LABOUR AND POLITICS IN NORTHERN RHODESIA,

1900-1953:

A STUDY IN THE LIMITS OF COLONIAL POWER

Ian Henderson

Ph.D.
University of Edinburgh
1972
BEST COPY

AVAILABLE

TEXT IN ORIGINAL IS CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF THE PAGE
TEXT BOUND INTO

THE SPINE
BEST COPY

AVAILABLE

Variable print quality
The thesis examines the politics of labour in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) from the establishment of the British presence in 1900 to the beginning of the Central African Federation in 1953. It is argued that the power of governments to control or direct labour migration or the conditions of labour was severely limited. The British South Africa Company (which administered the territory from 1900 to 1921) lacked the administrative resources to do more than tax the territory, and the laxity of early Administrators allowed the criminal conduct of some district officials to go unpunished. The introduction of labour migration and the cash economy to the rural areas set off a chain of social changes which the Northern Rhodesia Government (1924-1934) was similarly unable to control. Any attempt to change the territory's status as a labour reservoir for the South, or to improve African opportunities, met opposition from the entrenched local Europeans, who monopolised routine posts in the civil service and skilled jobs in the copper mines and on the railways. The articulation of African grievances is closely examined in the Copperbelt Strikes of 1935 and 1940, together with the pressures which resulted in the formation of African trade unions from 1947. The growing industrial power of Africans led to hurried concessions in the 1950's, though relations between African workers, their leaders, and the government remained complex, and posed development problems for the independent Republic of Zambia.
PREFACE
This thesis was written in the intervals of teaching at the University of Zambia, and it owes much to the friendly co-operation of the Vice-Chancellor, Lameck Goma, and to John Omer-Cooper, Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Professor of History. I am also grateful to the University's Research and Publication Committee for a grant towards research on the Copperbelt in 1970.

Library and archives staff made my work easier and more agreeable by their skill and helpfulness. In particular, I wish to thank Bright Malwindi, P. Mukula and Bruce Byrne of the National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka; Anthony Loveday and Pat Spann of the University of Zambia Library; and the staffs at the Public Record Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library, London, Rhodes House, Oxford, the Copper Industry Service Bureau, Kitwe, the National Assembly Library, Lusaka, and the University Library and the Library of the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.

Knowingly or unknowingly, friends, colleagues and students have helped to form and criticise my ideas. Rather than evaluate their contributions, I list them alphabetically: Sholto Cross, James Hooker, Richard Jacobs, Augustine Nkumbula, John Omer-Cooper and Robin Palmer. In addition, some helped materially by committing their comments to writing or by imparting valuable additional information. They are: Elena Berger, Kabwe Kasoma, Andrew Roberts, Jaap van Velsen and Philip Warhurst. To all I am grateful. My understanding of Zambian history and society has also been enhanced by my association with the students of the University of Zambia, particularly those who took my course on Land and Labour in Central Africa.

Before even I had decided on the final theme of this work, I had decided that it should be supervised by George Shepperson. I am grateful to him for accepting the task, for corresponding with me so patiently, and for the sympathy and moral pressure which he applied as required.
The rapid and professional production of this thesis is due
to my mother, who typed most of the first draft, and to Denise Brown,
who typed the final version. My thanks are due to them for their
help, and for pointing out errors and imperfections in the presentation.
Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.

Throughout the work, I omit forms of address, viz., Professor,
Dr., Mr., Miss, Mrs. Bantu nouns are rendered without the pronominal
concord, unless the meaning is otherwise unclear.
### CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. the theme and its justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. the published material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. the method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 The Chartered Company and the political economy of Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. the Company's design for the North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. tax and labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. the Southern African labour crisis, 1901-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. migrant labour: its impact and the response from African society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 Economic necessities and the retreat from paramountcy, 1920-1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. the economics and politics of a labour reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. African economic response: changes in labour migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. African political response: &quot;we have worked in the South and it is not good&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. European objectives: &quot;a plentiful supply of boys&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. European objectives: &quot;a job for our children&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi. summing-up: labour and the struggle for power in Central Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
iv. The limits of bureaucracy: success and failure in regulating black and white labour, 1935-1940

1. regulating industrial relations: the Labour Department
2. regulating European labour: the Mine Workers' Union
3. regulating African migrant labour: the Salisbury Agreement
4. regulating African development: the failure of a fiscal policy
5. summing-up: Limitations, inherent and acquired

Chapter 4 The Copperbelt strikes, 1933 and 1940

1. the mines
2. the 1935 strike
3. the 1940 strike
4. the Copperbelt strikes in the history of African protest
5. the strikes and colonial power

Chapter 5 The obstacles to African job advancement, 1940-1953

1. the war and dependence on copper
2. the fate of Forster and Dalgleish
3. the limits on knowledge: the problem of stabilisation

Chapter 6 Trade unions and African politics

1. "Development on sound lines": the colonial government's ideal
2. an African initiative, 1947-1953

Conclusion

1. labour and colonial power
2. labour and the development of African nationalism
3. colonial power and the colonial legacy
List of Appendices

Appendices 232-238

Bibliography 239

Maps

1. Northern Rhodesia: administrative boundaries and the changing district pattern, 1913-1933 290

2. Settlement and land use on the Copperbelt, 1933 291


LIST OF TABLES

Table

1 Number of labourers from Northern Rhodesia distributed by the RNLB, 1906-1923 15

2 Total able-bodied population, East Luangwa, 1917 40

3 Average Jones's estimate of men employed, Awemba, 1913 45

4 Numbers and percentage of Rhodesian labourers in Katanga, 1917-1923 47

5 Southern Rhodesia: death rate of labourers on mines, 1905-1929 53

6 Northern Rhodesia: outward flow of African migrant labourers, 1928-1933 61

7 Riots in connection with labour in the British Empire, 1935-1945 98
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nakuri (Swahili)</td>
<td>African soldier or policeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awomba</td>
<td>term used for the Bemba by the administration up to about 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bomo (Swahili)</td>
<td>enclosure; district administrative headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boss-boy</td>
<td>African head of a gang of labourers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>buLozi (Lozi)</td>
<td>the Lozi heartland; the Zambezi floodplain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capitau (Port.)</td>
<td>African head of a gang of labourers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>changachanga (Central Bantu language)</td>
<td>compound manager; compound or municipal offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chimalu, chibaro, sipala</td>
<td>forced labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chilapalapa</td>
<td>medium of communication between white and black, Copperbelt. cf. pidgin, kitchen kaffir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citemene (Bemba)</td>
<td>slash-and-burn agricultural system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corvee (French)</td>
<td>forced labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>induna (Zulu)</td>
<td>headman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kalambu (Bemba)</td>
<td>big man; eminent personage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kalata (Nyanja)</td>
<td>letter; check-off system of paying poll-tax direct from employer to government in Nyasaland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kapenta (Central Bantu language)</td>
<td>small fish from Lakes Mweru and Bangweulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khotla (Lozi)</td>
<td>council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long ton</td>
<td>2240 pounds weight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mseliona (Central Bantu language)</td>
<td>the lost ones; those migrant labourers who never returned home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nakobo (Bemba)</td>
<td>a better-paid worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>muzungu amikoda npako (Nyanja)</td>
<td>&quot;my master likes me&quot;; expression applied to accommodators with the colonial regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>short ton</td>
<td>2000 pounds weight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voluntaries</td>
<td>migrant labourers who travelled independently of recruiting organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wiko (Lozi)</td>
<td>a foreigner; term applied by the Lozi to the Lunda-Luvale and related peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACEC</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACJ</td>
<td>Arthur Creech Jones; prefix for Creech Jones Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALAB</td>
<td>African Labour Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMWU, NRANWU</td>
<td>(Northern Rhodesian) African Mine Workers' Trade Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Aborigines' Protection Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>African Representative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASR</td>
<td>African Social Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBA</td>
<td>Boss Boys' Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBOC</td>
<td>Boss Boys' Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFS</td>
<td>Congo Free State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.O.</td>
<td>Colonial Office; prefix to Colonial Office files series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>District Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encl.</td>
<td>enclosure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H of C Deb</td>
<td>House of Commons Debates (U.K. Hansard)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAH</td>
<td>Journal of African History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMAS</td>
<td>Journal of Modern African Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legco</td>
<td>Legislative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legco Deb</td>
<td>Legislative Council Debates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASA</td>
<td>Mines African Staff Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Member of the Legislative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWU (NRANWU)</td>
<td>(Northern Rhodesia) Mine Workers' Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ix.

NC Native Commissioner
n.d. no date
NILAB Native Industrial Labour Advisory Board
NR Northern Rhodesia
NRJ Northern Rhodesia Journal
OAG Officer administering the government
OB Orde Browne; prefix for Orde Browne papers
PA Provincial Administration
PRO Public Record Office, London
RICU Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union
RLJ Rhodes-Livingstone Journal
RNLB Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau
RST Rhodesian Selection Trust
SAMWU South African Mine Workers' Union
s.o. semi-official
SR Southern Rhodesia
TR tribal representative
TT Tanganyika Territory
UNIP United National Independence Party
WNLA Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
INTRODUCTION
The theme and its justification

Though the 1960's was United Nations Development Decade, at the end of it the gap between the developing and the rich nations of the world had not closed, but widened. The independent Republic of Zambia, formerly the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, experienced, along with the rest of the Third World, acute problems of economic development and consequent political upheavals in the 1960's. In 1972, she was moving towards the implementation of a one-party state (the official phrase was "one-party democracy"), the former leader of the banned United Progressive Party, Simon Kapwepwe, was in detention, and the economy was under severe pressure from dropping foreign reserves, the result of the low level of the copper price on the London Metal Exchange (1). Zambia's Second National Development Plan, to run from 1972 to 1976, gave special emphasis to the welfare of the rural areas and to the replacement of expatriate experts and technicians by Zambians (2), but these goals were almost totally dependent on a rise in the price of copper. In the meantime, wage demands by urban workers helped to push up prices, further impoverishing the rural areas.

One of the first political problems of development is to mobilise and control labour. This study deals with the problem historically, not from a merely technocratic point of view, but as a way of illuminating the interrelations of the colonial past with the present. We shall examine Zambianisation via its colonial predecessors, the problems of the colour bar, Africanisation and African advancement; we shall examine rural development problems through the colonial concepts of detribalisation, stabilisation and urbanisation; and throughout, we shall be concerned with the constraints on governments which prevented them from solving these problems, or even from properly identifying them.


We shall also analyse some of the problems of the interrelations of African labour with governments and with other sections of the African people by studying the Copperbelt Strikes of 1935 and 1940, and the formation of African trade unions after 1947. In so doing we shall observe the peculiar circumstances of the origins of African nationalism in Zambia. We shall acknowledge that colonial rule was fundamentally exploitive, but we shall not require to dwell on this well-worn theme.

Of greater importance to the preoccupations of the 1970's is the reminder that all governments, colonial or post-colonial, experience similar problems in mobilising labour for development. If all this appears to be studying the past through the obsessions of the present, thus losing historical objectivity, we can only reply that all history is written in this way, whether the historian admits it or not. E.H. Carr rightly avers that the study of history involves a constant dialogue between past and present, in which the questions we ask about the past are dictated by what we know about the present, and are therefore constantly changing (1).

But the writing of history must remain independent and impartial. To accept these requirements is not incompatible with acknowledging that we are involved in the present; if he rejects independence and impartiality, the historian loses much of his usefulness in society, though he may prove to be useful to certain elements in it. Later in this Introduction, we shall describe the method through which the theme is examined to allow the reader to conclude whether the work is consistent with these self-imposed (and generally approved) requirements. But at this stage we move to an examination of the previously published material on the subject.

ii. The published material

A great many books and articles were published on the social history

of the Central African territories between 1953 and 1964. The break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland focussed Britain's attention on the problem of race relations, and most of the published work has for its theme black-white relations and the prospects for cooperation and conflict between the races. Of greatest academic value are three works published by the Institute of Race Relations (London), and produced by Richard Gray and Philip Mason (1). In the Foreword to The Two Nations, Mason and Gray describe two kinds of visitors to the Federation in the 1950's: one kind visits the leading figures, Governors, Ministers, managers of mines and businesses, and only meets selected Africans:

"... each meeting is apt to be an occasion. It is arranged; there is a constraint. The sentiments expressed will not be those which either side would put with unbuttoned ease across the table in his own home; sometimes they will deliberately be meant to please and reassure". (2)

The other kind of visitor equally sees only "one nation", not two: he stays with people who share a generous concern for the downtrodden, and his original suspicions of the intentions of governments are confirmed. Gray and Mason's books certainly fulfilled their purpose in providing the intelligent sections of the British public with a balanced analysis of the history of race relations in the three territories. Federation is now a historical curiosity, but the fact that the battle is over does not prevent The Two Nations from being an essential starting-point for scholars who wish to pursue further the study of Central African society.

Other works during this period exhibit similar preoccupations: Clegg, Creighton, Phillips, Franck, Leys and Pratt, and, from an Africa-wide viewpoint, Jack Woddis, all emphasised race conflict as their central theme.


to a greater or lesser degree (1). Standing apart from the others, however, is Lewis Gann, whose works were unfashionably pro-Federal (he dedicated his first book to Sir Roy Welensky), and who has gone on to occupy a distinguished right-wing revisionist position on colonialism in Africa generally (2). Gann alone, at this time, had access to and had mastered the official files in the Central African Archives in Salisbury, and his books are potential mines of information, even for those who do not share his views (3). Since then, nothing has been published specifically on labour problems in Northern Rhodesia, although Robert Rotberg has written of labour as one of the manifestations of African discontent which ultimately led to nationalism. We shall have occasion to disagree with Rotberg's interpretation, particularly in Chapter 6 (4). Robert Bates has analysed the relations between the mineworkers of Zambia and the government since independence, an analysis which has relevance for our study (5). Frank Coleman has published a technological history of the Copperbelt which contains some material on labour problems (6), and in a thesis whose publication is eagerly awaited, 


2. For a list of Gann's works, see Bibliography, below.

3. "Potential" is used advisedly. References are few and the index is poor.


6. Frank L. Coleman, The Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, 1899-1962 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971). I was able to read this work at proof stage.
Elena Berger (nee Plotnikoff) showed that a more refined analysis of the politics of labour was possible when she revealed the dimensions of the triangular contest between the white miners, governments and copper companies over African advancement (1). In particular, the contrast between the skilfully-presented public image of the companies and their private anti-trade unionism, both black and white, can be clearly inferred from Berger's work. But although Berger examined labour policies on the Copperbelt more thoroughly than anyone hitherto, there remained two gaps, the filling of which would involve answering two historical questions: first, how far had labour policies been determined by events in Southern Africa before 1924 (the starting-point of her thesis)? And secondly, how far does the study of African self-politics from 1933 illuminate the development problems of later decades?

iii. The method

Our study is historical in the generally understood sense: it presents events on a time-scale and it integrates the study of political decisions against their socio-economic background. In doing so, it makes use of the work of sociologists, economists, geographers and political scientists. Such labels are less important in the field of African studies than they might be in the more highly-developed study of modern Western society.

Although the socio-economic backdrop is the Southern African sub-continent, the work will confine itself to the pressures and constraints on those who governed Northern Rhodesia, both at the Colonial Office in London and in Northern Rhodesia itself. The theme is studied through the official archives in Lusaka (open to 1951) and London (open to 1941), supplemented by the private papers of some of the participants. The views

of unofficial whites were perhaps the most difficult to obtain: the files of the Zambia Expatriate Mineworkers' Association (containing some of the records of the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union) are now somewhere south of the Zambezi; and my efforts to gain access to the files of the Copper Industry Service Bureau in Kitwe (containing the records of the Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines) proved unsuccessful. To compensate for this possible lack of balance, extensive use has been made of the reports of the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, and of the Bulawayo Chronicle and the Northern News (Ndola).

Most important for the study of the development of African labour self-politics is material from African participants themselves. This is a problem which has not been solved, and sometimes not even tackled, by previous writers. There is a wealth of oral material awaiting collection, and it is not argued that this thesis does more than make a beginning in examining the African viewpoint. Besides interviews with participants and others, I have been privileged to see several unpublished manuscripts bearing on the events discussed (1). The same standards of interpretation are applied to these oral and written sources as are applied to other sources.

The treatment will study the changing nature of the pressures and constraints on governments from 1900 to 1953, focussing latterly on the African factor, which proved ultimately to be an important reason for decolonisation in the political sphere. In chapter 1 we shall see how the British South Africa Company succeeded in taxing 290,000 square miles of sparsely-inhabited territory, but failed to predict or control the effects of that taxation; chapter 2 will examine the settler factor and the continuing status of the territory as a labour reservoir as factors making nonsense of paramountcy theories and limiting the political base

---

1. See Bibliography, below, for a list of informants and unpublished mss.
from which the Colonial Office could begin to effect change; in the
crucial period 1924-35 we shall argue that two British policies overlapped
and contradicted each other: the old Southern African strategy, favoured
by the Foreign Office, of securing Northern Rhodesia for an eventual
federal state with its political and economic fulcrum in South Africa,
and the newer, reforming policies of the Colonial Office, aimed at
"developing" the natives, however, that might be defined. The appoint-
ment of Sir Herbert Stanley as the first governor of the territory furthered
the first objective at the expense of the second, and entrenched the white
minority. Chapter 3 will examine more closely the difficulties of regula-
ting black and white labour in the context of white initiatives on the spot,
and the lack of knowledge on which to base any plans for African development.
Chapter 4 will analyse the first two African strikes in Northern Rhodesia,
both as exposing the contradictions in government policy, and as revealing
the beginnings of African urban self-politics independent of the colonial
government. Chapter 5 will examine how, even after the alarm caused by
the Copperbelt Strikes, the policies of the previous twenty years continued
to prevent African advancement in industry. In chapter 6 we continue our
examination of African labour politics, and argue that the formation by the
government of African trade unions opened the door to the first positive
African initiative on the Copperbelt, to the rapid breaking down of barriers
to African political and industrial advancement, and ultimately contributed
to a situation which by the late 1950's dictated rapid decolonisation as the
only solution to political and industrial instability.
CHAPTER 1

THE CHARTERED COMPANY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
NORTHERN RHODESIA, 1900-1923
For Sir Harry Johnston, "that part of Africa which is well within the tropics must be ruled by whites, developed by Indians, and worked by blacks" (1). This simple blueprint for development did not, however, work straightforwardly in the British sphere north of the Zambezi.

The rapid development seen in Southern Rhodesia in its first two decades could not be repeated in the North, if only for the political reason that the Matabele and Mashona Rebellions and the Jameson Raid had brought strong-arm methods into disrepute with the Colonial Office. The Company, therefore, advanced slowly in its northern sphere (2).

After repeated requests from Lewanika, Paramount Chief of the Barotse, Robert Coryndon was sent to Lealui as Resident in 1897, the previously-appointed Resident having been killed in the Rebellions (3). Administration at that stage, however, consisted of little more than the imparting of advice to Lewanika and the occasional exercise of judicial powers over white men; it was not until the passing of the Barotseland - North-West Rhodesia Order-in-Council, 1899, that the beginnings of bureaucratic machinery could be set up at Kalomo (4). Similarly modest beginnings were made in North-East Rhodesia. The first Company posts there were on the Stevenson Road between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa, and on Lake

---


4. Gann, Plural Society, p. 92; The Order-in-Council is in Proclamations, etc. 1889 -1904 of the High Commissioner for South Africa.
Hwero. Administration was first carried on from Zomba, in the British Central Africa Protectorate, but from 1900 Fort Jameson housed the offices of the Administrator for North-East Rhodesia (1).

If the Company had a grand design for the North, it lay in mineral extraction. Acting for the Company, F.E. Lochner, Joseph Thomson and Alfred Sharpe took care to include all mineral rights in the treaties which were signed with Lewanika and the chiefs of North-East Rhodesia between 1890 and 1893 (2). But the great prize of the copper-rich Katanga eluded Rhodes and his agents when Captain Stairs's Belgian expedition wrested the mineral rights of Karanganze from the Yeke chief Mairi in 1891 (3).

The gilt was, therefore, missing from the gingerbread - if indeed there was any gingerbread at all. The mines of the Hook of the Kafue, Kansanshi, Ndola (copper), and Broken Hill (lead, and later zinc and vanadium) were hardly enough to build a colonial economy on. Though Broken Hill and Dwana Likuba (at Ndola) both expanded their operations when the line of rail reached them in 1906 and 1909 respectively, economic activity remained on a very small scale. The oxide copper ores of Dwana Likuba yielded only 3 to 5 per cent copper, a barely profitable margin compared with the rich Katanga oxides which contained 18 to 25 per cent copper (4).

1. See Appendix 1 for a list of Officers Administering the Government of North-Eastern, North-Western and Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1964.

2. The British South Africa Company's claim to the mineral royalties in Northern Rhodesia (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1964) embodied the Zambian Government's case in the negotiations over mineral royalties in the period immediately prior to independence. See also Peter Slim, "Commercial concessions and politics during the colonial period. The role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890-1964", African Affairs, 70, 281 (1971).

3. Hanna, Beginnings, p. 180. It is doubtful, however, if the British Government would have recognised any treaty with Mairi, since Karanganze lay within the boundaries of the Congo Free State as declared by Belgium in 1885.

The North Charterland Exploration Company with its 10,000-square mile concession in East Luangwa District found little in the way of minerals, the Sassare gold mine near Fort Jameson producing only £7,400 worth of gold in its lifetime, according to Michael Gelfand (1). The Exploration Company soon turned to plantation agriculture. No figures are available for the labour force needed for the mines in this period, but it could only have run to a few hundred. Lawrence Wallace, the Administrator of North-Western Rhodesia, was being unduly sanguine when he told Lewanika in 1909 that work could be found for his people "at Broken Hill, Ndola, Kansanshi and Bilawayo". (2).

There were, it might be argued, possible alternatives to mining as means of developing the new territory. When gold-mining in Southern Rhodesia, for example, was seen to be a disappointment by 1907, the Company in that territory began to emphasise the alternative of large-scale white commercial agriculture (3). The Uganda Railway similarly led to the opening up of the "White Highlands" of Konya. Lord Milner had laid down in 1899, that Northern Rhodesia was to be a tropical dependency, not a colony of white settlement, but this political decision might not have stood for long if it had not been supported by ecological factors. Apart from the BATEKA Plateau and parts of the Fort Jameson and Abercorn areas, conditions in the North did not favour large-scale European agriculture. The tsetse fly, which covered large parts of the woodland area, the distance from markets, the poor soils, and competition from the South were all factors militating against white settlement on any considerable scale. Those farmers who did settle

1. Michael Gelfand. Northern Rhodesia in the Days of the Charter (Oxford: Blackwell, 1931), p. 155. Gelfand gives no reference for this information, and I have been unable to confirm it from other sources.

2. NW/A/ZA/1 Minutes of Proceedings at a meeting with Lowanika at Loculi, 2 August 1909. The NW, NE and NR series of files are in the National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka.

in the years after the Boer War were strung out along the line of rail from Livingstone to Broken Hill, and produced mainly maize and cattle for the Katanga market, which expanded more rapidly after the railway reached Elisabethville in 1910. Buyers from Union Miniere travelled to the railway sidings of Batoka to purchase the grain and meat to provide rations for the labours on the mines, who by 1917 numbered 4,700, with a further 4,500 to 5,000 in ancillary occupations (1). But no other major export crop was developed in the North beyond the requirements of the mines. Some tobacco was grown for export in East Luangwa after the First World War, and very small amounts of coffee were produced by plantation agriculture in the Abercorn area (2).

ii. Tax and labour

If Northern Rhodesia was not to be a second Rand, or even a second Southern Rhodesia in mineral production, and if its agricultural possibilities were strictly limited, there was one residual economic function for the "Black North" to perform: to provide unskilled labour for the expanding, labour-intensive economies of Southern Rhodesia and (to a lesser degree) South Africa.

But before migrant labour could begin to flow, tax had to be imposed by a very rudimentary colonial administration. There was no colony which was not, eventually, taxed. But the relation between tax and migrant labour is a complex one, and it will be argued here that historians have paid too little heed to the actual incidence and effect of the tax, as opposed to its objectives and supposed effects as interpreted


2. Gann, Plural Society, p. 145.
by the administration. To a marked degree, some analysts such as Woddis (1) have been the willing prisoners of colonial administrators' propaganda. He sees tax as the main factor in forcing Africans on to the wage market. Gann (2) says "the need to earn tax-money was one of the most important incentives to induce Africans to take up paid employment", and goes on to link the imposition of tax in the North with the demands for labour by the settlers in the South. Economic historians, in so far as they have studied Northern Rhodesia in this period, assume, with Baldwin (3) that "in the early days, 'push' factors, especially the necessity of earning sufficient funds to pay the native tax, were no doubt much more important than they are today", and although he points out that many other "push" and "pull" factors operated by the 1920's, he assumes the all-importance of taxation "in the early days". Charles W. Coulter, writing the first systematic study of the sociological problem in Merle Davis's pioneering work (4), saw the influences drawing the workers to the mines as being the African's familiarity with mines and mining labour, his desire for foreign goods, and "the increasing necessity for money to discharge his growing obligations, some of which had formerly been paid in kind" (5).

The objection to these views is not that they are misleading so much as that they do not offer a sufficiently refined analysis of the

2. Gann, Plural Society, p. 77.
5. ibid., p. 52.
whole process of taxation within social change. It is true that a
great deal of the energy and ingenuity of the Company was taken up
with collecting tax, but this probably also had the effect of blinding
them to the social changes which were going on around them, and which
were an additional factor forcing the young men on to the labour market.

In this section, it will be argued that taxation was not a necessary
or sole cause of labour migration, but rather that it was only one stage
(though perhaps the most important one) in the process of the imposition
of European control. It will also be argued that labour migration did
not necessarily follow from the imposition of tax, at least in any pre-
dictable or simple way. As one illustration of the first argument,
many Lozis and other peoples from the North had worked in the mines and
farms of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in the 1890s, before tax,
or even European control, had been imposed on the North (1). Contra-
riwise, employers were mystified by the unwillingness of some people to
present themselves for wage labour in spite of tax and other pressures.
The Shona of Southern Rhodesia are in this category, as were the Western
Lunda of North-West Rhodesia. We shall analyse the reasons for these
phenomena later in more detail. It is sufficient now to point to a
lack of symmetrical cause-effect relationship between tax and labour
in the Company sphere.

It follows from this that the concept of a "labour reservoir" is
inadequate to describe Northern Rhodesia at this period. This is not
to deny that the territory provided a great deal of labour for the
South (see Table 1), but if "reservoir" means a supply which can be
turned on and off at will, then, as we shall see, Northern Rhodesia
never operated in this way, much as the Company may have wished it to.
If the labour supply had acted as a reservoir, there would have been

1. Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the financial and
economic position of Northern Rhodesia (Colonial No. 150, 1938)
(The Pim and Milligan Report) p. 29.
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>7590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>7511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>7457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>9120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>6688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>12126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>6801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>5408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>6602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>4142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>8549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>5418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>6509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>14579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>9038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>4060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>5348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>4409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>8028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore not including "voluntaries". There were 17,100 Northern Rhodesian Africans living in Southern Rhodesia in 1911; the earliest year for figures for "voluntaries" is 1925, when 19,803 Northern Rhodesian Africans entered Southern Rhodesia in search of work. This figure included original registrations, re-entrants and juveniles.

no scarcity of labour in the South, whereas, as we shall see, the period saw a persistent and wide-ranging crisis in the supply of labour to the industrial centres. The labour supply constantly fluctuated, causing a glut here and a famine there. The Company at first floundered as it attempted to fulfil the needs of the South while at the same time satisfying the Colonial Office of the legality of all its proceedings. Even attempts to recruit labour for the local homas fell into difficulties; the Company made a practice of calling out villagers to make roads or carry loads in fulfilment of their tax obligations, but this practice of "tax labour" was firmly forbidden as early as 1902 by Sir Clement Hill at the Foreign Office. A variation on tax labour was the practice whereby a European farmer or trader engaged Africans for a month's work, then handed over the wages in toto to the Company. In Nyasaland, this was known as the kalata system; such practices were widespread and inevitable. As yet, there was little coin in circulation, and payment in the form of cloth had limited utility for the Company. But however inevitable they were, tax labour and kalata were forced labour by even the most conservative definition. They persisted for at least a decade, but they disappeared from the official record (1).

However, this occasional, often forcible recruitment of carriers and labourers for Company, farmers or traders in Northern Rhodesia was not the same thing as labour migration. Indeed, for many Bemba and Ngoni (2) this kind of work was an intermediate stage between

1. NE/A/2/4/1/1: Report of Acting Administrator (Codrington) on the operations of the Hut Tax for the half year ending 30 September 1901; NE/A/1/4/2/7: C. H. Hill (Foreign Office) to Secretary, British South Africa Company, 31 May 1902; J. F. Jones (Joint Manager and Secretary, British South Africa Company) to Hill, 2 July 1902; A. T. Miller (Assistant Secretary, British South Africa Company) to R. Codrington 18 October 1902; Jones to Codrington, 9 May 1903. For extra-legal methods of tax collecting, see J. E. Stephenson, Chirumpala's Tale (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1937), pp. 213 ff.

2. Unless otherwise stated, tribal terms such as "Bemba" and "Ngoni" refer to the people from a broad region rather than to the historic ethnic group. In the history of labour migration, regions are more important than traditional ethnic identities, with the possible exception of the Lozi. See below, pp. 30-52.
the imposition of tax and migration to the South. The economic benefits derived from local labour may have led to a desire for more, and thus to more extended migration. Thus, labour migration was undoubtedly economically motivated, but tax only occupied one place in a complex chain of events.

iii. The Southern African labour crisis, 1901-20

The Transvaal labour crisis of 1901-06 may be regarded as only the most dramatic manifestation of a continuing labour crisis throughout Central and Southern Africa which lasted until at least 1920. Settlers were not slow to offer their diagnosis and remedies (often contradictory), coloured by their own prejudices and limitations. The laziness of Africans and the existence of reserves was blamed by the Bulawayo Chronicle in 1911:

"so long as the germs of sloth and demoralisation are allowed to multiply in the native reserves, we cannot hope for a solution to our labour difficulties; much less can we expect the country to settle down to a stable condition of prosperity" (1)

On the other hand, the Southern Rhodesian Native Affairs Committee of Inquiry, 1911, followed the Native Department in asserting that the natives of Southern Rhodesia were not in fact indolent, that traditional agriculture required their labour for large parts of the year, and that they not only supplied their own food requirements but a large part of the mines' also (2).

The true reason for the 'scarcity' of labour lies in the fact that this was a period of painful adjustment to new economic relations on the part of both European capitalists and African cultivators. A rapidly-expanding mining industry on the Rand and in Southern Rhodesia required a large unskilled labour force. The economic


Inducements to the indigenous people to come to the developed areas to earn wages were not at this time high. The "nexus of centrifugal tendencies" referred to by Mitchell in his analysis of the causes of labour migration (1) was not yet strongly developed, and a crude reliance on the tax weapon led to only limited success. Southern Rhodesia's towns proffered as yet few amenities for Africans; the "bright lights" did not as yet exist (2).

But if the "pull" factors did not as yet operate with any great effect, tax and famine combined could be a strong "push" factor. The famine of 1911-12 in Southern Rhodesia turned the labour crisis temporarily into a glut. But famine, as with tax, was unpredictable in its effects. Employers were particularly irritated by the non-availability of the people in the immediate vicinity of mines or European farms. The Shona had retained some of their economic independence by selling their produce to the mines. For similar reasons the Lamba of Katanga and the Copperbelt, and the peoples of the Transvaal, were notoriously unwilling to work in industry which was effectively on their doorstep. All the Africans at work on the Sassare gold mine in North-Eastern Rhodesia in 1907 were Nyasas and not Ngoni from the surrounding area (3). Sassare was in the middle of a labour-producing area, but this Ngoni labour preferred to travel south to earn higher wages.


3. Correspondence relating to the recruitment of labour in the Nyasaland Protectorate for the Transvaal and Southern Rhodesia Mines (Cd. 3993 of 1908); No. 47, encl.: Report and Suggestions ... by J.C. Casson, Superintendent of Native Affairs, Nyasaland, November 1907.
Throughout the period the settlers of Southern Rhodesia were driven to desperation by this situation, which they were unable to understand. They advocated forced labour and intensive recruitment as the remedies, in spite of the fact that the Martin Report had pointed out forced labour as a reason for the rebellions of the Shona and Ndebele (1). They saw it as a government responsibility to put pressure on the chiefs to produce labour, and they demanded the setting up of a Government department with the responsibility for supplying labour.

But the Colonial Office shied away from any notion of compulsion, and by early 1902 had ruled that the Company must confine itself to giving information and advice about labour, while the recruitment was done by private bodies:

"the labourer cannot dissociate those who have taken part in obtaining his labour from any ill-treatment he may receive. In the present case of Southern Rhodesia, he imagines that it is useless to appeal for redress to those whom he ought to regard as his natural protectors". (2)

It was a frustrating impasse for the Company, the mineowners and farmers of Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Land and Mine Owners' Association complained to the Company in 1903:

"Mines which have arrived at the producing stage find that systematic simultaneous development and extraction is impossible and uneconomical production is inevitable. The mineral wealth of Rhodesia is being wasted and the prosperity of the country endangered so long as we have to depend on local labour". (3)


3. Rhodesian Land and Mine Owners' Association to the British South Africa Company, 5 March 1903, quoted in the Morning Post (London), 19 March 1903.
This last was a plea for labour from abroad, which by 1903 seemed to be the only legal answer to Rhodesia's labour problem. Attempts at recruiting Africans from north of the Zambezi by an early form of the Native Labour Bureau had been a dismal failure, and a demarcation agreement with the more efficient Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) was terminated after it had produced not a single labourer for Rhodesia (1). Evidently, it was felt that quicker results could be obtained by recruiting batches of labourers from more exotic sources: the Horn of Africa, Aden, China and India.

It was an ill-fated experiment. 250 labourers of various nationalities from the Horn of Africa duly arrived in 1901, and were "found to be efficient" (2). On the other hand, 130 of the labourers brought from Aden in the same year "after one day's work, absolutely refused to go down the mine". Chinese labour was suggested, but was caught up in the Transvaal Chinese labour controversy, and never materialised; the Government of India in 1903 placed so many obstacles in the way of the importation of Indian labour that the matter was dropped in 1905. The Indian Government's doubts were shrewdly founded, and were the same as had decided it to refuse labour to British East Africa in 1902:

"The pioneers of colonial enterprise are naturally and necessarily masterful men - not very squeamish or tender-hearted; it is probable that for the control of Africans sterner measures than are needed for Indians are absolutely necessary; and there is always a risk that the distinction between the two races may not be recognised when both are labouring side by side .... admirable provisions may be made on paper for the protection of emigrants, but the machinery and opportunity for enforcing them may alike be lacking". (3)

1. Wilson Fox, Memorandum, p. 238.


Thus, circumstances were forcing the Rhodesians to look northwards again. Indentured labour from overseas seemed increasingly unlikely after the furore of the Transvaal Chinese labour crisis (1). WNLA was recruiting in Mozambique, and menacing Rhodesia's pool of "voluntary" labour there, aided and abetted by the Portuguese government (2). In 1903, a reconstituted Native Labour Bureau was set up, with some financial backing from the Company, and containing representatives from the mines, agriculture and the administration. Val Gielgud was the General Manager, and recruiting took place within Southern Rhodesia, although probably many North-East Rhodesian Africans found their way across the Zambezi and along the Bureau's labour route via Sipolilo to Salisbury and Hartley (3). But the financial problems of this Bureau proved insurmountable, and in 1903 yet another Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) was constituted, this time backed by a labour tax on the larger mines. This RNLB began for the first time to organise a system of agencies, rest-houses and labour routes north of the Zambezi. The RNLB had arrived in Northern Rhodesia (4).

Before going on to examine the local pressures and responses of tax and labour in Northern Rhodesia, it is necessary to attempt to summarise the inter-territorial dimensions of the conflict caused by


2. Bulawayo Chronicle, 27 June 1903. The writer gives a figure of 9000 Mozambiquans out of 11,000 labourers on the Rhodesian mines, but "in the last few months the Portuguese have efficiently patrolled the RhodesiakPEA border, and today the number of Portuguese natives entering Rhodesia is almost a negligible quantity".

3. Wilson Fox, Memorandum, pp. 238-239.

4. Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, pp. 28-29. For details of the inter-governmental agreement on RNLB recruitment see Cd. 3993, item 56; Acting Governor, Nyasaland Protectorate, to Secretary of State, 20 November 1907, and encls.
the labour crisis in Southern Africa. The nature of this conflict depended on the interests and loyalties of a particular administration, though the outcome of the conflict (i.e. the volume and direction of labour migration) was usually decided by uncontrolled economic factors, not by governments. To a large extent we are dealing with a conflict of attitudes which only marginally affected the volume of labour migration.

The case of Nyasaland is perhaps the clearest, and has been well analysed by Krishnamurthy (1). The Chamber of Mines in Johannesburg recruited the support of Chamberlain at the Colonial Office and Milner, the High Commissioner, to put pressure on the Nyasaland Government to allow labour recruiting for the Rand mines. Standing against these pressures were the British Foreign Office, the Scottish Missions in Nyasaland, the Nyasaland settlers, and, less firmly, the Commissioner/Governor of Nyasaland, Sir Alfred Sharpe. Though the line-up of forces might alter, there were always substantial pressures against allowing unrestricted labour migration from Nyasaland (2). Recruitment for WNLA and the RNLB was restricted from time to time, and during the 1910-11 sleeping-sickness "epidemic" (3) Governor Manning not only prohibited all recruitment, but also did all in his power to prevent


2. Cd. 3993 of 1908, the "Blue Book", was a result of these pressures.

3. Gelfand, Charter, pp. 196-211. Though sleeping sickness never reached the dimensions of an epidemic, doubt about which tsetse fly was the carrier of trypanosome rhodesiense made the medical authorities nervous about human movements southwards across the Zambezi. In 1912 the Southern Rhodesian Sleeping Sickness Commission proved that glossina morsitans was the carrier, but "despite the abundance of fly, few cases of human sleeping sickness are seen". Restrictions were gradually lifted. Probably the restrictions made little difference to labour migration.
voluntaries from going south. Even the marginal reduction in the labour supply which this brought to the Rhodesian settlers was enough to provoke a farmers' revolt against the Company in Southern Rhodesia (1).

But the administrations of Northern Rhodesia adopted a much less positive approach to the protection of their subjects from the rigours of labour migration. Even after the Rebellions, the Company found it difficult to forget its role as a labour-recruiting organisation. One of Coryndon's first acts as Resident was to arrange for the employment of "a number of natives" who had "expressed their intention of travelling to Bulawayo for work", (2) and in 1898 Captain Lawley, the Deputy Administrator of Mashonaland, met Coryndon and Lewanika at Victoria Falls to discuss the supply of labour for the Rhodesian mines. At least 150 labourers arrived on the mines as a result (3). North-Eastern Rhodesia was equally forthcoming, and at least 2000 labourers were recruited there for the mines and the Mashonaland Police between 1898 and 1900 (4). Even after the Colonial Office had stopped the Company's participation in active recruitment, the BSA Company's London Office continued to urge on the Administrators at Kalomo/Livingstone and at Fort Jameson to leave no stone unturned in inducing labour to go south. "There is no reason", said the Company's General Report on Rhodesia for 1907-08, "why North-East Rhodesia should not in future be of the greatest assistance to Southern Rhodesia in supplementing the constant shortage

1. For further analysis of the farmers' revolt, see my "White populism in Southern Rhodesia", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14, 4 (1972).


3. Ibid., p. 439.

4. Ibid., pp. 439, 440.
of labour there". (1). When Codrington demanded a deferred pay system for RNLB recruits from North-Eastern Rhodesia in 1906 (a condition laid down by Nyasaland) the London Office urged him to drop the demand if it interfered with recruitment (2). The North-Western Rhodesia administration did not demand deferred pay.

The Northern administrations, therefore, saw their role as the custodians of labour for the Company sphere in the south. This outweighed most other considerations. Even during the years of high mortality rates in the South, and in spite of the close Colonial Office scrutiny as seen in the 1908 Blue Book, the London directors refused to suspend recruitment in Northern Rhodesia:

"the introduction of labour from North-East Rhodesia to supplement the deficiency in Southern Rhodesia is ... so clearly to the mutual benefit of both territories, that the Directors would greatly regret to learn that it must be abandoned". (3)

Nor was recruitment abandoned, except during the sleeping-sickness "epidemic", when, of course, the Southern Rhodesian administration was equally, though reluctantly, forced to close its borders, for fear of the spread of human trypanosomiasis southwards.

At the same time, it was made clear that the Transvaal was not permitted to tap what was pre-eminently a source of labour for Southern Rhodesia (4). As we have seen, WNLA was confined to Nyasaland and Mozambique, and, although small batches of North-East

1. BSA Company: General Report for the year ending 31 March 1908.

2. NE/A/1/4/18: Millar (Assistant Secretary, BSA Company, London Office) to Codrington (Administrator, North-Eastern Rhodesia), 29 September 1906.

3. NE/A/1/4/4/8: Brodie (Secretary, BSA Company) to Codrington, 12 January 1907.

4. NW/A/1/1/5: Selborne (High Commissioner for South Africa) to Administrator, North-Western Rhodesia, 18 September 1907.
Rhodesian Africans might be added to WNLA's Nyasaland quota, North-East Rhodesia remained a channel for Nyasa labour going to the Rand rather than a supplier of labour. Relations between the Company and the Transvaal Chamber of Mines were less than warm, and Southern Rhodesia threatened to block all movement of labourers to the South in 1908, ostensibly because of the threat of sleeping sickness (1).

In their desperate quest for labour, district officials, especially in North-Western Rhodesia, went far beyond the rules of conduct laid down by Whitehall. Scandals racked the North-Western administration between 1908 and 1914, as a result of their "pacifying" recalcitrant parts of the country. The Balunda District, for example, was in a state of anarchy because of the activities of slave-raiders from Angola, and Codrington, the Administrator, appears to have given carte blanche to Native Commissioner "One-Eye" McGregor in 1908 to treat the district as if it were in a state of rebellion. Previously, in 1903, McGregor had so indulged in an orgy of burning and destruction in the Kaunga District that his police companion, Hodson, had complained to his commandant (2). McGregor equally swept through Balunda like a tornado. He systematically flogged both tax defaulters and his own messengers and bearers, ordered his police to shoot "deserters" (i.e. those fleeing from forced labour) and killed at least three people and probably more. He never held a trial or judicial proceedings of any kind, and he is still remembered as the scourge of the district (3).

1. Cd. 3993, item 63: High Commissioner for South Africa to Secretary of State, 10 February 1908, and encls.

2. Colonial Office Confidential Print: African (South) No. 763, esp. item 178: Harding (Commandant, Barotse Native Police) to Imperial Secretary, Johannesburg, 29 May 1905; and C.O. 417/408: minute by George Grindle, 14 June 1905. The C.O. series of files is in the Public Record Office, London.

In the Gwembe District in the south of the territory, labour recruiters from the south accompanied district officials and spread terror by their brutal methods. In 1907 about 100 Gwembe Tonga tribesmen took to the hills to resist tax. Patrick Macnamara, the Native Commissioner, defeated the resisters in a skirmish, and subsequently forced many of the Gwembe Valley people, through floggings and threats, to go to work in Southern Rhodesia (1). For this Macnamara received only a warning, yet he was forced to resign in 1910 when it was revealed that he had been living with an African woman(2).

In both of these cases, the North-Western administration took only belated action after the whole matter had been raised by the High Commissioner in Johannesburg and the Colonial Office. In McGregor's case there were good grounds for a charge of murder, as the Colonial Office pointed out, yet the Administration had taken no action when McGregor mentioned the shootings in his routine monthly reports (3). A Colonial Office official privately observed that

"Mr. Beak/British consul in the Congo Free State/ in one of his reports said that the NWR administration was as bad as the Congo Free State! This is one of several recent bad cases. This officer appears to have flogged systematically, had several natives shot, and indulged in forced labour, all CFS methods". (4)

1. African (South) No. 932, item 245: Acting Administrator, North-Western Rhodesia to High Commissioner, 10 November 1909; also memorandum by F.V. Worthington, Secretary for Native Affairs, North-Western Rhodesia, on Mr. A.C. Anderson's Report, 28 October, 1909; and Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 75-76. African (South) Nos. 932 and 948 contain the printed correspondence on the McGregor and Macnamara cases.

2. African (South) No. 932, items 46, 48: High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 11 April 1910 (telegram), and Secretary of State to High Commissioner, 16 April 1910.

3. African (South) No. 948, item 7: Secretary of State to High Commissioner, 20 January 1910.

While supporting the new Administrator of both territories, Lawrence Wallace, the Colonial Office considered that the least said about his predecessors the better. Sir Henry Lambert in the Dominions Division of the Colonial Office thought that "the light which The Macnamara case throws on the spirit of the administration is quite unpleasant, and it makes one wonder how far Mr. Coryndon, who was in charge while these things were being done is to be trusted in Swaziland (where he went in 1907)... It is to be hoped that Mr. Wallace will prove to be a better administrator than Mr. Codrington or Mr. Coryndon would seem to have been". (1)

For a time, the Colonial Office campaigned for a thorough investigation of the Northern Rhodesian administration. In 1914, Lambert suggested that the newly-appointed Resident Commissioner for the territory under the 1911 Order-in-Council should be "sent up with directives to overhaul and specially report on the native administration of Northern Rhodesia". (2). But the First World War supervened, and the imminent end of Company rule at the end of it made such an investigation pointless.

There were, of course, vast structural and practical difficulties in simultaneously pacifying, taxing and establishing a presence in a territory with a small and scattered population and poor communications. The Company found itself in the position of being able to please nobody. Their own settlers in the North put up an endless barrage of complaints about the scarcity of labour with which to develop the territory, and the primacy of Southern Rhodesia in the Company's attitude to the labour supply. The North-Western settlers had to rely on the crumbs from the RNLB's table, while the settlers in the North-East were left to their own devices. Like the Nyasaland settlers, the Fort Jameson farmers formed a temporary holy alliance with the non-conformist conscience in their attempts to conserve labour. In 1912,

1. ibid., minute by H. Lambert, 10 January 1910.

2. C.O. 417/539: Minute by H. Lambert, 15 April 1914.
they obtained the aid of the Aborigines Protection Society in their bid to reduce the activities of the RNLB in the area: "We desire to conserve the labourers now going South; we have been compelled this season, for want of labour, to ruthlessly curtail the acreage under cultivation". (1). By 1918, the Fort Jameson farmers were complaining that their tobacco had to be planted with the help of female labour, since so many able-bodied males had gone south (2). For these and other reasons, the Fort Jameson settlers seriously considered a relationship with Nyasaland should the Company proposal of 1915 for amalgamation of the Rhodesias go through; like the Nyasaland settlers, the farmers of Fort Jameson paid low wages in order to be even marginally economic; they, therefore, saw an apparent abundance of labour drain away to the better wages of the South; but the Company was decidedly less sympathetic towards their grievances than the Protectorate Government might have been: the Administrator (Wallace) told a deputation of Fort Jameson farmers in 1917 that the Company's first priority must be to develop Southern Rhodesia, and the output of the Southern Rhodesian mines were "an imperial necessity" during the War (3).

1. NR/A/4/1/1: J.A. Foord (Secretary, Farmers' and Commercial Association of North-Eastern Rhodesia) to Gladstone (High Commissioner for South Africa), 27 November 1912; see also BSA Company, Administrator's Report for North-Eastern Rhodesia for the year ending 31 March 1910; NW/A/1/1/3: Selborne (High Commissioner for South Africa) to Acting Administrator, North-Western Rhodesia, 10 November 1903, and encls.; and John B. Stabler, "The British South Africa Company proposal for amalgamation of the Rhodesias, 1915-1917: Northern Rhodesian reaction", African Social Research (ASR), 7 (1969).

2. NR/A/4/1/2: G.R. Christie (Secretary, North-East Rhodesia Farmers' and Commercial Association) to Cookson (Resident Magistrate, Fort Jameson) 13 November 1918.

3. ibid., Minutes of a deputation of the North-East Rhodesia Farmers' and Commercial Association to the Administrator at Fort Jameson, 4 August 1917.
A final dimension of the inter-territorial labour contest was the relationship between North-East Rhodesia and the Nyasaland Protectorate. Although both were labour-supplying areas and attempted from time to time to shield their migrants from the worst excesses of employers (1), a sharp conflict arose over Nyasaland's greater anxiety to prevent labourers from migrating on a large scale to the South. North-East Rhodesia constituted a serious leak in Nyasaland's arrangements to discourage both recruitment and voluntary migration. Both an RNLB and a WNLA recruiting agency operated at Fort Jameson, just across the border from Nyasaland, and it was a simple matter for Nyasas to pass themselves off as Ngonis from North-East Rhodesia. Those who did not wish to sign on at Fort Jameson continued along the well-known mailroute to Feira, where a ferry operated from as early as 1904. From there, the labourers walked to Salisbury, a journey of about 400 miles from the Nyasaland border (2).

The Nyasaland Government tried to persuade the Company administration in North-East Rhodesia to co-operate in reducing the outflow as early as 1903, but we have already noted the divided

1. See, for example, Cd. 3993, item 56, encl.: L.A. Wallace (Acting Administrator, Fort Jameson) to Governor, Zomba, 11 November 1917.

2. It is impossible to give an exact estimate of the scale of this migration. Casson, the Superintendent of Native Affairs in the Protectorate, estimated that "over 5000" Nyasas were at work in Southern Rhodesia in 1907; C. Knipe, the District Manager of WNLA at Salisbury, estimated that 18,000 left the Protectorate in the same year. See Cd. 3993, item 47 (Casson's Report); item 61: Knipe to Acting Governor (Manning) of Nyasaland, 11 January 1908. These figures, however, would include migrants entering via Tete in Mozambique. The ferry at Feira in 1904 carried 6,126 Nyasas, 704 North-East Rhodesians and 151 Portuguese southwards. In early 1907 Kanyemba boma was set up on the southern side, and an RNLB office and compound set up. By 1910 a total of 13,877 labourers were ferried south, 8,555 ferried north. By that time, however, the Broken Hill route was being used by the RNLB in preference to Feira for labourers recruited at Fort Jameson. See Feira District Notebook, Lusaka Archives, pp. 372 ff; Gelfand, Charter, p. 101.
loyalties of the Fort Jameson government on the subject. At the
time North-East Rhodesia was also a small-scale consumer of Nyasa
skilled labour, and Judge Beaufort of North-East Rhodesia complained
about "the highly improper pressure .... by the Administration of
the British Central Africa Protectorate to prevent the natives
coming to North-East Rhodesia to earn money", and cited a case
where Protectorate police had forcibly prevented labourers from
crossing the border (1). Codrington in this case agreed to co-
operate in preventing any recruitment of Nyasa labour for North-
Eastern or Southern Rhodesia which was contrary to the laws of the
territory, but governments could only strike at cobwebs: no admini-
stration was strong enough to resist the "pull" forces operating
on labour in Southern Africa, short of a cordon of police round
its frontiers. No-one could stop this flood of "voluntaries",
any more than Canute could turn back the tide:

"They were robbed and murdered passing through Portuguese
territory, were swindled at the Zambezi ferries and died
of thirst and starvation on unknown routes. In spite of
this they persevered ...". (2)

iv. Migrant labour: its impact and the response from African
societies

Enough has been said about the differential incidence and impact
of tax and about the uneven spread of administration to prepare us
for the argument in this section, namely that the responses of African
societies to the "push" and "pull" factors governing labour migration
were varied and complex. We shall examine examples of peoples who
were said by district officials to be "reluctant" to come out to work
for wages, and examples of peoples who had to be restrained from

1. NE/A/3/7/4: Codrington to Sharpe (H.M. Commissioner, Zomba),
24 April 1903.

2. ibid., Codrington to Sharpe, 25 June 1904.
migrating southwards on a large scale. We shall see that migrant
labour was a response to a variety of factors connected with colonial
rule; it will be argued - if it still needs argument - that labour
migration did not have one single cause, or one single effect.

