This thesis is a study of the pneumatology of Gregory of Nazianzus which aims particularly to discover the grounds in his thinking for his strong and forthright assertion of the deity of the Holy Spirit.

Three areas of his pneumatology are considered. First, from the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of the Christian, it is Gregory's conviction that only if he is God can the Holy Spirit bring Christians to that true knowledge of God which transforms them. Secondly, from his work in the intelligent creation, in the prophets, with Christ, and in the disciples and the Church, the Holy Spirit is seen to be the Creator and the one who re-creates and perfects intelligent life. His distinction from the Father and the Son is known from his coming, sent by the Father, at Pentecost, so that in the unfolding of the divine economy the Trinity is gradually revealed. Thirdly, Gregory's understanding of the Spirit is seen within the context of his doctrine of the Trinity. For Gregory, Christian devotion is centred on the Trinity, whose threefold Light illuminates the mind. The truth of the Trinity can only be expressed in the paradox of the Three-yet-One. Since God the Holy Trinity is one Being, the Holy Spirit is not merely one who shares divine nature. Rather he is God Himself. But on the other hand he is distinct from the Father and the Son with his own personal identity. As a way of expressing and safeguarding this distinction which has been revealed in the economy we say that whereas the Father is the Unbegotten and the Son is the Begotten, the Spirit is the Proceeding One. Gregory believed that the Spirit's deity should be openly confessed.

The study therefore shows that Gregory's belief in the deity of the Holy Spirit is rooted in each of these major areas of his theology. It is integral to his whole Christian faith.

This thesis has been composed by me and is entirely my own work.

F. H. Noble
THE DEITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT
ACCORDING TO GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
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It was because the late fourth century was a crucial period in the development of the Christian doctrines of the Holy Spirit and the Trinity that my interest was first attracted to it. Gregory of Nazianzus was one of the leading figures of the period, one of the Cappadocian Fathers, the three great bishops from Cappadocia who are still counted among the doctors of the Church. His eloquent and influential sermons not only shaped the thinking of his contemporaries, but were studied through later centuries by Christians both in the Greek East and the Latin West. To-day, the Trinitarian pattern of thought which he helped to formulate and to make central to Christian devotion remains fundamental to the understanding of God shared by countless Christians. Indeed it is so deeply embedded in the assumptions of many, that it is scarcely noticed or reflected upon.

In order to understand Gregory's thought on the Holy Spirit, I concentrated first on Gregory's own statements on the Spirit, collating them and grouping them according to topic. This formed the basis for the plan of the thesis, and throughout it I have tried to let Gregory's own voice be heard by quoting him extensively. The method was exactly that advocated by P. de Regnon in a sentence quoted by Jean Plagnieux in his book, *Saint Grégoire de Nazianze Théologien*.
"À mon avis, le seul moyen de connaître l'exacte pensée d'un docteur grec est de le citer longuement, afin de se familiariser avec elle."

The attempt was then made to understand the significance of each area of Gregory's doctrine of the Spirit with the aid of the extensive secondary literature.

In writing the thesis I have tried to keep a clear and uncluttered line of thought in the main text expounding Gregory's own thought, and to keep other matters to the footnotes. The work can therefore be read on two levels. The general reader with some knowledge of theology should find the main text readable, but may wish to leave the footnotes to the specialist. Greek words in the main text are accordingly transliterated. To be consistent in transliteration, the plural of *hypostasis* appears not in its usual Latin form, *hypostases*, but (except in quotations) in its strict Greek plural form, *hypostaseis*. I have generally used the *Sources chrétiennes* text of Gregory's works where these are available, and where they are not, the text from J.P. Migne's *Patrologie Graeca*. The English translations frequently are (or are based upon) those of C.G. Browne and J.E. Swallow published in the *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* (Second Series), Vol. 7. Other orations and lines of poetry have been translated as necessary. The system of numbering the footnotes was taken from the thesis by F. Dinsen listed in the bibliography, and seems to me to give the easiest mode of reference for the reader.
It was Professor T.F. Torrance who first suggested when I expressed an interest in working on the pneumatology of the Cappadocians that I should concentrate attention on Gregory of Nazianzus. I am grateful to him not only for initial guidance but for the interest he has expressed from time to time since his retirement. My thanks are due also to Professor Alasdair Heron for guiding the first year of research, and to Dr Noel O'Donoghue who has been a supervisor throughout the whole period. Not least among his many points of practical guidance was the suggestion that I should focus particularly on Gregory's view of the deity of the Spirit. I am also grateful to Professor James Mackey for his supervision during the final stages, particularly his helpful comments on the text.

My gratitude must also be expressed to a considerable number of people who have helped in innumerable ways. Several have come to my rescue with translations. Mr & Mrs Nunzio Faranda translated two articles from Italian and Miss Ciska Verwoerd one from Dutch. Mr Antonino Tamburello also helped me to read a little Italian. When time proved too short to read all the relevant German material, Mrs Brenda Cant kindly translated sections of A.M. Ritter's Das Konzil von Konstantinopel and Mrs Hazel Maciver some pages from Karl Holl's Amphilochius von Ikonium. My thanks must also go to the Governors of British Isles Nazarene College and to the former principal, Dr Hugh Rae, and the present principal, the Revd Herbert McGonigle, for all the facilities put at my disposal.
All my colleagues have been most helpful. I must particularly
mention Dr Kent Brower, who assumed my administrative
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But my chief thanks must go, of course, to my family who have
cheerfully endured my absence on too many occasions and for longer
than expected. Above all my wife deserves the greatest thanks,
not only for coping with my absence and my share of the chores, but
for all the support and encouragement without which this work would
never have been begun and could certainly never have been
completed.
ABBREVIATIONS

AbS  Abba Salama
AThR  Anglican Theological Review
ANCL  Ante-Nicene Christian Library
Aug  Augustinianum
ByZ  Byzantinische Zeitschrift
Byz  Byzantion
CH  Church History
ChQ  Church Quarterly
DS  Dictionnaire de Spiritualité
DThC  Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique
DOP  Dumbarton Oaks Papers
Diak  Diakonia
EkPh  Ekklesiastikos Pharos
ETL  Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses
HERE  Hastings Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics
ITQ  Irish Theological Quarterly
Mus  Le Muséon
JThS  Journal of Theological Studies
NLT  Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift
NNPF  Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
OrChP  Orientalia Christiana Periodica
PByzR  Patristic and Byzantine Review
PG  Patrologia Graeca
PGL  A Patristic Greek Lexicon
RHE  Revue d'Histoire ecclésiastique
RHistPhR  Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses
RS  Religious Studies
RSR  Revue des Sciences religieuses
RThL  Revue théologique de Louvain
SJT  Scottish Journal of Theology
Sob  Sobornost
SP  Studia Patristica
StVladThQ  St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly
THZ  Theologische Zeitschrift
TB  Tyndale Bulletin
TRE  Theologische Realencyklopädie
TDNT  Theological Dictionary of the New Testament
TVT  Tijdschrift voor Theologie
VC  Verbum Caro
VigChr  Vigiliae Christianae
ZKG  Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte
ZKTh  Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie
ZMP  Zurnal Moskovskoj Patriarchi
ZNW  Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
ZThK  Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Gregory of Nazianzus is indisputably a significant figure in the development of the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit. At least, a brief recitation of the facts seems to indicate so. A close ally of the brothers, Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, who together with him are known as the Cappadocian Fathers, he was archbishop of Constantinople during the Council of Constantinople of 381. This was the council, later recognized as the second ecumenical council, which finally judged Arianism (the view that Christ was not God but a subordinate divine being) to be a heresy and sealed its fate within the Roman Empire. It also seems to have produced the Church's definitive statement on the deity of the Holy Spirit, which was also a matter for dispute. It was Gregory who prepared the way for the triumph over Arianism within the Eastern imperial capital itself. He was the one who at this critical moment in church history enunciated the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity within which the doctrine of the Spirit was articulated as an integral part. It was Gregory Nazianzen who gave the definitive exposition later accepted by East and West as the measure of orthodoxy, and who for his Five Theological Orations particularly was surnamed with John, "the Theologian" or "the Divine".

The objective of this study is to produce an account of the
teaching of Gregory of Nazianzus on the deity of the Holy Spirit. To do this it will be necessary to consider some related areas of his thought. Specifically, his understanding of the work of the Spirit in the life of the Christian must be studied, touching therefore on his view of Christian spirituality. His understanding of the work of the Spirit in the divine economy, the work of God in creation and redemption, must also be examined, touching on his Christology and soteriology. It will also be necessary to look at his doctrine of the Trinity. These areas of his thought provide the grounds for his strong assertion of the deity of the Spirit. After dealing with introductory matters in this first chapter, we shall therefore examine Gregory's thought on The Christian and the Spirit in the second chapter, and his thought on The Economy and the Spirit in the third. The fourth and fifth chapters will be concerned with his doctrine of the Trinity. The sixth chapter will summarize the findings in these three major areas in a review of Gregory's pneumatology which will lead to a concluding study of Gregory's open, almost passionate, proclamation of the Spirit's deity.

It must be emphasized, however, that none of the related areas in Chapters 2 to 5 can be examined fully in its own right. A study of Gregory's thought as a whole cannot be attempted here. There are areas of his Christology, soteriology and theology (in the strict sense), even areas of his pneumatology, which cannot be fully examined. The focal point of this study is Gregory's teaching on the Spirit's deity, and insofar as we take a general view of his thought it will only be seen from the angle of this
Before coming to Gregory's own thought, however, it will be
helpful in this first introductory chapter to consider the wider
context. Gregory's teaching on the deity of the Spirit can only
be understood within the historical context of the development of
doctrine in the fourth century. His teaching must be seen
against the background of the Arian controversy which engulfed
the Church for sixty years. Arius, a presbyter of Alexandria,
carried to its conclusion a general tendency in much Christian
thought of the period to make the Son or Logos a divine being
subordinate to the Father, by denying that the Son was God at
all. Although the Council of Nicea in 325 (later recognized as
the first ecumenical council) declared the deity of the Son by
saying that he was "consubstantial with the Father (homoousion
tôle{i} Patri)", the controversy continued and became more complex
in the succeeding decades. The deity of the Spirit also became a
matter for debate, particularly in the 360s and 370s, the period
of Gregory's active ministry. It was denied not only by the
Arians but also by those referred to as "Spirit-fighters
(Pneumatomachi)", who accepted the deity of the Son but denied
the deity of the Spirit. The Arians and the Pneumatomachi were
the major opponents Gregory had to face in proclaiming that the
Holy Spirit was none other than God himself. Gregory's teaching
on the deity of the Spirit must also be seen in relation to his
predecessors and contemporaries. Athanasius and Basil are the
two most obvious influences, but there is also the more distant
influence of Origen over a century earlier to be considered, and
the secular influences of Hellenism generally and Neo-Platonism in particular. Contemporaries like Gregory of Nyssa and Didymus the Blind, whose pneumatology was similar to Gregory's, had less influence on him than Athanasius and Basil.

Once again it must be emphasized, however, that we cannot attempt here a full study of the pneumatological debates of the period, and certainly not of the whole Arian controversy. These other theologians and parties will only be considered insofar as they throw light on Gregory's own view of the Spirit's deity. That implies that we shall be concerned mostly with those whose influence on Gregory was strong and immediate, especially Athanasius and Basil. Even then we cannot attempt a full first-hand study of either of those, and we shall consequently be dependent on the researches of others.

It will be useful to begin this introductory chapter with a brief account of the extant works of Gregory Nazianzen available for study and of the state of critical scholarship. This will be undertaken in section (a), The Corpus: Modern Editions. The main body of the chapter will look at Gregory's background and context in two sections. Section (b), Gregory's Life and Work in Historical Context, will trace Gregory's personal history against the background of the Arian controversy. Section (c), Predecessors and Contemporaries, will review the pneumatology of Origen, Athanasius and Basil. As a final preliminary to the study of Gregory's pneumatology, it will be useful to take note in section (d) of the mystical and apophatic character of his theology which any study of his thought must bear in mind.
Unlike his two fellow-Cappadocians, Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus wrote no theological treatises. His extant works, contained in four volumes of J.P. Migne's *Patrologia Graeca*, consist of forty-five orations, 244 letters, 507 poems, and a long tragedy, *Christus Patiens*. Of the forty-five orations, twenty-two (laying aside one regarded as inauthentic) were delivered during the brief highlight of Gregory's career, the two and a half years in Constantinople. Nineteen were delivered during the previous two decades in Cappadocia, probably almost all in Nazianzus, and the remaining three were delivered there after his retirial from Constantinople in 381. Fifteen or sixteen of the orations may be classified as primarily dogmatic. The longest, *Oration 2*, is really an extended essay on Pastoral Theology, and was to be influential. A group of eight may be classified as panegyrics, although two of these may also be included in the dogmatic orations. Two orations are invectives against the apostate emperor, Julian. Almost all of Gregory's orations relate to specific events or to specific Christian festivals.

The orations are by far the most important source for Gregory's theology. The letters are mostly incidental and personal, with the exception of three, the *Theological Letters*, which are important sources for Gregory's Christology. These were written after Gregory's retirial from Constantinople to counter the heresy of Apollinarianism (which denied that Christ had a human mind) and contain little directly relevant to his
pneumatology.¹ The poetry² contains some pneumatological material and recurring references to the Trinity. One poem of 94 lines is devoted to the Holy Spirit.³ The tragedy, Christus Patiens, is of disputed authorship and contains (virtually) nothing relevant to this study.⁴

There is no modern critical edition of the complete works of Gregory of Nazianzus.⁵ The standard text printed in the four volumes of Migne⁶ devoted to Gregory is a reprint of the Benedictine text prepared by the monks of St. Maur.⁷ This was a considerable advance on the two volume de Billy-Morel edition,⁸ which was based on the text published at Basel in 1550 by Joannes Hervagius.⁹ The de Billy-Morel edition was published at Paris in 1609-11 and reprinted at Paris and Cologne in 1630. Morel published it after de Billy's death, working from his annotations crammed in the margins of his copy of the Basel edition, and, not surprisingly, the published text was full of errors.¹⁰ The Benedictine edition was consequently begun in the late seventeenth century, reaching completion about a century later. It was principally the work of Jacobus du Frische (1640-93), Franciscus Louvard (1661-1739), Prudentius Maran (1683-1762) and Ch. Clemencet (1703-78). The first volume was published just before Clemencet's death in 1778, but the manuscript of volume two was mislaid during the French Revolution. A copy was eventually traced by the Abbé Caillau several decades later in the possession of the heirs of de Verneuil, one of Clemencet's assistants, and was published in 1840.¹¹ J.P. Migne's reprint in volumes thirty-five to thirty-eight of the Patrologia Graeca
is (Denis Meehan notes) not absolutely reliable. Further, the Benedictine edition itself does not reach the standards of a modern critical text, failing, for example to give adequate indications of manuscript sources for variant readings. The Latin version, which is that of de Billy, is particularly suspect, being based on the faulty Basel edition of the Greek text. It has been evident therefore since the beginning of the twentieth century at least that a critical edition of Gregory's works was needed.

The Benedictine texts of eight of the sermons in total were reproduced in three editions at the turn of the century. In 1899, A.J. Mason published the Five Theological Orations (Orations 27 to 31) with a commentary in the Cambridge Patristic Texts series. In 1903, J.H. Verin published Oration 15, the panegyric on the Maccabees. In 1908, F. Boulenger published Orations 7 and 43, the panegyrics on Gregory's brother Caesarius, and on Basil, with a French translation and notes. But a project to produce a critical text of Gregory's works was first begun in Poland, led by Tasdeusz Sinko, Jan Sajdak, Gustav Pryzchocki and Leon Sternbach. Many scholars worked on the project, examining manuscripts throughout Europe. Preparatory work was published, and in 1939 Paul Gallay was informed in correspondence with Sinko and Pryschocki that work had been completed. The unpublished material, however, apparently disappeared in the Second World War. After the war an attempt was made to re-activate the project in Poland, but there was little progress. About 1955, Heinz-Martin Werhahn began a
critical edition of the poems. This was taken up into a co-
ordinated effort in which J. Mossay took charge of the work on
the orations and M. Sicherl directed work on the poems. Meanwhile a provisional critical text of the orations, based on a
more limited examination of the documents is being edited by the
Institut des Sources chrétiennes. It is not certain how much
the exhaustive study of the manuscript traditions will improve
this. Certainly T. Sinko expressed the view in his
correspondence with Gallay "que le texte des Discours était
particulièrement satisfaisant dans l'édition bénédictine." Despite the failure of the Polish project, therefore, we do have
this indication that the Benedictine text of the orations
reprinted in Migne (and therefore a fortiori that in the Sources
chrétiennes editions) is sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of this study. The poetry and letters may not be so reliable,
but neither are they nearly so theologically significant.

As to the authenticity of the works published as Gregory's,
we have already noted that Oration 35 is not thought to be
authentic and that there is debate about the authenticity of the
tragedy Christus Patiens. A more general attack on the
authenticity of several of Gregory's orations has been launched
by Reginald Weijenborg. Weijenborg argues that the Five
Theological Orations (Orations 27 to 31) are in part the work of
Maximus or Herona the Cynic, who tried to supplant Gregory as
archbishop of Constantinople and whom he identifies with Evagrius
Ponticus, a disciple of the Cappadocian Fathers. He regards
as authentic only thirteen of the forty-five orations. We
cannot attempt here a detailed examination of Weijenborg's arguments, but it is sufficient for our purposes to note that he stands alone with almost the whole weight of scholarship against him. The editors of the Sources chrétiennes editions accept the authenticity of all the orations except Oration 35.¹

Paul Gallay, the doyen of Nazianzen scholars, dismissed Weijenborg's theory about the Five Theological Orations.² Frederick W. Norris analysed Weijenborg's arguments,³ identifying four principles underlying them, and showing the weakness of his rather intricate and implausible hypothesis. He concludes:

"Weijenborg has not been able to prove that Evagrius was the author of the last three Theological Orations. His lack of literary sensitivity and his misunderstanding of the four principles employed here to organize his efforts disallow his arguments. He particularly failed to establish the quality and quantity of contradictions necessary to demand forgery."

The weight of critical scholarship therefore clearly supports the authenticity of all of the orations attributed to Gregory with the single exception of Oration 35. The authenticity of the letters is not in dispute. According to J. Quasten, sixteen of the poems in Migne are spurious.⁴ The authorship of Christus Patiens is debated, but this work is not relevant to our concerns.⁵
(b) Gregory's Life and Works in Historical Context

The main task of this introductory chapter is to review the background and context of Gregory's pneumatology, beginning with the historical background of the fourth century debates, and setting Gregory's life and writings in their contemporary context.

The great theological debates of the fourth century were initiated by Arius, an Alexandrian presbyter, who made more explicit and sharp a general tendency in the Christian thought of the period to think of the Son as a divine being subordinate to God the Father.1 As the Logos, generated or produced by the Father, he was regarded as the one through whom the Father created the world, and who later became incarnate for our salvation. Arius clarified the ambiguities in this way of thinking and accentuated the subordinate position of the Logos by insisting that although he was divine in a lesser sense, he was created as the first of the creatures with a view to the creation of the world. To say that he was "begotten" or "generated" meant no more than that he was brought into being or created. Arius went so far as to say (at least at first) that he was created out of nothing.2 In reaction to this, the Council of Nicea, called by the emperor Constantine to settle the matter in 325, declared the essential deity of the Son by saying in its definitive creed that he was "begotten not made (gennethenta ou poiethenta)"; "consubstantial with the Father (homoousion to(i) Patri)"; and "of the Father's substance (ek tēs ousias tou Patros)". The council, however, had moved ahead of the thinking of many in the
Eastern Church whose thinking was still moulded by the subordinate position often given to the Son by theologians from the second century Apologists up to Origen. Consequently there was a reaction, led by Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of Nicomedia, both of whom sympathised with Arius. Although the Nicene creed remained sacrosanct as long as Constantine lived, the Eusebians achieved the deposition of its most prominent supporters, Eustathius of Antioch, Athanasius of Alexandria and Marcellus of Ancyra. The West, in contrast, remained solidly "Nicene".

It was at an early stage of the controversy, four or five years after the Council of Nicea, that Gregory of Nazianzus was born. Several bishops, passing through Cappadocia in 325 on their way to the council, had baptized his father (also Gregory), a wealthy landowner of the curial class. His mother Nonna was from a Christian family. Gregory the elder became bishop of his home town of Nazianzus in 329, the year that his son was born, and there the younger Gregory grew up, being schooled in the Greek paideia so highly valued by his class. Going to Caesarea, the provincial capital, around 343 to continue his education, he first met Basil, a youth slightly younger than himself, whose grandfather had been converted to Christianity by Gregory Thaumaturgus, the apostle of Cappadocia and disciple of Origen. During these years of Gregory's schooling in Greek paideia and Christian piety, the church at large was struggling with the issues raised by Arianism. By the time Gregory and Basil went to Caesarea in 342 or 343, the dispute had developed
into a serious division between East and West at the Council of Serdica. To the Easterners, Rome's support for the strong opponents of Arianism, Athanasius of Alexandria and Marcellus of Ancyra, was proof of naive "Sabellianism". Marcellus of Ancyra in particular so emphasized the deity of Son and Spirit that he seemed to be compromising their eternal distinctness from the Father in a way similar to the third century heretic, Sabellius. To the Westerners, on the other hand, the Origenistic East with its lack of commitment to the homoousion of the Creed of Nicea was under suspicion of Arianism or Arian sympathies. They so emphasized the distinct existence of the Son and Spirit as hypostaseis distinct from the Father that they appeared to the Westerners to compromise their true deity.

By the time Gregory and Basil left Caesarea to go their separate ways and pursue their education elsewhere, a temporary compromise had been reached. Athanasius, having disowned the "Sabellian" Marcellus along with Rome, had been allowed to return to Alexandria and was occupying his see when the young Gregory visited the schools there following a brief sampling of the education available in Palestinian Caesarea. But Gregory did not wait in either of these scenes of Origen's influence. He hurried on to Athens, landing safely after a stormy and perilous voyage had impressed upon him his need for baptism. By the time his friend Basil joined him in Athens, coming from Constantinople in 351, the temporary settlement of church affairs had ended. That same year the triumph of the emperor Constantius at Mursa supported by the prayers of Valens, the Arian bishop,
initiated a thirty-year period mostly characterized by Arian dominance. While Gregory and Basil were studying rhetoric at the feet of the pagan Himerios and the Christian Prohaeresios in Athens, Constantius was putting pressure on the West at the Councils of Arles and Milan to accept an Arian settlement. By the time Basil was on his way back to Cappadocia to be a lawyer (356), Athanasius was in hiding in Egypt (his third exile) and the Arian George of Cappadocia had been installed in his place as bishop of Alexandria.

The last years of the 350s, as Gregory reluctantly tore himself away from his student life in Athens and followed Basil back to Cappadocia, saw the emergence of several ecclesiastical parties vying with each other for the emperor's approval. A new more radical and consistent form of Arianism emerged, led by Aetius and Eunomius. These Eunomians, as they were later called (or "Neo-Arians", in the useful recent designation of Thomas A. Kopeček), believing that they could define the essence of God as "unbegotten" or "unoriginate" (and recognizing no difference between the two concepts), pronounced that, since the Son was "begotten", then by definition he was not God. He was "of a different substance (heteroousios)" from God. The Neo-Arians were opposed by another emerging party, conventionally known as Homoiousians. This group, led by Basil of Ancyra and Eustathius of Sebaste, represented the old broad Eastern tradition which followed Origen in speaking of Father, Son and Holy Spirit as three hypostases. They were opposed to Arianism, particularly in its new rationalistic form which claimed to be able to define
the essence of God, but, out of fear of "Sabellianism", they did not wish to use the Nicene term *homoousios*. They proposed to avoid both extremes by saying that the Son was "like in substance (*homoios kat' ousian*)" to the Father. After briefly enjoying the emperor's favour during much of 358, the Homoiousians were out-manoeuvred by an alliance of Arian bishops including the Neo-Arian party. The leaders of this Arian alliance, a group of Danubian bishops led by Valens of Mursa, tried to secure broad agreement at the joint councils of Seleucia and Ariminum for dispensing with any reference to essence or substance (*ousia*) and for simply confessing the Son to be "like (*homoion*)" the Father. At the end of 359 the warring factions were summoned to Constantinople by the emperor Constantius to settle their differences. The Homoiousian bishops, Basil of Ancyra and Eustathius of Sebaste, tried to draft the younger Basil from Cappadocia into service as a brilliant young rhetor fresh from his studies in Athens, to face the redoutable Neo-Arian, Aetius, in debate. But he fled, and Aetius triumphed. When Constantius himself undertook a personal investigation, however, Aetius was thrown out of the palace as a troublemaker, and both Neo-Arian and Homoiousian bishops were forced to accept the compromise Homoian solution. Only those on the extremes, Aetius the leading Neo-Arian and uncompromising supporters of Nicea such as Athanasius, were excluded from the settlement.

But in 361, while Basil and Gregory were experimenting with monasticism in Pontus, the Arian dominance was briefly broken. Constantius died and the accession of Julian the
Apostate, once Gregory's fellow-student in Athens, deprived the Arians of imperial support and led to toleration for all. In 362, the year of Athanasius' return to Alexandria and his rapprochement with the Homoiosians at the Council of Alexandria, Gregory was forcibly ordained in Nazianzus and preached his first two sermons. These were given in explanation of his reluctance to accept ordination and his subsequent flight to seclusion in Pontus. They contain his earliest pronouncements on the Trinity and the Spirit, made only two or three years after Athanasius had written his major pneumatological work, the Letters to Serapion.

The year 363 was a hopeful one for the Nicene party. The Homoiosians, repelled by the Neo-Arianism of Aetius and Eunomius and shocked perhaps into a clearer understanding of the issues by the Apologia of Eunomius (published around 360) were now their allies. Basil published his reply to Eunomius, Against Eunomius, probably in 363. Most hopeful of all, the emperor Julian was succeeded by Jovian, a strong Nicene supporter.

But it was a false dawn. The accession of Valens in 364 re-established the Arian supremacy (and specifically the Homoian formula) for a further fourteen years (364-378). During his reign, Gregory served as priest and bishop-coadjutor at Nazianzus. In 370, Basil, who had been ordained in 364, became archbishop of Caesarea, the Cappadocian capital, after a contested election in which the elder Gregory played a decisive part. But the division of the province of Cappadocia at the end of 371 led to an ecclesiastical power struggle between Basil and
Anthimus, the bishop of Tyana, capital of the new province of Cappadocia Secunda, who immediately asserted his claim as metropolitan bishop. Gregory's forced consecration by Basil as bishop of Sasima in Cappadocia Secunda, one of a number of consecrations intended by Basil to maintain his control, led to a rift between the two friends. Gregory never took possession of his see and it was shortly afterwards that he became auxiliary bishop of Nazianzus, continuing to serve after his father's death at an advanced age in 374. The previous year, Athanasius had died, leaving Basil as the leading anti-Arian bishop in the East.

It was in 374 and 375, in response to a request from Amphilochius, bishop of Iconium and cousin of Gregory of Nazianzus, that Basil wrote his treatise, On the Holy Spirit. Fifteen years earlier, Athanasius had written the Letters to Serapion against an obscure Egyptian group who denied the deity of the Spirit and whom he dubbed the Tropici. But now the deity of the Spirit was a matter of widespread debate and was denied even by some who were regarded as orthodox on the deity of the Son. It was probably in 375, the year in which Basil completed On the Holy Spirit that Gregory went into retirement at Seleucia in Isauria after a serious illness. It could well have looked as if his active involvement in church affairs was at an end and that he would be left at last to a life of contemplation.

But that was not to be. The death of Valens in 378 led to the appointment of Theodosius, a Westerner committed to the Nicene faith, as emperor of the East. At this critical point, a
call to Gregory to re-establish the Nicene remnant in Constantinople (which he received almost simultaneously with news of the death of Basil) thrust him from contemplative retirement into the eye of the storm. The next two and a half years were to be the climax of Gregory's career, when as the Church's outstanding orator he was to deliver in the imperial capital major orations proclaiming the doctrine of the Trinity, and was to preside briefly as archbishop of Constantinople at the ecumenical council of 381 which re-established the Nicene faith and added a clearer declaration of the deity of the Spirit. Most of Gregory's expositions of the Trinity and the deity of the Spirit belong to these crucial two and a half years.

Gregory himself, in his autobiographical poem, Concerning His Own Life, distinguished six periods in his time in Constantinople. These are used by Paul Gallay (following the work of Tasdeusz Sinko) as a framework for establishing the chronology of the Constantinopolitan sermons. Gregory arrived in Constantinople early in 379 and set up in a private house the aptly named chapel of the Resurrection, the Anastasia. He immediately faced Arian opposition, both verbal (accusations of tritheism) and physical: the Nicene congregation was attacked with stones during the Easter baptism. But the second period was marked by difficulties of another kind, dissension in his own congregation. This was caused probably by divisions over a long-standing schism at Antioch and by the presence of some Apollinarians. Oration 22, The Second on Peace, was an attempt to calm this storm. Oration 32, On
Moderation in Discussion, was an attempt to deal with the mania for theological discussion he found generally in the capital among both Nicenes and Arians. Both of these sermons, the earliest of Gregory's Constantinopolitan period which we have, include short passages of Trinitarian and pneumatological interest. Oration 33, Against the Arians and of Himself, in which Gregory replies to the charge that he is a stranger and a foreigner, may also be dated in this early part of his sojourn. But the major sermons of this second period begin with Oration 21, On the Great Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria, probably preached on 2nd May, and Oration 41, On Pentecost. The panegyric on Athanasius traces his role in the Arian controversy, praising him for keeping the mean between Arianism and Sabellianism and for acting as mediator in the essentially terminological dispute between the orthodox of East and West. Oration 41, On Pentecost, is notable for its gently persuasive approach to those who are hesitant to say explicitly that the Spirit is God, and on this account is placed this early in his ministry in Constantinople. Next to the Fifth Theological Oration, it is Gregory's fullest statement on the deity of the Spirit. This second period stretches to the beginning of 380 and thus includes three more major sermons, Oration 38, On the Theophany, or Birthday of Christ, thought to have been preached on 25th December, 379, and the twin sermons for Epiphany, Oration 39, On the Holy Lights delivered on 5th January, 380, and Oration 40, On Holy Baptism, preached the next day. The Christmas sermon, Oration 38, focuses first on the
doctrine of God, who is eternal and infinite "like some great sea of being, limitless and unbounded", before proceeding to the "secondary splendours", angels and men, and eventually to the paradoxes of the Incarnation. Oration 39, On the Holy Lights, after a long exordium, comes to two paragraphs on the Trinity and the Spirit identified by Heinrich Dörrie as key ones, introducing phrases crucial for the debate. Oration 40, preached to the catechumens awaiting baptism next day is a powerful and persuasive piece of oratory which reaches its climax in an exposition of the baptismal confession of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. This second period of Gregory's time in Constantinople, a period of about ten months from the Spring of 379 to January, 380, thus includes nine of the 44 extant sermons, five of them, Orations 21, 41, 38, 39 and 40 (in chronological order) being of major significance for his doctrines of the Trinity and the Spirit.

The third period, the Spring of 380, was not to be so productive in major orations, at least according to the chronology of Paul Gallay. It was to be dominated by the bizarre episode of Maximus the Cynic. Oration 25, In Praise of Herona the Philosopher, is a highly laudatory address, eulogizing Maximus, who was an Egyptian Cynic converted to the Nicene faith. It is not known precisely when he arrived in Constantinople, but he was welcomed by Gregory who probably preached this oration on his departure once again to Alexandria. When he returned to Constantinople, however, he had managed to procure the support of Peter of Alexandria, brother of and
successor to the great Athanasius, and stole into the Anastasia during the night with a priest and some Egyptian sailors to forestall Gregory by having himself consecrated archbishop of Constantinople. The affair was ludicrous, but it shook Gregory and demonstrated his gullibility. Three more sermons are connected with those events: Oration 26, To Himself, Oration 34, On the Arrival of the Egyptians, and Oration 23, The Third on Peace. Oration 34, delivered impromptu it would seem when the sailors from the Egyptian corn-fleet by-passed the churches held by the Arians, and came to Gregory's Anastasia, contains an exposition of the Trinity and an assertion of the deity of the Spirit. Gregory thus sought to re-establish the support of the see of Alexandria.

According to Paul Gallay, the Five Theological Orations belong to the fourth period of Gregory's stay in Constantinople, during the summer and autumn of 380. This dating has been challenged by Jan Szymusiak, whose one major alteration to the Sinko-Gallay dating is to date the Theological Orations earlier, during the third period, the Spring of 380, making them contemporary with the Maximus affair. Whichever dating may be correct the Theological Orations are generally regarded as the peak of Gregory's attainments. The first, Oration 27, warns the talkative and disputatious away from theology.

"It does not belong to everyone to philosophize about God... it is permitted only to those who have been examined, and are past masters in contemplation, and who have been previously purified in soul and body, or at the very least are being purified."
The second, *Oration 28,*¹ entitled *On Theology,* is concerned with the incomprehensibility of God. *Oration 29,*² the third, is entitled *On the Son* and deals with the heart of Gregory's Trinitarian concerns, the relationship between the Father and the Son. The fourth, *Oration 30,*³ also entitled *On the Son,* deals with passages of Scripture used by the Arians and interprets them according to the Nicene Christology of Christ as both God and man. The *Fifth Theological Oration,* *Oration 31,*⁴ is Gregory's single most important statement on the Holy Spirit.

*Oration 20,* *On the Teaching and Constitution of Bishops,*⁵ is also regarded as belonging to this fourth period since it echoes the arguments of the first four of the *Theological Orations.* Gallay views it as a first rough draft.⁶ But Szymusiak sees it as a summary of the first four,⁷ which were preached during Lent. The series was interrupted by the return of Maximus (according to this view), and Gregory later summed up their contents in *Oration 20* before preaching the fifth in the series on Pentecost Sunday, 380.

The fifth period of the time in Constantinople begins on 24th November, 380, with the entry of the emperor Theodosius to the city. Theodosius lost no time in summoning Demophilos, the Arian archbishop, who refused to accept the Nicene faith. The Arians were expelled from the churches on 26th November, and the next day, the emperor led Gregory in procession through the streets to the basilica of the Apostles.⁸ Two sermons preached in the basilica between then and the following May are extant. *Oration 36,* *On Himself and Those who said He Desired the See of*
Constantinople, was preached after an assassination attempt.¹ Oration 37, On the Words of the Gospel, is an exposition of Matthew 19: 1-12 concerned with marriage and divorce, yet it ends with two passages on the Trinity.²

Finally, the sixth period began with the meeting of the Council of Constantinople in May, 381, and ended with Gregory's departure from the city in July. The council met under the presidency of Meletius of Antioch and its first act was to recognize Gregory as archbishop of Constantinople. The first sessions saw the withdrawal of thirty-six Pneumatomachi who accepted the deity of the Son, but not the Spirit.³ The death of Meletius brought about Gregory's election as president of the council, but he, failing to gain agreement that the wounds of the schism of Antioch should be healed by recognizing Paulinus, the leader of another faction, as bishop in succession to Meletius, and suffering from ill-health, largely withdrew from the sessions.⁴ The arrival of the Egyptian and Macedonian bishops at the beginning of July brought a challenge to the legitimacy of his election as archbishop, and Gregory immediately resigned.⁵ Oration 42, The Last Farewell, was preached in the basilica before his flock and the 150 bishops of the council.⁶ Not disappointing them, he included an exposition of the Trinitarian faith.⁷

Gregory's last years of retirement in Cappadocia saw two more notable sermons, the Panegyric on Basil, Oration 43,⁸ and the Second Oration on Easter, Oration 45.⁹ The former gives Gregory's explanation of Basil's "economy", that is, his refusal
to state explicitly: "The Spirit is God." The latter has two sections lifted straight from the Christmas sermon, *Oration 38.*

Gregory's retirement was also notable for the three *Theological Letters* on Apollinarianism. He also wrote many of his poems then, including the autobiographical poem *Concerning His Own Life.* His death took place in 389 or at beginning of 390.
(c) Predecessors and Contemporaries

Having set Gregory's works in their biographical context, and his life and work in their historical context in the ecclesiastical struggles of the fourth century, the next task in this introductory review of the background to Gregory's pneumatology is to look briefly at the pneumatology of Gregory's predecessors and contemporaries. Clearly a brief review such as this can be little more than a summary of the work of others, but it will give a useful broader perspective for the later detailed examination of Gregory's contribution. Basil, whose leadership Gregory acknowledged from their student days onwards, had the most immediate influence on his thought. On the other hand, Gregory of Nyssa, the youngest of the great trio, probably had little influence on Gregory Nazianzen. While regarded as the greatest philosophical intellect of the three, his development and elaboration of Cappadocian theology took place mainly in works written in the 380s, the decade of Nazianzen's retirement. 2 Athanasius, both predecessor and contemporary, may be regarded as the one who had the largest single influence on Cappadocian pneumatology, especially that of Nazianzen, but the influence of Basil of Ancyra and the Homoiousian party must not be forgotten. 4 Also, behind all the fourth century debates lies the all-pervasive influence of Origen. Basil and Gregory Nazianzen took a special interest in Origen 5 and inherited his influence specifically through his disciple, Gregory Thaumaturgus, the apostle of Cappadocia.
The object of this section will not be to trace the influence of these predecessors and contemporaries on Gregory of Nazianzus. Comments on their influence will be kept for the study of Nazianzen's own pneumatology in the succeeding chapters. The object here is the preliminary one of presenting the pneumatology of these men in brief outline in order that Gregory's contribution may be seen in perspective.

1. Origen

Origen's teaching on the status of the Holy Spirit appears somewhat ambivalent. In this it reflects a similar apparent ambivalence in his teaching on the status of the Son arising from ambiguities in his whole doctrine of the divine Triad. On the one hand, the Holy Spirit stands with the Father and the Son over against everything else that is. God is good by nature and receives goodness from none; the Word is wise and righteous by nature and receives wisdom and righteousness from none; similarly the Holy Spirit is holy by nature and receives holiness from none. Any other nature which is holy, receives its holiness by participation in the Holy Spirit. Thus Origen emphasized (in the words of G.L. Prestige) "the gulf which separates the Triad of the Godhead from all created beings." He appears even to emphasize co-equality in the Triad: "Nothing in the Triad can be called greater or less." But, on the other hand, in complete contrast, there is a subordinationism in his view of the Triad arising from a strongly hierarchical view in which the Holy Spirit takes third place. The Son and the Holy Spirit transcend
all created beings, but the Son is transcended by the Father in as great a degree, or even greater, than that by which he himself and the Holy Spirit transcend the best of other beings.¹ Part of this hierarchical picture is Origen's reservation of the term agenêtos (ingenerate, without beginning) for the Father, classifying the Son and the Spirit as genêta (generated things, things with a beginning).² At one point, commenting on John 1:3, "All things were made through him," he concludes:

"We Catholic Christians...believing that nothing is ingenerate (agenêton) except the Father, must admit as more reverent and as true the answer which places the Holy Spirit in the category of things made by the Father through the Son, although in honour he is above them all."³

It seems as if Origen is simply making clear here in the case of the Holy Spirit what is implied by the term genêta, that the Son and the Spirit are creatures. According to G.L. Prestige, however, this inference is utterly false.⁴ Prestige draws attention to a phrase in the Contra Celsum in which Origen refers to the Son as "the agenêtos, and first born of all genêtos nature."

"It must be perfectly obvious," concludes Prestige, "that, if the Logos is both agenêtos and genêtos, the one word cannot simply imply just the plain negative of the other word. He is agenêtos or uncreated because he belongs to the Triad of deity, and uncreated life is the substance of his being. On the other hand, he is genêtos or derivative because he is not himself the source and origin of that being, but derives it from the Father."⁵

While paradoxical, therefore, Origen's use of language is not inconsistent, and his subtle distinction was to be made clearer by the later terminological distinction between gennêtos, from the verb gennaô, to be born, and genêtos, from the verb ginomai.
to become or come into being. This distinction made it possible for Athanasius to argue that the Son was *agenētos*, that is, that he had never at any time come into existence and was eternal as the Father was eternal, but that he was simultaneously *gennētos*, generate, in the sense that He was derived from the Father by an eternal, not a temporal, generation.

In Origen's own thought, however, the role of the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son was more subtle. Eternal generation was less distinctive in that not only was the Son eternally generated, but the other *genēta*, the rational creatures, were also eternal. Yet despite that, they were creatures, whereas the Son and the Spirit were not. The Father may be the source of being both for the Son and the Spirit on the one hand and for the rational creatures on the other, and the rational creatures may thus participate in the Father's divine attributes along with the Son and the Spirit; but the Son and the Spirit possess divinity as their proper and inalienable substance, whereas the reasonable creatures share in the divine attributes imperfectly and accidentally. According to Henri Crouzel, this substantial character of all which the three persons possess distinguishes them clearly from the creatures and "fonde entre elles une égalité qui n'est pas inconciliable avec une hiérarchie intérieure à la Trinité."

Origen's teaching on the Triad has frequently been compared with the three *hypostaseis* of Plotinus, the One, the Mind, and the Soul. Certainly there are similarities. Both use the word *hypostasis*, both speak of three *hypostaseis*, and in both
schemes there is a hierarchy. For Plotinus, since the One (τον έν) is beyond limitation of any kind, it is therefore beyond plurality, beyond thought and even beyond being. Only negative theology, denying any specific predication, can therefore be used to refer to it. The superabundant power of the One overflows as light outflows or radiates from the sun, but in a non-material and totally effortless emanation.

The result of this emanation is the second hypostasis, the Mind or Intellectual-principle (ὁ νοῦς). This Universal Intelligence is "a unity-in-plurality, a multiple organism containing a plurality of Forms and Intelligences." It "embraces the whole Intelligible world in a single timeless vision," and in a "perfect self-awareness...based on full identity between subject and object." From this hypostasis emanates the third, Soul (ἡ ψυχή), indivisible and immaterial, but intermediate between the intelligible and sensible worlds. The Soul contemplates the Forms in the Intelligible world (although not in a single timeless vision like the self-contemplation of Mind or Intelligence). More accurately, the Soul contemplates images or verbal formulae reflecting the Forms, and so produces and governs bodies extended in space. It can thus be described as twofold, "a higher and a lower, the former standing nearer to Nous and being in no immediate contact with the material world, the latter (γεννήμα ψυχῆς προτερας) being the real soul of the phenomenal world," also termed nature or physis.

Clearly there are differences as well as similarities
between the two schēmas. For Plotinus, the One is beyond plurality, thought, and being, but for Origen, while God is beyond plurality, he is not beyond thought and being. He is "an uncompounded intellectual nature...the mind and source from which all intellectual nature or mind takes its beginning," and Origen speaks of his "nature", his "real substance" and "being". For Origen, the second hypostasis contains the Forms, the pre-existent ideas according to which the world is patterned; and similarly, for Plotinus, Intellect, the second hypostasis, contains the Forms. Here perhaps with regard to the two second hypostases the conceptions are most similar, but even here there is the major difference, of course, that for Origen, the Logos became incarnate and experienced death and resurrection. But the most marked difference between the two Triads is that between Origen's view of the Holy Spirit and the Plotinian concept of Soul. The Soul has a universal role. It forms reflections of the Forms which are in the Intellect, the logoi spermatikoi, through which it "everlasting forms, orders and governs the material universe." By contrast, Origen gives the Holy Spirit no clear role in creation. The Father bestows existence on all things, the Son bestows rationality on the rational creatures, and the Spirit bestows sanctity on the saints. This appears to give the Spirit a more restricted role, but this doctrine of appropriations must not be taken too far. According to Henri Crouzel, the idea that this implies a hierarchy of power is Jerome's interpretation and not a conclusion drawn by Origen himself. Further, even the idea of
restricted spheres of work for the Spirit and the Son must be
treated with caution. Origen also writes of the operation of
both Father and Son in all things which exist, and of every
rational creature receiving a share of the Spirit as surely as of
the Word. According to Crouzel, creation is viewed by Origen as
the common work of the Trinity. Joseph Wilson Trigg may
consequently be going too far in saying that Origen denies the
Spirit a role in creation. Nevertheless Trigg is right that the
Holy Spirit is not assigned a specific role in creation
comparable to the role assigned to the third hypostasis in the
thought of Plotinus. It is thus true of Origen's thought that,
"like the doctrine of Christ's Incarnation, the doctrine of the
Holy Spirit owes nothing to Platonism."

2. Athanasius

The half-century which separates the birth of Athanasius
(c. 298) from the death of Origen (c. 254) may in part explain the
difference in perspective in Athanasius' doctrine of the Spirit.
But Origen's disagreement with the bishop of Alexandria leading
to his expulsion in c. 229 indicates that the differences may also
be attributed to different theological traditions in Alexandria,
perhaps that of the episcopal succession, and that of the
catechetical school. Athanasius stands in the episcopal
succession. Certainly, significant similarities may be observed
between the Triadic doctrine of Origen and that of Athanasius,
most notably the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son.
But even this is set in a different perspective. For Athanasius,
the eternal generation of the Son is quite clearly unique. Both may state that the eternally-generated Son is *homoousios* with the Father (although this is disputed in the case of Origen), but for Athanasius, Father, Son and Holy Spirit are alone eternal. The cosmos of eternal *logikoi* falls away.$^3$

The quite different perspective of Athanasius has been attributed by Brooks Otis to his inheritance of the Irenaean tradition. Otis sees two systems of thought contending in the fourth century Church, the Irenaean and the Origenist.$^5$ He regards Arianism as the outcome of an Origenist tradition$^4$ and Athanasius as standing within the tradition characterised as Irenaean.

For the purposes of this chapter it is not necessary to investigate such broad claims about the development of Christian thought. It is sufficient to note that Athanasius' perspective is different from that of Origen and to investigate Athanasius' doctrine of the Spirit as it is presented in the *Letters to Serapion*. Since Athanasius' theology is so interwoven around the same essential themes, and since the *Letters to Serapion* are a late work and extend his Christological perspective into pneumatology, an analysis of the argument of the *Letters* will give a sufficiently accurate picture of Athanasius' doctrine of the Spirit.$^5$

Three inseparable axioms in the thought of Athanasius form a coherent perspective for his pneumatology.

First, Athanasius assumes the unity and indivisibility of
the Triad. This axiom is first stated early in the First Letter in the form of a charge against the Tropici: ¹

"Why have they not understood that just as by not dividing the Son from the Father they ensure that God is one, so by dividing the Spirit from the Word they no longer ensure that the Godhead in the Triad is one, for they tear it asunder, and mix with it a nature foreign to it and of a different kind and put it on a level with the creatures? On this showing, once again the Triad is no longer one but is compounded of two differing natures."²

Athanasius then launches into twelve paragraphs (3-14) countering the exegetical arguments of the Tropici, concluding with a re-statement of the same axiom.³ The same axiom runs through the next section (paragraphs 15-20).⁴ Athanasius then sets this theme aside temporarily while he devotes attention to the attributes and actions of the Spirit in Scripture (paragraphs 21-27) but returns to it to make it one of the themes of the concluding section of the first letter (paragraphs 28-33).⁵ Here he links it with baptism in paragraphs 28, 29 and extensively in paragraph 30:

"...He who takes anything away from the Triad, and is baptized in the name of the Father alone, or in the name of the Son alone, or in the Father and the Son without the Holy Spirit receives nothing... For as baptism, which is given in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is one...so the holy Triad, being identical with itself and united within itself, has in it nothing which belongs to things originate. This is the indivisible unity of the Triad..."⁶

In this concluding section, the unity of the Triad is linked to its unity in action: "The activity of the Triad is one."⁷ The penultimate sentence of the letter re-iterates the theme as a warning:

"Let them not divide the Triad, lest they be divided from life."⁸
In the second letter, devoted to Christology, this axiom is not explicitly stated, but it is stated in the third letter, where the Christological arguments are carried over into pneumatology, and in the fourth letter, most prominently in his concluding summary:

"The Godhead which is in this Triad is one; and there is one faith and one baptism given therein."

The importance of this axiom is recognized in standard histories of doctrine, and confirmed by studies such as those by Theodore C. Campbell and George D. Dragas.

The second of the Inseparable axioms appears in subtly different forms. It first appears in the first paragraph of the first letter:

"For as the Arians in denying the Son deny also the Father, so also these men in speaking evil of the Holy Spirit speak evil also of the Son." Here the axiom seems to take the form of a principle of proportion: as the Son is to the Father, so the Holy Spirit is to the Son. In this form it makes a frequent appearance as an ontological and an epistemological principle.

But it is perhaps in the second and third letters that the epistemological significance of this principle becomes clearest. The whole of the second letter is devoted to a restatement of Christology, specifically the homoousion, the reason for which becomes clear at the beginning of the third letter:

"Perhaps you will wonder why, when I was charged to abridge...the letter I had written concerning the Holy Spirit, you find me...writing against those who are guilty of impiety towards the Son of God..."

He explains:
"It is natural, therefore that I should have spoken and written first concerning the Son, that from our knowledge of the Son we may be able to have true knowledge of the Spirit. For we shall find that the Spirit has to the Son the same proper relationship as we have known the Son to have to the Father."

The final sentence here states the axiom as the principle of proportion, the relationship of the Spirit to the Son is the same as the relationship of the Son to the Father. But the preceding sentence states the same axiom in a slightly simpler form: our knowledge of the Spirit comes from our knowledge of the Son. This is repeated at III.4:

"We must take our knowledge of the Spirit from the Son."

Consequently,

"if the Son is not a creature...it follows that the Spirit cannot be a creature."2

This second axiom is thus a statement of what Charles Kannengiesser has called "the Christological concentration of the notion of Pneuma in Athanasius."3 T.F. Torrance concludes:

"...In the order of Athanasius' development of formulated doctrine, controlled knowledge of the Spirit is taken from our knowledge of the Son and of the Father through the Son... The mutual relation of the Son and the Father constitutes the epistemic ground for all our knowledge of God."4

Similar judgments were made C.R.B. Shapland6 and J.A.B. Holland.6

This second axiom takes yet another subtly different form when it is expressed in the traditional images for the Trinity which Athanasius traces back to Scripture:

"As then the Father is light and the Son is his radiance... we may see in the Son the Spirit also by whom we are enlightened... Again, as the Father is fountain and the Son is called river, we are said to drink of the Spirit."7

Rather than casting the axiom in the form of a principle of
proportion or correlation, the images express it as a series relationship:\(^1\) from the Father through the Son to the Spirit.

The question which arises is whether this series relationship suggested by the images is to be understood ontologically as a model for the intra-Trinitarian relationships. Despite occasional phrases which may seem to suggest an ontological interpretation of the images,\(^2\) it is much more likely that Athanasius had mainly in mind here the economic movement of the Triad in revelation and redemption. That seems to be clear from the way the images are made to refer to the Spirit as the one "by whom we are enlightened" and as the one of whom we drink.\(^3\) The ontological conclusion Athanasius draws from the series relationship depicted in the images is not that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and the Son from the Father, but the unity and mutual coinherence of the Triad:

"But if there is such co-ordination and unity within the holy Triad, who can separate either the Son from the Father, or the Spirit from the Son or from the Father himself?"\(^4\)

We may not understand how this may be, but divine Scripture has given us these illustrations to help us to apprehend that,

"As the Son is in the Spirit as in his own image, so also the Father is in the Son."\(^5\)

This second axiom is thus not only an expression of a Christocentric doctrine of the Spirit, but also inseparable from the first axiom, the unity and indivisibility of the Triad.

The third of the three inseparable axioms is the radical disjunction between the Creator and the creature. This is also closely connected with the first axiom, the indivisibility of the
Triad. These two axioms appear together at the beginning of the First Letter:

"...they [the Tropici] no longer ensure that the Godhead is one, for they tear it asunder, and mix with it a nature foreign to it and of a different kind, and put it on a level with the creatures. On this showing, once again the Triad is no longer one but is compounded of two different natures... What doctrine of God is this, which compounds him out of Creator and creature?"

The two axioms are restated in 1,17:

For this reason too, it is madness to call him a creature. If he were a creature, he would not be ranked with the the Triad. For the whole Triad is one God. It is enough to know that the Spirit is not a creature, nor is he numbered with the things that are made. For nothing foreign is mixed with the Triad; it is indivisible and consistent.

The Creator-creature disjunction then becomes the basis for a section of the First Letter in which Athanasius looks "one by one at the references to the Holy Spirit in the divine Scriptures" in order to judge "whether he has anything in common with the creatures or whether he pertains to God." The Spirit sanctifies me and is not sanctified; he gives life and he anoints; through the Spirit we participate in God; all things are created through the Spirit and he is the one in whom creation is made divine; the Spirit is immutable, and omnipresent; he is partaken and does not partake; he is one but the creatures are many. Consequently the Spirit is "proper (idion) to God and one in essence (homoousion) with him." For all these reasons the Spirit is the Creator and not a creature:

"These sayings concerning the Holy Spirit by themselves alone show that in nature and essence he has nothing in common with or proper to creatures, but is distinct from things originate, proper to, and not alien from, the Godhead and essence of the Son; in virtue of which essence and nature he is of the Holy Triad..."
This third axiom is the one most closely related to the question of Athanasius' ontology. In positing this radical disjunction between the Creator and creation, Athanasius clearly ranges himself with the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* developed by Irenaeus, Tertullian and others. He takes this position over against the hierarchical cosmologies of Gnosticism or Neo-Platonism where reality descends in stages from the divine to the less divine. But it is in the course of using this disjunction to establish the deity of the Spirit that Athanasius employs the non-Biblical, Hellenistic concept of "substance (*ousia*)", by insisting that the Spirit is "one in essence (*homoousion*)" with God. Does this suggest that Athanasius' theology was finally controlled by a Hellenistic, perhaps a Platonist, ontology?

The fact that Athanasius scarcely uses the Nicene catch-word *homoousion* till later in his career suggests that the answer to this question is no. It would appear that the concept of "substance" was not fundamental to his belief in the deity of the Son and the Spirit but simply a convenient means of expression which performed the useful function of ruling out Arianism. Having used it to defend the deity of the Son, Athanasius is the one who extends its usage here in the *Letters to Serapion* to the Spirit. Here also, it would appear, he is using it as a convenient way of defending the deity (this time) of the Spirit, and not as a philosophical statement on the nature of being of God. James Mackey diagnoses the problem with this extension of *homoousion* to the Spirit, namely that it broke the explanatory link of *homoousion* with the concept of generation. No doubt
this was an apologetic disadvantage. Athanasius seems to have been prepared to accept this disadvantage in order to use the concept of *homoousion* to clarify and emphasize the indivisibility and unity-in-being of the Triad as one God, the Creator over against his creation.

3. Basil

Of all Gregory Nazianzen's predecessors and contemporaries, Basil had the most immediate influence. It is reasonable to assume that since they were fellow-students and close friends, the mature thought of each would be the result of reciprocal influence. Yet Basil is generally regarded as the leader and pioneer. Once again, as with Origen and Athanasius, Basil's pneumatology must be seen within the context of his doctrine of the Trinity. The thesis of Zahn and Harnack, that Basil, emerging from the Homoiousian party led by Basil of Ancyra, reinterpreted *homoousios* to mean, in effect, *homoiousios* has been widely rejected. Yet it is still useful to refer to Basil and his followers as "neo-Nicenes". The significant difference is not their precise philosophical understanding of *ousia* nor that they had a weaker concept of the unity of God, but the more obvious fact that, unlike Athanasius and the "old Nicenes", they spoke of "three hypostases". Here they represented the broad tradition of Eastern triadology with its strong opposition to Sabellianism. Basil's achievement was to achieve a synthesis between this and the Athanasian emphasis on the unity of God expressed in the *homoousion* of the Son.
This Eastern triadology is frequently referred to as "Origenist", and indeed Origen was the originator of the terminology of "three hypostaseis" in Christian theology.\(^1\) There is some evidence for a direct line of influence from Origen to Basil in that it was Origen's pupil, Gregory Thaumaturgus, who evangelized Cappadocia and who laid the foundations of Christian teaching there. The Creed of Gregory Thaumaturgus\(^2\) has long been regarded as influential on Basil.\(^3\) There is also evidence of Basil's Origenism in the Philocalia,\(^4\) a selection of excerpts from the works of Origen, which he compiled along with Gregory Nazianzen. But the authenticity of the Creed is disputed,\(^5\) while the Philocalia contains nothing of Origen's triadology.\(^6\) The conclusion that Basil's doctrine of the Trinity is influenced by Origen cannot therefore be supported by the specific documentary evidence of references to Gregory Thaumaturgus. It must rest more generally upon the historical link with Thaumaturgus, and, more significantly perhaps, theologically, on the structure of Basil's thought, his use and development of the language of three hypostaseis.\(^7\)

The other element in Basil's synthesis is the influence of Athanasius and the Nicene party. Here again, there is on the one hand the external historical evidence of Basil's acknowledgement of Athanasius as the leading figure among the orthodox, and on the other the substantive theological point, the homoousion. Benoît Pruche particularly emphasized the influence of Athanasius on Basil. He wrote of Basil:

"Dans la 'bataille contre l'Esprit' c'est encore vers Alexandrie qu'il jette les yeux. Il les jettera souvent, et
The combined influence of Origen and Athanasius is therefore to be seen in Basil's Trinitarian theology, perhaps most clearly in the formula *mia ousia, treis hypostaseis*, in which Athanasius' emphasis on the unity of God is brought together with Origen's "three hypostaseis". According to Boris Bobrinskoy,

"The great theological innovation of St Basil was to define the terminological distinction between ousia and hypostasis, between 'essence' and 'person'. This entailed elaborating the specific and inalienable characteristics of each hypostasis..."

Basil states his view briefly:

"Ousia has the same relation to hypostasis as the common has to the particular...the term ousia is common, like goodness, or Godhead, or any similar attribute; while hypostasis is contemplated in the special property of Fatherhood, Sonship, or the power to sanctify."

Basil, however, abandoned this scheme at times, perhaps because he was aware of the danger of tritheism which was inherent in thinking of ousia as referring only to common attributes. It is against the background of this Trinitarian theology (the one ousia and the hypostaseis of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and the clearer definition of terminology) that Basil's pneumatology must be considered as it is expressed in his treatise of 375, *On the Holy Spirit*. 

The occasion which led to the writing of *On the Holy Spirit* was a dispute over Basil's use of an unfamiliar doxology to God the Father "with the Son together with the Holy Spirit," in addition to the more familiar "through the Son in the Holy Spirit." The treatise was written in response to a request from
Amphilochius, the bishop of Iconium, who was present when the dispute arose. But there was another context in the colloquy which Basil had had with Eustathius of Sebaste.¹

It will be helpful to identify six sections in the work. First, the dispute over the doxologies is reflected in the introductory section (Chapters I to VIII) and in the concluding section (Chapters XXV to XXIX).² Basil's defence of the unfamiliar doxology begins with an attack on "an old sophism invented by Aetius," that

"things naturally unlike are expressed in unlike terms, and, conversely, that things expressed in unlike terms are naturally unlike."³

From this principle his opponents have established a rule that "of whom (ex hoi)" must be assigned only to the Father, "by whom (di' hoi)" to the Son and "in whom (en hoi)" to the Holy Spirit. Basil attributes this rule to pagan writers,⁴ and has no difficulty in showing that it is not observed in Scripture.⁵ The words of I Cor. 8:6 are

"the words of a writer not laying down a rule, but carefully distinguishing the hypostases."⁶

In Romans 11:36, according to Basil, Paul uses "of him (ex autou)", "through him (di' autou)" and "to him (eis auton)" all in reference to the Son.⁷

The substantive point at issue here is the question of the equality of the hypostases. Basil is disputing with those who share with him the Origenist inheritance of three hypostases, and is trying to rid this tradition of its subordinationism. He therefore turns the argument from prepositions back on his
opponents to prove the identity of essence and equality of Father and Son. The Son is not "after" the Father temporally and therefore is not to be subordinated or "subnumerated (hyparithmoumenon)" but "connumerated (synarithmoumenon)" as one of equal dignity (homotimon). The doxology "through him (di' autou)" is to be understood economically, and "with him (met' autou)" ontologically.

When he returns to the doxologies in Chapter XXV, Basil extends the equality at greater length to the Holy Spirit. Although Scripture never uses the phrase "with the Spirit (syn tōē Pneumati)", the phrase "in him (en autō)" does not imply a lower dignity, and "with the Holy Spirit (syn tōē hagiō Pneumati)" implies exactly the same as "and the Holy Spirit (kai tou hagiou Pneumatōs)" found in Matt. 28:19, and in effect in II Cor. 13:13 and Rom. 15:30. "In the Spirit (en tōē Pneumati)" refers to the role of the Spirit economically as the "place" of the sanctified, but "with the Spirit" is sanctioned by tradition. Basil appeals to Irenaeus, Clement of Rome, Dionysius of Rome and Dionysius of Alexandria, Eusebius of Caesarea, and Origen, and attributes the use of the phrase in Cappadocia directly to Gregory Thaumaturgus.

The second section of the treatise is Chapter IX. Here Basil appeals to "common conceptions (kolnai ennoiai)" of the Spirit drawn from Scripture and unwritten tradition. This chapter has attracted much comment. Several Scriptural citations, and particularly the title, "Holy Spirit", lead us to think, according to Basil, of
"an intelligent essence, in power infinite, in magnitude unlimited, unmeasured by times or ages...perfecting all other things, but itself in nothing lacking...supplier of life...omnipresent, origin of sanctification, light perceptible to the mind..."

Hermann Dörries drew attention to the special position of this chapter as an isolated period of calm in the midst of the storm. It has no specific references to the debate on the doxologies which dominates the preceding chapters, or to the colloquy with Eustathius of Sebaste, which forms the background to Chapters X to XXVII. Hans Dehnhard and S. de Boer maintained that it was influenced by Plotinus, Origen and Gregory Thaumaturgus, but this has been questioned by John M. Rist.

A third major section in On the Holy Spirit, Chapters X to XVI, concerns the significance of baptism and the baptismal formula from Matt. 28:19 for the doctrine of the Spirit. The baptismal formula is introduced to refute the assertion of his opponents that

"it is not permissible for the Holy Spirit to be ranked with the Father and Son, on account of the difference of his nature and the inferiority of his dignity."

The issue is once again, as with the doxologies, the equality of the Spirit, and once again one of Basil's main arguments is the use of Matt. 28:19. This time however, he is not deducing the equality of the Spirit from the word "and". His argument is rather that the Christian's faith, baptism and regeneration are bound inseparably to Father Son and Holy Spirit. To deny one is to lose all.

"For he who does not believe the Spirit does not believe in the Son, and he who has not believed in the Son does not believe in the Spirit."
The theme is as much the inseparability of Father, Son and Spirit as their equality. After dealing with some objections, Basil develops the idea of inseparability in Chapter XVI. He begins:

"In all things the Holy Spirit is inseparable and wholly incapable of being parted from the Father and the Son."

The inseparability is to be seen in the *opera ad extra* of Father, Son and Spirit. The three are inseparable in prophecy. Peter's words to Sapphira show us:

"that in every operation the Spirit is closely conjoined with and inseparable from, the Father and the Son."

The three are inseparable in creation. We are to think of:

"the original cause of all things that are made, the Father; the creative cause, the Son; the perfecting cause, the Spirit."

The three are also inseparable in the *oikonomia*. "Our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ" worked through the Spirit before and in His coming in the flesh. In his ministry,

"every operation was wrought with the co-operation of the Spirit."

He works now through the Spirit in the Church, and the Holy Spirit will be present with Him in the *parousia*. Inseparability is to be seen above all in 1 Cor. 2:11.

"But the greatest proof of the conjunction of the Spirit with the Father and the Son is that he is said to have the same relation to God which the Spirit has to each of us."

The fourth section to be identified comprises only two chapters, XVII and XVIII, and is concerned with number and the *hypostaseis*. "Subnumeration" is again rejected, and Basil maintains that God is "above and beyond number."

"We proclaim each of the *hypostaseis* singly; and, when count we must, we do not let an ignorant arithmetic carry us away
to the idea of a plurality of gods."¹

There is the "distinction of hypostaseis (to idiazon tôn hypostaseōn)" but "we also abide by the Monarchy."² This is to be understood by means of the mutual indwelling,

"for the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son... and herein is the Unity."³

The Spirit similarly does not share plurality with the creatures, but the unity of God.⁴ The Spirit is "of God (ek tou Theou)"... "in the sense of proceeding out of God, not by generation, like the Son, but as Breath of His mouth... Thus the close relation is made plain while the ineffable existence is safeguarded."⁵

The fifth section of the treatise, Chapters XIX to XXIV, is concerned with the Scriptural evidence for the deity of the Spirit seen against the radical disjunction: either creature or Creator. There is no third possibility.⁶ The titles⁷ and operations⁸ of the Spirit in Scripture and the texts where the Spirit is called "Lord"⁹ all lead us to glorify the Spirit with the Father and the Son.¹⁰

The sixth and final section, comprising Chapters XXV to XXIX,¹¹ returns, as noted already, to the defence of the disputed Doxology.¹² But a new theme makes its appearance here, one of the most original points in On the Holy Spirit. In setting out the traditional support for "with the Spirit", Basil develops in Chapter XXVII the distinction between dogma and kerygma.

"Dogma and kerygma are two distinct things; the former is observed in silence; the latter is proclaimed to all the world."¹³

There are, therefore,

"unwritten precepts and practices, that the knowledge of our dogmas may not become neglected and contemned by the
multitude through familiarity."

The disputed doxology belongs to this secret unwritten tradition dating back to the apostles. Basil concludes his treatise with an epilogue (Chapter XXX) bewailing the state of the Church.

From this brief examination of Basil's On the Holy Spirit, two comments need to be made. First, all three of the axioms of Athanasius are present. The unity and inseparability of the Trinity is defended, especially in the third section (Chapters X to XVI); the principle of proportion (as the Father is to the Son, so the Son is to the Spirit) is also present with its Christocentric implications in the same section; and the Creator-creature disjunction is present as the axiom underlying the examination of the Scriptural evidence in the fifth section. The second of these axioms is developed somewhat with the use of causality in construing the relationships between hypostaseis.

The second comment is that although Basil clearly accepts the deity of the Spirit, he refuses to state it explicitly. He refuses to state that the Spirit is homoousios with the Father and the Son, preferring to say that the Spirit is homotimos, of equal rank; and he refuses to state explicitly, "The Spirit is God." This "economy" of Basil seems to be linked to his distinction between kerygma and dogma, but all of this must be set in the context of his development of an apophatic theology in deliberate contrast to the rationalism of Eunomius.
4. Didymus and Gregory of Nyssa

Of Nazianzen's other contemporaries, two must receive at least a brief mention, namely Didymus the Blind and Gregory of Nyssa, the third of the great Cappadocian Fathers.

Didymus was head of the catechetical school at Alexandria throughout the latter half of the fourth century and is generally celebrated for his encyclopaedic knowledge rather than for his original intellect. His Trinitarian doctrine is similar to the Cappadocians, but it seems to be difficult to determine whether they were influenced by him or he by them. P.C. Christou and Boris Bobrinskoy assume the former. Christou believes that although the authentic writings of Didymus may not have been disseminated until after 381, they probably included material taught earlier in the catechetical school. This would explain the similarity of the arguments of Basil and Gregory Nazianzen to those of "leur maître alexandrin". Bobrinskoy sees Nazianzen as closer to the Alexandrian tradition than Basil and regards him as a "disciple of Didymus". The older standard work of Gustave Bardy, however, regarded it as unlikely that Nazianzen was influenced by his stay in Alexandria and more likely that Didymus was influenced by the Cappadocians.

Unlike Athanasius and like the Cappadocians, Didymus spoke of one ousia and three hypostaseis. In speaking of three hypostaseis, he stood like the Cappadocians in the tradition of Origen, but according to Alasdair Heron, he adopted only one side of Origen's teaching. He dropped that side of Origen's thinking which distinguished gradations of being within the
Trinity itself: "The hierarchical cosmology, pivoting on the Logos/Son, which is fundamental to Origen's system, has been quietly left aside."1 Rather, Didymus emphasizes the absolute contrast between God and creatures: God is simple and uncompounded and infinite; he is goodness, holiness and wisdom. The creatures only share his attributes by participation in God as he indwells them. Against the background of this absolute contrast, "the qualities and nature of the Holy Spirit are identical with those of the Father and the Son."2 Being holy in himself, he sanctifies his creatures as he indwells them. Didymus therefore speaks openly of the Holy Spirit as God, consubstantial with the Father and the Son.3

Gregory of Nyssa, Basil's younger brother, surpassed both Basil and Gregory Nazianzen as a speculative theologian. But since his works were written and published mainly after Nazianzen's retirement it is unlikely that he had any detectable influence on Nazianzen's thought.4 One possible exception is his treatise _That There Are Not Three Gods_, traditionally given the date of 375.5 As its title suggests, this work was intended to rebut charges of tritheism against the Cappadocian doctrine, charges presumably raised among the "old Nicenes" by talk of three _hypostaseis_. Gregory of Nyssa argues from a Platonist concept of the real unity of the humanity shared by three men to the real unity of the deity, and secondly that each operation of God in creation is a unity, having its origin in the Father, proceeding through the Son and reaching its completion by the Holy Spirit. This emphasis on the unity of God, shared by
Nazianzen, is complemented by an emphasis on the distinction of the persons with respect to causality. There is the cause, one which depends on the cause, and one which is derived from what immediately depends on the first cause. We must therefore distinguish between the nature of God, which is one, and cause, which refers to a difference in manner of existence.

This Trinitarian theology is very similar to that of Nazianzen, but it is impossible to establish that Nazianzen was influenced by his younger contemporary since there are reasons for assigning the treatise a later date, probably 390. If anything, it is more reasonable to assume that the greater philosophical gifts of Gregory of Nyssa elaborated, refined and developed the Trinitarian theology pioneered by Basil and given its classic form in the elegant, balanced and persuasive oratory of Gregory the Theologian.

The only major work of Gregory of Nyssa which was certainly known by Nazianzen before his retirement was Against Eunomius, Gregory of Nyssa's reply to the delayed response of Eunomius to Basil's Against Eunomius composed between 363 and 365. Gregory read his first two books to Gregory of Nazianzus and Jerome in 381 just before or during the Council of Constantinople. By that time however, Nazianzen's theology was well-formed, and he had already delivered almost all his major orations. The conclusion must be that if there is any detectable influence, it is more likely to be the influence of Gregory Nazianzen upon Gregory of Nyssa.
The Character of Gregory's Theology

Having briefly summarized the pneumatology of Gregory's most influential predecessors and contemporaries, this introductory chapter must conclude with a provisional glance at the character of Gregory's theology. The treatment must be provisional if it is to avoid discussing prematurely matters which will be best left to succeeding chapters. Two related characteristics may be noted.

First, Gregory's theology is mystical in the sense of mysticism defined by Vladimir Lossky: "personal experience of the divine mysteries." As "preached" theology, formulated not in treatises or theses for debate, but in sermons preached by the bishop in the midst of the worshipping church, captured "live" for the most part by stenographers, it breathes an awareness of the reality and presence of the Triune God. It is quite possible to hold that Gregory was deluded, but it is scarcely possible to deny that he believed he was in the presence of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit of whom he spoke. Jean Plagnieux described this as a "réalisme spirituel." A recurring expression of it is Gregory's repeated insistence that it is not terminology which matters, but reality: "Truth is a matter not of names (onomata) but of realities (pragmata)."

Secondly, this mysticism, being an awareness of the reality of the mystery of God rather than a concern with terminology, issues in an apophatic theology, one which refrains from attempting to express the inexpressible. Gregory shared Basil's reaction to Eunomius. Nicholas Gendle comments:

"It would be hard to over-emphasize the importance of the challenge of Eunomius for the spiritual doctrine of the Cappadocians. ...his literal interpretation of Jn 4:32 ('we
worship what we know') in terms of a divine essence absolutely comprehensible in its simplicity, was anathema to them. Such extreme over-intellectualism threatened to eliminate completely the mystical and experiential element in Christianity, reducing theology to a mere analysis of abstract ideas."

The result is Nazianzen's emphasis on the "radical unknowability" of God, and on "the innate inadequacy of theological language."

These are the two conclusions towards which he works throughout the First Theological Oration. He begins by protesting against the Eunomians, "persons who pride themselves on their eloquence", "who delight in profane babblings...and strifes about words...".

"Every market place must buzz with their talking; and every dinner party be worried to death with silly talk and boredom...the evil is intolerable and not to be borne, and our great mystery is in danger of being made a thing of little moment."

Against this talkativeness Gregory asserts:

"Not to everyone, my friends, does it belong to philosophize about God; not to everyone - the subject is not so cheap and low - and, I will add, not before every audience, nor at all times, nor on all points; but on certain occasions, and before certain persons, and within certain limits."

It is only permitted to "past masters in meditation, to those who have been previously purified in soul and body, or at the very least are being purified." Gregory devotes an entire oration to the spiritual preparation of the theologian before coming to theology itself at the beginning of the Second Theological Oration:

"...Let us now enter upon theological questions, setting at the head thereof the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, of whom we are to treat..."

He begins "to go up eagerly into the Mount," but soon makes a discovery:

"What is this that has happened to me, O friends, and initiates, and fellow lovers of the truth? I was running to lay hold on God, and thus went up into the Mount, and drew aside the curtain of the cloud... And then when I looked up,
I scarce saw the back parts of God... And when I looked a little closer, I saw, not the first and unmingled nature, known to itself — to the Triad, I mean... but only that nature which at last even reaches to us. And that is, as far as I can learn the majesty, or, as holy David calls it, the glory which is manifested among the creatures, which it has produced and governs. For these are the back parts of God, which he leaves behind him, as tokens of himself, like the shadows and reflection of the sun in the water, which show the sun to our weak eyes, because we cannot look at the sun himself, for by his unmixed light he is too strong for our power of perception."

It is in the light of this experience of God that Gregory enunciates the thesis towards which he has been driving: the "radical unknowability" of God, and "the innate inadequacy of theological language." He enunciates them first in the words of "one of the Greek teachers of divinity" (apparently Plato):

"It is difficult to conceive God, but to define him in words is an impossibility."3

But Gregory is not satisfied with this and strengthens it:

"But in my opinion it is impossible to express him, and yet more impossible to conceive him."4

The Second Theological Oration is accordingly devoted to the theme of the incomprehensibility of God.5

It must be said that with Gregory, as with Basil, this apophaticism does not result in agnosticism. Positive statements about God follow in the Third Theological Oration:

"But since to rebuke others is a matter of no difficulty whatever, but a very easy thing, which anyone who likes can do: whereas to substitute one's own belief for theirs is the part of a pious and intelligent man, let us, relying on the Holy Spirit, who among them is dishonoured but among us is adored, bring forth to the light our own conceptions about the Godhead..."6

Yet all Gregory's teaching about God, and particularly his teaching about the Spirit, must be viewed in the light of this mysticism and radical apophaticism. This is the mode in which the whole of Gregory's theology is sung.
CHAPTER II
THE CHRISTIAN AND THE SPIRIT

Of the several areas of Gregory's thought which must be considered in order to understand his assertion of the Spirit's deity, the first to be examined here is that of the work of the Spirit in the life of the Christian. It may seem rather individualistic to begin here. It may be thought that the corporate, the work of the Spirit in the Church, should come first. Or perhaps it would seem more suitable to begin with the work of the Spirit in Christ, proceeding then logically and chronologically to the Spirit in the Church and in the Christian. It must be remembered, however, that these areas of thought are being considered in order to arrive finally at Gregory's understanding of the Eternal Spirit. And therefore, it will give a clearer movement of thought to move in ascending order, beginning with Gregory's awareness of the contemporary activity of the Spirit in himself and others, then passing to the work of the Spirit in the oikonomia, that is, in the coming of the Son and in the Church, and finally rising to the eternal position of the Spirit with the Father and the Son in the Triad.

This movement of thought could be compared to the movement from the Spirit through the Son to the Father described by Basil:

"Thus the way of the knowledge of God lies from One Spirit through the One Son to the One Father, and conversely the natural goodness and the inherent holiness and the royal dignity extend from the Father through the Only-begotten to the Spirit."
The human ascent to the knowledge of God is thus the converse of God's gracious descent to man in the *oikonomia*. Gregory himself does not use such formulae in his orations, yet clearly for him as for Basil, our knowledge of God begins with the work of the Spirit in us. He is the one

"by whom the Father is known and the Son is glorified; and by whom alone he is known."\(^2\)

It will therefore give the clearest exposition of Gregory's thought on the deity of the Spirit to begin where the knowledge of God begins according to Gregory, in the contemporary work of the Spirit in the Christian.

