to dream, like the watchmen of Chatellerault 
in Poitou, of the meal waiting for them when they came off duty, 
only to be brought to their senses by their fellows in the arrière-
guet. The Montpellier defence ordinances of 1418 forbade the 
watchmen to tear down timber from buildings adjoining the walls to 
make fires. Gambling was a common way of killing the hours. The 
same ordinances punished any man who ventured to 'gagner a l'argent

1 "Une tour y avoit qui estoit haute et grant 
   Cu une gaité y avoit qui estoit la gaitant 
   Pour le gait rvelesier aloit souvent oiant 
   "Gaitez eu pie du mur! Alez partout gaitant! 
   Maintenant sera jour, je le voi apparant 
   S'Irons mengier des trippes qui vont au feu boiillant 
   Car certes j'ai si faim o'onces je n'os si grant" 
   Ainsi diegit la gaité con je vois desvisit; 
   Mais oelx dorment a qui il s'aloi desreant, 
   Nul mot n'ont respondu; ainois vont fort ronflant."

Jean Cauvelier, La chronique de Bertrand du Guesclin, ed. L. 
Charrière, Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de 
en Poitou', p.161.

2 AC Montpellier, Louvet, no.670, & below, appendix VI.
estant en sa garda', while the fines taken from the watch at Castelnaudary in 1363 included 2s 6d from one Guillaume Robert of Villeneuvette 'qui ludebat'. The staider citizens merely chatted, perhaps supping the wine that was customarily supplied free to the guet.

It was because the guetteurs were so notoriously unreliable that the arrière-guet was conceived. The rôle of the arrière-guet is open to misunderstanding because of the inconsistency of the documents. Broadly speaking, reyregach and its variants were employed in the south and east, and estialgach in Ouyenne and the west. There were differences in practice from place to place, but the two terms are synonymous and describe a patrol duty distinct from the guet but complementary to it.

The first task of the arrière-guet was to ensure that the men of the guet were at their posts and awake. At Mende the arrière-guet went round the walls 'excitando gentes in dictis exoubiis

1 AC Montpellier, Louvet no.670, & below, appendix VI.
2 AC Castelnaudary, CC.49, fo.10vo.
3 Testimony of Helias Forreti, notary, in a fourteenth-century case from Rodez: 'et quia ipsi loqutor est de una dezena cum dicto Petro et per magnum tempus fecerunt exoubias supra murum Ruthenensis et custodiunt et stando in simul supra murum et ad portam dictus Petrus plura facta antiqua narravit dicto Petro multociens ...' AD Aveyron, C.1444, fo.cix.
4 '(Paguem) per I baralh sommadal de vin vermel per donar a beure a la gent que anar fait lo gait de la viale'. AC Narbonne, CC.2415, fo.xxxxvi.
5 The fullest definition of the terms is to be found in E. Levy, Provenzalisches Supplement-Wörterbuch, Leipzig, 1892-1924, sub esquillgacha and reiregach.
dormientes.\(^1\) This function is elaborated in an ordinance of the
watch drawn up by the mayor and échevins of Bayonne in 1315. The
esquiguosayt were to patrol the streets and ramparts of the town at
night. If they came upon any of the guosayt asleep they could con-
fiscate their weapons and any other valuables they found on them and
share them out amongst themselves. Watchmen discovered asleep a
second time were to be thrown off the walls ('los puyron gectar de
la mureauhe en bat\(^1\)'), while for a third offence they were to be at
the mercy of the mayor and council.\(^2\)

The Bayonne ordinances also reveal the second rôle of the
arrière-guet, that of a nocturnal police force. The esquiguosayt
were to arrest and imprison any 'mauffeitors, gent suspecte,
corroders de russ, armatz o no armatz, ab luts o chens luts', and
were enjoined to move about the streets stealthily so as not to
alert wrongdoers to their approach.\(^3\) The arrière-guet, unlike the
guet, was itinerant. At Bergerac householders were ordered to
clear the streets outside their homes so that the roy guach could
pass unimpeded.\(^4\) Sometimes the arrière-guet was mounted.

Recommendations for the fortification of Saint-Gilles in 1381
included the creation of a passage inside the walls so that the
arraigauach could move swiftly from one part of the ramparts to

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1 André, L'invasion anglaise en Gévaudan, p.lxviii.
2 Giry, Les Établissements de Rouen, II, p.91.
3 Ibid.
4 'Que cascus cure la carriera en drech son ostal afin que lo rey
guach e aquel que fan la guarda puscan anar per la vilà'.
another, if necessary on horseback. At Agen the estialgach regularly consisted of mounted men. This suggests that part of its function was as a supporting force to be rushed to the scene of attack to hold back the enemy until the rest of the defenders could be raised from their beds. The arrière-guet normally operated inside the walls, but could be sent out to patrol the surrounding countryside if the situation demanded.

In most towns the task of both guet and arrière-guet was made easier by the imposition of a curfew. At Auch the customs of 1301 forbade citizens to wander the streets after dark, any one discovered more than four doors from home being fined. The consuls of Narbonne enjoyed the right, also expressed in their customs, to cry the curfew through the city; between the first bell of the watch and midnight no person could go out without a light and after midnight nobody could go out at all. The arrière-guet usually carried lights. At Agen the consuls budgeted a sou a night 'per luminaria' for the estialgach. In 1385 the consuls of Albi complained that 'lo reyregag de la presen ciutat es mot avol per so

1 Ménard, Histoire de Mînes, III, pr. p.47.
2 Jurades de la ville d'Agen, pp.279, 331.
3 Payement to Bernat del Don 'que fayro lo reyre gach de foras per la nucne, car se desia que los Engles ero embusquats de torn Rodes'. Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, II, p.164, Cf. Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.258.
4 AC Auch, AA.1, Livre Vert, fo.12.
6 Jurades de la ville d'Agen, pp.284, 318, & passim.
quar hom no los provesi de candelas. 1

Gates were the most vulnerable part of the defences of towns and
castles and consequently garde des portes was one of the most
important defensive duties. Responsibility for opening and shutting
the gates was usually entrusted to salaried gatekeepers. 2 In war-
time some gates were walled up or kept permanently bolted, and armed
guards were posted at the others. Unlike guet and arrière-guet,
which were primarily nocturnal duties, garde des portes was per-
formed during the day, 3 when the gates were open. It was thus
more disruptive of the lives of the citizens upon whom the obliga-
tion fell. For this reason professional guards were employed from
time to time, especially in the larger towns. The capitouls of
Toulouse decided during the emergency of 1420 to station at each of
the gates of the city ‘duos de gentibus que sunt ad vadia’. 4 In
the autumn of 1431 the consuls of Narbonne paid guards to stand at

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1 'Délibérations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit. XLVIII,
p.446.

2 'Ordenam que los sirventz qui barren et obren las portas de la
bila sian paguats de lora guatges ayssi cum es acostumant deu
tempo passat per causa de ubrir las portas de la bila et de
barrar'. Archives municipales de Bordeaux, IV, p.44, 24 July
1414. ‘Au comensament deu mes de feure logua l'd. Ramon hun
home per barrar e hobrir la porta de Nostra Dona de matin e de
ses e per retornar las claus’. ‘Comptes des consuls de Montréal-

3 ‘La garda que se fay per jorn en las portas de la viala’.
Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, 1376-1405, ed. M. Boudet,
Paris, Riom, 1900, p.194.

4 AC Toulouse, BB.3, fo.107.
the gates during the wine harvest. These were exceptional cases though, and garde des portes was almost always carried out, like guet and arrière-guet, by the townspeople themselves.

Because of its importance, garde des portes was usually assigned to the more reliable citizens. Gates were the first and most obvious target of attack, and so the defenders had to be completely trustworthy, and as soldierly and well armed as possible. At Gourdon in 1350 the consul selected six 'bos homes' to guard the one remaining gate into the town. Custody of the gates of Montpellier was the responsibility of the escalas, the craft guilds.

Guet, arrière-guet and garde were performed by rota. The frequency with which each citizen had to turn out depended on the size of the town, the complexity of its defences and the number of available defenders. Most documents suggest that men serving in the guet and arrière-guet turned out once a week, and the gardes des portes, because of the greater personal inconvenience involved, once a fortnight or once a month. The registers of the watch at Millau

1 'Despessa feita e pagada per comandament dels senhors cossole a las guardas que an guardat los portals de vendemias a xxi de setembre l'an MCCCCXXI cum apres'. AC Narbonne, CC.2415, fo. cxxxiii.

2 AC Gourdon, BB.3, fos.5, 7.

3 Petit Thalamus, pp.95-98, 'Aysso es l'establiment de l'ordemen de las vii escalas segons los vii jorns de la setmana per gardar los portals'.

4 'Que om guaches de vii en vii nachts'. Comptes consulaires de Saint-Antonin, p.50, 25 Nov. 1362. 'Que hom fassa gach de huyeg en huyeg jorns, ha porta de mes en mes'. AC Albi, BB.19, fo.3, 21 Sept. 1419. 'Et ponatur vigilia noctis de vii in septem noctibus et vigilia diey de xv in xv diebus'. AC Saint-Affrique, BB.6, fo.50vo, 24 Sept. 1431. 'Et custodie portalium mandentur de quinse en xv'. Ibid, fo.164, 12 April 1435.
give the impression that duties were not interchangeable and that men performed the same duty, week by week and month by month all year round.  

11) The general mobilisation

Guest, arrière-guest and garde des portes were intended to guard against surprise attack while allowing the life of the community to continue as normally as possible. But in times of immediate danger the whole population was mobilised and put at action stations, ready to meet an assault.

In such an évre it was essential that every citizen knew where to go, what to do and under whose orders to act. To this end there existed in most towns a military-style structure of command based on the organisation of the citizens in cinquantaines and dizaines.  

A cinquantaine was a company of roughly fifty men commanded by a cinquantainier, and a dizaine a squad of ten men under a disainier. This organisation was very fluid. The 1361 register of the watch at Nîmes shows that each dizaine there in fact consisted of between eight and thirty men, with the average nearer twenty than ten. The fourteen cinquantaines comprised seven or eight (and in one case nine) dizaines, five (and in one case six) from the town and two or three from the suburbs.

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1 AC Millau, EE.73, ee.36, 37; passim.

2 In addition to the examples below, the system, in one form or another, is encountered at Castres, AC Castres, EE.1, fo.98, 1375; Lunel, CC.65, 1387-1388 (from the H3 inventory by Millerot); Rodez Bourg, AC Rodez, Bourg, CC.125, fos.103, 121, 1349-1350; Toulouse, Inventaire sommaire AC Toulouse, Série AA, AA.5, no.296.
the cinquantaines of Pierre de Salve there were 159 men, but only 91 in those of Michel Regnier and Jacques Gautier.\(^1\) The cinquantaines and dizaines of Nîmes were made up by wards, and so their composition reflects the demography of the town. Elsewhere there were numerous local variations in the system. At Montpellier, in addition to the cinquantainiers and dizainiers, who were responsible for the muster and array of the citizens in an emergency, there were also setenyers and irlatas who supervised the daily arrangements for the guet and garde. As far as may be judged, the setenyers, who were directly responsible to the deputies of Montpellier, each took charge one day a week, while the irlatas saw to the recruitment of the watchmen and guards by blocks of streets (irlas).\(^2\) At Rodez the guet and garde were grouped in sesenas of six men each.\(^3\) The councillors of Martel were unsure about what arrangements should be adopted and suggested that the inhabitants might be organised into companies of ten, twelve or twenty men as the consul saw fit.\(^4\)

When the alarm was sounded the citizens took up their appointed stations on the ramparts. Their disposition was governed by the size and situation of the town, the complexity of its defences and the forces available. The 1361 register of the watch at Nîmes lists 1749 householders liable for guet and garde: 1219 from the

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1 AC Nîmes, JJ.2.

2 AC Montpellier, Louvet no.670, & below, appendix VI.

3 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, II, p.303; AD Aveyron, C.1444, fo.cix.

4 AC Martel, BB.5, fo.25vo, 2 Sept. 1346.
town and 530 from the faubourge. The total number of able-bodied men and women who could be mustered in an emergency was very much greater, perhaps in the order of two or three times as many, and even more if account is taken of the refugees from outlying parishes who swelled the city population in wartime. These forces could be deployed along some 2000–2200 metres of fortifications.

A defence ordinance issued by the consuls of Nîmes in 1358 assigned to each of the fourteen cinquantainiers responsibility for a sector of the walls. Brémond Savaric, for instance, was put in charge of 58 small merlons ('merleti parvii') between the Porte Redes and the Porte de Camine. He was to station one man at every other merlon of the parapet and an archer at every loop-hole of the lower level ('arquesias bassas'). Two whole dizaines and any remaining men out of the cinquantaine were to be posted at the Porte de Camine, on the tower and around the gate itself. According to the 1361 register of the watch, Savario's cinquantaine consisted of eight dizaines, five from the town and three from the faubourges; 126 men in all. If necessary, each man was to be joined at his post by his whole family.

At Saint-Flour an ordinance 'per la garda et deffensa de la

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1 AC Nîmes, JJ.2.


4 AC Nîmes, JJ.2, fos.42-46.

dita viala es cas d'esfre o de perilh' issued by the consuls in about 1383 divides the fortifications into seven sectors, to which were allotted a total of 249 men, distributed according to the size of the sector and the lie of the ground. Between the Tour du Mag and the Porte de Muret there were to be 53 men stationed, but only 25 between the Porte du Tuile and the Porte des Lacs. In an esfre these men were to go to their posts, armed and ready for action, while a company of 100 other citizens was to assemble 'am las trompetas de la viala' in the great square of the town outside the maison consulaires and there await deployment by the consuls. A further 124 men were assigned to the defence of the faubourge.¹

At Cordes there survives a more detailed battle plan dating from 1436.² In November of that year the consuls decided that urgent measures should be taken to defend the town against Rodrigue de Villandrando who was operating in the Albigeois with an army numbering, according to their estimation, between four and five thousand men. Founded as a bastide by Raymond VII of Toulouse in 1222, Cordes was unusual among the smaller towns of southern France in the complexity of its fortifications, which consisted of four concentric enclosures. The highest part of the town, the original thirteenth century settlement known as the fort or castel, was surrounded by two separate enceintes, composed of the actual dwellings joined by short sections of curtain wall and pierced by four principal gates, two inner and two outer, each flanked by a pair of

1 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, pp.194-197.

drum towers. The third circle lay just outside the second wall and was originally a simple retaining wall and earthen terrace called the lice or planol, but in the fourteenth century this was embellished with a proper wall-walk and watchtowers (gachials). At the bottom of the hill the fourth line of defence enclosed the lower town, but it was rather rudimentary, consisting only of garden walls and palissades. The circumference of the fort at the level of the lice was about 950 metres, and that of the enceinte of the lower town about 1400 metres.¹

The defenders of Cordes were deployed along these four lines of defence. To guard the fort each of the four consuls was to have at his disposal fifteen men. When the alarm was raised they were to assemble in the square of the upper town and wait there for orders. In each of the gachials on the walls of the fort where the guetteurs were stationed at night, two men were to be posted. The lices between the second and third enceintes were to be patrolled by twenty men, ten based on the Porte de la Boucherie and ten 'al Cayreforo', to guard the entrances to the upper town not only against the enemy but also against the defenders of the lower positions who might be tempted to retreat prematurely and seek shelter in the citadel. Ten men were to be posted at the Porte de la Vergue and another ten in the Terre-pleine du Formiguier, between the third and fourth lines, to be kept there in reserve. The

majority of the inhabitants were allotted to the ramparts of the lower town. Sixteen of the most notable citizens were picked to take charge there and the defenders sectioned into quartiers of fifty men, each responsible to one of these captains and stationed along the walls and in the watchtowers. In all, 946 men were deployed under this scheme. The population of Cordes at this date was in the region of 4000 souls. Thus about a quarter of the inhabitants, probably all the able-bodied adult males, were mobilised.

iii) Non-military duties: corvées and prestations.

In addition to their obligation to defend the community in arms, the inhabitants of towns and castles could also be compelled to contribute labour and materials to the construction and maintenance of the fortifications. This obligation is clearly spelt out in some urban charters. The charter granted to Privas by the count of Valentinois in 1281 exempts the townspeople from all feudal dues and impositions, including all fossatis, except those necessary for the defence of the town. The custom of Lectoure of 1294 insists that the householders and all other inhabitants 'francas e servici' must, when required, contribute their labour to the repair of the town wall. These corvées or manobras were imposed in the

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1 C. Portal, 'Essai d'études démographiques sur Cordes', Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes, LV, 1894, pp. 133-142.


3 Archives de la ville de Lectoure, p. 41.
same way as *guet* and *garde*. At Bayonne, as at Lectoure, the custom was that manobres, like the *guet*, was discharged by hearth or household, although in an emergency the mayor and jurats could call upon the service of all the inhabitants. And like *guet* and *garde*, defensive labour services fell not only on the townspeople but on outsiders and refugees enjoying the protection of the walls. At Alès, for instance, the consuls permitted one Bertrand de Montaut of the outlying parish of Saint-Christophe to take refuge in the town in wartime so long as he agreed to pay 4 florins tax for the fortifications and provide one day's labour a week 'cum suo animalis' until the work was complete.

Corvées were closely linked to *guet* and *garde*. It was often the practice for the citizens to be made responsible for the maintenance and munitioning of their own sector of the rampart. Every dizainier of Martel had to supervise the repair of the walls and watchtowers by the men in his charge, who were supplied with the materials and bread and wine for their sustenance, but received no wages. The householders of Saint-Flour had to carry out minor repairs to the town walls themselves and notify the consuls of any more serious damage. The 1418 Montpellier ordinances laid down

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2. AC Alès, 1315, no.XV, 6 June 1356.
3. AC Martel, BB.5, fo.87v, 15 May 1355.
4. 'Los dessud nomats sont aussi echargat de ordenar, lor et los altres nomats per dessus, a la defensa de la dita plassa e la far garnir e tenir perveguda de peyra, et penre garde de las menudas reparations que y convenia, e dels perilhs que y appa-risserient, et los venir dire als cossols, a fin que per lor y sia pervegut', *Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour*, p.194.
that every centenier must check the section of fortification in his command to see that it was properly munitioned. Those men in his company who had beasts and carts had to fetch stones from the quarries and place them in the passage behind the wall, where the others would sort and distribute them.¹

All inhabitants, irrespective of whether they were responsible for a station on the wall, could be ordered to dig ditches and transport materials to the building site. These corvées were organised on the same lines as the watch, and were usually referred to as work done per cartas, that is by duty-roll, or per gachas, by wards. Following the capture of Lafrançaise by the English in November 1352, the council of Montpellier, in consultation with the royal officers in the city, ordered that a ditch be dug around the suburbs and that the work be performed by the seven échelles, each working one day a week.² At Millau in the autumn of 1355 the consuls decided that the completion of the fortifications, made more urgent by the Black Prince's invasion, should be achieved by the direct participation of the inhabitants. Cartas based on the fiscal wards of the town were drawn up and each carta had to turn out once in eight days. The system operated like the watch. Every household had to provide one labourer on the assigned day, or pay the cost of hiring a substitute. Two regidores or overseers were appointed for each carta, who denounced all defaulters to the

¹ AC Montpellier, Louvet no.670, & below, appendix VI.
² Ibid, no.659.
At Nîmes the following year the citizens were organised by *cinquantaines* and *dizaines* to carry lime from the kilns to the building sites. Each *dizaine* was assessed for an amount of lime corresponding to the length of the construction for which it was responsible. There was a similar arrangement at Agde for the carriage of timber and stones to the kilns.

Citizens were assessed for *corvées*, like *tailles*, on their taxable wealth. In 1381 the council of Albi held that repairs to the walls should be carried out by the wards of the town 'per sol e per libre'. A curious document in the archives of Millau gives some clue as to how this worked in practice. It is a small register bearing no internal evidence of date or purpose in which are listed the names of the inhabitants by *cartas* and against each name there is an entry: 'xi palms', 'la cana', 'la cana e v palms', etc. As these are measurements of length, it can be assumed that the entries refer to work done on the fortifications, most likely digging the ditches. The list of names corresponds almost exactly to the *taille* register for March 1353 relating to a subsidy of ½ *écu* per taxable denier raised to pay the town's share of a subsidy voted to the count of Armagnac for the siege of Saint-Antonin.

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1 AC Millau, CC.348, fo.xiii vo; EE.7, 9.
2 AC Nîmes, LL.1, fos.72vo-73, April-May 1356.
3 AC Agde, CC.1, fo.60, 3 Feb. 1361.
4 'Déliverations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit. XLVII, p.554.
5 AC Millau, II.1.
6 Ibid, CC.66.
Comparison of the two lists shows that in a large number of cases, though by no means all, there is a direct correlation between the tax assessment and the work quota, as is indicated by table I. The sample names and assessments are taken from two wards only, La Mandarous and La Peyssière. There is a good deal of variation among those taxed at less than 1 denier, but for those whose assessment was 1 denier or above, the corvée quota was fairly uniform: one additional palm's length of work for every taxable denier.

Where the work-load fell more heavily on some parts of a town than on others, the authorities tried to ensure an equitable distribution. When the palissade of Agen was being repaired in 1351 the jurade decided that wards in which relatively little work was needed should help those who had to make more extensive repairs. At Martel the following year a commission was elected, consisting of four prud'hommes called taxadors from within the town and two from each of the suburbs, to draw up a scheme of work for digging the ditches and to apportion the tasks among the wards. If the people of one ward completed their share inside the time allowed, they could not be compelled to do work outstanding in other wards.

Corvées could usually be commuted for a cash payment. In 1355 the consuls of the Cité of Rodes raised nearly 70 florins in commutations from the citizens who chose not to perform their corvées in person. The size of this sum suggests that direct participation

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1 Jurades de la ville d’Agen, p.237.
2 AC Martel, BB.5, fo.67, 4 May 1352.
3 Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, I, pp.200-201.
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<td>Guido da Guasao</td>
<td></td>
<td>½d</td>
<td>1 canne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W. Bauselli</td>
<td>½d</td>
<td>1 canne</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N. d'Albi</td>
<td>½d</td>
<td>1 canne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me. Derondel</td>
<td></td>
<td>1d</td>
<td>9 palms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Catala</td>
<td></td>
<td>1d</td>
<td>9 palms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Layssac</td>
<td></td>
<td>1½d</td>
<td>9½ palms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confraternity of</td>
<td></td>
<td>3d</td>
<td>11 palms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notre-Dame</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me. W. Massabuen</td>
<td></td>
<td>3d</td>
<td>11 palms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Azarn</td>
<td></td>
<td>5d</td>
<td>1 canne,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 palms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Espessiayre</td>
<td></td>
<td>6½d</td>
<td>1 canne,</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6½ palms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heirs of W. Pelegri</td>
<td></td>
<td>10½d</td>
<td>2 cannes,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2½ palms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. del Ricu</td>
<td></td>
<td>14d</td>
<td>2 cannes,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6½ palms</td>
</tr>
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Table I. Corvées at Millau c.1353

Comparison of the taille assessments for March 1353 (AC Millau CC.66) with the register of corvées (AC Millau II.4) for sample names from the two wards of Le Mandarois and La Peyssière.

* 1 canne = 8 palms = approximately 1.9 metres
in the construction of the defences was for many an irksome and unpopular obligation from which it was preferable to buy exemption. Tailles and other impositions, which were really no more than a generalised and systematic commutation of personal service, were thus a much more acceptable and efficient alternative.

In any event the usefulness of corvées was limited. A large labour-force could be mobilised quickly, but it was a force of unskilled men and women suited only to simple tasks of digging and carrying. The masonry and woodwork, which were the most important part of any sophisticated fortification, had to be entrusted to professional craftsmen. They too could be pressed into the service of the community, but they were always paid, so that even where there was compulsion, their enlistment cannot be considered a corvée in the true sense. The customs of Figeac empowered the consuls to force smiths and other specialists to leave their usual occupations and apply their skills to public works. In November 1355 the newly appointed deputies for the defence of Narbonne, in drawing up their plan for the fortifications, laid down that all master-masons, carpenters, plasterers and smiths, together with all necessary labourers, men as well as women, were to be employed solely on the work of fortification for five years, or until the walls of both Cité and Bourg had been completed. In the following June the deputies of Montpellier were invested with similar powers of direction over the craftsmen of the city, including the arbalesterios

1 Ordonnances, VII, p.666.
2 AC Narbonne, EE.1309, & below, appendix III.
and all those capable of making bows, quarrels and any other kind of artillery. ¹

Town governments also had the right to requisition necessary building materials from the inhabitants. This was really a form of taxation, but it was often closely linked to corvées. The customs of Pigeons further allowed the consuls to seize iron brought into the town and to use it for the needs of the community. ² In March 1354 all the inhabitants of Agen over the age of fourteen were ordered each to provide a plank two cannes (c. 3.6 metres) long and half a foot wide for the repair of the palissade. The timber was paid for by the town, but every person had to pay 3d to have his plank turned into a stake. ³ An account for building works at Millau in 1355 shows that large quantities of timber and other materials were requisitioned from the inhabitants. Every item was estimated by sworn experts and its value deducted from individual taille assessments. B. Ribeyre, for instance, who supplied 10 cannes and two palms of poplar posts for the wall scaffolding with a total of 3 florins, 2 gros and 5d was excused all contribution to the taille imposed in November. ⁴ However, prestations of this sort were rare and materials were usually obtained from merchants, contractors or from royal grants.

¹ AC Montpellier, Louvet no. 229.
² Ordonnances, VII, p. 666, art. 32.
⁴ AC Millau, EE 78, fo. 1 & passim; EE 80.
iv) 'Badas', 'messatges' and 'espías'

Town defence, being necessarily a part-time, civilian affair, depended for its effectiveness on the authorities receiving enough warning of the approach of the enemy to call the population to arms. Surveillance of the countryside within sight of the town was assured by lookouts (badas) placed on steeples, hills and other vantage points (gachins). Unlike the guet and garde, the badas were paid a salary. Many towns only employed badas in wartime, although they were just as necessary in peacetime to watch for fires and civil commotion. At Albi there was a gachil on one of the towers of the church of Saint-Salvi and additional lookouts were often stationed on the hills outside the town.¹ Nîmes has a magnificent vantage point in the Tour Magne, the Roman tower which, impressive even today, dominates the town and surrounding country from the Mont Cavalier, about a mile outside the medieval town wall. Two men were stationed at the top of the tower from which they signalled the approach of the enemy to their colleagues on the tower of Sainte-Marie in the town to ring the tocsine. The consul of Montpellier posted their lookouts on the tower of the consular church of Notre-Dame-des-Tables. The municipal accounts of 1371-72, for example, record payments of 52 livres each to two men employed as lookouts for the whole year.³ In March 1403 Pierre Ayle,

¹ AC Albi, EE.14; Douze comptes consulaires d'Albi, I, pp.128-129 & passim. For the reconstruction of this gachil see AC Albi, EE.14. The massive tower of the cathedral was not completed until the end of the fifteenth century.

² Wénard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pr., pp.246, 249 & passim.

³ AC Montpellier, Joffre no.847, fo.xxix.
tornerius, of Montpellier, was engaged as 'custodem campanilis ...
et pulsatorum horarum noctibus et diebus ac tubicinatores vigilis
sive guache de vespere et de mane et pro faciendo ibidem vigilias
propter incendia guerras et gentes armorum' for four years at an
annual salary of 24 livres and two cannes of cloth worth 32s.¹ In
1381 the consuls of Narbonne, at war with their viscount, ordered
that two badas be placed on the cathedral and two on the church of
Saint-Paul in the Bourg. At night they were replaced by scotas
who, as their name implies, were to listen for suspicious noises.²
The badas were paid regularly at the end of the week whereas the
scotas, who were hired intermittently, were paid after each night's
service, though both received the same salary, 15d a day or night.³
Similarly the consuls of Cordes posted watchmen along the walls
'per gachials e per escotas'.⁴

Badas and scotas raised the alarm by means of bells, banners,
trumpets or beacons. A curious directive issued by Aymeri VII,
viscount of Narbonne and captain-general in Languedoc in 1358,
provided for the creation of an inter-communal alarm system using
beacons. In every town and village of the province there were to
be lookouts on duty day and night. One man was sufficient to watch

¹ Renouvier & Ricard, 'Des maîtres de pierre', p.327.
³ P. Cayla, 'Aspects de Narbonne à la fin du XIVe siècle', Bulletin de la Commission archéologique de Narbonne, XXIV,
1957-1959, pp.51-52.
by day, but at night there must be two, one to watch while the 
other slept. They were to signal the approach of the enemy with 
a fire (faro) by night and a column of smoke (fumi) by day; the 
greater the numbers of the enemy the more intense the fire or smoke. 
On receipt of the signal all the communities of the vicinity must 
reply in like fashion and send scouts to investigate the cause. 

The ordinance was transcribed by the consuls of Nîmes into their 
register of deliberations, but there is no other evidence of its 
implementation. Interestingly though it is echoed in an Aragonese 
royal ordinance of 1384 concerning the defence of Roussillon, which 
has the additional sophistication of stipulating one faro or fumi 
for every hundred soldiers sighted. 

The municipal accounts of Millau record the purchase in 1440 
of a piece of white cloth to make a banner to wave as a signal when 
hostile troops were seen, but the most ubiquitous alarm signal was 
the tocsin whose urgent toll quickly roused the whole community and 
alerted the surrounding countryside. On 6 January 1369 the consuls 
of Albi paid two scouts 'que anero per espiar al Castelnou et a 
S. Serni que avian fach tocasenh'. Likewise the olavaire of 
Narbonne notes that on 23 April 1380 a messenger arrived from the 
captain of Cuxao warning the consuls to be on their guard because

1 Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pr. p.231.
2 AC Nîmes, LL.1, fo.211.
3 J.-F. Finô, Forteresses de la France médiévale, Paris, 1970, 
p.177.
4 Documents sur la ville de Millau, p.304.
5 Douze comptes consulaires d'Albi, I, p.89.
the 'gran toquasenh' had been heard in the villages of Sallèles and Saint-Marcel. Bells, being the only effective means of simultaneous communication over a distance, played an important part in defensive arrangements. The bell called the people to the watch and sounded the change at midnight. In 1427 the consuls of Millau transferred the town bell from the steeple of the church of Saint-Martin to the new tower of the Porte du Mandarou. "E ayso per sonar la nueg can los semanias montaran sul gach per far venir aquellos que son de gach e lo semaniania que venra a miega nuag la fara sonar per so que lo gach si remude e aquel del mati la fara sonar cant lo gach davalara del mur per so que las gardas sian a l'ubrien dels portals." Bells too called consuls and councillors to their meetings, indeed at Millau the inner council was known as the 'Council of the Bell' (cossaIhe de l'esquilhe). Hugues de Cardaillac's ordinance for the defence of Montauban insists that at each gate of the town there should be a bell which the defenders are to use to call for help in the event of an assault. When the great bell of the town ('lo gran senh') is tolled all the townspeople are to cease work and go to their posts on the walls; those labouring in the fields are to run for shelter in the town. To avoid the contempt of familiarity, the great bell is only to be used 'al gran bezonh'. At Lodève each tower of the

1 AC Narbonne, CC.2355, fo.xxxvii vo.
2 Documents sur la ville de Millau, p.287.
3 Ibid, p.93 & passim.
town wall was equipped with its own bell. A defensive ordinance of July 1428 states that at night all the bells are to be tolled in turn once an hour as a signal that all is well.¹

Bells were a symbol of civic independence and, perhaps because of their insurrectional potential, could be subject to seigneurial control. After the rising at Montpellier in 1379 the duke of Anjou stripped the consulate of its privileges, including the right to a bell and belfry.² In October 1357 the consuls of Nîmes had to approach the sénéchal of Beaucaire's lieutenant when they wanted a bell for the defence of the town,³ and in April 1434 the right to a new bell and tower from which to watch for the enemy and call the citizens to the guet and councillors to their meetings was the object of a grant by Charles VII himself.⁴ In December 1352 Jean I d'Armagnac permitted the consuls of Rodez Bourg, of which he was seigneur, to install a bell for the same purpose in a place to be determined after consultation with their advisers.⁵ Three years later, acting in his capacity as royal lieutenant, he instructed the sénéchal of Rouergue to investigate the petition of the consuls of the Cité for a bell to be erected on their town hall or some other convenient location.⁶ The Cité got its bell,⁷ but in 1369 the

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¹ AC Lodève, BB.1, fo.217.
² Histoire de Languedoc, IX, p.877.
⁴ Ibid, III, pr. p.245.
⁵ Coutumes et privilèges du Rouergue, I, p.134.
⁷ Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, pp.442-443.
consuls went to their lord the bishop, Payditus d'Aigrefeuille, with
the suggestion that small bells ('campanis parvis') be placed in the
towers of the town wall because the single bell was insufficient to
rouse the watchmen. Aigrefeuille consented, permitting them to
place a bell weighing 1 quintal in the Tour Raynalde 'because of the
great distance between this tower and the town hall', and in the
other towers and gatehouses 'parvas campanellas que tantummodo de
una ad aliam possint audiri', but added the proviso that these bells
were only to be used for defensive purposes; in particular the
consuls were on no account to use them to assemble the citizens or
to call their council meetings, and any breach of this undertaking
would result in forfeit of the privilege. In the event, the bell
in the Tour Raynalde proved too small and in 1375 the consuls were
allowed to replace it with one twice the size.

Mechanical clocks appeared in the southern towns towards the
end of the fourteenth century. In January 1385 the consuls of the
Bourg of Rodez were authorised by the count of Armagnac to build a
relogebium on the Portail du Pas which separated their part of the
town from the Cité. In 1403 the duke of Berry granted 200 livres
to the consuls of Villefranche-de-Rouergue for the purchase of a
clock. It is apparent from at least one source that the civic
authorities saw in the new invention a cheaper and less erratic

1 Coutumes et privilèges du Rouergue, I, pp.40-41.
2 Ibid, pp.46-47.
3 AC Rodes, Bourg, II.1, art. xxxvii.
4 B.N. Doat, 147, fos.213-215.
timekeeper than the badas. In 1410 the consuls of Montpellier declared that because of the 'magnis vadiis' and 'magna negligencia, quia non trahunt eas horis debitis' of the lookout on Notre-Dame des Tables they had decided to purchase a clock. Also, their faith in the new technology proved ill-founded, for shortly after its installation the clock broke down and had to be rebuilt. 1

Town authorities kept themselves informed of developments further afield by the extensive use of spies (espías) and messengers (messatges). Espías prospected for news whereas messatges carried letters or requests for specific information, but there was no fundamental distinction between them. Both Hugues de Cardaillac and the anonymous authority responsible for the defensive ordinances of Villefranche-de-Rouergue stressed the importance of an effective intelligence system. At Montauban Cardaillac urged the consuls to send out scouts to ascertain the disposition and intentions of the enemy and to post escotás outside the town to intercept espías 'si n'avía per trahir la vila'. 2 The Villefranche ordinances are more explicit. 'Gran re d'espías bonas et certanas' must be employed to give advanced warning of the approach of the enemy. When the hostile army was within six or eight leagues of the town the captain was to send out two skilled messatgers to parley with the enemy commanders. They must talk of truces and terms, protracting the negotiations for as long as possible, going to and fro repeatedly so as to learn what they could of the enemy forces and

2 Forestié, 'Hugues de Cardaillac et la poudre à canon', p.211.
to give the town more time to prepare its defence.\footnote{Et quant hom es sertz que elh veno ann que la part deu lou capitani trâmets dos bos savis homes en contra los enanims siays ou ceyt leges messtgiars per demandar et saber als capitanias de la est que volo far ni ou volo anar et scaber tot so que poiron de lor volontat et porto lor rasonier cum aquel luoc no lor a tort et dire so que lo cossielh quels trêmet lor a comandat e no lcs de tardar tant quant podo a lor demandan acort cu trevas et far lor atendre resposta al plus que podo et entretan los messtgiars entendo lor volntat et aprendo quan de gens so ni que volo far et devo y retornar motas bets et entretan las gens se arman et van en lor gardas et an cossielh que devo far ..., B.N. Doat, 147, fos.286-286vo.} Entries in the consular accounts of Nîmes covering payments made to spies and messengers in late 1363 show how these precepts were applied. The winter of 1363-64 was a time of special difficulty for Nîmes and Bas-Languedoc as bands of routiers made their way from Auvergne and the north, some bound for the war in Spain, most with no evident destination or purpose, or so it appeared to the civilian population, but to loot and terrorise. The situation became critical just after Christmas. On 26 December the consuls received a message from Maître Johan Trenquier, notary, of Anduze informing them of the capture of the village of Durfort, some forty kilometres to the north-west of Nîmes on the edge of the Cévennes.\footnote{Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pr. p.262, \& below, map II.} On the same day two villagers from Parignargues, just fifteen kilometres outside Nîmes, in the same direction, arrived with news that troops had passed by there in the night, obviously on their way to Nîmes.\footnote{L't quant hom es sertz que elh veno ann que la part deu lou capitani trâmets dos bos savis homes en contra los enanims siays ou ceyt leges messtgiars per demandar et saber als capitanias de la est que volo far ni ou volo anar et scaber tot so que poiron de lor volontat et porto lor rasonier cum aquel luoc no lor a tort et dire so que lo cossielh quels trêmet lor a comandat e no lcs de tardar tant quant podo a lor demandan acort cu trevas et far lor atendre resposta al plus que podo et entretan los messtgiars entendo lor volntat et aprendo quan de gens so ni que volo far et devo y retornar motas bets et entretan las gens se arman et van en lor gardas et an cossielh que devo far ..., B.N. Doat, 147, fos.286-286vo.} They were followed by two men from Durfort who had been held captive by the enemy and who were able to give eye-witness
accounts of the disaster which had befallen their village. A messenger also arrived from the castellan of Beaumaire asking the consuls to pass on to him whatever news they had. On receiving these reports the consuls dispatched espies and messengers. Ponce and Bertrand Polzani were sent to Anduze, Bocciran and Vézénobres.

The next day, 27 December, Ponce Barges and a companion took letters to the consuls and captain of Aramon, the prudhommes of Thézières and Vollepellicières and the consuls of Moussac, a journey of three days, and two other messengers left for Gujan, Moulézan, Montmirat and Sauve and were away for two days. On the 28th letters were received from the consuls of Montpellier and from Guillaume d’Uzès, who reported that the enemy were near Alès, had burnt the village of Nera on the Gardon, between Alès and Mîmes, and taken Moussac. The citizens of Mîmes, he urged, must be on their guard at all times since this kind of enemy ‘unum dicunt et alia faciunt’.

On the 29th the consuls learned from Sauve of the capture of Saint-Christophe and received from the consuls of Alès a detailed report on the situation in their area based on information obtained from spies captured by the count of Beaufort, their seigneur. The royal treasurer, Pierre Scatisse, ordered the report

1 Ménard, Histoire de Mîmes, II, pr. p.262.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
to be sent to the king's commissioner, the bishop of Thérouanne. 1

The region in which the consuls of Nîmes were immediately
interested was bounded by Alès and the Cévennes to the north, Font-
Saint-Spirit, Avignon, Beaucaire and Arles to the east, the sea to
the south, and Montpellier to the west, a radius of about sixty
kilometres. But not infrequently the consuls received news of
events considerably further away. In August 1373, for instance,
the syndics of Lunel sent them a copy of a letter from the consuls
of Millau concerning the departure of an English army from Pigeac
in Quercy 2 and in October the same year the consuls sent their own
spies to Le Puy and Broude, nearly 200 kilometres from Nîmes, to
report on the situation in Velay and Foës. 3

At Nîmes, and doubtless in most other towns, the espiaes and
messagres were recruited from among a small group of professional
messengers. A series of quittances for sums paid by the consuls to
one T. Olivier, described as 'Incorudor de Nemse', in March 1433
illustrates the activity of one of these agents. On 5 March he
returned from a journey to Apostoli and Génolhac on the road to
Le Puy where he had been sent for news of Rodrigue de Villandrando.
On the 10th he was paid 2½ moutons for a five days journey to
Le Caylar, and on the 15th 3 moutons for six days to an unspecified
destination. On the 23rd he returned from a trip to Alès, where
he had been two days. In many towns mendicant clergy were used as

1 Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pre. p.262.
3 Ibid, p.319.
4 AG Nîmes, JJ.1, nos.19, 22, 24, 27.
spies and messengers. In December 1358 the consuls of Saint-Antonin learned of the capture of the castle of Feneyrols from a Carmelite friar.¹ In May 1410 the consuls of Bergerac sent two Franciscans, Jehan de Cussat and Pray Helioto to Langrais 'per saber algunas noelas'.²

In addition to gathering intelligence of a specifically military kind, towns kept in constant touch with events at the local, regional and national level through their daily administrative correspondence. The evidence from Nimes, and from other towns throughout the Lidi, is of a high degree of communication and cooperation between towns and villages and local seigneurs and the king's officers. Towns and castles may have been captured 'per negligentia de bona garda' but seldom through complete ignorance of the movements and probable intentions of the enemy.

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¹ Comptes consulaires de Saint-Antonin, p.30.
² Jurades de la ville de Bergerac, I, p.169.
CHAPTER 5

TOWN MILITIAS

The internal duties of guet and garde were the mainstay of the civilian defence effort throughout the Hundred Years War. But towns were under the obligation of furnishing troops to the seigneurial ost and to the royal army while enjoying the limited right to organise military operations in the local area. Their citizens could therefore be required to serve outside the town walls as soldiers in the milice communale.¹

1) Recruitment and organisation

Service in the town militia was an obligation falling, like guet and garde, on the householders. The twelfth-century customs of Moissac entitled the abbé-chevalier, seigneur of the town, to the service in wartime of one man from every family.² Service in the town militia of Agen was compulsory for every cap d'estal (except widows and orphans) up to the age of seventy, although the customs allowed exemption on the grounds of sickness or absence on pilgrimage or legitimate business, and substitution by a son.

¹ The term 'militia', translating the French milice, is employed in this context to describe any contingent of civilians raised in the towns for outside service, whether for local defence or in royal or seigneurial armies.

Although all citizens were liable for service in the militia, and could, if necessary, be called up, in practice the contingents raised in the towns were usually quite small. How the men were selected is not clear. There is no evidence of any form of rota such as existed for the guet and garde: the irregularity of service and the variability of the numbers required on each occasion would have made such a system difficult to operate. Probably the chief criterion was military aptitude. In 1353 the consuls of Millau resolved to send only their best men to the siege of Saint-Antonin so that the count of Armagnac should be well pleased with them. At Paris, Rouen, Caen, Laon and in many other towns of Languedoc companies of arbalétriers were formed in the later fourteenth century, who in return for generous fiscal exemptions undertook to train and equip themselves for service with the king. They provided royal armies with skilled soldiers as well as bringing a greater professionalism to urban defence. The françois-archers created by Charles VII's ordinance of 28 April 1448 were directly derived from these arbalétriers. Before that date there is no evidence of any similar organisation in the towns of the Nidi, at least there are no foundation charters of the northern type.

1 A. Ducom, La commune d' Agen; essai sur son histoire et son organisation depuis son origine jusqu' au traité de Brétigny (1360), Paris, Agen, 1892.
2 'Documents inédits sur Millau', loc. cit., 21, p. 556.
although there are incidental references to companionships of archers. Probably these were no more than loose associations of men meeting to train and compete in the use of the crossbow. In 1320 the arbalestiers of Montpellier complained that they had no space in which to practise, and were granted part of the town ditch.\(^1\) A public crossbow competition was instituted in Nîmes in 1363.\(^2\) Six years later Charles V's ordinance of 3 April 1369 gave new encouragement to martial exercise by ordering archery contests to be held regularly in every town in the land.\(^3\) This sensible measure seems to have been generally observed. In 1383 the consuls of Saint-Flour offered a silver dagger as a prize to the archers of the town as an inducement to prepare themselves for the siege of Le Saillant.\(^4\) In 1428 the council of Lodève decided to set aside a practice ground for the use of archers.\(^5\) There was an association of arbaletriers at Le Puy by at least 1443.\(^6\)

1 AC Montpellier, Thalamus des Ouvriers, fo.107. They were granted a part of the escama (embankment) near the Porte de Lattes 'en que puesco joguar e deportar li arbalestier las festas els autras dias als bons homes dela villa e ab totas bonas personas'. These arbalestiers were probably bowmakers rather than archers, being referred to in one document as 'arbalestiers ho quo fano bilestas'. Petit Thalamus, p.301.


3 Ordonnances, V, p.172.

4 'Baylet lodit recebedor a Quill, Falissa uma dagua que li dit ss. cossols donez als companhos ar Baldwin per joyau et per far plaser affin que fesso melhs prest per anar davant lo dit luco de Salhens Xe.' Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, pp.172-173.

5 AC Lodève, BB.1, fo.190vo, 7 Feb. 1428.

6 Delambre, Le consulat du Puy, p.132.
training and competition obviously made it easier for the town authorities to select the citizens likely to make the best soldiers, though this is not to say that the town militia necessarily contained the best soldiers each time it was raised.

The social composition of the militias is also hard to judge. Two documents from the early part of the war suggest what was probably a commonplace, that it was from among the poorer citizens that the troops were recruited. A force of 25 men raised in Narbonne in 1342 for service in the royal army consisted entirely of artisans: there were ten weavers, four tailors, four agricultural labourers, three shoemakers, two furriers, a turnspit and a smelter.\(^1\) Of twenty sergeants sent from Millau to Montoucq in 1349 only four names can be definitely identified on the register of the taille for that year, and they are all assessed at one denier or less.\(^2\) The others doubtless fell below the tax threshold, although their names, like Fabre and Sabaterii, indicate their social condition.

While service in the militia was customarily free, it was common practice in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries for the troops to be paid at public expense, unless the numbers were too great. In March 1353 the consuls of Millau decided that the contingent sent to the count of Armagnac at Saint-Antonin should be paid by the town, but that if the count called up all the citizens

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1. AC Narbonne, EE.456.
2 AC Millau, EE.121; CG.255.
then each man should pay his own expenses. 95 sergeants sent from Courdon to Montpazier in June 1351 were supplied with their victuals by the consuls, and received 2s a day each in wages, which were deducted from their taille contribution. In 1360 twenty sergeants dispatched by the consul of Albi to the siege of Mirepoix were paid 1s 4d each *per beure e per vesperti*.  

The mobilisation of troops was the responsibility, in most towns, of the consuls or syndics. The act of union between the Cité of Périgueux and the Puy-Saint-Front in 1240 gave to the common consulate the right to call up the militia. Two centuries later, in 1442, the officers of the court of pariage at Le Puy at last recognised the sole right of the consuls of the town to mobilise the citizens for service outside.

The town militia was commanded by one or more of the consuls, the town captain or a prominent citizen with military experience. The customs of Agen laid down that whenever the town sent troops to the royal ost they were to be captained by the four consuls. The Millau contingent which went to Saint-Antonin in March 1353 was led by Gui de Vono, a knight living in the town.

1 'Documents inédits sur Millau', loc. cit., 21, p.556.
2 AC COURDON, CC.17, fo.3vo.
3 Comptes consulaires d'Albi 1352-1360, p.57.
4 Recueil de titres sur Périgueux, p.40.
5 Delcroix, Le consulat du Puy, p.128.
6 Ducon, La commune d'Agen, p.200.
7 'Documents inédits sur Millau', loc. cit., 21, p.556.
commander of the troops sent by Montpellier to the siege of Peyriac in 1363, later became the king's vice-admiral in Languedoc. The town captains of Saint-Flour, J. Chapola and P. de Barrea, were placed in charge of the town contingent at the siege of Les Maisons in 1382.2

When all the citizens were called up in the militia it was the personal responsibility of each man to arm and equip himself as befitting his station. Small contingents on the other hand, were usually supplied with arms and harness by the town.3

The militia marched under the banner of the town. In 1362 the consuls of Mimes had a new banner made for their troops who were sent to join the sénéchal at Alès.4 For the siege of Chalière in 1380 the consuls of Saint-Flour bought green and white cloth, the colours of the town, to make a large standard, a smaller pennant for the town trumpeter and decorations for the militia sergeants.5 The town band sometimes went too. It was the custom at Agen for trumpeters to accompany any contingent marching out to war.6

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2 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.175.
3 The manufacture and distribution of arms is dealt with below, in Chapter
5 'Per far l'estendard, lo peno de la trompeta et altres petitz penes per los glavis de los comenhos de la viala que ancro al dit setge, per vi almas et i dimay de boquasis blanx et vers, tant de l'un com del altra, a vi s, la alna xxix s.' Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.89.
6 Ducom, La commune d'Agen, p.200.
town pipers of Saint-Antonin led the town militia to the siege of Sainte-Croix in 1363, and for their trouble were supplied by the consuls with shoes.\footnote{1} Johan Corret,\footnote{1} trumpeter of Saint-FLOUR, also had his boots paid for by the town when he trumpeted the sanflorain contingent to the siege of Montgieux in 1382.\footnote{2}

There is very little evidence of how town militias were organised in the field. When forming part of the royal est they were disposed in companies and battles by the king’s captains. In July 1382 the inhabitants of Saint-FLOUR were ordered to hold themselves ready for the siege of Le Saillant \textit{per dizaines},\footnote{3} which suggests that it was the practice to mobilise the citizens for the militia in \textit{dizaines} and \textit{cinquantaines} in the same way as for an \textit{efrei} inside the town.