Let us first examine two neighbouring areas which were extremely
late in producing labour migrants, just, as indeed, they were late
in producing modern political leaders. As we shall see in subsequent
chapters, the two are related. First, the area around Kasempa,
inhabited by the Kaonde people, was subjected in 1909 to sudden pres-
sure for labour by an administration which underestimated the resistance
of a remote people to the rigours of a new life. In 1909, Worthington,
the Secretary for Native Affairs, argued that it was high time that
the 5/- tax paid in the Kasempa, Ndola and Loangwa Districts (roughly
present-day North-Western, Copperbelt and Central Provinces) was
raised to 10/-, in line with the rest of North-Western Rhodesia and
North-Eastern Rhodesia. In the usual mechanistic manner of the
administration, he judged that "availability" of employment would mean
that Africans would seek jobs more eagerly if tax was raised. Besides,
he complained, the Kaonde were selling their grain to pay tax. Employ-
ment was dependent on the RNLB, since the only employment possible for
the Kaonde inside the territory were Kansanshi and Bwana Mkubwa mines,
the small limestone industry around Lusaka, or European farming near
Chilanga (1).

To understand the reluctance of the Kaonde to travel to work, we
must revert to Worthington's complaint that some had the opportunity
of growing maize for the nearby Katanga mines. This could be a
lucrative proposition. In 1910 Union Miniere offered 27/6 each for

1. NW/A/2/1/3: Memorandum by F.V. Worthington, Secretary for Native
Affairs 18 November 1909.
2000 bags of maize from the Kaonde near Kansanshi. The North-West Rhodesia administration had no hesitation in banning the transaction, on the grounds that the high price offered to the Kaonde would not ultimately be of benefit to them. The Acting Administrator, Carden, argued that, since the Kaonde were of fine physique they could earn more by migrating to Kansanshi or Dwana Mkubwa mines:

"it would seem to be a better policy to encourage the energies of the Bakahondi in the direction of mining rather than agriculture". (1)

In other words, the Company's aim was to encourage wage labour and discourage cash cropping among Africans; one hesitates, however, to see this as a deep-laid conspiracy or a carefully-thought-out plan: but all the Company's assumptions about the primacy of mining and industry led inevitably to a neglect of the possibilities of the rural areas, and to the constant raising of the opportunity cost of remaining a peasant.

The RNLB duly opened an agency at Kasempa in 1910, and tax was raised to 10/- for all districts of North-West Rhodesia in 1911. This led to the first murder of a white man by Africans in Northern Rhodesia. In June 1911, Ohlund, a minor functionary of the RNLB, was murdered near Kasempa by his Bemba servants. The District Commissioner, W. Hazell, had no doubt that the murder was directed against the RNLB, for Severts, another RNLB agent, was nearly murdered on the same night, and there had been attempts to kill RNLB messengers (2).

1. NW/A/2/1/2: A.A. Thomson, General Manager, Kansanshi Mine, to Administrator, North-West Rhodesia, 11 February 1910; Carden (Acting Administrator North-Western Rhodesia) to High Commissioner for South Africa, 12 March 1910. Mr. Thomson feared that his mine would have to close down if Union Minière tapped all the surplus maize in the area by offering high prices to producers.

2. NW/A/2/1/5: W. Hazell (District Commissioner, Kasempa) to Secretary for Native Affairs, 13 and 20 June 1911, encl. in Administrator to High Commissioner for South Africa, 4 August 1911.
There was, said Hazell, resentment against the Bureau because of the deaths of labourers sent to the South, and the absence of compensation for them. Thus, although the Bemba were the culprits, it emerged that the Kaonde also had cause to wish for Chlund's removal from the scene. The High Commissioner for South Africa expressed anxiety about the conditions of recruitment, and the Resident Commissioner in Salisbury, Burns-Begg, argued that "the capacity of Kasempa natives to bear taxation has not yet been clearly demonstrated, and they are probably even less ripe for exploitation by the Labour Bureau" (1). RNLI recruiting in the District was temporarily stopped, but the underlying problem of how the people were to find their tax was not solved.

In isolated cases, the obvious inability of the people to pay tax led to a moderation in the demands of the colonial authority. Our second area of late labour migration, the Lunda-Lovale area of the North-West, was remote from all places of employment, and communications were poor; as a result, in 1922, there were 10,000 known tax defaulters in the Balovale Sub-District (now Zambezi District) alone. The missionary G.R. Suckling, in 1923, deplored the way tax was collected: 'since I entered the district there has been a series of officials to take charge, each one determined, by tightening the screw, to get a record "tax"' (2). He argued that the reason why the Balovale Sub-District was so backward

1. NR/A/4/1/1: Resident Commissioner, Salisbury (Burns-Begg) to Administrator, Northern Rhodesia, 21 September 1911.
2. KDE/2/39/2: Tax-Barotse, 1914-1923: G.R. Suckling (Kabompo Mission Station) to the Secretary to the Administrator, Northern Rhodesia, 23 February 1923. District Reports (prefix K) are in the National Archives, Lusaka.
was the harrying of tax defaulters. According to Suckling, indiscriminate arrests and raiding of villages by boma messengers took place, though not when the district officials were present. The occasional recruiting activities of the RNLB and of Robert Williams and Co. (for the Katanga mines) did little to help the situation. There was a very real fear of chipalu (work or forced labour) among the Loyale people, a fear justified by the death rates of 9.5 and 11% respectively suffered by 700 recruits for Robert Williams and Co. in 1916 and by 432 for the RNLB in 1917. Of the latter group 32% deserted before the end of their contract in the South (1). The Assistant Native Commissioner at Balovale's comment, however, was spine-chillingly unsympathetic:

"To obtain work the Natives must travel some hundreds of miles and, no doubt, the prospect of doing so frightens them, but those who return are the first to confess they are sorry they had not gone before". (2)

Recognition was given, however, to Balovale's problems, and in 1923, it was decided to write off tax arrears there after one year (3). In 1925, the tax in Balovale District was reduced from 10/- to 5/- per year (4).

Tax was, therefore, a blunt-edged weapon, and did not always work as expected. If there was no prospect of work for the people of an area, the administration could not lock up the entire population; they therefore collected as much as they could, and cast around for

---

1. KDE/2/39/3: J. Warrington (Assistant Native Commissioner, Balovale) to Resident Magistrate (RM) Mongu, 1 January 1919.

2. Ibid.

3. Loc. cit., J.C.C. Conhead (Secretary for Native Affairs) to RM Mongu, 1 March 1923.


* author's emphasis
suitable employment. There is no doubt that tax and labour were regarded by the Administration as indispensable to one another, and that no people was to be permitted to attempt permanently to pay their tax through selling their crops, no matter how keen the market. The labour recruiter was the strong right arm of the administrator, though both had occasionally to withdraw in the face of African resistance.

But it would be misleading to assert that the universal response of Africans in the territory to labour and tax demands was "resistance". Even at this early period, some areas, notably Barotseland, East Luangwa, Awerda and Tanganyika Districts, responded to the new demands by migrating for wages in substantial numbers. One of the main reasons for this was that they were either near places of employment, or could travel there by well-known routes.

The incidence of migrant labour in Barotse was, to a larger extent than elsewhere, determined by its internal politics. The colonial power recognised the obligation of Lozi commoners to perform tribute labour for the nobility. Twelve days' tribute labour to the paramount and his induna was recognised by the administration as being due at the same time as Lewanika abolished slavery in 1909 (1). This privilege placed a double burden of labour on the Lozi commoners, since they also had to find their tax as well as cultivate their own gardens (2). The Paramount was in some ways in the position of a settler: he consumed labour, and therefore wanted to conserve some, while at the same time, he had an interest in a steady cash inflow to pay tax.


2. NR/B/15/2/297: Minutes of an official interview held at the Khotla, Lealui, 2 July 1920, between the Resident Magistrate (G.G.P. Lyons) and Paramount Chief Yetta III.
Labour recruitment was therefore encouraged in the north of the District, in Lovale country, where many Wiko, or immigrants from Angola, could be recruited, but a more conservationist attitude was adopted in Bulozi itself (1). The Mulena Mukwae of Nalolo, indeed, by 1920, was growing grain for sale, "employing" labourers to work for her all the year round, with the result that they were unable to cultivate their own gardens (2). Paramount Chief Yeta, on the other hand, was allowed by the Administration to commute his tribute labour to a "labour tax" of 2/6 per year, and his interest lay in finding jobs for his people and in ensuring that they came back from the South. This, together with arguments about the Paramount's share of the tax, was the staple of the exchanges between the Lozi and the Company in this period. "(The Lozi)", remarked Lawrence Wallace, Administrator of North-West Rhodesia in 1909, "... would like some easy work to be found for them near their homes or would prefer to be left unmolested by any offer of work or demand for taxes". (3). But Wallace could only suggest

1. It is said that the Paramount's indunas at Kazungula, the port of exit for the South from Barotseland, inspected would-be emigrants to determine whether or not they were circumcised. The uncircumcised (Lozi) were sent back, the circumcised (Western Lunda, Lovale, Luchazi, Lwena, Chokwe and Mbunda) allowed to proceed. It is unlikely that the Paramount had any greater success than the Administration in conserving labour, but the story illustrates the desire to prevent the depletion of the ruling group. Information from Keli Walubita, 1968. See also Max Gluckman, "The role of the sexes in Wiko circumcision ceremonies", M. Fortes (ed.), Social Structure: Essays presented to A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949).


Broken Hill, Ndola, Kansanshi or Bulawayo as places of work, none of which was less than 350 miles distant from Lealui as the crow flies. A few found their way to the white farms of Batoka, but on the whole work inside Northern Rhodesia was not popular because pay and conditions were inferior to those of Southern Rhodesia (1).

Despite the reluctance of the Lozi nobility to see their commoners migrating far afield, the fact remains that the Lozi were found in large numbers working throughout Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and, later, Northern Rhodesia. The reasons for this are varied: we have seen that the nobility had an interest, through tax, in exporting labour. But this does not mean that they acted purely from such motives. The high death rate of labourers, their "lack of respect for chiefs" on their return, and the difficulty of sustaining the indigenous economy in the absence of large numbers of young men, were all factors which affected the power and prestige of the chiefs as much as tax did. But other factors besides the attitude of the chiefs pushed young men south. The Lozi language could be understood by the Sotho and the two peoples had historic contacts; besides, the Lozi had the advantage, like the Lakeside Tonga of Malawi, (2) of early contact with mission education, which enabled them to secure jobs as clerks, capitas and interpreters.

As we shall see when we deal with the Copperbelt, this enhanced the separateness of the Lozi from the other peoples of Zambia, who by and large had had no such advantages. The lukewarmness of the Lozis during the 1935 and 1940 strikes on the Copperbelt was partly

---

1. NR/A/4/1/2: Resident Commissioner, Salisbury (Burns-Begg) to Norris W. Dent (North-West Rhodesia Farmers' Association), 11 October 1910.

at least due to their superior position in the labour hierarchy. Thus began a so-called "tribal" antagonism between Bemba and Lozi which was not based on any traditional hostility and which arose from an urban industrial situation (1).

The second area of early migration in Northern Rhodesia was East Luangwa (present-day Eastern Province). The "Ngoni" (a general term embracing all the Nyanja-speaking peoples of the area, including Nsenga, Senga, Chewa, Kunda and Mpeseni's Ngoni) like their neighbours the Nyasas, were much in demand in Southern Rhodesia, and the sealing off of North-East Rhodesia by sleeping sickness in 1910-11 precipitated a major labour crisis in Southern Rhodesia which has already been referred to (2). The demands of the Fort Jameson settlers were added to those of the RNLB, and we have also noted the Gresham's Law of labour, namely that labourers preferred distant, better-paid work to nearby, worse-paid work, the result being that local labour in East Luangwa came predominantly from Nyasaland.

In spite of these increasing demands for labour, the Ngoni, according to Lane Poole, (3) were growing enough grain on their fertile soils up to 1915 to be able to convert their surplus to cash. But when the demands of World War I escalated, there came a shortage of labour in the subsistence economy, and 1918-19 saw something like famine.

1. "Tribalism", as a competition for political and economic power in the urban areas based on regional groupings, need not be based on pre-colonial historic antagonisms, as Robert Rotberg points out. See his "Tribalism and politics in Zambia", Africa Report, vol. 12, No. 9, 1967.

2. Above, pp.17-18. See also NW/A/1/1/3, Selborne to Acting Administrator, North-West Rhodesia, 10 November 1906, and encls.

3. E.H.L. Poole, Native Reserves - East Luangwa District, 1922 (Miscellaneous reports, Lusaka Archives, typescript).
In 1917, out of an estimated total of 34,000 able-bodied males in East Luangwa, only 6000 were not working for wages, according to Cookson, the Resident Magistrate at Fort Jameson. In a report (1) he gave a vivid picture of an area suffering from impossible demands on its able-bodied men. Cookson's figures (Table 2) are unlikely to be accurate, but they give an indication of the volume and direction of labour migration at the time.

To make the Ngonis' impoverishment complete, increased tax was imposed in 1920, and when Lane Poole wrote in 1922 he estimated that about 50 per cent of the adult (male) population had left the district for work. Not only did they go to Southern Rhodesia in increasing numbers, but they remained there for five or six years, or, in some cases, permanently.

There is need for caution in assessing these raw figures. As Kuczynski points out, (2), the terminology even of the official annual reports is loose, and the numbers of labourers leaving the territory in any one year is constantly confused with the number employed outside the territory; also, it is often hard to guess whether the figures given by, for example, Cookson, were average figures for labourers employed during the year, maximum figures of the total labourers in employment during any period of the year, or simply quota figures of labourers "allotted" to various employments.

The "total able-bodied population" is a complete guess, and probably an underestimate, and it is not stated what proportion this is of total population. "Able-bodied males" was often taken to be two-thirds of all males over eighteen, though this calculation varied.

1. ML/B/1/2/320: Cookson to Administrator, 30 March 1917.
Table 2

1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total able-bodied population of East Luangwa</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of this, already allotted:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military porters</td>
<td>7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNLI natives</td>
<td>4100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private carriers, African Lakes Corporation, BSA Company</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working outside district</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Rhodesia police</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetauwe, Lundazi natives in Southern Rhodesia</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruited Lundazi by RNLI</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local labour</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

leaving 6000 for all contingencies, including unfit.

Source: NA/3/1/2/329: Cookson to Administrator, 30 March 1917.
There is also a need for caution in assessing the impact of this migration on "tribal life". Recent works on this subject (1) show that the incidence of hardship occasioned by the absence of young men seems to be determined by a number of factors, including the agricultural methods and village system of the people concerned, access to Western education, and the kind of work obtained, and Margaret Read found it impossible to generalise about the Ngoni villages she studied.

However, the political effects of the situation are more clear-cut. Large numbers of Ngoni from the North were a vital factor in the Southern Rhodesian economy, and especially in agriculture. The Northern Rhodesian administration made no attempt to stop this flow, except during the special conditions of the war, and during the sleeping sickness "epidemic". Economically, East Luangwa was a native reserve of Southern Rhodesia. Linked with this was the political experience of the Ngoni. The Ngoni later had a reputation for being cautious in politics (2) and were regarded as less militant than the Demba. This may have been due to their experience as expatriate labourers in a white-dominated community, a role which demanded extreme passivity. But the origins and validity of such "tribal" stereotypes will be discussed in subsequent chapters.


2. A.L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community (Manchester: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1958), p. 152. Both Ngoni and Nyasans had the reputation of being 'mumvungamo' amikoda mukwa (Nyanja: "my master likes me") during Copperbelt labour disputes, i.e., they favoured moderation against Demba intransigence.
But the area which in later times received most attention from scholars studying the effects of labour migration was that of the Awemba-Tanganyika Districts (1). Though historically distinct, the peoples of this area (principally Bemba, Bisa, Mambwe, Iwa, Namwanga, Lungu, Ushi Chisinga and Eastern Lunda) experienced similar problems during the colonial period, and may be examined collectively here. They all occupied the Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia, which has poor soils and is subject to tsetse fly; all understood a form of the Bemba language; there were few employment opportunities in the area, apart from the small white settlement around Abercorn; and labour migration at this stage took place mainly to the Katanga and Tanganyika.

Little has been written about the early labour experiences of the Bemba, though in fact, like the Ngoni, this experience was to be a vital factor in their eventual place in African politics in Northern Rhodesia. The process of change from a slave-raiding to a wage-earning economy went almost unnoticed by the colonial rulers, and was certainly swifter than a similar change among the Western Lunda (2). Even the remote Unga of the Bangweulu Swamps were paying


2. Between 1905 and 1913 there was widespread unrest among the Western Lunda. Because of the proximity of Angola, the slave trade with Bihe continued clandestinely and was an obstacle to the introduction of tax. See B.C. Kakoma, "Colonial administration in Northern Rhodesia", pp. 61-75.
tax, albeit in otter skins, by 1911, and during the First World War they were summarily dragooned into wage labour (1). Only a preliminary hypothesis can be put forward on the reasons why the Bemba became wage labourers faster and in greater numbers than any other people in the territory, with the possible exception of the Plateau Tonga and the Ngoni.

One reason must be quite simply their geographical position near a much-trodden trade route which was also one of the points of Anglo-German contact during the First World War. Carriers were needed for the African Lakes Company, the BSA Company, and for the Anglo-German and Anglo-Belgian boundary commissions. The neighbouring administrations of the Congo Free State, German East Africa and the British Central Africa Protectorate, were active in their respective spheres, and it was not possible for Northern Rhodesian Africans to evade tax by slipping over the frontier, as was the case in those parts of North-Western Rhodesia which bordered on Portuguese Angola. There was, therefore, a necessity to pay tax, difficulty in evading it, and the opportunity of wage labour, in the early years of the century at least, nearby as carriers and general labourers. As early as 1899, Captain Close, R.N., reported to the Foreign Office that there was an increasing demand for carriers on the Plateau: in July of the previous year, about 300 carriers had worked for the Anglo-German Boundary Commission, over 1000 for a Belgian expedition, and about 1000 for the African Lakes Corporation, the BSA Company, and others:

"As there are about two grown men per square mile all over the plateau, this is equivalent to a depopulation of the men over more than 1000 square miles, or about one-seventh of all available men on the plateau". (2)


2. NE/A/1/4/4/6: Report by Captain Close, R.N. //B// encl. in F. Bertin (Foreign Office) to Secretary, BSA Company, 3 May 1899.
Other factors, too, must have pushed the Bemba out of their homes into wage employment. The sheer non-existence of alternative opportunities for earning cash was one. The Plateau seldom produced an agricultural surplus, and the creation of one by the citemene method must have been too exhausting to contemplate, or, in economic terms, the marginal benefit received did not warrant the marginal effort involved. Nor did the Bemba have cattle, which might have formed the basis of an alternative form of income. This complex of circumstances, then, pushed the Bemba into wage employment and earned for them the stereotype of footloose migrants, ever ready to leave their uxorilocal villages, a stereotype investigated and confirmed by Audrey Richards in the late 1930's (1).

The Katanga mines provided the first large-scale, permanent source of employment for the people of the Plateau, and an alternative to the RNLB. The Kweru-Luapula peoples were particularly well placed to take advantage of the new job opportunities. After 1910 Union Miniere recruited extensively on the Plateau through Robert Williams and Company. Averay Jones, the Acting Magistrate, Awemba District in 1913, calculated that nearly all the able-bodied men in the District had been in wage employment at some time during the year (See Table 3). Even the District Report for 1913 admitted that this drain of young men had caused hardship. Particularly hard-hit were the Kasama and Mpika sub-districts, and "this has undoubtedly affected the work in native gardens" (2).

Northern Rhodesian labour was employed mainly at the smelters at Lubumbashi, Elisabethville, and at the Star of the Congo Mine.

1. Audrey Richards, "Bemba marriage and present economic conditions" (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Paper 4, 1940).
2. ZA/7/1/1/1: Awemba Province (sic) Annual Report, 1913.
Table 3

E.A. Averay Jones's estimate of men employed,

Awemba District, 1913

Total population: 95,587 (tax collected, year ending 31 March 1914: £4,087)

Outside Northern Rhodesia:
- Number employed by RNLB: 1,444
- Robert Williams and Company: 933
- Railways: 3

Inside Northern Rhodesia:
- Northern Rhodesia mines: 629
- (Anglo-Belgian) Boundary Commission: 367

Transport, Buildings, Traders, etc.: 14,059

Total at work: 17,435

Estimated number of able-bodied men: 18,000

Source: ZA/7/1/1/1: Awemba Province (sic): Annual Report, 1913. The ZA series of District Reports is in the National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka.
Union Minière's labour conditions were somewhat better than those of pre-1910 Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The men worked eight-hour shifts, compared with twelve-hour shifts at Kimberley and in Southern Rhodesia (1). They had good rations, the compounds were regularly inspected, and the death and desertion rates by 1919 were negligible by Southern African standards (2). By an agreement of 1911 between the Northern Rhodesia Government and Robert Williams and Company, a permanent Inspector of Rhodesian Natives was stationed at Star of the Congo (3). The Rhodesians were highly prized in Katanga for their reliability and resilience, in much the same way as Nyasas were in demand in other parts of Southern Africa. Their accommodation and wages were better than those of the Katangese from the surrounding area, and their accumulated experience was a growing asset (see Table 4).

But if the Katanga mines were now exerting a "pull", especially on those who by 1920 were signing on for their second or third contract, the "push" effects of government coercion still operated, with the greatest effect on the Plateau during the First World War. The East African campaign of 1916-18 was fought at the northern end of the Plateau, and during the fighting all recruitment of labour for other than war purposes was stopped. A government circular ordered the


2. NR/A/4/1/3, esp. encl. in Acting Administrator, Northern Rhodesia, to Resident Commissioner, Salisbury, 17 July 1919. Gelfand quotes a figure of 70 per 1000 for the death rate on the Katanga mines in 1915. Gelfand, Charter, p. 104.

3. NW/A/1/1/13: British Vice-Consul Beak (Elisabethville) to H.M. Consul, Boma, 4 May 1911. See also NR/A/4/1/3: Annual Reports of inspector of Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga (M.A.B. Denton Thompson), encl. in despatches to the Resident Commissioner, Salisbury, 1918-1923; and Merle Davis, Modern Industry, p. 53.
### Table 4

**Numbers and percentage of Rhodesian labour in the Katanga mines of Union Minière, 1917-23**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917 (1 April)</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918 (31 March)</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919 (31 December)</td>
<td>5034</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 (30 April)</td>
<td>6836</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921 (December)</td>
<td>5546</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922 (September)</td>
<td>2177</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923 (October)</td>
<td>4267</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Does not include Rhodesians in domestic and other non-mine employment, who probably amounted to a similar number. See note 1, page 12, above.

**Source:** NR/A/4/1/3: Despatches from the Administrator, Northern Rhodesia, to Resident Commissioner, Salisbury, 1918-24. These enclose reports from the Inspector of Rhodesian Natives in Katanga.
first assessment by district officials of the amount of labour available for war purposes (1). Major operations began in May 1916, when two columns of Rhodesian and South African troops invaded German East Africa as part of a concerted Anglo-Portuguese campaign which culminated in the capitulation of von Lettow Vorbeck a few days after the Armistice in Europe in November 1918. A military effort of this nature required thousands of tons of supplies, which had to be carried by porters from the line of rail at Broken Hill via Kasama to the Tanganyika border, a return journey of 1000 miles. Tsetse fly prevented the use of ox-wagons, and although a motor road was built along the route, the conditions proved too difficult for the motor lorries of the time. (2).

Thus, in 1916-17, 25,000 porters were employed on the war route, and “every available man in Tanganyika District did five months war work, and in the Kivu and Kweru-Luapula Districts nearly 3½ months”. By “every available man”, the Administrator meant in this case two-thirds of the able-bodied males in the area (3).

Even Wallace, the Administrator, admitted that these demands placed great strain on the indigenous economy. In Tanganyika District there was “a great scarcity amounting almost to famine”; also, Kweru-Luapula District “supplied and carried large quantities of food in 1916 but this year the supply diminished considerably and it was found that many of the well established cassava gardens had been used up. It will take two years to re-establish them”. But Wallace took the long


2. NR/B/1/2/325, Wallace to High Commissioner: see note 1 above.

3. ibid.
view: "The effect of calling out so many men has on the whole been good; it has enabled District Officers to insist on some work being done by those who habitually shirk (sic) it", especially the Ila and the people of the Bangweulu Swamps (1). Thus, forced labour, hitherto frowned upon by the Colonial Office, was permissible in wartime, and enabled the administration to tap hitherto recalcitrant areas (2).

"The chiefs are asking what they are going to get from it all; after the war, they state that they will have 'something to say'", wrote Wallace (3). But it was not the chiefs but the common people of Tanganyika District who in 1917-19 made the first effective protest against the effects of colonial rule. The facts about Watch Tower in 1917-19 in Tanganyika District are well known, although the interpretation of them differs (4). The turmoil caused by the 1917-18 campaign in the District brought about a similar situation to that of the Shire Highlands of Nyasaland in 1915 and in the Zambesi Valley in Mozambique in 1917. The latter two cases brought forth the Chilesabwe Rising of 1915 and the Makombe Rising of 1917; in Northern Rhodesia, the preachings of Watch Tower brought the Tanganyika District very near to similar violence. On top of tax and labour migration had come the

---

1. Ibid. The Unga of the Bangweulu Swamps had previously been able to meet their tax with otter skins. Now they found themselves on a major supply route by canoe to the north: Ndola - Luapula River (Kabunda), through the Swamps and up the Chambesi and Lukulu Rivers to a point 30 miles south of Kasama.

2. Section 7 of the Northern Rhodesia Administration of Natives Proclamation 1916 stated that chiefs could be called upon to supply men for the defence of the territory in time of war.

3. Wallace to High Commissioner: see note 1, page 48, above.

additional demands for food and labour occasioned by the East Africa campaign. Conditions were ideal for the reception of the Watch Tower message that soon the whites would be swept from the territory, that they were in league with the devil, and

"They make us work very very hard and give us little for the work we have done to them, and therefore if we pray very hard with all our hearts, God will hear our prayer and will clear all the Europeans back home to England and everything will be ours, and we will be rich as they are". (1)

Watch Tower adherents were to live together in a godly manner, were to refuse to obey or work for chiefs or Europeans, and must patiently wait for the Day of Judgment. Unrest and defiance spread throughout the District, which only seems to have died down when Nanoc Shindano and other leaders were arrested and sentenced to jail terms (2).

The first attempts, then, of the British South Africa Company to investigate and develop the economic possibilities of its sphere north of the Zambezi were hampered by the fiascos of the Jameson Raid and the Ndebele and Shona Rebellions. To make matters worse, the Boer War precipitated a wide-ranging labour crisis in Southern Africa which lasted until at least 1920. This led the Company to see the North as a source of labour to help in the development of its sphere in the South. This determination on the part of the Company led it into conflict at times with the South African and Nyasaland administrations, as well as


2. For a more general discussion of the role of Watch Tower in the development of African protest in Northern Rhodesia, see below, pp. 154-155.
with their own settlers, who, like their Nyasaland equivalents, wished to conserve the labour for themselves and to keep wages low.

The methods used by the Company and its individual officials ranged from persuasion to coercion, from the shutting off of alternative opportunities to earn money to the press-ganging of thousands of men for "war service". The methods of the Company, however, did not always have the effect which had been calculated, and areas which were not closely controlled or which were remote were able for decades to resist the clarion call to wage labour. Tax was not a predictable weapon in the hands of the administration, and it sometimes rebounded against the Company, causing it to make temporary tactical withdrawals in its drive to impose tax.

The African people of Northern Rhodesia avoided paying tax when they had the opportunity. This need not really surprise us, since tax avoidance is so widespread as to be ranked as a normal human activity. Where Africans went further than mere avoidance, their usual response was passive withdrawal, as when the Ovembe Tonga took to the hills, and the Unga withdrew to their swamps. But where the Company met this with force or intimidation, Africans were willing to resist. Active resistance made the Company imagine a "Kashukulumbwe Rebellion" in 1907, and Hanoc Shindano posed a real threat to security in 1919. But the colonial conquest of Northern Rhodesia was by and large peaceful, considering the unprecedented demands being made on the African people. Only a handful of white men were killed or harmed during the period of Company rule, and none of these were officials. The point is significant, since the opportunities for the assassination of the few white men must have been abundant. It points to the fact that before 1920 Africans had accepted, however reluctantly, their new economic circumstances, and saw officials as intermediaries between the traditional life and the complex of social changes which were flooding northwards.

The steady increase in the numbers of Northern Rhodesians in Southern Rhodesia (see Table 1) is some indication of the growing labour migration
rate. The generally appalling conditions at this time (see Table 5) did not stop, or even slow down, labour migration. Donald Denoon (1) argues that the experience of the bad conditions of the mines of the Rand deterred labourers from returning. If this were so, then the settlers of Northern and Southern Rhodesia would have been happier men. But it is not borne out by the figures, or by the consensus of contemporary comment.

We do not know how many Africans perished in this economic baptism of fire. Statistics for the period show only the death-rates on the mines and in industry. They do not show deaths en route or on farms. Further, we can only sketch in the social effects of the absence of young men from the villages, or the perpetual absence of the machona, the lost ones who would never return. But it is certain that for the Africans of Northern Rhodesia, the toll of dead, maimed and missing in the first quarter of this century constituted a social disaster which one can imagine, but not quantify.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average number employed</th>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
<th>Death rate per Mille per Annum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>17,381</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>75.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>26,098</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td>60.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>30,865</td>
<td>1,529</td>
<td>49.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>32,721</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>47.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>37,826</td>
<td>1,864</td>
<td>49.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>37,908</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>32.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>35,669</td>
<td>1,236</td>
<td>35.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>33,763</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>28.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>36,514</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>28.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>38,413</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>25.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>40,749</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>26.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>39,158</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>21.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>32,784</td>
<td>3,717</td>
<td>113.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>31,099</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>19.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>37,890</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>17.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>37,694</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>20.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>36,289</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>21.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>37,936</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>15.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>41,372</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>18.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>39,644</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>15.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>42,047</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>18.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>42,046</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>18.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>43,703</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>19.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>46,811</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>21.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These figures are for all labourers on the Southern Rhodesian mines. Death rates for Northern Rhodesians were consistently higher than the average.

CHAPTER 2

ECONOMIC NECESSITIES AND

THE RETREAT FROM PARAMOUNTY, 1920-35
i. The economics and politics of a labour reserve

Apart from its role as a labour reserve in the years up to 1923, the Company's northern sphere showed little unity, either physically or in political purpose. When North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia were fused administratively in 1911, the main purpose was to economise on the overheads of governing 290,000 square miles of "empty" and unproductive territory. North-Eastern Rhodesia had had historic and ethnic ties with Nyasaland, and its administration was under Foreign Office control until 1904. North-Western Rhodesia consisted of three quite separate entities, held together by the fiction of the Lawley-Lewanika concessions of 1896-1900: the Barotse reserve, where the Paramount Chief had well-publicised rights of internal self-government and revenue collection; the line of rail from Livingstone to Ndola, which was regarded as designated for white settlement, whatever the legalities of the matter; and the great, sparsely populated districts of Kasempa, up-country Luangwa and Kafue, which were often regarded as the special labour reservoirs of the line-of-rail settlements, but which were undoubtedly "native areas" in the sense that there was no foreseeable demand by Europeans for land there.

Though "Northern Rhodesia" was the omnibus term used for that part of the Company sphere to which 'white man's country' policies could not immediately be applied, the difference between North and South was recognised as a practical matter rather than an immutable frontier of principles. If more whites settled, then it was assumed that a time would come when the weight of their numbers would have to be considered. But the attractions of Northern Rhodesia were few: "its white population is a comparatively recent incident and is not its chief raison d'être", as a Company official expressed it in 1916 (1). However, 'Rhodesia'

---

1. Birchonough to Chaplin, March (?) 1916, quoted in Warhurst, "Rhodesia and her Neighbours", p. 198. The Company's move to achieve amalgamation in 1916 is discussed by Stabler, "The British South Africa Company's proposal".
was still the term used, confusingly, for the Company's territories on both sides of the Zambezi, and the seemingly laudable objective of "unification of policies" was pursued until the end of the Central African Federation. It only then (1953) became clear that Northern Rhodesia was a black man's country, definitively contrasted with the white supremacy of the South. Up till then, or at least until the 1950's, Governors and officials on the spot equivocated on the political destiny of this variegated territory.

The ambiguity, of course, was caused by the possibility that the line-of-rail areas in Northern Rhodesia might eventually be of political or economic benefit to the South. White Rhodesians had as little interest in the "native areas" of Northern Rhodesia as they had in Nyasaland. A seemingly sensible way of pre-empting the problem was the proposal to excise the line of rail from Northern Rhodesia, and add it to Southern Rhodesia, making a "Greater Rhodesia", homogeneous in political and economic character. The remaining "native areas" could have the status of Colonial Office dependencies or High Commission territories. Selborne, the High Commissioner for South Africa, made this suggestion in 1907 (1), but both the Colonial Office and the Afrikaner politicians rejected it as cutting across the policy of a wider South African Federation. The small number of whites, their penuriousness, and the large number of blacks involved made the proposal unattractive to the advocates of Union.

The "Greater Rhodesia" idea, which directly contradicted any idea of Northern Rhodesia as a coherent unit, was later taken up by such different men as the first Governor of the territory, Sir Herbert Stanley, and by the unofficial Member of the Legislative Council (MLC) nominated to represent African interests, Sir Stewart Gore-Drowne.

---

Both, for their separate reasons, were intent on eliminating the power of the Colonial Office in the territory, but whenever the proposal was made, it re-emphasised the essentially non-interlocking collection of parts which was called Northern Rhodesia. There was a dichotomy not only between black and white, but between black and black. The people of East Luangwa worked for wages in Southern Rhodesia; those in Tanganyika and Awamba districts (1) in Tanganyika Territory or Katanga; those in Mweru-Luapula almost exclusively in Katanga. The Lozi were sought after as clerks and capitalos in the South, and some worked in the mines of South-West Africa. The Lozi and the Ndebele developed a joking relationship because of their constant interaction in the urban situation (2), but there was practically no contact between Lozis and Bambas, the two principal peoples of Northern Rhodesia. A journey from the capital, Livingstone (3) to Fort Jameson could take three weeks, via Bulawayo, Salisbury, Beira and Port Herald in Nyasaland.

The political discreteness of the territory was equalled by the lack of co-ordination of its economic activities. The line of rail was the obvious route for the export of minerals or crops, but up to 1930 at least it was seriously underused. It is true that most Katanga copper, and lead and zinc from Broken Hill, was exported via Rhodesia Railways, and there was some local trade between the European farmers of Batoka and Kafue and the Union Miniere copper mines (4). But the

1. The Districts became Provinces in 1930, and Sub-Districts became Districts. Names and boundaries of the Districts and Provinces changed frequently in colonial times. See Map 1, below.


3. The capital moved to Lusaka in 1935. Lusaka was in the agricultural midlands, nearly midway between Livingstone and the Copperbelt.

4. See above, p. 11-12.
line of rail did nothing to aid the territory's main export item up to the late 1920's - tobacco (1). The European tobacco farmers in East Luangwa exported their crop to South Africa via Nyasaland and Beira. They had little direct economic interest in links with the South, and some considered that they would benefit from closer links with Nyasaland, from which they drew most of their labour. Any government which gave them plentiful cheap labour and an assured external market would receive their support; but no government was ever able to guarantee the former (2). Thus, the vicious circle of low wages and labour scarcity plagued the tobacco growers of Fort Jameson and made them politically discontented with government from Livingstone or Lusaka. "The reason why the Fort Jameson tobacco grower has to pay such a miserable wage is because he is running on something like a twenty-hour week", said Orde Browne to the Bledisloe Commission (3), adding that there might be a turn-out of 60 or 40 out of 100 labourers.

The main area of white settlement in Northern Rhodesia up to 1930 lay in the Bateka and Kafue Districts, where white commercial farmers produced maize and cattle for domestic consumption and for the Katanga market. Here, farmers had similar problems of labour scarcity, and continually complained of the inferior quality of their labourers. Some, but not all, saw their salvation in amalgamation with the south.

1. The Colonial Annual Reports series: Northern Rhodesia (London: HMSO from 1924-25) gives figures, where available, of the value of crops and minerals produced each year. The number of planters varied a great deal, averaging perhaps 100.


and after the publication of the Passfield Memorandum in 1930 they were nearly unanimous in demanding a rapid end to Colonial Office rule. Their fear of the south was that they would be demoted of their labour supply and undercut by southern agricultural products; but their fear of paramountcy was even greater.

Mining production in Northern Rhodesia was comparatively small-scale until 1930, when copper became permanently the highest-value item of production in the territory (1). In the 1920's lead and zinc from Broken Hill compared in value of production with tobacco, and small amounts of gold and vanadium were produced. Varying amounts of copper were produced at the Hook of the Kafue and Kansanshi. The Zambezi Sawmills at Mulobesi was the final item on the economic list, providing jobs for perhaps 1000 Africans. The construction of the great new copper mines at Roan, Mufulira and Nkana temporarily increased the African labour force in the late 1920's (2).

Apart from wage labour, the economic activities of the African people were mainly associated with subsistence production. Governor Maxwell asserted in 1930 that "of the natives as a whole, it can be said that they can earn sufficient for their requirements, including their tax, without leaving the areas to which they belong". (3) Moffat Thomson, the Secretary for Native Affairs, added that "there are few places in Northern Rhodesia today where natives have of necessity to work for wages as the only means of earning money". (4). But these statements must be taken with a grain of salt. Labour migration did not now diminish just because famine was rather less common: the

1. Colonial Annual Reports: Northern Rhodesia 1930.
2. For an account of the early growth of the Copperbelt, see below, pp. 138-145
3. C.O. 795/38/35565: Governor Maxwell to Secretary of State, 25 March 1930.
4. Ibid., J. Moffat Thomson to Chief Secretary, 15 March 1930 (encl.).
"centrifugal factors" affecting labour migration, which we have discussed in chapter 1 (1), operated with even greater force. What Maxwell and Moffat Thomson were describing was an exceptional situation caused by the Copperbelt construction boom. There was not only a demand for labour, but also a demand for rations to feed the workers, which led to expansion in the European agricultural sector and to a lesser extent in the small-scale African sale of surplus crops. The construction boom was followed by a slump, and rural conditions reverted to those described by Audrey Richards in Bembaland in the mid-1930's. and confirmed by the Pim and Milligan Report of 1939 (2). There was still no halfway house between subsistence production and migrant labour for the great majority of the African population.

If it is possible to generalise about the wage-labour activities of Africans in the 1920's and 1930's, one might say that labour migration continued unabated and uncontrolled by the Government. The directions of the migration changed, but the volume continued unchanged except by the economic slump of 1931-33 (see Table 6). This volume is almost impossible to calculate with any accuracy, since Government figures were ill-informed estimates. The Lacey Report for Nyasaland painted a grim picture of the effects of migrant labour on the rural areas, and tried to calculate some relative volumes (3), but Northern Rhodesia never had a Lacey Report, although the Reports of Orde Browne and Pim and Milligan in 1933 indicated the existence of the problem (4).

1. See above, pp. 17-18.


4. Major G. St. J. Orde Browne. Labour Conditions in Northern Rhodesia Colonial No. 130, 1933), passim; Pim and Milligan Report, esp. chapter 2: "Native Labour"
**Table 6**

**NORTHERN RHODESIA**

Outward flow of African migrant labour, 1928-1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>TT</th>
<th>Rand</th>
<th>Congo</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>23,373</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>36,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>29,833</td>
<td>2,515</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>42,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>27,398</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>39,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>18,943</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>30,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>12,613</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>25,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>8,514</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>21,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>20,572</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>31,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>33,030</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>49,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>34,212</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>51,212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The Pim and Milligan Report, relying on figures supplied by the administration, erroneously entitles this table "Average number of Africans employed outside Northern Rhodesia". Kuczynski pointed out that the figures could only represent numbers leaving the territory. The correct figure for Northern Rhodesian Africans employed outside the territory at the end of 1937 was at least 80,000.

**Sources:** Pim and Milligan Report, pp. 36-38; Kuczynski, Demographic Survey, pp. 450, 458; Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report (Cmd. 5549 of 1939), paras. 415-430.
The other economic activities open to Africans consisted of some trade and agriculture, but neither appears to have been enough in itself to enable Africans to pay their tax and buy the essentials of life. The sale of dried fish from the Lukanga Swamp, Lake Uweru, Lake Bangweulu and Lake Tanganyika flourished according to the prosperity of the urban markets (1). Dried fish was a convenience food much in demand on the Copperbelt (2), it could be easily transported by bicycle, and it had a high weight-to-value ratio. The structure of this trade in the 1920's and 1930's has never been investigated, but it is possible that the growing prosperity of the trade accounts for the smaller proportion of Luapulans (who were the main fish traders) working on the mines in the 1910's (3). However, many people would undoubtedly make a living partly by trading and partly by working for wages.

There was also a trade in salt centring on Mpika, which had been going on since pre-colonial times (4). But probably the major item of African production was the maize and cattle of the Tonga people of Katoka district. Fortunate in being near the line of rail and free from tsetse fly, the Tonga provided grain and livestock for the copper mining areas of the north. This was done entirely on their own initiative, for the government did nothing to help. The agricultural research station


2. The small fish from Lake Tanganyika became known as "kapenta" on the Copperbelt. "Kapenta" also means 'painted woman' or prostitute, and the derivation of the word is said to be that a wife supplementing her income by prostitution did not have enough time to prepare a traditional stew for her husband, but instead regularly cooked fish, which needed a minimum of preparation. By transfer the word was applied to the fish itself.


at Chilanga benefited mainly the European commercial farmers, and agricultural instruction at the new James School at Mazabuka was regarded as expendable by the government commission on economics which reported in 1932 (1). A tiny experiment in encouraging cotton-growing by Africans in the Fort Jameson District was permitted in 1924, but nothing further was heard of it. The Acting Secretary for Agriculture argued that it would not affect the labour supply, and there were no objections from the white growers (2). The London Missionary Society had a ginnery at Kambola, in Tanganyika District, but in the absence of an assured market African-grown cotton could not flourish (3).

Was this lack of initiative by the Government due to an assumption that Northern Rhodesia was a "white man's country", at least potentially? Or was it the often-pleaded poverty of the Government which kept rural conditions stagnant, and ensured that most Africans would have to seek wage labour either within or outside the territory? We shall certainly not find the answer to this question in the rhetoric of "paramountcy" and the dual policy in East Africa. Instead, we shall examine what is revealed by government actions, and deduce from these a few assumptions which governed them. We shall argue that from 1921, when the Colonial Office took direct control of the territory and put an end to the commerce-centred pragmatic neglect of the Company, a fundamentally "South African"

1. C.O. 703/33/30333: Governor Maxwell to Secretary of State, 12 April 1932; Secretary of State to Governor Storrs, 10 January 1933. The Bledisloe Report (para 247) pointed out that in 1938 Northern Rhodesia had 23 agricultural and irrigation demonstrators as against 74 in Southern Rhodesia and 77 in Nyasaland.

2. C.O. 705/3: Governor Stanley to Secretary of State, 3 October 1924, and encls.

attitude grew up at all levels of the administration. It was manifested in the 1920's by the policy adopted on land reserves, and in the 1930's by the policy towards increased opportunities for the whites on the mines and in the administration (1).

First, the whole policy on native land reserves in Northern Rhodesia was bound up in the South African background and outlook of Governor Sir Herbert Stanley, an outlook quickly adopted by Sir James Crawford Maxwell. Although reserves had been informally delineated for the Ngoni in the North Charterland Concession since 1904, no commitment was made in the sphere of land policy by the BSA Company, since it was inextricably connected with the question of unalienated land in Southern Rhodesia, and with the mineral rights question (2). The Buxton Committee's report on Northern Rhodesia, published in 1921, had recommended that the whole question of mineral rights and the ownership of the unalienated land should be submitted to a court of law. A case on the same lines as that brought to the Privy Council by Southern Rhodesia in 1919, argued Buxton, might result in a declaration that the unalienated land in the North belonged to the natives (3).

By an agreement between the British Government and the Company in 1923, however, all unalienated land was declared to be in the hands of

1. For a discussion of the Africanisation issue in the civil service, see below, pp. 83-91.


3. Second Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to consider certain questions relating to Rhodesia (Cmd. 1471 of 1921) (The Buxton Report) pp. 9-14; Slinn, "Commercial concessions and politics".
"the Crown" (1) and one of Sir Herbert Stanley's first acts as Governor of the territory was to propose the setting up of a reserves commission for East Luangwa District - the first of the MacDonnell Commissions (2). Setting up reserves for Africans was an indispensable preliminary to an extension of European settlement. It had happened in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya; it had not happened in Nyasaland and Tanganyika, where the governments exercised their administrative rights to permit Europeans to settle, but regarded their territory as one big native reserve.

Admittedly, the differences were as yet theoretical. There was no great flood of Europeans to take up land in Northern Rhodesia. But Sir Herbert Stanley's "South African" views were clearly revealed in his reactions to the Ormsby-Gore Report on East Africa, published in 1925. He rejected the Commission's modest suggestion that leasehold, as in Tanganyika Territory, would be a more appropriate tenure than freehold for white settlers in Northern Rhodesia, since few were likely to settle permanently (3). This was not the 'Rhodesian' concept, declared Stanley. The settler here was not an interloper: 'Rhodesia' was his permanent home. (The difference between Northern and Southern Rhodesia was left vague and equivocal). The settler would be "politically dominant, no doubt, but conscious of a more than temporary association with the country and all its inhabitants, and obliged, therefore, in the long run to recognise the economic interdependence of the two races".

Security of tenure had 'a good psychological effect' on settlers, and European standards of farming were "a valuable object lesson to the native".

1. Rhodesia: agreement between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the British South Africa Company for the settlement of outstanding questions relating to Southern and Northern Rhodesia (Cmd. 1984 of 1923).

2. C.O. 795/2: Governor Stanley to Secretary of State, 10 August 1924.

3. The Ormsby-Gore Report, p. 10; C.O. 795/10: Governor Stanley to Secretary of State, 12 January 1926
The unspoken corollary of this attitude was, of course, the division of land into "native" and "European" categories, the suppression of competition between the two, and the functioning of reserves not as powerhouses of economic development but as convenient stores of manpower to work in European enterprises. Though Northern Rhodesia never reached the stage of segregation seen in Southern Rhodesia, nevertheless its 'men on the spot' held the door open so that such developments could freely take place if sufficient numbers of whites appeared. The Colonial Office in 1927 abandoned its hopes of imposing a 'Tanganyika' land policy on Sir Herbert and his Legislative Council, and settled for the second-best security afforded by the reserves system. "The Governor is evidently sincere, but the forces which persist in dealing with a tropical country as if it were Canada or New Zealand are too strong, in spite of the object lesson (the colour bar controversy) now being taught in the territories of the Union", reflected Sir Charles Strachey at the Colonial Office (1).

But Stanley, like Welensky and Malvern after him, was immune from the colour bar argument. A great East and Central African Federation, he argued, would bring such economic prosperity that the colour bar would no longer be a problem. The federationists clung fiercely to this classic non sequitur until the 1960's, and Stanley's main objective was to do nothing which would frighten off Southern Rhodesia from links with the North. In this strategy, Northern Rhodesia was vital: "The bridge over which Southern Rhodesia might conceivably at some future date think of entering the East African group". (2).

In this context, the land reserves policy adopted in Northern Rhodesia falls into place. It was a skeleton outline for the extension of the white settler belt in Southern Africa. By 1936 reserves had been

---

1. C.O. 793/10: minute by Strachey, 7 September 1923; minute by Sir Cecil Bottomley, 21 January 1927.

2. C.O. 793/40/35663: memoranda by Sir Herbert Stanley, 1 June 1927 and 12 March, 1931.
officially delineated along the line of rail, in East Luangwa and in Tanganyika District. These were the areas of white settlement, and a glance at the map makes it obvious that the reserves were planned as reservoirs for labour, places to which the old, the sick and the unemployed might retire, and from which the young, healthy men would, it was hoped, pour to seek employment. There was little likelihood of anything except grinding poverty, for example, in the Ngoni reserve, where there were pockets of 120 to 150 people per square mile (1).

But a land reserve system is appropriate to a colony where white agricultural enterprise is dominant. It performs the dual role of safeguarding African land and providing a labour supply for European farms. In Northern Rhodesia, mining dominated the economy after 1930, and, since the mining companies' need for land was not great, competition for land in Northern Rhodesia was only a very minor item of racial conflict in the last thirty years of colonial rule. However, an examination of the land problem in the territory has been sufficient to show the attitude of the Northern Rhodesia Government towards control of the two main factors of African production: land and labour. If the land was of doubtful worth ("there is nothing you can grow that is worth having. The cost of transport kills the value of anything you grow", asserted Major Orde Browne in 1939 (2)), then their labour must be made to pay. Nowhere did the Government state specifically a policy of not developing African areas lest the labour supply be cut off. It was just that the Government omitted to bring the subject up. The status quo was favourable, and there was no cause to change it.

1. African economic response: changes in labour migration

The pre-war Colonial Office doctrine on African migrant labour survived into the 1920's, with only a few genuflections towards government

2. Racial Evidence, xi.
regulation. The government continued to act as a referee and not as a participant, ensuring that the laws of supply and demand operated freely, and that labour recruiters did not indulge in foul play. It is noticeable that the files kept by the administration seldom discussed migrant labour as a subject in itself: it was relegated to District reports, and no specific discussion at central level began until the Provincial commissioners' conferences in the 1930's. Officials were insulated from the realities of labour conditions until the first Copperbelt Strike broke forth in 1935. Thereafter, the administration began thinking in terms of early warning systems, which involved a far closer analysis of migrant labour and of labour conditions. By 1940, officials were thinking about urbanisation and rural poverty rather than of labour supply and recruitment.

This change, of course, ran parallel to changes in Colonial Office thinking about social welfare and "development" in the colonies, and it does not predate the world slump. In 1929 the Hilton Young Commission still saw the colonial government as having two main duties: to see that the native sold his labour on "fair terms", and "that the labour demands of non-native enterprises do not operate in such a manner as to prevent the proper development of native society". (1). The Commission saw adequate native reserves as providing a substitute for African trade unions, helping Africans to maintain a proper standard of wages, and providing a protection against being forced to bargain at a disadvantage (2). The Commission, however, saw a need for a systematic study of the impact of migrant labour on tribal life, pointing out that a Belgian study had laid down 5 p.c. as the permissible maximum for labour absentees from

2. ibid., p. 36.
societies in the Belgian Congo. Hailey's great African Survey was the result, but meanwhile, benevolent intentions took the place of systematic knowledge or constructive action. The Passfield Memorandum of 1930 laid down the same doctrine:

'as regards labour, ... the native should be effectively and economically free to work, in accordance with his own wish, either in production in the Reserves, or as an individual producer on his own plot of land, or in employment for wages'. (1)

We are implying that this doctrine was remote from the facts of life in Central Africa, but we must now specify in what ways it was irrelevant. Do we now know more of the lives of African labourers, so that we are less ignorant than the inter-war government? Or is it a change of emphasis, a new angle on the data, which unfairly puts governments in the wrong? To some extent the answer is both. Economists and sociologists from the 1940's onwards have been able to say more with certainty about changes in African life, and we may, with caution, extrapolate their findings backwards in time. But the very desire to investigate African life systematically comes with a certain sympathetic point of view which is determined to place Africans on an equal scientific footing with Europeans. Each decade got the answers it was looking for. Orde Browne, attempting to analyse labour conditions in Northern Rhodesia in 1936, found that labour problems had been ignored in government Annual Reports.