(a) Inspiration

Even as he speaks Gregory is aware, he claims, of this work of the Spirit within him, enabling him to know God and to express his knowledge in the spontaneity of preaching. He lays claim, in other words, to the Spirit's inspiration. At his installation in 372 as bishop-coadjutor with his aged father at Nazianzus he begins his oration:

"I opened my mouth, and drew in the Spirit, and I give myself and my all to the Spirit, my action and speech, my inaction and silence. Only let him hold me and guide me and move both hand and mind and tongue where they must go as he wills and restrain them from where they must not go as is right."\(^3\)

The consequence is that Gregory becomes an instrument:

"I am an instrument of God, a rational instrument, an instrument tuned and struck by that skilful artist the Spirit. Yesterday, was his work in me silence? I mused on not speaking. Does he strike upon my mind to-day? My speech will be heard and I will muse on utterance."\(^4\)
This opening of the mouth to draw in the Spirit, so becoming a rational instrument (organon logikon), is for Gregory a part of that total self-consecration to God which was a necessary prerequisite for ordination to the priesthood. In *Oration 2, In Defence of his Flight to Pontus*, delivered following his enforced ordination in 362, Gregory enlarges on this:

"Since then I knew these things [the perfection required in the Old Testament priests], and that no-one is worthy of the mightiness of God, and the sacrifice and priesthood, who has not first presented himself to God, a living, holy sacrifice, and set forth the reasonable, well-pleasing service...how could I dare to offer to him the external sacrifice, the antitype of the great mysteries, or clothe myself with the garb and name of priest, before my hands had been consecrated by holy works...before my ear had been sufficiently opened to the instruction of the Lord...before my mouth had been opened to draw in the Spirit, and opened wide to be filled with the Spirit of speaking mysteries and doctrines...before my tongue had been filled with exultation, and become an instrument of Divine melody...before all my members had become instruments of righteousness..."

But it must not be thought that in becoming an instrument blown upon or struck by the Spirit, Gregory believes himself to be possessed in such a way as to lose control of his rational faculties. He is not supposing some kind of mantic inspiration or ecstasy like that of the priestesses of Apollo at Delphi. Nor does he find any place in his doctrine of the Spirit for glossolalia, meaning by that ecstatic utterances of the kind sometimes attributed to the apostles on the basis of Acts 2 or to the Corinthian church addressed in Paul's letters. In his Pentecost sermon (*Oration 41*), Gregory interprets the "tongues" of Acts 2 as other languages. He concludes that the miracle described there was one of speaking rather than of hearing. It was not that each listener heard a babble of sounds as if it were his own language:
rather the apostles spoke different languages.' In the Last Farewell he expressly denies that the disciples were ecstatic or out of their minds on the day of Pentecost. Similarly, when Gregory himself is inspired by the Spirit, he is not in a mindless ecstasy. Quite the contrary: he is a rational instrument, an organon logikon. He believes that the inspiration of the Spirit brings about a deepening and expansion of the rational faculties without which it would be impossible to speak truly of God. Gregory makes this clear also in Oration 2. After he has given his first account of Trinitarian theology, he continues:

"A suitable and worthy comprehension and exposition of this subject demands a discussion of greater length than the present occasion allows, and, what is more, both now and at all times the aid of the Spirit, by whom alone we are able to perceive, expound or understand God."\(^3\)

The "deep things of the Spirit" are not at the disposal of anyone. What is most mystical and deep is not accessible to him (Gregory), but only to the all-searching and all-knowing Spirit.\(^4\) Only by the aid of the Spirit are our minds able to form some conception of the reality of God and to express the resulting concepts:

"Let us, relying on the Holy Spirit, who is among them dishonoured but among us is adored, bring forth to the light our own conceptions about the Godhead..."\(^5\)

This is Gregory's resolve eighteen years after his ordination, at the beginning of the Third Theological Oration. He has already reminded his hearers in the previous oration that even the aid of the Spirit does not enable us to comprehend God:

"Who has opened the mouth of his mind and drawn in the Spirit, so as by the Spirit that searches all things, yes even the deep things of God, to take in God, and no longer to need progress, since he already possesses the extreme object of desire...?"\(^6\)
Both sides are held together here. On the one hand, God is incomprehensible, as Gregory mockingly reminds the Eunomians in the succeeding sentence:

"For what will you conceive the Deity to be, if you rely upon all the approximations of reason? Or to what will reason carry you, O most philosophic of men and best of theologians, who boast of your familiarity with the unlimited?"'

But on the other hand the mind is not by-passed. There is genuine knowledge of God when the Spirit enables us "to perceive, expound or understand." Here is the balance of Gregory's apophatic and mystical theology. Our minds may not comprehend God, but by the enlightenment and inspiration of the Spirit we may genuinely know him. Inspiration therefore does not mean a mindless babble of ecstatic utterances. It is the work of the Spirit in the mind, enabling the preacher to know God and thus to speak of him. That this inspiration enables us to think and not just to speak mindlessly is quite explicitly stated in Oration 41, On Pentecost:

"As to the things of the Spirit, may the Spirit be with me, and grant me speech as much as I desire... Anyhow he will be with me as my Lord; not in servile guise, nor awaiting a command, as some think. For he blows where he wills and on whom he wills, and to what extent he wills. Thus we are inspired both to think and to speak of the Spirit."

Further, the inspiration of the Spirit not only enables the preacher to express the mysteries of God, but enables the hearers to grasp his meaning. That is to say, it is the Spirit who establishes rapport between speaker and hearer.

"O the wonderful chain," Gregory exclaims, "which the Holy Spirit forms and fixes by indissoluble bonds."

He goes on to marvel at the influence he has with his hearers and the attention they pay him, which, he says, is not due to his
powers. In his very first oration he speaks of the discourses his hearers long for,

"not such as are vain and poured out into the air and reach no further than the hearing, but those which the Spirit writes and engraves on tables of stone, or of flesh, not merely superficially graven nor to be easily erased, but marked very deeply, not with ink, but with grace." 

This inspiration therefore implies not just the Spirit's activity in the preacher, but his activity in the hearer so that the communication is effective and the message is carried home. 

That the Spirit inspired the Biblical writers, the psalmists, prophets and apostles, is assumed by Gregory rather than systematically taught. The implication, referred to in the opening sentences of Oration 2, is a present as well as a past activity of "him who spoke by David, and even now speaks through him." It implies also as Gregory states rather emphatically later in the oration a certain accuracy in the Scriptures:

"We, however, who extend the accuracy of the Spirit (tou Pneumatos tēn akribēian) to the merest stroke and tittle, will never admit the impious assertion that even the smallest matters were dealt with in a haphazard way by those who have recorded them..."

That seems to imply a lack of contradiction, and yet Gregory's concern at this point is rather to insist that even the details of the Old Testament story of Jonah have significance for his audience. The lack of contradiction in which he is interested is in substantial matters of faith, and certainly allows for different emphases by different writers. Gregory refuses to accept

"that the Evangelists are at variance with one another because some are more occupied with the human side of Christ and others with the divinity... They followed the impressions of the Spirit within them (tou en autois typoumenoi Pneumatos)."
Gregory's view of the inspiration of the Scriptures is part of his inheritance from Origen. That he and Basil were particularly influenced by Origen on this point may be inferred from the fact that the first fourteen of the twenty-seven chapters of their *Philocalia of Origen* is devoted to Scripture and its inspiration.1

Gregory does not hesitate to compare his own inspiration to the inspiration of the prophets and apostles. In the Pentecost oration he declares:

"This Spirit...if he takes possession of a shepherd, makes him a psalmist, subduing evil spirits by his song, and proclaims him King of Israel. If he possess a goatherd and scraper of sycamore fruit, he makes him a prophet. Call to mind David and Amos. If he possess a goodly youth, he makes him a judge of elders even beyond his years, as Daniel testifies who conquered the lions in their den. If he takes possession of the fishermen, he makes them catch the whole world in the nets of Christ... If of zealous persecutors, he changes the current of their zeal, and makes them Pauls instead of Sauls... He too it is who has made me to-day a bold herald to you..."2

That he too is inspired, like David or Paul, does not detract from the authority of the canonical books. Gregory gives us no reason to think that he regards his authority as equivalent to theirs. But he does regard the inspiration he claims as analogous to that of the prophets and apostles.

All those who are similarly inspired and are thus enlightened in their minds by the Spirit, recognize the Spirit's deity:

"They who reduce the Holy Spirit to the rank of a creature are blasphemers and wicked servants and worst of the wicked...but they who deem him God are inspired of God and enlightened in mind."3

To those who rightly deny that the Spirit is a creature, yet hesitate to call him God, Gregory gives encouragement:

"Confess, my friends, the Triad to be of one Godhead, or, if you will, of one nature, and we will pray the Spirit to give
you this word, 'God'."

It is the Spirit himself who must enlighten them to confess his deity.

Gregory's understanding of inspiration by the Spirit has generally not been noticed. It may not be a major theme in his orations, but it expresses a basic epistemological assumption. This primitive model for divine activity in the world, 'wind' or 'breath', which gives us the very words *ruach*, *pneuma* and *spiritus,* and the very concept of inspiration, is for Gregory the key to knowledge of God. It is only by inspiration, by the inhaling through the mouth of the mind (*to stoma tês dianoias*) of the mysterious, imperceptible yet powerful divine Breath, that Gregory becomes able to understand and express something of the incomprehensible God. God alone makes it possible. And since that is so, he comes to recognize that the Breath of God is God himself breathing into him. It is by the Spirit's inspiration that he recognizes the Spirit's deity.
(b) Baptism

The model of inspiration is, however, somewhat limited in its scope. Gregory claims the inspiration of the Spirit as he preaches, and by its very nature the model of inspiration tends to refer only to preachers, prophets and apostles, who publicly express the Church's knowledge of God. A wider understanding of the work of the Spirit in revelation is to be gained from the mystery of baptism, through which all Christians come to know God.

According to D.F. Winslow, "perhaps no other patristic author is as convinced of the necessity for baptism as is Gregory of Nazianzus."¹ Winslow identifies its significance for Gregory's thought:

"Baptism is primarily the operative locus of the deifying economy of the Holy Spirit and as such provides for the individual what was made available to all men by the economy of the Incarnate Logos... The vigour with which Gregory underlines both the necessity for and the benefits derived from baptism would suggest that for him baptism is the nodal point in his scheme of salvation."²

Gregory certainly presses the necessity of baptism with vigour. His sermon On Holy Baptism, preached on 6th January, 380, with catechumens before him awaiting baptism, might serve as a model for the modern revivalist in its pleading with the hesitant.³ Yet, although baptism is of vital importance, it is not viewed as automatically conferring salvation in a mechanical, impersonal way, simply by virtue of being performed. The one being baptized receives by faith personal knowledge of the Triune God as it is given by the Spirit.⁴
Four models associated with baptism make it clear (as does the model of inspiration) that knowledge of the incomprehensible God is given only by the Spirit. But whereas inspiration may seem to suggest a momentary knowledge of God restricted to certain individuals, the activity of the Spirit in baptism makes it clear that all Christians are initiated into a knowledge of God which is continuing and progressive.

The first of the four models is regeneration. For Gregory, as for the Fathers generally, baptism is the moment of regeneration. He speaks of his father's baptism in Johannine terms. Gregory the Elder requested "the common salvation" from the bishops hastening to the Council of Nicea and "was approaching that regeneration by water and the Spirit." Yet although baptism is the moment of regeneration, the water is not the agent, nor is the presbyter or bishop, who simply "lends his hands to the Spirit." The Spirit is the agent who regenerates and creates anew. In his panegyric for his brother, Caesarius, Gregory refers to "his newly regenerate soul which the Spirit has transformed through water." The Spirit is the agent and the water the instrument. Similarly, Gorgonia his sister "received regeneration from the Spirit." Gregory accordingly declares in his Pentecost sermon in 379 that the Spirit is "the author (demiourgos) of spiritual regeneration," a work which is analogous to creation and is in fact a creating anew. The connection with creation and the resurrection or new creation is restated the next year in the Fifth Theological Oration, devoted to the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is "the Creator-spirit, who by
baptism and resurrection creates anew. Clearly this identification of regeneration with the resurrection and the new creation has implications for the status of the Spirit, for only God is the Creator. Thus, "if the Holy Spirit is a creature, you are baptized in vain." 2

The second model associated with baptism is purification or cleansing (katharsis). Gorgonia, Gregory tells us in his panegyric,

"had recently received the blessing of cleansing (katharsis) and perfection (teleiosis) which we have all received from God as a common gift and foundation of our second life." 3

This katharsis is not something different from regeneration, or indeed, from perfection (teleiosis). All of these are models for baptism, even though cleansing and perfection may also be used (as the succeeding sentence demonstrates) to refer to virtue and moral progress.

"Rather," he continues, "all her life was a cleansing and a perfection, and while she received regeneration from the Spirit, its security was hers by virtue of her former life." 4

Gregory speaks similarly of his father:

"He was approaching the laver with warmth of desire and bright hope after all the pre-cleansing (prokatheras) possible, and a far greater purifying (kathagnisas) of soul and body than that of the men who were to receive the tables from Moses... The whole of his past life had been a preparation for the enlightenment (ellaspeos) and a cleansing before the cleansing, making sure the gift, in order that perfection might be entrusted to purity..." 5

But although virtue and moral progress may be "a cleansing before the cleansing (pro tes katharseos katharsis)", baptism is the moment of that cleansing by the Spirit which, as Gregory
expresses it in the oration On Holy Baptism, is a cleansing of sins:

"Such then is the grace and power of baptism; not an overwhelming of the world as of old, but a cleansing (katharsis) of the sins of each individual, and a complete cleansing from all the bruises and stains of evil."1

Therefore since at the Feast of Epiphany they remembered the baptism of Christ, his cleansing,2 the catechumens were to keep the feast spiritually by being cleansed: "Be washed, and be made clean!"3 Every member and every sense is to be purified, the seeing of the eye, the hearing of the ear, the tasting of the tongue, the smelling of the nose, and the touch.4

This purification or cleansing (katharsis) which takes place in baptism is also, like regeneration, the work of the Spirit. Gregory explains the agency of the Spirit in relation to the water by the twofold nature of man:

"Since we are double-made, I mean of soul and body, and the one part is visible, the other invisible nature, so the cleansing (katharsis) is also twofold, by water and the Spirit, the one received visibly in the body, the other concurring with it invisibly and apart from the body, the one typical, the other real and cleansing the depths."5

The water may cleanse the body, but that is only typical (typikos) of the real (alēthinōs) cleansing effected by the Spirit as the catechumen enters the water in faith.6 It is the Spirit therefore who purifies in baptism. Gregory does not draw any inference in the context of baptism from the Spirit's purifying work to his deity, although he does draw this inference in another context. In speaking of Pentecost, Gregory speculates that the Spirit came as tongues of fire, "perhaps because of his purifying power...or else because of his
substance." He continues: "For our God is a consuming fire."

Purification is closely connected to the third model associated with baptism, enlightenment or illumination (ellampsis, phōtisma). According to Heinz Althaus, purification is the preliminary step, but illumination is the heart of Gregory's understanding of baptism. Certainly it is the climax of his account of his father's baptism. Having spoken of the cleansing (of virtue) before the cleansing (of baptism), and the whole life as a preparation for the illumination (ellampsis), Gregory continues:

"And as he was ascending out of the water, there flashed around him a light and glory worthy of the disposition with which he approached the gift of faith..."

But it is the twin sermons for Epiphany, Oration 39, On the Holy Lights, delivered on 5 January, 380 and Oration 40, On Holy Baptism, preached the next day, which give the most sustained exposition of baptism as Illumination. Epiphany had become a festival celebrating the baptism of Christ and hence known as the Feast of Lights. The opening paragraphs of Oration 39 are concerned with Christ as the light of the world:

"For the Holy Day of Lights, to which we have come, and which we are celebrating to-day, has for its origin the Baptism of my Christ, the true light which lightens every man who comes into the world..."

Then after a long introduction on the immorality of the pagan Greek festivals and the necessity for purification (katharsis), Gregory comes to two key paragraphs for the Trinitarian debate (according to Heinrich Dörrie) in which he speaks of the splendid brilliance of the Trinity:
"And when I speak of God you must be illumined at once by one flash of light and by three."\(^1\)

The sermon closes with Gregory's urging,

"that you may be like lights in the world... that you may stand as perfect lights beside that great light, and may learn the mystery of the illumination of heaven, enlightened by the Trinity more purely and clearly..."\(^2\)

Oration 40 continues the theme, setting baptism in the context of a whole "theology of light."\(^3\)

"To know the power of this sacrament (mystérion)," Gregory explains, "is itself enlightenment (phōtisma)."\(^4\)

Baptism (which is, he says, the second of three births, natural birth, baptism and resurrection) "gives its name to the Feast of Lights." The "name" of baptism is thus Illumination (phōtisma), and Gregory proceeds to expound the meaning of baptism, using Illumination as a synonym:

"Illumination is the splendour of souls, the conversion of the life... the renunciation of the flesh, the following of the Spirit... the perfecting of the mind... Illumination is the greatest and most magnificent of the gifts of God. For just as we speak of the Holy of Holies, and the Song of Songs, as more comprehensive and more excellent than others, so is this called Illumination, as being more holy than any other illumination which we possess. And as Christ the Giver of it is called by many various names, so too is this Gift... We call it, the Gift, the Grace, Baptism, Unction (Chrisma), Illumination, the Clothing of Immortality, the Laver of Regeneration, the Seal, and everything that is honourable."\(^5\)

Gregory launches from this straight into his theology of light:

"God is light: the highest, the unapproachable, the ineffable, neither conceived in the mind nor uttered with the lips, giving light to every reasoning nature."\(^6\)

These other reasoning natures (or beings) are thus also light:

"A second light is the angel, a kind of outflow or communication of that first light... A third light is man."\(^7\)
Gregory continues with a review of the theme of light in the Biblical theophanies, and returns to the theme of light yet again later in the oration.

Light is clearly a significant model for Gregory's whole concept of God. Its significance must be examined later when his doctrine of the Trinity is considered. What is relevant here is that this illumination (phōtisma) of baptism is the work of the Spirit as of the Father and the Son. When Gregory returns to the theme of light later in the oration On Holy Baptism, it is to use Ps. 36:9, a favourite text of the Fathers on the Christian's experience of the Trinity as light. He is urging his hearers to baptism when he says:

"In the Lord's light see light, that threefold and undivided light, and in the Spirit of God be enlightened by the Son."

If baptism is illumination, then the Spirit, who is active in baptism, is God who illuminates. The Spirit too, like the Son and the Father, is the light who lightens every man.

"I cannot bear," he exclaims to the Egyptian sailors, "to be unenlightened after my enlightenment, by marking with a different stamp any of the Three into whom I was baptized; and thus to be indeed buried in the water, and initiated not into regeneration, but into death."

The fourth model associated with baptism is deification (theōsis). Like regeneration, purification and illumination, deification is through Christ. In his very first sermon, Gregory exhorts his hearers:

"Let us become like Christ, since Christ indeed became like us. Let us become gods for his sake since he became man for us."
The significance of the Incarnation for our deification is even clearer in the Third Theological Oration:

"...the lower (nature), the humanity, became God because it was united to God,...in order that I too might be made god so far as he is made man."

Yet while the Incarnation was to make our deification possible, it is by the work of the Spirit in baptism that our individual deification is effected. The implication of that, which Gregory makes quite explicit, is that the Spirit must be God. Gregory makes the point in an impassioned plea:

"I dare to utter something, 0 Trinity: and may pardon be granted to my folly, for the risk is to my soul. I too am an Image of God, of the Heavenly Glory, though I be placed on earth. I cannot believe that I am saved by one who is my equal. If the Holy Spirit is not God, let him first be made God, and then let him deify me his equal." 2

In his poem on the Spirit, Gregory comes more reflectively to the same conclusion:

"Why hesitate, my soul? Sing praises also of the Spirit But offer no fables which beyond its nature go. Let us fear the great Spirit, by whom God I know, Yet more, who is God, and makes me god below." 3

In the Epiphany sermon, On the Holy Lights (Oration 39), the deity of the Spirit is linked with our deification while Gregory is contrasting Christ's baptism with that of John:

"John also baptized; but this was not like the baptism of the Jews, for it was not only in water, but also 'unto repentance'. Still it was not wholly spiritual, for he does not add 'and in the Spirit'. Jesus also baptized, but in the Spirit. This is the perfect baptism. And how is he not God, if I may digress a little, by whom you too are made god?" 4

Later, in the Fifth Theological Oration, he repeats the point:

"If he is the same rank with myself, how can he deify me, or join me with Godhead?" 5
The moment of baptism is specified towards the end of the oration as the moment of deification:

"For if he is not to be worshipped, how can he deify me by baptism? But if he is to be worshipped, surely he is an object of adoration, and, if an object of adoration, he must be God; the one is linked to the other, a truly golden and saving chain."

Brooks Otis saw the development of the idea of deification as the one crucial respect in which Gregory went beyond Basil and laid down the lines for Gregory of Nyssa. Neo-Arianism had reduced the Father to "a bare philosophical theorem", whereas (according to Otis) "the anti-philosophical piety of the East (especially of Egypt) was steadily tending towards a more and more physicalist and even crassly materialist concept of Christ and salvation." The Cappadocians therefore had to show that God was "neither a static Platonic Form (to reach whom the inferior human psyche required a semi-divine mediator) nor a kind of magician mainly concerned to impart immortality to human flesh." Salvation was neither simply physical on the one hand nor philosophical on the other, but was essentially deification, "the finite's pursuit of the infinite." It was Gregory who first developed this, according to Otis, drawing on Clement of Alexandria, especially for his image of Moses in the mountain-cloud. Theosis is thus the core of Gregory's theology, and, according to Otis, his great theological significance lies in that he was the one who first used the Clementine theology and the Clementine metaphors in the new Nicene context.

D.F. Winslow follows Otis in giving deification a central place in Gregory's thought. Particularly, it is for him the
significance of baptism. According to Winslow, the Trinitarian and Christological thought of the Fathers rests upon soteriological principles. This is particularly true of Gregory of Nazianzus who was "primarily a soteriologist," and the central concept in his soteriology is deification or theōsis. Winslow writes:

"Gregory's characteristic term for describing that union which is both the origin and the goal of the theo-logically-soteriological process was theōsis, a term he used perhaps more freely than any of the Greek Fathers." 112

Baptism is to be seen as "the primary locus of the Spirit's deifying action",3 and is therefore to be understood primarily with reference to deification. The other terms used to explain baptism

"are but variations on a single theme, namely, that of the 'deifying' operation of the Holy Spirit who is God." 4

The deifying work of Christ is for mankind as a whole. In baptism, "that most 'individual' and 'personal' of Christian rites",5 the Spirit makes this universal salvation particular in the deification of the individual. This is the "chief work" of the Spirit. And since only God can deify, Gregory is as convinced of the deity of the Spirit as he is of the deity of Christ.

The thesis of Otis and Winslow that deification is Gregory's central concept of salvation is open to debate. 7 As Winslow notes, Heinz Althaus would take a different view, seeing illumination as the central concept. 6 Nor is it necessary to accept Otis's picture of the "crassly materialist" and "anti-philosophical piety of the East" as much more than a caricature
if it is intended as a description of what Otis sees as the Irenaean or Athanasian tradition. But what is beyond dispute is that deification is a significant model for Gregory's understanding of salvation and particularly for his understanding of baptism. And along with the other three models connected with the baptism, it leads directly to the conclusion of the Spirit's deity. The logic is clear. The one who regenerates or re-creates us must be the Creator; the one who purifies us must be God who alone is pure; the one who illuminates or enlightens us must be God, for God is light; and the one who deifies us, bringing to us the divine life, must be, and can only be, God himself.

One more point must be made about baptism, namely, that it provides grounds for Gregory's assertion of the deity of the Spirit through the ancient Triadic baptismal formula found in the New Testament itself. Christian baptism is baptism into the common name of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In the oration *On Holy Baptism*, Gregory tells each waiting catechumen

"I will baptize you and make you a disciple in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; and these three have one common name, the Godhead."

Gregory had expounded this theme more fully in the magnificent conclusion to a sermon preached early in his ministry in Constantinople. In what was probably his first explicit declaration in Constantinople of the deity of the Spirit, he declares that the members of his flock are those who

"worship the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, one Godhead; God the Father, God the Son and (do not be angry) God the Holy Spirit..."
The Father, he continues, will not bear to be deprived of the Son, nor the Son of the Holy Spirit.

"Neither will I bear to be deprived of my perfecting (teleiosis). One Lord, one faith, one baptism. If this be cancelled, from whom shall I get a second? What say you, you who destroy baptism or repeat it? Can a man be spiritual without the Spirit? Has he a share in the Spirit who does not honour the Spirit? Can he honour him who is baptized into a creature and fellow-servant? It is not so! It is not so for all your talk! I will not play thee false, O unoriginate Father, or thee, O only-begotten Word, or thee, O Holy Spirit! I know whom I have confessed..."

The point at issue is obviously the deity of the Spirit, for it is at that assertion that he expects them to be angry, and his emphasis is upon the implication of being baptized into the Spirit, namely, that the Spirit must be God. The basis for this implication is that baptism is into the common name:

"Remember your confession. Into what were you baptized? The Father? Good, but still Jewish! The Son? Good, no longer Jewish but not yet perfect. The Holy Spirit? Very good. This is perfect. Now was it into these simply, or some common name of them? The latter. And what was the common name? God!"

Perfect baptism is baptism not only into the Father and the Son, but also into the Spirit, and it is baptism into the common name of all three.

There is possibly a link to be discerned here between the description of baptism as "perfection" or "perfecting" (teleiosis) and the particular role of the Spirit as the one who perfects. He is our Perfector, Gregory also seems to say, because he is the one in whom the Godhead comes to completion or perfectness. He urges the waiting catechumens:

"Let us hasten your salvation. Let us go up to your baptism. The Spirit is eager, the Perfector (teleiotes) is ready, the Gift prepared. But if you still halt and will
not receive the perfectness (teleion) of the Godhead, go and look for someone else to baptize you - or drown you! I have no time to divide the Godhead and make you dead in the moment of regeneration... For whatever you may subtract from the deity of the Three, you will have destroyed the whole - and your own perfecting (teleiosis)."

Baptism implies the Spirit's deity therefore not just because God alone is the one who regenerates, purifies, illuminates and deifies. Baptism implies the Spirit's deity because it is baptism into the Holy Trinity. For Gregory, the doctrine of the Trinity is not a "second order" doctrine, a theological construct required to explain the deity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, each separately established. He does not begin with the Three and move to the subsequent conclusion that the Three must be One. He begins with the Three-in-One already illuminating the expectant Christian in the very initiation of baptism. For Gregory, it is within the context of a faith already intuitively Trinitarian that the belief in the deity of the Spirit is to be seen as an integral part.
(c) Living in the Spirit.

Baptism does not, of course, conclude the work of the Spirit in the life of the Christian. Although it is a teleiōsis or perfecting, it is at the same time an initiation. In a sense, all is achieved in baptism, but yet the subsequent life of the Christian is also a teleiōsis. Gregory reflects the Pauline usage of teleiōsis when he speaks of the different kinds of teaching needed by different groups in the church.

"For some need to be fed with the milk of those most simple and elementary doctrines, namely those who are in habit babes, and, so to speak, new-made... Others require the wisdom which is spoken among the perfect..."
The Word produces "that laudable increase" in one who is rightly fed,

"by making him a perfect man, and bringing him to the measure of spiritual stature."

So, towards the end of his career, Gregory can refer in the Last Farewell to his whole congregation in Constantinople as advancing in perfection.

"If it be not yet in perfection it is, however, advancing towards it by constant increase, and I prophecy that it will advance."

This "laudable increase (epainētēn auxēsin)" towards perfection is the outworking of the purification or katharsis which took place in baptism. A consecrated and disciplined life issues from the total consecration which is demanded of the candidate for baptism. Gregory's exhortations to the catechumens in his baptismal sermon made this clear.

"Let us give to God all our members which are upon the earth. Let us consecrate them all...let us bring ourselves entire, let us be reasonable holocausts, perfect sacrifices."
The head, "the workshop of the senses," must be purified, to hold fast the head of Christ; the shoulder must be sanctified and purified to take up the cross of Christ; the hands and feet must be consecrated. But it is when he comes to the loins (osphys) and the "reins (nephroi)" that Gregory speaks of discipline.

"Let the purification take hold of these also. Let our loins be girded about and kept in check by continence, as the Law bade Israel of old when partaking of the Passover. For none comes out of Egypt purely, or escapes the Destroyer except he who has disciplined these." 1

The secret of this discipline is the inner conversion of the nephroi (literally 'the kidneys', but understood as the seat of the affections):

"And let the reins (nephroi) be changed by that good conversion (alloliosin) by which they transfer all the affections (epithymetikon) to God...for you must be a man of desires (epithymiōn), but they must be those of the Spirit." 2

Katharsis can then refer by extension to the purified and self-disciplined life. In the Pentecost oration, Gregory tells those in his congregation who were hesitating to confess the Spirit's deity, that he reveres their continence,

"and those sacred assemblies, and the august virginity, and purification..." 3

Here "purification" must refer to their life of self-disciplined purity. Jean Plagnieux sees spiritual progress as "une seconde et incessante purification" in Gregory's thought. 4 Yet Gregory does not describe this as a progressive purification. It is the ceaseless outworking of the purification accomplished once for all in baptism, which Gregory sees as radical and complete. He exhorts the catechumens in the baptismal sermon:

"Let the washing be not only for your body, but also for the image, not only a releasing from sins, but a correction of your way of life. Let it be not only a washing away of previous mire, but let it cleanse the source (tēn pēgēn)." 5
If having been cleansed by the gift of God, as he exclaims in a poem, the spring yet remains and sprouts forth evil again, how wretched a salvation!

Purification and the purified life are necessary for those who are to exercise pastoral care. Before being entrusted with the priesthood, Gregory the Elder had to "add to his own katharsis the skill and power to cleanse (kathairein) others." Gregory calls this "the law of spiritual sequence." He deprecates the conduct of "illegitimate and intrusive priests" who "undertake the cleansing of others before being cleansed themselves." In his seminal work on the Christian ministry, the oration, In Defence of his Flight to Pontus, Gregory lays down that it is not sufficient for a man to keep himself "pure from all sin." He must "outstrip men further in virtue than he is superior to them in dignity. He should know no limits in goodness or spiritual progress, and should dwell upon the loss of what is still beyond him rather than the gain of what he has attained..."

Purification and the purified life are necessary above all for those who would engage in theologia, the contemplation of God. This is the theme of the First Theological Oration.

"Not to everyone, my friends, does it belong to philosophize about God... Not to all men, because it is permitted only to those who have been examined and are past masters in contemplation (theoira), and who have been previously purified (kekatharmenôn) in soul and body, or at the very least are being purified (kathairemenôn). For the impure (mê katharô) to touch the pure (katharou) is, we may safely say, not safe, just as it is unsafe to fix weak eyes upon the sun's rays."

All of these aspects of Christian living are closely linked in Gregory's thought with the work of the Spirit, for the Spirit is the agent of purification and perfection, katharsis and teleiôsis. It is not that men are passive. There must be on the human side a total consecration to God which must then be expressed in a life of
purity and self-discipline. But the Spirit is the one who purifies the Christian at baptism and so all of the subsequent life of purity and discipline is the result of the work of the Spirit and is under the Spirit's guidance. The Christian's life is life in the Spirit. It is a matter of

"living in the Spirit, walking in the Spirit, drawing your knowledge from him..."

So he tells his flock at Nazianzus, shortly after his ordination, praying that they

"may walk in the King's highway, turning aside neither to the right hand nor to the left, but led by the Spirit through the strait gate."

Gregory is conscious of "the Spirit's guidance of our affairs." He speaks of it after being prevailed upon to become bishop-coadjutor of Nazianzus in 372. He is torn between retiring to the mountains and deserts to engage in contemplation and serving the church.

"The former are imaginings of desire, the latter the teachings of the Spirit."

He resolves the tension:

"But hereafter I will offer my wing to the Spirit to be borne whither, and as, he wills."

Later he similarly proclaims that it is the agency of the Spirit which has brought him to Constantinople. He has come not of his own accord, he says,

"but because I was invited, and compelled, and have followed the scruples of my conscience and the call of the Spirit."

But it is particularly in the moral sphere that the agency of the Spirit is to be seen, for it is by the Spirit that the Christian lives a life of purification and self-discipline. This involves a struggle which Gregory describes in the classic Pauline
terminology of the Spirit against the flesh. Baptism, or Illumination, is, among other things, "the renunciation of the flesh, the following of the Spirit." But baptism is not the end of the struggle. Gregory speaks about it at length in his Defence of his Flight to Pontus when he is describing the struggles of those called to the Christian ministry.

"I have said nothing yet of the internal warfare within ourselves, and in our passions, in which we are engaged night and day against the body of our humiliation, either secretly or openly, and against the tide which tosses and whirls us hither and thither, by the aid of our senses and other sources of the pleasures of this life; and against the miry clay in which we have been fixed; and against the law of sin, which wars against the law of the Spirit, and strives to destroy the royal image in us, and all the divine emanation which has been bestowed upon us..."

Gregory seems to understand this internal warfare as a struggle against the passions inherent in the physical body and inflamed by the tempter. Despite the Pauline terminology of flesh and Spirit, used not infrequently, the context in which Gregory uses the words leads to more than a suspicion that he understands the flesh not in the distinctively Pauline sense of man's guilty self as an inner power in opposition to the Spirit, but as the physical body. In Oration 2, he speaks of "the depressing power of matter" as that which must be overcome. In his oration on becoming bishop-coadjutor, he asks who is spiritually stronger and more fervent than his father, "especially now, when the powers of the flesh are ebbing and fading, like so many barriers which interfere with, and dim the brilliancy of a light." In his panegyric upon Athanasius he proclaims that it is necessary "to escape by reason and contemplation from matter and this fleshly cloud or veil" in order to hold communion with God, the purest light. This deification takes place "by rising superior to the
It is clear that victory over the flesh is only possible through the action of the Spirit within. He counsels the catechumens:

"If after baptism the persecutor and tempter of the light assail you (for he assailed even the Word my God through the veil, the hidden light through that which was manifested), you have the means to conquer him. Fear not the conflict; defend yourself with the water; defend yourself with the Spirit, by which all the fiery darts of the wicked shall be quenched. It is Spirit, but that Spirit which rent the mountains. It is water, but that which quenches fire."

In the Last Farewell, he states simply:

"The Spirit can beget those who rise superior to the body."

Purification comes about therefore not just through human agency or human desire, but through the work of Christ and the work of the Spirit. Thomas Špidlík summarizes Gregory's view:

"Il est vrai que le désir de Dieu est en soi déjà une force purifiante, encore qu'insuffisante. Le chrétien sait que par ses propres forces il ne peut parvenir à la katharsis totale, mais il sait aussi que le Christ, qui se manifeste au regard de la foi dans les paradoxes de son 'économie', achève en l'homme la purification en l'illuminant de son mystère... Et parce qu'il est le feu qui brûle et qui éclaire, l'Esprit Saint achève notre purification."

The guiding and purifying Spirit also indwells the Christian. His sovereign guidance may imply his deity, as does his purifying activity as "consuming fire," but his indwelling makes his deity plain. A Christian is one who

"has become the temple of God, and the habitation of Christ in the Spirit."

The alternative is not to be borne:

"Why do you make me, who am the temple of the Holy Spirit as of God, the habitation of a creature?"

For Gregory the implication is clear, as it is in every other activity of the Spirit in the life of the Christian. The Spirit must be God himself.
CHAPTER III
THE ECONOMY AND THE SPIRIT

The second area of Gregory's thought which must be considered in order to understand his assertion of the Spirit's deity, is the work of the Spirit in the Economy. At its widest, the term oikonomia embraces all of God's dealings with the world from creation to the final consummation. Yet for the Fathers, the oikonomia mainly concerned God's redemptive activity, and was centred to such an extent on the coming of Christ (from his birth to his Ascension) that oikonomia frequently refers to that alone. In moving therefore in this chapter from Gregory's awareness of the contemporary work of the Spirit in himself and others to Gregory's exposition of the work of the Spirit in the history of redemption, we are moving not only from the contemporary to the historic (the whole sweep of redemptive history), but also from the individual to the corporate (the Church), and indeed to the cosmic. We are also moving in Basil's words already quoted "from One Spirit through the One Son...", for the coming of the Son is the focal point of the oikonomia. The main concern, however, will continue to be with the work of the Spirit, and an examination of what Gregory has to say about the Spirit's work in Christ will illuminate Gregory's Christological basis for his teaching on the Spirit in the Christian, as well as elucidating further grounds for Gregory's assertion of the Spirit's deity. The work of the Spirit before the coming of Christ must be considered first.
a) The Spirit in Creation and on the Prophets

Gregory does not have a great deal to say either about the Spirit's role in creation or about his inspiration of the prophets. Therefore, although the latter is an activity of redemption rather than creation, it will be convenient to include both activities in one short section.

There is no doubt whatever that Gregory believed that the Spirit was active in the creation of the world, but he is usually more concerned to assert that the Spirit is to be identified with the Uncreated who was in the beginning before creation than to say what his role in creation was. Only the Pentecost oration among his sermons gives us any indication.

"He wrought first in the heavenly and angelic powers, and such as are first after God and around God. For from no other source flows their perfection and their brightness, and the difficulty or impossibility of moving them to sin, but from the Holy Spirit." 2

Gregory passes immediately to the Spirit's work on the men of the Old and New Testaments, beginning with the patriarchs and prophets, but he returns briefly a little later to the work of creation:

"This Spirit shares with the Son in working both the creation and the resurrection..." 3

Gregory quotes three standard proof-texts of his day to validate the Spirit's role in creation. 4 The linking of creation and resurrection is echoed later in the Five Theological Orations where the Spirit is called

"the Creator-Spirit, who by baptism and by resurrection creates anew." 5

The role of the Spirit in creation is thus understood in connection with his role in the resurrection. He is "Life and Life-giver", 6 that is, the one who gives personal life to the creature, as
distinct from mere existence. He is the source of vitality. It therefore appears to be significant that his role in creation is first in the heavenly and angelic powers, and that Gregory passes immediately to his work in men throughout the course of salvation history. Gregory seems to see the Spirit's creative activity as the inspiration of sentient, intelligent, personal life in communion with God. The heavenly and angelic powers are "such as are after God and around God." The patriarchs and prophets knew God because each mind or "master part" was "moulded by the Spirit." The Spirit's inspiration of the prophets was traditionally one of the main elements in the Church's doctrine of the Spirit (to be reflected in the phrases apparently added at Constantinople in 381 to the Nicene Creed), but Gregory has little to say about it. Apart from the references in the Pentecost oration to the Spirit's inspiration of the patriarchs and prophets, with further references to David, Amos and Daniel before passing on to the New Testament, there are only a few other references to the inspiration of David.

The continuity which there appears to be between the Spirit's role in creation in the heavenly and angelic powers and his role in inspiration, working on the "master-part (hægemonikon)" of the patriarchs and prophets, suggests that Gregory thought of the Spirit as bringing the intelligent, living creation to perfection through communion with God. This coheres well with his view of angels and men as "secondary lights" drawing their life from the "primal light." And clearly, if the Spirit is the one who imparts the divine intelligent life of personal communion to creatures as part of his continuing work of bringing creation to its telos or
perfection, it is hard to see that the Spirit could be anything other than God. Yet this view of the Spirit's role in creation is only suggested in Gregory's works. It is not developed. Generally, when he relates the Spirit to the creation, it is not to elaborate on his precise role, but simply to make the point (inherited from Athanasius and shared with Basil) that, given the great gulf fixed between the Uncreated and the created, between the Lord and the servants, the Spirit must be ranked with God.²
The Spirit and Christ

When it comes to the life of Christ, Gregory has more to say, for the coming of Christ is the focal point of the whole oikonomia. He gives his most comprehensive survey of the role of the Spirit in the life of Christ in the Fifth Theological Oration. Having set out to answer the charge that he is introducing a "strange and unscriptural God (xenon Theon kai agraphon)"\(^1\) he comes to the Scriptural evidence for the Spirit's deity at the end of the oration. First to be considered in the Scriptural evidence is the role of the Spirit in the life of Christ:

"Look at these facts: Christ is born; the Spirit is his forerunner. He is baptized; the Spirit bears witness. He is tempted; the Spirit leads him up. He works miracles; the Spirit accompanies them. He ascends; the Spirit takes his place."\(^2\)

Clearly the implication carried by the cumulative style, is that throughout the life and ministry of Christ, the Spirit works with him, going before him, bearing witness to him, guiding him, accompanying him and eventually taking his place with the disciples. It will be useful in considering the theme of the Spirit and Christ in this section to follow the outline Gregory presents in this comprehensive survey in the Fifth Theological Oration.

The first major point in this series is the work of the Spirit in Christ's birth from the Virgin. Gregory had more fully described this a few months earlier in his Christmas oration, On the Theophany or Birthday of Christ:

"...the Word of God himself...came to his own image and took on him flesh for the sake of our flesh, and mingled himself with an intelligent soul for my soul's sake, purifying like by like; and in all points except sin was made man. Conceived by the Virgin, who first in body and soul was purified by the Holy Spirit (for it was needful both that childbearing should be honoured, and that virginity should receive a higher
honour) he came forth then as God with that which he had assumed, one out of two opposites, flesh and Spirit, of which the latter deified the former."

"Spirit" appears twice in this passage. First, the Holy Spirit is said to purify the Virgin before the conception. A similar point is made in the poem, On the Soul:

"Nor does he come by man from the seed of man.
But yet from flesh, the precious Virgin Mother
Whom the Spirit had previously purified;
Self-formed he became mortal, for my sake cleansed."  
In neither passage does Gregory make the Spirit the agent of the conception itself. The agent of Incarnation is the Son himself who came forth "self-formed (autopágês)." D.F. Winslow considers it not surprising that Gregory does not see the Spirit as the agent of conception, "since the phrase 'conceived by the Holy Spirit' was not yet a part of the Eastern credal tradition." For Gregory, the Spirit's role is the purification of the Virgin, who had to be purified "in body and soul" in order that both child-bearing and virginity should be honoured.

The second reference to "Spirit" in the passage from the Christmas oration is in the statement that the Incarnate Son was "one out of two opposites, flesh and Spirit, of which the latter deified the former." Here "Spirit" does not refer to the Holy Spirit as such, but to "Spirit" as deity or Godhead, that which God is. As man is flesh, so God is Spirit. The two are "opposites", but out of the two opposites comes the one Incarnate Son, his humanity deified by his deity. This use of "Spirit" by Gregory to mean deity is significant. Spirit Christology of this kind has a long history in the early Fathers, and clearly it had not died out. Gregory apparently does not find it incompatible with the more restricted use of Spirit to refer to the Holy Spirit. The
concept of Spirit still retained a certain flexibility and, along with that, its connotation in the Biblical literature, that to speak of the Spirit was to speak of God himself and not some other intermediary being. The fact that to speak of the Spirit of God in the context of Hebrew monotheism was a way of speaking of God and not of another intermediate being is ultimately what justifies Gregory's insistence on the deity of the Spirit as an interpretation of the New Testament and invalidates the effectively polytheistic hierarchy of his Arian opponents.

Gregory's use of "Spirit" to mean deity in this passage from the Christmas oration should also be seen in the light of his statement in the Fourth Theological Oration:

"He is Christ because of his deity. For this is the anointing of his manhood, and does not, as is the case with all other anointed ones, sanctify by its action, but by the presence in his fullness of the Anointing One."  

Gregory does not mention the Spirit here, but the figure of "anointing" is sufficiently connected with the Spirit in Biblical literature to suggest that this sentence should be taken as a parallel to the statement in the Christmas oration. In the Christmas oration Gregory speaks of the Spirit (by which he means the deity of Christ) deifying the flesh. In this statement from the Fourth Theological Oration a few weeks later he speaks of the deity anointing the humanity. It is difficult to see how the two statements could be referring to different things. In Gregory's thought, as men are anointed by the Spirit, so Christ himself is a man anointed by the Spirit, not just from his baptism, but from birth, for his deity anoints his humanity, or, expressed otherwise, "Spirit" deifies flesh.

This way of thinking clearly rules out Adoptionism, the view
associated with the name of Paul of Samosata that the deity of Christ was nothing more than the divine Spirit which came on Christ at his baptism. The Adoptionists (like the Spirit Christology tradition) equated "Spirit" and deity. Gregory accepted that, but, possibly in reaction to Adoptionism, he insisted that the union of deity (Spirit) and humanity (flesh) in Christ begins with the Incarnation and not at the Baptism. It is moreover a true union, "one out of two opposites," and comes into being not when the Spirit descends on an already existing man, but when the Word of God, who as God is Spirit, came forth in birth from the Virgin with the humanity he had assumed.

In the Incarnation therefore Gregory holds that "Spirit" or deity deifies flesh or humanity. In preparation for this, the one who is the Holy Spirit sanctifies the Virgin, in order that the Son may assume humanity in her and from her, and come forth self-formed as a mortal, yet deifying the humanity he has assumed. The Holy Spirit purifies; the Son assumes, deifies, comes forth. In Gregory's language the roles are distinct within the one act but there is simultaneously a close identification between the "Holy Spirit" and the Word who also is "Spirit", in the sense of "deity".

If the birth is the first major point in the series of acts of the Spirit in the life of Christ, the second is the baptism: "He is baptized; the Spirit bears witness." When Gregory placed this as his second point in his outline survey of the oikonomía in the Fifth Theological Oration, he had already expounded this at some length a few months earlier in both the Christmas oration and more fully at Epiphany. In the Christmas oration he spoke of the witness of the Spirit to Christ at the Baptism:
"A little later on you will see Jesus submitting to be purified in the River Jordan for my purification (katharsis), or rather sanctifying the waters by his purification (katharsis) (for indeed he had no need of purification who takes away the sin of the world), and the heavens split open, and witness borne to him by the Spirit who is akin to him." I

Nothing is said here about Christ's receiving the Holy Spirit, or his being anointed with, or energized by, the Holy Spirit. There is no thought of the Spirit as power (dynamis). Nor is the Holy Spirit said to purify Christ. Gregory does begin by saying that Christ submits to be purified, thus giving Christ at first a passive role, but there is nothing to suggest any thought here of the Holy Spirit as the agent purifying Christ. Rather, Gregory seems to have in mind the outward purification by the waters of the River Jordan. Moreover, Gregory is unhappy with a passive role for Christ, and immediately substitutes as preferable the statement that Christ sanctifies the waters by his purification. "For indeed," he adds, "he had no need of purification who takes away the sin of the world." The role given to the Holy Spirit is neither that of purifying nor that of empowering. He is in no way superior to Christ, rather he is equal to Christ ("akin to him") and his role is to bear witness.

The baptism of Christ, introduced in this way at the conclusion of the Christmas oration, becomes the centre of interest at the feast of Epiphany and receives its most extended treatment in the Epiphany oration, On the Holy Lights:

"Now we come to another action of Christ, and another mystery... Christ is illumined, let us shine forth with him. Christ is baptized, let us descend with him that we may also ascend with him." 2

The Pure One (ho katharos) is baptized by John, therefore we are to purify ourselves, says Gregory, and to be lowly minded. He draws some other lessons and then returns to the theme:
"But John baptizes, Jesus comes to him, perhaps to sanctify the Baptist himself, but certainly to bury the whole of the old Adam in the water; and before this and for the sake of this, to sanctify Jordan; for as he is Spirit and flesh, so he perfects by Spirit and water."  

Once again, Gregory portrays the role of Jesus as active rather than passive. John is baptizing, but it is Jesus who sanctifies John in being baptized. He buries "the old Adam" totally in the water, sanctifying Jordan for the purpose. Again this is said to be for our sake. Gregory had said at Christmas that Christ sanctified the waters "for my purification." Now he repeats the point: in this act, Christ perfects us. Moreover, he perfects us by "Spirit and water" as he himself is "Spirit and flesh." Here the usage of "Spirit" for deity, first noticed in the Christmas oration, recurs. Christ is Spirit and flesh, that is to say, God and man, and so it is fitting that he consecrates us by Spirit and water. The parallel is somewhat rhetorical. Yet the juxtaposition of ideas is significant. "Spirit and water" in the context seems to refer to the Holy Spirit and the waters of the Jordan. Yet the phrase also carries the Johannine reference to the baptism of the Christian.  

Thus an intimate link is suggested between the act of Christ then in his own baptism and the baptism of the Christian now. The purification of the Christian at his baptism is somehow rooted in the consecrating action of Christ. The play on the word "Spirit" seems to suggest that if "Spirit" stands for the deity of Christ in the phrase "Spirit and flesh" then it implies deity also when it refers to the Holy Spirit in the phrase "Spirit and water." This use of the word "Spirit" to refer both to the deity of Christ and to the "Holy Spirit" as a distinct hypostasis may appear rather confusing, but if the question is
raised whether it implies in Gregory's mind an identification of Son and Spirit in such a way as to lose the distinction between them, the answer is definitely no. To Gregory that would have been "Sabellianism". The fact that "Spirit" may be used as a synonym for "deity" simply strengthens the point that the Holy Spirit is who God is.

Gregory continues his exposition of the Baptism:

"But further, Jesus goes up out of the water, for with himself he carries up the world, and sees the heaven opened which Adam had shut against himself and all his posterity, as the gates of Paradise by the flaming sword. And the Spirit bears witness to his Godhead, for he descends upon one that is like him, as does the voice from heaven (for he to whom the witness is borne came from there), and like a dove, for he honours the body (for this also by deification is God) by being seen in bodily form; and moreover, the dove has from distant ages been wont to proclaim the end of the deluge."

In the midst of the somewhat rhetorical references to Paradise and the Flood, Gregory's interpretation of the role of the Spirit at the baptism is the same here as in his outline summary in the Fifth Theological Oration: the Spirit bears witness to the deity of Christ. Christ is not said to receive the Spirit or to be anointed or empowered. The Spirit descends upon one who is like him. As with the birth of Christ, so also here the action of the Spirit is distinct from the action of Christ. Although Christ who sanctifies, buries, perfects, and goes up, is "Spirit and flesh", he is not the Spirit who descends and bears witness. He does not descend upon himself or bear witness to himself. The Spirit is like him but distinct from him.

Gregory adds to his exposition a paragraph on different kinds of baptism. Moses' baptism was

"typical as Paul says; the sea of the water and the cloud of the Spirit... John also baptized; but this was not like the baptism of the Jews, for it was not only in water, but also 'to repentance'. Still it was not wholly spiritual, for he
does not add 'and in the Spirit'. Jesus also baptized, but in the Spirit. This is the perfect baptism.'

Here the baptism of Jesus himself is not included, but Moses' "baptism" (as Paul calls it in I Cor. 10:2) is typical of the perfect and spiritual baptism Jesus gives, baptism in the Spirit. Gregory adds his little aside on the deity of the Spirit:

"And how is he not God, if I may digress a little, by whom you too are made god?" 

The link between our deification through baptism and the deity of the Spirit is now seen to have a Christological reference. The Spirit deifies us through baptism, but Jesus is the giver of the Spirit, the one who baptized "in the Spirit", and who is therefore the source of our deification. The present experience of the Christian in baptism is rooted in the oikonomia and specifically in Christ's own baptism. Our purification in baptism somehow becomes possible because of his purification (katharsis) in the Jordan.

After the birth and the baptism, Gregory's outline survey in the Fifth Theological Oration of the activity of the Spirit in the life of Christ passes thirdly to the temptations and the miracles:

"He is tempted; the Spirit leads him up. He works miracles; the Spirit accompanies them."

The role assigned here to the Spirit in leading Christ is an unusual expression for Gregory, who avoids speaking of any action of the Spirit upon Christ. Yet it accurately reflects the mode of expression in the Gospels, where Christ is said to be led by the Spirit into the desert, and where the miracles are associated with the Spirit. But Gregory does not develop his thinking on the Spirit's role in Christ's ministry. It appears to be mentioned only here in this outline survey in the Fifth Theological Oration.

The Spirit's role in the death of Christ does not enter
Gregory's thought at all, but this is not surprising, since the New Testament is almost entirely silent about it. It is otherwise with the Resurrection. Certainly the Resurrection is not mentioned in the outline survey in the Fifth Theological Oration. But in Gregory's very first oration after his ordination, the First Oration on Easter, the Pauline link between the Resurrection and the Spirit and the new spiritual life of the Christian is vividly expressed. Gregory's purpose is (he says):

"...that he who to-day rose again from the dead may renew me also by his Spirit; and, clothing me with the new man, may give me to his new creation, to those who are begotten after God, as a good modeler and teacher for Christ, willingly both dying with him and rising again with him."

Here is the Pauline link between the Resurrection of Jesus, the Spirit and the new life, the clothing with the "new man", the "new creation", the dying and rising with Christ. Christ is the agent, the one who rose from the dead, and the one who will renew Gregory. But he will renew Gregory "also" by his Spirit. Gregory clearly pictures the Christian life of mortificatio and vivificatio as one rooted in the dying and rising of Christ. But Christ who rose will renew Gregory also "by his Spirit". The risen Christ is the sender of the Spirit by whom Gregory is to be conformed to his death and to share in his Resurrection. The work of Christ now in renewing the Christian arises out of his work in the oikonomia and specifically in his Resurrection. But what he does now, he does by his Spirit.

Throughout Gregory's account of the work of the Spirit in the life of Christ one feature has been notable, namely, Gregory's refusal to see the Holy Spirit acting upon Christ. The Spirit purifies the Virgin, but is not said to be active in the
conception: it is the Son who comes forth. The Spirit bears witness at the baptism, but is not said to anoint Christ, for already his deity anoints his humanity. The Spirit accompanies the miracles, but it is Christ who performs them. The Spirit is the one by whom the risen Christ renews us, but it is Christ who rises from the dead and who renews us by his Spirit. This feature of Gregory's pneumatology is clearly expressed in the Pentecost oration. In the course of a review of the role of the Spirit in the whole oikonomia from creation to Pentecost, all he says about the Spirit and Christ is a brief parenthetical remark:

"...for I omit to mention Christ himself in whom he dwelt, not as energizing, but as accompanying his equal (hōs homotimō symparomartoun)..."\(^1\)

Gregory uses here Basil's word, homotimos, emphasizing the equal status of Son and Spirit. It may be that he is afraid that to give the Spirit an active energizing role will imply the inferiority of the Son.\(^2\) But by rejecting the idea of "energizing" and emphasizing the equality between them, he seems to be refusing to relate the Spirit to the humanity of Christ. He sees the Spirit only in relation to Christ's deity. If it is true, as Boris Bobrinskoy has argued, that the Cappadocian Fathers revived the "pneumatic Christology" of Irenaeus and the Apologists which gave an important role to the Holy Spirit in the life of Christ, it is also true that Gregory of Nazianzus is the one who treats this with the greatest caution.\(^3\)
Gregory's survey near the end of the Fifth Theological Oration of the work of the Spirit in the life of Christ ends with the sentence, "He ascends; the Spirit takes his place." The same point had been more fully expressed the previous year in his oration, On Pentecost:

"The things of the body of Christ are now at an end, or rather those of his bodily sojourn...and those of the Spirit begin." The idea that the work of the Spirit succeeds the work of Christ is more fully developed a little later in the same oration when Gregory reviews the role of the Spirit in the whole oikonomia from creation to Pentecost. Having considered the Spirit's work in creation and on the prophets, Gregory moves straight to his work on the disciples (omitting, as he says, Christ, whom he did not energize but in whom he dwelt as an equal). The Spirit dwelt in the disciples

"In three ways, as they were able to receive him, and on three occasions; before Christ was glorified by the Passion, and after he was glorified by the Resurrection; and after his Ascension, or restoration, or whatever we ought to call it, to heaven." It appears that this threefold development of the dwelling of the Spirit must modify the earlier apparently clear-cut statement that the things of the Spirit begin when those of the bodily advent of Christ end. And yet it is also clear that it is the Resurrection and the Ascension of Christ, which define the ways or modes in which the Spirit dwells in the disciples. The economy of the Spirit is shaped and determined by the economy of the Son. Gregory explains the three modes more fully:

"For it is clear that the first, the cleansing of the sick and of the spirits could not be apart from the Spirit; also the inbreathing after the economy, clearly a divine inspiration; and so too the present distribution of the fiery tongues which
First, the healing and casting out of evil spirits by the disciples during the ministry of Jesus imply that they must have had the Spirit in some way. The insufflation by Jesus after the Resurrection brought about a different mode of the Spirit's dwelling, and Pentecost a third. There is a progressive manifestation of the Spirit reaching its climax in the era beginning with Pentecost (still the present one) in which the Spirit is present substantially.

"But the first manifested him indistinctly, the second more expressly, this present one more perfectly, since he is no longer present only in energy (energeia(1)), but as we may say, substantially (ousiōdōs), associating with us, and dwelling in us. For it was fitting that as the Son had lived in our company in bodily form (sōmatikōs hēmin homilēsantos) - so the Spirit too should appear in bodily form (phanēnai sōmatikōs) and that after Christ had returned to his own place, he should have come down to us, coming because he is the Lord, sent because he is not a rival to God. For such words no less manifest the unanimity than they mark the natural distinction."

The Spirit thus comes in succession to the Son revealing his own deity in that he "comes" and the unity of the Godhead in that he is said to be "sent" and therefore not a rival to God. The word "sent" also conveys the distinctiveness of the Spirit, according to Gregory, presumably because it implies one who sends and one who is sent. It is therefore his coming at Pentecost which most fully reveals both the deity and the distinctiveness of the Holy Spirit. Previously he was present only in energy, that is by his operations in the world, but now he comes in person, as it were like the Son. As the Son was substantially or actually present on earth as a result of his Incarnation, so now, following Pentecost, the Spirit is substantially or actually present in the world.

The distinction Gregory makes here between the Spirit's
presence in energy (energela(1)) and his presence substantially or in essence (ousiōdēs) may seem similar to the distinction Basil makes between the energies or operations of God, which are various, and the essence of God, which is single and simple. According to Basil, we know God from his energies, which come down to us, but do not approach his essence, which is beyond our reach.\(^1\) This distinction between the essence and energies of God was later elaborated by Eastern Orthodox theology, especially by Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth century.\(^2\) Gregory Nazianzen makes a distinction similar to Basil's but in different terms in the Second Theological Oration. He distinguishes there between "the first and unmingled nature, known to itself" and "that which at last even reaches to us." He identifies the latter with the majesty (megaleiotēs) or glory (megaloprepēla) of God.\(^3\) According to Nicholas Gendle, Gregory is clearly extending there the thought of Basil.\(^4\) But here in this passage in the Pentecost oration, Gregory is not concerned with our knowledge of God and reflecting that we may know God's operations in the world but not his essence. Rather, he is concerned with the Spirit's presence in the world and saying that before Pentecost he was present in energy, that is to say, in his work or operations, but that after Pentecost he was substantially present or present in person in a way analogous to the substantial or personal presence of the Son from his Incarnation to his Ascension. There is no thought here that men may know or observe the essence of God in the Spirit any more than they were able to know or observe the essence of God in Jesus. It is simply that from Pentecost the Spirit is actually and personally present in a way which was not true previously.
The third stage of the Spirit's activity in the disciples which Gregory describes here in the Pentecost oration is thus seen to be qualitatively different. Indeed it would appear that Gregory really has no characteristic difference to indicate between the first and the second stages, and that he only introduces this distinction in an attempt to see the Johannine insufflation of the Spirit as a stage distinct and different from Pentecost. The real difference occurs when Christ ascends and the Spirit comes to take his place. The more elaborate picture of three stages is not sustained: Pentecost marks the real change. The Spirit is active with Christ and the disciples before Pentecost, but the emphasis lies on his activity and his presence in succession to Christ. It is when the "things of the body of Christ" are at an end that those of the Spirit begin. Winslow's assessment is correct when he says that Gregory

"conceives of the work of the Spirit as belonging more to the present than to the past. In the unfolding oikonomia of God's providential love for his creation the Spirit has his particular - though not exclusive - role to play after the 'economy of the body of Christ' has been complete."  

It is here as he is speaking about the coming of the Spirit at Pentecost in succession to Christ, that Gregory makes his most significant use of the Johannine title for the Spirit, the Paraclete:

"And therefore he came after Christ, that a Paraclete should not be lacking unto us; but Another Paraclete, that you might acknowledge his co-equality. For this word 'another' marks an alter ego, a name of equal Lordship, not of inequality. For 'another' is not said, I know, of different kinds, but of things consubstantial (tôn homoousiôn)."  

Once again, Gregory is arguing that it is the coming of the Spirit at Pentecost which most fully reveals both his deity and his distinctiveness. This time it is the word "another" which implies
both. Gregory makes explicit the implication of equality with the Son, and speaks explicitly in public for the first time of the consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Son. At the same time, the word "another" in John 14:16 implies a distinction. The Spirit is Christ's alter ego.

Gregory's evident assumption of the Spirit's distinct subsistence should probably be seen against the background of the widespread reaction aroused throughout the Greek East earlier in the century by the views of Marcellus of Ancyra, the strong supporter of the Nicene party whose support for the homoousion arose from his strong views on the unity of God. Marcellus, whose views were comparable with, but not the same as, those of Sabellius in the previous century, rejected not only the words "three hypostases" but also the very idea that the Father, Son and Spirit were eternally distinct in God. He saw the Godhead "as a single hypostasis with a double extension, Spirit and Word, which will ultimately be reabsorbed," and used the Paraclete passages to support his view. Marcellus had passed from the scene by the time Gregory preached this sermon, and his views were in any case not strictly Sabellian: he would not have disputed that the Spirit was distinct (although not a distinct hypostasis) at this point. Yet awareness of the Sabellian danger remained strong in the East, possibly partly because of the followers of Eustathius of Antioch, the Nicene bishop deposed shortly after the Council of Nicea, whose followers continued as a distinct group in Antioch under the leadership of Paulinus. Here Gregory clearly assumes that the distinctiveness of the Spirit is evident in the wording of the Paraclete sayings in John's Gospel, the allos Paracletos and the
saying that the Paraclete is "sent". Yet it is not merely a matter of the wording of the text of Scripture. He is interpreting the Paraclete sayings here in the Pentecost oration in the context of the event of Pentecost. Gregory assumes of course that the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost described in Acts 2 was a real event and not a theological construct, and he interprets it in connection with the Ascension: "He ascends; the Spirit takes his place." He assumes too that at the Ascension, Christ ascended in his Resurrection body to the Father: "The things of the body of Christ are now at an end, or rather those of his bodily sojourn..." Given those assumptions it is self-evident for Gregory that the one who descends on the disciples at Pentecost, not in the Resurrection body of Christ but in the form of tongues of fire, must be distinct from Christ, an alter ego, "another Paraclete." The distinction lies not merely in the verbal revelation of the text of Scripture, not, as Gregory would say, in the onomata, but in the pragmata, the facts themselves.

The deity of the Spirit, which Gregory has already said is evident at Pentecost in the fact that the Spirit is said to come ("coming because he is the Lord") and in the saying that he is another Paraclete ("another Paraclete, that you might acknowledge his co-equality"), is now confirmed in the fact that he came as tongues of fire:

"And he came in the form of tongues because of his close relation to the Word. And they were of fire, perhaps because of his purifying power...or else because of his substance. For our God is a fire, and a fire consuming the ungodly; though you may again be annoyed at the word 'consubstantial (homoousion)' finding yourself too restricted."

Gregory pursues the theme of the Spirit's deity with some allegorical interpretation. The fact that the tongues of fire sat
on the disciples signifies the royalty (i.e. deity) of the Spirit and is likened to the presence and glory of God resting upon the cherubim, the throne of God upon the ark of the covenant. The upper room where the Spirit came upon the disciples is likened to the "upper chamber" upon the waters above the heavens which are said by the Psalmist to praise God. He continues:

"And Jesus himself in an upper room gave the communion of the mystery [sacrament] to those being perfected in higher things, that by that might be shown, that on the one hand God must come down to us, as I know he did formerly to Moses, and that on the other we must go up to him, and that by this a communion of God to men should come into being by an intimacy of dignity."  

The Last Supper indicated that God was to come down as he came down to meet Moses, and that we must go up like Moses to enter into communion with him. The deity of the Spirit is implied in the comparison of Pentecost with Sinai. For as it was beyond doubt God himself who descended upon Mount Sinai to enter into intimate fellowship with Moses, so it is God himself who comes upon the disciples in the upper room at Pentecost.

There is a great gulf fixed, Gregory continues, between the created and changing natures and the eternal and immutable, unless God comes down. That descent of God was precisely what the prophets including Joel declared, as did Jesus,

"being glorified (by the Spirit) and giving back glory, as he was glorified by and glorified the Father."  

Gregory goes beyond the statements of Scripture here, for while in the Johannine discourses Jesus speaks of the mutual glorifying of Father and Son, the Spirit's glorifying of the Son is not mirrored by the Son's glorifying of the Spirit. Gregory himself adds the thought that the Son reflects glory back upon the Spirit, an expression of his belief in the Spirit's deity rather than
evidence for it. The Spirit too must be glorified, for he is God, descending upon the waiting disciples to abide with them for ever. The mutual glorification of Father and Son and of Son and Spirit in the events of the Crucifixion, Resurrection, Ascension and Pentecost is thus for Gregory the revelation in the oikonomia of both the hypostatic distinctions and of the equal deity of Father, Son and Spirit.

Pentecost does not of course conclude the oikonomia. It marks, as Gregory said, the beginning of the things of the Spirit, and Gregory regards himself and his contemporaries as living in the era initiated by Pentecost. He speaks of "the present distribution of the fiery tongues which we are indeed celebrating." It is the present era in which the Spirit is manifested more perfectly, present not just in his works but substantially (ousiōdōs), "associating with us and dwelling in us." Gregory sees the Church of his day in continuity with the Church of the apostles. The Spirit who descended upon them in the upper room at Pentecost still dwells in Christians and in the Church.

As he comes to the conclusion of his Pentecost oration, Gregory finds in the strange tongues spoken by the disciples on the day of Pentecost a sign of the Spirit's work in the Church. The significance is found in the contrast between the tongues of Pentecost and the confusion of tongues at the Tower of Babel.

"But as the old confusion of tongues was laudable, when men who were of one language in wickedness and impiety...were building the Tower, for by the confusion of their language the unity of their intention was broken up and their undertaking destroyed, so much more worthy of praise is the present miraculous one. For being poured from One Spirit upon many men, it brings them again into harmony."

Here is Gregory's characteristic view of the work of the Spirit in
The appointing of some as pastors and teachers is for the perfecting (καταρτισμόν) of the Church, so that all may be

"so combined and knit together by the harmony of the Spirit (τῇ[1] χρυσολ[1] του Πνεύματος) to form one perfect body, really worthy of Christ himself, our Head."

Such Pauline echoes recur in Gregory's picture of the Church. He speaks of the tabernacle of God, "set up by the Lord and not man," being built up with varieties of excellence

"into a perfect work, a dwelling-place of Christ, a holy temple, united and framed together by the architecture of the Spirit."

We are "to hold the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." We are "one body in Christ", each a member of Christ, and "members one of another", "joined together" and united into one by the Spirit. This unity is not just in the local congregation, for the Spirit unites the members of Christ's body even though they may be separated by distance.

"O my people," Gregory addresses the Egyptian sailors, "for mine you are though afar, because we are divinely joined together and in a way quite different to the gross; for bodies are united in place, but souls are harmonized by the Spirit."

The Spirit thus unites all Christians as one body or one temple in which Christ dwells. Gregory, like Paul, uses the same picture of indwelling equally for the individual Christian and for the corporate Church. The scope of the pastoral art is "to make Christ dwell in the heart by the Spirit," so that each man may become "the living temple of God and the habitation of Christ in the Spirit." It is the indwelling of Christ by the Spirit in each member which produces the harmony of the Spirit in the whole body, making it in its living unity the temple of God. It is hardly surprising that Gregory's mind moves naturally to see this unity and harmony as a unity in the Holy Trinity.
"For some agree on evil," he declares in his Third Oration on Peace, "but we who are of the same mind agree on all that is best, in order that we may glorify with one accord and as by one mouth the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. And this is to be said about us, that God is truly in us, he who conceives as a unity those who are uniting, glorifying those who glorify. And it is not only said, but believed."

Thus in his panegyric on Basil he can speak of the Cappadocians as those

"whose special qualities are firmness in the faith and loyal devotion to the Trinity, to whom is due their unity and strength..."

The work of the Spirit in the Church since Pentecost is thus both individual and corporate. On the one hand, each Christian is regenerated, purified, enlightened and deified by the Spirit in baptism. Each Christian is renewed by the Spirit in dying and rising with Christ. There is some truth therefore in D.F. Winslow's statement:

If the incarnate Son of God is the agent of redemption for mankind in general, the Spirit is the agent of providing for us, individually, the means whereby we can appropriate that redemption. What Christ has accomplished universally, the Spirit perfects particularly.

All that has already been said about the work of the Spirit in the present experience of each Christian must therefore be seen also in relation to the whole oikonomia. The work of the Spirit in the Christian now is somehow made possible by the coming of Christ then and by his dying and rising and sending the Spirit.

But Winslow's statement does not give the whole truth, for there is also in Gregory's thought on the other hand the corporate aspect of the Spirit's work in the present day, the unifying of the Church. The mystical unity of the Church, brought into harmony and concord by the Spirit as the dwelling-place of Christ and the temple of God, is also the present result of the whole oikonomia.
The coming of the Spirit at Pentecost to be actually present in succession to the bodily presence of Christ initiated a communion of men with God which is ultimately to be understood and experienced by faith in the Holy Trinity. According to Gregory's perspective therefore, only the living confession of the Holy Trinity brings peace and unity to the Church.

Before turning to Gregory's doctrine of the Trinity, however, and the basis he found in that for his defence of the deity of the Spirit, one novel feature of his understanding of the oikonomia must be examined, namely his view of gradual revelation.
(d) The Gradual Revelation of the Trinity

Throughout the Fifth Theological Oration, Gregory is concerned to reply to the argument that there is no clear statement in Scripture that the Spirit is God. "Over and over again," he tells his opponents "you turn upon us the silence of Scripture." He meets their argument first with a discussion of how Scripture should be interpreted. He calls his hermeneutical excursus a short discussion of "things (pragma tôn) and terms (onomatôn) and especially of their use in Holy Scripture." Some things which are objectively true, he argues, are not explicitly stated in Scripture. It is true, for example, that God is unoriginate, but the word anarchon does not explicitly appear. We are bound therefore to accept the implications of Scripture, including the deity of the Holy Spirit, even though it is not stated in so many words.

He then turns to another counter-argument:

"But now I will take up the argument again a little way further back, and show you, though you are so clever, the reason for this entire system of secrecy. There have been in the whole period of the duration of the world two conspicuous changes of men's lives, which are also called two Covenants, or on account of the wide fame of the matter, two earthquakes; the one from idols to the law, the other from the law to the gospel." The first change abolished idols, but allowed sacrifices to continue, thus making Gentiles into Jews. The second destroyed sacrifices but did not forbid circumcision, making Jews into Christians. Thus men were moved persuasively towards God by gradually discontinuing their ancestral habits. Gregory then turns to theologia, the doctrine of God:
"To this I may compare the case of theology, except that it proceeds the opposite way (that is, by additions instead of subtractions). The Old [Covenant] proclaimed the Father openly, and the Son more obscurely. The New manifested the Son and suggested the deity of the Spirit. Now the Spirit himself dwells among us, and supplies us with a clearer demonstration of himself. For it was not safe, when the Godhead of the Father was not yet acknowledged, plainly to proclaim the Son; nor when that of the Son was not yet received to burden us further (if I may use so bold an expression) with the Holy Spirit."

If overloaded with divine revelation, men might have lost even what they had, like those overloaded with food, or like eyes too weak to bear the sun's light. It was done in this way so that

"by gradual additions, and, as David says, goings up (anabases) and advances and progress from glory to glory (ek doxēs eis doxan proodois kai prokopais) the light of the Trinity might shine upon the more illuminated."

Gregory's negative and positive versions of his view of progressive revelation do not quite coincide. The two "conspicuous changes" of the negative progression mark off three eras: the 'Gentile' era of idolatry and sacrifices, the 'Jewish' era of the Old Covenant with sacrifices, circumcision and the law, and thirdly the 'Christian' era of the gospel. But the three eras of the positive progression begin with the Old Covenant in which the Father is revealed clearly and the Son obscurely. The second era is that of the New Covenant by which he seems to mean not the years covered by the books of the New Testament (including the early Church), but the years of Christ's earthly life. This is the era in which the Son is clearly revealed and the deity of the Spirit suggested. The third era is the present era, beginning, one would think, at Pentecost, when the Spirit dwells among us revealing his own deity.
Gregory completes the picture with an account of the gradual revelation of the Spirit during the life of Christ and up to Pentecost, an account largely repeated from the Pentecost oration:

"For this was the reason, I think, that he gradually came to dwell in the disciples, measuring himself out to them according to their capacity to receive him, at the beginning of the gospel, after the Passion, after the Ascension, making perfect their powers, being breathed upon them, and appearing in fiery tongues."

Gregory sums up the progression:

"You see lights breaking upon us, gradually; and the order of theology (ταξιν θεολογίας), which it is better for us to keep, neither proclaiming things too suddenly nor yet keeping them hidden to the end."

It is within this perspective that the silence on the deity of the Spirit must be understood:

"Our Saviour had some things which, he said, could not be borne at that time by his disciples... And again he said that all things should be taught us by the Spirit when he should come to dwell amongst us. One of these, I take it, was the deity of the Spirit himself, made clear later on...after our Saviour's restoration."

Gregory's approach has received general acclaim. Lebreton called it "la page justement célèbre" and commented: "le texte est capital, et éclaire en plus d'un point l'histoire du dogme de la Trinité." R.P.C. Hanson regards this "very interesting theory of progressive revelation extending beyond Scripture" as more satisfactory than Basil's argument from secret tradition. F.W. Norris writes about Nazianzen's "stunning views of the order of revelation." There is some disagreement about the originality of Gregory's idea of the gradual revelation of the three hypostaseis. He appears to be the first to use the idea of progressive revelation to explain the late recognition of the deity of the
Spirit as a distinct *hypostasis*. But his approach is strikingly similar to the pre-Nicene tradition of Economic Trinitarianism, represented for example by Irenaeus, Hippolytus and Tertullian. Broadly, Economic Trinitarianism linked the unfolding of the Triad into Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with God's dealing with the world in his *oikonomia* of creation and redemption. The exclusive association of the Father with creation, the Son with redemption and the Spirit with the age of the Church was resisted, however, in that the Son was also the one through whom the worlds were created, and the Spirit also the one who spoke by the prophets. To tie Father, Son and Spirit too rigidly to successive modes of activity was in fact judged to be heretical in Sabellianism. And yet the elementary point which Gregory Nazianzen seems to be recognizing in his doctrine of gradual revelation is that the Triad must be revealed in the *oikonomia* or nowhere at all. Gregory goes beyond Economic Trinitarianism of course in affirming the Eternal and Immanent Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. But he is one with the tradition of Economic Trinitarianism in his view that the distinctions between the *hypostaseis* can only be known, not from some subordinationist hierarchy, as in that attributed (rightly or wrongly) to Origen, where the Three have a gradation of areas of competence (all creation, the intelligent, the sanctified), nor from distinctive properties of Father, Son and Spirit (though these may be deduced), but from the distinct roles carried out by Father, Son and Spirit (albeit in complete harmony and unity of will) in the *oikonomia*. Thus the Christian belief in the Trinity is ultimately inextricable from the historical nature of the Christian
revelation. For Gregory, it is in the Incarnation of the one who is the Son, but not the Father, and in the descent of the one who is the Spirit, but not the Father who sent him nor the ascended Incarnate Son, that we may discern the distinctions between them. And it is in the unity of action of the whole oikonomia albeit with distinguishable roles for the Three, that we may see the essential unity of the Godhead. Gregory's doctrine of the Trinity is grounded therefore in his perception of the actions of God in the oikonomia.