\section*{ii) Town militias and local defence}

The towns of the French Midi had no 	extit{contado} in the Italian sense. Their jurisdiction extended no more than a few miles outside the walls. Over this 	extit{territoire} the municipal authorities had the same defensive rights and responsibilities as inside the town and the militia was frequently used to patrol the outlying fields and farms which did not enjoy the protection of the town walls.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] \textit{Pagues ad Alio le cornamuzaire per i parelh de sabatas que n’aguem can anet al seti de Sta. Crotz que ac de Jaume Parti ... an R. Azam per i parelh de sabatas que pres B. lo cornamuzaire can anero al seti de Sta. Crotz an lo castela}. \textit{Comptes consulaires de Saint-Antonin}, p.57.
\item[3] Ibid, p.172.
\end{footnotes}
In 1347 the jurade of Agen voted for the establishment of a force of one hundred sergeants ‘per guardiar en torn de la vila’. 1 The council of Courdon resolved in March 1353 that the town should raise sixty sergeants ‘a que los sirven uno sobre los enemix o lor fasso emboscadas’. 2 In November 1351 twenty conquerhos were paid by the consule of Bergerac to ‘emboscar deffora la vila per guardar las gens e lo bestial’. 3 Sometimes town militias were also sent to the aid of neighbouring towns and villages. In 1346 the consule of Cahors sent a force of ten archers to defend the village of Lauzarre against the English. 4 In February 1356 the consule of the Cité of Rodez despatched ten balesties to Villefranche-de-Rouergue ‘per accora’ against the enemy holding the abbey of Locdieu. 5

But independent military operations by the towns were small in scale and confined for the most part to the immediate locality. For the crown discouraged private initiative, even in the public interest, and had struggled for centuries against seigneurial and municipal pretensions to the right of making war. The towns of the Midi, it is true, had never displayed the same spirit of belligerency as those of Italy or Flanders, but in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the larger cities like Toulouse had nonetheless taken to the field in defence of their privileges and

1 Jurades de la ville d’Agen, p.123.
2 AC Courdon, BB.4, fo.7.
3 Jurades de la ville de Bergerac, I, p.79.
5 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, p.243.
interests. Even as late as 1381, as a result of the dispute over the barbicans and town captaincy, the consul and people of Narbonne made war on the viscount, raising a mercenary army and destroying the viscount's castles and palaces. This, admittedly, was an exceptional occurrence, which must be seen in the light of the popular unrest which swept Languedoc in the 1380s, for by the start of the Hundred Years War the crown had largely succeeded in stopping this type of military adventure, at least as far as the towns were concerned.

Even in wartime, if the towns wanted to take independent action against their own and the king's enemies, they had first to obtain the king’s permission. In January 1347 Philippe VI wrote to the castles, cities and towns of the southern Sénéchausséées allowing their inhabitants to attack and kill or bring to justice robbers, bandits and freebooters whose were terrorising the civil population "sous l'ombre de nos guerres". In 1385 the duke of Berry allowed the men of Beaucaire to take reprisals and make war on Toulouse and the other cities of Provence which had attacked them.

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2 Histoire de Languedoc, IX, pp.907-908.
3 Royal letters dated Vincennes, 11 Jan., 1347. Copies to the sénéchal of Périgord and Quercy, AC Cujaro, FF.288; to the sénéchal of Carcassonne, with the authorisation of the latter to the people of Albigèse to put the measures into practice, B.N. Dat., 104, fo.30.
4 "Ils puissent resister, faire guerre, prendre, tuer et apprisonner les preux dits Provencaux et vous mettre a ransoms telles comme bon leur semblera". Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols. 1703-1704.
In June 1440 the royal bailli of the mountains of Auvergne gave the consuls and people of Saint-Flour licence to make war on 'gens d'armes de traits' and other enemies of the king who were operating in the region.¹

Unauthorized military action was dangerous and invited reprisal, not only from the enemy, but also from the king and his officers in whose very interest the towns were acting. In about 1363 the castle of Villeneuve near Cordes fell into the hands of the routiers. The inhabitants of Cordes bought back the castle and returned it to its seigneur, Pierre-Raymond de Rabastens, who garrisoned it with his own captain and soldiers. However, these troops had no sooner taken up their stations than they began in turn to terrorise the neighbourhood. This provoked the men of Cordes to storm and burn a part of the castle, acting, so they claimed, under the umbrella of Pope Urban V's bull granting indulgence to those who resisted the routiers, and of letters given by the sénéchal of Toulouse urging robbers and looters to be attacked wherever they were found. Rabastens did not regard the affair in the same light and used his position in the royal administration to harass the people of Cordes. Only an appeal to the king's lieutenant, the duke of Anjou, could bring them peace.² At about the same time Anjou, at the intercession of the pope, granted a pardon to the citizens of nearby Albi who, in similar circumstances, had

¹ Inventaire des archives de Saint-Flour, chapitre IV, no. 21, fos. 111vo-112.

² AC Cordes, E.E. 3, duke of Anjou's letters of remission, April 1363.
sacked the routier fortress of Peyrolles. In August 1377 Charles V
gave a pardon to the consuls and people of Béziers who, some three
years earlier, had attacked a company of brigands and captured
about fifteen of them whom they summarily executed. Later, seised
with remorse, and fearing that the victims might have been soldiers
of the king, the citizens had buried the bodies secretly and
appealed to the king for mercy.

There were, of course, good military reasons why local initia-
tive by civilians was discouraged. The impact which the militia
of a single town could make was small and enthusiasm alone, without
discipline and experience, was no guarantee of success. Urban V
counselling prudence in a letter written to the towns of Languedoc
in 1363. His offer of an indulgence to those who fought against
the routiers had caused simple folk to throw away their lives
futilely. At Sauveterre in the diocese of Lombes a band of local
men had tried to tackle looters and had been slaughtered, and in the
light of this incident he urged civilians not to embark on any kind
of military venture without proper organisation and leadership.

A mémoire drawn up by the consuls of Mimes after the tuchin disturb-
ances relates how the townspeople, despairing of any end to the
looting and banditry in the region, decided to take the law into
their own hands and marched out against the routiers, who, they

1 B.N. Deat, 104, fos.34vo-39, letters of Urban V, 23 Jan. 1363,
and of the duke of Anjou, April 1363.

2 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.1596-1597.

3 Archives de la ville de Montpellier, Inventaires et documents.
 I. Notice sur les anciens inventaires. Inventaire du Grand
Chartrier, ed. J. Berthelot, Montpellier, 1895, no.2253.
claimed, were being assisted by the local nobility. As they approached, the routiers shouted 'Berry, Berry' to make them believe that they were soldiers of the king, and, when they turned in confusion, butchered them miserably.¹

Probably the real reason why the crown was reluctant to allow independent military action by non-professionals was a social one. Professor Contamine has persuasively argued that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the French nobility deliberately sought to exclude from the profession of arms all but the members of their own caste. Thus to encourage civilian enterprise would have been to erode their monopoly.²

This theory is difficult to test in relation to the Midi, where traditionally social distinctions were more fluid than in northern France. But in 1363 the Estates of the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire ordered a force of 200 men at arms to be raised for local defence, to consist not only of knights and squires but also of burgesses and any other persons with the necessary military skill.³ The realism of the marshal Arnoul d’Andrehem is detectable in this decision. He and Du Guesclin and experienced field commanders like them were prepared to make full use of non-professionals when the need arose. However, from 1358, for almost sixty years, Languedoc was ruled by the king's sons, the dukes of Berry and Anjou, who as princes of the blood, typified the ideals and

1 Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, III, pr. p.62.
2 Contamine, Guerre, État et société, pp.177, 217, & passim.
3 Ordonnances, III, pp.618–627.
shared the prejudices of the aristocracy. Jean I d'Armagnac, who
preceded Berry as the king's lieutenant, certainly held firm views
about the role of civilians in warfare. In the autumn of 1355 the
men of Toulouse assembled outside the walls of their city to resist
the Anglo-Gascon army of the Prince of Wales. But, according to
Froissart, 'li contes d'Ernignach leur deffendoit et leur aloit au
devant. Et disoit que, se il issoient hors, il sieroient tout
perdre, car il n'estoenient mies usearmes ensi que li Engles et li
Gascon, et ne poisoient faire milleur exploit que de garder leur
ville'.

On this occasion the military argument for caution was no doubt
strong, but the townspeople and villagers who saw their homes and
fields destroyed while the royal commanders held their forces back
found it hard to understand. When the Prince of Wales's army was
allowed to return to Bordeaux without so much as a skirmish, 'oij
de Tholose furent durement esmeu et couroucie sus les gentils
hommes ... et en parlerent mout vilainement sus leur partie'.

Accusations of incompetence, indifference and even of con-
nivance with the enemy were commonly levelled at the nobles. In
1359 the consuls of Saint-Antonin complained bitterly that while
they and the other communities of Rouergue had furnished men, money
and equipment for the siege of Fenayrols, the local nobility had
let them down, and that out of 150 men at arms recruited from among

1 Froissart, Chroniques, ed. S. Luce, G. Raynaud & L. & A. Mirot,
the gentlemen of the province; two thirds had deserted.¹ The consul of Nîmes accused the nobles of collaborating with the king's enemies and of looting and robbing with them.² And the charge rang true all over the Midi. The deteriorating social climate in the later fourteenth century, of which the rural tuchinats and the revolts in the towns were symptomatic, was attributable to many factors, of which taxation looms large. But perhaps one important root of the unrest was also the frustration of civilians with the conduct of a war from which they were debarred by aristocratic prejudice from playing anything but a secondary and largely defensive rôle.

On the other hand, it would be wrong to place too much weight on the enthusiasm of the towns to participate in the war in a more direct and useful way. Many shared the view of the count of Armagnac that the proper rôle of townspeople was the defence of their own town. When summoned by Armagnac himself to provide their militia for the siege of Saint-Antonin in 1353, the consul of Cajarc refused on the grounds that if they did so the town would be deprived of its defenders.³ The consul of Nîmes used the same argument in 1363 when called upon to mobilise all the men of the city for service at Carcassonne.⁴ It was a common and convenient excuse, whose validity the crown was in fact prepared to recognise.

1 Comptes consulaires de Saint-Antonin, p.36.
3 AG Cajarc, III (supplément).
4 Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pr. p.270.
The customs of Condom, confirmed by Jean II in 1358, stated that, because the majority of the inhabitants were needed to guard the extensive fortifications, the town was to be exempt from all military obligation, save of providing one hundred sergeants for the defence of the diocese of Agen alone.¹ In 1373 Charles V wrote to the Viscount of Narbonne, his admiral, forbidding him to enlist into the navy any citizens of Narbonne except those who were trained sailors or archers, since the city was surrounded by two great walls requiring many defenders.²

iii) **Urban militias and royal armies**

While the military independence of the towns was severely restricted, urban militias nonetheless played an important role in royal armies throughout the Hundred Years War.

From the towns of the royal domain, in the largest sense, the king enjoyed the right of forty days military service a year by the burgesses.³ There were, however, innumerable local variations and constraints. The customs of Aigues-Mortes, granted by Philippe III in 1279, exempted the inhabitants from all chevauchées by land or sea for twenty years, and thereafter they could only be called upon to serve in a strictly delimited area: the dioceses of Uzès, Maguelone and Nîmes, and those parts of the dioceses of Arles and Avignon lying on the west bank of the Rhône. Furthermore, they

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1 *Ordonnances*, III, p.234.

2 AC Narbonne, EE.1993.

could only be called up if all the other towns of the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire were also summoned. In 1272 the consuls of the Cité of Narbonne declared that the citizens were only under the obligation of following the king in arms if peace was broken, in which case they could only serve inside the borders of the sénéchaussée of Carcassonne. If they had lately agreed to serve in the king's expedition to Pamiers against the count of Foix, then it was purely 'ob gratiam regis magestatis'.

The syndics of Lunel alleged in 1328 that the town was under no obligation of providing forty days service to the king, although in the event they were compelled to send their quota of sergeants to the royal ost.

The number of men furnished by each town also varied, being dependent on the wealth and size of the town. Agen had to supply two hundred sergeants to the king's army, Condrom, the second town of the Agenais, only one hundred. In Rouergue, in 1341, Saint-Antonin sent five sergeants to the king's wars in Gascony and Picardy, Najaro eighteen and Millau forty.

In addition to the customary military services from the towns

1 Ordonnances, IV, p.45, art.2.
2 AC Narbonne, EE.441, 442.
3 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.671-676. Contamine, Guerre, État et société, pp.53-54.
4 Ducos, La commune d'Agen, pp.199-200.
5 Ordonnances, III, p.234.
of the domain, the crown had succeeded by the early fourteenth century in extending to the whole kingdom a system of general mobilisation. This, the arrière-ban, entitled the king to the free, unlimited service of all able-bodied men in the defence of the realm. This obligation could not be enforced in Guyenne, but it was applied everywhere else in the Midi, even in the great ecclesiastical franchises. For instance, the pariage agreement made between Philippe IV and the bishop of Viviers in 1307 stated that the bishop and his men were not held to serve in the royal oat, but that as loyal subjects of the king they must play their part in defending the kingdom, so that if all the men of the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire were called out then they must follow them.

By the start of the Hundred Years War the distinction between the particular services owed by the towns of the domain and the arrière-ban had become blurred, although it was generally accepted that the arrière-ban could only be called up if the kingdom was in evident peril. Thus the rôle of the arrière-ban was entirely defensive. It could be mobilised nationally or locally as the situation demanded.

In the early years of the war, from 1337 to about 1360, the crown made extensive use of these services and contingents from the towns of the Midi saw frequent action. In February 1339 the

1 Contamine, Guerre, État et société, p.26ff.
3 Contamine, Guerre, État et société, p.29.
capitoul of Toulouse were ordered to send all the able-bodied burgesses of military age to Penne-d'Agenais for forty days service.¹ The following year Philippe VI ordered the seneschal of Beaucaire to see that the men of the sénéchaussée who were liable for forty days royal service discharged their obligation when required.² In March 1341 the consuls of Montpellier were told to furnish one properly equipped sergeant from every household in the city.³

The consuls of Millau were summoned on several occasions in the early part of the war to furnish troops for the royal army, both for operations in Gouyenne and, as the war spread eastwards, for the defence of the province of Rouergue. Demands for troops were naturally unpopular and the consuls, like town authorities everywhere, resisted and prevaricated. In 1341 they were recorded as having sent forty sergeants to the king's armies in Gouyenne and Picardy.⁴ But when in 1346 the king's lieutenant, the duke of Bourbon, ordered them to send all the able-bodied men of the town between the ages of fourteen and sixty to Agen to resist the king's enemies, they refused, declaring that only the king himself had the power to make such a demand, and that anyway all their men were

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¹ Inventaire sommaire AC Toulouse, Série AA, AA.3, no.162. Contamine, Guerre, État et société, p.54.


⁴ Le Livre de l'Epervier, p.192.
required for the defence of the town. In May 1349 the town dispatched twenty sergeants to Montouq in Quercy to join the sénéchal of Rouergue. Just before Christmas 1351 the town of Saint-Antonin, on the western border of Rouergue, fell to the English. The count of Armagnac began the siege at the beginning of February 1352, using men and money raised from all the southern provinces. The count ordered the consuls of Millau to send him twenty men at arms, mounted and properly equipped, ten balisterios and fifty men 'cum securibus et ligonibus'. Once again they refused, though for what reason is not clear. Instead they agreed in February of the following year to supply the count with sixty quintals of salt.

In March 1353 Armagnac sent them a fresh demand for troops and this time the council decided to send him 'bos homes' so that he should be pleased with them. Fifteen men left the town for Saint-Antonin on 14 March and a further 21 on the 15th, but the advanced party had got no further than Rodez when news arrived that the siege had been lifted. However, operations began again soon afterwards under the direction of Armagnac's marshal, the viscount of Gimoès.

1 AC Millau, EE.121. The document is undated, but it seems most likely that the troops were raised for the siege of Aiguillon, which took place between April and August 1346. Pierre I, duke of Bourbonnais, was appointed royal lieutenant in Languedoc in August 1345. Dupont-Ferrier, Gallia Regia, III, no.13673.

2 AC Millau, EE.121.

3 J. Donat, Autour d'une place de guerre sous le règne de Jean le Bon (Saint-Antonin), Toulouse, 1936, pp.116-118.

4 AC Millau, EE.121.

and a now, much larger contingent, consisting of ninety 'bos homes an platae' and fifty 'am balestas' left Millau on 19 and 20 June 1353.  

During the Black Prince's expedition of 1355 and in the months of emergency which followed it the urban militias of the Midi were called up in strength. In anticipation of the raid the count of Armagnac raised the arrière-ban of the sénéchaussée of Toulouse, every household being ordered to provide one armed man. In the east the consuls of Montpellier furnished 88 mounted men and 450 archers to the army raised in the sénéchaussées of Beaucaire and Carcassonne to resist the English. In July 1356, shortly after being appointed royal lieutenant in Languedoc, Jean de Poitiers ordered Armagnac to see that all able-bodied men of military age were mustered at Toulouse by 1 August, ready for forty days service. In January 1358 Hugues Adhemar, sénéchal of Beaucaire, gave orders that every man in the sénéchaussée of military age was to arm himself for its defence.  

After about 1360 a change took place in the pattern of military organisation which significantly affected the contribution made by the towns. The levée en masse of the arrière-ban was

1 Documents sur la ville de Millau, p.90  
2 Histoire de Languedoc, IX, p.649.  
4 Lehoux, Jean de France, I, p.68.  
5 Ibid, p.96.
abandoned and towns were no longer required to furnish contingents for campaigns in distant provinces. Instead they were called upon as the need arose to supply troops for small-scale local operations, usually sieges of routier castles. The numbers of men involved in these operations were usually quite small. For the siege of the castle of Thuriès near Albi in 1380 troops were raised from all the communities of the diocese and viguerie of Albi, the town of Albi sending twenty men. The following year the consuls of the Cité of Rodes recruited twenty pavésiers for the siege of Le Caylar.

In March 1424 32 companhos of Bergerac were sent to join the sénéchal of Périgord at the siege of Sainte-Foy. But if necessary, the towns could be asked for much larger forces. In June 1380 'la plus gran partida de la gent' of Saint-Flour were sent to the siege of Chaliers, and in August 1382 400 men left the town for the siege of Les Maisons.

It is seldom clear under what obligation the towns supplied troops for these local sieges. Probably it was a limited

1 The old-style arrière-ban was mobilised on rare occasions, notably in the sénéchaussée of Beaumarch in 1414 to resist the duke of Burgundy, and again in 1457-1458. A. Gouron, 'Le ban et l'arrière-ban d'après les Sources languedociennes', in Fédération historique du Languedoc méditerranéen et du Roussillon XXVIe et XXVIIIe Congrès (Perpignan - Saint-Gilles 1953-1954, Montpellier, 1956, pp.91-92.

2 Dous comptes consulaires d'Albi, I, p.344.

3 Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, II, p.221.

4 Jurades de la ville de Bergerac, I, p.223.

5 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.92.

6 Ibid, p.175.
application of the arrière-ban. The contribution of the towns to local operations also included the provision of equipment and victuals not only to their own troops but often to the royal forces as well. And while towns tried vainly to recover their expenses, it was generally accepted that the burden of local warfare fell on the communities of the area. The expenses incurred by the town of Bergerac in sending 32 men to Sainte-Foy for four days in 1424 came to a relatively modest 42 livres 18s 4d. The men's wages, at 3s 4d a day, came to 17 livres 1s 8d, victuals to 14 livres 3s 4d, and transport, by boat, to 8 livres 3s 4d.\(^1\) In contrast the much weightier contribution made by the consuls and citizens of Saint-Flour to the siege of Chaliers cost them 1500 francs.\(^2\)

The preparations for the siege of Chaliers are chronicled in some detail in the consular registers of Saint-Flour and they give a very lively insight into the organisation of a typical local operation. On 10 June 1380 the consuls received word from the constable of France, Du Quesclin, that he and the duke of Berry intended to invest the castle of Chaliers.\(^3\) Standing on the Truyère, about fifteen kilometres to the south-east of Saint-Flour, Chaliers was held by a garrison of 'Engles' with whom the consuls had been forced to conclude a series of expensive truces for the protection of the town. Du Quesclin ordered men, victuals and artillery to be made ready for the start of the siege. The consuls

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1 Jurades de la ville de Bergerac, I, pp.225-227.
2 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.92, n.2.
3 Ibid, p.83.
immediately told the town bakers to begin purchasing flour and a guard was placed on the mills. In all, 4716 lbs of bread were supplied, most for consumption by the Saint-Flour militia, but 150 loaves were provided for Du Quesolin and Berry and their officers.

Cheese, salt, meat and wine were also hastily obtained from various merchants in the town. The bill for the wine alone came to some 130 francs.

Considerable attention was given to the preparation of the town artillery. Saint-Flour already possessed four cannons (canons peyrières) and a fifth was purchased from Johan 'lo saralher'. They were examined, repaired and tested and wooden shields (mantels) built for the protection of the gunners. As the cannons were of different bores, the stone balls were carefully sorted and marked with the number of the cannon for which they were intended. A servant was dispatched to Le Puy to purchase saltpetre, sulphur, turpentine and other ingredients required for the manufacture of gunpowder and Greek fire. On his return a potently inflammable mixture 'a botar fueo' was brewed up in the town hall under the supervision of Francois Aymeric, the town captain, and then put in jars for carriage to Chaliers. The town's two siege engines were

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1 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.83
2 Ibid, p.90.
3 Ibid.
4 'Per tachas a senhar los socs dels canos et las gherlas en que foron portadas las peyras dels canos el setge, afi de plus tot probar las peyras de i chacum cano'. Ibid, p.85.
taken out of store in the barn of P. Nassi and overhauled by one
Guillaume, 'maistre dels ditz engins', who also took charge of them
during the actual siege. The engines were of a considerable size;
sixteen oxen were required to transport the principal arm (maistre
vergha) 'del gros enginh, et altres fustas delz ditz engins', and
another four for the vergha of the smaller engine alone.

The town blacksmiths were commissioned to produce crossbow
bolts, and carpenters built sixty shields (panes) for the archers.
The actual number of troops sent from Saint-Flour is not recorded,
probably there were about five hundred. They were commanded by
P. Mercer, one of the consuls.

Operations began at Chaliers on Wednesday, 20 June 1380, and
continued for a week. On the following Tuesday, the 26th, the
rumour went round the town that the final assault was about to take
place, and the remaining citizens hurried over to Chaliers to watch
the action. But they were disappointed; after negotiations with

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1 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, pp.89-90.
2 Ibid, pp.92-93.
3 Ibid, p.84.
5 Ibid, pp.91-92.
6 '... loqual setges fos mes per moss, lo duc de Berry et
d'Alverna et per moss. Bertrant de Quesolin, constable de
Fransa, lo dimores avant la festa de la Nativita de S. Johan
Batista et ay levet, per composicion fayta per los di's senhors
am los Engles que tenian lo dit lloc, lo dimores apres la dita
festa'. Ibid, pp.82-83.
7 'Per III badas que estero per los murs de la viala lo mars a
XXVI del dit mes de junh, per so que li plus grans partida de la
gent de la viala era el dit setge, que se disia que al dit jorn
si devia donar l'assalta el dit loc de Chaliers'. Ibid, p.92.
the French commanders the garrison agreed to surrender, the siege was lifted the next day and Du Quesclin and his army made for Châteauneuf-de-Randon where on 14 July he was killed.\(^1\)

By the beginning of the fifteenth century the English and routier garrisons had been expelled from most of the heartland of Languedoc. The war continued in Guyenne however, and the towns of the region went on providing troops for local operations in much the same way. The men of Bergerac, for example, were called up for the sieges of Chalais in 1404, Bassidan in 1407 and Sainte-Foy and Duras in 1424.\(^2\) Further east, in the sénéchaussées of Beaucaire, Carcassonne and Toulouse, town militias were occasionally called up in strength, even in the 1430s and -40s. In 1438 and again in 1440 Charles VII mobilised the 'arbaléstriers et autres gens de commune' from the three sénéchaussées for service against the routiers.\(^3\)

After the army reforms of 1448, companies of francs-archers were established in the duchy of Guyenne and in Rouergue and Quercy, but the system was never introduced to the three sénéchaussées\(^4\) of Languedoc. The francs-archers made little impact on the war and even after their creation town militias were called out for service just as before. Under the ordinance of 1448 Risole, on the frontier of Guyenne, had to maintain two francs-archers, yet the

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1 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.93.
2 Jurades de la ville de Bergerac, I, pp.142, 155-156, 223, 228.
3 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.2137, 2170-2171.
4 Contamine, Guerre, Etat et société, p.348.
citizens continued to serve in the militia and were mobilised at intervals until the end of the fifteenth century. \(^1\) A lance of six france-archers was established at nearby Montréal-du-Gers in 1448, but the consuls were still ordered to send thirty archers to the siege of Bergerac in 1350. \(^2\)

The military effectiveness of urban militias is difficult to assess, although the towns themselves, naturally enough, were glad to celebrate the achievements of their soldiers. The town chronicler of Montpellier records the part played by the citizens at the siege of Peyriac in 1364. The castle had been captured by routiers in November 1363 and in May of the following year the siege was begun by the marshal of France, Arnoul d'Audrehem, and troops raised in the sénéchaussées of Carcassonne and Toulouse. The siege had lasted six weeks without success before the arrival on 16 June 1364 of the Montpellier contingent, led by their captain, Johan Colombier. That very night it was learnt that the defenders were fleeing from the castle 'per paor que avian avut per la venguda de las gens de Montpellier e por la gran artilharia que lay avian portat'. The assault took place the next day. The men of Montpellier were the first to enter and succeeded in placing their banner on the highest tower, so that it flew higher and more proudly than the banners of Audrehem and all the other lords. \(^3\)

The chronicler also records with satisfaction that in May 1365 the

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1 Comptes consulaires de Riscle, I, pp.lx, 108.
3 Petit Thalamus, p.366.
famous routier captain, Louis Robaut, was discomfited and captured by the men of Le Ruy in an action near Annecy. The consuls of Le Ruy, with justifiable pride, wrote to the consuls of Nîmes to relate the exploit.

Coloured as these accounts certainly are, they do suggest that the old martial spirit was not entirely dead, or at least that towns were proud to be associated with noble feats of arms. Whether this enthusiasm went beyond the consuls and councillors is hard to say, but it is certainly noticeable that the kind of protests which everywhere followed the call-up of troops for service in Guyenne in the early part of the war had become rare by the later fourteenth century when town militias were used almost entirely for local operations. Quite naturally civilians were much readier to fight to protect their own families and property than to campaign far from their homes in a war whose purpose was obscure.

1 *Petit Thalamus*, p.368.
2 B.N. M3 latin 9175, fos.6-7vo.
CHAPTER 6
'GENS D'ARMAS' AND 'ESTABLITAS':
THE PROFESSIONAL ELEMENT IN TOWN DEFENCE

The successful defence of towns depended almost entirely on the free, personal participation of the citizens. In some towns in Guyenne, the crown actually paid townspeople for defensive duties. In 1340 two hundred sergeants and fifty bourgeois of La Rèole were retained by Philippe VI's trésoriers des guerres for garrison duties in their town, the bourgeois receiving as their salary 'demi-gages d'hommes d'armes', and the six jurés in command the full wages of men at arms.¹ In 1384 the consuls of La Rèole were ordered by the duke of Berry to select twenty bourgeois 'des plus sages et convenables au fait de la guerre et defense de ladite ville', each of whom would be paid 7½ livres a month.² Possibly the bourgeois referred to here were in fact nobles with burgess rights who chose to discharge their military obligations to the crown by garrison service. There were similar arrangements at Marmande and Tonneins, but there is no evidence that the system operated outside the region.³

In most towns the civilian defenders were supplemented from

1 Contamine, Guerre, Etat et société, p.177.


3 Contamine, Guerre, Etat et société, pp.176-177, n.105.
time to time by professional soldiers. These soldiers were of two kinds. Firstly, town authorities recruited and paid for small numbers of gens d'armas, as they are usually styled in vernacular documents. They were hired for a few weeks or a few months at a time and were usually employed guarding fields and vineyards at harvest times. Secondly, the crown established garrisons, known in the fourteenth century as établies, and in Occitan as establidas, and after Charles VII's army reforms as morte-payes, in key towns and castles. These troops were engaged and paid by the crown and lay outside the control of the municipal authorities. Their impact upon the civilian communities on which they were quartered, and whose protection they were supposed to guarantee, was often catastrophic.

1) 'Gens d'armas'

The enlistment of mercenary gens d'armas was a temporary expedient in times of peril or at crucial moments in the agricultural year. There is no evidence that towns ever maintained even small numbers of men at arms at their disposal permanently. The accounts of the clauaire of Narbonne in 1381-1382 show that the consuls employed professional soldiers during the war with the viscount, but the belligerent use of mercenaries in this way had become rare by the fourteenth century as the ability of the towns to make private war diminished.

Hired soldiers were sometimes assigned to internal defensive

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duties. At Toulouse in 1420, for example, men at arms paid by the consuls were stationed at the city gates. But more usually they were employed outside, in the mundane but essential task of protecting crops and vines. In July 1353 the consuls of Gourdon enlisted an unspecified number of 'gens del senescal' to guard the cornfields and in October they decided to take on ten men at arms and fifty sergeants for the week of the grape harvest. In the late summer of 1368, when bands of armed men were said to be roaming the whole country from Tarascon to Toulouse, the consuls of Montpellier employed as 'gardas de la vindimia' two Breton knights, Alain de Beaumont and Robin de Vaucouleur, and thirty soldiers. The deliberations of the jurade of Bergerac record several contracts made between the town and various captains for services in guarding the town fields and vineyards. In June 1377 the governor, nobles and consuls offered the English captain of Castillonnès three hundred francs and 48 pipes of wine if he and his men would defend Bergerac during the corn harvest. At the beginning of May 1386 Pierre de Mornay and his men were engaged for the same purpose at a monthly salary of 150 francs and a quantity of wine, wheat and oats.

The employment of mercenaries during the harvest and vintage

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1 AC Toulouse, BB.3, fo.107.
2 AC Gourdon, BB.4, fos.14, 17vo.
3 Petit Thalamus, pp.382-383.
4 Jurades de la ville de Bergerac, I, pp.36-37.
5 Ibid, p.98.
illustrates the vulnerability of the towns at those times of the year. The cornfields, pastures, gardens, orchards, and above all the vineyards, from which most ordinary folk derived their livelihood, lay outside the walls and were therefore fatally exposed to every enemy. And there was little that the citizens by themselves could do to protect them, for even if the population was kept permanently mobilised, which was self-defeating, untrained and poorly armed civilians were no match for professional soldiers.

But while mercenary gens d'armes could play an important rôle in defence, towns were reluctant to employ them except of absolute necessity. On 29 September 1382 the town council of Castres met to decide whether to hire soldiers to protect 'las gens delas vendemiadas' against the English garrison of Saint-Jean-de-Jannes. They resolved to enlist the services of the mercenary captain, Peyre de Lautrer, and up to forty mounted men (cavalgaduras) for the two weeks of the vintage. De Lautrer arrived in the town on 15 October but was told by the consuls that he was no longer required as the wine harvest was almost over, and anyway the town had no money to pay him.¹

Money was the root of the problem, for professional soldiers were expensive to employ. In 1372 the consuls of Cahors paid troops in their service monthly salaries of 15 livres for men at arms, 10 livres for mounted sergeants and 5 livres for foot sergeants.² These were standard rates of pay, which altered very

¹ AC Castres, BB.2, fo.55vo.
little during the course of the war. Thus the cost of maintaining even a modest force of between ten and twenty gens d'armes, the sort of number that the consul of Albi had in mind for the defence of the town in 1384, would amount to between 150 and 300 livres a month, a hefty sum by the standards of municipal budgets in this period.

Before taking on men at arms towns carefully considered other possible courses of action. Council deliberations show that in most cases there was only one realistic alternative, and that was the negotiation of a truce or pati with the enemy. Indeed, this was often thought to be the cheaper and more effective solution.

On 17 September 1381 the town council of Albi met representatives of the cathedral chapter and the canons of the church of Saint-Salvi to talk about ways and means of safeguarding the vintage. In their deliberation the two possible lines of action are clearly set out:

'dizens alous que hom agues gens d'armas; d'autres que hom fezes quelque acort am los Engles que no nos dampnegasso e que nos laissson reculhir las vendemias'. It was decided to make overtures to the English garrison of Thuriès to see if a pati could be arranged and also to look into the cost of hiring troops, but to take no firm action for the time being. On 22 September it was further decided to impose a tax on wine to pay for a pati or men at arms, but the deliberations do not reveal which, if any,

1 Contamine, Guerre, État et société, p.538.
2 'Délibérations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit., XLVIII, p.427.
3 Ibid, XLVII, pp.556-557.
course was taken. The jurade of Bergerac had the same choice to make. In the middle of September 1378 the consuls decided to see whether a pati could be concluded with the garrison of Puy-Guilhem and if not then to hire soldiers to guard the vineyards. Three years later they were debating the same question, this time in relation to the garrison at Couze. The dilemma was the same: whether to hire gens d'armas 'per lor resistir e contratar, o si volian que hom composit am lor', and again it was decided to try to negotiate a pati and to employ soldiers only if satisfactory terms could not be obtained. Revealingly, the justification for the decision were the 'gran costages e despens que ferian a la vila si avian gens d'armas'.

Implied in the reluctance of Bergerac and other towns to employ mercenaries except as a last resort is a deep suspicion of professional fighting men. Soldiers were useful only during the time that they were actually being employed and paid; once discharged they joined the ranks of the towns' potential enemies. This paradox was at the root of the security problem in Languedoc as in all of France during the Hundred Years War. The men who one day arrived as protectors might the next be lynched as thieves and murderers by the very people they had come to protect. The ambivalence of the civilian attitude to the professional soldierly was revealed most strongly in the uneasy relationship between the towns and royal garrison troops.

1 'Délibérations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit., XLVII, p.557.
2 Jurades de la ville de Bergerac, I, p.42.
3 Ibid, pp.61-62.
11) *Establidias*

Garrison forces differed from the mercenaries hired by the towns in two important respects. Firstly, they were stationed by the king and his lieutenants according to national defensive strategy. Secondly, because garrisons were established and paid for by the crown, the towns had no control over them. Towns might appeal to the king for troops to protect them, but all too often they found themselves saddled involuntarily with bands of indisciplined soldiers whose victuals and arrears of pay had to be found by the citizens and whose military effectiveness was minimal because their equipment had been mortgaged or sold.

From the établies of the fourteenth century to the morte-payes of Charles VII's army ordinances there ran a consistent royal policy of maintaining resident forces on the frontiers and in important castles and towns throughout the kingdom. During the war the preoccupations of royal lieutenants and captains-general in the south were with the Guyenne frontier and it was there, principally in Agenais, Périgord and Quercy, that the majority of garrisons were stationed. In Bas-Languedoc 'es merches de l'Empire' there were permanent castle garrisons at Roquemaure, Villeneuve-lès-Avignon, Beaucaire, Nîmes, Sommières and on the coast at Aigues-Mortes.

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Fortresses and centres of royal government like Carcassonne had resident forces. Other castles and towns were garrisoned as the need arose.

Garrison forces were broadly of two kinds: those assigned to a particular town or castle, and those responsible for the defence of a whole province or region. The distinction is somewhat academic, for contemporary documents use the terms estableida and garmiso indiscriminately, and troops intended for regional defence might well be stationed in one town or castle all the time. And the impact of garrison soldiers on the communities which had to put them up was much the same, whatever designation those troops might be given. Nevertheless, the responsibility of a garrison assigned to a single town was in the first instance the protection of the citizens, and so the establishment of a royal garrison was a privilege eagerly sought.

The experience of Agen in the early 1350s was that a royal garrison could be an uncertain and costly benefit. Although Agen was an important frontier town, the deliberations of the jurade suggest that in those years the crown was reluctant to agree to the

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1 B.N. Doat, 64, fos.101-103, 130vo-175.

2 'Item, aquel an mezeis (1361) fes hom gens d'armas per estar enestablida contra gassiot del Castel que era engles'. Jaume Mascaro, 'Le "Libre de Memorias" de Jaume Mascaro (1336-1390)', ed. C. Barbier, Revue des Langues Romanes, XXXIV, 1890, p.54. 'Eso se maix despessa per lo capitani e per la guarda de l'establida que fo meza en Rouergue de 110 homes d'armas l'an LVI (1356)'. Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, p.255. '... las gens d'armas pausadas sta vila en guarnisson per lodit nostre senhor lo Rey'. 'Comptes des consuls de Montreal-du-Cer', loc. cit., XXXII, pp.46-47, 11 Nov. 1446.
consuls' request for a garrison. In July 1350 the consuls sent a
deputation to the king's lieutenan t, Jean I d'Armagnac, 'per
demostrar al senhor l'estat de la vila et del pays e per las gardas
de la vila e dels loos dentorn nos e per supplicar que i meta remedi
cum pusoa hom estivar e vendenhar'. The appeal apparently went
unheard, at least there is no record that Armagnac sent any troops,
and in August of the following year the jurade resolved to send
another embassy, to Condom this time, to the royal lieutenants,
Charles, king of Navarre, and the count of Foix, 'per demostrar
l'estat de la vila e la oppressio quels enemico nos fan e demandar
capitani bo e sufficient per gardiar'. On this occasion they met
with more success. No garrison had yet been established by
13 September 1351 when it was decided to employ fifty sergeants
to guard the vintage, but on 28 September the jurade met and
agreed to offer a 'bon present entre a c liv. torn' to Guiraut de
la Barthe 'nostre capitani novel' who had arrived to take up sta-
tions in the town with a garrison of Lombards.

However, difficulties soon developed, and on 13 October the
jurade, having learnt that the Lombards proposed to leave Agen for
Castelsarrasin, decided to induce them to stay for at least another
week by advancing them fifty livres and in the meantime to write
to the king of Navarre requesting that he pay the arrears of their

1 Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.209.
2 Ibid, p.245.
3 Ibid, p.249.
wages. This approach was apparently successful, but at the end of December there was again talk of the garrison leaving, whereupon the consuls hastily borrowed 45 sous from some wealthy citizens to pay their wages. Quirin de la Barthe exercised his functions as captain of Agen until at least September 1352, when he was reported as having twenty men at arms under his command, but thereafter the deliberations are silent on the subject of the garrison until a year later. On 25 October 1353 the jurade urged the consuls to negotiate a pact with the English captains of the region, alleging that the town was completely undefended because the garrison lately established by the count of Armagnac and consisting of one hundred men at arms and two hundred sergeants under the captaincy of the count of Monluc had left after five days, even though they had been ordered to guard Agen until the end of the vintage. The consuls replied that they had already made representations to Armagnac and to the seigneur of Agenais, and by 7 November the troops had returned.

Although royal garrisons were unreliable and a constant source of expense and irritation to the local communities on which they were quartered, they did give towns added protection, while as a pledge of royal concern for the plight of the inhabitants they were.

1 Jurudes de la ville d'Agen, p.252.
5 Ibid, p.333.
initially at least, a fillip to morale. The renewal of the war in 1369 brought a more deliberate and consistent royal policy of stationing garrisons according to the defensive needs of individual towns, and the offer of troops was used as an inducement to places in Quercy and the other provinces lost to the English by the treaty of Brétigny in 1360 to return to French allegiance. The archbishop of Toulouse, who was commissioned by the duke of Anjou to take oaths of allegiance from towns and seigneurs who wished to recognise the king of France, was empowered to offer them money, privileges and 'retenues de gens d'armes'.

He visited Cahors on 5 February 1369 and at the request of the consuls agreed that 'for the duration of the present war' the king should establish and maintain in the town a garrison of two hundred men, of whom half were to be recruited in Cahors itself and half in the surrounding pays. The size of this force was exceptional and is to be explained by the importance of Cahors as the capital of Quercy and its position on the frontier, and also by the expectation of an English offensive. At about the same time Figeac was assigned twenty men at arms for its defence and Capdenac ten. In November 1370 Bernard d'Armagnac, seigneur of Agenais, and twenty-five homes d'armes were retained by the duke of Anjou himself 'en la garde, tuticion et defense de la ville d'Agen'.

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1 AG Cahors, II.4, fos.1-2.
2 Ibid, fo.2vo.
3 B.N. M3 français 20581, no.35.
4 B.N. Doat, 125, fos.218-221.
5 AG Agen, EE.5.
In the last two decades of the fourteenth century and in the fifteenth century grants of this kind to individual towns were much rarer. In 1386 the consuls of Gourdon could still appeal successfully to the count of Armagnac for a garrison 'al gatges del senhor', while in 1410, during the civil war, the consuls of Béziers were granted a force of twenty-five men. But in the 1380s and -90s, as the emphasis of the war in the Midi moved away from the frontier with Guyenne to the small bands of English and routiers entrenched in fortresses in the hill country, it became royal policy to recruit and deploy troops on a regional rather than a local basis. Establiges consisting of several hundred men were established to protect entire provinces. They were placed under the command of royal captains and paid for by the local communities. There was nothing new in this, for in the 1350s and -60s the provincial Estates of the south had been raising forces for regional defence. In May 1358 representatives of the sénéchaussées of Beaucaire, Carcassonne, Toulouse, Quercy and Rouergue agreed to establish a force of two thousand men for the defence of Languedoc. In 1362 the Estates of Velay, Gévaudan and Vivarais voted taxes to raise troops to expel the English, and the next year the Estates of the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire recruited two

1 AC Gourdon, BB.6, fo.1, 6 March 1386.
3 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.1145-1151.
hundred men at arms for the defence of the Rhône. But the 1380s saw a wider application of this policy. In June 1381 a force of four hundred men at arms and one hundred bowmen was created to defend the upland provinces of Auvergne, Velay, Gévaudan, Vivarais and Valentinois. In October of the same year the Estates of the sénéchaussées of Beaucaire, Carcassonne and Toulouse assembled at Masères in the county of Foix and agreed to the establishment of a standing defensive army consisting of one man at arms, one mounted and one unmounted sergeant for every group of thirty hearths. However, the appointment of the duke of Berry as royal lieutenant in Languedoc in preference to the count of Foix stopped further development of this scheme. In March 1382 the Estates of Albigeois decided to raise sixty 'lansasas o homes d'armas' to guard their region. Between November 1384 and October 1386 the Estates of Rouergue met at least six times to vote subsidies for an establishment of between one hundred and 160 men commanded by the count of Armagnac.

The poor state of these regional garrisons is revealed in a mémoire drawn up in 1386 after the departure of Jean III d'Armagnac, the king's captain-general in Languedoc, to join the royal army being assembled at Sluys for the invasion of England. The count,

1 Ordonnances, III, pp.618-627.
3 Inventaire sommaire AC Narbonne. Annexes de la série AA, AA,177.
4 AC Castres, BB.2, fo.72vo, 3 March 1382.
5 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, II, p.314.
it was alleged, had left on or about 15 September 1386 without appointing a deputy to take charge in his absence. The troops stationed under his command 'as establishment' in Bigorre, Agenais, Quercy, Rouergue and Velay had almost all deserted because they were owed four or six months wages and those who remained had sold or mortgaged their horses and armour. Because of the inadequacy of these garrisons, the English had penetrated deep into French territory so that even villages within two leagues of Toulouse were forced to make pacts with them. As a result the common people were completely demoralised, many had abandoned their homes, and everywhere 'a este et est tres grand murmure et clamour'.

Matters had come to a head in 1386, but in fact complaints of this sort were to be heard throughout the war. In November 1369 the Estates of the sénéchaussées of Beaucaire, Carcassonne and Toulouse agreed to vote subsidies for the duke of Anjou's army only if a proper system of discipline was imposed on the troops. Accurate muster rolls were to be kept under the supervision of three controllers, one from each sénéchaussée, and only those men actually present for service were to be paid. Whereas in the past soldiers raised for the defence of the frontier had drawn their wages while living all the time in Toulouse, in future they were to reside permanently in the towns and castles where they were stationed, and if they returned to Toulouse their wages would be stopped. Desertion would be punishable by death. Captains and soldiers were to swear on the gospels not to pillage the countryside;

1 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.1711-1716.
if they did then the local inhabitants had the right of armed resistance. More than half a century later, in May 1424, the same Estates were making the same kind of plea: 'que las gens d'armas ordenadas a la defensa del dit pays sian pagadas de so que lor sera promes, per so que non aion occasion de raubar ni pilhar lo present pays de Lengadoch, coma an fach non gran temps a e fan de jorn en jorn'.

Some towns were able to make agreements with royal captains to compensate themselves for the inevitable damage that was caused by the presence of garrison troops. In June 1369 commissioners appointed by the duke of Anjou agreed to pay the consuls of Cahors more than 2,800 francs for damage caused to the town fields, pastures and vines by Pierre de Savoie and other captains retained by the duke. In August of the same year Anjou himself promised the consuls of Montauban that if a garrison was placed in the town the citizens would on no account be made to contribute money or victuals.

The exceptional favour shown to Cahors and Montauban was due to the anxiety of the crown to preserve the good will of these two key towns. The tribulations of another town in Quercy, Gourdon, were much more typical. In July 1386 the consuls of Gourdon wrote to the count of Armagnac requesting soldiers to protect them from

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1 Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents, II, no.DCCCGXXIII.
2 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. col.2044.
3 AC Cahors, II.4, fos.4vo-54.
4 B.N. Dat, 87, fos.181-181vo.
Nolot Barba and other Anglo-Gascon captains in the area.¹ A company of men commanded by the Bastard of Comminges arrived at the beginning of August,² but they had hardly settled in before trouble started. By 19 August the consuls were writing to the count pleading for victuals, and on the 23rd they dispatched messengers 'per explicar la negligensia dela gens que a tramezas e lo gast que fan e lo damnatge',³ alleging in particular that the soldiers had extorted ransoms from some of the citizens.⁴ But the situation did not improve. In early November the consuls had to distribute firewood to the troops to stop them tearing down houses in the faubourgs,⁵ and at a council meeting on 5 January 1387 it was decided to compensate the inhabitants for loss and damage out of municipal funds.⁶ The town was constantly advancing money and victuals to the garrison and the costs were met by a weekly imposition called, significantly, 'endictio de pati'.⁷ In effect the town was forced to negotiate the same kind of truce with the troops who were there to protect it as with the English captains outside.

Indeed, an arrangement with the enemy was often a better guarantee of protection than the presence of a royal garrison. In

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1 AC Gourdon, Hb.6, fo.5vo.
2 Ibid, fo.16.
3 Ibid, fo.8.
4 Ibid, fo.16.
5 Ibid, fo.10.
6 Ibid, fo.11vo.
7 Ibid.
September 1383 the consuls of Saint-Flour even persuaded a royal garrison to leave the town so as not to violate a recently negotiated pact with the English captain of Alleuze.¹

Even where towns did not actually suffer damage at the hands of these troops, they had to bear a heavy financial burden in supplying victuals and advancing money to make up for the arrears in their wages. The sums involved were sometimes considerable.

The consuls and townspeople of Castelsarrasin, for example, lent at least four thousand francs to Olivier de Nauny and the garrison of three hundred Bretons stationed in the town during 1367 and 1368.² Despite the assurances of the duke of Anjou, it is unlikely that all this money was ever paid back, which was no doubt one of the reasons behind the rebellion which took place in the town in 1368 and during which the royal castle was attacked and several citizens killed.³ The anger of the people of Castelsarrasin must have been a sentiment widely felt, and so it is surprising that more disturbances of this kind are not recorded.

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1 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.315.
3 B.N. Doct, 92, fols.511vo-517vo.
CHAPTER 7

PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASURES AND INTERNAL SECURITY

The defensive measures discussed so far were accompanied by efforts to tighten internal security, boost public morale and create among the citizens a stronger and more lasting sense of loyalty to the community.

In wartime, public opinion and public emotions were volatile. A major disaster such as the Black Prince's great raid into Languedoc in the autumn of 1355, or a local turn in the war, caused widespread panic. Rumour flourished. The authorities kept themselves informed of events through their spies and messengers, but the information was not always passed on to the citizens, and fear and ignorance bred speculation, which the authorities probably encouraged.

Often the basis of stories was a plot to hand over the town to the enemy. Plots, real or fictitious, were discovered in a number of towns. In January 1353 Maître Bertrand de Pibier confessed to conspiring with others to deliver the town of Martel into the hands of the English and was publicly executed. More serious was the conspiracy unearthed in 1358 by which, so it was alleged, a number of prominent southerners had planned to betray Nîmes, Beaucaire, Lunel, Saint-Gilles and other towns to the Provençals. For their part in the affair several citizens of

1 AC Martel, B3.5, fo.72.
Nîmes, among them Georges Rati, a knight of the Arènes and sometime consul, were put to death.\textsuperscript{1} The Montpellier town chronicle reports that in 1361, after the routier captain, Bortucat d'Albret, had managed to capture the suburbs of the city, many suspected collaborators were hanged.\textsuperscript{2}

Whether these plots and others like them had any substance or whether they were simply fabricated by the authorities is impossible to say. Confessions like those which Pibier and Rati are said to have made are suspect, but there is little other evidence. Spies and agents-provocateurs operated everywhere, and the frequency with which towns and castles were betrayed from inside made treachery a recurrent nightmare. In December 1423 the consuls of Millau forbade all unauthorised gatherings of three or more persons, since it had come to their notice that certain 'colluzios, manipolitz e congreccios illicitas e tractatz dampnables' had taken place, thus putting the town in danger. All such unlawful associations were to be denounced to the royal proctor or the bailli.\textsuperscript{3} The dramatic disclosure of a plot, particularly one in which men of wealth and standing were involved, must have had a cautionary effect on the population, discouraging those who might be enticed to betray their fellow citizens, and inspiring the loyal majority into renewed vigilance.