"Statistics of the movements of natives, analyses of contracts, records of court cases under industrial legislation and similar particulars, are not to be found: wider aspects of the problem are hardly mentioned". (2)

We are therefore handicapped in attempting to quantify and analyse African labour in this period. Figures on labour only begin to be reliable after the forming of the Labour Department in 1940. But we may venture

1. Memorandum on native policy in East Africa (Cmd. 3373 of 1930) (The Passfield Memorandum, known simply as "The White Paper" in Northern Rhodesia), para. 12 (ii).
two large generalisations which will be of great importance after 1935: first, labour migration by mine-workers changed its pattern from predominantly emigration to neighbouring territories to being predominantly internal migration; and second, African workers stayed at work for longer periods, became "urbanised", and learnt enough of modern industrial life to be able to organise a strike on the mines of the Copperbelt in 1935.

We saw in a previous chapter (1) that by 1920 labour migration routes had been well established. Southern Rhodesia, Katanga and Tanganyika were the main places of work, and all of these places relied on Northern Rhodesians and Nyasas to supplement local scarcities. The numbers of Rhodesians in the Katanga had persuaded the BSA Company to set up the post of Inspector of Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga in 1914, and by 1921 J.P. McGregor, the British Vice-Consul in Elisabethville, estimated that his office looked after the interests of 10,000 Rhodesians:

"All Rhodesian natives have come to look upon this office as a place to which they can come in the certainty that their grievances will be examined, and, if found well founded, redressed". (2)

Though the number of Northern Rhodesians in Southern Rhodesia was considerably higher (the Southern Rhodesian census in 1941 gave a figure of 48,117 Northern Rhodesian Africans in employment (3)) the Government did

1. See above, pp. 35-50.

2. C.O.795/6: J.P. McGregor to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 3 April 1924, encl. in Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 May 1924. Frederick Green, head of the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department of the Colonial Office (the Department responsible for Northern Rhodesia) gave a figure of 20,000 Rhodesians in Katanga in 1929: C.O. 793/32/35103: minute by Green, 29 July 1929.

3. SEC/LAB/10: Labour statistics, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1940, encl. in R.S. Hudson (Labour Commissioner) to Chief Secretary, 10 July 1941. The SEC/LAB series of Secretariat papers relating to labour matters is in the National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka.
The relative decline in migration to the Katanga coincided with the beginning of construction work at Roan Antelope and Nkana in the late 1920's. The Depression of 1931-2 led to mass redundancies at Union Minière; by 1933 the Belgians had begun recruiting in Ruanda, and no further recruiting took place for the Katanga. The days, indeed, of the recruiting agent were now over, as Moffat Thomson, Secretary for Native Affairs, remarked in 1933 (1). Africans now went to the employers and places that they preferred.

It is, however, an open question how many ex-Katanga mineworkers went directly to the Copperbelt. The original composition of the Copperbelt labour force is obscure, though from 1935 we have good analyses of the provincial origins of labourers. Their previous labour experience is not, however, analysed. Spearpoint, the compound manager at Roan from its beginnings, spoke of raw and inexperienced mineworkers in 1928. It was

"almost a nightly occurrence to find the night shift gang standing dumbly defiant before a distracted European miner who was doing his best to get them to go down". (2)

Then, from 1930 onwards, experienced underground mineworkers, mainly Nyasas from Southern Rhodesia, were brought in, and

"from then onwards these natives were used as trainers of other labourers, and the incapables were gradually weeded out to be replaced by others willing to learn". (3)

1. CO/795/69/25539: Minutes of Native Affairs Conference, 8 June 1933, encl. in Kennedy (Governor's Deputy) to Secretary of State, 10 Dec. 1933.
3. Ibid., See also advertisements for African labour placed in the Bulawayo Chronicle, 20 and 27 September 1930, for the Native Labour Association, Ndola.
One should not deduce from this that the workers on the Copperbelt were totally inexperienced. Many probably had worked in the Katanga in the 1920's, but were unused to underground conditions, the Union Minière mines being opencast, whereas the new sulphide ores of the Copperbelt had to be won by sinking shafts deep underground. The legend of a 'snake' at Roan Antelope which devoured people must reflect the apprehensions of people unaccustomed to the underground conditions of the Copperbelt.

We may therefore piece together a picture of the early labour force of the Copperbelt. The Bemba-speaking peoples began to go to the Northern Rhodesian copper mines on their first engagement instead of to the Katanga, since Union Minière now sought its labour elsewhere. Many Northern Rhodesians remained in Katanga throughout the 1930's, and it is important to realise that movement of labour was never accomplished by the stroke of a pen. The labour requirements of the Copperbelt could not be fulfilled solely by employing ex-Katanga mineworkers, for construction work in the late 1920's required a labour force of over 30,000, compared with the 5000 Northern Rhodesians usually at work in the Katanga mines in the 1920's (1). The rest of the labour force came mainly from North-Eastern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Nyasas outnumbering North-East Rhodesians in 1931-32 at Roan Antelope (2).

If it is difficult to ascertain volumes and timing of changes in the direction of labour migration at this time, it is even more difficult to assess its significance. To the copper companies in general (though not to the compound managers) one labourer was much like another. But differentiation was undoubtedly present within the labour force, the main

1. This rough average is derived from figures in A/4/1/3: Reports on native labour in Katanga, 1919-24, encl. in despatches from the Administrator, Northern Rhodesia, to Resident Commissioner, Salisbury.

2. Spearpoint, "The African native". Spearpoint gives a table of "Annual territorial distribution of labour", but it is unclear whether it applies to Roan Antelope alone or to all mines on the Copperbelt.
distinction apparently being between Nyasas and "Bembas" from North-Eastern Rhodesia, on the Copperbelt. We shall see this distinction resulting in conflict in a subsequent chapter. It is sufficient here to note that the Nyasas had been specifically imported by the copper companies for their experience in mining and for their rudimentary education: "The boy who collects the pick at the end of the day", remarked Orde-Browne in 1938, "is generally a Nyasa boy, who has enough education to make the necessary notes". (1) The Bemba-speaking people, on the other hand, lacked the advantages of education, but were working in their own country and were the most numerous language group on the Copperbelt.

Thus the educational difference between Nyasas and Bembas was enhanced by the difference in nationality and in occupational grouping. In 1940, we shall see that this distinction had become very clear indeed (2).

The shift of labour to the Copperbelt also betokened higher expectations on the part of the labourer. In the construction boom years of 1928-31, average African wages in the copper mines were over 30/- per month, a scale unsurpassed except on the Rand. Compound conditions were arguably better than in Katanga or Southern Rhodesia, though not so good as the copper companies' propaganda (3). At the Roan and Mufulira mines, wives were encouraged, and the 1300 women in Roan compound were given a one-acre plot for vegetables if they wanted one. "It is our ambition", said Arthur Storke of Roan Antelope Copper Mines, "to bring about as

1. Bledisloe Evidence, xi.

2. See below, pp. 163-165.

3. C.O. 795/60/5543/5: A.D. Storke (Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd.) to G.L.M. Clauson, Colonial Office, 14 November 1933, and encls.
close a parallel to village conditions in the Compound, consistent with working conditions, as is possible with a labour strength of some sixty different tribes" (1). This rosy view did not include the brutal behaviour of mine policemen, and of the compound manager at Mufulira, whose excessive punishments led to his dismissal in 1936. The system also brought in its train the problem of urban unemployment, since the copper companies did not recruit or repatriate their labourers after 1932.

But the most ideal conditions and the highest wages would scarcely have tempted the labourer to hazard himself in unknown conditions if there had been opportunities to earn an equivalent living in the rural sector. As we have seen, such opportunities were few and meagre, and African labourers migrated as the result of a compromise decision; the social and economic disadvantages of leaving his family without a head were weighed against the possible advantages of wage labour. The resulting decision varied by area and by period. To the inhabitants of the Balovale District, for example, the long journey and their inexperience on the mines made the prospect unenticing. Tax arrears (a very rough measure of rural unemployment) in the District remained high, though it paid the lowest rate of tax in the territory after 1928 (2). On the other hand, the Bemba,

1. ibid.

2. C.O. 795/38/35565: Governor Maxwell to Secretary of State, 25 March 1930. In Mankoya, Senanga and Mongu (Districts of Barotse Province), conditions were particularly bad in 1931-32, when both the RNLB and Robert Williams and Company ceased to recruit.

| Percentage of taxable males paying tax, Barotse Province 1932-3 |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                             | 1932 | 1933 |
| Mankoya District            | 19.7% | 8.9% |
| Senanga District            | 23.8% | 17.5% |
| Mongu District              | 24.5% | 15  % |

partly because of their uxorilocal social structure, partly due to
the poverty of their land, came out to work in large numbers.

Labour migration, therefore, presents a complex picture in the
1920's and 1930's. Often the impressions of the man on the spot were
erroneous. It was believed, for example, that Africans worked towards
a monetary "target", and once the target had been reached, they went
home (1). Though this may have been true during the early part of
colonial rule, it is not a useful concept after 1920. Godfrey Wilson
found from a sample of workers at Broken Hill in 1940 that 69.9 per cent
could be regarded as "temporarily urbanised", i.e., they had spent over
two-thirds of their life in town since first leaving their home village (2).
Labourers changed their jobs frequently in the urban setting. They left
a particular job, not because their monetary wants had been satisfied,
but because they had found a better job. Other factors also militate
against the "target-worker" hypothesis. For one thing, the "target"
might change when the worker arrived in town. The weight of his new-
found urban obligations, including perhaps a "town wife" and new social
obligations in the compound, would mean that the successful attainment
of any "target" would recede into the distance. It was not only the
"machona" (the lost ones, who had broken all ties with their home village)
who fell into this category, but also men who retained their links with
home but who saw their true economic interests as lying in a prolonged
stay in town (3).

1. Baldwin, Economic Development, chapter 5, deals with the "target worker"
hypothesis.
2. Godfrey Wilson, "An essay in the economics of detribalisation in Northern
Rhodesia" (Rhodes-Livingstone Paper 5, 1941), part 1, pp. 36-57.
3. J. van Velsen, "Labour migration as a positive factor in the continuity
of Tonga tribal society", Aidan Southall (ed.). Social Change in Modern
Africa (London: International African Institute and Oxford University
iii. **African political response:** "We have worked in the South and it is not good".

The attitude of Africans themselves to white political aspirations, and to the fundamental underlying question of who was to control their future, was not a factor in the equation which was regarded by governments as important. The tiny Western-educated elite were united with the traditional authorities on this one point at least, for both stood to lose by closer links with the South. As "two educated natives" wrote to Passfield in 1931:

"The natives know more about this question than the whites think and we do not want to be taken out of the direct control of the British Government" (1).

When Ndola Native Welfare Association sent Governor Sir Ronald Storrs an anti-amalgamation resolution in 1933, Storrs admitted that this view was "generally held by the more intelligent natives" (2). For years, this resolution was practically the only indication of African opinion available to officials; it duly reappeared, via a Colonial Office memorandum in the Bledisloe Report. Chief Chikwanda Chibanta told Henry Meebelo in 1967:

"The Bledisloe Commission proved a focus upon which these clashing interests of the Chiefs and their people converged with unprecedented and almost inexplicable unanimity. The chiefs and the people were in total agreement in the abhorrence of amalgamation and it was perhaps the first time since the establishment of European rule that the interests of the people and of the chiefs fused" (3).

We must, however, be cautious about projecting backwards this and the other rich evidence given to the Bledisloe Commission by African representatives in 1938. By then amalgamation between Northern and Southern Rhodesia, possibly with Nyasaland, had become a clear issue. Up to 1930, however, the

---


amalgamation issue had been linked with the "Greater Rhodesia" concept, which involved breaking up Northern Rhodesia into areas of white and black paramountcy. The Passfield Memorandum drove the idea of partition out of the minds of the Northern settlers by posing the explicit threat of "immediate steps" to bring native policy in Northern Rhodesia into conformity with the "trusteeship" principles first enunciated in the Devonshire Memorandum in 1923 (1). The Colonial Office was not willing to go further than an offer of the white-settled area south of the Kafue to be amalgamated with the South, an offer unacceptable alike to the Southern Rhodesians and to the white miners of the Copperbelt. Thus, amalgamation became salvation for the white man in the North, the only credible way of achieving an end to Colonial Office rule, and other solutions such as partition or responsible government became the slogans of smaller minorities of whites.

But we must admit that the evidence for African views on links with the South is scanty. One exception to this, however, was Barotseland, where Yeta III insisted on his rights under the treaties of 1893-1900 and was unwilling to accept a settlement which would remove Barotse from the Colonial Office to the Southern Rhodesian sphere. Lozi particularism was not irrevocably opposed to a federal solution on the lines of Sir Herbert Stanley's scheme, which would involve partition but would keep Barotse under the Colonial Office (2). Indeed, Welensky at a later date sought to use Lozi secessionism for his own ends (3). However, on the other hand, as had been pointed out before, the Lozi nobility had no wish

1. The Passfield Memorandum, paras. 2-4; Correspondence with regard to native policy in Northern Rhodesia (Cmd. 3731 of 1930).

2. Stanley's views were constantly reiterated in the 1920's and 1930's. For a sample, see C.O. 795/61/5555, Sir Herbert Stanley to Sir Edward Harding (Dominions Office) 24 April 1933; and above pp. 56-57.

to see their young men draining away to the South, and they were just as suspicious as the inefficient white farmers of the Batoka Plateau of schemes for mass labour recruitment from the South which might be a concomitant of any federal solution. Yeta pleaded with the administra-

iv. European objectives: "a plentiful supply of boys".

African labour, its availability and its scarcity, was also a factor affecting European attitudes to amalgamation. The white farmers of Northern Rhodesia constantly expressed fears that amalgamation would bring about a labour crisis for them, if labour were allowed to flow freely to the higher wages of the South (2). Though this problem was small compared with the larger political ones of where power was to lie, nevertheless a satisfactory solution of it was demanded by the farmers before they would support amalgamation. Linked with the labour problem was that of the South African tobacco quota. Northern Rhodesian growers (nearly all in East Luangwa in the 1920's and 1930's) enjoyed an assured quota on their tobacco which was sold on the South African market, a privilege not enjoyed by Southern Rhodesian growers. If the quota was removed as a result of amalgamation, the industry would be ruined, both from the point of view of its market and because Southern Rhodesia would no longer have to stop at the border in order to pick up migrant labourers from the North. The East Luangwa farmers were being "bled of labour"

1. B/1/2/293; Petitions presented to His Excellency the Governor of Northern Rhodesia by Yeta III, 21 August to 28 August 1924; and C.O. 795/3; Governor Stanley to Secretary of State, 18 September 1924. The B series of files is in the National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka.

2. For example, Bulawayo Chronicle, 22 February 1936.
already, and amalgamation would be the last straw. On the other hand, they did not want amalgamation with Nyasaland by 1933, since Europeans there had been put out of business through Government-encouraged competition from Africans (1).

There is no doubt that an assured labour supply was one of the advantages which Southern Rhodesia hoped to reap from closer association with both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. What might be called the "Forward" school in the 1920's and 1930's, of which Governor Stanley was a strong advocate, wanted a positive policy of closer co-operation between the three territories in the matter of labour. Hilton Young, but not his fellow commissioners, saw the matter simply. The two northern territories had a "surplus labour population"; all their communications were with the South; there was "need for co-ordination in native policy and white settlement": it seemed to Hilton Young, therefore, to be obvious that a readjustment of boundaries was necessary, and he proposed a somewhat convoluted partition scheme which would have made the territory look like a medieval bishopric (2), with the economically vital line of rail united with the South. The rest of the Commissioners took the line of the Colonial Office and what might be called the "conservationists": they proposed to "wait and see", meanwhile retaining the political status quo and tentatively suggesting that the North might benefit from Southern Rhodesian and South African mining experience. (3).

As the 1930's drew on, the "Forward" school of co-operation between the Central African territories got the upper hand. The white settlers, who up to 1930 had been doubtful about amalgamation, now supported a closing

3. ibid., paras. 269-285.
of ranks against the Colonial Office. This is nowhere more apparent than in the field of African labour. In 1923, the Conference of East African Governors contented itself with a restatement of the Colonial Office "conservationist" view of land and labour policy: "sufficient land" was to be secured to the African, "to afford full opportunity for economic stock-breeding and dairying, or for production of crops . . .", while it was not felt to be contradictory to add that the African's labour should be used to "secure steady progress" on his land, while at the same time he must do "a reasonable amount" of wage labour or in the reserve - "whichever pleases him best" (1). Well-controlled inter-territorial recruitment was regarded as desirable, but no follow-up machinery was created to examine how these benevolent resolutions were implemented, apart from an obligation on each Governor to state what action had been taken on the Conference's resolutions.

But, as in most spheres, the late 1920's and early 1930's saw a speeding-up of developments. The settlers having made their political demands at the first Victoria Falls Conference, governments had to begin to decide what their "native policy" was. In Northern Rhodesia there was an increased demand for labour and vastly enlarged development activity. "Native pass" legislation, in line with that of Southern Rhodesia, came into force with the Native Registration Ordinance of 1929 (2). Coupled with the Masters' and Servants' Ordinances and the Employment of Natives Registration Ordinance of 1929 (3), it theoretically made labour contracts

1. Ibid., Appendix viii; C.O. 795/20/21G02: R. Goode (Acting Governor) to Secretary of State, 29 March 1927.

2. The Natives Registration Ordinance (No. 50 of 1929).

3. The Employment of Natives Ordinance (No. 56 of 1929) amended and consolidated the existing measures, viz. The Masters' and Servants' Proclamation (North-Western Rhodesia, No. 37, 1908) as applied to Northern Rhodesia by Proclamation 18 of 1912; the Native Labour and Recruiting Proclamation (Northern Rhodesia, No. 1, 1917) governed the licensing and control of labour recruiters. C.O. 795/32/35403: Governor Maxwell to Secretary of State, 23 July 1929.
in the white-settled districts more easily enforceable by laying down that all Africans living in or entering the line-of-rail districts must be in possession of an identification certificate. Employers were to sign the certificate on commencement or termination of employment. This measure, long demanded by the unofficial members of the Lagoo and by employers, was the outcome of a longstanding debate among the provincial officials and the Secretary for Native Affairs, E.S.B. Tagart, whose conversion to the idea made the measure possible. The Colonial Office agreed to it on the grounds that Kenya had a more onerous system, which was working well, while even Tanganyika was willing to consider a system of identification based on tax receipts (1). But it was undoubtedly a step in a "South Africa" direction.

However, the legislation in Northern Rhodesia was never very effective. It did not apply, for example, to the Fort Jameson area, where the white farmers were the hardest-pressed for labour, until 1936. The District Commissioner, Fort Jameson, advised his superiors that any desertions in his district were the fault of the employers, who, as late as 1933, were paying their day labourers in salt, not cash (2). Also, no pass was required for labourers leaving the territory, so that the Ordinance could never be a measure for outflow control. There never was a hint that any officials wanted to stop external labour migration, and all saw it as a

---

1. C.O. 795/28/35232: Governor Maxwell to Secretary of State, 25 November 1929; and 20 December 1928 and encls.

2. C.O. 795/68/25839: Minutes of Native Affairs Conference, 8 June 1933, encl. in D. Mackenzie Kennedy (Governor's Deputy) to Secretary of State, 16 December 1933; C.O. 795/28/35232: Governor Maxwell to Secretary of State, 20 December 1926; C.O. 795/11: Officer Administering the Government (OAG), Northern Rhodesia, to Secretary of State, 20 July 1926; C.O. 795/100/45109: Governor Maybin to Secretary of State, 11 October 1938; Secretary of State to Governor Maybin, 9 November 1938.
necessary means of strengthening the territory's finances by facilitating the flow of tax, for one's tax receipt was stamped inside one's identification certificate.

The Northern Rhodesia Government, indeed, saw its interests as lying in ensuring maximum labour mobility coupled with rudimentary safeguards. With a small white population, a small budget, and what was considered a labour surplus, labour migration was welcomed as an indispensable lubricant for the financial machine.

One cannot but contrast this southward-oriented attitude with that of the Nyasaland administration. In 1931, during the slump, Northern Rhodesian Mines Labour Association proposed to recruit several thousand Nyasaland labourers to augment their "general supply" of labour (1). Thus, for perhaps the first time, Northern Rhodesia was a labour consumer, and this role mixed ill with previous notions of trusteeship. It was proposed to the Nyasaland Government that there should be "permanent migration" of Nyasas with their families;

"the mining industry wants a permanent supply of labour settled at its own doors and permanently employed rather than be dependent on a system of periodical recruitment and repatriation". (2)

This struck a chord of deep fantasy in those nurtured in Colonial Office "stabilisation" notions. The Fabian Lord Passfield especially liked the idea of giving families suitable cottages (3). Governor Thomas of Nyasaland refused the request point blank, and brought some sociological reality to the debate:

"I wish to place it on record that it would be absolutely incredible to any native in this country in which I have served that the Government should wish him to uproot himself, his wives and his

1. C.O. 795/43/36043: Memorandum by H.S. Munroe, Chairman, Native Labour Association, Northern Rhodesia, n.d., encl. in Munroe to Permanent Under-Secretary, Colonial Office, 30 January 1931.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., minute by Lord Passfield, 5 March 1931.
children from the place consecrated in his eyes by age-long associations, to abandon his relations to whom by native custom he is so closely tied, his plot of land, his flocks and his herds, and to betake himself to a new country. Whether he agreed or whether he refused, the harm would have been done: in the place of confidence and friendship there would be uneasiness and mistrust". (1)

v. European objectives: "a job for our children".

Northern Rhodesia, although officially a territory where the doctrine of "native paramountcy" applied, had a native reserves and native labour policy which was scrupulously harmonised with Southern Rhodesian policies. Governor Stanley had also built up a "South African" administration in which Europeans occupied positions which were occupied by Africans in other tropical dependencies. The almost complete inability of the Colonial Office to replace these Europeans by Africans, even at a time of direct financial stringency, was exposed in the "Africanisation" controversy of the early 1930's. The history of this episode is instructive, for it shows that Europeans without direct access to power could, like Africans, achieve their ends by passive non-co-operation and passionate protest, both very effective when they were opposed to a bien-pensant but reticent officialdom.

Initially the clash of doctrines over the employment of Africans as government clerks was masked by the disconnected geography of the territory. In Fort Jameson, as Coghlan complained to the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council,

"... one found black men who could read and write and use a typewriter, who could satisfy the educational tests ...". (2)

Livingstone, however, was in a different world. There, whites, most of them from the South, were employed in administrative or technical jobs which would have been done by Africans in Tanganyika or Nyasaland. From Livingstone, this system spread through the Provincial Administration.

1. ibid., Governor Sir Shenton Thomas (Nyasaland) to Secretary of State, 7 May 1931.

Frederick Green, head of the Tanganyika Department at the Colonial Office, commenting on Northern Rhodesia's financial crisis in 1932, said:

"The reason for the financial difficulties is that a tropical native territory was run by the British South Africa Company on South African lines, employing expensive whites on petty work and doing nothing to train the natives. Since we took the place over in 1924 the position has, if anything, grown worse. As an example of this method, the Provincial Administration, which uses 105 administrators to control a smaller population than Nyasaland manages with 45 (of course the difference in area must be allowed for), employs 19 European clerks at an average of £400 a year. Nyasaland has one (who I believe is at headquarters) and does the work with first grade native clerks averaging £70 a year. There is no reason why Northern Rhodesia should not employ Nyasalanders, if they cannot train their own natives". (1)

A chief raison d'etre of the elected members of the Legco was to fight to keep this reservation of jobs for whites (2) against the opposition as they conceived it, of high finance and the Northern Rhodesia Government. The Passfield Memorandum, which expressly extended the doctrine of native paramountcy to the territory, provoked the first white outburst. Its disparaging reference to the whites as an "immigrant race" brought assertions by white protest meetings that they intended to stay in the country and wanted outlets for their children. Kennedy Harris, MLC for the Northern area, which included the Copperbelt, complained that "the Government offices at Livingstone were crowded with native clerks". (3) "This is our hinterland, and no 'White paper' will drive us away" asserted another speaker at Nkana (4). However, although the reaction of the elected members to the Passfield Memorandum was intemperate, it was couched in general terms, and did not specifically mention job reservation, for

1. C.O. 795/33/36385: Memorandum by J.F.N. Green, 23 September 1932.
2. Gray, The Two Nations, p. 133, implies that Moore typified the elected members on this issue when he said "We cannot develop this country with white Trade Union labour". However, as we shall see below, the elected members opposed a positive policy of "Africanisation" in 1933.
4. ibid., 23 August 1930.
the memorandum itself was not explicit on any point of detail (1).

It is difficult to see the Memorandum as anything other than provocative shirt-trailing by the Colonial Office. By stating the principle of African paramountcy, they did not bring it a day nearer in Northern Rhodesia, but merely stirred up a hornet's nest. Governor Maxwell was obviously embarrassed by it, and backtracked immediately by assuring the whites that it enunciated nothing new in native policy (2).

Without wholehearted support from their civil service on the spot, Governors Storrs and Maxwell could barely hold the line. Even the Colonial Office and the Cabinet themselves were in two minds about where the future white-black boundary in Africa lay:

"The fundamental issue is where, in the future, the boundary is to lie between a Southern Africa, with one type of civilisation, and Central, or central and eastern, Africa, with another type of civilisation", stated a Cabinet Minute in April, 1931 (3).

The paper went on to discuss the "natural" development of lines of division on the obvious assumption that Britain would not interfere with this process. Among the "natural" developments of the next decade, which we shall later discuss, was the introduction of white trade unions on the mines and railways and the enshrinement of a colour bar in industry.

One of the most telling arguments against the colour bar was the economic one. A native clerk cost a fraction of a European. How far the Colonial Office were prepared to go in pushing the Northern Rhodesia Government in a liberal direction emerged in the financial crisis of 1932.

---

1. The exchanges between the elected members and the Colonial Secretary are in Cmd 3731 of 1930.

2. Bulawayo Chronicle, 11 October 1930; C.O. 795/40/35863 Governor Maxwell to Secretary of State, 16 October 1930. It will be noted that the Governor's assurances to the press predated his despatch, which proposed to make the assurances official by a statement in Legco. In this way, the principles of the White Paper could be manipulated by pressures on the spot.

The territory, like many other dependencies, was in that year faced with a critical Budget situation. Nkana and Roan Antelope mines were producing far below capacity, and Mufulira had closed down at the point of production. Unemployment was high, and government revenue was expected to drop alarmingly from the peak year of 1930, when Treasury control over the territory's finances had been discontinued (1).

Obviously retrenchment was in order, but Sir James Maxwell's reaction was to cushion the whites against the economic blasts, and not to introduce Africanisation at that critical moment. He had already argued in 1931 that Northern Rhodesian Africans did not have the necessary education to take over even from the many Nyasas in government service, far less from whites (2). Now, in his draft Estimates for the critical year 1932-33, Maxwell budgeted for a slight deficit by reducing African government staff and by postponing expenditure on African education.

The start of the African Technical School was delayed. Thus, a vicious circle of inertia was created whereby the Government postponed action on Africanisation because of the retarded state of African education; African education was held back by the blanket excuse of 'lack of funds'; and to a large extent the 'lack of funds' was attributable to the upkeep of a highly expensive white establishment. Prophetically, Green in the Colonial Office minuted: "I doubt if we shall find a successor to Sir James Maxwell strong enough to remodel the system inherited from the British South Africa Company". (3).

Maxwell had appointed a local Financial Commission to suggest cuts, and its report was the signal for a brief skirmish over Africanisation in the government service, from which the Colonial Office retired without

1. C.O. 795/47/33107, Secretary of State to Governor Maxwell, 2 April 1931.
2. ibid., Governor Maxwell to Secretary of State, 16 May 1931.
3. Green made this point repeatedly. This quotation is on C.O. 795/31/38321, minute by Green, 30 March 1932.
putting up any serious fight. The Commission was composed of men of "South African" outlook and proposed a leave moratorium for civil servants, both black and white, advised dispensing with the Assistant Director for Native Education and two Superintendents of Native Education; stopping the special agricultural teaching programme for Africans at the Jeanes School, Mazabuka, and proposed that Public Works Department work should be put out to contract instead of being performed by direct labour (1). These economies were, of course, entirely consistent with a policy of bringing Northern Rhodesia more into line with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa: the leave moratorium was an alternative to the dismissal of white civil servants, while the attack on the Native Education Department was a popular settler move, reinforcing the general white feeling that Northern Rhodesian Africans were "inferior" to others, and that efforts to educate them were a waste of time. The change to contract labour by the Public Works Department would have meant a higher proportion of white artisans.

The Colonial Office, urged on by Green, put a set of counter-proposals to the Northern Rhodesian Government, making suggestions on cutting back expenditure on the provincial administration, the police and military, and European education, "which", said Green "at present amounts to paying for the education of whites out of the taxes on blacks". (2). Meanwhile, however, there was a hiatus in the Governorship during which Maxwell was succeeded by Sir Ronald Storrs. Storrs, an Arabist of distinction, saw Northern Rhodesia as an inferior consolation prize,

1. The Report is on C.O. 795/53/36363, encl. in Governor Maxwell to Secretary of State, 12 April 1932. The Commission was composed of E.A.T. Dutton, the Chief Secretary (Chairman), C.H. Dobree, the Treasurer and the most highly-placed official of "South African" outlook, Chad Norris and F.H. Lowe, elected members, and C.A.A. Teagle, a settler and former accountant.

2. Ibid., minute by Green, 23 September 1932.
and made little effort to implement Colonial Office views, (1) which were eventually explicitly stated in a despatch of 10 January 1933, (2) which made a reference to the "replacement" of Europeans in the public service by Africans.

Once again, through its inability to act effectively over 6000 miles, the Colonial Office had created a situation where the sudden re-enunciation of a platonic policy of good intentions towards Africans as in the Passfield Memorandum, was made to sound like something new. When the Governor referred to the "replacement" policy in Legco on 3 April, the furore broke loose on a similar scale to 1930 (3). Leopold Moore abandoned his doubts about the benefits of amalgamation and became a wholehearted supporter of it. A political rival suggested that his late conversion might be a last-ditch attempt by the old 'Livingstone' faction to prevent the new capital of Northern Rhodesia from being built at Lusaka (4), but the "Africanisation" controversy, as it became known, was probably the final pressure pushing the tiny 'Livingstone' faction into a united front with the other settlers in Northern Rhodesia in favour of the security offered by amalgamation (5).

2. C.O. 795/63/36385: Secretary of State to Governor Storrs, 10 January 1933.
3. Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates (NR Legco Deb), 19, 301, 305, 325-7 (3 April 1933); C.O. 795/61/5555 passim.
5. It was not yet a united front entirely. H.L. Goodhart, representative of the East Luangwa farmers, remained resolutely non-committal until he could see what shape any amalgamation proposals took, despite a pro-amalgamation resolution by his constituents in May 1933. Brown and Chad Norris did not declare themselves until they had consulted their constituents. Bulawayo Chronicle, 8 April, 27 May 1933; Cape Times, 25 July 1933.
As with the Passfield Memorandum controversy, back-tracking by the Governor began almost immediately. At Fort Jameson, for example, Storrs "said the 'Africanisation' policy should occasion no anxiety to thinking persons. It would be, he said, a matter of generations before the native would be fit to hold responsible positions, and there need be no fear of white people being replaced by natives in our time". (1)

At the same time, he assured the Legislative Council that

"there is no intention on the part of this Government prematurely or artificially to extend 'The field of employment for natives". Nor would there be any policy "prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the white inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia". (2)

Storrs indeed shared the settler view of the "backwardness" of Northern Rhodesia's Africans, and took refuge behind the argument of their lack of education, which really meant a policy of inaction. His aim was a higher, not a lower, entry point for African clerks, so as to show them that it paid to stay on longer at school. "It must be remembered that the European settler not unreasonably demands opportunities for his children to enter the lower grades of the Civil Service". The answer to this demand, argued Storrs, was a well-educated African civil service (3).

The third side of the triangular argument was a financial one. In 1933 retrenchment was everywhere necessary, and it was only in 1938 that a substantial increase in revenue made itself felt. Therefore, though substitution of African clerks for Europeans might be in theory an admirable measure of retrenchment, the necessary expansion in African education could not be carried through, for the same excellent reasons of economy. Though the superintendent of a native trade school was appointed in 1933, this was separate from the issue of African clerks in government service. The African secondary school which was the

2. NR Legco Deb, 20, 88 (29 May 1933).
3. C.O. 795/61/55: Governor Storrs to Secretary of State, 15 February 1933.
essential base for any expansion of opportunities in the civil service was not started until 1939. (1) Perhaps a decade was lost in polite discussion while Africans in Northern Rhodesia had to be content with perhaps the worst educational system in East and Central Africa. Technical training was non-existent. In the time of the copper boom of 1928-31, Africans were excluded from skilled employment on the grounds that the work needed to be done quickly; after the boom, Africans were not trained because the funds were not available and the jobs were not there. It was a vicious circle which the Colonial Office could do little to break (2).

Could not the Colonial Office have arranged for the appointment of a Governor who would push matters forward in the Territory and defy the settlers? The answer is that Governors reflect the political climate of their time. Sir Arthur Benson and Sir Evelyn Hone belong to the 1950's and 1930's. A reforming Governor in the 1930's would have been naked and defenseless, and his position would quickly have become impossible. Even the pro-settler Sir Hubert Young was faced with a near-rebellion by his unofficial members in 1938, and constitutional changes had to be made giving the unofficials more power. "West African" governors like Maxwell were soon captured by the white men on the spot. "You will have to get a man trained under Cameron to help you, as your civil service is - excuse my saying it - hopeless when it comes to developing native responsibility", wrote Frederick Green in a farewell letter to Mackenzie-Kennedy, the Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia in 1933 (3). But the "man trained under Cameron" was never heard of

1. Trevor Coombe, "The origins of secondary education in Zambia" (3 parts), ASR, 3, 4 and 5 (1967-68).
3. Ibid., D. Mackenzie-Kennedy (Chief Secretary and Governor's Deputy) to Sir Cecil Bottomley (semi-official) (a/o), 8 November 1933.
again, and the secretariat resolutely continued to function on South African lines. And when amalgamation was in the air, there was all the more excuse to postpone controversial talk about Africanisation.

vi. Summing-up: labour and the struggle for power in Central Africa

In attempting to analyse the dynamics of government in Northern Rhodesia before the dawn of the copper boom, we have sketched in the system which, after 1935, had to cope with shattering problems of economic expansion, political uncertainty and social unrest. The political and economic discreteness of the Territory and its close links with Southern Rhodesia belied its technical status as a Colonial Office dependency. The congenital reluctance of British Governments to make theoretical statements about the future of their dependencies was strengthened in the case of Northern Rhodesia, as in Kenya, by the strong reaction of settlers to any statements of duty towards Africans.

Governors were both victims and perpetrators of the situation. Stanley only continued the system employed by the BSA Company, and to have done otherwise would have occasioned strong opposition from the settlers in the Legislative Council. The hold exerted by men of 'South African' origin or views in the Northern Rhodesian civil service was crucial, since they were the natural allies of a Governor in conflict with his Legislative Council. Without them a Governor was almost helpless.

Though white settlement in the Territory was sparse, and did not noticeably increase until the copper boom, the administration of this small white population absorbed a disproportionate part of the government's resources. Many services were, of course, common to white and black, notably the district administration. But the amount spent directly on services for Africans (veterinary, educational, agricultural and medical) was tiny. In 1929-30 the revenue from Africans was £125,270, about one-fifth of the total revenue. Direct expenditure on
services for Africans in the same year amounted to £12,028, with a further £11,471 at headquarters - altogether a very small proportion of the total government expenditure of £554,527. (1) So much for the theory that white settlement brought all-round prosperity. In Northern Rhodesia white settlement brought an expensive administration, exclusion of Africans from education to fit them for jobs held by Europeans, and an administration which increasingly sought a consensus with settlers in the Legco.

Thus Africans got the worst of all possible worlds. White enterprise provided little employment in the Territory, and that which existed was poorly paid, yet at the same time the Europeans insisted that Africans should not aspire to anything better. Labour migration to the South was therefore the ordained lot of the African if no use could be found for his services in Northern Rhodesia. A land reserves policy for Africans in the territory showed that the Government hoped for an expansion of white enterprise and white landholding; development of the African areas did not figure in their plans.

Migration to the South, then, was a convenient solution to the problem of how to 'develop' the African areas. It was a primitive view of development: the function of the migrants in the Government's scheme of things was to bring back cash and goods from the South. This would make their home area look more prosperous, and tax receipts would go up. This end could best be achieved by well-ordered rather than anarchic migration, and Governments therefore encouraged well-run labour recruiting organisations. In this situation, too, the Government adopted the role of supplier of labour to other countries, and gave little thought to the organisation and protection of labour in its own territory. When the copper mines began employing Africans in large numbers after 1928, the Government's only information about labour conditions came from its

---

1. C.O. 795/47/36150: Governor Maxwell to Secretary of State, 24 April 1931.
district officers on the Copperbelt, who had myriad other functions to perform. It took a decade and two major African strikes for the Northern Rhodesia Government to acknowledge that the employment of labour inside the territory on a large scale posed problems different from those of a labour reserve.

The exact place of the labour problem in the drive for closer union in Central Africa is hard to document. As Green said to Creech Jones in 1938, neither the British nor the Southern Rhodesia Government gave publicity to their real motives in the debate (1). Southern Rhodesia probably always wished to have a closer control over an unpredictable labour supply from the North, though few conflicts arose, since the Northern Rhodesia Government normally co-operated with the RNLB until the latter's demise during the slump. The fact that Northern Rhodesia was becoming a labour consumer by the early 1930's worried the Southern Rhodesians, and a suggestion was made in 1933 by Colonel Carbutt, their Chief Native Commissioner, for some sort of agreed apportionment of the available labour:

"A scheme which encourages Natives to leave their own colonies to seek employment in neighbouring states would automatically increase the available labour, because each individual who goes out to seek employment would remain at work for a longer period". (2)

Competition from the Rand for this available labour was, as we shall see, a crucial factor in bringing about the Salisbury Agreement on Migrant Labour in 1936, but in 1933 Northern Rhodesia's Secretary for Native Affairs, J. Moffat Thomson, was able to assure Carbutt that the North had more labour than it could use, and labour recruitment was welcome. Probably, then, Southern Rhodesia could have continued to


2. C.O. 795/38/25539: Minutes of Native Affairs Conference held at Victoria Falls, 8 June 1933, encl. in Kennedy to Secretary of State, 16 December 1933.
obtain labour from the North without any need for political ties, and 
the clinching argument for Federation was copper revenues, not labour 
supply. But there was always the possibility that a government in 
Northern Rhodesia might run away with notions of paramountcy and attempt 
to construct a "native state" like Nyasaland or Uganda, and one of 
the dreaded results of that move might be the drying-up of the labour 
supply from the North. Federation was designed to pre-empt this kind 
of situation, and to that extent labour and politics were entwined in 
the struggle for power in Central Africa. More specifically, the 
Northern Rhodesian settlers and miners sought the protection of a "white 
labour" government, and the first swelling of this tide came with the 
"Africanisation" controversy in 1933. Though the dispute was a theoret- 
etical one, since no-one could find a qualified African to replace a 
European civil servant, nevertheless closer union with the South would 
prevent the issue from reaching the realm of practicalities.
CHAPTER 3

THE LIMITS OF BUREAUCRACY:

SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN REGULATING BLACK AND WHITE LABOUR 1935-40
It is a feature of the history of Northern Rhodesia in the 1930's that the official and independent reports upon its administration and policies were uniformly critical of the lack of progress made in African development, even compared with dependencies whose revenues were poorer. Yet at the same time African progress remained slow and unsure, despite laborious Colonial Office follow-up measures. The Orde Browne, Rim and Milligan and the Bledisloe Reports all made specific criticisms and clear-cut recommendations on how to put Northern Rhodesia on the path to native welfare in the social sphere, if not to paramountcy in the political sphere; yet the colour bar became more, not less stringent, and the political progress of Europeans reinforced this trend. The labour issues discussed in this chapter show the growing de facto power of unofficial Europeans in Northern Rhodesia against the attempts by the Colonial Office to give meaning to the ideals expressed in the Passfield Memorandum. The Northern Rhodesia Government shuffled uneasily between these two contradictory pressures.

1. Regulating industrial relations: the Labour Department.

The rapid search for a labour policy in Northern Rhodesia in the years after the first African copperbelt strike provides strong evidence for the "man-on-the-spot" view of African history, for policy was defined only as a result of radical action by workers on the spot, both white and black. But compared with Northern Rhodesia, the Egypt and South Africa of Robinson and Gallagher's study (1) presented a simple picture: in those two areas, the British Government reacted to nationalist revolts on the spot by reluctantly establishing a presence in the area. By contrast, Northern Rhodesia presented the real possibility in the late 1930's of two kinds of revolts: black and white. In apprehension of trouble from

both sides, the Colonial Office attempted for the next two decades to conciliate both. The contradictions in this policy mostly worked against Africans and in favour of Europeans, but Whitehall remained at all times responsive in some measure to African pressure. Perhaps here we have the first clue to the key mystery of Zambia's history: why Northern Rhodesia ever became Zambia at all. The answer may lie in the same area as the answer to a question posed in a previous chapter: why did Northern Rhodesia survive as a territorial unit? To both questions the answer is: British official passivity and reluctance to change. If the British Empire was acquired in a fit of absence of mind, then Zambia got African rule mainly because of British procrastination.

One must not, however, see Northern Rhodesia as unique at this period. Much of the policy which the Colonial Office was intent on applying was common to the whole Empire: in the 1930's the progressives like Hargery Perham, Arthur Creech Jones and G. St. J. Orde Browne, the Fabians and the Labour Party, were making their views heard. Colonial Development and Welfare, economic planning, special administrative provisions for labour, were all discussed at this time (1). Hailey's African Survey was a monument to the new, more positive policy.

Action was spurred by two developments: in the international field, the League of Nations was focussing attention on colonial peoples through organisations like the International Labour Office (ILO), and in the colonies themselves, the peoples were beginning to develop political and industrial organisation. From 1935, labour "riots" presented an important security problem in the colonial empire (see Table 7). Labour Departments in the colonies were an attempt to foster the concepts of welfare now officially accepted by the British. It was a bi-partisan policy, for the

Table 7

Riots in connection with labour
in the colonial empire, 1935-45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Guiana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Coast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Rhodesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tya Territory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The 1938 "incident" in Northern Rhodesia was presumably the European indignation over the Rex v. Mupanta case. See below, pp. 115-116.

Source: ACJ/22/3/19-20: Orde Browne to Creech Jones, 4 January 1946.
Conservative Ormsby-Gore in a circular in 1937 emphasising the need for Labour Departments, argued that the greater prosperity should be passed on to the workers; that penal sanctions should be eliminated from Masters' and Servants' legislation; and that trade unions should not be subjected to disabilities (1). Malcolm MacDonald in the following year emphasised the security aspects of Labour Departments: they were to diagnose incipient causes of unrest and deal with them (2).

The setting up of Labour Departments, then, within colonial administration was a recognition of the fact that a new situation had been created by the growth of industry and large-scale agriculture in the colonies. This situation could not be fully dealt with by the classic colonial district officer on rural safari. The existence of Labour Departments did not, of course, prevent labour troubles, but, as we shall see, the lack of a Labour Department in Northern Rhodesia contributed to the haze of ignorance surrounding the administration’s views about the development of industrial relations on the Copperbelt between 1935 and 1940 (3). This ignorance was a serious handicap in a territory which in these years suffered two waves of African unrest on the mines, and whose labour problems were at least as serious as those of the West Indies, Malaya, Ceylon, Tanganyika and Uganda, all of which had Labour Departments.

3. In justice to the Northern Rhodesia Government it must be added that the sudden demand for officers to man Labour Departments in the colonies led to an acute shortage of qualified men in 1938. In that year the Colonial Office discovered that not only was there no suitable candidate for Northern Rhodesia, but that there were unfilled vacancies in Sierra Leone, Mauritius, Jamaica, Barbados and Fiji. C.O. 795/100/45109/2 (Part 2): minute by J.N. Martin, 12 December 1938.
by 1930 (1).

The difficulty about setting up a Labour Department on Colonial Office lines in Northern Rhodesia in the 1930's was that it was against the political trend. Under pressure from settlers and industry, the Northern Rhodesian administration was allowing the unofficial Europeans more and more say in the advisory machinery of government. Besides ad hoc enquiries such as the Select Committee on Unemployment in 1932 (2) and the Finance Commission of the same year (3), on both of which unofficials were strongly represented, there were standing advisory committees on education and agriculture, and, as a result of the 1933 Copperbelt strike, the Native Industrial Labour Advisory Board (NILAB), chaired by an official, but composed of two elected members of the Legislative Council, two officials from the Executive Council, and a varying number of representatives of employers (4). Besides, Sir Hubert Young in 1935 had assured the elected members that "some informal procedure" would be instituted by which duly accredited elected members could be consulted by the Governor between sessions on subjects which would normally be debated by the Legislative Council if it were in session (5). Though none of these developments

4. The only complete set of the proceedings of the NILAB is on SEC/LAB/33, vol. ii. Some of the early reports of proceedings were widely circulated, and are to be found, for example, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Library, London.
5. NR Legco Deb, 25, 450-452 (6 December 1935); see also C.O. 795/32/45104: Governor Young to Secretary of State, 15 January 1936.
in themselves contravened the vague principles of native paramountcy, they nevertheless showed a strong trend which was only to be countered by the strong opposing pressures of African nationalism in the 1950's.

A government Labour Department cut across this trend towards wider consultation with European interests. As conceived by Orde Browne, it would be very much an instrument of paramountcy, setting itself up as a guardian of African interests in the urban areas in much the same way as the Provincial Administration functioned in the traditional tribal setting. It would investigate problems of welfare, labour, migration and stabilisation, and would perform the much-needed task of compiling reliable statistics of labour movements, wages and conditions (1). A Labour Commissioner with the authority of a head of department would, Orde Browne envisaged, take over the chairmanship of NILAB, and would supervise four Labour Officers on the Copperbelt and four others elsewhere. Ideally, though it was never explicitly stated, a Labour Department would have an educative effect on both labour and management and would be more expert and knowledgeable about labour matters than the Provincial Administration or the compound managers (2).

There was positive opposition to a Labour Department in Northern Rhodesia. We should not be deceived by the fact that its creation was discussed almost exclusively in terms of "available funds". Opposition remained even when revenue had risen dramatically between 1935 and 1940. Ordinance No. 41 of 1930 had made provision for a Labour Commissioner and officers to give special attention to labour matters, but Governor Maxwell had carried the matter no further (3). The serious misjudgment shown by

the Government in changing the basis of taxation in 1935, resulting
in the Copperbelt strike, though gently passed over by the Russell
Commission, stung Governor Young into action. He established the
Native Industrial Labour Advisory Board to advise him on the problems
which seemed to have been at the root of the strike: industrial
conditions, unemployment and the breakdown of tribal control (1).
But a body composed in the way which has already been described, and
meeting only once or twice a year, was hardly enough to stifle the
qualms of the Colonial Office. Though NILAB was a useful body whose
advice, by the standards of time and place, was humane and relevant,
though at times naive(2), it had no permanent staff and no executive
powers. Employers still enjoyed a wide freedom to regulate their own
conditions of employment under the Employment of Natives Regulations.
If the government adopted an attitude which went beyond laissez faire,
the immediately hostile reactions of all the whites was enough to make
the government withdraw.

Young, however, thought that there was also room for a general
review of labour issues: the Copperbelt, after all, was transforming the
life and resources of Northern Rhodesia. He therefore proposed, in July,
1933, to appoint a commission to investigate the labour problem in all
its aspects, a proposal quickly taken up by the Colonial Office, but

1. Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances
in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia (The Russell Report) (Lusaka:
Government Printer, 1935): Governor Young to Secretary of State,
23 October, 1935. This despatch is printed and bound with the
Russell Report, at the beginning in some copies, at the end in
others.

2. C.H. Lockhart, Northern Rhodesia's Treasurer, later Financial
Secretary, was successful in arguing for the inclusion of Milligan
in Sir Alan Pim's Commission, so that the former could deal with
the "complete misconceptions" perpetrated by NILAB, for example,
that the development of native production would stop migrant labour.
C.O. 795/92/45173 (Part 1): memorandum by Lockhart (n.d.) encl. in
Dundas (Acting Governor) to Secretary of State, 19 February 1937.
postponed until 1937 by financial stringency (1). Among the tasks of
this Commission was to report on the advisability of a Labour Department.
The appointment of Major G. St. J. Orde Browne was, therefore, a compromise
between those in Northern Rhodesia who saw the necessity for coming into
line with the Colonial Office and those who preferred the old system to
continue. The decision whether or not to create a Labour Department
could very properly now wait until Orde Browne had reported, and the
increasingly urgent Colonial Office circulars about Labour Departments
could, for the time, be ignored (2).

Major Orde Browne was no left-wing radical, but he had strong ideas
about the implementation of paramountcy doctrines in the dependencies.
As part of the new wave of experts who in the 1930's produced An African
Survey, Orde Browne had the advantage of a wide experience in labour
matters, and in the 1930's was a substitute member of the ILO Committee
of Experts on Native Labour. He had already produced a report on Labour
in Tanganyika (3), and in 1936 became the Colonial Office's Labour Adviser (4).
His own view of his appointment to Northern Rhodesia was expressed when he
wrote to an ILO official: "So at last the progressive view on labour seems
to be coming into its own!" (5).

Apart from Merle Davis's pioneering study, Orde Browne's Labour Conditions
in Northern Rhodesia was the first methodical survey of the subject of

1. OB/2/5/11: G.F. See to Orde Browne (s.o.), 31 August 1937; C.O. 795/91/
   45109/2: Governor Young to Secretary of State, 1 July 1933.

2. The important items in the correspondence are printed in Colonial Office
   Confidential Print, Miscellaneous No. 487 (Misc.No. 487). See esp.
   Colonial Office circulars of 9 November 1935 and 24 August 1937.