It has been alleged that the Cappadocians so emphasized the unity of the actions of the Trinity (as later expressed in the principle, *opera trinitatis ad extra Indivisa sunt*) that only the internal relations distinguished the hypostaseis and they had to be deduced from the statements of Scripture. Maurice Wiles concluded that the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity therefore depended on the statements of Scripture and upon accepting the statements of Scripture as verbal propositional revelation. In the light of Gregory's view of the revelation of the Trinity in the oikonomia, this conclusion is false, at least for Gregory. Certainly Gregory followed Origen in seeing the words of Scripture as inspired, but for him the Trinity was revealed not only in the words of Scripture, but also, inseparably from the words, in the events of the oikonomia. The Trinity is revealed in the Old Covenant, the Incarnation (that is, the earthly life of Christ), and in the life of the Church since Pentecost. Wiles views this as an inadequate schêma, since the Spirit is active during the Old Covenant in the inspiration of the prophets. But for Gregory it would be a
disadvantage if this schema became a rigid succession. It would lead in fact to a Sabellian view that God is successively Father, Son and Holy Spirit. For Gregory, it is not that the Son and Spirit are inactive before the Incarnation, the Father and Spirit inactive during the earthly sojourn of the Son, and the Father and Son inactive since Pentecost. It is rather that the Fatherliness of the one, unique God is evident before the Incarnation, the distinct hypostasis of the Son is evident during his earthly life (for the Son alone is incarnate), and the distinct hypostasis of the Spirit is evident after Pentecost (for it is not the Risen Christ in his Resurrection body who is now present). The significant connection for us to note here is the link between, on the one hand, the historicity of both the Ascension of Christ in his Resurrection body and the subsequent coming of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost and, on the other, the distinctiveness of the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit within the Holy Trinity. The historicity of these events in the oikonomia and the doctrine of the Trinity, particularly the distinctiveness of the hypostaseis, stand or fall together. But while the distinct roles of the Three lead Gregory to assert their distinctiveness as hypostaseis, all Three act in unity at each stage of revelation. The Son and Spirit are not absent before the Incarnation for they are active in creation and revelation; the Father and the Spirit are not absent during the incarnate life of the Son on earth, for the Spirit particularly "accompanies his equal"; and the Father and Son have not been absent since Pentecost, for while the Son is not now present in his Resurrection body, his presence is somehow mediated
by the Spirit. For Gregory therefore, the Trinity, that is to say, the paradoxical distinctness and unity of the Three, is revealed not only in the words of Scripture, but also in the divine acts of the *oikonomia*.

Gregory's teaching of the deity of the Spirit has its context within those Trinitarian horizons which the next two chapters must now more fully examine.
According to Jean Daniélou, Gregory of Nazianzus is considered to be the theologian of the Trinity par excellence. Hans von Campenhausen attributes this to his rhetoric: "In smooth, beautifully balanced formulas he unhesitatingly professed his faith in the essential unity of the three divine hypostaseis." Yet according to Jacques Rousse, it is unjust to see this oratorical skill as his sole merit. The polished phrases and balanced formulas in fact represented a subtle change in emphasis. When previous generations spoke of God, they meant the Father, but when Gregory spoke of God, he meant the Holy Trinity:

"But when I say 'God', I mean Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For Godhead is neither diffused beyond these...nor yet is it bound by a smaller compass than these... This then is the Holy of Holies which is hidden even from the Seraphim, and is glorified with a thrice repeated 'Holy' meeting in one ascription of the title 'Lord and God'..."

The doctrine of the Trinity is therefore the third area of Gregory's teaching which must be examined in order to understand his assertion of the Spirit's deity. Once again, this area of Gregory's thought cannot be fully examined here, even given the more extended treatment in two chapters which is demanded by the amount of material. It can only be examined so far as to see that, for Gregory, the doctrine of the Spirit is an integral part of the doctrine of God, and its coherence is to be seen within his Trinitarian faith. His awareness of the work of the Spirit in the
Christian and his exposition from the Christian Scriptures of the role of the Spirit in the oikonomia centred in the Son, demanded that the Spirit be identified with the Father and the Son as God.

But conversely, since the doctrine of the Trinity was grounded in the historical revelation in the oikonomia, Gregory was able to make the converse movement, and beginning with the doctrine of God as the Holy Trinity, to deduce the deity of the Holy Spirit as God active in the world. The two movements of thought are evident in Gregory's two major orations on the Spirit. In his oration, On Pentecost, delivered, it is believed, at Pentecost in 379 in the Anastasia, his chapel in Constantinople, Gregory bases his defence of the deity of the Spirit on his role in the oikonomia. But in the Fifth Theological Oration, possibly delivered at Pentecost, 380, his first approach is to begin with the Holy Trinity:

"But we have so much confidence in the deity of the Spirit whom we adore, that we will begin our teaching concerning his deity by fitting to him the names which belong to the Trinity... The Father was 'the true light which lighteth every man coming into the world.' The Son was 'the true light, which lighteth every man coming into the world.' The other Paraclete was 'the true light, which lighteth every man coming into the world.' 'Was' and 'was' and 'was', but was one thing. 'Light' and 'light' and 'light', but one light and one God. This was what David represented to himself long before when he said, 'In thy light shall we see light.' And now we have both seen and proclaim concisely and simply the doctrine of God the Trinity, comprehending 'out of light,' the Father, 'light', the Son, 'in light', the Spirit."

In this way Gregory begins his defence of the Spirit's deity from his teaching on the Trinity given in the previous four Theological Orations. His starting point is the adoration of the Trinity who is revealed as the Triune light, "'light' and 'light' and 'light', but one light and one God."
(a) Faith is faith in the Holy Trinity

Since the adoration of the Trinity is the starting point for Gregory, the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be for him a second-order doctrine developed as a theological defence or an inference from Christian faith. Rather it is fundamental to Christian faith. As Gregory proclaims in his first oration: "sound faith" is faith "in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the one Power and Godhead." The Trinity is fundamental to Christian faith because our faith is placed in Father, Son and Holy Spirit into whom we were baptized. In an early oration, Gregory prays for the peace of the church in Nazianzus,

"that we may all abide in one Spirit...guarding the good deposit which we have received from our fathers; adoring Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; knowing the Father in the Son, and the Son in the Holy Spirit, into which we were baptized, in which we have believed."

The doctrine of the Trinity is not an advanced abstract theological explanation for Gregory. It is the very foundation of Christian life and experience. It is the good deposit received from our fathers. The humblest and most recent Christian knows God as the Holy Trinity for his trust is placed in Father, Son and Holy Spirit into whom he has been baptized. For a Christian to deny the deity of the Spirit therefore is to deny not only the perfection of the Trinity but also his own perfection or completion as a Christian. For one being baptized to deny the deity of the Spirit is to nullify his regeneration and cut himself off from salvation. Gregory leaves the catechumens in no doubt with his trenchant, indeed violent, language:

"The Spirit is eager, the Perfector is ready, the Gift prepared. But if you still halt and will not receive the
perfectness of the Godhead, go and look for someone else to baptize you or drown you! I have no time to cut the Godhead, or make you dead in the moment of your regeneration, that you should have neither the gift nor the hope of grace but should in so short a time make shipwreck of your salvation. For whatever you may subtract from the deity of the Three, you will have overthrown the whole, and also your own perfecting."

To become a Christian is to confess faith in the Trinity and to remain solid and firm in that confession. It is to hold fast to the Trinity and to look to the Trinity for salvation.

All of that is most comprehensively expressed in saying that to become a Christian is to become a worshipper, one who adores the Holy Trinity.

"As long as you are a catechumen, you are but in the porch of religion. You must come inside and cross the court and observe holy things and look into the Holy of Holies, and be in company with the Trinity (meta tês Triados genesthai)."

In becoming a Christian, one comes into the temple, as it were, and into the presence of the Trinity. Christians are those who adore Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The Church at Nazianzus is a "sacred flock", Gregory tells them:

"...those by whom the Father is exalted, and the Son is held to be equal to Him and the Holy Spirit is glorified together with them."

Gregory instructs Eulalius, a new bishop, at his consecration:

"Teach the worship of God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit in three hypostaseis, in one glory and brilliance."

The Church is to be led,

"in its perfect worship of the perfect Trinity, which as Father and Son and Holy Spirit we contemplate and adore."

The Church gives expression to its adoration of the Trinity in the Trinitarian doxologies of the liturgy, which are echoed in twelve
or thirteen of Gregory's perorations. Normally Gregory concludes by glorifying the Son, but on certain occasions he concludes with a full Trinitarian doxology. E. Bellini has examined three of these Trinitarian doxologies found in the early orations (including those just noted, to the "sacred flock" at Nazianzus and to Eulalius). These "present the common characteristic of underlining the equality of the three Persons," a comment which may be equally applied to the twelve or thirteen concluding Trinitarian doxologies. In six of these Gregory emphasizes the equality of the Three by using a variation of the doxology defended by Basil: "Glory be to the Father and to the Son together with (syn) the Holy Spirit." In others he emphasizes the equality by emphasizing the unity:

"Let us minister to God the one praise of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, both contemplating and uplifting the glory and splendour of the deity that to him may be the glory and the honour and the adoration to the ages of ages. Amen."

The adoration of the Trinity is a theme frequently repeated. "We worship the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, distinct identities (idiotētas), but one in deity." Jacques Rousse concludes:

"Mais pour Grégoire et pour les Pères, la 'théologie', c'est la théologie de la trinité: on ne saurait trop insister sur le caractère foncièrement trinitaire de sa spiritualité."

Faith for Gregory is an attitude of trust and adoration whose object is God the Holy Trinity.
(h) The Beatific Vision: the Light of the Trinity.

Closely connected to adoration in Gregory's thought is the language of contemplation. Worshipping Christians are said to "contemplate" the Holy Trinity. Theoria and theorein, which are usually translated by the English "contemplation" and "to contemplate", have the literal meaning of "viewing" or "observing", "to look at" or "to view". To contemplate the Trinity is therefore to look at or view or gaze upon the Trinity. The metaphor or model is one of sight or vision, and the heart of the model is the idea of the Trinity as light. The Christian's destiny is the beatific vision of the brilliant splendour and radiance and glory of the light of the Holy Trinity. In his panegyric for his sister, Gorgonia, Gregory visualizes what she now sees:

"Better, I know well, and far more precious than eye can see is thy present lot: the song of those who keep the feast, the throng of angels, the heavenly host, the vision (theoria) of glory, and that splendour of the Trinity most high, pure and perfect beyond all other, no longer above the flight of the captive mind, dissipated by the senses but entirely contemplated (theoroumenas) and possessed by the undivided mind and flashing like lightning upon our souls with the whole light of the Godhead."

In another oration he envisages that, at the Last Judgment,

"some will be welcomed by the unspeakable light and the vision (theoria) of the holy and royal Trinity which now shines upon them with greater brilliancy and purity and unites itself wholly to the whole mind, in which solely and beyond all else I take it that the kingdom of heaven consists."

And at the end of his life, as an old man, having retreated from Constantinople to Nazianzus and honouring his friend Basil at last with a panegyric worthy of him, Gregory looks forward to his translation, when they will once again live together,

"and gaze together more clearly and more perfectly upon the holy and blessed Trinity of which we have now in some degree
Received the image."

Accompanying this idea of the vision of God is the implication that the life of the body is a hindrance. In the words of Nicholas Gendle, Gregory "gives an unbalanced, dualistic prominence to the opacity of matter as the main bar to gnōsis theou [knowledge of God]." Occasionally this becomes quite explicit. Gregory envisages his late father before God, freed from his body:

"I am well assured that his intercession now is better than his instruction of old, since he is closer to God, now that he has shaken off his bodily fetters, and freed his mind from the clay which obscured it, and, naked, converses with the nakedness of the prime and purest Mind..."

Gregory makes the point more generally in his panegyric on Athanasius, but this time speaking of the possibility of rising above matter to contemplate God while still in this life in the body:

"Whoever has been permitted to escape by reason and contemplation (logou kai theōrias) from matter and this fleshly cloud or veil, whichever it should be called, and to hold communion with God and be associated with the purest light as far as man's nature can attain, blessed is he, both from his ascent (anabaseōs) hence, and for his deification (theoseōs) there, which is conferred by true philosophy, and by rising superior to the dualism of matter (tēn hylikēn dyada), through the unity which is perceived in the Trinity."

Gregory goes on to contrast the wretchedness of the one who is depraved by being "knit to the flesh" and "oppressed by the clay" so that he cannot look at "the rays of truth" but remains "miserable in his blindness".

The idea of the flesh as a hindrance to the vision of God is an extension of the model of God as intellectual and spiritual light, and as the source of intellectual illumination. He had
just outlined this model in the previous opening paragraph of this
panegyric:

"For as the sun is to the things of sense, so is God to
intelligible things. The one lightens the visible world, the
other the invisible. The one makes our bodily eyes to see
the sun, the other makes our intellectual natures to see
God."1

A similar explicit statement of the model appears in the "theology
of light" in the Epiphany oration:

"God is light, the highest, the unapproachable, the ineffable,
neither conceived in the mind nor uttered with the lips,
giving light to every reasoning nature. He is in the world
of thought (en noētois) what the sun is in the world of sense
(en aisthētois), presenting himself to our minds in proportion
to our cleansing, and loved in proportion to his appearing to
our minds... I speak of that light which is contemplated
(theōroumenon) in Father, Son and Holy Spirit, whose riches is
their unity of nature and the one outleaping of their
brightness."2

Insofar as a man is purified therefore, he may engage in theōria
and contemplate the splendour of the Holy Trinity. In a measure
the light of the Holy Trinity shines upon all men through the
teaching of the Church. Athanasius

"restored the teaching which had been overthrown: the Trinity
was once more boldly spoken of, and set upon the lampstand,
flushing with the brilliant light of the one Godhead into the
souls of all."3

Yet at the same time to philosophize about God is for those
previously purified in soul and body, or who at least are being
purified:

"For the impure to touch the pure is, we may safely say, not
safe, just as it is unsafe to fix weak eyes upon the sun's
rays."4

This was why the revelation of the Trinity had to be given
gradually in the oikonomia,

"that by gradual additions, and, as David says, goings up, and
advances and progress from glory to glory, the light of the
Trinity might shine upon the more illuminated."

In several places Gregory speaks even more explicitly of the triple light. The apostles, he explains were sent as strangers among the nations that "nothing might miss the illumination of the triple light (hē tou trissou phōtos) or be unenlightened by the truth." In the key passage in the Epiphany oration, On the Holy Lights, he launches into his exposition of the Trinity (after elaborate preparation) by exclaiming:

"And when I speak of God you must be illumined at once by one flash of light and by three, three in identities (idiotētas) or hypostaseis, if any prefer to call them, or persons... but one in respect of substance (ousias), that is, Godhead." And he expresses the same idea in two similar but slightly different ways in the Fifth Theological Oration when he speaks of "Light and light and light; but one light and one God," and a little later of "one mingling (sygkrasis) of lights, as it were of three suns holding each other." God is light, eternal and "triple-bright."

In conceiving of God as light, Gregory stands in what Heinz Althaus calls,

"eine grosse Tradition seit dem Hellenismus, die auch in der Philosophie Plotinus einerseits und in der Heiligen Schrift und im Glaubensbekenntnis des ersten Konzil von Nizäa andererseits ihren Niederschlag gefunden hat, in Gott das reine und inverfälschte Licht erblickte."

F.W. Norris also comments on the significance of the Council of Nicea as a precedent for Gregory's image of the threefold light:

"One of the backgrounds for this figure is the 'light from light' phrase in the Nicene Creed, a traditional, Biblical and literary image used to indicate both distinction and unity between Father and Son. The present expression, 'threefold light', is an attempt to expand that figure to include the place of the Holy Spirit in the Godhead, again drawing
together the sense of three and one."\(^1\)

Origen, Athanasius and Basil all used the model of light. Origen does not include the Spirit as light, at least in the *De Principiis*, but only the Father and the Son.\(^2\) The Nicene Creed also speaks of the Son as "light from light", but not of the Spirit. Athanasius extends the model of light and radiance to the Spirit in his *Letters to Serapion*:

"But the Son...in contrast with the light is called radiance, as Paul says, 'Who, being the radiance of his glory and the image of his essence.' As then the Father is light and the Son is his radiance...we may see in the Son the Spirit also by whom we are enlightened... But when we are enlightened by the Spirit, it is Christ who in him enlightens us."\(^3\)

Basil also writes of the Spirit as the one who enlightens us:

"If you remain outside the Spirit you will not be able even to worship at all; and on your becoming in him you will in no wise be able to dissever him from God, any more than you will divorce light from visible objects. For it is impossible to behold the image of the invisible God except by the enlightenment (*phōtismos*) of the Spirit... Thus fitly and consistently do we behold the 'brightness of the glory' of God by means of the illumination (*phōtismou*) of the Spirit..."\(^4\)

But in both these passages Athanasius and Basil use the model of light, radiance and enlightenment to refer to the revealing activity of God towards us in the *oikonomia*. Gregory Nazianzen remodels the model to rule out any subordinationism and to refer to the ontological Trinity, God as he is in himself:

"Again I thought of the sun and a ray (*aktīna*) and light (*phōs*). But here again there was a fear...lest we should give essence to (*ouslēsomen*) the Father, but deny subsistence (*mē hypostēsomen*) to the others and make them only powers (*dynamēs*) of God, existing in him (*enhyparxousas*) and not hypostatized (*hyphestōsas*). For neither the ray nor the light is another sun, but they are only effulgences (*aporroial*) from the sun and qualities (*poiotētes*) of his essence."\(^5\)

Gregory prefers to speak therefore not of the sun, its radiance and
enlightenment, nor of the sun, its ray and its light, but of three
suns mutually indwelling and coinhering in each other.1

"No sooner do I conceive of the One than I am illumined
(perilampomai) by the Three. No sooner do I distinguish them
than I am carried back to the One. When I think of any One of
the Three I think of him as the Whole, and my eyes are filled,
and the greater part of what I am thinking of escapes me. I
cannot grasp the greatness of that One so as to attribute a
greater greatness to the rest. When I contemplate the three
together (sunelô tê theôria), I see but one torch (lampada),
and cannot divide or measure out the undivided light."2

In this way the equality of the hypostaseis and their unity in the
Godhead is preserved and the model of God as light is adapted to
refer not only to God as he is towards us in the oikonomia, but to
God as he is in himself.3

The significant point about Gregory's whole imagery of light,
and apparently his use of "Spirit" too, is that he is referring to
reality which is essentially intellectual. As the sun enlightens
our eyes to see material reality, so God enlightens our minds to
see truth, that is, intelligible reality, and eventually and
supremely to see ultimate Truth, the ultimate intelligible reality,
God himself. In this sense, God is light and gives light "to every
reasoning nature (pasês logikês physeôs)."4 That is why Gregory
can speak of angels and men as lesser lights, implying that,
enlightened by God, they too are intellectual beings:

"A second light is the angel, a kind of outflow or
communication (aporroê tis, è metousia) of that first light,
drawing its illumination (phôtismon) from its inclination and
obedience to it... A third light is man, a light which is
visible externally. For man is called light because of the
power of speech in us."5

As men, we are minds because God is "Mind", and so we are able to
communicate and converse with him. God is indeed "the prime and
purest Mind."¹ In his oration delivered when his father made him auxiliary bishop of Nazianzus, Gregory had dropped the imagery of light to speak plainly of the Trinity as "Mind, Word and Spirit."² His thinking was more fully revealed in his Third Oration on Peace, delivered in Constantinople in the same year as the Five Theological Orations, when he spoke of man's intellectual nature as an analogy for the Trinity:

"For ourselves, we know that there is one and the same nature of deity, known as Unoriginate and Begotten and Proceeding One, as in us there is mind and word and spirit (as far as sensible things resemble intelligible things and great things little things, since no image approaches the truth)..."³

Expressed in this way, Gregory's comparison of the intellectual nature of man with the intellectual nature of God is seen to be a very interesting anticipation of the psychological analogy for the Trinity developed so thoroughly by Augustine.

Gregory of Nyssa was to develop a radical apophaticism of the divine darkness, emphasizing by this way of speaking the incomprehensibility of God. Gregory of Nazianzus did not go so far. He continued to follow the Biblical, credal and philosophical precedents for speaking of God as light.⁴ Hence it is within this context of the Trinity as the threefold light and as three coinhering suns that we are to set his understanding of the Holy Spirit as the one who illumines and enlightens. Yet Gregory did recognize that to speak of God as light was merely a model, a way of speaking. Even to speak of God as light or mind did not capture or define the essence or nature of the Holy Trinity. The mystery of God is greater than our minds are able to grasp.
(c) The Paradox of the Three-in-One

It is when we come to contemplate and consider God as he is in himself that Gregory's apophaticism is most marked. In considering God's actions in the oikonomia, that is, God as he has revealed himself in the incarnation of the Son and the descent of the Spirit, it may be possible to be more explicit. But when we come to consider the God who has revealed himself in the oikonomia as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, our vision is limited and our language and logic are inadequate. Gregory confesses that this talk of God who is Three yet One is paradoxical:

"Monad is worshipped in Triad, and Triad in Monad - a paradox both in separation (dairesin) and union (henosin)."

The paradox is that the Three must be seen as simultaneously divided and united. As he enters upon theological questions (tois tēs theologias) at the start of the Second Theological Oration, Gregory prays

"that one illumination may come upon us from the one Godhead, one in diversity (henikos diairoumenos), diverse in unity (synaptoimenos dialretos), which is a paradox (paradoxon)."

Gregory's earliest exposition of the paradox of the Three who are One is given in his First Oration on Peace:

"Worshipping Father, Son and Holy Spirit, recognizing the Father in the Son, the Son in the Spirit...distinguishing before joining (prin synapsal dialrountes) and joining before distinguishing (prin dialrein synaptontes), not that the Three are as One (for they are not anhypostatic or one in hypostasis so that the plural is only in names and not in things) but that the Three are one entity. For they are not one in hypostasis, but in deity. The Monad is worshipped in the Triad, and the Triad recapitulates itself in the Monad..."

He expresses the paradox again in his Third Oration on Peace. He honours equally, he says, the One who is the Beginning (archē) of deity and those who are from the Beginning,
"diverely One Being (hen onta diē(1)rēmenōs) and unitedly diverse Ones (dialroumena synēmmenōs), if one may also pronounce a paradox (paradoxon)."¹

The paradox is expressed similarly in the Fifth Theological Oration in close connection with the model of the three suns:

"But the Godhead is, to speak concisely, undivided in its divisions (ameristos en memerismenois), and there is one fusion (sygkrasis) of lights, as it were of three suns holding each other."²

Some months earlier in the Epiphany oration, Gregory had said of the Godhead:

"For it is undividedly divided (diairetal gar adiairetōs), if I may say so, and diversely united (synaptetai diērēmenōs). For the Godhead is One in Three, and the Three are One, in whom the Godhead is, or to speak more accurately, who are the Godhead."³

Heinrich Dörrie comments that the rhetorical figure of oxymoron used here (as in these other examples) to express the paradox may be compared in its effect to a sudden flash of lightning.⁴ It powerfully and brilliantly illuminates the necessity of holding both sides of the paradox, for failure to do so, as Gregory goes on to say, will mean being carried away into the extremes of Arianism or Sabellianism:

"We will omit then the exaggerations and omissions, neither making the unity (henōsin) a confusion (sygchysin), nor the division (dialiasin) a separation (allotrίōsin). Equally absent from us be both the confusion (synairesisin) of Sabellius and the division (dialiasisin) of Arius, evils diametrically opposed yet equal in profanity. For what necessity is there to fuse God together wickedly or to cut him up into unequal ones?"⁵

The balancing of these diametrically opposed evils, which is the corollary of holding both sides of the paradox, is one of Gregory's common themes. It is developed most fully and at greatest length early in his career in his second oration, his Defence of his
Flight to Pontus, effectively a small treatise on pastoral theology. Those who must enlighten others about the Holy Trinity, the crown of Christian teaching, are at very great risk,

"lest they contract the doctrine into a single hypostasis (eis mian hypostasin synairethenta) from fear of polytheism and so leave us empty terms (psila...ta onomata) if we suppose Father and Son and Holy Spirit to be one and the same; or lest on the other hand they sever it into three opposed divinities (antitheous), so to speak, foreign and diverse, or disordered and unoriginate, thus falling from the opposite side into an equally dangerous error, like some distorted plant bent back in the opposite direction."

Gregory elaborates this picture a little more fully, distinguishing three dangers which he calls the "atheism" of Sabellius the Libyan, the "Judaism" of Arius of Alexandria, and the "polytheism" of "some of the ultra-orthodox among us." But the Arians and the ultra-orthodox to whom he refers both divide the Triad, differing only on the deity of the second and third hypostases, so that essentially it remains a matter of balancing the extremes of union and division by the paradox of the Three in One and One in Three. This is the balance reflected elsewhere in Gregory's thought. In his funeral oration on his father, for example, he declares that he

"worshipped One God in Trinity, and Three united in one Godhead, neither Sabellianizing as to the One, nor Arianising as to the Three either by contracting (systellein) and so atheistically annihilating (analyein) the Godhead, or by tearing it asunder (katatemnein) by unequal differences either of greatness or nature."

Similarly, in his significant panegyric on Athanasius, Gregory praises the great Alexandrian pillar of the Nicene faith for his balanced approach. He was faced with the "madness" of Arius ("whose name is derived from frenzy"), yet did not topple over into the opposite extreme of Sabellianism:
"But being aware that to contract (systellein) the Three to a numerical unity is godless and the innovation of Sabellius who first devised a contraction (systolēn) of deity, and that to divide (diairein) the Three in nature is an unnatural mutilation of deity, he both happily preserved the Unity (to hen) which belongs to the deity and devoutly taught the Three, which refers to distinct identity (idiotēs), neither fusing (sygcheas) into One nor dividing (diastesas) into Three, but staying within the bounds of piety by avoiding excessive inclination or opposition to either side."

Arianism was, of course, the dominant threat to the Nicene faith throughout Gregory's career. Sabellianism had been most prominent not among Gregory's contemporaries but in the previous century. Yet Gregory's repeated balancing of the two extremes is not purely formal, for the central tradition of the Greek East, holding firmly to the triadology of three hypostaseis, strongly opposed Sabellianism and had been aroused to suspect its presence in the Nicene party through the writings of Marcellus of Ancyra, the ally of Athanasius. It is clear that the attack on "Sabellianism" early in his career in the second oration is in fact an exclusion of the views of Marcellus as heretical. Gregory condemns the "contracting of the doctrine into a single hypostasis (eis mian hypostasin synairesthēnta)" and the new "dissolving and composing (tēs kainēs tautēs analyseōs ἐς synthēseōs)", terms which E. Bellini has traced to the attacks on Marcellus by Cyril of Jerusalem and Eusebius. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not to be dissolved into one indistinguishable composition or mixture of deity. Their distinction is to be maintained.

Set in historical context therefore, Gregory's rejection of "Sabellianism" has a subtly different purpose from his rejection of Arianism. By 362 when this sermon was delivered (or at least
written, since it is probably too lengthy to have been delivered as
we have it), the emergence of the extreme Neo-Arianism of Aetius
and Eunomius had made it clear where the real enemy lay. The broad
conservative Eastern party, emphasizing the three distinct
hypostaseis, was thrown back into the arms of the Nicene
Homoousians with whom they had parted company thirty years before,
alarmed at the "Sabellianism" of Marcellus. It was in the year
that Athanasius sealed the new alliance at the Synod of Alexandria,
that Gregory's sermon was written. The rejection of Arianism was
common ground between the two groups. The clear rejection of
"Sabellianism" was a reassurance for the broad central party,
including the so-called Homoiousians who had tried to express their
position in the phrase "like according to substance (homoios kat'
ousian)", that acceptance of the homoousion did not mean
compromising the eternal distinctions of the Trinity like Marcellus
of Ancyra (a danger still suspected in Paulinus of Antioch)." It
meant keeping the balance, like Athanasius himself. It was a
matter, as Gregory put it years later in the Last Farewell, of

"neither like the Sabellians assailing the Three for the sake
of the One, and so destroying the distinction by a wicked
confusion, nor like the Arians assailing the One for the sake
of the Three, and overthrowing the One by an evil division...
But we," he adds, "walking along the middle and royal road
which is the seat of the virtues as the authorities say,
believe in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, of the
same substance (homoousia) and glory (homodoxa)..."

It was not that the "Sabellians" had half the truth in holding to
divine unity, for their unity was a "wicked confusion", nor that
the Arians had half the truth in holding to the distinctions, for
theirs was an "evil division" since it overthrew the divine unity.
To lose one side of the paradox was not to lose half the truth, but to lose it all.\(^1\)

Gregory asserts the paradoxical nature of Trinitarian doctrine as he addresses the catechumens in the oration, *On Holy Baptism*:

"Besides all this and before all, keep the good deposit...the confession of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. This I entrust to you to-day...the one Godhead and Power found unitedly (*henikōs*) in the Three, and comprising the Three dividedly (*meristōs*), not unequal in substances or natures... in every respect equal, in every respect the same...the infinite conjunction (*apeiron symphyian*) of three infinite ones (*trîn apeirôn*)...each God because of the consubstantiality (*homoousiotēta*), one God because of the monarchy."\(^2\)

The mind cannot comprehend the two sides of the paradox simultaneously. Our thought, as Vladimir Lossky puts it, "must swing ceaselessly between the two poles of the antinomy,"\(^3\) an interpretation of Gregory's next sentence:

"No sooner do I conceive of the One, than I am illumined by the splendour of the Three; no sooner do I distinguish them, than I am carried back to the One."\(^4\)

The mind is unable to account for the reality of the One and Three and fails to express the reality in human concepts and language. It must regard each of the Three as equal to each other of the Three, since each is equally infinite, and the sum of three infinities can only be Infinity. Each is the infinite God: but they can only be conceived of together as one infinite God.

The apophatic tradition in the Greek East had long insisted on the ineffability of God. Clement of Alexandria had asked:

"For how can that be expressed which is neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor individual, nor number...? No-one can rightly express him wholly... For the One is indivisible; wherefore also it is infinite... And therefore it is without form and name... It remains that we understand, then, the Unknown, by divine grace, and by the word alone that
proceeds from him."\(^1\)

Nicholas Gendle considers that it was to Clement that the Cappadocian Fathers looked in resting their essential theology on the divine infinity and incomprehensibility, and believes that "Gregory Nazianzen was probably the first to see the major difference between Clement and Origen in this respect."\(^2\) But the important development going beyond Clement which is due to the Cappadocians, and to Gregory of Nazianzus in particular, is that "the negative theology is used to denote the transcendence of the co-equal Trinity, not only of the single essence which all three Persons in God share." With Nazianzen and the other Cappadocians, not the simplicity of the divine essence, but "the supreme antinomy of the inner life of God, revealed as Three-In-One, becomes the primary locus of apophaticism."\(^3\)

Nothing could reveal more clearly that Cappadocian Trinitarian theology is not a speculative religious philosophy. It may borrow terminology and even concepts from the religious philosophy of its day, but its commitment to the doctrine of the Trinity is based on God's self-revelation in the oikonomia. Because of that Gregory feels bound to proclaim the Three, yet at the same time feels compelled to assert that God is One. "There is then one God in Three and these Three are One."\(^4\) The Trinity as revealed is therefore for Gregory (in Gendle's phrase) "the primordial Given."\(^5\) It can only be stated in a paradox which cannot be resolved by reason but cannot be abandoned. It can only lead us to contemplate the Mystery and adore.
(d) One *Ousia* in Three *Hypostaseis*

If the revelation of God in the *oikonomia* demands a paradoxical doctrine of God as the only way of thinking of the Mystery which is beyond explanation, and consequently demands a measure of apophaticism in theology, there is nevertheless an obligation to explain the doctrine as far as possible. If it is asserted that God is One, yet he is Three, some explanation will be needed as to what this One is and what these Three are, and some terminology will have to be coined to answer the questions 'one What?' and 'three What?'

Gregory uses a variety of words to supply the need for terminology. He shares with Basil the formula primarily associated with the Cappadocians which speaks of one *ousia* and three *hypostaseis*. But in addition to speaking of one *ousia*, which may be translated as one Being, one essence or one substance, Gregory also speaks rather more often of one *theotēs*, translated deity or Godhead, and of one *physis*, translated nature. And in addition to speaking of three *hypostaseis* (best left untranslated to minimise confusion), he also speaks occasionally of three *prosōpa*, translated Persons, and also, frequently, of three *idiōtētes*. Gregory uses this term not only to mean "properties", but to refer to the Three themselves, a distinctive usage which is perhaps best conveyed by the translation "identities".

The fact that Gregory's theological vocabulary is "fairly fluid" is significant, especially when it is taken along with his maxim that it is not the terms or names (*onomata*) which matter, but
the realities (pragmata) to which they refer. He declares in the Third Theological Oration,

"Truth is a matter not of names (onomasìn) but of realities (pragmasìn)."¹

He expands on this principle in the Fifth Theological Oration in the short hermeneutical excursus which he calls,

"a short discussion of things (pragmatōn) and names (onomatōn) and especially of their use in Holy Scripture."²

Gregory concludes his short discussion by asking his opponents,

"Since then there is so much difference in terms (onomasi) and things (pragmasi), why are you such a slave to the letter... a follower of syllables at the expense of facts (pragmata)?"³

If his opponents said "twice five" or "twice seven" or spoke of "a rational mortal animal", would he be wrong in inferring that they meant "ten", "fourteen" and "man"? "Surely not," he concludes,

"because I should merely be repeating your own meaning; for words do not belong more to the speaker than to him who elicited them. As in this case then, I should have been looking not so much at the terms (ta legomena) as at the thoughts (ta noumena)."⁴

In its context this discussion is aimed at convincing his opponents that the Holy Spirit is God even although the Scriptures may not explicitly say so. But what this passage reveals about Gregory's attitude to terminology and language is significant. For if the truth is not limited to what is stated explicitly in the words of Scripture, inspired though Gregory held them to be, but was in the divine Realities, the pragmata to which the inspired words pointed and which they may imply without stating, how much more relativized were the terms, the onomata, which might be selected from outside Scripture to formulate and express the doctrine of the Trinity. What matters to Gregory is not so much the terminology, ousia or
hypo-staseis or prosōpa or whatever it may be, but the thoughts *(ta nooumena)* which the language is meant to convey and the realities *(ta pragmata)* which speaker and hearer have in mind. It is therefore important to see that while the complex pre-history of such terms as *ousia* and *hypostasis* is important to help us to understand what Gregory meant by them, and to help us to see why, along with his contemporaries, he chose to use them, his Trinitarian theology, while possibly shaped by them, was not based upon them. Gregory was not a religious philosopher attempting to construct a metaphysical system, an explanation of reality expressed in a philosophy of substance. He was a Christian bishop first committed to the paradox that God was simultaneously Three and One, and who then expressed his doctrine in some common terms, some of which had a complex philosophical pre-history in his own Hellenistic culture. The concepts of *ousia* and *hypostasis* were not the basis of his Trinitarian theology, they were a means of expressing it. While the pre-history of these words provides vital clues, it is the context of the Trinitarian theology in which he uses them which finally decides what he meant by them.

Interestingly the exact formula "one *ousia*, three *hypostaseis*" associated with the Cappadocians appears only once in all Gregory's orations. In the panegyric on Athanasius he declares:

"For we speak of one essence (*ousia*) and three *hypostaseis* in an orthodox sense, the one to denote the nature (*physin*) of the Godhead (*theotētos*), the other the identities (*idiotētas*) of the Three..."^{12}

In the oration *On the Holy Lights*, in the passage already quoted which Heinrich Dürrie has analysed, Gregory expands the formula to include almost all his usual terms for both the One and the Three:
"And when I speak of God you must be illumined at once by one flash of light and by three, three in identities (idiotētas) or hypostaseis, if any prefer to call them, or Persons (prosōpa)...but one in respect of essence (ousias) or Godhead (theotētos)."

In his oration to the Egyptian sailors from the corn fleet, ousia and hypostaseis appear together. He urges them when they read, "I and my Father are one," to keep before them "the unity of essence (to synaphes tēs ousias)," and when they read, "We will come to him and make our abode with him," to remember "the distinction of hypostaseis (to diē(i)rēmenon tōn hypostaseōn)." And he was to conclude his ministry in Constantinople the next year with a similar reference in the Last Farewell to

"acknowledging on the one hand the One in essence and...on the other, the Three in hypostaseis or Persons..."

Without juxtaposing the words exactly as in the formula, Gregory frequently refers to the ousia of God and to the three hypostaseis, sometimes in the same sentence or passage, and sometimes quite separately. He speaks of the ousia of God at greatest length in the Second and Third Theological Orations, where he is concerned to assert against the Eunomians or Neo-Arians that the ousia of God is indefinable. The Eunomians, in order to prove that the Son, the "Begotten (gennētos)", was not God, asserted that the ousia of God was by definition "unbegotten (agennētos)", a word which they equated with "unoriginate (anarchos)". Gregory argues that none of the negative terms in the debate defined the ousia of God:

"But this term 'incorporeal (asōmaton)', though granted, does not yet set before us, or contain within itself, his essence (tēs ousias), any more than 'unbegotten (agennēton)', or 'unoriginate (anarchon)', or 'unchanging (anallolōton)', or 'incorruptible (aphtharton)', or any other predicate which is
used concerning God or in reference to him." 1

It is not just that negative statements must be replaced with positive ones. It is rather, as Gregory concludes a little later in the oration, that,

"What God is in nature (physin) and essence (ousian) no man ever yet has discovered or can discover." 2

Gregory was not simply concerned to assert that the concept of the ousia of God could not be defined in words, but that the actual ousia or Being of God was without limit. He had asserted this graphically in the Christmas oration:

"God always was, and always is, and always will be; or rather, he always is. For 'was' and 'will be' are fragments of our time, and of changeable nature, but he is Eternal Being (dn aei). And this is the name that he gives himself when giving the oracle to Moses on the mount. For in himself, he sums up and has all being (to einal), having neither beginning nor end, like some great sea of being (ti pelagos ousias) limitless and unbounded, transcending all conception of time and nature..." 3

This key statement makes clear how closely Gregory linked ousia with the verb "to be (to einal)" from whose participle it is derived, suggesting that at least in Gregory's use of the word, it ought to be translated "Being" rather than the more abstract and philosophical "essence" or "substance". 4

If the "Being" of God is indefinable and infinite, God is nevertheless for Gregory "one Being (mia ousia)", that is, one God. This has been questioned. The view of Zahn and Harnack was that, although the Cappadocians spoke of mia ousia and used the Nicene term homoousion, they really gave these words a Homolousian sense. 5 They were able to use the terms homoousion and mia ousia only because they had a different, looser concept of ousia. They
thought of an ousia not as one actual concrete individual being, but as the substance or essence, the nature (physis) shared by the individuals belonging to one kind or genus. Consequently, although the Cappadocians spoke of the one ousia of God, they did not mean, as Athanasius did, that God was one Being, but that the three hypostaseis were three Beings sharing the same substance, deity or Godhead (theotēs), and thus belonging to the same exclusive class or genus. This "generic" understanding of ousia seemed to be clearly expressed in the analogy of three men used for the Trinity by all three of the great Cappadocians. It also seemed to be implied in the statement that the relationship between ousia and hypostasis was the same as the relationship between the common (koinon) and the particular (idion). Thus as three particular men with their own distinguishing characteristics or properties were hypostaseis sharing the same common humanity, so the three particular hypostaseis in the Trinity, each with his distinguishing characteristics or properties, shared the same common substance of deity. The classic expression of this distinction is in Epistle 38 in the corpus of Basil's works. The contrast between the common (koinon) and the particular (idion) is to be found in Gregory. In Oration 25, In Praise of Heraon the Philosopher, he says:

"For common (koinon) to the Father and to the Son and the Spirit is the not having come into existence and the deity: common to the Son and the Spirit is that they are from (ek) the Father. Peculiar (idion) to the Father is the Unbegottenness, to the Son, the Begottenness, and to the Spirit, the Procession."

But this does not link koinon and idion to ousia and hypostasis,
nor with the analogy of three men, and indeed uses koinon to refer to a particular characteristic which Son and Spirit have in common. There is no evidence here for a technical generic understanding of ousia in Gregory's thought.

Against the generic interpretation it was argued more generally by J. Lebon, that while it is true that the Cappadocians compared the Trinity to three men, and also true that Basil at least, interpreted the relationship of ousia to hypostasis as that of the common to the particular, Zahn and Harnack and their followers read into this an Aristotelian understanding of ousia as what is common or generic. In Lebon's view, far from being Aristotelians, the Cappadocians, sharing in the prevailing Platonist milieu of their time, regarded the common ousia of manhood not as a merely generic term but as just as real and actual, and just as much a single entity, as an individual man. The ousia of God, therefore, common to the three hypostaseis, is not abstract being, but for Basil and his colleagues one concrete reality or Being. George D. Dragas regards the Cappadocians as followers of Athanasius in overcoming the tension between primary and secondary substance, being Platonist in speaking of one ousia and being Aristotelian in speaking of Father, Son and Holy Spirit as truly subsisting. The One and the Three are not fused into a "monistic or monosemantic way of being," but a new Platonic-Aristotelian ontology is developed, a "dysemmatic existential perspective" in which equal ontological status is given to both sides of the paradox, to both the One and the Three.

Whatever the true interpretation of the philosophical
influences on the Cappadocian understanding of ousia, it is clear that Gregory of Nazianzus thinks of deity or Godhead not as an abstract or generic substance, as in the case of men - or, indeed, pagan gods who were said to share deity - but as a single objective reality, "a Being." He develops this point in a key passage in the *Fifth Theological Oration*.

"Our argument has now come to its principal point," he declares. "...If, say they, there is God and God and God, how is it that there are not three Gods, or how is it that what is glorified is not a plurality of principles?"

He points out the inconsistency of Pneumatomachi who argue against the Nicenes in this way, calling them Tritheists while they themselves are by the same argument guilty of Ditheism. He then proceeds to his positive statement in an important passage quoted previously, but which is worth quoting now in full:

"To us there is one God, for the Godhead is one, and all that proceeds from him is referred to one, though we believe in Three. For one is not more and another less God; nor is one before and another after; nor are they divided in will or parted in power: ...but the Godhead is, to speak concisely, undivided in its divisions; and there is one mingling of lights, as it were of three suns holding each other. When, then, we look at the Godhead, or the first cause, or the monarchia, that which we conceive is One; but when we look at those in whom the Godhead dwells, and at those who timelessly and with equal glory have their being from the first cause, there are Three whom we worship."

Gregory balances both sides of the paradox even while arguing against those who accuse him of losing hold of the unity. He then proceeds to show that the analogy with humanity is inadequate since it points not to a real unity but a unity only in thought, akin rather to the 'deity' shared by the Greek gods:

"Do not the Greeks also believe in one deity, as their more advanced philosophers declare? And with us humanity (hé anthrōpotēs) is one, namely, the entire race; but yet they have many gods, not one, just as there are many men. But in
this case that which is common (hē koinotēs) has a unity which is only conceivable in thought, and the individuals (ta kath' hekaston) are parted from one another very far indeed, both by time and by dispositions, and by power."

But it is quite otherwise with the Christian God: "Our faith is not like this, nor is this the portion of Jacob." For with the Three in the Trinity, it is not merely a unity in thought,

"but each is united to the others no less than to itself by identity of essence and power (tō tautō tēs ousias kai tēs dynameōs)."

F.W. Norris comments that this phrase "identity of essence (tēn tēs ousias tautotēta)", which occurs early in Gregory's career in his First Oration on Peace, makes him "Athanasian in the strict sense."

Attempts to see the Cappadocians' understanding of the ousia of God as influenced by the philosophy of substance held by one school or another seems therefore to be ultimately beside the point. Undoubtedly they did adopt or assume concepts of ousia derived from Platonist, Aristotelian or, indeed, Stoic sources which had become commonplace in the intellectual milieu of their day. But Frauke Dinsen is surely correct in her conclusion that the comparisons of the divine ousia with Aristotelian genus, with Stoic material substratum, or with Platonic Idea are merely expedients. The divine ousia is none of these things. Similarly to speak of "Spirit" or "Fire" or "Light" or even "God" or "Godhead" is inadequate. All of these are mere analogies. The best we can do, according to Gregory is to call him by the name he has given us to indicate that his Being is simply to be: that he is who he is.
"As far, then as we can reach, 'He who is (ho on), and 'God' are the special names of his Being; and of these especially 'He who is,' not only because when he spoke to Moses in the mount...this was what he called himself...but also because we find that this name is the more strictly appropriate... We are inquiring into a nature (physin) whose being (to einaí) is absolute and not bound up with something else. But being (to on) is in its proper sense peculiar to God and belongs to him entirely..."

The Being of the Self-existent is ultimately ineffable. Substance in any of its senses - substratum, genus, form or whatever - may be used as an analogy, as may Light, Spirit, Fire or any of the Biblical models. Gregory lists such images in the Second Theological Oration, but dismisses them all as inadequate. None of these defines his Being: he is who he is. Yet we can and must say that he is one God, one ousia, one Being. \(^3\)

J.F. Bethune-Baker succinctly expressed the significance of Gregory's understanding of "one ousia" as "one Being" for his argument for the deity of the Spirit in the Fifth Theological Oration:

"So, too, the whole argument in regard to the deity of the Holy Spirit... ( though physis is sometimes used) depends on the conception of the mia theotés (heis theos) as a substantive entity - an ousia in the old sense - not simply physis; which substantive entity exists all through and in the three idiotētes, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." \(^4\)

In defending the deity of the Spirit therefore, Gregory is not saying that the Spirit is one of three divine Beings who share deity. That is not an accurate statement of his position. For Gregory, God is one Being. The deity of the Spirit means that while the Spirit is an eternal objective reality, distinguishable from the Father and the Son, he is the one Being, God, as also is the Father, and as also is the Son.
CHAPTER V
FATHER, SON AND HOLY SPIRIT

Having considered the centrality of the Holy Trinity in Gregory's faith, his adoration of the Triple Light, his assertion of the paradox of the Three-in-One to safeguard the divine Mystery, and his emphasis on the unity, the one Being of God, it is necessary now to focus on the Three, the hypostaseis or Persons or distinct "identities", and particularly on the intra-Trinitarian relationships between them. The focus of attention must be especially concentrated on the Holy Spirit as "the Proceeding One". Consequently, while much more could undoubtedly be written (especially with regard to the generation of the Son), the intra-Trinitarian relationships must be examined here specifically for the light they throw on Gregory's understanding of the procession of the Spirit. The aim is to elucidate his understanding of the place of the Spirit within the Holy Trinity and thus his understanding of the Spirit's deity.

(a) The Distinct Identities

If the phrase "one ousia" emphasizes the unity of God as one Being, the parallel phrase "three hypostaseis" safeguards for Gregory the eternal distinctiveness of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit within the one Being. According to J.F. Bethune-Baker, hypostasis as a philosophical term is a later and much rarer word than ousia. Since it is derived from the verb hyphestanai, to
underlie, and since the *ousia* of a thing was said to be the underlying existence, "the noun *hypostasis* was a possible equivalent for *ousia* expressing the essential *substratum*, 'the vehicle of all the qualities'."¹ This usage of *hypostasis* as an equivalent of *ousia* was assumed by the Council of Nicea and adhered to by Athanasius. Vladimir Lossky also concludes:

"The two terms would thus appear to be more or less synonymous; *ousia* meaning an individual substance, while being capable at the same time of denoting the essence common to many individuals; *hypostasis* on the other hand, meaning existence in general, but capable also of application to individual substances."²

Lossky quotes Theodoret of Cyrus who stated that "for profane wisdom there is no difference between *ousia* and *hypostasis*,"³ and concludes that it was the genius of the Fathers to use two synonyms to distinguish in God that which is common from that which is particular. Certainly the use of synonyms would heighten the sense of paradox, which would be somewhat lost once *ousia* and *hypostasis* became differentiated as standardized doctrinal terms.

According to G.L. Prestige, *hypostasis* was commonly used in a great variety of senses.⁴ The sense which has the chief importance for theology is that "in contrast to imaginative conceit or picturesque unreality, it expresses the perdurability and objective resistance of solid fact."⁵ He continues, "*Hypostasis* thus comes to mean positive and concrete and distinct existence, first of all in the abstract, and later...in the particular individual."⁶ Prestige concludes that although *hypostasis* and *ousia* are often for practical purposes equivalent yet they are probably never strictly identical in meaning. He sums up his findings:
Both hypostasis and ousia describe positive, substantial existence, that which is, that which subsists... But ousia tends to regard internal characteristics and relations, or metaphysical reality; while hypostasis regularly emphasizes the externally concrete character of the substance, or empirical objectivity."

This emphasis on distinct empirical objective reality was precisely what was necessary to allay Eastern fears that the Nicene doctrine of one ousia was a cloak for Sabellianism. It was Gregory of Nazianzus who prepared the way for the Council of Constantinople within the imperial city and beyond by proclaiming both the one ousia and the distinct objective reality of each hypostasis. But in addition to hypostasis he used two other terms, prosōpon and idiotēs. Each of these will help to refine further our understanding of his Trinitarian doctrine.

Prosōpon was not a word Gregory would normally have used himself. Originally meaning "face" or "mask" it was somewhat discredited when Basil associated it with Sabellianism. It seemed to imply that Father, Son and Holy Spirit were simply outward appearances of God which did not correspond to any distinct objective realities. Consequently Gregory made no use of the word in his earlier career. It is only when he came to Constantinople that it began to figure in his vocabulary, and he first used it significantly in his panegyric on Athanasius. He explains there that there is a division of opinion,

"not only between us and those who are impious but also between us and those who are pious both about doctrines of little consequence...and about expressions intended to bear the same meaning."

Gregory explains what he is referring to:

"For we speak of one ousia and three hypostaseis in an orthodox sense, the one to denote the nature of the Godhead,
the other the identities (idiotētas) of the Three: the Italians mean the same, but owing to the scantiness of their vocabulary and its poverty of terms, they are unable to distinguish between ousia and hypostasis, and therefore introduce the term 'persons (prosōpa)' to avoid being understood to assert three essences (ousia)."

The result, according to Gregory, would be laughable if it were not piteous. The slight difference in sound was taken to indicate a difference in doctrine so that the Westerners, speaking of three Persons (prosōpois), were suspected of Sabellianism while the Easterners, insisting on three hypostases, were suspected of Arianism. According to Gregory, Athanasius conferred with both parties and finding they meant the same, achieved a reconciliation which allowed each party to use its own terminology.

André de Halleux concludes that Gregory's remarks here relate more closely to the contemporary situation in his own Nicene congregation in Constantinople than to the statesmanship of Athanasius at the Council of Alexandria seventeen years earlier. While the evidence does not suggest that the term prosōpon was debated at Alexandria, de Halleux argues that in the following years it had figured in the division in the Antiochene church. There the majority led by Meletius took a theological position close to Basil and the broad conservative Eastern party, speaking of three hypostases. The minority led by Paulinus, who was recognized as bishop by Rome and Alexandria, took the "old Nicene" position of Athanasius, identifying ousia with hypostasis. While this latter group accepted the majority as more or less orthodox, they were not prepared to speak of three hypostases and had apparently adopted the Western terminology of three personae or
The Antiochene schism had caused no end of trouble to Basil who had striven valiantly to heal this rift in the orthodox camp. Now it was causing a division between Meletian and Paulinist sympathisers in the congregation which met in the Anastasia. Gregory's aim therefore in speaking of Athanasius as a conciliator was to reconcile the two groups in his own congregation. Although identifying himself as one who preferred "three hypostaseis" he deliberately rehabilitated the term "persons (prosōpa)" and recognized it as acceptable if used in an orthodox way. He repeated his view that the dispute was only about words in the key passage on the Trinity in his Epiphany oration, On the Holy Lights, at the beginning of the following year:

"And when I speak of God you must be illumined at once by one flash of light and by three; three in identities (idiotētas) or hypostaseis, if any prefer so to call them, or Persons (prosōpa), for we will not quarrel with our comrades about names so long as the syllables amount to the same meaning."2

The Antiochene schism was to trouble Gregory later and lead to his resignation as archbishop of Constantinople and president of the Council of 381, when he failed after the death of Meletius to persuade the broad Eastern party to heal the troublesome schism by the magnanimous gesture of recognizing Paulinus as the bishop of Antioch.2 There is a particular poignancy therefore in a passage in the Last Farewell, delivered after his resignation where he speaks of "the Three in hypostaseis, or prosōpa, which some prefer." He continues:

"And let not those who are contentious on these points utter their scandalous taunts, as if our faith depended on terms (onomasi) and not on realities (pragmasi). For what do you mean who assert the three hypostaseis? Do you imply Beings
Gregory takes his last bow in the role in which he had unsuccessfully cast himself as a reconciler in the mould of Athanasius. His willingness to accept prosōpa demonstrates (as did his emphasis on the strict Athanasian sense of ousia) his Alexandrian sympathies. Although he stood in the tradition which spoke of three hypostaseis, Gregory was prepared to countenance the weaker term prosōpa. Once again it must be concluded that far from viewing the Holy Spirit as a third divine Being, Gregory was prepared to speak of him as one prosōpa, one Person, or one "face", of the one divine Being, God himself.

A study of Gregory's third term for each of the Three, idiotēs, will lead to a similar conclusion. Unlike prosōpa, it is not a term which Gregory uses occasionally as a conciliatory gesture to those who prefer it. Idiotēs is Gregory's own preferred term, a word which he uses more often even than hypostasis, and which best expresses his own understanding of the inner mystery of the Holy Trinity. Hergenröther, in his classic exposition of Gregory's doctrine of the Trinity, refers to a double distinction which must be accepted, a real distinction between Person and Person, and a formal distinction between Person and Essence.  Gregory's understanding of the Trinity as paradoxically Three yet One and his distinction between ousia and hypostasis, two
features of his doctrine of the Trinity so far considered, are concerned with the formal distinction between Person and Essence. The term *idiotēs* is the key to Gregory's understanding of the real distinction between Person and Person.

*Idiotēs* had been used by Origen and Athanasius, and was taken up by Basil. For him, *idiotēs* was a variation of the term *idion*, the particular, as opposed to *koinon*, the common. Basil defined the *idiotēs* or distinguishing characteristic of the Father as "Fatherhood (*patrotēs*)" and of the Son as "Sonship (*huiotēs*)". Alternatively, the *idiotēs* of the Father was that He is derived from none, or is ingenerate (*agennētos*), and the *idiotēs* of the Son was that he is derived from the Father, or is generate (*gennētos*). Basil did not formally identify any distinguishing characteristic of the Holy Spirit, emphasizing rather that the Spirit's mode of existence was ineffable. Yet he is prepared to say that the Spirit is

"of God'...in the sense of proceeding (*proelthon*) out of God, not by generation (*gennētos*), like the Son, but as the breath of his mouth (*hōs pneuma stomatos autou*)."

Basil here uses "proceeding (*proelthon*)" as a term common to both Son and Spirit and differentiates between them by specifying a mode of proceeding, "proceeding by generation" for the Son, but "as the breath of his mouth" for the Spirit. But Gregory Nazianzen makes the idea of "proceeding" (expressed by several Greek words) the *idiotēs*, the distinguishing characteristic, of the Holy Spirit. He speaks therefore of the Unbegotten One (*to agennēton*), the Begotten One (*to gennēton*), and the Proceeding One (*to ekporeuton*). The verbal forms become here adjectival forms used
as nouns. The process of formalization is carried further on occasions when abstract nouns are used:

"Peculiar (idion) to the Father," he says, "is the unbegottenness (hē agennēsia), to the Son, the generation (hē gennēsis), to the Spirit, the sending forth (hē ekpempsis)."

Quasten sees it as Gregory's great merit to have given a clear definition of the distinctive characters of the divine Persons, and believes that he has advanced beyond Basil in defining the distinctive character of the Spirit as "procession". Gregory thus completes the definition of the idiotētes, the distinguishing characteristics of three hypostaseis. Yet this advance may be more formal than real.

Equally if not more significant is Gregory's distinctive use of the word idiotēs as a substitute for hypostasis. Whereas for Basil idiotēs refers to the distinguishing characteristic of an hypostasis, Gregory extends the usage of idiotēs, using the plural idiotētes to refer to the hypostaseis themselves. Karl Holl drew attention to what he called "this blurring of a clear, logical distinction" in his magisterial study of Cappadocian theology. He cites a passage in the Fourth Theological Oration, where "Father" is the idion or distinguishing characteristic of the Unoriginate (anarchou), "Son" the idion of the Unoriginately Begotten (anarchōs gennēthentos) and "the Holy Spirit" the idion of the Unbegottenly Proceeding One (agennētōs proelθhontos) or the One-who-goes-forth (proiνontos). With this Holl compares a passage in Oration 25 where the terms are used conversely. There "the unbegottenness (hē agennēsia)" is the idion or distinguishing characteristic of the Father, "the Begottenness (or Generation, gennēsis)" of the
Son, and "the Sending forth (ekpempsis)" of the Holy Spirit.

Gregory can sometimes distinguish idiotēs from hypostasis, as in Oration 20 where he speaks of

"the three hypostaseis, and therefore three Persons (prosōpa), each with his own distinguishing characteristic (idiotētos)."

But at other times, the distinction between the two words completely disappears, as in the Trinitarian passage in the Epiphany oration:

"And when I speak of God you must be illumined at once by one flash of light and by three, three according to idiotētas or hypostaseis, if any prefer so to call them, or Persons (prosōpa), for we will not quarrel with our comrades about names..."

Here idiotētas can hardly be translated as "distinguishing characteristics" but takes on a meaning closer to distinct personal "identities". What appeared to Holl at first as the blurring of a logical distinction is in fact a recognition that the distinguishing characteristics of the Three are not incidental but express distinct identities which are not only apparent, but real. The identities are not simply names, or appearances only existing, as it were, in the eye or mind of the beholder. The Fatherhood, Sonship and Procession are not mere words or concepts but refer to actual realities. They are ontological: the Father really is the One who is not derived from any of the other Two; the Son really is the one who is generated or begotten by the Father and has no existence or subsistence apart from this; and the Holy Spirit really is the One who proceeds from the Father having no subsistence apart from that. The names are interchangeable because they truly express the reality: the Father is "the
Unbegotten" and the Unbegotten is "the Father"; the Son is "the Begotten" and the Begotten is "the Son"; the Holy Spirit is "the Proceeding One" and the Proceeding One is "the Holy Spirit". The distinguishing characteristics are not detachable from the objective realities described, in such a way as to be merely notional or conceptual. What may appear to analysis to be confusion is in fact a leaping of the gap which logic cannot pass, a crossing of the boundary from the logical or conceptual to the real, from the idea to the thing. The Three have no existence other than in the relationships to each other which these distinguishing characteristics describe. Unbegottenness, Begottenness and Procession are not just characteristics in the sense of attributes. Even to call them unchangeable attributes in the Aristotelian sense of differentia is not sufficient. They are modes of being (tropoi hyparxeos), in the phrase of Basil and the other Cappadocians.

Perhaps it may be said that the ontological nature of the idiotetes is made clear in that they are hypostaseis, whereas the relational nature of the hypostaseis is made clear in that they are idiotetes. The latter is true because the idiotetes, the distinguishing characteristics or personal identities, are in the inter-relationships expressed as Unbegottenness, Begottenness and Procession. Nazianzen expresses this in two passages in the Theological Orations. In the Third Theological Oration he argues against the Eunomians:

"'Father' is not a name either of an essence (ousias) or of an action (energelas), most clever sirs. But it is the name of the relation (scheseōs) in which the Father stands to the Son
and the Son to the Father."

As with us these names denote a "genuine and intimate (gnēsion kai oikeion)" relation, he continues, so here they denote an "identity of nature (homophylian)" between the Begotten and Begetter.

In the Fifth Theological Oration, Gregory explains his thought a little more fully:

"The difference of manifestation (ekphanseōs), if I may so express myself, or rather of their mutual relations one to another (hē tēs pros allēla scheseōs) has produced the difference in their names. ...The very fact of being unbegotten, or begotten, or proceeding, has given the name of 'Father' to the first, of 'Son' to the second, and to the third - him of whom we are speaking - 'the Holy Spirit'..."

By denying that the idiotētes are a matter of ousia, Gregory avoids the Neo-Arian position that the Son as begotten is of a different essence from the unbegotten Father. By denying that the idiotētes are actions (energelai) of God, Gregory avoids reducing the Son and the Spirit to mere appearances of the Father (or reducing Father, Son and Spirit to mere appearances of the one ousia). By identifying the idiotētes as mutual relations, Gregory simultaneously safeguards the distinctions and the unity. Since the Son and Spirit "come forth into view" (the literal meaning of ekphansis) in different ways, and since the Father has his way of being as the sourceless source of their ways of being, the Three are distinct. But since the Son and Spirit would not be (Son and Spirit) if they were not from the Father each in a distinct way, and since the Father would not be (Father) if the Son and Spirit were not from him, the "identities" have their being only in the mutual relationships which unite them inseparably as one Being. Walter Kasper sees this development of the concept of
"relational realities", so that the distinctions in God affect not the substance or one divine being but the relations in God, as a brilliant insight. Although the basis is laid by Athanasius and the idea is later developed by Augustine, the formulation of the insight is the work of Gregory of Nazianzus. The concept of relations was to be particularly significant in the later development of the doctrine of the Trinity.¹

Once again then, as with the term prosōpon, the term idiotēs, interpreted as referring to mutual relations, represents a softening of the concept of hypostasis. As Karl Holl concluded, it was not fortuitous that in Gregory's thought hypostasis and idiotēs flowed into one another.² It is not looseness of thought, but a modification of the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity giving greater emphasis to the unity. The Holy Spirit is not a third divine Being. He is God himself in one of his three distinct but interdependent ways of being, one of his three distinct identities who are who they are only in relationship to each other.

To explore further Gregory's understanding of the distinct identity of the Holy Spirit, it is necessary now to examine the meaning and significance of "Procession".
(b) Procession

Although not the first to speak of the Spirit "proceeding" from God, Gregory was the one who established this word as the standard term used to refer to the distinct personal characteristic of the Spirit. Basil's words for the distinguishing characteristics of the Father and Son, *patroš* and *huiotēs*, are formed from the names Father (*pater*) and Son (*huios*) themselves. His other terms, *agennētos* and *gennētos*, develop the implication that the Scriptural names, Father and Son, are applied in a unique way to God. Gregory expresses the point in the *Second Theological Oration*:

"He is Father in the absolute sense (*kyriōs*), for He is not also Son; just as the Son is Son in the absolute sense (*kyriōs*) because he is not also Father. These names do not belong to us in the absolute sense (*kyriōs*), because we are both, and not one more than the other..."

Hence the Father is the ultimate Source who begets but is "unbegotten" whereas the Son is "begotten" but does not beget.

Unlike the other two distinguishing characteristics which are implied by the names "Father" and "Son", "procession" is not implied by the name "Holy Spirit". Gregory employs several words for procession, or, as Karl Holl put it, "quite a pattern-card of expressions," but, "the variations are only of a linguistic, not of a material kind."  

Pro-odos is used as early as Gregory's second oration, *In Defence of his Flight to Pontus*, where he speaks of "the proceeding and indissoluble Spirit." In *Oration 20*, which is either a preliminary sketch or a summary of the first four of the *Five Theological Orations*, he speaks twice of the "procession (pro-odos)" of the Spirit. In *Oration 23*, the *Third Oration on*
Peace, Gregory speaks of "the marvellous procession (pro-odon)" and, a little later, of "the Unoriginate (anarchō(i)), the Begotten (gennēsel) and the Proceeding One (pro-odō(i))." Pro-odos is similarly used twice in Oration 25, and once finally in the Last Farewell, where Gregory speaks of the "inexpressible procession (pro-odon arēton)." A rare reference to the Spirit as the "Product (problēma)" of the Father occurs in the Third Theological Oration, although the corresponding designation of the Father as the Producer (proboleus) appears both there and in Oration 23.

Proion and proelthon, both meaning "the Proceeding One" are used twice as synonyms. In Oration 25 Gregory speaks of "one Holy Spirit, the proelthon or proion from the Father," and in the Fourth Theological Oration, he uses a more complex formula, speaking of "the unoriginate Father, the unoriginately begotten Son and the unbegottenly proelthon or proiontos, the Holy Spirit." Proion occurs also in Oration 26 and in the important Trinitarian paragraphs in the Epiphany oration, On the Holy Lights.

Ekpempsis, meaning "sending forth", occurs in the orations only in Oration 25 where Gregory defines the three distinguishing characteristics:

"Peculiar (idion) to the Father is the unbegottenness (agennēsia), to the Son, the generation (gennēsis), to the Spirit the sending forth (ekpempsis)."

The words which gained greatest prominence, however, in Gregory's major orations in Constantinople are those cognate with the verb ekporeuetai used in John 15:26, "the Spirit of Truth who proceeds from the Father." In the panegyric on Athanasius, Gregory refers to the Unbegotten, the Begotten and the Proceeding One (to
ekporeuton). In the Trinitarian passage in the Epiphany oration he consciously draws attention to the new term:

"The Spirit is truly the Holy Spirit, coming forth (proion) indeed from the Father, but not after the manner of the Son (huiros), for it is not by generation (gennetos) but by procession (ekporeutos), since I must coin a word for the sake of clearness."

He continues:

"...neither is the Spirit changing into the Father or the Son, because he proceeds (ekporeuetai) or because he is God... for the identity (idiotes) is unchangeable."

In the Third Theological Oration Gregory refuses parallel philosophical concepts, proclaiming that we must confine ourselves simply to "the Unbegotten, the Begotten and the One who proceeds (ekporeuomenon) from the Father." Coming to the question of when the Son and Spirit came into being, he proclaims that these things are above and beyond time.

"Ask me again, and again I will answer you: when was the Son begotten? When the Father was not begotten. And when did the Holy Spirit proceed (ekpeporeuetai)? When the Son was not proceeding but being begotten - timelessly and above reason."

In the Fifth Theological Oration, in his longest statement on procession, Gregory quotes John 15:26 and introduces procession specifically as an answer to his opponents' conundrum that a third hypostasis who is also God must either be unbegotten or begotten:

"For, tell me, what position will you assign to the Proceeding One (to ekporeuton), starting up in the middle of your division, and introduced by a better theologian than you, our Saviour himself? Or perhaps you have taken out of your Gospels for the sake of your third Testament that word, "the Holy Spirit who proceeds (ekporeuetai) from the Father." In that he proceeds (ekporeuetai) from such, he is not a creature; in that he is not begotten, he is not Son; and in that he is between the unbegotten and the begotten, he is God... What then is procession (ekporeusis)? Do you tell me what the unbegottenness of the Father is, and I will explain to you the physiology of the generation of the Son and the
procession (ekporeusin) of the Spirit, and we shall both of us be frenzy-stricken for prying into the mystery of God."

Karl Holl asked why Gregory showed such zeal for defining the distinguishing characteristic of the Spirit, especially when "so little was gained factually by the empty expression ekporeusis." He considered that aesthetic motives played a part: Gregory, more than Basil, aimed at "rounded fully resonant formulas," for "an unbalanced Trinitarian confession must have caused him disquiet, like a limping sentence." The polemical value of the term (perhaps of any convenient term) in the debate with the Eunomians and Pneumatomachi was also important, but Holl considered that Gregory's deeper interest in this arose out of his "more strongly developed spirituality." Whatever the motive, the concept of procession was chosen specifically as a concept distinguishable from, but parallel to, the concept of the eternal generation. Each time procession is spoken of, it is compared to and contrasted with generation. Procession, it would appear, was intended to play the role in the doctrine of the Spirit which the concept of the eternal generation, inherited from Origen and Athanasius, played in the doctrine of the Son. The advance, however, seems more formal than real. As already noted, Karl Holl considered that little was gained by the empty expression ekporeusis. R.P.C. Hanson criticizes Gregory more severely:

"The extraordinary statement of Gregory of Nazianzus that the Spirit goes forth from the Father 'processionwise' shows the bankruptcy of this theology. What is the point of maintaining a doctrine of the Holy Spirit if we can say nothing at all about how his mode of hypostatic existence differs from those of the other two Persons of the Trinity, except that it differs?"
Gregory is disingenuous, according to Hanson, in comparing our ignorance of the meaning of procession to our ignorance of the meaning of ingenerateness and generateness. These words, though used analogically, convey some meaning, but procession "leaves us with virtually none, except a vague sense of movement."

To evaluate the justice of these criticisms of Gregory's defining of the distinctive identity of the Spirit as "the Proceeding One" it is necessary to look at the pattern of intra-Trinitarian relationships as a whole. The key to Gregory's understanding of both generation and procession is to be found in his concept of the Father as the Origin (archē) or Cause (aitia).
(c) The Father as Origin

The idea of the Father as the Origin of the Son and Spirit is present in Gregory's thought from the beginning of his preaching ministry. It is introduced in the early Trinitarian passage in Oration 2 where Gregory also first spoke of procession:

"It is neither necessary to be so devoted to the Father as to rob him of his Fatherhood, for whose Father would he be if the Son were separated from him by nature?... Nor is it necessary to be so devoted to Christ as to neglect to preserve both his Sonship - for whose Son would he be if his origin (arché) were not referred to the Father? - and the rank of the Father as Origin (arché) inasmuch as he is the Father and Generator (gennéter). For he would be the Origin (arché) of petty and unworthy ones, or rather the term would be used in a petty and unworthy sense if he were not the Origin of deity and goodness (theotélos arché kai agathotélos) which are contemplated in the Son and Spirit..."

The significance of this passage for Gregory's thought is seen in that it is repeated almost word for word in Constantinople eighteen years later in Oration 20, the oration which summarizes the first four of the Five Theological Orations. In Oration 23, the Third Oration on Peace, which was given also in the same year, Gregory dismisses as a lie and a vanity that view of one God which sees him as "not having sufficient greatness to be an Origin (arché)" either through jealousy or fear. The more highly revered, the more fitting it is for the First Cause (tē protē aitia) to be the Origin of deity (archēn theotētos). We must not see the Son and Spirit as unoriginate (anarcha) or trace them to another origin (heteran archēn). Son or Spirit must not be raised above the Father, nor separated from the Cause (aitias).

In Oration 25, Gregory warns against making the Father subject to an origin (arché) or making the Son or the Spirit unoriginate (anarchon). He also draws attention to the element of paradox:
"For they are not unoriginate, yet in a certain way they are unoriginate. Here is a paradox. For they are not unoriginate with respect to cause (aitiō(i)), for they are from God, if not also after him as light from the sun, but they are unoriginate with respect to time."

Fatherhood and origin (archē) are thus closely connected. Gregory declares:

"It is necessary to acknowledge one Father God, unoriginate (anarchon) and unbegotten (agennēton), and only one Son, begotten of the Father, and only one Spirit having his existence from God (ek Theou tēn hyparxin echon)."

Gregory emphasizes the paradox once again in the oration, On Holy Baptism, and expresses not perhaps so much his own doubts about the word "Origin" (although he does seem to betray a certain hesitation) as his fears that his hearers will not understand the paradoxical way in which it is used:

"I should like to call the Father greater, for from him flows both the equality and the being of equals... But I am afraid to use the word 'Origin (archēn)' lest I should insult him by making him the Origin of inferiors...for the lowering of those who are from him is no glory to him. Moreover, I look with suspicion at your insatiate desire, for fear you should take hold of this word 'greater' and divide the nature, using the word 'greater' in all senses, whereas it does not apply to nature, but only to cause (aitian)."

The deliberate paradox of the first sentence quoted here is unmistakable. The Father is greater in that he is the Origin and Source of the equality, and of those who are equal to him. That "greater" is applicable in one sense but not in another is reinforced in the Third Theological Oration:

"And if, when we admit that the Father is greater as the Cause (aitiō(i)) than the Son, they should assume the premise that he is Cause by nature (to de aition physel) and then deduce the conclusion that he is also greater by nature, it is difficult to say whether they mislead most themselves or those with whom they are arguing."

Once again Gregory insists on the paradox that the Father is
greater as Cause, but not by nature.

Earlier in this oration, he expressed the paradox as he did in Oration 25 in the assertion that the Son and Spirit are unoriginate in one sense, but not in another:

"How then are they not alike unoriginate (synanarcha) if they are co-eternal (synaidia)? Because they are from him [the Father], though not after him. For the unoriginate (anarchon) is eternal, but the eternal is not always unoriginate, so long it may be referred to the Father as its Origin (archên). Therefore with respect to cause (aitios(i)) they are not unoriginate (anarcha); but it is evident that the cause (aitios) is not always prior to its effects, for the sun is not prior to its light. And yet they are in a sense unoriginate (anarcha) with respect to time..."

In the oration to the Egyptian sailors he spoke of the Three as Cause (aitios), Creator (démourgos) and Perfector (teleiopoli̊s), and proclaimed that all that the Father has belongs likewise to the Son except causality (aitios) and all that is the Son's belongs to the Spirit except the sonship (hulotês) and whatever refers to his Incarnation. This seems to attribute causality specifically to the Father (although he apparently also has in mind here his being the cause of the world's existence). Yet when he comes to deliver the Fifth Theological Oration, Gregory uses "Cause (aitios)" in a somewhat different way. Immediately after speaking of the one mingling of lights and of the three suns holding each other he says:

"When, then, we look at the Godhead, or the First Cause (tên protén aitian), or the Monarchy (monarchian), that which we conceive is One. But when we look at those in whom the Godhead dwells, and at those who timelessly and with equal glory have their being (onta) from the First Cause (ek tês protês aitian), Three are worshipped." "

Here the First Cause is identified not with the Father, but with the Godhead from which, he seems to say, there are Three who have
their being. A.J. Mason suggests a reconciliation with Gregory's normal usage:

"It is possible that Gregory here means to speak of the Father himself as \( \text{ek tēs protēs aitias} \); but if so, that \( \text{protē aitia} \) is within himself. He is the source of his own being."

Mason's note is a useful suggestion, but it does not alter the fact that in this passage the Godhead rather than the Father is said to be the First Cause. The meaning of the passage is perhaps better understood from Gregory's use elsewhere in the Five Theological Orations of the term "the First Cause" and of the term "Monarchy", which is linked with it here. In the Second Theological Oration God is twice referred to as the Cause of creation. He is "the efficient and maintaining Cause of all things."

Gregory declares, adding later while speaking of God's incomprehensibility, that "every rational nature longs for God and for the First Cause (tēs protēs aitias) but is unable to grasp him."

Similarly when Gregory says at the beginning of the Third Theological Oration, "But monarchy is that which we hold in honour," it is monarchia as the rule of one God in the world as opposed to anarchia and polyarchia, and it is explicitly "a monarchia which is not limited to one person (prosōpon)". Gregory does not speak of the monarchy of the Father within the Trinity, but of the monarchy of the Trinity over creation.

In speaking of God as the First Cause (protē aitia) of creation Gregory therefore has in mind external causation: the bringing into existence of that which is other than God. Aitia is also used for what we may call internal causation, as a synonym for arche. But arche is characteristically reserved for the Father as
the Origin or Source of the Son and the Spirit, an internal and eternal causation or derivation in which Son and Spirit share in the Father's own Being.

This pattern of internal derivation is also expressed in other terms, Monad, Dyad and Triad. In the Third Oration on Peace, Gregory spoke of:

"Perfect Triad of perfect Three, of Monad, moved because of abundance; Dyad profoundly deepened (since beyond matter and form) from whom are corporeal things; constituted Triad for perfection, for it surpasses the composition of a Dyad so that the deity neither remains restricted nor pours forth endlessly. This would be absolutely Jewish; that Hellenistic and polytheistic."

The better known reference to Monad, Dyad and Triad comes at the beginning of the Third Theological Oration. Having laid down that monarchy is what we hold in honour, Gregory continues:

"It is, however, a monarchy that is not limited to one person (prosōpon) - for it is possible for the One (to hen) if at variance with itself to come into a condition of plurality - but a monarchy that is made of an equality of nature (physēs homotimia), and a unanimity of mind (gnōmēs symnoia), and an identity of motion (tautotēs kinēseōs), and a convergence (synneusis) to the One (to hen) of those who are from it - a thing impossible to created nature - so that though numerically distinct, there is no severance of essence. Therefore Monad, having moved from the beginning (ap' archēs) to Dyad, came to stand firm at Triad. This is what we mean by Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The Father is the Begetter (gennētōr) and the Producer (proboleus)... The Son is the Begotten (gennēma), and the Holy Spirit the Product (probēma)."

This passage has been the subject of much discussion, particularly the meaning of Gregory's reference to Monad, Dyad and Triad. The reference to an unnamed Greek philosopher in the succeeding sentences has helped to excite the interest shown:

"For I know not how this could be expressed in terms altogether excluding visible things," Gregory continued. "For we shall not venture to speak of 'an overflow of goodness (hyperchysin agathotētos),' as one of the Greek philosophers..."
dared to say, as if it were a bowl overflowing (hoion kratēr tis hyperryē), and this in plain words in his Discourse on the First Cause (aiτίων) and the Second."

Gregory rejects the idea implicit here of involuntary generation (tēn akousion gennēsin), a natural overflow hard to retain (perīttōma ti physikon kai dyskathekton), and recommends staying within the limits of speaking of the Unbegotten, the Begotten and the One who proceeds (ekporeuomenon) from the Father.