Prolonged war created many new tensions in urban society, and

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\begin{enumerate}
  \item Petit Thalamus, p.359.
  \item 'Nouveaux documents inédits sur la ville de Millau', p.296.
\end{enumerate}
aggravated those which already existed. Communities became introverted and introspective. Distinctions between men assumed a new importance, since the ability to distinguish friend from foe might make the difference between life and death. Aliens, paupers, vagrants, those with no roots and no commitments to the community, were an obvious security risk. At best they were kept under close supervision, at worst expelled or done to death.

In 1358 the royal court of Nîmes ordered the expulsion from the city of all people who could be considered 'extranea et suspecta'. In 1436 the town council of Béziers decided that because of the danger from Rodrigue de Villandrando, whose army was approaching the area, all vagabonds should be driven out. Security measures often included restrictions on the entry and movement of strangers. Royal ordinances of November 1368 forbade the admission into towns and castles of strangers in numbers 'qui puissent avoir la force sur ceulx qui y demourent'. An agreement made between the consuls of the Cité and Bourg of Rodez and the count of Armagnac in 1389 allowed only 25 'estrangiers ni gens d'armes' to enter the town at any one time, and then only on condition that they passed in and out through certain gates, stayed only at taverns approved by the consul, did not venture out after the curfew, and committed no 'escomagou, insult ni bruch'. In 1423 the consuls of Millau

2 'Registre de la maison consulaire de Béziers', p.314.
4 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, II, p.524.
decided that because many noble towns had been lost 'per sostenenssem recolhimen de gens strangieros' the inhabitants should not be permitted to receive outsiders into their homes without declaring them to the royal judge. 1 The definition of a stranger must have caused some difficulty. Presumably he was someone not personally known to any of the inhabitants. Identification was easy in a tightly-knit, small community, but well nigh impossible in the larger cities.

The security risk posed by strangers was particularly great in frontier areas, and drastic measures were sometimes considered necessary. In August 1347 Jean, duke of Normandy, ordered the consuls of Périgueux to assemble all the citizens who had close relatives—fathers or sons, brothers or nephews—living in enemy-occupied territory and to expel them from the town if they should seem 'suspecti'. 2 The deliberations of the jurade of Agen reveal a persistent concern with the same problem. In April 1347 the jurats decided to remove all strangers from the town, especially those who came from areas hostile to the king of France, 3 and in July of the same year new security ordinances forbade innkeepers to put up outsiders for more than one night without special permission. 4 In January 1353 the jurats complained that large numbers of refugees from Port-Sainte-Marie and other towns held by

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1 'Nouveaux documents inédits sur la ville de Millau', p.296.
2 AC Périgueux, EE.10.
3 Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.119.
the English had arrived in Agen, and urged the consuls to write to
the king about it, in the meantime admitting no more strangers into
the town because of the possible danger. When it was learnt in
June 1353 that the English were gathering outside Agen, the consuls
immediately ordered the expulsion of 'tot hom estranh'.

The clergy were a special problem. There were many foreign
priests and religious, while the allegiance of all churchmen was not
in the first instance to the lay community in which they lived and
worked, but to a body which transcended local and national bound-
daries. Although there is little evidence that the clergy as a whole
were considered a threat to the security of towns, priests, monks and
friars, especially foreigners, were regarded with suspicion. In
June 1345 the jurats of Agen ordered one Johan Bartholomei, a cleric,
said to be a native of the English diocese of York, to leave the
town for the duration of the war. After the Black Prince's
incursion into Bas-Languedoc in 1355, the consuls of Agde alleged
that certain familiare of their bishop 'diversarum nationum' had
entered into secret negotiations with the English to hand over the
town. At Montauban in 1433 two Dominican friars were trussed up
in sacks and drowned in the Tarn for plotting to betray the town
to the enemy.

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1 Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.263.
2 Ibid, p.325.
3 Ibid, p.21.
4 A. Castaldo, Le consulat médiéval d'Agde (XIIIe-XIVe siècles),
   Paris, 1974, p.361, n.76.
5 B.N. Doat, 88, f.350-14vo.
The Jews, traditional scapegoats for Christian misfortune, became in wartime the objects of heightened public hostility. There were sizeable Jewish communities in Languedoc, at Toulouse and the towns of the Mediterranean seaboard, Narbonne, Montpellier, Lunel and Nîmes. In July 1359 the consuls of Nîmes resolved that the Jews, whose numbers in the town had been increased by the arrival of refugees from the surrounding plat-pays, should be forced to reside in one single street, the Corrigaira vielle, 'since it is unreasonable that Jews and Christians live together'. But the following August a deputation of Jews came to the consuls to complain that this arrangement was unsatisfactory because the street backed onto the town walls from which the watchmen threw stones at the Jewish houses. The consuls agreed that the boundaries of the ghetto should be changed so as to include another street, the Carrières Chausées. In 1365 the consuls of Montpellier told the duke of Anjou that many people from the suburbs wanted to move inside the city for safety but were prevented from doing so by the shortage of living space, and yet the Jews were permitted by their great wealth to occupy a disproportionately large ghetto near the Carrefour de Castlemot. Anjou ordered the Jews to be evicted and resettled in the rue de la Baterie, near the town baths. And like other wealthy and privileged groups, the Jews were often at the centre of disputes with the town authorities about their contribution to war taxation. At Narbonne, for example, in 1375 the royal viguier and

1 Ménard, Histoire de Mîmes, II, pp. 235–236.
2 AG Montpellier, Louvet nos. 2445, 2446.
judge were instructed by Charles V to see that the Jews of the city paid their full share of the costs of fortification.¹

Less obvious, but potentially just as damaging as aliens, who could at least be recognised, was the enemy in the heart of the people themselves, for in wartime the malice which one man bore his neighbour or the community at large could open his ears to suggestions of treason. Hugues de Cardaillac's ordinances for the defence of Montauban in 1346 warned the captain of the town to watch out for signs of personal differences and feuds among the townspeople and to settle them quickly, 'car es mot perilhosa en tel loc'.² The similar ordinances of Villefranche-de-Rouergue urged every citizen to forget any 'farda o malevolensa' which he might nurture against his fellows.³

Often the settling of differences was formalised in a public ceremony in which the people swore their allegiance to the community and its leaders. Hugues de Cardaillac ordered the captain of Montauban, on taking office, to make all the inhabitants of the town, 'gran e pauc' alike, swear to be loyal to him personally, and, if necessary, to die in the defence of the town.⁴ In January 1356 the consuls of Martel decided that 'tota maniera de gens' should make a public testimony of loyalty to the town and to the king of France. Consequently, on the Sunday before the Purification,

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¹ Ac Marbotte, EE.1535.
³ B.N. Dact. 147, fo.285vo.
38 citizens, probably the majority of the householders, assembled in the church of Saint Maur and, with one hand on the missel, they swore, one by one, to be faithful to the town of Martel and its people, to the consuls and to the king of France, and to serve and defend the community even to death. In December 1418 the jurats of Bordeaux brought together their councillors and the common people of the city to swear an elaborate oath ‘per la sauvacion et bon gouver de ladeita ciutat’. They promised ‘sobre lo cored precios de Jhesu–Christ’: to be faithful to the king of England; to place themselves and their property at the disposal of the mayor and jurats for the defence of the city; to have no dealings with the enemy, nor to let themselves be seduced by relatives and friends living in French territory; to declare to the jurats any letters and messages received from such relatives and friends; to inform the jurats of any injury or insult inflicted on them personally and to seek redress only from the jurats; and to swear no other oath of allegiance to any other party.

The minutes of the town council of Toulouse in January 1419 reveal a similar preoccupation with loyalty and public unity. At the meeting on 9 January several speakers stressed the need for peace and harmony among the citizens; Raymond d’Aurivalle urged

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1 ‘Vos juratz que vos seretz bous e leyals al luceo e alas gens de Martel a honor del rey de ffransa e dela senhors & a proffegs del pays e prometetz e juratz estar en vostra garda quan besoh sera e no parar daquela in aquela desampan per paor de mort duren lo combatemen ses license e seratz nobodes als cossols e alas causas que serau de la garda e dela deffensa del luceo de Martel.’ AC Martel, BS.5, fo.93vo.

2 Archives municipales de Bordeaux, III, pp.80–82.
men to speak no ill of their neighbours; Johan Molinier thought there should be 'pax et unio inter illos qui habeant discordia inter ipsos'; Hélie Brulheti suggested the creation by the capitouls of a 'unio inter populares'. The idea of a popular union was taken up again at the council meeting on 20 January. An unusually large gathering, consisting of all twelve capitouls and 239 other councillors, including representatives of other towns in the viguerie of Toulouse, agreed that an oath of union and allegiance to the king, the Dauphin and the count of Foix should be administered to the citizens in the chapel of Saint Michel. The form of the oath—or, indeed, whether it was actually sworn by the people—is not recorded, but a few months later, on 12 April, 280 councillors solemnly promised to be loyal to the king, the king's vigier and the capitouls, and to carry out their duties faithfully. The next day the capitouls, the sénichal of Toulouse, Jean de Grigny, the royal treasurer of Languedoc, Jean Mariot, and other royal officers for their part undertook to obey the king, not to obey the count of Foix without the king's permission, and to guard the liberties and privileges of the city.

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1 AC Toulouse, BB.3, fos.17-17vo.
2 Ibid, fos.22-24vo.
3 'In quoquidem consilio fuit appunctamentum quod omnes ibidem presentes iurare esse boni fideles domino nostro regi, dominis vicario et dicta capitulo, et venire ad eorum mandatum'. Ibid, fo.63vo.
4 'Sio a la forma del jurament prestandor per moss. lo senescoalo e los autres officiess e moss. de capitoli que cossun prometa destre bo e fivel al Rey nostre sobiran senhor, et gardar sa honor et sa senhoria asen poder, no obebir al conde de Foix sens licentia del Rey nostre senhor o de autre ne en nom de luy, et gardara et mantenatra los privileges e libertats dela vil'. Ibid, fo.64vo.
As well as encouraging men to sink their differences, town authorities took positive action to stop disputes starting in the first place. Gambling was a recognised public vice, and in April 1369 Charles V outlawed games of 'dez, tables, palmes, quilles, palet, soules, billes' and other frivolous pastimes so as to encourage Frenchmen to train in the use of the bow. The security ordinances of Villefranche-de-Rouergue prohibited games of dice pilota, trasgitadores and encantadores which might lead to arguments and brawls among the defenders of the town. The consuls of Millau too were concerned by the public nuisance of 'falssas dissimulaciones de jocs', and in 1423 they banned all gaming for money or 'causas victuallas' in private homes and secret places on pain of an enormous fine of fifty livres. Gambling in taverns was tolerated, but on condition that no man staked more than 5s a day, and that any man blaspheming at the gaming tables also paid fifty livres or had his tongue cut out. Curiously, the authorities at Villefranche-de-Rouergue also thought that music and dancing were a threat to security, because they proscribed public dances, carolas and the playing of samphonia and other sturmens.

Religion was so deeply ingrained in later medieval urban life that it is hard to distinguish any special efforts to mobilise the religious sentiments of the population in wartime. The defensive

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1 Ordonnances, V, pp.172-173.
2 B.N. Doat, 147, fo.285vo.
3 'Nouveaux documents inédits sur la ville de Millau', p.294.
4 B.N. Doat, 147, fo.285vo.
ordinances of Villefranche-de-Rouergue enjoined all preachers to make peace the theme of their sermons 'quar en tels jours a hom plus de perilh que en autre', and the same ordinances end by invoking the protection and mercy of God for the town and those who governed it. The register of accounts for the fortification of Millau in 1363 similarly begins with a prayer to Christ, but invocations of this kind on public documents were commonplace. The placing of the town under divine protection was symbolised by the statue of the Virgin which so often stood in a niche above the gates. The fortifications themselves were sometimes attributed a mystic significance, being the object of wills and pious bequests. The city walls of Montpellier figured in the curious ceremony of cointurage. The Petit Thalamus chronicle records that in 1374 plague raged in the city from the beginning of Lent until after Midsummer. On 27 April, at the height of the epidemic, the consuls girdled the city walls and palisade with a cord 1,900 cunes.

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1 B.N. Doat, 147, fo.286.
2 'Lo glorius salvador del mon veulha salvar per sa misericordia la bona Viola Franca et las bonas gens que y son els bons perregiders quei so ni la governo et totas las autras garde Dieus de perilh selh plahs'. Ibid, fo.287.
3 'liber compotorum et debitorum operum murorum fossatorum et aliorum fortaliciarum ville Amilavi, quam villam altissimus Jhesus Christus custodire et preservare dignetur ab omnibus adversitatibus sua benigna gratia nuno et semper'. AC Millau, EE.81, fo.(14).

4 '... lampade sancte Marie portalis vocati de na Peytavina ... Item, lampade que ascenditur ante ymagium sancte Marie portalis de Bothalaria ... Item, luminarie sancte Marie portalis picti'. Extraits de registres de notaires: documents des XIVe-XVIe siècles concernant principalement le pays albigeois, ed. C. Portal, Archives historiques de l'Albigeois, VII, Albi, 1901, p.116.
5 See below, p.369.
(about 3,800 metres) long which was then made into a huge candle (resenoh) and placed in the consular church of Notre-Dame des Tables, where it burnt day and night 'per placar Nostre Senhor de la via siena e per far cessar la dicha mortalitat e que nos dones bona pas'.

This ceremony, which the chronicler mentions again in 1384 and 1397, seems, among the towns of the Nidi, to have been unique to Montpellier, and reflects, like the Oeuvre de la Commune Clôture, the special significance attached by the city to its fortifications.

Elsewhere religious ceremonies took the more familiar form of masses and processions for the protection of the town from its enemies, the success of the king’s armies and the celebration of his victories. On the feast of the nativity of the Virgin Mary in September 1373 the consuls of Nîmes organised a procession ‘ut Deus det bonam pacem domino nostro regi Francie et quod etiam det dicto domino nostro regi bonam victoriam contra suos inimicos’. On the departure of the Saint-Flour contingent to the siege of Les Maisons on August 6 1382 the consuls had a mass said to the Holy Spirit ‘affin que lo S. Esprititz volgues ajudar o guardar lo nostra gent de tota perilh’ and another the following day in thanksgiving for the return of the men ‘sana et alegra’. In October 1435 the consuls of Saint-Affrique requested the ecclesiastical authorities in the town, unsuccessfully as it turned out, for permission to hold a

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1 Petit Thalamus, pp.391-392.
2 Ibid, pp.408, 430.
4 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.175.
procession and ring the church bells to celebrate the peace of Arras.¹ At Montpellier in October 1448 news of the fall of Rouen was marked by a solemn procession of the consuls and ouvriers to the church of Notre-Dame des Tables, and bonfires were lit in the streets.² At Montagnac, not far from Montpellier, news of the defeat of the earl of Talbot at the battle of Castillon on 17 July 1453 was greeted on 26 July by enormous public festivities, which included bonfires, processions and balls.³ It is certainly noticeable that municipal records mention more celebrations of this kind in the reign of Charles VII than at any other time in the war. The twenty years up to 1453 were a time of consistent French military and diplomatic victory, and the king and his councillors cannot have been insensitive to the public-relations value of associating in the reconquest every part of the country, especially the most distant provinces and those only recently reintegrated into the kingdom. It is difficult to say though whether the initiative behind the festivities came from the crown’s officers or whether they were the spontaneous demonstration of popular loyalty and enthusiasm.

War was just one of many calamities that afflicted southern France in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the masses and processions 'for the protection of the town' were as often celebrated in response to plague, famine or drought as to the

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¹ AC Saint-Affrique, BB.6, fo.175vo.
² AC Montpellier, Thalamus des Ouvriers, fos.125-126vo.
natural disaster might be averted by divine intervention, war, on the other hand, was of man's creation and demanded human solutions, and, when all else failed, it was to the king and the pope, the highest authorities on earth, that man appealed for salvation. Facing a desperate situation in the winter of 1352-1353 with the English pressing on all sides, the consuls of Agen decided to send a solemn embassy to the king and at the same time to write to the pope describing 'l'estament del pais e la paubretat en que es per la guerra ni cum se pert del tot,' and imploring him to make peace between the kings of France and England. It was in response to this kind of appeal that Innocent VI and Urban V, both southern Frenchmen like the majority of the Avignon popes, launched their crusades against the _routiers_. Throughout the war years towns appealed to the crown for special protection. A feature of royal charters granted to the towns which came back into French allegiance after 1369 was the stipulation that they could never again be alienated from the royal domain. Militarily speaking the effects of royal protection were nil unless the king provided troops or money, but the psychological advantages were no doubt potent. At Mimes in times of danger it was the custom to display four blue banners embroidered with white fleurs de lys from the gate and tower of La Bouquerie.

1 Jurades de la ville d'Agen, pp. 298, 301-302.

2 For example, the charters granted by Charles V and Louis, duke of Anjou, to Montauban in March 1369, Villefranche-de-Rouergue in March 1369 and Najac in August 1373. B.N. Dat, 87, fos. 171-173vo; 147, fo. 115; 146, fo. 102.

The routier captain, the Bascot de Mauléon, once boasted to Froissart how easily he and his men had managed to capture the town and castle of Thuriès near Albi. Leaving most of his troops hidden nearby, the Bascot and five companions approached the town disguised as women carrying pitchers of water. When they reached the gates they found them completely unguarded, in fact the only person about was an old cobbler setting up his workshop. One of them blew a horn to bring up the others who were waiting in ambush outside. The cobbler paid them no attention, except to ask who had blown the horn. They replied that they thought it was a priest out riding, and he agreed that it was probably Maître François, the parish priest, who was very fond of going out in the morning after hares. At this the rest of the Bascot's men arrived and stormed into the town, where they found not a single citizen ready to put hand to sword in its defence.¹

The Bascot's story, which may or may not be true, is echoed in the archive sources by many similar tales, all of them suggesting that security in towns and castles was often very lax. In September 1353 Peyre Sagart, a guard at one of the town gates of Martel, was arrested because, so it was alleged, he had opened his gate at night and gone with a large number of other people to the fair at La Bastide, even though it was well known that the English were operating throughout the area.² At Agen in August 1354 four men were delivered up to the royal baili and consuls for deserting

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¹ Froissart, Œuvres, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Brussels, 1867–1877, IX, pp.120–121.
² AC Martel, BB.5, fo.69vo, 7 Sept. 1352.
their posts at the Porte de la Garonne and allowing the English to enter part of the town.¹ Bérenger Seurat, consul of the Bourg of Rodez, reported to the common court of pariage in May 1385 that during his tour of the walls 'circa auroram et hora multa suspecta' he had discovered one of the barbican gates of the Bourg wide open and with the keys still in the lock. It was not the first time, he complained, that this gate and another near it, which were both in the custody of the Franciscan friars, had been left open at night. The friars were ordered to surrender the keys to the consuls, and to block up all other gates and windows in their convent through which the enemy could get into the town.²

Another Rodez document, a case heard in the court of pariage in 1346-1347,³ reveals a good deal about the contrast between popular and official attitudes to security in the town in the early part of the war. The case concerns some men from the Bourg who were accused of breaching defensive regulations by opening a gate at night and climbing over part of the town wall. Curiously among the defendants was Bérenger Seurat, perhaps the same man who in 1335, older and wiser then and invested with the responsibility and dignity of consular office, berated the friars for leaving their barbicans open. The case opens with the depositions of the accused. Seurat's account comes first. He recalls that on the feast of the nativity of St. John the Baptist (24 June) 1346 he accompanied

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¹ Jurades de la ville d'Aren, p.327.
² AC Rodez, Bourg, EE.2, no.7.
³ AD Aveyron, C.59, fos.7-16.
Pierre Galenca, alias Bernardo, and others to the Cité to recover a debt for Galenca's brother. The business took a long time and it was late at night before they were able to set out back to their homes in the Bourg. Saurat himself was especially anxious to return, so he claimed, because his son was seriously ill. Arriving at the gate of the Cité at the end of the rue Saint-Etienne, they discovered, to their great surprise, that it was locked and bolted. The house of the gatekeeper, Johan Gabriac, adjoined the gate and so they shouted up to him to open up and let them through. Gabriac, rudely aroused from his bed, appeared at the window 'in tunica' and growled down to them 'quod non erat clausum cum clave, sed solum cum verre et quod apperiret illum'. Then one of the party, he cannot recall who, picked up a stone and struck the bolt to open the gate. They passed through, crossed the place Saint-Etienne, which divided the two towns of Rodez, and tried to enter the Bourg by the Portail du Pas, but finding it shut they retraced their steps back into the Cité, hoping to find another route out. After fruitlessly trying the other gates they came eventually to the Portail del Pertus, and, discovering that that too was shut, they scaled the wall adjoining the gate, crossed a meadow and eventually got back into the Bourg.

1 D. Suaud-Noulens, 'La Cité de Rodez au milieu du XVe siècle d'après le livre d'"Estimes" de 1449', Biblothèque de l'École des Chartes, CXXXI, 1973, passim, especially map I. The Porte Saint-Etienne (or Saint-Estève) formed part of the interior defences dividing the Cité from the Bourg.

2 The Portail del Pertus stood in the western flank of the exterior wall of the Cité, between the Château de Caldegouse and the Tour de Corbières. It had been walled up by 1357-1359. Comptes Consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, p.177.
In his defence, Seurat freely admits climbing the wall near the Portail del Pertus, but argues that at the time he did not realise that the wall formed part of the defences of the Cité, since it seemed to him to be no more than five or six palmes (about five feet) high. If by his action he has committed a crime, then, he pleads, it was not in malice but simply because he wished to return to the sickbed of his son. The depositions of the other defendants are virtually the same, even to the point of using the same excuse of sick wives and children. All agree that it was Seurat who knocked open the bolt of the Forte Saint-Etienne to get them out of the Cité in the first place.

The case against the men was moved by the proctor of the common court. He recalled that because there was war and evident peril in the kingdom of France the judge and bailli of the common court, acting on behalf of the joint seigneurs, the count of Armagnac and the bishop of Rodez, had commanded the consuls to surround the Cité with walls, ditches and other defences. By smashing open the Forte Saint-Etienne and scaling the wall the accused had contravened the ordinances and committed a serious breach of security. It was common knowledge that the wall formed part of the defences of the Cité and those who damaged or abused it did so in contempt of the seigneurs of the town, the more so if they were caught at

1 AD Aveyron, G.59, fos.7-7vo.
2 Ibid, fos.11-12.
3 The case opened on 5 September 1346. The ordinances to which the proctor referred are not dated, but they probably coincided with the duke of Lancaster's second campaign in the Agenais in the summer and autumn of that year.
night 'hora tarda et suspecta'. The wall in question was at least eight palma in height on the town side, and more than twelve on the outside, and so was a good deal more substantial than the accused maintained.¹

Unfortunately there is no record of any judgement, but even as it stands this case shows how easily the safety of the community could be sacrificed to personal expediency. The expectation of Seurat and his friends of finding the town gates open at all hours of the night, the willingness of the gatekeeper, Gabriac, half asleep, to admit to these unknown men, who, for all he knew, might have been English soldiers, that the gate was not properly locked, and the apparent ease with which the accused were able to wander about the Cité at that late hour and then climb over the town wall all point to the weakness of the security arrangements at Rodez. Cases of this kind lend plausibility to the Bascot's tale of the capture of Thuriès, and show why the authorities were haunted by the fear of towns being lost to the enemy not through weakness or cowardice but through the sheer carelessness and indifference of the citizens.

¹ AD Aveyron, G.59, fons.14-14vo.
PART III

FORTIFICATIONS AND ARMAMENTS
CHAPTER 8

THE FORTIFICATIONS

1) Military and non-military function

Town defence in the Middle Ages was organised on the fundamental assumption that a fortified enclosure of walls and ditches was the surest guarantee of protection for the citizens. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries no single southern town could field a militia capable of meeting on equal terms in battle even a small professional army. Yet a few determined defenders could hold a town or castle against an enemy far superior in strength and numbers. Froissart's account of the Black Prince's chevauchée of 1355 makes the point clearly enough. The bourgeois of Carcassonne resolved to stand against the Anglo-Gascons and drew themselves up in their companies. There was no town wall to protect them, only chains drawn across the streets as a barrier against horsemen. But the English knights dismounted and advanced up the long straight streets of the Bourg preceded by volleys of arrows. The townspeople were butchered in their hundreds and their houses put to the torch. 1 It had been the same story all the way up the Garonne, at places like Avignonet, a town of 1500 hearths 'mais elle n'estoit point fremée', or Castelnaudary, 'une moutl grosse ville et bon chastiel etraempili de gens et de biens; mais elle n'estoit fremée'. 2

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2 Froissart, Chroniques, IV, pp.163-164.
However, the Prince and his army avoided the strongly-fortified Cité of Carcassonne and were checked at Narbonne, where the Cité was 'assés bien fremée de murs, de portes et de tours'.

In more than a hundred years of war the defensive efficacy of stones and mortar was never seriously questioned. In 1349 the consuls of Narbonne petitioned the king's lieutenant, the archbishop of Auch, for permission to rebuild the walls of the Cité and Bourg to safeguard the people and their homes and property from the ravages of the king's enemies, who throughout the kingdom had burnt and laid waste a great number of towns and murdered their citizens or inflicted on them the cruellest tortures and oppressions. In March 1382 Raymond-Jourdain, vicomte de Gimols, authorised the construction of a defensive enceinte in his village of Montbéqui (Tarn-et-Garonne). In the preamble to the charter he justified his decision

'... cum urgente necessitate propter evidentia pericula guerrarum presentium ducatus Aquitannie que fulminantur in partibus istis et in pluribus aliis partibus regni Francie ... et propter discursum latrunculorum, depredatorum et pilhatorum, patriam presentem distruentium, de die in diem et frequenter gentes et subditos regios capiendo, apresando et captivando, et de bonis eorumdem depredando, et opporteant de necessitate facere loca fortia et incepta fortificari et reparare adeo ut fideles et subditi dicti domini nostri

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2 AC Narbonne, CC.1304.
More than sixty years later, in 1445, the villagers of La Couvertoirade and Sainte-Bulalie on the plain of Larzac decided to surround their homes with walls, 'volentes futuris periculis et allotgiamentis obviare et ne dicta loca sic pateant incurves dictorum armigerorum'.

There was, however, a limit to the effectiveness of fortifications. Even the most sophisticated defensive schemes could eventually be reduced by artillery and mines, or by starving or infiltrating the defenders. Town fortifications were seldom very sophisticated; nor did the majority of citizens have much appetite for battle. To the mind of the urban civilian the dishonour of surrender was probably of little consequence in comparison to the horrors that attended a protracted siege. Moreover, the protective carapace of walls and ditches could be a strait-jacket, because no town could exist for long separated from the countryside on which it depended. Against the scores of Anglo-Gascon garrisons in the fortresses of upland Auvergne and Languedoc who exploited this simple fact of life the towns had no recourse except the pati.

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1 E. Forestié, 'Montbéqui: notes monographiques et chartes de reconstruction (1er mars 1382)', Bulletin de la Société archéologique de Tarn-et-Garonne, XXXVI, 1908, p. 205.

Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that fortification was the best defence against the lightly-armed and highly mobile raiding-party, such as that which the Black Prince led into Languedoc in 1355, against robbers and brigands and against the errant solider.

Town fortifications had a significance beyond their primary military function. The wall was a sign of a town's status and of the pride and solidarity of its citizens. Among the humiliations which the duke of Anjou proposed to inflict on Montpellier after the rebellion of 1379 was the destruction of the whole eastern flank of the city wall and the filling-in of the ditch so that a cart could pass from bank to bank. In the event he relented, perhaps because to breach the famous Commune Clôture would have been to break completely the spirit of the city. In the art and literature of the period towns were often symbolised by their walls and gates, although the magnificence of the poetic and artistic vision was seldom attained in reality. Fortifications were frequently represented on town seals. A common motif was the stylised gate surmounted by turrets which figures on the consular seal of Périgueux. The seal of the consuls of Montpellier shows

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1 Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents, I, no.2746.


the city enclosed by a crenelated wall and four towers. Some modern authorities have stressed the symbolism of the town wall, a divide between the serene urban world of commerce and progress and the backward countryside. In Languedoc this distinction cannot be taken too far, for even in the largest and most cosmopolitan of its cities, Toulouse and Montpellier, and especially in the more typical small towns, the frontier between the urban world and the rural world was tenuous. Nevertheless, contemporaries recognised that secure behind their walls townspeople enjoyed a special, hallowed kind of peace that set them apart from the plat Pays outside. In 1363 the consuls of Montpellier, acting as executors of Hugues Carrel, merchant of the city, declared that debts still owing to the deceased should be paid to the Commune Clôture because 'the walls are considered to be holy, and within their safety the offices of the Church can be celebrated and her sacraments administered, men go about their business protected from robbers and enemies and nuns, virgins, widows and ordinary women lead their lives in peace'.

More prosaically, town fortifications were used in peacetime

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1 Roschach & Molinier, Histoire graphique de l'ancienne province de Languedoc, p.74, pl.25.


3 '... cum juxta legitimas sanxiones, muri dicantur sancti et infra eorum clausuras divina tute celebrantur officia ecclesiastica secure ministretur sacramenta, hominum vita conservat eorumque facultates a pravis conantibus inimicorum et latrunculorum defendantur mulieresque virgines et sanctimoniales in sui virginitate nec non conjurate et vidue in eorum preservantur ...', Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents, XII, EE.97.
for a multitude of domestic and commercial purposes. Towers and
gatehouses were leased as workshops, stores and private dwellings,
almost always on condition that they reverted to the authorities in
wartime. In April 1449 the consuls of Millau leased the Tour de
la Capelle to one Gui Trespuech as a warehouse for his pelts and
fleeces; they retained right of access whenever the defence of the
town required while he undertook not to allow into the tower any
'gens dezonestas ni sospechozas'. The customs of Cahors expressly
recognised the right of the consuls to farm out the town walls and
ditches for profit, and they used this faculty to shift some of
the burden of maintenance and improvement onto the lessees. In
June 1279, for instance, Arnal Blac undertook to spend a total of
30 livres to repair part of the barbican of the Portail Saguina
which he rented from the consuls for 15s a year. Water-filled
ditches were stocked with fish, dry ditches served as pasture.
In 1297 the king upheld the right of the inhabitants of Pézenas to
graze their beasts in the ditches adjoining the royal castle.
Every year in August the captain of Aniane (Hérault) auctioned the
hay in the town ditches. The hunting rights to the ditches of

1 Documents sur la ville de Millau, p.323.
2 AC Cahors, Livre Noir, fo.2, art.15.
4 Ordonnances, XII, p.493 (Trio). Documents sur la ville de Millau, p.223.
5 AC Pézenas, Rasseguier nos.947, 948.
6 AD Hérault, D-supplément, Aniane, BB.1, foa.32, 40, & passim.
Albi were shared by the town and the bishop.\textsuperscript{1} The extensive archives of the Commune Clôture illustrate the importance of the non-military use of the fortifications at Montpellier,\textsuperscript{2} although that city was uniquely businesslike in the exploitation of its public resources.

ii) Rights to the fortifications

Until the mid-fourteenth century the authority of the crown over castles, fortresses and walled towns outside the royal domain was nominal. Fortification and the associated rights of gueu and garde were seigneurial prerogatives, generally considered concomitant with rights of justice. The ultimate control of the king was sanctioned only by the notion of 'rendability', the duty of the vassal to make available his fortresses to his overlord when so required.\textsuperscript{3}

During the Hundred Years War the crown asserted its right to control all the defences of the kingdom on the grounds not of outdated feudal custom but of national security. In 1362 King Jean claimed that as he held his kingdom direct from God and was accountable for its safety the ultimate control of all its

\begin{itemize}
  \item[1] Douze comptes consulaires d'Albi, II, p. iii.
  \item[2] Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents, XII, passim.
\end{itemize}
fortifications was his alone.¹ This doctrine is implicit in defence ordinances of the period. Royal commissioners operating in the sénéchaussée of Carcassonne in 1356 were empowered to inspect all fortresses, whether they belonged to nobles, barons or prelates.² In the same year the consuls of the castle of Sérignan (Hérault) declared to representatives of their co-seigneurs that they would continue with the fortification of the castle only by royal mandate.³ By 1487 Charles VIII could argue with little fear of contradiction that 'by common law and observance which from all time have obtained in the kingdom' authority over the walls of cities, towns and fortresses was the king's and that seigneurs directes et particuliers had no right to permit any encroachment upon them nor to

1 'Ad nos qui regnum nostrum pure a Deo sine alio superiore tenemus solus et insolida super omnes alios pertinet protectio et defensio regni nostri et habitantium in eodem modum etiam resistenti et ordinatio guerriandi seu guerram inimicis nostris et regni nostri faciendi: ad nos etiam per consequens pertinet constructio et defensio fortaliciorum in regno nostro solus et insolida.' M. Keen, The Laws of War in the Middle Ages, London, 1965, p. 79.

2 AC Agde, EE. (77).

3 'Dixerunt (consules) quod illud quod clausum est in dicto loco de Serignano est clausum mandato regio et non alio mandato ... et talia mandata de dicto loco cavis et muris fortificando ad dominum nostrum regem pertineat'. 'Documents relatifs aux guerres anglaises dans le diocèse de Béziers', ed. M. Carou, Bulletin de la Société archéologique, scientifique et littéraire de Béziers, 2e série, VII, 1873, pp. 19-20.
dispose of them in any way without reference to him. ¹

By the beginning of the fifteenth century seigneurs thought it prudent to consult the king before proceeding with defensive schemes. In May 1435 the abbot of Psalmodio declared that he dared not fortify his house at Saint-Laurent (Gard) without the king's permission even though he enjoyed full rights of high and low justice there. ² A few years later Bernard d'Arpajon, prior of Saint-Gilles, allowed the villagers of La Couvertoirade in Larzac to build a fortified enclosure only on condition that they first obtained permission from the king or the royal sénéchal of Rouergue. ³

But powerful feudatories continued to enjoy considerable independence in this sphere. Royal defence ordinances of January 1372 exempted the peers of France from having their fortresses

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¹ 'Notre procureur en la senechaussée de Beaucaire pour nostre interest et conservation de nos droits et domaine nous a fait dire et remontrer que savoir ce que par droit de royale et souveraine disposition juridiction de droit commun et commune observance de tout temps gardée et observée en nostre royaume la toutelle disposition juridiction et administration des murs et murailles des cites villes et forteresses de nostredit royaume appartenent a nous ou a nos officiers pour nous et en nostre nom sens ce qu'il soit permis ne loisible aux seigneurs directes et particuliers desdits cites et villes et forteresses suis en autrement mesmes pour bailer donner ne octroyer congé ne licence de appuyer edits murs et murailles ne en icelux et icelles faire ouverture fenestres yassus ne autres aysimens au moins sans ce avoir autorite congé et licence de nous ou nos officiers ne des crimes et delits qui se y commettent prendre aucune cour jurisdiction ou connoissance de cause ...' AD Hérault, A.8, fo.250.


inspected by the king's commissioners. The almost regal powers which the counts of Armagnac exercised over their fiefs gave them the de facto right to build and demolish fortresses belonging to themselves or their vassals without any reference to the crown.

In 1426 Leberun de Laura appealed to Count Jean IV for authorisation to erect a fort on his land near Risole and there to enjoy all the privileges which the other nobles of Armagnac enjoyed in their castles. The count consented, declaring that the construction of castles and strongholds to resist the enemy was of public benefit, and approved the building of a fort, saving certain comital rights over the place, including that of destroying the fort if he saw fit. There is no mention of the king in this agreement.

Ecclesiastical seigneurs were especially jealous of their rights. In 1360 a royal commissioner who arrived to inspect the fortifications of Viviers was sent away with a flea in his ear by the bishop's officers, who claimed that by virtue of the parage of Vivarais the bishop had exclusive rights over the defence of the town. The bishop of Albi made similar claims. In 1362, in a dispute with the consuls of Albi about the right of watch, it was maintained that from time out of mind the bishop and his predecessors had enjoyed the uncontested right to guard the town and that this privilege had been upheld by the king. And indeed the crown

1 Mandements et actes divers de Charles V, pp.439-442.
2 AD Tarn-et-Garonne, A.44, fos.147vo-149.
3 AC Viviers, AA.5, no.5. For the parage of 1307 see Babey, Le pouvoir temporal de l'évêque de Viviers.
4 AC Albi, FF.39.
did support him in this. In 1344, 1361 and 1363 the sénéchal of Carcassonne and the royal vicaire of Albi were instructed to see that the townspeople mounted watch on the walls whenever they were so ordered by the bishop.\(^1\) In 1347 the king's lieutenant in Languedoc, the count of Armagnac, allowed the consuls to impose subsidies on merchandise sold in Albi to raise money for the walls, but the bishop protested that the temporal jurisdiction over the city was his and that it covered the fortifications, and Armagnac was forced to revoke his grant.\(^2\)

The construction, maintenance and guard of town walls were the responsibility of the municipality, subject to the ultimate authority of the king or seigneur. However, the administration of defence was complicated in many towns by the existence within the fortified enclosure of royal and seigneurial buildings, such as castles, palaces and churches, over which the municipality had no formal authority. Some towns had been able to wrest from their seigneurs an undertaking not to build castles within their walls. In 1207 Marie, countess of Montpellier, ordered the demolition of her castle in the city and promised the citizens that neither she nor her successors would ever build any other fortress to replace it.\(^3\) Custom placed a similar constraint on the lord of

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\(^1\) B.N. Doat, 109, fo.248; 110, fo.204. Cf. L. de Lauger, L'évêque, le roi, le clergé et la commune à Albi pendant la seconde moitié du XIVe siècle, Albi, 1913, p.11ff.

\(^2\) B.N. Doat, 109, fo.278.

But there remained hundreds of castles, often no more than single keeps or towers, which lay within town walls and which were considered part and parcel of the town defences.

The crown was generally prepared to entrust the guard of these castles to the local inhabitants. At Saint-Antonin the consuls were given custody of the royal tower and appointed the castellan. The consuls of Millau were permitted to appoint two or three men for the defence of the royal castle, although in practice they enjoyed almost complete control over the building, altering it as they saw fit to conform with the defensive needs of the town. In 1356 they were authorised by the sénéchal of Rouergue to block up the castle gate, which opened to the outside of the town walls, and build a new entrance giving direct access to the town. The English were keen to strengthen the castle after taking over the town in 1361, for it had gained a new importance from its frontier situation, and in 1365 Thomas Wetenhale, the English sénéchal of Rouergue, ordered the reopening of the original gate and the addition of a drawbridge and tower. The consuls were made responsible for the work, but they prevaricated and the building had not apparently progressed very far by 1369 when the town returned.

1 Ducom, *La commune d' Agen*, p.204.
2 E.N. Doat, 146, fo.260vo., confirmation of privileges 1369. Royal castellans were still appointed at intervals, see Dupont-Ferrier, *Gallia Regia*, IV, p.272.
3 *Documents sur la ville de Millau*, p.203.
into French allegiance. In December of that year the castle was garrisoned by the townspeople who barred the gates to the English, and in February 1370 the consuls concluded a secret agreement with the English castellan, Mego Nasi, by which the new constructions were to be destroyed. The early fifteenth-century registers of the watch assign up to forty men each night to the guard of the castle, and in the absence of any reference to the regular appointment of a royal castellan until the later fifteenth century, it seems likely that the town had exclusive responsibility for the castle.

Ecclesiastical and lay seigneurs were less disposed to alienate responsibility for the defence of their property, and in many towns there were large areas which remained, partly or entirely, outside the military ambit of the municipality. This was frequently the case in episcopal towns. The authority of the consul over the defence of Cahors was carefully circumscribed by an agreement made with the bishop in 1351. They were allowed the custody of the keys and gates of the bridges, towers and other fortifications of the town, except the central tower of the Pont-Vieux, the Tour des Chanoines on the riverside and all the other defences which the

2 Documents sur la ville de Millau, p. 169.
3 Ibid., p. 176.
4 AC Millau, cc. 36.
5 Royal castellans were appointed regularly from 1454. Dupont-Ferrier, Gallia Regia, IV, p. 267.
bishop and chapter chose to retain. At Albi, the bishop's palace of La Barbie, the old cathedral and its cloister formed a citadel within the town over which the bishop and chapter had sole and undisputed rights, and the same sort of situation was to be found in other episcopal towns.

Town governments rarely attempted to gain absolute control over seigneurial fortifications and other private and institutional buildings. Their aim was to ensure that the town was adequately surrounded by a circuit of walls and ditches, interrupted in as few places as possible, to which they had right of access in wartime. After a dispute at Béziers the bishop agreed to allow the consuls to build a wall-walk through part of his palace and to block up some of its lower windows at his own expense, although the arbitrators did not support the consuls' claim that a section of the palace should actually be destroyed. In 1375 the capitouls of Toulouse and the cathedral chapter of Saint-Etienne came to an understanding about rights of access to a length of the city wall lying within the chapter's jurisdiction. The city would compensate the chapter for the destruction of its property and build a new length of curtain at public expense. In wartime the capitouls were to enjoy free access to this wall and the towers along it, to which they were

1 AC Cahors, Livre Noir, fos.11vo-12.
2 Lacour, L'évêque, le roi, le clergé et la commune à Albi, p.13.
3 For example at Le Puy, Saint-Flour and Viviers. 'Inventaire de la maison consulaire du Puy', p.691. Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, pp.7-10. 'Catalogue des actes de la ville de Viviers', loc. cit., XXVII, p.117.
4 B.N. Doat, 60, fos.106-108, 17 April 1358.
to hold one set of keys and the chapter the other, and they were empowered to block any openings and destroy any constructions impairing the defence of the Forte Saint-Etienne, on condition that they restored the wall to the chapter in peacetime.\footnote{Inventaire sommaire AC Toulouse. Série AA, pp. 79-80.}

Agreements of this kind could apply to other types of building with a defensive function, not merely those on the line of the walls. At Albi the consuls had a standing arrangement with the canons of Saint-Salvi for the use of a watchtower on their church, the highest building in the town before the completion of the cathedral tower at the end of the fifteenth century. During the 1380s the tower became unsafe and had to be pulled down and after a certain amount of bickering the canons and consuls came to an agreement about its reconstruction. The watchtower would be built at town expense, the contractors taking care not to damage the structure of the church, and the consuls would retain custody and see to its upkeep. In times of danger the canons were free to place their relics and valuables in the tower for safety and in return the watchmen could signal fires or the approach of the enemy with the church bells.\footnote{AC Albi, EE.14. "Élaborations du conseil communal d'Albi", loc. cit. XLVIII, p.456.}

Each party would keep a key to the tower, the only restriction placed on the watchmen being that they should on no account bring in 'mulieres aliquas neo alias personas in honestas'.

To judge from the surviving evidence, symbiotic relationships of this sort were the exception rather than the rule, and disputed claims to the use of the fortifications and to rights of construction
and demolition were a constant source of friction between towns and seigneurs. At Albi the consuls might live amicably with the canons of Saint-Salvi, but they came up against fierce opposition from the cathedral chapter when they tried to extend the wall-walk around the still incomplete western towers of the cathedral of Sainte-Cécile. The ecclesiastics complained that the structure converted their church to profane use, that it blocked out the daylight to the chapter house so that meetings had to be held in candlelight, that the damage caused to the cathedral and surrounding property came to four thousand marks, and that the work had been undertaken not from a spirit of public utility but of pure malice.¹

The chapter's arguments ought not to be accepted too literally, and anyway the final outcome of the affair is unknown, but it does illustrate the atmosphere of suspicion and enmity which plagued so many towns and which prevented unity in the face of the enemy.

To implement their scheme for the fortification of the Cité and Bourg of Narbonne, the consuls had to fight on two fronts, against the archbishop and cathedral chapter on one side, and against the viscount on the other.² The dispute with the former hinged on the chapter's proposal to extend the nave of the cathedral church of Saint-Just through the town wall. Already in 1288 the royal viguier had confirmed the right of the consuls of the Cité to build, destroy and rebuild the fortifications and guard the town.

¹ AG Albi, ff. 44.
² The archbishop held the Bourg of Narbonne, and shared lordship of the Cité with the viscount.
notwithstanding the pretensions of the clergy to the contrary,¹ but
the chapter were either unaware of this ruling, or chose to overlook
it, and pressed ahead with the cathedral until in August 1345 the
consuls obtained royal letters ordering the work to be halted and
the walls of the town restored to their proper state.² But the
dispute continued, and it was not until 1361, after the traumatic
siege of 1355 had perhaps convinced the clergy of the value of the
defences, that a final agreement was reached. Work on the nave of
the cathedral was stopped for good, the chapter abandoned to the
consuls all claims to the town walls and undertook to maintain free
passage through the cloister from matins to curfew, and in wartime
at all hours of the day and night, so that the watchmen could get
to their posts.³

A separate dispute between the consuls and the archbishop centred
on the Capitole, a vestige of the Roman fortifications of Narbonne
which, the consuls complained, was being systematically dismantled
by the archbishop's men even though it was the largest and strongest
tower in the city. The archbishop had decided to build a convent
on the site of the Capitole, claiming that as the tower stood in his
half of the city, he was able to dispose of it as he saw fit. In
1345 the sénéchal of Carcassonne was instructed to investigate the

¹ AC Narbonne, EE.598.
² Ibid, EE.627. R. Amouroux, Le consulat et l'administration munici-
pale de Narbonne des origines à la fin du XIVe siècle,
Université de Toulouse Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Écono-
miques, thèse pour le doctorat en Droit, 1970, (unpublished),
pp.252-258.
³ AC Narbonne, EE.2229. The cathedral remains incomplete to this
day.
archbishop's case and, if it was upheld, to see that his privileges were respected. In 1356 the consuls retaliated by challenging the archbishop's proposal to increase the height of the episcopal towers. They argued that if the palace were to fall to the enemy the rest of the city would certainly be lost. The king's lieutenant, the count of Armagnac, ordered the scheme to be halted if the danger was as serious as the consuls alleged.

The quarrel between the consuls and the viscount, Aymori IX, was altogether more acrimonious and eventually led to war between them. Its origins lay in two separate, but related, issues, the construction of two barbicans near the viscount's palace and the right to appoint the town captain. The affair of the barbicans started in 1362 when Jean de Villaines, royal viguier of Béziers, inspected the fortifications of the Cité and Bourg and made a series of recommendations for their improvement, notably the construction of 'sufficient barbicans' with associated ditches and bridges running from the episcopal palace along the banks of the canalised Aude to 'the great round tower known as the Tor Bentoan'.

1 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pp. cols.1125-1126.
2 Ibid, cols.959-962.
3 AC Narbonne, EE.1649. The Cité and Bourg of Narbonne were divided in the Middle Ages, as today, by the canalised River Aude, the Canal de la Robine, which flows in a straight line from NW to SE. The final agreement between the viscount and the consuls, sealed in July 1388, most clearly defines the position of the barbicans.

Una est versus circum juxta flumen Atacis et pretenditur de turra domini archesupci Narbonensis que est tercia a portali Salinerio usque ad flumen Aracis et prosequendo ripam usque ad Pontem Venterem; alio vero est a parte altani procedens a pede turris vocata turris Ventoa soita loco dicto al Pla de las Naus usque ad flumen Atacis et sequendo dictam ripam Atacis versus circuitm usque ad dictum Pontem Venterem. Inventaire sommaire AC Narbonne, Annexes de la série AA, p.369. The viscomital palace was in the Cité, on the left bank of the river. On the topography of medieval Narbonne see the maps in Amouroux, Le consulat de Narbonne, pp.29-30.
viscount protested that the works blocked the entrance to his palace, and tried to have them stopped, but in August 1366 the consuls received letters from Charles V ordering them to continue building despite the viscount’s objections.¹ These instructions were endorsed by Louis of Anjou in January 1372² but the viscount’s officers persistently harassed the workmen, until in November 1373 the royal proctor placed the building sites under royal protection by surrounding them with stakes painted with the fleurs de lys.³ Meanwhile Aymeri had obtained letters from the juge ordinaire of Carcassonne ordering the work to stop pending investigation, at which the outraged consuls persuaded no less a figure than the duke of Anjou himself, accompanied by the constable of France and other worthies, to inspect the work and confirm the justice of their case.⁴ The viscount was not intimidated by such a weight of expert opinion, and, while his men continued to bombard the builders with stones, he surreptitiously obtained letters from the king directing that the barbicans be destroyed and the status quo restored.⁵ The consuls appealed, Charles realised his mistake

¹ AC Narbonne, EE.1459.
² Ibid, EE.1455.
³ Ibid, EE.1459. ‘... signati fecit vallata barbacane supradiicti nonullos palos fusteos floribus licii signatos circumcirca eodem fossata apponi faciendo’. The episode affords an interesting insight into the customs surrounding disputed constructions. The viscount’s men had signalled their disapproval by the formal hurling of stones, ‘... nonullos lapidas in signum novi hoperis denunciationis in vallo seu fossato ipsius barbacane progressit’. Ibid.
⁴ Ibid, EE.1460. The inspection by Anjou took place on 19 May 1374.
and cited both parties to appear before Parliament.\textsuperscript{1} No more is heard of the case in the Narbonne archives, but apparently neither side had obtained satisfaction by the time open war broke out between them in 1381.\textsuperscript{2} Several of the viscount's castles were destroyed and hostilities continued sporadically until the conclusion of a peace in 1384.\textsuperscript{3} A final agreement on the two central issues of the captaincy and the barbican was not reached until 1388. In each of the disputed barbican the consuls were to build at their expense a suitably-sized gate, to which they would have one key and the viscount the other, and to which each party was to have free access at all hours. The consuls would maintain the works.\textsuperscript{4}

The simplicity of the solution in no way detracts from the importance of the case. It shows how public good could be prejudiced by private interest, however legitimate, and how easily that interest could be pursued by an adroit exploitation of the law and the tortuous, often contradictory, workings of the royal administration.