5. OB/2/5/22: Orde Browne to Weaver, 12 September 1937.
African labour in the territory. Orde Browne spent six months in the territory, sized up the political situation with some shrewdness, and made polite but devastating criticisms of the Northern Rhodesia Government. Labour problems, he reported, had generally been ignored in Government Annual Reports:

"statistics of movements of natives, analyses of contracts, records of court cases under industrial legislation and similar particulars, are not to be found: wider aspects of the problem are hardly mentioned". (1)

and

"generally the Protectorate presents a picture of a country which has long developed slowly in agricultural directions, the Administration being adequate for the simple needs of such a society. Sudden mining activity, with consequent rapid industrialisation of a very primitive native populace, has taken the existing Government largely by surprise, with the result that experienced men and proper machinery to deal with such growth have been lacking". (2)

or, as he put it more pungently in a letter to Ormsby-Gore, the Colonial Secretary:

"Northern Rhodesia reminds me of an elderly maiden lady who has let her lodgings to a party of racing sharps, and is scandalised by their behaviour, though very glad of the rent". (3)

Though he seldom committed his views on individual officials to paper, his opinions carried much weight in the Colonial Office. He reinforced the Colonial Office's fastidious distaste for the white miners of the Copperbelt: "the European element on the Copperbelt", he wrote to a Colonial Office official, "is pretty difficult" comprising a sort of human Whipsnade including some fine specimens of rogues". (4). But his views on African labour organisation remained those of an enlightened paternalist:

2. Ibid., para. 8.
3. 08/2/5/46: Orde Browne to Ormsby-Gore, 26 December 1937.
4. C.O. 793/100/45109/2 (Part 2): Orde Browne to Boyd (s.o.), 26 December 1937.
"normal European methods are inapplicable. Trade unions are impossible, as the great bulk of the labourers are primitive and uneducated men, who are the easy prey of any dishonest schemer". (1)

"Some disinterested government official" was the best substitute for trade unions: in other words, a Labour Department was essential.

Orde Browne's recommendations could not have been surprising to anyone familiar with the Colonial Office view: labour recruiting should be more closely controlled, with provision made for rest houses on route and for deferred pay and repatriation; an effort should be made to improve African housing on the Copperbelt; and a government labour organisation should be set up, the Labour Commissioner taking over the chairmanship of NILAB and also heading a strong team of Labour Officers, who would take over the whole problem of industrial relations from the district officials. The trouble with these proposals was that they could easily be transformed from concrete intentions into platonic ideals by an appeal to economic stringency, a device used by the Northern Rhodesia Government throughout the 1930's. The provisions of the 1936 Salisbury Agreement on migrant labour (2) were similar, and similarly remained unimplemented for years.

The appointment of a Labour Commissioner was to take two more years. The Northern Rhodesia Government complained - with some justification - of the lack of suitably trained men for the post, postponed a decision until the Bledisloe Commission had reported, and played with the idea of a joint Labour Department with Nyasaland, for the sake of economy (3). It is hard to pin down where the opposition came from. The Provincial Administration had no wish for rivals to its power, and T.F. Sandford, the Senior Provincial Commissioner and later Secretary for Native Affairs, was in

1. OB/2/5/37: memorandum by Orde Browne, "Labour organisation in the Crown Colonies", encl. in Orde Browne, to "Doctor", 16 October 1937.

2. See below, pp. 118-125.

explicit opposition to the idea of a Labour Department (1). Governor Young was at loggerheads with the Colonial Office towards the end of his term of office over the mineral rights question, and W.M. Logan, the Chief Secretary, took over much of the Governor's work in 1938-39, during the changeover to Maybin. But it would be wrong to single out individuals. The assumptions of the Government as a whole about priorities were not those of the Colonial Office, and officials found it increasingly hard to oppose the views of the elected members. In any case, it is hard to see that the appointment of a Labour Commissioner would have forestalled the Copperbelt strikes of 1940. With the appointment of R.S. Hudson as substantive Labour Commissioner in 1940, however, a focus was at last provided for the development of Colonial Office policies towards African workers.

ii. Regulating European labour: the Mine Workers' Union

Orde Browne also wrote a confidential Report which, if published, would have raised the ire of the European community (2). In it, he considered that there was a real possibility of a disturbance involving Europeans "at any moment". To understand this, we must examine the emergence of the European mine workers of the Copperbelt as a new and powerful force which struck something resembling terror into the hearts of governments in Lusaka.

The European population of Northern Rhodesia grew from 10,642 in 1931 to 21,881 in 1946 (3). The fact that a preponderance of white miners

1. ibid. The Provincial Commissioners were, however, in favour of a Labour Commissioner in 1936: C.O. 795/82/45096: Minutes of Provincial Commissioners' Conference, June 1936.

2. C.O. 795/103/45233: Interim Report by Major G. St. J. Orde Browne on interracial relations in the mining area of Northern Rhodesia, (n.d.), encl. in W.M. Logan (Acting Governor) to Secretary of State, 26 March 1938.

come from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (1) does not in itself explain the apprehensions of the Government, for the period of white South African trade union militancy was over by the 1930's. The militancy of the Northern Rhodesian whites was sharpened during the slump of 1931-32, when the Northern Rhodesia Government behaved with a callousness towards the white unemployed which was normally reserved for Africans. In March 1932, 700 Europeans were unemployed out of a total white population of 13,851 (2). Towards the end of 1931, Mufulira and Nchanga mines had closed, and Roan Antelope and Iindka had retrenched construction workers. The Government's reaction was to save money by deporting as many of the unemployed as possible through the application of the Vagrancy Ordinance, and to stop the supply of rations to those "destitutes" who had been in Northern Rhodesia for less than five years (3). The primitivism of this policy alarmed the Colonial Office, and conditions were eased, but the white workers reacted with all the bitterness of mineworkers in other parts of the world:

"Get out and be damned is the slogan of the powers that be. This is a native country, a Colonial Office toy, a hard-worked, spoon-fed university six hours a day paradise for the Boma new capital for administrative offices" (sic) (4)

Class antagonism between the whites, then, was a factor in the Copperbelt equation, an antagonism nowhere more apparent than in attitudes towards Africans. The Oxford and Cambridge graduates of the Provincial Administration regarded white workers with distaste, since they destroyed the

1. Central African Territories: Geographical, Historical and Economic Survey (Cmd. 6234 of 1951), Appendix I gives figures for immigrants to the territory by country of last permanent residence for 1933 and later years.


3. ibid., Governor Maxwell to Secretary of State, 19 March 1932.

4. ibid., extract from the Bulawayo Chronicle, n.d.
direct relationship between official and "native" which, it was thought, had existed previously; the white workers distrusted the Government for its unpredictable espousal of paramountcy doctrines; they had a well-founded suspicion that the Government wished to replace whites with Africans in skilled and semi-skilled employment, and they saw that they would have to fight to retain those privileges which the Government had done nothing either to provide or withhold. It was a battle which the white workers, the miners and the railwaymen, fought on their own; the Rhodesia Labour Party in the South considered the battle lost in the North, and opposed amalgamation (1) in order to prevent paramountcy from spreading south. Links with the South African Mine Workers' Union were, as we shall see, scotched by the Government. Thus, added to the isolation of mineworkers everywhere was the political isolation of the European miners of Northern Rhodesia. They were an island of white supremacists in a black sea. Their survival depended on the successful vindication of white supremacy policies in the mining industry and on the railways. As the Northern Rhodesia Government gradually awoke to the implications of paramountcy doctrine, the white workers became an increasing embarrassment to them; but the existence of these workers was merely a legacy of the necessities of the 1930's. Hatred of a particular social system naturally projects itself upon those at its fringes whose position is most threatened, and who therefore put up the stiffest fight against change (2). But historical analysis must also examine the system of which the white workers were the well-paid victims.


The system in Northern Rhodesia in the 1930's was that of 19th-century laissez-faire. The Government laid down minimum conditions of safety and hours of work, but wage rates, the apportionment of jobs, and even the policing of compounds, were left to the copper companies. The Government, while building a new capital at Lusaka for the administration, offered no overall plan for townships on the Copperbelt, with the result that twin mine-Government townships grew up, duplicating services and resources, at Kitwe/Nkana, Chingola/Nchanga, and Roan/Luanshya (1).

The Copperbelt was therefore a semi-independent industrial entity, and the struggle for power there was only marginally to involve the Government.

The first object of the white workers was to establish a colour bar on the Copperbelt on South African lines. Already by 1936, many jobs normally performed by whites in the South, both in the mines and outside, were being done by Africans for a fraction of European pay. Africans held blasting certificates, handled pneumatic drills, and drove lorries (2).

To Charlie Harris, General Secretary of the South African Mine Workers' Union, all this was cause for concern. He visited the Copperbelt in 1936 at the invitation of Olds, whose wife was an elected member of the Legislative Council. When Harris saw Sir Hubert Young, the governor appears to have emphasized that no colour bar legislation would be allowed in the territory, but, on the other hand, the Bulawayo Chronicle noted the


2. Julius Lewin, The Colour Bar on the Copperbelt (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1941), pp. 1-10; Evidence given to the Commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia, 1940 (Forster Evidence) (Z/12, typescript, 1940, National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka), pp. 143 ff. Lewin's book is an amplified version of his evidence to the Forster Commission, 1940.
"sympathetic attitude of the Governor" who, according to Harris, had "promised that the Government would not encourage any encroachment by natives into work now performed by Europeans" (1).

The Government, indeed, hoped that the mines management would do the Government's work for it by refusing to enforce a colour bar on the mines. Certainly, for different motives, the views of mine management and government coincided on the colour bar question. The mines wanted at least to keep open the possibility of African advancement into European jobs, though they denied that this was purely for reasons of lower working costs (2). As part of the implicit bargain, the Colonial Office strongly supported the mines management in their fight against the establishment of a branch of the South African MNWU on the Copperbelt, and in their attempt to prevent a closed shop on the mines.

Formal South African control over the Union was relatively easily avoided. Old's attempt to form a branch of the SAMWU foundered on personal squabbles, and by October 1933, the Northern Rhodesian Mine Workers' Trade Union (MNWU) had been formed under Ben Rount. It began as a rickety structure, and Roan Antelope refused, for example, to join the European mine workers' strike in 1940. But it had no formal South African connection, and thus satisfied the copper companies that they would not be involved in strikes on South African issues (3). The question

1. Bulawayo Chronicle, 16 July 1933; also C.O. 795/92/45165; minute by Davies, 31 March 1937.

2. Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia (The Forster Report) (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1941), para. 193. The copper companies were frankly in favour of replacement of European by African labour, but the final version of the Forster Report toned this down. I have only seen one copy of the original draft of the Report, on C.O. 735/117/45103/75. See also Appendix 3, below.

3. C.O. 795/45/45106: Memorandum by J.A. Calder, 15 September 1935; Governor Young to Secretary of State (tel.) 16 October 1936; and Ben Rount to Chief Secretary Dundas, 20 October 1936.
of recognition of the MWU then arose. Here again, the management were concerned to keep the door open for African advancement, as well as to circumscribe the MWU's power - two objectives which went together. To this end, both Government and the mines management sought to avoid an industrial conciliation system on the Southern Rhodesian and South African model, whereby trade unions, once recognised, were integrated into the industrial structure through conciliation boards, with the inevitable concomitant of a closed shop and the entrenchment of "white" wage standards. Instead, they succeeded in persuading the MWU to accept the British system, which recognised trade unions as lawful voluntary bodies with wide protection from civil and criminal actions, but having no particular legalised status in industry (1). In this way, the Government could still say that it could "in no circumstances countenance any terms involving colour bar" (2) since no actual law was passed like the Southern Rhodesian Industrial Conciliation Act, 1934, which explicitly excluded natives from the purview of the Act, and thereby excluded African trade unions from official recognition (3).

But in adopting the British industrial relations system, the Colonial Office and the Northern Rhodesia Government merely evaded and did not solve the problem of the colour bar. It was simply shifted to another sphere; that of private agreements between the copper companies and the MWU. Under the British system, the Registrar of Trade Unions (in this case the Northern Rhodesian Attorney-General) registered a trade union on request, and kept a copy of its constitution

1. This was effected by the Imperial Acts Extension (Amendment) Ordinance 1937 (No. 12 of 1937), which applied the relevant English legislation to the territory.

2. C.O. 795/92/45166: Officer Administering the Government (Dutton) to Secretary of State (tel.) 14 April 1937.

and rules. Since the constitution of the MWU did not contain any colour-bar provision, it was accepted (1). But the Government did not participate in, or comment on, any private agreements made between employers and trade unions, so long as these agreements were not in themselves unlawful. Thus, although F. Ayer, the General Manager of the Selection Trust mines of Roan Antelope and Mufulira, informed the Governor of the conditions of recognition of the MWU, the Government thereafter took little interest in the day-to-day workings of the system. Thus the crucial Agreement of 1937 between the mines and the MWU was nowhere discussed by the Government. Clause 39 of this Agreement between the mines management and the MWU enforced a standstill on the advancement of "native labour" (2). This agreement and its successors were the basis of strength from which the MWU fought in the 1940's to maintain their monopoly of well-paid jobs on the mines.

Even one Labour Officer on the Copperbelt might have alerted the Government to what was happening, but none was appointed until 1940. Orde Browne did not exaggerate the urgent necessity for a Labour Department in Northern Rhodesia.

By 1940, then, white labour on the Copperbelt had achieved substantial reinforcement of their privileged position: their Union was recognised, and was in practice consulted over industrial matters; a closed shop was de facto in existence, and was to be formalised in 1941(3).

---

1. C.O. 795/92/45106: OAG to Secretary of State, 4 March 1937. A trade union was not compelled to register, nor were specific conditions laid down under which the Registrar might refuse to register it. The Northern Rhodesian African Mine Workers' Trade Union (NHAMWU) was registered without question in 1948, though its constitution (and indeed title) excluded Europeans. Stubbs, the Labour Commissioner in 1948, thought that "if a union is formed with sufficient numbers to carry any weight it must be 'recognised' even if not acceptable to the employers". SEC/LAB/125: minute by Stubbs, 2 April 1948. Under these conditions in 1937 the MWU would have had to be registered, even if its constitution embodied a colour bar.

2. Forster Evidence, p. 690-738: evidence of the Northern Rhodesian Mine Workers' Trade Union.

while a standstill agreement was in force which prevented Africans from moving from their current positions in the industrial ladder. From this position of bargaining strength they could conveniently begin to deploy the "rate for the job" argument, as expressed by the trade union leader Purvis to the Forster Commission in 1940:

"We do not wish the Native to be exploited to the disadvantage of European labour. We have no objections to the Native being a tradesman if he is paid a tradesman's rates". (1)

Part of the Government's attitude was based on fear of the Europeans on the Copperbelt, and of European workers generally, together with a realisation that the Government had to have their support for any innovations. When caught off guard, members of the Government were often candid about it. Sir Hubert Young told the Advisory Council for Education in the Colonies:

"If ......... Africans were trained to drive on the railways this would only lead to trouble with European labour. It would be inconsistent to set up a Legislative Council and then not to listen to the views of the settlers who were represented upon it. He thought that no other community was so likely to arrive at the right solution as the Europeans living in Northern Rhodesia". (2)

Another advocate of letting sleeping dogs lie was T.F. Sandford, Secretary for Native Affairs from 1939 to 1944. Explaining the decreased turn-out of African artisans in government employment in 1938, Sandford attributed this to the attitude of the European artisans, who refused to work alongside black artisans. He did not insist on African artisans in the building of Lusaka because "I could not afford then to let the whole of this place stand still". He concluded: "Naturally the Government does not wish to cross swords on such an issue. We do not want to fight it now and here". (3)

1. Forster Evidence, p. 708.
2. C.O. 793/69/45047: Minutes of Advisory Committee for Education in the Colonies, 28 January 1937.
This passive acceptance of European colour-bar attitudes was overlaid in the late 1930's by a positive and almost hysterical apprehension that the Europeans on the Copperbelt were on the point of revolt. It was this apprehension, and not just the immediate necessities of war, that persuaded the Government and the mining companies to capitulate quickly to most of the men's demands in the European strike at Mufulira and Nkana in 1940. The main complaint voiced by Europeans was that discipline of natives was not sufficiently severe, a complaint familiar enough, even in Southern Rhodesia thirty years before (1). But the situation was made more threatening by the tiny numbers of district officials and police compared with the large numbers of white miners on the Copperbelt by 1935. In that year there were 13 European and 133 African policemen on the Copperbelt; even by 1939 these had increased to only 40 Europeans and 250 Africans. A company of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, which consisted of African ankari officered by whites, was stationed at Bwana Mkubwa, but would never be deployed against Europeans (2).

The hostility of the Europeans, latent since the bitterness of the slump, had blown up after the 1935 African strike. Europeans had no hesitation about laying this at the door of the Government, and the protests of the miners and other Copperbelt residents brought about a change in the composition of what became the Russell Commission. The Government caved in to European direct action in the 1937 Bissett case (3). A European youth had assaulted an African in Kitwe Township,

1. Henderson, "White populism".

2. C.O. 795/110/45233: Governor Maybin to Secretary of State, 25 March 1939; C.O. 795/103/45233: minute by Cohen, 9 April 1938. Orde Browne's Interim Report, said that the use of native troops 'cannot be advocated'.

and was sentenced by the District Magistrate, Fleming, to four strokes with the cane. Europeans staged an indignant protest at this, and forced the Government to institute an enquiry. The enquiry found that the official had acted strictly according to the law, but made recommendations that the Government should set up a domestic labour bureau, and that mine townships should be placed out of bounds to Africans other than those employed there. These recommendations, together with the transfer of Fleming to Fort Rosebery, shook the confidence of officials (1).

During Orde Browne's stay in the territory, the *Rex v. Mupanta* case occurred. Mupanta was convicted of assault causing grievous bodily harm on a European woman, committed near the Roan club. Feeling ran high among the European community at this "Black Peril" assault, and there was the threat of a lynching party. Mupanta was given one year's imprisonment with hard labour, and twelve lashes, but R.S. Jeffreys, Resident Magistrate at Ndola, feared that violence would have broken out if the accused had been acquitted (2). During the crisis the Governor telegraphed for 18 extra European police constables to be added to the establishment, since special constables could not be depended on in the event of European disturbances (3). The Superintendent of Police at Ndola requested that each police unit should be equipped with a machine gun "to enable them to deal with the situation should the European population get out of hand". (4).

1. Government Notice 68 of 1938 included compounds in mine townships, thus increasing control over Africans' movements; C.O. 795/103/45228, *passim*, for action on the Jenkins Report; also minute by H.N. Swanzy, 5 April 1938, on C.O. 795/103/45233.


3. C.O. 795/103/45233; Governor Northern Rhodesia, to Secretary of State, 2 March 1938 (tel.).

4. Logan to Secretary of State, 26 March 1938, *loc. cit.*
Orde Browne's confidential report on the situation was gloomy. He pointed to the "insulting and disgusting treatment of the native; spitting at a servant is not uncommon, incredible as this may sound". (1)

Domestic disputes between mistresses and their African servants were particularly dangerous: "in such cases, the unfortunate African can only hope for prompt arrest, as he is otherwise likely to suffer very rough treatment". It was "a menacing situation", and there was at least the possibility of a disturbance at any moment. Orde Browne, however, emphasised that the trouble was caused by a minority, all of them South Africans.

It was indeed a worrying situation as danger of war grew in Europe, and copper became a strategic mineral. Not for the first time, the Colonial Office and the officials on the spot wished that the most troublesome of the Europeans could be spirited away quietly. In a highly confidential meeting with representatives of Rhokana and Roan Antelope in London, Colonial Office officials suggested discreetly that the general standard of Europeans on the mines would be improved by substituting Africans in some low-grade work. Predictably the managers' reply was that, although this could be done at Roan Antelope and Mufulira, it would lead to serious opposition from the LWU (2).

On a broader front, the Government worked to improve relations with Europeans through employees' committees and residents' committees (3). The immediate threat to security was contained, and a European Defence

1. Interim Report by Orde Browne.

2. C.O. 795/103/45233. Note of a meeting held on 7 July 1938 with S.S. Taylor (Rhokana) and R.J.P. Parker (Roan Antelope).

3. C.O. 795/110/45233: Logan to Secretary of State, 26 March 1938; Governor Haybin to Secretary of State, 25 March 1939.
Force was formed in 1939, as a volunteer reserve to the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (1). The fact that Roy Welensky was on the Executive Council as Director of Manpower by 1940 went some way towards conciliating European fears. The 1940 strike of Europeans at Mfufulira and Nkana, though it was in breach of the 1937 Agreement with the companies, was a specifically industrial dispute, and the men's demands of a rise in basic wages of 2/- per shift, a war bonus of 5 per cent, and overtime pay at time and a half, double on Sundays, were not overtly political, though their demand for a closed shop bore political implications (2).

The great power of the Europeans on the Copperbelt to make trouble for a physically weak government meant that the Government was compelled to conciliate the European community at every stage. Later, the power of the whites to endanger copper production was enough to make the Colonial Office back the closed shop principle on the mines. In these circumstances only very cautious efforts could be made to conciliate Africans. Africans, after all, had no guns. "The native", said Orde Browne, "even if riotous, can be controlled by the police and the military, who are in fact available". (3) The 1940 African strike and the Forster Report destroyed the assumption that Africans could be controlled by well-devised security and minimal welfare measures. But the fight to secure economic and political opportunities for Africans after 1940, fought mainly by Africans themselves, was made harder and more bitter by the solid entrenchment achieved by European labour in the years up to 1940.

1. Ibid., Deputy Governor to Secretary of State, 28 December 1938.
2. Forster Report, paras. 43-45.
3. Interim Report by Orde Browne.
iii. Regulating African migrant labour: the Salisbury Agreement

Governments in Central Africa had been trying to control the flow, volume and conditions of migrant labour since the turn of the century, but had made few significant advances in solving the complex problems involved. Technical advances such as the introduction of motor buses and improved medical facilities combined with the tightening grasp of the administration on all parts of Northern Rhodesia to bring about a gradual improvement in general conditions for migrant labourers en route; the tragic death rates and the disgraceful recruiting practices of the early days were now at an end, but the fundamental problems of African development had not been tackled. The Agreement on Migrant Labour of 1936 (the Salisbury Agreement) between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was the final stage in the attempts to perfect the old system whereby the three territories regulated the circulation of labour between them, the two northern territories accepting the role of labour reserves (1). It did not work any better than previous arrangements: the Southern Rhodesia Government instead saw a steady draining away of Northern Rhodesian labour in the 1940's as the Northern Rhodesian mining industry expanded. Once again, African labour chose its jobs and its routes according to its own calculation of possible benefits. Even if this freedom of choice was within a framework of colonial exploitation, it upset the calculations of governments and demonstrated the limits of bureaucracy.

1. The Agreement is printed in Orde Browne, Labour Conditions, Appendix I and in the Pim and Milligan Report, Appendix IV. It was revised in 1941 and 1947: SEC/CAC/30: memorandum on the working of the migrant labour agreement by the acting labour adviser, Nyasaland, 10 October 1949. The SEC/CAC series of Secretariat files on the Central African Council is in the National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka.
The Salisbury Agreement was part of Southern Rhodesia's attempt to secure the best of both worlds in Central Africa in the 1930's. If amalgamation was not always obviously in the South's interests, especially when Northern Rhodesia was running a budget deficit in 1932-33, the North might be useful in other ways. Southern Rhodesia had a chronic labour shortage, only temporarily eased by the Depression; she also had a chronic shortage of land for Africans, particularly since the 1931 Land Apportionment Act had allocated much of the best unalienated land to the European area (1). The land shortage could be eased by giving Southern Rhodesia's Africans some of the apparently ample land available in the North, an expedient suggested by Huggins in 1934 (2), while the labour shortage could best be solved by plugging gaps in southward migration, and placing recruitment on a regular and agreed basis.

The recovery of mining in Southern Africa from the slump in 1934-5 saw the revival of competition for labour between the Rand and the Southern Rhodesian mines. In 1936 WNLA was permitted by the South African Government to recruit north of 22° south for the first time since 1913. Though formally WNLA confined its recruiting to its traditional territories - Mozambique and Bechuanaland - the whole system was distorted by "voluntary" labour, which had a tendency to by-pass Southern Rhodesia for the £3-a-month wage-rates of the Rand. Even recruits from the North to Southern Rhodesia were known to desert for the Rand, once they had been transported


2. C.O. 795/72/25659: memorandum by Bottomley, 13 September 1934; and by J.A. Calder, n.d. Huggins' suggestion proves that the fears of Africans in the northern territories that they would "lose their land" if Federation came were not unfounded.
to Salisbury or Bulawayo (1). The phantom labour force of Southern Rhodesian Africans was also attracted by the Rand. Ruggins therefore saw it as essential not simply to control recruiting, but to control voluntary labour migration in order to conserve Southern Rhodesia's supply. This meant government action to an extent previously unknown.

A provisional agreement was made by the three Central African governments in April 1933 (2) and approved by the Colonial Office in 1933. Its main provision was to institute a passport system for labourers travelling between the three territories. From March 1938 all Africans going to Southern Rhodesia from Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland had to have their identity certificates endorsed for work in Southern Rhodesia. (3) All three territories undertook to turn back all who did not possess this document. The governments of the two northern territories had full power over the number of passports issued, and might cease to issue them, as indeed Nyasaland did for a short time in 1939 (4). Provisions were made in the Agreement for compulsory deferred pay and repatriation after two years by the three governments, but these provisions remained unattainable ideals.

Southern Rhodesia seems, indeed to have obtained few advantages from the Salisbury Agreement. Labour migration from the northern territories dropped in volume from 1938 onwards, mainly, it seems, because of increased employment opportunities in Northern Rhodesia, though one

1. Though the RNLB went out of business during the Depression, private recruiters continued to operate in Northern Rhodesia.

2. C.O. 795/73/45007: Resolutions of a Conference held at Salisbury on 15, 16 and 17 April 1935. The three Governors had evolved the basis of the agreement in January. See Confidential Note of Young, Stanley and Kittermaster - Governors' informal discussion, 23 January 1935, ibid.


4. SEC/LAB/10: G. Howe (Acting Labour Commissioner) to Chief Secretary 1 November 1939.
cannot be sure of the figures (1). The withholding of passports, whether deliberately or through lack of co-ordination, by the Northern Governments, was a cause of much complaint by the Southern Government (2). It struck at the roots of the system, and the Southern Rhodesians were compelled either to turn non-passport holders back at the border, or break the Agreement. Nor did the Agreement prevent the two northern territories from making their own arrangements with WNLA, which they both did shortly afterwards.

What, then, were the gains for Southern Rhodesia in the Salisbury Agreement? The answer is to be found in political terms. The Agreement capitalised on the long-standing labour links between the three territories, and made them formal for the first time. It was a bridgehead for the advocates of closer union, for a permanent standing committee on the Agreement was set up, consisting of the Secretaries for Native Affairs, or equivalent, of the three territories (3). It was the first piece of "federal" machinery to be set up in the 1930's, apart from the periodic meetings of Governors.

These 'Federal' links were not simply platonic, for one of the main objectives of the Salisbury Agreement, from Southern Rhodesia's viewpoint, was to exclude South Africa from the Central African labour market. It was due to the increasing labour demands from the Rand that the Agreement was necessary at all, and it was itself subsidiary to Huggins's
greatest desire of all: to exert effective control of labour migration from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa, a migration which contained large numbers of labourers from the northern territories, who treated Southern Rhodesia as only a step on the road to the Rand. T.F. Sandford, at this time Northern Rhodesia's Senior Provincial Commissioner, thought the situation was serious:

"I have come to the conclusion that we are heading straight for a very severe labour shortage. At the present time we are beginning to approach what you might describe as a labour war - one British possession is endeavouring to secure its labour from another possession". (1)

The Standing Committee on the Salisbury Agreement spent many hours trying to solve the problem of leakage of labour to South Africa, which prevented the deferred pay and repatriation sections of the Salisbury Agreement from taking effect (2). The Southern Rhodesians were not made happier by the fact that Northern Rhodesia entered into an agreement with the Transvaal Chamber of Mines in 1938 to allow WNLA to recruit up to 10,000 per year in Barotse (3). Though recruiting only began, and on much smaller scale than this, in 1940, it was a dangerous precedent, and Colonel Carbutt, the Chief Native Commissioner in Salisbury, would have been happier to allow WNLA to recruit 20,000 labourers per year from Southern Rhodesia, provided they did not actively

1. NR Legoo Deb, 31, 601 (20 December 1938).


3. Pin and Milligan Report, p. 33. Orde Browne told the Bledisloe Commission in 1938: "the feeling at the background was that [the Salisbury Agreement] was to secure the three countries from undue exploitation by the Rand. Since then the position has been appreciably weakened because both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have found it so conspicuously advantageous to make a definite deal with WNLA, that Southern Rhodesia now considers that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have betrayed her to some extent by entering into an agreement with these sinister powers at a distance". Bledisloe Evidence, xi.
recruit in the two northern territories (1). So long as no specific quotas were laid down in the Salisbury Agreement, there was, besides, always the danger of piracy from the South: in 1938 Capelli, a South African millionaire, attempted to secure sole recruiting rights in Northern Rhodesia through Macnab, a labour recruiter, and a former Native Commissioner (2). It was a stroke worthy of some of Rhodes's associates, but it failed "owing to its inherent dangers and the opposition of the Southern Rhodesian Government". (3)

The Salisbury Agreement, then, was a commentary on the limits of the power of the governments concerned to regulate the flow of labour. The labour requirements of the three territories were, according to the Agreement, to have first call on the territories' labour supply. But both labour requirements and labour supply were only imperfectly known, and were only worked out in the following decade. The power of governments to issue passports was not enough to regulate the flow of labour. Africans moved to places of work for economic reasons, and did not do so for administrative convenience. When more jobs became available in Northern Rhodesia in the years after 1936, the flow of labour to the South slowed down, though between 40,000 and 50,000 Northern Rhodesians still worked in Southern Rhodesia at any given time.

We have noted that the Salisbury Agreement had important political facets. We must add here that the way it worked could have been an important pointer for those who were interested in the Federal idea, for the main function of the Standing Committee on the Agreement was

1. C.O. 795/78/45109/1: Bottomley to Sir Hubert Young (s.o.), 10 August 1935.
3. C.O. 795/100/45109/3: Minutes of the NILAB, 23 March, 25 April 1938, encl. in Acting Governor Logan to Secretary of State, 9 August 1938; also minute by H.N. Swanzy, 25 August 1938.
to seek a consensus which was favourable to Southern Rhodesia. When Nyasaland sought to impose a quota on the number of migrants to Southern Rhodesia in 1939, as was done with WRLA, the two Rhodesias opposed such controls as being unworkable. In any case, Nyasaland had never been able to control her labour outflow, but the lack of cooperation from the other two territories contributed in this case to her difficulties (1). When Nyasaland attempted to impose deferred pay and repatriation conditions more stringently, the other two governments returned a non possumus (2). Northern Rhodesia's position was ambivalent as an employer and an "exporter" of labour, but on the Standing Committee Howe, the Acting Labour Commissioner, did not usually oppose Southern Rhodesia's views. The Southern Rhodesians returned a dusty answer when the Nyasaland Government attempted to spell out desirable labour conditions late in 1939: no legislation would be passed on feeding labourers, nor on an 8-hour day "until the native increases his efficiency". Factories legislation was not contemplated, and even a suggestion that African markets selling green vegetables should be set up near mines was rejected because of opposition from European farmers (3). The Standing Committee on the Salisbury Agreement certainly showed that the 'Colonial Office liberalism' of the northern territories was not acceptable to Southern Rhodesia, even as a quid pro quo for the right of first call on northern labour. It also shows as naive the recommendation of the Bledisloe Commission that there should be consideration of a joint Labour Department for Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.

2. Ibid., G. Howe (Acting Labour Commissioner) to Chief Secretary, 1 November 1939.
and that this should be a prelude to the amalgamation of the two
northern territories (1). There was in fact considerably more
co-operation and common views between the officials in Northern and
Southern Rhodesia than between Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
Amalgamation between the two Northern territories assumed a common
policy and, since 1930, this could not be assumed.

The importance of the Standing Committee as a federal bridgehead
was seen when the three Governors and Huggins proposed in 1940 to
extend the scope of the existing Governors' Conference and set up a
small secretariat in Salisbury. The existing Standing Committee on
Labour was to be converted to a delegation of the Conference (2).
In 1941 a permanent secretariat was set up in Salisbury, and the
Central African Council began to function in 1945, though the Colonial
Office was clearly unhappy at being rushed into action on the Bledisloe
recommendations (3).

iv. Regulating African development: the failure of a fiscal policy

The paralysis of the most well-meaning governments can most
easily be seen in the problem of what is nowadays termed "the rural
areas" of Zambia. Contrary to popular belief, colonial governments
gave constant consideration to the problems of the subsistence economy,
but were prevented from ever doing anything by the gigantic nature
of the problem, the puniness of the colonial administration's resources,


2. C.O. 795/113/45007. Record of Proceedings of a meeting of the
Governors of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and the Prime Minister
of Southern Rhodesia, the Governor of Southern Rhodesia presiding,
3 October 1940.

3. Ibid., Secretary of State to Governors of Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, n.d. 9November 1940. Bledisloe Report, para. 503; Gunn,
History, p. 353.
a lack of expertise on how to set about balanced development, and, it must be said, a lack of will and conviction. The problem could be stated endlessly, but solutions were at a premium. Often, what passed for a solution was simply a restatement of the problem.

W.H. Mainwaring, the Labour M.P., added his own Note to the Bledisloe Report which typifies the bankrupt heartsearchings of the period:

"Something needs to be done of a positive character to assist in the progressive improvement of the native economy itself; the native economy should not be left to serve merely as a supply of cheap labour for others. The real welfare of the African native depends not upon his obtaining work in industries established, owned and administered by Europeans, but upon his own efficiency in working upon the land". (1)

But on the other hand, how was modernisation of the urban sector to take place in Africa without African labour? The policy of "developing the rural areas", whatever that might mean, must eventually conflict with the need for a flow of labour to the urban areas. Ordo Browne perhaps typifies the humanitarian progressives of the 1930's, intent, not on breaking up the Empire, but on developing it for the benefit of the indigenous peoples and, it must be added, of the mother country.

Labour, Ordo Browne thought, was the crucial factor in the development of tropical Africa. Labour migration was an inevitable consequence of uneven development in a poor continent, and a policy of enlightened self-interest was necessary in harnessing it to the needs of the colonial powers. Better transport, more scientific surveys of available labour, and better administration generally, were the keys to making colonialism pay. Ordo Browne considered himself neither a 'sentimentalist' nor an 'exploiter', but a realist (2). Bernard Shaw


would have approved of this treatment of the Empire as a going concern, with full government participation. It came too late, but it was in earnest.

Whatever this benevolent policy implied for Northern Rhodesia, it certainly could not approve of the status quo on the export of labour. "The old tradition of the export of labour", Orde Browne told the Bledisloe Commission, "has made Northern Rhodesia settle down and accept the tradition of going out of the country for work that does not exist in any other African country, with the possible exception of Nyasaland. You will find Tanganyika guarding the exportation of her labour most jealously". (1). But how were Africans to be persuaded that it would profit them better to stay at home than to go south for wage-labour, when it was abundantly obvious that staying at home meant poverty, isolation and stagnation? In the late thirties the Colonial Office addressed itself to the problem, but found the system so entrenched as to be immovable.

In October 1936 the Colonial Office suggested to Sir Hubert Young that a commission to enquire into the financial and economic position of Northern Rhodesia was desirable (2). It seemed to be the only way of securing some changes in the inflexible Northern Rhodesian pattern of revenue and expenditure, which had been producing budget deficits regularly, and enabled the Governor to postpone embarrassing items under the excuse "lack of funds". African education and training had particularly been held back in this way, the Jeanes School, the African secondary school and the African technical training institute all having been held up by white opposition on the spot (3).

1. Bledisloe Evidence, xi.


3. Coombe, "Origins of secondary education".
What started as an enquiry about the poverty of the government ultimately became a tactical weapon in the hands of the paramountcy men in the Colonial Office, and served as a basis for Northern Rhodesia's first Five-Year Plan: Northern Rhodesia did not suffer from fiscal poverty after 1937, since the price of copper rose in that year, and restrictions on copper production were removed (1). But equally, the Bledisloe Commission was in the air, and the paramountcy men saw the Pim Commission as a holding operation. Calder put it candidly:

Sir Hubert Young is likely to receive approval for his policy of some sort of British Central African Federation, and of aiming at common policies for Northern and Southern Rhodesia. To what extent that may involve retarding the economic development of the native in Northern Rhodesia is not clear, ... but there is much to be said for the Pim-Milligan enquiry. It is possible they may suggest some lines of native development which we may not be able to get adopted, 7But it might enable us to achieve more for native development in Northern Rhodesia than would be possible in any other way". (2)

Sir Alan Pim was duly appointed, with Milligan co-commissioner, an agricultural expert who would give due emphasis to native development. Though Colonial No. 145 is a brilliant analysis of the workings of the territory's finances and economy, it failed to alter radically the economic position of Africans. The problem of "native tax" was the most striking example of this.

There was little to be said in favour of the existing system of taxation of Africans in the 1930's, except that the act of changing it was a delicate one, and that the district administration was contented with a system with which it was familiar, and Africans distrusted any changes. Tax was imposed on every able-bodied male in the territory, with only a crude attempt at making the rates progressive.

1. Gann, "World of Copper".
From 1933 the rates were:

- Mufulira, Nkana and Luanshya: 15/-
- Most other districts: 10/-
- Mulovale, Mwinilunga: 7/6 (1)

These rates were held despite the Copperbelt Strike of 1933. Pim and Dundas, the Chief Secretary, then put forward the view, unorthodox for the time and place, that tax should be assessed according to the means to pay, and that in particular an attempt should be made to tax wages. Thus, the traditional colonial poll-tax system would be graded nearly out of existence, and a tax on earned income substituted. This had much to support it from the point of view of ordinary humanity. The balance of payments of the poverty-stricken rural areas could be rectified. The Pim Report said that in parts of the Northern Province, tax, if assessed on local resources, would be 3d or 1s. Even Logan admitted that based on local cash resources, Africans in some outlying areas would only be taxed "3d or nothing". (2) The tax therefore operated as a corvée, a kind of labour service imposed by the money economy on the subsistence economy.

But despite the obvious arguments from the point of view of humanity and equity, the idea of tax assessment according to resources was not acceptable to the district administration. A Northern Rhodesian Committee on Taxation, consisting of the able C.H. Lockhart (Financial Secretary), T.F. Sandford (Senior Provincial Commissioner) and Stewart Gore-Browne, MLC, reported in 1938 and recommended a reduction of the

1. *Northern Rhodesia Government Gazette*, xxv, No. 31, 5 June 1935; C.O. 763/73/45004: Governor Young to Sir John Maffey (s.o.), 21 November 1934.

tax to 6/6 in the remote areas (1). It rejected, however, any proposal to relate tax to means because of the great administrative difficulties, and because it would not ultimately benefit the rural areas in any case. Lochhart's hard-headed view seems, in fact, to be an accurate one: "We are certain that there are a certain number of natives who would not leave their villages but for pressure of taxation. We are also satisfied that the great majority would continue to seek employment, tax or no tax". (2) It was, therefore, no hardship to tax this majority, and a kind of tax labour system could always be devised for the old and the unenterprising. There was a further point: it could, said the Committee, prove "highly embarrassing" to tax wage-earners and to miss out those who earned a living on their own account. The embarrassment would be incurred, presumably, from the fury of the European settlers against this tax exemption of Tongs agricultural entrepreneurs, who, together with the Lake Bangweulu fish producers, formed the only sizeable group of self-supporting non-wage-earners in the territory, and were a potential threat to European agriculture.

Thus, despite Colonial Office promptings, the Northern Rhodesian administration refused to move away from a poll-tax system which was still barbarically regressive despite the elementary division of the territory into three areas of differential taxation: the Industrial Area, the Farming Area, and the Labour Supplying Area (3). The average annual income of 50 Africans in the relatively prosperous Abercorn reserve was £18-3, on which they paid 6/6 tax (4). This

1. C.O. 795/94/45004: Report on Native Taxation, 8 February 1938, encl. in Governor Young to Secretary of State, 16 February 1938.

2. ibid. Remission of tax in the rural areas, however, as part of a planned policy of development, would have been a start.

3. ibid.

was scarcely comparable with the 1/- paid by a mineworker on an average income of £27 per annum; or for that matter with the very light income tax which only fell upon a minority of Europeans. The tax, therefore, remained substantially the same in its incidence and structure as it had been in the pre-1914 era, when it was imposed to raise a revenue and persuade Africans to emerge from their villages into wage employment (1).

The next best thing, from the Colonial Office point of view, was to reduce the rates of tax all round so as to give some relief to the rural areas. This also was scotched when the Provincial Commissioners declared that Africans by 1938 were now able to pay a tax rate of 7/6 or 6/6 in the 'labour supplying areas' (2). The Colonial Office had to confess themselves beaten, and dropped the proposal to reduce the rates to below 7/- and 6/- (3).

v. Summing-up: limitations, inherent and acquired

The search, then, for a labour policy in Northern Rhodesia, took place in an atmosphere in which the urgency of the situation only slowly communicated itself to those in power. In the Copperbelt, a community was growing which could not be administered in the same way as a rural district, in which white and black met in conflict, and where the white miners' and settlers' demands plainly conflicted with the declared policy of the Colonial Office. Things could not stand still.

1. Native tax by 1937 comprised only one-ninth of total revenue, compared with almost one quarter in 1924/25 and 70 per cent in 1901/02. Report on Native Taxation, loc. cit., and I am also grateful to Robert Melteno for allowing me to see some of his unpublished work on the administrative history of Zambia.

2. C.O. 795/94/45004: Governor Maybin to Secretary of State, 4 September 1938; C.O. 795/96/45096: Minutes of Provincial Commissioners' Conference, August-September 1938, p. 3.

for the United Kingdom was now under scrutiny by international bodies, and she had to begin to demonstrate what she meant by 'paramountcy'. At home, too, a well-informed humanitarian opposition was exposing the lack of policies to back up the professions of goodwill. But most of all, the impetus to change came from the men on the spot, particularly the black and white miners.

The success of the Colonial Office and the Northern Rhodesia Government in implementing a labour policy in these years was very limited, indeed Orde Browne remarked in 1938 that Northern Rhodesia had plenty of committees and conferences about labour, but nothing ever seemed to be done (1). Certainly, officials met to talk about the problem more frequently. NILAB, the eventual Labour Department, the Standing Committee on the Salisbury Agreement, Provincial Commissioners' Conferences, all provided opportunities for officials to mull over the limited range of information and interpretation available. All this talk sometimes brought diminishing returns, since one committee might be unwilling to propose anything until a higher one had reported. T.F. Sandford, explaining to the Bledisloe Commission why no planned programme of native development existed in 1938, said:

"We have been subjected to so many examinations lately - the first one the Pim, the other Orde Browne - that there is the tendency to stop everything until the next body has reported. Do nothing because Sir Alan Pim is going to report, and if we start now we shall probably have to change what we are doing. With regard to labour we have had any number of things we wanted to do in regard to labour in the last twelve months, but it has been 'wait for the Orde Browne Report' ". (2)

The modest achievements of these committees and of the Northern Rhodesia Government lay in the field of the welfare of migrants rather than in African development. Conditions of migrant labour improved during the 1930's, as more rest-houses and dispensaries were set up,

---

1. C.O. 795/100/45109/2A: minute by Cohen, 2 September 1938.
2. Bledisloe Evidence, lxxxviii.
and as motor transport became widespread. There was less tax labour as the depression eased, and some embarrassment when it was talked about (1). It belonged to the primitive era of colonial rule, and was specifically forbidden by the ILO. Above all, conditions for African labourers on the Copperbelt were on the whole approved of by outside investigators, though the Government had to thank the copper companies for this happy state of affairs. This did not mean, of course, that conditions were satisfactory by any reasonable standards, and nearly every African worker interviewed complained of the very bad conditions in the compounds. It is now solidly part of nationalist tradition that it was the sheer misery of compound life that brought about the 1935 and 1940 strikes, and we need not rely on hindsight to confirm this belief. Solid evidence from the 1940’s gives ample reinforcement (2).

The failures of the Colonial Office and the Northern Rhodesia Government are easier to enumerate, and we enumerate them, not in order to arraign these cautious and humane men before the bar of history, but to give us clues about what was possible and what was impossible in the Northern Rhodesian situation. There was the continual postponement of a Labour Department at a time when the territory's problems required expert advice and information; there was the slow, grudging and miniscule provision for African education and industrial training, as was seen in the miserable saga of the Jeanes School, the Survey Platoon of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, and the African trade school, all of which were postponed continually in the 1930's (3).

2. See below, pp. 195-197.
There was above all the passive acceptance of the entrenchment of white privilege on the mines and the railways, a position from which officials were to spend twenty years extricating themselves. It has been said that the reason for these failures was the presence of a powerful group of Europeans who were steadily entrenching themselves politically. The struggle was, therefore, on one level between the paramountcy men in the Colonial Office and the intransigent Europeans on the spot. But there was another struggle at another level - between a British imperial power attempting for the first time to cope with the problems of underdevelopment with administrative tools best suited to colonial exploitation, and the indigenous peoples of the Empire, whose demands were beginning to cut across the petty struggle between the white men on the spot and the white man at home. The indigenous people were beginning to demand to be admitted into the system, but to do so was to begin to destroy the system, which was essentially designed to exploit them.

The colonial power in Northern Rhodesia found it difficult to make any changes in the direction of African development without offending its agents on the spot. But it had placed those agents there in the first place, and the system could not work without them. It was therefore a prisoner of its own system. When white trade unionism arose on the Copperbelt in 1936, the officials recognised and legitimated its existence. Pressure, indeed, was put on the mines management by Dundas, the Chief Secretary, to recognise the MWU even if its membership was less than 60% of the daily-paid Europeans on the mines (1). Though the principle of "no colour bar in His Majesty's dominions" was enunciated, the officials made no effort to prevent a de facto colour bar from growing up on the mines. Indeed, it is difficult

1. C.O. 793/92/4516 [missing], esp. minute by Calder, 25 May 1937.
to see how they could have insisted at that point on African advancement, given the underdeveloped state of African education in the territory, and the migrant nature of African labour.

The working of the Salisbury Agreement showed the other aspect of the problem of the colonial power: how to achieve development with the primitive tools of colonial exploitation.

The rural areas of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia remained as they had been since the beginning of the colonial era: areas of subsistence economy, drained of young men, paying tribute to the urban areas of the South in the form of labour. The problems of distance from markets and poverty of soils would have daunted a Stalin. This poverty made the two northern territories, and more especially Nyasaland, vulnerable to the pull of wage labour in the South. The drain of young men went on, willy-nilly, whatever government committees said. To break this vicious circle of migrant labour and poverty requires a radical reorientation of government goals, of which a colonial government was not capable. The Salisbury Agreement was an attempt to harness the existing system and make it more rational, and possibly more humane. But the reluctance to change the existing system in such a way as to alleviate the poverty of the rural areas was evident in the territory's insistence on the old exploitative weapon of native tax as a necessity of government. Here we cannot blame the settlers for being reactionary, for they wanted to see the system of native tax reformed, and Leopold Moore favoured its abolition (1). Rather we must blame the inability of officials to envisage a new financial and fiscal structure which could form the basis for African development.

The limits of colonial power, then, in the 1930's, were determined partly by the changed circumstances of the world, and partly by the inability of an Empire to reorient itself towards "development" without doing fatal injury to the loyalty and morale of its agents on the spot.

1. NR Legco Deb, 31, 53 (7 December 1938).
CHAPTER 4

THE COPPERBELT STRIKES,

1935 and 1940
On 29 May 1933 six African mineworkers were killed by the Northern Rhodesia Police at Roan Antelope Mine, Luanshya, in the course of a strike. On 3 April 1940, 16 African mineworkers were killed in similar circumstances at Nkana Mine by soldiers of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment.

By contemporary standards the death toll was not high, and strikes in the British colonial empire were common in the 1930's (1) But this was the first surfacing of African industrial grievances in Northern Rhodesia as well as being the first time African blood had been shed on the fissile Copperbelt. The episodes are firmly embedded in Zambian political consciousness, and form the conventional terminus a quo of the popular history of nationalism (2). For this reason alone the strikes merit close analysis. There is a sufficient number of participants still alive for us to be able to compare their version of events with the official one, and both of these in turn with the emerging stereotype of popular history.

Besides their importance for the history of African political consciousness in Zambia, the strikes had more conventional, but equally important, political effects. The 1933 strike struck something like panic into the breasts of the whites of Northern Rhodesia, united the unofficials against the seeming ineffectiveness and incompetence of the Government, and made whites once again look to the South for security.

The 1940 strike had a much broader effect. It was an issue of the first importance in Britain, the Colonial Office was able to snatch the initiative from the unnerved Governor Maybin, and the question of African industrial advancement was aired openly and officially for the first time. From that time onwards the whites on the Copperbelt suffered

1. See Table 7, above, p. 98.

2. See, for example, M.J. Chimba, M.P., 'The struggle for independence' in Zambia News (Lusaka) 20 October, 2 and 9 November 1939. Mr. Chimba was at the time Minister of National Guidance in the Zambian Government.
from exposure: though they retained their monopoly of industrial power for twenty years, their explicit defence of it looked increasingly threadbare.

The more specific effects of the strikes on African political and industrial organisation are less easy to assess. It will be argued that the 1935 strike had some of the elements of a tax revolt translated into industrial terms, and that the basic weakness of the African workers lay in the inability of the ad hoc strike organisation to articulate grievances. This weakness had been remedied by 1940, but we still know little about the process by which this came about. The 1940 strike was a general protest about the industrial colour bar, and, according to the eye-witness, R.J.B. Moore,

"the leaders ... were able to control the mob, instruct it in its demands, publish grievances so that they were on everyone's lips, and (up to the last moment at Nkana) keep it peacefully under control". (1)

The 1940 strike, however, did not lead to the emergence of a permanent, institutionalised African leadership on the mines. The conventional view of the whites was that Africans were "not ready" for trade unions in 1940, and Africans do not appear to have attempted to form any.

Instead, the alliance forged in the late 1930's between the "official" leadership of tribal elders and tribal representatives and the "unofficial" leadership of militant young men was continued, to surface again with the formation of the Northern Rhodesia African Mine Workers' Trade Union (ALWU) in 1947 (2).

1. The mines

The great copper industry on which Northern Rhodesia's future

1. R.J.B. Moore, These African Copper Miners (London: Livingstone Press, 1948) p. 84.

2. See below, pp.218-233.
prosperity was to be based, was founded in the years 1920 to 1935. (1) The discovery in 192 of rich deposits of sulphide ores by geologists working for prospecting companies financed by British, American and South African capital brought five years of furious construction activity at Roan Antelope, Nkana and Mufulira. The former producing mines of Dowa Mkubwa and Kansanshi were dwarfed in significance by these great new underground mines. By 1930, control of mining on the Copperbelt was in the hands of Chester Beatty's Rhodesian Selection Trust and Ernest Oppenheimer's Anglo-American Corporation. The British South Africa Company, both through its ownership of the mineral rights in the territory, and by virtue of being a shareholder in most mining ventures, entered on to a new era of prosperity (2). By 1938, the Copperbelt was producing 213,000 long tons of copper per year, 13.42 per cent. of the copper produced in the non-communist world, compared with 708 long tons in 1926. African labourers employed rose from 7,439 in 1933 to 14,023 in 1936, and to 26,203 in 1940. The European population of the territory meanwhile rose from an estimated 5,587 in 1926 to an estimated 10,588 in 1936 (3).

Around the mines grew the townships of the Copperbelt, containing, as Orde Browne had observed, an unstable mixture of black and white. Up to the development of the Copperbelt, mining in Northern Rhodesia had been a small-scale venture, employing a few hundred labourers. Now labourers were numbered in thousands, and a vital difference impinged

1. This account is based on Kenneth Bradley, Copper Venture (London: Mufulira Copper Mines Ltd., 1952), pp. 75-102; and L.H. Gann, "The Northern Rhodesian copper industry and the world of copper, 1923-1952", MLJ, xviii (1953).

2. The British South Africa Company's claim, p. 1. Company profits were mostly made in the period 1943-54.

on their way of life: they now lived in large compounds alongside people from all parts of Central Africa, and there was also the possibility of moving from one job to another without leaving the urban scene. Thus, urbanisation became possible and, with it, the possibility of stable leadership outside the framework of tribal chiefs and elders.