J. Draseke identified four phrases in this paragraph which he claimed as proof that Gregory was a Neo-Platonist: the One coming into a condition of plurality; the Monad moving from the beginning into a Dyad till it came to rest in Triad; the overflow of goodness; and the overflowing bowl quoted from the First and Second Causes. Henri Pinault accepted that the references here were to Plotinus but pointed out Gregory's express comment that he dare not make the Plotinian formula his own for fear of making the Son a product against the will of the Father by a kind of necessity. Although Gregory borrowed formulae and Neo-Platonic terms including synneusis, Monas, etc., and to hen, the source of his thought was in Scripture, oral tradition and the liturgy. Claudio Moreschini considers Pinault's rejection of Plotinian influence unbalanced, and examines nineteen points of comparison between Gregory's thought and Neo-Platonism. These include the kosmos noētos and the kosmos aisthētos, the beatific vision, the ideas of purity as light, deification and the ascent of the purified soul, the unknowability of the divine nature and the theologia negativa, the concepts of time and eternity, the idea of God as the "Great Mind" and as the simple, first nature and source
of multiplicity. The particular sentence in the Third Theological Oration referring to Monad, Dyad and Triad also reflects the thought of Plotinus, but Moreschini considers that Drüseke overestimated the influence of Plotinus here and did not sufficiently take account of Plotinus's explicit rejection of the idea of movement by the One. Moreschini concludes that Gregory's sentence is a re-interpretation of Plotinus in which there is movement, the movement of the Father, which is to be identified as the generation of the Son.¹

E.P. Meijering goes so far as to say that Gregory attacks the Neo-Platonic doctrine because it implied (as Gregory saw it) that the eternal generation of the second hypostasis was against the will of the first.² But Meijering implicitly accepts that it is not simply a matter of Gregory's use of Neo-Platonic vocabulary. Whether or not Gregory may be regarded as a Neo-Platonist or a theologian influenced by Neo-Platonism, Meijering accepts in fact that there are substantive points of comparison between the views of Gregory and Plotinus. He notes that Plotinus speaks of the first and second Causes, implying that the second hypostasis is ontologically inferior to the first. In Meijering's view, Gregory moves away from Athanasius towards Plotinus by emphasizing that the Father is the cause of the Son and, as such, more than the Son, but he tries to combine this with Nicene orthodoxy by declaring that this "more" is not meant ontologically.³ The "more" of the Father does not exclude but includes the equality in being of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Yet it is not easy, Meijering notes, for Gregory to explain what he means by "not ontologically 'more'".
The idea of a parallel between Gregory's view of the internal relationships and the pattern of derivation within the Trinity on the one hand, and the Neo-Platonist model of the derivation of the third hypostasis from the second and the second from the first on the other, is not surprising. The Cappadocian formula, one ousia, three hypostaseis, was after all a combination of the Athanasian and Nicene insistence upon one ousia with the insistence of the broad Eastern Origenist tradition upon three hypostaseis; and the Origenist doctrine of three hypostaseis carried with it the pattern of relationships of derivation with its similarity to the Neo-Platonist philosophy of Plotinus. But there are other features of the Christian tradition not linked to Neo-Platonism which suggest themselves as having claims to being equally formative influences on Gregory's view of the relationships of derivation among Father, Son and Spirit.

First, there are the traditional images for the Trinity. Gregory considers these doubtfully at the end of the Fifth Theological Oration, "in order to find some illustration (eikona)," as he says, "of this most important subject." He declares himself unable to find anything to compare to the nature of Godhead, but nonetheless considers two of the traditional analogies:

"I picture to myself an eye (ophthalmon), a fountain (pēgēn), a river (potamon) as others have done before, to see if the first might be analogous to the Father, the second to the Son, and a third to the Holy Spirit."

He liked the unity and the lack of difference in time conveyed by this image:

"But I was afraid in the first place that I should present a flow in the Godhead (rhysin tina theōtētos) incapable of standing still; and secondly that by this figure a numerical
unity would be introduced. For the eye and the spring and the river are numerically one, though in different forms (diaphoros schematizomena)."

He considers "the sun and a ray and light", but rejects that analogy because of the implication of composition (synthesis) which he thinks is present ("the sun and things in the sun") and the implication that since the ray and light are merely "effulgences (aporroidi)", the Son and Spirit are only powers of God (dynameis theou) not hypostaseis."

B.S. Schultze argued that Gregory did not reject these analogies altogether, but rather noted negative and positive points about each. Schultze is particularly interested in the fact that Gregory did not object to the idea that the ray and the light were "outflows" (or emanations) of the sun and that light came from the sun through the radiance. Why did Gregory concern himself so carefully with these examples if he then set them entirely aside? Schultze takes the view that Gregory grants that these "shadows" still somehow contribute to an elucidation and lays stress on Gregory's allowing that one may accept "one point (hen ti)" of the image while rejecting the rest. Certainly Gregory discusses these analogies on this one occasion. But his attitude to them is ambivalent, for while including them and allowing that they may contribute one point of comparison, he does conclude on the other hand:

"Finally, then it seems best to me to let the images and shadows go, as being deceitful and very far short of the truth."  

By contrast, Athanasius, who refused to speak himself of three hypostaseis and rarely spoke of any causal relationships among the
Three, used the traditional analogies widely and unhesitatingly as an explanation of the *homoousion*. ¹

The second feature of the Christian tradition which may claim to be a formative influence on Gregory's view of the pattern of derivation within the Triad, is the Scriptural terminology. Here there is good explicit evidence in the orations that the names "Father" and "Son" at least (if not so clearly "Holy Spirit") shaped Gregory's thinking. Many of the relevant passages have already been considered, ² Two are perhaps particularly clear on the significance of "Father" and "Son." The first is the Trinitarian passage in the *Oration 2*, where Gregory asks:

"For whose Father would he be if the Son were separated from him by nature and ranked with the creation? For an alien being, or one which is combined and confounded with his father...is not a son."³

The same question is posed by the use of the name "Son":

"For whose Son would he be, if his origin (archēn) were not referred to the Father?"

We must preserve

"both his sonship...and the rank of the Father as Origin (archē) inasmuch as he is the Father and Begetter (gennētori)."⁴

Clearly many of the human implications of the names do not apply, but the strict meanings of "Father" as the origin and source of derivation, and of "Son" as the one who is derived, are absolutely fundamental to Gregory's thinking.⁵ The names are not merely conventional: on this one point they are informative. As names they truly reveal the facts of the relationships within the Trinity.

The second particularly clear statement of the importance of
"Father" and "Son" in the orations (also already considered) is in the Fifth Theological Oration:

"But the difference of manifestation (ekphanseōs, literally, 'coming forth into view'), if I may so express myself, or rather of their mutual relations one to another, has caused the difference of their names (diaphoron autōn kai tēn klēsin pepolēken)... The very fact of being unbegotten or begotten, or proceeding, has given the name of Father to the first, of the Son to the second, and to the third, him of whom we are speaking, of the Holy Spirit..."

Gregory's case here rests on the meaning of the words "Father" and "Son" as refined by their use in reference to God. Gregory's use of the names "Father" and "Son" in this way has been criticized. F.W. Norris thought that Gregory was being inconsistent here:

He castigates the Arians for applying human images to the description of God, but rests his case for the sameness of essence among Father and Son on the basis that a human father and son have the same nature. Yet he can also insist that the Father and Son are absolutely father and son in a way which earthly kindred cannot be.

But when Gregory criticizes the Arians, as he does in the Third Theological Oration, it is not for applying human images to God, but for using material metaphors to speak of the begetting of God, or, to be more exact, for applying features of human gestation to God. Gregory's point is the logically consistent one that because human relationships provide an analogy for divine relationships at one point, it is not justifiable to argue that other features of the relationships, or of humanity, are therefore analogous.

Gregory might equally be thought to be inconsistent in arguing for the doctrine of the Trinity from the words "Father" and "Son", while at the same time criticizing the Neo-Arian argument against the deity of the Son and the Spirit based upon the word
"unbegotten". Is he not as guilty as the Neo-Arians or Eunomians of arguing from words or names (onomata) to realities (pragmata)? But apart from the point that "Father" and "Son" are central to the Christian revelation whereas the word "unbegotten" was an interpretation of the Christian revelation drawn from the Greek philosophical tradition, it must also be said that the status of Gregory's argument is quite different. L.R. Wickham summed up the argument of Aetius and Eunomius like this:

"In its logical aspect the doctrine asserts that different names indicate different essences and, conversely, that where the essences are different, that difference shows in different names. In its epistemological aspect, the doctrine is that names are annexed to realities (by God, according to Eunomius) in such a way that the essences are thereby revealed and become capable of being comprehended. From this follows the real, not merely verbal, distinction of the Son from the Ingenerate God."

The Eunomians claimed that "unbegotten" defined the essence of God in such an exhaustive way that they comprehended the essence of God and so were able to determine exhaustively a priori what could or could not be true about him. It was because "unbegotten" (which they identified with "unoriginate" or "never having begun") was given this definitive status that they were able to rule out any kind of literal derivation of the Son from the Father and interpret the word "Son" as merely a kind of courtesy title. But in denying this Eunomian doctrine of the attachment of names to essences, it is not necessary to go to the opposite extreme of emptying words of all meaning and all objective reference. Gregory clearly accepted that onomata could truly refer to pragmata and communicate information about them. The words "Father" and "Son" thus indicate a real distinction and a real relationship between the two. In
applying the human terms "father" and "son" analogically to God, the analogy must depend (as any analogy must logically depend) upon two literal statements which may be made about the analogates. These are that a human son is derived from his father; and that the divine Son is derived from his Father. The fact that the derivation does not take place in the same way (the human is physical, requires two parents, and so on) does not affect the truth of these two statements. Gregory also sees the further point of comparison that as a human father and son are of the same (human) nature, so the divine Father and Son are of the same (divine) nature.

"For the nature of the relation of father to child is this: that the offspring is of the same nature as the parent."

But if the names "Father" and "Son" imply derivation or generation, the name "Holy Spirit" does not in itself imply procession. The idea that the Holy Spirit proceeds seems to be reached at least partly by analogy with the idea of the Son's being begotten. What the name "Holy Spirit" does seem to contribute however is in a way rather negative. It is the fact that the Holy Spirit is not called "Son" in Scripture which rules out the use of "generation" or "being begotten" to describe his relationship to the Father and which therefore seems to require the less explicit term, "procession". That is an aspect of the term "procession" which is easily missed. It is usually viewed as Gregory's addition to the terminology of the Trinity, his definition of the distinct personal identity of the Spirit, completing Basil's work at a point where Basil refused to be precise. In fact it is
probably better viewed as a subtraction rather than an addition, a barrier to idle curiosity and a guard against presumptuous and unwarranted speech. It is precisely because it does not explain, any more than the title "Holy Spirit" does, how the Spirit comes from the Father that it is appropriate. But the fact that the Spirit does come from the Father is expressed in the title archē. The Father is the Father of the Son: the specific model of generation is warranted by these titles. But he is, in Gregory's terminology, the Origin or Source (archē) of both Son and Spirit. This more general title is significant in Gregory's thought because it widens the concept of derivation in the idea of fatherhood. Archē is therefore able to express the relationship of the Father to both the Son and the Spirit. This is the reason for its importance for Gregory's doctrine of the Trinity and particularly for his doctrine of the Spirit.

The third feature of the Christian tradition which, it may be argued, underlies Gregory's view of the pattern of derivation within the Trinity is the revelation of God as Trinity in the oikonomia. It was noted earlier that Gregory's argument for the distinctiveness and deity of the Three is not only an argument from the words of Scripture, but is also from the gradual revelation of the deity of each in the oikonomia. Yet it cannot be said that the principle that the missions of the Son and Spirit into the world reveal the processions of the Son and Spirit from the Father in eternity is explicitly stated in Gregory's theology. He characteristically argues for the intra-Trinitarian relationships from the titles, and is usually more concerned to defend the
coherence of the pattern of relationships rather than to examine the grounds for that pattern in the revelation. Nevertheless, there is in fact a close parallel between the role he attributes to the Spirit in the oikonomia and the place attributed to him within the Trinity. This is seen most clearly in Gregory's oration, On Pentecost, where he deals at greatest length with the role of the Spirit in the oikonomia. The actions of the Spirit in the world are seen to be rooted in his relationships to the Father and the Son. It is because the Holy Spirit is "the consummation of the perfection (symplērōsion teleiotētos)" of the Godhead - "for it was not fitting that either the Son should be lacking to the Father, or the Spirit to the Son" - that "he was ever being partaken, but not partaking, perfecting, not being perfected, sanctifying, not being sanctified, deifying, not being deified..."

His role in the oikonomia is that he is "the Spirit of Adoption, of Truth, of Wisdom, of Understanding, of Knowledge, of Godliness, of Counsel, of Fear...by whom the Father is known and the Son glorified, and by whom alone he is known..." From this statement of the Spirit's role in revelation and salvation Gregory comes to his summing up:

"Why make a long discourse of it? All that the Father has the Son has also, except the being unbegotten (tēs agennēsias). All that the Son has the Spirit has also, except the generation (tēs gennēseōs)."

The juxtaposition indicates that, for Gregory, the role of the Spirit generally in the world is based upon, and is the clue to, his position within the Trinity.

From viewing the role of the Spirit generally, Gregory passes on (after silencing some hecklers) to review his role in the world
historically or chronologically in the creation of "the heavenly and angelic powers", in the revelation of God to the patriarchs and prophets, in the disciples, and in coming "substantially (ousiodos)" after Christ had "returned to his own place", "Coming (erchomenon) because he is the Lord; sent, (pempomenon) because he is not a rival God."

The emphasis on the sending of the Spirit which safeguards the unity of God is picked up a little later when Gregory is speaking of the joint work of the Son and the Spirit in the oikonomía:

"This Spirit shares with the Son in working (syndëmiourgéi) both the creation and the resurrection, as you may be shown by this Scripture: 'By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the power of them by the Breath (pneumati) of his mouth,' and this: 'The Spirit (pneuma) of God that made me, and the Breath (pnoe) of the Almighty that teaches me,' and again: 'Thou shalt send forth thy Spirit (éxaposteleis to pneu'ma sou), and they shall be created...'."

The connection is not explicitly drawn at this point between the sending of the Spirit for creation and re-creation (Gregory links the last quotation to spiritual regeneration) and the distinctive personal identity attributed to him within the Trinity. But it is surely clear that when Gregory elsewhere defines the idiotés of the Spirit as ekpempsis, "sending forth," the concept which is used to refer to the eternal procession of the Spirit within the Godhead is drawn from the temporal mission of the Spirit in the oikonomía. The same must be said of the more common terms, pro-odos, and ekporeusis, the latter drawn from a Johannine text speaking of the sending of the Spirit into the world.

Hints are not lacking that what is true of the idiotés of the Spirit is true of the Trinity as a whole, namely, that the whole
pattern of derivation within the Trinity reflects and is the basis for the respective roles of Father, Son and Spirit in creation and redemption. Thus Gregory can speak of Father, Son and Spirit as Cause (aitios), Creator (dēmiourgos) and Perfector (teleiopoios), a triad of titles which seems to express the economic roles of the Three rather than their inter-Personal relationships. There is even perhaps the suggestion here that not only the idiotētes of the Son and Spirit are revealed in their work in the world, but that this is also true of the Father. The role of God as the Cause (aitia) of creation (and, one would want to add, as the originator of salvation) is a reflection of, and is based upon the Father's eternal identity as the Origin or Source (archē) of the Son and the Spirit.

Gregory's doctrine of the pattern of derivation within the Trinity may thus be seen to have its roots within the Christian tradition first in the Scriptural names "Father" and "Son", then in the missions of the Son and Spirit in the oikonomia, sent by the Father in distinctive ways, and thirdly (perhaps of least importance) in the traditional images of light and of the river. No doubt the pattern of derivation in the Neo-Platonist hypostaseis re-inforced the picture and provided language for its expression.

What is of significance here, however, is that in this broader Trinitarian perspective it may be seen that Gregory's talk of the procession of the Spirit is not a feeble and pointless addition. It is integral to his whole doctrine of the Trinity, and particularly to his doctrine of the Father as Origin.
(d) Paradox and Procession

It has been alleged that Gregory's view of Origin (archē) is ambiguous. F.W. Norris considered that there was "a certain ambiguity about Gregory's position on the question of monarchy, particularly the level to which he wishes to assign the conception of archē." On the one hand he wishes to attach the monarchy of God to the Trinity, but on the other, within the Godhead, on the level not of essence but of hypostasis, he wishes to preserve the archē of the Father. Norris concludes that "the evidence indicates that he did not think through the problems raised by applying the archē to both levels," and believes that "in the end the difficulty remains." It must be asked, however, whether this difficulty can be removed by taking thought, and whether the so-called ambiguity would not be more accurately viewed as a paradox. It may be true that often one man's ambiguity is another man's paradox, but the difference here lies in whether the unresolved difficulty is a failure to think through conceptual contradictions and conflicts which are soluble in principle, or whether it reflects an unfathomable mystery in the reality itself. Paradox must not be used to excuse a lack of rigorous thinking, but enough has been said about Gregory's explicit adoption of the paradox of the Three-yet-One, of the conjoined separation and the separated conjunction, to make it more than likely that the paradoxical nature of the doctrine of the Trinity is at least as good a way of understanding his view of the archē as the idea that he is ambiguous because he failed to think it through.
F. Dinsen, writing on the paradoxical nature of the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity, commented that in places where the three hypostaseis, Father, Son, and Spirit, are given real and distinct existence and the divine ousia is pictured as genus or divisible substrate, the unity appears to be an empty, merely conceptual, unity. But where the real unity is stressed, the distinct existence of the Persons is put in question and the meanings of hypostasis and idiotēs flow into each other. Perhaps the nature of the Trinitarian paradox in Gregory's thought is better expressed like this: that when the One is considered the ultimate reality, the Three, being 'within' this ultimate One, are equal in essence, deity, glory, power and dignity; but when the Three are considered ultimate (the one ousia being 'within' or common to the Three), there is an order (taxis), and the Father is 'greater' as archē and ousia of the Son and the Spirit. It seems to be impossible to do justice to both sides simultaneously, but both must be held together.

The emphasis on the distinction of the three hypostaseis is characteristic of the Origenist tradition out of which the Cappadocians came. Causality within the Trinity and the view of the Father as the archē of Son and Spirit are part of this approach. The doctrine of the Father as archē and as the source therefore of the unity of the Trinity is a useful corrective to any idea that the common ousia is the guarantee of unity in that it is the primordial source of the three hypostaseis and thus a superior and prior entity in its own right. Rather the ousia or Being of God is the Being of the Father. John Zizioulas has recently
argued for the importance of this Patristic insight in breaking up the ancient Greek ontology of impersonal ousia by its insistence that the personal Father and not the impersonal ousia is the ultimate source of Being. The Neo-Platonic model of the derivation of one hypostasis from the preceding one is closer to this side of the paradox, as are the traditional analogies of the eye, the spring and the river, and the sun, the ray and the light. The sending of the Son and the Spirit by the Father in the oikonomia also suggests the intra-Trinitarian relationships of derivation.

But in Gregory’s thought the Origenist triadology of a hierarchy of hypostaseis is complemented, balanced and corrected by the more unitary model of Athanasius with its emphasis upon the divine unity of Father, Son and Spirit in the Godhead. This view of the Trinity emphasized the one Being of God and consequently the equality of Father, Son and Spirit, since each is God himself. It therefore calls in question the subordinationism which seems to be inherent in the internal causation and derivation of the Origenist triadology. It disallows any thought of the ousia of God as a kind of substance or stuff which flows from the Father to the Son or Spirit. According to E.P. MeiJering, Athanasius had adapted the Origenist concept of arché, ruling out the idea that the ousia of the Father is the arché of the ousia of the Son and of the Spirit, for that would imply that there were three ousiai in descending ontological order. Rather, the Father’s ousia was the arché of the hypostasis of the Son in such a way that there was one divine arché and ousia and Godhead. The Son and Spirit were from
the substance of the Father (ek tēs ousias tou patros), as the Nicene Creed of 325 expressed it. Athanasius therefore did not call the Father "Origin of deity (archē theotētos)" as Origen did, but Origin (archē) of the Son and Spirit. Unlike Athanasius, Gregory does occasionally speak of the Father as the archē theotētos. In Oration 2, his early work on pastoral theology, he speaks of the Father as "the Origin of deity and goodness (theotētos ἀν archē kai agathotētos) contemplated in the Son and the Spirit." Again in Oration 23, The Third Oration on Peace, he speaks of the Father as the "Origin of deity (theotētos archēn)" and in Oration 20, the summary of the first four of the Five Theological Orations, in the passage which is strongly reminiscent of that in Oration 2, preached almost twenty years earlier, he speaks of the Father as the "Cause of deity (theotētos aitios) contemplated in Son and Spirit." But such phraseology is rare and since it certainly does not imply three ousiai or Beings, but one, we can only conclude that the Father is to be thought of as the Source of his own Being and deity, which was also the Being and deity of the Son and the Spirit, and thus, in this way, was the Origin and Source of the Son and the Spirit who are from the Father's ousia. Such a concept of Being (ousia) must be personal, not impersonal, for it is the ousia of the Father.

In Meijering's view, Gregory moves away from Athanasius here towards Plotinus. (Meijering characterizes the Eastern triadology as "Neo-Platonist" rather than "Origenist"). Meijering comments: "Gregory's position seems logically untenable. Logically one would have to choose between Athanasius' doctrine of the complete equality of Father, Son and Holy Spirit and the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the ontological subordination of the
caused beings to their causes. Gregory somehow wants to combine these positions by maintaining that the Father is the cause of the Son and in this respect 'more' than the Son while at the same time stressing that the Son is not only co-eternal but also homousios with the Father. Therefore he introduces causal superiority in God, at the same time stressing that there is only one divine ousia.\textsuperscript{13}

In other words, Gregory deliberately embraces paradox: two different models, each with its own logic apparently incompatible with the other, but both of which are required to do justice to the mystery of the Trinity.\textsuperscript{14} The Father is greater (as Cause), yet he is not greater (in nature); the Father is Cause and Origin, yet the one God is Cause; God is Three, yet God is One. Just as he had striven to unite the Meletians and Paulinists in his congregation in the Anastasia and the divided bishops at the Council, so Gregory tried to rise above the division between Origenists and Nicenes with an ecumenical doctrine of the Trinity which united all the orthodox by a use of paradox which alone could do justice to the Mystery.\textsuperscript{15} In holding both sides of the paradox, Gregory not only corrected the subordinationism in Origen's doctrine of three hypostases, but also developed the other viewpoint, that of Athanasius. T.F. Torrance comments:

"It may well be claimed that Gregory's understanding of the Holy Trinity registered a significant deepening of the Athanasian conception of the divine ousia as being considered in its internal relations, for it was cast in a more dynamic form. In the Godhead all subsistent relations are dynamic, mutually interpenetrating, unitary and without opposition in their reference to one another. Here we have presented a rather more satisfactory view of the Triunity of God than that of the other Cappadocians, for the monarchia is not limited to one Person: it is a Unity constituted in and by the Trinity."\textsuperscript{16}

It is because both sides of the paradox are held that the position of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity is also seen therefore
in two ways. On the one hand, Gregory emphasizes that the Spirit is not a third divine Being, but is God himself. On the other hand, the Holy Spirit is a distinct identity (idiotēs) who is characterized as being the Proceeding One. The idea of procession belongs to that side of the paradox which distinguishes yet unites by the intra-Trinitarian pattern of derivation. At one level, Gregory's deliberate selection of "procession" to make it into a technical term, a specific distinguishing characteristic for the Spirit, is merely polemical. It answers the Pneumatomachian conundrum which attempted to reduce Trinitarian doctrine to incoherence and absurdity. Seen at this level it is singularly uninformative. On the other hand, it may be seen as an integral part of the intra-Trinitarian pattern of relationships which is inferred from the relationships revealed in the oikonomia (including the divine names of Father and Son) and which is illustrated by the traditional analogies and to some extent comparable with the Neo-Platonist model of the three hypostaseis. At this level it is an example of apophatic reserve, a negation as much as an affirmation, a subtraction rather than an addition. It is not more explicit than "begottenness": it is deliberately and appropriately less explicit. It does not give new information but simply asserts that what is seen to be true in the revelation, namely that the Spirit is sent by the Father in succession to the Son and is thus distinct from both, must also be true ontologically or immanently in God himself.

Gregory's distinguishing characteristic for the Spirit, procession, was recognized and confirmed by the Council of
Constantinople in 381 when it adopted the Constantinopolitan-Nicene Creed with the clause:

"And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and life-giver, Who proceeds from the Father (to ek tou patros ekporeuomenon)."¹

It has been debated whether Gregory would have accepted the later Western addition that the Spirit proceeded "from the Father and the Son (filioque)."² B.S. Schultze argued against Sergius Bulgakov that the idea of the filioque clause was implicit in Gregory's thought, particularly in the traditional analogies which he did not entirely reject.² But Gregory does not explicitly address the question of the Spirit's eternal relationship with the Son, and the peculiar place he gives to the Father as arché of the Son and Spirit suggests that while he may have accepted that the Spirit proceeded from the Father through the Son, he would probably have regarded the statement that the Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son (had it been suggested to him) as so unsophisticated a statement of the truth as to be misleading. In the circumstances of his day, his concern was to defend the deity of each and he was consequently primarily asserting that each came from the same Source of deity (arché theotētos). The polemical value of "procession" was to differentiate between Spirit and Son and rebut the charge of confusion or absurdity. But the underlying theological significance of procession for the doctrine of the Spirit was to safeguard the Spirit's deity. One who proceeded from the divine Origin or Source must be thought of as having a distinct personal identity, but at the same time cannot be other than God himself.
CHAPTER VI
THE DEITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

Three major areas of Gregory's pneumatology have now been considered. Each of these is significant for an understanding of Gregory's defence of the deity of the Holy Spirit, and before concluding with an examination of Gregory's forthright declaration of the Spirit's deity, it will be useful to undertake a brief review.

(a) Gregory's Pneumatology: A Review

The first major area to be studied was the Spirit's work in the Christian. The focus of attention moved next to the work of the Spirit with the Son in the oikonomia and finally rose to the eternal being of the Spirit with the Father and the Son in the Holy Trinity. The chapter on the Christian and the Spirit began with Gregory's own awareness as he opened his mouth and drew in the divine Pneuma that he became an organon logikon, a rational instrument, his intellectual powers deepened and expanded to express the inexpressible. The Breath of God was God breathing into him so that by the Spirit he recognized the Spirit's deity. Through the action of the Spirit in baptism not only the prophet or preacher, but every Christian knows God by faith as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The Spirit who regenerates and re-creates in baptism must be the Creator; the Spirit who purifies must be God who alone is pure; the Spirit who illuminates or enlightens is God, for God is Light; the Spirit who deifies us, bringing to us the divine
life, can be none other than God himself. Thus the Christian lives out of his baptism a whole life of perfecting or *teleiōsis* as the temple of God the Holy Spirit.

Moving from the contemporary work of the Spirit in the Christian to the historic and cosmic horizons, the chapter on the Economy and the Spirit looked at the work of the Spirit in creation and in the divine *oikonomia* of salvation centred on the Incarnate Son. Here the Spirit was seen active in creation as the source of sentient, intelligent, personal life, the secondary lights, angels and men. He worked as the Creator Spirit in the heavenly and angelic powers and moulded the minds of patriarchs and prophets to know God. He purified the Virgin so that the Son might come forth as God with the flesh he had assumed, the Spirit (using "Spirit" here to mean Christ's divine nature) deifying the flesh. The Holy Spirit bore witness to the deity of Christ at his baptism when, as "Spirit" and flesh (that is, God and man) he perfected us by Spirit and water. The Holy Spirit was with Christ at each point of his earthly life, not energizing him, but accompanying him as his equal. When Christ ascended and his bodily presence on earth was at an end, the Spirit took his place, no longer just active in the world, but (in some way not true before) personally present. Pentecost thus reveals the distinctiveness but also the deity of the Paraclete, who now unites the Church as the body of Christ. Thus the Trinity is gradually revealed in the *oikonomia*, the Spirit dwelling among us now from Pentecost onwards and clearly revealing his deity.
Moving from the deity of the Spirit revealed in the economic history to the place of the Spirit in the Eternal Trinity, the fourth chapter began with Gregory's understanding of Christian faith as essentially faith in the Trinity. The Christian is one who has come into the Holy of Holies to adore Father, Son and Holy Spirit. His destiny is to gaze enraptured upon the dazzling splendour and radiance of the Triple Light, the unity of three suns, as it were, mutually indwelling and co-inhering in one another. Our inadequate language and logic can only express this as the paradox of the Three-yet-One, God who is one in diversity and diverse in unity, Monad worshipped in Triad and Triad in Monad. The diametrically opposed evils of Arianism and Sabellianism both lose the paradox. To maintain the truth, we must hold both poles of the antinomy, for each of the Three is infinite, but there is one infinite God. The one God is not simply the common nature of the Three, as humanity is the common nature of three men. He is one Being. His Being cannot be defined in any way. Philosophical concepts such as substance, genus or substratum and Biblical imagery such as Spirit, Fire and Light may be used. But no human concept or image defines his Being. He is who He is. But he is one Being, and therefore the Holy Spirit is not a third divine Being, but is God Himself.

From the paradox in the doctrine of the Trinity and the emphasis on unity of Being, the fifth chapter went on to expound the complementary aspect of Gregory's Trinitarian doctrine, the hypostaseis or distinct "identities". Gregory followed the Cappadocian formula of one ousia, three hypostaseis, paradoxical in
itself, given that the two terms were originally virtually synonymous. He accepted the terminology three Persons (prosōpa), but himself preferred to speak of three "identities (idiotētes)"; a term which emphasized that the distinctiveness of the Three arose out of their mutual relations. Thus the distinguishing identity of the Father was to be the Source or Origin of Son and Spirit, while the distinguishing identities of Son and Spirit were, respectively, to be begotten by and to proceed from the Father. At one level, to distinguish the Holy Spirit as the Proceeding One was merely a polemical reply to a conundrum. But at a deeper level it was an integral part of Gregory's doctrine of the Trinity, being the concomitant of his understanding of the Father as Origin or Source. Gregory feared that his hearers would miss the paradox here and make the Son and Spirit inferior in nature to the Origin. It is necessary to see that on the one hand the whole Godhead is the First Cause of the creation so that in this sense the Son and the Spirit are unoriginate. But on the other hand, within the Eternal Trinity there is an internal causation, so that Son and Spirit are originate. The divine Monad moves eternally to Dyad and finds its rest eternally in Triad. Some Neo-Platonist language and concepts may be used, but traditional Christian imagery, the Scriptural terminology "Father" and "Son" and the revelation of God in the oikonomia are all grounds for this intra-Trinitarian pattern of source and derivation. But the model drawn from the Origenist tradition of three hypostaseis with origination and derivation is balanced and corrected by the Athanasian emphasis on one ousia. The causation is therefore a causation of the
distinct identities of Son and Spirit from the Father in the one Being.

Holding together both sides of the Trinitarian paradox implies two emphases in the doctrine of the Spirit. On the one hand the Holy Spirit has a distinct identity as "the Proceeding One". There must be no Sabellianism. Gregory's selected title asserts the Spirit's distinctiveness but in a deliberately apophatic way. On the basis of the oikonomia we know of his distinctiveness and use this distinctive title to assert that what is true in the oikonomia is true immanently and eternally in God himself. But the term is one of apophatic reserve because it perfectly expresses the fact that whereas the model of human parentage is given for the Son in the revelation, not even a model so greatly refined because of its use in reference to God is given for the Spirit. So with apophatic reserve, the distinct identity of the Spirit is asserted. On the other hand the Holy Spirit is none other than God himself. This side of the paradox guards against Arianism and Pneumatomachianism. The unity of the one Being of God is rigorously insisted upon, so that the deity of the Spirit is openly asserted in the strictest sense. The Spirit is God himself.
Gregory's desire for an open confession that the Spirit is God and his impatience with concealment or reserve in stating the truth was first publicly expressed in 372 in the oration he gave after his installation by his father as bishop-coadjutor of Nazianzus. It may be that his rift with Basil over his forced consecration and the attempt to install him as bishop of Sasima, possibly just a few weeks earlier, emboldened him to take an independent line. The oration is notable for its devotion to pneumatological themes, beginning with the opening of the mouth to draw in the Spirit so that Gregory becomes a rational instrument ready at the bidding of "that Mind and Word and Spirit who is one unity of nature (symphyia) and one deity." He speaks of the "spiritual and priestly ointment" of Aaron, of his father's fading powers of the flesh and consequent increase in spiritual strength, of his own dilemma between withdrawal to solitude to be "illumined by the dazzling rays of the Spirit" and coming forward to "publish the divine light", the former "the imaginings of desire, the latter the teachings of the Spirit." His forthright declaration comes in his peroration where he looks for "the Spirit's guidance of our affairs (for our discourse comes back to the point where it began), the Spirit to whom we have given ourselves, the head being anointed with the oil of perfection in the Almighty Father, and the only-begotten Son, and the Holy Spirit, who is God. For how long shall we hide the lamp under the bushel, and withhold from others the full knowledge of the Godhead, when it ought to be now put upon the lampstand and give light to all churches and souls and to the whole fullness of the world, no longer by means of metaphors (eikazomenon) nor by intellectual sketches (dianoia) but by distinct declaration (phaneros eklaloumenon)? This indeed is a most perfect demonstration
Gregory is forthright again shortly afterwards, when in one of his first acts as bishop-coadjutor of Nazianzus, he preached at the consecration of Eulalius as bishop of the small town of Doaris, instructing him:

"Teach the worship of God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit..."  

Gregory raised the issue with Basil in a letter written probably again some weeks later when he described how he had defended Basil at a dinner party against a monk who had attacked him for slurring over the deity of the Spirit.

"'As for you, my good sir,' he said, looking at me, 'you do now theologize openly on the Spirit,' and he referred to some remarks of mine when theologizing at a well-attended synod, using in reference to the Spirit that expression which has reverberated around ('How long shall we hide the lamp under the bushel?') 'But the other man hints obscurely, and as it were, merely suggests the doctrine, but does not openly speak out the truth, flooding people's ears with more policy than piety, and hiding his duplicity by the power of his eloquence.'"

Gregory had defended Basil by arguing that in his prominent position he must not risk the well-being of the Church by giving his Arian enemies an excuse to expel him, and that it was legitimate to "recognize the Spirit as God from other phrases which lead to this conclusion." The company, however, had not accepted Gregory's defence of Basil, and so he was writing to Basil for guidance:

"But do you, O divine and sacred head, instruct me how far I ought to go in setting forth the deity of the Spirit, and what words I ought to use, and how far to use reserve (oikonométeon), that I may be furnished against my opponents."  

Basil took offence at this, viewing it (not surprisingly, since
Gregory had already departed openly from his stance as a disguised and artful reproach. But Gregory was to defend Basil again after his death in his panegyric. According to Gregory's recollections (about a decade later) Basil would have been quite prepared to have undergone expulsion from his see (in which he had no desire to be enthroned), and even to have suffered exile, torture and death in defence of "the union (synaphelas) and co-equal deity (synthelias) of the Holy Trinity." But he held it to be necessary for the good of the Church to be discreet:

"The enemy were on the watch for the unqualified statement that the Spirit was God...so that they might banish him and his power of theological instruction from the city... Accordingly, by the use of other terms, and by statements which unmistakably had the same meaning, and by arguments necessarily leading to this conclusion, he so overpowered his antagonists, that they were left without reply..."

Gregory sees On the Holy Spirit in this light:

"His treatise on this subject also makes it plain, being evidently written by a pen borrowed from the Spirit's store. He postponed for a time the use of the exact term (tēn de kyrian phōnēn), begging as a favour from the Spirit himself and his earnest champions that they would not be annoyed at his economy (olkonomía)...

But Gregory is emphatic that despite appearances Basil's doctrine was clear:

"That he, no less than any other, acknowledged that the Spirit is God is plain from his often having publicly preached this truth, whenever opportunity offered, and eagerly confessed it in private. But he made it more clear in his conversations with me, from whom he concealed nothing during our conferences on this subject."

Basil not only asserted it but proceeded

"to imprecate upon himself that most terrible fate of separation from the Spirit, if he did not adore the Spirit as consubstantial (homoousion) and co-equal (homotimon) with the Father and the Son."
Gregory's recollection does not take account of the possibility that in addition to the political reasons there were theological reasons for Basil's "economy" with the truth. Basil's views on *kerygma* and *dogma*, expounded in *On the Holy Spirit* would lead to that conclusion. But Gregory's account gives no indication that the theological reasons for reserve were raised in their private discussions. What the account does seem to confirm however, despite Gregory's insistence that their theology was identical ("Let his theology be mine...!"), is that there was a distinct difference of emphasis. Gregory was keen to proclaim the deity of the Spirit openly and was impatient with restrictions which seem to have been placed up to that point upon him also. And it seems that Basil needed to assure Gregory of his doctrinal soundness to the point that he found it necessary to declare himself anathema if he did not really accept the co-equality and consubstantiality of the Spirit. Gregory was evidently the more passionate on this point and was pressing for an open declaration. Basil's hesitations were not on the fact of the Spirit's deity, but on the wisdom and legitimacy of declaring openly to the world *dogma* which should be safeguarded within the Church.

After Basil's death and the accession of the orthodox emperor Theodosius, Gregory was in a position to declare the deity of the Spirit openly in Constantinople. The issue was obviously controversial and the open declaration was likely to provoke some of his hearers. At first Gregory contented himself with speaking of

"one Father God, unoriginate and unbegotten, and one Son, begotten of the Father and one Spirit who has his subsistence
At his first open declaration he seems to have expected some protest when he spoke of

"God the Father, God the Son, and (do not be angry!) God the Holy Spirit..."

In the panegyric on Athanasius a little later, Gregory claimed to be following his example. He recalled that when

"many were faltering in their conception of the Son, and still more in that of the Holy Spirit (a point on which to be only slightly in error was to be orthodox) and few indeed were sound upon both points, he was the first and only one, or with the concurrence of but a few, to venture to confess in writing clearly (σαφές) and distinctly (διαρρέων) the one Godhead and Being (όυσια) of the Three. He thus attained by inspiration in later days the same position regarding the Holy Spirit as had been granted to most of the Fathers in earlier days on the Son."

Gregory noted that many cherished this truth in silence,

"but others spoke the truth with boldness (παρεσιαζεσθαι), on whose side I would be, for I dare make no further boast; no longer consulting my own fearfulness...but bringing forth to light my offspring, nourishing it with eagerness, and exposing it in its constant growth to the eyes of all."

The Pentecost oration, delivered some months after his arrival in Constantinople, is notable for its persuasive tone towards those who, like Basil, were sound in faith but reluctant to confess openly the Spirit's deity. The Pneumatomachians who expressly regarded the Spirit as a creature were blasphemers,

"But they who deem him God are inspired by God and are illustrious in their mind."

This included all in his audience apparently, but some still had to take a further step:

"They who go further and call him so before well-disposed hearers are exalted."

It is not wise to call him God in the hearing of those who are not
ready for it. That is like placing pearls in clay or presenting the sun to weak eyes. They should be led little by little to higher truths. Gregory proceeds to lead the doubters in his audience to the truth. If they escaped the evident impiety of regarding the Spirit as a creature,

"then see for yourselves with the help of the Holy Spirit and of us what follows... Either shew me some mean between lordship and servitude, that I may there place the rank of the Spirit, or if you shrink from imputing servitude to him, there is no doubt of the rank in which you must place the object of your search."¹

Having argued from the Creator-creature disjunction, Gregory then asks them to begin from the unity of the Trinity:

"Confess, my friends, the Trinity to be one Godhead, or, if you will, of one nature, and we will pray the Spirit to give you this word 'God'."²

Gregory thus employs thoroughly Athanasian arguments to bring them to a full Athanasian declaration of the deity of the Spirit. It is not unbelief but some "spiritual cowardice" which makes them hesitate. He seeks, he says, to gain brethren.

"We admire your life, but we do not altogether approve your doctrine. You who have the things of the Spirit, receive also the Spirit himself... May this reward of your way of life be granted to you, that you may confess the Spirit perfectly and proclaim with us, indeed before us all, all that is his due."³

Statements which are by implication open declarations of the Spirit's deity were made at the beginning of 380 in the two Epiphany orations, On the Holy Lights and On Baptism.⁴ Again in the Spring of 380 in the oration for Maximus, In Praise of Herona the Philosopher, Gregory speaks of

"One Holy Spirit, proceeding and coming forth from the Father - God, to those thinking intelligently of the things at hand."⁵
But it is again in an oration with Alexandrian connections, the oration for the Egyptian sailors, also probably in the Spring of 380, that the deity of the Spirit is openly stated in a variety of ways. Again the Athanasian axioms of the disjunction between Creator and creature, or, as Gregory expresses it here, Rule (despoteia) and Service (douleia), and the unity of the Trinity, "the one Godhead in the Three," lead to the assertion of the equal rank (homotimia) of the Spirit and the statement that,

"Blasphemy is not the reckoning him God, but the separating of him from the Godhead." The assertions follow that to deify us he must be God, and that he dwells in us so that we are the temples of the Holy Spirit as of God. Ananias and Sapphira were guilty of

"stealing the Godhead itself and lying not to men but to God." The fact that he breathes upon whom, and when and as he wills (upon Cornelius before baptism, upon others after it) testifies to the Spirit's Godhead, and Paul attributes the operation (energelan) of God to the Spirit.

It is in the Fifth Theological Oration that Gregory's best known declaration of the deity of the Spirit comes:

"What, then? Is the Spirit God? Most certainly! Well then, is he consubstantial (homoousion)? If he is God, yes!" This emphatic proclamation comes at the climax of a line of reasoning which is aimed at those of the broad Origenist tradition. Gregory had begun with the unity and co-eternity of the Trinity:

"But we have so much confidence in the deity of the Spirit whom we adore that we will begin our teaching concerning his
Godhead by fitting to him the names which belong to the Trinity..."

But he had quickly left that Athanasian starting point to begin "from a somewhat earlier point", namely, the position acceptable to those in the Origenist tradition, the existence of the Holy Spirit as a distinct hypostasis. From that starting point he had dismissed the conundrum that the Spirit must either be begotten or unbegotten, arguing that he was the Proceeding One, and so had risen to the Trinitarian principle that

"the difference of manifestation (ekphanseōs)...or rather of their mutual relations one to another, has caused the difference of their names.""

Thus,

"The Three are one in Godhead, and the One three in Identities (idiotēsin)."

It is having argued from the agreed starting point of the distinct existence of the Spirit to the unity of the Trinity that he makes his ringing declaration that the Spirit is most certainly God, and if so, consubstantial. In this context, the homoousion of the Spirit is not the ground for the Spirit's deity, but the consequence of it and a way of asserting it in the strictest sense. Gregory speaks of the homoousion of the Spirit on two other occasions in the Fifth Theological Oration, and elsewhere concludes conversely that because the Spirit is homoousion, he is therefore God.

After defending the coherence of his doctrine of the Trinity and dealing with objections, Gregory comes in the concluding section of the oration to the Scriptural basis for the deity of the Spirit. Having argued in a little excursus on hermeneutics that
Scripture implies things it does not explicitly state (by implication, the deity of the Spirit), and having set out his view of gradual revelation, in which now since Pentecost the deity of the Spirit has been made clear, he comes to the Scriptural evidence itself and supplies a concatenation of almost fifty Biblical references in which the acts and titles of God are attributed to the Spirit. Having granted the lack of an explicit statement, he introduces these citations with the remark:

"But now the swarm of testimonies shall burst upon you from which the deity of the Holy Spirit shall be shown to all who are not excessively stupid, or else altogether estranged from the Spirit, to be most clearly recognized in Scripture."

The literal statement, "The Spirit is God," may not be found in so many words, but Gregory has no doubts that such an open declaration is fully warranted by the Biblical evidence.

A.M. Ritter argued that Gregory's insistence on the open and explicit declaration of the Spirit's deity led to his downfall at the Council of Constantinople. Later, in retirement, Gregory was to make clear his desire to complete the Nicene Creed at this point. In his second letter to Cledonius he wrote:

"I never have and never can honour anything above the Nicene faith, that of the holy Fathers who met there to destroy the Arian heresy...completing in detail that which was incompletely said by them concerning the Holy Spirit. For that question had not then been mooted, namely, that we are to believe that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are of one Godhead, thus confessing the Spirit also to be God (Theon kai to Pneuma ginōskontas)."

It is reasonable to assume that such an open declaration was his aim for the Council. Ritter's argument is based on his careful examination of a difficult and obscure passage in Gregory's autobiographical poem, Concerning His Own Life, where Gregory is
undoubtedly writing about his dispute with the majority at the Council.¹ The dispute, Ritter deduces, was to do with the "palladium of orthodoxy," the Nicene Creed, and Gregory regarded the proposed additions to the third article to be "salinely" insufficient.² They would serve more to cloud the clear source of the Nicene faith rather than to express more precisely what was already implicit. Gregory wished a clearer and more open declaration that the Spirit was God. Ritter draws attention to Gregory's declaration in another poem written in retirement, the fervency of which is inexplicable, in Ritter's opinion, if it does not imply a hidden criticism of the Council of Constantinople:

"The Spirit (hear it!) as God, I say again. You are my God! And a third time I cry, 'He is God!'³

It is certainly clear that right to the end Gregory was the most passionate advocate of the open declaration that the Spirit was God himself.
(c) "You are my God!"

It remains now by way of conclusion to ask why Gregory of Nazianzus was such a passionate advocate of the deity of the Holy Spirit. Perhaps the answer lies in the particular way in which he combined the Athanasian and the Origenist traditions. Basil too was the inheritor of both these ways of thinking, and indeed deserves the honour of being the foremost advocate of the combining of the Nicene emphasis upon the one ousia of God and the traditional Origenist terminology of three hypostaseis in one formula. Both Basil and Gregory inherited Athanasius' axioms of the unity of the divine Trinity and the disjunction of Creator and creature. Both used Athanasius' argument from baptism and the baptismal formula, and both spoke like Athanasius of the inseparability of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. But in Basil, the hierarchical pattern of the Origenist Triad continued to have a stronger lingering influence. The Son was said to be homoousion with the Father (as Nicene orthodoxy required), but the Spirit was homotimos, not said to be of equal substance but of equal honour. That may also imply deity, but there remained a reluctance, for whatever reason, to say it in the same way. Similarly there was a reluctance to say outright that the Spirit was God. Certainly there were political reasons of prudence. But Gregory Nazianzen was aware of a more general reluctance on the part of his friend to allow the open declaration even before he (Gregory) was a bishop, never mind a prominent archbishop. It is hard to resist the conclusion that although Basil was undoubtedly sure in his own mind
that the Spirit was God, the lingering influence of Origen's ambivalence on the Spirit was seen in Basil's "economy" with the truth. Hence for him, apophaticism extended to the Spirit's deity. It was a *dogma*, known and understood in and through the liturgical traditions of the Church, but not a *kerygma* to be proclaimed to the world.

By contrast, while Basil was the one more influenced by the hierarchical Origenist Triad, Gregory Nazianzen had perhaps a deeper appreciation of the Athanasian emphasis on the unity of the Trinity. It may not be without significance that while Basil was the one who was closely associated as a young rhetor with the Homoiousians, those representatives of the broad conservative Origenist party, Nazianzen was the one who in his student days visited Alexandria.² Basil also of course spoke of the inseparability of the Triad and of the one *ousia*, but Nazianzen was more aware of the dangers of comparing the Trinity to three men and somewhat softened the concept of *hypostasis* with his preferred concept of "identity (*idiotēs*)".³ It was not that Nazianzen wished to lose hold of the paradox, but he was perhaps more aware than Basil of the need to stress the divine unity. He therefore tends perhaps to approach the deity of the Spirit more often "from above", that is to say, from the Triune God, than Basil does. He not only argues that the Spirit whom we know in the *oikonomia*, in the Church and in personal faith, is God, but he has a deeper grasp of the converse movement, that the one God whom we worship is not only the Father and the Son but is also the Holy Spirit. If it is true that Gregory has a deeper grasp of this Athanasian emphasis on
the unity of the Triune God, it may help to explain why, unlike Basil, he was prepared to follow Athanasius in proclaiming openly that the Spirit is God himself, consubstantial with the Father and the Son.

Indeed, nothing other than the full deity of the Spirit could give coherence to Christian doctrine. The alternative was some form of polytheism or some kind of divine hierarchy of the kind towards which Arianism in all its varied forms was ironically driving. In insisting that the Spirit was God himself, Gregory, like Athanasius, was being true to the profound conviction of Biblical faith whether in its Old or New Testament form that there was one God, and that to speak of the Spirit was a way of speaking of God himself. Approaching the question from this side, Gregory could not be hesitant or apophatic at this point. The Spirit was God to be worshipped and proclaimed. Only the weakness and inability of his hearers could impede that proclamation, and then only temporarily. They had to be led step by step to the vision of the glory of the Triple Light and to the worship of God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit.

But Nazianzen's passionate advocacy of the Spirit's deity was rooted not only in what he inherited from Athanasius in Trinitarian doctrine, but also in what he valued in his inheritance from Origen. Karl Holl found the explanation for Gregory's divergence from Basil on the question of the Spirit ultimately in his "more strongly developed spirituality" which he traced to the stronger influence (at this point) of Origen. By "spirituality (Spiritualismus)" Holl means here Gregory's greater interest in the
spiritual, or mental or, better, the intellectual aspect of man and of salvation. He points to Gregory's acceptance of the spiritualization of the flesh at the resurrection, and to his interest in the mind of man within the psyche as being "spiritual in a closer and peculiar sense."\(^1\) Holl also draws attention in passing to Gregory's particular concern to combat Apollinarianism, and indeed it is worth noting at this point that Gregory's well-known Christological dictum, "the unredeemed is the unhealed", was intended to emphasize not that Christ took human physical flesh but that Christ took human mind in order to heal it.\(^2\) The concern with intellectual salvation is mirrored in Gregory's doctrine of God, particularly his view of God as the Great Mind (\textit{megas nous}), or in one interesting Trinitarian formula, as Mind, Word and Spirit.\(^3\) Here it is worth recalling that Gregory's primary imagery is of God as light, by which he means spiritual or intellectual light, the source of intellectual illumination.\(^4\) Thus salvation is enlightenment: at baptism, the one being baptized is illuminated. Nor is this something different from deification. To be deified is not to become God literally;\(^5\) it is to be illuminated by God, for God is light. In plain language, it is that creation or re-creation in us by God the Holy Spirit of sentient, intelligent, personal life so that we share in intelligent communion with God, and in this way, participate in the life of God himself.

With such an integrated concept of the nature of God and the nature of salvation it is unthinkable that the Spirit by whom we are illuminated could be other than God himself. As it was God as
the Holy Spirit who was the Source and Creator of those secondary lights, the heavenly and angelic powers, and of the third rank of lights, human beings,' so it is God as the Holy Spirit who works in the oikonomia of salvation to restore mankind to its intelligent communion with himself. He is the Source and Restorer of all sentient, intelligent, personal life. Thus it is that for Gregory, the deity of the Spirit is not just a matter of intellectual speculation or of doctrinal orthodoxy. It is a matter of ultimate salvation and of his own intimate and secret life of devotion. It is hard to escape the conclusion that Gregory's passionate defence of the deity of the Spirit arose out of his own intense adoration of God the Holy Trinity. Gregory believed himself to be in communion with the Triune God and was convinced that his intellectual life, the very power of thought itself, his rationality and his very existence as a thinking, feeling person in communion with God and with others, came from God the Holy Spirit whom he adored. That is the deeper explanation of the strong personal conviction with which he proclaimed the deity of the Holy Spirit.
Chapter I - INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The creed associated with the Council of Constantinople of 381 is popularly known today as the Nicene Creed and appears at first sight to be an expansion of the Creed promulgated originally in 325 at the Council of Nicaea. Whereas the original Nicene Creed confessed belief in its third article simply "...in the Holy Spirit," the Constantinopolitan-Nicene Creed (to give it its full title) confessed belief:

"...in the Holy Spirit the Lord and Life-giver, who proceeds from the Father, who together with Father and Son is worshipped and glorified, who spoke through the prophets."

In fact, however, it appears that the Council of Constantinople did not expand the Creed of Nicaea, but adopted or recognized another creed probably already extant as an equally valid expression of the Nicene faith in the deity of the Son, but a fuller expression of faith in the deity of the Spirit.

The Corpus: Modern Editions

5,1 J. P. Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus, series Graeca*, Vols XXXV - XXXVIII, Paris, 1857-62. The title will be represented in these notes by the standard abbreviation, PG.


5,3 *PG* XXXVII, 20-388.

5,4 *PG* XXXVII, 397-1600, *PG* XXXVIII, 11-130. Gregory's will is also to be found in *PG* XXXVII, 389-396.

5,5 *PG* XXXVIII, 133-338.


5,7 Oration 20 to 42. For a fuller account cf. infra, 17-22.

5,8 Oration 1 to 19. Cf. infra, 13-14. Two of the Cappadocian orations not delivered in Nazianzus are Oration 8, *On His Sister Gorgonia*, probably delivered at Iconium where she spent her married life, and Oration 13, *At the Consecration of Eulalius as bishop of Doarlis*.

5,9 Oration 42 to 45. Oration 43 is a panegyric on Basil, delayed by Gregory's sojourn in Constantinople. Oration 44 was for the opening of a new church near Nazianzus. Oration 45, the Second Oration on Easter, includes an important passage repeated from Oration 38, *On the Theophany*, probably preached at Constantinople four years earlier. Cf. P. Gallay, *La Vie de Grégoire de Nazianze*, Lyons: Vitte, 1943, 224-225.


5,11 This oration has 117 paragraphs and takes up 54 columns of Greek in Migne. Browne and Swallow comment: "S. Chrysostom in his well known treatise, S. Gregory the Great in his Pastoral Care, and Bossuet in his panegyric on S. Paul, have done little more than summarise the material or develop the considerations contained in this eloquent and elaborate dissertation." C. Browne and J. Swallow (eds), Select Orations of Saint Gregory Nazianzen, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. VII, Oxford: James Parker, 1894, 204.

5,12 These include panegyrics on members of his family, his brother Caesarius, physician at the imperial court (Orat. 7, PG XXXV, 755-788), his sister Gorgonia (Orat. 8, PG XXXV, 789-818) and his father, Gregory the Elder, bishop of Nazianzus (Orat. 18, PG XXXV, 905-1044). There are also panegyrics on Athanasius (Orat. 21, PG XXXV, 1081 - 1128), Cyprian (Orat. 24, PG XXXV, 1169-1194), and Basil (Orat. 43, PG XXXVI, 493-606). One panegyric Gregory soon regretted was on Herona the philosopher (alias Maximus) who shortly afterwards tried to supplant him as archbishop of Constantinople (Orat. 25, PG XXXV, 1197-1226). The two panegyrics of dogmatic significance are Orat. 21, on Athanasius, and Orat. 43, on Basil.


5,15 Cf. infra, 17, note 4.

6,1 Letters 101, 102 and 202 (PG XXXVII, 175-194, 193-202, 329-334). Letters 101 and 102 were written to Cledonius, the priest in charge of the diocese of Nazianzus from 381 to 382, about Apollinarism.

Letter 202 was written (also about the problem posed by the Apollinarians) to Nectarius, who had succeeded Gregory as archbishop of Constantinople. Significantly, in the manuscripts these letters are normally found with the orations rather than with the other correspondence. Cp. the
introduction in Paul Galay (ed.), Grégoire de Nazianze: Lettres Théologiques (Sources chrétiennes, 208), Paris: Cerf, 1974. Only two brief passages relate to pneumatology. In Letter 101, Gregory refers to the Apollinarians as "puffed up by their theory of the Trinity (τῇ περὶ Τριάδος φωσιδόμενον λόγῳ)." He believes that it is necessary that people should know "that Apollinaris while granting the name of Godhead to the Holy Spirit, did not preserve the power of the Godhead (ὅτι Ἀπολλινάριος μὲν τῷ τῆς θεότητος ὄνομα τῷ ἄγιῳ Πνεύματι δῶσε, τὴν δύναμιν τῆς θεότητος οὐκ ἐφέλατε). For to make the Trinity consist of Great, Greater, and Greatest, as of Light, Ray and Sun, the Spirit and the Son and the Father (as is clearly stated in his writings) is a ladder of Godhead not leading to heaven, but down from heaven." (PG XXXVII, 192B).

In Letter 102, Gregory declares that he will ever be of the Nicene faith, "completing in detail that which was incompletely said by them [the Nicene Fathers] concerning the Holy Spirit (προσδιαφρόδητος τῷ ἐλκείνως εἰρήμενον ἐκείνος περὶ τοῦ ἄγιου Πνεύματος); for that question had not then been mooted, namely, that we are to believe that the Father Son and Holy Spirit are of one Godhead, thus confessing the Spirit also to be God (ὅτι μίας θεότητος κληνην τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον, θεόν, καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα γινώσκοντας)" (PG XXXVII, 193C).

The only other letter of particular pneumatological significance is a letter to Basil (Ep. 58, PG XXXVII, 113-116) in which Gregory relates how he had defended Basil against a monk attacking his reserve on the deity of the Spirit. Gregory, whose declaration had been more open, asks how far he should go. Cf. infra, 188.

6,2 The Benedictine editors classified the poems into two books. Book I, Poemata theologica, is divided into two sections, Poemata dogmatica and Poemata moralia. There are thirty-eight poema theologica. The first three are on the Persons of the Trinity, De Patre, De Fillo, De Spiritu Sancto (PG XXXVII, 397-415), followed by three on the world and providence, De mundo, De providentia, De eodem argumento (PG XXXVII, 415-438), and two on the spiritual creation, De substantus mente proeditis and De anima (PG XXXVII, 438-456). Three poems on Christ, De testamentis et adventu Christi, De incarnatione, adversus Apollinarium and De Christi incarnatione, PG XXXVII, 456-471) are then followed by numerous poems on Scriptural themes including the miracles and parables of Christ. Four poems worthy of note later in this section are the four hymns to God, poemata 29-32 (PG XXXVII, 507-514). The second section of Book I, the Poemata or Carmina moralia consists of forty poems on themes such as virginity, chastity, the frailty of human life, poverty, patience, etc. (PG XXXVII, 521-968). Book II is entitled Poemata historica and is again divided into two...
sections, poems on himself, De seipso (PG XXXVII, 969-1452). and poems on others, Poemata quae spectant ad alios (PG XXXVII, 1451-1600 ). There are also epitapha (PG XXXVIII, 11-82) and epigramma (PG XXXVIII, 81-130). The most significant poem in the Poemata historica is also Gregory's longest, an autobiographical poem of 1,949 lines, De vita sua (PG XXXVII, 1029-1165).

6,3 PG XXXVII, 408-415.


6,5 For a comprehensive account of the major modern editions of Gregory's works up to the middle of the twentieth century cf. Denis Meehan, op. cit. Cf. also F. Lefherz, Studien zu Gregor von Nazianz: Mythologie, Überlieferung, Scholastien, Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms - Universität, 1958, 281-289.

6,6 Cf. supra, 5, note 1.

6,7 P. Clemencet and D. Caillau (eds), Sancti Patris nostri Gregorii Theologi, vulgo Nazianzeni, Archeepiscopi Constantinopolitan, Opera omnia quae extant, Paris, 1778-1842.

6,8 J. Billius and C. Morellus, Sancti Patris nostri Gregorii Nazianzeni Theologi, Opera, Paris, 1630 and 1690.

6,9 According to D. Meehan, op. cit., 204, the Hervagius edition while claiming to be the Opera Omnia only contained some of the poems, 80 epistles and most but not all of the orations. It also contained the tragedy, Christus Patiens, now generally regarded as a later work. Altogether, some thirty-seven editions were published between 1504 and 1753 according to Clemencet's preface to volume one of the Benedictine edition reprinted by Migne (PG XXXV, 11-18). But according to Meehan, the Hervagius edition remained the standard text until 1778.

6,10 Ibid., 206.
Ibid., 207-8. Meehan also recounts Caillau's earlier success in tracing another copy of volume two which was in the possession of Cardinal Fesch in Rome. The Cardinal, however, would not allow him to copy it.

Ibid., 209.

Meehan states that Louvard made a new Latin translation of Orations 1 and 2, but then decided that the translation of de Billy should be reproduced. A new prose translation of the poems was added to de Billy's metrical version. Ibid., 209.


Meehan, op. cit., 211.

Browne and Swallow (op. cit., 201) remark: "There are perhaps more MSS. of the works of Gregory than of any other Father." According to J. Mossay, there are more than 1200, perhaps 1500 MSS of the orations. M. Sicherl, J. Mossay and G. Lafontaine, "Travaux préparatoires à une édition critique de Grégoire de Nazianze," RHE, 74 (1979), 629.

Denis Meehan lists the publications of Sinko, Sajdak, Przychocki and Sternbach in an appendix, op. cit., 215-219.

Gallay wrote: "Par deux lettres de M. Sinko, en date du 9 septembre 1935 et du 23 juillet 1939, nous avons su que les travaux entrepris à Cracovie étaient terminés et que l'édition attendue pourrait bientôt voir le jour." (P. Gallay, La Vie de Saint Grégoire de Nazianze, Lyons: Vitte, 1943, X).

The war also brought the death of Leon Sternbach, who was from a Jewish family, in the concentration camp of Oranienburg in 1940.


The progress of this project up to 1979 is traced in Sicherl, Mossay and Lafontaine, op. cit. Critical texts of some of the poetry have already been published. H.M.

8,2 Sicherl, Mossay and Lafontaine, op. cit., 631.
8,3 Gallay, op. cit., X.
8,5 Cf. supra, 5, note 6.
8,6 Cf. supra, 6, note 4.
9,1 Cf. supra, 5, note 6.
concludes his brief note on Weijenborg's arguments: "On reste très sceptique."


9.4 op. cit., 338.


9.6 Cf. supra, 6, note 4.
I(b) Gregory's Life and Works in Historical Context


10.2 Cf. R.P.C. Hanson, "Who Taught ΕΞ ΟΥΚ ΟΝΤΩΝ?" Arianism: Historical and Theological Reassessments, 79-83.


Cappadocian Fathers, unpub. thesis, Brown University, 1972) support the view of Stanislas Giet (S. Giet, "Basile était-il Sénateur," RHE, 60 (1965), 429-444) that the families of Gregory and Basil and of most of the Cappadocian bishops of the period belonged to the curial class. "The curials were 'hearts of the cities' because traditionally it was they who not only administered the cities and dominated their ruling councils (the Boule or curiae) but also were expected to contribute of their private resources to maintain municipal buildings and amenities" (Kopeček, thesis, 95). Against this background we may understand the rapid rise of Gregory the elder to the episcopacy.

Before his conversion the elder Gregory had belonged to a little known sect called the Hypsistarii which is thought to have been influenced by Judaism.

11,3 The birth of the younger Gregory is established at either 329 or 330 (Gallay, op. cit., 25-27).

11,4 Kopeček lists as three of the traditional values of the curial class "civic patriotism, devotion to Greek μακάρια, and a strong sense of the value of family ties and tradition" (Kopeček, thesis, 125). Kopeček later writes of Basil as archbishop of Caesarea:

"In promoting the ideal of μακάρια among the sons of Cappadocian curial families, but with the proviso that they also pay close attention to the health of their souls, Basil was clearly trying to produce a synthesis of Christianity and classical culture in upper-class Cappadocian social circles" (Ibid., 191).


11,6 This at least is stated by Jean Daniélou, but without citing the evidence. Cf. J. Daniélou, "Patristic Literature," The Pelican Guide to Modern Theology (ed. R.P.C. Hanson), Vol. 2, 1969, 97. Cf. J. Quasten, Patrology, Vol. III, Utrecht: Spectrum, 1960, 204: "He received his elementary training from his father Basil, a famous rhetorician at Neocaesarea in Pontus, who was the son of St Macrina the Elder, a pupil of St Gregory the Wonderworker."

12,1 Browne and Swallow conclude that since Gregory does not mention a meeting with Athanasius in his panegyric on him (Orat. 21, PG XXXV, 1081-1128), "we must suppose that the former [i.e. Athanasius] was at this time suffering one of his many periods of exile" (NPNF, Second Series, VII, 189). But Athanasius was in possession of his see for a decade after 346, and since Gregory arrived in Athens in 350, the two must have been in Alexandria at the same time. It seems more probable than not that the young student from Cappadocia must at least have seen the great archbishop, but
there is no evidence that they met. Didymus the Blind was in charge of the catechetical school.

12,2 Gregory describes his experience in two places. First, in the oration, On the Death of His Father (Orat. 18:31, PG XXXV, 1024C), he said:

Πάντων δὲ τὸν κοινὸν θάνατον δεδοικότων, ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢν έμοι φοβερότερος. Ἐκινδύνευον γὰρ ἄθλιοι ἀπελευέν καὶ ἀπέλευτος, ποθὸν τὸ πνευματικὸν ἅδωρ ἐν τοῖς φονικοῖς ἅδωρ. (While we were all in fear of a common death, spiritual death was what I was most afraid of; for I was in danger of departing in misery, being unbaptized ['imperfected'], and I longed for the spiritual water among the waters of death).

The same description is put into verse in the De vita sua, 162-166, PG XXXVII, 1041A:

Πάντων δὲ τὸν κοινὸν θάνατον δεδοικότων,
'Ὅς χρυσός ἢν, ἔμοιγε φρικωδέστερος.
Καθαρσίων γὰρ, οίς θεομεθ' ὑδάτων
'Ἡλιοτροπούμην ἅδως ἐξενχότοις.
Τοῦτ' ἢν ὀδυρμός τοὐτ' ἔμοιγε συμφορά
(But while we all were fearing sudden death, Mine was a worse, because a secret, fear.
The cleansing waters ne'er had passed on me, That stay our foe and join us to our God.
This was my lamentation, this my dread.)

The translation is from Browne and Swallow, op. cit., 189.

The comparison with two eighteenth century Evangelicals is striking. John Wesley, struck with fear on his voyage to Georgia "to convert the Indians" was impressed with the calm singing of a party of Moravians. John Newton, captain of a slaving ship, experienced conversion after a storm on the North Atlantic. The imagery of 'the voyage is found frequently in Nazianzen's poems. Cf. B. Lorenz, "Zur Seefahrt in den Gedichten des Gregor von Nazianz," VigChr, 33 (1979), 234-241.

13,1 Cf. Kopeček, A History of Neo-Arianism, Chapters 4 and 5, for a full reconstruction of the rapid and complex events during 359 and 360.

13,2 The Eunomians are inaccurately called Anomoians. Cf. the comment in Richard P.C. Hanson, "A Note on 'Like according to the Scriptures',' ZKG, 98 (1987), 230-232:

"...the watchword of the Eunomians was not 'unlike' (anhomoeos); they constantly and indignantly repudiated this word, which their opponents as constantly attached to them and which modern scholars have too often
thoughtlessly perpetuated. Their great slogan was ἔνας οὐσίαν, 'of a different ousia'."

R.P. Vaggione seems to attribute the word anomolos to Eunomius in the introduction to Eunomius. The Extant Works, Oxford: Clarendon, 1987 (cf. xiv), but the word does not appear in the index of important words, 196ff.

14.1 It has been argued by Jeffrey N. Steenson that homoousios was rejected by Basil of Ancyra not because it seemed Sabellian but because it seemed to imply a material and passible substance. Cf. Steenson, "Basil of Ancyra on the Meaning of Homoousios," Arianism, ed. Gregg, 1985, 267-279.

14.2 Although known as Homoiousians, it appears that they did not use the term homolousios. Cf. Jeffrey N. Steenson, op. cit., 275:

"It is worth recalling that nowhere in the surviving texts do we see Basil actually using the word (i.e. homolousios) as a terminus technicus; rather he leans to the periphrasis, ὁμοίος καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν."

Cf. also R.P.C. Hanson, op. cit.

14.3 Those bishops who had previously defended homolos from the Second Sirmian Creed of 357 onwards were not simply defending an expedient. Their full formula, ὁμοίος κατὰ τὰς γραφάς, expressed an opposition to ousia as unscriptural. Cf. also R.P.C. Hanson, op. cit.


15.2 Oration 2: 36-38 is particularly significant and has been analysed in an important article by Enzo Bellini: E. Bellini, "Il dogma trinitario nei primi discorsi di Gregorio Nazianzeno," Aug 13 (1973), 525-534.


15.4 It was during the 360s that Gregory preached the following sermons (according to Paul Gallay's dating): in 362, Oration 15, In Praise of the Maccabees (PG XXXV, 911-934); at the end of 363 or the beginning of 364, Orations 4 and 5, Against Julian I and II (PG XXXV, 531-720); in 364, Oration 6, On Peace (PG XXXV, 721-752); in 365, Oration 14, On Love of the Poor (PG XXXV, 857-910); in late 368 or early 369,
Oration 7, the panegyricon his brother, Caesarius (PG XXXV, 755-788), and a little later, Oration 8, the panegyricon on his sister, Gorgonia (PG XXXV, 789-818). Paul Gallay, *La vie de Saint Grégoire de Nazianze*, Lyons: Vitte, 1943, 65-99.

16,1 According to Gallay (Ibid., 100-131), Oration 10, To Himself (PG XXXV, 827-832), was preached before the consecration and Oration 9, Defence to his Father (PG XXXV, 819-826), after it. Oration 11, To Gregory of Nyssa (PG XXXV, 831-842), was also preached at this time to Basil's younger brother who was consecrated bishop of Nyssa for the same reason. Gregory resented being used as an ecclesiastical pawn and being appointed to "a frightfully horrible and narrow little village; everywhere dust and noise and carts, weeping and shouting, lictors and chains" (Carmen de vita sua, 442-444: PG XXXVII, 1059-1060).

16,2 Oration 12, To his Father (PG XXXV, 843-850) was delivered upon his appointment as auxiliary bishop. Oration 16, On his Father's Silence (PG XXXV, 933-964), Oration 13, At the Consecration of Eulalius (PG XXXV, 851-856), and Oration 17, To the Citizens of Nazianzus (PG XXXV, 963-982) belong to this period. Gregory the Elder died at the beginning of 374, apparently having attained his century. Oration 18 (PG XXXV, 981-1044) is his panegyric. Nonna, Gregory's mother, died shortly afterwards. Oration 19, On his Sermons and to Julian (PG XXXV, 1043-1064) is also set by Gallay within this period.


16,5 Gregory later addressed himself to this group, "sound as to the Son (τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ὑγιατούοντι)," praying "that you may confess the Spirit perfectly (ὁμολογήσατο τῷ Πνεύμα τελεῖως")." Orat. 41:8, PG XXXVI, 440B.

16,6 The tension between involvement and withdrawal, action and contemplation is characteristic of Gregory's life. It is seen, for example, in his flight into seclusion at each crisis - at his ordination as a presbyter in 362, at his consecration as a bishop in 372, at this point in 375, and again in 381 when he ran into opposition as president of the Council of Constantinople. Brooks Otis examines this tension in, "The Throne and the Mountain. An Essay on St. Gregory Nazianzus", *Classical Journal*, 56 (1961), 146-165.
"The key, I think, to his life... is the antithesis I have expressed in the title of this paper - 'the throne and the mountain'. On the one side was what appeared to his friends and colleagues as his obvious destiny and role - the episcopal throne... But Gregory thought differently. As against the throne - the busy life of an archbishop - he longed for and returned to the mountain, the height on which he, like Moses, could enter the cloud and see not God's face but God's back - the divine mysteries which finite man can never reach but can always approach in that infinite search which was, to Gregory, the blessed life."

Gregory's best known passage on the ascent into the mountain to see the back of God is in the Second Theological Oration (Oration 28): 2 and 3, PG XXXVI, 27-30. Otis continues later (Ibid., 157):

"His whole life... was marked by a definite rhythm of advance and retreat, withdrawal and return, flight from the world and work in the world. It seemed he could not resist the importunities of family and friends: at Athens, at Nazianzus, at Sasima, at Constantinople he was in spite of himself compelled to serve a world to which he had ever been alien... He was indeed a double man, a dual personality: his oratory, his poetry, his very actions were obviously designed to attract and astound, to inspire public and private loyalties; yet these were but the husks or outer skin of an inner self that was not in the world at all but in the mountain-cloud surrounding the divine presence."


17,2 T. Sinko, De traditione orationum Gregorii Nazianzeni, pars prima, Cracoviae, 1917.

Gallay, op. cit., 137: "Il faut avant tout, comme l'a vu Sinko, chercher un fil conducteur dans le récit du grand poème autobiographique, où sont singulièrement développées les confidences touchant le temps passé par Grégoire à Constantinople. De ce récit se dégagent différentes étapes bien distinctes. Et si l'on confronte les renseignements trouvés dans les discours datant de cette période avec les détails fournis par le poème sur chaque étape, on arrive à des résultats satisfaisants."

17,3 Gallay, op. cit., 138, referring to Ep. 77, PG XXXVII, 141C. The theme of stoning emerges in the second and fifth of the Theological Orations (Orats. 28 and 31). Orat. 28:2, PG XXXVI, 28BC:
"But if any is an evil and savage beast... let him stand afar off and withdraw from the Mount, or he shall be stoned and crushed... for to those who are like wild beasts true and sound discourses are stones."

Orat. 31:1, PG XXXVI, 133B:

"Such, then, is the account of the Son, and in this manner he has escaped those who would stone him, passing through the midst of them. For the Word is not stoned, but casts stones when he pleases, and uses a sling against wild beasts - that is, words - approaching the Mount in an unholy way."

17,4 Gallay, op.cit., 140ff. For the schism at Antioch, cf. infra, 22, note 4. Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea, had been a strong supporter of the Nicene Creed of 325 and an ally of Athanasius, but had propounded the theory that in Christ, the divine Logos took the place of a human mind. This view was to be condemned at the Council of Constantinople in 381. Gregory's Theological Letters, Ep. 101, PG XXXVII, 176A-193B, Ep. 102, PG XXXVII, 193B-201B, and Ep. 202, PG XXXVII, 329A-333C, are mainly devoted to refuting Apollinarism.

17,5 PG XXXV, 1131-1152.


18,2 Orat. 22:12 and 14, PG XXXV, 1144-1145 and 1148B; Orat. 32:5, PG XXXVI, 180.

18,3 PG XXXVI, 213-238. Jean Bernardi, in La prédication des Pères Cappadoiciens, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1968, argues on pp. 165-168 that this sermon was preached in 380.


18,5 PG XXXVI, 427-452.

18,6 Orat. 21:13, PG XXXV, 1096.

18,7 Orat. 21:35, PG XXXV, 1124-1125.

18,8 Orat. 41:7 - 8, PG XXXVI, 437-441.

18,9 Browne and Swallow comment (NPNF, Second Series, VII, 378):

"The Oration deals again with the subject of the Fifth
Theological Oration, the question of the deity of the Holy Ghost, but proceeds to establish the point by quite a different set of arguments from those adopted in the former discourse, none of whose points are here repeated."

Browne and Swallow are assuming that Orat. 41 was delivered after the Fifth Theological Oration. They are not entirely correct that Gregory's arguments are entirely different.

18,10 PG XXXVI, 311-334.

18,11 Gallay (op. cit., 154-159) traces the argument establishing this dating.

18,12 PG XXXVI, 335-360.

18,13 PG XXXVI, 359-426. Gallay concluded (op. cit., 153) that Orat. 39 was preached on 6th January, "et comme l'orateur fut surpris par le temps, il continua sa prédication le lendemain: ce fut le discours 40, où il parla sur le baptême." But Szymusiak (op. cit.) corrects this, concluding that Orat. 39 was preached on 5th January (a Sunday) and Orat. 40 on the 6th, Epiphany, to the catechumens about to be baptized.

19,1 οτόν τι πέλαγος οὐσίας ἁμετρον καὶ ἀόριστον (Orat. 38:7, PG XXXVI, 317B).


19,4 Another sermon dated during this period is Orat. 24, On St Cyprian, PG XXXV, 1169-1194, which according to Gallay, was delivered on St. Cyprian's day, 4th October. Gregory seems to have returned from the country and given this impromptu oration, amplifying his material after the style of Athenian rhetoric, but confusing two Cyprians, Cyprian of Carthage and another Cyprian of Antioch. Gallay, op. cit., 150ff.

19,5 According to J.M. Szymusiak (op. cit.) on the contrary, it was the period when the Five Theological Orations were delivered. Cf. infra, 20, note 7.

19,6 PG XXXV, 1197-1226.