The obstructive effect of the law is further illustrated by a similar example from Rodes. Like Narbonne, Rodes was divided into Cité and Bourg, but whereas at Narbonne there was a single consulate from 1338, Rodes continued to be separately administered

\begin{itemize}
  \item[1] AC Narbonne, EE.1461, the writ served on 5 March 1377.
  \item[3] Ibid, p.908.
\end{itemize}
until the seventeenth century. Relations between the Bourg and its
seigneur were generally cordial largely because the counts of Rodez
as counts of Armagnac had wider interests and were seldom resident.
The bishops, on the other hand, made of the Cité their chief seat,
and the fact that their three most important buildings, the cathed-
ral, the palace and the castle were not only encompassed by the
walls but actually adjoined them led to a protracted conflict in
the later fourteenth century and through the fifteenth. The
quarrel started in 1378 over constructions at the Porte Saint-
Martial, popularly known as the Porte de la Bascalerie, which stood
between the episcopal palace and the cathedral and over which the
bishop and chapter claimed control. From the late 1360s the main
defensive project on which the consuls of both Cité and Bourg had
been simultaneously engaged was the building of an outer curtain
wall known as the muretta. The chapter asserted that the muretta
and associated ditch obstructed the gate, and in October 1378,
having first tried unsuccessfully to deter the consuls by placing
royal ponnants on the gate, (the diocese then being under the
special protection of the crown), they prevailed upon the royal
sénéchal of Rouergue to order a halt to the work. In July a
compromise was reached between the consuls and the bishop, Bertrand

1 For the position of these buildings relative to the fortifica-
tions of Rodez, see Suan-Noulens, ‘La Cité de Rodez au milieu
du XVe siècle’, pp.151-175 & plan 1.

2 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, II, passim. AC Rodez, Bourg,
EE.1; Cité, EE.1.

3 AD Aveyron, G.493, no.12. John, patriarch of Alexandria, admi-
nistrator of the vacant see of Rodez, had been placed in the
royal safeguard in June 1372.
Raphin. Each party would elect two representatives who would work out a final settlement by Christmas. The consuls handed over the keys of the barbican to the bishop who in turn placed them and his own set in the hands of two men from the Bourg. In fact no such settlement evolved, and the dispute broke out again in the 1430s.

In 1431 the Tour de Corbières, one of the towers of the town wall standing near the episcopal palace, became unsafe and had to be pulled down. It was later claimed on the bishop's behalf that the condition of the tower was due to inadequate maintenance by the consuls, but relations between the municipality and the bishop, Guillaume de La Tour, were amiable enough at this stage for an interim agreement to be reached allowing the consuls to build a passageway across the gap left by the tower so as to spare the watchmen the trouble of climbing down from the wall. In February 1433 the consuls were further permitted to erect a small cabin on this passage, the bishop reserving the right to demolish both cabin and passage at eight days notice if he should decide to rebuild the tower. But trouble started shortly afterwards. The bishop alleged that, contrary to their undertaking, the consuls had

1 AD Aveyron, G.493, no.14.

2 The Tour de Corbières was eventually rebuilt in the later fifteenth century and still stands. The present wall of the episcopal palace with its splendid ornamented arcing dates from the sixteenth century, but stands on or near the line of the original town wall from the Porte Saint-Martial to the Tour de Corbières.

3 AD Aveyron, G.493, nos.18, 20.

refused to allow him access to the cabin and that a band of men from both Cité and Bourg, among whom was the count of Armagnac's proctor, had assaulted his palace and forcibly removed a door opening out onto the wall-walk between the Tour de Corbières and the Porte Saint-Martial. The topographical indications are somewhat confusing here, but the implication is that the consuls had used the fortuitous destruction of the tower to entrench their position at the Porte Saint-Martial. The bishop retaliated by asserting his absolute authority over the fortifications from the Porte Saint-Martial to the Tour de Corbières and again invoked royal protection, but the consuls appealed to the court of pariage and in March 1437 their custody of the gate and wall was confirmed, subject to the bishop's right of access.

In 1440 the dispute started all over again, on the original issue of the barbican, now described as a boulevart. Probably it was the outbreak of the Praguerie which persuaded the consuls of the need to put the fortifications in order, and they decided to go...

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1 AD Aveyron, G.493, nos.21, 22.

2 The construction in question is described as a 'baletum sive passatgium erectum super portale de Sanoto Martiale iuxta dictam domum mamn episcopalem Rethenensem situm et quedam porteta in capite seu in fine vel in loco ubi septum fuit seu terminatum et clausum huiusmodi baletum sive passatgium et a parte muri dicte civitatis et turris episcopalis ad ipsum dominum episcopum et eius ecclesiam seu mensam episcopalem Rethenensem pertinensis collapse et de Corberiis muncupate erecta', ibid, no.22.

ahead and complete the work at the Porte Saint-Martial, suspended since the prohibition of 1378. The bishop was quick to protest and brought the consuls before the court of the sénéchal at Villefranche, but the court was unable to proceed with the main case until it had considered the bishop's complaint that building had continued since his denunciation of the work, a shrewd delaying tactic. The court decided that the consuls' plea could be heard if they undertook to demolish the new work if so directed, at which the bishop appealed to Parlement. In the meantime the affair had ramified. In October 1440 the consuls had received royal letters granting them a subsidy on meat and wine to pay for repairs to the fortifications. The bishop suspected that the monies raised would not be assigned to this purpose but to fund their lawsuit against him, and having persuaded the cathedral chapter and some butchers of the town to protest against the tax, he appealed to Parlement on this score too. Parlement took cognisance of both cases simultaneously and on the question of the barbicans it directed that the new constructions should be demolished. Unhappily the officer executing this sentence exceeded his brief and pulled down an adjoining house, thus opening up a whole new field for argument. The case was eventually transferred to the Parlement of Toulouse where it continued for many years, apparently without any conclusive outcome.

1 The arrêté is dated 16 May 1444. AD Aveyron, G.493, no.30.
iii) The chronology of fortification

Because of the disjointedness of the documentation and the unreliability of the archaeological evidence, it would be difficult to make a comprehensive chronological survey of town fortification in the Midi. But enough survives in the way of royal and seigneurial authorisations to build or improve town walls, grants of taxes, building contracts and accounts, for the broad pattern of the defensive effort in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to be discernible.

a) Fortification before 1337

All the principal towns of the South were in some measure fortified long before the start of the Hundred Years War. A thirteenth century history of Narbonne confidently asserts that the city was already walled in the time of King David.¹ In the fourteenth century parts of the external fortifications of Millau and Rodez were of such recognisable antiquity that they were known as parets sarrasinas.² In fact both Narbonne and Rodez, like most other Gallo-Roman towns, were probably first walled in the third or fourth century.³

Gallo-Roman fortifications may or may not have been maintained; there is virtually no evidence for the state of town defences from the late Empire until the twelfth century. In the later twelfth century, and during the Albigensian troubles, there was an upsurge

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¹ Inventaire sommaire AC Narbonne, série AA, AA.130, fo.130vo.
² Rey, Les fortifications de Millau, p.77ff.
³ Lot, Recherches sur la population, I, p.310, II, p.132; & passim for the history of towns of Gallo-Roman origin.
in building which reflected not only the insecurity of the time, but also the growing power, wealth and self-assurance of the towns. Montpellier, the only major town of Languedoc which was not of Roman origin, was enclosed within the new wall of the Commune Clôture, encompassing the previously separate bourses of Montpellier and Montpellierret and increasing the area of the city four-fold. In 1194 Raymond VI of Toulouse permitted the consuls of Mimes to extend their town walls. The Cité and faubourgs of Albi were probably enclosed at about the same time. Extensive rebuilding also took place at Béziers and Mende.

The Treaty of Paris of 1228 stipulated that the count of Toulouse was to found no more walled towns, and that the walls of Toulouse itself and thirty other towns and castles were to be pulled down and not rebuilt without royal or papal approval. The long-term effects of the treaty varied from place to place. In 1242

1 Vigié, 'Des enceintes de Montpellier', pp.136-137.
4 L. Noguier, 'Enceinte murale de Béziers à l'époque gallo-romaine et au moyen-âge', Bulletin de la Société archéologique, scientifique et littéraire de Béziers, 2e série, VII, 1873, p.274.
5 J. Barbot, Recherches sur les anciennes fortifications de la ville de Mende, Mende, 1903, p.7.
6 Histoire de Languedoc, VIII, cols.889-890. The towns and castles whose fortifications were to be demolished were Fanjeaux, Castelnau-d'Emporia, Labédo, Avignonnet, Puylaurens, Saint-Paul, Lavaur, Rabastens, Gaillac, Montaigu, Puyoles, Verdun, Castelsarrasin, Noissac, Montauban, Montou, Agen, Condom, Saverdun, Hauterive, Cussaneuil, Pujols, Auvillar, Peyrusse, Laurac and five others to be decided by the papal legate.
Raymond VII of Toulouse ordered the inhabitants of Agen to rebuild their walls, and between 1250 and 1271 Alphonse of Poitiers restored the fortifications of Aiguillon. On the other hand, the walls of Toulouse and Beaucaire had not been rebuilt by the start of the Hundred Years War.

In the century that followed the end of the Albigensian wars the continued growth of established towns and the foundation of new bastides were not matched by a corresponding increase in defensive building. It was a period of relative peace in which fortifications were not considered an absolute necessity. Even in the sensitive frontier areas of Guyenne, Périgord and Quercy, the majority of bastides were at first built without walls. Elsewhere existing fortifications were allowed to fall into disrepair or even cleared to make way for developments of more immediate public utility. At Albi an inquiry into the Pastoureux disturbances of 1320 revealed that there were countless breaches in the town wall through which people could enter and leave the town without passing through the gates. In 1271 the bishop of Cahors authorised the consuls of his

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2 Alis, Histoire de la ville d'Aiguillon, p.47.
3 Histoire de Languedoc, IX, p.594; Eyssette, Histoire administrative de Beaucaire, I, pp.95, 320.
5 E.N. Doat, 103, fo.131.
town of Cajaro to fill in part of the town ditch and there build a
market or public square with houses and shops, and also to pierce
the town walls with gates, windows and other openings, adding the
somewhat optimistic proviso that the work was to go ahead only on
the understanding that the town would suffer no harm. The result
of this and other encroachments was that in 1345 Cajaro was,
according to the then consuls, totally lacking in defences against
the English.

The bishop justified this scheme on the grounds that Cajaro was
expanding. As in other towns, the redundant fortifications were a
constraint on movement and growth, and occupied substantial tracts
of land which were ever more in demand as the population went on
increasing. Only Montpellier had in the Oeuvre de la Commune
Cloître a permanent apparatus to supervise the maintenance of the
defences. Elsewhere it was only the more circumspect municipal
authorities who attempted to keep alienations and encroachments to
a minimum. Several clauses in the peace treaty of 1299 between the
abbot and consuls of Sarlat (Dordogne) relate to the upkeep of the
fortifications. In future no public or private buildings were to
be erected in the town ditches without the approval of both the
abbot and the consuls. Buildings standing within 13 brasses
(about 23 metres) of the walls were to remain for the time being,

1 AG Cajaro, DD.(7), no.78.
2 Ibid, EE.(8), no.211, FF. no.334.
3 "... attendentes etiam quod propter hou villa nostra de Cajaro
amplietur et quamplurimum auomertetur...", ibid, DD.(7), no.78.
but could be destroyed in wartime. In private dwellings adjoining the walls there were to be no windows higher than the wall-walk. No householder could pierce the town walls with windows, gates or other openings, except loop-holes, and gutters, drains and latrines could only be built into the walls with the permission of the abbot and consuls. In 1325 Charles V ordered a halt to all building contiguous to the walls and ditches of Millau, and in 1334 Philippe VI told the consuls to block up any openings in the wall. But references to royal intervention of this kind are rare, and the crown certainly had no policy for the maintenance of town fortifications in peacetime.

A few towns undertook major works of fortification in the 1320s and -30s. The war of Saint-Sardos in 1324 alerted some of the western frontier towns to the insecurity of their situation, and in the following years extensive building took place at Périgueux and Agen. On the coast of Languedoc the fortifications of Agde were rebuilt in the same period after the town had been sacked by Aragonese pirates. In 1332 the consuls placed the financing of the work on a more solid footing by the creation of the Oeuvre Commune.

1 J.-M. Maubourguet, Le Périgord méridional des origines à l'an 1370, Cahors, 1926, pp. 413-414.
2 Documents sur la ville de Millau, p. 67.
3 Ibid, p. 73.
in imitation of Montpellier. But large-scale construction programmes like these were very much the exception at this time. Probably the majority of towns did no more than carry out the most urgent repairs to their fortifications. From the panic building which followed the English advances of the 1340s and -50s the clear inference is that at the start of the Hundred Years War the towns of Languedoc were in a very low state of defensive preparedness.

b) Fortification during the Hundred Years War

The pace and pattern of town fortification in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries matched the spread of war through the Midi. The towns on the Gauenne frontier and on the sea coast were the first to place their defences on a war footing. Work on the walls of Agen continued through the 1330s and into the 1340s. The sequest on wine, first granted in 1329 for repairs to the bridge, was diverted to the fortifications in 1331, and for that purpose extended for four years in December 1339, and for a further five years in September 1344. In the same period repairs were being carried out to the walls of Périgueux; in the consular year 1339-40 some 494 livres were spent on them. The consuls of Cahors probably began to repair their town walls towards the end of 1342.

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2 Chartes d'Agen se rapportant au règne de Philippe de Valois, pp.8-9. AC Agen, CC.39.

3 AC Périgueux, CC.58.

4 AC Cahors CC.20.
coast of Languedoc the consuls of Agde were permitted in June 1341 to
divert royal subsidies to their defences in consideration of a
possible attack from the sea,¹ and in the same year ouvriers were
elected at Aimargues to supervise works on the walls.²

The first great wave of fortification followed Henry of
Lancaster's devastatingly successful campaign in the late summer and
autumn of 1345. The capture by the English, in the space of a few
weeks, of Bergerac, La Rèole, Aiguillon, and a host of smaller
places in Périgord and Agenais sent a tremor of alarm deep into
Languedoc.³ It is certain that La Rèole, Aiguillon, Bazas and
probably many other towns and castles were surrendered voluntarily
by their inhabitants.⁴ Nevertheless, the English victories were in
large measure due — and were certainly attributed — to the defensive
weakness of the towns. Bergerac was able to hold off the enemy for
a few days but, if Froissart's account of the operation is accepted,
the English quickly made themselves masters of the faubourgs and
then launched their final assault from the river, that side of the
town being protected only by a palissade which was easily breached.⁵

In the westward-looking areas along the Garonne and its
tributaries the impact of these disasters was immediate. Bergerac

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¹ AC Agde, (DD.6).
² AC Aimargues, EE.1.
³ For Lancaster's campaign see Fowler, The King's Lieutenant, pp.53-74.
⁵ Froissart, Chroniques, IV, pp.229-230.
surrendered on Wednesday, 24 August 1345. On Sunday, the 28th, the town council of Martel met to discuss the implications of the disaster and decided to appoint deputies to supervise the fortification of the town and raise the necessary taille. Rebuilding started at Albi in early September, but was soon brought to a halt by a dispute between the consuls and cathedral chapter. On 22 September the duke of Bourbon granted a fresh socquet to allow work to be continued on the walls of Cahors. At the beginning of October the consuls of Auch were ordered by their seigneurs, the king and the count of Armagnac, to surround the town with new walls, and work began on the walls of Toulouse at about the same time. On 27 November the consuls of Cajarc were authorised to begin the reconstruction of their fortifications, and on 21 December the consuls of Gourdon were instructed by the sénéchal of Périgord and Quercy to do the same.

The sense of crisis penetrated far eastwards into Auvergne and Rouergue. On 25 August 1345, the day after the surrender of Bergerac, the consuls of Aurillac, a hundred miles to the east,

1 Fowler, The King's Lieutenant, pp.56-57.
2 AC Martel, BB.5, fo.15vo.
3 AC Albi, EE.5.
5 AC Auch, EE.1.
6 Histoire de Languedoc, IX, p.594, n.4.
7 AC Cajarc, (EE.8), no.211.
8 AC Gourdon, EE.1, no.4.
called a general meeting of all the inhabitants at which it was
resolved that to resist the English, who had surprised Bergerac,
the town walls should be hastily repaired and the abbot of Aurillac,
seigneur of the town, be called upon to fortify his castles. On
14 October the consuls of Saint-Flour received orders from the bailli
of Auvergne to put their defences in order. On 9 January 1346
the lieutenant of the sénéchal of Rouergue instructed the bailli
of Millau to see that the consuls set to work to repair the town
walls. The intervention of royal officers in this way shows a
growing awareness of the necessity for co-ordination of the local
defensive effort, in contrast to the years before 1345 when fortifi-
cation had depended on the initiative of individual towns.

In the ten years between the duke of Lancaster’s first campaign
and the Black Prince’s chevauchée in the autumn of 1355 fortifica-
tion continued steadily, but with no great urgency. In the towns
not threatened directly by the enemy, lethargy quickly followed the
first flush of enthusiasm. Defensive works started at Rodes in
1346 with the construction of wooden barbicans at the gates of the
Bourg, but over the next five years expenditure on the fortifica-
tions was small and intermittent. Gradually, however, the feeling
of insecurity and anxiety hitherto felt only in the west permeated
the heartland of Languedoc. In the sénéchaussée of Carcassonne,

1 AG Aurillac, CC.28.
2 AG Saint-Flour, cap. II, art. 2, no. 13. (From the MS inventory,
   fo. 51).
3 AG Millau, EE.120.
4 AG Rodes, Bourg, CC.125, fo. 81, & passim.
Philippe VI authorised the fortification of Montréal in February 1347,¹ of the Bourg of Carcassonne at about the same time² and of Limoux in April 1350.³ His lieutenant in Languedoc, Guillaume Flavacourt, archbishop of Auch, permitted the consuls of Narbonne to begin building new walls in December 1349.⁴ Work started at Lodève in 1351.⁵ In December 1352 the consuls of Montpellier hurriedly began to dig a ditch to enclose the suburbs after receiving news of the fall of Lafrançaise, less than forty miles from Toulouse.⁶ Further east, rebuilding commenced at Uzès in 1348⁷ and at Lunel at least by 1353,⁸ but there is no record of activity during this period at Nîmes, Alès, Beaucaire or any of the other major towns of the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire which, despite their proximity to the Rhône frontier, still felt immune from what was still, after all, only 'the war in Gascony'.

Fortification was necessarily a lengthy business. Decades of neglect and decay could not be made up for overnight and many towns

1  Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols. 1009-1011.
2  Ibid, IX, p.599.
3  Ibid, X, pr. cols.1048-1050.
4  AC Narbonne, CC.1304.
5  Cartulaire de la ville de Lodève pour servir de preuves à l'Histoire de la ville de Lodève depuis ses origines jusqu'à la Révolution, ed. E. Martin, Montpellier, 1900, p.130.
6  AC Montpellier, Louvet no.659.
8  AC Lunel, EE.1, no.1976.
had virtually to rebuild their walls from scratch. Major works begun in 1345 were still unfinished ten years later. The towns of the Aude valley, Montréal, Limoux and the bourgs of Carcassonne and Narbonne, where fortification had started between 1347 and 1350, were quite unable to resist the English in 1355. And many of the principal towns of Languedoc were in the same position or worse, inadequately fortified and fatally vulnerable.

The Prince of Wales' chevauchée in October and November 1355 was the greatest single disaster to befall the Midi during the entire course of the war, and arguably the event of most significance. The material damage was considerable, large areas of countryside were devastated and scores of villages and towns destroyed; but the psychological impact was much greater. Up till then the English advances had not been sufficiently consistent or far-reaching to make much impact on the towns of Bas-Languedoc and the east. After all, Bergerac was almost two hundred miles from Montpellier and Lafrancaise one hundred and fifty. But in November 1355 the Anglo-Gascons were at Capestang, barely ten miles from Béziers, three days march from Montpellier and within reach of the Rhône and Avignon. The whole complexion of the war was thus altered, every part of the Midi was now involved. In the months of panic that followed the raid all the southern towns without exception laboured frantically to restore their fortifications against the possible return of the English and the defensive effort was


2 For the campaign see Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355*, p. 50ff.
co-ordinated and supervised by the king's officers. In the short term the expedition was enormously destructive, but paradoxically its ultimate effect was beneficial, for by the early 1360s most of the larger towns were sufficiently well defended not to suffer the worst excesses of the free companies.

The first necessity in the autumn and winter of 1355–56 was to rebuild and fortify the towns and villages destroyed in the raid. The Bourg of Carcassonne was fired on 6 November, on the 22nd the king wrote to express his sympathy to the bourgeois and shortly afterwards instructed his lieutenant, Armagnac, to provide for the reconstruction of the town. The work was more or less complete by April 1359.¹ On 20 November, only ten days after the English had left, the town council of Narbonne approved a five-year plan for the fortification of the Cité and Bourg.² In August 1356 the king confirmed a series of letters issued by Armagnac earlier in the year promising royal help to rebuild the towns of Avignonet, Fanjeaux, Castelnaudary, Montgiscard, Carbonne and Mas-Saintes-Fuzelles. Priority was given to the fortifications: the town authorities were empowered to establish tolls, to impose duties on wine, meat and rents, to take a portion of the profits of justice, to commandeer masons, carpenters and other workmen and to compel the inhabitants of the surrounding ressort to share the expenses. To make sure that the monies raised were actually used for the fortifications, the sénéchal of Toulouse was to appoint the collectors and see that

² AC Narbonne, EE.1309, & below, appendix III.
they submitted their accounts for inspection.¹

All over Bas-Languedoc, in the eastern part of the sénéchaussée of Carcassonne and in the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire, emergency fortifications schemes were started, often preceded by the arrival of defence commissioners. On 25 October 1355, while the English were still only between Auch and Toulouse, the sénéchal of Carcassonne ordered the viguier and judge of Béziers to supervise the fortification of the towns and castles in the viguerie.² On 11 November the English were actually in the viguerie, at Capestang, which, according to Froissart, was only saved by the hasty erection of a palissade.³ Nearby, at Béziers, the inhabitants tore down trees, buildings and anything else they could lay their hands on to fill the gaps in the town wall.⁴ The Béziers chronicler, Mascaro, records that the consuls began rebuilding the walls in 1356, probably early in the new year.⁵ The king's commissioners were at Pézenas in December 1355, and at intervals through the spring and summer,⁶ and at Agde on 12 January, where despite almost continuous work on the walls since the 1320s extensive repairs and improvements were found to be necessary.⁷ Work began at Sérignan, just along

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¹ Ordonnances, III, pp.73–83, 177–178.
² AC Pézenas, Resseguiers no.953 bis.
³ Froissart, Chroniques, IV, pp.169, 377–379.
⁴ Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.1126–1127.
⁵ Mascaro, 'Libre de Memorias', p.49.
⁶ AC Pézenas, Resseguiers nos.952, 955, 956.
⁷ AC Agde, (EE.77)
the coast, at about the same time. At Montpellier six deputies were elected to take charge of the defence of the city. In the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire, the consuls of Nîmes published a comprehensive series of defence ordinances on 20 December 1355; nearly all the gates, posterns and barbican, large sections of the town wall and the Château des Arènes required major repairs, and it was decided to destroy the faubourgs. At the end of December, or early January, the count of Armagnac was at Lunel and inspected for himself the defences of the town and barony. Beaucaire was visited by Guillaume de Lèdre, the royal juge-maire, on 28 January; almost all the eastern flank of the town wall, which had lain in ruins since 1226, had to be rebuilt. Work had started at Alès by mid-April.

The panic seized the whole Midi, and fortification schemes were initiated with the same sense of urgency in the areas which had not been directly affected or threatened by the chevauchée. The sénéchal of Toulouse gave orders for the defence of that part of the juretie of Albi which fell within his competence on 19 October 1355, a fortnight after the English left Bordeaux, and his commissioners appeared in the barony of Cordes at the end of the

1 'Documents relatifs aux guerres anglaises dans le diocèse de Béziers', pp.17-20.
2 AG Montpellier, Louvet, no.230.
4 AC Lunel, EE.1, no.1977.
5 Eyasette, Histoire administrative de Beaucaire, II, pp.255-259.
6 AG Alès, 1315, no.XII.
month. The sénéchal of Carcassonne, slightly later off the mark, ordered the fortification of the rest of the Pays albigeois and castraits on 19 December. In Auvergne work on the walls of Saint-Flour was accelerated after the consuls received a directive from the bailli des Montagnes in February 1356, and on 31 May the king himself gave orders for the defence of all fortresses in Haute-Auvergne. In Gévaudan defence commissioners began operating in April 1356 and in Rouergue at about the same time. The consuls of Millau held crisis meetings on 30 October and 23 November 1355 and work on the walls and ditches continued across all through the winter and spring. Massive spending on the walls of Rodez is revealed by the 1355-56 consular accounts of the Cité.

In the summer of 1356 a second English incursion into Languedoc was feared. More defence ordinances were issued at Nîmes following the receipt of the report, on 4 July, that the Prince of Wales was again on the march. The ensuing defeat of

1 AC Cordes, EE.3.
2 AC Albi, EE.7. The Tarn marked the boundary between the sénéchaussées of Carcassonne and Toulouse. Albi, on the left bank, was in the former, its suburb, Le Bout du Pont, in the latter.
3 AC Saint-Flour, cap.II, art.2, no.16.
4 AC Aurillac, EE.6.
5 AD Lozère, G.1034, no.1.
7 Documents sur la ville de Millau, pp.93-99; AC Millau, CC.348, fos.xvi-xviii vo.
8 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, pp.183-394.
King Jean at Poitiers made less of an impact on the Midi than the events of the previous year. More remote, the disaster was of less immediate consequence, and while it undoubtedly quickened public alarm and despondency, there is no evidence of a resultant intensification of defensive building. Probably most towns were already fully stretched. Certainly the impetus of the great effort begun in 1355 was sustained through 1356 and for the next decade, particularly during the lieutenancy of the king's son, the count of Poitiers. Much more active during his first tenure of that office than when he returned to Languedoc in 1380, he presided the important assembly of the Estates of the province in May 1358 which decided upon the establishment in each sénéchaussée of two experts to oversee the work of fortification, and for the next five years commissioners were operating all over the Midi. Many of them were the count's own councillors; Gilles, bishop of Thérouanne, and Pierre Scatissé were working as commissioners in 1359; in March 1361 his secretary, Cernin Bestor, was instructed to visit the fortresses of the sénéchaussées of Carcassonne and Toulouse. And Poitiers himself constantly intervened directly: at Beaucaire and Béziers in disputes between the municipality and the clergy; at Moissac and Montauban to supply the inhabitants with timber for the fortifications; at Albi, Montpellier and Narbonne to authorise

1 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.1145-1151.
2 AD Hérault, A.5, fos.49-vo.
3 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.1259-1260.
5 B.N. Doat, 127, fo.192; AC Montauban, 3.EE.1.
the raising of taxes.¹

In most towns in the Midi the major work of fortification was accomplished in the quarter-century after 1345. From about 1370 onwards defensive building consisted for the most part of improvements and necessary maintenance while new fortification schemes were confined to the villages and hamlets of the plat-pays. The history of the fortification of Millau exemplifies the general pattern. Repairs to the town walls began in the autumn and winter of 1345–46 and continued steadily for the next ten years, given fresh impetus and urgency by each English incursion eastwards into the confines of Rouergue.² Frenetic activity followed the débâcle of 1355. On 30 October and again on 23 November the conseil général met in emergency session and decided to give absolute priority to the reconstruction of the defences 'in the most necessary places'; tailles were to be raised, contractors engaged and the inhabitants organised into corvées to excavate the ditches per cartas.³ Major works continued for the next decade, the most urgent projects being the consolidation and crenelation of the town wall, the erection of gachlials at strategic points along them and the strengthening of the

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¹ AG Albi, CC.69; Archives de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents, I, nos.2409, 2421. AG Narbonne, CC.840, 1310.

² Documents sur la ville de Millau, pp.83–89.

³ Ibid, p.93.
gates. From then on the pace of building slowed. From 1371 until 1407, the attention of the consuls and builders was concentrated on the external defences, and chiefly on the construction of murettes, smaller, secondary walls beyond the ditches. In 1410, following a collapse, a large section of the town wall between the Porte des Gozos and the Porte Saint-Antonin was rebuilt; in 1415 and 1419 towers were built on the Porte de la Capelle and the Porte du Manderou. At Rodez the pattern was very similar. As at Millau, the absence of building accounts for all but a few years of the fourteenth century makes it impossible to chart the progress of building year by year, but the surviving comptes consulaires and contracts with various entrepreneurs show that systematic rebuilding of the walls of the Cité began in 1350 (and of the Bourg slightly earlier), reached a peak in 1355-56 and had been largely completed by the later 1360s. From 1369 until the first decade of the fifteenth century the main task in hand was the building of murettes, barbicans and other outworks.

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1 Rey, Les fortifications de Millau, pp.16-17, 34-35 & passim.
5 In addition to the comptes consulaires of the Cité published by Bousquet, the chief sources for the history of the fortifications of Rodez in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are the deliberations of the Bourg, 1365-1375, AC Bourg, BE.2, the accounts of the Bourg, 1342-52, AC Bourg, CC.125, and the series of contracts and acquittances in respect of work carried out by various contractors, AC Bourg, EE.1, AC Cité, CC.224-225, EE.1.
iv) Building organisation and management

The fortification of even a small medieval town was a major undertaking, calling for the management of money, labour and materials, often in difficult conditions, on a scale comparable to the construction of the castles and cathedrals which have more readily captured the imagination of historians.¹

Consuls and syndics, acting in consultation with royal and seigneurial officers, had overall responsibility for the planning and direction of building projects. The day-to-day site administration was usually delegated to clerks of works, generally known as ouvriers (obriera, operarii). At Montpellier, exceptionally, the ouvriers attained magisterial status.² After the foundation in 1332 of the more modest Ouvrière of Agde, two ouvriers were appointed each year to administer the funds and allocate them to the necessary works.³ In 1374 Charles V allowed the consuls of Nîmes to elect two surveyors annually to supervise the repair of the streets and walls.⁴ But ouvriers were more commonly appointed for the duration of a particular project. Ruô Raynal was made ouvrier by his fellow consuls of the Cité of Rodez to oversee the massive

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¹ Apart from the useful study by Rey, Les fortifications de Millau, there has been no systematic study of defensive building in any of the towns of the Midi, although the documentary evidence is abundant. Miss Elizabeth Gregg of Yale University proposed to make such a study of Rodez, but her interests have shifted northwards and she is currently working on Nantes.

² See above, pp.67-76.

³ Inventaire des cartulaires d’Agde, AA.2, fos.52vo-56.

⁴ Nénard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pr. p.331.
new works which started there in June 1351. At Mende two ouvriers were chosen, one by the bishop and the other by the syndics, whenever there was any building to be done for the town.

The kinds of powers entrusted to ouvriers are illustrated by the procès-verbal of appointment of three ouvriers at Aimargues in 1357. On 9 September the inhabitants assembled and requested permission from their seigneur, the lord of Uzès, to appoint ouvriers to supervise the rebuilding of the town walls. With his approval Berenger Barrière was chosen on behalf of the nobles of Aimargues and Maître Guillaume Novelli, notary, and Jean Radulphi for the commons. They were empowered to restore the walls of Aimargues to their original state, building gates, towers, bridges and ditches in stone or in earth as they should see fit; to hire the necessary masons and carpenters; to demolish all buildings erected on or adjacent to the walls; to impose one or several tailles and to appoint collectors; to compel all the inhabitants, clerical and lay, to contribute to them, if necessary by litigation; to nominate councillors to advise them; in short to do all those things pertaining to the restoration of the fortifications and the defence of the interests of the community. Their powers were to last two years and no longer.

Unskilled labouring work on the construction of the defences

1 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, p.106.
2 AC Mende, DD.5, 6.
3 AC Aimargues, EE.2.
was, in an emergency, performed by the inhabitants in corvées, but the specialist stone- and woodwork were always left to professionals. Masons, carpenters and other craftsmen were engaged by a form of contract known as *prix-fait* (*prefach, pretium-factum*), a formal agreement between the consuls or ouvriers and the builder regulating the nature and conditions of the work and the form of payment. The town authorities would either approach a contractor direct or invite tenders 'ad extinctum candele'. The consuls of Rodez Cité, for example, decided in 1357 that the wall near the 'costal de Boat' needed strengthening by the construction of a tower (*battor*) and asked for tenders below 5 florins a square *canne* of stonework. Duran Sampso and Qui de Pessolas bid 4 florins 15s and won the contract.\(^2\)

The terms of the *prix-fait* were determined by the contracting parties according to the nature of the work. On 29 January 1364 the ouvriers of Aimargues made a *prix-fait* with Henri de Balma of Nîmes and Guillaume Guache of Gallargues, masons, for the construction of a section of wall between 'lo cornit de mont esquien' and the gate next to the house of Pierre Thomas. Balma and Guache would recruit for the work six other masters and the necessary labourers, but the ouvriers would supply the mortar and all the other materials. For each square *canne* of completed stonework 'tam vacuum tam plenum' they would be paid 15 gros and, additionally,

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1 See above, pp.124-131.
50 florins a fortnight until the completion of the work.¹ On 12 March 1415 the consuls of Millau awarded the contract for the reconstruction of the Tour de la Capelle to two master-masons, Jacme Acetet and Johan Tulo for a total of 280 livres, 40 setiers of wheat, 12 muids of wine, 4 quintals of salt meat and 2½ cannes of cloth each. The contractors were to increase the height of the tower by 4½ cannes, including the machicolations, build the gates, windows, loop-holes and other openings and cart the large corbels ("trayre los machacouls") while the consuls supplied the materials.² Johan Chamoelon of Saint-Flour and his companion Johan Bareti, who contracted for the rebuilding of the Porte d'Aiguespasses at Mende in December 1436, received a fixed sum of 100 livres for digging the foundations and "pro jocolibus", and then 4½ livres for every square canne of masonry, out of which they had to pay for their labourers and materials, except lime which was provided by the ouvriers.³

The accounts of Huc Raynal, ouvrier in charge of works in the Cité of Rodez, illustrate the organisation and administration of one major building scheme over a period of six months, from 19 June until Christmas 1351.⁴ They relate chiefly to the reconstruction of the Tour del Fertus and of the adjoining wall. The main contract for the tower was awarded to R. Cantalob at an agreed price.

¹ AC Aimargues, EE.3.
² Documents sur la ville de Millau, pp.267-268.
³ "Marché pour la construction de la porte d'Aiguespasses à Mende (1436, 20 décembre)", ed. M. Philippe, Bulletin archéologique, 1904, p.88
⁴ Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, p.106ff.
of 25s a canne for a total of 103 cannes of masonry plus 4 livres for
the stairs. The work on the walls was done by Johan Manusac and
Maître D. Marti. Manusac was paid 30s a canne for 58 1/2 cannes of
stonework, including merlons and loop-holes, and Marti 25s a canne
for 163 cannes. Raynal was responsible for the supply of materials
and labour. From various merchants he secured the purchase of a
total of 11,975 setiers of sand at between 28s and 35s for 100
setiers to a total cost of 194 livres 19s 9d, and 4170 setiers of
lime at between 17d and 20d a setier to a total cost of 330 livres.
6s 6d. Purchases of stone in contrast were modest; 17 livres 3s
for about 250 dressed and semi-dressed blocks of sandstone (peyra
de bresier) and 12 cannes of 'hard' stone (peyra fregal) and
5 livres 5s for 21 cartloads of quarry stone from Johan Manusac. Timber, consisting of 15 large beams (trans) and 5 rafters (cabros)
for the tower, came to 15 florins.

After the contracts and materials Raynal lists his weekly
expenses from the week ending 29 June until the week before
Christmas. They are divided between labour, transport, and 'altras
causas necessaris' such as nails, bolts and other ironmongery. Labour rates remained static through this period, at 3s a man-day.
The numbers of men employed and the days worked fluctuated from

1 Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, I, pp.113-114.
5 Ibid, p.115ff.
Raynal's labour-force was small in comparison to that recruited for work on the ditches of Rodez in the autumn of 1355. In the week ending 21 November 1355 the consuls paid wages totalling 51 man-days for masters and 296 for labourers (manobrag), increasing to 103 and 720 respectively in the following week. Raynal employed no women at this period, although women do figure in later accounts and their employment, like the employment of children, was quite common. Nor did he experience the serious labour-shortage which Rodez and other towns suffered in subsequent years. In the autumn of 1355 the consuls of the Cité were forced to send deep into the surrounding countryside to recruit the necessary workmen.

P. Basinhac with his cart and two horses was responsible for most of the carriage of materials. He was paid a usual daily rate of 10s.5

In times of crisis building materials could be secured by prests and requisitions. The crown also gave assistance where practicable: in 1345, for instance, the capitoules of Toulouse were granted 500 livres worth of timber from the royal forest of

1 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, pp.118, 127.
3 Ibid, pp.259, 269, 316, & passim.
5 Ibid, p.115ff.
6 See above, p.131.
Fousseret,¹ and in 1360 the count of Poitiers gave the consul of Montauban timber to the value of 400 écus.² But normally the town authorities had to purchase their materials on the open market at the best price they could obtain. Huc Rynal’s account shows that even over a comparatively short period costs fluctuated. Some towns rationalised the supply of materials by the lease or purchase of quarries and brickworks. In 1346 the consuls of Alès bought a quarry for the town with the right of unlimited extraction.³ At Toulouse, where much of the town wall was of brick, the capitouls entered into an agreement with one W. Claris for the exclusive use by the city of the most productive of his two brickworks for one year from February 1355. He would be paid 3 écus for each charge (formada) of bricks supplied and the works would revert to him at the expiry of the contract. For the rest of the year these brickworks met most of the requirements of the builders engaged in the restoration of the city wall.⁴ In the week ending 23 May, for example, over 29,000 bricks were delivered on site, of which all but 3000 came from ‘nostra teularia den Wm. Claris’.⁵ No materials which could be used for the fortifications were allowed to waste. Timber and stone from buildings demolished to make way for the walls were always re-used, the owners receiving proper compensation. In

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¹ Histoire de Languedoc, IX, p.594, n.4.
² AC Montauban, 3.EE.1.
³ AC Alès, 1522, no.9.
⁴ AC Toulouse, EE.32, fo.25.
⁵ Ibid, fo.91.
1363 the consuls and two sworn experts from the Cité of Rodez inspected a property belonging to Bernard Martin and Agnès Esquivola, his sister, lying in the path of the town wall at l'Arpajon. There were found to be 40 cannes of recoverable stone, for which, and for the site, the consuls paid 50 florins.\(^1\) In 1370 the sénéchal of Toulouse allowed the consuls of Agen to take any useful materials from the house of Gerald de Donadieu, who had been declared a rebel, and employ them in the fortification of the town.\(^2\)

On the face of it the middle and later years of the fourteenth century were a boom time for contractors and craftsmen. Large sums of public money were being spent on town fortifications, work was plentiful and labour scarce. At Albi an ordinance of 1343 designed to regulate prices and wages fixed the daily wage of a master mason or joiner at 18d and of his 'dissipol' at 12d.\(^3\) But to no avail, and in the years following wage-rates soared. In 1359-60 the master of works (maestra de l'obra) at the 'Portal de la Costa 'N. Gieysa' was being paid 7s a day, other master masons and carpenters 6s and the assistants to the masons ('homes a quaregar lo mortier e ajudar als maestres') 4-5s.\(^4\) In the later fourteenth century wages fell a little. In 1407-08 masons working on the Portal de Roanel at Albi were paid 5s a day and labourers

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1 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, II, pp.410-411.
2 AC Agen, EE.54.
3 Comptes consulaires d'Albi, 1359-60, p.183.
4 Ibid, pp.139-152.
(affanayres) 3s. 1 At Rodes in 1351 and 1355 masons received 5s and labourers 3s; 2 in 1407-08 the rates had dipped to 4s 7d and 2s 6½d. 3 Wages fluctuated seasonally. Men were paid more in summer than in winter because the days were longer and extra at harvest-time to prevent them returning to their villages. 4

Building contracts, though not vastly remunerative - rarely were they worth more than a few hundred livres at a time - were valuable enough by small-town standards. Some were sufficiently lucrative to attract the attention of entrepreneurs other than professional builders. In May 1369 the capitouls of Toulouse made a prix-fait for the construction of a barbican at the Porte Saint-Etienne with a syndicate of three, Bernard Capitelli, mason, and Bernard de Pinallo and Mariand de Lannaco, described as 'merchants of the City'. 5 No doubt favouritism and influence were brought to bear in the award of contracts. Simon Portal, who in November 1357 undertook the crenellation of the walls of Aimargues, was at the same time a councillor to the ouvriers and perhaps a relative of the Johan Portal who was ouvrier in 1361. 6 In the last three decades of the fourteenth century almost all the important contracts for work on the fortifications of Rodes went to Gaiard Guizardon,

1 AC Albi, CC.167, fo.99.
2 Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, I, pp.115, 259; & passim.
3 AC Rodes, Bourg, CC.130, fos.17vo, 20.
4 Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, I, pp.276, 403.
5 AC Toulouse, CC.1847, p.27.
6 AC Aimargues, EE.2, 3.
who during that period was almost continually either a consul or councillor of the Cité.¹ And inevitably there was profiteering, real or alleged. At Millau the town council resolved in July 1410 that the reconstruction of the southern flank of the town wall between the Porte des Gosons and the Porte Saint-Antoine should not be carried out by prix-fait, because the estimates were far too high, but that masons should be hired by the day.² But the consuls reverted to the prix-fait for work on the Tour de la Capelle in 1415 and contracted with two masons, Jacme Aostet and Johan Taloo. However, the day after the prix-fait had been made one Jonfre approached the consuls and claimed that they had been defrauded ('baratats') and that he could carry out the work for a good 50 or 60 florins less than the 280 livres agreed. Upon which the consuls turned on the contractors ('nos nos ranourem al maystre') and forced on them a number of additional tasks to be done for the original price.³ In 1419, when it came to the rebuilding of the Porte du Mandarous, the consuls more circumspectly insisted that estimates should be submitted by different masters 'separadamen', though in the event Aostet put in the lowest bid and won the contract.⁴

There were no great fortunes to be made in public works, but some contractors certainly prospered. One such was Gaillard Guizardon, alias Marti, builder and entrepreneur of Rodes.  

¹ See below, p.259.
² Ray, Les fortifications de Millau, p.130.
³ Documents sur la ville de Millau, pp.267-268.
statement of indebtedness prepared by the consuls of the Bourg in
October 1376 shows the extent of his activity. Up till then he had
carried out work for them to a total value of 2458½ francs, 6 gros.
Four important contracts accounted for the bulk of this sum: the
construction of a murette and ditch from the Portal de la Cros to
the union (pertnes) with the Cité (731 francs); a similar murette
and ditch from the garden of Guillaume Nata to the Franciscan
church (825 francs); the tour de la Serria (80 francs) and the
barbican at the Portal de la Madeleine (286 francs 6 gros). The
Bourg still owed him 510 francs 9½ gros, which the consuls managed
to reduce by 250 francs, claiming that Guizardon had not fulfilled
his contracts properly and that some of the work was seriously
deficient.¹ In the same period he was working on the same scale
for the Cité. The consuls (and Guizardon himself was a consul in
1377-78, 1381-82 and 1385-86) paid him 334 livres 13s 9d in 1377
for work on the barbicans, 493½ francs in October 1378 and a
further 845 livres in October 1379 for a murette between the Tour
de Corbières and the Porte de la Penavayre, 1011 livres 11s for the
murette between the Chateau de Caldegous and the Porte de
l'Embergue, as well as numerous small sums for minor works and the
supply of materials.² The importance of Guizardon's contracts
may be judged by comparison with the municipal budget. The total
expenditure of the Cité - the Bourg accounts for this period have
not survived - was 2461 livres 3s 1d in 1377-78, 1811 livres 17s 8d

¹ AC Rodes, EE.1.
² Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, II, pp.154, 224, 253, 399,
404-405 & passim.
in 1379-80 and 1793 livres 12s 5d in 1380-81. Ouizardon's personal wealth grew steadily. His taille assessment in the Cité in 1364 was 3 deniers in immovables (possession) and 3 deniers in movables (moble); in 1373 it had risen to 7d and 10d, by 1382 to 10d and 18d and in 1401, shortly before his death, to 7s3d and 50d.

It cannot be proved that Ouizardon's fortune was solely derived from building, probably he had other business interests. But it is as a builder and builders' merchant that he most frequently appears in the Rodez archives and as such that he made his way.

v) The architecture of town defence

The defensive scheme was fundamentally the same everywhere. The town was enclosed within a continuous fortified enceinte consisting of a concentric wall and ditch, buttressed and flanked by towers, pierced by gates and posterns and complemented by a palissade, or sometimes a second, lower wall, barbicans and other outworks.

The shape of the fortifications was determined by the lie of the land and by the topographic and demographic evolution of the town. As the town expanded so the enclosure had to be extended to include new suburbs, and in the course of the Middle Ages all the principal towns of Languedoc outgrew and rebuilt their ancient walls several times. Thus an irregular, roughly circular or oval defensive plan characterises the older towns. In contrast a

1 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, II, pp.171-252.
2 AC Rodez, Cité, CC.37, 43, 50, 74.
3 Lot, Recherches sur la population, passim.
rectangular pattern was adopted for the new foundations of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The size and complexity of the defensive enclosure were commensurate with the town's wealth, importance and population. Montpellier, with a pre-Black Death population of about 40,000, was for most of the Middle Ages the largest city in Languedoc. Its fortifications had a total circumference of 1900 cannes (about 3775 metres), according to the ceinturage of 1374.1 Within this perimeter lay the old town, protected by the twelfth-century wall of the Commune Clôture, and the suburbs to the west and south-west, around which a less substantial ditch and palissade had been thrown in the 1350s.2 To the west of Montpellier, along the coast, Agde with its 4000 souls was very much smaller, but typical of many episcopal towns in the Midi. In 1355 the combined walls of its Cité and Bourg measured 715 cannes (about 1420 metres).3 East of Montpellier, near Lunel, the small town of Marsillargues was fortified in 1363, the inhabitants being authorised to build an

1 Petit Thalamus, p.391.

2 The ditch around the suburbs was begun in December 1352. In 1364 the ouvriers of the Commune Clôture were granted the same rights over this 'novam clausuram ... in suburbis' as over the other fortifications of the city. AC Montpellier, Louvet nos.659,661. Referred to as 'la clausura de la palissada' in the ceinturage of 1384, this enclosure then measured 883 cannes (c.1754 m.). Petit Thalamus, p.408. In 1366 work started on a stone wall around the suburbs. Ibid, p.372.

3 AC Agde, (EE.77). The mid-fourteenth century population of Agde, according to the taille returns of 1369, was between 3000 and 4800. Castaldo, Le consulat d'Agde, p.400.
enclosure of 600 cailles (about 1192 metres). It was a prosperous community and in 1322 numbered 543 hearths. A few miles to the south of Marsillargues lies Aigues-Mortes, one of the most perfectly preserved of all medieval walled towns. A thirteenth-century plantation, Aigues-Mortes is much more akin to the bastides of Guyenne than to its neighbours on the plain of Ense-Languedoc. Like many other bastides it failed to realise the expectations of its founder and its splendid rectangular walls, which measure approximately 500 metres by 300 metres, were certainly more lavish than the defence of its population of some 3000 souls strictly required.