Though Orde Browne in 1933 considered the physical conditions in the compounds to be comparatively good, almost all the other factors in the situation tended towards instability. There was a permanent pool of unemployed labourers on the Copperbelt, the result of the mines' policy of employing voluntary labour, which made its own way to and from the mines. Some recruitment by the Mines Native Labour Bureau had been necessary in the boom years 1929-32, but thereafter labour beat a path to the door of the copper companies (1). Added to the unemployment problem was the problem of the children and young people who grew up on the Copperbelt without education and without a job (2). The Government toyed with the idea of administrative deportation for the unemployed, but shied away from the massive administrative problems which it involved. No pass system existed, though identity certificates were usually taken up by Africans going outside the territory, more especially after the signing of the


2. Nkana Mine had a primary school for Africans, and the Government set up schools at Roan Antelope and Mafulira in 1938. The Bishop of Northern Rhodesia confessed in 1937 that until a short while previously "hardly any" schools had been provided by the missions on the Copperbelt for the 3000 children there. CO 755/31/45137: Minutes of the 74th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies (ACEC) 25 February 1937; memorandum to ACEC from the Government of Northern Rhodesia, 7 September 1937.
Salisbury Agreement in 1933 (1).

Faced with this daunting problem of control, the Government began by treating it as an extension of its normal administrative responsibilities in the rural areas. The District Commissioners at Mufulira, Luamkhy and Nkana had the same powers and responsibilities as those in the rural areas, though it was early understood that the administration fielded its best team on the Copperbelt (2) and from 1939 district officials there were paid a special allowance (3). But the sensitive problems of industrial relations needed rather more than the basic ability to handle men. The Russell Commission said that district officials on the Copperbelt were burdened with too much routine work (4). As Sir Alison Russell put it in 1935:

"It is all very well putting a District Officer in the open in the middle of 100,000 natives and with half a dozen askaris to keep order ... But mining areas are a different matter. 6000 or so natives in a compound; more or less detribalized; without chiefs; unaccustomed to machinery; and with pathetic contentment rapidly giving way to divine discontent ... might lead to a serious disaster ... The whole position rests on bluff - the prestige of the white man - a good and effective bluff which must continue in this country - but not at the mines". (5)

The bluff was backed by a police force which in 1932 consisted of 32 Europeans and 586 Africans spread all over the territory. By 1940

---

1. Orde Browne told the Bledisloe Commission: "Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Tanganyika have none of them got an efficient pass law or an identification system. The consequence is that nobody knows what is going on" - Bledisloe Evidence, xi.

2. Orde Browne, loc. cit., said "They have their best officers on the Railway - in fact that is an admitted principle". R.S. Hudson concurs (personal communication, 11 February 1969).

3. C.O. 795/105/45008/7: Governor's Deputy to Secretary of State, 26 June 1939.

4. Russell Report, para. 94.

5. C.O. 795/76/45083: Sir Alison Russell to Sir John Maffey, August 1935. Sir John Maffey was the Permanent Secretary at the Colonial Office.
it had been strengthened on the Copperbelt to about 12 Europeans and 50 Africans each at Mufulira, Kitwe, Luanshya and Chingola (1). In emergencies the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, which had been formed in 1933 from the military section of the Police, could be deployed, as indeed happened in 1935 and 1940. The white Defence Force of part-time volunteers, formed in 1939, was called out during the 1940 strike (2). There was added security in the knowledge that Southern Rhodesia and South Africa would not stand idly by if native disorders took place in the North. The South African Government, whether nationalist or not, regarded her hinterland anxiously, and in 1935 sent a plane load of tear gas bombs to the Copperbelt, which arrived too late for use in the strike. In 1935 and 1940 the Southern Rhodesia Government sent a detachment of police. There was an understanding between the Governors of Northern and Southern Rhodesia whereby the South was pledged to send a force of 50 police immediately when requested by the Governor of Northern Rhodesia (3). But these back-up procedures were for emergencies only. The political embarrassments of over-reliance on Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were very real at a time when amalgamation was already the subject of investigation by a Royal Commission.

1. Forster Report, para. 17.

2. Gann, History, pp. 325 ff; SEC/LAB/78: note by the Chief Secretary, 1 April 1940; also Proclamations by the Governor calling out the Defence Force at Kitwe, Ndola, Mufulira, Lusaka and Broken Hill; Brelsford, Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. See also above, pp. 116-117.

3. SEC/LAB/78, vol. 1: Governor, Southern Rhodesia to Governor, Northern Rhodesia, 1 April 1940 and 3 April 1940; Governor, Northern Rhodesia to Governor, Southern Rhodesia, 3 April 1940; SEC/LAB/67: High Commissioner for South Africa to Secretary of State for the Dominions, 5 June 1935; SEC/LAB/GCA: Provincial Commissioner, Central Province to District Commissioner, Ndola et al, 7 June 1935.
Whatever the measures for their physical welfare, Africans on the Copperbelt lived a precarious life. Wage levels, in the absence of rival opportunities to earn cash, were low, and the cost of living on the Copperbelt was high. This may sound like a truism, but in fact we have so little data on the cost of living of Africans in the 1930's that it is difficult to be more precise. An investigation by A.L. Saffery in 1943 found that the great majority of Africans lived below the poverty datum line, and that a large proportion of their wages was spent on basic food, despite the fact that each employee was provided with rations by the mines in addition to his pay (1). The starting cash wage for most of the 1930's was 22/6 per ticket of 30 shifts (i.e. one month on average) underground and 12/6 per ticket on the surface. Through a system of increments and a 'good behaviour' or safety bonus, the average take-home pay on the mines was 23/6 per ticket. Though rations were provided for the labourer himself, his wife and children were provided with only mealie meal.

The dangers in treating the Copperbelt in the same way as a tribal area were seen at their worst in the frail and rudimentary system of control of labour at the mines. Parallel with the District Commissioner in the civil sphere was the compound manager in the industrial sphere. All African complaints were dealt with by him as a kind of personnel manager and township supervisor. 'Draba Changachanga' had much of the de facto power of a district official within the compound, hearing cases and inflicting punishments, and acting as a source of advice on 'native' matters to the General Manager. W.J. Scrivener at Nkana and F. Spearpoint at Roan Antelope were reasonably humane men, though

1. See also my paper "The Second World War and Northern Rhodesian society", presented to the East African Social Sciences Conference, Nairobi, 1939.
neither was able to anticipate or prevent the fatal strikes at their respective mines; Schaefer at Mufilira was unpopular and brutal, and was dismissed in 1933 under Colonial Office pressure (1). A system of consulting tribal elders had been in operation at Roan and Mufulira from the early 1930's. This system worked well enough for minor grievances about conditions in the compound, but the tribal elders, chosen for their standing in the rural areas and symbolising the effort to urbanise indirect rule, could not properly articulate industrial grievances about wages and conditions of work:

"It is not my duty to look after every Jim and Jack; anyone looking for a place to stay, it is for that elder to look after him. It was not their job to advise the workers to go on strike, but to look after tribal custom ... They had no power to deal with matters pertaining to the labour movement". (2)

In any case, no amount of prior communication prevented the strikes. Combined misjudgments by the Government and the mines brought about the shooting affray at Roan Antelope in 1935. The first mistake was made, with the best of intentions, by the Government. In order to relieve the distress in the rural areas caused by the depression, it was decided to reduce the tax rates there and to increase the rate in the Copperbelt towns from 12/6 to 15/- (3). From now onwards, in

1. C.O. 795/82/43683; A.D. Storke (Managing Director, Mufilira Copper Mines Ltd.) to Sir Cecil Bottomley, 24 March, 1933; and A.S. Hudson, personal communication.


3. Bicycle licences issued in Luwingu fell from 632 in 1932 to 75 in 1935, a measure of the depression in the Northern Province. Native Affairs Annual Report, 1935 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1935), p. 46; Russell Report, paras. 11, 77-83; Northern Rhodesia Government Notice No. 52 of 1935, Supplement to the Northern Rhodesia Government Gazette, 5 June 1935. There was the equivalent of 1½ years' tax arrears outstanding for the whole territory: C.O. 795/73/43094; Sir Hubert Young to Sir John Maffey (s.o.), 21 November 1934.
addition, tax would be levied, not according to the tribal area where one was domiciled, but according to one's place of residence. All Africans on the Copperbelt now had to pay 15/-, therefore, but in many cases their dependants at home paid less tax. The total tax assessment was actually lowered, but the Government hoped that, with fewer defaulters, there would be a net increase in revenue. (1) As was usual with increases in native tax, the Colonial Office was uneasy, but had to accept the judgment of the men on the spot (2).

ii. The 1935 strike

Perhaps the Northern Rhodesia Government should have been aware of the electric effect this sudden increase in Africans' cost of living would have. Certainly the unofficial members of Legislative Council pushed the point home a few months later, when they pointed out that Africans were already too highly taxed, and that the tax rise itself was bungled by the Government. (3) But only the Colonial Office were wise before the event. As usual, they were in the position of the spectator who sees more of the game than the players, but cannot change the outcome of it.

Early in the morning of 21 May 1935 the mine policemen at Mufulira woke the morning shift by shouting that tax was now 15/-. This in itself seems to have been the result of a misunderstanding between John Moffat, the District Officer, and Schaefer, the compound manager, but the details need not concern us. Subsequent events merit close analysis, since they throw the first light on African attitudes and organisation on the Copperbelt.

2. Ibid., Secretary of State to Governor Young, 12 March 1935 (telegram) and 16 March 1935.
The crisis of May had been preceded by the mysterious 'Lover Monstrance', a notice posted at Nkana in April 1935, written in Bemba, and calling for a strike on 29 April (1). Though this did not mention the intention to increase the tax, it listed other industrial grievances. The Bulawayo Chronicle and the Livingstone Mail both reported the debate in the Legislative Council on 2-3 May 1935, which gave a second reading to the Native Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, in which unofficial members pointed to the hardship which some Africans might suffer as a result of the proposed tax changes (2). The workers (or at least the clerks) could therefore have had advance notice of the changes, since 'newspapers are read very freely in the Copperbelt by the natives, and the contents are passed round' (3). There were certainly meetings of clerks and compound policemen at Mufulira before the official announcement of the tax change on 21 May, but it is not clear from the available evidence whether they discussed industrial action (4).

The African clerks and mine policemen began to discuss and organise on 21 May. A meeting took place at Mufulira between Mateyo Musiska (a Nyasa clerk of the compound manager, Schaefer), Fred Kabombo, a clerk and Watch Tower leader, Peter Musonda, another clerk, and Chachabonongo, a mine policeman. The next day these men were in touch

---


2. This was the *Native Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 1933*. See NR Legco Deb, 24, 13-15 (2 May 1935).

3. Evidence taken by the Commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia, July-September 1935 (Lusaka, Government Printer, 1935, 2 vols.) (Russell Evidence), p. 81; Evidence of E.B.H. Goodall, PC Western Province.

with officials of the Lbeni Dance Society, and on 22 May all the
African labourers of Mufulira mine were on strike (1). It was avowedly
a strike against the tax and against the Government, and the strikers
demanded either a reduction in the tax or a rise in wages.

William Sankata, King of the Lbeni at Mufulira, and Ngostino
Mwamba and James Mutila provided the leadership for the 2-day strike
at Mufulira. Fred Kabombo was also, according to Moffat, "very important
indeed", (2) providing an inspiring Watch Tower message of the coming
downfall of colonial rule. But the strike itself was basically
spontaneous; the morning shift, meeting in the cocoa shed, simply
deciding not to go down that day. The leaders emerged thereafter,
with the need for organisation and articulation of grievances. Mufulira
had started as it was to go on: the 'tough' mine of the Copperbelt.

The strike was not, however, spontaneous at Nkana and Roan Antelope,
for the labourers there had accepted the rise in tax without protest
when it was announced, the operation having been carried out with more
tact by A.T. Williams, District Commissioner at Nkana and D.B.Hall,
District Officer at Luanshya. There was, therefore, a greater effort
at organisation at the latter mines, and the strikes there were the
result of rumours of the success of the Mufulira strike, together with
rather more deliberate organisation by some of the workers. The action
of the administration in arresting leaders as a precaution also meant
that spontaneity would not be enough as the fuel of the strike. Organi-
sation came on two levels: the clerks and the ordinary workers. As
early as 18 May (before the Mufulira strike began) a letter had, according
to Keith, been sent from Mateyo Musiska, clerk at Mufulira, to Blackmore
Musuku and Herbert Kamanga, clerks, and also Nyasa, at Nkana, urging

2. Russell Evidence, pp. 271 ff; 318.
them to contact the Mbeni and persuade the Bemba to strike. But at another level, workers from Mufulira had been arriving at Nkana and Roan Antelope urging their colleagues to strike. Alexander Kaniki, who was at Luanshya in 1935, says:

"... Everything started from Mufulira. Just as it was a grain of sand it sparked up from there. People at Mufulira were most of them exaggerators, because once they start a little thing, they run to tell us. All the bridges were closed on the Kafue River, so they crossed by canoe. When they came here they had to shout 'We have won!' When Nkana and Luanshya heard that, they said: 'We haven't done anything at all' " (1)

At Nkana the officials of the Mbeni were more reluctant to participate, and the militants had to exert some pressure. By Saturday, 25 May, the King of the Mbeni at Nkana, Samson Chisanga, had been deposed because he was against the strike. The Governor of the Mbeni, Kolala Mawisa, was urged by Musuku to use the Mbeni apparatus to articulate the strike, and on Monday 27 May the workers were out at Nkana. Mbeni leaders and members mingled with the morning shift and persuaded them to turn back to the compound.

By the 27th the authorities were alerted, and Chisanga and Petulo (Doctor of the Mbeni) were arrested. Police reinforcements were sent to Nkana, and the attitude of officials was one of firmness: they had little alternative, for they had no direct control over industrial conditions, and all their training impelled them to enforce the new tax regulations with punctiliousness, so as to preserve the prestige of the white man. They found it almost impossible to get in touch with the leaders of the strike, for each crowd had its ad hoc spokesmen.

By the time the Nkana strike ended on 28 May, both the authorities and the workers were desperately seeking hard information. Rumours were circulating among workers in Luanshya that wages had been increased

1. A.B.K. Kaniki, personal communication; Russell Evidence, pp. 295 ff; Russell Report, para. 128.
at Mufulira and Nkana as a result of the strikes there. About 27 May three emissaries arrived from Nkana, one of whom was the elusive Paska, a leader who disappeared after the strike (1). They carried letters for two of the Bemba compound elders, Shimutale Chileka (Roan compound) and William Ng'andu (town compound). As far as can be seen they did not approach the Mbeni Society directly, although three of the 'ringleaders' were later said by the government to be Mbeni officials (2).

The leadership of the strike at Roan Antelope appears to have been an ad hoc alliance between Mbeni, Watch Tower and some tribal elders, but the latter were in an impossibly intercalary situation, and most could not give active leadership. Shimutale Chileka was summoned by the compound manager, Spearpoint, when the trouble began, and was asked to make discreet enquiries and report back (3). But Shimutale seems to have told the Bemba that they should strike (4). Later he was one of the refugees in the compound office when the strikers were only prevented from killing all the occupants by a fusillade from the police (5).

1. SEC/LAB/67: CID Ndola to Superintendent of Police, Ndola, 16 June 1935. Though many of the leaders in 1935 were subsequently arrested and convicted on charges of riot, Paska was never arrested or traced. He was apparently connected with Watch Tower.

2. SEC/LAB/47: Report of a conversation between the Chief Secretary and Mr. Moffat and Major Dutton, n.d. 7 June 1935.


4. This at least was the view of the CID Ndola (16 June 1935, loc. cit.): "Shimutale, a native implicitly trusted by the Compound Manager, definitely advised the Awemba to strike on 29 May". The Governor accepted this view when he later wrote to Malcolm MacDonald at the Colonial Office that "at Roan [sic] Awemba elder was himself one of the chief agitators and was largely responsible for the trouble that ensued". Governor Young to Secretary of State, 6 July 1935, C.O. 795/76/45083.

Either Shimutale was playing for both sides simultaneously, or he was a victim of the language barrier. The line of the authorities was "you may go on strike but you must not cause a riot". But the permissive "may", when translated into Central Bantu languages depends on tone and vocal stress to distinguish it from a straight command. Many strikers were convinced that the Europeans were in favour of the strike and that the Nyasa clerks were, as usual, conveying the bwana's instructions. This might explain Shimutale's ambivalence. But it could just as easily be explained by his impossible situation as a go-between.

William Ng'an'du in the town compound, however, felt no conflict of loyalties. He beat the drum for a meeting which decided to support the mine workers. Great excitement was engendered, and Watch Tower supporters were shouting that Armageddon was at hand. For a time, it looked as if the strike in Luanshya would become general, and some house-servants joined in (1).

29 May was the climactic day of the strikes. A mass meeting on the football field at Noan marched to the compound offices where police were drawn up and where compound officials and some African clerks and elders were sheltering. The police panicked under heavy stoning and opened fire with rifles. Six strikers were killed and seventeen injured. The leader of the crowd on the football field was Joseph Kazembe, who was possibly an associate of Clements Kadalie, and had worked as a head waiter in Mafeking and in the CID in Fordsburg, Transvaal. He was one of the few Ngoni clerks on the mines (2).

The killings successfully ended the strike at Luanshya. The

1. Bulawayo Chronicle, 1 June 1935.
2. Kazembe came from Petauke. His name suggests a Bisa origin, and he gave his tribe as "Ngoni". Russell Evidence, p. 779. See also C.O. 795/75/45083: Governor Young to Secretary of State, 2 June 1935.
strikers at Mufulira and Nkana had already gone back to work. Many questions immediately arise about the organisation and ideology behind this, the first mass manifestation of African grievances in Northern Rhodesia. The main question, relevant to any discussion of the origins of African nationalism in Zambia, has to do with the roles of the Mbeni Dance Society, Watch Tower, and "the Bamba" in the strike.

All African non-traditional organizations were regarded (correctly) with suspicion by officials: Mbeni and Watch Tower were no exception. But they need not have worried about the Mbeni. It was genuinely a dance society which was used on this unique occasion as a medium of strike organisation. In normal times it was one of the many dance, burial and protective societies which were a response by Africans in East, Central and Southern Africa to the stresses of urban and mine compound life. The Mbeni dancers imitated the dress and manners of Europeans, and elected officials with colonial titles, such as the King, the Governor, the Doctor and the Nurse. How and when it arrived in Northern Rhodesia is not definitely known. Its origins were on the East African coast, and Nyasa and Bemba ex-soldiers probably brought it to Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia in the 1920's. It may have come to the Copperbelt via the Katanga mines with the repatriation of large numbers of Bemba-speaking labourers after the Slump in 1931 (1).

There is little reason to doubt the overwhelming majority of opinions expressed to the Russell Commission that the Mbeni Society was genuinely

a dance society that met to give its members amusement. When consulted secretly by the Northern Rhodesia Police's ill-informed plain-clothes branch, the CID Dar es Salaam assured them that it was an "invariably harmless society for the entertainment of the native and usually included some brass bands hence the name". (1)

But it was also an organisation which, in the 1930's at least, was run by men of prestige and standing among their fellow workers. Sociologically speaking, their status was acquired, not ascriptive. The Society offered its officials recognition of superior ability or education outside the tribal context. Moffat said:

"The Mbeni has, I am convinced, no seditious or trouble-making element in it as a body. It happened to be a very convenient organisation to be used by a group of influential natives in the compound to further their own ends". (2)

This was, indeed, the point. The Mbeni had a ready-made organisation which covered all three producing mines. Its officials were democratically elected and had earned the respect of their fellow-workers. Conveniently, the Society also had recognisable symbols: Mbeni songs were sung at strike meetings at Mufulira, and the Mbeni cross was used on strike notices at Nkana (3). This point need not be laboured. The history of African protest is full of organisations like the Mbeni which were used to articulate a grievance, and were then either developed or discarded. The Mbeni was discarded, since, as we shall see, the 1940 strike was organised by a leadership cadre within the industrial pattern.

But the Mbeni was also the mise en scène for an entity which was to play a vital role in the development of nationalism in Zambia, namely

2. Russell Evidence, p. 270.
3. ibid., pp. 263, 266.
"the Bemba". This term was used by the employers to signify Bemba-speaking peoples from the Northern and Luapula Provinces, and was a recognised "joking" category among the workers. J.C. Chiwale explains the grouping:

"... other tribes from the Northern and Luapula Provinces whose languages have similar dialects as those of Bemba proper found it a good thing and a social security to tease and joke with Ngonis without any fear ... Similarly other tribes from the Eastern Province of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland whose languages have similar dialects as those of Ngoni, i.e. Nyanja speakers were regarded as Ngonis by the other groups." (1)

The Bemba were, in the opinion of the authorities, the most troublesome and coherent group in the Copperbelt labour force (2). The Bemba language, in the form of "Town Bemba" was to become the lingua franca of the Copperbelt, incorporating elements of English, Nyanja and Chilapalapa, although what stage this process had reached by 1935 is uncertain (3). Although the Nyasa clerks were useful to the strikers as slogan-writers and advisors, the strike was led by prominent Bemba militants on all three mines, most of them Mbeni officials. There was also very strong Bemba rank-and-file support for the strike which was not paralleled by the other groupings in the labour force. The Bemba were the first out and the last to go back to work. Only one Lozi (Smoke Muyunda) was prominent, and Joseph Kazembe of Petuwe was the only Ngoni among the leaders at Roan Antelope (4). Spearpoint, compound manager at Roan, told the Russell Commission that -

1. J.C. Chiwale, "Brief history of how joking relationship came about between Ngoni and Bemba speakers" (Typescript, n.d., Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia.)

2. Mucubelo, REACTION, pp. 262-265; and my "Pre-nationalist resistance". Also Russell Evidence, p. 155.


"the Bemba were the last people to go back to work ... the natives generally just allude to the disturbances as the Wemba strike". (1)

After the 1935 strike the Bemba continued to assert their leadership among the Copperbelt workers. There was tension and faction fights between Bembas and Nyasas because the Bemba alleged that the latter had not supported the strike (2). We shall see that the Bemba remained prominent in the 1940 strike.

We turn now to the role of Watch Tower in the 1935 strike. The Government was in a state of periodic alarm about its activities, and we have seen that Hanoc Shindano's protest in 1919 did not confine itself to spiritual matters. Watch Tower preachers, who were frequently educated and able men, ranged widely in their condemnation of the colonial government, and their keen anticipation of Armageddon did not seem entirely out of place in 1935 (3). The Russell Commission was convinced that the organisation had a bad effect on the minds of the natives and weakened the power of the chiefs, and the Government in 1936 banned the import of Watch Tower literature (4). Watch Tower witnesses had a rough passage before the Commission, and De Jager, the representative of the European-controlled Jehovah's Witnesses based on Cape Town, was similarly interrogated, despite the fact that the Witnesses disclaimed all connection with Watch Tower in Northern Rhodesia (5).

Historians have tended to share contemporary governments' estimates of Watch Tower's potential for subversion. Rotberg calls it "the

1. ibid., p. 597.

2. ibid., p. 505; C.O. 795/76/45083: Governor Young to Secretary of State, 17 July 1935.

3. I am grateful to Sholto Cross for letting me see some of his unpublished work on Watch Tower in Zambia.

4. Russell Report, paras. 100-114; Russell to Maffey, August 1935, loc. cit.

religious expression of discontent", and places it in a kind of apostolic succession which ended in full-scale nationalism (1). But its subsequent history shows that although Watch Tower and millenarian movements similar to it could indeed be subversive, this subversion affected all authority, whether controlled by British colonial officials or by black Zambians. The Lumps Church of Alice Lenshina has constituted the most persistent and violent opposition group in independent Zambia (2).

By their nature, these millenarian groups could offer an opportunity for anguished and eloquent protest, but no clear political programme. Shindano's movement in 1918-1919 was a minor peasants' revolt against the established order without any clear, practical ideas about what was possible and what was impossible to achieve. Similarly, Watch Tower on the Copperbelt in the 1930s could make maximum use of the Armageddon atmosphere of a strike, but in the long run had no constructive, down-to-earth solutions to the detailed problems of working on a mine and living in a town. Besides, a proportion of the Bemba were Catholics, so that Watch Tower, far from uniting the labour force, might well have been a divisive influence. Watch Tower in Northern Province in 1935 was conducting its own "census", dividing the people into "snakes" (Roman Catholics), "goats" (Protestants and heathens) and "sheep" (Watch Tower) (3).

To sum up, then: the 1935 strike was an attempt by the African workers of the Copperbelt to resist a tax increase in a concerted fashion; the leadership was ad hoc, and came mostly from the Mbeni


Society, aided by Nyasa clerks and others with worldly experience; the Bemba were the most enthusiastic strikers, while other groups were at first undecided. The strike was put down without any attempt to ascertain grievances. Although the government attempted to open up channels of communication through the NILAB and more indirectly through the setting up of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, this trickle of information was not enough to enable the government to head off trouble in 1940.

iii. The 1940 strike

The 1940 strike was, like the 1935 strike, a mass protest against a rise in the African cost of living; but in 1940 the strikers went further in setting out grievances and demanding remedies for them. It was both a protest and an attempt to achieve a negotiating position, for, despite the Government’s attempts to communicate, no negotiating machinery for African workers yet existed. At the same time, the European union had been set up, and its recognition agreement with the Chamber of Mines in 1937 was the first step towards formal job reservation for whites (1). A "gentleman’s agreement" with the management in 1938 stipulated that "the relation between black and white will not be interfered with for a period of another two years" (2). But these arrangements had not yet become the subject of public debate, nor of correspondence with the Colonial Office. Africans were, however, becoming increasingly aware of the industrial colour bar, and the 1940 strike brought the issue into the open for the first time.

But the most immediate issue in 1940 was the rising cost of living in the first year of the war. The European mineworkers at Nkana and Mufulira went on strike from 18 to 27 March, demanding a rise in their


basic wage, increased overtime pay and the establishment of a "closed shop". Because of dissensions within the MWU, the Europeans at Roan and Nchanga did not join the strike. The MWU officials supported the strike, but the Union as such did not strike, since this would have been in clear breach of the 1937 Agreement, which provided for joint consultations with the management in the case of a dispute. Whether or not the 1937 Agreement was broken, the strike was in flagrant violation of imperial interests, since copper was a vital commodity in great demand by the Allies.

The first indication to the government that Africans might also strike came on 24 March, while the European strike was still in progress. Notices were posted at Nkana "in native languages", urging Africans to strike in imitation of Europeans (1). On 26 March the government belatedly decided to order its DCs on the Copperbelt "to consider whether there is a case for any increase in native wages, e.g. a cost of living bonus owing to the increased cost of living due to war conditions" (2)

After initial resistance, the mine management announced a wartime bonus of 2/6 per ticket for all African labourers (3).

This offer was put to a meeting of boss-boys at Nkana and Mindolo (the two operating mines of Rhokana Corporation), and to the elected elders at Mufulira and Luanshya. At Luanshya the offer was well received, but at Mufulira and Nkana the Africans demanded that the 2/6 should be added to the basic wage. The concession had in fact signalled an escalation of African demands and a turn to militant action. A strike began on

1. An English version is printed in the Forster Report, Appendix.

2. SEC/LAB/78: Record of discussion, 26 March 1940, between Acting Labour Commissioner (Howe), DC Kitwe, the Governor and the Chief Secretary.

3. ibid.: A Royden Harrison and F. Ayer to Chief Secretary, 27 March 1940; memorandum by Sandford, Secretary for Native Affairs, 28 March 1940; Forster Report, para. 54.
28 March at Mindolo and spread to Nkana, Kitwe (the town compound), and Mufulira on the 29th.

The strike was therefore confined to the mines where Europeans had struck a week previously. About 15,000 Africans stayed out until 7 April, demanding, or so it appeared, "ten shillings a day". This demand is still universally remembered on the Copperbelt (1). Considering that the flat-rate wage for Africans was 5d per shift on the surface and 9d per shift underground in 1940, it represented a very steep demand, but one which was in keeping with good negotiating practice. As Smoke Muyunda, a Mufulira strike leader, told the Forster Commission,

"... our point was that the Company should think of a less amount than that. In fact the Government did not help us to suggest a lesser amount than 10/- a day". (2)

As the strike progressed, the elder system broke down at Mufulira. When T.F. Sandford, the Secretary for Native Affairs, and William Stubbs, DC Mufulira, met the strikers at the mine on 30 April, the elders were hoolied down by the younger men. Jacob Mataweli, a Nyasa compound elder, later lamented that

"the younger men of this time, their heads are not well. They do not obey their elders at all, but do whatever they like". (3)

Sandford later reported: "I stated that I was willing to speak to any representatives whom they might put forward". (4) The crowd moved off to appoint spokesmen for each "tribe". The "Committee of Seventeen" was born, which besides demanding 10/- a day,

"Stated they could work as well as Europeans and they were prepared, if a European Surveyor was provided, to undertake

---


3. ibid., p. 521.

4. SEC/LAB/137: "Report on Native Labour Strike by the Secretary for Native Affairs", 26 April 1940 (Sandford's Report). Stubbs claims that he made the suggestion, but his account otherwise corroborates Sandford's. William Stubbs, personal communication.
all the work of one shift and allow the Europeans to do all
the work of another shift, and prove that they could produce
more ore". (1)

It then became clear to Sandford and to W.M. Logan, the Chief Secretary,
that the strike was a racial challenge to the Europeans as well as a
demand for more pay (2).

No blood was spilt at Mufulira, despite the tough reputation of
the workers there. On 1st April, three or four thousand strikers
assembled in front of Mufulira compound offices demanding to be "signed
off", i.e., paid, on mass. Stubbs, the DC, talked his way out of this
situation, but from then until the end of the strike the men slept on the
football field, so that the leaders could control the strikers better.
Their demand for ten shillings a day never wavered.

At Nkana the compound manager threatened to suspend the issue of
rations by 4 April if the strikers had not returned to work by then.
This tough line was answered by the strike leaders collecting (probably
by persuasion and intimidation) three metal drums full of the registration
certificates which had to be produced when rations were issued, and leaving
them at the compound office. On 3 April the Rokana Corporation held its
daily pay-out at the same time as a strike meeting was being held at the
nearby football field. A large crowd of strikers returning from the
meeting attacked the office, after clumsy attempts by the police to head
them off with teargas. (3) Heavy stoning began, and the company of the

1. Forster Report, para. 86. Ten of the members of the Committee of Seventeen
Inter gave evidence to the Forster Commission. They were: Bankamu,
Jelias Chama (underground workers), Yafet Gerusa (shaft-office clerk),
Kawolida (underground worker), Stephen Kopa (compound office clerk),
Lasaro (underground scraper-boy), Jelias Humba (underground electrical
fitter), Smaiko Muyunda (surface worker), Kapunu Samson and Herklos
Silwanda (spokesman of the Seventeen).
2. SEC/LAB/78, vol. iii: Chief Secretary to Sandford, 15 April 1940.
3. Pay parades were held every day, and this does not appear to have been
deliberate provocation by the Corporation. SEC/LAB/139: A.T. Williams
(DC Nkana) to H.F. Cartral-Robinson (DC Western Province), 10 March 1941;
also The South African Mining and Engineering Journal, 26 April 1941,
in the same file.
Northern Rhodesia Regiment which was defending the offices opened fire (1).

The blood shed at Nkana was inevitable after the police tear gas fiasco. There was an all-out assault by the strikers, armed with stones and bottles, on the compound offices. One Lewis gun and its gunner was put out of action, and a number of soldiers were injured. Seventeen strikers were killed or died of wounds, and 65 were injured. Among those killed were two of the strike leaders at Nkana, Elliot Mulenga and Sam Nkhata. Elliot Mulenga, a bossboy from Bena Ng'umbo country to the north of Lake Bangwolu, had sufficient chibonda to survive in all the oral accounts of the 1940 strike thirty years later (2). An Mbeni song after the strike recorded the scene and preserved the memory of Elliot Mulenga:

"All you fellow-workers, arise! Let us all go to the compound manager, The owner of the people. Let us go and talk about money, Let us go and talk about money, we said. But oh! we found Mantelo there With a weapon in his hand to attack us. See! Elliot Mulenga is now dead!" (3)

The day after the shootings, Stewart Gore-Browne, the member of the Legislative Council nominated for African interests, went round the mine compound to find nearly all the strikers armed with clubs and spears, and every group of houses picketed. Gore-Browne remarked on the efficiency

1. SEC/LAB/78, vol. iii: "Inquest proceedings on 13 Africans killed at Nkana on 3 April", encl. in Resident Magistrate, Kitwe, to Chief Secretary, 10 April 1940. The crowd was infuriated by the unsuccessful attempt by the police to tear gas them. Captain Francis-Jones of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment saw "one man tearing at the barbed wire of the compound fence with his hands and teeth in a frenzy". Rotberg, Rise of Nationalism, p. 175, wrongly places this episode after the shooting to illustrate the crowd's resultant anger. Francis-Jones quoted it to justify the subsequent shooting.


3. Mboni song by courtesy of Casimiro Mumba, Lubwe, Zambia. Song transcribed and translated by Medard Kasere, 1969. I have not been able to discover the identity of "Mantelo". It may have been Captain Francis-Jones, who gave the order to fire.
with which the strike was organised (1). Four days after the shootings, all the strikers went back to work in an orderly fashion.

Any analysis of the organization of the 1940 strike must begin with its sheer efficiency. We have seen (2) R.J.B. Moore's high opinion of the leaders' abilities. But the most notable feature of the 1940 strike was the emergence of a boss-boy-capitao class, who spearheaded the negotiations with officials and employers. This was certainly the official view, and there is no reason to disbelieve it. The Committee of Seventeen at Mufulira contained only one member, Smoke Muyunda, who was clearly not one of this class of worker. At Nkana, Sandford interviewed six "strike-leaders", three of whom were boss-boys or capitaoes (3). R.S. Hudson, Labour Commissioner by August 1940, thought that "the semi-skilled natives ... were the chief malcontents on the Copperbelt". (4) Sandford's impression was that the boss-boys, "despite good wages", were likely to strike again (5).

The issues chosen, and the way in which they were followed through by the leaders before the Forster Commission, is also consistent with the explanation of a new and growing boss-boy elite who quickly learnt the elements of industrial negotiating strategy and who were subject to increasing frustration from the colour bar in job advancement. Gore-Browne thought that the 1940 strike

"... was not caused by any demand for betterment of conditions (a few comparatively minor grievances which have come to light and which can be remedied, were emphatically not the cause of the strike), but by the growing consciousness of the native of


2. See above, p. 138.


4. SEC/LAB/79: R.S. Hudson to Chief Secretary, 30 August 1940.

5. Sandford's Report.
the disproportion between the wages of the least efficient European and those of any African however competent he may be.
It was in effect a strike against the colour-bar, and the ultimate issue it raises is an extremely serious and delicate one. I doubt if that point has been appreciated at Lusaka yet". (1)

The colour-bar, therefore, made the boss-boys and their clerk allies into a radical group, frustrated by obstacles to their advancement, and convinced that they were capable of doing the work of Europeans. As leaders of the strike, however, they articulated the grievances of all the workers, while at the same time leaving the door open for some differentiation between unskilled and semi-skilled African workers.

Herklos Sikwenda, the spokesman of the Committee of Seventeen, told the Forster Commission:

"It was not chiefly for one particular class of workers, skilled labour, boss-boys, or any ordinary labour, they all had one aim, one heart, because they wanted more money". (2)

On the other hand, Stepan Kopa, a clerk at Mufulira and another one of the Seventeen, maintained

"we were not asking for 10/- even for a sweeper in the compound, there are some people who work with their minds, some work with their hands, different work, and the mine should say how much the different classes get". (3)

In other words, the strikers' demand for a flat 10/- rise was a bargaining position, and was not incompatible with a demand for a new grading system which would recognise experience and skill, and would move away from regarding all African labourers as interchangeable, unskilled units.

Tentative beginnings at this new structure came from the mines management in 1941, when African labour was graded into 'A', 'B' and 'C' categories, according to work done, whether underground or on the surface (4).

1. C.O. 725/116/45109/7, part 2: Gore-Browne to MacDonald (personal), 8 April 1940. A copy was sent to Governor Maybin by the Colonial Office semi-officially on 2 May 1940.

2. Forster Evidence, p. 518.


The colour bar was certainly not breached by this modest amendment to the African wages structure, but a start had been made on the lengthy process of recognition of the differentiated skills of African workers. It was a process which met with many obstacles, but it was also irreversible. Increasingly, Africans were treated by the mines and the government as workers, with a stake in the towns and possessing skills and aptitudes, not as labour - unskilled, undifferentiated, a commodity to be "supplied" and "used".

But we must not conclude our consideration of the leadership of the 1940 strike without a backward glance at 1935, and the place of the Bemba in the strike leadership. Officials still saw the trouble as coming mainly from the Bemba-speakers in 1940. Sandford reported:

"I and all officials concerned felt that the main impetus came from Mufu1ima and that the main support came from the hot-headed natives of the Bangweulu and Luapula areas". (1)

The Bemba (i.e. the Bemba of Chitimukulu) were lukewarm, and the Ngoni were against the strike, according to Sandford. The oral evidence from participants contradicts this: the surviving workers are unanimous: The strike was solid, and all tribes co-operated. But I prefer to accept Sandford's evidence on this issue. It was recorded at the time and on the spot, the report was confidential, and the government was intent on analysing the strike so as to prevent a recurrence. It would be intellectually arrogant to assert that he did not understand what was happening.

On the other hand, oral informants were answering questions put to them by an "expatriate" in 1970, at a time of growing political conflict about "tribalism" in Zambia. In my experience, almost all Zambians present a united front to Europeans on this issue: they deplore "tribalism", and assert that its practice is confined to a small minority of power-hungry men in Lusaka. I therefore got the answer which I expected. A longer period of participant observation might have elicited more data; better still, further investigation should be pursued by a Zambian historian.

But even accepting Sandford's identification of the "troublemakers" in 1940 does not tell us the whole story of the workers' organisation in 1940. It is one thing to bring about a strike, it is another to conduct negotiations. The negotiations, both during and after the strike, were conducted by the workers with a punctilious concern for all tribes and categories of workers to be represented. The Committee of Seventeen was deliberately elected on a tribal basis, and for this reason it probably did not represent the strike leadership. Alexander Kaniki said in 1970:

"If the election of these people to the Committee of Seventeen was a correct one, I should have been one of them because I was one of the ringleaders of the strike. But they just took those people who were moderate... I remember Smoke Muyunda. He was a moderate. All militant leaders didn't want to be elected". (1)

Of course, "tribal" categories can coincide with occupational ones.

Gluckman says:

"During the early years of the mines, the posts open for educated and semi-skilled Africans were largely taken by Nyasalanders and Barotses. Bomba, who are the most powerful tribe near the mines, filled many minor authoritative posts. Hence while many Africans see the struggle for leadership on the mine in tribal terms, this covers a struggle between groups of different skill". (2)

But for anthropologists like Gluckman to emphasise the objective occupational roles in the conflict does not get us very far in analysing the 1940 strike. Nor does his beguiling assertion that

"The African newly arrived from his rural home to work in a mine is first of all a miner (and possibly resembles miners everywhere). Secondarily he is a tribalman; and his adherence to tribalism had to be interpreted in an urban setting". (3)

But the leadership of the mineworkers had certainly not transformed itself

---

1. A.B.K. Kaniki, personal communication. This is supported by the views of Augustine Nkumbula, who was trade union representative on the Brown Commission, 1936. These, however, are based on hearsay. I am grateful to Mr. Nkumbula for useful discussions on this and related topics.


3. ibid., p. 68.
into anything "resembling miners everywhere" by 1940, if Gluckman is hinting that "Bemba" can be equated with "workers in middle-range positions". There is a perfectly good reason for this. The Luapulans and the Bemba of Chitimukulu had worked in the Katanga mines in large numbers before coming to the Copperbelt, and, according to Sandford, "knew of the different attitude in that territory towards the colour bar restrictions". (1) In other words, the Bemba speakers were likely to be more politically conscious than the other groups, because of their history as migrant workers. This political consciousness was to be the basis of the Bemba's claim to leadership on the Copperbelt, and later in Zambia. It cannot entirely be explained by their occupation as miners, or by the fact that they constituted a simple majority on the vital Copperbelt.

iv. The Copperbelt Strikes in the history of African protest

By studying the processes of leadership and of the articulation of grievances in these two strikes, we have seen that the urban setting created common grievances for Africans, but did not necessarily create a common front among the workers. A common front had to be painfully struggled for, in the face of deliberate attempts by the colonial regime to keep the tribal system alive by a system of elders, and in the face of the lack of political consciousness of many mineworkers. Leadership in both strikes was ad hoc, and there seems to have been little continuity in the personnel of the leadership between 1935 and 1940. Some leadership groupings were based on educational or possibly class considerations, like the clerks and elders in 1935 and the boss-boys in 1940. But where firm, decisive, and if necessary violent action was required, the Bemba were the leaders.

All of this analysis is vital when we view the strikes in the

1. SEC/LAB/78, vol. iii: Sandford to Chief Secretary, 13 April 1940; Marie Davis, Modern Industry, pp. 170-177, and above, pp. 44-48.
the context of the whole spectrum of African protest in Northern Rhodesia. The weak and Nyasa-dominated Welfare Societies had achieved little in the 1930's, and remained debating societies until the 1940's. Watch Tower and other chiliastic religious movements had caused the government much worry in the inter-war period, but their value in transforming the political consciousness of the Zambian people was nil. I know of no later political leaders who emerged from this kind of training-ground.

But on the Copperbelt, the workers were faced with a situation of stark confrontation between black and white, and were rapidly armed with the knowledge that Africans could do "white" work. What stopped them from obtaining "white" wages was the political system, which was a somewhat rickety alliance between the Northern Rhodesia Government, the mines management, and the MWU. Although neither strike achieved its declared objective, they initiated changes in government policy which had not been contemplated before the events. The workers had pioneered the techniques of strike and mass confrontation which were to be used, with varying success, by later political leaders. The Copperbelt had emerged as a power base waiting for a garrison: the workers achieved concessions through their own independent action, without aid or advice from the educated élite outside the mines. What it lacked as yet was decisive political leadership. Whoever led the later political movement would be wise to secure the support of the Copperbelt miners. While this would not guarantee success, it was equally unlikely that success could be achieved without it.

Another feature of the strikes which was important for later nationalism was the lack of violence shown to whites and to their property. Violence, indeed, seems to have been mainly reserved for African compound policemen and blacklegs. Considering the conditions under which the workers lived, and the treatment accorded to them by white workers, this is remarkable. There appear to be two possible explanations
for this: first, a fear of retribution, and second, a deliberate policy of preserving not only the property which yielded the much-needed wages, but the relationships which ensured that African miners had hope of better things to come.

The preservation of property was too widespread to be an accident. Both in 1935 and 1940 the strikers had parts of the industrial and urban complex at their mercy. J.L. Keith (DC Ndola) pointed out that at Luanshya in 1935, despite the killings, the damage was confined to a few window panes in the compound office, about £10 of damage at the beer hall, a few pounds worth of miscellaneous damage, and 300 bags of grain from the grain store (1). In 1940 the strike was in control of the leaders except for the riot at Nkana, and Gore-Browne and his companions were able to visit the mine compound in complete safety the day after the shootings.

In Gluckman's terms, the African mineworkers recognised their "interest in the system", and thus did not behave like Luddites (2). Unlike Luddites, there was nothing they could remotely gain from a policy of destruction. But it is something of an achievement for the leaders of the strike to be able to direct the energies of their followers away from purely destructive ends.

The other aspect of this policy of restraint was a deliberate attempt by the strike leaders to conciliate Europeans, especially officials. Officials could walk among the crowds talking to leaders and even arresting them without coming to any harm. Sandford was surprised that the strikers wanted to converse with him even after the Nkana shootings:


"to indicate the strange atmosphere, it is worth noting that these natives, who were chiefly Chiwemba-speaking, in speaking to me, kept on reminding each other that they should talk Chinyanja dialect, with which they knew I was conversant (1).

After the 1940 strike, Africans continued to use the existing system. They used the Forster Commission as a platform, and most of the surviving leaders gave evidence before it. This evidence concentrated on arguments for African industrial advancement, and the Commission took the point.

It is pointless, therefore, to seek a "black-white confrontation" in the first Copperbelt strikes. In both strikes, the leaders appreciated the advantages of conciliating at least some sections of the white community. Leaders tried to stop stoning and the beating-up of Europeans. As Epstein puts it, Africans "were not protesting against an industrial system as such; they were complaining of the position accorded to them within the system". (2) They saw the government as their main potential ally among the whites. How much weight they were justified in placing on this alliance remains to be seen.

v. The strikes and colonial power.

The settler government of Southern Rhodesia never fired a shot in anger at its African subjects until the emergency of 1959; the Northern Rhodesia Government, despite an official policy of trusteeship for African rights, had killed or wounded over 100 African miners by 1940, a figure which bears comparison with the later independence struggle (3). NRG was not more oppressive than the Southern Rhodesia Government, but it was a good deal weaker. The weakness was one of firepower and of will. During both strikes help was needed from the South, and in 1940 even


2. Quoted by Gluckman, "Tribalism, ruralism", p. 130.

3. The figure for those killed during active participation in the independence struggle in Zambia (1958-61) is hard to compute, since political violence shades into "normal" violence. The number killed is probably nearer 50 than 100.
the mistrusted whites on the Copperbelt were mobilised in the Defence Force to defend property.

The Copperbelt was *terra incognita* to the government in 1935. We have seen how Sir Hubert Young attempted to set up warning devices such as NILAB and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, so that the government would not be taken by surprise again. We have also seen, however, how the most vital device of all — a Labour Department independent of the Provincial Administration — was subjected to obstruction, and had not got off the ground sufficiently to matter either way in the 1940 strike.

But all the information in the world was useless unless the Government was prepared to act on it. The undeclared war between the Provincial Administration and the Colonial Office over the creation of a Labour Department resulted in a compromise — Gilbert Howe was appointed Acting Labour Commissioner in 1940. He was not an outstanding personality, and he was given no power except to be a non-participant referee in the conflict between mines and workers. He proposed to advise the copper companies to raise African overtime rates in the days before the 1940 strike, but he was told by his superiors to stay out of the conflict.

"The Government took the view that the dispute was a domestic matter between the managers and their workers, and instructed him not to intervene". (1) When this instruction was subsequently withdrawn, it was too late to prevent the strike. Governor Maybin later explained to the Colonial Office that he had approved this course because there seemed "no possibility of a strike at the time" (2). The inability of the government to see the consequences of their actions or inaction paralleled the 1935 tax changes.

Though "liberal", therefore, in allowing Africans to strike in accordance with their English common law rights, and in conciliating them.

2. SEC/LAB/139: Governor Maybin to Secretary of State, 6 March 1941.
afterwards, the government's quelling of the strikes showed a brutality stemming from weakness. The government was also weak politically in that it could not operate without the acquiescence of the mines and of the European community. In a fundamental issue like the colour bar, NRG could go no further than the copper companies and the European union were willing to go. There was also the inhibiting factor that the government itself practised a colour-bar and implemented a dual wages structure in the civil service, a point which was not lost on the mines management. The latter challenged the Government in 1941 to investigate the colour-bar throughout the territory, not only on the mines. Governor Maybin evaded the issue, but the impression remained that the copper companies were being arbitrarily forced into the position of being more virtuous than anyone else in the territory, simply because a strike had exposed the colour bar on the mines.

But if NRG was a weak instrument to use against the economic and political power of the Europeans in the territory, the Colonial Office did not perform much better itself. A golden opportunity for a Colonial Office initiative came in the wake of the 1940 strike. Governor Maybin had entirely lost his nerve and was anxiously waiting for a stern rebuke from his masters. Questions were being asked in the Westminster Parliament. Maybin's proposals for an "arbitrary enquiry" and for Gore-Browne and Sandford to act as advisers to the African workers were politically inept, and a small meeting of Colonial Office officials in London on 15 April decided on the membership and terms of reference of the Forster Commission without consulting Maybin (1). At first the Commission had not planned to stay at Government House when it reached Northern Rhodesia, so as to

---

1. C.O. 795/115/45109/7, part 1: OAG to Secretary of State, 4 April 1940 (telegram); minutes by A.R. Thomas, 5 April 1940, and by Sir John Maffey to Sir George Gater, 6 April 1940; minutes of a meeting held on 15 April 1940, with Sir George Gater, A.J. Dawe, A.R. Thomas, Sir John Forster and F.W. Leggett (Ministry of Labour) present.
preserve its independence, but there were limits to how far the Colonial Office could go in undermining its own Governor, and the Forster Commissioners (Sir John Forster, Sir Walter Buchanan-Smith and Andrew Dalgleish) finally did spend a few days at Government House "to avoid misunderstanding", and the Commission formally reported to the Governor under the Northern Rhodesian Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance (1).

Despite the measures to bolster Sir John Maybin's confidence, the fact remained that the Forster Commission was appointed by the Colonial Office and not, like the Russell Commission, by the Governor in consultation with the Colonial Office. In the event, however, the Commission caused more discomfort to the copper companies than to the Government. The only explicit criticisms of the administration were the issue of Howe's non-intervention before the strike, and the neglect of education on the Copperbelt. (2) But the issue of the colour bar was seized on vigorously by the Commission in chapter X: Racial Difficulties. The mines management in London became extremely agitated when they read paras. 194 - 195 of chapter X, which dealt with the extension of African workers' opportunities (3). They complained that the draft report set out and attributed views which they had given to the Commission in confidence, and they foresaw serious conflict with the European union over para. 195 of the draft (para. 195 of the printed version), which envisaged the substitution of Africans for Europeans in some supervisory jobs, and a separate wage standard.

There followed a series of high-level consultations between representatives of the copper companies and officials both in London and Lusaka,

---


2. Forster Report, paras. 51 and 155; C.O. 795/117/43109/7F: minute by E.S. Boyd, 30 July 1940.

3. First draft of the Forster Report is in C.O. 795/117/43109/7F. This draft was circulated to officials in July 1940. The printed report was published in February 1941. See also below, Appendix 3.
which postponed publication of the eagerly-awaited report for six months. The Colonial Office, increasingly aware of the need for an uninterrupted supply of copper, soft-pedalled the issue of African advancement and succeeded only in achieving a new grading structure for African mineworkers. Maybin resisted a general inquiry into African wages in the territory, urged upon him by the copper companies and the Colonial Office, and the proposal was dropped (1). Maybin similarly successfully refused to open negotiations with the European union about African advancement, since it was "likely to exacerbate feelings without achieving practical results" (2).

Thus, the Colonial Office was unable even to persuade a rattled Governor to accept the recommendations of the Forster Commission in the field of African advancement. The Dalgleish Commission of 1917 reopened the question, with similar results. When Arthur Creech Jones asked Harold Macmillan, Under-Secretary for the Colonies, in 1942 what was being done to advance Africans in Northern Rhodesia, the confidential reply was:

"To be quite frank, for the period of the war I want copper and a great deal of it. As long as we must have copper we are in the hands of the (European) Mine Workers' Union ... A frontal attack would fail ... The best we can do for the African at present is to aim at a little unobtrusive infiltration without saying too much about it". (3)

As long as the British needed copper, they were tied to the Europeans without whom it could not be produced. The Northern Rhodesia Government was similarly hamstrung, and subject to more immediate social and political pressures from the European community as a whole. What little progress was made was directly or indirectly attributable to the African strikes of 1935 and 1940. But in the meantime, Europeans made far more spectacular advances in political and economic status during the War, creating further obstacles to the effective wielding of colonial power by the post-war Labour Government.