19,7 Gallay, op. cit., 160ff. Maximus ("qui portait le bâton de philosophe, et qui possédait une magnifique chevelure,
teinte en roux") seems to have been a charlatan of the first order. According to Gallay, he not only duped Gregory and Peter but also Ambrose of Milan. "Pour tromper non seulement Grégoire, non seulement Pierre... mais pour duper un homme sage, expérimenté et pondéré comme saint Ambroise, il fallait une singulière puissance d'intrigue" (op.cit., 168).

20,1 Dorothy Brooke gives a vivid and amusing account of the midnight consecration in the Anastasia, op.cit. (supra, 11, note 1), Chapter IV, 247-335.

20,2 PG XXXV, 1227-1252.

20,3 PG XXXVI, 241-256.

20,4 PG XXXV, 1151-1168.

20,5 Gallay argues that Gregory was re-establishing a good relationship with the Egyptians after the embarrassment of the support given to Maximus by Peter of Alexandria. Gregory certainly goes out of his way to emphasize the common theological position.

Orat. 34:6, PG XXXVI, 245B: "Wherefore I embrace and salute thee, 0 noblest of peoples and most Christian, and of warmest piety, and worthy of thy leaders... 0 my people, for I call you mine, as of one mind and faith, instructed by the same Fathers, and adoring the same Trinity (καὶ τῆς αότης Τριάδος προσκυνητὴν)."

He will discourse to them briefly concerning God "that you may see that not in vain have you come to us, and that you have not brought up in a port among strangers and foreigners, but amongst your own people, and have been well-guided by the Holy Spirit (ὁ ἑγγένετος ὑπὸ τοῦ Πνεύματος)"
Orat. 34:7, PG XXXVI, 248C.

The outright assertion of the deity of the Spirit is in Orat. 34:12, PG XXXVI, 252C: "I cannot believe that I am saved by one who is my equal. If the Holy Spirit is not God, let him first be made God, and then let him deify me his equal (Ὅδε πείθομαι τῷ ὅμοιῳ σώζεσθαι. Εἰ μὴ θεὸς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον, θεοτήτω πρῶτον, καὶ οὕτω θεοτάτω με τὸν ὄμοιον)."

20,6 Gallay (op.cit., 178 and 181) bases his dating on some lines of the De vita sua referring to this period, especially line 1113, Θεοτοκὸς δ’αοτίς ἡστραπτε λόγος. He writes:

"Si Grégoire insiste, dans son poème autobiographique, pour dire que cette quatrième étape de son séjour a vu la prédication chrétienne prendre un essor remarquable, si c’est alors que la parole de Dieu a 'brillé comme
l'éclair', ce nous est un indication pour placer ici les célèbres Discours théologiques, point culminant de sa prédication" (Ibid. 181).

20,7 Szymusiak (op. cit., 189) concludes "que les Discours théologiques, places autrefois par Tillemont en 379, reculés à l'été 380 par les historiens plus récents, semblent bien avoir été prononcés durant le Carême de l'année 380." He argues for this on the grounds (i) that the orations of the spring and autumn contain allusions to the treason of Maximus, whereas the Theological Orations do not, (ii) that Gregory speaks in Orat. 26, delivered after the attempted usurpation of Maximus, of having initiated them into "theology" and (iii) that at Easter he wishes the people "to guard the precious deposit of the Trinity" which he had entrusted to them. The series was therefore delivered during Lent, but interrupted by the return of Maximus after the Fourth Theological Oration. Oration 20 (which Sinko suggested should not be entitled Περὶ θεολογίας καὶ καταστάσεως ἐπισκόπων, but Περὶ θεολογίας καὶ καταστάσεως ἐπισκόπων), was delivered around Easter time, summarizing the series thus far, and the Fifth Theological Oration, On the Holy Spirit, was added at Pentecost. Szymusiak also suggests that Orat. 21, On Athanasius the Great, was delivered at this time as part of the rapprochement with Alexandria rather than a year earlier (cp. supra 18, note 4). He agrees with Gallay that Orat. 34, On the Arrival of the Egyptians, brought the affair to an end and suggests that it would be preached when the first cargo of corn was brought from Egypt in June.

There is not the space nor is it within the objectives of this thesis to follow this debate further, and it would seem that the evidence is not compelling either way. Fortunately it does not matter for our understanding of Gregory's pneumatology. Cf. the suggested chronology in Rosemary R. Ruether, Gregory of Nazianzus, Rhetor and Philosopher, Oxford: Clarendon, 1969, 178-180. Cf. also F.W. Norris, Gregory Nazianzen's Doctrine of Jesus Christ, thesis, Yale, 1970, 10.

20,8 PG XXXVI, 11-26. This oration is sub-titled Κατὰ Εὐνομιανῶν προθάλασσας. Kopeček asks why Gregory suddenly became concerned to attack the Eunomians or Neo-Arians:

"During all of A.D. 379 and the first half of A.D. 380 Gregory of Nazianzus had given no indication at all about being particularly concerned about them. Although his sermons from A.D. 379 revealed intense concern about the capital city's Apollinarians (Orats. 22 and 32) and Macedonians (Orats. 32 and 41), as well as concern about the official homolitan bishop of Constantinople, Demophilus (Orat. 21), they mentioned the Neo-Arians only once, very much in passing (Orat. 21:13)... Then suddenly, between

Kopeček finds the answer in a flurry of Neo-Arian activity reported by Philostorgius, including a meeting of the Neo-Arian bishops led by Eunomius in Constantinople to elect a new Neo-Arian bishop for Palestine. The Macedonians, to whom Kopeček refers, were the Pneumatomachi. Macedonius was archbishop of Constantinople 342-359. His name seems to have become associated with the Pneumatomachi around 380.


20,9 Orat. 27:3, PG XXXVI, 13CD:

Οδ παντός, δ οθόνι, το περί Θεοθ ψιλοσοφεύν...ατι των ἄητησαμένων καὶ διαβεβηκτών ἐν θεωρία, καὶ πρὸ τούτων, καὶ γυγήν καὶ σώμα κεκαθαριμένων, ἡ καθαριμένων, τὸ μετριώτατον.

The Neo-Arians were the most disputatious of the ecclesiastical parties. Following Aetius and Eunomius, they placed great emphasis on correct dogma and on the use of dialectic and logic to achieve it.

21,1 PG XXXVI, 25-72. The theme of the incomprehensibility of God was directly contrary to the Neo-Arian position that God's essence was comprehensible and was summed up in the word ἀγένεν(η)τος.

Gallay argues (op. cit., 182), following Sinko, that the Second Theological Oration was not preached in order, but added later:

"T. Sinko remarque en effet que l'exorde du troisième discours rappelle avec précision le premier et ignore totalement le second: d'où l'on conclura qu'il fut prononcé immédiatement après le premier, car l'orateur a coulisse, dans les autres allocutions de la série, de résumer le discours qui précède: le quatrième discours donne un aperçu rétrospectif du troisième, et le cinquième fait de même à l'égard du quatrième. Le second discours a donc été prononcé hors de cet ensemble et il y fut joint seulement pour la publication."

This argument deserves due weight, but it is not conclusive. Orators may not be fully consistent in references to what succeeds or precedes (the orations were taken down by
stenographers from a more-or-less impromptu delivery), whereas the theme of the incomprehensibility of God in the second oration certainly follows the attack on the presumptuous Neo-Arian dialectics in the first. But cp. Bernardi, op. cit., 181-185.

21,2 PG XXXVI, 73-104.
21,3 PG XXXVI, 103-134.
21,4 PG XXXVI, 133-172. Kopeček comments in a footnote that this oration was against the Macedonians (i.e. the Pneumatomachi) rather than the Neo-Arians (op. cit., 495, note 3).
21,5 PG XXXV, 1065-1080.
21,6 Gallay, op. cit., 185f.
21,7 Szymbusiak, op. cit.
21,8 De vita sua, 1325-1391 (PG XXXVII, 1120-1125). Gregory was led by Theodosius through dense crowds, some shouting with rage, others making supplications to the Emperor. The basilica had been secured by soldiers that morning. Just as Gregory and Theodosius entered, the sun broke through clouds and the darkened building was suddenly resplendent with light. The faithful, calling this a miracle, demanded Gregory's enthronement as archbishop, but he, ill and in pain, had them calmed and proceeded to celebrate the liturgy.

22,1 PG XXXVI, 265-280. The assassin was overcome with remorse before striking the blow.
22,2 PG XXXVI, 281-308. The passages on the Trinity are in Orat. 37:18, PG XXXVI, 304AB and 37:22, PG XXXVI, 308A.
22,3 Gallay (op. cit., 199) notes that Gregory says nothing of this event which is known through the historians Socrates (PG LXVII, 576-577) and Sozomen (PG LXVII, 1429-1432).
22,4 Meletius was the canonically elected bishop, but was not recognized by Alexandria or Rome, since, although never an Arian, he had originally been of the broad Eastern party which avoided the term homoousion. Paulinus became bishop of that faction of the church at Antioch which had remained loyal to the deposed bishop Eustathius (cf. supra, 11), uncompromisingly supporting the Nicene faith, and so was recognized by Alexandria and Rome. Basil had striven valiantly to heal this division between the anti-Arians of East and West. Cf. infra, 98, note 3, on Paulinus.
22,5 The challenge was on the basis of the canon of the Council of Nicea (325) which forbade bishops to move from one see to
another - a canon which was ignored. Gregory, however, was more than ready to go.

22,6  
*PG XXXVI, 457-492.*

22,7  
*Orat. 42:14:* "But you are perhaps longing for me to give an exposition of the faith (Δει δέ Ἰσως ποθοῦσιν ὡμίν καὶ τὸν τῆς πιστεώς αὐτῆς ἐπιδιξασθαι λόγον)..." The exposition fills paragraphs 15-18.

Gregory’s farewells are moving, but not without some telling thrusts:

"Farewell my Anastasia... Farewell likewise, grand and renowned temple, our new inheritance... Farewell, my throne, envied and perilous height. Farewell, assembly of high priests... Farewell, choirs of Nazarites... Farewell, hospitable and Christ-loving dwellings, helpers of my infirmity. Farewell, ye lovers of my discourses... ye pencils seen and unseen... Farewell, emperors, and palace, and ministers and household of the emperor, whether faithful or not to him, I know not, but, for the most part, unfaithful to God... Farewell, mighty Christ-loving city... Farewell, East and West... He is witness, who will give you peace, if but a few would imitate my retirement. Farewell ye angels, guardians of this church... Farewell, O Trinity, my meditation, and my glory... My children, keep, I pray you, that which is committed to your trust. Remember my stonings. The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen."

22,8  
*PG XXXVI, 493-606.* This oration is thought to be amplified.

22,9  
*PG XXXVI, 623-664.*

23,1  
*vide 68-69,* *PG XXXVI,* 585-590.

23,2  
*Orat. 45:3-9* is a repetition of *Orat. 38:7-13,* the section on the infinity and eternity of God "like some great sea of being, limitless and unbounded" (*supra,* 19, note 1). 16-17 is a repetition of *Orat. 38:14-15.*
I(c) Predecessors and Contemporaries

24,1 Cp. Gregory's opening statement in Epistle 58, PG XXXVII, 413, written to Basil:

"From the first I have taken you, and I take you still, for my guide of life and my teacher of the faith, and for every thing honourable that can be said."

Gregory concludes by asking for instructions as to how far he should go in setting forth the deity of the Spirit. Cp. also Gregory's statement in his panegyric on Basil (Orat. 43:2, PG XXXVI, 496C):

"And as, when he was among us, he constantly corrected me in many points, according to the rights of a friend and the still higher law (for I am not ashamed to say this, for he was a standard of virtue to us all)..."

It might just be possible to dismiss the first as diplomatic flattery and the second as rhetorical license fitting for a eulogy were it not that Basil's career witnesses to his character as a determined and strong leader whereas Gregory's vacillations indicate that he was more probably (on the whole) the follower.

Karl Holl, in his thorough study of the Cappadocians and Amphiloche of Iconium had no doubt that Basil was the leading figure:


24,2 Bernard C. Barmann, alluding to Jerome's statement in De viris illustribus 128, that Gregory of Nyssa read his Contra Eunomium to Nazianzen and himself at the Council in the Spring of 381, suggests that Orations 38 to 40 may have been dated too early. The implication is that they show traces of Nyssen's influence. But since these orations were delivered over Christmas and Epiphany, and since Nazianzen left Constantinople in July, 381, this is impossible. Nazianzen must have delivered these before listening to Nyssen's reading of his treatise. Bernard C. Barmann, The Cappadocian Triumph over Arianism, thesis, Stanford University, 1966, 10.
"Pour rendre compte suffisamment de ce large parallélisme avec Athanase et de l'admiration sans réserve, enthousiaste que Grégoire lui porte, il faut admettre que l'influence de l'alexandrin sur sa doctrine trinitaire est incontestable et même profonde."

It was Harnack's controversial thesis that the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity as expressed in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed was more an expression of Homoiusianism than of Homoousianism:

"From the fact that in the Church the Creed of Constantinople gradually came to be accepted as a perfect expression of orthodoxy, and was spoken of as the Nicene Creed while the latter was forgotten, it follows that the great difference which existed between the old Faith and the Cappadocian neo-orthodoxy, and was no longer understood, and that under cover of the ὁμοοοσιός a sort of Homoiusianism had in general been reached, the view which has really been the orthodox one in all Churches until this day. The father of the official doctrine of the Trinity in the form in which the Churches have held to it, was not Athanasius, nor Basil of Caesarea, but Basil of Ancyra." Adolf Harnack, History of Dogma, Vol. IV, London: Williams & Norgate, 1898, 100.

Harnack's thesis was contested by Bethune-Baker among others. Cp. J.F. Bethune-Baker, "The Meaning of Homouios in the Constantinopolitan Creed," Texts and Studies, Vol. VII (1905), 1-83. But historically, at least, it is evident that Basil was associated as a young man with the Homoiusian party, who wished him to be their spokesman at the confrontation with the Neo-Arians in December, 359. Cf. supra, 14, and infra, 38, note 2 and 3.

One clear evidence of their interest in Origen is the Philocalla, a compilation of extracts from his writings put together by Basil and Gregory probably during their retreat to Pontus around 361. It is worth noting, however, that nothing in this relates to pneumatology or the Trinity. Cf. J. Armitage Robinson (ed.), The Philocalla of Origen, Cambridge: University Press, 1893; and George Lewis (trans.), The Philocalla of Origen. A Compilation of Selected Passages from Origen's Works made by St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. Basil of Caesarea, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1911.

It would be ideal, of course, to trace the whole development of pneumatology so that Gregory's contribution may be seen in perspective. Since that is impossible here except in a quite superficial way, attention is concentrated on those who

25,2 *De Principiis*, I, 8, 3. Cf. also *Ibid. I*, 5, 5:

"...spotless purity exists in the essential being of none save the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, but in an accidental quality in every created thing..."


"Il y a en effet, d'après plusieurs passages du *Traité des Principes*, une opposition radicale entre la divinité et les créatures raisonnables, celle de la 'substantialité' de la première et de l' 'accidentalité' des secondes. Bien que le Fils et l'Esprit aient reçu tout ce qu'ils ont du Père, origine de la divinité et de l'univers, ils le possèdent comme leur bien propre et parfaitement, sans possibilité de croissance ou de diminution. Au contraire la créature raisonnable participe aux biens de la divinité toujours d'une manière imparfaite..."


25,4 *De Principiis I*, 3, 7.

Comm. St. John 2. 28, 172, cited by G.L. Prestige, op. cit., 135. Prestige also refers to the fragment preserved by the Emperor Justinian (De Prin., 4, 4, 1) in which Origen referred to the Logos as xτίσμα (op.cit., 133).

Comm. St. John, 2. 10, quoted in H.B. Swete, op. cit., 128. ἀγέννητος and ἀγέννητος were interchangeable at this point.

Prestige also refers to the fragment preserved by the Emperor Justinian (De Flrfn., 4, 4, 1) in which Origen referred to the Logos as xτίσμα (op.cit., 133).

*135. G.L. Prestige, op. cit., 137. Prestige is commenting on the assertion of Epiphanius (haer. 64. 8. 3.) that Origen, by calling the Son genētos theos, meant to define Him as a creature. Henri Crouzel (op. cit., 262-263) also denies that Origen classes the Holy Spirit as a creature in this passage.

G.L. Prestige, op. cit., 138, quoting Origen, Contra Celsum, 6, 17.

G.L. Prestige, ἄγεν(ν)ητος and γεν(ν)ητος and Kindred Words, in Eusebius and the Early Arians, "JThS, 24 (1923), 486-496.


Origen states the doctrine in De Prin. 1. 2. 4: "His generation is as eternal and everlasting as the brilliancy which is produced from the sun."

Cp. Joseph Wilson Trigg, Origen, Atlanta: John Knox, 1983, 103-107. On the one hand, "the spiritual world of rational creatures was...God's original creation" (103), but, on the other hand, "the human soul exists eternally before it enters the body" (107). This eternity (and not simply immortality) of rational natures is identified by Otis and Barmann as one of the features of Origenism which began to break down at the end of the third century. Cf. Bernard C. Barmann, op. cit., 5:

"In Origen's system God stood in an eternal relation to all logikoi, which were of one substance with the divine nature. Once Origen's doctrine of pre-existent souls
was rejected, eternal generation was left as a prerogative of the logos in contrast to ta poiēthenta."

Cf. also Brooks Otis, "Gregory of Nyssa and the Cappadocian Conception of Time," SP XIV (1976), 327-357. According to Otis, the crisis in the break-up of Origenism came with the attempt to drop the theory of the eternally begotten Logos. Origen had masked the difference between the agenetic Father and the genetic (creaturely) Son by his theory of an eternally created genetic. Arianism thus finished Origenism "which spoke of genetic or created spirits, but in effect regarded them as agenetic, eternal logikos" (335). He shocked Alexander and the "orthodox" Egyptians, according to Otis, not by denying the agenetic character of Christ but by denying the δηνεγνης or eternal creation of Christ (334, note 5). Otis's thesis is that once it was seen that no genetic or created thing could be deemed eternal, the issue was simply whether the genetic could be transformed into the eternal, or alternatively, could be saved as genetic (i.e. in time). It was the Cappadocians, and particularly Gregory of Nyssa, who established the distinctively Christian view of the relationship between eternity and time (adopting the Stoic term διώσκυρος from Methodius for the latter). Otis helps us to see that the ambiguity in the status of the Son and the Spirit in Origen's system arose precisely because they were conceived of as intermediaries in the hierarchy between God and world. Arianism forced the Church to choose, but as late as 381 there were still Christians trying to cling to the outmoded ambiguities of an Origenistic hierarchy.

27,5 Henri Crouzel, op. cit., 237-238. Crouzel also points out (Ibid., 239) that the equality of the persons is also safeguarded in that

"seule la Trinité est absolument incorporelle, les créatures raisonnables, incorporelles en tant qu'âmes, étant toujours unies à un corps, terrestre ou éthéré, même les anges et les démons."

He refers to the De Principis I, 6, 4; II, 2, 2; IV, 3, 15. On the other hand there is subordinationism in Origen's doctrine of the Trinity, but this is not contrary to equality (op.cit., 245):

"La 'subordination' du Fils au Père ne met en cause ni l'identité de nature ni l'égalité de puissance. Le Fils est à la fois subordonné et égal au Père, double affirmation qu'il est possible de retrouver après Nicée chez Athanase et Hilaire eux-mêmes. La subordination tient d'abord à ce que le Père est Père, origine des deux autres personnes et initiateur de leurs activités, en quelque sorte centre de décision au sein de la Trinité."


"This hierarchical scheme is more than a little like that of the Neo-Platonist philosopher, Plotinus, Origen's younger contemporary, who spoke of the three hypostases... Origen as a Christian, identifies the hypostases differently, but arranges them in a similar way. This leads him to assign increasingly narrower spheres of operation to each of the three, corresponding to their descending power, but at the same time enabling the expressing in Christian terms of the equivalent to Plotinus' mystical ascent."

Cf. Plotinus, *The Divine Mind, Being the Treatises of the Fifth Ennead*, trans. by Stephen Mackenna, London: The Medici Society, 1926. This is Vol. IV of this edition of the *Enneads*. Plotinus was apparently a student of "the mysterious teacher, Ammonius Saccas, at Alexandria, in whose lecture room Origen had also studied philosophy a few years before him" (according to Henry Chadwick, *The Early Church*, London: Penguin, 1967, 116). It seems reasonable to speculate that the explanation for the similarity may lie here.

R.T. Wallis, *Neo-Platonism*, London: Duckworth, 1972, 58: "In other words, significant predication implies denial of everything inconsistent therewith and hence limits the reality to which it is applied. From this follows the fundamental principle of the negative theology, that words can tell us only what the One is not, never what it is (V. 3. 14. 6-7)."

Enneads, V, 2, 1 (Medici edition, Vol. IV, 16):

"Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, lacking nothing, the One is perfect and, in our metaphor, has overflowed, and its exuberance has produced the new: this product has turned again to its begetter and been filled and has become its contemplator and so an Intellectual-Principle."

This Intellectual-Principle, which is simultaneously Being, repeats the act of the One

"In pouring forth a vast power. This second outflow is a Form or Idea representing the Divine Intellect as the Divine Intellect represented its own prior, the One. This active power sprung from essence (from the Intellectual-Principle considered as Being) is Soul."

Plotinus specifically indicates that "overflowing" is used metaphorically.

"It would be a radical misunderstanding of his thought to suppose that he [Plotinus] intends to say that this 'emanation' is automatic and necessary in a sense which excludes freedom and spontaneity... There is no deliberate action on the part of the One, and no willing or planning or choice or care for what is produced... But though this production or giving out is necessary in the sense that it cannot be conceived as not happening, or as happening otherwise, it is also entirely spontaneous: there is no room for any binding or constraint, internal or external, in the thought of Plotinus about the One. The One is not bound by necessity; it establishes it."

Armstrong also expounds (242-243) the element of τόλμα, illegitimate self-assertion on the part of the dyad, the Intellect, in separating from the One, and on the part of the Soul. This feature has been unjustifiably neglected, according to Armstrong, and he attempts to show how it may be harmonized with the idea of the overflow of the spontaneous creativity of the One.


Ibid., 53.


De Prin. I, 1, 6. In referring to "God", Origen of course means the first hypostasis, God the Father. He characteristically speaks of God, the Lord Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, not of God as Father, Son and Spirit.


There is also a difference in the use of the term logos. For Origen, logos is one name (one of the aspects or ἐνδόξους) of the second hypostasis, but for Plotinus, logos is among other things (according to A.H. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, 252) "the living, formative and directive pattern, derived from Intellect through Soul in the usual way, which keeps the material universe in the best possible order and brings it into a unity..."

De Prin., I, 3, 7-8.

H. Crouzel, op. cit., 249-250. In the very passage where Origen expounds the appropriation of operations to the three hypostases at greatest length he thinks it necessary to deny that this leads to a hierarchy (interestingly an inverted hierarchy) and to emphasize the equality of the three (De Prin., I, 3, 7):

"Let no one suppose that we, from having said that the Holy Spirit is conferred upon the saints alone, but that the benefits or operations of the Father and of the Son extend to good and bad, to just and unjust, by doing so give a preference to the Holy Spirit over the Father and the Son, or assert that his dignity is greater, which certainly would be a very illogical conclusion. For it is the peculiarity of his grace and operations that we have been describing. Moreover, nothing in the Trinity can be called greater or less...."

De Prin., I, 3, 5:

"I am of the opinion then that the working of the Father and of the Son takes place as well in the saints as in sinners, in rational beings and in dumb animals; nay, even in those things which are without life, and in all things universally which exist."

Ibid., II, 7, 2:

"Now we are of the opinion that every rational creature, without any distinction, receives a share of him [the Holy Spirit] in the same way as of the Wisdom and Word of God."

H. Crouzel, op. cit., 249: "La Création, comme la Providence, est l'oeuvre commune de la Trinité." Cf. J.W. Trigg, op. cit., 102: "Origen, denying the Spirit a role in creation, limited its role to the inspiration and sanctification of believing Christians."

Ibid. Origen himself writes that while some of the Greek and Barbarian philosophers entertained an idea of the existence of the Son in that they acknowledged that all things were created by the Word or Reason of God, "of the existence of the Holy Spirit no one indeed could entertain any suspicion, save those who were familiar with the law and the prophets, or those who profess a belief in Christ" (De Prin., I, 3, 1).
A.H. Armstrong, in "The Plotinian Doctrine of NOYE in Patristic Theology," VigChr, 8 (1954), 234-238, identifies points of similarity and one crucial point of difference between Plotinus and Athanasius. He identifies three axioms in The Enneads: (i) that spiritual being is essentially self-communicative and creative, (ii) that the process of giving out which produces each lower level in the hierarchy leaves the higher level unaffected, and (iii) that the product is always on a lower level of being. According to Armstrong, Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa see that the fundamental difference in Christian thought lies in its rejection of the third axiom of degrees of divinity, that it is possible to be more or less God. Nicene and Post-Nicene Christian thought proceeds on the opposite assumption that in the divine and eternal spiritual generation the Product is equal to, not inferior to, the Producer. This, says Armstrong, is a point of immense theological importance.

Armstrong continues his comparison by emphasizing that Athanasius shares the assumption of the spontaneous production of the Son from the Father, but that for him, creation is an extra, superfluous, spontaneous act. The Divine Goodness is essentially self-diffusive, as in Plotinus, but this leads not to the necessary emanation of all things from the One, but to utterly free and supremely generous (because not necessary) creation.

This article may be compared to Armstrong's later emphasis in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, that the emanation within the Triad of Plotinus is free and spontaneous (cf. supra, 28, note 3). The difference between Plotinus and Athanasius therefore appears to be not so much the presence or absence of spontaneity, but the presence or absence of necessity. The emanation in the Plotinian Triad and cosmos may be spontaneous, but it is necessary in the sense that it could not be otherwise. The creation of the cosmos according to Athanasius is also spontaneous, but it could have been otherwise. Creation is contingent.

This comparison of Plotinus and Athanasius could also stand in the main as a comparison between Origen and Athanasius since Origen, at least when he regards the Triad as a hierarchy, shares these axioms attributed to Plotinus.


"In discarding the philosophical doctrine of the Logos, Athanasius also discarded the dichotomy between a kosmos aisthētos and a kosmos noētos, and therefore the principle so dearly loved in the Platonic and Neo-Platonic tradition that the sensible world is a symbolic reflection of the invisible realities of the intelligible world..." (52, I, 447-448).

Maurice Wiles, in his note, "Eternal Generation," *JThS*, 12 (1961), 284-285, contrasts the function of the doctrine of the eternal generation in Origen's system and in the theology of Athanasius. The doctrine of the eternal generation originated with Origen, but for him it was part of a whole cosmology. The idea of "generation" was originally linked with "wisdom" from Proverbs 8:22, not with "sonship". It implied the eternity of the wisdom of God and of his power over his creatures, and therefore the eternity of the spiritual creation. By contrast, for Athanasius, the doctrine was implied not so much by the eternal generativeness of the immutable Father, as by the deity of the Son.


"For all the disputants in the Arian controversy were grappling with a common problem which was inevitable with the breakdown of Origenism. In Origen's system God stood in an eternal relation to all logikoi, which were of one substance with the divine nature. Once Origen's doctrine of pre-existent souls was rejected, eternal generation was left as a prerogative of the logos in contrast to ta polēthenta. The so-called orthodox (Alexander of Alexandria, Athanasius and others) stopped here and held that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. Origen's more radical critics (Methodius, Eusebius of Caesarea, and Arius) went further and insisted on the Father's priority to preserve the monarchia of God and rejected the Origenist doctrine of the Son's eternal generation because it implied two agennētoi."

"In order to solve the dilemma that on the one hand God was never inactive (as he and Origen firmly believe) and on the other hand that the creation is not eternal (as he and the Arians firmly believe) Athanasius takes a position of which we can say as historians, that both the Origenistic view and the Arian view are 'aufgehoben' in it (in the Hegelian sense): as the eternal Father of the eternal Son, who is his creative Power, the one God was never lonely, inactive and in splendid isolation, but had the eternal will to create a world which as a creature is sharply differentiated from him by having a beginning in time. The notion of the Father as the origin of the Son is neither an 'unüberwindlicher Rest' in Athanasius, nor does it indicate a certain subordination of the Son to the Father, but it is a useful way of showing that the one God, who stands so clearly apart from the world, is and was nevertheless not an inactive and lonely being" (op.cit., 99-100).

Brooks Otis, "Cappadocian Thought as a Coherent System," DOP, 12 (1958), 95-124. According to Otis, the "Irenaean" tradition, whose most logical exponents were Marcellus of Ancyra and Apollinaris, conceived of salvation as physical. The flesh is deified, its mortal and genetic quality is transformed by immortal and agenic deity. The deity of Son and Spirit are therefore strongly emphasized and there is a tendency towards a Monarchian or Sabellian concept of God (as in Marcellus) and towards an Apollinarian view of Christ's humanity. The contrasting Origenist tradition, a modified fourth century form of Origen's thought, conceives of salvation as the liberation of the immortal soul from the flesh. Since the flesh is the locus of passion, change, evil and death, and since sin is closely equated with it, the Father, as passionless, immortal, agenic deity, cannot make direct contact with sinful, enfleshed man. Therefore Christ and the Holy Spirit are conceived of as subordinate mediatory agents at home in both worlds and so able to effect the ascent of man to theōsisis from his genetic mortal condition. Once this Origenism lost Origen's view of the pre-cosmic fall, it lost the need for the eternal generation of the Son: only God the Father was eternal and Christ as genetic becomes a creature. Thus, according to Otis, this Origenist tradition issued in Arianism. Arianism provoked a crude Irenaean reaction (Otis accepts that Athanasius was Apollinarian up to 362) and it was eventually the Cappadocians who produced a remarkable synthesis of the two traditions, divorcing Athanasian theology "from the crude physicalist Christology and anthropology of most Athanasians" (op.cit., 105).

The view that Athanasius himself tended towards Apollinarianism (as a "crude Irenaean"), expressed in the idea that he adopted a "Word/flesh" Christology as opposed to a "Word/man" Christology was proposed by F.C. Baur, Die Christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung.
Gottes, 1841, resurrected from obscurity by M. Richard, "Saint Athanase et la psychologie du Christ selon les Arisens," Mélanges de Science religieuse, 4 (1947), 5-54, and accepted by A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, first ed., London: Mowbrays, 1964 (2nd ed., 1975) and J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, fourth ed., London: Black, 1968, 284-289. It has recently been strongly rejected by George Dragas in a thesis "Athanasius contra Apollinorem," published in ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΑ, 6 (1985), 5-609. It is beyond the scope of this work to examine the arguments, but Dragas is surely right in that the "Word/flesh" schema is a systematization (a "dogmengeschichtliche straightjacket") which must be treated with great reserve. Athanasius may not refer to the soul of Christ as often or as clearly as we may wish, but he was not an Apollinarian. Cf. the comment of John J. Zizioulas that "it is a gross misunderstanding of Alexandrian Christology to speak in terms of a 'Logos-flesh' synthesis (e.g. A. Grillmeier, etc.); flesh without personhood would be absolutely inconceivable for the Alexandrian whose ontology is based on the notion of communion" (Idem, "Human Capacity and Incapacity; A Theological Exploration of Personhood," SJT, 28 (1975), 401-447, esp. 435, note 2). The Irenaean/Origenist schéma of Otis is a similar systematization which the historian must also treat with great reserve. Nevertheless, there is enough truth in Otis's schéma to let it stand as the background to the different perspectives of Athanasius and Origen, and to see Athanasius as an heir of Irenaeus.

This view of the genesis of Arianism may be compared with that proposed by Robert Gregg and Denis Groh first in an article, "The Centrality of Soteriology in Early Arianism," AThR, 59 (1977), 260-278, and then more fully in Early Arianism - a View of Salvation, London: SCM, 1981. Gregg and Groh agree with Otis that the difference in soteriology is fundamental. But for Otis, the Origenist (i.e. Arian) view of salvation is essentially "spiritual" in opposition to the "physicalist" view of the Irenaean tradition. According to Gregg and Groh, it is not so much that Arianism has an Origenist "spiritual" view of salvation, as that it is centred on a view of the Redeemer which sees him as the adopted Son of the Father, essentially a creature who wins salvation for us by obedience to God's will.

C.R.B. Shapland, The Letters of St. Athanasius concerning the Holy Spirit, London: Epworth, 1951, gives the date of the Letters in his introduction as 359 or 360. What is now referred to as Letters II and III was originally one letter. The letter now referred to as Letter IV, originally therefore the third, had only seven paragraphs. IV, 8-23, as it appears in Migne (PG XXVI, 648-676) was an earlier work.

The Tropici are generally regarded as an Egyptian group who had no relationship to the Pneumatomachi of Constantinople (later called Macedonians) who were opposed by Gregory of

"On the basis of the surviving sources it seems virtually impossible to determine with any precision the relation between the several groups variously called Pneumatomachi, Tropici, and Macedonians by the theologians and historians of the fourth and fifth centuries; modern efforts at reclassification have not proved to be very helpful, either."

32,2 Ad Serapionem, I, 2, PG XXVI, 532-533. This translation and those which follow are taken from C.R.B. Shapland, op.cit.

32,3 Ibid., I, 14, PG XXVI, 565AB.

"But the Apostolic faith is not thus, nor can a Christian endure these things for a moment. For the holy and blessed Triad is indivisible and one in itself. When mention is made of the Father, there is included also his Word, and the Spirit who is in the Son. If the Son is named, the Father is in the Son, and the Spirit is not outside the Word. For there is from the Father one grace which is fulfilled through the Son in the Holy Spirit; and there is one divine nature, and one God 'who is over all and through all and in all'."

32,4 It is re-stated Ibid., I, 17, PG XXVI, 569C and 572B:

"For the whole Triad is one... For nothing foreign is mixed with the Triad; it is indivisible and consistent... the holy Triad may still rightly be characterized as indivisible and of one nature,"

and at Ibid., I, 20, PG XXVI, 576D-577A:

"But if there is such co-ordination and unity within the holy Triad, who can separate either the Son from the Father, or the Spirit from the Son or from the Father himself? Who would be so audacious as to say that the Triad is unlike itself and diverse in nature, or that the Son is in essence foreign from the Father, or the Spirit alien from the Son?"

32,5 Ibid., I, 28, PG XXVI, 596A:

There is then a Triad, holy and complete, confessed to be God in Father, Son and Holy Spirit, having nothing foreign or external mixed with it...; it is consistent and
in nature indivisible, and its activity is one... Thus the unity of the holy Triad is preserved."


"It must be said, then, that the very basis of Athanasius' doctrine of the One triune God in the co-activity and co-essentiality of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, depends upon his holding together the Being of God in his Act and his Act in his Being - that is, in declining to have anything to do with the distinction between his being (ουσία) and his activities (ἐνέργεια) which developed in later thought, starting with the Cappadocians and becoming characteristic of Byzantine theology... the activity inhered in the very Being of God as ἐνόσσιος ἐνέργεια."

Torrance interprets this as the principle that God must be "in himself always and reliably what he is towards us through the Son and in the Spirit" (Ibid., 236).

"Therefore there is in the Triad - in Father, Son and in the Holy Spirit himself - one Godhead, and in the same Triad there is one baptism and faith."

Theodore C. Campbell, "The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Theology of Athanasius," *SJT*, 27 (1974), 408-440. The first two sections of Campbell's article cover the three axioms identified here. In his second section, "The Spirit as a Member of the Triad," he deals with this first axiom and devotes considerable attention to the μία ἐνέργεια in relation to the unity of oβεία.

George D. Dragas, "The Eternal Son," *The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed*, ed. T.F. Torrance, Edinburgh: Handsel, 1981, 16-57. Dragas regards this axiom as central: "The central statement of the Letters to Serapion is that the truth of God is in the Trinity, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, which is undivided and homogeneous in itself." He also links this unity of being to unity of action: "The whole argument of the *Ad Serapionem* is based on this holistic Triadic involvement of God in human history" (*Ibid.*, 40).

John McIntyre, in his article, "The Holy Spirit in Greek Patristic Thought," *SJT*, 7 (1954), 353-375, identifies three principles which he claims are used by all the Fathers in their formulation of doctrine. The third of these is this principle, "The Spirit is to the Son as the Son is to the Father." McIntyre calls this "an ontological or correlative principle." The principle is certainly ontological in that it asserts the unity and indivisibility of the Triad, but it is also epistemological. McIntyre's first principle, "Identity of ousia is to be derived from unity of energēia," which he calls "a logical or deductive principle," is not prevalent in that form in the *Letters to Serapion*, although present (*cp. supra*, 32, note 7). The related argument, not in Triadic form, that since the Spirit fulfils divine functions the Spirit is divine, takes a sizeable portion of the first letter (1, 22-27). Similarly, McIntyre's second principle, "Knowledge of any one of the Persons within the Trinity is at the same time knowledge of the other two," which he calls "an epistemological or conceptual principle," is not particularly prominent or explicit in the *Letters*.

Why then do they say that the Holy Spirit is a creature, who has the same oneness with the Son as the Son with the Father? Why have they not understood that, just as by not dividing the Son from the Father they ensure that God is one, so by dividing the Spirit from the Word, they no longer ensure that the Godhead in the Triad is one."

It may be seen here how the second axiom is inseparable from the first. At the end of 1, 2 he writes:
"For those who 'resist the Spirit'... deny also the Son. But those who deny the Son have not the Father."

At the end of the exegetical section of the first letter (Ibid., 1, 1, 14, PG XXVI, 565B) it reappears:

"... the Spirit had not been divided from the Son, but was himself in Christ, as the Son is in the Father."

At 1, 20, PG XXVI, 576D-577A, the axiom is explored beginning with a clear statement in the form of the principle of proportion, inseparable linked to the first axiom:

"But if there is such co-ordination (σωστοχίας) and unity within the holy Triad, who can separate either the Son from the Father, or the Spirit from the Son or from the Father himself? Who would be so audacious as to say that the Triad is unlike itself and diverse in nature, or that the Son is in essence foreign from the Father, or the Spirit alien from the Son."

It would be possible to dismiss the expression of proportion in those sentences as merely rhetorical, but that is not possible with the explicit statement at the beginning of the next paragraph (I, 21, PG XXVI, 580B):

"But if, in regard to order (τάξιν) and nature, the Spirit bears the same relation to the Son as the Son to the Father, will not he who calls the Spirit a creature necessarily hold the same to be true also of the Son."

At the end of 1, 24, PG XXVI, 588B, in the middle of the section arguing for the deity of the Spirit from his actions as given in Scripture, Athanasius writes of the Spirit as "the image of the Son" as the Son is "the image of the Father." In 1, 25, PG XXVI, 588C, the same principle of proportion is expressed with regard to essence (οὐσία):

"And if the Son, because he is of the Father, is proper to his essence (τόπος τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἐστιν) it must be that the Spirit, who is said to be from God, is in essence proper to the Son (τόπον εἶναι κατ' οὐσίαν Υἱοῦ)."

It appears once again in the concluding paragraph (I, 33; PG XXVI, 608A).

"For the Spirit is inseparable from the Son, as the Son is inseparable from the Father."

Cp. also III, 1, PG XXVI, 628A; III, 3, PG XXVI, 628-629; III, 4, PG XXVI, 629-632.

33,10 Ibid., II, 5, PG XXVI, 616B.
Charles Kannengiesser, "Athanasius of Alexandria and the Holy Spirit between Nicea I and Constantinople I," ITQ, 48 (1981), 166-180. Kannengiesser undertakes a study of the doctrine of the Spirit throughout the writings of Athanasius. His view of the Spirit as the unique inspirer of the whole of Scripture (evident as early as the Festal Letters) determines his hermeneutical rules (cf. Contra Arianos I, 54 and II, 44). These lead to his doctrine of the Son of God on which rests his reply regarding the substantial divinity of the Spirit in the Letters to Serapion. The Holy Spirit does not appear in the Contra Gentes-De Incarnatione, but in Kannengiesser's view,

"His absence may be compared to that of the human soul in the humanity of Christ as the author of the apology evokes it. In neither case does the silence signify a denial. It must be interpreted" (Ibid., 172).

The "Christological concentration" of which Kannengiesser writes is developed in Contra Arianos I, 46-51. Kannengiesser sums up the lessons of this section in three statements: (a) the Spirit is the perfect gift of the Son, (b) the Spirit is the "power" of the Son, and (c) the Spirit acts in us. In commenting on Contra Arianos I, 46, Kannengiesser concludes:

"All is said in those few lines: the Christological concentration of the notion of Pneuma in Athanasius owes nothing to the anti-Arian controversy, but stems from his own meditation on the salvation accomplished in Christ; it is not derived from a theory of the divine Triad, but is conceived in function of the Incarnation of the Son" (Ibid., 175).

T.F. Torrance, op. cit., 232. Torrance sees this close dependence of Athanasius' pneumatology on his Christology as the explanation for the fact that "the foundation of Athanasius' doctrine of the Spirit, in its essential points, is already found in the Contra Arianos."

C.R.B. Shapland, op. cit., 34f.:

"For Athanasius, the doctrine of the Spirit stands in the closest possible relation to that of the Son."

Irenaeus, which is a commentary on a Trinitarian creed) which can be considered as a systematic study of the Trinity as a whole" (Ibid., 1231). He gives a useful resume of the theology of the Letters, identifying five grounds given for accepting Trinitarian doctrine and the deity of the Spirit: (i) exegesis (shallow, according to Holland), (ii) the argument from the titles of the Persons of the Trinity (which is less strong here than in reference to the Son), (iii) the categorical argument that the Spirit, like the Son, is unique, and acts as God towards the creatures, (which in Holland's view bears the main weight), (iv) the connection between the unity of operations and the unity of God (not a straight argument from the first to the second) and finally, since the problem is more formidable than when similar arguments were used for the deity of the Son, (v) an a priori Trinitarianism which gives consistency to the piecemeal evidence of Scripture.

This fifth argument may be identified with what is called in this thesis the first axiom of Athanasius in the Letters. The third argument may be identified with the third axiom, still to be considered here. The fourth argument is related to the second axiom currently under discussion, but Holland deals with the Spirit's relation to the Son and the intra-trinitarian relations in his succeeding section on the content of Trinitarian doctrine (Ibid., 1246-1253).

34,7 Ad Serap., I, 19, PG XXVI, 573CD. This is the only place in the Letters where these images are expounded (i.e. I, 19-21). They occur also in II, 1-3 in reference to the Son but not in Triadic form. J.M. Ford, in "The Ray, the Root and the River. A Note on the Jewish Origin of Trinitarian Images," SP XI, Berlin, 1972, 158-165, suggested that these similes, and that of the tree ("the root, the shoot, and the fruit"), which are found in Tertullian (Adv. Prax. 8) and in Hippolytus "may have originated from Jewish symbolism portrayed by the menorah, the seven-branched candlestick." Cf. also R.P.C. Hanson, "The Transformation of Images in the Trinitarian Theology of the Fourth Century," SP XVII, (1982), 97-115, republished in Richard P.C. Hanson, Studies in Christian Antiquity, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1985, 253-278.

35,1 This is J.A.B. Holland's term for this principle. Vide, J.A.B. Holland, op.cit., 1244:

"This is the problem, as we have put it, of whether the Son and the Spirit are in series with the Father or in parallel, or in a different, more complex relation."

35,2 Cf. Ad Serap., I, 20, PG XXVI, 576D: "But if there is such co-ordination and unity within the holy Triad..."; or I, 21, PG XXVI, 580B: "But if in regard to order and nature..."
Ad Serap., I, 19, PG XXVI, 573CD. Cf. supra, 34, note 7. The terminology of "ontological Trinity" and "economic Trinity" is not, of course, to be found in Athanasius, and although he is a major figure precisely because he insists that the Trinity, and specifically the Son's relationship with the Father, is ontological and eternal and not merely economic or temporal, the distinction may not have been as clear in his mind or as sharply defined as in later reflection and later terminology. Although it has been argued here that the traditional images of light-radiance-enlightenment and fountain-river-drink have a mainly economic reference, the ontological reference is not entirely absent. Later in Ad Serap., II, 1-3, the only other place in the Letters where they are used, the images are given an ontological implication:

"If God is Fountain (πηγή) and Light (φῶς) and Father, it is not lawful to say that the fountain is dry, or that the light has no ray, or that God has no Word; lest God be without wisdom, reason, and brightness. As, therefore, the Father is eternal, the Son also must be eternal..." (II, 2, PG XXVI, 609B).

Ibid., I, 20, PG XXVI, 576D.

Ibid., I, 20, PG XXVI, 577B. Cf. also IV, 4, PG XXVI, 641C-644B. According to G.L. Prestige, "PERICHOREO and PERICHORESIS in the Fathers", JThS, 29 (1928), 242-252, the term περιχώρησις was first used by Gregory of Nazianzus (Orat. 18:42) with reference to Christology, and first applied to the Trinity by John of Damascus. But the idea of mutual co-inherence, explicitly drawn mainly from Johannine and Pauline sources, is present here in Athanasius.

Ibid., I, 2, PG XXVI, 533AB. The axiom also underlies the charge made against the Tropici in the opening sentences of the letter (I, 1, PG XXVI, 569C) that:

"...certain persons...oppose the Holy Spirit, saying that He is not only a creature, but actually one of the ministering spirits, and differs from the angels only in degree..."

Ibid., I, 17, PG XXVI, 569C.

Ibid., I, 21-27, PG XXVI, 580B-593C.

Ibid., I, 21, PG XXVI, 581A. Athanasius continues in I, 22, PG XXVI, 581AB:

"The creatures came from nothing, having a beginning from which they came into being... The Holy Spirit is said to be from God... What kinship could there be, judging by the above, between the Spirit and the creatures? For the creatures were not; but God has
being, and the Spirit is from him. That which is from God could not be from that which is not, nor could it be a creature..."

36,5 Ibid., I, 23, PG XXVI, 584B.

36,6 Ibid., 584BC.

36,7 Ibid., I, 24, PG XXVI, 585B.

36,8 Ibid.

36,9 Ibid., I, 26, PG XXVI, 589C.

36,10 Ibid.

36,11 Ibid., I, 27, PG XXVI, 593A.

36,12 Ibid.

36,13 Ibid., 593C: καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνὸς ἵδιον καὶ ὑμνοῦσιν ἐστι.

36,14 Ibid.

37,1 It is Fathers such as Irenaeus and Tertullian who clarify the doctrine as creatio ex nihilo, as clearly stated in II Macc. 7:28 but not so clearly in the canonical Scriptures. It was compromised in different ways, for example, by Justin and Origen. But it seems to be common to most if not all of those later accounted as Fathers of the Church. Cf. the useful treatment of this in Richard A. Norris, God and World in Early Christian Theology, London: A. & C. Black, 1966. On the other hand, if some Christian thinkers thought of creation through intermediaries, Porphyry at least among pagan philosophers developed a Platonic version of creatio ex nihilo in his commentary on Plato's Timaeus.

37,2 E.P. Meijering, in Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius. Synthesis or Antithesis?, Leiden: Brill, 1974, identifies this rejection of hierarchical concepts of God and the world as a significant difference between Athanasius and Origen (129):

"From Origen's doctrine about the Logos it becomes clear that he accepts such a hierarchic conception of God. Although he says that the Son is of the same eternity as the Father, he nevertheless makes him ontologically inferior to the Father... Athanasius is obviously completely opposed to any hierarchy in God, and in this he differs both from Origen (and his followers in Alexandria) and the Platonists."


Methodios Fouyas expresses this understanding of the use of Greek categories by the Fathers in general and Athanasius in particular:

"In making use of the Hellenistic language and traditions as means, the Christian Church does not derive the essence of her teaching from them... Language and παραδείγματα do not constitute the Faith, but serve it. They are means, not the end. It is noticeable that the Council of Alexandria in 362 under St. Athanasius declared that what mattered was not the dogmatic language as such but the dogmatic meaning underlying its use." Methodios Fouyas, "The Homoousion," *AbS*, 10 (1979), 5-17, this quotation from page 12; reprinted in *The Incarnation*, ed. T.F. Torrance, Edinburgh: Handsel, 1981, 1-15.

E.P. Meijering in his study of the role of Platonist ontology in Athanasius' thought corrects the impression this may leave that Hellenistic language and Platonist categories are only incidental to Athanasius' thought:

"One may ask whether Athanasius consciously uses Platonic ontology as a foundation of his Christian faith. There can be no doubt that he was confronted with Platonist ontology in his philosophical education. Plato's *Timaeus* was well known. The feeling of security which this ontology gives may have appealed to him emotionally. On the other hand he need not have had the feeling that he was adding a new and strange element to the Christian faith" (op.cit., 125).

The Platonist ontology was simply part of his cultural milieu, the accepted framework of thought for a man of his time. Athanasius was quite happy to use Platonist terms compatible with Scripture and approved by ecclesiastical tradition:

"He is confronted with the difficulty that the words *σῶσις* and *δομονοσος* do not appear in the Bible. He says that it is allowed to use non-biblical terms, provided one keeps a pious mind..." (op.cit., 125-126).

What was significant was not so much whether a specifically Platonist ontology was used, but that the faith be expressed ontologically. As in Platonism "the world of ideas is meant to give stability to this sensible world", so

"similarly, in Athanasius' view, the ontological foundation of Christ's divinity gives stability and reliability to God's revelation... Athanasius believes..."
that if God is not by essence what He does or what He is to us, then He might cease doing what He does or cease being what He is to us" (op. cit., 124).

There is a second reason:

"The other reason why Athanasius stresses the ontological Godhead of the Son is... that he believed that only God can redeem man, and that Christ, as the Redeemer, must therefore be God " (op. cit., 125).


"... as long as the homoousios was confined to the relationship of Father and Son it could (a) both be justified and given meaning from its unbroken ties to the image of generation and (b) seem, because of those same ties, to leave intact, despite its approach to the connotation of identity of substance, the distinction of parent and offspring which this very image requires. But of course once the homoousios is extended to the Holy Spirit, its links to the image of generation are effectively broken, and with these will go also its obvious source of justification and meaning, and even its remaining ability to retain impressions of distinction despite its own progress towards connotations of identity. Hence the whole project of distinguishing hypostases will be threatened. The break with the explanatory and justificatory link with the image of generation will tend to introduce the kind of equivalence of images of derivation (being born of, created by, established by, and so on) on which Arianism had insisted; and the same break will make the quest of formulae for distinction within the one identical essence even more difficult than it otherwise needs to be..."

38,1 Cf. supra, 24, note 1. J.H. Srawley, in his article on "Cappadocian Theology" in HERE, Vol. 3, 212-217 (cf. 214), denotes Basil as the pioneer.

38,2 Cf. supra, 24, note 4, and infra, 135f. Although popularized by and associated with Harnack, this view was first proposed by Theodore Zahn in Marcellus von Ancyra, Gotha: Perthes, 1867. Franke Dinsen, in her Kiel dissertation, Homoousios. Die Geschichte des Begriffs bis zum Konzil von Konstantinopel (381), completed in 1976, lists works by the following scholars in which neo-Nicenes are distinguished from Old Nicenes on this basis: H.M. Gwatkin, F. Loofs, R. Seeberg, J. Leipoldt, G. Kruger, J. Gummerus, K. Müller, M. Werner, G. Kretschmar, B. Lohse and A. Schindler (op. cit., Einleitung 1, notes 1 and 2).
In addition to J. F. Bethune-Baker (vide supra, 24, note 4) the following scholars according to Dinsen (op. cit., Einleitung, I, note 3) reject the Zahn-Harnack view: F. Cavallera, O. Bardenhewer, R. Arnou, G. L. Prestige, J. N. D. Kelly, S. Gonzalez, J. Lebon, A. Grillmeier and A. M. Ritter.

Vide Atanasije Jevtich, "Between the 'Nicaeans' and the 'Easterners': the 'Catholic' Confession of Saint Basil," StVladThQ, 24 (1980), 235-252. According to Jevtich, the Homoioussians are best understood as Easterners who accepted the Nicene faith in all respects except that they preferred homoiousios since to them it better accommodated the real distinction of hypostases. Homoioussianism was one attempt to give expression to this Eastern triadology.

"St. Basil and the other Cappadocians were firmly rooted in the general Eastern dogmatic tradition, and not particularly in that of 'homoioussianism'" (Ibid., 246).

Jevtich sums up the Cappadocian achievement:

"The holy Cappadocian Fathers, having become embroiled in the contest between the 'Nicaeans' and the 'Easterners', succeeded in winning a real victory for the cause of Nicene consubstantiality and the true faith in the Holy Spirit. They did this in such a way as not to sacrifice anything of the sound Eastern triadological tradition" (Ibid., 245).

Cf. also the same author's earlier article, "Introduction à la théologie du Saint Esprit chez les Pères cappadociens," Messager de l'exarchat du Patriarche Russe en Europe Occidentale, 83-84 (1973), 145-162. This is a translation from Serbian of an article published the same year in Teolosky Polgedy (Revue du Patriarcat serbe), 5 (1973), 22-36.

Cf. supra, 27. Cf. also G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, London: S. P. C. K., 1952, 179: "Persons of the Trinity seem to have been described by the word hypostasis first in Origen (c. Cels. 8.12)." More recently, Atanasije Jevtich writes of Origen (op. cit., "Between the 'Nicaeans' and the 'Easterners', 248): "He was the one who first used the expression 'three hypostases' for the Holy Trinity." Jevtich cites Exegesis of the Gospel of St. John, V,11,6.


J. H. Srawley (op. cit., 213) states that the Cappadocians "exhibit especially the influence of the Creed of their local saint, Gregory Thaumaturgus." Hans Dehnhard's close study (Das Problem der Abhängigkeit des Basilius von Plotin, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1964) documents the close verbal links between
Basil's *De Spiritu Sancto*, a smaller work entitled, *De Spiritu* (which Dehnhard argues is from Basil's pen) and various sources, including the Creed of Gregory Thaumaturgus. R.P.C. Hanson concluded (*Basil's Doctrine of Tradition*, *VigChr*, 22 (1968), 247, note 42):

"Dehnhard has shown that this doctrinal tradition which was so strongly entrenched in Basil's family went back to the *Symbolum* of Gregory Theodorus (later called Thaumaturgus)."


39,4 Cf. supra, 24, note 5.

39,5 John M. Rist (*op.cit.*, 210) writes:

"What then is the truth about the 'Creed of Gregory Thaumaturgus'? Basically Abramowski is right: there was such a 'Creed' (*ἐκθέσις*): Basil refers to it in *ENeoc.p.m.* (210). He apparently knows its content, though he makes no use of it – presumably because it was related to third century problems and thus no help in his Trinitarian dealings with Artabius or anyone else in the fourth century. The document which Gregory of Nyssa produced and which Dehnhard claims as a source for Basil, is a reworking of the original 'Creed' by someone close to Basil; and as Abramowski points out, its material on the Spirit seems to depend on the work of Basil himself."

The reference here is to Ep.210, *Ad primores Neocaesarienses*. Artabius was bishop of Neocaesarea, originally the see of Gregory Thaumaturgus. A major argument against the authenticity of the Creed of Gregory Thaumaturgus is that Basil does not use it in a dispute with Artabius.

39,6 E. Junod, in "Remarques sur la composition de la Philocalie d'Origène par Basile de Césarée et Grégoire de Nazianze," *RHistPhR*, 52 (1972), 149-156, gives a useful summary of the contents of the *Philocalia*:

"La Philocalie peut être divisée en trois parties. La première, la plus courte (ch.1-14), est entièrement consacrée à l'herméneutique. Elle traite de l'inspiration divine de l'Écriture, évoque longuement les problèmes du langage biblique, défend l'unité du témoignage scripturaire et insiste sur la nécessité de
l'interprétation spirituelle. La seconde (ch. 15-20) est de caractère apologétique. Elle ne contient d'ailleurs que des textes du Contre Celse. Elle répond aux principales objections que l'hellénisme a faites au christianisme. Enfin, la troisième (ch. 21-27), si elle est plus composite, peut cependant être rangée sous le titre général: rapports entre l'économie divine et la liberté humaine" (Ibid., 151-152).


40,1 Benoit Pruche, Introduction to Basile de Césarée. Traité du Saint Esprit (Sources chrétiennes, 17), Paris: Cerf, 1947, 17. Pruche restates the point:

"Bien souvent l'on croit entendre, par delà les paroles de l'évêque de Césarée, la voix du patriarche d'Alexandrie" (Ibid., 87).

"Basile, on le sait, professait pour l'évêque d'Alexandrie une grande admiration, avait en lui quelque chose de la totale confiance d'un disciple pour un maître vénéré en qui l'on est sûr de trouver toujours orthodoxie très pure et parfaite sécurité doctrinale" (Ibid., 92).

Several Athanasian themes taken up in the De Spiritu Sancto are listed as well as several points at which Basil shows originality in going beyond Athanasius (Ibid., 87-97).

40,2 Basil himself seems to avoid the formula μία ομοία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, particularly τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις. It occurs once in De Spiritu Sancto (72) but in a statement attributed to Dionysius of Alexandria (εἰ τῷ τρεῖς εἴναι τὰς ὑποστάσεις). It does not occur in Ep. 38, Ep. 214 or Ep. 236. Cf. J. Lebon, "Le sort du 'consubstantiel' nicéen," RHE, 47, 485-529 and S. Gonzales, La formule τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις en San Gregorio de Nisa, Rome, 1939. Gregory of Nazianzus refers to the phrase as common in the East when speaking of Athanasius' role in reconciling the usages of East and West at the Council of Alexandria of 362 (Orat. 21: 35, PG XXXV, 1124C):

"We use in an orthodox sense the terms one essence and three hypostases..."

It is possible that Basil's avoidance of the number 'three' in connection with the hypostases is related to his refusal to use number in reference to God. Cf. De Spiritu Sancto, XVIII (44), PG XXXII, 249A.
"But, O wisest sirs, let the unapproachable be altogether above and beyond number... Count if you must; but you must not by counting do damage to the faith... We proclaim each of the hypostases singly; and, when count we must, we do not let an ignorant arithmetic carry us away to the idea of a plurality of gods."


40,4 Ep. 214,4, PG XXXII, 789AB. Cf. Ep. 236,6, PG XXXII, 884AB:

"The distinction between ousia and hypostasis is the same as that between the general and the particular; as, for instance, between the animal and the particular man. Wherefore, in the case of the Godhead, we confess one essence or substance so as not to give a variant definition of existence, but we confess a particular hypostasis, in order that our conception of Father, Son and Holy Spirit may be without confusion and clear. If we have no distinct perception of the separate characteristics, namely, fatherhood, sonship, and sanctification, but form our conception of God from the general idea of existence, we cannot possibly give a sound account of our faith. We must, therefore, confess the faith by adding the particular to the common. The Godhead is common; the fatherhood particular."

According to Alasdair I.C. Heron, this "generic" interpretation of *ousia* was unfortunate. He comments in "Homousios with the Father," *The Incarnation*, ed. T.F. Torrance, Edinburgh: Handsel, 1981, 58-87:

"Athanasius wisely avoided taking that path: he seems to have sensed accurately that this way of applying the *ousia/hypostasis* language would raise more problems than it solved. The Cappadocians too did not always follow it...but it may be held that it would have been better if they had never followed it at all" (Ibid., note 13).

Heron refers to Christopher Stead, *Divine Substance*, Oxford: OUP, 1977, 258 for his statement that the Cappadocians did not always follow the generic/specific definition of *ousia/hypostasis*. S. de Boer sees the abandonment of this definition in the *De Spiritu Sancto*:

"The relationship of ὀσία to ὑπόστασεσ is meant in an Aristotelian sense, namely as species-specimen. Every *hypostasis* is characterised by his own γνώρισμα. The question here is: what is really the relationship of the mutual *hypostases* and of the *hypostases* to the *ousia*? How must one distinguish the characteristics of the *hypostases* from the qualities of the *ousia*? The Aristotelian scheme is not of much help to Basil. That is why he throws the net to the other side of the ship. And in Περὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος we hear formulations that are not exactly Aristotelian. Here evidently the Father is seen as the source of the deity, while the Son and the Holy Spirit are ἐγεργεία which point to that one ὀσία" (S. de Boer, op. cit., 372, trans. C. Verwoerd).

For this last assertion, de Boer quotes *De Spir. Sanct.*, XVIII (47), PG XXXII, 153B.

"Thus the way of the knowledge of God lies from the One Spirit through the One Son to the One Father..."

R.P.C. Hanson, in his article, "Basil's Doctrine of Tradition in Relation to the Holy Spirit," *VigChr*, 22 (1968), 241-255, describes *De Spiritu Santo* as Basil's "greatest work" (248). Going further in an article published the following year, "The Divinity of the Holy Spirit," *ChQ*, 1 (1969), 298-306, he describes it as "the most important work on the theology of the Holy Spirit done in the fourth century" (300).

Benoit Pruche gives an evocative description of the occasion of the dispute, Basil's use of the two doxologies in his cathedral at Caesarea on 7th September, 374 (cf. Pruche, op. cit., 1-2). Basil's account is in *De Spiritu Sancto*, I(3), PG XXXII, 72BC.
Blomfield Jackson refers to Eustathius of Sebaste as "the Vicar of Bray of the Arian controversies, who probably subscribed more creeds than any other prominent bishop of his age" (NPNF, Second Series, Vol.VII', 194, note 3). He was a leader of the Homoiusian party along with Basil of Caesarea in the crisis of 359/360, and Basil of Caesarea admired him for his asceticism. Basil spent two days in 372 persuading him to accept the deity of the Spirit, but no sooner had Basil departed than Eustathius repudiated this "Protocol of Sebaste". Hermann Dörries identifies Eustathius as the leader of the Pneumatomachians against whom Basil's arguments are primarily aimed. Hermann Dörries, De Spiritu Sancto. Der Beitrag des Basilius zum Abschluss des trinitarischen Dogmas, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1956, 86:

"Es ist nicht schwer, unter den Pneumatomachen die einzelne Gestalt namhaft zu machen, für die alle diese Voraussetzungen zutreffen: De Spiritu Sancto ist ja mitten in dem Kampf entstanden, den der zum Repräsentanten der Pneumatomachen gewordene ehemalige Gefährte des Basilius gegen ihn entfacht hatte, Eustathios von Sebaste. Genannt oder ungenannt steht er in jedem Fall Basilius hier von Augen, und nichts liegt näher als die Annahme, dass gerade er der Unterredner war, der mit Basilius ein solches Streitgespräch geführt hat."

41,2 PG XXXII, 68-105; PG XXXII, 173C-209C.

41,3 De Spir. Sanc., II (4), PG XXXII, 72A.

41,4 Ibid., III (5), PG XXXII, 76A.

41,5 Ibid., IV(6).

41,6 De Spir. Sanc., V (7). I Cor. 8:6 reads:

ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἰς θεός ὁ πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτὸν, καὶ εἰς κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ.

41,7 Ibid. Basil argues that Rom. 11:36 must refer to God the Word, the Creator, since it follows a quotation from Isaiah 40: 13, "Who has known the mind if the Lord, or who has been his counsellor?" and the prophet has just been speaking of his creative actions.

42,1 Ibid., V (11), PG XXXII, 85A:

"For if the difference of language indicates, as we are told, that the nature has been changed, then let identity of language compel our adversaries to confess with shame that the essence is unchanged."
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42,2 Cf. Ibid., VI (15), PG XXXII 89C:

"The expression 'right hand' does not, as they contend, indicate the lower place, but equality of relation."

42,3 Ibid., VI (13), PG XXXII, 88B.

42,4 Ibid., VI (15), PG XXXII, 92A.

42,5 Ibid., VII (16), PG XXXII, 93BC.

42,6 Ibid., XXV (59), PG XXXII, 176C.

42,7 Ibid., XXVI (62), PG XXXII, 181C:

ο δὲ παράδοξον μὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀληθὲς δὲ οὐδὲν ἑλλάττων, δι᾽
καὶ ὑς χῶρα τὰν ἁγιασμένων πολλάκις τὸ Πνεῦμα λέγεται.

Mary Ann Donovan, in "The Spirit, Place of the Sanctified. Basil's De Spiritu Sancto and Messalianism," SP XVII (1982), 1073-1083, examines the spirituality synthesized by Basil in Chapter XXVI of De Spiritu Sancto and also whether it is in any sense Messalian. The Messalians, or Euchites (prayer-ers), came into prominence in the late fourth century. They relied on prayer as solely efficacious to obtain the sanctifying presence of the Spirit (the sacraments were not) and believed that all sin was the result of demonic possession. They were condemned in 390. Mary Ann Donovan concludes that although Basil shares their interest in ἅμαστία, for him it was not a precondition for the presence of the Spirit, but a consequence of it. Although there is a "sympathy of climate", Chapter XXVI of De Spiritu Sancto is not Messalian. This chapter does develop, however, profound uses of "in the Spirit". In presenting the Spirit as the "place" of the sanctified, Basil outlines the role of the Spirit in the "unfolding dynamic of the Christian life".

42,8 Ibid., XXIX (72), PG XXXII, 201B.

42,9 Ibid., XXIX (73), PG XXXII, 204A.

42,10 Ibid., XXIX (74), PG XXXII, 205B.

42,11 Ibid., IX, PG XXXII, 108A-109A.

43,1 Ibid., IX, 22, PG XXXII, 108B.

43,2 Hermann Dörries, op. cit., 54:

"Deutlich ist, das Kapitel IX im Zusammenhang des ganzen Buches eine Sonderstellung innehat. Es nimmt keine Rücksicht auf die Kampflage. Es lässt jedes liturgische Interesse vermissen und erwähnt den Lobpreis nicht, der das Thema des Buches ist. Und während sonst die Lehre
vom Hl. Geist trinitarisch entwickelt und durchweg aus dem Taufbefehl abgeleitet wird, steht sie hier in eigentümlicher Isolierung... Mitten im Kampf, von dem das Buch kündet, atmet dies Blatt die Stille der Abgezogenheit."


"En analysant le Traité, Dörries a reconnu dans les chapitres centraux, 10-27, un affrontement serré. Les objections ne ressemblent point à celles qu'un auteur se fait pour trouver l'occasion de développer son thème. Elles reviennent à la charge, reprennent ce qui vient d'être établi; il n'est donc pas possible d'y voir le résumé d'un écrit pneumatomique préexistant, que Basile aurait réifié point par point... Plus encore que dans les chapitres précédents, on constate ici l'improvisation, la vie: autre chose que la méditation en cabinet, comme dans les chapitres 1-8, ou la contemplation lyrique, comme au chapitre 9. Ce dialogue, Dörries a pensé y voir le compte-rendu des deux journées du juin 372 à Sébaste... Plus je relis ces chapitres, plus cette hypothèse me paraît s'imposer" (Ibid., 40).

Gribomont reconstructs the course of the discussions.

43,4 Hans Dehnhard, op. cit., 85:

"Eine ganze Reihe von Quellen hat zu diesem Kapitel beigetragen. Schriftworte sind am Anfang zusammengestellt. Sie nehmen dadurch zwar eine besondere Stelle ein, aber sie bestimmen und tragen doch nicht das Kapitel im ganzen. De Spiritu, De virginitate, Irenäus' Adversus Haereses V und Euseb, De ecclesiastica theologia III, 21 sind für einige Grundgedanken wichtig, De Spiritu auch für den Aufbau des Kapitels. Hinter DS steht vor allem die Pneumatologie des Origenes und des Gregor Thaumaturgos, hinter Euseb die des Origenes... In der Mitte von DSS IX, 22 und ebenso wieder von IX, 23 liessen sich Beziehungen zum Symbol des Gregor Thaumaturgos feststellen... Man darf also sagen: Das Bekenntnis des Gregor is unter den Quellen die wichtigste."

Dehnhard regards DS (De Spiritu) as an earlier work of Basil.


"This way of expressing, this schematic build up of
thoughts in cap. IX, that amongst others uses terms like όξειοσίς, εἰκόνα, and this in a special connection, reminds one of pronouncements of Gregory Thaumaturgus. And this apostle of Cappadocia, who lived a century before, is the direct link with Origen... There are differences between Basil and Origen, but Basil lives in a world of thought that is mainly set by the fruits of Origen's toil, and that of pagan thinkers among whom Plotinus must be mentioned first."

Later de Boer comments (Ibid., 375):

"No explanation is needed that we do not find an extract from the Enneads of Plotinus in Basil, nor that he does not mean the same by the Holy Spirit as Plotinus means by the perpetual spirit. But it is clear that Basil knows Plotinus's way of thinking inside out."

43,6 John M. Rist (op. cit., 702) concludes after a critical examination of Dehnhard's case, that it is possible but not likely that Basil quotes from the Enneads in De Spiritu Sancto, IX.

"And of Dehnhard's case that De Sp. S. IX uses not Plotinus directly, but De Sp. as a source, only one dubious passage remains. At least this much of a positive nature may be concluded: that whereas in the remaining chapters of De Sp. S. it is almost certain that there is no direct use of Plotinus, or of Plotinus via De Sp., in Chapter 9 the matter is in doubt. Clearly this tells in favour of Dorries' thesis of a later composition of Chapter 9 - after the remaining chapters of De Sp. S."

Rist suggests that the short work, De Spiritu, may have been written by Gregory of Nyssa, who may have interested Basil in Plotinus towards the end of his life. He finishes with this caveat:

"Basil is a true supporter of the Council of Nicea and all that implies. There is not a trace of the influence of Neoplatonic speculation in that area of Trinitarian theology from which the Council excluded Platonism for ever. And it must be admitted that though, in the area of moral/ascetical thought where Platonism was still allowed to flourish, Basil may have become interested, however mildly, in Plotinus towards the end of his life, his utterances might have been very similar in content whether or not he ever read any 'original' Plotinus at all" (Ibid., 220).

43,7 De Spir. Sanc., X (24), PG XXXII, 109D-112A.

43,8 Ibid., XI (27), PG XXXII, 116B.
In Chapter XIII, Basil deals with objections based on I Tim. 5:21, "I charge you before God and the Lord Jesus Christ and the elect angels." In Chapter XIV, he deals with objections based on 1. Cor. 10:2, some were baptized "into Moses". In Chapter XV, he deals with objections arising from baptism "into water".

44,2 Ibid., XVI (37), PG XXXI, 132A.

44,3 Basil actually conflates Acts 5:4, Peter's words to Ananias with Acts 5:9, Peter's words to Sapphira.

44,4 Ibid.

44,5 Ibid., XVI (38), PG XXXI, 136B:

τὴν προσαρτητικὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων, τὸν Πατέρα, τὴν δημιουργικὴν, τὸν Υἱόν, τὴν τελειωτικὴν, τὸ Πνεῦμα.

44,6 Ibid., XVI (39), PG XXXII, 140B-141A. Basil actually refers here in the plural to the οἰκονομίας.

44,7 Titus, 2:13.

44,8 De Spir. Sanc., XVI (39), PG XXXII, 140C:

"Επείτα πᾶσα ἐνέργεια συμπαρόντος τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐνηργεῖτο.

Boris Bobrinskoy, op. cit. (Cf. supra, 40, note 3), notes particularly this paragraph of De Spiritu Sancto. Bobrinskoy shows that Origen lost this note of 'pneumatic Christology' which was present in the Apostolic Fathers and in Irenaeus, but that it was recovered by Athanasius and the Cappadocians.

44,9 De Spir. Sanc., XVI (39 and 40), PG XXXII, 141AB.


44,11 De Spir. Sanc., Chapter XVII, PG XXXII, 144B-145A.

44,12 Ibid., Chap. XVIII (44), and Chap. XXXII, 149A. Cf. supra 40, note 2.

45,1 Ibid.
Ibid., Chap. XVIII (45), PG XXXII, 149B.

Ibid. ήδος γάρ ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ, καὶ Πατὴρ ἐν τῷ Υιῷ...καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ ἔν. Is this said in deliberate contrast to Neo-platonism?

Ibid.:

"One, moreover, is the Holy Spirit, and we speak of him singly, conjoined as he is to the one Father through the one Son, and through himself completing the adorable and blessed Trinity. Of him the intimate relationship to the Father and the Son is sufficiently declared by the fact of his not being ranked in the plurality of the creation, but being spoken of singly; for he is not one of many, but One. For as there is one Father and one Son, so is there one Holy Spirit."

Ibid., XVIII (46), PG XXXII, 152B:

ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ προελθόν, οὐ γὰρ γεννητὸς ως ὁ Υἱὸς, ἀλλὰ ως Πνεῦμα στόματος αὐτοῦ...τῆς μὲν οἰκειότητος δηλουμένης ἐντεῦθεν, τοῦ δὲ τρόπου τῆς ὕπάρξεως ἀρρήτου φυλασσομένου.

Ibid., XX (51), PG XXXII, 160C-161D, rejects the idea of a third option, i.e. that the Spirit is neither slave nor master, but "free (ἐλεύθερον)".

Ibid. XIX, (48); PG XXXII, 156.

Ibid., XIX (49-50); PG XXXII, 156D-160C.

Ibid., XXI (52); PG XXXII, 164-165C. The texts are II Thess.3:5; I Thess.3:12,13; II Cor. 3:17-18. I Cor. 3:16 and II Tim.3:16 are also mentioned.

Ibid., XXII (53), XXIII (54) and XXIV (55), PG XXXII, 165D-172C. The Spirit is to be glorified as One who is as unapproachable in thought as the Father and the Son.

PG XXXII, 173C-209C.

Cf. supra, 41f.

De Spir. Sanc., XXVII (66), PG XXXII, 189B:

'ἀλλο γὰρ δόγμα, καὶ ἀλλο κήρυγμα. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ σιωπᾶται, τὰ δὲ κηρύγματα δημοσιεύεται.

Hermann Dürries drew attention to this distinction Basil makes between kerygma and dogma (op.cit., 121-128). According to E. Amand de Mendleta, in "The Pair κήρυγμα and δόγμα in the Theological Thought of St. Basil of Caesarea," JThS, 16
(1965), 129-142, this distinction is of the highest importance:

"This basic distinction is of such importance for his theology and its literary expression, that, if anyone wilfully neglects this essential pair of χήρωμα and δόγμα, this carelessness would prevent them from gaining a proper understanding of Basil's Trinitarian theology, especially of his pneumatology" (op. cit., 133).


46,1 Ibid., XXVII (66), PG XXXII, 189B:

"Οδις ο λόγος τῆς τῶν ἀγάφων παραδόσεως, ὡς μὴ καταμελήθεται τῶν δογμάτων τὴν γνώσιν εὐκαταφρόνητον τοῖς πολλοῖς γενέσθαι διὰ συνήθειαν.

46,2 R.P.C. Hanson in "Basil's Doctrine of Tradition," op. cit., supra, 40, note 6, traces the development of Basil's attitude to tradition from Adversus Eunomius where he shares Athanasius' view that "Scripture is doctrinally sufficient," through his Letters, where there is "a readiness to appreciate the value of Christian tradition," to De Spiritu Sancto where he takes "quite a new step" (Ibid., 248f.):

"He deals with the Scriptural evidence briefly, without much success or conviction, and then comes to the subject of extra-Scriptural tradition. In the twenty-seventh chapter therefore he boldly defends his own formula of doxology by claiming that tradition independent of the Bible is important, indeed essential, in doctrinal matters as well as merely practical."

According to Hanson,

"...Basil's doctrine of tradition is a startling innovation... He claims that the extra-Scriptural traditions which he is concerned to defend not only had been handed down by the apostles and preserved intact from their time, but that this had been done secretly and that to reject them would be to damage the gospel in the most important points and to reduce the public teaching to a mere name. Had Irenaeus or Tertullian encountered this doctrine, they would have branded it as typical of the Gnostics. Whether he is aware of the fact or not, Basil is introducing a new doctrine" (Ibid., 251-252).

The explanation for this innovation lies in Basil's discussions with Eustathius:
"Basil could not meet Eustathius' demand for a full documentation from Scripture of his doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The methods of interpreting the Bible which were accepted and conventional in the fourth-century Church simply did not admit of such a possibility. Basil was quite perspicacious enough to realize this. So he took the alternative course of developing to an extent not previously achieved the support which extra-Scriptural tradition could give to the Church's doctrine" (Ibid., 253).

46,3 Cf. supra, 30-38. Benoit Pruche (op. cit., 87-94) presents a list of themes from Athanasius which are to be found in Basil:

"Bien souvent l'on croit entendre, par delà les paroles de l'évêque de Césarée, la voix du patriarche d'Alexandrie. L'affirmation à la lumière de laquelle Basile essaye de comprendre les rapports de l'Esprit et du Fils vient tout droit d'Athanasie, nous l'avons dit: 'L'Esprit se trouve par rapport au Fils comme le Fils par rapport au Père.'"

Also the affirmation of "un seul Principe de tout ce qui est, qui crée par le Fils et parfait dans l'Esprit," and "l'attribution au Fils de la modalité 'créatrice'" are Athanasian. When it comes to the Holy Spirit,

"...saint Basile a fait de l'argument essentiel des lettres à Sérapion le nerf de son propre traité: Celui qui sanctifie n'est pas de même nature que ceux qu'il sanctifie."