Within the perimeter of the walls there might be two or more distinct lordships, sometimes towns in their own right, while conversely a single town might comprise two separate enclosures. At Montpellier the episcopal and comital towns were united in the twelfth century within the Commune Clôture. At Rodez the Cité and Bourg shared the same hill-top site, but were divided, at least nominally, by a ditch. The walls were separately administered by the respective municipalities, but during the great rebuilding of the fourteenth century, if not before, a common defensive scheme was evolved; the exterior curtains and ditches joined end-to-end and the interior fortifications ceased to have any practical

2 Ibid, p.41.
3 Fino, Forteresses de la France médiévale, p.307.
4 Vignal, 'Des enceintes de Montpellier', p.137.
importance. The Cité and Bourg of Narbonne were fused in a single consulate in 1338, but their fortifications, which were separated by the Aude, were thought of as two distinct units. The situation was much the same at Agde.

The town wall was the most obvious and important element in the defensive scheme. It served both as a physical barrier and as a fighting-platform for the defenders. The wall was the first and last line of defence for the townspeople; if it was breached their resistance was effectively at an end, for there was generally no keep or citadel into which they could retreat. Admittedly, many towns were built close to or around a castle, but the defence of the town and castle were rarely integrated.

Town walls were unsophisticated with few of the refinements of the great medieval castles. In the main they were thrown up more as a deterrent to marauding gens d'armes and brigands than as a serious obstacle to a determined army equipped with a siege train. Certainly town walls were not very durable, at any rate to judge from the references to collapse or damage from natural causes. The Montpellier chronicler records that in November 1361 the walls of Aniane, Cignac and other places in the region were washed away

1 Suan-Noulens, 'La Cité de Rodez au milieu du XVe siècle', p.160 & plan 1.
2 Inventaire sommaire AC Narbonne, série AA, AA.99.
3 AC Narbonne, EE.1309, & below, appendix III. Cf. the map of Narbonne in Amouroux, La consulat de Narbonne.
4 Castaldo, Le consulat d'Agde, p.333ff.
5 As at Beaucaire, for example.
by storms, while in February 1365 part of the town wall of Montpellier itself fell down.¹

Town walls were generally of stone or brick, although in some places earthen ramparts survived even into the fifteenth century. In 1453 the consuls and cathedral chapter of Albi agreed on the reconstruction 'in bricks and mortar' of a section of the town wall between Sainte-Cécile and La Berbie 'que es de present de terrissa batuda'.² Part of the town wall of Toulouse was also of baked mud.³ Stone walls were usually built with a core of rubble in a lime mortar faced with dressed or semi-dressed blocks.⁴ The dimensions varied from town to town and with the lie of the ground. The Commune Clôture wall of Montpellier was 2 metres thick and 7-8 metres high.⁵ At Millau the wall was 5 pieds (c.1.66 metres) thick and measured 10-12 metres from its base, in the ditch, to the top of the parapet.⁶ The town wall of Albi was also about 10 metres high and varied in thickness between 3.12 and 3.57 metres.⁷ Town walls often consisted in part of private dwellings or churches and other institutional buildings, which created something of a security risk. Periodic municipal ordinances insisted that in wartime the

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1 Petit Thalamus, pp.359, 368.
2 Compayré, Etudes historiques sur l'Albigeois, p.186.
4 Vigie, 'Des enceintes de Montpellier', p.150.
5 Ibid, p.145.
6 Rey, Les fortifications de Millau, p.12.
7 Douse comptes consulaires d'Albi, II, p.iv.
owners of such buildings should see that windows, doors and other openings to the outside were blocked up.  

Town walls were either crenelated or capped by wooden hourds. The Commune Clôture wall of Montpellier was crenelated, the parapet being carried on corbels of an arched design similar to those which survive in the town wall of Avignon and many other fortifications in the area. An inspection carried out by the ouvriers in 1411 reveals that there were 1757 merlons in the wall. At Millau a contract made in 1355 between the consuls and the builder, Guillaume Velot, shows that in approximately 200 metres between the Porte de la Capelle and the Porte du Mandarous there were 50 merlons. The town wall of Albi was partially covered by wooden hourds (amvans), which, though giving more complete protection to the defenders, had the serious disadvantage of being inflammable. Hourds were usually movable and could be taken down and stored when not required.

The effectiveness of town walls depended upon the defenders being able to move round it quickly to cover any sector threatened.

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1 AC Martel, BB.5, fo.18, 19, December 1346; Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.102.
2 Vigie, 'Les enceintes de Montpellier', p.150.
3 Petit Thalamus, p.457 n.(H).
4 Rey, Les fortifications de Millau, p.16.
5 Douze comptes consulaires d'Albi, II, p.v.
by the enemy. Along the top of the wall ran the wall-walk (allees, aleia), serving both as a line of communication and as a fighting-platform. Its width varied with the thickness of the wall: at Viviers the walk was to be wide enough to allow two men to pass side-by-side. On the outward side the wall and parapet were often corbelled out to form a machicolation, on the townward side there was a barrier or rope for the safety of the watchmen. More important than the walk for communication was the ground-level path running along the inside of the wall and dividing it from the buildings behind. At Montpellier this was known as the Chemin des Douze palms, dedina los muro to distinguish it from the similar path of the same dimensions outside the walls, costa los escamas dels valats. As the term suggests, its width was 12 palms (2.98 metres). Technically it was supposed to remain free of obstruction, although the ouvriers had gradually allowed buildings to encroach upon it. At Beaumont-de-Lomagne (Haute-Garonne) the custom also fixed the width of the path inside the wall as 12 palms, perhaps in imitation of Montpellier. The consuls of Béziers

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1 'Item: quod infra menia civitatis fiant allees sive corserie largitudinis quo due persone possent ire ad frontem', AC Viviers, AA.5, no.5.
2 For example, at Villeneuve-lès-Avignon. Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. col.1419.
4 Archives de Montpellier, Inventaires et Documents, XII, EE.37.
5 Ibid, EE.19, 21; Petit Thalamuz, pp.363-364.
considered a width of 20 palms (nearly 5 metres) necessary to allow the watch to circulate freely on foot or on horseback. Where the wall was pierced with meurtrières, as, for example, at Villeneuve-lès-Avignon, the path served as a platform for the archers.

At intervals the town wall was buttressed by towers and turrets projecting outwards to give flanking cover. Towers were necessarily more expensive, canne for canne, than sections of the curtain-wall and therefore their number and the interval at which they were spaced were determined as much by financial as by military considerations. The consuls of Nîmes and their military advisers thought that the optimum distance between towers was 60 paces. At Montpellier there were some 25 towers in the wall of the Commune Clôture. An inspection of the fortifications of Narbonne in February 1371 revealed that there were 42 towers in the wall of the Cité and 26 in the wall of the Bourg, in a total perimeter of somewhat over 3000 metres.

The size and shape of towers changed with military fashion, and most town fortifications, built and repaired over a span of centuries, probably incorporated towers of several different styles.

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1 B.N. Doat, 60, fom.106vo, 115vo.
2 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. col.1419.
5 AC Narbonne, EE.1452; Lot, Recherches sur la population, I, pp.311-312.
All the towers of the Commune Clôture enclosure of Montpellier were built to the same rectangular plan as the surviving Tour des Pins. At Béziers, where a large-scale reconstruction of the town wall also took place at the end of the twelfth century, the towers were of a similar pattern. Of the seventeen towers of the Cité wall of Agde, two were semi-cylindrical and the rest rectangular. A late-fifteenth century representation of the Bourg of Rodez, a rare piece of contemporary pictorial evidence, shows regularly-spaced, open-backed, half-round towers, rising about half as high again as the curtain-wall and crenelated at the top. The artist was not primarily concerned to reproduce the fortifications faithfully and so the accuracy of the drawing must be questioned, but is likely that the towers of the Bourg were in fact of this pattern. In the Cité of Rodez part of what is probably a fourteenth-century tower survives in the boulevard de la République. It is of a semi-cylindrical, open-backed plan, projecting from the curtain-wall 2-2.50 metres. On the western flank of the Cité wall the fifteenth-century Tour de Corbières, of a more pronounced D-shape, rises nearly 30 metres above present ground-level. At the time of construction it was probably open at the back, although it has since been closed. The Tour des Pénitents is the only surviving

2 Noguier, 'Enceinte murale de Béziers', pp.253-290.
3 Castaldo, Le consulat d'Agde, p.340 plan.
4 AC Rodez, Bourg, II.5.
5 Suau-Noulens, 'La Cité de Rodes au milieu du XVe siècle', plan 1.
fragment of the medieval fortifications of Mende. Of twelfth-century origin, but extensively rebuilt in the fifteenth, it is of a similar shape and size, measuring some 30 metres from top to base and dominating the wall-walk by nearly 20 metres. The corbels which now support the roof probably originally carried a parapet.¹

Towers were supplemented at intervals by smaller turrets or outlook-towers (gachiales, échauguettes). At Millau, according to a sixteenth-century survey, there were eighteen gachiales in all, two for each section of the curtain-wall between gates. They were originally built of wood, later replaced by stone, and probably had no serious defensive purpose, being intended simply to accommodate the watchmen.²

Gates were potentially the weakest element in any fortified enclosure and required the most attention and expense. Their importance is recognised in the valuable privilege granted to some bastides whereby the crown undertook the construction of the four gates if the inhabitants built the walls.³ If a town was not to be constricted by its fortifications there had to be a sufficient number of gates to allow easy movement in and out. At Aigues-Mortes, which was intended to develop as an important port and centre of commerce, there are five main gates and five posterns.⁴

¹ L. Causse, La Tour des Pénitents (de Mende), s.d. M3 deposited with the AD Lozère, pp.11, 22, 53.
² Rey, Les fortifications de Millau, p.25.
³ E.g. at Castillonès, Kiramont, Montségur, Trabut-Cussac, 'Bastides ou forteresses?', pp.98, 101-102.
⁴ Fino, 'Forteresses de la France médiévale', p.226.
At Albi there were six gates,\(^1\) at Rodez eight, four in the Cité and four in the Bourg.\(^2\) On the other hand, the enclosure of the fortress Cité of Carcassonne is pierced by only three principal gates.\(^3\) In wartime the practice was to reduce access to a minimum by keeping some of the gates permanently shut or else completely sealing them with stones and mortar. Defensive ordinances issued at Alès in 1360, for example, laid down that only three gates and a postern were to be left open and all the others blocked up.\(^4\)

The simplest sort of gate was merely an opening in the curtain-wall, but to be defensively effective a gate had to be protected and covered from the side or from above, by one or a pair of flanking towers or by a surmounting tower with brètaches or machicolations. The gate built in the line of the curtain and flanked by a pair of round or half-round towers was a scheme widely favoured from the thirteenth century to the fifteenth. At Aigues-Mortes the Porte des Moulins, built between 1272 and 1289 and almost identical to the four other main gates, is flanked by a pair of D-shaped towers some 22 metres high, twice the height of the curtain. Each tower is pierced just above ground-level by three arrow-slits, while the centre of the passage is protected from above by a brètache.\(^5\)

Almost the same arrangement was adopted in the contemporary Porte

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1 *Dousc comptes consulaires d'Albi*, II, p.viii.
2 *Sauv-Mouliers, 'La Cité de Rodez au milieu du XVe siècle',* plan 1.
3 *Finot, Forteresses de la France médiévale*, p.333.
4 *AG Alès, 1815, no.XXXIII.*
5 *Finot, Forteresses de la France médiévale*, p.309, & fig.75.
The **prix-fait** for the rebuilding of the *Porte d’Aigues-Passes* at Vende in 1436 sheds useful light on the constructional details of the now-demolished gate. According to the specification, the gate was to be flanked by two round towers of a height to be determined *ad voluntatem sindicorum et operariorum*. The walls were to be of good masonry, the foundations 9 *palmes* (about 3 metres) thick and the rest 6 *palmes*. On the lower and upper floor of each tower there was to be a window and two cannon-ports, and a window in the room above the gate passage between the two towers. On each side of the gate passage there was to be a door and steps to give access to the wall-walk, which was to be continued through the towers by means of a *corredor*. There was also to be a crenelated *corredor* at the top of the edifice, projecting from the exterior wall by four rows of corbels and by three rows from the interior wall. Inside the gate passage there was to be a *portcullis* (*porte escladisse*) and outside, a draw-bridge closing up against the gate.  

An early nineteenth-century lithograph of the gate, made shortly before its demolition and admittedly somewhat suspect, shows two cylindrical towers, very tall in relation to their width, with pepper-pot styled parapet and roof, bearing a very strong resemblance to the exactly contemporary castle of Anjony in Auvergne. Allowing for artistic licence, it is not unlikely that Anjony influenced the builder, Jean Cham colon, who did in fact hail

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1 *"Marché pour la reconstruction de la porte d’Aigues-Passes*, pp.89–90.
A simpler pattern of gate consisted of a single square tower rising one or two storeys above the passage. The five secondary gates of Aigues-Mortes are of this type. Each consists of a square tower some 15 metres high cantoned with octagonal turrets and with a bretèche above the entrance arch. In 1415 a square tower was built above the Porte de la Capelle at Millau. According to the prix-fait it was to rise 4½ cunes (c.8.9 metres) above the parapet of the curtain-wall. This was to include the corbels and the crenelated parapet which accounted for 1 cune (c.2 metres) of the height. The tower was roofed and machicolated at the front and sides but not at the back. The walls were to be 6 palms (c.1.50 metres) thick, with windows and loop-holes; cannon-ports were inserted later.

The dimensions of the gate passage were fairly uniform, tall and wide enough to admit a loaded cart. Posterns were smaller, generally only permitting access by pedestrians and riders leading their mounts. The commissioner inspecting Alès in 1360 recommended that the gate of the Franciscans be reduced to the dimensions of a postern through which only one man could pass at a time.

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1 The lithograph by Benoît is in the museum of the Société d'Agri-culture, Industrie, Sciences et Arts de la Lozère at Xande. For Anjony see Fino, Forteresses de la France médiévale, pp.315-318, figs.78-80.

2 Fino, Forteresses de la France médiévale, p.310.

3 Documents sur la ville de Millau, pp.267-268; Rey, Les fortifications de Millau, pp.31-43.

4 AC Alès, 1515, no.XXXIII.
gate might be preceded by one or more portcullises (porta coladiisse). There were usually two leaves to the gate, opening inwards and secured by bars, bolts and one or more locks. For additional protection against rams and fire the gates might be covered in hide or studded with nails.

Major gates were further protected by bridges and barbicans. The Porte de la Capelle at Millau was preceded by a draw-bridge leading to a barbican. This was a substantial stone structure, possibly of semi-circular design, with a crenelated parapet. It was open towards the town and its gate opened at right angles to the town wall and ditch. At Castelnaudary the barbican at the Porte del Pon was a much less durable affair of timber and daub, although at the same time as it was being built (1360) a solid stone barbican was being constructed at the Porte de la Plasse.

The enclosure formed by the curtain wall was complemented by a ditch, unless the lie of the ground made it impracticable or superfluous. At Millau the ditches were about 20 metres wide from bank to bank, and because the terrain sloped down to the Tarn, the water in them was retained by a series of dams. At Agen the ditches were normally kept dry, but a system of sluices ensured

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1 'I portal nou am III claus e am II barras ... It. I portal am las portas et am III claus ...' Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, I, p.176.
2 '... oochoperta corio bovis vel ferro cum congruis farraturis', Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pr. p.194.
3 Rey, Les fortifications de Millau, p.35.
4 AC Castelnaudary, CC.48, fos.51vo-55vo, 80vo-81.
5 Rey, Les fortifications de Millau, pp.19-20.
that they could be rapidly flooded in wartime.\footnote{Archives municipales d'Agen, Chartes, 1re s\'\'rie, pp.318-324.} The ditches of Mende reputedly took two days to fill.\footnote{Andr\'e, L'invasion anglaise en G\'evaudan, p.xlvii.} On the other hand, the ditches of Albi were kept permanently dry; in 1398 the consuls paid for them to be planted with thorn-bushes.\footnote{Doux comptes consulaires d'Albi, II, pp.iii, 217.}

The external works were completed by a palissade (\textit{palis, paleno}) or second wall (\textit{murette}). At Albi the palissade was erected between the ditch and the town wall and consisted simply of sharpened stakes.\footnote{Ibid, p.iii.} The palissade was often a temporary expedient, designed to give some measure of protection until more substantial defences could be constructed. In 1352 the south-western suburbs of Montpellier were hastily surrounded by a ditch and palissade, which after 1365 were gradually replaced by a stone wall.\footnote{Petit Thalamus, p.372.} In the later fourteenth and early fifteenth century most of the Bourg and C\'ite of Rodes was surrounded by a \textit{murette} constructed outside the main curtain-wall. The details of the work are difficult to grasp, but from the surviving contracts it seems that the \textit{mureta sive dogua} was an escarp built on the townward side of the ditch. It was of stone, 3 \textit{palms} (0.075 metres) thick and 2 \textit{cannes} (0.4 metres) high, the specified depth of the ditch.\footnote{AD Aveyron, C.1405, fos.98-99. \textit{\'doga, s.f. douve; paroi d'un fossé, berge, fossé, chemin qui bord un fossé.} Levy, Petit dictionnaire proven\'al-français, p.130.} At Millau it
appears that the murette or reyre-murette was a free-standing wall built on the far side of the ditch to replace the palissade.¹

River bridges and fords were of great strategic significance, and as most of the larger towns of the Midi, and particularly of the south-west, in that vast region drained by the Garonne and its tributaries, were built along or astride rivers, their defence generally incorporated one or more bridges. The Pont Valentré at Cahors, built between 1306 and 1355, with its five arches and three towers is a unique and magnificent survival,² although other fortified bridges may have been just as elaborate; in 1304 Philippe IV allowed the consuls and inhabitants of Montauban to build just such a bridge across the Tarn.³ However, the majority of fortified bridges were probably of more modest design, like the thirteenth-century Pont-Neuf at Cahors, just upstream from the Pont Valentré, which was defended by a single tower.⁴ A draw-bridge was sometimes included in the scheme, as on the bridge across the Dordogne at Bergerac.⁵ But in an emergency the whole bridge might have to be sacrificed. In April 1350 the capitouls of Toulouse were granted a royal pardon for having destroyed the bridge across the Garonne at Grenade for fear that it would be used by the English to cross

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¹ Rey, Les fortifications de Millau, pp.26-29.
² Fino, Forteresses de la France médiévale, p.271 & fig.64.
³ B.N. Doat, 87, fos.72-vo.
⁴ Fino, Forteresses de la France médiévale, p.225.
⁵ Jurades de la ville de Bergerac, I, pp.133, 194.
cross the river and reach their city.\(^1\)

In most fortification schemes an almost total reliance was placed on the enceinte formed by the walls and ditches, and the internal defences, such as they were, counted for little. Traces of earlier walls and gates might survive within a new enclosure, as at Rodez,\(^2\) but there is no evidence, nor likelihood, that once superseded they continued to play any rôle in the defence. However, one commonly-practised internal security measure was the placing of chains across the streets at night. This faculty was important enough to be recognised in an agreement between the bishop and townspeople of Lodève in 1219\(^3\) and to be withdrawn from the inhabitants of Mende after their insurrection in 1262.\(^4\) Eight chains are listed in the inventory of the fortifications of Rodez in 1355.\(^5\)

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1 Inventaire sommaire AC Toulouse, Série AA, p.463.
2 Suau-Noulens, 'La Cité de Rodez au milieu du XVe siècle', plan 1.
3 Cartulaire de la ville de Lodève, p.39.
4 AC Mende, AA.2.
5 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, pp.174-177.
i) Personal arms

The duty of the citizen to defend the town also implied a personal obligation to be armed and equipped for the job. The late-thirteenth century customs of Lectoure insisted that for the defence of the town every householder must possess at least a sword, lance, shield and helmet. During the Hundred Years War this responsibility was reaffirmed in numerous royal and municipal ordinances.

Some documents insist on a formal relationship between a man's estate and the arms he was expected to bear. In 1341 Pierre Bauchan, reformator in the barony of Lunel, ordered the men of Lunel and of the outlying villettes to arm and equip themselves according to a strict scale of personal wealth: those with between 20 and 50 livres *in bonis seu facultatibus* were to have a sword, lance or dagger; those with between 50 and 100 livres, a sword, lance, dagger, crossbow and servelliere; those with upwards of 100 livres, spaulders, gorget, servelliere, iron gauntlets, lance, dagger or crossbow; and the richest, those with more than 500 livres, the arms of eight foot sergeants. But more usually, the authorities

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1 'E tots hom qui ten mezgo capçalaceren deu tenir escut e lança e espasa e cofa punta, las quals armas deuaver e tenir a la requesta dels predits senhors per gardar la dita ciutat'. Archives de la ville de Lectoure, pp.40-41.

2 AC Lunel, EE.1, no.1970.
merely required that a man should be armed 'segont sa possibilitat', and fixed only a minimum standard. In January 1358 Hugues Adhemar, sénéchal of Beaucaire, instructed the men of the sénéchaussée to arm themselves according to their condition, the poorest having at least a tunic, pavise, lance, cervellière, gorget and sword. The consuls of Nîmes similarly expected the poorest townspeople to have the same basic equipment; the wealthier burgesses and the nobles of the Arènes were to have full harness for themselves and appropriate weapons and harness for their retainers, and in addition all persons, rich and poor alike, were to have a club and sling ('masseam cum fronda sive flagellatam').

There was probably a large gulf between official expectations and reality. An inventory of the personal weapons and armour of the inhabitants of Millau, drawn up by the consuls in about 1352, suggests that the majority of townspeople were very poorly armed. The inventory contains 1388 names, arranged in two separate groups: in the first appear the 206 wealthiest citizens, with an assessment of their taxable wealth; in the second are listed the 1182 menuts who fell below the threshold of the taille. In the first group there is an approximate correlation between the type and number of weapons recorded and the wealth and standing of their owners. For example, Guy de Vono, donzel, of the gacha of La Capelle, was

1 'Item, quod quilibet secundum statum suum se pareat et muniat armis et armillis. Item, quod pauperior habeat juponerium, paviseum, lanceam, cervellériam, gorgeriam et ensem'. Lehoux, Jean de France, I, p.96, n.5.


3 AC Millau, EE.72.
equipped with a complete harness (*plata garnyt*) and accompanied by an armed sergeant;¹ Guillaume Biquembre of the same ward, whose assessment was 16 deniers, had two *platas garnidas*;² B. Biquembre of Lafon, assessed at 35 deniers, had two *platas garnidas* and two crossbows (*balestas garnidas*);³ and B. del Rieu of Valpel, worth 58 deniers, three *platas garnidas*.⁴ Among the menuts there was a very wide assortment of weaponry. A few had crossbows, helmets of various types and odd pieces of armour; most had a pike (*gazarma*) or gaff (*gar*); many apparently possessed no weapons of any kind.

Inventories of personal and household effects paint the same picture. In 1348 a well-to-do bourgeois of Moissac had a personal arsenal of five lances, four shields, two swords, two crossbows, and three bascinets.⁵ A fascinating series of inventories from the Toulouse area and from Vic-Fézensac in Gascony illustrate the kinds of arms likely to be possessed by people of more modest means.

The heirs of Jean de Figuarol of Le Portet near Toulouse, who died in March 1425, found in his house a crossbow and two quivers containing 40 bolts.⁶

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¹ 'Armé de plata garnida am i sirven armat'. AC Millau, EE.72, fo.1.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid, fo.4.
⁴ Ibid, fo.5.
village of Aussonne, to the north-west of Toulouse. His home was inside the fortified enclosure which he would therefore have been expected to defend in wartime. At his death in 1427 he left a steel crossbow and belt, two swords and a lance 'parvi valoris'.

Among the worldly goods of Vital Luguet, farmer, of Vio-Fézensac, were listed a half-share with the heirs of J. de Garrossio in a sword, a crossbow and a *canonia ferri*, probably a piece of body-armour. The interest of this series of inventories is that although they all date from the Hundred Years War period, they contain very few references to arms or armour of any kind. Of the fourteen inventories from Vio-Fézensac only seven mention weapons at all, and out of the nineteen from the Toulouse area there are only two crossbows, a buckler, two quivers, a sword and a lance that have a specifically warlike purpose, although there are frequent references to knives, hatchets, staves and other domestic implements and tools which could no doubt have been pressed into service in an emergency.

The inference from these and similar documents is that the poorer citizens were unable, and unwilling, to arm themselves in anything but the most rudimentary fashion. Probably the limiting factor was cost, for arms were expensive. At Albi in 1359-1360 a lance cost 6s, a bascinet 1 livre 4s and a crossbow 1 livre 10s.

The complete equipment of an *arbaletier* cost 6 livres 12s.

1 'Inventaires villageois du Toulousain (XIVe-XVe siècles)', p.534.
representing 44 days work by an average labourer. 1

People who could afford more sophisticated arms were tempted
to sell them off when times became hard, or had them distrained to
settle debts. The customs of Bergerac, Créon and many bastides
in Guyenne prohibited the judicial seizure of weapons or armour
necessary for town defence. 2 In 1339 royal commissioners in the
sénéchaussée of Toulouse complained that the local people refused
to obey orders to arm themselves because they feared that weapons,
which had become scarce and expensive because of the war, would
afterwards be seized and sold off cheaply by the bailiffs. 3 In
1412 the consuls of Nîmes alleged that the high level of royal
taxation had forced citizens to sell their military equipment, thus
gravely endangering the city. Accordingly the king ordered his
vigilier and judge to see that the inhabitants were armed 'chaque
selon sa puissance et faculte, l'estat et condition des personnes';
in case of refusal, the consuls were to provide the appropriate
arms at the recusant's expense, and to prevent sale and dispersal
there was to be an annual inspection. 4

Some men may have been discouraged from obtaining weapons by
royal and municipal police ordinances intended to reduce crime and
brigandage by limiting the right to bear arms. In 1303 Jean

1 Comptes consulaires d'Albi, 1359-1360, pp.196-197.
2 Ordonnances, XII, p.534. 'La charte des coutumes de la bastide
de Créon (1315)', ed. G. Loirette, Annales du Midi, LXIV, 1952,
3 Inventaire sommaire ACF ou Toulouse, Série AA, p.83.
4 Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, III, pr. p.204.
d'Arreblaye, sénéchal of Périgord and Quercy, prohibited the carrying of lances, bows or crossbows, swords, daggers or any other kind of offensive weapon under heavy penalties.\(^1\) In the same year the consuls of Narbonne amended the customs of the city to allow the confiscation of such weapons.\(^2\) The need for measures like these became more urgent in wartime. In 1364 the king's lieutenant in Languedoc, Arnoul d'Audrehem, prescribed the death penalty for those who were caught bearing arms unlawfully,\(^3\) but in the prevailing climate of lawlessness and confusion this ordinance can have had little effect. Probably more successful were steps taken by the municipal authorities to limit the entry and movement of arms inside towns. It was common practice for strangers, especially soldiers, to be made to deposit their weapons at the town gates. In 1389 the guards at the town gates of Rodez were empowered by the consuls to request outsiders coming into the town to leave with them 'tot armes enbasible'.\(^4\) In 1418 the deputies of Montpellier proclaimed that no person whatsoever was to be allowed to bear arms in the city without licence from themselves or the royal court.\(^5\)

In wartime municipal authorities acted to ensure that there were sufficient weapons inside the towns. The deputies of

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1 AC Périgueux, EE.5.
3 B.N. Doar, 104, f.os.28-29vo.
4 Comptes consolaires de Rodez, Cité, II, p.524.
5 AC Montpellier, Louvet no.670 & below, appendix VI.
Montpellier were authorised to conscript bowmakers, smiths, carpenters and other craftsmen into building arms, artillery and ammunition for the city. In September 1406 the jurats of Bordeaux appealed for citizens with the necessary skills to come forward and help build artillery, and prohibited the removal from the city of all arms and warlike materials. Large-scale purchases of weapons and armour had often to be made from outside. In September 1345 the consuls of Martel decided to buy harnesses for fifty sergeants, together with 100 crossbows and 2000 quarrels. This material had been obtained by the beginning of October when the consuls decided to distribute some of the bows and harness to the more reliable citizens. In 1352 the consuls of Cordes commissioned 60 complete harnesses from an armurer at Castelnau-de-Brassac (Tarn). In 1367 the proctors of Fontes, near Béziers, purchased 50 breastplates, 50 cervellières, 12 bascinets, 12 pairs of gauntlets and a quantity of crossbow bolts from the Datini of Avignon.

Materials bought like this were usually sold to the citizens. In October 1352 the consuls of Martel decided that the weapons and harness bought in Toulouse should be paid for by the citizens.

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1 AC Montpellier, Louvet no.229.
2 Archives municipales de Bordeaux, III, p.65.
3 AC Martel, BB.5, fo.16.
4 Ibid, fo.16vo.
5 Portal, Histoire de la ville de Cordes, p.50.
to whom they had been distributed, if necessary by allowing them
credit. In January 1419 the capitouls of Toulouse ordered all
the inhabitants of the city to buy arms corresponding to their
estate, which could similarly be paid for 'a termes'.

ii) Municipal arsenals

The municipality could not afford to supply arms to all the
inhabitants, but reserves of weapons and ammunition were kept,
usually in the town hall, for distribution in an emergency and for
equipping the town militia for service outside. A royal ordinance
of March 1317 provided for the establishment in every town and
castle of an arsenal where the inhabitants could keep their weapons.

The arsenals were to be guarded by royal officers, which suggests
that the measure may have been prompted by a fear of civil disturb-
ance. The ordinance was principally intended for the communes of
Languedoc, and there is no evidence of its application in the
towns of the Midi.

Inventories suggest that in many cases town arsenals were very
modest. In 1355 the consuls of the Cité of Rodez counted among
the possessions of the town 24 crossbows, 13 longbows, 5 lances,
3 pairs of cuisses, 2 pairs of greaves, 2 pairs of sabatons,

1 '... que aqulsls que poirau aver armeis ago daquslq s que so aportats
el cossolat per en W. Deni cossus daquls que punrau pago an
W. Deni seque peura a termes'. AC Martel, EB.5, fo.16vo.

2 AC Toulouse, EB.3, fo.28vo, & below, appendix VII.

3 Ordonnances, I, p.636.
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2915 quarrels, 100 **garrots** and 100 arrows. In addition the inventory records the purchase by the consuls during the course of the year of 10,000 quarrel shafts, 1100 iron tips, 50 **cairels garnists** (quarrels with both tip and shaft), 8 bucklers, 5 bascinets and 150 slings.\(^2\) In 1373 the municipal arsenal of Albi contained 35 crossbows, 6 cannons, 4 **jacques**, 4 bucklers, 4 bascinets, 9 boxes of quarrels and various spare parts for the crossbows.\(^4\)

In the town hall of Lodève in April 1424 there were found to be 8 good crossbows, 2 of steel and the others of wood, a number of old and broken crossbows, 2 bucklers, 21 bascinets, 4 **copelinas**, a helm 'modo antiquo', 5 breastplates, several miscellaneous pieces of armour, 2 **garots** and a quantity of powder for bombards.\(^5\)

Inventories like these give only an approximate indication of the arms resources of towns, since they list only the items actually in the armoury at the time of compilation. Weapons belonging to the town might well remain almost permanently in the hands of individual citizens, while cannons and the larger pieces of artillery would be kept in towers and gatehouses.

Generally there seems to have been little effort made to keep

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1 Type of quarrel, fired from a crossbow or cannon. **Fino, Forteresses de la France médiévale**, pp.138, 278.

2 **Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité**, I, pp.181-183.

3 '... brigandine or its poor relation, the **jacq**, which consisted of many small plates of iron or horn secured between layers of canvas by a trellis-work of stitches'. **C. Blair, European Armour circa 1066 to circa 1700**, London, 1958, p.178.

4 **Délivrations du conseil communal d'Albi**, loc. cit. XLVIII, p.259.

5 **Cartulaire de la ville de Lodève**, pp.156-157.
town armories properly stocked and up to date. The references to old and damaged pieces and the feverish searches that accompanied every emergency suggest a lack of concern by the municipal authorities. One exception was Agen, which, because of its position on the frontier of Guyenne, maintained a higher degree of defensive preparedness than most other towns. The deliberations of the jurade in the 1340s and -50s mention arms being contributed to the armory as fines or gifts, while by the sixteenth century it had become the practice for every newcomer to the town to donate a pike or musket. Similarly at Moissac it was the custom by the mid-fifteenth century for each consul to make an annual donation to the town of a crossbow and quarrels.

Weapons and ammunition were distributed from the town armory as the need arose. The first few folios of the Albi compoix, begun in 1343, record the arms allotted to various citizens for defence of the town and service in the militia during the 1350s and -60s. In 1354, for example, Jean de Fanaria, P. Fumet and ten other men were between them given four crossbows and a number of quarrels to defend the Porte Neuve. The bows and ammunition were returned unused and then distributed to the sergeants sent to Saint-Antonin. The following year, probably during the Black Plague of 1341, an unnamed benefactor gave the town four crossbows and 500 quarrels. In April 1342, for an unspecified offense, Pierre d'Arnaudi was condemned to a fine of four pikes. Jurades de la ville d'Agen, pp.15, 343.

1 Lagrèze-Fossat, Etudes historiques sur Moissac, II, p.290.
2 Ducom, La commune d'Agen, p.201.
4 AC Albi, CC.2, fo.1vo.
Prince's raid in the autumn, crossbows, bolts and items of armour were handed out to a total of eighty citizens. Eight men were each given a cannon, ten or twelve lead plombatas as ammunition, a quantity of powder and a fuse or taper (alucador).

A higher standard of armament and equipment was expected of men serving in royal armies. The arms and armour needed to equip the militia and which could not be supplied from the municipal armoury were borrowed or requisitioned from the wealthier citizens. In 1323 the sénéchal of Périgord and Quercy authorised the consuls of Périgueux to equip the town contingent by seizing the arms they needed from the townspeople. A list in the consular accounts of Millau records the names of the citizens who lent equipment to the sergeants sent by the town to the siege of Saint-Antonin in 1353. Against each name are entered the nature of the equipment, its value and whether or not it was returned to the owner. Hao Benastruc, for example, lent two jacks (perponobas), one worth 2 florins and the other 3 florins, both of which came back from the expedition intact. Maître B. Fournier, notary, was not so lucky: he supplied a crossbow and draw-hook ('balesta am croc de tela'), but the bow was lost and only the hook was returned to him. Whether Fournier was compensated for the loss of the bow is not

1 AC Albi, CC.2, fos.2-3.
2 AC Périgueux, EE.7.
3 AC Millau, CC.348, fos.i1-xii vo.
4 Ibid, fo.i1.
5 Ibid, fo.i1 vo.
recorded, but it certainly seems to have been the practice for missing items to be paid for or replaced. D. Gabiscal of Rodez, who lent his jaque to the consuls of the Cité to equip a contingent sent to Villefranche in 1355, received 5s 'per lo dammatge'. In the same year the hapless Jean Pestelli of Roquemaure, who had been called up for service in the levies of the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire, was condemned to replace every single item of the equipment which had been distributed to him by the town, and which, all but a jupon, he claimed to have lost in battle.

As a sergeant in the Roquemaure contingent, Pestelli had allegedly been equipped with a surcoat, jupon, gauntlets, cervellière, gorget, targe, sword and lance. Although royal commanders tried to enforce minimum standards, the equipment of soldiers serving in the militia was in most cases determined by what was available in the town. In May 1354 Jean I d'Armagnac sent to Agen for 200 sergeants 'cubert de fer ab bassinet e ab balestas e ab lansas e autres armes'. Agen, being better organised for war than most other towns of the Midi, the consuls were able to oblige, and decided in addition to furnish the count with twenty or thirty 'homes armatz a caval ab lor saumes e armes e trapes e vitahas'. Twenty sergeants sent by the consuls of Albi to the siege of Mirepoix in 1360 were each provided with a coat of plates (platas), cervellière (gineza), crossbow, sword, buckler and

1 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, pp. 389-390.
2 AD Gard, 3E.160, (Roquemaure), no.12.
3 Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.352.
knife (cotel). This was more or less the standard equipment for town contingents in the later fourteenth century. Some of the men had additional pieces of body-armour such as gorgets and spaulders, some had short knives (coteliersas), and one cap and one pair of gauntlets were also provided, probably for the captain.¹ For small-scale local operations lighter armour was sufficient. In March 1353 the consuls of Gourdon decided that the sixty men 'que ano sobre los enemix e lor fasso emboscadas' should each have only a jupon (gonel).²

iii) Artillery

Artillery played an important part in town defence. Municipal arsenals contained artillery of two kinds: traditional mechanical pieces, and firearms. Of the former, the most widely employed were various types of crossbows. In the field the longbow with its ease of operation and faster rate of fire was supreme for most of the Hundred Years War, but in defensive warfare the crossbow was far superior. With a stable firing platform and the protection of the fortifications, the advantages offered by the crossbow's greater velocity, range and accuracy could be exploited to the full. Crossbows were of several types; the differences being in their size, the materials of which they were constructed and the way in

² AG Gourdon, BB.4, fo.7.
which they were loaded.¹ The most frequently mentioned types in
the municipal archives of the Midi are the balesta am croc, where
the bow was drawn by means of a hook (croc) attached to the belt of
the bowman, and the balesta de torn, in which the loading mechanism
consisted of a winding-drum and ratchet. Crossbows were often
described as being either 'de i pes' or 'de ii pes', the pes or
foot being the stirrup with which the weapon was held down as it
was loaded. This distinction was usually intended to indicate the
relative size of bows in the municipal arsenals.² Use of winding-
drums and systems of pulleys offered the possibility of building
very large bows of several metres in span, and the records often
mention 'gros balestas de torn' placed in towers.

Some idea of the artillery at the disposal of a medium-sized
town may be gained from the distribution of balestas and bolts
ordered by the consul of Agen in January 1346.³ The bows are
referred to as 'la artilharia velha', perhaps to distinguish them
from the eighty cannons which had been handed out to some of the
citizens the previous September.⁴ Only the artillery actually
distributed from the town arsenal is mentioned, although it is
clear that each ward was also responsible for keeping some arms.

¹ For descriptions of different types of crossbows, see Fino, Forteresses de la France médiévale, pp. 42, 84, 137-139, 142, 252; V. Gay, Glossaire archéologique du Moyen Âge et de la Renaissance, Paris, 1867-1928, sub arbalète.
² 'vii balestas de torn de ii pes ... It. iii balestas de i pe
cascuma que son de torn'. AC Albi, CC.2, fo.1vo.
³ Jurades de la ville d'Agen, pp. 41-45.
⁴ Ibid, pp.25-27.
Three kinds of crossbow are listed: balestas de torn, balestas de ii pes, and balestas d'estremp (stirrup), a smaller variant of the latter. The twelve large balestas de torn were placed at the main towers and gates, and supplemented by the smaller bows. Of these there were 17 de ii pes and 34 d'estremp. For example, at the Porte Saint-Pierre there were one balesta de torn, two de ii pes and four d'estremp, together with the necessary ammunition: 25 quarrels de torn, 100 de ii pes, and a box of cairels d'estremp. At the less important Porte de la Croix there was only one balesta de ii pes. Four balestas d'estremp were allocated to each section of the rampart between the major gates and towers.

In addition to the various kinds of crossbow, most towns possessed one or more large siege engines. The type most frequently mentioned in the documents is the brida, apparently a form of trebuchet. These machines were of little value in defence, but they were often employed in operations against local fortresses. In 1369 the consuls of Albi lent their brida to the sénéchal of Toulouse for use at the siege of Castelmari, where it was burnt to save the cost of bringing it back to the town. Both the engine of Saint-Flour were requisitioned by Du Guesclin for the siege of Chaliers in June 1380, and in July 1382 the consuls sent a breyda

1 Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.44.
2 Ibid, p.43.
3 Ibid, p.45.
4 Douze comptes consulaires d'Albi, II, p.x.
5 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.84.
Cannons figured in town arsenals from the earliest years of the Hundred Years War. In 1345 there were at least eighty cannons at Agen, and the following year the consuls of Cahors ordered the construction of 24 cannons, five of which were sent to the duke of Normandy at Aiguillon. These first cannons were small, uncertain, and of limited range and accuracy. From the second half of the fourteenth century larger cannons began to appear, usually called bombardas to distinguish them from pieces of smaller bore. Cannons certainly made a useful contribution to town defence, but it would be a mistake to overestimate their importance. The cannon was not a revolutionary new weapon bringing swift and dramatic change to warfare, but rather a valuable complement to existing forms of artillery which it replaced only gradually. After all, even in the later fourteenth century and long into the fifteenth, most towns possessed only a small number of cannons. There were only six in the town arsenal of Albi in 1373, and five at Saint-Flour in 1380. Even as late as 1457 an inventory of the artillery of Bergerac lists only two 'canos de far petitz', nine 'cano gran' and another 'cano gran qui es en la tor de Clayrat'. Nor did the cannon make much impact on the style of town fortifications. The

1 *Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour*, p.173.
3 'Délibérations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit. XLVIII, p.259.
4 *Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour*, p.84.
5 *Jurades de la ville de Bergerac*, I, p.236.
only small concession to the new weapon was the construction of specially shaped embrasures in walls and towers through which the guns could fire. Bombardeyras were incorporated into the town wall of Tournon in 1432, and into the Porte d'Aiguespasses at Mende in 1436. By the next decade they were to be found in even the most rustic of fortifications. For instance, the tiny fortified hamlet of Flaujac (Aveyron), built in the early 1440s, has a fine set of keyhole-shaped ports in the tower of the surviving gate.

iv) The manufacture and distribution of arms

In Languedoc, the manufacture of arms on a large scale was mainly confined to Toulouse, which already by the end of the thirteenth century had a flourishing industry. The situation of Toulouse on the frontier of Guyenne made it an important centre for the supply of arms throughout the Hundred Years War, attracting buyers from a wide area of the Midi. At Montpellier there was a


2 AD Ardèche, 3E.204, (Tournon), liasse 8, comptes des procureurs et des syndics 1420-1433, fo.143vo.

3 Marché pour la construction de la porte d'Aiguespasses à Mende', p.89.

4 A. Ginesty, Flaujac, Rodaz, 1962, p.15.

5 Wolff, Commerces et marchands de Toulouse, p.290.

6 AC Kartel, BB.5, fo.71. AC Albi, EE.16.
guild of bowmakers from at least the early fourteenth century, but the paucity of references to the purchase of arms from Montpellier suggests that it was much less important as a manufacturing centre than Toulouse, and that it was almost certainly eclipsed by Avignon. The trade in arms from Avignon in the fourteenth century was considerable. Armourers, mainly Italians like the Datini, supplied a market covering not only Provence and the valley of the Rhône, but also Bas-Languedoc and the eastern parts of the Massif Central, even as far as Rodez. In 1347, for example, the consuls of the Bourg of Rodez dispatched a buyer to Avignon to obtain a quantity of bows and quarrels for the town. A census taken during the pontificate of Gregory XI (1370-1378) revealed that there were in Avignon at least seven armourers, one maker of harness and four general arms dealers.

Although the town authorities seem for the most part to have preferred to buy arms and armour direct from the manufacturers, an important part of the arms trade was probably in the hands of middle-men. The Bonis brothers of Montauban were general merchants whose principal interests were cloth and spices, but in the 1340s and -50s they sold quantities of arms and harness to seigneurs and communities in Quercy. They were not manufacturers themselves, but handled the finished products of local armourers, mainly

1 Petit Thalamus, p.301.
2 Brun, 'Notes sur le commerce des armes à Avignon', passim.
3 AC Rodez, Bourg, CC.125, fo.83.
4 Brun, 'Notes sur le commerce des armes à Avignon, p.210.'
While there is no denying the importance of centres like Toulouse and Avignon, the armaments industry was not particularly specialised or centralised. The requirements of most towns could be met in most circumstances by resident armourers, or by smiths and carpenters and other ordinary craftsmen. Indeed, the distinction between armourers and bowmakers on the one hand, and smiths and carpenters on the other, is probably academic, because in an emergency any craftsman with the necessary skill could be pressed into the service of the community. The custom of Figeac empowered the consuls to compel smiths and other artisans to work for the town whenever the need arose.\(^2\) In 1406 the jurats of Bordeaux ordered all workers with the necessary skill to leave their jobs and start making bows and lances.\(^3\) Nevertheless, the trade of bowmaker (balester) implied a special skill. At Montpellier the regulations of the guild of balesters stipulated that crossbows were only to be made of seasoned wood of proper quality; the steel was to be properly tempered; only fine cord was to be used; and all finished items were to be inspected by the master before being offered for sale.\(^4\) The skills of bowmakers were in great demand during the war. In 1413 the consuls of Montréal-du-Gers were unable to find anybody to repair the town crossbows.\(^5\) In 1369 and

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1 Livres des comptes des frères Bonis, passim.
2 Ordonnances, VII, p.666.
3 Archives municipales de Bordeaux, III, p.65.
4 Petit Thalame, p.301.
5 'Comptes des consuls de Montréal-du-Gers', loc. cit. XXIX, p.316.
1370 the consuls of Cahors had been able to persuade two balestiers to establish themselves in the town only by offering them generous privileges, including the provision of a house and workshop and exemption from all tailles and from guet and garde.\(^1\)

The manufacture of the larger pieces of artillery and cannons required a high degree of expertise, the preserve of a small number of specialists. In 1369 the consuls of the Cité of Rodez had to send as far as Argentat (Corrèze) for Jean Messias to come and construct a new brida for them. His price was a substantial 55 francs.\(^2\) The consuls accepted the terms without demur, if only because the previous year they had tried to cut corners by employing an unskilled builder whose machine had broken the first time it was tried out.\(^3\) Whenever the consuls of Saint-Flour needed to use their engines they had to call on a master from Lavoute-sur-Loire, near Le Puy, to come and service them.\(^4\) The reputation of Guiraud Vinagre of Castres, 'fabro seu magistro instrumentorum vocatorum bombardas', extended throughout his native Albigeois and Castrais even as far as Toulouse. In 1380 the consuls of Montgiscard, just outside Toulouse, who could have bought their guns from any of several manufacturers in the city, chose instead to travel the sixty kilometres to Castres to commission a pair of bombards from

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1 AC Cahors, Livre Tanné, fos.81-82.
2 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, II, pp.113-115.
3 Ibid, pp.77, 113.
4 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, pp.89, 173.
him. In the same year Vinagre was placed in charge of the artillery of the communes of Albigéois at the siege of Thuriès.  

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1 E. Cabié, 'G. Vinagre de Castres, fabricant de bombardes au XIVe siècle', Revue du Tarn, XV, 1898, p.293.

2 Douze comptes consulaires d'Albi, I, p.345.
PART IV

TOWN DEFENCE AND REGIONAL DEFENCE
CHAPTER 10

THE TOWN AND THE 'RESSORT'

Every fortified town served as a defensive focus for the area around it. Some towns, chiefly those centred on royal castles and administrative seats or developed from feudal castra, were surrounded by a clearly delimited territory, the ressort, whose inhabitants were considered for military and fiscal purposes to be dependent on the town and who might or might not enjoy the urban franchises. The charter granted by Philippe IV to Lunac, one of the lordships of Aiguillon, in 1295 named eighteen parishes which were to comprise the ressort of the consulate, and which were to share the liberties of the town. ¹ The barony of Lunel comprised the town of Lunel and twelve villettes, which until towards the end of the fourteenth century formed a single political and administrative unit. ² Attached to the consulate of Cordes as its 'ressort et juridiction' was a string of more than thirty smaller communities: the eight nearest, known as jurisprima, owed guat and garde to the town; the others had by the later fourteenth century become completely emancipated or were too far away for the link to have any practical significance. ³ The ressort sometimes coincided with an

¹ Ordonnances, XII, pp.401-402. R.L. Alis, Histoire de la ville d'Aiguillon et de ses environs depuis l'époque gallo-romaine jusqu'à nos jours, Agen, Sainte-Hedégonde, 1895, pp.87-88.
² Millerot, Histoire de la ville de Lunel, p.26 à passim.
³ Portal, Histoire de la ville de Cordes, pp.229-239.
administrative unit like a royal vigerie. At Aigues-Mortes the
ressort and viguerie were the same.¹ In January 1358 the sénéchal
of Beaucaire told captains of fortresses in the sénéchaussée to
bring their garrisons up to strength by recruiting men from their
vigueries. Most towns, however, had no formally circumscribed
ressort.² In wartime their zone of influence covered the undefended
villages of the surrounding plat-pays³ which relied on them for
shelter. It corresponded more or less to the region of commercial
inter-dependence.

Towns could never be hermetically isolated behind their walls;
they were necessarily affected by events in the country outside.
They tried therefore to shape those events as far as possible to
their advantage. They regarded the surrounding plat-pays, even
beyond the area of direct military dependence, as their legitimate
sphere of interest, and strove to bring it within their control.
This was consistent with royal defence policy which, in the early
part of the war at least, tended towards concentration and consoli-
dation, but it often brought the towns into conflict with the
country.