1. SEC/LAB/79: Secretary of State to Governor Maybin, 13 December 1940; Governor Maybin to Secretary of State (telegram) 19 December 1940; Secretary of State to Governor Maybin, 24 December 1940.

2. SEC/LAB/79: Governor Maybin to Secretary of State, 25 January 1941.

CHAPTER  5

THE OBSTACLES TO

AFRICAN JOB ADVANCEMENT, 1940-53
1. **The War and dependence on copper**

The Forster Commission had recommended that

"the mine managements should consider with representatives of the Government and the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union, to what positions, not now open to him, the African worker should be encouraged to advance". (1)

Though in practice this recommendation determined the direction and shape of the colour bar controversy in Northern Rhodesia for at least the next fifteen years, it was not in itself a surprising statement. It was completely in accordance with the political doctrine of trusteeship which had been hammered home in the Pim, Orde Browne and Bledisloe Reports. We have seen, however, that the practice bore little relation to the professions. What the Forster Report did was to throw the colour bar into the arena of politics, contrary to the desires of the mines management and the European Union, and to the embarrassment of the Northern Rhodesia Government. Questions were asked in the Westminster parliament, and statements had to be made about what the colonial government was doing to implement the recommendations of first the Forster and then the Dalgleish Commission (2). These statements were necessarily general, since, as we shall see, little was being done, but they could be used as an ideological facade to cover the fact that each small advance for Africans was the result of hard bargaining in the context of a balance of power which in the 1950's swung towards Africans. G.H. Hall, Under-Secretary for the Colonies in 1941, answering a question from Arthur Creech Jones on the colour bar on the Copperbelt, said

"I think it is necessary to make it quite clear that the Colonial Office and the Government do not stand for the colour bar either in this country or in any of the Colonies". (3)

---

1. Forster Report, para. 212 (x). See also paras. 196 and 197, Appendix 3, below.


3. Hansard, House of Commons, 5th series (H of C Deb), 369, 1260 (12 March 1941).
The Forster Board of 1954 quoted this statement before proceeding to illustrate that nothing had been done to break the colour bar since then (1).

We have seen how Governor Sir Hubert Young simultaneously made anti-colour bar pronouncements while assuring the Europeans that he would always consider their views (2). The phenomenon was not new, but the publicity given to Copperbelt affairs after 1940 brought the dichotomy between professions and actions into clearer relief.

The Second World War and its aftermath of austerity for Britain played into the hands of those who wished to preserve the status quo on the mines. The British were clear about the role of the colonies from the outset. While in the social sphere the policy of trusteeship remained,

"in the economic sphere the general aim of policy should be to bring to the maximum the positive contribution of the colonies to the immediate war effort in the way of supplies; and to reduce to the minimum their demand on the resources in men, materials and money which are, or might be, made available to this country either at home or overseas. In particular ... colonies which produce raw materials of importance to the war effort, including of course those sold for 'hard' currencies, should aim at maintenance and increase of production at whatever level may be indicated from time to time as being necessitated by Allied requirements". (3)

Northern Rhodesia's place in this scheme of things was clear: as an essential supplier of copper to the Allies, and nothing was to be allowed to interrupt the supply. The copper mining companies developed closer links with the British government. From October 1939 the British Ministry of Supply had a bulk agreement with the companies, and advanced £750,000


2. See above, p. 109-110; 113.

3. Colonial Office Circular Telegram No. 82 (5 June 1940) sent to all colonial governments, quoted in "War policy in British colonial dependencies" (no author given), International Labour Review, xiii, 3 (March 1941). Parts of this chapter are based on my "Second World War and Northern Rhodesian society".
in 1943 towards the development of Nchanga Mine (1). The result of this close dependence was a paralysing reluctance on the part of the British to raise the question of African advancement during the War for fear of unrest from the European Union. The raising of African wages and the improvement of their conditions did not, however, rouse the MWU so passionately as the advancement question. As a result, African wages rose from an average of 21/3 per ticket on the surface and 33/2 underground in 1940 to an average of 49/10 and 60/- respectively in 1948 (all figures exclusive of bonus, which was 2/6 in March 1941 and 10/- in February 1948) (2). But European wages also rose steeply in the same period, and the gap between the two wage scales widened. This was the crux of the advancement issue: there were two ladders, the European high above the African one. Africans increasingly demanded a foothold on the European ladder.

Thus, although British Labour MPs kept their eye on the Copperbelt, their questions in parliament were consistently parried by Ministers. We have seen how Harold Macmillan confided in Arthur Creech Jones in 1942 that "the best we can do for the African at present is to aim at a little unobtrusive infiltration without saying too much about it". (3)

ii. The fate of Forster and Dalgleish

Nearly everybody in power professed to believe in African advancement from 1940 onwards. Sir John Forster had said so in his Report, although he had had to tone down an earlier version which had said so more directly (4).

1. Gann, "Northern Rhodesian copper industry".
4. See above, p.172.
The mines management, both in London and in Northern Rhodesia, were in favour of it for hard-headed economic reasons; the MWU continually assured Africans that it wanted them to advance, so long as they did not thereby undercut European labour; officials and politicians in Lusaka and London continually paid lip-service to the principle, though their files on the subject were noticeably thin, for reasons which we shall examine; and finally, Africans themselves wished to move into jobs which were often being performed by them de facto in any case.

What must be explained is why the practice was so remote from the principle, and why, up to 1953, despite wage rises for Africans, practically no progress was made in breaking down the colour bar on the mines. The simple answer, that the Mine Workers' Union prevented advancement, will not do. A few thousand white mineworkers could hardly have resisted a concerted and determined bid by government and mines management to break the colour bar. Governments had fought trade unions before, in other parts of the world, and won. It will further be argued that historic neglect and the migrant labour system also contributed to making the colour bar a genuine problem which could not have been solved overnight. Zambianisation, the successor in the 1970's to African advancement, has suffered in its progress equally from lack of skilled Zambian manpower and falling productivity (1).

In 1940, however, these problems had not even begun to be faced, though the government saw the political necessity for African advancement. The Nkana shootings brought the largest death-toll of Africans in civil disturbances in the territory until 1961, and they seemed to confirm the forebodings of Orde Browne and Bledisloe. Governor Maybin wanted to

deal with Forster's recommendations urgently. On the extension of African workers' opportunities, he thought the Report "thoroughly sound ... We should try to provide for the future advancement of the African, but in doing so to strike a fair balance between the African and the European (1).

A conference with the mines management and the European Union was necessary.

Nor did there appear to be any problem about the attitude of the mines management to African advancement: they had already told the Forster Commission that they favoured it. The Commission had considered that "it would be unfair to ascribe to /the Companies! self-interest their attempt to satisfy to some extent the Africans' aspirations towards a higher standard". (2)

Whatever their higher motives, the companies would not refuse a scheme which lowered their working costs. They were not in Northern Rhodesia to benefit humanity, though benefiting humanity might coincide with their interests. A general rise in African wage levels without advancement into European jobs would bring about a serious rise in labour costs. That was emphatically not what the Companies understood by the term "advancement", and during 1940 and 1941 they fought the Forster proposals for wage rises for Africans, claiming that the government should instead initiate an enquiry into the general level of wages in the territory (3). In the matter of raising the general level of African wages, then, humanity did not coincide with the companies' interests. The companies further thought that Europeans' wages were exorbitant. Ernest Oppenheimer, head of the Johannesburg-based Anglo-American Corporation, wrote to his son Harry in 1941 about Nkana:

1. SEC/LAB/79: minute by Governor Maybin to Chief Secretary, 26 August 1940.
2. C.O. 795/117/45109/7F: Forster Report, Chapter 10, para. 196 (original draft).
3. SEC/LAB/79: Secretary of State to Governor Maybin (telegram), 13 December 1940.
... "it is not normal when underground miners draw cheques of £150 up to £200 per month. It is clear to me that further requests will be made and that we cannot fight during the war". (1)

It was clear, then, that the Companies were willing to encourage African advancement, by stealth if necessary, but neither they nor the government would have the stomach for a confrontation with the European union. Peace with the MWU was a necessary precondition for African advancement.

But if the question of African advancement was ever broached, the MWU would hardly back down without a fight. The Companies and the government never succeeded in resolving this paradox until the 1950's. The bilateral talks between the government and the Companies on the Forster Report had revealed how little there was to talk about in the absence of the MWU (2). By January 1941 it was clear to Governor Maybin that the scope for widened African employment had been narrowed down by developments during the war and by the dilution agreement reached between the MWU and the mines in 1940:

"It appears ... that we shall be very hard put to it to secure re-employment for all Europeans with military or essential war work service who will have claims to such re-employment. In these circumstances, it would be impossible to maintain in employment to the exclusion of such a European any African who had during the war been employed in the place of a European, and therefore it seems of very doubtful wisdom to press for such employment now in view of its short duration and consequent dissatisfaction". (3)

He therefore, despite Colonial Office anxiety, abandoned all intention of opening negotiations with the European Union, since these would be "likely to exacerbate feelings without achieving practical results". (4) The hope expressed by the government in its later published statement on the


2. SEC/LAB/79: R.M. Paterson, General Manager, Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd., to Chief Secretary, 4 January 1941; A. Royden Harrison, General Manager, Rhokana Corporation, to Chief Secretary, 4 January 1941.

3. SEC/LAB/79: Governor Maybin to Secretary of State, 25 January 1941.

4. Ibid; see also SEC/LAB/79: Secretary of State to Governor Maybin, 30 January 1941.
Forster Report that discussions would be initiated was, therefore, a somewhat hypocritical one (1).

Part of the reason, then, for the government's abandonment of its intention to initiate three-party talks was the discovery that the 1940 dilution agreement severely restricted the job categories to which Africans could be advanced (2). Governor Maybin was rapidly realising how circumscribed was his power on the Copperbelt. The government was not a party to the 1940 dilution agreement. This was in accordance with the accepted doctrine of non-interference between management and labour, but it was also due to the fact that only one Labour Officer (William Stubbs) had as yet been appointed to the Copperbelt, and he confined his attentions to African labour conditions. Thus, the Government faced a fait accompli. Clause 46 of the 1940 Agreement read:

"Both parties agree that dilution of labour during the War may be necessary, in which case it will be carried out after mutual consultation between the Union and the Company. After the War, conditions will revert to normal". (3)

But of course no one doubted that if the Union were consulted, it would insist on the rate for the job as laid down in the agreement, thus effectively preventing any reduction in labour costs. The Union further consolidated its position in the 1941 Closed Shop Agreement with the mines. This successfully closed the loophole whereby the companies might have employed Africans or "low-grade Europeans" who were not members of the MWU in skilled jobs at wage-cutting rates. The likelihood of this was not, as we have seen, very great, but the MWU had erected yet another barrier to African advancement which would be used after 1945.

1. See Statement by the Government of Northern Rhodesia in Forster Report, at end.
2. The 1940 Agreement is on SEC/LAB/108: Agreement between Mufulira Copper Mines Ltd. and the Mine Workers' Union. Identical agreements were signed for the other producing mines. All were signed in July 1940.
3. Ibid.
The MVU's power to create industrial dislocation need not be doubted. Frank Maybank, the General Secretary, was a 'communist' in the South African manner. Though an advocate of white labour, he also, as we shall see in the next chapter, saw the strategic advantages of incorporating Africans within the Union, or at least of controlling them so as to present a united front against the employers. In 1942 he was deported until the end of the war when he tried to involve the MVU in a dispute on the Katanga mines (1). Agitation could also be on a political level, since the white miners by 1941 elected three or four of the eight unofficials to Legislative Council (2). Marthinus Visagie and Brian Goodwin, both MVU officials, represented Nkana throughout the 1940's, and Roy Welensky, at this time an official of the Rhodesia Railway Workers' Union, was elected for Broken Hill in 1941, and immediately became Director of Manpower for the territory. Though these men had differing views on the place of Africans in industry, any move by the government or the mines to change the status quo was liable to bring a united front of unofficials in full cry. The amalgamation card could be played with some effect.

"Any immediate initiation of discussions as envisaged by Forster" argued H.F. Cartmel-Robinson, the Provincial Commissioner responsible for the Western Province, which at that time comprised the Copperbelt, "would lead to immediate political pressure for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia in the hope that the Government Native Policy would be changed". (3)

Since there was an election to the Legislative Council in August 1941, officials agreed that the whole matter could be deferred. Conflict with the whites was to be avoided in normal times, doubly so during the War.

African advancement was, then, thrust into the background for the duration of the War, and the government addressed itself to what it considered more immediate problems. This meant in effect that the European

2. Broken Hill, Ndola, Nkana and Luanshya Electoral Areas. See J.W. Davidson, The Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council (London: Faber and Faber, 1948), Appendix E.
3. SEC/LAB/139: H.F. Cartmel-Robinson to Chief Secretary, 21 August 1941.
Union consolidated its industrial and political position. It succeeded in killing a Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Bill which modelled itself on the British Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, the notorious post-General Strike law which protected non-strikers and compelled "opting-in" instead of "opting-out" of political funds (1). The position on dilution was held in the 1941 Agreement with the mines, and by March 1947, the new, definitive post-war Agreement enshrined the colour bar in Clause 42, which read:

"42. Dilution of labour

The Company agrees that work of the class or grade that is being performed, or job that is being filled, by an employee at the time of the signing of the Agreement shall not be given to persons to whom the terms and conditions of this Agreement do not apply". (2)

By way of compromise, the Union accepted clause 1, which defined the MWU as representing the daily-paid European employees, and which therefore precluded them from forming African branches. But the two clauses together firmly turned the lock on African advancement. Both management and MWU asserted that they were anti-colour bar after their fashion, and that it was the other side which was hindering progress.

Meanwhile, however, world events after the end of the war pushed the African advancement issue once more into the forefront of events. The issue was bound up with the cry of trade unions for colonial peoples, which was the defined policy of the Colonial Office under Creech Jones (3). There was the additional and growing factor of the wishes of the Africans themselves. They left little doubt in the minds of the Government's Labour officers that they considered their wages to be too low and that they could


do the work of Europeans. In 1918 they volunteered to run the mine at 
Nkana during a European strike under the supervision of the salaried staff. (1)

The whole post-war industrial situation in Northern Rhodesia needed 
sorting out, and successively the British Government tried expert advice, 
impartial investigations, and top-level political negotiation. Only in 
the latter case did a glimmer of success ensue, namely the creation of 
African trade unions. The other two tactics failed miserably.

The expert adviser was M. A. Bevan, seconded from the British Ministry 
of Labour as Industrial Adviser to the Northern Rhodesia government in 
1945 (2). His province was European labour, and he helped to draft the 
wording of Clause 42, though, according to Stubbs, he did not support 
the principle behind it (3). When it came to African advancement, 
however, Bevan was only as 'expert' as his prejudices would allow him. 
His opinion in 1946 was that Africans were not ready for formally-
constituted trade unions, and that African leaders would simply 'bang 
the big drum' without having a real understanding of the functions of 
trade unions. (4) Bevan approached Maybank, now returned from exile, 
suggesting a conference to discuss African advancement. Maybank replied 
that such a conference should discuss the whole economic status of Africans, 
a position to which the MWU adhered throughout the Dalgleish Commission's 
investigations (5). Bevan was confident that the MWU would attend any 
conference.

1. SEC/LAB/45: Labour Reports, Copperbelt, 1940-45. See esp. Stubbs's report 
on a visit to Mufulira, 24-25 September 1940 (dated 1 October 1940); 
2. ACJ 22/3/19-20: Orde Browne to Creech Jones, 4 January 1946.
3. SEC/LAB/61: William Stubbs (Labour Commissioner) to Chief Secretary, 
25 March 1948.
4. ACJ/ 22/3/32-33: Minute by M. A. Bevan, 12 April 1946; SEC/LAB/125: 
"African trade unions" (memorandum by M. A. Bevan, 13 April 1945).
5. ACJ 22/3/32-33: M. A. Bevan, note of a discussion with Maybank, 18 May 1946, 
on opportunities for the African worker (Secret).
But the "Four-party talks" held on African advancement in 1947 proved a fiasco. Andrew Dalgleish, a British trade unionist, arrived in Northern Rhodesia in 1947 to carry out the recommendation of the Forster Commission (of which he had been a member) on African advancement. He was accompanied by H.O. Smith, a director of Imperial Chemical Industries, and James Kelly, of the Durham Association of the International Association of Mine Workers. But now the Government's policy of letting sleeping dogs lie exploded, as it were, in its face. What, the MWU and the Chamber of Mines asked, was the policy of the Government on African advancement? (1)

The Government's policy was to wait and see what the MWU and the Chamber of Mines could agree upon. Thus, an impasse was reached, with recriminations all round. Even before the British delegates had met formally, James Kelly had become committed to the MWU's "rate for the job" argument, and H.O. Smith took the Chamber of Mines line that the Government should say what its policy was, and that if the MWU insisted on "the rate for the job", the task of the conference would be impossible (2).

There was, however, sufficient fear among all the parties of an African reaction for a Commission of Enquiry to be appointed under Dalgleish in October 1947, but with Henry Main and James Young as Commissioners. Main had been President of the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation, and Young was General Secretary to the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen. The Dalgleish Commission was ostensibly a new initiative, and was to enquire into African opportunities in industry generally, not only the mines. However, Rhodesia Railways was in the process of being taken over by an inter-territorial Commission from the two Rhodesias in


2. SEC/LAB/60: Memorandum of Industrial Relations Conference (no author, no date); J. Kelly to Andrew Dalgleish, 3 May 1947 and H.O. Smith to Andrew Dalgleish 29 April 1947.
1947, and the Dalgleish Commission decided not to "prejudice" the position of the Railways Commission by making any recommendations in their sphere. In all "lesser" industries, there was no opportunity for Africans to advance except after a long period of training and improved education. The Commission therefore focussed on the mines (1).

The MWU refused to give evidence to the Commission on the grounds that Dalgleish was personally unsympathetic to European workers, and that the terms of reference of the Commission did not include any reference to "equal pay for equal work", which Maybank and Goodwin expanded to equal pay for equal work for equal responsibility, a phrase which was designed to exclude job fragmentation (2). The MWU's boycott made it likely that the Commission's Report would be only the beginning of a further long round of talks about advancement.

In the event, the Dalgleish Report was a conservative one. 27 posts were listed as being capable of being filled immediately by Africans, 24 of them on the surface. 'In the comparatively near future', eleven further jobs could be filled by individual Africans after testing and initially under supervision. Africans 'might advance after a period of training' to 16 more jobs. No European should be discharged in order to make way for an African; the African wage structure should not be revolutionised, but the Government should lay down a minimum wage, while the emoluments of a European vacating a job might be divided between three Africans. Skilled Africans, however, should earn the same rates as skilled Europeans. But in order to effect these recommendations, the Commission could only make an appeal to the MWU and the Chamber of Mines to "give earnest consideration" to the alteration of Clause 42 (3).

2. ibid., paras. 21-23.
3. ibid., chapters v, vi, viii, x; para. 217. See also Appendix 4 below.
William Stubbs, the Labour Commissioner, commented:

"the key to the Dalgleish Report, or perhaps it would be more realistic to describe it as a padlock on this Report, is contained in Chapter ix i.e., the section on the alteration of Clause 42/. The key to the padlock is the goodwill of the NBMWU. Without this key the Report itself cannot be acted upon in so far as the Mining Industry is concerned". (1)

The Government, he thought, need only concern itself with apprenticeship and education: for the rest, the advancement issue could be thrashed out between the MWU and the Mines. But honest brokerage by the Government was unlikely to break the colour bar. The Government "did not stand for" the colour bar, just as it "did not stand for" adultery, but it regarded each as a private arrangement to be settled by the parties concerned (2). In the abortive negotiations between government, MWU and Chamber of Mines after the Dalgleish Report, it became obvious that the employers would not move on the colour bar unless supported by legislation.

The managing directors of the London headquarters of Anglo-American and RST wrote to Governor Rennie in 1949:

"... in the last analysis it is not the responsibility of the Companies but of the Government of the Territory to ensure that the terms of employment in a protectorate where no official Colour Bar exists, should be so ordered as to permit of equal opportunity for all according to their capabilities and to the jobs to which they are suited, irrespective of colour". (3)

Not to be outdone as an advocate of sweetness and light, Maybank submitted an anti-colour bar clause for inclusion in the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Bill, but the Government insisted that this would be interference

1. SEC/LAB/61: Stubbs to Chief Secretary, 25 March 1948.

2. Rowland Hudson (Acting Chief Secretary) explained the government's position to the Dalgleish Commission, though not in these precise terms. ZP/20/1, vol. 2: Evidence to the Dalgleish Commission, pp. 814-827.

between employers and employees (1). When Pascale Sokota, a nominated African member of the Legislative Council, asked the Chief Secretary in 1951 what progress had been made on the Dalglish recommendations on African advancement, Stanley, the Chief Secretary, replied that "African mineworkers are now able to negotiate and press their claims direct", through the African Mine Workers' Union. The matter was closed thus:

"Mr. Welensky: Would my hon. Friend the Chief Secretary not agree that this question of progress within an industry is primarily the concern of the industry, that it is both the employer and employee [sic], and there is definitely a limit as to how far the Government can intervene?

Mr. Stanley: Yes, Sir." (2)

This was a fittingly negative conclusion to a phase of Northern Rhodesia's industrial history. From 1952, when the African Mine Workers' Union conducted a peaceful three-week strike, followed by the Guillebaud recommendations for increased wages (3), it was clear that the African factor had entered the industrial scene, allied with the African nationalist movement. The 1940's were a decade of uneasy transition towards a more positive policy of government towards 'development'. The Forster Report had said that the three parties concerned should discuss African advancement together; the Dalglish Report had said that advancement was feasible. In the meantime, all parties said that they did not favour the colour bar. The Northern Rhodesia Government was equipped with only a very primitive ideology on its industrial role: it should get the parties

1. SEC/LAB/61: Notes on a meeting between representatives of Government and the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union held at Kitwe, 7 January 1949; and Berger, "Labour Policies", p. 186.

2. NR Legco Deb., 72, 498 and 501 (7 December 1951).

3. Report and Award of the Arbiter, C.W. Guillebaud Esq., C.B.E., nominated under the Industrial Conciliation Ordinance to arbitrate in a dispute between the Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers' Trade Union and the Copper Mining Companies, January 1953 (typescript, 1953).
together, and hope, no doubt, that the MWU would accept a phasing-out of its members from jobs, or that the Chamber of Mines would carry out a programme of replacement with such tact that no protest would be emitted by the white mineworkers. Economic difficulties both during and after the war placed grave limitations on what could be done for Africans. When it came down to essentials, was not the territory's role to produce copper? The Government was also a prisoner of history, which is to say that its past neglect of education and training for Africans was now exposed to the publicity which was another feature of the 1940's. Fate had perhaps played an unkind trick. The well-intentioned amateurs in the government were now being asked to unscramble a complicated situation which they had had literally no part in creating.

iii. The limits on knowledge: the problem of stabilization

Part of the problem of advancing Africans lay in the Government's lack of power to do battle effectively with the MWU and the Chamber of Mines in a territory where copper revenues were an essential and growing part of government income; but another part of the problem lay in the fact that the Government were almost totally unequipped with information about Africans which was relevant to the industrial situation. The Labour Department collected statistics and made frequent tours of inspection as more labour officers were appointed, but the Provincial Administration's hold on Government policies led to a continued emphasis on the African as a tribesman and country-dweller which was quite incompatible with the development of industrial skills. If the government knew little about what was going on, it was also unsure of what it wanted. The proletarianisation of the peasantry was a dreadful prospect, yet the migrant labour system was wasteful, and it was obviously impossible and undesirable to prevent Africans from coming to town for work. Industry had a more hard-headed view of its needs:
its initial demand for 'cheap native labour' soon gave way to an interest in employing Africans as cheap, semi-skilled or skilled workers. But this did not necessarily mean that a body of permanent African town-dwellers had to be deliberately created: long service in one kind of employment was desirable, but a severance of rural ties was not, for the rural areas should remain as a morally stabilising influence (1). Thus, the copper companies remained undecided on the subject of stabilisation until the 1950's, when the phenomenon was accepted (2).

It has been said that the 1940's was a transition period, when government functions began to widen, but the men and the principles behind them were still living in the pre-war world. Nowhere is this more visible than in the Government's sincere and agitated attempts to devise an attitude and a policy on stabilisation (3). The PA remained wedded to the theory of indirect rule and the 'development' of the rural areas, so as to prevent the disastrous drift to the urban centres. As such, their policy is identical with that of the independent Government of Zambia, though the scale of 'development' envisaged by the PA was miniscule, and dependent on annual budgetary fluctuations. The first meeting of the Native Industrial Labour Advisory Board (NILAB) in 1935, chaired by H.F. Cartmel-Robinson, at that time Senior Provincial Commissioner, considered that there was no need to adopt a 'hard-and-fast' policy as the Belgians had done in Katanga;


"no special steps are necessary or desirable to encourage or
discourage /the gradual tendency towards stabilisation of labour/
at present". (1)

The Board, however, was so obviously inadequate as a source of advice
that Orde Browne recommended in 1938 that it should be reconstituted to
make it more representative and efficient. (2) But even the reconstituted
African Labour Advisory Board (ALAB) functioned mainly to record the
views and impressions of individuals in government and industry; it
had experience, but little expertise, in the matter of the gathering of
statistics and in the methods of social investigation that were necessary
for meaningful government decisions. Even the Labour Commissioner,
Hudson, could only record his impression in 1941 that stabilisation
had persisted (3). By 1943, ALAB had changed its mind, and recommended
that a definite policy on stabilisation should be adopted. A degree of
industrialisation was inevitable, and should be recognised and suitably
provided for (4).

"Suitably provided for" was the explosive phrase. What kind of
facilities should be provided for urbanised Africans? It was a problem
which the Anti-Slavery Society dealt with in its memorandum on the Forster
Report. There should be a wide-ranging government plan to provide social
services, housing and better wages in the urban centres, as well as "social
and agricultural betterment" in the rural areas. Funds for these projects
should come from taxes on the copper companies and the British South
Africa Company (5).

1. Report of the Chairman of the Native Industrial Labour Advisory Board
3. SEC/LAB/27: Minute by Hudson, 4 August 1941.
4. Report of the Chairman on the 4th Meeting of the African Labour Advisory
   Board, 19-20 July 1943.
5. Memorandum by the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society on
   the Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the 1940
   disturbances in the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia (London: Anti-
   Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, 1941).
Any decision on stabilisation, then, meant large-scale finance, and at that stage it became an issue which was much less theoretical and brought about clashes of interests. When the PA heard of the proposal to appoint a Development Officer for the Copperbelt, H.A. Watmore, Provincial Commissioner for the Western Province, protested that the rural areas should be given priority in development schemes. Besides, the proposed Development Officer's functions were

"best done by providing the District Commissioners with an adequate staff, which would enable them to think out development programmes for their Districts which could be co-ordinated by the Provincial Commissioner". (1)

Plans for social welfare facilities for Africans in the towns were scuttled by Sandford, the Secretary for Native Affairs in 1945, on the grounds that benefits should be spread throughout the country (2).

Officials were, then, deeply divided on principle about stabilisation and what the government should do to encourage it, and where. The PA was generally for "rural development", an attitude which, in retrospect, made good economic sense. But the PA was not thinking in economic terms. Their interest lay in the preservation and possibly the strengthening of traditional structures in the rural areas, of which process indirect rule was a part. The PA, in other words, was intent on fulfilling its time-honoured, static function of preserving law and order and dispensing their conception of "good government". The Labour Department, on the other hand, was concerned about the welfare of Africans in towns. The bad conditions with which they were familiar would not be remedied by "developing" the rural areas, and the rapid growth of the Copperbelt and of the wage force presented, in their view, an emergency situation which had to be tackled immediately.

1. SEC/LAB/27: H.A. Watmore to Chief Secretary, 29 May 1945.
2. Heisler, "Creation of a stabilised urban society".
Accordingly, it is no surprise that official policy on stabilisation represented a compromise - the "balanced stabilisation" formula which tried to take account of R.S. Hudson's (the Labour Commissioner's) arguments for urban development and the PA's more traditional concerns. When Governor Waddington met Colonial Office officials in 1944, they made it clear to him that some kind of programme would have to be laid down, and that the Northern Rhodesia Government would have to address itself after the war to such problems as housing, education, health, welfare and training for Africans. But action on these was most obviously needed on the line of rail, if only from a security viewpoint. We have already seen the anxieties of Russell and Orde Browne about the urban areas. Waddington, however, still delayed action by stressing the "balanced stabilisation" concept:

"The declared policy should be the recognition of and provision for that degree of urban stabilisation which exists from time to time and the progressive development of rural areas to keep pace as far as possible with the progress in the urban areas, special provision being made to encourage the retirement of urban workers to village life with the object of achieving a balanced stabilisation in both urban and rural areas". (1)

But, as the Secretary of State pointed out, this was an unrealistic policy. It was unlikely that the same degree of progress could be made in the backward rural areas as on the line of rail. Special and more elaborate services would be required for a long time in the industrial areas. To this the Governor agreed, although still stressing the need for minimum social services in the rural areas (2). But in a society like Northern Rhodesia's, government policies were subject to scrutiny by the white unofficials on the Legislative Council. The Ten-Year Development Plan of 1947, which at first placed some emphasis on the development of the rural

---

1. SEC/LAB/27: Secretary of State to Governor Waddington, 21 April 1944; Governor Waddington to Secretary of State, 2 January 1945.

2. SEC/LAB/27: Secretary of State to Governor Waddington, 29 March 1943; Governor Waddington to Secretary of State, 22 October 1945.
areas, was amended after six years to foster greater urban development, and to improve expensive services for Europeans (1). Besides the political obstacle to allocating resources to African development, there was also administrative opposition. A Commissioner for Native Development, John Smith Moffat, was appointed in 1915, and in 1918 his functions were broadened from being purely advisory to co-ordinating projects in the rural areas. But his functions cut across regular departmental channels, and we have seen that the PA would have preferred to guide development themselves. What Dennis Driesang calls the "structural fragmentation" of the colonial administration was in itself a hindrance to development (2).

Africans, so long as they remained migrant labourers, could not acquire job skills because they were unlikely to stay in town for a sufficient length of time to learn anything except unskilled occupations. The debate about stabilisation was, then, highly relevant to the problem of African job advancement. If Africans were induced to stay in towns and live more settled lives there, they could not at the same time be expected to be content with ill-paid, unskilled jobs without prospects of advancement. But in formulating its policies, the government listened to the copper companies and the Europeans in general. It was extremely nervous about hearing African views, and particularly mistrustful of any methodical investigation into the facts of urbanisation. Two instances may serve to illustrate this reluctance to gather data: the government's relations with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and the Saffery affair.

The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute had been set up in the wake of the 1933 Copperbelt strike. Its role was to investigate "the effect upon native African society of the impact of European civilisation", and thereby


aid the Government by providing it with the scientific data about social change among Africans which was so direly needed. But anthropologists do not always produce data palatable to governments. Godfrey Wilson, the first Director of the Institute, was a pacifist who was influenced by Marxist thinking (1). His immediate proposal to study labour migration from the urban end of the process was received with great agitation by government and copper companies in 1938. Rhokana Corporation refused to allow Wilson to conduct fieldwork in the mine compounds, and Cartmel-Robinson, PC for the Western Province, argued that the interference of an outsider would upset the arrangements being made for the setting up of Native Courts on the Copperbelt. Wilson was therefore compelled to confine himself to an investigation of Broken Hill, which resulted in his important *An Essay on the Economics of Detribalisation*, published in 1941-2. (2) However, his work at Broken Hill was cut short by opposition from the compound manager, and Wilson resigned his Directorship in 1941. In 1944 he committed suicide while serving as an Education Officer in the South African army.

Max Gluckman, the third Director of the Institute, made more headway in anthropological studies, and was on terms of friendship with Roy Welensky, while remaining a Marxist. But A.L. Epstein was excluded from the Roan Antelope mine compound when doing fieldwork in 1953-54, and his *Politics in an Urban African Community* was based mainly on data collected in Luanshya town compound (3).

The suspicions of a government at the prospect of a visiting "expert" investigating the Africans' way of life can well be understood: feelings could be stirred up, and a hostile published report could damage the


2. Wilson, *Essay on the economics of detribalisation*.

government's standing in Britain. Officials suspected that "experts" would not take into account the practical day-to-day problems with which the man on the spot was faced. But granted all this, the Government also showed itself, in the Saffery affair, to be nervous about accepting data collected by its own official, but which was unwelcome to the copper companies.

ALAS had felt the need for more knowledge of African living conditions, and in 1942 it agreed to Hudson's proposal to appoint an officer trained to investigate the problems of African wages, cost of living and stabilisation on the Copperbelt and in other urban areas (1). A.L. Saffery, formerly Secretary of the South African Institute of Race Relations, was duly appointed, and his first report, based on six months of investigations on the Copperbelt, was printed in 1943 and circulated to government departments and to the copper mining companies. It painted an alarming picture, particularly of the cost of living of urban Africans (2). Discarding the approach of breaking down each family's budget, Saffery instead tried to calculate "a reasonable minimum standard of living - a standard designed to do no more than maintain a person or persons in reasonable health", (3) and found that there was "a startling difference between the average cash wage and the minimum cost of living". (4) Saffery's method of calculation estimated the minimum cost of existence on the Copperbelt for an average African family of four on the mines was £6:11/7 per month; the average family in secondary industry or domestic service had a substantially lower average income, and had to meet similar expenses to those of the miners (5).


4. ibid., p. 17.

5. ibid., pp. 5 - 17.
Saffery had exposed a situation which no one in the government or on the mines had been fit to expose before. There was abject poverty and poor nutrition among the best-paid African workers in the territory.

What made government and mines even more uncomfortable was the clear reporting of African grievances: Africans were bitter about low wages; there might be argument that Saffery's projected living standards were too high, but there is no doubt that his work reflected more accurately than ever before how Africans actually lived. The fact that they consistently lived beyond their incomes was confirmed by the Cost-of-Living Commission, which reported that 37 per cent of all African workers in 1947 were buying more than they could pay for out of their earnings, one quarter of these spending more than double their cash income (1). Although the cost-of-living bonus awarded to African mineworkers in 1941 increased from 2/- per ticket in November 1941 to 10/- in February 1947, this did not keep up with the rise in the cost of living, which the official Colonial Annual Report for the territory reported as having risen by 35 to 90 per cent for Africans between 1939 and 1945 (2).

Saffery, however, had stirred up a hornet's nest in implying that Africans were not satisfied with their lot. Even his supportive superior, Hudson, did not believe that there was any serious poverty among Africans on the Copperbelt (3). The Chamber of Mines made a weighty protest at the Report, criticising it for being inadequate and incomplete, for being almost exclusively concerned with Kitwe, for being based on only six months'... 

1. Barrow Report, pp. 33 ff. The question arises of how Africans succeeded in spending more than they earned. To some extent this was achieved through credit, extended either by retailers or by relatives and friends. But it seems more likely that their "official" income was supplemented by extra-legal means, as when their wives brewed and sold beer. Such earnings would not be reported to the Commission.


3. SEC/LAB/71: Hudson to Chief Secretary, 25 October 1943.
work, and for its "many definite and far-reaching recommendations on a
superficial investigation of conditions". (1)

Saffery had indeed exceeded his brief in making recommendations on
fixing minimum wages and in proposing a commission to investigate the
possibilities for secondary industry in the territory. He also appears
to have got some of his minor figures wrong. For these reasons, his
Report was firmly locked in a departmental drawer, and despite many
requests from outside bodies and a parliamentary question by Creech
Jones, the Report was never published (2). To do so would have upset
the Chamber of Mines and given ammunition to increasingly vocal critics
in Britain. Saffery was allowed to produce another, purely factual,
report on wages and cost of living of Africans on the line of rail,
but he resigned his post in late 1941, and sought the assistance of
Creech Jones against the Northern Rhodesia Government (3). It is not
clear if he ever carried out his intention of publishing his findings
independently.

The Northern Rhodesia Government, then, lacked data on which to
base a policy for Africans in town. But when it seemed possible that
uncomfortable facts would come to light as a result of any methodical
investigation of African conditions, it shied away from the facts. There
was a constant nervousness about how the copper companies would react, and
the spectre of industrial "discontent" (i.e. active agitation rather than
passive suffering) hovered in the background to reinforce the traditional
official dislike of publicity. The necessity for supplying copper to
Britain now stood as equal priority with the preservation of law and order

1. ibid. Memorandum setting out the comments of the Northern Rhodesia Chamber
of Mines on the Report dated 26 February 1943 by A.L. Saffery (14 September
1943).

2. Written reply to Creech Jones by the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
H of C Deb, 410, 2485 (10 May 1943).

3. ACJ/22/3/6: A.L. Saffery to Creech Jones, 11 December 1941; SEC/LAB/71:
Report on wages and cost of living of Africans at Ndola, Livingstone,
Broken Hill and Lusaka. (Saffery's Second Report) (1941).
as a governmental function. African advancement had to await the
satisfying of these two prior claims on government resources. The
government's most acute nervousness was reserved for occasions when,
as in the 1940 strike, Africans began expressing their own grievances,
or, as with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and the Saffery affair, an
"expert" outsider began to talk directly to Africans. The government's
main channel of advice, ALAB, expressed the views of employers or of the
whites chosen to represent African interests, such as Gore-Browne and
the Rev. E.C. Nightingale. When Roy Welensky nominated Nelson Nalumango
in 1948 to represent "native interests" on ALAB after Gore-Browne had
resigned, familiar official symptoms appeared: William Stubbs, now
Labour Commissioner, was against the move, partly on grounds of Nalumango's
"lack of experience", and

"it must also be considered that an African on this board might hamper
the freedom of speech which has always been a valuable feature of
meetings in the past". (1)

But Nalumango duly became a member of the Board, and the Europeans
presumably had to adjust the expression of their views accordingly.

The indecision of the Northern Rhodesia Government about African job
advancement and its pre-requisite, a policy on stabilisation in the towns,
prevented any progress from being made in this vital political sector up
to 1953. The overriding factor in this indecision was the necessity to
produce copper for Britain and the Allies, and this could not be done without
the co-operation of the mining companies. So long as Africans were unable
to exert political pressure on the Government, this situation was unlikely
to alter. In J.A. Hobson's terms, the taproot of imperialism now dominated
the whole plant, and governments were subjected to the wishes of the great
capitalist combines which possessed the wealth without which no government

could implement the smallest welfare measure (1). This all-embracing
drive for production was, of course, at the expense of all the other
sectors of the Northern Rhodesian economy, particularly the African rural
subsistence sector; the employers would have used Africans to fill
skilled jobs at low wages if they calculated that the total socio-political
result would be sustained low-cost production. This was what the copper
companies told the Forster Commission, though they deplored the crudity
of making their views public. But the European Union did not allow
the companies to attain this desired end. By erecting an effective
colour bar to job advancement by Africans, the MWU limited the victorious
progress of extractive capitalism in Northern Rhodesia. They did so,
of course, in order to preserve the interests of their members, who were
among the best-paid manual workers in the world. It is not necessary
to accept Maybank's or Goodwin's view of the MWU as a Sir Galahad
delivering the African workers from the moral obliquity of blackleggism
to see that the MWU had a historic role of a sort. But its tactical
position was, in the short term, in a state of hopeless confusion. The
white miners were seen to be the only obstacle in the way of advancing
the blacks, and their attitudes were not improved in their public
expression by the cultural traits of South Africa, from which many came.
But however inept their propaganda, the white miners were not the only
obstacle to African advancement in Northern Rhodesia. We have seen that
the British and Northern Rhodesian Governments and the copper companies
all placed their vital interests before the advancement of Africans,
and the end result was a stalemate producing maximum bitterness for the
Africans. The MWU was, as it were, the prize-fighter placed in the
ring to fight until he dropped. At the end of the conflict, the copper

1938), pp. 71 ff.
companies would collect the winnings and would be happy to see both combatants powerless. In the next chapter we shall see how Africans became for the first time an active factor in the politics of labour in Northern Rhodesia, and how the African Mineworkers' Union overtook the feeble efforts of the Government to improve their lot, and within a very few years became as important as any other factor in the colonial equation.
CHAPTER 6

TRADE UNIONS AND

AFRICAN POLITICS, 1940-1953
In Chapter 4 we discussed the place of the Copperbelt Strikes of 1933 and 1940 in the politics of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia. In this chapter, we go on to examine the creation of institutionalised modes of expression for Africans between 1940 and 1953, and in what ways these reflected the growing conflict between Africans and Europeans in these years. It will be argued that from 1940 to 1949, European initiatives were paramount, and Africans' responses were a pragmatic adaptation to a situation in which they were offered few options; after 1949 the existence of a powerful but unstable African union on the mines meant that African initiatives would more and more compete with those of Europeans in the industrial field; but at the same time, the political instability of the AMWU and other African trade unions was a reflection of growing conflict among Africans themselves about the proper role of a union and the appropriate demarcation of political roles between the unions and the African political movement at large (1). It will also be argued that although the creation of colonial trade unions under government auspices was strictly in line with the policy of the British Government from as early as 1930, African trade unions in Northern Rhodesia constituted one step further in the process of the passing of the political initiative to Africans, and in the wider perspective, helped to create the necessity for political decolonisation by forming for the first time institutions for Africans which were legal, but at the same time uncontrolled by the government, the mines, or the white unions.

The rise of African trade unions in Northern Rhodesia has attracted a fair body of literature. A survey of this literature shows the necessity

for clear distinctions: first, between the twentieth-century colonial situation and the situation in nineteenth-century Europe in which modern European trade unions were born, and which forms a prototype against which some authors test the African case; and secondly, between the objectives of the home government and those of the men on the spot, both officials and unofficials.

The first generation of post-war Marxists, of whom Jack Woddis is perhaps the best known (1) saw the rise of organised labour in the colonies as a significant phenomenon, resembling the rise of a working class in Europe. The working class was in the vanguard of revolution in Europe in the twentieth century; it was, therefore, tempting to view the emergence of colonial trade unions as heralding a similar revolution there.

"The Colonial Office and Fabians have combined to foster the myth that trade unionism in Africa was not the result of African effort but the fruit of British generosity ... The African working class has literally had to fight every inch of the way to win and maintain trade union recognition, and even to this day its rights are constantly violated" (2).

Woddis asserts that the formation of African trade unions in Northern Rhodesia was "at the insistence" of the Africans, and that the history of the 1950's showed evidence of class solidarity among workers, and even the beginnings of "a class-conscious proletariat" (3). It must be added that later Marxist scholars have adopted a less Eurocentric framework of analysis, and have noted the conflict between the political elite and the workers, emphasising the still-embryonic nature of "a working class almost without workers", which did not act analogously with the European working class (4).

1. Woddis, Roots of Revolt; Africa, the Lion Awakes (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1961).
3. ibid., pp. 91, 98.
It will be argued in this chapter that local officials, far from opposing African trade unions, came to support them, and the European MTU, which was the most enthusiastic supporter of African trade unions among the white community, was also least enthusiastic about African industrial advancement. And the assumption that Africans wanted trade unions must not go unquestioned.

The opposite viewpoint from that of the Marxists also fails to deal with the complexity of interests at work in the territory in the late 1940's. Roberts's thorough study of colonial labour policy (1) accurately reflects the traditional Fabian-Colonial Office philosophy on the gradualist, non-political role of trade unions both in Britain and the colonies. But the work does not explain why the delays, reverses and contradictions of policy implementation on the spot led to a situation where the African trade unions in the 1950's contributed their share to the many-fronted conflict which has come to be known as the freedom struggle. Only by examining the politics of labour through the local situation can we understand the limitations of labour policies. James Hooker has also examined the problems through consideration of the role of the Labour Department in the formation of African trade unions in Northern Rhodesia (2), and concludes, in a similar vein to Roberts, that the key part played by the Department prevented a deterioration in industrial relations in the 1940's. But Hooker's analysis, like that of the Marxists, omits any attempt to fathom what the African workers wanted at this stage in their history. The unsatisfactory nature of all these analyses lies in their perspective: the problem is regarded as one of policy implementation.


Even Woddis adopts the method of quoting from and italicising official reports, so that his critique is expressed within the same framework as that of the officials. Woddis can, therefore, only see the African struggle through European lenses.

The "Dar es Salaam school" has also touched upon the growth of trade unionism, though only in Tanganyika (1) so far. John Iliffe illustrates the "growth of docker consciousness" in Dar es Salaam port, leading to the first dockers' trade union, formed without the assistance or knowledge of the Labour Department. Iliffe emphasises the "grass-roots grievances" which powered the movement, and criticises Tom Mboya for asserting that African trade unionism had to be created from the top downwards. The theory of initiative from the bottom upwards is in line with Iliffe's interpretation of the Maji-Maji Rebellion (2), and with John Lonsdale's theory of the rise of nationalism in East Africa which emphasises the essential spontaneity of African resistance, and consequently the co-ordinating rather than the instigating role of the elite (3).

This account will argue that the intellectual populism of Lonsdale and Iliffe is not any more satisfactory than Marxism or the "colonial policy" approach. Trade unions in Northern Rhodesia were accepted by the African elite as a pragmatic response to the situation in 1947-48. It is practically impossible to find any evidence that the mass of the African workers wanted trade unions until such time as they came into


existence. But we must now carefully examine the development of African trade unions in Northern Rhodesia in the light of our knowledge of the local situation from official and unofficial sources, assessing what opportunities the local situation presented to Africans.

i. "Development on sound lines" - the colonial government's ideal

In Europe, trade unions had led a hunted existence in their early stages. The ideology of nineteenth century governments held no place for these essentially unlawful organisations which were in restraint of trade, and were possibly also seditious conspiracies of the disinherited, plotting to dislocate industry and even to overthrow legitimate governments.

The Trade Union Act, 1871, was a victory for British trade unions in that at least they were recognised in law, strikes and peaceful picketing being made legal. By the 1930's, despite the hostile Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, British trade unions had become part of the sinews of government: increasingly, trade unionists sat on Royal Commissions, and were formally consulted by governments. Parallel with this trend, a more outward-looking policy was progressively being adopted by the trade unions, who had hitherto been diehard isolationists in their foreign and colonial policies. In 1937, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) set up an advisory committee on colonial problems, similar in scope to that set up by the Labour Party after the First World War (1). In the 1940's, British trade unionists sat on the Colonial Labour Advisory Committee,

which replaced the old departmental Labour Committee in 1942 (1), and helped to choose the first trade union advisers for the colonies (2).

The climate in which African trade unions grew up was, then, very different from nineteenth century Europe, quite apart from the fact that in colonies the class struggle was smothered by the larger struggle for national liberation (3). Far from being mistrusted as subversive institutions, trade unions for colonial peoples were now regarded as something to be encouraged, which could help to develop an interest in local self-government and development. Not only paternal guidance from governments was to be available, but also fraternal encouragement from the labour movement in the United Kingdom, which by the 1940's was forging many personal links with the leaders of colonial peoples. There were, of course, limits to be imposed on the growth of colonial trade unions, and they were to be closely supervised in their early stages. Above all, they were not to be allowed to become political organisations. Here the British government and the TUC were in agreement. But the ideal remained firm: trade union institutions were to be part of the scene in the colonial empire. Drummond Shiels, the Under-Secretary for the Colonies in the 1929-31 Labour Government, first enunciated the policy in 1930 (4). Malcolm MacDonald's despatches in 1935 and 1937 (5), on the importance of Labour Departments in the colonies, were part of a broad-fronted attack

4. Roberts, Labour, p. 178. Roberts argues that Drummond Shiels was the prime mover in these matters during the Second Labour Government, 1929-31. Lord Passfield, who was Secretary of State, had "got into a Civil Service way of looking at things". Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues, p. 113.
5. q.v. above, pp. 97-99.
on the lethargy of colonial governments in the labour field, which, as we have seen, achieved only a partial success in Northern Rhodesia. The Moyne Commission on the West Indies, 1938-39, (1) criticised the colonial government there for neglecting to implement Colonial Office policy on trade unions, and the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 enabled further pressure to be put on local administrations.

But as usual, there remained a gap between the ideals expressed in Colonial Office despatches and what was practised on the spot. For the Colonial Office, trade unions were to be striven for in the colonies as part of a wide-ranging policy for the development of native peoples which would include co-operatives, and the extension of local government. For the Northern Rhodesia Government, trade union-type institutions would be worthwhile if they could act as alarm mechanisms to warn officials of impending unrest. Without too much exaggeration, it could be said that for the local administration, workers' organisations were to be an additional mechanism for controlling the African urban population; for the Colonial Office, they were channels through which ideas about development could be applied. In the event, neither of these functions proved to work in the way that was expected, and African trade unions became independent bodies used by Africans themselves for collective bargaining, which in the nature of things in Northern Rhodesia, involved demands which were closely allied to those of the African political movement.

The Northern Rhodesia Government's strategy after the Forster Report was to work towards something like African trade unions, without admitting this either to themselves or to anyone else. We have seen that the

1. The West India Royal Commission Report (Cmd'. 8607 of 1943).
government had been anxious since 1935 to open up channels of communication with the urban African workers; but at the same time the copper companies were suspicious of any moves in the direction of collective bargaining about wages and conditions. Between 1941 and 1947, therefore, a number of transitional organisations were set up for African workers which fell short of trade unions but which were a step forward from the tribal elder system which had proved to be of so little use in a situation of industrial crisis at Roan and Mufulira. Scrivener, the compound manager at Nkana, did not have a system of elders, but held talks with leading Africans on the mine from time to time.

Hudson, the Labour Commissioner, approached the general managers of the four producing mines in July 1941, after prodding from the Colonial Office (1). The mines agreed to the formation of committees of Tribal Representatives (TR's) at each mine, to be guided by Labour Officers. The method of election differed at each mine, depending on the inclination of the compound manager, who continued to be the only management representative with whom Africans dealt. The TR's function, according to the Secretary for Native Affairs, was "to keep in touch with all native workers and to present to management on their behalf any grievances there may be in regard to working conditions". (2) By the end of 1941, TR's had been instituted at all the mines except Nkana, where the workers, remembering

---

1. SEC/LAB/139: Secretary of State to OAG (W.H. Logan) 28 April 1941; Record of tentative decisions reached ... Kitwe, 3 July 1941. The latter document recorded tentative agreement between Hudson, Stubbs and Cartmel-Robinson with Messrs. A. Royden Harrison, R.M. Peterson, W.J. Scrivener, H.H. Field, P.H. Truscott and A.H. Brunsdon of the copper companies' management: tribal representatives were to be substituted for tribal elders, Nkana was to institute tribal representatives, and the representation of Africans was to be through TR's and boss-boys.

2. Epstein, Politics, p. 62.
the shootings of 1940, delayed the setting up of TR's until 1942 (1).

But TR's were already an anachronism in a work force in which various occupational groupings were already differentiating themselves. The boss boys as a group were comparatively highly paid, bore some responsibility in the work situation, and were extremely conscious of the colour bar, since it placed an immediate barrier on their further progress. When Stubbs, the first Labour Officer appointed to the Copperbelt, toured the mining towns in 1940, the boss boys kept asking him about the results of the Forster Commission, and complaining about their treatment by Europeans underground (2). It was, therefore, thought wise to form Boss Boys' Associations, (BBA's), which would meet with the Labour Officers and the compound managers regularly, but which would confine themselves to discussing boss boys' grievances only. By the end of 1942, BBA's existed on all the mines except Nchanga (3). At the same time, and parallel with the BBA's, African Clerks' Associations were being formed (4).