Secondly,

"...cet autre argument, où Basile voit l'indice d'une communion de nature avec le Père et le Fils: l'Esprit-Saint étant parfaitement 'un' ne peut faire partie des créatures pourrait n'être qu'un rappel des raisonnements analogues d'Athanasie par lesquels, dans la première lettre à Sérapion, il établît la divinité du Saint-Esprit."

Finally,

"...tous le passage où se trouve analysée la relation de l'Esprit au Fils est sûrement inspiré de la théologie athanasienne: l'Esprit-Saint est en effet 'l'activité sanctificatrice et illuminatrice du Fils...'"

In addition to these themes on the Spirit, Basil inherits

"le grand 'schème' trinitaire alexandrin exprimé par la doctrine de la 'monarchie': du Père, par le Fils, à l'Esprit."
At the same time Basil goes beyond Athanasius on certain points. From this Alexandrian schéma of the Trinity, he goes on to see in the properties of the hypostaseis that which characterizes the Persons. Thus he distinguishes two "modes" of "procession" in God.

"On pressent là une attitude décidée de la part d'Athanase: le mystère de la distinction des deux 'processions' est impénétrable..."

Or saint Basile n'est pas de l'avis de saint Athanase. Il avouera bien que 'le mode d'existence du Saint-Esprit demeure ineffable,' mais il essaiera tout de même d'en dire quelque chose... Le Verbe est 'engendré' comme 'Image' et à ce titre 'Fils', et lui seul, car lui seul procède du Père par 'génération'; l'Esprit est 'expiré' comme 'Souffle' et à ce titre lui seul est 'Pneuma', car lui seul procède par mode 'd'expiration.'"

Basil's originality is also to be seen in the doctrine of the deification of the Christian, where he introduces "cette idée vraiment neuve et originale du Saint-Esprit lieu des âmes sanctifiées," and in his attributing to the Spirit "une causalité 'perfectionnante'."

46,4 What was identified earlier as the "second axiom" of Athanasius (cf. supra, 33-35), is in fact related to the question of the intra-Trinitarian relationships. In Athanasius the axiom takes two forms, the "relationship of proportion" (as the Father is to the Son, so the Son is to the Spirit), and the "series relationship" (from the Father, through the Son, to the Spirit). In both forms, the axiom is concerned with the economic movement of the Triad.

Both of these are present in De Spiritu Sancto. Cf. VII (16), XI (27) and XVIII (47). The non-controversial doxology, giving glory to the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit is also an expression of the series relation and is to be thought of economically. The question is, however, whether this economic pattern of relationships (either in its series or proportional form) is carried over in Basil's thought into the ontological intra-Trinitarian eternal relationships of the hypostaseis. According to R.P.C. Hanson in "The Position of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity," ChQ, 3 (1971), 270-316, the Cappadocians have little to add here:

"Their account of the Spirit's activity in the strategy of redemption is brilliant and full, especially in Basil's De Spiritu Sancto and the Fifth Theological Oration of Gregory of Nazianzus... But on the subject of the position of the Spirit within the Trinity, they can find very little to add to Athanasius' small store of doctrine. More than this, they confess boldly that they can say nothing" (Ibid., 270).
The little they add is the idea that the hypostases may be distinguished by the pattern of causal relationships between them. P.C. Christou in "L'enseignement de Saint Basile sur le Saint-Esprit," VC, 23 (1969), 86-99, comments:

"La causalité provoque en Dieu la distinction des personnes qui occupent une certaine place dans la Trinité. Le Père est non-engageur, le Fils est engendré et L'Esprit procède; leurs attributs distinctifs correspondants sont la paternité, la filialité et la sanctification" (Ibid., 92).

But curiously, Basil does not develop this in the De Spiritu Sancto. He writes in VI (14) that the Father and Son

"...are mutually conceived of in accordance with the relationship subsisting between them (στὰν ἄλληλοις νοεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν)."

But he does not use the term "cause (αἰτία)" in reference to the Father's relationship to the Son. The closest he comes to this in De Spiritu Sancto is in XVI (38), where, after referring to each of the hypostases as in a different sense the cause of creation,

"the original cause of all things that are made, the Father; the artificer, the Son; the perfector, the Spirit,"

he does refer to the Father as the archē, but it is not with explicit reference to the origin of the Son and Spirit, nor is it in reference to the intra-Trinitarian relationships. To find Basil refer to the Father as "cause (αἰτία)" of the Son, it is necessary to go to his earlier work, Contra Eunomium I-3, 1.20, PG XXIX, 557B:

"For among these we speak of the First Cause, and of the Second out of him, not that these are separated from each other by time, but conceived in thought as the Cause preceding the Effect. (Ἐν τούτοις γὰρ προτερον τὸ αἰτίον λέγομεν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἕκαστος, οὐ διαισθήματι χωρίζοντες ἀπ' ἄλληλων τάσσεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ λογισμῷ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ προεπινοούντες τὸ αἰτίον)."

Certainly in De Spiritu Sancto, he writes of the Son as "generated" by the Father, and the Spirit as "proceeding" from the Father. Cf. XVIII (46), cited supra, 45, note 5. But here the pattern of relationships is not the series, from the Father through the Son to the Spirit, nor the proportion, as Father to Son, so Son to Spirit, but the quite different parallel relationship, from Father to Son and from Father to Spirit.
"It is well known, of course, that the Holy Spirit is never described as ὁμοούσιον by Basil in any of his extant works."

Yet it is not difficult to deduce Basil's acceptance of the deity of the Spirit from his own words. In chapters XIX and XX of De Spiritu Sancto he presents the alternatives, Creator or creature, ruling out the alleged third possibility that he is free, and then concludes (XX,51):

"If he is a creature of course he serves with all the rest, for 'all things', it is said 'are thy servants,' but if he is above creation, then he shares in royalty."

Clearly, despite the circumlocution, since the Spirit is not a creature (and Basil has just dismissed this as blasphemy) and since there is no third option, he must be Creator.

Gregory of Nazianzus is also witness to Basil's acceptance of the deity of the Spirit. In Orat. 43:69, PG XXXVI, 589A (the Panegyric on Basil), he states:

"That he, no less than any other, acknowledged that the Spirit is God, is plain from his often having publicly preached this truth, whenever opportunity offered, and eagerly confessed it when questioned in private. But he made it more clear in his conversations with me, from whom he concealed nothing during our conferences upon this subject. Not content with simply asserting it, he proceeded, as he had but very seldom done before, to imprecate upon himself that most terrible fate of separation from the Spirit, if he did not adore the Spirit as consubstantial and coequal with the Father and the Son."

According to Benoit Pruche (op.cit., 29), the two words amount to the same thing:

" Dire 'de même honneur' ou 'de même substance', c'est donc pour lui dire une seule et même chose: l'ὁμοόυσιος est à ses yeux une sorte de succédané, un équivalent de l'ὁμοόυσιος."

S. de Boer (op.cit., 369) disagrees:

"Nergens echter in dit hoofdstuk worden we er van overtuigd dat 'homotimie' een synoniem moet zijn voor, 'homoousie', zoals Pruche concludeert. (Nowhere in this chapter are we being convinced that 'homotimos' is a synonym for 'homoousios', as Pruche concludes)."

Nor is de Boer satisfied with Pruche's explanation of the
absence of *homoousios* in terms of political prudence. Even Dörries' explanation in terms of *kerygma* and *dogma* does not take us far enough. The real answer lies in the influence of Plotinus, Origen and Gregory Thaumaturgus (which de Boer also finds in Chapter IX). Basil may not quote from the *Enneads*, but he knows that the closer things are to the source of light, the more powerful is their reflection. De Boer concludes (op. cit., 375):

"Omdat Basilius mede door deze denkwijze is gevormd en omdat hij de begrippen die daar bij behoren gebruikt, daarom spreekt hij wel over de 'homotimie' maar niet over de 'homoousie' van de Hl. Geest. Want de sfeer van de Hl. Geest is enger dan die van de Zoon en de Vader. (Because Basil is formed also by this way of thinking and because he uses the terms that belong to it, he therefore speaks about the 'homotimos', but not about the 'homoousios' of the Holy Spirit. It is because the sphere of the Holy Spirit is narrower than that of the Son and the Father)."

P.C. Christou, writing a few years later, had a different explanation (op. cit., 93):

"Dans certaines de ses lettres, saint Basile emploie des expressions aristotéliciennes pour définir l'ousia (au premier sens) et l'hypostase (ousia au second sens). Il n'est pas entièrement satisfait de ces catégories, parce que la logique aristotélicienne exige des divisions et des classifications qu'il rejette absolument comme inapplicables à Dieu. Parfois, il caractérise les hypostases comme étant de même ousia, homoousios. C'est conforme au dogme de Nicée, mais il s'agit d'intégrer cette notion dans le structures de la triadologie de l'école de Cappadoce, dans laquelle ousia n'est pas une chose plus élevée que les personnes, une sorte de source dont les personnes tireraient leur origine. Le terme d'ousia, en outre, donne à première vue l'impression d'une chose matérielle et créée, bien que son usage en théologie en ait fati une terme particulier. La manière dont saint Basile évite d'appliquer le terme homoousios au Saint-Esprit peut s'expliquer par ses hésitations en présence du mot ousia, pour les raisons mentionnées et pour cette autre raison qu'il était utilisé par les Pneumatomakes pour désigner une subordination."

46,7 Gregory of Nazianzus defended Basil's refusal against the dissatisfaction of an orthodox monk at a dinner party. Cf. infra, 188.

46,8 Ibid. The company present at the dinner party supported the monk and disapproved of "the so-called economy (της δεθεν ὀικονομίας)" Ep. 58, PG XXXVII, 117.
Milton V. Anastos, op. cit., traces the development of Basil's apophaticism in his *Contra Eunomium* (of which Books 1 to 3 are regarded as genuine). Against the "most astute" of the arguments of Eunomius, that *agennēsia* was God's *ousia*, Basil asked why this one attribute of God should be singled out. None of the designations of God adequately explains his nature. True, God's *ousia* is *agennētos*, but *agennētos* is not his *ousia*. *Agennēsia* does not indicate what he is, but his lack of origin. His *ousia* is incomprehensible and a mystery. Cf. also Nicholas Gendle, "The Apophatic Approach to God in the Early Greek Fathers with Special Reference to the Alexandrian Tradition," Part III, "The Cappadocian Achievement," ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΑ, IV (1983), 305-374.

According to Gendle, Eunomius' theory of knowledge "seems to have been an extreme form of nominalism" (op. cit., 307). The Cappadocians were aware of "the virtues of precise use of language," but they "gloried in the irreducible mystery at the heart of all theological concepts." Consequently Basil emphasizes "the utter inadequacy of all human language in speaking of God" (308). Ep. 233-5 outline Basil's apophaticism. Ep. 234, "with its clear distinction between the permanently and ontologically unknowable divine essence and the knowable energies is a key document in Cappadocian apophatic theology" (309). Gendle continues:

"What we have here is clearly a doctrine of radical unknowability: even if we were angels or sinless men, we still could not (and never shall) know the divine essence. This is not so much a loss entailed by the Fall, as a situation inherent in our existence as mortal and contingent, and God's existence as immortal and absolute: it is the epistemological expression of the Creator/creation gulf... The element of apophaticism in these letters is salutary, not only as a corrective to Eunomian rationalism, but as an essential element to bear in mind in considering Basil's own positive theology, above all his Trinitarianism" (310).

This does not mean agnosticim. God has bridged the gulf by sending his Son and Spirit, and the divine names do have meaning, "above all the names of Father, Son and Holy Spirit," which "denote three unconfused divine Persons in their mutual relationship" (311).

This negative theology cleared the way for a rich spirituality. Gendle quotes L. Bouyer's statement in *Spirituality of the New Testament and Fathers*, London: Burns and Oates, 1968, 333, that it is in the spiritual teaching of the Cappadocians

"that we can best appreciate how profound is their perception of the transcendence of the Christian God, in the very fact that he is a living God in a sense which the Greeks had not a notion of."


47,3 Christou, *op. cit.*, 87-88:

"Tant Grégoire le Théologien que Basile le Grand connaissaient probablement ses opinions sur l'Esprit avant leur publication dans ses écrits, parce qu'ils avaient vraisemblablement suivi ses cours. Cela explique en partie la similitude de leurs démonstrations par rapport aux preuves de leur maître alexandrin."

47,4 Bobrinskoy, *op. cit.*, 64.


"Il est peu probable que le séjour de Grégoire de Nazianze en Égypte ait exercé une grande influence sur la formation de son esprit; il est au contraire tout à fait naturel que Didyme se soit laissé pénétrer des doctrines et des expressions cappadociens: l'ισοτηθω of the trois personnes divines, la διπλωματία du Verbe, et son indépendance vis-à-vis du Père; son caractère de μονογενής; l'ἐξοντοστοιχία du Saint-Esprit regardée comme la caractéristique de la troisième personne, il y a là autant de traits, recueillis par Didyme, dans lesquels l'influence des Cappadociens, celle surtout de Basile et de Grégoire de Nazianze, se laisse facilement reconnaître."

Bardy endorses the judgment of Karl Holl that the hypothesis that Gregory frequented Didymus during his time in Alexandria is far from proved (*op. cit.*, 9).

47,6 Ibid., 108:

"Il ne faudrait pas exagérer l'indépendance de Didyme et des Cappadociens vis-à-vis d'Origène: c'est au grand catéchète d'Alexandrie, nous l'avons dit, que remonte peut-être le premier indice de la distinction entre les termes οὐσία et ὑποστάσεις. Si l'on se rappelle l'importance de la formule μία οὐσία τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις dans la théologie de Didyme, et aussi dans celle des Cappadociens, on pensera peut-être que l'héritage qu'ils ont reçu d'Origène n'est point méprisable."

48,1 Ibid., 229.

48,2 Ibid., 224.

48,3 De Spiritu Sancto, 17, PG XXXIX, 1049D- 1500A:

In omnibus approbatur eadem operationem esse Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Quorum autem una est operatio, una est substantia, quia quae ejusdem substantiae

The same usage may also be seen in the work discovered in the eighteenth century by J.-L. Mingarelli and identified by him as the De Trinitate of Didymus. It appears as such in Migne, PG XXXIX, and was accepted as such until questioned by L. Doutreleau in "Le De Trinitate est-il l'oeuvre de Didyme l'Aveugle?" RSR, 45 (1957), 514-557. B. Kramer, in her article on Didymus in TRE, 8 (1981), 743, refers to "die neuere Forschung" of Doutreleau, Bizer, Béranger, Bienert and Koenen, all of whom doubt the attribution. But she fails to note Alasdair Heron's thorough study of the authorship of works attributed to Didymus in his Tübingen thesis of 1972, Studies in the Trinitarian Writings of Didymus the Blind: His Authorship of the Adversus Eunomium IV-V and the De Trinitate. Heron concluded (Ibid., 226) that the evidence in favour of Mingarelli's ascription of the De Trinitate to Didymus was overwhelmingly strong and that therefore the attribution must still be accepted. Heron's major study is not mentioned either by R.P.C. Hanson when he concludes after a brief review that the weight of evidence is against the authorship of Didymus. (Cf. The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988, 651-657). In the light of Heron's study it seems better to conclude with Frances Young, that Didymus should be taken on balance as the author. (Cf. From Nicaea to Chalcedon, London: SCM, 1983, 85).

Cf. De Trin., 1, 19, PG XXXIX, 368C-369A:

σαφώς καὶ διαφθιδήν αὐτὸ θεὸν ὑμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ ἡμα καὶ αὐτεξουσιον παριστάνων:

also 2,10, PG XXXIX, 636B-637A:

'Απεδείχθη οὖν μονονούχη θεός τῷ ἀγίῳ Πνεύμα: ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰσος, καὶ δυμοιοι τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ, ἐν τῷ Ισως καὶ ὑμοιος ναον ἔχειν τὸν ἀνθρωπον...


49,1 Quasten, Ibid., 259.

49,2 PG XLV, 237-1122.

49,3 According to Jerome, De viris illustribus, 128. Bernard C. Barmann (The Cappadocian Triumph over Arianism, thesis, Stanford University, 1966) thinks that Nazianzen may have been influenced by Gregory of Nyssa:

"Three orations (38-40), which are usually assigned to December and January 379-380, appear to echo the results of Gregory of Nyssa's philosophizing in Book I of the Contra Eunomium. It is possible that Gregory of Nazianzus was influenced by his younger friend, who read his Contra Eunomium libros to Nazianzus and Jerome at the Council in the spring of 361. Perhaps Orations 38-40 have been dated a little too early" (Ibid., 10).

But by the following Christmas and Epiphany, Nazianzen had long departed from Constantinople. Either there was some earlier influence, or the thoughts of the two Gregorys moved independently along similar lines, or (since the Christmas and Epiphany orations were definitely earlier than this reading of the Contra Eunomium) Gregory of Nyssa developed the insights of Gregory of Nazianzus.
I(d) The Character of Gregory's Theology


"It is not by chance that the tradition of the Eastern Church has reserved the name of 'theologian' peculiarly for three sacred writers of whom the first is St. John, most 'mystical' of the four Evangelists; the second St. Gregory Nazianzen, writer of contemplative poetry; and the third St. Symeon, called 'the New Theologian', the singer of union with God. Mysticism is accordingly treated in the present work as the perfecting and crown of all theology: as theology *par excellence.*"


50,3 *Orat.* 29:13, *PG* XXXVI, 92A:

"...εἰπη μη ἐν ὄνομασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν πράγμασιν ἐστιν ήμιν ἢ ἀλήθεια."  

Cf. *Orat.* 31:20, *PG* XXXVI, 156B:

"as if the fact depended on the order of names (ὡςπερ ἐν τῇ τάξει τῶν ὄνομάτων κειμένων τῶν πραγμάτων)."

Cf. *Orat.* 39:11, *PG* XXXVI, 345C:

"...for we will not quarrel about names so long as the syllables amount to the same meaning (οὐδὲν γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὄνομάτων γυγομαχήσεσθέν, ἐως ἣν πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἑπότοι ἐννοοῦσι τις συλλογία φέρωσιν)."

Cf. *Orat.* 42:16, *PG* XXXVI, 477A:

"as if our faith depended on terms and not on realities (ὡςπερ ἐν ὄνομασι κειμένῃς ἡμῖν τῆς εὐθείας, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐν πράγμασι)."
51,1 op.cit., 327.

51,2 Gendle quotes (op.cit., 328) Nazianzen's "uncompromising statement" in Orat. 28:17, PG XXXVI, 48C:

"What God is in nature and essence, no man ever yet has discovered or will discover (Θεόν, δὲ τι ποτὲ μὲν ἐστὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὀφθαλμ, οὕτως εἴρην ἀνθρώπων πόσοτε, οὕτω μὴ εἴρη)."

51,3 Ibid., 330.

51,4 Orat. 27:1, PG XXXVI, 12.

51,5 Orat. 27:2, PG XXXVI, 13AB. The Browne and Swallow translation of τεχνόδρομον ("a thing of little moment") is not quite satisfactory. In Lampe's PGL it is translated "petty device."

51,6 Orat. 27:3, PG XXXVI, 13C. J. Plagnieux takes this as the outline for the central chapters of his book (op.cit., 4):

"De ce fait, saint Grégoire nous a presque lui-même tracé d'avance le plan de notre étude. 'Ce que doit être le théologien, quelles qualités il doit avoir; devant qui l'on peut discuter et quand, sur quoi et dans quelle mesure'...dans la réponse que saint Grégoire donne à ces questions nous avons trouvé la matière des chapitres centraux de notre travail: les qualités du théologien (chap. III) et de son auditoire (chap. IV), l'objet de la théologie (chap. V) et son esprit (chap. VI)."

51,7 Orat. 27:3, PG XXXVI, 13D.

51,8 Orat. 28:1, PG XXXVI, 25D.

51,9 Orat. 28:2, PG XXXVI, 28A. This whole passage is an eloquent allegory in which Moses' ascent into Mount Sinai in Exod. 34 is used as a figure for Gregory's spiritual experience of God. Cf. B. Otis, op.cit., supra 16, note 6.

52,1 Orat. 28:3, PG XXXVI, 29AB. A.J. Mason's comment is worth quoting here:

"Gr. does not of course mean to distinguish sharply between the πρῶτη and τελευταία φώσις, as if they were separate natures. He means the expressed and unexpressed parts or aspects of the same nature. The danger of misunderstanding is not felt in Greek, where words like πρῶτος, μέσος, and the like, are commonly used in a partitive sense: e.g. ὁ πρῶτος ποὺς, 'the front of the foot.'" (A.J. Mason, The Five Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus, Cambridge: CUP, 1899, 25).
For further comment on this passage cf. *infra*, 96.

52.2 It would be possible, of course, to interpret this passage merely as eloquent rhetoric. Gregory would then be making what is essentially an abstract theological point, but dressing it up in a dramatic Scriptural allegory told in the first person. One telling phrase seems to preclude such an interpretation: "as far as I could I withdrew within myself (καὶ εἰς ἐμαυτὸν ὡς οὖν τε συσταφεῖς)." It would seem that, whether this mystical experience is allowed objective validity or not, Gregory is not merely speaking rhetorically. The allegory refers to some specific, or some typical experience of the mystery of God which Gregory has had.


52.4 *Ibid.*.

52.5 Gregory concludes the oration with this sentence (*Orat*. 28:31, *PG* XXXVI, 72C):

"For this is what we were labouring to show, that even the secondary natures surpass the power of our intellect; much more then the first and (for I fear to say merely that which is above all) only nature."

If this is taken seriously as encapsulating the theme of the Second Theological Oration then it is a mistake to regard it as an oration on the Father on the grounds that the Third and Fourth are on the Son. But it is equally mistaken to regard it as a treatise *De Deo Uno* to be followed by *De Deo Trino* in the following orations. Rather the major theme of the Second Theological Oration is the incomprehensibility of God. The Third Theological Oration is on the Father and the Son and the Fourth on the Incarnate Son. *Contra Sinko* therefore (*cf. supra*, 21, note 1), the opening sentence of the Third Theological Oration may be taken to refer to the whole line of argument developed through the First and Second Theological Orations, namely, the inadequacy of language and the incomprehensibility of God.

52.6 *Orat*. 29:1, *PG* XXXVI, 73A.
NOTES for Chapter II - THE CHRISTIAN AND THE SPIRIT

53,1 De Spir. Sanct., XVIII (47):

"Τοιούτον οιδός τῆς θεογνωσίας ἐστιν ἀπὸ 'Ενὸς Πνεύματος διὰ τοῦ 'Ενὸς Υἱοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν 'Ενα Πατέρα, καὶ ἀνάπαυσιν ἡ φυσικὴ θαυμάσθης καὶ ὁ κατὰ φύσιν Ἀγιασμὸς καὶ τὸ βασιλείαν Ἀξίωμα ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς διὰ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς ἐπὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα διήκει.

Basil also sees these movements in the context of the two forms of the doxology. One form of the doxology expresses the Ontological Trinity and one the Economic Trinity. Cf. Ibid., XXVI (63):

"Thus whenever we have in mind the Spirit's proper rank, we contemplate Him as being with the Father and the Son, but when we think of the grace that flows from Him operating on those who participate in it, we say that the Spirit is in us."

54,1 This downward movement of grace from the Father through the Son in the Spirit may be identified with what has been called (supra, 35f.) the 'series' relationship. As such, it is one of the forms of the second axiom of Athanasius (supra, 33f.), which expresses the economic movement of the Triad in revelation and redemption. Curiously, the converse movement of response, from the Spirit through the Son to the Father, does not seem to be expressed by Athanasius in the Letters to Serapion.

The double movement is clearly expressed by Irenaeus, who relates it to the Trinitarian baptismal rule of faith (Demonstration, 7):

"And for this reason the baptism of our regeneration proceeds through these three points: God the Father bestowing on us regeneration through his Son by the Holy Spirit. For as many as carry (in them) the Spirit of God are led to the Word, that is to the Son; and the Son brings them to the Father; and the Father causes them to possess incorruption. Without the Spirit it is not possible to behold the Word of God, nor without the Son can any draw near to the Father: for the knowledge of the Father is the Son, and the knowledge of the Son of God is through the Holy Spirit; and, according to the good pleasure of the Father, the Son ministers and dispenses the Spirit to whomsoever the Father wills and as He wills." (J. Armitage Robinson, St. Irenaeus. The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, London: SPCK, 1920, 75-76).

54,2 Orat. 41:9, PG XXXVI, 441C:
δι' οὗ Πατήρ γινώσκεται, καὶ Υἱὸς δοξάζεται, καὶ παρ' ἄνομον γινώσκεται.

54,3 Orat. 12:1, PG XXXV, 844A: Το στόμα μοι ἄνοιξε, καὶ ἐλκύσα Πνεῦμα... Cf. Orat. 6:1, PG XXXV, 721B: ἢ ἐξετά τό στόμα τῆς διανοιάς ἄνοιξε ἐλκύσαι Πνεῦμα, ἐξετά ἐξερεύνασθαι λόγον ἁγιον, καὶ λαλεῖν Θεοῦ σφάζαν τελείαν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις...

54,4 Orat. 12:1, PG XXXV, 844A: ἔκρατον εἰμὶ Θείον, ἔργανον λογίκον, ἔργανον καλῷ τεχνίτῃ τῷ Πνεύματι ἄρμοζόμενον καὶ προωμένον...

55,1 Orat. 2:95, PG XXXV, 497ABC:

...πρὶν τό στόμα...τήν γλώσσαν, τό μὲν ἄνοιγηκαί καὶ ἐλκύσα Πνεῦμα, ἢ πλατυνθῆκαί καὶ πληρώθηκαί τῷ πνεύματι λαλομένων μυστηρίων τε καὶ δογμάτων...τήν δέ πληρώθηκαί ἀγαλλιάσεως καὶ θετάς μελόδιας γενέσθαι... πρίν ἢ πάνε μέλος ὁ πλοῦν γενέσθαι δικαιοσύνης...

The references to Rom. 12:1 and Rom. 6:13 should be noted. To be endowed with the Spirit, but to fail in this total self-consecration is to court disaster. Early in 372, after his enforced consecration as bishop of Sasima, Gregory spoke before his father and Basil of the warning provided by the case of Saul:

"What do we understand about Saul? For he was anointed and partook of the Spirit, and was then spiritual, neither would I say otherwise concerning him but that he even prophesied, and did so according to hope and truly, so that this wonder became a proverb still spoken and heard to-day: 'Is Saul also among the prophets?' Since he did not render himself wholly to the Spirit, he was not changed genuinely (καθαρῶς) into another man as it had been uttered, but something of the old wicked spark (τι τοῦ κακαίου τῆς κακίας σπινθῆρος), and the evil seed (τοῦ πονηροῦ σπέρματος) remained in him, and there was in himself a battle of spirit and flesh (μάχη πνεύματος καὶ σαρκὸς)" (Orat. 9:2, PG XXXV, 821A).

56,1 Orat. 41:15, PG XXXVI, 449A:

"They spoke with strange tongues (ἐξελαίας γλώσσας), and not those of their native land; and the wonder was great, a language (λόγος) spoken by those who had not learnt it."
Gregory discusses whether τῇ ἑδικᾳ διάλέξω in Acts 2:6 refers to ἡχοῦν or λαλοῦντων, and concludes that it was the latter.

Gregory says that he may be thought to be out of his senses because he disagrees with the majority of the Council (of Constantinople),

"or even be thought full of new wine as were in later days the disciples of Christ, because they spoke with tongues, since men knew not that it was the power of the Spirit, and not a distraction of mind (οὗ ὑπενων ἔξτασις)."

Elsewhere, Gregory speaks of the gifts of the Spirit. Cf. Orat. 32:11, PG XXXVI, 188A:

"And the Spirit is one, but the gifts are not equal because neither are the receptacles."

Gregory lists charismata from Eph. 4 and I Cor. 12, including γενη γλωσσών (diversity of languages) and ἐρμηνεια γλωσσών (interpretation of languages). Among the gifts of God listed in Orat. 14:27, PG XXXV, 893A, are ἅγιος μερισμοῦ (distributions of the Holy Spirit). But in neither of these passages does glossolalia play any part.

Reinhart Staats concludes that charismatic and ascetic groups could have influenced the Council of Constantinople and suggests that Gregory's opposition to them may have contributed to his resignation. Presumably "charismatic" in this instance implies a practice of ecstatic utterances. Cf. R. Staats, "Die Basilianische Verherrlichung des Heiligen Geistes auf dem Konzil zu Konstantinopel 381. Ein Beitrag zum Ursprung der Formel Kerygma und Dogma," Keryngma und Dogma, 25 (1979), 232-253. Staats concludes (251):

...τοῦ Πνεύματος, ὃ μόνον Θεός καὶ νοεῖται καὶ ἐρμηνεύεται καὶ ἀκούεται.

Here too Gregory regards this as inseparable from purification. He continues:

Καθαρᾷ γὰρ μόνον ἀπεόν τοῦ καθαροῦ καὶ ἁσιώς ἔχοντος.

56,4 In Orat. 2:79, PG XXXV, 485B, Gregory deplores that fact that "All fear has been banished from souls, shamelessness has taken its place, and knowledge and the deep things of the Spirit (ἡ γνώσις καὶ τὰ βαθὺ τοῦ Πνεύματος) are at the disposal of anyone who will."

τὰ βαθὺ τοῦ Πνεύματος seems to be a reference to 1 Cor. 2:10. Cf. Orat. 14:28, PG XXXV, 896BC:

"If then there is something most mystical and deep of hidden things (τὶ καὶ ἄλλα κρύπτων ἀπορρητότερον καὶ βαθύτερον) such as the many depths of the law and of the ambiguous, this will not be seen by me, but by the all-searching and all-knowing Spirit (τοῦ πάντα ἐρευνῶντος καὶ γινώσκοντος Πνεύματος)."

56,5 Orat. 29:1, PG XXXVI, 73A

56,6 Orat. 28:6, PG XXXVI, 33AB. A.J. Mason notes (op.cit., 31) that the phrase ἑρωτὸν ἀρετῶν (the ultimate object of desire) comes originally from Aristotle's Metaph. xi 7. The idea of unlimited ascent into God, a corollary of his infinite and therefore incomprehensible nature was to be more fully developed in the spirituality of Gregory of Nyssa. Nazianzen's point here is that although we may know God by the Spirit, we do not know him exhaustively. There is always need for progress (τοῦ πρόσω).

57,1 Orat. 28:7, PG XXXVI, 33B.

57,2 Cf. supra, 56, note 3.

57,3 Orat. 41:6, PG XXXVI, 436-437:

...Ὅβως ἥμετρα καὶ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν ἐμπνεομέθα περὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος.

57,4 Orat. 36:1, PG XXXVI, 265A.

58,1 Orat. 1:6, PG XXXV, 400C.

Similarly, Gregory asserts in reference to the twelve baskets and the seven baskets of leavings after the miraculous feedings (Mt. 14:19; 15:34) that neither could be without a reason worthy of the Spirit (Orat. 41:4, PG XXXVI, 436A). Cf. J. Plagnieux (op. cit., 38): "C'est son Verbe qui nous instruit dans la Révélation et l'Écriture est l'écho fidèle de sa voix: inspiration et inerrance des livres canoniques ne font l'objet d'aucun doute chez saint Grégoire: ce sont les postulats de sa méthode de théologie." Cf. Ibid., 38-48.

58,1 Cf. supra, 24, note 5.

59,2 Orat. 41:14, PG XXXVI, 448.

59,3 Orat. 41:6, PG XXXVI, 437A:

59,1 Orat. 41:8, PG XXXVI, 440:

11(b) Baptism


61.2 Ibid., 371.

61.3 *Oration 40, PG XXXVI, 360-425.* Gregory pleads with the unbaptized not to procrastinate. An unforeseen calamity may overwhelm them, war or earthquake, a storm, a wild beast or sickness. A crumb may go down the wrong way! A strong wind or a runaway horse or a drug may cheat them of salvation (14).

"As long as you are a catechumen you are but in the porch of religion. You must come inside, and cross the court, and observe holy things, and look into the Holy of Holies and be in company with Trinity" (16).

Baptism is for the young and the old. It is for infants:

"Have you an infant? Do not let sin get any opportunity, but let him be sanctified from his childhood. From his very tenderest age let him be consecrated by the Spirit" (17).

Baptism is for the virgin (18) and for the man of public affairs (19). Gregory demolishes excuses for delay: "I am waiting for Epiphany; I prefer Easter; I will wait for Pentecost" (24); or "A bishop shall baptize me" (26). They must seize the opportunity now.

61.4 Heinz Althaus, in *Die Heilslehre des heiligen Gregor von Nazianz*, Münster: Aschendorff, 1972, comments on Gregory's paragraph on repentance and restitution (Orat. 40:32). The fact that failure to repent and restore illegally acquired goods nullifies the remission of sins, implies that the efficacy of the sacrament depends on the inner attitude of the one being baptized.


62.1 πρόσειτο μὲν τῇ δι', ἐκάρpatος ἀναγεννῆσαι καὶ Πνεῦματος (Orat.
18:13, PG XXXV, 1000C). Cf. Jn 3:5: ἕαν μὴ τὶς γεννηθῇ ἐξ ἁδάτος καὶ Πνεῦματος...

62,2 ἵνα κῦριος τὰς χεῖρας τῷ Πνεύματι (Orat. 40:44, PG XXXVI, 421B).

62,3 τῆς νεοκτίστου ψυχῆς, ἢν τὸ Πνεῦμα δι' ἁδάτος ἀνεμόρφωσεν (Orat. 7:15, PG XXXV, 773C).

62,4 καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἀναγεννήσεως ἐξέχεν ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος...

(Orat. 8:20, PG XXXV, 812D).

62,5 Τοῦτο τὸ Πνεῦμα συνήδειμνυργεῖ μὲν ὑιὸν καὶ τὴν κτίσιν καὶ τὴν ἀναστασίαν... Δημιουργεῖ δὲ τὴν πνευματικὴν ἀναγέννησιν (Orat. 41:14, PG XXXVI, 448AB).

63,1 Πνεῦμα τὸ ποιήσαν, τὸ ἀναστήσαν διὰ βαπτίσματος, δι' ἀναστάσεως (Orat. 31:29, PG XXXVII, 165C).

63,2 Εις τὴν κτίσιν τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον, μάτην ἐβαπτίσθης... (Orat. 37:18, PG XXXVI, 304A).

63,3 Orat. 8:20, PG XXXV, 812C.

63,4 Ibid.

63,5 Orat. 18:13, PG XXXV, 1001A.

64,1 Orat. 40:7, PG XXXVI, 368A.

64,2 Orat. 38:16, PG XXXVI, 329B.

64,3 λούσασθε, καθαροὶ γίνεσθε (Orat. 39:20, PG XXXVI, 357D, quoting Isaiah 1: 17,18 (LXX)).

64,4 Orat. 40:38, PG XXXVI, 413.

64,5 Orat. 40:8, PG XXXVI, 368B. Purification is closely linked with the Spirit's work in enabling us to know God. Cf. Orat. 2:39, PG XXXV, 448A, where Gregory says that to speak of God we need the aid of the Spirit, "by whom alone we are able to perceive, expound or hear God (ὅ μόνο Ϙεός καὶ νοεῖται καὶ ἀκούεται καί ἄκούεται)." He immediately adds: "For the pure alone can grasp him who is pure and of the same disposition as himself (καθαρὸ γὰρ μόνον ᾧτέου τοῦ καθαροῦ καὶ διαφούς ἔχοντος)." Gregory's doctrine of man as "double-made (διττάνων)" is examined in an Uppsala thesis by Anna-Stina Ellverson, The Dual Nature of Man. A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Gregory of Nazianzus, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1981.

64,6 Cf. Heinz Althaus, op. cit., 161:

"Da nur die mit Vernunft begabten Wesen von Gott als
Licht erschaffen wurden, so kann auch nur das Geistige erleuchtet werden. Der Mensch wird also nicht in seinem gesamten Sein, sondern nur in seiner Seele unmittelbar von der Taufgnade betroffen... Wenn allerdings die Seele mit dem göttlichen Lichte erfüllt worden ist, so hat dies natürlich auch auf den gesamten Menschen eine Auswirkung."

65,1 Πυρίνας δὲ, ζητῶ πότερον διὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν... ἢ διὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. Πῶρ γὰρ ὁ θεός ἡμῶν... (Orat. 41:12, PG XXXVI, 445A).

65,2 Heinz Althaus, op. cit., 157:
"Gewiss die Reinigung ist die unumgängliche Vorstufe zur Erleuchtung. Doch so sehr sie auch dem von Sünden beladenen Menschen zuerst nottut, für Gregor ist nicht die Reinigung die Hauptsache, sondern die Erleuchtung, und zwar in einem solchen Masse, dass selbst die Taufe zunächst ganz aus dieser Sicht behandelt wird. Das zeigt sich schon in dem Namen Erleuchtung (φωτισμός), den Gregor konsequent für sie verwendet. Sie ist die Erleuchtung schlechthin."


65,3 He adds: "To the baptizer and perfector i.e. the bishop however it was so clear and visible that he could not even hold back the mystery, but publicly cried out that he was anointing with the Spirit his own successor (ὅτι τὸν εὐαγγ. διάδοχον τὰ πνευματ χρίσειν)" (Orat. 18:13, PG XXXV, 1001B).

65,4 Cf. J. Mossay, Les fêtes de Noël et d'Epiphanie d'après les sources littéraires cappadociens au IVe siècle, Louvain, 1965, 35.

65,5 Orat. 39:1, PG XXXVI, 336A. The reference is of course to Jn 1:5.

65,6 Cf. supra, 19, note 2.

66,1 θεοῦ δὲ ὅταν εἴπω, ἑνὶ φωτὶ περισσώτερῳ καὶ προσι... (Orat. 39:11, PG XXXVI, 345C).

66,2 Ibid., 20, PG XXXVI, 360A.

66,3 Cf. Althaus, op.cit., 157, "...mit einer Lichttheologie."

66,4 Orat. 40:1, PG XXXVI, 360C.

66,5 Ibid., 3 and 4, PG XXXVI, 361.
66,6 Θεός μὲν έστι φῶς το ἀκρότατον, καὶ ἀπρόσιτον, καὶ ἀφρητον, οὗτο νῦν καταληκτόν, οὗτε λόγῳ ῥήτον, πάσης φωτιστικῶν λογικῆς φώςεως (Ibid. 5, PG XXXVI, 364B).
66,7 Δεύτερον δὲ φῶς ἀγγελος, τοῦ πρώτου φωτὸς ἀπορροή τις, ἡ μετονοσία... Τρίτον φῶς ἀνθρωπος... (Ibid.).
67,1 Cf. Infra, 117ff.
67,2 'Εν τῷ φωτὶ Κυρίου θέασαι φῶς, ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν Ὕδων αγαθοθετή, τὸ τρισάγιον φῶς καὶ κατ' ἀνατομίον (Ibid. 34, PG XXXVI, 408C). Cf. infra, 120, note 6.
67,3 Cf. Orat. 31:3, where Gregory applies Jn 1:9 to each hypostasis, including the Spirit: 'Ἀν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν, ὁ φωτίζει πάντα ἀνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον, ὁ ἄλλος Παράδειγμας.
67,4 Orat. 34:11, PG XXXVI, 252B.
67,5 Γενομέθα δὲ Χριστὸς, ἐπεὶ καὶ Χριστὸς δὲ ἡμεῖς. γενομέθα θεοὶ δὴ αὐτοὶ, ἐπειδὴ κακεῖνος δὲ ἡμας ἀνθρωπος (Orat. 1:5, PG XXXV, 397C. It must be remembered that deification (like inspiration, regeneration, purification and illumination) is a model. Gregory is using the word metaphorically and quite clearly denies that it is intended literally in Orat. 42:17, PG XXXVI, 477C: "For the creature must be called God's and this is for us a great thing. But 'God', never. Otherwise I shall admit that God is a creature, if I become God in the strict sense of the term [i.e. literally] (κτίσμα δέ, Θεοῦ μὲν λεγέσθω: μέγα γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ τούτο. Θεος δέ, μηδᾶμος. Ἡ τότε δέξαμαι κτίσμα εἶναι Θεὸν, ὅταν κἀγα γένωμαι κυρίως Θεος)."
68,1 ...καὶ γενομένοις ἀνθρώποις ὁ κάτω, Θεος, ἐπειδὴ συνανεκράθη θεοὶ...Ἰνα γένωμαι τοσοῦτον Θεος, ὅσον ἐκείνος ἀνθρώπος (Orat. 29:19, PG XXXVI, 100A).
68,2 ...Έι μὴ Θεος το Πνεύμα το ἄγιον, θεωσθητω πρώτον, καὶ οὕτω θεωσθω με τὸν ὄμοστιμον (Orat. 34:12, PG XXXVI, 252C).
68,3 Carm. 1, 1, 3, 1-4, PG XXXVII, 408.
68,4 ...καὶ πῶς σο Θεος, ὅνα τι παραθάρρησι μικρόν, ἐκ σο καὶ σο γίνῃ Θεος; (Orat. 39:17, PG XXXVI, 353C).
68,5 Εἴ τέκταται μετ' ἐμοῦ, πῶς ἐμὲ ποιεῖ Θεὸν; Ἡ πῶς συνάπτει Θεοτητι; (Orat. 31:4, PG XXXVI, 137B).
69,1 Orat. 31:28, PG XXXVI, 165A.
"Gregor bezeichnet das christliche Heilsziel mit Vorliebe, ja fast ausschliesslich als ἡ ἁνεῳς γενεσθαι. In welchem Masse diese bei Athanasius selten vorkommende, von Basilius gemiedene Wendung bei Gregor vorherrscht, mag die folgende Liste zur Anschauung bringen... An mehreren der aufgeführten Stellen hat Gregor zu erkennen gegeben, dass er das Überstiegene des Ausdrucks empfand... Gewiss nicht nur darum, weil er ihn doch durch eine einfache Gleichung rechtfertigen konnte - voōγ-Werden = Gottwerden; denn Gott ist der μεγας voūγ - , sondern hauptsächlich aus dem Grund, weil von dieser Bezeichnung des christlichen Endziels aus das Postulat der vollen Gottheit des Sohnes und des Geistes am leichtesten zu gewinnen war..."

"If the incarnate Son of God is the agent of redemption for mankind in general, the Spirit is the agent of providing for us, individually, the means whereby we can appropriate that redemption. What Christ has accomplished universally, the Spirit perfects particularly."

Winslow further espouses the thesis that Gregory's whole theology is based upon soteriology. He chose his topic of study as a result of "an attempt to ascertain to what extent the Trinitarian and Christological debates of the first five centuries were dependent upon or informed by the Fathers' understanding of salvation." He summarizes his conclusion: "It soon became apparent that, with few exceptions, the major arguments and formulations concerning the doctrine of the Trinity and the Person of Christ rested directly upon a variety of soteriological principles" (Ibid., V). Cf. M.F. Wiles, "Soteriological Arguments in the Fathers," SP IX (Texte und Untersuchungen, 94), Berlin, 1966, 321-325.

Winslow notes (Ibid., V) that Althaus's conclusions about
Gregory's concept of salvation are different. Cf. Althaus, op.cit., and supra, 65.

71,1 Cf. supra, 31, and note 3.


71,3 Βαπτίστη τον μάθητέων, εἰς ὄνομα Πατρός, καὶ Υιοῦ, καὶ Ἁγίου Πνεῦματος. 'Ὅνομα δὲ κοινόν τῶν τριῶν ἐν, ἡ θεότης (Orat. 40:45, PG XXXVI, 424A). J. Schaberg affirms, like Gregory, that the baptismal formula "implies the unity of the three figures, Father, Son and Spirit." She calls the formula Triadic rather than Trinitarian, however, since "there is no decisive evidence in Matthew's Gospel that the Spirit is considered 'personal'" (op.cit., 24 and 25).

71,4 Ἀπεκτέθη δὲ προσκυνοῦσι τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ τὸν Υἱόν, καὶ τὸ Ἁγίον Πνεῦμα, μετὰ θεότητα: Θεόν τὸν Πατέρα, Θεόν τὸν Υἱόν, Θεόν, εἰ μὴ τραχύνη, τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἁγίον... (Orat. 33:16, PG XXXVI, 236A).

72,1 Orat. 33:17, PG XXXVI, 236B.

72,2 Ibid., 236C.

72,3 Cf. Orat. 7:4, where Gregory speaks of his mother's achieving "her husband's perfection (τελειώτητα)"; Orat. 8:20: Gorgonia "had recently obtained the blessing of cleansing and perfection (τὸ τῆς καθαρότητας καὶ τελειώσεως ἡν ἀγαθάν)"; Orat. 18:13: baptism is "the formation and perfection of the Christlike man (τὴν τοῦ κατὰ Χριστὸν ἀνθρώπου μόρφωσιν τε καὶ τελειώσειν)"; Orat. 40:3: in the long list of names for baptism (cf. supra, 66) is included "perfecting of the mind (νοῦ τελειώσις)."

73,1 Orat. 40:44, PG XXXVI, 421C. J. Rousse reminds us in his article on Gregory (DS, VI, Paris: Beauchesne, 1967, 931-971) that this perfecting is to be identified with deification:

"L'oeuvre de perfectionnement (τελείωσις) que l'Esprit accomplit en chaque homme consiste à le déifier... Dès le baptême, tout est déjà, d'une certaine manière, donné, accompli... Car s'il y a dans l'illumination baptismale l'action d'un feu qui purifie, c'est le feu de l'Esprit... Mais il y a aussi une onction mystérieuse, celle de l'Esprit, qui conforme le néophyte au Christ dans sa filiation même à l'égard du Père..." (op.cit., 944).

Cf. also Orat. 31:4, PG XXXVI, 137A, where the Spirit perfects the Godhead:
"For what profit is there in an imperfect Godhead? Or rather, what Godhead can there be if it is not perfect? And how can that be perfect which lacks something of perfection? And surely there is something lacking if it has not the Holy, and how would it have this if it were without the Spirit? For either holiness is something different from him, and if so let someone tell me what it is conceived to be; or if it is the same, how is it not from the beginning (Δμ' ἀρχῆς), as if it were better for God to be at one time imperfect and apart from the Spirit?"
2(c) Living in the Spirit

74,1 Orat. 2:45, PG XXXV, 453AB. Cf. I Cor. 3:1-2, 2:6, Eph. 4:13.

74,2 Orat. 42:6, PG XXXVI, 465A.


75,1 Ibid.: 39, PG XXXVI, 413.

75,2 Ibid.: 40, PG XXXVI, 416BC.

75,3 Ibid. Browne and Swallow translate νεφοείς as "reins" following the Latin translation in PG.

75,4 Orat. 41:8. PG XXXVI, 440C.

75,5 J. Plagnieux, op.cit. (cf. supra, 50, note 2), 95f: "Le baptême chrétien est la 'première purification' (et aussi l'illumination fondamentale: φωτισμός); le progrès spirituel est comme une seconde et incessante purification." But in none of the references given by Plagnieux (Orat. 38:16, Orat. 40:3, 4, 8, 19, 26, 29, 32, Orat. 45:9) does Gregory speak of a progressive purification, a gradual cleansing. Heinz Althaus (op.cit., 162) expounds Gregory's view of the completeness of the purification effected in baptism. Plagnieux also compares and contrasts the Christian and Neo-Platonist doctrines of katharsis (op.cit., 92-95). While it is not surprising that Neo-Platonist expressions are used by cultivated Christians of this epoque, yet by examining the analogies between Christian katharsis and Plotinian, one can measure the irreducible opposition which separates Gregory from these pagan philosophers. The differences come down to two:

"Le christianisme, et singulièrement la doctrine du Verbe incarné, devait rectifier la purification plotinienne sur deux points essentiels: sur le besoin de Dieu et sur le respect du corps" (op.cit., 95).

On the first, Plagnieux writes:

"Plotin représente la tentative suprême de sauver l'homme par l'homme. Dieu sans doute est au terme de cet effort, mais il n'y est qu'au terme, et nullement à l'origine; encore se distingue-t-il à peine de l'homme. Le salut s'obtient finalement par la reconquête orgueilleuse du divin inhérent à l'âme" (op.cit., 92).

But the concept of katharsis shows the opposition best:

"Mais à tout prendre, c'est peut-être le katharsis qui
révèle au mieux l'opposition foncière des deux doctrines: l'une désincarnation de l'homme, l'autre incarnation du divin. L'une considérant la création elle-même comme une chute...l'autre assume non seulement le corps, mais même les infirmités de la chair, pour guérir et réintégrer à l'harmonie totale ce que la chute par le péché avait perdu. L'une est tendue tout entière vers l'esprit par un effort d'évasion hors de la matière, hors du monde, hors du corps; l'autre tout en accordant à l'esprit une attention privilégiée, s'applique aussi à purifier le corps lui-même, quoique d'ailleurs en fonction de l'esprit" (op.cit., 94).

75, 6 Orat. 40:32, PG XXXVI, 404C.
76, 1 Carm. 2, 1, 12, 445-450, PG XXXVII, 1198.
76, 2 νόμος ἀπολογητικός πνευματικός (Orat. 18:15, PG XXXV, 1004B).
76, 3 Orat. 21:9, PG XXXV, 1089C.
76, 4 Orat. 2:14, PG XXXV, 424AB.
76, 5 Orat. 27:3, PG XXXVI, 13D. On théoria and praxis in Gregory's thought, cf. H. Pinault, Le Platonisme de Saint Grégoire de Nazianze, Roche-sur-Yon: Romain, 1925, esp. Chapter 9, "La Contemplation," 181-205. Pinault concludes that although Gregory uses Plotinian formulas, his concepts of praxis and théoria are "proprement chrétiennes". Cf. also Thomas Špidlík, Grégoire de Nazianze. Introduction à l'étude de sa doctrine spirituelle, Rome: Pont. Inst. Stud. Orient, 1971, which is a study of théoria and praxis in Gregory. Cf. also M. Kertsch, "Gregor von Nazianz' Stellung zu Theòria und Praxis aus der Sicht seiner Reden," Byz, 44 (1974), 282-289. Cf. also T. Špidlík, "La théoria et la praxis chez Grégoire du Nazianze," SP XIV (1976), 358-364. According to Špidlík, théoria is a Greek ideal introduced into the Church by Clement and Origen. In the thought of Gregory of Nazianzus, three ways of relating théoria and praxis appear: "1) une opposition très nette; 2) un enchaînement, la praxis précédant et 'acheminant vers la théoria', 3) la théoria et la praxis sont l'une et l'autre prises dans leur sens large comme une manière de vivre: dans la solitude ou au service d'autrui" (Ibid., 359). The last, a contrast between the active life and the contemplative, is the most superficial and was a commonplace by the end of antiquity. Posing the question, "Which is the road to God?", Špidlík concludes that for Gregory, it was théoria, intellectual contemplation to be pursued after separation from matter. But the conflict with the Arians reinforced the necessity to see the great abyss between Creator and creature. Man is ceaselessly thwarted in his attempt to rise intellectually to God and so must revert to
deeds. "Ces faits, c'est la voie de la vertu, la purification du péché, l'imitation du Christ, la vie des simples chrétiens qui croient et vivent leur foi dans la simplicité de l'obéissance évangélique" (Ibid., 362).

Expressed otherwise, theoria is an anabasis, an ascension to the heights, stimulated by the erōs of the human soul. But encountering divine agapē, a movement of condescension or descent, the soul must descend from the heights to the humble reality of the flesh. But because this abasement imitates that of Christ in his Incarnation and death, the soul participates in his resurrection and ascension. "La katabasis se convertit en anabasis..." (Ibid., 363).


77,1 ...πνεύματι ζωντες, πνεύματι στοιχέωντες, τούτω τῇ νύσσῳ ἔλθοντες... (Orat. 3:7, PG XXXV, 524B). Cf. Gal. 5:25: εἰ ζωμέν πνεύματι, πνεύματι καὶ στοιχαμέν.

77,2 ...καὶ δίὰ τῆς στενῆς ὡς πλάτειας ὑπὸ τοῦ Πνεύματος δῆγομένοι... (Ibid. 8, PG XXXV, 525A).

77,3 τοῦ Πνεύματος ἀγόντος τὰ ἡμέτερα (Orat. 12:6, PG XXXV, 849B).

77,4 ἦκεῖνα μὲν δὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τὰ πλάσματα, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ Πνεύματος τὰ διδάγματα (Ibid.: 4, PG XXXV, 848B).

77,5 μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ δῶσα τῷ Πνεύματι τὴν ἐμὴν πέτυχα φέρειν ἢ βούλεται, καὶ ὡς βούλεται (Ibid.:5, PG XXXV, 849A).

77,6 ἀλλὰ χληθεῖς, καὶ βασθεῖς, καὶ καταχολουθήσας φῶς καὶ Πνεύματι (Orat. 33:13, PG XXXVI, 229C). Cf. Orat. 34:7, PG XXXVI, 248C, where Gregory tells the Egyptian sailors who have by-passed the Arian churches and come to his Anastasia that they have "well guided by the Holy Spirit (καλὸς δηγηθῆσες ὑπὸ τοῦ Πνεύματος)."

Cf. Orat. 42:13, PG XXXVI, 472D, where, in the Last Farewell, Gregory attributes his success in Constantinople to the Spirit (καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ Πνεύματος...).

78,1 τὸ φῶτισμα, σαρκὸς ἀπόθεσις, Πνεύματος ἀκολουθησις... (Orat. 40:3, PG XXXVI, 361B).

78,2 Orat. 2:91, PG XXXV, 493B. The references to two Pauline phrases may be noted: τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως, Phil. 3:21; τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας, Rom. 8:2 (cf. Rom. 7:23). In this context it is reasonable to see the
reference to the Pauline σάρξ. Cf. also Orat. 9:2 and 3.

78,3 Orat. 2:91, PG XXXV, 493C: τῆς κατασπώσης ὀλής.

78,4 Orat. 12:3, PG XXXV, 845B: καὶ νῦν μάλιστα, δοφ τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς ύποβαίνει καὶ υπεξίσταται, ὅπερ φαί, τὸ ἀντιφάττον καὶ ἀντικείμενον...

79,1 Orat. 21:2, PG XXXV, 1084C:

Gregory continues:

"Whoever has been depraved by being knit to the lower [nature], and so far oppressed by the clay that he cannot look at the rays of truth...though he is born from above (γενομένως ἀνωθεν)...I hold him to be miserable in his blindness."

Cf. Gregory's invectives against the flesh in Carm. II, 1, 46, 1-50. PG XXXVII, 1378-1381. This element in Gregory's thought perhaps shows a Platonic influence. J.-M. Szymusiak comments (Elémens de théologie de l'homme selon Grégoire de Nazianze, Rome 1963, 29): "Si sa pensée a gardé des traces de platonisme d'école, c'est dans ce domaine proprement anthropologique qu'elle les laisse transparaître le plus clairement." Thomas Špidlík (op.cit., 27) sees both Platonist and Cynic Influences and comments: "Delibérément Grégoire confond corruption et réalité corporelle : σάρξ et σῶμα, c'est habituellement pour lui une seule et même chose." Cf. Orat. 41:1, PG XXXVI, 429B, where Gregory pleads that Christians keep festival in a spiritual manner, not according to the letter like the Jews, or honouring the passions of the body, personified in the gods of the Greeks:

"... For sufficient unto the body is the evil thereof. What need has that fire of further fuel, or that beast of more plentiful food, to make it more uncontrollable, and too violent for reason?"

Cf. infra, 99, note 2, and 118.

79,3 Orat. 42: 12, PG XXXVI, 472C: ὡς γεννᾷν οὗτος Πνεῦμα τοῦς ἀπανισταμένους σώματος.


NOTES for Chapter III - THE ECONOMY AND THE SPIRIT

80.1 Cf. supra, 53.

III(a) The Spirit in Creation and on the Prophets


81.2 Orat. 41:11, PG XXXVI, 444A. The only comparable reference to the Spirit is a passing one in a quotation from Ps. 33:6 in Orat. 32:10, PG XXXVI, 185AB (following loose quotations from Prov. 8:28-30):

"When everything received being from God and began to exist, 'I was beside him, organizing it all.' Similarly, when he set his own throne upon the winds and the clouds on high, when he laid the foundations of the earth and established the fountains under heaven and when 'by the Spirit of his mouth' he gave them 'all power'."

81.3 Orat. 41:14, PG XXXVI, 448A: Τούτω τὸ Πνεῦμα συνήθισεν ἐν Ὑλῇ καὶ τὴν κτίσιν καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν...

81.4 Ps. 33:6, Job 33:4, Ps. 104:30. This section of Orat. 41:14 is quoted infra, 173.

81.5 Orat. 31:29, PG XXXVI, 165C: Πνεῦμα τὸ ποιήσαν, τὸ ἀνάστισιν διὰ βαστίσματος, δι' ἀνάστασιν...

81.6 ζωὴ, καὶ ζωοποιόν. Orat. 41:9, PG XXXVI, 441B. This link between creation and resurrection, seeing the Spirit as the one who breathes life into the dead as he once did at creation, is not, of course, peculiar to Gregory. It may be traced back to Paul's words in I Cor. 15:45 where he refers to Gen. 2:7.

82.1 Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, "The Doctrine of the Spirit and the Task of a Theology of Nature," Theology, 75 (1972), 8-21. Pannenberg argues that the phrase πνεῦμα ζωοποιόν in the Constantinopolitan Creed of 381 which to-day "is often interpreted in a restrictive way as a purely soteriological expression referring to the new life of faith," should be interpreted (because of Paul's allusion in I Cor. 15:45 to Gen. 2:7) in reference to the idea of the Spirit as the origin of all life. This idea was common in the ancient world, not only in the Ancient Near East but also in Greek thought. "In Greek patristic theology, as in the Eastern Orthodox tradition until the present time, there has always been preserved a continuous awareness of the fundamental
importance of the Spirit's participation in the act of creation as providing the basis for the significance of his soteriological presence in the Church and Christian experience. Donal F. Winslow (op. cit., 127) argues that Gregory's whole soteriology "has its initial roots in his doctrine of creation. God created the world with the specific purpose of having mankind fulfill progressively its divinely ordained destiny of theosis." The work of the Spirit in bringing man to perfection through salvation and resurrection is therefore a fulfilling of the Spirit's work of the perfecting of creation. The question must be asked, however, whether Pannenberg and Winslow are not inverting the order, and whether Greek Patristic thought, and Gregory in particular, did not derive this understanding of the Spirit's work of theosis from his role in salvation, and develop from that their understanding of his role in creation.

82,2 τοῦ Πνεύματος τῆς ἡγεμονίας. Orat. 41:11, PG XXXVI, 444B.

82,3 The original creed adopted at Nicea in 325 contains only the words καὶ εἷς τὸ Ἁγίον Πνεῦμα in the third article. It appears that the Council of Constantinople added several phrases, including τὸ λαθησή τῶν προφητῶν. That the Holy Spirit inspired the prophets and that the prophets spoke of Christ had long been part of Christian teaching on the ministry of the Spirit. It was argued by A.M. Ritter, however, in Das Konzil von Konstantinopel, Göttingen: Vandenhoech & Ruprecht, 1965, that the Council adopted another existing creed which included these additional phrases on the Holy Spirit. Ritter deduced from Gregory Nazianzen's poem, De vita sua (Carm. 1, 1, 11), that this creed was adopted because, since it did not include a specific statement that the Spirit was God or consubstantial with the Father, it offered a basis of reconciliation with the Pneumatomachi. J.N.D. Kelly summarized and adopted Ritter's conclusions in the third edition of Early Christian Creeds, London: Longman, 1972. Cf. esp. 322-331. Cf. also infra, 195, note 6, and 196, notes 1, 2, and 3 on Ritter's interpretation of the poem.

82,4 For the references to David, Amos and Daniel cf. Orat. 41:14, PG XXXVI, 448, and supra, 59. Other references to David occur at Orat. 2:1, PG XXXV, 408A:

"Let the most blessed David supply my exordium, or rather let him who spoke in David, and even now speaks through him."

and at Orat. 17:2, PG XXXV, 968B:

"David...who sings even of evil spirits through the Spirit within him."
82,5 Cf. Orat. 40:5, PG XXXVI, 364BC, and supra, 66.

83,1 On the role of the Spirit in creation according to Athanasius and Basil, cf. T.F. Torrance, "Spiritus Creator: A Consideration of the Teaching of St. Athanasius and St. Basil," Theology in Reconstruction, London: SCM, 1965, 209-228. Torrance comments on Basil's saying that "the way of knowledge of God lies from the one Spirit through the one Son to the Father" (cf. supra, 53), comparing this unfavourably with the perspective of Athanasius:

"This series of 'before' and 'after' is difficult, for it would appear to imply a creative act of the Spirit first and independently of the act of the Son. Is this due to Basil's ascetical interest, his concentration upon the work of the Spirit in his own heart and life? If so, how can it be distinguished from an anthropocentric starting-point? This is worth mentioning, for it is along this line that the doctrine of the Spirit, as we see in nineteenth-century theology, is easily led astray. The stronger Christological perspective of Athanasius is theologically sounder" (op. cit., 224).

If this formula does suggest a pneumatology independent of Christology which is therefore a prey to subjectivism, then that may explain why Gregory himself does not use it. It could also be pointed out that Nazianzen is perhaps a more significant figure than Basil in the development of Christology, and that Christology may play a more significant role in his pneumatology. He is generally regarded as more influenced than Basil by Alexandrian thought, especially that of Athanasius and Didymus. It could be argued on the other hand that Gregory with his sensitive and fragile personality and introspective poetry was more open than Basil to subjectivism.
The Spirit and Christ

Orat. 30:1, PG XXXVI, 133B.

Orat. 31:20, PG XXXVI, 165B:

Cf. Basil, De Spir. Sanc., XIX (49):

"Is it Christ's advent [of which you are thinking]? The Spirit is forerunner. Is it the incarnate presence? The Spirit is inseparable. Working of miracles, and gifts of healing are through the Holy Spirit. Demons are driven out by the Spirit of God. The devil was brought to naught by the presence of the Spirit."

Basil proceeds however without intermission to include here the activities of the Spirit after Pentecost.

Boris Bobrinskoy, in "The Indwelling of the Spirit in Christ: 'Pneumatic Christology' in the Cappadocian Fathers," StVladThQ, 28 (1984), 49-65, sees the Cappadocians as those who revived the second-century Jewish-Christian tradition of the Apostolic Fathers and Irenaeus, characterized by a "pneumatic Christology." This was particularly based on the Synoptic accounts of the baptism of Jesus, the emphasis on the Spirit in the gospel of Luke (esp. 4:16-22) and the Acts of the Apostles (esp. 10:38), and on I Corinthians (esp. 15:45). The Trinitarian synthesis of Origen, with its hierarchy of hypostaseis analogous to that of Plotinus, produced a disequilibrium and loss of perspective. The narrowing spheres of influence of the hypostaseis and the diverse functions of the Logos were detrimental to the role of the Spirit. It was the Cappadocians in succession to Athanasius, according to Bobrinskoy, who revived the earlier perspective.

It is true that the Cappadocians reflect here their Athanasian inheritance rather than their inheritance from Origen. Like Athanasius their doctrine of the Spirit's activity in the oikonomia is thoroughly Christocentric.
Gregory's clear teaching on the human soul of Christ was a repudiation of Apollinarianism, the heresy that Christ took human flesh and soul, (i.e. 'animal soul', the 'animating' principle which gave all 'animals' including man the power of bodily movement), but did not take a human mind (i.e. 'intelligent soul' with the ability to think and purpose). The place of the intelligent soul in the man Jesus was taken by the divine Logos. Apollinaris, who proposed this ingenious theory, belonged to the Nicene party and seems to have had some contact with Basil in the 360s before his Christological theory made him suspect. Epp. 361-4 in the corpus of Basil's letters may be correspondence between them. The case for authenticity is argued in G.L. Prestige, St. Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea, London: SPCK, 1956, and Henri de Riedmatten, "Basile de Césarée et Apollinaire de Laodicée," JThS, 8 (1957), 53-70. K.J. Woollcombe, reviewing Prestige's book in JThS, 9 (1958), 162-163, concluded that "the correspondence must undoubtedly be promoted from the ranks of the Spuria of Basil to the Dubia." Paul J. Fedwick endorses this view in "A Chronology of the Life and Works of Basil of Caesarea," Basil of Caesarea. Christian, Humanist, Ascetic (ed. Fedwick), Toronto: PIMS, 1981, 6-7.


85,2 Carm. I.1.9. 67-69, PG XXXVII, 462.
85,3 Donald F. Winslow, op.cit., 128, note 1. There is no developed Mariology in the orations of Nazianzen. There are references to the Virgin birth but it is always a Christological point which is being made. Apart from those already quoted (Orat. 31:29 and Orat. 38:13), the following references may be given: Orat. 29:4, PG XXXVI, 77D-80A: Orat. 30:21, PG XXXVI, 132B: Orat. 38:2, PG XXXVI, 313A: Orat. 40:45, PG XXXVI, 424B, Orat. 43:62. PG XXXVI, 576C. In Orat. 45:13, PG XXXVI, 641A, Gregory's emphasis is on the strength and agency of the Son:
"A male, because offered for Adam; or rather the Stronger for the strong, when the first man had fallen under sin; and chiefly because there is in him nothing feminine, nothing unmanly (μηδὲν θηλυ, μηδὲ ἄνανδρον ἐν θυτῷ φέρον); but he burst from the bonds of the Virgin-Mother's womb with much power (ἄλλα καὶ ἐξαραγέν βῆς ἑκάσὶν παρθένικῶν τε καὶ ματρικῶν, κατὰ πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν), and a male was brought forth by the Prophetess (καὶ τεχθὲν ἄραν ἐκ τῆς προφητικῆς), as Isaiah declares the good tidings."

Similarly, the concern is Christological in this extract from Ep. 101, PG XXXVII, 177C:

"If anyone does not believe that holy Mary is the God-bearer (Θεοτόκοι τῆς ἀγίαν Μαρίαν), he is severed from the Godhead. If anyone should assert that he passed through the Virgin as through a channel (διὰ διάκοιλον τῆς Παρθένου διάδρομον), and was not at once divinely and humanly formed in her (θείους ἄμα καὶ ἄνθρωπικοὺς), divinely because apart from a man, humanly because by the law of conception, he is similarly godless."

J. Quasten quotes this passage to show that "the term 'Theotokos' became through Gregory of Nazianzus, long before the Council of Ephesus (431), the touchstone of orthodoxy." He continues: "This passage shows that Gregory regards the dogma of Mary's motherhood as the pivot of the Church's teaching about Christ and salvation." (J. Quasten, Patrology, Vol. 111, 253).

In one early passage, Gregory draws a parallel between Mary and Eve in a way reminiscent of Irenaeus: Orat. 2:24, PG XXXV, 433B:

"This is the reason for the generation and the Virgin, for the manger and Bethlehem; the generation on behalf of the fashioning, the Virgin on behalf of the woman, Bethlehem for Eden, the manger for the Garden..."

Cf. Irenaeus, Demonstration, 33 (Armitage ed., 99). Winslow points out that Gregory's view of the Spirit's purification of the Virgin removes the necessity for a prior immaculate conception (op.cit., 128). The two are not necessarily incompatible (for Christ was "purified" at his baptism although previously pure), but it is highly unlikely that Gregory held to the latter.

Cf. Carm. 1, 2, 197-202, PG XXXVII, 537-538, where Gregory sees the sanctification of woman, the "reversal" of Eve, in Christ's birth from the Virgin. This Carmen, In Praise of Virginity, has a remarkable passage in which virginity is used to interpret the relations within the Trinity (Ibid., 20-30, 523A-524A).
A similar passage in the Epiphany oration, delivered less than two weeks later, substitutes "mind" for deity:

"...not only is God mingled with birth and mind with flesh (οὐρανοὶ υἱοὶ), the eternal with time and the measurable with the limitless, but also birth with virginity..." (Orat. 39:13, PG XXXVI, 349A).

Cf. G.W.H. Lampe, God As Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon, 1977, 210ff. Lampe traces the usage in Athenagoras, Callistus, Eusebius and Gregory of Nyssa. It is used specifically referring to the deity of Christ by Callistus, in Il Clement and Barnabes, by Praxeas, Cyprian, Adamantius, Apollinaris, Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian and Hilary. Cf. J.N.D. Kelly, op. cit., 142ff.: "The Christological theory (if theory is an apt name for what was usually a pre-reflective supposition) which commanded most support, and which lingered on beyond the second century, may be described as a Spirit-Christology. By this is meant the view that in the historical Jesus Christ the pre-existent Son of God, who is divine spirit, united himself with human nature."

Cf. Lampe (op. cit., Chapters 2 and 3), who emphasizes that in Hebrew religious language "Spirit" is one of several "bridge" words expressing the idea of God's contact with the created world. "The Spirit of God is God disclosing himself as Spirit, that is to say, God creating and giving life to the spirit of man, inspiring him, renewing him and making him whole" (Ibid., 61). Had Gregory been defending his Trinitarian theology to-day, he would have had to fight on quite a different front defending not the deity of the Spirit but (against Lampe, for example) his subsistence as a distinct hypostasis. James P. Mackey refers to "two quite different, if not contrary, types of problem" within the one Trinitarian formula (op. cit., 66):

"In the case of the one called 'the Son' there is no problem about his distinction from the Father, but there is considerable difficulty with any idea of his having existed with God from before the beginning of time. In the case of the Spirit, on the contrary, though there is little difficulty with its reference to the eternal and the divine in the relevant pre-Christian sources, grave problems are encountered in any attempt to distinguish Spirit from the God who is named as Father in these sources and in their Christian counterparts."

This is a succinct analysis of the issues of debate. More attention has been paid perhaps to the pre-existence of the Son than to the distinctiveness of the Spirit. Although Gregory was not fighting on that front, there is sufficient material to indicate that he would have developed his argument for the distinctiveness of the Spirit from the
distinct role of the Spirit in the *okinomia*. Cf. *infra*, 87, for the Spirit's distinct role in the birth of Christ, 90, for his distinct role in the baptism, and 95 and 98f. for the way Pentecost reveals his distinctiveness.

86,2 Orat. 30:21, PG XXXVI, 132B:

Χριστός δὲ, διὰ τὴν θεότητα: χρίσις γὰρ αὕτη τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος, οὐχ ἐνεργείᾳ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους χριστούς ἀνιλάξουσα, παρουσία δὲ ὥλοι τού ὑρίσσων.

86,3 The practice of anointing in ancient Israel seems to go back to the institution of the monarchy and is expressly linked with the coming of the Spirit (1 Sam. 10:1,6; 16:13). In the New Testament, Luke refers to the anointing of Jesus with the Holy Spirit (Acts 10:38, cf. Lk. 4:18).

87,1 Paul of Samosata was condemned for heresy at the synod of Antioch in 268. According to J.N.D. Kelly, Paul's thought is "notoriously difficult to evaluate" (*Early Christian Doctrines*, London: Black, fourth ed., 1968 and 1975, 118), but he was the most notable of the Adoptionists (later called "Dynamic Monarchians" by modern historians). Theodotus, the originator of Adoptionism held that "until his baptism Jesus lived the life of an ordinary man, with the difference that he was supremely virtuous. The Spirit, or Christ, then descended upon him, and from that moment he worked miracles, without, however, becoming divine..." (*Ibid.*, 116).


88,1 Orat. 38:16, PG XXXVI, 353B. The reference to the Spirit as "akin to him (οὐγιστανοῦς)" implies the equal deity of the Spirit. The word refers to someone of the same family, a kinsman or relative.

88,2 Orat. 39:14, PG XXXVI, 349C.

89,1 Orat. 39:15, PG XXXVI, 352B: ...ὁπερ ἦν Πνεῦμα καὶ σάρξ, οὕτω Πνεύματι ἐκείνῳ καὶ δέστι.

89,2 John 3:5

90,1 Orat. 39:16, PG XXXVI, 353B:

... Καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα μαρτυρεῖ τὴν θεότητα: τῷ γὰρ ὁμοίως προστείχει: καὶ ἢ ἐξ οδρανόν φωνῆ: ἐσχήθην γὰρ ὁ μαρτυρούμενος: καὶ ὡς περιστερὰ, τιμὰ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο τῇ θεώσει θεός, σωματικῶς ὄρωμεν...

The Spirit descends on "one who is like him (τῷ ὁμοίῳ"). This phrase may seem rather weak, indeed Homelian! But there is no justification for concluding from this isolated usage
that Gregory was anything other than strongly Homoousian. He is simply stating the "kinship" (cf. συγγενός, supra, 88, note 1) between the Son and the Spirit in a looser way. The body referred to here, which is deified through its union with God, must be the human body of Christ, not the body of the dove. To honour Christ's body, the Spirit appears "in bodily form (σωματικώς)", which may imply an actual physical dove, but more probably means a dove-like appearance. There is not sufficient evidence here for any idea of an incarnation of the Spirit.

90,2 This also is an assertion of the deity of the Spirit.

91,1 Orat. 39:17, PG XXXVI, 353C:

The last sentence should perhaps be interpreted to mean that this is the baptism which perfects. The perfecting of the Christian which takes place in baptism is not the work of the Spirit in isolation from Christ. It comes from Christ who gives the baptism and the Spirit. Perfection and the Spirit are linked once again.

91,2 Cf. Orat. 34:12, PG XXXVI, 252C, and Carm. I, 1, 3, 1-4, PG XXXVII, 408, both quoted supra, 68.

91,3 This seems to be the thought behind Gregory's words in the opening paragraph of Orat. 39, PG XXXVI, 336A:

"For the holy Day of Lights to which we have come, and which we are celebrating to-day, has for its origin the baptism of my Christ, the true light which lightens everyone coming into the world, and works my purification (katharsis), and assists that light which we received from the beginning from him from above, but which we darkened and confused by sin."

Gregory seems to be attributing his purification to the festival, the Day of Lights (Epiphany), but in fact, taking the sentence as a whole, Gregory has in mind Christ, and particularly his baptism as the source of purification and illumination for mankind. Cf. supra, 66, for Gregory's view of angels and men as lights (intelligent natures) derived from the First Light.

Gregory also views baptism as one of "three births" (natural birth, baptism, and resurrection) in Orat. 40:2, PG
"My Lord Jesus Christ has shown that he honoured all these births in his own person; the first, by that first and quickening inbreathing; the second by his Incarnation and the baptism with which he himself was baptized, and the third by the resurrection of which he was the firstfruits; condescending, as he became the firstborn among many brethren, so also to become the firstborn from the dead."

Once again, the present spiritual birth of the Christian is rooted in Christ who by his Incarnation and baptism was the first born.

91,4 Cf. supra, 84.
91,5 Cf. Mt. 4:1, Mk. 1:12, Lk. 4:1.
91,6 Cf. Mt. 12:28.
92,1 The only clear reference is in Heb. 9:14, although Lk. 23:46 and 1 John 5:8 may also be considered.
92,2 Orat. 1:2, PG XXXV, 3966-397A:

92,3 Cf. Rom. 1:3-4, 8:2ff., 8:10ff., 1 Cor. 15:45.
92,4 Eph. 4:24, cf. 2:15.
92,5 II Cor. 5:17, Gal. 6:15.
92,5 I Cor. 15:31, II Cor. 6:9, Gal. 2:20, Col. 2:12 and 3:1.
92,7 Phil. 3:10.
93,1 Orat. 41:11, PG XXXVI, 440B:

93,2 In commenting on John 3:34, "God does not give the Spirit by measure," in the Fourth Theological Oration, Gregory says (Orat. 30:12, PG XXXVI, 120A):

Oúte γὰρ δίδωσιν, οὔτε μετετηρημένον: οὗ γὰρ μετείται παρὰ θεοῦ θεός.
Browne and Swallow's amplified translation probably conveys Gregory's intention:

"For as a matter of fact he does not give the Spirit to the Son, nor does he measure it, for God is not measured by God."

Cf. supra, 84, note 2. Bobrinskoy comments on this quotation from Orat. 41:12 (op. cit., 61):

"With this particular aspect of St. Gregory's thought, we have something of a foretaste of the Christological polemic that ultimately led to the condemnation of Nestorius. For Nestorius deviated from patristic orthodoxy precisely by according too great a role to the Holy Spirit within the life of Christ, and thereby he jeopardized the traditional vision of Christ's hypostatic unity."