This process is illustrated by an interesting case involving
the consuls of Béziers and the syndics of Doujan, a village some
five kilometres outside the town. In 1366 the villagers decided

¹ AD Hérault, A.4, fos.409vo-410vo, & below, map III.
³ The term plat-pays was employed in contemporary documents to
distinguish, usually for fiscal purposes, the undefended country
districts from the fortified villes closes or villes fermées.
to protect themselves from the depredations of the routiers by enclosing Boujan with ditches and a wall. The consuls regarded the plan with apprehension, fearing that if the village was captured, it could be used as a base from which to assault the town. In this anxiety they were quite justified, because in 1358 the routier captain, Louis Robaut, had taken the village of Lignan, also just outside Béziers, from which he had terrorised the whole region and forced the inhabitants to pay him protection money amounting to ten thousand florins. In August 1366 the consuls inspected the fortifications at Boujan and pronounced that if the scheme was to go ahead the syndics must agree to certain conditions: the vault of the church must be removed and the tower pulled down to the height of the nave; all trees within bowshot of the village must be cut down; houses standing beyond the outer moat must be destroyed and those between the two moats unroofed; in wartime the syndics must ensure that the fort was properly guarded, appoint a competent captain and in addition accept, at the village's expense, a contingent of ten armed men from Béziers. The syndics could not agree to all these terms; in particular they refused to destroy the church vault and the houses between and beyond the ditches. The consuls and their councillors were adamant that the fort must be destroyed if the conditions were not met, but unfortunately the eventual outcome of the affair is unknown.1

The syndics of Marsillargues met the same sort of opposition as they fortified their village in the same period. Although their

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1 'Quatre délibérations municipales de Béziers en 1366', pp.54-64.
scheme, started in 1363, was approved by their seigneur direct, Raymond de Nogaret, and by royal defence commissioners, it was resisted by Louis, count of Etampes, lord of Lunel, of whom Nogaret held the fief of Marsillargues. Marsillargues is barely three miles from Lunel, whose syndics had undoubtedly prevailed upon their lord to intervene on their behalf. At any rate his arguments have a familiar ring: Lunel is a stronghold traditionally offering protection to the villages of the district; Marsillargues is within its ressort and near enough for the villagers to take refuge in the town and contribute to its defence; because of the mortality, which has dangerously reduced the population of Marsillargues, there are not enough defenders for the fort, which is therefore a liability and ought to be destroyed. The villagers submitted and offered to demolish their fortifications, but in January 1365 the count allowed them to continue building after they had agreed to pay him 2000 florins and to accept his nominee as captain.1

The fears expressed by the consuls of Béziers and the syndics of Lunel were shared by many other town authorities, some of whom took pro-emptive action not only against modest village fortification but against seigneurial castles as well. In June 1356 the consule of Cajarc came to an agreement with Aymeric Peyrié, owner of a fortified tower at Le Verdier, which he undertook to render unusable by the enemy on condition that the town paid the cost of restoration after the war.2 When, in 1382, Jean de Courdon

1 Thomas, 'Un village du Languedoc au XIVe siécle', pp.39-68.

2 Inventaire des Archives anciennes de la ville de Cajarc, MS ed. L. d'Alauzier, 1960, appendice, no.283.
proposed to rebuild his castle of Laroque-des-Aros outside Cahors, neutralised by the consuls of Cahors some years previously, and to re-establish a garrison there, the consuls vigorously protested. At length they prevailed upon him to leave the castle in its actual state and to employ no more sergeants there than were strictly necessary for his personal use.¹ Some two years later the consuls of Saint Flour burnt down the castle of Broussadouls on the grounds that it stood only half a league from the town, and that, despite the offer of defenders from the consuls, the seigneur, Aimon de Broussadouls, had failed to mount a proper guard so that the castle had been captured by brigands. In this case the consuls' action was vindicated by the duke of Berry,² but, when in 1405 they embarked upon a similar adventure and destroyed the castle of Alleuze belonging to the bishop of Clermont, they were forced to rebuild the castle or compensate the bishop to the tune of 6000 livres.³

The result of episodes like this one discouraged towns from taking military initiatives, except in desperation, and offensive operations in the countryside were undertaken only under the direction of the king's officers. The military relationship of the towns to the surrounding plat-paye was therefore an essentially passive one, of affording a safe haven to the people of the undefended villages.

1 Lacoste, Histoire de Quercy, III, p.273.
2 AC Saint-Flour, chapitre IV, article 6, no.8.
3 Ibid, no.15.
It was axiomatic that the people of the plat-pays performed gueut and garde and contributed to the fortifications of the towns and castles in which they found refuge. In June 1356 the king wrote to the sénéchal of Beaucaire instructing him to see that all persons holding property in Aimargues or who sheltered there in wartime were liable for watch duty and paid a share of the costs of fortification. Similarly in October 1357 the count of Armagnac ordered everyone sheltering in Narbonne to pay defence taxes. The people of Lunel and the cutlying villettes reached agreement in April 1356 whereby the latter were allowed freely to shelter in the town in return for a contribution amounting to a quarter of the total costs of fortification. A second, more detailed, arrangement was concluded in January 1356 after Armagnac himself had visited Lunel. In the presence of Jean Arbalétrier, the count's commissioner, the syndics and inhabitants of Lunel and the representatives of the villettes agreed to abide by the count's ordinance that people from villages with no actual or vestigial fortifications of their own must shelter in the town. As previously agreed, the townspeople would pay three-quarters of the building costs of the walls of Lunel and the villagers one quarter; whenever it was necessary for three men to work more than one day at the defences the villettes should contribute a quarter of the labour-force, that is to say if there were thirty men working from Lunel there would be

1 AD Hérault, A.4, fos.431vo-432vo.
2 B.N. Doat, vol.53, fo.244.
3 AG Lunel, EE.1, no.1976.
ten from the villettes; these labourers would be given free accommodation in the town. In wartime the people of the villettes would move into Lunel and also be assigned houses rent-free; at the end of the emergency they were at liberty to return to their own homes; four men from Lunel and two from the villettes were to be elected to raise the necessary tailles and pay the contractors; the two from the villettes would have over the villagers the same powers as the captain of Lunel over the townsmen.¹

At about the same time the consuls of Alès were making arrangements of the same sort with outlying parishes, although the outsiders were somewhat reluctant to participate. The consuls argued that the people of Marmoyrac ought to contribute to the fortification expenses of the town because they paid royal taxes with the citizens and enjoyed the same privileges. For their part the representatives of Marmoyrac insisted that they were under no such obligation because the consuls had no power to grant them the privileges of the town. Nevertheless, they undertook to pay thirty gold florins for the repair of the town walls of Alès. In return they could take refuge in the town with their families and chattels. They were quit of the barrage imposed on outsiders, and once the thirty florins had been paid they could be asked for no further contributions.² Other neighbouring parishes agreed to pay comparable sums, presumably equivalent to the number of their inhabitants, against the same guarantee of refuge: ten florins

¹ AC Lunel, EE.1, no.1977.
² AC Alès, 1315, no.XIII.
came from Espinaux, and Le-Bout-du-Pont, 1½ florins from Valle and Soustelle, 9½ florins from the castrum of Nayrerius in the parish of Saint-Jean-de-Chambon. And private individuals made similar arrangements: Bernard Forvier and Raymond de Soler of Saint-Martin-de-Valgalgue and Guillaume de Beneira, alias de Poret, domicellus, each undertook to pay one mouton for the right of shelter in Alès.

For the towns there were obvious benefits in securing the contribution of the plat-pays. The burden of fortification was eased, even if the townspeople bore the largest share, and the more defenders there were, the better for security. And by keeping the villages under their tutelage the towns could prevent independent and prejudicial fortification schemes being undertaken in their vicinity. Of course, there were problems of accommodation and supply, but these could be overcome with relative ease. For the outsiders, on the other hand, the blessings were mixed. Admittedly, they were offered protection at a fraction of the cost of erecting effective defences for their native villages, but at the expense of seeing their homes abandoned to the enemy and of suffering considerable dislocation to their lives by moving to the fortresses at every suspicion of danger. For while it made economic and military sense for the villages within a league or so of a town or castle to take refuge there, it was irksome for those living at greater distances. And such were the vagaries of seigneurial rights and connections that villagers did not necessarily remove to the nearest

1 AC Alès, 1315, nos. XIII, XVII, XVIII.
2 Ibid, nos. XIX, XX.
or most convenient fortified centre. Moreover, even if they persevered in building defences of their own, they might still be held liable for guet in a castle many leagues distant.

The size of the defensive ressort served by each town and castle varied according to the terrain, the settlement pattern and the number of other fortifications in the district. The ressort of some castles in Quercy in the 1390s extended up to fifteen leagues,¹ but distances of this order were exceptional. In 1359 six named villages comprised the ressort of Aigues-Mortes, the furthest, Mauglione, being fifteen kilometres away as the crow flies.² Of the twelve villages of the ressort of the royal castle of Roquemaure three were more than sixteen kilometres away.³ The villages owing guet and garde at Cordes were grouped within a radius of ten kilometres.⁴

To travel ten miles to shelter each time there was an alert, encumbered with personal valuables and supplies, was certainly a serious burden to the villagers of the plat-pays, the more so when the same distances had to be covered weekly or even nightly in the performance of customary services of guet and garde which were often exacted by perverse and mercenary captains when the security situation no longer justified them. On the whole, the crown was sympathetic to genuine pleas for relief, or for complete emancipation.

¹ Roy, Les finances royales sous Charles VI, p.361.
² AD Hérault, A.4, fos.409vo–410vo, & below, map III.
³ AD Gard, 3E.160 (Roquemaure), no.1, & below, map IV.
⁴ Portal, Histoire de la ville de Cordes, p.231.
from dependence on distant fortresses, provided that there was no threat to security, and that the villagers could make satisfactory alternative arrangements for themselves. In September 1364 the marshal Audrehem wrote to the royal castellan of Saint-André on the Rhône telling him not to compel the inhabitants of Les Angles to perform guet in his castle unless they actually took refuge there, because they were poor, and, as they lived a league away, a large part of their working day would be occupied in travelling.¹ In May 1363 the king forbade his castellan of Aigues-Mortes to take any more watch services from the people of Posquières and Vauvert because they had fortified their villages.² In March 1369 Louis d'Anjou similarly exempted the inhabitants of Sales in Albigeois from the obligation of guarding Cordes, notwithstanding the protests of the consuls of Cordes, on the grounds that there was a royal castle in Sales itself which they guarded and in which they took refuge.³

Despite the generally enlightened attitude of the crown — and in this as in other areas of government there was no consistent policy, each case was assessed on its merits — the officers on the spot, royal captains and castellans as well as local seigneurs with rights of guet and garde, were often less sympathetic to the plight of civilians. The cabochienne ordinance complained that people living at great distances from the fortresses to which they were

1 AD Hérault, A.5, fo.157.
3 AD Hérault, A.1, fos.186vo-187vo.
subject for service had been compelled by unscrupulous captains to perform guet more often and in greater numbers than were strictly required. 

Captains were therefore enjoined not to insist on more guet than was necessary, nor to make compositions with the inhabitants, and to impose fines of no more than 12d per person per occasion, which were to be used only to meet the costs of a replacement.¹

The impact of these measures can only have been marginal because royal ordinances of 1451 were railing against exactly the same abuses.² But the motives of fortress captains in this respect were not entirely mercenary. Against a background of general population decline those responsible for the defence of towns and castles found it increasingly difficult to muster sufficient defenders.

As early as August 1348 the consuls of Cahors were allowed to compel citizens who had fled the town because of plague to return and perform guet and garde.³ In June 1375 the consuls of Rodez Cité had to hire watchmen from outside because so many inhabitants were

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¹ L'ordonnance cabochienne, pp.129-130.
² Ordonnances, XIV, pp.185-187.
³ AC Cahors, CC.19(b).
sick or dead. And the eagerness of villages of the ressort to free themselves from military obligations only intensified the problem. The clause in the charter of privileges granted to the royal castle of Najac (Aveyron) in 1368 that the ressort would comprise those villages which had been attached for the last fifty years reveals the anxiety felt on this score, as indeed does the tenacious resistance offered by captains and castellans and town authorities to the emancipation of dependent villages.

The right of a community to build its own defences did not automatically exempt its inhabitants from service in the fortress to which they were originally bound. An irritating application of this principle was the insistence on castle-guard in places like Beaucaire, Roquemaure and Sommières which were walled towns in their own right and where the castles were defended by professional sergeants in the pay of the crown. In October 1362 the syndics of Beaucaire appealed against the sénéchal and their castellan and viguier, Pierre Scatisse junior, who had compelled fifteen inhabitants to guard the castle in contempt of their privileges. Indeed, in 1359 the count of Poitiers had instructed the castellan not to demand guet from the townspeople, but on this occasion Scatisse judged that because there were not enough sergeants to guard the castle properly, he was justified in making up numbers from the

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1 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, II, p.139.
2 Ordonnances, VII, p.221.
3 AC Beaucaire, EE.1.
4 AD Hérault, A.5, f.os.57-58.
town, and the appeal was therefore frivolous. The consuls of Roquemaure managed to obtain an undertaking from the king himself in December 1362 that, because there were paid sergeants in the royal castle, the inhabitants would not be asked to perform scout except in an emergency. And when the consuls did send men to the castle, such as during the visits of the duke of Anjou's wife, Marie de Bretagne, in 1371 and 1378, they made it patently clear that the service was done as a favour and should not be considered a precedent. In the royal castle of Sommières there were twelve sergeants on duty in wartime and four in peacetime. The townspeople complained that when war broke out the castellan had obliged them to mount watch, but they were quit of the obligation in 1363 on payment of 400 florins towards the cost of four additional sergeants. The people of Villevicille, just outside Sommières, were also exempted, on the intervention of Arnoul d'Audrehem, although they had to agree to guard the castle in an emergency. This stipulation, an elaboration of the principle that the crown could call on the service of all its subjects in defence of the realm, meant that the civilian victory in cases like these was conditional upon the war situation. It is unlikely that in a genuine crisis townspeople and villagers would refuse to defend castles on which

1 AC Beaucaire, CE.1.
2 AD Gard, 3E.160 (Roquemaure), no.3.
3 Ibid, nos.6, 8.
their own safety might depend. The point of friction was the exaction by castellans of routine services which to civilian minds could not be justified by the actual military situation.

The issues involved in a struggle for defensive independence between a small town and a fortress some miles away to which the inhabitants were customarily bound is illustrated by the unusually well-documented case between the syndics and people of Aimargues and the royal castellan and viguier of Aigues-Mortes.

Aigues-Mortes had been planted in the thirteenth century to give the crown access to the Mediterranean. It never attained the hoped-for commercial prosperity, and as a fortress it was not of the first importance, although it did form a useful link in the chain of defences that stretched along the coast of Languedoc and up the Rhône. (The castellan's assertion that it was 'clavis regni in lingua occitana' cannot be taken too literally.) It was the administrative centre of a viguerie whose towns and villages, among them Aimargues, formed its military ressort. Aimargues in the fourteenth century was, as it still is, a small town typical of the densely settled lowland between Montpellier and Nîmes. Aimargues is thirteen kilometres from Aigues-Mortes by the fast road linking the coastal resorts with the interior, and nearer sixteen by the old road that winds through Marnillargues and Saint-Laurent-d'Aigouze. Before 1364 Aimargues numbered 520 fiscal hearths, which were reduced in that year to 180. It had fortifications dating from

1 AD Hérault, A.4, fos.409vo–410vo.
2 Ordonnances, IV, pp.445–446.
before the start of the war which its inhabitants put into a state of readiness rather earlier than other places in the region. In 1341 and 1346 ouvriers were elected to see to the repair of the fortifications, but in 1356 the syndics petitioned the king for outsiders to be forced to contribute to the work on the walls, ditches and other defences which had fallen into a state of dilapidation. However, the existence of these walls was not considered sufficient grounds to exempt the inhabitants of Aimargues from guet and garde at Aigues-Mortes, at least not by the castellan and viguier, Guiraud Malepui. In February 1358 Jean, count of Poitiers, ordered the sénéchal of Beaucaire to prevent Malepui from molesting the villagers who, their syndics complained, had been unjustly forced to mount guard at Aigues-Mortes for days on end. They were no longer to be liable for service there; if Malepui required extra defenders he was to take them from Aigues-Mortes itself.

But Malepui was not deterred. In contempt of the royal lieutenant's letters, he summoned men from Aimargues for service. Visiting Aimargues personally, and finding the syndics absent, he cited them to appear before his court. They countered with the

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1 Inventaire sommaire AD Gard. Série E-supplément, no.250.
AC Aimargues, EE.1.

2 AD Hérault, A.4, fos.431vo–432vo, 24 June 1356.

3 AC Aimargues, EE.4, 15 Feb. 1358. Apparently the castellan was only to draw upon the inhabitants of Aigues-Mortes for guet at night. 'Volumus tamen quod si vobis expediens videtur et necessarium fuerit pro vigilando et dictum castrum custodiendo possint accipere de hominibus dicti loci de Aquarum Mortuarum de noote pro securitate eiusdem', ibid.
inevitable appeal to Parlement. If this move was intended to buy time, or even to intimidate their adversary, its success was short-lived. Malepui prevailed upon the count of Poitiers to revise his earlier estimation of the situation. In November 1359 Poitiers wrote to him that the king's proctor in the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire had informed him that the people of six villages, among them Aimargues, had from time out of mind been liable for cust night and day in Aigues-Mortes. But, on the grounds that they had constructed defences of their own, the villagers had surreptitiously obtained letters from the lieutenant (those of February 1358) exempting them from these services, as a result of which the defence of Aigues-Mortes was seriously prejudiced. Malepui was therefore to see that the villages of the viguerie sent men to Aigues-Mortes as required, disregarding his previous instructions and all frivolous appeals.

Thus justified, and brushing aside a fresh appeal to Parlement by the syndics, Malepui ordered them to send him twelve armed bowmen on pain of 100 marks. Etienne Calvin, on behalf of himself and his fellow syndics, refused, for which he was distrained and imprisoned in Aigues-Mortes. The other syndics decided this time to appeal to the king direct. In April the regent, Charles, apprised of the case, declared that it seemed to him reasonable that the people of Aimargues should defend their own village, a fortified place in which they, their families and possessions were

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1 AD Hérault, A.4, fos.319vo-320vo, 11 May 1358.
2 Ibid, fos.409vo-410vo.
adequately protected. The castellan was therefore commanded not to demand any further services while the case was adjourned to Parliament.¹ Served with the royal letters of non-prejudice, Malepui's lieutenant insisted upon his right to call up the inhabitants of Aimargues in an emergency, but agreed to abide by the decision of the court.²

The law was left to take its ponderous course. Meanwhile, work on the fortifications of Aimargues continued. Ouvriers were appointed, taxes raised and contributions secured from local landlords like the priors of Malepuis, Saint-Saturmin and Saint-Sylvestre-de-Telhan.³ For Bas-Languedoc the 1360s were a period of severe trial, yet, despite the strains placed on the defence system, it does not appear as if the castellan troubled the inhabitants in these years. Guy de Prohines, sénéchal of Beaucaire, inspected Aimargues in March 1365 and pronounced that the fortifications, which had been allowed to deteriorate because of the dispute and the negligence of the syndics should be brought up to scratch with the aid of a capage and other taxes.⁴

By 1369 the process in Parliament had still not been terminated, and so the syndics decided once more to address themselves to the king himself. They put their case thus: Aimargues is ' locus fortis et insignis', walled by its citizens at their own expense,

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¹ AD Hérault, A.4, fos.411-416vo, 10, 12 April 1360 (incorrectly dated 1359 in the eighteenth-century transcripts).
² AC Aimargues, EE.3, 15 May 1360.
³ Ibid; AD Hérault, A.5, fos.179vo-180.
⁴ AC Aimargues, EE.3, 26 March 1365.
and providing a safe refuge for the people of the plat-pays; it needs to be effectively guarded because of the great harm that would come to the region by its capture; because of the mortality, there are already insufficient defenders, and yet the sénéchal and castellan have compelled them to guard Aigues-Mortes day and night, even though they have at their disposal a garrison of royal troops for that very purpose; letters in favour of Aimargues have already been obtained from the count of Poitiers, but the castellan has ignored them and continued to vex the inhabitants, until they appealed to Parlement; the case has now gone on for so long that they can no longer bear the cost of sending proctors to Paris; they therefore request the king to conclude the question once and for all by confirming his lieutenant's original letters.

This tactic brought success. Charles V recognised the justice of the syndics' cause, ordered the process in Parlement to be stopped and instructed the sénéchal to see that the people were quit of all obligations to serve at Aigues-Mortes.¹ Malepui though would still not give up. In February 1372 he called for six men from Aimargues to perform suit at Aigues-Mortes, and, on their refusal, cited them to appear in his court. There, the syndics were able to exhibit the king's letters and with no support forthcoming from the sénéchal Malepui and his lieutenant were obliged to admit defeat.² There is no record that Aimargues was subsequently troubled on this score.

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¹ AC Aimargues, EE.4, royal letters dated Paris, 22 Nov. 1369.
² Ibid, 26 Feb.-3 March 1372.
The victory of the syndics was symptomatic of a general trend as the pattern of defensive organisation changed through the latter part of the fourteenth century and into the fifteenth. In the first phase of the war, defence had necessarily been concentrated on places already fortified or which could be fortified quickly. As the conflict wore on, more and more smaller communities clamoured for defences of their own. The process is difficult to quantify; the documentation is fragmentary and there is no means of precisely knowing the number of castles, walled towns and villages and other fortifications in a given area, nor of charting their evolution over a period. But incidental references give a clear enough indication of what was happening. Of the six named villages of the viguerie of Aigues-Mortes in 1359, Aimargues and at least two others had independent defences by the mid-fifteenth century; the emancipation of Vauvert was recognised in 1363 while in 1435 the abbot of Psalmodie was permitted to fortify his 'hostal principal abbatial' at Saint-Laurent. Municipal authorities found themselves fighting the same kind of battle against outlying villages as the castellan of Aigues-Mortes. In March 1406 the consuls of Périgueux obtained a royal injunction that the charge of guarding and paying for the town walls fell on the parishes of Atur, Sanilhac, Saint-Laurent, Coursac, Mursac, Merlande, Chancelade, Champoevinel and Cornille. The villagers of Champoevinel claimed exemption because they no

2 AD Hérault, A.10, fos.284-285.
3 AC Périgueux, EE.14, & below, map V.
longer took refuge in the town, having fortified their church, but
the consuls would not accept the validity of this argument and took
them to court, apparently without success. Likewise the consuls
of Cordes struggled to retain their authority over the villages of
the ressort. Of the eight juratifs, villages whose inhabitants
were liable for guet and garde in Cordes, at least four, Itzac,
Nouailles, Saint-Marcel and Virac, had been fortified by 1465.
In that year, and again in 1471, the villagers of Nouailles and
Saint-Marcel refused to perform guet at Cordes while in 1471
Virac and Rauouls were no longer considered to be among the
juratifs.

1 AC Périgueux, FF.96.
2 Portail, Histoire de la ville de Cordes, p.238.
4 AC Cordes, EE.5.
5 Ibid, EE.6.
CHAPTER 11

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

Town walls offered security not only to the townsfolk but also to the inhabitants of the surrounding areas whose own villages were unfortified. Royal defence ordinances were adamant that in times of emergency the people of the undefended plat-pays should gather up their belongings and take refuge in the castles and walled towns. For the authorities of the host communities this influx of outsiders created an additional burden of responsibility.

Refugees were of two kinds: villagers from the plat-pays who sought only temporary protection and who returned to their homes once the danger had passed, and townspeople from the extra-mural suburbs, the harris or faubourgs, whose houses had been destroyed either by the enemy or, more usually, by the town authorities as a security measure.

Private property had been pulled down piecemeal as town walls were built in the 1340s and -50s, but after 1355 a more systematic policy of destruction, enforced by royal defence commissioners and town authorities alike, involved either the wholesale razing of the faubourgs or the clearing of all buildings within a specified distance from the walls. In May 1358 the Estates of Languedoc laid down the general principle that buildings standing outside town and castle walls which might be prejudicial to defence should be demolished under the supervision of royal officers, notwithstanding the appeals of the owners, and that consuls, syndics and
other municipal officers who had ordered such property to be destroyed should be quit of all penalties and processes. In June 1356 the king ordered the seneschal of Carcassonne to see that houses within twelve palms of the walls of Narbonne were destroyed, and in 1362 the consuls and ouvriers of Montpellier, accompanied by sixty armed sergeants, toured the walls supervising the demolition of buildings erected in the chemin des douze palmes. In January 1360 the consuls of Alès were allowed to destroy all buildings within a stone's throw of the town walls and to unroof the ones beyond. While the most spectacular destructions were limited to the panic years of the 1350s and -60s, the abandonment of faubourgs was a process which continued into the later phases of the war.

In 1404 the syndics of Viviers successfully petitioned the seneschal of Beaucaire's lieutenant to permit them to pull down the outlying parts of the town, and as late as 1426 the consuls of Montagnac were considering the same course of action.

These last two examples illustrate the reasons why town authorities decided to abandon the faubourgs. The syndics of Viviers explained that every year men at arms travelling up and down the Rhône passed through Vivarais, especially in summer when the

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1 *Histoire de Languedoc*, X, pr., col.1149.
2 AC Narbonne, EE.69.
3 *Petit Thalamus*, pp.363-364.
4 AC Alès, 1315, no.XXXII.
5 'Catalogue des actes de la ville de Viviers', loc. cit., XXVII, p.74, no.236.
6 'Comptes consulaires de Montagnac', loc. cit., XVII, pp.526-527.
crops were most vulnerable. They would stop at Viviers because of the large number of houses in the faubourgs in which they made themselves at home, often staying several days at a time, seizing the livestock, cutting down the corn to feed their horses and tearing up trees and vines. If the faubourgs were destroyed, the syndics argued, the soldiery would be less inclined to linger in the town. For their part, the consuls of Montagnac estimated that the survival of the faubourgs cost them 200 moutons a year. The inhabitants were willing to move, many of them had houses within the walls, and the town was large enough to accommodate them all, with room to spare for the merchants coming to the great fair.

Not unnaturally, the people of the faubourgs were often reluctant to abandon their homes. The inhabitants of the extra-mural suburbs of Martel were forced to leave under threat of a heavy fine, while some of the villagers of Alairac and Preixan in the vicomté of Pechansaguet refused to move until they were burnt out of their houses.

One group of refugees which posed special difficulties was the clergy. The mendicant orders, especially the Carmelites, were hardest hit. Their churches and convents had been built outside town gates as a matter of policy and in wartime were quickly earmarked for demolition because of their size and potential usefulness

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1 'Catalogue des actes de la ville de Viviers', loc. cit., XXVII, p.74.
2 'Comptes consulaires de Montagnac', loc. cit., XVII, pp.526-527.
3 AC Martel, BB.5, fo.69vo., 7 Sept. 1352
4 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols. 1366-1367.
to the enemy. During the siege of Aiguillon in 1346, the town captain, Hugues Ménil, destroyed the Carmelite convent in the Muneau faubourg. In 1348 Edward III ordered his sénéchal of Guyenne to see that an advantageous site be found inside the town to rehouse the friars and pay the damages, estimated at more than 2000 livres, out of the revenues of the duchy. At Mende the Carmelite church was pulled down because it was higher than the town wall, and the Carmelites of Montpellier saw their church destroyed after it had been occupied by Bertucoat d'Albret in 1361 and used as a base for operations against the city, although they were later allowed by the consuls to rebuild on a smaller scale on the same site.

The Carmelites of Carcassonne agreed to abandon their convent and move to a new site in the rue Saint-Jean, but only after obtaining from Innocent VI a dispensation from the bull of Boniface VIII prohibiting the establishment of new mendicant houses within 180 cannes of existing churches and convents.

The consuls of Millau fought a long action with the Franciscans and the Hospitallers of St. John to secure the destruction of their conventual buildings outside the town walls. In May 1356 Jean I d'Armagnac sent the sénéchal of Rouergue and judge of Millau to inspect the fortifications of Millau, Saint-Rome-de-Tarn, and Saint-Sernin and remove any houses, churches and other buildings.

1 Alis, Histoire de la ville d'Aiguillon, p.177.
2 AC Mende, CC.157.
3 Petit Thalamus, p.358. AC Montpellier, Louvet nos.3074, 3075, 3077.
obstructing the defences. The Franciscans of Millau resisted, and in September Armagnac instructed the sénéchal to see that his original orders were carried out without delay. In the meantime, the consuls had sent to Le Minier for two or three master miners to come and give their opinion of the technical difficulties involved in destroying the Franciscan church. These experts declared that it would be inadvisable to use mines, for, if the church collapsed — and it was chiefly in the destruction of the church that the consuls were interested — it would bring with it the chapter-house, dorter and refectory, involving the consuls in expenses of some 700 florins. The mining project was therefore abandoned and at the beginning of October the consuls started to demolish the church by more conventional means. However, the offending buildings were only partially destroyed and it was not until 1367, with the routiers menacing the province, that Thomas Wettenhale, the English sénéchal of Rouergue, ordered their complete destruction. In fairness to the religious, it should be pointed out that the attitude of the consuls was ambiguous and that they were far from anxious to have the Franciscans or other orders establish themselves within their town; at the end of the thirteenth century they had resisted the

1 Rouquette, Le Rouergue sous les Anglais, p.453.
2 Ibid, p.454.
3 AG Millau, CC.350, fo.7.
4 Documents sur la ville de Millau, pp.101-102.
construction of a Dominican house inside the walls, while in 1363 they petitioned the Prince of Aquitaine not to allow more clergy to settle in Millau without special licence, because those who had already taken refuge had abused the hospitality of the inhabitants, refused to return to their houses of origin and were buying up vacant plots of town land. However, there was an amicable settlement to at least one of these disputes. In December 1408 representatives of the Franciscans approached the consuls to suggest that, as the Dominican, Carmelite and Hospital churches had been restored, their own church should likewise be rebuilt, on the understanding that if war should break out in the future, the consuls would be at liberty to destroy it again. For the honour of God and the souls of their colleagues who had pulled down the original churches, the consuls and councillors agreed, stipulating that the new church must be no more than 6 cannes high, and on 21 February 1409, at the friars’ request, Bertrand del Ricé, the senior consul, set his seal on the agreement by laying the first stone of the new edifice.

The decision of the clergy of Millau, Montpellier and other places to return to their abandoned churches in easier times suggests that the destruction of faubourgs was not permanently catastrophic, even though the immediate result was a shift in population towards the inner-town wards. The taille rolls of Saint-Flour, for example, show that in 1338 there were 719 taxable

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1 AC Millau, AA.1.
3 Documents sur la ville de Millau, pp.257-259.
households inside the town and 603 in the faubourgs. By 1356, after
the English had partially destroyed the faubourgs and plague had
ravaged the whole town, the figures were respectively 552 and 217.
In 1363 the faubourg population had sunk to 59 after fresh English
raids, but by 1380 it had risen again to 178 against an inner-town
figure of 516.\(^1\) However, the compoix of the Cité of Rodez show
that in 1355 there were 663 householders inside the walls and 223
outside. By 1397 the numbers had fallen to 477 and 81.\(^2\)
Similarly Professor Wolff's analysis of the taille registers of Toulouse
shows that the suburbs outside the city walls were almost deserted
by the end of the fourteenth century.\(^3\)

For the town authorities who had to provide for the refugees
and evacuees, whether they came from the plat-pays or the faubourgs,
the immediate problem was accommodation. In December 1355 the
commissioners inspecting the fortifications of Albigeois ordered the
inhabitants of Montsalvi, Les Avalats and other villages which could
not be defended to assemble in Albi on 1st January to be allocated
accommodation in the town.\(^4\) The syndics of Lunel agreed to provide
free accommodation for the people of the surrounding villettes who
moved into the town in wartime,\(^5\) but elsewhere the outsiders had to
pay for their lodgings. In October 1352 the consul of Marsel

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1 Registres consulaires de Saint-Mour, p.150.
2 Lat Pecherohes-ourla-population II, p.145.
3 Wolff, Commerces et marchandes de Toulouse, p.87.
4 AC Albi, EE.7.
5 AC Lunel, EE.1, no.1977.
ordered all persons with houses to rent, or owning more houses than
their situation justified, to make them available to refugees at a
fair rent. If landlord and tenant could not come to agreement then
two arbitrators, B. Taillefer for the town and Estèves Vorio for the
faubourgs, would intervene to see that the outsiders were not
exploited.¹ The same sort of arrangement was evolved at Pézenas.
In the wake of the Black Prince's raid, royal defence commissioners
had ordered the demolition of houses built outside the walls.
After a dispute, the consuls and representatives of the faubourgs
agreed that one third of the houses within the walls should be made
available to the outsiders under the supervision of four deputies.
If by reason of the war any houses outside the walls were destroyed,
either by the enemy or by the town authorities, then the town would
compensate the owners by an amount fixed by the deputies and pay
any rents accruing to those houses until the full compensation had
been paid. Owners of two or more houses would keep one and make
the others available for rent or purchase. And the deputies were
empowered to auction property and fix price limits for private
transactions.²

At Montpellier and Nîmes the consuls used the refugee problem
as a pretext for reducing the size of the Jewish ghettos,³ but
there is little indication elsewhere of undue pressure on living
space within town walls, and no evidence that outsiders were refused

¹ AC Cartel, BB.5, fo.69vo.
² AC Pézenas, Resseguiër, no.953bis.
³ See above, p.192.
admission on the grounds that there was no room for them. The arrangements made at Lunel, Martel and Pézenas suggest that while there certainly were difficulties, they were capable of solution by intelligent co-operation. It is impossible to calculate the number of evacuees from the plate-pays, although taille rolls give a rough indication of the faubourg populations. The increase in the inner-town population of Saint-Flour from 517 households in 1361 to 745 in 1363 is almost exactly matched by the decline in the faubourg population from 314 to 59. At its recorded maximum in 1338 the inner-town population was 719, and so it is unlikely that the authorities faced undue difficulty in accommodating an additional 26 families. Admittedly, the taille rolls tell us nothing of the size and quality of the housing stock nor of the ability or inclination of the townsmen to receive the outsiders, but taken at face value they suggest that the dramatic decline in most town populations after the plague epidemic of 1347-48 considerably eased the refugee problem in the next two decades. And by the end of the fourteenth century and beginning of the fifteenth the towns were crying out for immigrants; the poorer inhabitants of Saint-Flour had to be prevented by royal ordinance from fleeing the town, the people of Narbonne lamented that their once populous city numbered barely 2000 adults, while at Nîmes the consuls alleged that only in the market-place and outside the cathedral could one

1 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.150.
2 Ibid, p.314.
3 AC Narbonne, EE.1603.
be certain of meeting another living soul.\textsuperscript{1}

To the accommodation problem was added the difficulty of keeping townspeople and refugees supplied with the necessities of life during long periods of emergency. Theoretically the people of the plat-

peys were self-sufficient, because royal ordinances insisted that they take adequate food with them into the towns and castles where they sheltered. In the autumn of 1355 the peasants of the undefended villages of Albigois were ordered to provide themselves with wheat, wine, flour and salted meat when they retreated into the fortified towns and castles.\textsuperscript{2} The following year the consuls of Nîmes and royal defence commissioners told the people of the faubourgs and outlying parishes taking refuge in the city to bring with them enough victuals to last six months.\textsuperscript{3} Probably six months was an over-optimistic estimate of the ability of the refugees to support themselves. King Jean took a more realistic view when in December 1360 he wrote to the consuls of Nîmes reminding them that the people of the plat-

peys had been instructed to bring with them into the walled towns and castles enough food for fifteen days.\textsuperscript{4} Nonetheless, important towns and castles were expected to be able to withstand long sieges. In January 1358 the sénéchal of Beaucaire ordered captains and castellans to see that all fortresses

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\textsuperscript{1} Ménard, \textit{Histoire de Nîmes}, III, pr. p.156.
\textsuperscript{2} B.N. Doat, 103, fo.344vo.
\textsuperscript{3} Ménard, \textit{Histoire de Nîmes}, II, pr. p.181.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid, p.239.
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were stocked with enough provisions for six months. Two years later the count of Poitiers' commissioners were instructed to see that there were a year's supplies in the towns and castles of the sénéchaussées of Carcassonne and Beaucaire, and Charles V's defence ordinances of November 1363 similarly expected fortresses to be self-sufficient for a year.

In ordinances for the defence of Montauban in 1346 Hugues de Cardaillac deals at some length with the question of victuals. The necessities, he writes, are wheat, wine, water and vinegar, which must be obtained in as large a quantity as possible. Once brought inside the town they must be inspected and inventoried by the captain and in case of siege distributed to the defenders sparingly day by day. Salt, salted and fresh meat, salted fish, cheese, oil, fat, oats, hay and straw should also be acquired, and peas and beans too, 'for the bean is strong and nourishing and keeps very well.' There must be hand-mills for grinding corn and an oven for baking bread, and any bakers must be persuaded to exercise their craft in the service of the community. Eggs, pepper, ginger and all manner of other spices, raisins, figs, dried almonds and 'other gums' should be stockpiled, not for consumption but for dressing wounds. In fact Cardaillac carefully considers the medical and surgical arrangements. He urges the presence of one or two surgeons to attend to the wounded, as many physicians for the sick, and barbers,

1 Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, II, pr. p.198.
2 AC Aîles, 1315, no.XXXIII.
3 Mandements et actes divers de Charles VI, p.237.
all supplied with the instruments of their profession. For bandages there must be ample cotton, oiled wool and olive oil.¹

Probably the implementation of Cardaillac's recommendations to the letter was beyond the resources of the smaller towns, most of which had little stomach for a siege anyway. Nevertheless, the documents show town authorities adopting many of the measures he advocated — which were, after all, only an elaboration of those prescribed by royal ordinances — to prepare if not for siege at least for a long state of emergency. The acquisition of wheat and the control of its price and distribution in times of shortage was a recognised duty of the municipality. The thirteenth-century customs of Narbonne allowed the consuls to place an embargo on the movement of grain and to requisition surpluses for sale to the citizens.² And the consuls exercised this right when necessary. In May 1381, for instance, they forbade the export of wheat from the city and accumulated large stocks in the town hall.³ During the famine of 1374-75 the consuls of Albi and Rodez Cité made sizeable purchases of grain.⁴ In August 1374 the consuls of Castres ordered that people importing goods into the town should bring proportionate quantities of wheat.⁵ In 1405 the consuls and jurats

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³ AC Narbonne, CC.355, fo.oxxxix.
⁴ 'Délubrations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit., XLVII, p.350; Comptes consulsaires de Rodes, Cité, I, p.137.
⁵ AC Castres, BB.1, fo.27vo.
of Bergerac decided not to avail themselves of a royal grant of a barrage on the grounds that it might discourage people from bringing food into the town.¹

Water-mills on which towns depended generally lay outside the walls and to ensure adequate supplies of ground corn when the gates were closed for long periods the authorities insisted, like Cardaillac, that there should be sufficient hand-mills, or else they built windmills, usually on the town walls. The consuls of Nîmes ordered that ten or twelve hand-mills (molendina sanguinia) should be brought into the city during the emergency of 1356.² In 1371 the consuls of Béziers were permitted by Charles V to build windmills on the town walls for use in wartime and to assign the revenues to the fortifications.³ At Rodez the Cité windmills stood on the western flank of the town walls between the bishop's castle of La Caldegouse and the Tour de Corbières.⁴

As for the other essentials of life, wine was a staple of commerce from which the towns derived considerable taxation revenues and it would have been wholly exceptional circumstances which exhausted the cellars. As far as water supplies are concerned, it must be presumed that every town had sufficient springs and fountains within the walls to provide for the needs of the inhabitants even in summer; at least water supply is rarely alluded to in the

¹ Jurades de la ville de Bergerac, I, p.143.
³ Ordonnances, V, p.393.
⁴ AD Aveyron, C.59, fo.14.
documents except as a work of charity or public utility. At Alès and Nîmes gratings were placed over streams and conduits passing through the walls, but only to deny entry to enemies. Town ditches were usually stocked with fish. The charter of Trie in the sénéchaussée of Toulouse allowed the people to fish the ditches.

In 1389 the consul of Millau paid the sum of 16s 11d to put carp, trout and great quantities of other fish in the town ditches.

As for meat, the consul of Martel decided in 1352 to transfer the abattoir (mazel) to a site inside the town for the duration of the war, but the carcasses were to be skinned outside and only brought back into the town aparelhadas.

Meat supplies depended on the availability of livestock. Where possible beasts were led in wartime to the relative security of the upland pastures, and livestock was specifically excluded from regulations covering the transfer of victuals into fortified places in Charles V's ordinances of November 1368.

In October 1373 the sénéchal of Carcassonne ordered the peasants of the Pays narbonnais to lead their beasts away to safety, while in 1356 the people of Cajarco and the surrounding area had entrusted their flocks to a band of armed

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1 AC Alès, 1315, no.XXXIII; Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, IX, pr. p.223.
2 Ordonnances, XII, p.493.
3 Documents sur la ville de Millau, p.223.
4 AC Martel, EB.5, fo.70vo.
5 Mandements et actes divers de Charles V, pp.236-237.
6 AC Narbonne, EE.1459.
shepherds to be taken up to the remote highlands of the upper Lot. ¹

The arrangements for distributing victuals inside beleaguered fortresses are passed over in both royal and municipal documents. Presumably each household of townsfolk and outsiders alike was expected to be more or less self-sufficient, unless during a prolonged emergency or siege, in which case rationing and distribution from a central stock envisaged by Cardaillac must have been introduced. A rationing system of sorts was operated by the count of Poitiers' commissioners in the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire in 1360. The people of the plat-pays who had been ordered to remove their provisions to the fortresses were allowed to remain in their villages for the time being, keeping with them a week's supplies. Once these had been consumed they drew a further week's supplies from the stocks in the fortresses and so on until the approach of the enemy forced them to evacuate their villages and take refuge. ²

However, this scheme seems to have been designed not so much to keep the population fed as to prevent foodstuffs falling into the hands of the enemy.

Anxiety to deny the enemy useful supplies was the constant theme of royal ordinances in the 1350s and -60s. Victuals which could not be taken from the plat-pays to the security of fortresses were destroyed. Defence commissioners working in Albigeois in the autumn of 1355 were instructed to see that victuals which could not be taken from undefended villages were removed from houses and

1 Lacoste, Histoire de Quercy, III, p.124.
2 AC Alès, 1315, no.XXXIII.
barns and placed in the streets, there to be burnt at first sight of the English. Similarly the count of Poitiers' commissioners in 1360 ordered civilians to fire everything which could not be saved. There is no obvious link between royal policy in this respect and famine, but for the towns the problems of supply must have been accentuated and there must certainly have been shortages of some commodities. And understandably the people of the plat-pays were reluctant to abandon their homes and chattels and resisted royal defence ordinances, though in what numbers and with what success it is impossible to determine. The anxiety felt on this score is shown by a petition addressed by the Estates of the three sénéchaussées of Beaucaire, Carcassonne and Toulouse to the duke of Anjou in January 1372 requesting a pardon for all the people of Languedoc who had refused to obey royal orders to take livestock and victuals from the plat-pays into the safety of castles and walled towns.

1 AC Cordes, EE.3.
2 AC Alès, 1315, no.XXXIII; Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. col.1260.
3 AC Albi, CC.77.
CHAPTER 12

TREATIES AND ALLIANCES

Formal treaties of friendship and protection were a feature of inter-urban relations in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The ancient cities of Nîmes and Arles traditionally enjoyed close links, and in 1213, during the Albigensian wars, sealed a treaty guaranteeing peace and friendship between their citizens, the preservation of justice and mutual support if either city was attacked. In 1224, and again in 1239, six towns of Agenais, Agen, Condom, Nézian, Narmande, Port Sainte-Marie and Le Mas d'Agenais solemnly pledged armed assistance to each other in the event of war. In 1263 the consuls of Pigeac, Périgueux, Brive and Sarlat made a ten-year treaty, approved by the king's sénéchal, by which they undertook to defend their privileges. To supervise the maintenance of order within their territory they annually elected four arbitrators, one from each town. In the more peaceful climate of the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries the need for co-operation of this kind decreased and there is no evidence that any of these associations survived the particular circumstances in which they were created.

During the Hundred Years War the most active and successful

1 Ménard, Histoire de Nîmes, i, pr. pp.52-53.

2 Archives municipales d'Agen. Chartes, 1re série, pp.21-23, 46-47.

3 Villepelet, Histoire de la ville de Périgueux, pp.208-209.
alliance of towns was undoubtedly that centred on Bordeaux in the later fourteenth century. The success of the French reconquest of Guyenne in the 1370s and the political difficulties in England during the minority of Richard II convinced the mayor and jurats of the city and the towns of Bordelais still in English allegiance that they could no longer rely for protection on their king but must defend themselves as best they could. Consequently, in 1379 Blaye, Bourg, Libourne, Saint-Émilion, Castillon and Cadillac placed themselves under the guardianship of Bordeaux. Rions and Saint-Macaire, then in French hands, were included in the alliance by their citizens living in exile in Bordeaux. This association, which was blessed by Richard II's lieutenant, John Neville, was primarily defensive in purpose, but it was invested with a mystic and moral significance and framed in quasi-feudal terms. The fillesules (goddaughters), as the small towns were styled, bound themselves to Bordeaux, their marraine (godmother), in a solemn 'collegacion, union fe e liganza', swearing fealty to the mayor and jurats of the city, who, in turn, promised to protect and support them. 1

The alliance was put to its first serious test in 1405-1406. The duke of Orléans led a French army into the Bordelais with the intention of completing the reconquest. His strategy was to avoid a frontal attack on Bordeaux, and instead to capture castles on the Médoc peninsula and the towns of Blaye and Bourg on the right bank of the Gironde, so as to cut the city's communications with England.

1 Archives municipales de Bordeaux, I, Livre des Bouillons, Bordeaux, 1873, pp. 440-441. Histoire de Bordeaux, III, Bordeaux sous les rois d'Angleterre, p. 455.
Resistance to the French attack was almost entirely organised by the mayor and jurats of Bordeaux. Blaye and Bourg were kept victualled and munitioned by ships plying up and down the river from Bordeaux, and garrisoned with troops raised and paid for by the city. These efforts were rewarded in December 1406 when a flotilla of river boats from Bordeaux attacked and destroyed the French fleet lying off Saint-Julien-de-Médoc. On 14 January 1407 Orléans abandoned the siege of Bourg. In the 1420s the recapture of Nîmes, Saint-Macaire, Budos and a large part of Entre-Deux-Mers and Bazadais was accomplished by mercenary armies raised in Bordeaux and its filièules.

In the French Midi no city enjoyed the same independence or influence and domination over its surrounding region as Bordeaux, and none of the few town leagues that were created in Languedoc was as solid or effective as the association of Bordeaux and its filièules. In 1347 the consuls of Figeac, Cahors and Gourdon joined themselves in a triangular association, the object of which, they declared, was to make war on the enemies of the king of France. In Rouergue Rodez and Villefranche were closely associated throughout the war. In 1355, at the request of the consuls of Villefranche, Rodez sent a small force of bowmen to protect its

1 Archives municipales de Bordeaux, III, pp.1-146. Histoire de Bordeaux, III. Bordeaux sous les rois d'Angleterre, pp.414-415.
2 Ibid, p.415.
3 Ibid, p.417.
4 AC Cajaro, EE.11, no.361. AC Courdon, EE.1, no.5. & below, appendix I.
sister town from the English. In 1412 friendship between the two towns was cemented in a formal treaty of peace and protection. In Bas-Languedoc in 1429 Lodève and all the other communities of the viguerie of Gignac formed a defensive league to protect themselves against a local seigneur, Jean de Narbonne, after a dispute between him and the citizens of Lodève had led to a local war.

The conclusion of a defensive treaty implied that the signatories were able and willing to meet their commitments to the point of making war upon a common enemy. But the independent use of urban militias, even in the legitimate defence of town interests, was discouraged by the French crown. The consuls of Cajarc, Figeac and Gourdon were careful to justify their association by reference to 'certain royal letters' which they and other towns had lately received; (probably Philippe VI's letters of January 1347 directed against 'courreurs, robueurs' and 'maufaiteurs'). Private arrangements made without the authorisation of the king could bring the full weight of royal justice down upon the parties involved. In 1388 the consuls and people of Saint-Antonin were condemned for entering into a rebellious union and league with the capitouls of Toulouse and other towns of the three sénéchaussées of Beaucaire, Carcassonne and Toulouse and allowing hostile troops to enter their

1 Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, I, p.243.
2 B.N. Doat, 147, fos.220-222.
4 AC Cajarc, EE.11, no.361; & below, appendix I.
5 Ibid, FF., no.283.
The consuls pleaded that they had been forced to make the pact because they had been left out of a truce negotiated between the count of Armagnac and the English, and that but for the arrival of soldiers from Toulouse, Saint-Antonin would certainly have been lost. In the event, Charles VI accepted their argument and granted a free pardon, but the episode starkly illustrates the limits of independent action.

Treaties like these were made essentially in the interests of the towns concerned. Associations of wider public benefit were created by the regional Estates. In early 1359 the three sénéchaussées concluded a perpetual union for common defence against the king's enemies and to raise subsidies for the war. The importance of this union was chiefly fiscal, and its military rôle minimal, but in the summer of 1381 representatives of the three sénéchaussées assembled at Mazères in the county of Foix and resolved to create a more effective defensive association to resist the English and routiers. Troops were to be raised on a community basis, one man-at-arms, one archer and one sergeant from each group of three hearths, and mobilised by each participant town or village on the instructions of the captain-general or sénéchal. But what is especially interesting is the emphasis placed on co-operation at the local level. If any place in the three sénéchaussées was attacked, all the towns and villages in the area, up to a distance of five leagues, would automatically provide half of their 'host communal' for fifteen days service, and places up to ten leagues.