All this did not happen without opposition from the copper companies. The intrusion of both labour officers and new organisations for Africans disturbed the pristine simplicity of their labour relations. The Chamber of Mines protested that BBA's might register as trade unions under the draft Trade Unions Conciliation and Trades Disputes Ordinance, then before the Legislative Council. Then, the government and the mines would have no further control over them, and they would be ripe for takeover

---

1. Labour Department Annual Report for the Year 1941; SEC/LAB/45: Report by P.J. Law (Labour Officer) on a visit to Nkana and Mindola, January 5-8, 1942.

2. SEC/LAB/45: Reports by Stubbs on visits to Mufulira, 24-25 September and 9-12 June 1942.


4. Epstein, Politics, pp. 82-83.
by the MWU (1). The companies' reluctant acceptance of BBA's at the end of 1942 was on condition that they were not convertible into trade unions (2). Nor did the compound managers, hitherto supreme in the African mine compounds, take kindly to the lectures on representation and the presentation of grievances which the labour officers gave to the BBA's. Spearpoint at Roan Antelope and H.H. Field at Mufulira were obstructive, and in 1943 the Secretary of the Chamber of Mines was demanding that a precis of each lecture should be delivered and submitted to the compound manager in advance (3). The Labour Commissioner did not consider that these talks were subversive, and he refused the request.

Perhaps the companies were right to be nervous, for the adage that "he goes furthest who knows not whither he goes" applied sharply to the Labour Department at this time. Colonial trade unions were, after all, in the air, and not just figuratively. Brian Goodwin, President of the MWU, "heard" on the radio in 1943 that a British trade unionist was about to come to the territory to organise African trade unions (4). He was quickly reassured by officials: no British trade unionist had been detailed for this task. But the trend was there for all to see: the first six trade union advisers had been sent out to the colonies in 1942, and over the next ten years, between 15 and 20 British trade unionists

1. Acc 32/17: Confidential memorandum from the Chamber of Mines, 29 September 1942. The Bill was withdrawn after criticism from the Northern Rhodesia Labour Party and the MWU. The Acc series is in the National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka. See also Roberts, Labour, p. 232-3.

2. Epstein, Politics, p. 63.

3. Acc 52/17: P.H. Truscott (Secretary, Chamber of Mines) to Labour Commissioner, 26 October 1943.

4. SEC/LAB/34, vol. iv: Interview between Messrs. Goodwin and Ross (President and Vice-President of the MWU) and the Provincial Commissioner, Western Province at Kitwe, 1 October 1943. See also Hooker, "Role of the Labour Department".
performed the function of setting colonial trade unions "on the right lines", or, as Woddis puts it, "to fight militancy in the trade union movement and to encourage class collaboration". (1)

No decision had yet been made by the government on the simple question of whether or not African trade unions were to be encouraged. Governor Waddington had written confidentially to the Secretary of State in 1942 that

"there will be an ultimate development of trade unionism and collective bargaining on the part of Africans themselves, but progress ... must be gradual". (2)

This seemed to indicate a cautious policy of encouragement. But officials in the Legislative Council repeated the Forster Commission's opinion that Africans were "not ready" for trade unions, though there was a need for something "less neutral" than the Labour Department to safeguard African workers' interests (3). The Labour Department was therefore hard put to it to interpret its brief, which led Stubbs, as the labour officer most concerned, to seek definite support for a policy of progress towards collective bargaining:

"There is a general idea (among mines management) that Government is not wholeheartedly behind us in our efforts to advance towards collective bargaining. There is a firm feeling that the Labour Officers may only do what the Chamber of Mines approves, and there is considerable suspicion that we are constantly trying, without full authority from the Government, to rush ahead for some obscure ends of our own". (4)

Stubbs asked for a ruling that the Government was in favour of "steady progress towards African Trade Unionism provided that such

---

1. Woddis, Lion Awakes, pp. 44-65; Lee, Colonial Development, pp. 168-172

2. SEC/LAB/139: Governor Waddington to Secretary of State, 22 August 1942.

3. See, for example, NR Legco Deb, 45, 243 (1 June 1943), speech of T.F. Sandford, Secretary for Native Affairs.

4. Acc 52/17: Stubbs (Labour Officer) to Labour Commissioner, 24 November 1943.
progress was gradual and controlled by the Labour Department". (1) But the Governor shied away from any such definite commitment: where Africans were "ready", assistance would be given for "development along the right lines"; where they were not ready, no undue encouragement should be given to them (2). For Governor Waddington, the "ultimate development" of African trade unions was not something to be encouraged or engineered by the Labour Department, it was something which would merely "happen" when Africans, presumably by their own efforts, were "ready" for it.

Obviously some kind of external dynamic was necessary to persuade the government to be less negative. Chronologically, the first galvanising factor was the behaviour of the MWU. From 1942, when Maybank and his colleagues were deported, the MWU had been making sporadic attempts to organise Africans. The twin spectres of communism and the Ossewabrandwag, both of which were represented among the white miners, spurred the government to expand the TR system in late 1942, lest "white agitators" seized the leadership of the African miners (3). A year later, Governor Waddington confided in the Secretary of State that the Mine Workers' Union "is actively but covertly encouraging Africans to form a trade union". (4). In the same year, four out of five branches of the MWU passed resolutions instructing the Executive to examine the question of forming African trade unions (5).

As for Africans themselves, there was a polite but cautious interest in trade unions, though, as we shall see, this was never a decisive

2. ibid., phone message from Secretary for Native Affairs, 24 April 1944.
3. ibid., Hudson (Labour Commissioner) to Chief Secretary, 9 October 1942.
4. ACJ/ 14/4/34-35: Governor Waddington to Secretary of State, 30 August 1943.
5. NR Legco Deb, 51, 54 (6 May 1943).
factor in the decision by the government to form them. According to P.J. Law, who at the time was labour officer at Mufulira and Chingola, desire by Africans for information about trade unions began to grow in 1944-45 (1). But A. Royden Harrison, General Manager of Rhokana Corporation, claimed that no request had ever been made for the formation of African trade unions by TR's or BBA's at Nkana or at other mines (2).

The decisive push towards the formation of African trade unions came from a curious alliance between some elected members of the Legislative Council, notably Roy Welensky and Stewart Gore-Browne, and the British Colonial Office. Between 1947 and 1949, TR's, BBA's and Works Committees were thrust aside to make way for fully-fledged African trade unions, and the whole concept of "gradual progress" was abandoned, though the government still hoped to keep them "on the right lines".

The origins of the Welensky-Gore-Browne-Colonial Office axis lie in the strike of African railway workers in the territory and in Southern Rhodesia in October-November 1945 (3). Though the strike in Northern Rhodesia was avowedly a sympathy strike to coincide with the strike in the South, many specific local grievances came to the fore, and in the railway and mining town of Broken Hill, the strike spread to the miners, who had hitherto been noted for their apparent contentedness (4). The

1. SEC/LAB/125: Note by P.J. Law (Senior Labour Officer) on the evolution of collective bargaining on the Copperbelt among various classes of Africans, 21 January 1948 (encl. in Stubbs (Labour Commissioner) to Chief Secretary, 28 January 1948.)

2. NR Legco Deb, 54, 50 (6 May 1946).

3. Report of the Committee appointed to investigate the grievances which gave rise to the strike amongst the African employees of Rhodesia Railways (The Tredgold Report) (typescript, 1945); I am also grateful to Arthur Turner for allowing me to see some of his unpublished work on the history of Broken Hill/Kabwe.

mine TR's were swept aside and a strike committee formed, in a similar fashion to the Committee of Seventeen at Mufulira in 1940. This strike committee was placed on a permanent footing as a Workers' Committee, and recognised by the mine management and the Labour Department as the body which negotiated about work conditions, while the TR's continued to deal with domestic and compound matters (1). The strike had been highly successful, and committees of workers were negotiating wage increases and improvements in working conditions. Did this mean that Africans were now "ready" for trade unions? Richard Gray, basing his view on a subsequent speech by Welensky to a London audience, says,

"The successful organisation of the railway strike 'compelled' the leader of the Europeans in Northern Rhodesia, Mr. Roy Welensky, himself a railway trade unionist, to change his views on African capabilities". (2)

This was dramatic hindsight on Welensky's part. His "conversion" was much more gradual than this, and started earlier, if we are to believe what Welensky wrote to his radical friend Max Gluckman, in 1942, shortly before Gluckman became Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute:

"The trouble with me these days is that my mind is broadening on social problems, and I am very worried because I am getting to think more and more like you, and I can see no solution. There must be some place for the Africans - I cannot accept that it is right with us yet, but where it is I do not know". (3)

But even shortly after the railway strike, which he later declared had converted him to African trade unions, he was telling the Legislative Council

"Let me say straight away I do not think the African is yet fit for the trade union movement. That is my opinion and I think it cannot be cast aside lightly. I have had 22 years' solid

1. Labour Department Annual Report for the Year 1945.


experience of trade unionism and I am proud to be associated with it, but it is not a thing I think can be grafted on to people like Africans without a great deal of thought". (1)

The conventional "halfway house" was appropriate. By the following year, Welensky had been converted to African trade unions for compellingly political reasons.

In 1945-46 the Colonial Office under George Hall, and, from August 1946, Arthur Creech Jones, was turning to the problem of Northern Rhodesia. Orde Browne, the Labour Adviser, wrote to Creech Jones (who at the time was Under-Secretary) confidentially early in the new year of 1946 to the effect that a trade union officer should be appointed to the Northern Rhodesian Labour Department, "which has always been somewhat weak". (2) He pointedly attached a diagram showing riots involving labour in the colonial empire from 1935 to 1945, covering 15 territories and listing 23 serious clashes with security forces (3). The Labour Department, as we have seen, needed no persuasion of the fact that some kind of "listening-in" device was needed. Stubbs had been organising the shop assistants at Mufulira since 1940 (4). The far-sighted R.S. Hudson, now Secretary for Native Affairs, shrewdly analysed the stage that African aspirations had reached in 1946:

"I agree that there is no general demand for trade unions but that the small but growing politically minded class would like to be taught how to form trade unions largely because they are things the Europeans have and they have not, and partly because they believe that if they had trade unions they would be able to obtain wages and conditions more comparable with those of Europeans". (5)

1. NR Legco Deb, 52, 60 (28 November 1945).
2. ACJ 22/3/19-20: Orde Browne to Creech Jones, 4 January 1946.
3. Table 7, p. 98above.
5. SEC/LAB/125: minute by Hudson, 28 April 1946.
But more departments were involved than the Labour Department, and greater issues were at stake at this time than African trade unions. The Europeans of the territory had never abandoned their demand for greater political power, even during the War. Amalgamation, however, was becoming a less viable slogan, since the British Labour Party declared against it in 1943, and the changes in the constitution of the Legislative Council which took effect from 1945, which increased the proportion of nominated members, who usually voted with the officials (1). Welensky's motion for amalgamation in August 1945 was defeated, Gore-Browne being among those who voted against it (2). However, the progressive severing of ties with the Colonial Office was something on which the elected members and some of the nominated un-officials could agree, and Welensky, Gore-Browne and Governor Waddington visited London in 1946 to press for concessions from George Hall (3). High-level negotiations took place over 1946-47, the outcome of which was the 1948 constitution for the Legislative Council, which increased the number of elected members from 8 to 10, and reduced the number of nominated members from 5 to 2. Four unofficials were to be included in the Executive Council, and the Legislative Council would now elect a Speaker instead of being presided over by the Governor (4).

The Colonial Office officials took advantage of the presence of the Northern Rhodesian leaders in 1946 to bring up the question of the advancement of Africans in industry, and African trade unions. Whether Welensky was finally persuaded by Andrew Cohen (Head of the Central Africa Department of the Colonial Office at this time) of the political

---

necessity of African trade unions at this stage, or whether Welensky concluded that a concession on this point would be politically wise, or both, the British and the Northern Rhodesians on 27 June 1946 came to a general agreement that the objective of policy was the establishment of African trade unions, and as quickly as possible on the Copperbelt; that a trade union labour officer should be sent out from Britain to educate Africans in the ways of collective bargaining, and that meanwhile Works Committees for Africans (based still on the TR system) should be set up at each mine and in other parts of industry. (1)

The politicians, together with the Colonial Office, had overtaken the local administration in the matter of African trade unions. Now it was the Labour Department's turn to appear reactionary. Stubbs, the Labour Commissioner, remained an adherent of the "steady progress" policy, now dangerously outdated. In March 1947, William Comrie arrived in the territory as trade union labour officer, and events began to move with great rapidity. It is time now, however, to consider more closely what African workers wanted in industry, and how far they achieved it through the formation of trade unions.

ii. An African initiative, 1947-53

With the fresh eye of a newcomer, William Comrie reported on a series of meetings with Africans at the Kitwe African Debating Society shortly after his arrival on the Copperbelt:

1. ACJ 22/3/44-45: Note by Andrew Cohen of a meeting on 27 June 1946 at the Colonial Office. Present were: Sir George Gater (Permanent Secretary at the Colonial Office), Sir John Waddington, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, Roy Welensky, M.A. Bevan (Industrial Adviser to the Northern Rhodesia Government), G. St. J. Orde Browne (Colonial Office Labour Adviser), Andrew Cohen (Head of the Central African Department of the Colonial Office) and N.D. Watson (an official in the Central African Department).
"I was particularly impressed by the very intelligent standard of the questions and, above all, by the amazing frankness of the speakers ... there is a minority, probably a very small minority, who are definitely well advanced and who hold very definite views on the position of the African generally. This minority must be treated seriously, as, without doubt, they do form the real leadership in Northern Rhodesia. The masses, while still very far behind, and not realizing fully what everything is about will follow any lead given by this minority. It is fact (sic) of history that no movement has ever been initiated by the masses, but by the few who are aware". (1)

Comrie was pointing to the existence of an African elite on the Copperbelt who were seeking to set themselves at the head of the African workers. By "the African elite" we mean those Africans in the territory who were distinguished by their better education, higher industrial status and more westernized life-style, who consciously sought the political and social leadership of their fellow Africans. Within this broad definition, however, there were different sections of the elite who sought leadership in different situations: the "white-collar elite" on the mines and in government service consisted of clerks and functionaries who had received the maximum of Western education that it was possible for Africans to achieve at this time - about eight years of primary and possibly some secondary education. These men were mostly Nyasas and Lozis. The "boss-boy elite" was distinguished from the white-collar elite by inferior education and industrial status, and cutting across the first two there was a "tribal elite" consisting of notables with chiefly connections who were already officially recognised in the institution of TR's. None of these were watertight groups; on the contrary, they overlapped considerably, and the bakalamba ("big men") on the mines wielded influence and gained a following in a variety of ways.

The African elite of the territory was tiny, and was only given the opportunity to be articulate in the 1940's, when the government began to implement its policy of opening up lines of communication

with Africans. African Provincial Councils, consisting of traditional
and non-traditional rural notables, began meeting in 1943-44. These
councils elected representatives to the African Representative Council
(ARC), which first met in 1946. The ARC in its turn elected its two
nominees to the Legislative Council from 1948 (1). Parallel with
these official bodies grew the independent Welfare Societies, which
by 1950 had eclipsed the official Urban Advisory Councils (introduced
in 1941) as mouthpieces of urban African opinion (2). But the men
on these bodies overlapped markedly, because of their small numbers.
An able man was in demand to fill many slots. Edward Sampa, for example,
was one of the bakalamba at Nkana. He was clerk in the compound office
and in 1947 was simultaneously chairman of the Nkana mine TR's, chairman
of the Nkana-Kitwe War Funds Committee, and a member of the Kitwe Urban
Advisory Council, Western Province African Provincial Council, and of
the ARC (3). In 1948 he also became a trustee of the Nkana African
Mine Workers' Trade Union. Sampa's leadership position can be partly
attributed to his chiefly birth and high occupational status, but he
also possessed personal qualities of leadership and was one of the few
Bemba clerks on the mines. Any Bemba who had achieved such a position
on the mines was well placed to be a future labour leader, since we
have seen that the Bemba were the most numerous people on the mines,
but they occupied predominantly the middle grade jobs (4). Nyasas and
Lozis, on the other hand, occupied more typically elite posts. Godwin
Mbikusita Lewanika was a kalamba in this latter group. A clerk at Nkana,

1. For constitutional matters, see Gann, History, pp. 344-359; Rotberg,
Rise of Nationalism, pp. 199-220; Epstein, Politics, chapter 2.

2. Epstein, Politics, pp. 66-70. Epstein noted that tribal elders sat
on Luanshya African Welfare and Recreational Society, and that this
society did not confine itself to strictly "welfare" matters.

3. Northern Rhodesian African Representative Council Proceedings, 2nd

he had been prominent in Welfare Society and Lozi traditional politics since the early 1930's and was later to be President of the African Congress (1).

The boss-boy elite did not owe its position to western education. Some, indeed, were illiterate like Nkoma, whom Epstein shows winning an election to the AMWU at Luanshya through his toughness and his willingness to stand up to Europeans, though he could neither read nor write (2). We have noted that the boss-boys had been prominent in the 1940 strike, and that they saw the ER system as a rival to their own. The BBA's which grew up during the war had attempted to make themselves spokesmen for all the workers, and had had to be "guided along the right lines" by the labour officers, which meant confining them to discussing boss-boys' occupational grievances only. The boss-boys' interest in the BBA's dwindled when it became clear that their function was to be thus limited. The boss-boys, therefore, could look only to the rest of the African work force as allies in their bid for better conditions; the white-collar elite, on the other hand, could easily ally themselves with the elite outside the mines in Welfare Societies, and ultimately Congress.

Trade unions for Africans were no novelty to either of these groups. Charles Mzingeli's Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (RICU) had functioned in Southern Rhodesia in the early 1940's, and African trade unions were freely discussed in the Bulawayo Chronicle and the Northern News, which began publication during the war. But the new experience for Africans was that rival groups of Europeans were now seeking their support. The MWU had attempted to form African branches


2. Epstein, Politics, pp. 135-144.
during the war, while at the same time opposing the Forster recommendations on African advancement; now in 1946–17, the government declared itself in favour of African trade unions, or something very close to them, as a result of the 1946 negotiations in London. But the government still refused to acknowledge that it should also have a policy (as opposed to a view) about advancement. The copper companies supported advancement, but strenuously opposed trade unions, as they had tried to prevent the formation of the MWU in 1936. It seemed that self-interest rather than altruism was the prevailing motive. Africans, therefore, sought the best bargain from the limited options open to them.

The first option, which was quickly overtaken by events, was the "half-way house" towards trade unions, preferred up to the last moment by the Labour Department. But the shop assistants, an oppressed but intelligent group of workers, demonstrated that there could be no meaningful halfway house. Subjected to arbitrary dismissals and poor working conditions, they formed a Copperbelt Shop, Assistants' Association in 1943; William Stubbs had formed the first local grouping even earlier when he was DC at Mufulira. By 1946 the employers were reluctantly negotiating with the Association, which under Henry Malenga had achieved a membership of 500 (1). The Association then took the logical step, under the guidance of Comrie, of informing the Registrar of Trade Unions (who was also the Attorney-General) that it had formed itself into the first African trade union in Northern Rhodesia (2). The final step was surprisingly simple: registration, as opposed to informing the Registrar of their existence, was not required by law.

Although Hooker suggests that "where shop assistants might combine, miners tended to brawl away their resentments in beer halls", (1) this does not fully explain why the shop assistants formed the first African trade union in the territory. Admittedly, they were probably more "stabilised" and of a higher educational standard than the average miner, but the puny opposition of the employers is an instructive point. The shopowners formed a politically weak pressure group. Many were Indians, who were unpopular with both African and Europeans. The mines management, however, formed the toughest stumbling-block to African trade unions, as well as controlling the colony's main source of revenue. The Chamber of Mines was still adamant in 1946. It supported the Chambers of Commerce on the Copperbelt in opposition to the attempts by the Shop Workers' Association to represent the collective grievances of their workers, for the very good reason, as Stubbs put it

"The Chamber of Mines is still suspicious of any attempts to organise African labour and is afraid that the Shop Assistants' Association may advance so rapidly as to arouse imitation in their own workers". (2)

However, with the arrival of William Comrie in March 1947 the pace quickened, and the possibility of a "halfway house" faded further into the distance. Under M.A. Bevan's cautious regime, Boss Boys' Committees (successors to Boss Boys' Associations) on each mine had been reorganised in 1945-46 into Works Committees, with each department on the mine sending representatives. The TR's dealt more and more with domestic compound affairs, while the expanded Boss Boys' Committees (BBC's) discussed working conditions with the Government's labour officers and the compound manager. At Nkana, A. Royden Harrison, the General Manager (who was also a nominated unofficial member of the Legislative Council in 1945-46) and W.J. Scrivener, the Compound Manager, proved co-operative, and it was at this mine that most progress had been made by the time of Comrie's arrival (3).

1. Hooker, "Role of the Labour Department".
We also know most about the social situation at Nkana, and it is instructive to trace the interplay of forces involved in the formation of the Union there. In the first place, interest in a Union was not confined to miners, or to mines employees. The teachers and government employees who formed the Kitwe African Debating Society were also interested in further means of expressing their more general political aspirations (1). Epstein observed that the Luanshya African Welfare and Recreational Society discussed labour problems on the mines with labour officers, and met at the Central School, midway between the municipal location (where most members lived) and the African mine township (2). Similarly, the Kitwe society met at Wusikile Welfare Hall, in the mine African township. Matthew Mwendapole, at this time a pupil-teacher at Wusikile School, and Paul Gwamba, a Nyasa African Welfare Officer employed by the government, were organising the Society in 1948, together with Jameson Chapoloko, Gabriel Mushikwa, Simon Kaluwa, Robinson Puta and Jameson Namitengo (3). To this group William Comrie and his clerk-interpreter, Matthew de Luxe Nkoloma, expounded the second option open to Africans: trade unions formed "voluntarily", but to be "guided along the proper lines" by the Northern Rhodesia Government. At first, it may seem puzzling that Africans did not immediately seize this opportunity. The BBC's, after all, had demanded to speak for all the mineworkers, and Nelson Nalumango, soon to be one of the first two African nominees on Legislative Council, had publicly expressed African desires for trade


2. Epstein, Politics, p. 68.

3. Matthew Mwendapole was Workmen's Compensation Commissioner for Zambia in 1972; Paul Gwamba was in retirement in Malawi; Jameson Chapoloko and Robinson Puta were in detention because of their connections with the banned United Progressive Party (UPP); Gabriel Mushikwa is in retirement in Kitwe; Jameson Namitengo died in Kitwe on 16 March 1972.
unions in 1946 (1). Yet the fact remains that Comrie battled for a year before the first African trade union was formed on the mines. He recalled in 1970 that

"In the beginning, in the first few months, I just didn't know how I was going to be able to get it across, because it was something so utterly foreign. I felt I might work for the rest of my life and not get very far". (2)

Then he came into contact with the men of the African Debating Society, who straightaway expressed anxiety that trade unions would lead to confrontations with the police and the army as had happened in 1935 and 1940. No doubt they were also puzzled about the government's intentions, since Comrie could only advise them about the mechanics of forming a union, and could not tell them how to use it (3). We have also seen that part of the government's intention was to "listen-in" to Africans in industry, rather than directly to act to enhance their industrial status. The latter, after all, could have been done by determinedly implementing the recommendations of the Dalgleish Report, which was also being publicly discussed in 1948.

There was, therefore, caution among African leaders about the blank cheque which the government appeared to be offering them. Like workers elsewhere, they saw the dangers of "government unions", dangers which the MWU lost no opportunity to point out. But by the end of 1947, Mushikwa, Puta and Chapoloko were convinced that Africans could gain from the formation of trade unions. They were the original "Disciples" of African trade unions on the mines. According to Mushikwa's account (4), these three, together with a coloured man named Royd, talked to teachers, medical orderlies and mine clerks for over three weeks without

1. SEC/LAB/125: Extract from the record of the 3rd meeting of the Southern Province African Provincial Council at Livingstone, 11-12 June 1946.
2. W.M. Comrie, personal communication.
3. SEC/LAB/126: Progress report of Trade Union Labour Officer, 14 May 1948, encl. in Governor Rennie to Secretary of State, 4 June 1948.
4. Kasoma, "Introductory survey".
success, with the result that Puta and Royd dropped out in despair.

Evidently, allies were needed from within the mine itself, and Mushikwa recounts that the Disciples then turned to Edward Sampa, the widely-respected Bemba elder whom we have already mentioned, one of the *bakalamba* of Nkana since before the 1940 strike. Thereupon a meeting of the TR's of the Bemba and Ngoni was held at Sampa's home, which was attended by Comrie. Further meetings of the same group took place. It will be seen from Appendix 5 that, apart from Katilungu, the executive and office-bearers of the Nkana union had by now taken shape from among Comrie's Disciples.

But at this point we meet another reason for slow progress in trade union formation - divisions among Africans themselves, both among the work force and among the elite at large. Mushikwa and Chapoloko had had to recruit the Bemba and the Ngoni TR's to their aid, or their efforts would have come to naught. Thus, even if their purpose was a modern one, and "tribe" was not at first held to be an issue which could possibly be relevant to a black-versus-white issue, nevertheless the Disciples had to take cognisance of the structure of the work force, and work through the *bakalamba*, though these latter did not ultimately achieve a position of strength in the union. In using this, the only method of preaching the gospel which was available to them, they were to some extent captured by the existing system of social relationships. We saw in 1935 and 1940 that anyone wishing to unite Africans in a common cause could not afford to leave out the Bemba (the term is used, as always in this account, to denote Bemba-speaking people from Northern and Luapula Provinces). In this case, the Ngoni were also recruited to the Bemba side; Mushikwa attributes this to the easy "joking" relationship in the towns between these two peoples, but it is equally possible that they were drawn together by a common adversary.
This adversary was Godwin Mbikusita, who had a substantial following among the clerks and among the numerically less significant Western peoples (the Lozi, Luvale, Western Lunda and Kaonde). This able but enigmatic clerk never discovered the secret of achieving popularity on the mines. As chairman of the Nkana Works Committee he had made a show of militancy and rejected the advances of the MWU (1). By the end of 1947 he was in the running for the presidency of the Nkana union. Then Comrie suggested that a miner with underground experience was desirable as a president. None of the protagonists we have seen so far had had any underground experience; some, indeed, had never been employed on the mines at all. Then, according to Mushikwa, "someone remembered Katilungu", who up to this time, although popular and an acknowledged leader among the miners, had never exhibited the seriousness of purpose of the inexhaustible members of the African Debating Society. Indeed, "he had not time for a debating society or anything that took him away from lighter social mixups that often were characterised by beer drinking". (2)

But this Prince Hal of the miners now accepted his responsibilities and opportunities, defeated Mbikusita in the election for president of the Nkana union, went on to become the first President of the Northern Rhodesia African Mine Workers' Trade Union (AMWU) in 1949, and retained a firm grip on the Union till 1961 (3).

Opposition to independent African trade unions was not, however, over. At Mufulira the management was hostile, and the compound manager, H.H. Field, put every obstacle in Comrie's way. At Roan Antelope and Mufulira, the European union was active in 1947-48 in attempts to persuade African workers

1. Northern News, 23 March 1948. In a letter to the editor, Mbikusita disclaimed all connection with the MWU and quoted some of Goodwin's past racist statements.

2. Kasoma, "Introductory survey". See also Woddis, Lion Awakes, p. 92.

3. See my biography of Katilungu in Encyclopaedia Africana (Accra: forthcoming), and his obituary in African Mail (Lusaka), 14 November 1961.
of the desirability of the third of the options open to them: trade
unions under the aegis of the MWU. At Roan, the MWU approached some
African clerks and medical orderlies in February 1943, suggesting a
puppet union (1), and Roan lagged behind the other mines in African
trade union formation because of this struggle (3). To meet this
threat, the Nkana leaders sent a "good-will mission" to visit the
other mine townships in early 1948 to press for African trade unions
under government auspices on the Comrie model (3). A showdown with
Brian Goodwin took place at Wusikile Welfare Centre on 31 January 1948.
He addressed a meeting of Africans there in an attempt to persuade them
to ally themselves with the MWU. He asserted that government unions
were as bad as company unions, and that as soon as the government had
heard that the MWU intended to organise African branches in September
1947, they had sent to England for Mr. Comrie. Goodwin had a rough
reception, and was accused by one member of the audience of being
"a snake in the grass who bit people and then went away". He made
his exit in as dignified a manner as possible, inviting the audience
"to come to his house and hear about trade unions and have tea". (4)
Mr. Goodwin's tea party never took place, and the five-year courtship
petered out. By the end of 1948 there were African trade unions at all
four Copperbelt mines, and Nkana had a membership of 2,600, or about
25 per cent of the mine strength (5).

3. ibid., Trade Union Labour Officer's Report, February 1948.
4. ibid., Report of a meeting of Africans addressed by Mr. Goodwin in
the Wusakile Welfare Centre, Kitwe, 31 January 1948, encl. in Governor
Rennie to Secretary of State, 4 June 1948.
The years 1949-53 saw rapid advances in African industrial power, based on African trade unions. The AMWU was formed in 1949, with 10,000 members. In its agreement of August 1949 with the Chamber of Mines, an agreed procedure for disputes was laid down, which swept aside the compound managers and gave the union access to the general managers of the mines. For the first time, Africans could make wage claims collectively and in an orderly way, and the union lost no time in taking its first wage claim to conciliation, securing wage rises and improved conditions for all but a small group of workers (1). In 1952-33 the AMWU achieved perhaps its greatest industrial coup when a well-conducted three-week strike in October-November 1952 brought the massive wage increases recommended by the subsequent Guillebaud Tribunal (2). When the copper companies attempted to strengthen the TR's as a counterpoise to the growing power of the AMWU, the union succeeded in abolishing the TR system by an overwhelming vote of the Copperbelt labour force (3).

By 1953, African trade unions, which had been called into existence by the colonial government, had become independent, and were functioning as trade unions function anywhere. The AMWU was government-created but not government-controlled. Hindsight allows Munukayumbwa Sipalo to call Katilungu "a carbon copy of Comrie" (4), but Katilungu was never a government "stooge", although prudence dictated that he adopted a "responsible" attitude, especially to political issues, in the early years. The AMWU, however, could not hope to escape the convulsions of the rise of African nationalism in the 1950's, and the union executive became the centre of a struggle for power between men like Puta, Chapoloko, Mwendapole and

---

1. Labour Department Annual Report for the Year 1949. See also Appendix C, below.


3. Epstein, loc cit.

4. I am grateful to Richard Jacobs for allowing me to see some of his unpublished work on the Zambian labour movement, in which this quotation occurs.
Nkoloma, who had been converted to the necessity for a political role for labour in the circumstances of the 1950's and Katilungu, who preferred to keep the union separate from the political movement. We need not view this as sheer conservatism on Katilungu's part, nor as a slavish copying of British trade union practice; there was a genuine miners' consciousness which did not necessarily rule out a wider political consciousness, but which was keenly aware that the miners owed nothing to the political elite. When Katilungu addressed the miners at Nkana on the eve of the 1952 strike, he could appeal to a common past more effectively than any other group of urban Zambians, of whatever educational standard:

"This meeting is a symbol of labour unity on the Copperbelt. It represents the culmination of long and difficult struggle by Africans. The first leaders of the Africans were shot dead in 1935. Close to our own time, Elliot Mulenga, our brave and outstanding labour martyr, laid down his life, together with sixteen others in 1940 in Nkana. Tomorrow the strike action will vindicate the blood and fundamental truth for which they died. I call upon every one of you, men, women and children, to remember this and respect the spirit of the struggle. If we fail, our children shall curse our graves. If you follow me, I shall lead you to peace, for I have put my fingers on the mouth of the rifle which killed our brothers ... I promise you one thing: no rifle will be shot at anyone if you follow my orders". (1)

Of course, it would be artificial to separate too strictly the industrial from the political role of the union, and Katilungu recognised this. Any organisation which could control over 25,000 workers in Northern Rhodesia's only notable industry was bound to find itself in the political arena (2). Katilungu and some of his lieutenants found themselves on the Supreme Action Council of the African Congress, formed to organise the two "Days of National Prayer" against Federation, scheduled for 1-2 April 1953, but Katilungu's last-minute withdrawal meant that the protest lost its

1. Mwendapole, "Trade union history", p. 39. Mwendapole was at the time Secretary of the Nkana branch of the AMWU.

2. Membership of the AMWU was over 25,000 in 1953, but dropped considerably when the copper companies cancelled the "check-off" system for union dues in that year. The "check-off" was restored in 1957. Roberts, Labour, p. 59; Epstein, Politics, p. 112. See also Appendix 6, below.
impact when the AMWU did not strike (1). From then on, the more militant trade union leaders like Nkoloma, Mwendapole and Justin Chimba looked to an alliance with the political movement for a united front against the colonial power. Thus, part of the struggle was a struggle between Africans for control of their own organisation; the Labour Department neither could nor wished to control it, although they would have been distressed if Katilungu had been deposed (2). Colonial power over industrial relations diminished rather than increased when African trade unions were formed under government auspices. The British practice of government did not allow of government interference in the day-to-day running of trade unions. Trade unions might be banned for security reasons, although this never happened in Northern Rhodesia; and government could manoeuvre skilfully enough to prevent any other group from securing control of the African unions in 1946-48, but once unions were formed, it was only the informal contact with labour officers which could be used to keep them "on the right lines". Manifestly, by the late 1950's, African trade unions were not on "the right lines". They had become part of the apparatus used by Africans to protest against colonialism in general.

But trade unions also reflected in an industrial form the embryonic conflicts in African politics. At the top of the unions was the predominantly white-collar elite, who saw their interests as increasingly identified with the political elite as a whole. Therefore, the unions should be political instruments. But beneath the elite were the ordinary workers, who only slowly identified themselves with the political elite; indeed labour politics in independent Zambia show a constant tension between the two groups. The AMWU was, therefore, an uneasy alliance between

1. ACJ 22/4/48-52: Thomas Fox-Pitt to Creech, Jones, 3 February, 9 February and 22 February 1952; Freedom Newsletter (published by the Northern Rhodesian African Congress), vol. 1 No. 3, 4 March 1952.
the mass of the workers and their leaders. This alliance was a logical and appropriate one in the circumstances of the 1950's: the workers needed a leadership which could articulate grievances and which could conduct negotiations with the European management in such a way as to achieve results; equally the leadership needed the workers to give muscle to the protest campaign initiated by the politicians. So long as Europeans were in power, politically and industrially, the alliance survived. There was a sense in which all protests were protests against the entire white power structure. All Africans had in common poor wages and conditions, and a social and economic colour bar.

Even within the elite leaders of the workers, however, there were early signs that the "alliance with the people" was not unanimously acceptable. Within a colonial situation an alliance with the colonial government was always possible, and offered attractive short-term advantages. The Mines African Staff Association, formed in 1953 with Mbikusita as its chairman, represented the clerks and better-paid workers on the mines who believed that their interests were neglected by the AMWU. It was quickly recognised by the Chamber of Mines, which had in any case encouraged its growth as a bargaining counter against the AMWU. In this the Chamber had, it argued, done only what the government had done in 1946-48. The social gap between the well-paid clerks and the labourers was considerable, and was noted as early as 1940. When a Nyasa clerk had tried to counsel moderation to Elliot Mulenga during the strike at Nkana, Mulenga had replied:

"We do not want to see educated people, because when you get education you pretend to be white people, so we do not want to hear from you". (1)

The bamakobo, (the better-paid ones) were ripe for the blandishments of Federal multi-racialism until they accommodated themselves to the winning side in the early 1960's. An anti-bamakobo song in 1954 points

however, to a resentment which, in a different form, remains in inde-
pendent Zambia:

"Bana ba makobo bakaya sambilila
ku town, pantu ba wishibo balifwatika
ku matako, bakaye sambilila ku
ba sungu banabo
ifwe tulelwila icalo cesu"

"The children of the bamakobo
Will go and learn in school
in town because their fathers
have thumbprinted by their sides.
They shall go and learn in school
with the children of Europeans.
We — we are fighting for our country". (1)

Historians of African nationalism who see the nationalist movement
as a convergence into a united front of a number of heterogeneous organi-
sations and areas of discontent, spearheaded by the political party,
are seeing events in too simple a fashion. Bates has noted the conflict
between government policy and the interests of the workers in present-
day Zambia, and sees this as preceded by similar conflicts between the
United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the AMWU, in which the
AMWU refused to jeopardise its industrial position by striking for
political ends (2). This chapter supports Bates's analysis and attempts
to push it back in time. Far from presenting a solid "working class"
front, the AMWU instead faithfully reflected the conflicts between the
political elite and the ordinary wage-labourers; nor have these con-
flicts disappeared as a result of independence: the Zambian govern-
ment has imprisoned considerably more labour leaders than the colonial govern-
ment (3).

1. Mwendapole, "Trade union history", p. 83. The translation is Mr.
Mwendapole's. The reference to thumbprints is possibly to the identity
certificate which Africans carried in pre-independence days.

2. Bates, "Unions", pp. 77-80, 240-296. Authors as diverse as Woddis and
Rotberg adopt the "convergence" approach. Modern ultra-Marxists also
see the national movement as an all-out attack on "white power structure".

3. This is the theme of Bates, "Unions", passim. See also my "Role of
labor in Zambia".
The Second World War in Northern Rhodesia brought some gradual and
cautious reforms directed at improving communications with Africans,
although as yet the problem of improving their working and living
conditions was too big to be tackled seriously. The constraints on the
colonial government remained: the need to produce copper for the Allies,
both during the war and in the uneasy peace between 1945 and the outbreak
of the Korean War in 1951; the consequent need to secure the co-operation
of the mining companies and the European union.

A cautious policy of "steady progress towards collective bargaining"
did not lead to the formation of any independent African institutions
during the war. After 1945, the pace quickened, and the government was
overtaken by Colonial Office insistence on African trade unions backed by
Welensky and the unofficials for their own reasons, and they deliberately
set about forming African trade unions while denying that they were doing
so. They were further stimulated into action by the rival activities of
the MWU, and the more obscure dangers from the South (1). Paradoxically,
the British system of voluntarism in trade unions led the government to
form unions since there was, by the same token, nothing to prevent the MWU

1. Hudson, the Secretary for Native Affairs, kept warning of the danger of
African trade unions being "controlled from the South". Apparently
this could mean three things: first, the formation of African trade
unions under the aegis of the MWU, whose officials were mainly South
African; secondly, trade unions having links with Mzingeli's RICU in
Rhodesia; and thirdly, trade unions having links with the South African
Council of Non-European Trade Unions, in which the Communist Party of
South Africa participated. J.M. Chamululu caused some interest when
he proposed to come from Johannesburg to organise Africans in Northern
Rhodesia. Chamululu had been undergoing a course at the People's
College, Johannesburg, organised by the South African Left Club. He was
approached in 1946 by Brian Goodwin to form an African branch of the MWU,
but this came to nothing. He was Secretary of Kitwe African Society in
1948, and of the Johannesburg branch of the Northern Rhodesian African
Congress. In 1972 he was the owner of a steam laundry in Chingola:
personal communication, J.M. Chamululu, April 1972; SEC/LAB/125: Peter
L. Lubansa to Editor, Mutende, 9 July 1946; extract from African Weekly,
4 February, 1948; ACJ 7/1/71: Chamululu to Creech Jones, 7 June 1955;
Africans responded by organising under government auspices rather than those of the MWU, which they deeply distrusted.

Africans weighed up the advantages of trade unions against their disadvantages, and decided to accept them, with the support of the government and against the opposition of most of the mines management and the MWU. The government hoped that by creating African trade unions, such issues as African advancement could be worked out within industry, and government would no longer be required to intervene. When the MWU wanted to insert an anti-colour bar clause in the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Bill, 1949, the Commissioner for Labour and Mines, C.E. Cousins, replied that government should not intervene to that extent in private agreements (1). In creating African trade unions, and then opting out of industrial relations in this way, the government was openly placing initiative in the hands of Africans for the first time. The AMWU, the General Workers' Trade Union, the Shop Assistants' Union and others proceeded to attack bad conditions, poor wages, and white discrimination on all fronts in the 1950's. Decolonisation in Northern Rhodesia consisted of a series of hasty concessions, first to the whites, then to the blacks, with the result that the contradictory pressures became unbearable. In the formation of African trade unions, we witness an example of how cautious progress gave way to "undesirable haste", and how Africans seized on a new and powerful weapon to extend the field both of opposition to white economic power and of African self-politics (2).

Both decolonisation and the politics of independence began, in a sense, in the years after 1945.

---


2. Leonard Barnes, Africa in Eclipse (London: Gollancz, 1971) uses "self-politics" to describe the struggle for power within nations and institutions among Africans themselves, as opposed to the politics of relations with colonial powers and non-African states.
CONCLUSION
Labour and colonial power

Labour migration, urbanisation and the under-development of the rural areas are the stock problems of independent African governments, and the Republic of Zambia, with more than 30 per cent of her population living in or near towns, divorced from the rural economy in terms of their labour, possesses these problems in an acute form. One of the tasks of this work has been to examine the ascription of these problems to the period of colonial rule, and the assertion that the colonial rulers deliberately encouraged unbalanced development, serving only to increase the urban-rural gap.

The argument of this work has been that both the Colonial Office and the Northern Rhodesia Government were hedged in by severe limitations to their freedom of action, and that deliberate policies, carried through in a determined manner, were conspicuously scarce. In the first thirty-five years of its existence, the role of the territory was a negative one: that of a labour reservoir for the South. The next eighteen years, up to the beginning of Federation in 1953, saw some efforts to implement "development" for Africans within the unpromising framework created by the presence of large and wealthy copper companies and an increasingly powerful white community. "Development" in the context and at the time meant the cautious improvement of opportunities for Africans within the existing social, economic and political structure, achieved through slowly changing patterns of government expenditure and through tentative attempts by the government to persuade those who controlled the economic system to make it more open.

Unbalanced development was inevitable, given a weak government and powerful countervailing economic and political forces. In the first part of our period, this countervailing force was the economic dynamism of the white South, which created a labour-intensive economy which spread its tentacles northwards to recruit labour, overriding political boundaries and governmental decrees.
The magnet of the South, and later of the Copperbelt, constituted the difference between Northern Rhodesia and a territory like Uganda, with its government-encouraged peasant agriculture and low rate of external labour migration. The pernicious results of the drift from the rural areas could be discerned in the 1940's by those with eyes to see: urban poverty, crime, political instability, and the beginnings of the impossible government dilemma of how to allocate resources between urban and rural areas - in short, the syndrome which became known in the 1940's as the stabilisation problem. How could the disastrous process of labour migration, tolerated in the first 35 years of colonial rule, have been stopped? Governors could not put a ring fence round their territories; labour migrants would continue to respond to economic and social pressures, whatever the desires of governments.

But having said this, it is necessary also to analyse, as in this work, the changing pressures on governments, and how these affected their changing objectives. Labour migration, although a basic problem, was not the only one. The status of Africans in industry and in the towns, the control of black-white relations, and the political power of Europeans were all related problems which beset governments when the copper industry arose to bestow revenues, but not power, on the Northern Rhodesian administration.

Chronologically, the first, and also one of the most powerful constraints on governments was the Company's legacy. The BSA Company left behind a poor record in native administration when it handed over political authority to "NRG" in 1924. Its officials had subdued a territory nearly twice as large as Southern Rhodesia, and had displayed daring and initiative of a high order, though not in the workaday sphere of every day administration. Perhaps inevitably they were not bureaucrats, and they had little respect for laws and regulations made by, or in consultation with, Whitehall. They engaged in activities quite outside their commissions, in cattle trading, commercial speculation and labour recruiting.
They may have been "nearer to the people", since it was said that most unmarried Company officials had African mistresses, and some married them (1). But along with these informal activities were incidents of scandalous cruelty and brutality which went largely unpunished.

This last is an important comment. The Colonial Office, though theoretically supervising the conduct of the administration, received only the information supplied by the men on the spot, whether through official or unofficial channels, and scandal usually only erupted if there was a conflict between white men in the territory, one side seeking publicity as a means of redress. 'One-eye' Macgregor quarrelled with his companion from the Barotse Native Police while on tour in 1904, and his conduct towards the people of the Kaunga District was thereby exposed; C.N.B. Venables, a settler in the Kariba district, exposed Macnamara partly, it has been suggested, because Macnamara's labour recruiting activities were taking labour away from Venables's farm (2). It is impossible to say how much misconduct took place which was not reported to the Administrator, the High Commissioner in Pretoria, or the Colonial Office. One can, however, say that the Colonial Office was in a very weak position to control events. It could only deplore illegalities which did come to light, and urge the Administrator to follow them up. Since Administrators before Wallace attempted consistently to cover up for their subordinates, the task of the Colonial Office was a formidable one (3). The revocation of the Charter was always a possibility in the

1. African South No. 948, item 84, encl.: C.N.B. Venables to Imperial Secretary, Johannesburg, 11 May 1910; and item 135.
2. Warhurst, "Rhodesia and her neighbours", pp. 94-95.
3. See above, pp. 27.
years before 1914, but this was a drastic threat, as was the proposal
to "investigate" the administration, and there was no guarantee that
they would succeed in their objectives of purifying Company rule.

The Company's government was violent very largely because it was
weak. There is no record in its reports of any attempt to examine the
effects on the rural areas of the imposition of taxation and labour
recruitment. Its objectives were limited, like its resources: to
achieve a maximum tax assessment, and, closely linked with this, to
persuade or force a maximum of labourers into the cash economy.

The assumption of power by the Northern Rhodesia Government in 1924
scarcely changed matters. Many Company servants were inherited, the
territory remained an undeveloped labour reserve, and migration to the
South and to Katanga and Tanganyika remained a phenomenon which govern-
ments had given up commenting upon. 1923 in Whitehall saw the first
airing of the doctrine of native paramountcy, but this new phrase,
whatever it might mean when applied to Northern Rhodesia, came into
conflict with the growing ambitions of white settlers from Kenya south-
wards to Southern Rhodesia. From being a problem of undermanning and
remoteness, Northern Rhodesia became also part of the problem of "closer
association" in East and Central Africa. The importance of the governor-
ship of Sir Herbert Stanley cannot be overemphasised in this sphere.
He was a pioneer of the whole idea of closer co-operation and ultimate
political association among the territories of East Central Africa, and
the Colonial Office was aware of his views. His appointment to Northern
Rhodesia, after a career in South Africa, pinpointed the place of the
territory at the northernmost end of South African economic and political
power. Stanley put a brake on any attempts to make Northern Rhodesia's
social structure incompatible with that of the South. Stanley's re-
modelling of the administration created a bureaucracy dominated by Europeans
- not only, as was normal in a colony, by the predominantly British graduates
of the Provincial Administration, but by the lower-level émigrés from
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa who manned clerical and other subordinate posts in the Secretariat and in the Departments, and who formed the bulk of artisans and tradesmen in government employment. The way to African advancement in the civil service was thereby effectively blocked, even if any educated Africans had been forthcoming.

Assigning responsibility for this situation is difficult. In the first place, the educational heritage of the Company was not a distinguished one. With the exception of the Barotse National School, education of Africans had been left to the missions, a situation, however, which the Northern Rhodesia Government did not substantially alter until after 1940 (1). The result was that Governors and officials had a genuine conviction that the Africans of the territory were far "inferior" to those of neighbouring territories, and intent on rushing into clerical posts before they were ready for them. (2). Africanisation of the territory's civil service in these circumstances could only be a Colonial Office dream, and the attempt to impose it was blocked by Governor Storrs and his "Afrikander entourage at Government House" (3). The civil service in the 1930's was compartmented into a European and an African section, with Africans performing only menial or low-level clerical tasks. In 1952, after the recommendations of the Follows Commission, only 70 Africans were on Scale B of the graded posts of the civil service, the highest scale then available to Africans. The salary range in Scale B was £5.10. - to £25 per month, and for this, School Certificate or Matriculation qualifications were required (4).

2. See above, pp. 89.
The substantive European clerical scale for men was £300-£370 per annum, plus a cost-of-living allowance, the qualifications being the same as for Scale B of the African civil service.

There was, therefore, a blatant and institutionalised colour bar in the government service, and it remained in being until the Public Service Commission began functioning in 1961. The Commission was required to give first consideration in recruitment and promotion to local candidates, regardless of race. Thus paramountcy (though the word had gone out of use) was implemented at the eleventh hour, under political pressure from militant nationalism (1).

Perhaps assigning responsibility is a sterile activity: rather we should see decisions (as we have attempted to see them in this work) made as a result of a complex of countervailing pressures. Pressure from the settlers on the Legislative Council and in the various unofficial advisory boards was well-nigh irresistible. Pressure from the Colonial Office was more remote, and could be fended off. The natural tendency of colonial administrations to let sleeping dogs lie was victorious.

Politics and economics, therefore, conspired to limit the power of the colonial government to make the changes after 1924 which might have improved the conditions and prospects of the African population. But another problem immediately arises: did the white men in the government want to advance Africans, either by providing more opportunities in the rural areas, or by implementing a progressive policy in the civil service or on the mines? Marxist theory would reply, exemplified by Woddis, that the complexities revealed in this study are beside the point, and that colonialism operated to exploit subject races by the exercise of power structures controlled by Europeans. There might be friction between the

various structures - between government and mines, between mine management and European employees - but in the end they co-operated to ensure the survival of British imperial interests in alliance with those of South African capitalism.

But if such co-operation had been a real factor, Zambia would not be independent today. Neo-imperialism, of course, still extorts its toll on Zambian copper production and on dividends paid to external share-holders by the government of the republic. But even conceding that imperialism may only have undergone a transformation, it is nevertheless legitimate and useful to study the reasons for and the course of that transformation, and to study the nature and resources of imperialism at the time when it wielded unrivalled power in Northern Rhodesia. For these reasons we have examined the colonial period as a whole, and the period 1940-53 in particular. In Chapter 6 it was argued that decolonisation began in 1945 in Northern Rhodesia, and closely coincided with the first positive attempt to bring about African advancement in industry. The new-found Colonial Office enthusiasm for African trade unions and African development created a situation in which the Colonial Office and the Northern Rhodesia Government began to lose control over Africans in the important sphere of urban politics. The African labour force had never been easy to organise or administer; now, under its own leaders, it was much less so. Swift advancement was the only alternative to industrial strife on a large scale.

The crisis of control over the urban labour force was closely paralleled by the development of African political parties, and resulted in important African political gains after 1959. The smallness of numbers of the whites in the territory and the international character of the copper companies produced the situation where Great Britain could defy the threats of Welensky in 1961, when Britain's plans for a New Northern Rhodesian constitution

-----------
were announced (1). A British presence was maintained, and power was handed over to the United National Independence Party. Ironically, colonial power was exerted with most skill to bring Zambia to independence. Britain lacked the power and the will to police a lengthy black-white struggle in the territory.

ii. Labour and the development of African nationalism

Colonial power in Northern Rhodesia was limited, politically and economically, by the presence of white settlers, and by the situation of the territory in the Southern African sphere. But after 1935 Africans, and pre-eminently the African labour force on the Copperbelt, revealed the limits on the knowledge and expertise of the colonial regime, and how monumentally impossible was the task of implementing reforms while keeping the European unofficials loyal and contented. From 1940 onwards it became unclear whether the colonial regime could control the actions of the African labour force either. In 1940 Africans at Nkana and Mufulira broached the issue of the colour bar in a strike which showed the existence of an effective leadership. After 1949 the AMWU used its increasing industrial power to press for increases in African wages. In 1940, the government could suppress the strike and ignore most of the African demands for seven years, but the post-1945 situation did not allow of such a leisurely approach. More and more, the most effective and strongest pressure on the colonial government came from the Africans, backed by liberal opinion in Britain.