Bobrinskoy regards Theodore of Mopsuestia as one who risked accentuating the humanity of Christ and the work of the Spirit upon his humanity while devaluing his divinity. John Chrysostom on the other hand "employed a more balanced language to speak of the divinity of Christ without in any way diminishing the action of the Spirit within him." Gregory's stance here may be compared with that of Didymus the Blind:

"While Basil's ties with St Ephrem and Syrian tradition are certain, Gregory the Theologian was closer to Alexandrian tradition. Disciple of Didymus, he seems more reluctant than St Basil to investigate the mystery of Christ's humanity and the mode of the Spirit's presence within that humanity. The Spirit, he affirmed, is present but not acting; a formula that expresses his fear of diminishing the personal role of the divine Word-become-man" (Ibid., 64).
III(c) The Spirit and Pentecost

94,1 Orat. 31:29, PG XXXVI, 165B. Cf. supra, 84.
94,2 Orat. 41:5, PG XXXVI, 436B:

Τά μὲν δὲ σωματικά τοῦ Χριστοῦ πέρας ἔχει, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ τῆς σωματικῆς ἔνδημας... Τά δὲ τοῦ Πνεύματος άρχεται.

94,3 Cf. supra, 81-83.
94,4 Cf. supra, 93. The implication is that the Spirit did energize the disciples.
94,5 Orat. 41:11, PG XXXVI, 444B.
95,1 Ibid. Οἰκονομία is used here to refer to the incarnate life of Christ "in the days of his flesh" (Heb.5:7), that is, up to his death.
95,2 Mt. 10:1, Mk. 6:7, Lk. 9:1.
95,3 John 20:22.
95,4 Orat. 41:11, PG XXXVI, 444BC. Lampe's PGL suggests "concretely" or "in actuality" as a translation of ουσιοδόσ in this passage. G.L. Prestige notes (God in Patristic Thought, London: SPCK, 1952, 193):

"...the adjective οὐσιοδότης is frequently employed with the meaning of 'substantive' or 'concrete', in exactly the same sense as enhypostatos."

The contrast in the two verbs in the next sentence should also be noted. The Son "lived in our company" in bodily form, whereas the Spirit "appeared" in bodily form. Certainly φανερόω could be also of Christ, and it could be said that he "appeared" or "was revealed" in bodily form. But given the difference of verbs in this context, a difference in nuance may be detected. At least, the difference weakens any argument that the second σωματικός implies any kind of incarnation of the Spirit. Gregory's point is that the Spirit is actually or personally present in a way he had not been before.

96,1 Ep. 234, PG XXIX, 648.
96,2 Cf. V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, London: James Clarke, 1957, Chapter Four, 67-90. Lossky summarizes the distinction thus:

"We are therefore compelled to recognize in God an ineffable distinction, other than that between his essence and his persons, according to which he is,
under different aspects, both totally inaccessible and at the same time accessible. This distinction is that between the essence of God, or his nature, properly so-called, which is inaccessible, unknowable and incommunicable; and the energies or divine operations, forces proper to and inseparable from God's essence, in which he goes forth from himself, manifests, communicates, and gives himself" (Ibid., 70).

Jean-Philippe Houdret, in "Palamas et les Cappadociens," Istina, 19 (1974), 260-271, takes issue with Vladimir Lossky over his claim (op. cit., 71ff.) that the start of the distinction between essence and energies is in the Cappadocians. According to Houdret the key question is whether this distinction is only from the side of man or whether it is a real distinction in God. He considers one key passage from each of the three great Cappadocians, Theol. Orat. 4:17 (Orat. 30:17), PG XXXVI, 125BG from Nazianzen, Adv. Eun. I, 10, PG XXIX, 533C, from Basil and C. Eun. II, PG XLV, 953B, 597D, from Gregory of Nyssa. In Theol. Orat. 4:17, Nazianzen maintains that no mind has ever comprehended (κεχάραξεν) or speech exhaustively contained (περιέλαβεν) the being of God (οὐσίαν θεοῦ) He continues:

"But we sketch him by his attributes, and so obtain a certain faint and feeble and partial idea concerning him...."

Houdret concludes that for the Cappadocians, the divine nature is one and simple, but because of our weakness we must express it in a multiplicity of notions. The multiplicity is therefore not in the known reality (i.e. the energies of God which must be distinguished from the essence) but in our limited and imperfect mode of knowledge. "Sur ce point si important, nous devons constater le désaccord profond qui existe entre la pensée des Pères cappadociens et celle de Grégoire Palamas." The Cappadocian statements are susceptible to Palamite interpretation, but "replacées dans leur context, ces formules n'ont pas de contenu spécifiquement palamite."

Houdret is undoubtedly right that Gregory Palamas develops the distinction between essence and energies, but the distinction is present in both Basil and Gregory. Basil's reference to the energies or operations of God in Ep. 234 may not be a Palamite distinction in God, but Gregory's distinction between the first nature and the "majesty" or glory seems to come closer to it.

96,3 Orat. 28:3, PG XXXVI, 29A.

96,4 Gendle, op. cit., 330.
According to Anthony Casurella, *The Johannine Paraclete in the Church Fathers*, Tübingen: Mohr, 1983, it is regarded as self-evident from Origen's writings onwards that the Paraclete is the Holy Spirit (Ibid., 3) and that he was given in fullest measure on the day of Pentecost (Ibid., 67).

In Orat. 34:13, PG XXXVI, 253B, Gregory in passing uses "another Paraclete" again to mark the distinction between the Spirit and Christ, remarking: "other, that is, from the speaker, who was the Word of God (δηλαδή άλλον τοῦ λέγοντος: Θεός δὲ ο λόγος)."

References to the Paraclete are not numerous in Gregory's works. In the *Fifth Theological Oration* (Orat. 31:30, PG XXXVI, 168B) he warns against taking the implied distinction too far, speaking against those "who call him another Paraclete in the sense of another God (καὶ προσέτι γε άλλον Παράκλητον, ούν άλλον Θεόν, άνωμάζοντες)." Earlier in the oration there is an incidental reference (Orat. 31:3, PG XXXVI, 136B). Also in the *Fifth Theological Oration*, Gregory gives us a rapid examination of the Paraclete sayings (Orat. 31:26, PG XXXVI, 164AB). John 14:16 reveals the unity of the Son with the Father:

"'I will ask the Father,' he says, 'and he will send you another Paraclete, even the Spirit of truth.' This he said that he might not seem to be a rival God, or to make his discourses to them by another authority."

John 14:26 indicates the same:

"Again, 'He shall send him,' but it is 'in my name.' He leaves out the 'I will ask' but he keeps the 'shall send.'"

John 15:26 and 16:7 indicate the Son's dignity:

"Then again, 'I will send' - his own dignity."

John 16:7 also indicates the Spirit's authority:

"Then 'shall come' - the authority of the Spirit."
As to the frequency of references to the Paraclete in Gregory and the other Cappadocians, cf. Anthony Casurella's remarks (op.cit., 29) in reference to the orthodox writers of the period:

"In the many works which have survived the vicissitudes of the centuries, citations of the Paraclete passages occur in rich and sometimes wasteful profusion. The adherents of the School of Alexandria refer to them almost with abandon. Of these, the blind leader of the School, Didymus, invokes them with the greatest frequency; some sections of Trin. and Spir. contain hardly a page without one or more references. By contrast, the writers under Antiochene influence are much more restrained. The same is true of those neo-Alexandrines, the Cappodocian fathers."

98.1 Gregory had spoken previously of the one essence (μία οὐσία) of the Three (cf. Orat. 21:33 and 35, PG XXXV, 1121D and 1124D), but this is his first recorded use of ὅμοούσιον in reference to the Spirit. Cf. also Orat. 40:41, PG XXXVI, 417B: Θεόν τὰ τρία σὸν ἄλληλοις νοοῦμεν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὴν ὁμοοοσιότητα...: Orat. 31:10, PG XXXVI, 144A, Τι οὖν; ἐν Θεόν τὸ Πνεῦμα; Πάντα γε. Τι οὖν, ὁμοοοσίον; Εἰπὲν Θεός: Orat. 42:16, PG XXXVI, 476C, πιστεύομεν εἰς Πατέρα καὶ Υἱὸν, καὶ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον, ὁμοοοσία τα τε καὶ ὁμοόσιο: Orat. 43:69, PG XXXVI, 589A, έι μὴ σέβοι τὸ Πνεῦμα μετὰ Πατρός καὶ Υἱοῦ, ἢς ὁμοοοσίον καὶ ὁμόσιον.

98.2 A. Casurella, op.cit., 30.

98.3 Marcellus was not strictly Sabellian, although with the general suspicion of Sabellianism in the East he seems to have been represented as such. His views are characterized by J.N.D. Kelly as "reminiscent of Irenaeus, Hippolytus and Tertullian and the 'economic Trinitarianism' associated with them" (op.cit., 241). The Logos, eternally God's self-expression, is generated Son at the Incarnation, not even then a second hypostasis, but an extension of the Monad. With the outpouring of the Spirit, the dyad became a triad, but the process will be reversed after the judgment, and the kingdom of Christ will end as the Son is reabsorbed in the Logos of God. Cf. Th. Zahn, Marcellus von Ancyra, Gotha, 1867. According to Enzo Bellini, "Il Dogma trinitario nei primi discorsi di Gregorio Nazianzeno," Aug, 13 (1973), 525-534, Gregory's Trinitarian thought developed in polemic with two opposing viewpoints, Arianism, and what is called Sabellianism, but is in fact the thought of Marcellus of Ancyra:

"La riflessione (e la formulazione) di Gregorio si svolge in polemica con queste due concezioni, con particolare riferimento alla prima, che - come sarà dimostrato dall'analisi dettagliata - si identifica con
Il pensiero di Marcello di Ancira, così come fu compreso da Eusebio di Cesarea e Cirillo di Gerusalemme e quale abbiamo fondati motivi per pensare che fosse in base ai frammenti dei suoi scritti che sono giunti fino a noi" (Ibid., 528).

Marcellus, as noted, had passed from the scene, but the continued activities of some Nicene rigorists who rejected the language of three hypostases, and the continued existence of the party of Paulinus of Antioch fuelled the continuing suspicions of Sabellianism. Richard P. C. Hanson, in Studies in Christian Antiquity, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1985, 237, refers to Paulinus as "a Sabellian heretic", but in The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988, vii, he moderates this to "the near-Sabellian Paulinus of Antioch". Basil suspected Paulinus of being Sabellian (cf. Ep. 263 and Hanson, Search, 801), but Paulinus satisfied Epiphanius of Salamis in 376 that the charge of Sabellianism brought against him by the Apollinarian rival bishop of Antioch, Vitalis, was untrue. He did so by producing his subscription to the Tomus ad Antiochenos (cf. Hanson, Ibid., 642 and 658f.). On Paulinus, cf. supra, 22, note 4. For Gregory's opposition to Sabellianism cf. infra, 125ff.


"The story of Pentecost, however, is a theological construction in which the phenomena of the descent of the Spirit, the appearance of fire, the great sound, and the proclamation to all the peoples of the world, representatively in their own languages, are modelled on the Jewish traditions of the giving of the Law at Sinai, the parallels with Philo being especially close."

99,2 For Gregory's views of the bodily nature of man, cf. supra, 78 and 79 (esp. 79, note 1) and A.-S. Ellverson, op. cit. Chapter 2, "Man as a spiritual and bodily being." Cf. esp. Ellverson, 31, 32 for the resurrection body. F. W. Norris, in Gregory Nazianzen's Doctrine of Jesus Christ, unpub. Yale Ph.D., 1970, 143ff., sees two conflicting views of the body in Nazianzen's thought. It is viewed both as clay, weighing down the soul, a prison to be escaped from, and as something to be ruled by the Spirit and to be transformed in the resurrection. Specifically for Christ, "the body which Christ assumed was not discarded in his ascent to glory... When he comes again it will be in his body, the flesh which he now has with him in glory" (Ibid., 147). Gregory himself develops his doctrine of the resurrection body of Christ in Ep. 101, To Cleonius (PG XXXVI, 181A):
"If any assert that he has now put off his holy flesh, and that his Godhead is stripped of the body, and deny that he is now with his body and will come again with it, let him not see the glory of his coming. For where is his body now, if not with him who assumed it?"

Cf. also Orat. 30:14, PG XXXVI, 121C:

"For he still pleads even now as Man for my salvation; for he continues to wear the body which he assumed, until he make me god by the power of his Incarnation; although he is no longer known after the flesh - I mean, the passions of the flesh, the same, except sin, as ours."


99,3 For Gregory's distinction between onomata and pragmata, cf. supra, 50. Edmund Hill, in "Our Knowledge of the Trinity," SJT, 27 (1974), 1-11, refers to a leisurely or spasmodic debate over thirty years on the grounds for the doctrine of the Trinity. The starting point was Leonard Hodgson's The Doctrine of the Trinity, London: Nisbet, 1943, in which Hodgson maintained that Trinitarian theology is not dependent on "the acceptance of the Bible as giving revelation in the form of propositions concerning the inner mysteries of the Godhead." Rather Trinitarian theology is the result of rational reflection upon the divine revelation given in the acts of God to which the Bible gives witness. Maurice Wiles, in "Some Reflections on the Origins of the Doctrine of the Trinity," JThS, 8 (1957), 92-106, asks whether the full implications of this change in the understanding of revelation have been realized. He argues that no such Trinity of revelation can be found in God's dealings with mankind. Christian thought about God, at least as much binitarian as trinitarian, took on a threefold character not because the facts required it but simply because a triadic schema was present from the beginning in Scripture. In the fourth century however, faced with Arians and Macedonians, theologians (especially the Cappadocians) emphasized the unity of God, including the unity of all divine operations in the world: opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa. The only difference to be discerned was in the internal relations of the Persons to one another. This produced the serious difficulty that, if there is no distinction whatever in the activity of the Trinity towards us, then we cannot have any knowledge of the distinctions at
Wiles concludes that the Cappadocian construction logically requires the foundation belief that the threefold form of the Godhead is a datum of revelation given in clear propositional form. We are therefore left with three possibilities: to revert to propositional revelation, to identify an inherent threefoldness about every act of God's revelation requiring us to think in trinitarian terms, or to see the Trinity of revelation as a valuable but arbitrary analysis of the activity of God which is not strictly necessary. H. Cunliffe-Jones, in "Two Questions concerning the Holy Spirit," Theology, 75 (1972), 283-298, supports Wiles' choice of the third possibility, and begins to look for ways of differentiating the activities of the Persons of the Trinity meaningfully, which, he says, is essential if the doctrine is to be valuable. Bernard M.G. Reardon, in an appended comment, sees this disposing of the indivisa rule as a threat to the unity of God.

Edmund Hill's answer was to accept the inadequacy of the Hodgson view of revelation in act only to support the doctrine of the Trinity. He opts instead for a view of revelation which he attributes to Barth and Rahner and to Rowley and Dodd: that God reveals himself to men by act and word, in the events of salvation history as attested and interpreted by Scripture. He then proceeds to an examination of Augustine to demonstrate that this is essentially the view of revelation assumed by the Fathers. In Augustine, the 'missions' of the Son and the Spirit, that is, the coming of each into the world in the incarnation and at Pentecost reveal the 'processions', the distinct relations within the eternal Trinity. This appears to be the view also of Gregory of Nazianzus in this particular passage. He bases the eternal distinction between Son and Spirit upon their distinct actions at the Ascension and Pentecost as interpreted, he believes, in John.

The argument of David Brown in The Divine Trinity, London: Duckworth, 1985, from the historicity of Pentecost to the distinctiveness of the Spirit is comparable to what seems to be implicit here in Gregory (cf. Ibid., 176ff.). But Brown quite loses the paradox of the Three-yet-One which is fundamental to Gregory's doctrine of the Trinity (cf. infra, 124ff). Looking for logical coherence, he must opt for one side of the paradox. He opts for the Three in what becomes not an Arian but (despite disclaimers) a Trithestic form, by advocating a development of the generic idea of unity found in Basil.

99,4 Ora t. 41: 12, PG XXXVI, 445A:

'Εν γλώσσαις δέ, διά τήν πρός τόν Λόγον οικείωσιν. Πυρίναις δέ, ζητώ πότερον διά τήν κάθαρσιν... ἕ διά τήν οὐσίαν. Πῦρ γάρ ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν, καὶ πῦρ κατανάλισχον, τήν μοχθηρίαν, κάντ πάλιν ἀγανακτής τῷ ὑμοιουσίῳ.

"It is therefore, I believe, true, although to say this may sound paradoxical, that the central theme of this study of our experience of God as Spirit is Descendit de caelo, 'He came down from heaven.' This is not, of course, meant as a reaffirmation of the traditional credal mythology of the descent into the world, from another realm or order of being, of a pre-existent Jesus Christ... It is, rather, an assertion of the continual descent of transcendent deity into immanence.
which is involved in the (possibly everlasting) process of creation."

He later explains:

"The mythological picture of kenōsis (of the Son), however, must be transferred to a much larger canvas. It depicts for us the Creator-Spirit's descent to the level of his human creatures, his age-long incarnation of himself in human personality, and the continuance of his suffering at the hands of his human creation until the ultimate accomplishment of his creative purpose for them."

Clearly that is not what Gregory meant by the descent of the Spirit. Imbued with Greek culture and disciple of Origen as he was, one suspects that he would have found any such idea of an eternal process of creation too close to Origen's speculations and indeed perhaps too "mythological". For Gregory, the descent of the Spirit was not a process, but an event in the oikonomia.

100,6 John 13:31f; 14:13; 17:1

100,7 John 16:14

101,1 The glorifying of the Spirit in the worship of the Church was of course the point at issue in Basil's defence in the De Spiritu Sancto of the doxology glorifying the Father μετὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ σῶν τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἀγίῳ. Cf. supra, 40, and esp. De Spir. Sanc., XVIII (46).

101,2 Orat. 41:11, PG XXXVI, 444B:

οὐ νῦν μερισμός τῶν πυρίνων γλωσσῶν, ὡς καὶ πανηγυρίζομεν.

101,3 Ibid., 444C: συγγινόμενος τε καὶ συμπολιτευόμενον.

101,4 Orat. 41:16, PG XXXVI, 449B. Cf. Gen. 11:1-9. Gregory had just discussed (41:15, PG XXXVI, 449AB) whether the event described in Acts 2:1-13 was a miracle of speaking, or a miracle of hearing. Cf. supra, 55f. He engages in a little word-play on 'tongue' as speech and 'tongues' of fire. Cf. earlier in the Pentecost oration where he appears to be replying to a heckler (Orat. 41:10, PG XXXVI, 441D-444A):

"Honour the Day of the Spirit. Restrain your tongue a little if you can. It is time to speak of other tongues - reverence them or fear them, when you see that they are of fire."
But the tongues of the day of Pentecost are not an ecstasy. Cf. the Last Farewell (Orat. 42:22, PG XXXVI, 485A):

"I should not be surprised if I were imprisoned...or even be thought full of new wine as were in later days the disciples of Christ, because they spoke with tongues, since men knew not that it was the power of the Spirit, and not a distraction of mind (οὐ φρενῶν ἐχθασί τις).


102,2 Orat. 2:3, PG XXXV, 409C.

102,3 The reference here is not Pauline but to the Epis. to the Hebrews 8:2.

102,4 Orat 19:8, PG XXXV, 1052C:

*eis ἐγερόν τέλειον, εἰς κατοικητήριον Χριστοῦ, εἰς ναὸν ἔγιον, συντιθέμενοι, καὶ συναρμολογούμενοι τῇ ἀρχιτεκτονίᾳ τοῦ Πνεύματος.*


102,5 Orat. 24:2, PG XXXV, 1172C:

τηρήσειν τὴν ἑνότητα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τῷ συνδέσμῳ τῆς εἰρήνης.

Cf. Eph. 4:3.

102,6 Orat. 32:11, PG XXXVI, 185D. Cf. Rom. 12:5 and Eph. 4:16. Cf. also Orat. 6:4, PG XXXV, 725C:

οἱ τῆς κεφαλῆς, σῶμα ἐν συναρμολογούμενι καὶ συμβιβαζόμενοι κατὰ πᾶσαν συνάφειαν τῆν ἐν Πνεύματι.

Also Orat. 6:7, PG XXXV, 729BC:

καὶ εἰς τὸν οἶχον τοῦ θεοῦ πορευόμενα ἐν ὁμονοία, καὶ μίαν ἀρμονίαν ἡρμοσμένα τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος.

102,7 Orat. 34:6, PG XXXVI, 245C:

...Τὰ μὲν γὰρ σῶματα τόπῳ συνάπτεται, γυχαὶ δὲ Πνεύματι συναρμόζονται.

For Basil's idea that the Spirit is the "place" of the sanctified, cf. supra, 42, note 7.
Lossky regards the breathing of the Holy Spirit by the risen Christ in Jn.20:19-23 as a "first communication of the Holy Spirit...made to the whole Church, to the Church as a body...a presence of the Holy Spirit which is not so much personal as functional in relation to Christ, by whom the Spirit is given - the bond of unity in the Church." The communication of the Spirit at Pentecost was however his personal coming:

"Then he appeared under the form of divided tongues of fire which rested upon each one of those who were present: upon each member of the body of Christ. This is no longer a communication of the Spirit to the Church considered corporately. This communication is far from being a function of unity. The Holy Spirit communicates himself to persons, marking each member of the Church with a seal of personal and unique relationship to the Trinity, becoming present in each person" (Ibid., 168).
To say that the work of Christ concerns human nature while the work of the Spirit concerns persons is surely not adequate. Christ not only assumes our common human nature, he comes among us as a Person to persons. Conversely, the work of the Spirit concerns not only each person, but, as Gregory teaches, the whole body of Christ. The Spirit not only diversifies: he also unifies. Further, to contrast in the way Lossky does, the insufflation of John 20 and Pentecost is artificial. Cf. John D. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, London: DLT, 1985, 127f., and the earlier article, "Human Capacity and Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood," *SJT*, 28 (1975), 401-447, esp. 433ff.

The Gradual Revelation of the Trinity

105,1 Orat. 31:21, PG XXXVI, 156C:

Πάλιν καὶ πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖτς ημῖν τὸ ἀγαφων.

105,2 Orat. 31:21-24, PG XXXVI, 156C-156C.

105,3 Orat. 31:24-25, PG XXXVI, 160CD-161A.

106,1 Orat. 31:26, PG XXXVI, 161C:

Τοῦτω τὸ τῆς θεολογίας εἰκάζειν ἔχω, πλὴν ὅσον ἔκ τῶν ἐναντίων... ἐκήρυσε φανερῶς ἡ Παλαία τὸν Πατέρα, τὸν ᾿Ιηνὸν ἄμμυρότερον. Ἡ φανέρωσις ἡ Κατανή τὸν Ηθόν, ὑπέδειξε τοῦ Πνεύματος τὴν θεότητα. Ἡ ἐμποτίσεται γιὰ τὸ Πνεῦμα, σαφεστέραν ἡμῖν παρέχων τὴν ἐκατούς ἡλίων. Ὑπὲρ ὅτι ἄρατές ἡμῖν τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς θεότητος ἀμολογηθήσεις, τὸν ᾿Ιηνὸν ἀκούσας ἐφροτέσθαι: μηδὲ τῆς τοῦ ᾿Ιηνοῦ παραδεχθήσεις, τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἡγιον, ἔν τε ἔπω τι καὶ τολμηρότερον, ἐπιφορτίζονται.

Cf. Carm. I, 1, 3, 15-28, PG XXXVII, 409A.

106,2 Orat. 31:26, PG XXXVI, 161C-164A:

ταῖς δὲ κατὰ μέρος προσθήκαις, καὶ, ὡς εἴπεν Δαυὶδ, ἀναφάσει, καὶ ἐκ δόξης εἰς δόξαν προοδοις καὶ προκοπαῖς, τὸ τῆς Τριάδος φῶς ἐκλάμψει τοῖς λαμπροτέροις.

(PG gives the reading ἐκλάμψη, followed by Mason, but Gallay in the SC edition prefers ἐκλάμψει). Gallay comments in Grégoire de Nazianze: Discours 27-31 (Sources chrétiennes, 250), Paris: Cerf, 1978, 326: "Ce § 26 établit un lien entre l'histoire du salut et la doctrine de Dieu. C'est un point d'une importance capitale..."

Mgr Damaskinos comments on this passage,

"Le Saint Esprit qui habite l'Eglise, la remplit et la conduit à la perfection par un processus 'd'additions partielles' selon l'expression de Grégoire de Nazianze. Il entend par là la montée dont parle David (Ps. 84:6), la transformation de gloire en gloire, au cours de laquelle la 'Lumière de la Trinité' apparaît aux illuminés dans tout son éclat. Ce processus présuppose, sans malentendu, que le Saint Esprit révèle, dans chaque phase de l'illumination, quelque chose de nouveau qui est nécessaire au salut des hommes. Ce qui est révélé par le Saint Esprit n'apparaît 'tout à la fois' ni ne se cache 'jusqu'à la fin'." (Mgr Damaskinos, "La disponibilité au Saint
Possibly, if the theory is viewed as an explanation of the lack of clear statements in the books of the New Testament about the Spirit's deity, the third era ought to begin after all of these were written. Yet, there is no clear point in the oikonomia from which to date this change and in any case Gregory sees the present day of the Church beginning at Pentecost. Cf. Gallay's comment in his long foot-note referred to supra, 106, note 2.

Orat. 31:26, PG XXXVI, 164A:

Αἱ ἀρχές εἰς τὸν Σωτήρα... καὶ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸτε βαστασθῆναι τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐλέγετο... Καὶ πάλιν, πάντα διδαχθήσωσαι ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐννόημαντος. Τούτων ἐν εὐνοίᾳ νομίζω καὶ αὐτήν τοῦ Πνεύματος τὴν θεότητα, τρανουμένην εἰς ἑστερον... καὶ τὴν τοῦ Σωτήρος ἄποκαταστάσιν...

Orat. 31:27, PG XXXVI, 164B.

Ibid., 164ABC:


According to G.W.H. Lampe, the idea of the progressive, post-scriptural revelation of the Spirit's deity was a
"common explanation" of the "awkward fact" that "direct Scriptural evidence for the deity of the Holy Spirit as a distinct hypostasis was hard to find." He gives Gr. Naz. Orat. 31:22ff. as a reference (op. cit., 217). Yet according to D.F. Winslow, "Gregory appears to be the first patristic author to use this theory of 'progressive revelation' to express the novelty of a doctrine, a doctrine which in this case asserts the full deity of the Spirit" (op. cit., 125). He refers to J.N.D. Kelly, who called it "a highly original theory of doctrinal development" (op. cit., 261), and also to R.P.C. Hanson's article, "Basil's Doctrine of Tradition in Relation to the Holy Spirit," VC, 22 (1968), 241-255. But Hanson says of this section of Gregory that it is "a fine exposition of the gradualness of God's revelation, very largely borrowed from Origen" (Ibid., 253). Cf. A. Casarella, op. cit., 6, on Origen's view of John 16:12, and op. cit., 13, on Tertullian's view.


"This then is the order of the rule of our faith, and the foundation of the building, and the stability of our conversation: God, the Father, not made, not material, invisible; one God, the creator of all things: this is the first point of our faith. The second point is: The Word of God, Son of God, Christ Jesus our Lord, who was manifested to the prophets according to the form of their prophesying and according to the method of the dispensation of the Father: through whom all things were made; who also at the end of times, to complete and gather up all things, was made man among men, visible and tangible, in order to abolish death and show forth life and produce a community of union between God and man. And the third point is: The Holy Spirit, through whom the prophets prophesied, and the fathers learned the things of God, and the righteous were led forth into the way of righteousness; and who in the end of times was poured out in a new way upon mankind in all the earth, renewing man unto God."

Robinson draws attention to the similarity between Irenaeus's account of "the Preaching of the Apostles" and the baptismal confession later called the "Apostles' Creed" (op. cit., V). The latter also bears witness to the same Triadic order (τριάς) of revelation. Cf. Tertullian, De Praescriptione Haereticorum, 13, on the rule of faith. For an introduction to the Economic Trinity of Hippolytus and Tertullian, cf. J.N.D. Kelly, op. cit., 110-115.

Maurice Wiles (op.cit., cf. supra, 99, note 3) argued that if revelation is not given in the Bible in propositions, then the events of revelation must be unquestionably of a threefold character to compel us to postulate a threefold character in God. He reviews and dismisses three possible threefold schemas of God's activity: creation, redemption and sanctification; the Origenist schéma of ranges of activity, all creation, rational life, the sanctified; and the Old Testament dispensation, the Incarnation and the New Testament dispensation. The Cappadocian doctrine, according to Wiles so emphasized the unity of external operations (opera trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt) that only the internal relations distinguished the hypostaseis, and they were deduced from the statements of Scripture. There were no differences in the relations of the hypostaseis to the world. "The Cappadocian construction was built upon and logically requires the foundation belief that the threefold form of the Godhead is a datum of revelation given in clear propositional form."
NOTES for Chapter IV : THE TRINITY AND THE SPIRIT


"Unter den grossen Kirchenlehrern, die im vierten Jahrhundert, das vorzugsweise das Zeitalter der trinitarischen Kämpfe genannt zu werden verdient, das Dreieinigkeitsdogma gegen die damaligen Gegensätze mit Geist und Kraft entwickelt und verteidigt haben, strahlt besonders Gregor von Nazianz mit unvergänglichem Ruhm."


"Wer von diesen drei [Basil, Gregory and Gregory) mehr und wer weniger dazu beigetragen hat, ist nicht leicht zu sagen, weil man den Beitrag des Einzelnen zu einer geistlichen Errungenschaft einer Gemeinschaft nicht immer an äusseren, feststellbaren Merkmalen messen kann. Wenn man aber trotzdem hier etwas summarisch reden dürfte, so könnte man sagen, dass Gregor von Nazianz im Grossen und Ganzen derjenige ist, dem wir die vollständige Trinitätslehre verdanken" (Ibid., 86).


112,4 Orat. 38:8, PG XXXVI, 320B:

θεοῦ δὲ ὅταν εἶπο, λέγω Πατρὸς, καὶ Υἱοῦ, καὶ ΄Αγίου Πνεύματος: οὕτω ὅπερ ταῦτα τῆς θεότητος χειρομένης...οὕτω ἐντὸς τούτων ὑπομενομένης... οὕτω μὲν οὖν τὰ Ἀγία τῶν Ἁγίων, ὡς καὶ τοῖς σεραφήμις συγκαλύπτεται, καὶ δοξάζεται τρισίν ἄγιασμοίς, εἰς μίαν συνισταν χυριότητα καὶ θεότητα.

113,1 Cf. J. Plagnieux, op.cit., 37:

"La Révélation seule est à la base de sa théologie trinitaire: il ne le dit pas toujours ex professo, mais cela ressort de toute son argumentation: c'est là pour lui, vérité primordiale, indiscutable."
H. Pinault comments on this use of John 1:9 (Le platonisme de Saint Grégoire de Nazianze, La Rochelle-sur-Yon: Romain, 1925, 216):

"Il faut convenir cependant qu'il a parfois accommodé de grands textes bibliques à sa doctrine, comme le Prologue de Saint Jean, appliqué à la Trinité. Lui-même avoue que cette accommodation pourrait paraître assez audacieuse, 'toujours autant de Triade phénoménale, maintenant défini par la relation de l'Éternel à la Créature.' Mais à côté de ce texte 'accommodé', n'en cite-t-il pas un grand nombre qui expriment nettement la divinité de chacune des trois personnes divines et qui autorisent cette accommodation? Au cours de ces cinq discours théologiques où il expose sa doctrine trinitaire, bien des pages essentielles présentent des analyses minutieuses et des interprétations savantes, mais fidèles des textes bibliques; quelquefois son discours est un véritable tissu de citations d'Écriture, simplement unies par quelques mots de lui. C'est assez dire combien l'Evêque de Nazianze a su donner un fondement scripturaire authentique et large à son enseignement trinitaire et combien il s'est affirmé remarquable exégète."

For a precedent for this use in Orat. 31:3 of Ps. 36:9 one need look no further than Origen's De Princ. 1, 1, 1. But Origen sees no reference to the Spirit here, but only to the Son: "Such is the meaning of the expression, 'In thy light we see light,' i.e. in thy Word and Wisdom, which is thy Son, in himself we shall see thee, the Father." Cf. also supra, 67, and infra, 120, note 6.

Cf. Orat. 34:13, PG XXXVI, 253A:

Μετὰ δὲ λεγήτω, πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸν ἅγιον τὸν Υἱόν: ὅστε τῷ ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡμᾶς ζευγαρισμένης τῷ πνεύματι τούτῳ ζώον: οὗ τι δὲν γενότοι τηλαγενεστέρων;

J. Rousse (op.cit., 941) states that Orat. 31 "reprend toute l'argumentation d'Athanasie, Lettres à Sérapion." Certainly two of the axioms of the Letters to Serapion (cf. supra, 30-38) are fundamental to the Fifth Theological Oration, namely, the unity of the Trinity and the Creator-creature disjunction. The other axiom concerned with the relationships between Father, Son and Spirit and described supra, 33ff., as a relationship of proportion or a series relationship, has an epistemological significance for Athanasius, implying that our knowledge of God must be taken from the Son. In Gregory's Fifth Theological Oration, however, the intra-Trinitarian relationships are not viewed as a series relationship or a relationship of proportion with the Son as the middle term. Rather, the relationships are seen as the basis for the ontological distinction of the
three hypostaseis and their differentiation as unbegotten, begotten and proceeding. Gregory also has a different response to the "grandfather or two sons" argument. Athanasius replies with an argument about the use of language, but Gregory uses the idea of procession to escape from the dilemma of "two sons" or "grandson".

113,3 In addition to this argument from the Trinity to the deity of the Spirit in the opening paragraphs of the oration, Gregory also develops a line of argument to persuade those who already accept the Spirit's existence as a distinct hypostasis (5-6) and after defending the coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity (which is inseparable from the deity of the Spirit) in the central section of the oration (7-20), he argues for the Spirit's deity from the oikonomia (25-27) (having first developed the hermeneutical point that Scripture implies more than it explicitly states in 21-24), from worship and baptism (28), and from the titles and acts attributed to him in Scripture (29-30). The oration concludes with an examination of the traditional illustrations of the Trinity (31-33).

i(a) Faith is Faith in the Holy Trinity

114,1 Cf. Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, London: Lutterworth, 1949, 206, for this view:

"The ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity, established by the dogma of the ancient Church, is not a Biblical kerygma, therefore it is not the kerygma of the Church, but it is a theological doctrine which defends the central faith of the Bible and of the Church. Hence it does not belong to the sphere of the Church's message, but it belongs to the sphere of theology; in this sphere it is the work of the Church to test and examine its message, in the light of the Word of God given to the Church. Certainly in this process of theological reflection the doctrine of the Trinity is central."

114,2 Orat. 1:7, PG XXXV, 401A: Gregory speaks of those who "would lead you away from the sound faith...":

καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ὑγιεῦς πίστεως ἀπαγόρευσης, τῆς εἰς Πατέρα, καὶ Ὡλόν, καὶ ἄγιον Πνεῦμα, τὴν μίαν θεότητα τε καὶ δύναμιν.

114,3 Orat. 6:22, PG XXXV, 749B:

...άλλα πάντες μένωμεν ἐν ἐνὶ Πνεύματι...φυλάσσοντες τὴν καλὴν παρακαταθήκην, ἡν παρὰ τῶν Πατέρων εἰληφαμεν, προσκυνοῦντες Πατέρα, καὶ Ὡλόν, καὶ ἄγιον Πνεῦμα: ἐν
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115,1 Orat. 40:44, PG XXXVI, 421C. Cf. supra, 72f., where this passage was quoted to illustrate a slightly different point.

115,2 Orat. 36:10, PG XXXVI, 277B:

...έλαν τὴν εἰς Πατέρα, καὶ Υἱόν, καὶ Ἁγιον Πνεῦμα ἰδιολογίαν ἀκλίνη καὶ βεβαιαν φυλάττετε...

115,3 Orat. 29:21, PG XXXVI, 1048:

...ἐν ἐχὴς γε σφοιξαν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τὴν Τριάδα, καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς Τριάδος σφοίξεθα...

Cf. Orat. 40:10, PG XXXVI, 372A:

...καταπατήσω ἐπάνω δῷθεν καὶ σχορπιῶν, τῇ Τριάδι τετείχισμένος.

In Orat. 40:17, Gregory urges parents not to give their children amulets or incantations, but to give them the Trinity "that great and noble guard (τὸ μέγα καὶ καλὸν φυλακτήριον)."

115,4 Orat. 40:16, PG XXXVI, 380B:

'Ἐώς εἴ κατηχούμενος, ἐν προθύρῳ εἴ τῆς εὐσεβείας. Εἴσω γενέσθαι σε δεξ, τὴν αὐλήν διαβήναι, τά Ἁγία καταπτεθασί, εἰς τά 'Ἁγία τῶν Ἁγίων παραχύσαι, μετά τῆς Τριάδος γενέσθαι.

The imagery of the "porch of religion" makes its reappearance in the writings of that eighteenth-century Oxford tutor in Greek and student of the Fathers, John Wesley, in his often quoted summary of Methodist doctrine:

"Our main doctrines, which include all the rest, are three - that of Repentance, of Faith, and of Holiness. The first of these we account, as it were, the porch of religion; the next, the door; the third, religion itself" (Letter to Rev. Thos. Church, June 1746, Standard Letters, ed. Telford, Vol. II, 268).

115,5 Orat. 3:6, PG XXXV, 521C:

παρ' στὰς Πατήρ οὐχοῦται, καὶ Υἱὸς ἵσσεται, καὶ Πνεῦμα Ἁγίον συνδοξάζεται.

115,6 Orat. 13:4, PG XXXV, 856BC:

Διδάσκει προσκυνεῖν Θεὸν τὸν Πατέρα, Θεὸν τὸν Υἱόν, Θεὸν τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἁγιον, ἐν τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσιν, ἐν μιᾷ δόξη
This is only the second occurrence in Gregory's orations of the ascription of the title 'God' directly and specifically to the Holy Spirit. The first is in the previous oration, 12:6, PG XXXV, 849C:

ἐν Πατρὶ παντοκράτορι, καὶ τῷ μοναχεῖν Λόγῳ, καὶ τῷ Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι καὶ θεῷ


115,7 Orat. 21:37, PG XXXV, 1128BC:

καὶ τὸν λαὸν τόνδε διεξάγοις τέλειον τελείας τῆς Τριάδος προσκυνητήν, τῆς ἐν Πατρὶ, καὶ Υἱῷ, καὶ Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι θεωρούμενης καὶ σέβομένης.


116,2 Orat. 19:17, PG XXXV, 1064B:

λειτουργώμεν θεῷ τὴν αἴνεσιν, τὴν μίαν Πατρὸς, καὶ Υιοῦ, καὶ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος, καὶ θεωρούμενις καὶ ἀνυψωτέες τὴν τῆς θεότητος δόξαν τε καὶ λαμπρότητα, ὅτι αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα, καὶ ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἡ προσκυνησίας εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. Ἀμήν.

Cf. Orat. 10:4, PG XXXV, 832A; Orat. 26:19, PG XXXV, 125C; Orat. 31:33, PG XXXVI, 172B; Orat. 34:15, PG XXXVI, 256A; Orat. 45:30, PG XXXVI, 664BC. On Basil's defence of σοῦ τῷ Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι, cf. supra, 40ff. Gregory uses variations of this form in doxologies in Orat. 8:23, PG XXXV, 817A; Orat. 9:6, PG XXXV, 825D (σοῦ τῷ Ἁγίῳ καὶ ζωοποιῇ Πνεύματι); Orat. 17:13, PG XXXV, 981A; Orat. 41:18, PG XXXVI, 452C; Orat. 44:12, PG XXXVI, 621A. Cf. also variant reading of Orat. 16:20, PG XXXV, 964A. The doxology which appears in Orat. 33:17, PG XXXVI, 237A (σοῦ τῷ ἀνάρχῃ Πατρὶ, καὶ ζωοποίῃ Πνεύματι) is a later addition. Cf. C. Moreschini, *Grégoire de Nazianze: Discours 32-37*, (Sources chrétiennes, 318), Paris: Cerf, 1985, 196.

116,3 Orat. 20:5, PG XXXV, 1072A:

Προσκυνοῦμεν οὖν Πατέρα, καὶ Υἱόν, καὶ Ἁγίον Πνεῦμα, τὰς μὲν ἰδιότητας χαρίζοντες, ἐνοῦντες δὲ τὴν θεότητα.


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IV(b) The Beatific Vision: the Light of the Trinity

117.1 Cf. quotation from Orat. 31:3, supra, 113.

117.2 Orat. 8:23, PG XXXV, 816C:

κρίσιμον μὲν οὖν εὗ οἰδὰ καὶ μακρὸν τιμιώτερα τὰ παρόντα
οὐν ἡ κατὰ τὰ ὅψεις, ἢς ἔφρασατον μιγήλον
γοηία, τὰς ὀδρανία, βοῦς θεωρία, τὴν τε ἀλής καὶ
tῆς ἀνωτάτης Τριάδος ἐλλαμπόσης καθαρότερα τε καὶ
tελεωτερά, μηκέτι ἀποφευγόσης τὸν δέσμιον νοῦν καὶ
dιαγεμένον ταῖς αισθήσεσιν, ἀλλ' ὅλης διψάνοι
θεωρομένης τε καὶ κρατουμένης, καὶ προσαπαπτούσης
tαῖς ἡμετέραις συχαῖς διψά τῷ φωτὶ τῆς θεότητος.

Cf. Heb. 12:22f.: ἀλλὰ προσελκύθησε Σιών ὅρει καὶ πόλει
θεοῦ ζῶντος, ἔρωταλήμ ἐποιανίκ, καὶ μυρίσαν ἄγγελων,
πανηγυρίζει... Cf. also Rev. 5:9; 14:3. Cf. also the lines
from De Contemptu Mundi by Bernard of Cluny: "The shout of
them that triumph, / The song of them that feast."

117.3 Orat. 15:6, PG XXXV, 945C:

καὶ τοὺς μὲν τὸ ἐφραστὸν φῶς διαδέχεται, καὶ ἡ τῆς
ἀγίας καὶ βασιλικῆς θεωρία Τριάδος ἐλλαμπόσης
tρανότερον τε καὶ καθαρότερον, καὶ δήλη διψά
μυγμένης, ἢν δὴ καὶ μόνην μάλιστα βασιλείαν ὀδρανῶν
ἐγὼ τίθεμαι.

118.1 Orat. 43:82, PG XXXVI, 605A:

συνεποπεύοντες τὴν ἁγίαν καὶ μακραίαν Τριάδα,
καθαρότερον τε καὶ τελεώτερον, ἢς νῦν μετρίσε καὶ
tέλειμα τὰς ἐμφάσεις...

Cf. Orat. 11:6, PG XXXV, 840B:

καὶ τῷ φωτὶ τῆς μακραίας καὶ ἀρχηγῆς Τριάδος, εὗ οἰδ',
ὅτι ἐλλαμπούσης τρανότερον τε καὶ καθαρότερον, εἶς
haust ēπιπεσθάκαμεν, καὶ ὡτερεύμεν, καὶ ἡ ἠμαλαγή,
καὶ ἡ ἡμολογούμεν ἐμπροσθεν θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων...

Cf. also Orat. 20:12, PG XXXV, 1080C:

ὅλη τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος τὴν ἐλλαμψιν, ἡτὶς ἑστὶ, καὶ
οἶα, καὶ δὴ...

Cf. Carm. 11, I, 1, 194-202, PG XXXVII, 984-985:

Ἐξ ὁδ γὰρ πράσιστον ἀποτμέξας βιώτων
ψυχῆν ὀδρανοῦσιν νομίσας μίας φασινοῦς,
καὶ με φάροι νόσοι αίτιος ἀπὸπρόποι σορχὸς ἔθηκεν,
'Ενθὲν ἀναστήσας, σημνὴς δὲ μὲ κρύψε μυχοῖς
Οὐδανίας, Τριάδος δὲ φασος περίλαμψεν ὑπωπᾶς
Ever since I first severed my soul from earthly life
To live with heavenly and luminous contemplations,
When I was carried by the Supreme Mind and set far from
flesh,
Thence made to rise, hidden in the secret places of the
heavenly tabernacle,
From that day, around me has shined the light of
The Trinity, whose brilliance is beyond conception;
Enthroned on high, pouring out the common and ineffable
flame;
That which is the source of all below which time excludes
from above;
From then I was dead to the world, and the world to me.

"Ainsi, notre théologien rencontra dans ce milieu tout
un ensemble d'idées que nous allons retrouver
fréquemment dans son oeuvre. Ces conceptions
philosophiques et ces formules morales n'étaient pas
proprement l'apanage d'une école. Elles étaient
communes, plus ou moins évidemment, au gnosticisme des
Basilide et des Valentin, au néo-platonisme de Plotin,
et jusqu'à un certain point, à l'enseignement chrétien
du Didascalé, depuis Clément et Origène. Parmi ces
idées, il y avait l'opposition dualiste du monde
sensible et du monde intelligible dressés l'un contre
l'autre, le mépris du monde sensible et de la chair, la
nécessité de se purifier du corps, principe de
déchéance, et de se séparer par l'ascétisme de la vie
sensible jusqu'à l'impassibilité, la vertu consistant à
vaincre l'influence pernicieuse de la chair sur
l'esprit afin de mériter l'union contemplative à Dieu,
la 'θεωσία'. Tout cela, bien qu'avec des nuances,
était enseigné dans l'école gnostique et dans celle de
Plotin, comme au Didascalé Chrétien."

On Gregory's view of the body cf. supra, 78f., esp. 79, note
1, and 99, note 2.

Πείθομαι δ' ὅτι καὶ τῇ πρεσβείᾳ νῦν μᾶλλον, ἢ πρότερον
τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, διὸ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγγίζει θεό, τὰς
σωματικὰς πέντε ἀποστισάμενος, καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμολογίας τῶν
νόμων λύος ἀπηλλαγμένος, καὶ γυμνός γυμνὸς ἐντυγχάνον τῇ
πρώτῃ καὶ καθαρωτάτῃ νοτι...
Here Gregory seems to view the prospect of the naked spirit before God more positively than Paul (II Cor. 5:2f.), who longed "to put on our heavenly dwelling, so that by putting it on we may not be found naked (οὐ γὰρ τοῦτον εὑρεθησόμεθα)."

Cf. Thomas Binney's hymn, "Eternal Light!" which reflects an imagery very close to Gregory's. Cp. esp. here the third stanza:

"O how shall I, whose native sphere
Is dark, whose mind is dim,
Before the Ineffable appear,
And on my naked spirit bear
The uncreated beam?"


"... when that within us which is godlike and divine, I mean our mind and reason shall have mingled with its like, and the image shall have ascended to the archetype..."

118,4 Orat. 21:2, PG XXXV, 1084C. Cf. supra, 79, note 1.

119,1 Orat. 21:1, PG XXXV, 1084A. Gregory adheres to the dualism of the kosmos noëtos and the kosmos aisthētos which Athanasius himself had discarded. Cf. T.F. Torrance's comment, quoted supra, 31, note 2.

Cf. Orat. 28:30, PG XXXVI, 69A:

"Have you considered the importance of the fact that a heathen writer speaks of the sun as holding the same position among material objects as God does among objects of thought?"


The model of God as intellectual light, enlightening the understanding as the sun enlightens the eyes is found in a prominent place in Origen's De Principiis in the opening paragraph of his doctrine of God (De Prin. 1, 1, 1).

119,2 Orat. 40:5, PG XXXVI, 364B:
Gregory proceeds immediately in this passage to speak of angels and men as lights also.

An early example of this threefold order of God, angel and man appears in the First Oration on Peace, where at the end of an important early paragraph on the Trinity, Gregory speaks of the Triad alone entering the Holy of Holies "and leaving all creatures outside and shut off partly by the first veil and partly by the second, by the first, the heavenly and angelic host parted from the Godhead; by the second we men severed from the angels" (Orat. 6:22, PG XXXV, 749D - 752A). But his most extended development of the idea occurs in a passage in the Christmas oration, On the Theophany or Birthday of the Saviour (Orat. 38:9-11, PG XXXVI, 320C-324B). There Gregory gives us an outline of his doctrine of Creation. He conceives of the angels as "secondary splendours (λαμπρότητες δεύτεραι)" and thinks of them as "intelligent spirits (νοερά πνεύματα)" or as fire of an immaterial and incorruptible kind. He comments:

"Akin to deity are those natures which are intellectual, and only to be comprehended by mind, but alien to it are all those subject to the senses... (Οὐχέστον μὲν γὰρ θεότητος, αἱ νοερὰ φύσεις, καὶ νῦν μόνον λαμπταί: ἔνεν δὲ παντάπασιν, ὁσαὶ ὑπὸ τὴν αἰθήσεαν..." (PG XXXVI, 321B).


119,3 Orat. 21:31, PG XXXV, 1120A.
119,4 Orat. 27:3, PG XXXVI, 13D.
120,1 Orat. 31:26, PG XXXVI, 161D. Cf. supra, 106, note 2.
120,2 Orat. 33:11, PG XXXVI, 228C.
120,3 Orat. 39:11, PG XXXVI, 345C:

Appearance of the Lord in the country of the Jews...
Heinrich Dörrie, in "Die Epiphanius Predigt des Gregor von Nazianz," Kyriakon, Münster: Aschendorff, 1970, 402-423, comments on the references in this sentence both to Plato (Letters, 341C) and to Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus (the same verb, περιστράφητε, is used in Acts 9:3):


120,4 Orat. 31:3, PG XXXVI, 136B: Φῶς, καὶ φῶς, καὶ φῶς; ἄλλα ἐν φῶς, εἰς θεός. Gregory has just applied John 1:9 to each of the members of the Trinity. Each is the true light, therefore there is 'light, and light, and light' ('Light thrice repeated' is the Browne and Swallow translation), but yet there is one light and one God. Cf. supra, 113.

120,5 Orat. 31:14, PG XXXVI, 149A: καὶ οὗτον ἐν ἡλίῳ τρισίν ἐχομένοις ἄλληλων, μιὰ τοὺ φωτὸς σύγχρασις. Cf., infra, 138, note 2. Athanasius taught the coinherence of Father, Son and Spirit (cf. supra, 35, note 5) but had rejected the model of three suns in Contra Arianos III, 15, preferring the sun and its radiance:

"For as the illustration shews, we do not introduce three Origins (τρεῖς ἄρχας) or three Fathers, as the followers of Marcion and Manichaeans; since we have not suggested the image of three suns (τριῶν ἥλιων), but sun and radiance (ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύγασμα). And one is the light from the sun in the radiance; and so we know of but one origin; and the All-framing Word we confess to have no other manner of Godhead (τρόπον θεότητος)
than that of the only God, because he is born \(\varphi \nu \kappa \varepsilon \alpha \nu \kappa \varepsilon \alpha \nu\) from him."

Gregory of Nyssa, by contrast, developed this model in Against Eunomius I, 36. Cf. infra, 122, note 3.

120,6 Cf. Orat. 44:3, PG XXXVI, 609B: τριλαμπές. Cf. Orat. 34:13, PG XXXVI, 253A, and Orat. 40:34, PG XXXVI, 408C, where Ps. 36:9 is used: "With David be enlightened, who said to the Light, 'In thy Light we shall see Light,' that is, in the Spirit, the Son." Cf. supra, 67 and 113.


121,1 F.W. Norris, op.cit. (thesis), 103.

121,2 Cf. supra, 113, note 2.

121,3 Ad Ser., I, 19.

121,4 De Spir. Sanc. XXVI, (64). Cf. also IX (23).

121,5 Orat. 31:32, PG XXXVI, 169B:

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\text{Πάλιν ἡλιον ἔνεθυμην, καὶ ἀκτίνα, καὶ φῶς, Ἄλλα κάνταυθα δέος...μη τὸν Πατέρα μὲν οὐσιώσαμεν, τάλλα δὲ μη ὑποστήσαμεν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις θεοῦ ποιήσαμεν, ἐνυπαρχόσας, οὐχ ὑφεστώσας. Οὔτε γὰρ ἀκτίς, οὔτε φῶς, ἄλλος ἡλιος, ἄλλ’ ἡλιακαί τινες ἀπόρροιαι, καὶ ποιότητες οὐσιώδεις.}
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Cf. B.S. Schultzze, "Bulgakovs 'Utešitel' und Gregor der Theologe über den Ausgang des heiligen Geistes," OrChP, 39
Schultze’s article is a reply to Bulgakov’s criticism of Western theologians’ attempts to find a basis for the filioque clause (that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son) in Gregory’s theology. Bulgakov criticized Palmieri who found a basis for the filioque in Gregory’s use of the model of a source, a spring and a river in Orat. 31:31 (A. Palmieri, “Esprit-Saint,” DThC, V, 1 (1913) 729-731), arguing that Gregory discounts analogies. In reply to Bulgakov, Schultze argues that Gregory does not totally discount this analogy, nor the accompanying analogy in Orat. 31:32 of the sun, its radiance, and its light:

"Nicht aber beanstandet Gregor am Vergleich, dass Strahl und Licht dermassen Ausflüsse aus der Sonne sind, dass der Strahl an zweiter Stelle steht und das Licht an dritter, weil der Strahl zwischen Sonne und Licht vermittelt: das Licht kommt von der Sonne durch den Strahl; mit anderen Worten: der Geist geht vom Vater aus durch den Sohn. Hierin liegt ja der Kern des Verleiches" (172).

Schultze also sees the filioque implied in Gregory’s explanation of Ps 36:9 in Orat. 40:34, PG XXXVI, 408C (‘Εν τῷ φωτὶ Κυρίου θέσας φῶς, ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν Ὕλὸν αὐγάσθητι, τὸ τρισάγιον φῶς καὶ ἀμέριστον):


For comment on Gregory and the filioque cf., infra, 181, and note 2.

122,1 Cf. supra 120, note 5.

122,2 Orat. 40:41, PG XXXVI, 417BC:

Οὐ φθάνω τὸ ἐν νοὴσαι, καὶ τοῖς τρισὶ περιλήμψαι: οὐ φθάνω τὰ τρία διελεύν καὶ εἷς τὸ ἐν ἀναφέρομαι. Ὄταν ἐν τι τῶν τριῶν φαντασθῇ, τοῦτο νομίζω τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὴν ὑγίν πεπλήρωμαι, καὶ τὸ πλεῖον διέφυγεν. Οὐχ ἔχω τὸ μέγεθος τοῦτοι καταλαβέω, ἴνα δοῦ τὸ πλεῖον τῇ λειπομένῳ. Ὄταν τὰ τρία συνέλθῃ τῇ θεωρίᾳ, μίαν ὀρθὸν λαμπάδα, οὐχ ἔχων διελεύν ἡ μετρήσαι τὸ φῶς ἐνιούσιον.
Calvin quotes the first sentence of this passage in Institutes 1, 13, 17 with the comment: "It seems to me that nothing can be more admirable than the words of Gregory Nazianzen."

Cf. B. Bobrinskoy, "The Indwelling of the Spirit in Christ: 'Pneumatic Christology' in the Cappadocian Fathers," StVladThQ, 28 (1984), 49-65:

"The theme of the triune light reappears, of course, in the thought of St. Gregory of Nazianzen [sic], but it is conceived in a less hierarchical manner. Here the beholder who experiences the vision of God moves from the One to the Three and vice versa, utterly blinded by the three-fold Sun, without pausing at the mystagogical question of the 'how' and of the way of the vision. If we can express it in this way, St. Basil limits his perspective to the Trinitarian economy and the movement towards God. St. Gregory goes deliberately beyond this limit to explore new horizons; and in so doing, he leads the whole of the Eastern Church in Trinitarian praise" (Ibid., 58).

James Mackey, in The Christian Experience of God as Trinity, London: SCM, 1983, 148, draws attention to the more elaborate development of the analogy of the three suns by Gregory of Nyssa in Against Eunomius, 1, 36. The passage reads:

"For once having taken our stand upon the comprehension of the Ungenerate Light, we perceive that moment from that vantage ground the Light that streams from him, like the ray co-existent with the sun, whose cause indeed is in the sun, but whose existence is synchronous with the sun, not being a later addition, but appearing at the first sight of the sun itself: or rather (for there is no necessity to be slaves to this similitude, and so give a handle to the critics to use against our teaching by reason of the inadequacy of our image), it will not be a ray of the sun that we shall perceive, but another sun blazing forth, as an offspring, out of the ungenerate sun and simultaneous with our conception of the first, and in every way like him... Then again, we see yet another such Light after the same fashion, sundered by no interval of time from that offspring Light, and while shining forth by means of it yet tracing the source of its being to the Primal Light..."
"What God is in nature and essence (ἡν ψυχήν καὶ ἡν κοινωνίαν), no man ever yet has discovered or can discover... In my opinion it will be discovered when that within us which is godlike and divine (τὸ θεοτόκος τούτο καὶ θεός) shall have mingled with its like (τῷ οίκετῷ προσμετέρῳ) and the image (εἰκὼν) shall have ascended to the archetype (ἀρχήτυπον), of which it has now the desire."

Nicholas Gendle (op.cit., 351) draws attention to Gregory's poem, On the Soul (Carm. 1, 1, 8, 72-75, PG XXXVII, 452A): "[Man] is an emanation of the invisible deity...for in both the intellectual nature reigns supreme"; and Ibid. 1-3, the opening lines of the poem, (446A-447A): "The soul is a breath of God (Ψυχή δ' εστὶν Ἀγαθή Θεός)... It is light shut up in a cave, but it is nonetheless a light (φῶς) divine and inextinguishable (φωτεινότατος)." Gendle comments: "We are here dangerously close to a doctrine of a divine, eternal soul as a natural emanation of the One and imprisoned in alien matter." By contrast, Gregory of Nyssa denied the general philosophical tradition that the nous was timeless and able of itself to contemplate the eternal realities. "Alongside of this rejection of any doctrine of the divinity of the Mind, we observe a profound biblical development in his work away from metaphysical νοητός/ανθρώπος and even ἄγεννητος/γεννητός dichotomies to χίτος/ἀχτίος. The creation-gulf most radically indicates man's total otherness from God."

Vladimir Lossky includes passages from Gregory Nazianzen in his chapter "The Divine Darkness" (op.cit., 23-34) without making it clear that unlike Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo-Dionysius, the author of Περὶ μυστικῆς θεολογίας, Nazianzen does not use the idea of divine darkness to express his apophasis. Gendle comments (op.cit., 346): "Gregory Nazianzen is the most Origenist of the Cappadocians in his consistent use of φῶς language. For him, darkness in the spiritual life is a necessary purgative stage, but in the Age to Come this will be dispelled by the eternal radiance of the Trinity." For Gregory's use of the imagery of darkness as the obscuring of the divine light, cf. Orat. 28:12, PG XXXVI, 40C-41B.
IV (c) The Paradox of the Three-in-One

124,1 Orat. 25:17, PG XXXV, 1221D:

μονάδα εν Τριάδι, και Τριάδα εν μονάδι προσκυνουμένην, παράδοσον ἠχοῦσαν καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἔνωσιν.

124,2 Orat. 28:1, PG XXXVI, 25D - 28A:

μάλλον δὲ μίαν ἐκ τῆς μίας θεότητας γενέσθαι τὴν ἕλλαμψιν ἐνικώς διαιρουμένην, καὶ συναπτομένην διαίρετως, ὡς καὶ παράδοσον.

124,3 Orat. 6:22, PG XXXV, 749BC:

προσκυνούντες Πατέρα, καὶ Υἱόν, καὶ Ἁγίου Πνεύμα: εν Υἱῷ τὸν Πατέρα, εν Πνεύματι τὸν Υἱόν γινώσκοντες...πρὶν συνάψαι διαιροῦντες, καὶ πρὶν διαιρεῖν συνάπτοντες, ὃθεν τὰ τρία ὡς ἕνα (οὐ γὰρ ἄνυπαθτα, ἢ κατὰ μίας ὑποστάσεως, ὡς εἶναι τὸν πλοῦτον ἡμῖν ἐν ὅρμωσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πράγματι), καὶ τὰ τρία ἐν. Ἔν γὰρ οὐ ὑποστάσει, ἄλλα θεότητι: μονάς εν Τριάδι προσκυνουμένη, καὶ Τριάς εἰς μονάδαν ἀνακεφαλαιομένην...

125,1 Orat. 23:8, PG XXXV, 1160C:

ἐν δυνα διηρμένως, καὶ διαιροομένα συνμεμένως, εἰ καὶ παράδοσον τοῦτο εἶπεν...

125,2 Orat. 31:14, PG XXXVI, 149A:

ἀλλ' ἄμεριστος ἐν μεμερισμένοις εἰ δὲ συντόμως εἶπεν, ἢ θεότης; καὶ όσον ἐν ἡλίοις τρις ἐξομένοις ἀλλήλων, μία τοῦ φωτός σύγκρασις.

125,3 Orat. 39:11, PG XXXV, 345D:

Διαιρεῖται γὰρ διαιρέτως, ἐν' οὕτως ἐπικαὶ συνάπτεται διηρμένως. Ἔν γὰρ ἐν τρισίν ἡ θεότης; καὶ τὰ τρία ἐν: τὰ ἐν σὲ ἡ θεότης; ἢ τὸ γε ἀκριβέστερον εἶπεν, ἢ ἡ θεότης.

125,4 Heinrich Dörrie, op.cit., 407. According to Dörrie, Gregory has adapted a phrase used by Athanasius to denounce the absurd contradictory position of Valentinus, Marcion and Mani in epist. ad Adelphium 2, PG XXVI, 1073A:

"Gregor dagegen hat diese contradictio zum Oxymoron umgebildet. Was dort den Widerriss der Häretiker kennzeichnete, wird nun zum Kennzeichen der tiefen Weisheit, die der orthodoxen Formel innewohnt. Die von Gregor gewählte paradoxale Ausdrucksweise διαιρετῶς διαιρεῖται durfte sich tatsächlich mit einigem Recht
mit der Wirkung eines plötzlich erhellenden Blitzes vergleichen..."

Cf. Basil, Ep. 38:4, : "Marvel not then at my speaking of the same thing as being both conjoined and parted, and thinking as it were darkly in a riddle, of a certain new and strange conjoined separation and separated conjunction."

125,5 Orat. 39:11, PG XXXVI, 345D-348A.


126,2 Cf. E. Bellini's comment (op.cit., 528) on the three dangers considered in this passage:

"Delle tre concezioni qui esposte, la terza (che è anche la meno presa in considerazione) si riconduce o al grossolano politeismo popolare o, più precisamente, a concezioni di tipo gnostico o manicheo, le quali presentano due (o più) principi autonomi e contrapposti, se non addirittura in lotta tra di loro. La seconda concezione viene esplicitamente definita come 'la pazzia di Ario', la prima come 'l'ateismo di Sabellio'. La riflessione (e la formulazione) di Gregorio si svolge in polemica con queste due concezioni, con particolare riferimento alla prima, che - come sarà dimostrato dall'analisi dettagliata - si identifica con il pensiero di Marcello di Ancira, così come fu compreso da Eusebio di Cesarea e Cirillo di Gerusalemme..."

126,3 Orat. 18:16, PG XXXV, 1005A:

'Ένα μὲν θεόν εἶδός ἐν Τριάδι προσκυνοῦμεν, τρία δὲ εἰς μίαν θεότητα συναγόμενα: καὶ οὕτε τῷ ἑνὶ Σαβελλίζων, οὕτε τοῖς τρισὶν 'Αρειανίζων, ἡ τῷ συστελλέων θεότητα καὶ ἀναλείπειν ἀθέως, ἡ τῷ κατατέμενειν ἀνίσοις ἄλλοτριότησιν, η μεγέθους, ἡ φύσεως."

127,1 Orat. 21:13, PG XXXV, 1096B:

'Αλλ' εἶδός, τὸ μὲν εἰς ἄριθμὸν ἑνά τὰ τρία συστελλέων, ἀθέοτητος θεότητος τε, καὶ τῆς Σαββαλλίτου καινοτομίας, δοὺς τινὰς θέσεως συστολήν ἐπενόησε: τὸ δὲ τὰ τρία διαίρεσιν φύσεως, κατατόμην θεότητος ἔχολον: καὶ τὸ ἐν καλὼς ἑτήσιον, θεότητι γὰρ: καὶ τὰ τρία εὐσεβῶς ἐξιδίασεν,
For other examples of the balancing of the two extremes of Arianism and Sabellianism, cp. Orat. 20:5, 6, PG XXXV, 1069C-1072D; Orat. 22:12, PG XXXV, 1145A; Orat. 23:3, PG XXXV, 1153C; Orat. 31:30, PG XXXVI, 168D-169A; Orat. 33:16, PG XXXVI, 233D-236A; Orat. 34:8, PG XXXVI, 249A; Orat. 38:8, PG XXXVI, 320B; Orat. 38:15, PG XXXVI, 329A; Orat. 42:16, PG XXXVI, 476C; Orat. 43:30, PG XXXVI, 537A.

127.2 Cp. supra, 98, and note 3.

127.3 Orat. 2:36 and 37, PG XXXV, 444B and 445A. Bellini, op.cit., 529f.: "Nella polemica antiariana con il termine 'sabellianismo' e simili si indica comunemente la dottrina di Marcello di Ancira; ma qui il vocabolario e la tonalità del passo la richiamano da vicino. È facile scoprire un intento polemico contro Marcello nel termine συναίρεσις, se si pensa che questi era tutto impegnato a combattere chi divide (βαρεῖ) la divinità. Gregorio non vuol certo 'dividere' la divinità, ma vede un maggior pericolo nella 'concentrazione' di essa. Infatti, mentre condanna sic et simpliciter la συναίρεσις (o il συναίρετιν), ogni volta che deve condannare la 'divisione', si premura di specificare di quale divisione si tratta. Condanna la 'divisione di Ario'... Questa concentrazione avviene in conseguenza di una κατα διάκων ἡ σύνθεσις... Cirillo di Gerusalemme, non più di quattordici anni prima che Gregorio scrivesse questo discorso, chiamò Marcello di Ancira 'un'altra testa del drago', che 'osò raccontare che dopo la fine del mondo Cristo non regnerà più e osò dire che il Logos, come è uscito dal Padre, così si risolverà in lui e non esisterà più (ἐξελθὼν...ἀναλυθεῖτι)... In questo passo Cirillo usa lo stesso termine di Gregorio (non documentato nei frammenti di Marcello) per indicare il risolversi nel Padre della esistenza individuale di Cristo alla fine del mondo... Eusebio rivolse a Marcello anche l'accusa di introdurre in Dio 'una sostanza doppia e composta (διηλήν τινα καὶ σύνθετον σῶσαι) come unica via per evitare che il λόγος άλογος (il Logos esistente nel Padre prima dell'incarnazione) sia unito e congiunto al Padre in modo da non avere una sua esistenza individuale distinta.' Marcello - dice Eusebio - tenta di ridare vigore alle teorie di Sabellio..."
The Aristotelian principle that the virtuous is the mean between the extremes is referred to as a philosophical commonplace.

Cf. F.W. Norris, op.cit., 104.

Orat. 40:41, PG XXXVI, 417AB.

V. Lossky, op.cit., 46. Nicholas Gendle gives this sentence as a quotation apparently referred to Gregory himself (op.cit., 345) rather than to Lossky.


Clement, Stromateis, V, 12.

N. Gendle, op.cit., 306.

op.cit., 305.

Orat. 39:12, PG XXXVI, 348C.

op.cit., 345.
IV(d) One Ousia in Three Hypostases

131,1 It is true that Athanasius avoids a standard term for the Three. Augustine’s famous comment about the term persona makes the point that the terminology used is not the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity:

"Yet, when the question is asked, 'What three?' human language labours altogether under great poverty of speech. The answer, however, is given, three 'persons', not that it might be spoken, but that it might not be left unspoken" (De Trin., V, 9).

The literal translation of ὑπόστασις into Latin is substantia. As long as hypostasis and ousia were identified, as by the Creed of Nicea (325) and by Athanasius and the "old Nicenes", this presented no problem. It was the main Eastern (Origenist) tradition which spoke of three hypostaseis which conflicted with this. To the Latin West, they seemed to speak of "three substances", which, to those in the tradition of Tertullian, sounded like Tritheism. Gregory describes the confusion this caused in Orat. 21:35, PG XXXV, 1124C-1125A. Cf. infra, 133, note 2. The custom of translating hypostasis into "Person" in modern English translation obscures the whole debate and it seems best therefore to leave it untranslated.

In itself, the word may be translated "properties" or "distinguishing characteristics", but when Gregory uses it to refer to the hypostaseis or Persons themselves, the translation "identities", derived from the equivalent Latin root, suggests itself as particularly suitable. Cf. infra, 147ff.

To σαύτης οδύν οΰσης διαφοράς ἐν τοῖς ἐνόμασι καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι, πάς οὕτω σὺ λιαν δουλεύεις τῷ γράμματι... καὶ συλλαβάσις ἀκολουθεῖς, ἀφεῖς τὰ πράγματα;

132, 4 Ibid.:
καὶ πάς, τὰ σὰ λέγων; Οὐ γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος μᾶλλον οἱ λόγοι, ή τοῦ λέγειν συναναγκάζοντος. Ὅσπερ οὖν ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἐν τὰ λεγόμενα μᾶλλον ἐσκόπουν, ἡ τὰ νοοῦμενα.

133, 1 Cf. the comments of Methodios Fouyas supra, 37, note 5. Hergenröther points out that Gregory defines the relationship between the divine essence and the three hypostaseis in three phrases which do not need the term hypostasis:

τὰ δὲ ή θεότης (Carm. I, 1,3,74, PG XXXVII, 414A)
τὰ ἐν οίς ή θεότης (Orat. 31:14, PG XXXVI, 149A)
τὰ δὲ ή θεότης (Orat. 39:11, PG XXXVI, 345D).

The second phrase also appears in Orat. 39:11. Hergenröther translates and interprets these (op. cit., 41):

"Es sind nämlich die Persoren: 1. das, dessen die Gottheit, 2. das, in dem die Gottheit, 3. das, was die Gottheit ist, oder mit andern Worten: Die Personen besitzen die Gottheit; die Gottheit ist in ihnen; sie sind die Gottheit selbst."

133, 2 Orat. 21:35, PG XXXV, 1124D:

Τῆς γὰρ μιᾶς οὐσίας, καὶ τῶν τριῶν ὑποστάσεων λεγομένων μὲν ὁ τῆς ἡμῶν εὐσεβώς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τήν φύσιν ἀνάξιος τῆς θεότητος, τὸ δὲ τὰς τῶν τριῶν ιδιότητας)... The whole point of the paragraph in which the formula occurs is to praise Athanasius for demonstrating that the meaning and not the terminology is what matters. The East spoke of one ousia and three hypostaseis; the West "because of the scantiness of their vocabulary" were unable to distinguish between ousia and hypostasis (using the same word, substantia, for both) and so spoke of three Persons. The result, says Gregory, would have been laughable if it were not pitiable. The difference in words was thought to indicate a difference in meaning. The West suspected the East of Arianism; the East suspected the West of Sabellianism. According to Gregory, Athanasius conferred with both parties and after carefully weighing the meaning of the words (τῶν νοῦν τῶν λεγομένων) he found they had the same sense (συμφωνοῦντας) and so reconciled them allowing each its own terminology.

On the origin of the formula, μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, cf. F. Dinsen, op.cit., 154f.:

134,1 Orat. 39:11, PG XXXVI, 345C. Cf. supra, 19, also 120, note 3, where the original is given, 131, note 2, and 133, note 1.

134,2 Orat. 34:13, PG XXXVI, 253B:

καὶ δὲν μὲν, "Εγώ καὶ δ' Πατήρ ἐν ἑσμεν, ἀναγινώσκης, τὸ συναφὲς τῆς οὐσίας ἑνοπτηριζόμενος: δὲν δὲν, Πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔλευσόμεθα, καὶ μονὴν παρ' αὐτῷ ποιησόμεθα, τὸ διηρήμενον τῶν ὑποστάσεων λογιζόμενον.

134,3 Orat. 42:16, PG XXXVI, 477A:

τὸ μὲν ἐν, τῇ οὐσίᾳ γινώσκοντες...τὰ δὲ τρία, ταῖς ὑποστάσεσιν, εἰτον προσώποις...

134,4 For references to ousia apart from those quoted thus far and on pages 135 and 136 infra, cf. Orat. 20:7, PG XXXV, 1073A; Orat. 28:19, PG XXXVI, 52B; Orat. 29:2, PG XXXVI, 76B; Orat. 29:10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, PG XXXVI, 85D, 88BC, 89ABC, 92A, 93B, 96A; Orat. 34:9, PG XXXVI, 249B (την μίαν καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ δύο οὐσίαν); Orat. 40:41, PG XXXVI, 417B (οὐτε ἀνάμαλον οὐσίας). All of these orations belong to Gregory's time in Constantinople. In his earlier years he spoke occasionally of the Godhead (theotēs) and the nature (physis) of God, but not, it appears, of the ousia.

For references to three hypostaseis without a simultaneous reference to the one ousia, cf. Orat. 2:38, PG XXXV, 445C; Orat. 13:4, PG XXXV, 856C; Orat. 20:6, 7, PG XXXV, 1072D-1073A; Orat. 31:9, PG XXXVI, 444A; Orat. 34:15, PG XXXVI, 253D; Orat. 39:11, PG XXXVI, 345C; Orat. 42:16, PG XXXVI, 477A. Cf. also Orat. 6:22, PG XXXV, 749C:

οὕτε τὰ τρία ὡς ἐνα (οὕ γὰρ ἄνυποτότα, ἃ κατὰ μίας ὑποστάσεως, ὡς ἐεταὶ τὸν πλοῦτον ἡμῖν ἐν ἰδόμασιν, ἀλλ' ὁδ' πράγματι), καὶ τὰ τρία ἐν. Ἕν γὰρ οὕτω ὑποστάσει, ἀλλ' θεότητι.

It has been pointed out that Gregory's insistence here that hypostasis should not refer to the One but only to the Three runs counter to the policy of toleration devised by
Athanasius at the Council of Alexandria (which is roughly contemporary with this oration) and expressed in the *Tomus ad Antiochenos*. Cf. Winslow, *op.cit.*, 51. But Gregory may only be giving here the Cappadocian usage without necessarily condemning those who preferred the older Nicene use of *hypostasis* as an equivalent for *ousia*.

134,5 Cf. supra, 20 and 21, and esp. 20, note 8.

135,1 *Orat.* 28:9, *PG* XXXVI, 36C:

'Αλλ' εί δαόματον, οὕτω μὲν οὖδὲ τούτο τῆς οὐσίας παραστατικὸν τε καὶ περιεκτικὸν, ἧσπερ οὖδὲ τὸ ἀγέννητον, καὶ τὸ ἀναρχόν, καὶ τὸ ἀναλοίπον, καὶ τὸ ἕφαστον, καὶ δεα περί θεοῦ, ἣ περὶ θεον εἶναι λέγεται.

Cf. also *Orat.* 29:11 and 12, *PG* XXXVI, 88 and 89: God's essence is proper to him and belongs to him alone ('Ὁ δὲ μόνον θεοῦ καὶ ζωῆς, τούτῳ οὐσίᾳ), but it is no more defined as 'unbegotten' than humanity consists in being directly created like Adam. As that which is begotten is also human (καὶ γὰρ τὸ γεννηθὲν ἄνθρωπος), so that which is begotten of God is also God. "What then is the essence of God (Τίς οὖν οὕσια θεοῦ; ; ; ? To us it will be a great thing, if ever, even in the future, we learn this, when this darkness and dullness is done away for us." The Eunomians argued that since the Son is the same as the Father οὐσίαν, then if the Father is unbegotten, the Son must be so too. Quite so, says Gregory, "if the essence of God consists in being unbegotten (εἰπερ οὐσία θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον)." But the difference is outside the essence (περὶ οὐσίαν).

135,2 *Orat.* 28:17, *PG* XXXVI, 48C:

Θεόν, ο ι τί ποτε μὲν ἔστι τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, οὔτε τις εἴρην ἄνθρωπων πόσποτε, οὔτε μὴ εὖρη.

Gregory asks whether it ever will be discovered, and replies that in his opinion it will "when that within us which is godlike and divine (ἐπειδὰν τὸ θεοειδεῖς τούτῳ καὶ θεόν), I mean our mind and reason (νοοὶ τὲ καὶ λόγος) shall have mingled with its like (τῷ οἰκεῖῳ προσμίγη) and the image (ἡ εἰκὼν) will have ascended to the archetype (τὸ ἀρχετύπον) of which it now has the desire." Cf. supra, 123, note 2.