1 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols. 1749–1752.
2 Tognon, Institutions politiques, p. 235 ff.
away a quarter of their host for the same length of time.\(^1\) These measures were never introduced because Gaston Phébus, count of Foix, to whom the commons of Languedoc had turned for assistance, was replaced as lieutenant-designate by the duke of Berry.\(^2\) Thereafter the Estates of the three sénéchaussées played no real part in the recruitment of troops or the organisation of local defence, although the spirit of the union endured. In 1412 the communities of the sénéchaussées of Beaucaire gathered with a view to creating a union, and they were followed by the communities of the sénéchaussée of Toulouse in June 1415.\(^3\) In April 1418 the representatives of the sénéchaussées of Toulouse and Carcassonne were authorised by the queen to meet and form a union to bring an end to the miseries of the country. This privilege was confirmed in 1419.\(^4\) It was the point from which the Estates of Languedoc developed in the fifteenth century.

The failure of the three sénéchaussées to evolve a lastingly effective defensive alliance has to be contrasted with the success of the upland pays in attaining that same end. In 1362 the nobility and clergy of Velay, Gévaudan and Vivarais formed an association to raise forces for the protection of the three provinces.\(^5\) In June 1381 the duke of Berry as royal lieutenant

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1 Inventaire sommaire AC Narbonne, Série AA, AA.177.
2 Histoire de Languedoc, IX, p.882ff.
3 Dognon, Institutions politiques, p.243.
4 Ibid, pp.244-247.
approved the 'union et alliance' lately made between Velay, Gévaudan and Vivarais, now joined by Valentinois, Auvergne and the Montagnes d'Auvergne, to raise 400 men-at-arms and 100 archers to campaign against the English. The people of Rouergue were given the option of joining the alliance later if they so wished, and in December 1382 their representatives agreed, promising a further 80 men-at-arms. The new articles of association spelt out the obligations of the allies: each province was to send its troops to the aid of the others whenever it was requested; as far as possible these troops were to be recruited locally to reduce the risk of enlisting 'gens de pilharia'; if it was judged necessary and more advantageous to buy back a fortress rather than to take it by force, then all the allies would contribute to the cost, but no arrangements with the enemy would be made without general approval; the union would last until all the allies agreed to its dissolution.

The survival and achievements, however modest, of this league of provinces are partly to be explained by the war situation. The rugged upland terrain of the Massif Central permitted the survival from the 1360s onwards of scores of deeply entrenched English and routier garrisons. Until the evolution in the later 1380s and 1390s of a centrally co-ordinated policy of reducing or buying back fortresses, resistance was most effectively organised and funded locally. In Velay, Gévaudan and Vivarais the initiative came from the nascent representative assemblies and it is in the nature and

1 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, II, pp.510-514.
2 Ibid, pp.514-520.
composition of these assemblies that the most valid explanation of the fortunes of the alliance are to be found. For the Estates of Velay, Gévaudan and Vivarais were dominated by the lay nobility, and the towns of the area, fewer on the ground and less developed politically than further south, played no formal part. In the later fourteenth century representatives of the towns occasionally attended meetings of the Estates of Velay as observers, but even the consuls of Le Puy, the regional capital, were not regularly summoned before the end of the fifteenth century. 1

In contrast, the assemblies of the three sénéchaussées predominantly represented the interests of the towns. The original union of 1359 was inspired by the towns, but opposed by the nobility and clergy, who called for its dissolution and for twenty years afterwards took no part in the Estates. 2 The Montréal agreement too was forged by the larger towns without reference to the other two orders. 3 Nor were all the towns happy with this treaty. For their part, the consuls of Albi were extremely reluctant to enter into what could be construed as a treasonable association against the duke of Berry, and they refused to ratify the agreement until it had been approved by the king or his lieutenant. 4 This uncertainty of purpose and the antagonism of the nobility and clergy prevented the union of the three sénéchaussées assuming any more importance in the defence of Languedoc than as an expression of provincial solidarity.

2 Dognon, Institutions politiques, p. 235.
3 Ibid, pp. 238-239, 615-616.
4 'Délibérations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit., XLVII, pp. 561-562.
PART V

DEFENCE AND FINANCE
CHAPTER 13

PAYING FOR DEFENCE

1) The costs of defence

Town defence was an expensive business. In 1352 the consuls of Albi declared that in six years they had spent some 30,000 livres on the town wall; three years later they estimated that a further 40,000 livres would be needed to complete the work. In 1354 the town wall of Agen was found to be incomplete by 5465 brasses (about 8744 square metres), and each brasse of stonework, the consuls calculated, would cost three gold sous. For their part the consuls of Béziers reckoned that up to 1359 the fortifications had swallowed up 75,000 florins. Estimates like these are difficult to verify. The few surviving comptes consulaires from the crucial 1350s and -60s do not necessarily record all defence expenditure, as fortifications works were often accounted separately. The Rodez Cité accounts show that in 1350-51 work on the walls amounted to 1101 livres 8s 3½d out of a total municipal budget of 1651 livres 8s 6d. In 1355-56 the figure was 2118 livres 4s 1d out of 4147

1 B.N. Doat, 103, fo.352vo.
2 AC Albi, EE.7.
3 AC Agen, EE.54.
5 Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, pp.127, 148.
livres 17s 8d. At Pamiers in the same year a single contract for part of the town wall came to 8200 florins, which the consuls undertook to pay the builders at a rate of 350 florins a month. In 1420-21, after the major work of fortification had been completed, obras et reparaciones still accounted for more than 2000 livres of the Toulouse budget. But sums of this order were modest in comparison to the fortune spent to fortify Avignon. The new enceinte was begun in 1355; in just over two years, between 9 May 1366 and 15 July 1368, the consuls spent 57,585 florins, and 54,914 florins between August 1368 and February 1373.

The construction and maintenance of the fortifications was far and away the heaviest item of municipal defence expenditure. The 2118 livres which the consuls of Rodes Cité spent on the walls in 1355-56 represented 51.1% of their recorded budget. In contrast the salary of the town captain and other expenses arising out of the watch came to only 67 livres 13s (1.6%), purchases of arms to 34 livres 1s (0.8%), equipping the militia on its expedition to Villefranche to 23 livres 3s 6d (0.6%) and payments to spies, messengers and proctors and for other 'causas universals', (not all connected with the war but grouped together in the account), to 167 livres 0s 10d (4%). Additionally the Cité paid 126 livres 14s

1 Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, I, pp.257-377.
2 B.N. Doat, 93, fos.210vo-211.
3 AC Toulouse, CC.1856, fos.43-44bis vo.
as its share of an imposition raised in Rouergue that year to pay for an establida of 200 gens d'armes.\textsuperscript{1}

These costs were borne almost entirely by the urban population. The crown occasionally made grants of cash, materials or exemption from taxation to fund defensive schemes, chiefly in areas of military or political importance, or to compensate for disasters like the Black Prince's raid, but the royal contribution was small. In 1352 King Jean ordered 500 livres to be paid to the consuls of Agen to be used for the fortifications. In June 1354 the count of Armagnac granted them a further 1000 livres for the same purpose, 40 livres a month for the expenses of the watch and, in August, timber to the value of 60 livres.\textsuperscript{2} In July 1359 the consuls of Gourdon received 400 florins from the count of Poitiers because of the damage suffered in enclosing the town.\textsuperscript{3} During the English occupation they petitioned for another 3000 or 4000 livres, apparently without success, though they did get 300 francs from Louis d'Anjou in 1373.\textsuperscript{4} This latter sum was one of a number of grants made by the French crown to the towns of Quercy and Rouergue as they returned into its allegiance after 1369. In August 1369 Anjou granted 12,000 livres to the consuls and citizens of Montauban 'for repairs and other necessities'.\textsuperscript{5} This sum was exceptional.

\textsuperscript{1} Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, pp.204-377.

\textsuperscript{2} AC Agen, EE.15, 54; Chartes d'Agen se rapportant aux règnes de Jean le Bon et Charles V, ed. G. Tholin, Agen, 1899, pp.15,26-29.

\textsuperscript{3} AC Gourdon, EE.1, no.7.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid, nos.8, 9, 10.

\textsuperscript{5} B.N. Doat, 87, fos.183-184vo; B.N. fr.20582, nos.51-54.
a recognition of the position and status of Montauban. Earlier in
the year the consuls of Cahors had received some 3000 livres for
the purchase of victuals and artillery and, after the siege, 2800
florins to compensate for damage to the vines and orchards. In
the same period Villeneuve (Aveyron) was paid 1300 francs for
repairs to its defences; Saint-Antonin and Villefranche-de-Rouergue
1000 francs each and Capdenac 200 francs.

Crown grants frequently took the form of exemption from royal
taxation. Among the privileges granted to many towns of Rouergue
in 1369-70 was the right to the fruits of the commun de la Paix, a
seigneurial tax first levied in the twelfth century to raise troops
against the routiers. In April 1369 Louis d’Anjou permitted the
consuls of Rodez, Cité and Bourg, to take up to 100 livres annually
for ten years on the receipts of the commun de la Paix and apply
the monies to the fortifications. The consuls of Millau enjoyed
the combined revenues of the commun de la Paix and sestayral, an
ancient seigneurial tax on wheat, from 1370 to 1385. In this
period the two impositions made a useful but not spectacular con-
tribution to the Millau budget. In the sixteen years the commun
de la Paix yielded between 20 livres and 68 livres 10s, and the
sestayral between 85 and 244 livres per annum, a total of 2819

1 AC Cahors, II.4, fos.2vo-3, 54.
2 Ordonnances, V, p.396.
3 B.N. Doat, 146, fo.262; 147, fo.139; 125, fo.218.
4 L. Bernar, Une ville de consuls: Millau en Rouergue, Millau,
1938, p.69.
5 Coutumes et privilèges de Rouergue, I, p.257.
livres 16s 8d. Only in 1375 did the joint revenues attain the stipulated maximum of 300 livres. In the later 1360s and 1370s Charles V alienated to some of the towns of the Midi part of the sales-duty of 12d per livre and the thirteenth on wine voted by the Estates in 1360 to pay his father’s ransom. In August 1367 the consuls of Montpellier were permitted to take a third of these aides to pay for necessary repairs and the privilege was renewed at intervals until the impositions were abandoned in 1380. In 1375-76 the consuls received 1800 livres from these aides.

Royal grants, however, accounted for a very small proportion of the sums spent on defence and the bulk had to be raised locally out of municipal revenues.

The ordinary revenues of the average town were very small. In 1342 the town weights, the ban, various rents and fee-farms contributed just over 103 livres to the Bourg of Rodez, less than one fifth of a very modest total income of 551 livres 4s 10d. The ordinary revenues of Albi were not much greater, and yet in one year, 1377-78, the consuls were spending more than 5000 livres.

Among their ordinary revenues some towns counted funds earmarked for the construction or repair of the defences. Philippe III's

1 AC Millau, CC.507, & below, table II.
3 B.N. fr.20582, nos.66-68, 71.
4 AC Rodez, Bourg, CC.125, fos.2-3vo.
5 'Délégations du conseil communal d'Albi', loc. cit. XLVI, introduction, pp.49-52.
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Table II. Indirect taxation at Millau (1)

Receipts from the sestayral and commun de la Paix, 1370-1385. Under the terms of the original grant, made by the royal lieutenant in Languedoc, Louis I d'Anjou, on 14 March 1370, the consuls of Millau were to enjoy the combined revenues of these ancient seigneurial dues up to a total of 250 livres per annum for ten years to provide for the necessities of the town. On 12 June 1370 Charles V prolonged the grant to fifteen years and increased the permitted maximum revenue to 300 livres. (AG Millau, CC.507)
charter of privileges to Villefranche-de-Lauragais in 1280 allocated the receipts from the municipal bordel to the fortifications and other public works. The bishop agreed to hand over a number of unexploited pieces of land which would be farmed under the supervision of ouvriers elected for that purpose and the sums so raised, which were not to exceed 200 livres a year, channelled to the walls and public works. In 1435 the inhabitants of Saint-Gilles were similarly authorised by Charles VII to employ the emoluments from certain communal pastures to the fortifications.

A temporary arrangement of the same kind was evolved at Pézenas in 1356. The cathedral chapter of Lodève made over to the consuls of Pézenas their estate known as La Grange des Prés for a term of three years at an annual rent of 50 livres. The consuls in turn farmed the property to a number of lessees and used the profit for repairs to the defences. Probably though, the sums raised from this scheme were relatively small; the surviving acquittances for rents paid to the consuls amount only to some 216 livres.

1 Chartes de franchises du Lauragais, p.709.
2 Inventaire sommaire AC Agde (série AA), AA.2. Castaldo, Le consulat médiéval d'Agde, pp.344-351.
3 AD Hérault, A.10, fos.284-285. The right was contested by the abbot and chapter, who claimed that these lands were their property; ibid, fos.300vo-302.
4 AC Pézenas, Ressaguier, no.953.
5 Ibid, no.954.
A modest but steady income was derived from the profits of municipal justice. During the war years it was common practice for the fine paid by defaulters from the watch and transgressors of defensive ordinances to be assigned to the fortifications.¹

But the ordinary town revenues, even when supplemented by special funds, were quite insufficient to meet the costs of large-scale fortification schemes, although they might pay for small intermittent repairs. To raise the cash for the massive works of the 1350s and -60s all towns were forced to resort to some form of taxation, direct or indirect.

ii) Direct taxation

The right to impose direct taxes on the inhabitants for the necessities of the community was a recognised municipal attribute, not generally subject to any royal or seigneurial control. The custom of Figeac allowed the consuls to raise taxes for the needs of the town.² The consuls of the bastide of Montcabrier (Lot) were empowered by their charter to levy tailles for repairs to the walls and other public works.³ On the other hand, at Lodève, which remained at a very primitive level of political development until late in the fifteenth century, every taille was the subject of a special episcopal grant which had to be requested and justified by a deputation of twenty citizens.⁴

¹ See above, pp.103-104.
² B.N. Doat, 125, fo.8vo.
³ Ordonnances, XII, p.364.
Direct taxation by means of a taille was the most effective and straightforward way of raising a large sum of money quickly. The taille took the form either of a capitation, a uniform sum imposed per capita on all the tax-paying inhabitants, or of a fiscal on every household or hearth, or, more equitably, of a sliding imposition assessed 'pro solido et libra' on movables (mobil) and landed property (possessori). A taille might be both personal and real at the same time. For urgent repairs to the town walls in November 1355 the consuls of Millau imposed ½ florin per cap d'estal and 3 gros on every fiscal denier of wealth. In August 1356 the consuls of Alès raised 16s a hearth and 12d per centenario of property for the same purpose. The taille was generally collected in the space of a few days, but to spread the load on the taxpayers and also to achieve a more even flow of funds to the building works, a weekly imposition was often preferred. In February 1358 the council of Alès approved a taille for defensive works which was to be raised over three months at a weekly rate of between 12d and 3s per head.

The importance of the sums required to be raised determined the rate of imposition. In the Bourg of Rodez a taille of 2d per

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2 AC Millau, EX.9. The denier was the notional unit of taxation. See the note by Bousquet, Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, 1, p.25, n.2.

3 AC Alès, 1315, no.XII.

4 Ibid.
denier weekly imposed in 1346 brought in 188 livres 18s 10d over ten weeks. In 1350 a single taille of 5s 6d per denier raised 930 livres 13s 6d. Between May 1355 and March 1367 the consuls of Millau imposed fourteen tailles and forced loans whose receipts were employed wholly or partly for the fortification of the town. Eight of the fourteen were imposed at the same rate of \( \frac{1}{2} \) florin per denier, supplemented in October 1355 by a capitation of \( \frac{1}{2} \) florin per head of household.

The yield depended on the size and wealth of the population. The Millau tailles of October 1356, June 1360 and July 1364, imposed at the same rate of \( \frac{1}{2} \) florin per denier, respectively produced 691 florins 5 gros 2d, 760 florins 4 gros 3d and 476 florins 4 gros 5d, while the taille of 1 florin per denier of February 1363 yielded 925 florins 9 gros 5d. Taxation revenues were affected by the general decline in population and wealth. The drop in the yield of the Millau taille in 1363-64 is largely to be explained by the plague outbreak in the town in the summer of 1361. Short-term variations, however, can as often as not be attributed to the efficiency of the collectors, the inclusion or not of the outlying parishes of the faubourgs and ressort and the number of impositions raised in the course of the year.

1 AC Rodez, Bourg, CC.125, fo.69.
2 Ibid, fo.121.
3 AC Millau, CC.69, EE.7-17, A below, table III.
4 Ibid, EE.7, 12, 13, 14.
5 Documents sur la ville de Millau, pp.118-119.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Purpose of tax</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Total raised</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15. 5.1355</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications + subsidy</td>
<td>½ florin/denier</td>
<td>322 5 6</td>
<td>EE.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>voted by Estates of Rouergue to Jean I d'Armagnac</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.10.1355</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications and defence of the town.</td>
<td>½ florin/denier + florin/household</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>EE.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.11.1355</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications</td>
<td>3 florin/denier + florin/household</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>EE.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. 1.1356</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications</td>
<td>½ florin/denier</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>EE.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. 5.1356</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications</td>
<td>½ florin/denier?</td>
<td>853 3 10 ½</td>
<td>EE.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10.1356</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications</td>
<td>½ florin/denier</td>
<td>691 5 2</td>
<td>EE.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. 6.1360</td>
<td>(Repairs to fortifications?)</td>
<td>½ florin/denier</td>
<td>760 4 3 ½</td>
<td>EE.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. 2.1363</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications + repayment of municipal debts</td>
<td>1 florin/denier</td>
<td>925 9 5</td>
<td>EE.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III Direct taxation at Millau 1355-1367

Taxes and forced loans imposed by the consuls of Millau for repairs to the fortifications and other defensive purposes May 1355-March 1367.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Purpose of tax</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Total raised</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29. 7.1363</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications</td>
<td>2 gros/denier + 2 gros/head</td>
<td>Florins</td>
<td>CC.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>gross d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. 11.1363</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications</td>
<td>2 gros/denier + ½ florin/household</td>
<td></td>
<td>CC.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. 7.1364</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications</td>
<td>½ florin/denier</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>EE.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 5½</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. 10.1365</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications</td>
<td>½ florin/denier (loan)</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>EE.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(incomplete)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. 8.1366</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications</td>
<td>4 gros/denier (loan)</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>EE.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 8½</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(incomplete)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. 3.1367</td>
<td>Repairs to fortifications + repayment of municipal debts</td>
<td>9 gros/denier + 6 gros/household</td>
<td></td>
<td>EE.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III (cont)  Direct taxation at Millau 1355-1367
A variant of the taille was the forced loan (prêt). In May 1351 the jurade of Agen approved a scheme to raise 4 or 5 sous from every burgess, guaranteed on the security of the town revenues for the coming year. The consuls of Millau resorted to loans to pay for the walls in 1365-66. On 29 August 1366 the council decided to raise 4 gros per denier from every inhabitant by way of a loan which was to be repaid as remission from the next taille, in fact the taille of March 1367. In the 1370s and -80s negotiated loans became an accepted feature of the financial administration of Albi, a convenient expedient for the consuls and lucrative for the few wealthy citizens who could afford to lend.

iii) Indirect taxation

Fiscal policy varied from town to town. The consuls of Millau for their part relied on tailles to pay for the emergency building programme of the 1350s and -60s. In seventeen months from March 1355 to October 1356 they levied six tailles for defensive works and another eight between then and March 1367. Thereafter they imposed no other tailles specifically for the fortifications until July 1410 and in the intervening years relied entirely on indirect impositions, chiefly the accuet on wine.

1 Jurades de la ville d'Agen, p.240.
2 AC Millau, EE.15, 16; & above, table III.
3 Ibid, EE.16.
4 'Délibérations du conseil d'Albi', loc. cit., XLVI, p.52.
5 AC Millau, CC.69, 507, EE.7-17, 26; & see above, table III.
The change in the pattern of taxation at Millau reflects a widespread preference among the towns of the Midi for meeting the costs of defence out of indirect taxes. From the administrative point of view, *barrages*, *gabelles* and other impositions on consumption and commerce had over the *taille* the advantage that money was raised and supplied to the building works at a constant rate. And psychologically, as *barrages* and other duties were often taken at the town gates, there was a demonstrable connection between the taxes and their destination. But indirect impositions hit the poor proportionally much harder than the rich, which partly explains their popularity with the town oligarchs. At Le Puy the consuls systematically off-loaded the fiscal burden onto the less wealthy by substituting indirect taxes for *tailles*. 1 In 1368 some of the inhabitants of Narbonne managed to force their consuls to abolish all indirect impositions and in their place raise a *taille* assessed ‘au sol la livre’. The victory was short-lived and the offending taxes were soon reintroduced. 2 On the other hand, some tax-payers apparently considered indirect impositions the lesser evil. In 1360 the syndics of Beaucaire told the count of Poitiers that so much had already been raised to pay for the town walls that they dare not impose another *taille* for fear of revolt and that a *soquet* on wine would be more acceptable. 3

Unlike the *taille*, indirect taxes were subject to a royal

2 AG Narbonne, CC.1301.
3 B.N. lat. 9175, fos.34-vo.
grant, although the more powerful feudatories like the count of Armagnac or the bishops of Mende and Rodez could authorise the imposition of barrages, socquets and other duties without reference to the king. This prerogative gave the crown a certain measure of control over the building and financing of local defence, but in the event the initiative for taxation always came from the local community. There is no evidence that the crown ever turned down requests for the right to raise defensive impositions, though their rate and duration were probably dependent to a certain extent on royal discretion. The form of murage grants, royal or seigneurial, seldom varied. Philippe VI's letters-patent of 28 July 1350 to the consuls of Narbonne are typical of many royal grants in the municipal archives. Having heard the petition of the consuls that Narbonne, which is situated on the frontiers of the kingdom 'par terre et par mer', and which has always been loyal to the crown of France, is in urgent need of repair to its defences, necessary both for the security of the town and of all the surrounding country, the king grants them the right to impose a duty of 4d per livre on all commodities and merchandise bought and sold in Narbonne, or passing through the territory, for three years from the first day of September following, on condition that the monies

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1 Porée, Le consulat de Mende, pp.76-81; AC Rodez, Bourg, CC.111; Cité, CC.360.

2 The term 'murage', though not encountered in any southern-French source, is employed in the present context to describe any royal or seigneurial grant of indirect taxes specifically to raise funds for the construction or repair of fortifications. For murage grants in England, see Turner, Town defences in England and Wales, pp.30-44.
thus raised are applied to the reconstruction of the walls, ditches and other fortifications, and to no other purpose, and that the collectors render account to the consuls in the presence of the sénéchal of Carcassonne or his lieutenant or representative, who are instructed to see that the consuls enjoy the privilege for its full term without let or hindrance.¹

Indirect taxes fell into three categories: barrage, or tolls, on traffic passing through the town gates or over a bridge, duties on sales, purchases and other commercial transactions, and gabelles on commodities, chiefly salt, grain, meat and, above all, wine. The nature, and to some extent the size, of the imposition were determined locally, but the duration was fixed by the king or seigneur. Grants were usually for between one and five years and rarely for more than ten. The twenty-year right of barrage and soquet accorded by the duke of Anjou to the consuls of Millau in March 1370 was quite exceptional.² However, their validity could be prolonged by new letters, indeed in many places murage grants were renewed with such regularity that they came to be considered among the ordinary municipal revenues.³

The barrage was probably the easiest of these taxes to administer. Many towns already enjoyed the right of toll but during the war, and especially in its early years, a number of new grants of barrages were made to raise money for defence. In April

¹ AC Narbonne, CC.1305; & below, appendix II.
² Rouquette, Le Rouergue sous les Anglais, p.477; & below, table IV.
³ For example at Millau and Rodes, see tables IV, VII.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Grantor</th>
<th>Nature of grant</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19.1.1364</td>
<td>Edward, prince of Aquitaine</td>
<td>4d/livre on all goods sold in Millau</td>
<td>2 years from 25.3.1364</td>
<td>Rouquette, Le Rouergue sous les Anglais, pp.457-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.6.1366</td>
<td>Edward, prince of Aquitaine</td>
<td>Barrage of 1d (black money of Guyenne) / horse or mule, ½d/ass, ¼d/ox or cow, 1d/12 sheep or goats, 4d/12 pigs or sows, 2d/cart entering Millau</td>
<td>10 years from 14.10.1366</td>
<td>Rouquette, pp.462-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.1368</td>
<td>Edward, prince of Aquitaine</td>
<td>Soquet of sixteenth part of wine sold retail in Millau</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>AC Millau, EE.120; Rouquette, pp.463-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.3.1370</td>
<td>Louis I, duke of Anjou</td>
<td>Emoluments of sestayral and commun de la paix up to 250 livres p.a.</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>AC Millau, CC.507; Rouquette, p.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.3.1370</td>
<td>Louis I, duke of Anjou</td>
<td>Confirmation and prolongation of barrage and soquet</td>
<td>20 years</td>
<td>AC Millau, CC.507; Rouquette, p.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.6.1370</td>
<td>Charles V</td>
<td>Confirmation and prolongation of rights to sestayral and commun de la paix up to 300 livres p.a.</td>
<td>15 years from original grant</td>
<td>AC Millau, CC.507</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV  Murage grants to the consul of Millau, 1364-1439
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Grantor</th>
<th>Nature of grant</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.1.1377</td>
<td>Louis I, duke of Anjou</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{3}$ of imposition of 12d/livre on sales and of thirteenth on wine voted by Estates of Rouergue</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>AC Millau, CC.507; Rouquette, pp.435-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.8.1389</td>
<td>Charles V</td>
<td>Confirmation and prolongation of barrage and soquett</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>AC Millau, CC.507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.7.1393</td>
<td>Charles VI</td>
<td>Confirmation and prolongation of soquett</td>
<td>3 years from end of previous term</td>
<td>AC Millau, CC.353/354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.6.1397</td>
<td>Charles VI</td>
<td>Confirmation and prolongation of barrage and soquett</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>AC Millau, CC.507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.9.1434</td>
<td>Charles VII</td>
<td>Barrage of 1d/horse, $\frac{1}{2}$d/ass, 1d/cow or ox, 1d/pig or sow, 1d/12 sheep and soquett of tenth part of each pot or pint of wine</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>AC Millau, EE.120; Rouquette, pp.518-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1439</td>
<td>Charles VII</td>
<td>Confirmation and prolongation of barrage and soquett</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>AC Millau, CC.507</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV (cont) Mirage grants to the consuls of Millau, 1364-1439
1356 Jean I d'Armagnac allowed the consuls of Alès to impose 1d on every horseman, 1d on every large animal, laden or unladen, and one obol on every pedestrian for a term of three years to pay for the fortifications. As was the usual practice, the tax was farmed, but the yield was modest. In the year beginning 1 January 1357 three farmers between them paid 10s 1d a day for the right of taking the toll at the five town gates. The benefit to the town was no more than 183 livres 10s 4d over the year, which was spent on works at the town gates.¹

Sales taxes of various kinds were introduced in some towns in the earlier stages of the war. Philippe VI's grant of 4d per livre on merchandise bought and sold in Narbonne was prolonged for another three years by his son in December 1352, the consuls being allowed to increase the imposition to 6d per livre if they so desired.² In December 1353 the count of Armagnac granted the consuls of Albi a similar duty of 4d per livre for the fortifications and to pay royal subsidies.³ A variant was the pesage on goods weighed publicly. In June 1360 the syndics of Beaucaire obtained the right to take 2d from the buyer and 2d from the seller on every quintal of goods brought to be weighed at the town weights.⁴ Impositions of this kind were seldom granted after 1360, when a general royal aide of 12d per livre was introduced. Probably sales duties were not more

¹ AC Alès, 1315, no.XXI, & below, table V.
² AC Narbonne, CC.1305, 1306; & below, appendix II.
³ AC Albi, CC.68.
⁴ AC Beaucaire, EE.10.
### Table V  The barrage at Alès in 1357

Abstract of an account rendered on 14 December 1357 to Guillaume de Ledra, juge-mage of the généralités of Beaucaire and lieutenant to the sénéchal, Hugues Adhemar, by the consuls of Alès of the emoluments of a barrage of 1d on every horseman, 1d on every large animal, laden or unladen, and 1 obol on every pedestrian entering the town, granted to help pay for the fortifications by the royal lieutenant in Languedoc, Jean I d'Armagnac, on 26 April 1356.

(AC Alès, 1315, no.XXII)
widely favoured because they acted as a brake on commerce and indiscriminately affected townspeople and outsiders alike. In April 1354, barely four months after its introduction, the consuls of Albi asked the count of Armagnac to abolish the duty of 4d per livre on the grounds that the volume of trade was insufficient to make it worthwhile and that it would be 'easier and more bearable' to establish a weekly taille instead.¹

Declining trade was a constant anxiety and in an endeavour to revive flagging urban economies grants of markets and fairs were eagerly sought. To help pay for the fortification of Villeneuve-de-Berg in Vivarais Charles VI allowed a weekly market to be held in the town.² In 1420 his son, the Dauphin, granted three fairs annually to the people of Castelsarrasin in consideration of their plea that their town was so ravaged by the war and mortality that they had no other means of providing for their defence.³

More popular and widespread than either barrages or duties on sales, probably because they were more lucrative, were gabelles on staple commodities. The royal gabelle on salt was an important monopoly which was rarely alienated, even partially, to the towns. But in 1419, and regularly afterwards, the favoured consuls of Montpellier were permitted to take one blano from the duty of 5d per quintal of salt sold in the royal greniers at Marsillargues and Sommières and in the diocese of Maguelone for repairs to the walls

¹ AC Albi, CC.68.
² Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.1874-1875.
³ B.N. Doat, 92, fo.548.
and roads.\textsuperscript{1} Wheat and other grains were often taxed. For the 
fortification of Saint-Quentin (Ard) in 1363 Arnoul d'Audrehem 
granted an imposition of 12d per setier of wheat, as well as a 
squeg on wine and duties on other merchandise;\textsuperscript{2} in October 1410 
the consuls of Villefranche-de-Rouergue were granted 4d a setier 
on wheat and an entry-tax on wine.\textsuperscript{3} In the fifteenth century 
gabelles on meat and the sale and slaughter of livestock were 
commonly introduced. For repairs to the defences of Pont-Saint-
Esprit in 1442, for example, Charles VII authorised a duty of 2s 6d 
on every cow, 15d on every pig or calf, 6d on every ram and 3d on 
every ewe, lamb or goat slaughtered in the butchers shops of the 
town.\textsuperscript{4}

Duties on grain, meat and other commodities were seldom granted 
singly, but almost always in conjunction with a gabelle on wine. 
Wine in fact accounted for by far the greatest share of all the 
monies raised for defence by indirect taxation, and probably of all 
taxation revenues. For wine was the commodity around which the 
small-town economy of the Midi revolved, the one commodity which 
could be counted on to give a viable return year in, year out.

Impositions on wine were of several kinds: a duty of so much 
per tun or cart-load of wine or grapes entering the town, a dis-
criminatory duty on wine produced outside the terroir or, most

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{1} Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents, 
I, nos.3640-3672. The consuls of Narbonne were granted a similar 
faculty in 1407. AC Narbonne, CC.219.

\textsuperscript{2} AD Hérault, A.5, fos.144-145.

\textsuperscript{3} B.N. Doat, 147, fos.216-218.

\textsuperscript{4} AD Hérault, A.11, fos.215-217vo.
frequently, a scouquet, a simple fraction, between a quarter and a sixteenth, of all wine sold or consumed in the town by merchants, taverners and private individuals, apparently so called after the scouquet or block of wood used to diminish the measures.  

The revenues from the scouquet and other duties on wine varied according to the quantity and quality of the vintage and to consumption. At Millau the scouquet was of a sixteenth, first granted by the Prince of Wales in February 1368.  

In the eight years between 1368-69 and 1392-93 for which detailed accounts survive the scouquet receipts fluctuated between 554 livres 3s 11d in 1369-70 and 103 livres 8s 10d in 1373-74, averaging about 302 livres.  

In the Bourg of Rodez the gabela del vy, which consisted of a fourteenth of the wine sold in the inns and a thirteenth of that consumed domestically, was farmed for 1000 livres in 1370, 1371, 1374 and 1375, 800 livres in 1372 and 600 livres in 1373.  

The revenues from the scouquet in the larger towns were considerable. In 1359 the scouquet of Montpellier, a tenth, was farmed for 7200 livres, although thereafter the receipts steadily dropped from 6000 livres in 1366 to just over 3550 livres in 1395-96.  

---

1 '... lequel souquet est trouve et prins sur le vin qui est vendu a detail en mettant dedans le vaissel ou ledit vin est mesure un petit bloquet de bois ...'. B.N. Ioat, 87, fo. 289vo.  

2 Rouquette, Le Rouergue sous les Anglais, p. 464, & above, table IV.  

3 AG Millau, CC. 44-50, cc. 244; & see below, table VI.  

4 AG Rodes, Bourg, BB. 2, fos. 35-vo, 57-vo, 69vo, 84vo-85vo, 89-90.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total raised</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1367-1368</td>
<td>340 4 1</td>
<td>CC.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1368-1369</td>
<td>554 3 11½</td>
<td>CC.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1371-1372</td>
<td>301 2 9</td>
<td>CC.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1372-1373</td>
<td>108 8 10</td>
<td>CC.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1373-1374</td>
<td>295 9 4</td>
<td>CC.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1374-1375</td>
<td>142 5 4</td>
<td>CC.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1375-1376</td>
<td>172 7 0</td>
<td>CC.371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1389-1390</td>
<td>419 7 3½</td>
<td>CC.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1391-1392</td>
<td>253 13 4½</td>
<td>CC.244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table VI** Indirect taxation at Millau (ii)

Receipts from the soquet or gabelle on wine, 1367-1392. The right to take a soquet, consisting of the sixteenth part of all wine sold retail in Millau, and to use the emoluments for the reconstruction of the fortifications was first granted to the consuls for a term of three years by Edward, prince of Aquitaine, on 7 February 1368, confirmed and prolonged for twenty years by Louis I d'Anjou on 14 March 1370, and confirmed and prolonged at intervals thereafter. (AC Millau, CC.507, EE.120, & above, table IV)
a quarter of all wine sold in the city. The tax was farmed for
terms of six months in June and December. In the term 12 June to
13 December 1421 Johan Briguarel and his associates farmed the quart
del vi for 3567 livres 10s. ¹ In the four years from December 1430
to December 1434 the capitoules collected a total of 8193 livres
and 2980 gold moutons. ²

The regulations governing the farm of the gabelle on wine in
the Cité of Rodez in 1370 insisted on payment in six instalments:
an initial down-payment of 100 francs, 175 francs at Christmas and
again at the Purification, another 100 francs at Easter and then
half of the remainder at the feast of St-John in June and half at
Michaelmas. ³ In the Bourg of Rodez the farmers paid the consuls in
twelve monthly instalments. ⁴ Arrangements like these ensured a
steady supply of funds to the building works. Often the farmers
paid the contractors directly. In 1373 the consuls of the Bourg
instructed the farmer, Johan Paga, to pay his monthly instalments
to Gaillard Guizardon until Guizardon should be satisfied for his
work on the murettes and ditches. ⁵ After bidding unsuccessfully
for the gabelle in 1371, ⁶ Guizardon himself secured the farm in
1376, ⁷ a situation which he no doubt found advantageous and which

¹ AC Toulouse, CC.1856, fo.26.
² Ibid, CC.1859, fos.51-52.
³ Comptes consulaires de Rodes, Cité, II, p.92.
⁴ AC Rodez, Bourg, BB.2, fo.35vo, & passim.
⁵ Ibid, fo.69vo.
⁶ Ibid, fo.44vo.
⁷ Ibid, EE.1.
for the consuls must have considerably simplified the accounting system. Similarly, Jean Trialli, clavaire of the Commune Clôture, was among the farmers of the sequest of Montpellier in 1366.  

Regular murage grants put the financing of defence on a more secure footing, but they had occasionally to be supplemented by funds diverted from other sources. In May 1370 the consuls of Saint-Flour were permitted by their bishop to allocate 50 livres from certain pious bequests to the fortifications. Similarly, in June 1352 the consuls of Millau had been authorised to employ for the same purpose all 'caritats de Mélhau et legats pieu et per almona' for a period of five years. In fact, the fortifications, being considered causa pia, were the object of voluntary bequests. For example, Jacques Carcassonne, money-changer of Montpellier, who died in about 1428, left a sum to the ouvriers of the Commune Clôture with instructions that it should be used to raise the height of a tower in the city wall between the Tour de la Barbotte and the Porte de Lattes.

Internal defence was just one of the many financial burdens which the war placed on the towns. In the worst years of the fourteenth century consular authorities lived from hand to mouth, reeling from one crisis to the next. The consular deliberations

1 Archives de la ville de Montpellier, Inventaires et Documents, XI, p.22.

2 AC Saint-Flour, chap. II, art. 2, no. 33.

3 Documents sur la ville de Millau, p.89.

4 Archives de la ville de Montpellier, Inventaires et documents, XII, EE.86.
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Table VII The soquest at Rodez, 1352-1440

Renewals of the soquest or gabelle on wine granted to the consuls of the Cité and Bourg of Rodez by their respective seigneurs, the bishops of Rodez and the counts of Armagnac.
<table>
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Table VII (cont)
The soquet at Rodez, 1352-1440
of Albi evoke the dismal atmosphere of the 1370s and -80s. At every turn the consuls were pressed by demands for money; by the king's commissioners, for war subsidies; by creditors for the repayment of loans; by fortress captains of the surrounding pays for pass and safeconducts; and on top of all this they had to raise the cash for the day-to-day necessities of the town, not least the fortifications. Beneath the surface threatened popular sedition.  

These difficulties, it is true, were at least partly attributable to maladministration and peculation. In 1480 Bernard Gros, commander of the Temple of Breuil in Agenais, complained that taxes granted by the king and his predecessors for the repair of town walls and ditches and public roads were embezzled by the small cliques who ruled the towns. The charge was as valid then as it had been a century earlier. In 1371 it was alleged that in Montpellier certain rich and powerful men, formerly consuls, had during the exercise of their office deliberately falsified their taille assessments. In 1390 the consuls of the Bourg of Carcassonne were accused of operating the fiscal system to their personal advantage and the ruin of the menu peuple. And inevitably funds originally granted for the fortifications were channeled into other areas of need. According to the ouvriers of Montpellier, only half of the sequest revenues for 1361 actually found their way

1 'Libérations du conseil d'Albi', passim.
2 Quoted in Lewis, Later Medieval France, p.248.
3 Archives de la ville de Montpellier, Inventaires et documents, II, no.3311.
4 Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.1799-1808.
to the fortifications as intended.\(^1\) In 1390 Charles VII ordered the gouverneur of Montpellier to make the consuls pay back the sums raised from the socquet and not used for the walls.\(^2\) In July 1389 Jean III, count of Armagnac, made over all the revenues from the cabelle on wine in the Bourg of Rodez to his treasurer, Guilhamet Cocural, for as long as he should remain in his service.\(^3\)

In an effort to prevent abuse, the crown tried to bring defensive subsidies more closely under its control. Many royal grants, particularly those dating from the fifteenth century, carry the rider that account for the sums raised must be rendered in the presence of a royal officer and an attempt was made to subject existing grants to the same condition. But without much success.

At Millau the consuls upheld their right to account for the socquet and barrage only to their successors. Significantly, one of the questions asked of the witnesses in the case was whether the emoluments of the taxes had been applied to the fortifications. To a man they replied that they had seen for themselves the construction of barbicans, gachils, murettes and part of the town wall and that the masons and other craftsmen had all been paid out of the socquet and barrage.\(^4\)

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1 Archives de la ville de Montpellier, Inventaires et documents, XII, EE.66.

2 Ibid, I, no.1645.

3 AC Rodez, Bourg, CC.111.

4 AC Millau, FF.40, July–September 1411.
iv) Exemption and evasion

Municipal authorities struggled to enforce the principle that defensive taxation should be paid by all who enjoyed the protection of the walls, against the contrary pretensions of those who claimed exemption by virtue of their social or professional status. In 1384 the consuls of Montpellier complained that municipal tailles were not paid by the officers of the royal and seigneurial courts, the king’s advocates and proctors, notaries, sergeants, huissiers, and sergeants at arms, doctors of laws, medicine and arts, the officers of the Inquisition, the bishop of Maguelone, university students, beadles, nobles, clergy, married clerks and royal and imperial moneyers not exercising their profession.  

Of these it was the clergy who offered the most persistent opposition. The personal immunity from taxation of clergies living clergially was respected, but ecclesiastical property was generally deemed liable to taxation for the needs of the community. At Albi, for instance, the communal council insisted that the clergy should be exempt from municipal tailles "per sa testa" but should pay in full "per totz sos bes". However, a distinction was usually made between the ancient property of a religious foundation and property newly acquired on which the benefactor previously paid tailles. An agreement made in 1400 between the consuls and clergy of Auch recognises that the ancient property of the cathedral chapter and

1 Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents, I, no.287.

other foundations is to be quit of all tailles; new acquisitions, by grant or bequest, are to pay half-tailles, while the personal property of clerks in excess of 'una hostau, una vinha e un caso' is to be taxed at the full rate. These same general principles applied to indirect taxation.

In their struggle to enforce the contribution of the clergy the municipal authorities received the active and consistent support of the crown. Jean, count of Poitiers, writing to order the clergy of Beaucaire to pay defensive taxes in 1358, left no doubt as to royal policy. It had been laid down in the king's court that the costs of fortifications and other repairs necessary for the defence of the kingdom should be borne by all, ecclesiastics and other privileged persons included, and therefore the clergy of Beaucaire must be made to pay municipal taxes on all their property.

1 AC Auch, AA.1, Livre Vert, fos.48vo, 51-55vo, 57-vo. The same sort of agreement was made between the consuls and clergy of Montauban in 1409. AC Montauban, 3,EE.1.

2 For example the letters of Guillaume de Latour, bishop of Rodez, granting a socquet on wine to the consuls of the Cité, 7 Oct. 1409. '... gabellam predictam de et super vino per quascumque personas tan ecclesiasticas quam seculares infra dictam nostram civitatem quomodolibet vendendo seu aliter per laycos incolas eiusdem ex vini conductu et eorum provisionibus ad usibus expendendo, personis tamen ecclesiasticis et clericis solutis inhabitu et tonsura clericalibus incedentibus et clericaliter viventibus a solutione dicte gabelle quo ad eorum provisionem et usus necessarium dictique vini conductum dumtaxat exceptis ...', AC Rodez, Cité, CC.360.
and revenues in the town. This principle is reiterated in scores of similar royal letters. Even the papacy recognised the justice and expediency of this policy, if only temporarily. In the wake of the Black Prince's invasion in 1355, Innocent VI ordered the clergy of Montpellier to pay their share of the costs of fortifying the city, notwithstanding any privileges they might enjoy. The clergy themselves proved more obdurate. When they did agree to pay, as often as not at the end of a lengthy process, they maintained the fiction that their contribution was made as a free gift and implied no obligation. In 1391 the Auditors of the Sacred College confirmed the exemption of the clergy of Albi from municipal impositions, declaring, however, that if, for the common good, the bishop and chapter agreed to make a donation then the lay community should accept with humility and gratitude.

1 '... idcirco nos attendentes supplicationem eorumdem & quod in consistorio regio exitit ordinatum quod talibus reparationibus et constructionibus tam notorie necessariis ad tuitionem regni omnes personas ecclesiasticas seu privilegiata cujuscumque conditionis existant pro bonis et redditibus suis contribuere compellantur...' Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. col.1138. Cf. the almost identical letters of Jean I d'Armagnac to the consuls of Agde, 25 Sept. 1357. AC Agde (DD,18); and the very large number of similar letters in the archives of Montpellier. Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents, I, nos.3193ff, 3279 & passim.

2 Archives de la ville de Montpellier. Inventaires et documents

3 Campayre, Etudes sur l'Albigeois, pp.274-276. In a case of the same sort between the syndics and clergy of Mende an identical argument was used. 'Item ponit (dictus procurator universitatis presbitorum et clericorum) quod jure ipse canonicam ordinatum quod, ubi facultates laicorum non subpetunt in reparationibus, necessitatibus vel utilitatis communibus civitatem vel locorum tunc episcopus, consideratibus utilitatis et necessitatibus communibus hujusmodi, abaque ulla oatholicne poterit eis ordinare subsidia per personas ecclesiasticas conferenda; quae quidem subsidia supradioti laici humilitar deebunt recipere cum gratiarum actione ...' Forée, Le consulat de Mende, p.88.
It was on this basis that the clergy participated. What they actually paid was determined by local agreement and calculated, but only roughly, on the extent and value of their property. In June 1359 the abbeys and chapters of the churches of Saint-Nazaire and Saint-Aphrodise and the prior of Cassian between them agreed to pay the consuls of Béziers 3200 florins, approximately one twenty-fourth of the 75,000 florins which the consuls estimated they had spent on the fortifications up to then. The clergy stipulated that this was to be a once-and-for-all payment and thereby considered themselves quit of any further impositions, either on church property or the property of individual clerks.1 At Agde in August of the same year the cathedral chapter promised the consuls a twelfth (fixed at 850 florins) and the priors of the other religious houses in the town one twenty-fourth of the cost of the 1240 cannes of new town wall built 'since the mortality'. If further work became necessary the clergy were to contribute in the same proportion.2 In 1390 the clergy of Albi paid 72 livres, about one seventh, of a bill of 515 livres for repairs to the fortifications.3 At Mende in 1405 the clergy contributed a quarter of the 3000 florins spent on the walls.4

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1 B.N. Doat, 60, fos.123vo–162; 'Documents relatifs aux guerres du XIVe siècle dans le diocèse de Béziers', pp.24–37. The clergy were given the option of paying the consuls an annual rent of 200 setiers of corn for the three years but chose the cash alternative. Cf. Mascaró, 'Libre de Memorias', p.52.

2 AC Agde, (DD.18); AD Hérault, G.30, fos.47–60.

3 AC Albi, EE.14.

4 AC Mende, DD.6.
This is not to say that the clerical contribution could everywhere be enforced, and some privileged ecclesiastics successfully defended their immunity. The consuls of La Grasse (Aude) alleged that their seigneur, the abbot, and other clergy should pay a third of the total defence costs. The abbot retorted that as a prelate he was exempt, the more so as he did not personally enjoy the protection of the walls, and he was vindicated.¹

The nobility, who theoretically enjoyed the same exemption from taxation as the clergy, posed less of a fiscal problem to the towns to the extent that nobles were far less numerous in the towns than the clergy and collectively far less wealthy. Sizeable communities of urban nobles existed in many towns of the Midi, although by the fourteenth century their political and social influence had much declined and they had become almost totally integrated into the bourgeoisie. The privileged situation of the nobility was recognised in the Cité of Rodez where the gentils were taxed only occasionally and then as a group, separate from the other inhabitants.² In other towns no such distinction was made. Louis de Costrena of Bourg-Saint-Andéol, who claimed that he was 'nobilis a natura', was nonetheless made to pay his share of the municipal taille.³ In about 1388 the syndics of Lunel successfully brought an action against nobles of the town who claimed exemption on the same grounds. The syndics argued that in Lunel nobles and

¹ Cartulaire de Carcassonne, II, pp.492-495.
² Comptes consulaires de Rodez, Cité, I, pp.62, 476-477.
³ AC Bourg-Saint-Andéol, CC.73, 10 April 1369.
non-nobles formed a single universitas, that taxes for the repair of the fortifications, for churches, public works and the defence of the kingdom should be paid by all, an obligation reiterated in Charles V's letters of August 1371, and that the nobility of Montpellier, Uzès, Béziers, Clermont, Saint-Gilles and Toulouse paid the taxes of those towns.¹

The syndics of Beaucaire fought a somewhat more protracted engagement against the garrison sergeants of the royal castle, who, like other officers of the crown, considered that their privileges conferred upon them immunity from all taxation, of whatever kind. An initial agreement was reached in 1360, the sergeants collectively undertaking to pay tailles and other subsidies and impositions for the fortification of the town on any property which, as individuals, they owned in Beaucaire or its jurisdiction, while remaining quit of all taxes for the war and other purposes. In June 1362, the dispute broke out again over the payment of a twentieth on wheat and wine and the sénéchal of Beaucaire condemned the sergeants to pay the twentieth and the arrears on other tailles, amounting to 260 florins, adding that if the syndics wished to impose further taxes for the repair of the defences they must allow the sergeants to elect two representatives to supervise the collection and to audit the accounts.² This settlement was respected, at least when the process eventually reached Parlement the sergeants did not contest their liability to taxation for defensive works. But the

¹ Histoire de Languedoc, X, pr. cols.1758-1767.
² AC Beaucaire, CC.177, no.2.
syndics were able to press home their advantage and in February
1376 obtained an arrêt compelling the sergeants to pay royal war
subsidies, from which they had hitherto been exempt, and taxes for
all communal necessities, specified in a separate agreement as the
defence of municipal property and liberties, repairs to churches,
bridges, paths, levées, ditches, in addition to the fortifications,
and the recruitment of troops to guard the harvest.¹

1 AC Beaucaire, CC.177, no.5.
Conclusion: the effectiveness of the defensive effort

For much of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries war was a way of life for the towns of the Midi. The threat of attack was sometimes immediate, often remote but always present, and five generations of southerners, even if they did not themselves live through the horrors of siege and invasion, all knew alarms and crises, took their turns on the ramparts and helped build and pay for their town walls. Watchmen defaulted from duty, the clergy, nobles and other privileged people refused to pay defensive taxes and there were interminable disputes over military rights and responsibilities, but there is no evidence that the concepts on which urban defence was based were ever seriously questioned.