At the same time, however, the colonial government could postpone the situation where the whole African people confronted it with the demand for self-rule. The "Prester John apocalypse" in fact never happened.

anywhere in Africa (1). Our study has shown that Africans had to
struggle for unity in the context of African self-politics. It was
not simply a dichotomy between accommodationists and resisters: it
was rather a case of different adjustments made to colonial rule by
different groups, which we have analysed in terms of occupational
group, class and "tribe". There were brief moments of "mass confront-
atation": 1935, 1940, and the 1931 "cha-cha-cha". How the African
political elite seized control of these various strands in the fabric
of adjustment, and made themselves into popularly-chosen heirs to the
colonial power, is the subject of quite a different study. Our study
of the labour movement, however, points to the early origins of African
self-politics. History, admittedly, is hard on the losers, and we know
little about the losers who opposed the strikes in 1935 and 1940, or about
those who quietly negotiated with the MWU at Roan Antelope in 1948-49;
Mbikusita, leader of the "accommodationist" Mines African Staff Association
(MASA), rules in obscurity in his ancestral home. But up to the 1950's,
there was always a case for moderation: only after 1953 was political
advancement to be Britain's new response to political violence in the
colonies.

Our close examination of the 1935 and 1940 strikes revealed this
erly origin of self-politics. The clerks and mine policemen tried to
play both sides: on the one hand, if they placed themselves at the head
of the strike, they would almost certainly be demoted or dismissed; on
the other hand, if they did not, they would lose the opportunity for
industrial leadership. In the end, as a group, they lost the confidence

1. John Buchan's Prester John (London: Nelson, 1910) postulated an all-
Africa movement to push the Europeans into the sea. See also Shula
Marks, Reluctant Rebellion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. xvii,
326 and note; and G. Shepperson and T. Price, Independent African
of the mineworkers, and much of Katilungu's appeal lay in his association with the underground manual workers rather than with the clerks. A new group of popular leaders, mainly boss-boys, filled the vacuum left by the clerks. Elliot Mulenga might have stood out in this group as a more radical leader than Katilungu had he survived the 1940 strike. But this group also developed vested interests, its main one being African advancement on the mines. We have seen that advancement would in the short and medium run have benefited only a small fraction of the African labour force in the 1940's and 1950's, and a conflict developed in the AMWU about whether to press instead, or primarily, for an all-round wage increase and a unified ladder of promotion to relieve the poverty and improve the prospects of the lowest-paid workers. It was a conflict in which Katilungu held the balance with consummate skill after his disastrous admission of the "equal pay for equal work" principle in 1950. Katilungu saw that the African workers were unanimous in demanding better conditions, but further than this, they were divided about the distribution of benefits and the means of achieving them. The mines management also recognised this division when they attempted, with some success, to syphon off the better-paid workers - the bamakobo - from the rest in the early 1950's.

Cross-cutting the incipient group and class interests among Africans were the tribal divisions. Three of Zambia's main language groups (the Lozi, Tonga and Ngoni) did not establish themselves in any great strength on the Copperbelt (although the Ngoni succeeded in establishing themselves and their language in Lusaka - a process which awaits examination). By contrast, the Bemba were in a majority on the Copperbelt from the beginning. Not only was the area geographically convenient, especially for the Luapula peoples, but it also offered mining work with which the Bemba had become familiar in Katanga. The 1933 strike, as we have seen, was organised through the Mbeni Dance Society, a predominantly Bemba-Bisa body. The strike was led by Bemba militants at all three mines; the Bemba were the first out and the last to go back to work. In 1940, though the strike was different in formal organisation, the Bemba were again prominent, cajoling
and intimidating other groups into joining the strike. The later
dominance of the Bemba in the AMWU has also been noted, and Epstein
thought in 1954 that the other workers of the Copperbelt tended to
admire Bemba success in militant industrial action (1).

It was therefore numerical preponderance and advanced political
consciousness which brought the Bemba political success on the Copperbelt.
No political movement could succeed without their support, and their
early establishment of a power base in Northern, Luapula and Copperbelt
Provinces strengthened them, and political nationalism, in the 1950's.
It was these provinces, and the Southern Province led by Mumba,
which consistently gave most trouble in the 1959-61 period of sporadic
violence.

There are those who see the period of the "freedom struggle" as a
time of spontaneous unity of all Zambians against the whites, a unity
which independent Zambia might well envy, if it had existed. Molteno
argues along these lines, saying that "sectionalism" in Zambia arose
after independence (2). On the contrary, it is argued here that divisions
among Africans, by group, class and "tribe", have their roots in the
colonial era, and were a logical response to it. Colonialism in a real
sense gave birth to "sectionalism", through the creation of particular
patterns of labour migration and industrial development quite as much as
by crude policies of "divide-and-rule", such as the elder system on the
Copperbelt. Labour in Zambia, while breaking down traditional tribal
barriers sufficiently to form a cohesive front against the employers in
certain situations, still remained conscious of the need for Bemba leadership on the Copperbelt.

iii. Colonial power and the colonial legacy

There is another division in Zambia which is the most serious of all:

1. Epstein, Politics, pp. 5, 152.

2. R.V. Molteno, "Cleavage and conflict in Zambian politics: a study in
sectionalism" (University of Zambia seminar paper, duplicated, 1969).
For "sectionalism", see Rotberg, "Tribalism and politics in Zambia".
that between the rich urban areas and the poor rural areas. Organised African labour, by the very success of its efforts to improve the workers' conditions, contributed to and aggravated this division.

Tactically, they had no alternative. The colonial government's alternative of "balanced development", discussed in chapter 3, would have meant the postponement of improved conditions in the urban areas, with no guarantee that the rural areas would benefit. So, "stabilisation" was accepted by the government and by the workers as the only realistic policy in a situation where drift to the urban areas was already an irresistible force. Thus independent Zambia was faced with the problem, created by the development patterns of the colonial era, of what is comfortably called the cash economy and the subsistence economy.

It is accepted that this division was created in colonial times. Whether, and to what extent, the colonial power was to blame for it is another matter. The problem of underdevelopment is not confined to areas which are, or have been, under colonial rule. The problem is as much one of government power as colonial power. Underdeveloped countries have underdeveloped governments. The argument of this work has been that the power of governments either to "exploit" or "develop" colonies has been overestimated in the case of Northern Rhodesia. The Southern African labour crisis in the first quarter of the twentieth century is one example of this; the hitherto accepted equation for the early years of colonial rule was: tax plus compulsion equals migrant labour. We have seen that tax was a blunt and unpredictable instrument and that compulsion often brought diminishing returns, especially in the more remote areas of the north-west. The migrant labour system got under way under economic and social pressures, quite separate from the fiscal and administrative efforts of the colonial government. An old Bemba song of unknown date summed it up:
"Chinshele, watusundila ku lubanga
Te ku mona ba nohe bashitapo
Twa kufimbana, chinshele".

"Home dweller, you do nothing apart from
urinating on to our vegetables.
Don't you see your fellow men
Return from urban centres with blankets,
Home-dweller?" (1)

It would be foolish to deny that there was an overall compulsion
exerted through the economic system, and reinforced by the gradual
enforcement of the law by the government. But such compulsion is a
feature of all economic systems, and it is supported by all governments,
not just colonial ones. Stalin and the British Empire were attempting
similar tasks, and, given the power, the British Empire would no doubt
have used as much compulsion as Stalin in his collectivisation policy.
But the British Empire's power, as seen in Northern Rhodesia, was limited
partly by its own ideology, but more largely by an overstretching of
resources, a lack of knowledge of the problems, and in the end, by
resistance from Europeans and Africans on the spot. Decolonisation
began the minute the British realised that "development" of the colonies
was too big a task when it was accompanied by these other substantial
constraints.

LIST OF APPENDICES

1. List of Administrators, Governors and Chief Secretaries of Northern Rhodesia.

2. Districts of origin of Africans employed by the copper mines, April 1937.


6. African trade unions in Northern Rhodesia, 1953.
### Administrators, Governors and Chief Secretaries of Northern Rhodesia

(a) **Administrators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Administrator</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North-Eastern Rhodesia</td>
<td>R.E. Codrington</td>
<td>1900-1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Lawrence Wallace</td>
<td>1907-1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir L.P. Beaufort</td>
<td>1909-1911 (acting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Western Rhodesia</td>
<td>Sir R.T. Coryndon</td>
<td>1900-1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.E. Codrington</td>
<td>1907-1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Lawrence Wallace</td>
<td>1907-1911 (acting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Rhodesia</td>
<td>Sir Lawrence Wallace</td>
<td>1911-1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Drummond Chaplin</td>
<td>1921-1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.A.J. Goode</td>
<td>1923-24 (acting)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) **Governors of Northern Rhodesia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir Herbert Stanley</td>
<td>1921-1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir James Crawford Maxwell</td>
<td>1927-1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Sir Ronald Storrs</td>
<td>1932-1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Sir Hubert Young</td>
<td>1934-1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Maybin</td>
<td>1938-1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Waddington</td>
<td>1941-1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Gilbert Rennie</td>
<td>1943-1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Arthur Benson</td>
<td>1954-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Evelyn Hone</td>
<td>1959-1964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) Chief Secretaries of Northern Rhodesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.A.J. Goode</td>
<td>1934-1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.A.S. Northcote</td>
<td>1927-1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.C.D.C. MacKenzie-Kennedy</td>
<td>1930-1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>vacant</strong></td>
<td>1933-1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.C.F. Dundas</td>
<td>1934-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.M. Logan</td>
<td>1937-1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Beresford Stocke</td>
<td>1942-1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.J. Cartmel-Robinson</td>
<td>1945-1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.S. Stanley</td>
<td>1947-1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.T. Williams</td>
<td>1952-1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.D. None</td>
<td>1957-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.O. Wray</td>
<td>1959-1963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 2

**DISTRICTS OF ORIGIN OF AFRICANS EMPLOYED AT THE COPPER MINES AND BROKEN HILL AT THE END OF APRIL, 1937**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District of Origin</th>
<th>Nkana</th>
<th>Broken Hill</th>
<th>Rown Antelope</th>
<th>Mafulira</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Province</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abercorn</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinsali</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Rosebery</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isoka</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawambwa</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luwingu</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mopiwa</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mporokosho</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serenje</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,310</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>2,432</td>
<td>3,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Province</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Jameson</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lundazi</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petenke</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>497</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Province</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken Hill</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasempa</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khushi</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwililungu</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndola</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitiwe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanshya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafulira</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>688</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barotses Province</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balovale</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalabo</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lankoyua</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senanga</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soshepo</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Province</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalomo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livingstone</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabula</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mambwa</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngwawa</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>83</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alien</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyasaland</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Territory</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese East Africa</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese West Africa</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Territories</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>826</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** The limb and Milligan Report, Appendix vi.
193. In the course of our inquiry many witnesses, European and African alike, drew our attention to the bitter resentment caused amongst the African workers by the terms of address and the sneering attitude which, it was stated, were not infrequently used towards them by the European mineworkers. Concrete instances of this conduct complained of were difficult to secure and it is perhaps sufficient to express the view that European miners owe a duty so to order their conduct as not gratuitously to insult the African and, by so doing, to avoid the creation of a situation which may have the most serious consequences for the European population living in the mining area. We are glad to say that the view which we have expressed above is one which obtained the ready acceptance both of the mine managers and of the responsible officials of the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union, all of whom realised the possible consequences of the type of conduct complained of and undertook, as far as they were able, to check it.

194. We have referred in paragraph 121 to the challenge of the Africans to be allowed to show whether they or the Europeans, if working alone, could obtain the higher production. This challenge reveals a state of mind on the part of the African workers which makes it necessary for us to deal with the African generally in his relation to the European worker. The only supervisory post which an African is permitted to occupy is that of a boss boy controlling, within the overriding authority of a European mineworker, four to six other Africans. If the desires of the European miners are met by the mine managers, this position is not likely to alter. The recent demands submitted on behalf of the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union, included the following: "Non-European labour to be employed at all times under direct supervision other than that of the shift boss."
195. On the other hand we have formed the view that the African is so advancing in efficiency that the time cannot be far distant when the number of European supervisors could be reduced and in place of a European supervisor there could be appointed two or perhaps three Africans with the same powers. This could be effected by having one European supervisor over a number of gangs, each gang being in charge of an African. We appreciate that the introduction of a policy of this kind might cause some resentment on the part of the European mine workers. If, however, the attitude of the Europeans ultimately proved favourable to such a course as outlined above it would be necessary to settle a separate wage standard which should aim at securing to the African a fair wage for the supervisory services which the African would have to perform. For reasons to which we refer in paragraph 197 we recognise that the advancement of the African towards a higher standard might result in the first instance in a lower working cost to the Mining Companies, but this result of an attempt to satisfy to some extent the Africans' aspirations towards a higher standard it would obviously be unfair to ascribe to managerial self-interest.

196. The responsible officials of the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union informed us that they were prepared to see the Africans progress but they also wanted to see them receive what they were entitled to; for instance, if they were doing tradesmen's work they should receive tradesmen's wages. The Union had always laid down that there was no objection to any African being employed as a tradesman or in any other capacity, provided he was capable of doing a job of work as good or nearly as good as the European and that he obtained the European rate of pay. They objected strongly to the exploitation and cheap labour of the African who was trained or being trained to do work normally regarded as the European's prerogative. We were impressed alike with the claim of the African worker to progress in
the type of work that he was capable of doing or was being trained to
do, and with the European workers' fear of exploitation if the African
worker were permitted to take over at cheap rates what they regarded as
European work.

197. There is, for many years to come, likely to be a wide gulf between
the standard and outlook upon life of the European and the African worker -
a gulf that can only be bridged by the continued education of the African
and his children. To consider paying him the same wage and placing him
on the same standard of living as the European for the reason that he was
doing work usually undertaken by the European would be unfair to him,
reducing, as it probably would, his chances of employment. It is recog-
nized, for example, in the case of superior appointments to the Civil
Service in certain African colonies, that the African is living in his
own country and that his standard of living is not yet that of the European.
The salaries of the European and the African are, therefore, not on the same
scale, nor are they expected by the African to be so. We are anxious to
see the African mineworker's wage as high as is fairly possible. Con-
sideration of the foregoing factors is necessary, however, before a new
wage standard can be fixed, and it should be the aim to strike such a
balance between the wages of European and African workers as to convince
all concerned that the African is not being exploited. We commend this
point of view and suggest that it be taken into account in discussion
between the Government (the guardians of African welfare), the mine manage-
ments and the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union.
269. In making the following recommendations, we consider that the work or operations referred to should be transferred to Africans as early and as unprovocatively as possible.

270. We cannot urge too strongly that no European at present carrying out the work or operations involved should be discharged in order to make way for an African. The African should only be promoted when the European ceases to be employed or is himself promoted.

Posts not now occupied by Africans which they are capable of filling immediately.

271. WE RECOMMEND:

(a) Underground at Mines.

(i) Main level lashing - When the ends are close enough together, an African should supervise each end under the control of a European. Such Africans to have the necessary safety qualifications. Paragraphs 37 to 40.

(ii) Grizzly operating and tramming - an African should be put in charge of the tramming on one level, an African in charge of the grizzly feeding that level, and a European in charge of both, assuming that the grizzlies do not exceed six in number and are in close proximity. Paragraphs 41 to 45.

(iii) Underground storemen - This work could be carried out by Africans. Paragraph 46 to 49.

(b) Surface at Mines.

(i) Fuse capping - This work could be done by Africans who are authorised to handle explosives and are holders of blasting licences. Paragraphs 54 to 56.

(ii) Tripper operating - This work could be carried out by Africans. Paragraphs 57 to 58.
(iii) Cleaning up - This work to be done under the supervision of an African. Paragraphs 59, 60.

(iv) Routine slag dumping - This work to be done under the supervision of an African. Paragraphs 61, 62.

(v) Reverberatory furnace operating - This work to be done with an African in charge. Paragraphs 63, 64.

(vi) Casting and operating holding furnaces - This work to be done by Africans. Paragraphs 65, 66.

(vii) Re-handling of "reverts" - This work should be done under the supervision of Africans. Paragraphs 67, 68.

(viii) Steel scrap cutting - This work should be done by Africans. Paragraphs 69, 70.

(ix) Weighing and weighbridge attending - This work to be done by Africans. Paragraphs 71, 72.

(x) Inspecting - Inspection of blister copper to be carried out by Africans. Paragraphs 73, 74.

(xi) Crane chasing in the convertor aisle - This work should be done by Africans. Paragraphs 75, 76.

(xii) Bricklaying - All types of simple bricklaying should be done by Africans. Furnace bricklaying is not included in this category. Paragraphs 77 to 79.

(xiii) Carpentry, rough and simple work only - This type of work should be done by Africans. Paragraphs 80 to 83.

(xiv) Screw machine operating - This work should be done by Africans, but the setting of the machines should not be done by Africans without special training. Paragraphs 84, 85.

(xv) Machine saw operating - This work to be done by Africans. Paragraphs 86, 87.

(xvi) Crosscut timber-saw operating - This work to be done by Africans. Paragraphs 88, 89.
(xvii) Simple low-pressure pipe fitting and plumbing, both surface and underground - Simple pipe work up to a nominal bore of four inches should be done by Africans. Paragraphs 90 to 93.

(xviii) Driving winding engines - an African with the necessary qualifications should do this work where the cage does not carry more than five persons with a rope speed of not more than 500 feet per minute. Paragraphs 94, 95.

(xix) Overhead crane driving - The driving of overhead cranes, except those in the smelter converter aisle, should be carried out by Africans. Paragraphs 96 to 99.

(xx) Electric and diesel locomotives - These should be driven by Africans. Paragraphs 101 to 102.

(xx) Shunting and coupling - This work, except flying shunts, to be done by Africans. Paragraphs 103, 104.

(xxii) Stripping (refinery) - This work should be done by Africans under the supervision of Europeans. Paragraphs 105, 106.

(xxiii) Plate-laying - Africans should be employed as gangers assisting European platelayers. In the case of light tracks, Africans could do this work, with the exception of ballasting (where necessary), without supervision. Paragraphs 107 to 110.

(xxiv) Attending boilers - This could be undertaken by Africans, specially selected, on small boilers up to 100 lb. pressure, which are fitted with safety plugs. Paragraphs 111, 112.

Posts which individual Africans are capable of taking over in the comparatively near future.

272. The following operations are of a semi-skilled character and in our view these kind of jobs are unsuitable for Europeans, whose aim should be to qualify themselves for better and more responsible work. We recommend,
therefore, that as and when vacancies occur on any of these semi-skilled jobs an African who has in the meantime had experience of work in a mine be tested and put on to the vacant job. Extra supervision should be arranged as necessary and an African "stand-by" be trained to carry on the work in the event of the African doing the job being absent.

273. (i) Sub-level lashing - Africans who have a knowledge of this work and have shown some measure of responsibility should be given special training and after a test take over the supervision of a few ends. The number of officials required to supervise this work to be increased as found necessary. Paragraphs 118, 117.

(ii) Stope scraping and drift scraping - Africans who have some experience in this work should be trained and where the stopes are absolutely safe, i.e. when the operation can be handled without entering the stopes, Africans should be given charge of this work. Paragraphs 118, 119.

(iii) Attending endless rope haulages - This work could be given to Africans. Paragraphs 120, 121.

(iv) Crusher operating - Suitable Africans could be trained to undertake some of this work and the European supervision adjusted in accordance with the size and set-up of the plant. Paragraphs 122, 123.

(v) Simple routine repair work - Africans could after training do the simple repair work to the standard pumps used in the concentrator department. Paragraphs 124, 125.

(vi) Flux handling and concentrator handling - This work could be broken down and an African put in to replace one of the Europeans. Paragraphs 126, 127.
APPENDIX 4
Continued.

(vii) Anode casting - This work could be done by an African. Paragraphs 128, 129.

(viii) Take-off cranes for lifting anodes - This work could be carried out by Africans. Paragraphs 130, 131.

(ix) Assistants to European inspectors in the tank house - Africans could be appointed to assist the European inspectors and this in time would reduce the European inspectors by half. Paragraphs 132, 133.

(x) Drilling machine operating engineering department - Simple drilling of a repetitive nature could be done by an African. Paragraphs 134, 135.

(xi) Operating small subsidiary compressors - Small air compressors at outlying places could be handled and supervised by Africans. Paragraphs 136, 137.

What training facilities should be made available to Africans to enable them to advance to more responsible and skilled posts in industry and how should these training facilities be provided.

274. Regarding training and education special attention is directed to paragraphs 160, 161, 162, 163 and 164, where we specifically deal with the training and education necessary in the case of those who are at present in industry.

275. Regarding the young persons who have not yet entered industry, special attention is directed to paragraphs 165, 166, 167, 168, 169 and 174. In paragraph 170 it will be noted that we recommend that the Government in conjunction with industry should provide bursaries or scholarships, which would be open to competition. Those eligible to sit for competition must have reached the same educational standard as is required by European apprentices. These bursaries or scholarships should stipulate attendance for at least one year, longer in the case of those taking up agriculture at a pre-vocational training centre or college. Arrangements similar to those existing at Munali
and the Survey School at Broken Hill regarding board, etc., would be provided in the scholarships. In paragraph 171 we outline the arrangements necessary for giving training to the indentured apprentices and recommend that the scholarship or bursary should make provision for the payment of a certain sum of money when the young African has successfully completed his apprenticeship. This would be partly provided by the Government, and partly by the employer. In paragraph 172, we make various recommendations regarding the technical education necessary for the proper training of an African apprentice.

Posts in the Mines to which Africans at present in employment might advance after a period of training.

276. WE RECOMMEND:

(i) Skipmen at shaft loading boxes - Specially selected Africans after training and passing satisfactorily a test should be put on this work. The form of training and test to be decided upon by the mine management in consultation with the Inspector of Mines and the European staff. Paragraphs 175, 176.

(ii) Cage tenders and bankemen - Suitable Africans after training and test should be put on this work provided that the winding engine rope speed is not more than 500 feet per minute and when the hoist carries not more than five persons. Paragraphs 177, 178.

(iii) Pipe fitting (also on surface) - Africans who have been working with pipe fitters for a number of years should be given a short period of training and then put on surface work and after a period of satisfactory service transferred to perform this work underground. The size of pipes on which they are employed to be about four inches. On larger pipes the African could bolt up the pipes, after they had been laid out by a European.

Paragraphs 179, 180.
(iv) Timbering - African carpenters, after a period of training, could be put on barriers, ventilation doors, lining drains, protection for electric lines. As regards shuttering or concrete work, this to be reconsidered at a later date. Paragraphs 181, 182.

In these posts, (i) - (iv), all the Africans must have had a long period in the mines, have had intensive training, and hold the Grade A boss boy certificate. Paragraphs 183, 184.

(v) Supervising sanitation gangs - After a period of training in hygiene and a satisfactory trial these posts should be given to Africans. Paragraphs 185, 186.

(vi) Drilling and rock breaking - This post should only be given to an African who has undergone a proper course of training as a miner. Paragraphs 187, 188.

(vii) Track laying - Africans are at present laying light tracks with few curves and should not be given the responsibility of more important track laying, although Africans could be put in charge of a gang under a European. Paragraphs 189, 190.

(viii) Locomotive, steam - Africans should only be given this post after a lengthy period of training, (1) in the running sheds, cleaning and oiling engines, (2) as a fireman on the locomotive, and after a further period of training and instruction he might then be promoted to the post of steam locomotive driver. Paragraphs 193, 194.

(ix) Riveter - This should only be performed by an African after a long period of training similar to that of an apprentice. Because of the limited amount of such work, we consider that it would be advisable to have Africans properly apprenticed to do all the work required by a boilermaker or steel erector. Paragraphs 195, 196.
(x) Rock drill repairs - This work should only be performed by skilled artisans. Paragraphs 199, 200.

(xi) Sample preparation in concentrator - This should be given to an African after appropriate training and the passing of a satisfactory test. Paragraphs 201, 202.

(xii) Ventilation pipes - Africans might be trained to do this work, but consideration should be given as to whether it would not be more advantageous to have Africans serving a proper apprenticeship as sheet-metal workers when they could carry out other sheet-metal work also. Paragraphs 203, 204.

(xiii) Jack hammer repairs - This work should be in charge of a properly trained African although an African handyman might assist in minor repairs under the guidance of a trained artisan. Paragraphs 205, 206.

(xiv) Electrical work (wiring) - This class of work does not call for a fully trained man, after a higher basic education has been reached an African could be trained to do this job. The overall supervision being undertaken by a properly trained artisan. Paragraphs 209, 210.

(xv) Concentrator ball mill - After the necessary training, suitable Africans should undertake part of the duties and reduce the Europeans to one per shift, that European being in charge. Paragraphs 211, 212.

(xvi) Handyman's work round townships - Africans who have shown that they are capable of supervising others should be given the necessary training and undertake some of this work. Paragraphs 213, 214.
The Wage Structure of Africans in Industry.

277. The summary of our recommendations on this question of the wage structure must be examined in conjunction with Chapter X of our report. We would, however, specially direct attention to paragraph 256, and also to paragraph 217. In the latter paragraph it will be noted that we request the most earnest consideration be given jointly by the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union, the Chamber of Mines and the Government to such alteration in the agreements which exist between the union and the various mining companies as will permit the African to advance to more responsible work as outlined in our recommendations.
APPENDIX 5

The African MinO WOrkGrS9 (Nkana) Trade Union 1918

OFFICE-BEARERS

1. Mr. Lawrence Katilungu (Chairman)
2. Mr. Simon A. Kaluwa (Secretary)
3. Mr. H. Philip Simwanza (Treasurer)
4. Mr. Robinson C. Puta (Auditor)
5. Mr. Raphael C. Mwenifumbo (Auditor)
6. Mr. Edward Sampa (Trustee)
7. Mr. Jafael Mbone (Trustee)

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS


Source: SEC/LAB/125, encl. in Stubbs (Labour Commissioner) to Director of Information and Public Relations, 8 April 1948.

* Committee, Nkana Boss Boys' Association, 1947

** Nkana TR's, 1948.
APPENDIX 6

African Trade Unions in Northern Rhodesia 1953

Up to 250 members:

Northern Rhodesia African Cement Workers' Union
Livingstone African Municipal Employees' Trade Union
Mines African Staff Association

250-1000 members:

Northern Rhodesia African Hotels and Catering Workers' Trade Union
African Civil Servants' Association
Northern Rhodesia African Drivers' Trade Union

1000-5000 members:

Northern Rhodesia African Shop Assistants' Trade Union
African Railway Workers' Trade Union
Northern Rhodesia African Municipal and Management Board Workers' Trade Union
Northern Rhodesia Government Workers' Trade Union
Northern Rhodesia African General Workers' Trade Union

Over 25,000:

Northern Rhodesia African Mine Workers' Trade Union

Source: Labour Department Annual Report for the year 1953
BIBLIOGRAPHY
of sources and works consulted for
this thesis

A. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

1. Collections of private papers

The Creech-Jones Papers (Mss. Brit. Emp. s.332,
Rhodes House, Oxford).

The Orde Browne Papers (Mss. Afr. s.1117,
Rhodes House, Oxford).

Unpublished mss. of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute,
Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia,
Lusaka.

2. Informants

J. Meshak Chamululu
Kosam Chewe
William Comrie
Wynn Gray
Rowland Hudson, C.M.G.
A.B.K. Kaniki
J.L. Keith, C.B.E.
K. Mpika
D. Mutondo
Augustine Nkumbula
W.F. Stubbs, C.M.G., C.B.E.
Keli Walubita
Sir Alexander Williams, K.C.M.G.

3. Theses

Robert H. Bates, "Unions, parties and development: a study
of government policy towards the mineworkers of Zambia".

Elena L. Berger, "Labour policies on the Northern Rhodesian
Copperbelt, 1924-1964". (University of Oxford D. Phil.

Gerald L. Caplan, "A political history of Barotseland,

Ian Henderson, "The attitude and policy of the main sections
of the British labour movement to imperial issues, 1899-1924".

Benson C. Kaloma, "Colonial administration in Northern Rhodesia.
A case study of colonial policy in the Lwinilunga District of

B.S. Krishnamurthy, "Land and labour in Nyasaland, 1891-1914".
Official archival material

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF ZAMBIA, LUSAKA

Correspondence of the Administrator, North-Eastern Rhodesia (NE/A series, 1900-1911)

NE/A/1 in letters
NE/A/2 out letters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NE/A/1/2</th>
<th>NE/A/2/3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NE/A/1/2</td>
<td>NE/A/2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Commissioner for South Africa.</td>
<td>H.M. Commissioner, Zomba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/3 H.M. Commissioner, Zomba.</td>
<td>1/3 H.M. Commissioner, Zomba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. General, 1900-01</td>
<td>1. General, 1900-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6 Hut tax and labour, 1899-1905</td>
<td>4/6 Hut tax and labour, 1899-1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE/A/3 correspondence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE/A/3/7</td>
<td>Nyasa Labour in North-Eastern Rhodesia, 1901-05.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE/A/8 reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE/A/8/1</td>
<td>Administrator's reports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correspondence of the Administrator, North-Western Rhodesia (NW/A series, 1900-1911)

NW/A/1 in letters
NW/A/2 out letters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NW/A/1/1</th>
<th>NW/A/2/2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NW/A/1/1</td>
<td>NW/A/2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW/A/3 correspondence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW/A/3/17</td>
<td>NW/A/3/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/24</td>
<td>3/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Affairs.</td>
<td>Native Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/30</td>
<td>3/30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correspondence of the High Commissioner for South Africa, 1900-1924 (HC series, 1900-1924)

HC/1 in letters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HC/1/2</th>
<th>HC/1/2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HC/1/2</td>
<td>HC/1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator, North-Western Rhodesia, 1901-1911.</td>
<td>Administrator, North-Western Rhodesia, 1901-1911.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator, Northern Rhodesia, 1911-1924.</td>
<td>Administrator, Northern Rhodesia, 1911-1924.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HC/2 out letters

HC/2/1
2/2
2/3

Administrator, North-Eastern Rhodesia, 1909-1911.
Administrator, North-Western Rhodesia, 1908-1910.
Administrator, Northern Rhodesia, 1911-1924.

HC/3 correspondence

HC/3/3/4-14

Northern Rhodesia, 1903-1924.

Correspondence of the Administrator and Chief Secretary, Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1929.
(NR/A and NR/B series)

NR/A/4/1

Despatches to and from the Resident Commissioner, Salisbury, 1911-1924.

NR/B/1/1-3 correspondence to 1928

NR/B/1/1

Amalgamation: A333, A1845, A353B, A353E, A353C.
Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, A174.

Central and East African Territories, closer union, 1927, A1573.
Conferences: DC's and magistrates', 1927, A1880; East Africa: Victoria Falls, 1323, A946; East Africa: unofficial, 1927, A1583A; Governors', Nairobi, 1926, A899, native policy A899/13.

NR/B/1/2

270 Amalgamation, 1915-1917.
297 Barotse slavery, 1911-1924.
325 Northern Rhodesia natives used for war work, 1917.

NR/B/1/3


NR/B/1/1 1929 file series

NR/B/1/4/EA

1. Labour Department, 1932
3. Co-ordination of services, 1933-1935
1. Labour conditions in Northern Rhodesia.
2. Nkama mine labour policy, 1933
3. Romb Antelope Mine

District correspondence, 1900-1904
(NR/K series)

NR/KDE/2/23

Labour (Barotse)
1. RNLD, 1903-1904
2. Forced labour, 1925

KDE/2/39

Tax (Barotse).

KDG/1/7

Labour - East Luangwa District, 1914-1915

KSD/2/5

Labour - Mpika, 1911-1914.

KBZ 1/3

Labour - Luangwa, 1912-1913.

KTJ/2/2

Labour - Mubwana, 1909.
Open files, 1900-1954
(Z series)

ZA/1/10 Watch Tower, 1917-1927.
ZA/7/1/1-17 Annual Reports, Awezena-Tanganyika, 1913/14-1934.
ZA/7/7/2 Visiting Commissioner, 1918-1919.
ZA/7/7/2 Watch Tower Movement.

ZP/12 Evidence given to the commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia (Forster Evidence, 1940).
ZP/13 Report of the committee appointed to investigate the grievances which gave rise to the strike amongst the African employees of Rhodesia Railways (The Tredgold Report, 1945).

ZP/20/1 Commission of Inquiry into the position of Africans in industry (Evidence) (Dalgleish Evidence, 1947).

Secretariat correspondence, 1930-1952.

Correspondence on labour matters
(SEC/LAB series)

SEC/LAB/1 Native labour conditions on the Copperbelt, 1934-1948.
10 Migrant labour agreement: labour statistics, 1933-1938.
12 Standing committee on migrant labour: minutes of meetings, 1939-1940.
27 Stabilisation of African labour, 1941-1946.
34 NILAB and ALAB minutes, 1940-1948.
45 Labour Reports: Copperbelt, 1940-1945.
51 Senator Rheinallt Jones's Report, 1942.
71 The Saffery Report, 1943.
78 Strike by Africans on the copper mines, 1940.
79 Strike on the Copperbelt: Commission of Enquiry.
104 Strike by Africans on the copper mines, 1940.
108 Revised agreement entered into with the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union and the Mine Company, 1940-1944.
109 Union agreements, the four copper mines and the NRWU, 1947-1948.
132 Strike of Africans at Nchanga, 1940.
136 Strike by Africans on the copper mines, 1940.
137 Sandford's Report, 1940.
150 Copperbelt African mineworkers' dispute.
163 AFS memorandum, 1941-1942.
174 Formation of colonial labour advisory committee, 1942-1943.
191 Dilution of European labour, 1941.
194 Training in industry.
221 Employment and Training Act, 1948: duties of the Labour Department.
Correspondence on Native Affairs
(SEC/NAT series)

SEC/NAT/311 Native Welfare Associations (General), 1931-1946.

Correspondence on the Central African Council
(SEC/CAC series)


Correspondence accessioned but not catalogued
(Acc series)


Other Official material

Reports, etc., printed by the BSA Company for the shareholders:

- Report on the conditions of the territories in the sphere of its operations, 1896-1897.
- General Report for the year ending 31 March 1908.
- Administrator's Report for North-Eastern Rhodesia for the year ending 31 March 1910.
- H. Wilson Fox, Memorandum on the constitutional, political, financial and other questions concerning Rhodesia (1912).

Officially circulated but not published:


PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Correspondence of the Colonial Office with the High Commissioner for South Africa (C.O. 417 series)

The following files covering Northern Rhodesian and related matters, 1900-1924:

C.O. 417/321 (1901)
332 (1901)
363 (1902)
373 (1903)
379 (1903)
408 (1905)
437 (1907)
467 (1909)
481 (1910)
484 (1910)
539 (1914)
540 (1914)

Correspondence of the Colonial Office with the Northern Rhodesia Government, 1924-1940 (C.O. 795 series)

C.O. 795/1 Despatches, 1924: Employment of natives on road construction; Barotse; Watch Tower movement.
Despatches, 1924: Native Affairs.
Native Reserves.
Native taxation.
Offices and Individuals, 1924: Inspection of Rhodesian natives in Katanga.
Cotton production in Northern Rhodesia.
Despatches, 1925: Cotton specialist. Tour of Secretary for Native Affairs. Draft Masters' and Servants' (Amendment) Ordinance.
Paramount Chief's Proclamation as to abolition of unpaid labour. Native Unrest in Zumbo District.
Despatches, 1926: Land Policy.
Native labour supply in the North Charterland Exploration Company's concession.
Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia.
Governors' Conference, 1926: memorandum on certain conclusions.
Return of labour employed upon work carried out from loan funds, 1926.
Native Registration Ordinance, 1929.
Natives on Private Estates Ordinance, 1929.
Mining industry: health of miners, 1929.
Employment of Natives Ordinance, 1929.
Future administration of Northern Rhodesia, 1929.
The Workmen's (non-Native) Compensation Ordinance, 1930.
Native Taxation, 1930.
Mining Industry: Native Labour Association Limited, 1930.
Constitution of Northern Rhodesia, 1930.
Report by Dr. Alexander on conditions on Rand mines, 1930.
Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, 1930.
Native Policy (the Passfield Memorandum), 1930.
Recruitment of native labour for Northern Rhodesia from Nyasaland, 1930.
Trade mission to the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia, 1930-1931.
Recruitment of native labour for Northern Rhodesia from Nyasaland, 1931.
Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, 1931.
Position at Nyama Ilkubwa Mine; and Nchanga Mine, 1931.
Natives on Private Estates Ordinance, 1931.
Native Affairs Annual Report, 1930, 1931.
Native taxation and expenditure on native services: annual statement, 1931.
Employment of natives in government service, 1931.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52/36332</td>
<td>Unemployment in the mining areas, 1932.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52/36365</td>
<td>Unemployment in the mining areas: unemployment committee: minutes of meetings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52/36385</td>
<td>Financial position of the territory: commission of enquiry, 1932.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57/36357</td>
<td>Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 1932. Employment in mining areas, 1933.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58/36510</td>
<td>Retrenchment of staff, 1933.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60/36533</td>
<td>Copper industry: native labour policy, 1933.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60/36545</td>
<td>Vice-consul at Elisabethville, 1933.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61/36555</td>
<td>Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, 1933.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61/36563</td>
<td>Estimates, 1933-1934, 1933.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61/36566</td>
<td>1. Native education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62/36579</td>
<td>2. Employment of natives in government service, 1933.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63/36533</td>
<td>Native taxation, 1933.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64/36561</td>
<td>Estimates, 1934, 1933.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65/36585</td>
<td>Professor Macmillan's interview with Sir C. Bottineley on 10/1/33, 1933.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68/36559</td>
<td>Native Affairs: Conference at Victoria Falls (held June 1933), 1934.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69/36540</td>
<td>Recruitment of native labour for the Rand, 1934-1935.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69/36549</td>
<td>Native taxation, 1934.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72/36559</td>
<td>Native policy, 1934.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72/36579</td>
<td>Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, 1934.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73/36507</td>
<td>Proposed co-ordination of services between Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1935.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76/36508</td>
<td>Strikes in the mining areas, 1935.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77/36503</td>
<td>The Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 1935.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77/36504</td>
<td>Administration of Northern and Southern Rhodesia: question of amalgamation, 1935.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78/365109</td>
<td>Recruitment of native labour, 1935.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78/365109</td>
<td>Native labour: the Native industrial labour advisory board, 1935.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79/36504</td>
<td>Native taxation, 1936.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79/36507</td>
<td>Proposed co-ordination of services between Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1936.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82/36508</td>
<td>Dismissal of Compound Manager, Mufulira, 1936.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82/36509</td>
<td>Provincial Commissioners' Conference, 1936, 1936.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82/36504</td>
<td>Administration of Northern and Southern Rhodesia: question of amalgamation, 1936.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83/36509</td>
<td>Native labour: (A) suggested Labour Department (B) Supervision of Labour, 1936.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mine Workers' Union: Formation of a branch of the South African Mine Workers' Union in Northern Rhodesia, 1936.

The Rhodes-Livingstone Memorial Institute, 1937.

Native Education policy, 1937.

Native education: training centre at Lusaka, 1937.

Employment of natives legislation, 1937.

Native labour: (A) suggested Labour Department (B) Supervision of labour, 1937.

Appointment of a labour expert (Orde Browne), 1937.

Native labour: NILAB, 1937.

Educational facilities for natives in the Copper Belt, 1937.

The Mine Workers' Union (Rejection of an Industrial Conciliation Act), 1937.

Financial investigation (Pim), 1937.

Social and industrial conditions of Africans employed on the Copper Belt, 1937.

Native taxation, 1938.

Employment of natives legislation, 1938.

Provincial Commissioners' Conference 1938, 1938.


Administration: closer union: Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, 1938.

Native labour, 1938.

Native Labour: (A) suggested Labour Department (B) Supervision of Labour, 1939.

Native labour: Government's comments on Orde Browne's Report, 1938.

Native labour: NILAB, 1938.

Financial position, 1938.

Social and industrial conditions of Africans employed on the Copper Belt, 1938.

Copper Belt: relations between Europeans and Africans, 1938.

Native compounds in mine townships, 1938.


German activities in the Copper Belt, 1938.

Administrative staff: Copper Belt, 1939.

Strikes, disputes etc. in the mining areas, 1939.


Native labour: Comments on Major Orde-Browne's Report, 1939.

Native labour: (A) suggested Labour Department (B) Supervision of Labour, 1939.

NILAB, 1939.

Labour: employment on Sundays, 1939.

Copperbelt: security measures, 1939.

Administration: co-ordination of services between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, 1940.

Native labour (A) suggested Labour Department (B) Supervision of Labour, 1940.

Labour: Employment on Sundays, 1940.

Labour: Strikes, disputes etc. in the mining areas, 1940.

Labour: Strikes, disturbances, etc. in the mining areas. Report of Commission of Enquiry, 1940.
Further correspondence (1901) relative to affairs in the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesia.

No. 702 do.
No. 717 do. (1903)
No. 721 South Africa: correspondence respecting the native question (1902-1904).
No. 746 Further correspondence (1904) relative to affairs in the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesia.

No. 763 do. (1905)
No. 801 South Africa: further correspondence (1906) respecting the Labour Question.
No. 802 Further correspondence (1906) relative to affairs in the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesia.

No. 872 do. (1907)
No. 899 do. (1908)
No. 932 South Africa: further correspondence relating to the German South-West Africa Protectorate, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Rhodesia (1909).

No. 948 do. (1910)
No. 969 do. (1911)
No. 989 do. (1912)
No. 1002 do. (1913)
No. 1003 do. (1913)
No. 1012 South Africa: further correspondence relating to questions affecting coloured and native races (1914).

No. 1015 South Africa: further correspondence ... relating to the German South-West Africa Protectorate, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Rhodesia (1914).
No. 1034 South Africa: further correspondence relating to the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesia (1915-1916).

African series

African No. 1131 East Africa: further correspondence relating to the estimates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1930-1931).

No. 1164 Confidential Report by Major G. St. J. Orde Browno on certain aspects of labour in Northern Rhodesia (1938).

Miscellaneous series

Recruitment of native labour: correspondence, July 1934-April 1935.
No. 452 Recruitment of native labour: report of the colonial labour committee, 14 May 1935.
No. 458 do. (1935)
No. 487 Supervision of labour conditions in the colonial empire: papers, 1935-1940.
No. 493 (3 parts) Regulation of contracts of employment of indigenous workers in the colonial empire: correspondence and papers, 1937-1940.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE LIBRARY, LONDON


5. Other unpublished material

Matthew Mwendapole, "Trade Union history" (unpublished ms., n.d.)
B. PUBLISHED SOURCES

1. Government publications

GREAT BRITAIN

Colonial Annual Reports series (HMSO): Northern Rhodesia, 1924-1925 to 1938; 1946 to 1953.

Colonial numbered series (HMSO):

Report upon Labour in Tanganyika Territory (Colonial No. 19, 1926).


Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, Labour Conditions in Northern Rhodesia (Colonial No. 150, 1938).

Command Papers:

Correspondence relating to the recruitment of labour in the Nyasaland Protectorate for the Transvaal and Southern Rhodesia Mines (Cd. 3993 of 1908).

Second Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to consider certain questions relating to Rhodesia (Cmd. 1471 of 1921) (The Paxton Report).

Rhodesia: agreement between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the British South Africa Company for the settlement of outstanding questions relating to Southern and Northern Rhodesia (Cmd. 1984 of 1923).


Memorandum on native policy in East Africa (Cmd. 3573 of 1930) (The Passfield Memorandum).

Correspondence with regard to native policy in Northern Rhodesia (Cmd. 3731 of 1930).

Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia (Cmd. 5009 of 1935) (also published by the Government Printer, Lusaka).

The West India Royal Commission Report (Cmd. 6607 of 1945).


Parliamentary debates:

Hansard, House of Commons, 5th series, 1920-1953 (H of C Deb).

NORTHERN RHODESIA

Annual Reports on the social and economic progress of the people of Northern Rhodesia, 1935; and 1938.

Chairman's Reports of meetings of the Native Industrial Labour Advisory Board, 1935-1939.
Chairman's Reports of meetings of the African Labour Advisory Board, 1940-1949.

Native Affairs Annual Reports, 1924-1938


Labour Department Annual Reports, 1941-1953.


Report of the Select Committee on Unemployment, March 1932.


Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia (The Russell Report) (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1935), and Evidence (2 vols.) (also published as Cmd. 5009).


Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia (The Forster Report) (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1941).


Report of the Committee appointed to investigate the grievances which gave rise to the strike amongst the African employees of Rhodesia Railways (The Tredgold Report) (duplicated), 1945.

Ten-Year Development Plan for Northern Rhodesia (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1947).


Report and Award of the Arbiter, C.W. Guillebaud Esq., C.B.E., nominated under the Industrial Conciliation Ordinance to arbitrate in a dispute between the Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers' Trade Union and the Copper Mining Company, January 1953. (duplicated 1953).

Report of the Board of Inquiry appointed to inquire into the advancement of Africans in the copper mining industry in Northern Rhodesia (The Forster Board Report) (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1954).

The British South Africa Company's claim to the mineral royalties in Northern Rhodesia (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1964).
ZAMBIA


SOUTHERN RHODESIA


NYASALAND

2. Contemporary newspapers and periodicals

Cape Times
Bulawayo Chronicle
Northern News
Times of Zambia
Zambia News
Mutende


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michael Gelfand</td>
<td><em>Northern Rhodesia in the Days of the Charter</em> (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane</td>
<td><em>The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia</em> (London: Edward Arnold, 1911)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodore Gregory</td>
<td><em>Ernest Oppenheimer and the economic development of Southern Africa</em> <em>(Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1962)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Iliffe</td>
<td><em>Tanganyika under German Rule</em> <em>(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julius Lewin</td>
<td><em>The Colour Bar on the Copperbelt</em> <em>(Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1941)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.T. Leys, and Cranford Pratt</td>
<td><em>A New Deal in Central Africa</em> <em>(London, Heinemann, 1960)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Mason</td>
<td><em>The Birth of a Dilemma</em> <em>(London: Institute of Race Relations and Oxford University Press, 1938)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Meebelo</td>
<td><em>Reaction to Colonialism</em> <em>(Manchester: Manchester University Press for the Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia, 1971)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.J.B. Moore</td>
<td><em>These African Copper Minors</em> <em>(London: Livingstone Press, 1948)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Audrey Richards, Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia (London: Oxford University Press, 1939).


Shiela van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1942).

4. Articles, essays, published papers

anonym.  

Anti-Slavery Society,  
Memorandum by the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society on the Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the 1940 disturbances in the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia (London: Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, 1941).

G. Arrighi,  

J.M. Assimeng,  

R.E. Baldwin,  

W.V. Brelsford,  
The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1954).
"Fishermen of the Bangweulu Swamps" (Rhodes-Livingstone Paper 12, 1946).

M. Burawoy,  

G.L. Caplan,  
"Barotseland, the secessionist challenge to Zambia", JMAS 6, 3 (1968).

Szymon Chodak,  

Trevor Coombe,  
"The origins of secondary education in Zambia" (3 parts), ASR, 3, 4 and 5 (1967-1968).

E.A. Copeman,  
"The violence of Kasanza", NRJ 1, 5 (1952).

D.I. Davies,  

D.J. Denoon,  

Dennis Driesangs,  

Bruce Fetter,  

Ronald Frankenberg,  

G. Fryer,  
L.H. Gann, "The Northern Rhodesian copper industry and the world of copper, 1923-1952", RJW, xviii (1955).


Max Gluckman, Obituary of Godfrey Wilson, RJW, 1 (1944).


R.H. Hobson, "Fourteen months: Sir Ronald Storrar in Northern Rhodesia, December 1st 1932 - February 17th 1934", NRJ, vi, 2 (1965) (This number entitled The Zambian Journal)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Distribution of African labour by area of origin on the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia&quot;, RLJ, xiv (1954).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis Paine</td>
<td>&quot;Lake Mweru - its fishing and fishing industry&quot;, NRJ, 1, 2 (1961).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margaret Read</td>
<td>&quot;Migrant labour in Africa and its effects on tribal life&quot;, International Labour Review(1942).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audrey Richards</td>
<td>&quot;Bomba Marriage and present economic conditions&quot; (Rhodes-Livingstone Paper 4, 1940).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.D. Roberts</td>
<td>&quot;The Lumpa Church of Alice Lushina&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Spearpoint</td>
<td>&quot;Commercial concessions and politics during the colonial period. The role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890-1954&quot;, African Affairs, 70, 281 (1971).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. van Velsen</td>
<td>&quot;The missionary factor among the Lakeside Tonga of Nyasaland&quot;, RNJ, xxvi (1936).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.R. Warhurst</td>
<td>&quot;Labour migration as a positive factor in the continuity of Tonga tribal society&quot;, Southall (ed.), Social Change in Modern Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godfrey Wilson</td>
<td>An essay in the economics of detribalisation in Northern Rhodesia (Rhodes-Livingstone Papers 3 and 5, 1941-1942).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Northern Rhodesia: Administrative boundaries and the Changing District Pattern, 1913-1963

1913
1. Chiengi
2. Katwe
3. Kawambwa
4. Mporokoso
5. Abercorn
6. Fort Rosebery
7. Luwingu
8. Kasama
9. Fife
10. Mwinilunga
11. Mpika
12. Chinsali
13. Lundazi
14. Kansanshi
15. Ndola
16. Serenje
17. Balovale
18. Kasama
19. Lukona
20. Mankoya
21. Basala
22. Mwomboshi
23. Mkushi
24. Petauke
25. Fort Jameson
26. Lealu
27. Baluba
28. Magoye
29. Feira
30. Nalolo
31. Sesheke
32. Kalomo
33. Namwala
34. Guimbi
35. Livingstone

1935
1. Chiengi
2. Mporokoso
3. Abercorn
4. Kawambwa
5. Kasama
6. Isoka
7. Fort Rosebery
8. Luwingu
9. Chinsali
10. Mwinilunga
11. Solwezi
12. Mpika
13. Lundazi
14. Balovale
15. Kasama
16. Ndola
17. Serenje
18. Fort Jameson
19. Kalaba
20. Mongu
21. Mankoya
22. Mumbwa
23. Broken Hill
24. Mkushi
25. Petauke
26. Senanga
27. Namwala
28. Livingstone
29. Feira
30. Sesheke
31. Livingstone
32. Kalomo
33. Mazabuka

1963
a1 Mwinilunga
a2 Solwezi
a3 Kasama
a4 Kabompo
a5 Balovale
b1 Ndola
b2 Copperbelt
c1 Kawambwa
c2 Fort Rosebery
c3 Samfya
d1 Mporokosa
da2 Abercorn

d3 Isoka
d4 Chinsali
d5 Kasama
d6 Mpika
d7 Luwingu
e1 Lundazi
e2 Fort Jameson
e3 Petauke
f1 Mumbwa
f2 Broken Hill
f3 Mkushi
f4 Serenje
f5 Feira
f6 Luwaka
g1 Namwala
g2 Mazabuka
g3 Gwembe
g4 Choma
g5 Livingstone
h1 Kalabo
h2 Mongo
h3 Mankoya
h4 Sesheke
h5 Senanga

MAP 2

Settlement and land use on the Copperbelt, 1963


Fig. 26 Settlement and land use on the Copperbelt, 1963. The area marked as Chambishi indicates the site and probable extent of the mine and township now being developed there. Garneton is shown as a block of smallholdings to indicate its origin but it has developed into a rural suburb of Kitwe. Based largely on maps in the 'Duff Report', 1960.
Zambia: economic history, 1850-1971