And yet there were limits to the protection which town walls, however well built and guarded, could afford to the citizens living within them. A strongly fortified and victualled town, like a castle, could hold out against an enemy for many months – provided the inhabitants had the will to resist, for ultimately resistance depended on the resolve of the defenders. Civilian morale and determination are notoriously hard to judge, but it is probably safe to assume that beyond an immediate concern for the protection of their families and homes, most townsmen had no larger interest in a war that was not of their making except to survive and to live as normal a life as circumstances would allow. And for normal life to continue they had to have access to the surrounding countryside. They depended for their very existence on the fields,
orchards and vineyards that lay outside the walls, and for their prosperity on contact with other towns and villages. In this respect they were in the same position as the people of the undefended plat-pays.

This stark fact of life was exploited by the routiers and English entrenched in the hill country of Languedoc in the later fourteenth century. Narbonne might successfully resist the Prince of Wales, Montpellier hold out against Bertucat d'Albret and the consuls of Nimes close their town gates for days on end against marauding gens d'armas, but there was little that towns could do against locally-established garrisons who from captured fortresses terrorised the surrounding countryside, devastating crops, carrying off livestock, holding peasants and travellers to ransom and completely dislocating ordinary life. Against this kind of enemy, whose intention was never to capture towns but simply to plunder and demoralise the civilian population, the best fortifications were no defence, and the only solution was to come to some sort of arrangement with the garrison captains.

The situation of Saint-Flour was typical. Built on a steep-sided basalt pillar rising 300 feet above the valley, Saint-Flour commands one of the strongest natural defensive sites of the Midi. Between 1357 and 1365 the town successfully resisted a number of fierce English attacks, and indeed was never captured during the entire war. But the defences gave no protection against the captains and garrisons of Alleeze, Carlat, Le Saillant and many

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1 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, p.7.
others operating in the area in the 1370s and -80s. In just four years, between 1383 and 1387, the consuls paid out 5271 francs in pâties and marots to the captain of Alleuze alone. The experience of Saint-Flour was shared by hundreds of towns and villages throughout the Midi in this period. Probably in many cases communities paid out more money buying protection than they spent on the construction and repair of their defences.

However, the failure of town walls to protect against these kinds of tactics is not to deny the fundamental efficacy of the civilian defensive effort. Royal commissioners might complain that towns were inadequately fortified and laxly guarded - sometimes with justification, as the hair-raising stories of public negligence and indifference attest - but nevertheless, the impression is that by the later fourteenth century at least, all the major southern towns were as well protected as their resources would allow, and that the mechanism of guet and garde ensured that they were regularly and effectively guarded by their inhabitants, day and night. Professional soldiers might question the fighting ability of the civilian defenders, but evidence from episodes like the siege of Narbonne or the tenacious resistance of the people of Saint-Flour is that where they had the will, the organisation and the armaments, townsmen could give good account of themselves.

Most local people could only see the war in terms of local events, but collectively their efforts made an important contribution.

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1 Registres consulaires de Saint-Flour, pp.39, 184 & passim.
2 AC Saint-Flour, chap.IV, art.6, no.7.
to the national war. The great act of self-help by which the towns of Languedoc built and rebuilt their defences, especially in the decade after 1355, provided the country with a network of fortresses, maintained and guarded at next to no cost to the crown. Whether the local effort actually affected the course of the war can only be speculated upon. The success of the English deep-penetration raids in 1345 and 1355 is largely to be explained by the poor state of local defence in Languedoc. Larger political and strategic considerations aside, one reason why these tactics were never again tried in the south is that the French were much better prepared. The plat-pays could easily be devastated, but the English could never again hope by chevauchées to capture and destroy so many towns and strike such a stunning psychological blow as in the autumn of 1355. Ironically, the degeneration of the war in the Midi in the later fourteenth century into static garrison warfare may have been a direct result of the new strength and defensive preparedness of the towns.
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SAINT-FLOUR, Mairie de Saint-Flour. Chapitre II, article 2, nos. 17, 19, 41, fortifications (1356-1376). Chapitre IV, article 6, no. 7, damage inflicted on the town of Saint-Flour by the garrison of Alleuze (1383-1405). Use was also made of the very detailed manuscript inventory compiled in 1789.

DORDOGNE

Archives communales


GARD

Archives communales


AIMAEGUES, AD Gard. Série EE: 2, 3, 4, 5, fortifications, election of ouvriers, process relating to the guard of Aigues-Mortes, (1355-1371).
ALES, Mairie d'Alès. 1 S 15, nos. V, XII-XLIII, fortifications, defence ordinances, taille, barrages and other impositions, (1292-1380). 1 D 1, consular deliberations, (1427-1447).


LE VIGAN, AD Gard, sous-série 1E: 1359, fortifications, (1365-1366).


ROQUEMAURE, AD Gard, sous-série 3E: 160, nos. 1-3, 5, 6, 8, 12, castle-guard, muster of sergeants, (1355-1378).


HAUTE-GARONNE

Archives communales


GERS

Archives communales


HERAULT

Archives départementales, Montpellier

Série A: 1, 2, registers of the sénéchaussée of Toulouse; 4-12, registers of the sénéchaussée of Beaucaire (Nimes). 18th century transcripts of letters patent and other acts relating to the administration of the royal sénéchaussées of Toulouse and Beaucaire, (14th-15th centuries). Série G, évesque d'Agde: 16, 30, fortifications and œuvre of Agde, (1359-1412).


Archives communales

AGDE, Mairie d'Agde. (The archives of Agde are currently being inventoried by Mlle. D. Neirinck of the Archives départementales de l'Hérault. The provisional numbers in the new inventory are given in brackets.) Série AA: 3, Cartulaire français, capitaine, election of ouvriers, (1332-1403). Série BB: (46), keys of the town, capitaine, rights of the consuls to the fortifications, (1356-1364). Série CC: (1), Livre des claviers, accounts, (1360).

Série DD: (6-17, 18), fortifications, impositions on wine, grain, meat, etc., taxation of clergy, (1345-1411). Série EE: (77), inspection of the fortifications of Agde, (1356).

ANJANÉ, AD Hérault, série E-supplément. Série BB: 1, consular acts and deliberations, captains of the fort, keys, ditches, (1432-1445).


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PEZENAS, Hôtel Lacoste, Pézenas. Inventaire de Resseguier nos. 947, 948, 951-969, fortifications, impositions, contribution of the cathedral chapter of Lodève to the costs of defence, destruction of buildings outside the walls and resettlement of the inhabitants, (1290-1453).

LOT

Archives communales


LOT-ET-GARONNE

Archives communales


CASTELJALOUX, AD Lot-et-Garonne, série E-supplément, 2419, accounts (1372-1419).

LE MAS D'AGENAI, AD Lot-et-Garonne, série E-supplément, 1854, parriage between the chapter of Le Mas and Arnaud-Amanieu d'Albret, (1400).

LOZERE

Archives départementales, Mende

Série C, évêché de Mende: 295, murage grants to the syndics of Mende, (1358-1376); 1034, defence and fortification of Gévaudan, (1356-1381).

Archives communales

MENDE, AD Lozère, Mende. Série CC: 155, building accounts, (1361-1362); 156, 157, destruction of property for the fortifications, (1369-1385). Série DD: 5, 6, fortifications, impositions, contribution of clergy to costs of defence, (1365-1435).

TARN

Archives communales

5-7, 11-17, fortifications, captaincy, defence and fortification of Albigeois, English garrisons, (1345-1460). Série FF: 36, 39, 44, processes relating to the fortifications, right of watch, (1357-late 14th century).

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TARN-ET-GARonne

Archives départementales, Montauban

Série A, fonds d'Armagnac: 44, letters patent and other acts of Jean IV d'Armagnac, (1425-1426); 66, letters of Charles VI relating to Rouergue, fortification, defence ordinances, (1382-1426).

Archives communales

MONTAUBAN, AD Tarn-et-Garonne, Montauban. Série EE: 3 EE.1, fortifications, mirage grants, (1360-1409).

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APPENDIX OF DOCUMENTS
I

1347, 26 April. Treaty of mutual assistance between the consuls of Cajarc and the consuls of Figeac. (Original, parchment, AC Cajarc, EE.11, no.361)

Nos, consules de Cajarc, pro nobis et successoribus nostris, consulibus et communitate dicti loci, retenta voluntate domini nostri Francorum regis in omnibus inscriptis, ad honorem ipsius domini pacisque cultum, promitimus fideliter laborare deffentioni patrie et rei publice contra inimicos ipsius domini, iuxta tenorem litterarum regiarum nobis et aliis civitatibus missarum, et nichilominus tam de gentibus mittendis quam de expensis certa bona deffentionibus necessarianti faciendi pro complendo contenta in dictis litteris regis, asserimus nos contribuere velle juxta facultates nostras ad salvanguardiam dominorum consulum Figeaci bona fide.

Nos vero, consules ville Figeaci, pro nobis nostris quam successoribus et communitate dicte ville, voluntate prefati domini nostri regis retenta, promitimus vobiscum dictis dominis consulibus de Cajarc dictae deffentioni laborare et vacare et in expensis faciendi super predictis contribuere prout melius nobis erit possibile et fuerit rationis premissa utrinque mutua premissione firma et sigilla nostrorum consulatum apponentes presentibus litteris ad perhibendum testimonium inscriptum die vicesima sexta aprilis anno domini MCCC quadragesimo septimo. 2

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1 No doubt Philippe VI's letters of 11 January 1347 addressed to the inhabitants of towns and castles in the sénéchaussée of Périgord and Quercy urging them to take up arms against 'courreurs, robeurs, maufaitoires sous lombre de nos guerres'. AC Cajarc, FF, no.288.

2 On the same day the consul of Figeac made an identical treaty with the consuls of Gourdon. AC Gourdon, EE.1, no.5.
1350, 28 July, Melun. Letters patent of Philippe VI granting to the consuls of Narbonne the right to impose 4d per livre on goods bought or sold in the city for three years, and to use the emoluments for repairs to the fortifications. (Original, parchment, AC Narbonne, CC.1305).

Philippe, par la grace de dieu roy de France, a tous ceux qui ces presentes lettres verront, salut. Savoir faisons que oye la supplication des consuls de la ville de Narbonne, contenent que la dicte ville est sur les frontiers de nostre royaume par terre et par mer, et que les habitans en ycelle ville sont et ont tous jours este leaulx et feaulx a nous et a la coronne de France depuis que elle y fu premiers adiointe, et est tresgrant neecessite pour la seurte et defensse deuls et de tout le pais que la dicte ville soit close et bien fermee, par quoy nos ennemis ni puissent entrer ne meffaire, nous aus dis suppleans avons octroie et octroions par la teneur de ces letres de grace especial que les murs, fossez et autres forteresses de la dicte ville il puissent redrecier, reparer et mettre en bon estat, et faire selon leur semble autres forteresses de nouvel, tant ou bourse comme en la cite, et pour ce que ces choses il ne pourroient bonnement faire sens nostre aide, leur avons encore octroie et octroions de nostre dicte grace que sur toutes les danrees et marchandises qui jusques a trois ans acountier du premier jour de septembre prochien avenir seront vendues, achatées ou descendues en la dicte ville ou en la banlieue dicelle, il puissent prendre et lever par certainnes personnes quil deputeront ace, imposicion de quatre deniers pour livre es refections, reparacions, et amendemens des forteresses dessusdictes et non ailleurs pourveu
que celui ou ceux qui leveront la dite imposition en rendent
compte aux diz suppléants en la fin d'un chacun des diz trois ans,
present nostre seneschal de Carcassonne, ou son lieu tenant, ou
celui ou ceux qu'il voudra asse députer, au quel seneschal et a
tous nos autres justiciers, ou a leurs lieux tenants, et a chacun
deulz si comme a lui appartendra, nous donnons en mandement par
ces lettres que de nostre presente grace il facent et laissent les
diz suppléants paisiblement joir et user et selon la teneur dicelle
leur souffrent pranre et lever l'imposition dessus dicelle,
sens les y
empeschir ou souffrir entre empeschies en aucune maniere, et a
payer ycelle imposition contraignent les rebelles par voies et
remedes de droit. En testimonion de ce nous avons fait mettre
nostre grant seil aux letres. Done a Meuleun sur Seinne le
xxviiie jour de juillet lan de grace mil ccc cinquante.
III

1355, 20 November and 26 November, Narbonne. The consuls and conseil privé of Narbonne elect a commission of twelve prud'hommes to supervise the rebuilding of the fortifications of the Cité and Bourg. The commissioners draw up a five-year reconstruction programme. (Original, parchment, AC Narbonne, EE.1309)

Anno nativitatis Christi millesimo quinquagesimo quinto, serenissimo príncepe domino Johane dei gratia rege Francorum regnante, et die vicesima mensis novembris, noverint universi quod cum domini consules ville Narbone, attentis dampnis et invasionibus nuper per Anglicos et domini nostri regis inimicos in villa Narbone noviter illatis, fecissent ad diem presentem, cum tubis et sanafillis more solito, eorum generale concilium ut moris est in domo consulatus civitatis Narbone convocaverunt pro tractando disponendo et ordinando qualis et quomodo ac de modo construendi faciendi hedificandi et reperandí muros et fortalitias civitatis et burgi dicte ville Narbone, et de et ex quo et qualis premissa fieri possent, existentibus in domo consulatus civitatis Narbone die et hora predictis dominis consulibus dicte ville, videlicet Bernardo de Montepessulano, Bernardo Nieusavida, Gauberto Portalis, Petro Catalani, Guillelmo de Aquis Vivis, Chirando Baterre, Bertrando Sancte Dulalie, Berangario Amatorii, et Petro Fullarii, una cum eorum conciliarìis privatis dicte ville seu maiore parte eorumdem ibidem convocaìis ut premititur, et hoc pro habendo concilio et deliberatione de et super premìissiis ut per consequens dicte villa possit pro tempore tute et secure manere et inimiciis domini nostri regis viriliter resistere ad honorem domini nostri regis, et propulsare si opus sit inimicorum incursus, maxime hiis
graviss terribus quibus expedit castra et civitatis vallibus, muris et fossatis et alius fortaliciis munire ac et fortificare. Tandem cum periculorum damnum que irreperabilia nuper per Anglicos et domini nostri inimicos in dicta villa Narbone illata fuerint, et ampliora inferri possint in futurus nisi divina ac regia magestas super hoc providat de remedio condecenti, que dicto concilio fuerunt exposta ac et explicata demum ipsi consules cum dicto eorum generali concilio predictis periculis ad honorem et commodum domini nostri regis et domini vicecomitis Narbons, qui viriliter una cum nobilibus sibi associatis in conflictu et invasione facta ut premititur in villa predicta ut verus dominus et domini nostri regis fidelis vassalus se habuit in deffensione ville predicte et potenter propulsavit, una cum ipsis civibus, inimicorum predictorum incursus, providere cupientur, attendentes quod de et super repperatione, munitione, fortificatione ac constructione predictis et unde posset comode haberi pecuniam ex qua posset fieri et compleri constructic, reperatico, et fortificatio ac munitio predicte non possent de facili propter personarum multitudinem et capitum oppinionem in umum convenun sic concordare, et quod facilius talia tractare poterunt ac et ordinare per paucos viros ydoneos quam per plures, idcirco cupientes finem celerem predictis imponi cum predicta celeritate difidentes et requerunt, voluerunt, concesserunt, disponuerunt et consulerunt quod duodecim valentes viri de concilio antedicto eligantur, qui de modo construendi, fortificandi ac et faciendi seu repparandi pro securitye diote ville Narbone muros et fortalicia antedicta et de modo habendi levandi et exhigendi pecuniam ex qua possit fieri constructic,
munitio, fortificatio, factio ac reparatione antedictae, ordinent, provideant et disponant prout eis videbitur sive per modum tallie imponendi, sive per modum impositionis seu gabelle vel vinteni seu trenteni et aliter prout eis maior videbitur expediens ac et opportunum nominantes ibidem et eligentes in dictor duodecim probos viros, videlicet Raymundum Marghalionis, domicellum, Guillelum de Acusio, burgensem, Bernardum Raymundi de Ulmo, Berengarium Fuxi, burgensem, Johannem Doesii, Poncium Jacobi, parator, Poncium Salvati, canabasserium, Guillelum de Auribus, mercator, Johannem Nicholay, autorem, Jacobum Coste, blanquerium, Raymundum Sabate, curatorem et Bernardum Ricardi, bladerium, ville Narbone, quicidem duodecim probi viri superius proxime nominati dictus bonus in se suscipientem promiserunt, et ad sancta dei evangelia iuraverunt in predictis omnibus et singulis et circa predicta bene et fideliter se gerere et circa predicta facere et ordinare, omne favore, gratia, Hodio seu ranoone posponitis secundum eorum bonas conscientias et prout eis attenta publica utilitate videbitur rationabiliter faciendum. Quibus sic peractis, dicti consules et eorum consiliarii ibidem assistentes, pro se et nomine ac vice dicte universitatis et eorum conoconsulum et conoconsiliariorum suorum, ex nuno promiserunt tenere servare et compleere quicquid in predictis et circa predicta per dictos duodecim probos viros superius proxime nominatos disponetur seu ordinabitur quovis modo, ac si per ipsos consules et consiliarios acta fuissent et prope disposita ac et ordinata et contra ea non facere seu venire ullomodo. De quibus ipsi consules et duodecim superius process nominati petierunt et requisiverunt eis facere publicum instrumentum per me notarium infrascriptum.
Acta fuerunt hæo anno die et loco supra proxime scriptis in presentia et testimonii venerabilium circumspекторum virorum dominorum Petri de Rigando, licencarii, Raymundi Vitalis et Petri Raymundi Malipili, bacallariorum in legibus, nobilis Petri Arandi de Fraxino, domini castro de Fraxino dyocensis Narbone, et me Petri Fitoris de Narbona, publice auttoritate regia notarii, qui de premisis hoc instrumentum in nota requisitus recepi.

Post hæo anno et regnante quibus supra, die vicesima sexta mensis novembris, noverint universi quod prenominati duodecem proceres superius nominati existentes et congregati pro infrascriptis peragendi in aula superiori domus consularis civitatis predicte ad infrascripta peragendae potentem prout constat instrumento superscripto habentes protestantes premitus et ante omnia per ipsos prenominatos electos deputatos ad infrascripta, quod de et super infrascriptis non intenderunt nœo proposuerunt ao proponunt aliquid facere, tractare seu accordare nisi ad honorem domini nostri regis et pro utilitate et provisione rey publice ville Narbone, et cum eiusdem domini nostri regis seu eius locum tenentis in partibus occitanis beneplacito et eius interveniente assensu et alius seu aliter non, pronuncriarunt, declararunt ao ordinarunt, vigore et auttoritate eorum potentis eis in hac parte ut premititur atribute, in et per modum in quadam papiri oedula in romano descripta quam per me notarium infrascriptum perlegi fecerunt ooram eis in presentia testium infrascriptorum, contentum cuius quidem oedule tenor talis est:

Primieramen dizem et prononciam que la ciutat de Narbona se fortiffique per dos ans propdanamen venens el boro de Narbona se
fortiffique per tres ans propdanamen segens passats los dits dos ans aissi cant se sico. Que tot lo emolumon de dos ans propdanamen venens adordenada et empauzada per aisso per nos ditz dotze prozones obtenguda primieramen licencia sobre la dita empozitio levadoira del rey nostre señor e de son loc tenen complidamen se metau e se applicon a la hobra e a la repparatio dels murs e de las fortalicias de la ciutat de Narbona e non en autra causa.

\[2] Item: que un o dos homes de ciutat e de boro sobre aisso elegidos per nos ditz dotze prozones siau deputats a vendre a encautar e a recebre los emolumens de la ditz empozitio e aquels emolumens dels ditz dotze ans metan e convertisquan a la hobra et a la repparatio dels murs e de las fortalicias de ciutat aissi cant es dit.

\[3] Item: que totz los maistres peiriers, fustiers, geissies e totas las manobras e totas manieras de gens, tant domes cant de femmas, e fabres necessaris als dits maistres, tant de ciutat cant de boro, deien vacar e entender continuament per los ditz dos ans a la hobra et a la repparatio dels ditz murs e fortalicias de ciutat e non en autras hobras degunas si que la dita hobra e repparatio sia perficitament complida aitan cant far e complir se porra per los ditz dos ans.

\[4] Item: que si moneda sobrava de la dita empozitio dels ditz dos ans e de las tornas quel boro deu far a la ciutat aissi cant deios se conten si la dita hobra no era complida dins los ditz dos ans que aquela moneda deia estar en la man dels ditz prozones o en aquels que nos ditz dotze prozones o autres que lo dit comun de ciutat e de boro acordaria, e que la dita moneda venga passats
los ditz dos ans e sia meza en la repparatio de la dita ciutat, sal e retengut que aquo nos dei far am degun maestre peirier, fustier, geissier ni autre ni manobras ni gens del boro e dela ciutat de Narbona a fi que totz los ditz maistres e manobras deian vacar e entendre passatz los ditz dos ans a la repparatio dels murs de boro aissi cant dei; se conten.

5] Item: dizem e prononciam que tot lo emolumen de la dita emposizitio de tres ans propdanamen venens, fenitz los ditz dos ans de contenem complidamen, se meta e se applique a la hobra e a la repparatio dels murs antics e de las fortalicias del boro de Narbona e no en autra cauza.

6] Item: que un o dos homes de boro e de ciutat sobre aissel elegidos per nos ditz dotze proshomes sian deputatz a vendre e a encartar e a recebre los emolumens de la dita emposizitio, et aquels emolumens dels ditz tres ans metan e convertiscan a la hobra e a la repparatio dels ditz murs antics e de las fortalitias del dit boro aissi cant es dit.

7] Item: que totz los maistres peiriers, fustiers, geissiers e totas las manobras e totas manieras de gens, tant domes cant de femnas, e fabres necessaris als ditz maistres, tant de ciutat cant de boro, deian vacar e entendre continuament per los ditz tres ans a la hobra e a la repparatio dels murs antics e fortalitias del boro e no en autras hobras degunas fi que la dita hobra e repparatio sia perfectament complida aitan cant complir se porra per los ditz tres ans.

8] Item: dizem e prononciam que car un an durara mais la emposizitio per la hobra del boro que de ciutat, aissi com es dessus
dit, que per aquo lo boro el comun daquel deia tornar e reffar dels emolumens de la dita empositio que se levera per los ditz tres ans
el comun de la dita ciutat vueg oens floris daur e de bon aur e de bon pes pagadas de contenen passatz los ditz tres ans per los quals se deu levar la ditz empositio per hobrar e repparar los ditz murs de boro antios e la fortalicia daquel, los quals viii° floris se convertiscan a la hobra e a la repparatio dels murs e fortalicias de ciutat aissi qua dessus se conten.

\[9\] Item: dizem e pronocia que per las causas dessus ditas no es nostra ententio que las gens de boro e de ciutat no puescan fortifficar lo boro e la ciutat de temps que la un o lautre fortifficara o deu fortifficar ses empero preiudici de las ordenansas dessus ditas sossaber am autra moneda e am autras maiestras e am autras manobras e gens que no fassa hom preiudici als capítols dessus dits.

De quibus omnibus et singulis supradictis ipai prenominati duodecim proceres deputati petierunt et requisiverunt eis fieri unum vel plura publica instrumenta per me notarium infrascriptum.

Anno nativitatis Christi millesimo trecentesimo sexagesimo
secundo, illustriorissimo principe domino Johanne dei gratia rege
Franciae regnante, die duodecima mensis juli, noverint universi quod
receptis per nobilem virum Johannem de Villanis, armigerum, vicarium
Biteris domini nostri regis, quibusdam patentibus litteris nobilis
et potentis viri domini Petri de Villanis, alias Le Besque, militis,
senescalci Carcassone et Biteris, a tergo earum ut prima facie
apparebat sigillo ipsius domini senescalci sigilatus, que tales
sunt:

Petrus de Villanis, alias Le Besque, miles, senescalculus
Carcassone et Biteris domini nostri regis, directo et carissimo
fratris nostro, Johanne de Villanis, vicario regio Biteris, salutem.
Cum nos ex certis de causis nostris nonentibus ex nostra certa
scientia quoscumque commissarios generales seu speciales super
factis fortalsiorum, portuum, passagiorum monetarum, et alias ex
nostro mero officio datos et ordinatos, revocaverimus et revocemus
per presentes, confidentes igitur de vestri legalitate et industria,
yos commissarium generalem et specialem ad visitandum et reparandum
ac muniri et diligenter custodiri faciendum loca et castro villasque
et alia fortalscia dicte nostre senescalie, et victualia ac gentes
ipsorum locorum in locis fortificatis reponi et recolligi
faciendum, ne non ad custodiendum custodiri faciendum per vos seu
a vobis depudandos ne extra regnum Franciae per loca portus passagia
dicte nostre senescalie monete regie aut alie monete seu res
prohibite extrabantur, quathenus ad nos, ratione mandatorum et
commissionum regiorum nobis in hac parte directorum, et etiam ex
nostro presidiali officio spectat seu pertinet quoquomodo, facimus
et constituimus per presentes cum potestate plenaria de capitaneis,
rectoribus seu gubernatoribus in locis, villis et castris dicte
senescallie fortificatis et ad defensionem aptis et necessariis
nomine regio atque nostro, si et prout vobis expediens et neces-
sarium fuerit, providendi, ponendi et instituendi, locaque minus
fortia diruendi et dirui faciendi et alia quecumque faciendi et
exercendi que in predictis et circa predicta necessaria fuerint, seu
etiam opportuna mandantes et inimungentes omnibus dicte senescallie
justiciariiis subditis regiiis ac aliis quibuscumque non subditos
requirentes ut vobis et deputandis a vobis in predictis omnibus et
singulis et ea tangentibus et dependentibus emergentibus et connexionis
ex eisdem pareant efficaciter et intendant tanquam nobis prestentque
auxilium, consilium, forciam et iuvamen, contradictores et rebelles
per mutotarum et penarum inductiones et declarationes et per alia
iuris et facti remedia prout casus et facti qualitas exigat,
compellendo taliter quod aliis in antea sedet in exemplum. Datum
in villa Montisferrandi die vicesima quinta junii anno domini
millesimo trecentesimo sexagesimo secundo. Per dominum senescallum,
J. de Tertro.

Idem nobilis Johannes de Villanis, vicarius et commissarius
predictus, volens mandata predicta executioni, demandari et contenta
in dictis litteris adimplere vigore dicte sue commissionis, et pro
utilitye patrie, attento quod magne societates et alie gentes
armorum que erant in Alvernia in magna quantitate ad partes istas
proponebant declinare, ad villam Narbone accessit et ibidem coram se personaliter evocari fecit domum Lagerium de Villepassantibus, capitaneum regium dicte ville, Guillelmum de Aquis Vivis, Franciscum Lisme, Jacobum Sapte, et Raimundum Boenati, oonsules dicte ville Narbone, et ibidem dictus dominus vicarius et comissarius, presen-
tibus et coram ipso existentibus oonsulibus predictis, dictas litteras commissionis sue predicte in sui prima figura exibuit et ostendit et per me notarium infrascriptum legi fecit prout in ipsis litteris plenius continetur. Quibusquidem litteris lectis, ut dictum est, explicatoque dictis oonsulibus per dictum dominum vicarium et commissarium quod dictae magne societates et gentes armorum in partibus istis erant breviter declinantur, idem dominus vicarius et comissarius, attendentes quod in villa Narbone et in costodia eiusdem erant plures defectus, et etiam quia dicta villa Narbone est in introitu partium Rossiliones, in quibus dictae magne societates declinare proponebant, ad finem ne dicti oonsules et habitatores Narbone de predictis ignorantem pretender non valerent, et ob eorum defectum seu negligentia dicta villa Narbone aut patrie propter eorum defectum damnum posset evenire, dictam villam Narbone, presentibus dictis oonsulibus et pluribus aliis dicte ville, visitavit et ibidem fecit ordinationes et precepta que sequuntur.

Primo ordinavit idem dominus vicarius et comissarius quod in burgo dicte ville Narbone dicti oonsules faciant seu fieri faciant vallatum sive fossatum in parte deversus rippariam Aude.

Item: quod perficiat seu perfeci faciant murum inceptum versus aquam ab utraque parte porte.

Item: quod perficiat et compleant seu perfici et completeri faciant alium vallatum inceptum circumcircum dictum burgum.
421

4 Item: quod perficiant seu fieri faciant pallum fusteum inter fossatum et murum, vel quod diruent seu dirui faciant iter quod est inter vallatum et murum.

5 Item: quod perficiant seu fieri faciant duos pontes levantes et duas plancoas in duobus portalibus principalis dicti burgi.

6 Item: quod in ecclesia Sancti Pauli faciant seu fieri faciant viam seu transitum taliter quod custodes dicti burgi possint ire et transire ultra dictam ecclesiam sine descedendo de supra murum.

7 Item: quod reparent seu reparere faciant curserias taliter quod circumcirca murum possit ire sine periculo.

8 Item: quod faciant seu fieri faciant duas barbacanas ante dictos duas pontes levantes superius ordinatus.

9 Postque die XIII julii dictus dominus vicarius et commissarius visitavit civitatem Narbone et ordinavit quod dicti consules faciant seu fieri faciant in civitate dicte ville Narbone in porta regia unum pontem levantem.

10 Item: quod perficiant seu perficere faciant vallatum circumcirca dictam civitatem usque ad flumen Acatis sufficienti barbacana comprehendendo de turri rotunda versus circium hospitii archiepiscopi usque ad turrum magnam rotundam vocatam Torbentona versus altanum dicte civitatis, ita videlicet quod in quolibet introitu dicte barbacane fiat unus pons levandis cum sufficienti barbacana a parte exteriori pro tuitione et defensione utriusque pontium predictorum.

11 Item: quod in quolibet ponte levante faciant seu fieri
faciant unam barieram et unam plancam.

[12] Item: quod faciant seu fieri faciant duas barbacanas ante dictos duo pontes levantes.


Postque die XIIII<sup>a</sup> julii predictis ordinationibus factis, dictus dominus vicarius et commissarius, vigore dictae sue commissione, precipit dictis consulibus ibidem presentibus quod predicta omnia et singula per eum superius ordinata faciant et compleant seu fieri et compleleri faciant de die in diem et hora in horam, omni excusatione cesante, et sub pena ducentarum marobarum argenti, domino nostro regi danda et applicanda et sub omni pena quam erga dominum nostrum regem incurrere possent, protestans nihilominus contra dictos consules de omni damna quod ob eorum defectum seu negligentiam domino nostro regi dictae ville Narbones et toti patrie posset evenire de premissis omnibus et singulis se exonerando et dictos consules onerando, nec non precipit idem dominus vicarius et commissarius domino Lagerio de Villis Passantibus, militi, capitaneo regio predicto, ut dictos consules ad predicta omnia perficienda et complenda compellat seu compelli faciat prout in talibus est fieri consueatum.

De quibus omnibus et singulis supradictis dictus dominus vicarius et commissarius precepit fieri unum vel plura publica instrumenta per me notarium infrascriptum. Acta fuerunt heo Narbone testibus presentibus Magistro Cornino Bestoria, clerico et notario regio, Magistro Petro Fitoris, notario Narbone, Johanne de Mundone, domicello, consobrino et familiaris dicti domini vicarii,
et me Johanne de Tertio, clericco, habitatore Biterris, publico
auctoritate regia notario, qui predicta de mandato dicti domini
vicarii et comissarii in notam recepi, sed vice mea Guillelmus de
Lauduno, habitator Biterris, hec scripsit et ego Johannes de Tertio,
notarius predictus, hic me acribo et signo.
1367, 18 June, Albi. The consuls of Albi present their
nominees, Isarn Redon and Pierre Fumet, to Emile Cabirol,
viceaire of the bishop of Albi, who appoints them town
captains. (Original, parchment, AC Albi, EE.6)

In nomine domini amen. Noverint universi et singuli hoo presens
publicum instrumentum inspecturi visuri lecturi ac etiam audituri,
quod anno domini millesimo trecentesimo sexagesimo septimo, vide-
licet die decima octava mensis junii, excellentissimo principi et
domino nostro domino Karolo dei gratia rege Francie regnante, et
reverendo patre in christo et domino nostro domino Hugone eadem
gratia episcopo Albiensis, dominoque temporali civitatis Albic
existenti, existentes et personaliter constituti apud Albiam in
primo palatio Bisbie sive domus episcopalis Albie, coram venerabili
et circumspecto viro domino Amelia Cabirolli, licentatio in legibus,
vicario generali in spiritualibus et temporalibus supradicti domini
nostri Albiensis episcopi, videlicet prudentes viri Guillerms
Nicholay, Dominicus de Monnaco, Franciscus de Grava, Arnaldus
Furbitoris, consules civitatis Albiensis, pro se et eorum ooconsul-
bus et tota universitate civitatis Albiensis ut dixerunt, nomina-
verunt dicto domino vicario in capitateos dicte civitatis Albiensis
videlicet discretos viros Isarnium Rotundi et Petrus Fumeti et
eorem quemlibet ibidem presentes, tanquam sufficientes ydoneos ad
dictum officium exercoendum, quos et eorum quemlibet insolidum
petierunt et requisiverunt instanter per dictum dominum vicarium,
nomine et vice dicti domini nostri Albiensis episcopi, in dicto
officio institui et iuramentum recipro ab eisdem de bene et fideliter
se habendo in officio predicto, prout est actenus in talibus fieri
consuetum. Et dictus dominus vicarius, informatus prius de ydoneitate, probitate, legalitate, sufficientia, industria et diligentia bona prenominatorum Isarni Rotundi et Petri Fumeti, vice et nomine dicti domini episcopi, admisit nominationem dictorum consulum et per ipsos factam de predictis Isarno Rotundi et Petro Fumeti, nomine quo supra, iuxta acordum actenus habitum inter dominos vicarios dicti domini Albiensis episcopi ex parte una, et consules civitatis Albiensis ex parte altera, prout de dicto acordo constat per quodam publicum instrumentum manu magistri Jacobi Trencavelli notarii Abie receptum, ut ubi dictum fuit super nominatione, institutione et iuramente receptione dictorum capitaneorum, cum protestationibus et retentionibus salvitatibus in dicto instrumento contentis, prenominatos Isarnum Rotundi Petrum Fumeti ad dictum officium exercendum a die presenti usque ad festem dedicationis beati Michaelis mensis septembris proxime sequentem in dicto officio instituit, et eisdem et quilibet ipsorum insolidum dedit potestatem ordinandi excubias et personas ad faciendum excubias de nocte, et si opus fuerit etiam de die, in dicta civitate et semel ordinatas excubias mutandi, augendi, diminuendi, et etiam claudendi et claudi faciendo portas omnes vel unam aut plures dicte civitatis, ac in eisdem ponendi et deputandi pro diebus singulis personas unam vel plures pro custodia portarum dicte civitatis, inobedientes rebelles contumates puniendi per arrestationem personarum ac etiam bonorum eorumdem eademque relaxandi, penas

1 In 1354 the consuls and the bishop of Albi agreed that Guillaume de Marsac, Guillaume Golferii and Pierre Donadieu, elected by the consuls, should serve as town captains for one year. AC Albi, ES.6.
imponendi, preconisationes tangentes custodiam dicte civitatis fieri, faciendo bona et res capta ab inobedientibus rebellibus et contumibus pro penis eisdem impositis distrahendi, vendendi, alienandi seu distrahi vendi et alienari faciendo, et alia omnia faciendo, dicendi, exercendo que solita sunt talibus capitaneis dari et concedi, non intendens dictus dominus vicarius ut dixit propter hoc dominis regenti et judici nec aliis curialibus dicti domini nostri Albiensis episcopi in eorum officiis in aliquo derogare, sed eos suis officiis uti posse sicud prius. Quibus itaque per actis, prenominati Isarnus Rotundi Petrus Fumeti et eorum quilibet ibidem incontinenti in manibus dicti domini vicarii juraverunt supra sancta dei evangelia, manibus suis dextris gratis et sponte tacta, quod in premissis omnibus et singulis in dicto officio et circa custodiam civitatis Albiensis nocturnam et diurnam bene diligenter et fideliter per dictum tempus se habeunt, et alia juraverunt que per tales capitaneos in eorum nova institutione est jurare consuetum. De quibus omnibus universis et singulis supradictis dictus dominus vicarius precepit, et tam dicti consules quam dicti capitanei requisiverunt, per me notarium infrascriptum sibi fieri publicum instrumentum. Acta fuerunt hoo anno die looo, at regnante quibus supra, in presentia et testimonio venerabilium et discre- torum virorum Ramundi Concilini, domicelli, magistrorum Ramundi Yohardi, jurispriti, Arnaldi Payani, notarii, et magistri Galhardi de Borno, publici Albiensis notarii et curie temporalis ordinarii, qui de premissis requisitus hoc presens publicum instrumentum recepit et notavit.
1418, 7 July, Montpellier. Proclamation by Jacques Gibert, town crier, of ordinances for the defence of Montpellier issued by the deputies for defence. (Original, parchment, AC Montpellier, Louvet, no.670)


1. Per ordonançaça dels senhors deputats, et per octoritat del Rey nostre senhor azels donada, fay hom assaber a tota persona de qualque condicion que sies que non sies si auzarda de trayre nenguna maneyra d'armes ne d'artilharie de la villa de Montpellier sensa licencia dels dichs senhors deputatz et ayssos sus la pena de perdre l'armes et l'artilharie ho la valura daquel, aplicadoyra et convertidoyra a la fortificacion et reparacion de la muralha et vezitacion daquella.

2. Item: que tota persona que vende armes ne artilharie
a nengun estrangier aia a denunciar als dichs deputats davant que
parta de son poder sus la pena desus dicha, aplicadoyra et converti-
doyra coma desus.

[3] Item: que nengun lyaire ny autre non auro lyar balas,
fagostz ni mulas out agia arnes sens licencia dels dichs deputats
sus la pena de dets libras, aplicadoyras et convertidoyras coma
desus.

[4] Item: que nengun hostalier, fondiguier ni outra persona
non permeta ni soffra que en son hostal se lyon balas ni fagosts out
agia arnes may se sap nengun oeste que ne agia comprat ho degia
denonciar als deputats, et aysso sus la pena de paguar dets
libras, aplicadoyras et convertidoyras coma desus.

[5] Item: quo tots aquells que seran de dezena sien hobediens
a lurs deseniers et vengon armatz debes els totas veguadas que seran
mandatz; et per semblan los dichs dezeniers am aquells de lurs
dezenas sien obediens a lur cinquentenier et vengon armatz am totas
lurs dezenas cascun debes son cinquantenyer; et cascun cinquantenyer
am sa cinquantaina deiam venir debes los deputatz cascun daquestz en
lur propria persona per anar la hout lur sera comendat por los dichs
deputats totas et quantas veguadas que lur sera comendat, et aysso
sus la pena de vint sos totas et quantas ves que los cinquantenyers
ho deseniers falhiran et de dets sos totas et quantas ves que aquells
de la dezenas falhiran, aplicadoyras et convertidoyras coma desus.

[6] Item: que tostz los setenyers tant de la vila coma de
la pallissada fasson mandar hun guach coma es acostumat por los
irlatas et deseniers de jorn al portal et de nuech a la muralha et
da la pallissada, et aysso sus la pena de vint sous a cascun setenyer
per cascuna ves que falhira de far mandar lo guach, et de dets sobz per cascuna ves que lo irlata ho desenier falhira, aplicadoyra a la fortificacion et reparacion de la muralha et verytacion daquella.

7 Item: que tota persona que sera mandada al guach de la muralha la nuech degia esser vengut a una hora de nuech, et daqui non se parta de sa garda et de la plassa azel ordonada fin al matin que las gardas dels portals seran vengudas, et aquela que seran de la garda del portal lo jorn degion esser venguts lo mati ala derrieyra hora de la nuech, et agion estar a lur garda fin que los portals que gardaran sien sarratz, et ayuso sus la pena de dets sobz, aplicadoyra et convertidoyra coma dessus es dich.

8 Item: que tot cap dostal que sera mandat al guach de nuech ho de jom ho autramens per los dichs deputatz, setenyers, irlatas, desenierho cinquantenyers agia a venir en sa propra persona armat ben segon son poder per amar la out hy sera comenat, et ayuso sus la pena de dets sobz aplicadoyra coma dessus.

9 Item: que nenguna persona que sio de garda de portal ho de muralha ho palissada non auze gagnar a largent estant en sa garda, sus la pena de sinq sobz, aplicadoyra et convertidoyra coma dessus.

10 Item: que nenguna persona estant a la muralha ho pallissada non auze frencar nengunas fustas de las fores ni de la muralha ne far oramar, sus la pena de dets sobz, aplicadoyra et convertidoyra coma dessus, et de emendar a la muralha lo dan que hy aura fach ho donat.

11 Item: que tot setenyer, irlata et desenier sie tengut
de veritar son guach que aura mandat cascun jorn et cascuna meuch en lur propia persona. Et se hy a nengun que y falha los degion denonciar aquel jorn als dists deputats per far la provezion que y apartendra, et ayssu sus la pena de dets sobz aplicadoyra et convertidoyra coma desus.

\[12\] Item: que nenguna persona de qualque condicion que sie non se auzе metre sus las gardas ordonadas als portals, ho muralha, ho palissada, de jorn ne de nueg, am arnes ne sens arnes ne far ne dire nenguna engurias a las dictas gardas sus la pena de vint sobz torn. et de perdre larnes, aplicadoyra et convertidoyra coma desus.

\[13\] Item: que nengun de las dictas gardas non auzan far ny dire lun a lautre nengunas engurias ne a nengunas autras personas quals que sien, et ayssu sus la pena de dets sous, aplicadoyra et convertidoyra coma desus.

\[14\] Item: que se a nenguna persona en las dictas cinquantenas ho en los dichts setes que non sie soficiemment armat, que agia a comprar arnes segont sa possibilitat per la deffensa de sa persona, et dayssо a huech jorns, ho autrement los dichts deputats lur en farn comprar a lur despens.

\[15\] Item: que tota persona que aura balesta ny artilharye lagia a recognoyssе, et a tener tota presta, per so que se hy aure bezonh, hom sen pogue ajudar.

\[16\] Item: que tota persona que non aura balesta comprе una flagelada o fonda per trayre peyras de la muralha se hy aure bezonh, sus la pena de sinq sobz, aplicadoyra et convertidoyra coma desus.

\[17\] Item: que nenguna persona de qualque condicion que sie non auzе portar arnes de jorn ne de nuech, se non aquelс que ne
auran licencia de la cort ho dels dichs deputastz et aysso sus la pena de perdre larnes ho la valor, aplicadoyra et convertidoyra coma desus.

\[18\] Item: que deguna persona de qualche condicion que sie non aure tocar ny descendre bombardas no canos ho garostz que son asetiastz o asityadas sus la muralha, ne autra manieyra de balestas grossas de bauch, o autres engens, senssa lessencia dels ditz deputastz, et aysso sus la pena de cent sobz torn. et sus tota autra pena que pogues mes far.

\[19\] Item: que tot hom sie prest de venyr sus la muralha totas voutas que hy sera comandat, et venyr armat josta sa pocibilat, et se mete en la plassa que hy es esta ada ordenada, et daqui non se parta senssa mandament ho lecencia de son setenyer ho deputat, et que sant hy sera comendat per son setenyer, deputat ho capitany se de gia transportar la cut hy sera comendat per los desus ditz, sus la pena de vint sos, aplicadoyra et convertidoyra coma desus.

\[20\] Item: que cascum setenyer reconocosa se lo sieu sete o garda de la muralha o palissada se es ben fornit de payra per gitar, et al cas que non ho sie que comande adz aquel de son sete que auran bestias que ne devon portar a sofeccionia et metre dins los xii palms, et aquel que non auran bestias las pongron sus la muralha et las metra en los lox necessaris, et aysso sus la pena de detz sous, aplicadoyra et convertidoyra coma desus.

\[21\] Item: que nengun non aure enguiiar las badas de Sant Aularia de fach ne de dich et aysso sus la pena de cinq sos torn, aplicadoyma et convertidoyra coma desus.
\[\text{[22]}\]

Item: que tota persona de qualque condicion que sie a local sie comendat anar en la garda ho garnizo de lobra del papa o de Sant Salvayre o do autra part de la villa sie prest et hy ana arnat iusta sa pocibilitat al jorn et hora que hy sera assignat, et hy demora et fassa residencia personal lo temps que hy sera ordenat, et aysso sus la pena de cent sous, applicadocyrca et convertidocyrca coma desus.

Preconisaret et publicaret in presenti villa Montispessulani modo et forma in eodem rotulo contentis ac per loca et quadrivia in talibus fieri consueta. Quiquid prece dictum mantadum in se gratis susciapiens et asseruens una cum Johanne Ketas, uno de scutifferis dominorum consulum Montispessulani, voce neauphili alta et intelligibili voce in presencia mei notarii et testium infra-scriptorum easdem preconisationes fecit et preconisavit per loca et quadrivia inferius descripta ac modo et forma in dicto papiri rotulo contentis ...

The crier, accompanied by the notary, then reads the proclamation in ten streets and wards of the city and suburbs. There follow the usual formulas of witness and authentication and the act is received by Georges Clerici, notary of Montpellier.

(Original, from a register of deliberations, AC Toulouse, BB.3, fcs.28vo-29)

\[
\text{fo 28vo}\]

Siegön se las causas que moss. de Capitol an afar prestament per la deffensa de la vilag.

\[1\]
Primierament, que las claus delas portas de la vilag que se hubren sian divisadas entres parts afi que nos puescan ubrir sino que totz tres sian esemps.

\[2\]
Item: que se fassan de novelas claus alas ditas portas per so que las primiers poyrian esser falcifficadas, et que hom avise los sarrairos que las faran que non fassan sino las que Moss. de Capitol lor mandaran sus pena de tratio et que ho juren.

\[3\]
Item: que prestament se curen los valatz per tot la cu sera necessari e se fassan resclausuras e asao se fassa tot per comu et per vesinal.

\[4\]
Item: que prestament se fassa la unio e se procte lo sagrament ses plus delaya.

\[5\]
Item: que se fassa los ressert del armes de la vilag que veia hom qui na et qui no; e qui non aia quen comprè segon sa possibilat.

\[6\]
Item: que se fassa extima del armes dels marchans e dels armies per dos bos homes am sagrament et qui tantost no poyra pagar que se oblige a pagar a termes.

\[7\]
Item: que fassam lo ressert qualas gens a en la vilag por armar et qui sera bo per yssir defora et qui per demorar dedins,
e que de cascuns sapia hom lo nombre affi que a la coyta hom sia tot prest.

8] Item: que la vila prenga las torn de Sant Stephe e si fassa bon gait cascuna neyt.

9] Item: que a la Sala nava se meta bon gait cascuna neyt fora lo qui es.

10] Item: que los cubatz sian ples dayga et las lanternas se aluquen la neyt per cadaun detzenier.

11] Item: que hom derresisca las balestas de trayt o autra, tant del rey cum dela vila, en lautra artilharia necessaria per las torn de la vila e en autres locx ou beaunh sera,

12] Item: que lo cas meteys sia fait delas bombardas petitas e grandas.

29] Item: que hom fassa hum enbanament de post ou es la muralha nava.

14] Item: que hom fassa provecio de polveras de canos affi que la vila non demore desprovezida.

15] Item: que hom ane deffait als capitols de Sant Stephe et de Sant Servi per avisar los canonges que deguna gent no laissen habitar dedins fora que aquels que resideyment y an acostumat de demorar.

16] Item: que hom fassa lo ressort del armes que es per los monesties et que hom lo prenga tot fora aquel que sera degeus conegudas.

17] Item: que si degun bruch o escandol se endevenia, que Deus no vuelha, que cascu aia anar a son capitol e no en autra
part sens expres comandament desson cappitol, sus la pena arbitraria al dit cappitol.

18 Item: que se fassa boda por que spien las gens que per corre o autrement vendran corre a Tholosa.

19 Item: que hom prenga totas las ponezinas que se trobaran en las gleyas.

20 Item: que los brassies non anen deffora a las obras ses que no porten armes, et qui si far se pot al mens habren de vi en vi affi que se puecan tornar si besanh era.
Map I. Southern France showing principal towns mentioned in the text.
Map III. The defensive ressort of Aigues-Mortes in 1359
(AD Hérault, A.4, fos. 409vo-410vo)
Map IV. The defensive ressort of Roquemaure in 1356
(AD Gard, 3E.160, Roquemaure, no.1)
Map V. Villages of the defensive ressort of Périgueux in 1406
(AC Périgueux, EE.14)