135,3 *Orat.* 38:7, *PG* XXXVI, 317B:

Θεός ἣν μὲν ἄει, καὶ ἔστι, καὶ ἔσται: μᾶλλον δὲ ἔστιν ἅει. Τὸ γάρ ἄν, καὶ ἔταν, καὶ τοῦ ἵμας χρόνον τιμήσας, καὶ τῆς βασιλείας φύσεως: ὁ δὲ ἄν ἄει, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτοῖς ἑκατὸν ὄνομαζε, τῷ Μωϋσει χρηματίζον ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους. 'Ὅλων γάρ ἐν ἑκατὸν συλλαβῶν, ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, μὴτε ἄριστον, μὴτε ποιούμενον, οἷον τί πέλαγος οὐσίας
What then will you conceive deity to be (Τί γάρ ποτε διολήση το Θείου?)? He dismisses the idea that God is a body. "How then is he infinite (καὶ πάς τὸ άκειρον) and limitless (άόριστον), and formless (=XαμετταΤτον), and intangible (Αύπατος), and invisible (άόρατον)?" A body would also be a compound of elements (ἐξ στοιχείων) subject to dissolution. "But dissolution is altogether foreign to God and to the first nature (άλλας δὲ ἄλλοτριον πάντῃ Θεῷ, καὶ τής πρώτης φύσεως)."

"In the phrase of the Creed ἐξ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός there can be no doubt that οὐσία means the inmost being of the Father, his very self. The translation 'substance' which comes to us through the Latin is not satisfactory: 'essence' hardly conveys to English ears the real meaning: and 'nature' though 'nature' is certainly included in the sense is quite inadequate by itself. 'Being' is the nearest equivalent we have."

"The Nicene Creed thus gained an unqualified victory so far as its actual terms were concerned, but understood according to the interpretation of Meletius, the Cappadocians, and Cyril of Jerusalem. The community of substance in the sense of equality or likeness of substance, not in that of unity of substance, was from this time the orthodox doctrine in the East."

"On sait que, pour Zahn, la Wesenseinheit est l'unité numérique de substance concrète qu'il trouve, à bon droit, affirmée, entre le Père et le Fils, dans l'ὁμοούσιος de Nicee, tandis que la Wesensgleichheit, ou similitude de substance, est l'unité seulement spécifique, l'unité numérique d'essence, de οὐσία"
abstraite, qu'il appelle aussi Gattungseinheit, unité générique."

136,2 At least, it appears in Basil, Ep. 38 (possibly written by Gregory of Nyssa), in the latter's On Not Three Gods, PG XLV, 115-130), and in Nazianzen's Orat. 31:19, PG XXXVI, 153B. The generic understanding of ousia also seems to be expressed in Orat. 29:13, PG XXXVI, 92A:

"Our position, however, is that as in the case of a horse, or an ox, or a man, the same definition applies to all individuals of the same species (και ἑκάστου τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους, εἰς λόγος ἑστιν) and whatever shares the definition has also a right to the name; so in the very same way there is one essence (μίαν ὀσιαν) of God of God and one nature (καὶ φύσιν) and name (καὶ χωριστιν)."

136,3 Orat. 25:16, PG XXXV, 1221B:

"L'erreur des créateurs et des partisans de la théorie du néonicéisme des Cappadociens... Invocant une comparaison établie par saint Basile (i.e. the comparison of divine ousia with human ousia), ces historiens ont négligé de s'assurer que le second terme en était compris par les Cappodociens comme ils le comprenaient eux-mêmes. Mais ce dernier sens, inspiré par l'application postérieure de la philosophie aristotélicienne à l'illustration du dogme, nous croyons qu'un examen aussi loyal qu'attentif nous a montré qu'il n'est pas du tout celui que tenaient les Pères susdits en vertu de leur mentalité philosophique plutôt platonicienne."

Lebon presumably has in mind the distinction Aristotle makes in the Categories between primary substance (protd ousia), the substance of an individual being, and secondary substance (deutera ousia), the substance shared in common among members of one kind or genus, being thus 'generic' substance. Cf. Christopher Stead, Divine Substance, Oxford: OUP, 1977, 55ff. and 110ff., for the Aristotelian concepts. Cf. F. Dinsen, Homousios. Die Geschichte des Begriffs bis zum Konzil von Konstantinopel (381), Diss. Theol., Kiel, 1976, 156, where she writes of the Cappadocians:

"Sie vergleichen das Verhältnis von einer Usie und drei Hypostasen in der Gottheit mit Vorliebe mit dem der"
einen menschlichen Usie und drei Menschen, verstehen ousia und hypostasis dabei meist im Sinn der aristotelischen 'deutera ousia' und 'proté ousia' ('eidos' und 'atomon')."

Gregory uses the phrase "primary substance (proté ousia)" but not in the Aristotelian sense. He speaks of God as hé proté ousia, the First Being, over against his creatures. Cf. Orat. 34:13, PG XXXVI, 253A. Cf. the judgment of J.H.Srawley, op.cit., 214:

"But this theory [of Zahn and Harnack] appears to have gained ground from the weight of the authorities by which it is supported rather than from its intrinsic merits. It introduces confusion into the careful language of Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa... A careful study of the theological standpoint of all the Cappadocians (especially the two Gregories) shows how vital to their whole view of religion was the belief in the unity of the Godhead."


137,2 A.M. Ritter, op.cit., 285, comments that the Homoiusians would not use μία οðσία precisely because for them it meant one concrete being:

"Wohl konnten die Homolusianer eine (abstrakt verstandene!) θεότης, θρης und βασιλεία der drei göttlichen Hypostasen bekennen...und sagen, dass Vater und Sohn 'κατά τήν τού πνεύματος έννοιαν (also hinsichtlich des Geistseins alsGattungsbegriff gedacht) identisch'..., dass sie 'συμφωνώντας έν' seien... Bezeichnenderweise wurde aber diese generisch verstandene Einheit zwischen den göttlichen Personen nie durch die Formel 'μία οðσία' ausgedrückt, eben weil auch für die Homolusianer οðσία das konkrete Sein, nicht aber 'abstrakt' das Wesen 'im Sinne von Wesensinhalt' bedeutet haben wird."


138,1 Orat. 31:13, PG XXXVI, 148B:

'Άκει δέ ήμιν ὁ λόγος ἐπ' αὐτό τὸ κεφάλαιον... Εἱ θεός, φησὶ, καὶ θεός, καὶ θεός, πᾶς οὐχί τρεῖς θεοὶ; ἡ πᾶς οὖ νολουφρία τὸ δεξαζόμενον;
138.2 Orat. 31:14, PG XXXVI, 148D-149A (Cf. supra, 120, note 5):

'Ἡμὶν εἰς θεός, ὅτι μία θεότης: καὶ πρὸς ἐν τὰ ἔξαυτον τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει, κἀν ἢ ἀπειτεῖται. Οὐ γὰρ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ ἢπτον θεός: οὐδὲ τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὄστερον: οὐδὲ βουλήσει τέμνεται, οὐδὲ διδάσκει μερίζεται... ἀλλ' ἀμεριστος ἐν μεμερισμένοις, εἰ δὲ συντόμως εἰπέτεν, ἡ θεότης: καὶ σοὶ ἐν ἑλοῖς τρισὶν ἐχομένοις ἄλληλοι, μία τού φωτὸς σύγκρασις. Ὡς τῶν μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὴν θεότητα βλέψαμεν, καὶ τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν, καὶ τὴν μοναρχίαν, ἐν ἡμὶν τὸ φαντασάμεθα: ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἄνθρωποι ἡ θεότης, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας ἄνθρωπος ἔκειθεν ἄντα καὶ δομοδόξιος, τρία τὰ προσκυνούμενα.

138.3 F. Dinsen, op. cit., 160, points to the paradoxical nature of the doctrine of the Trinity. To express the unity of ousia is to appear Sabellian: to express the doctrine of the three hypostases is to appear Tritheistic:

"Da eine solche 'Dreieinigkeit' ein Paradox ist... An den stellen, an denen hervorgehoben wird, dass die drei Hypostasen Vater, Sohn und Geist wirkliche und eigene Existenz haben... scheint es, als werde die göttliche ousia von den Kappadokiern als Genus oder teilbares Substrat vorgestellt, die Einheit als eine reine gedankliche Einheit. Dort, wo das reale Einsein betont wird... ist die selbständige Existenz der 'Personen' in Frage gestellt, scheinen die Bedeutungen von 'hypostasis' und 'idiotés' ineinander zu fließen."

139.1 Orat. 31:15, PG XXXVI, 149B:

οὖχι καὶ παρ' Ἐλλησι, φαίεν ἄν, μία θεότης, ὥς οἱ τὰ τελεώτερα παρ' ἐκείνοις φιλοσοφώντες, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώποις μία, τὸ γένος ἀπαν; 'Ἀλλ' ἡμως θεοὶ πολλοὶ, καὶ οὖχ εἰς, ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπως; 'Ἀλλ' ἐξεί μὲν ἡ κοινότης τὸ ἐν ἑξεί μόνον ἐπινοεὶς θεωρητῶν; τὰ δὲ καθ' ἑκατόν πλεῖστον ἄλληλων, καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ, καὶ τοὺς πάθεσι, καὶ τῇ δυνάμει μεμερισμένα.

According to F. Dinsen, the only point of comparison in the analogy of the three men is that their humanity is common as the deity is common to the three hypostases. She writes in reference to ps-Basil, Ep. 38 (op.cit., 158ff.):

geht die eine aus der anderen hervor, und zwar in einer ganz bestimmten Reihenfolge (τάξις): erst kommt der Vater, dann der Sohn und dann der Geist. Ferner ist – da die göttliche ousia unteilbar ist und kein διάστημα kennt – die Einheit der Hypostasen ungetrennt, real..."

She eventually concludes:

"Die Einheit, die zwischen Vater, Sohn und Geist besteht, hat also nach den Kappadokern mit der Einheit der Menschen... nur dies gemein: sie ist keine Einheit der Hypostase und damit der Zahl."

139,2 Orat. 31:15, PG XXXVI, 152B:

"...und die Vater, der Sohn und der Geist. Ferner ist – da die göttliche ousia unteilbar ist und kein διάστημα kennt – die Einheit der Hypostasen ungetrennt, real..."


"Endlich ist nicht zu übersehen, wie Gregor den Eindruck der Einheit in der Trinität regelmässig noch dadurch zu verstärken sucht, dass er neben der ταυτότης der ouσία die ομόνοια, σύμπνοια u. ä. hervorhebt, vergl. z. B. or. 1; M 35 401B or. 6; M 35, 740B or. 22; M 35, 1144C or. 29; M 36, 76A. Die Tendenz, die allem zu Grund liegt, ist unverkennbar: auf die Einheit soll etwas grösseres Gewicht hinübergeschoben werden, als ihr bei Basilius zugeteilt war. Infolge davon nähert sich Gregors Begriff von der ouσία wieder mehr dem des Athanasius."

139,4 F. Dinsen, op. cit., 157-158.

140,1 Orat. 30:18, PG XXXVI, 125C-128A:

"...und die Vater, der Sohn und der Geist. Ferner ist – da die göttliche ousia unteilbar ist und kein διάστημα kennt – die Einheit der Hypostasen ungetrennt, real..."

140,2 Orat. 28:13, PG XXXVI, 41C.

"...und die Vater, der Sohn und der Geist. Ferner ist – da die göttliche ousia unteilbar ist und kein διάστημα kennt – die Einheit der Hypostasen ungetrennt, real..."
Our mind longs to rise above these corporeal images and even the incorporeal, "for every rational nature longs for God and for the first cause, but is unable to grasp him..."

Cf. Carm. 1, 1, 29, PG XXXVII, 507-508, ὁ πάντων ἔπεξειν, where Gregory so insists on the ineffability of God that even ὁ ἄν is inadequate, and he addresses God as the Nameless One, τὸν μόνον ἀκαλήματον. An English translation is published in B.P. Blackett, Translations, London: The Latin Press, 1937, 31, and in A.W. Chatfield, Songs and Hymns of the Earliest Greek Poets, London: Rivington, 1876, 98-101. Bernard Delfgaauw in "Gregor von Nazianz: Antikes und Christliches Denken," Eranos-Jahrbuch, 36 (1967), 113-165, studies the poem for its evidence of the blend of Greek and Biblical thought in Gregory. While arguing that Gregory does not use ὁ ἄν in the poem lest it be understood more according to Parmenides than according to Biblical thought, Delfgaauw comments on the Theological Orations and specifically on this paragraph (Orat. 30:18) where Gregory prefers this name to all others:

"Doch alle diese anderen Namen geben Gregor bestimmte Aspekte, nicht das Wesen der Gottheit an. Das Wichtige für uns ist, dass Gregor der Ansicht ist, dass es im Grunde doch nur einen Namen gibt, der Gott absolut ausspricht und sein Wesen trifft, soweit ein Wort dies vermag. Und das ist der Name ὁ ἄν" (Ibid., 144-145).

140,3 Cf. Orat. 31:14, PG XXXVI, 148D-149A:

"Ὣμιὲν εἰς θεὸς, διὶ μία θεότης; καὶ πρὸς ἐν τὰ ἐς αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει, κἂν τρία πιστεύσαι.

also Orat. 34:9, PG XXXVI, 249B:

προσκυνώμεν τὴν μίαν ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ θεότητα...τὰς δύναμες τοῦ ἐνός θεοῦ ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ, διὰ παντὸς ἐν τῷ λάρυγγι φέροντες.

also Orat. 40:45, PG XXXVI, 424A, where the unity of God is expressed by the common name:

Βασιλείων σε μαθηταίων, εἰς ἀνομα Πατρός, καὶ Υιὸν, καὶ Ἀγίου Πνεῦματος. Ὁνομα δὲ κοινὸν τῶν τριῶν ἐν, ἡ θεότης.

140,4 J.F. Bethune-Baker, op.cit. 58. Cf. Gregory's appeal to those reluctant to speak of the Spirit as "God" in Orat. 41:8, PG XXXVI, 440B:

Μὴς θεότητος, ὁ οὕτω, τὴν Τριάδα ὁμολογήσατε, εἴ δὲ βούλεσθε, μῆτας φύσεως; καὶ τὴν θεός φωνήν παρὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος ὑμῖν αἰτήσομεν.
NOTES for CHAPTER V: FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT

141.1 Cf. supra, 131, with note 4.

V(a) The Distinct Identities

141.2 Cf. supra, 134, note 4 for references to ousia and hypostaseis.

142.1 J.F. Bethune-Baker, op. cit., 75-76.

142.2 V. Lossky, op. cit., 51.

142.3 Lossky gives the reference PG LXXXIII, 33AB.

142.4 G.L. Prestige, op. cit., 163.

142.5 op. cit., 172-173.

142.6 op. cit., 174.

143.1 op. cit., 175. Prestige continues: "Hence, with regard to the Trinity, it never sounded unnatural to assert three hypostaseis, but it was always unnatural to proclaim three ousias."

143.2 It was Basil, followed by Gregory of Nazianzus, who associated the term prosopon with Sabellianism and with Marcellus. Evidence is lacking that the Sabellians themselves used the term. Cf. Prestige, op. cit., 161.

144.1 Orat. 21:35, PG XXXV, 1124D-1125A. Cf. supra, 133, note 2.

144.2 André de Halleux, "'Hypostase' et 'personne' dans la formation du dogme trinitaire (ca 375-381)," RHE, 79 (1984), 313-369 and 625-670.


145.2 Orat. 39:11, PG XXXVI, 345C. Cf. supra, 19, 120, note 3, 133, note 1.


Es muss in der Trinität ein doppelter Unterschied angenommen werden: a) ein Realunterschied zwischen Person und Person, indem die eine nicht die andere ist; b) ein formeller Unterschied zwischen Person und Wesen, indem a) jede Person das Wesen ist, aber nicht das Wesen adäquat ihr allein zugehört (quaevis persona est totus Deus, sed non totum id quod est Deus), und b) indem jede Person das Wesen ist, aber afficirt mit einem besonderen Merkmal (essentia cum proprietate).

Now there is that which disturbs many who sincerely profess to be lovers of God. They are afraid that they may be proclaiming two Gods, and their fear drives them into doctrines which are false and wicked. Either they deny that the hypostasis (ὅντας τοῦ Σωμάτος) of the Son is different from that of the Father, and make him whom they call the Son to be God in all but name, or they deny the divinity of the Son, giving his hypostasis (ὅντας τοῦ Σωμάτος) and essence (οὐσίαν) a sphere of existence which falls outside that of the Father.


Orat. 21:13, PG XXXV, 1096B: οὗ, τὸ ἀγγελητῷ τῆς θεότητα περιγράφαστε, τὸ γεννητὸν, οὐ μόνον δὲ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐκπορευτὸν ἐξωρίσαν τῆς θεότητος...: cf. Orat. 29:2, PG XXXVI, 76B: Καὶ τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ὁ Πατήρ, καὶ ὁ Υἱός, καὶ τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα: ο μὲν γεννητωρ καὶ προβολεὺς...τᾶν δὲ, τὸ μὲν γέννημα, τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα...τὸ ἀγγελητὸν εἰσάγομεν, καὶ τὸ γεννητὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον...: cf. Orat. 42:17, PG XXXVI, 477C: Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄγγελητον, καὶ τὸ γεννητὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐκπορευτὸν λεγόμεθα τε καὶ νοεῖθα, εἰ νὰ φίλον δημιουργηθεὶν ὄνοματα.


"Dieser klar hervortretende Typus der trinitarischen Formel unterscheidet sich zunächst in den Bezeichnungen für die ιδιότητες der drei Hypostasen scharf von der Terminologie des Basilius. Erinnert man sich an dessen Sprachgebrauch, so fällt sofort auf, dass die von Basilius bevorzugten Ausdrücke πατρότης und υἱότης in keiner von Gregors Formeln vorkommen, während die bei Basilius im Hintergrund stehenden Termini ἁγγελησία und γέννησις (und ihre Synonyma) hier die geläufigen sind."


Karl Holl, op.cit., 171f., citing Orat. 30:19, PG XXXVI, 128C:
Gregor greift dazu auf den bereits seit geraumer Zeit eingeführten, seit jüngstem viel diskutierten Terminus der idiotēs zurück. Die Missverständlichkeit, die diesem Terminus anhaftete, lässt Gregor behutsam bei Seite. Für den gegenwärtigen Zweck ist das Wort darum gut verwendbar, weil es die beiden kontroversen Ausdrücke ὑπόστασις und πρόσωπον umgreift (und damit entbehrlieh macht).

Cf. Ibid., 411:

"Nun erst wird deutlich, welche Einschränkung der zuvor eingeführte Terminus idiotēs nach sich zieht; hier erst wird der jeden Tritheismus ausschließende Gebrauch des Wortes präzisiert, wonach im Grunde weder von ὑπόστασις noch von πρόσωπον die Rede sein dürfte. Hier wird die zuvor ausgesprochene Konzession, man dürfe die nun seit 100 Jahren hergebrachten Worte ὑπόστασις oder πρόσωπον verwenden, recht drastisch eingegt: Beide Termini dürfen nur im Sinne von 'besonderem Aspekt' verstanden werden."

Cf. Ibid., 411:

"Alla ἀληθῶς πατέρα τὸν Πατέρα... Ἀληθῶς υἱὸν τὸν Υἱὸν... Ἀληθῶς ἄγιον τὸ Πνεύμα τὸ Ἁγιον..."
"This teaches that the substance of natural objects is defined per genus et differentiam, adding that a substance can also possess 'properties' which are invariant attributes which are distinguishable from the substance itself, since they do not form part of its definition, and also from its 'accidents' in their ordinary sense of variable attributes" (op.cit., 164).

Stead adds a footnote on Basil (op.cit., 165):

"Basil replies [to the Neo-Arians] that 'ingenateness' and 'generateness' are not internal to the substance of God, but are 'distinguishing properties'; in Aristotelian terms they are not properties but differentia, marking off individuals (or individual species?) within a genus."

The phrase tropoi hyparxeos appears, for example, in Basil's De Spir. Sanct., XVIII (46), and in Ep. 235, 2. The phrase as such does not appear in Nazianzen's writings, but cf. tropos in Orat. 25:16, PG XXXV, 1221C, Εἰ δὲ τῶν τρόπων ἐνικητές (cf. Pinault, op.cit., 216); and hyparxis in Orat. 32:5, PG XXXVI, 180AB:

Δέον ἐνα θεόν Πατέρα γινώσκειν, ἄναρχον καὶ ἄγεννητον, καὶ Υἱὸν ἐνα γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός καὶ Πνεύμα ἐν ἐν θεῷ τῆν ὑπάρξιν ἔχον, παραχωροῦν Πατρὶ μὲν ἄγεννησίας, Υἱῷ δὲ γεννησίας : τά δὲ ἄλλα συμφωνεῖ καὶ σύνθρονον καὶ ὁμόδοξον καὶ ὁμόστιμῳ.

T.F. Torrance suggests (The Trinitarian Faith, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Ltd, 1988, 321) that Gregory avoided Basil's phrase, τρόπος ύπάρξεως, because "as he understood them the relations between the divine Persons are not just modes of existence but substantial relations which belong intrinsically to what Father, Son and Holy Spirit are in themselves as distinct hypostatic realities as well as in their objective reciprocal relations with one another." That is to say, the phrase did justice to one side of the truth, the objective distinct realities, but at the risk of understanding them to be independent realities with mutual relations (and, presumably, a common ousia) rather than interdependent realities who are who they are precisely in, and only in, their relationships to each other.

150,2 Orat. 29:16, PG XXXVI, 96A.
151,1 Orat. 31:9, PG XXXVI, 141CD-144A.
"It was the brilliant insight of the fourth- and fifth-century fathers - an insight with a basis in Athanasius, and developed in the East especially by Gregory of Nazianzus, and in the West even more clearly by Augustine - that fatherhood, sonship and passive inspiration are relational realities, so that the distinctions in God affect not the one divine substance or one divine being but only the relations in God. This insight was later incorporated into official church teaching. It led to the basic Trinitarian principle: 'In Deo omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio (In God everything is one where there is no opposition of relationship)."

Cf. J. Quasten, _op.cit._, 249:

"The doctrine of relations, which forms the heart of the later scholastic analysis of the Trinity, and which the Council of Florence (Febr. 4, 1441) summarizes in the sentence: _In Deo omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio_, basically goes back to Gregory's sentence: There is complete identity among the three divine Persons except for the relations of origin."

The actual sentence in _Orat. 34:10, PG XXXVI, 252A_ (not 352A, as in Quasten) reads:

Εἴ δὲ πάντα ὅσα ἔχει ὁ Πατήρ, τῷ Υἱῷ ἐστιν, πλὴν τῆς αἰτίας: πάντα δὲ ὅσα τῷ Υἱῷ, καὶ τῷ Πνεύματος, πλὴν τῆς υἱότητος, καὶ τῶν ὅσα σωματικῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγεται διὰ τὸ ἐμὸν ἀνθρώπων...

Moreschini prefers the reading πλὴν τῆς ἀγεννησίας τῷ πλὴν τῆς αἰτίας (_SC 318, 216_). The reference Quasten gives in _Orat. 41:10, PG XXXVI, 441C_, reads:

Πάντα ὅσα ὁ Πατήρ, τῷ Υἱῷ, πλὴν τῆς ἀγεννησίας. Πάντα ὅσα ὁ Υἱὸς, τῷ Πνεύματος, πλὴν γεννήσεως.

Quasten's other references are to _Orat. 20:7, PG XXXV, 1073A_ and _Orat. 31:29, PG XXXVI, 165B._


Karl Holl, _op.cit._, 177:
V(b) Procession


153,2 Orat. 29:5, PG XXXVI, 80A. Cf. Athanasius, *Ad Serap.* I, 16:

"And in the Godhead alone, the Father is a father in a strict sense, and the Son is a son in a strict sense; and of these it holds good that the Father is ever Father and the Son ever Son. As the Father could never be son, so neither could the Son be father."

153,3 Karl Holl, *Amphilochius,* 168-9:


154,2 Orat. 29:2, PG XXXVI, 76B: ὁ μὲν γεννητῶρ καὶ προβολεύ... τῶν δὲ, τὸ μὲν γέννημα, τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα, ἡ οὖν οὐδ' ὡς ἄν τις ἁλλὰ καλέσθη ἀφελών πάντη τῶν ὀρμήμων. Orat. 23:7, PG XXXV, 1160A: τῷ θεῷ δὲ ἄλλο τι μετέχον, ἡ γὰρ τυγχάνει τοίνυν Πατέρα, ὁ προσδήκη δόξης ἐστὶν, συν ὀφαίρεσις, ὡς δὲ καὶ προβολεύ Πνεύματος; (Mossay, in the SC ed., makes this a statement rather than a rhetorical question).
154,4 Orat. 25:15, PG XXXV, 1220B: 'Εν δὲ Πνεῦμα Ἀγιον, προελθὼν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός, ἣ καὶ προῖον.

154,5 Orat. 30:19, PG XXXVI, 128C: Ἰδιὸν δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἄναρχου, Πατήρ; τοῦ δὲ ἀνάρχους γεννηθέντος, Υἱός : τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτως προελθόντος, ἢ προῖοντος, τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον.

154,6 Orat. 26:19, PG XXXV, 125C: τὸ ἀγέννητον, καὶ τὸ γεννητὸν, καὶ τὸ προῖον. Orat. 39:12, PG XXXVI, 348B: Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον ἀληθῶς τὸ πνεῦμα, προῖον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός, οὐκ διόκας δὲ, οὐδὲ γὰρ γεννητῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκπορευτῶς.

154,7 Orat. 25:16, PG XXXV, 1221B: Ἰδιὸν δὲ Πατρός μὲν, ἢ ἄγεννητος: Υἱὸς δὲ, ἡ γέννησις: Πνεῦματος δὲ, ἢ ἐκπορευτῆς.

155,1 Orat. 21:13, PG XXXV, 1096B: [Arius and others....] οἱ, τῷ ἄγεννῆτῳ τὴν θεοτητάν περιγράφαντες, τὸ γεννητὸν, οὐ μόνον δὲ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐκπορευτόν ἐξάρισαν τῆς θεοτητος...

155,2 Orat. 39:12, PG XXXVI, 348B:

Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον ἀληθῶς τὸ πνεῦμα, προῖον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός, οὐκ διόκας δὲ, οὐδὲ γὰρ γεννητῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκπορευτῶς: εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ κατονομᾶσαι περὶ ὅνωμα σαφνείας ἐκεῖνον. ...οὕτω τοῦ Πνεύματος, ἢ εἰς Πατέρα μεταπίπτοντος, ἢ εἰς Υἱόν, ὑπὲρ ἐκπορεύεται, καὶ ὑπὲρ Θεος... γὰρ ἰδιότης ἀκίνητος.

The parallel should be noted: Son and Spirit is each a προῖον, one who goes forth from the Father: but the Son goes forth ὑιόκας, filially, the Spirit ἐκπορευτῶς, "procession-wise."

155,3 Orat. 29:2, PG XXXVI, 76C: τὸ ἀγέννητον εἰσάγομεν, καὶ τὸ γεννητὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός ἐκπορευόμενον.

155,4 Orat. 29:3, PG XXXVI, 77A:

Πάλιν ἔρατα με, καὶ πάλιν ἀποχρινοῦμαι σοι. Πότε ὁ Υἱός γεγέννηται; ὡσπερ ὁ Πατὴρ ὁ γεγέννηται. Πότε δὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκπορεύεται; ὡσπερ ὁ Υἱός, οὗ ἐκπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ γεγέννηται ἁρχόνως, καὶ ὑπὲρ λόγον.

156,1 Orat. 31:8, PG XXXVI, 141B:

Ποῦ γὰρ θῆσεις τὸ ἐκπορευτῶν, εἰπὲ μοι, μέσον ἁναφανεύ τῆς σῆς διαπρέσωσας, καὶ παρὰ κρείσσοσας ἢ κατὰ σε θεολόγου, τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν, εἰσαγόμενον; Εἰ μὴ τὴν φωνὴν ἐκείνην τῶν σῶν ἑξετάς Ἑυαγγελίων, διὰ τὴν τρίτην σου Διαθήκην, τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον, ὃ παρὰ τοῦ Πατρός ἐκπορεύεται: ὃ καθ᾽ ἐσον μὲν ἐξετάθην ἐκπορευεῖται, οὐ κτίσμα: καθ᾽ ἐσον δὲ ὁ γεγέννητος, οὐχ ὁ Υἱός: καθ᾽ ἐσον δὲ ἀγεγέννητο καὶ γεγέννητο μέσον, Θεὸς. ἰπὶ οὕτω σου τὰς τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἄρκεις διαφυγόν, Θεὸς.
Δυσάρεστου, τῶν σῶν διερέσεων ἰσχυρότερος. Τίς οὖν ἐκπόρευσις; Εἰπὲ σοὶ τὴν ἁγενησίαν τοῦ Πατρὸς, κἀγὼ τὴν γεννησίαν τοῦ Υἱοῦ φυσιολογήσω, καὶ τὴν ἐκπόρευσιν τοῦ Πνεύματος, καὶ παραπληγιτίσομεν ἄμφω εἰς θεοῦ μυστήρια παρακύπτοντες.


156,2 Karl Holl, op.cit., 161-2. Stylianos Harkianakis criticized the first and third of Holl's suggestions (op.cit., 92):

"Aber das ist bestimmt eine Übertreibung, die hier nur dann einen Platz hat, wenn sie das Mass der inneren persönlichen Anteilnahme Gregors an der bestehenden Lücke zu zeigen sucht, denn mit Sachen des Glaubens hat die Ästhetik nichts zu tun. Selbst die andere Hypothese K. Holls, dass Gregor gerade deswegen besonders Gewicht darauf gelegt hat, die Gotthetdes Geistes unzweideutig festzustellen, weil sie unmittelbar mit dem letzten Heilsziel des Menschen zusammenhänge, was nach Gregor im Gott-Werden besteht, scheint nicht den eigentlichen Grund der Pneumatologie Gregors getroffen zu haben. Denn Gregor formuliert nicht was seinen Interessen entspricht, sondern was er als unzweideutige Lehre der Selbstoffenbarung Gottes betrachtet. Sonst würde man keinen Unterschied zwischen der Theologie Gregors und seiner 'Wohneinrichtung' sehen können!"

Harkianakis' comment is a useful corrective. Nonetheless, some allowance must be made for aspects of the revelation which Gregory was particularly disposed to see clearly. Even the aesthetic motive should not be entirely discounted. for Gregory was a rhetorician to his fingertips.


157,1 Ibid.
V(c) The Father as Origin

158,1 Orat. 2:38, PG XXXV, 445BC.

158,2 Orat. 20:6, PG XXXV, 1072C.

158,3 Orat. 23:6, PG XXXV, 1157C:

οὐχ ἔχουσιν τὸ μεγάλων εἶναι ἄρχην... Ἐκιντοὶ δει τιμέτερον θεὸς κτισμάτων, τοσούτῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον τῇ πρώτῃ αἰτίᾳ, θεότητος εἶναι ἄρχην, ἡ κτισμάτων: καὶ διὰ θεότητος μέσης ἔλθειν ἐπὶ τὰ κτισματά...

Orat. 23:7, 1157D-1160A:

Ἐκατον καὶ Πνεύματος... ἡ ἀναρχὴς ταῦτα εἰσάγειν, ἡ εἰς ἐτέραν ἄρχην ἀνάγειν... Ἐλ δὲ δόου ἄν ἐξαρχῆς τόν Ἐλιόν, ἡ τό Πνεῦμα, τοὺς ὑπὲρ τόν Πατέρα θήσεις, οὔδε τῆς αἰτίας ἀποζενώσεις...

159,1 Orat. 25:15, PG XXXV, 1220C:

Οὐχ ἀναρχα γάρ, καὶ ἀναρχά πως: δ καὶ παράδοξον. Οὐχ ἀναρχα μὲν γάρ τῷ αἰτίῳ: ἐκ θεοῦ γὰρ, καὶ εἰ μὴ μετ' αὐτόν, ὡς ἐξ ἠλιοῦ φῶς: ἀναρχα δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ.

159,2 Orat. 32:5, PG XXXVI 180AB:

ἐν θεόν Πατέρα γινώσκειν, ἀναρχον, καὶ ἀγέννητον, καὶ Ἐλιόν ἐνα γεγενημένον ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός, καὶ Πνεῦμα ἐν ἐκ θεοῦ τὴν ὑπαρξίν ἔχων.

Cf. Orat. 33:17, PG XXXVI, 236B: Οὐ ψεύσομαι σε, Πάτερ ἀναρχε...

159,3 Orat. 40:43, PG XXXVI, 420B.

159,4 Orat. 29:15. PG XXXVI, 93B. Cf. also Orat. 23:8, PG XXXV, 1160C:

"But I, introducing the timeless, indivisible and infinite Origin of deity (θεότητος ἄρχην), honour the Origin (ἄρχην) and equally those from the Origin (τὰ ἐκ τῆς ἄρχης); this, because it is the Origin of such, those, because they are thus and such from such a one, divided neither by time, nor by nature, nor by dignity: One Being dividedly and diverse ones unitedly, if I may state this paradox: not less praiseworthy in relationship to each other (τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως), or thought of and understood singly."

160,1 Orat. 29:3, PG XXXVI, 77B:
Neither is it necessary to be so Father-loving as to take away his being Father (for how indeed can he be Father if the Son is emptied of his nature and differentiated as a creature?); nor so Christ-loving as not to safeguard his being a Son (for how indeed can he be Son if he is not referred back to the Father as Cause (αἰτίον); nor to lessen the rank of the Father as Origin (τῆς ἀρχῆς), that is as Father and Progenitor (γεννητός), for he would indeed be an Origin (ἀρχή) of little and unworthy ones if he were not seen as the Cause of their deity (θεότητος ὑπὸ αἰτίας), that in the Son and the Spirit. According to my reasoning there should be then one God referring to one Cause (αἰτίον) both of Son and Spirit. The identities (ἴδιότητες), first of the Father, both unoriginate (ἀνάρχοις) and Origin (ἀρχής) of purpose and speech (for he is Origin (ἀρχής) as Cause (ὡς αἰτίων) and as Source (ὡς πηγής), and as Eternal Light (ὡς ἀλήθεια φωτός)); then of the Son, on the other hand not at all unoriginate (ἀνάρχου μὲν ὀδύμας), on the other, Origin of entire things (ἀρχῆς δὲ τῶν διαλων)... Therefore the Father is unoriginate (ἀνάρχος).... For the Son, if it so be that you take the Father as Cause (αἰτίον), is not unoriginate (ἀνάρχος), for the Father is the Origin (ἀρχή) of the Son as Cause (ὡς αἰτίων); but if you think of the origin by time (ἀπὸ χρόνου νόης ἀρχήν), then he is unoriginate (ἀνάρχος), for the Ruler of time does not originate in time (οὐχ ἀρχεῖται γὰρ ὑπὸ χρόνου ὁ χρόνων διεστίησις).

The phrase θεότητος ὑπὸ αἰτίας in this passage calls for comment. Gregory does not use the phrase οὐσίας ὑπὸ αἰτίας, and it is scarcely likely that he would have done so if this implied a plurality of οὐσία. Perhaps then θεότης is to be taken here in a looser sense, meaning "status of deity." On the other hand, Gregory may have in mind the idea of the Father as the Cause of the one οὐσία common to
all of the Three. For an modern exposition of this latter idea, cf. John T. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church*, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985. Zizioulas sees the idea of the Father as the source of the divine *ousia* as a fundamental break with ancient Greek thinking, allowing Christian thought to attain the insight that the Person of God the Father and not impersonal *ousia* is the ultimate source of all that is. Thus for the first time a true understanding of the nature and value of personhood was attained. As T.F. Torrance points out, however, to speak of tracing the being, and not just the mode of being, of the Son and Spirit to the *ousia* of the Father is a "strange lapse from the Nicene doctrine that the Son proceeds from the being of the Father (εκ της ουσίας του Πατρός)." (T.F. Torrance, *The Trinitarian Faith*, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Ltd, 1988, 318f.) Cf. further infra, 177, note 1. Cf. infra, 164, note 3, on Athanasius' hesitation about the idea of causality within the Godhead.

160,2 Orat. 34:8, PG XXXVI, 249A:

Θεός...ἐν τρισὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις ἔσται, αἰτία, καὶ δημιουργή, καὶ τελειοποίη: τῷ Πατρὶ λέγω, καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ, καὶ τῷ ἀγίῳ Πνεύματι.

Cf. Basil, *De Spir. Sanc.* XVI (38) quoted supra, 46, note 4:

τὴν προακαρτικὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων, τὸν Πατέρα, τὴν δημιουργικὴν, τὸν Υἱόν, τὴν τελειωτικὴν, τὸ Πνεῦμα.

Both Gregory and Basil here have the Father in mind as the ultimate source of created things.

160,3 Orat. 34:10, PG XXXVI, 252A:

Εἰ δὲ πάντα διὰ ἐχεῖ ὁ Πατήρ, τοῦ Ὑιοῦ ἔστι, πλὴν τῆς αἰτίας [SC ed.: ἀγέννησίας]: πάντα δὲ διὰ τοῦ Ὑιοῦ, καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος, πλὴν τῆς ὑιόστητος, καὶ τῶν διὰ σωματικῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγεται διὰ τὸν ἠμὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὴν ἠμὴν σωτηρίαν...

160,4 Orat. 31:14, PG XXXVI, 149A.

161,1 A.J. Mason, *op.cit.*, 163.

161,2 Orat. 28:6, PG XXXVI, 32C:

"Now our very eyes and the law of nature (ὁ φυσικὸς νόμος) teach us that God exists and that he is the efficient and maintaining Cause (κοινητικὴν τε καὶ συνεκτικὴν αἰτίαν) of all things."

161,3 Orat. 28:13, PG XXXVI, 44A.
161,4 Orat. 29:2, PG XXXVI, 76B. Cf. Orat. 40:41, PG XXXVI, 417B:

"The Three one God when considered together with each other, each God because of the consubstantiality (διά τὴν δυοσύνδεστην), one God because of the monarchy (διὰ τὴν μοναρχίαν)."

162,1 Orat. 23:8, PG XXXV, 1160C:

Τριάδα τελείων ἐκ τελείων τριάν, μονάδας μὲν κινηθείσας διὰ τὸ πλοῦσιον, δυάδος δὲ ύπερβαθείσας (ὑπὲρ γὰρ τὴν ὑλήν καὶ τὸ εἴδος, ἐξ δὲ τὰ σώματα), Τριάδος δὲ όρισθείσας διὰ τὸ τέλειον, πρῶτη γὰρ ὑπερβαίνει δυάδος σύνθεσιν, ἢν μήτε στενὴ μένῃ [ ἢ ] θεότης, μήτε εἰς ἀπειρον χέτασι.

162,2 Orat. 29:2, PG XXXVII 76B. Bernard Schultze, in "S. Bulgakovs 'Utesitel und Gregor der Theologe Uber den Ausgang des Heiligen Geistes," OrChP, 39 (1973), 162-190, discusses in 175f. the interpretation of the Monad-Dyad-Triad passage in Orat. 29:2:

"Auf den ersten Blick scheint der Gedankengang des Nazianzeners sehr klar zu sein; schaut man aber näher hin, so entstehen gleich mehrere Fragen: Was ist mit μονάς (ohne Artikel) gemeint? Was bedeutet ἀπ' ἀρχής? Ist μονάς die eine göttliche Natur; ist es der Vater zusammen mit der einen göttlichen Natur; oder ist es die ganze in der einen Natur geeinte Τριάς?... Heisst sodann ἀπ' ἀρχής 'zu Anfang', 'ursprünglich', oder aber bezeichnet es den 'Ausgangspunkt', die 'Ursache' in der Dreifaltigkeit, den Vater, mit dem dann Δωκὸς und Τριάς (beide wie ἀπ' ἀρχής ohne Artikel) als verbunden zusammengestellt werden?"

Schultze prefers the interpretation that Μονάς refers to the Father, Δωκὸς to Father and Son and Τριάς to Father, Son and Holy Spirit. He interprets ἀπ' ἀρχής to mean "from the beginning", but also to include the meaning "from the Father as Principle." He is thus able to derive from this sentence what Bulgakov does not see here, namely that Gregory implies that the Spirit proceeds through the Son.

163,1 Orat. 29:2, PG XXXVI, 76BC.

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Henri Pinault, op.cit., 230-233. Cf. 231: "Qu'il y ait là allusion à une doctrine néo-platonicienne, cela ne nous paraît pas niable. C'est aux Ennéades même que Grégoire semble se référer." Plato originated the analogy of the bowl (Timaeus 41D), but Plotinus developed it and Pinault identifies Ennéads V, 1, 6 to 9 and V, 2, 1 as the passages to which Gregory is referring when he speaks of one of the Greek philosophers in his Discours sur les Premières et Deuxième Causes (επι πρώτου αξίου καὶ δευτέρου). Pinault concludes (232):

"Toutefois, si Grégoire fait ici allusion à une conception plotinienne, il y a loin de là, à une influence néo-platonicienne profonde. La doctrine de 'ce profane' est signalée, mais nullement adoptée. Il n'oserait pas, déclare-t-il expressément, faire sienne la formule de ce païen, par crainte de faire entendre que la génération du Fils est produite comme malgré la volonté du père, par une nécessité contraignante de nature. C'est que l'opposition de la thèse néo-platonicienne et de la pensée chrétienne lui était apparue très nettement."

Cf. Ibid., 226 on the differences between the Trinitarian thought of Gregory and the three hypostases of Plotinus.

On the reference to Plotinus in Orat. 29:2, John Whittaker, in "Procclus, Procopius, Psellius and the Scholia on Gregory Nazianzen," VigChr, 29 (1975), 309-313, confirms Pinault's findings. According to Whittaker, the phrase οὗ τοις πρώτων αξίων καὶ δευτεροφιλοσοφη is a reference to Plotinus, Enn. 5, 2 [11], 1, 7ff., the only instance in which Plotinus employs the verb άπερρεῖ to describe the overflowing of the One. Gregory's έν οὕς πρώτων αξίων καὶ δευτεροφιλοσοφή is a clear enough reference to the subject matter of Enn. 5, 2 [11]. It seems therefore safe to conclude that Gregory's τῶν παρ' Ἐκλησίᾳ φιλοσοφήσαντων τις is an indirect way of referring specifically to Plotinus. φιλοσοφήτων τις, however, is Christian and therefore Gregory's addition. This last comment of Whittaker is at odds with Pinault.


"Abbiamo di fronte, quindi, anche in questo caso, una reinterpretazione del pensiero di Plotino...; Plotino aveva detto: l'Uno, Immobile, produce il molteplice (il Nus); e Gregorio corregge: il Padre, muovendosi (e in
questo movimento bisognerà vedere il movimento per eccellenza, cioè la generazione), produce la diade, finché tale movimento-generazione si ferma nella Trinità.

C'è, pertanto, Plotino, in questa speculazione di Gregorio, come pensava il Drèseke; ma si tratta di un Plotino rielaborato.


164,3 Cf. E.P. Meijering, "Athanasius on the Father as the Origin of the Son," Ibid., 89-102. Meijering notes (89):

"It is well known that Origen's doctrine of the Father as the ground of divinity represents a hierarchic conception of the divine which betrays Platonic influence. It appears that Athanasius too states firmly that the Son and the Spirit have their ἄρχη in the Father."

From Athanasius' statements in Contra Arianos I, 14, Meijering notes that he wrote of the Father as Origin of the Son in order to avoid a divine οὐσία or ἄρχη out of which a theogony has taken place. From II, 57 he concludes that Athanasius does not mean that the Son is caused in his being by the Father (i.e. that the Father's οὐσία is the cause of the Son's οὐσία and so superior). To speak of the Father as ἄρχη of the Son therefore does not imply superiority for Athanasius, because it does not mean a divine theogony or three οὐσίαι. The Father's οὐσία is the ἄρχη of the Son so that there is only one divine οὐσία and one divine ἄρχη. Ἐρχη is used as a synonym for divinity, and within the one ἄρχη, the Father is the ἄρχη of the Son. Athanasius does not call the Father ἄρχη θεότητος (as Origen does), but ἄρχη of the Son and Spirit. As to how it is logically possible to say that within the divine ἄρχη which is the Triune God, the Father is the ἄρχη of the Son and Spirit, Meijering points to Athanasius' answer in the fact that without the Son the Father would be imperfect and in the traditional image of the well (source) and the river. In another article, "Cyril of Alexandria on the Platonists and the Trinity," Ibid., 114-127, Meijering seems to show Athanasius as more hesitant about causality. He notes that Cyril of Alexandria accepts the Cappadocian thought where it amplifies Athanasius (e.g. μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ῥόος τῆς ὁμοιότατης) but returns to Athanasius where they have modified his thought: "Whilst the Cappadocians positively teach that the Father is the cause of the Son and as such more than the Son, Cyril, just like Athanasius, only occasionally admits that the Father is the cause of the Son" (114). Cf. also supra, 160, note 1.
165,1 Cf. supra, 27-30.

165,2 Orat. 31:31, PG XXXVI, 169A.

166,1 Ibid., 169B.

166,2 Orat. 31:32, PG XXXVI, 169BC.

166,3 B. S. Schultze, op. cit. (cf. supra, 162, note 2). For this argument that Gregory does not entirely set aside the analogies, cf. 173f. Schultze wishes to use the analogies to prove that the *filioque* is implicit in Gregory's thought.

166,4 Ibid., 172:

"Nicht aber beanstandet Gregor am Vergleich, dass Strahl und Licht dermassen Ausflüsse aus der Sonne sind, dass der Strahl an zweiter Stelle steht und das Licht an dritter, weil der Strahl zwischen Sonne und Licht vermittelt: das Licht kommt von der Sonne durch den Strahl; mit anderen Worten: der Geist geht vom Vater aus durch den Sohn. Hierin liegt ja der Kern des Vergleiches."

Similarly in reference to the other analogy Schultze writes:

"Dieser Zusammenhang zeigt sich in Bilde dadurch, dass die Quelle aus dem Quellgrund hervorgeht wie der Fluss aus der Quelle; oder, anders ausgedrückt, dass der Fluss durch die Quelle aus dem Quellgrund hervorsprudelt. Theologisch bedeutet dies im Gedanken des Nazianzeners, dass sich der Geist zum Sohn verhält wie der Sohn zum Vater; oder dass der Hl. Geist vom Vater durch den Sohn ausgeht" (Ibid., 171).

Schultze does not seem to take into account sufficiently Gregory's reservation: "But I was afraid in the first place that I should present a flow in the Godhead (*rhysen tina theotētos*), incapable of standing still." Schultze notes one of the inadequacies Gregory finds: "Der Verleich lässt im Dreifaltigen nur das Dynamische hervortreten, nicht das Statische, Beständige, als ob Gott in ständigem Wechsel begriffen wäre" (Ibid., 171). But it is not simply the dynamic concept, but the concept of "flow (*rhysin*)" to which Gregory objects.

166,5 Orat. 31:33, PG XXXVI, 172A.

166,6 Ibid. Gregory also considers another analogy (in Orat. 31:32) which was not a long-established and traditional one: "A ray of the sun flashing upon a wall and trembling with the movement of the moisture which the beam has taken up in mid-air, and then, being checked by the hard body, has set
up a strange quivering." But this seems to illustrate how something may be many yet one rather than the intra-Trinitarian relationships. Gregory rejects it since it suggests instability in God and also a cause prior to God.

167,1 Cf. supra, 34f., esp. 34, note 7. Cf. also C. Stead, op.cit., 262, where Stead classifies under four headings the analogies used by Athanasius to explain the term *homoousios*: (1) human paternity, father and son; (2) continuous natural processes: (a) fountain and stream, (b) source and ray of light, (c) vine and branches; (3) two men *simpliciter*; and (4) mind and word. On the three natural processes Stead comments (Ibid., 263):

"All three convey the notion of a common stuff (water, light, vine-tissue) emerging in markedly different forms. They also convey the notion of organic continuity, indeed of one-way communication: the stream comes from the fountain, the ray from the source, and not vice versa; and the vine analogy is probably to be understood in the same way..."


167,3 Orat. 2:38, PG XXXV, 445B.

167,4 Ibid.

167,5 Cf. Orat. 29:5, PG XXXVI, 80A (Cf. supra, 153).

168,1 Orat. 31:9, PG XXXVI, 141C-144A. The onomata are due to the pragmata.

168,2 F.W. Norris, op.cit., 98.

168,3 Orat. 29:8, PG XXXVI, 84C. This is the passage to which Norris refers.

169,1 L.R. Wickham, op.cit., 261-262.

170,1 Orat. 29:10, PG XXXVI, 88A:

αὕτη γὰρ φύσις γεννήτορος καὶ γεννήματος, ταῦτα εἶναι τῇ γεγεννηκότι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τὸ γέννημα [SC omits τὸ γέννημα].

170,2 That we need to think of the Holy Spirit as a distinct hypostasis with a distinct relationship to the Father is, in Gregory's view, the result not only of his distinct name but also of the revelation of the Triune God in the oikonomia. Cf. supra, 94-99, 105-111.
Again, cf. supra, 94-99, 105-111.

Orat. 41:9, PG XXXVI, 441B.

Ibid., 441C.

Ibid.

Orat. 41:10, PG XXXVI, 441D-444A: "Are you labouring to bring forth objections? Well, so am I to get on with my discourse. Honour the day of the Spirit! Restrain your tongue a little!" The Anastasia apparently at times resembled Speakers' Corner.

Orat. 41:11, PG XXXVI, 444ABC.

Orat. 41:14, PG XXXVI, 448AB. The preceding paragraph is devoted to the descent, pouring out and sending of the Spirit throughout the Old Testament and reaching its climax at Pentecost.


Orat. 31:8, PG XXXVI, 141B, cf. supra, 155f.

Orat. 34:8, PG XXXVI, 249A. Cf. supra, 160, note 2. Another unusual triad of titles, this time with an unusual application of archê to the Son occurs in the Last Farewell (Orat. 42:15, PG XXXVI, 476AB) in a summary of the doctrine of the Trinity which he gives to the assembled bishops of the Council of Constantinople and the imperial court as well as his own flock:

"The Unoriginate (ἀναρχον), and Origin (ἀρχη) and the One with the Origin (το μετα της ἀρχης), is one God. For the nature of the Unoriginate (το άναρχου) does not consist in being unoriginate (το ἀναρχον), nor in being unbegotten (το ἀγέννητον), for the nature of anything does not lie in what it is not, but in what it is... And the Origin (ἀρχη) is not divided from the Unoriginate (του ἀνάρχου) because it is the Origin (τη ἀρχη ετοι)... Again, the One with the Unoriginate (το μετα του ἀνάρχου) and the Origin (και της ἀρχης) is not anything other than they are. Now the name of the Unoriginate is 'Father', of the Origin, 'Son', and of the One with the Origin, 'Holy Spirit.' And the Three have one nature, God. And the union is the Father ('Ἐνωσις δε, ο Πατρις), from whom (ετε ο) and to whom (προς ον) run those who are from him (ἀνάρχου τα ξης), not so as to be confounded, but so as to be held (δε ξεσηαι) without distinction in time, will or power."
The application of archē to the Son is highly unusual for Gregory. It appears also that here for once archē refers not to internal causation, but to external causation or creation. In other words it is the equivalent of the title dēmiourgos for the Son. Yet since the Father is the one "from whom and to whom the order of Persons runs its course" (as Browne and Swallow translate it), the idea of the Father as Origin of that internal causation within the Godhead is also present.

Cf. Orat. 29:17, PG XXXVI, 96C, where Gregory lists "great and lofty utterances" of Scripture on the deity of the Son. The first is John 1:1, where Gregory identifies God the Word as "He that was in the Beginning/Origin (ὁ ἐν ἀρχῇ), he that was with the Beginning/Origin (ὁ μετὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς) and he that was the Beginning/Origin (ἡ ἀρχή)."
V(d) Paradox and Procession

175,1 F.W. Norris, op.cit. (thesis), 116.

175,2 Ibid., 118. It is not correct to state (Ibid., 117) that Gregory "avoids the term archē."

175,3 Cf. supra, 124ff.

176,1 F. Dinsen, op.cit., 160:

"An den Stellen, an denen hervorgehoben wird, dass die drei Hypostasen Vater, Sohn und Geist wirkliche und eigene Existenz haben...scheint es, als werde die göttliche ousie von den Kappadokern als Genus oder teilbares Substrat vorgestellt, die Einheit als eine rein gedankliche Einheit. Dort, wo das reale Einsein betont wird...ist die selbstständige Existenz der 'Personen' in Frage gestellt, scheinen die Bedeutungen von 'hypostasis' und 'idiotēs' ineinander zu fliessen."

176,2 According to E.P. Meijering, Athanasius retained a modified form of the Origenist doctrine of the Father as archē in order to safeguard this very point. Cf. E.P. Meijering, "Athanasius on the Father as the Origin of the Son," op.cit., 89-102, esp. 89:

"It is well known that Origen's doctrine of the Father as the ground of divinity represents a hierarchic conception of the Divine which betrays Platonic influence. It appears that Athanasius, too, states firmly that the Son and the Spirit have their ἡρῴη in the Father. The present paper intends to show to what degree Athanasius has adopted and to what extent he has adapted Origen's views on this matter."

One reason for Athanasius' retaining the idea of the Father as the Origin of the Son (Meijering notes in commenting on Contra Arianos I, 14) is to avoid a divine ὅσια or ἡρῴη as such out of which a theogony has taken place.

177,1 Cf. John D. Zizioulas, op.cit. (supra, 160, note 1). According to Zizioulas, the development of the Patristic understanding of being as communion required a departure from the monistic ancient Greek ontology in which the being of the world and the being of God formed an unbreakable unity. The creation of this new ontology, the greatest philosophical achievement of Patristic thought, was achieved not so much by academic theologians, such as Justin Martyr, Clement or Origen, but by bishops, pastoral theologians such as Ignatius of Antioch, Irenaeus and Athanasius who approach God through the experience of the ecclesial community of ecclesial being.
"This ontology, which came out of the eucharistic experience of the Church, guided the Fathers in working out their doctrine of the being of God, a doctrine formulated above all by Athanasius of Alexandria and the Cappadocian Fathers, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa... The being of God is relational being... It would be unthinkable to speak of the 'one God' before speaking of the God who is 'communion', that is to say of the Holy Trinity. The Holy Trinity is a primordial ontological concept..."

Communion thus becomes an ontological concept, but:

"'Communion' does not exist by itself: it is the Father who is the 'cause' of it. This thesis of the Cappadocians that introduced the concept of 'cause' into the being of God assumed an incalculable importance. For it meant that the ultimate ontological category which makes something really be, is neither an impersonal and incommunicable 'substance', nor a structure of communion existing by itself or imposed by necessity, but rather the person... The fact that God exists because of the Father shows that his existence, his being is the consequence of a free person; which means, in the last analysis, that not only communion but also freedom, the free person, constitutes true being" (Ibid., 17-18).

177,2 Cf. supra, 30ff.

177,3 Not that that was held in that way by Origen or the Origenists. Cf. G.L. Prestige, op.cit., 193:

"Ousia was applied by the Stoics, who were materialists, to their conception of the material content or substance of God... Origen (c. Cels. 3.75) reminds us that the Stoics had taught the existence of a corruptible God and had described his ousia as a mutable body. Though rejected in this crude form by all Christian teachers, this kind of thought continued to have a certain influence on theology. The being or substance of God, without being considered as material, came to be regarded as something which could, at least by a sort of metaphor, be thought of as in extension."

According to Prestige, the orthodox doctrine as expressed by Eusebius was that "the whole ousia of the Father became by derivation the whole ousia of the Son" (Ibid., 194). Athanasius seems to think of the Father's ousia as "the divine stuff of which the Father consists" (Ibid.), but:

"The Father's ousia is the Father himself, and not an attribute of the Father...therefore the being of the
Son, if he proceeds from the Father's being, must be the same as the Father's being, and not inferior" (Ibid., 195).

177.4 E.P. Meijering, op.cit., 95-96.


"Moreover, from the statement that the Son was 'begotten...of the ousia of the Father' it may be further gathered that, again, like Tertullian, the Creed does not conceive of the substratum as something underlying both the Father and the Son but rather as something which is identical with the Father, so that it is the Father who is the substratum of the Son. When, therefore, the Creed adds the statement that the Son is 'homoousios with the Father', it means thereby that the Son, because he is begotten of the Father as his substratum, is one with the Father in the sense of oneness of substratum."

178.2 E.P. Meijering, op.cit., 96.

178.3 Orat. 2:38, PG XXXV, 445C. Cf. supra, 158.

178.4 Orat. 23:6, PG XXXV, 1157C.

178.5 Orat. 20:6, PG XXXV, 1072C. Cf. supra, 158.

179.1 E.P. Meijering, "The Doctrine of the Will and of the Trinity in the Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus," op.cit., iii. Meijering compares the Trinitarian doctrine of Nazianzen with Athanasius' doctrine of the Trinity on the one hand and the Neo-Platonic speculations about the divine Principles on the other with special attention to the function of the will. For Athanasius, free will implies changeability, therefore the Son cannot be the Son because of a decision of the will of the Father. Gregory attacked the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the Principles (in Orat. 29:2) because he believed it implied that the eternal generation was an act against the will of the One. He believed that what was done under necessity was not lasting whilst what was done out of free will was lasting. Athanasius says that God generates the Son "by nature" which transcends free will and necessity. The generation is therefore not against the Father's will, but God's will must be identified with God's nature. For Plotinus, the second Principle was caused by the eternal generation of the One (not by the will of the One) and hence is ontologically inferior. For Athanasius, the Son is the eternal will of the Father by nature and is thus co-eternal and homoousios with the Father. For Gregory, the Son is caused by the eternal will of the Father.
to generate and is thus co-eternal and homoousios, but the Father is greater as generator and eternal cause of the Son. It is this position between Athanasius and Plotinus which, Meijering says, seems logically untenable.

179,2 James P. Mackey, *op. cit.* (supra, 37, note 6), comments that whereas Athanasius relegated the traditional emanationist imagery to the status of a mere illustration (**"In the older subordinationist model, this imagery [image and radiance, fountain and river] was more than illustrative of a faith already established; it was the very analogy of God's presence and action"**), the Cappadocians seem to rehabilitate it (**Ibid.**, 142f.). He comments: "It is difficult to rid oneself altogether of the suspicion that the old emanationist model is emerging periodically still to help a new schema to overcome weaknesses in itself which it cannot itself outgrow" (**Ibid.**, 149). Although Gregory Nazianzen is suspicious of the traditional images, he does indeed rehabilitate the Origenist triadology, but only as held in tension with the Athanasian model as one side of a paradox.

179,3 T.F. Torrance, in "Toward an Ecumenical Consensus on the Trinity," ThZ, 31 (1975), and with a similar ecumenical concern, advocates the abandonment of the Cappadocian doctrine of Cause within the Trinity (**Ibid.**, 340):

"We have to remember, as Hilary has said, that revelation is not of the Father manifest as God, but of God manifested as the Father. This may well provide us with a further point of ecumenical convergence, as it might serve to cut out the false problematic which gave rise in different ways in East and West to the difficulties in respect of the procession of the Spirit: if we could agree that while the Son is from his Father, i.e. from God who is his Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds not from God his Father but only from God who is Father, then we might come closer together. For the Orthodox, however, that would mean accepting Cyril of Alexandria's rejection of the Cappadocian modification of the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity, when in their determination to reject any tritheism that might be apparent in the formulation 'one ousia, three hypostaseis' they spoke of a causal priority or superiority of the Father over the Son and the Spirit."


180,1 Cf. *supra*, 155f. and the criticisms of Holl by Harkianakis in 156, note 2. Harkianakis did accept the polemical value of the term (**op.cit.**, 94):
"Theologisch-Inhaltlich war zwar mit dem von Gregor geschaffenen Begriff der *ekporeusis* nichts im Grunde gewonnen, aber, wie die verschiedenen Forscher an diesem Punkt bemerken, es war ausserordentlich wichtig für die Polemik gegen die Pneumatomachen, dass man jetzt eine bestimmte eigene Bezeichnung hatte, um die Seinsweise des Geistes von der Zeugung des Sohnes, mindestens terminologisch zu unterscheiden."


181,2 B.S. Schultze, *op.cit.* (cf. supra, 166) argued that the *filioque* was not only implied by the traditional images but by such passages as *Orat. 29:2*, *PG XXXVI*, 76B, διὰ τοῦτο μονάς ἀπ' ἀρχής εἰς διάδα κτισθεῖσα, μέχρι Τριάδος ἔστη: *Orat. 40:42*, *PG XXXVI*, 417D, ἡ τὸν Ὕλον τέμνων ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρός, ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὕλου τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πνεύματος: *Orat. 40:34*, *PG XXXVI*, 408C, Ἔν τῇ φωτὶ Κυρίου θέσαν φῶς, ἐν τῇ Πνεύματι τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν Ὕλον συγγάθητι: *Orat. 41:9*, *PG XXXVI*, 441C, Πάντα δοσα ὁ Πατήρ, τοῦ Ὅλου, πλὴν τῆς ἁγιοσίας, Πάντα δοσα ὁ Ὅλος, τοῦ Πνεύματος, πλὴν τῆς γεννήσεως: *Orat. 32:10*, *PG XXXVI*, 185B, τῷ Πνεύματι τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ. Schultze emphasizes (Ibid., 189) "dass die Trinitätsslehre der grossen Kappadokier wie schon die des Athanasius in keiner Weise abgeschlossen ist, sondern dynamisch nach vorwärts drängt." Cf. P. Godet, "Grégoire de Nazianze," *DThC*, VI, 1839-1844. Godet thought that the *filioque* was presupposed in *Orat. 42:15*, *PG XXXVI*, 476A, ἀναρχόν, καὶ ἀρχή, καὶ τὸ μετὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς."
NOTES for CHAPTER VI: THE DEITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

VI(b) The Open Confession

187,1 Orat. 12:1, PG XXXV, 844B. Cf. Carm. 1, 2, 34, 154, PG XXXVII, 956A: Θεού τε μη σέβεται συμφωναν.
187,2 Orat. 12:2, PG XXXV, 844B.
187,4 Orat. 12:4, PG XXXV, 848AB. Cf. supra, 77, note 4.
188,1 Orat. 12:6, PG XXXV, 849BC.
188,3 Ep. 58, PG XXXVII, 116AB.
188,4 Ibid., 117B.
189,1 Orat. 43:68, PG XXXVI, 585D.
189,2 Ibid., 588AB.
189,3 Ibid., 588BC.
189,4 Orat. 43:69, Ibid., 589A.
191,1 Orat. 32:5, PG XXXVI, 180AB.
191,3 Orat. 21:33, PG XXXV, 1121CD.
191,4 Orat. 21:34, PG XXXV, 1124B.
191,5 Orat. 41:16, PG XXXVI, 437A.
191,6 Ibid.
192,1 Orat. 41:7, PG XXXVI, 437C.
192,2 Orat. 41:8, PG XXXVI, 440A.
192,3 Ibid. 440BC.
192,4 Orat. 39:16, PG XXXVI, 353B (cf. supra, 90):

"And the Spirit bears witness to his [Christ's] deity, for he descends on one who is like him... and like a dove, for he honours the body (for this also by deification is God) by being seen in a bodily form..."
But if you are to judge of deity by bulk and weight, and the Spirit seems to you a small thing because he came in the form of a dove."

Orat. 40:41, PG XXXVI, 417B (cf. supra, 129):

"...the one Godhead and power found in the Three unitedly, and comprising the Three distinctively...the infinite conjunction (συμφωνία) of the three Infinite Ones, each God, when considered in himself (ἐκαστὸν καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἑωρομένον)...the Three one God when contemplated together, each God because of the consubstantiality (ἐξείνο διὰ τὴν ὀμοουσίατη) one God because of the monarchy."

192.5 Orat. 25:15, PG XXXV, 1220B.
193.1 Orat. 34:8, PG XXXVI, 248D.
193.2 Orat. 34:9, PG XXXVI, 249B.
193.3 Orat. 34:11, PG XXXVI, 252B.
193.4 Orat. 34:12, PG XXXVI, 252C. Cf. supra, 68, note 2.
193.5 Ibid.
193.6 Orat. 34:14, PG XXXVI, 253C.
193.7 Ibid.
193.8 Orat. 34:15, PG XXXVI, 256A.
193.9 Orat. 31:10, PG XXXVI, 144A:

Τί συν; θεός το Πνεῦμα; Πάνυ γε. Τί συν, ὀμοούσιον; Εἰπέρ θεός.

194.1 Orat. 31:3, PG XXXVI, 136B.
194.2 Orat. 31:5, PG XXXVI, 137B. Gregory actually begins further back with the question whether the Holy Spirit exists at all, but refuses to enter into discussion with those who deny his existence and effectively begins with the question whether the Holy Spirit is a self-existent reality or exists in something else, that is, whether he is substance (ousia) or accident (symbebekos). The fact that he uses ousia here (because he is using the conventional language ousia and symbebekos which originated with Aristotle), and does not use hypostasis, does not affect the point that he begins his argument here from a point more suited to the Origenist schema of three hypostases, namely the independent existence and reality of the Holy Spirit, rather than from
the more Athanasian starting point, the unity of the Triad in the one God.

194.3 Orat. 31:9, PG XXXVI, 141C. Cf. supra, 151.

194.4 Ibid., 144A.


"Der Terminus homoousios begegnet bei allen dreien jedoch relativ selten: Basil verwendet ihn noch am häufigsten; er scheint es auch als einziger noch für erforderlich gehalten zu haben, sich für den Terminus (die Sache ja ohnehin) auszusprechen; Gregor von Nyssa gebraucht das homoousios nur im Zusammenhang der Polemik gegen Eunomius und Apollinaris - um ihre Thesen ad absurdum zu führen -, nicht dort, wo er die orthodoxe Anschauung darlegt; Gregor von Nazianz ist der einzige von den dreien, der den Geist explizit homoousios nennt."

194.6 Orat. 31:11, PG XXXVI, 145B:

"Will you, then, give up your contention against the Spirit, that he must either be altogether begotten, or else cannot be consubstantial (δομοοσιον) or be God?"

Orat. 31:29, PG XXXVI, 165C, where Scripture is said to attribute to the Spirit so many titles and divine actions (which are quoted),

"to manifest, as I take it, his consubstantiality (το δομοοσιον)."

Cf. Orat. 41:12, PG XXXVI, 444D-445A;

"Another Paraclete that you might acknowledge his co-equality (δομοτιμαν)... For 'another' is said, I know,
riot Of different kinds, but of things consubstantial (τῶν ὀρθοσωσιών)."

Cf. Orat. 40:41, PG XXXVI, 417B:

"The Three one God when contemplated together, each God because of the consubstantiality (ὁμοουσίωτητα), one God because of the monarchia."

It is here that in contrast to Orat. 31:10, the Spirit (along with the Father and Son) is said to be God because he is consubstantial. In Orat. 31:10 he is said to be consubstantial because he is God. Cf. also Orat. 42:16, PG XXXVI, 476C:

"We believe in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, consubstantial (ὁμοουσία) and of equal glory (ὁμόδοξα)."

195,1 Orat. 31:21-22, PG XXXVI, 157A:

"But since the fact that Scripture does not very clearly (μη λίαν σαφώς) or very often (μηδέ πολλάκις) write of him as God by name (ὁνομασία) becomes to you an occasion of blasphemy and of this excessive wordiness and impiety, we will release you from this inconvenience by a short discussion of things and names (προγνώμων και ὄνωμῶν) and especially of their use in Holy Scripture. Some things have no existence, but are spoken of; others which do exist are not spoken of; some neither exist nor are spoken of; and some both exist and are spoken of."

Gregory is most interested in the second class, and particularly instances the facts so important to his opponents that God the Father is "unbegotten (αγέννητον)" and "unoriginate (ἀναρχον)", facts not stated in Scripture but implied.

"Is it not evident that they are from passages which imply them although they are not stated?"

Cf. supra, 132.


195,3 Orat. 31:29, PG XXXVI, 165A-168B: Luke 1:35; Matt. 1:20; John 1:32,33; Matt. 4:1; Luke 4:1,14; Matt. 12:28; Acts 1:8,9; 1 Cor. 2:11,16; Rom. 8:9; 11 Cor. 3:17; Rom. 8:15; John 14:17; 15:26; 16:13; Isa. 11:2; Ps. 143:10; Ps. 51:10,12; Rom. 15:26; 1. Cor. 12:11; Phil. 2:11; 11 Cor. 13:14; Matt. 12:31; Luke 11:20 (Matt. 12:28); Acts 2:3 (Heb. 12:29); John 3:5; Rom. 8:11; 1 Cor. 2:10; John 14:26; John 3:8; 1 John 2:27; John 16:13. Ps. 143:10;
Acts 13:2, 2; Acts 20:23; Isa. 63:10; Acts 5:9; 1 Cor. 2:10; John 6:63; Rom. 8:10; 1 Cor. 12:11; Eph. 4:11; Acts 2:3; John 14:16; Matt. 12:31, 32; Acts 5:3, 4. Also Wisdom 1:7 and Wisdom 7:22-27.

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195.4 Orat. 31:29, PG XXXVI, 165AB.

195.5 R.P.C. Hanson, in "Basil's Doctrine of Tradition in Relation to the Holy Spirit," VigChr, 22 (1968), 241-255, draws attention to a divergence of approach here between Basil and Gregory. (Cf. supra, 40, note 6 and 46, note, 2). Since Basil felt he could not meet the demand of Eustathius of Sebaste for a full documentation from Scripture of his doctrine of the Holy Spirit, "he took the alternative course of developing to an extent not previously achieved the support which extra-Scriptural tradition could give to the Church's doctrine" (Ibid., 253). Hanson traces the development of Basil's view of tradition from the position in the Adversus Eunomium, written in 364, that Scripture is "doctrinally sufficient" through a readiness to use Christian tradition to argue theological points, until he takes "the quite new step" in his "greatest work, the De Spiritu Sancto," of developing the "doctrine of secret tradition" which Hanson calls "a startling innovation" (251). Nazianzen's approach is compared:

"It is instructive to compare the manner in which Basil's great friend and fellow defender of Nicene orthodoxy, Gregory of Nazianzus, deals in one of his works [the fifth of the Theological Orations] with exactly the same problem... He is just as aware of the difficulty of the problem of finding Scriptural evidence to support the doctrine of the homoousia of the Spirit as an hypostasis within the Trinity as was Basil, but he solves it in quite a different way. He argues first that we are bound by the logical consequences of Scripture, even though they are not stated in Scripture."

Hanson concludes that "the twentieth-century reader is likely to conclude that Gregory's method was a much preferable one to Basil's."


"Les historiens du symbole de Constantinople ne semblent donc pas encore en mesure de percer l'anonymat des rédacteurs de la clause pneumatologique, et il y a fort à parier qu'ils n'y parviennent jamais, dans l'état actuel de la documentation conservée."

195,7 Ep. 102, PG XXXVII, 193C.

196,1 Carm. II, 1, 11, PG XXXVII, 1029-1166. Ritter examines lines 1703-1796 (col. 1148-1155), a section which begins:

Ritter concludes, op. cit. (Das Konzil), 258:

"Der Streit zwischen Gregorios und der Konzilsmehrheit und der Anlass für des Nazianzeners Polemik hatte, so lehren die Verse 1703ff., mit dem Palladium der Orthodoxie, mit dem nikäischen Glauben zu tun, der 'die anzubetende Natur der trinitarischen Gottheit in eins verband', was meint, der - mindestens implizit - bereits die rechte Lehre von der Einheit der Gottheit in der Dreiheit der göttlichen Hypostasen enthielt."

196,2 Ritter, op. cit., 259:

"Wenn Gregorios nun im weiteren berichtet, der nikäische Glaube habe auf der Konstantinopler Synode 'Zugüsse', also Zusätze, erhalten, so konnten dagegen
seinerseits nach dem, was wir eben hörten, an sich keine Bedenken bestehen. Wohl aber gegen die Art dieser Zusätze! Sie waren nämlich seiner Meinung nach 'salzig', ungenügend, ja, sie dienten eher zur 'Trübung' der klaren Quelle des nikäischen Glaubens, als dass sie das zu deutlicherem Ausdruck gebracht hätten, was darin - für den Einsichtigen wenigstens - bereits impliziert war.

Hier nun erhebt sich die entscheidende Frage: Auf welche uns bekannte Konzilsentscheidung könnte sich diese Beschreibung und diese Kritik beziehen wenn nicht allein auf das der kirchlichen Überlieferung als Werk dieser Synode geltende Symbol, nämlich C? Gilt doch C nicht nur seit alters als namentlich pneumatologische 'Erläuterung' und 'Ergänzung' des 'Nicaenum', sondern erweisen sich auch seine 'Zusätze', gemessen an den Desideraten Gregors, in der Tat als 'ungenügend', 'salzig', als Werk von 'Unentschiedenen'!

Gregory's opponents at the Council were not the Macedonians (as the Pneumatomachi came to be called) but those who wished to compromise (perhaps to please the emperor) and make the assertion of the Spirit's deity less than clear.

Ritter deduces from lines 1774-1776 (PG XXXVII, 1153A) that Gregory regarded the acknowledgment of the Spirit's deity as necessary to salvation (Ibid., 265). The lines read:

Πρόοθεν φασίς τοις ἀνω πηγῶν φύσις,
Καὶ ποὶ ὁδεῦσε τὴν ἐναντίαν φόραν,
'Η τι προδώσω τῆς ἐμῆς σωτηρίας.

Meehan translates this (op.cit., 126): "Water shall flow upwards or fire take the opposite course before I yield up one whit of my salvation."

196,3 Carm. II, 1, 14, PG XXXVII, 1244-1250. The quoted lines are 34-36 (1247A):

'Tὸ ἱνεῦμ' (ἀχουσαθ'), ὡς θεὸς, πάλιν λέγω. 'Εμοὶ θεὸς σύ, καὶ τρίτον βοῶ, θεὸς Ἵκτι' ἐστι.

VI (c) "You are my God!"

197,1 Cf. supra, 31ff., 46.
197,2 Cf. supra, 31f. and 35, 43f.
197,3 Cf. supra, 46.
197,4 Cf. supra, 187-189.
198,1 Cf. supra, 45f.
198,2 Cf. supra, 12, also note 1.
198,3 Cf. supra, 148f.

199,1 This was ironic because of Arius's professed concern to safeguard monotheism. Cf. the Letter of Arius to Alexander Bishop of Alexandria as found in Athanasius, De Synodis, 16 and Epiphanius, Haer. 69.7; and printed in Christology of the Later Fathers, ed. E.R. Hardy and C.C. Richardson, London: SCM, 1954, 332-334 and A New Eusebius, ed. J. Stevenson, London: SPCK, 1957.

199,2 Cf. the comments of G.W.H. Lampe and Alasdair Heron from their quite different perspectives. G.W.H. Lampe, God as Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon, 1977, 35: "In Hebrew religious language 'Spirit' is one of those 'bridge' words which express the idea of God's outreach towards, and contact with, the created world." Alasdair Heron, The Holy Spirit, London: Marshall, 1983, 7-8: "...ruach is used to speak of God as present and active in the world and in particular among human beings... The ruach of Yahweh is not detachable, as it were, from Yahweh himself: it is his living impact here and now." On the New Testament and Christian tradition cf. James Mackey's comment quoted supra, 86, note 1, that the problem is not the deity of the Spirit; but the distinguishing of the Spirit from the Father. On the early Fathers, T.F. Torrance comments ("Spiritus Creator: A Consideration of the Teaching of St. Athanasius and St. Basil," Theology in Reconstruction, London: SCM, 1965, 209-228):

"It is significant that in the earliest tradition of the Church there was little or no controversy about the deity of the Spirit. It was everywhere acknowledged that God is Spirit and taken for granted that the Spirit of God is God."

"The concern of Irenaeus, as of Justin before him, is with the Father and the Son; and he writes always with the heresy of Marcion in the back of his mind. It would seem as though no question of the deity of the Holy Spirit occurred to him. The Spirit was the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ. It was necessary to insist that 'that which is begotten of God is God': the Godhead of the Son required proof. But to say that 'the Spirit of God' is truly God would have been to him a tautology. The thought of the Spirit as God did not as yet involve any such distinction as could seem to conflict with the unity of the Deity" (Ibid., 61).

199,3 Cf. supra, 191f.

199,4 K. Holl, op.cit., 162:

"Denn die Abweichung Gregor's von Basilius in unserer Frage wurzelt schliesslich in seinem um eine Nuance kräftiger entwickelten Spiritualismus."

200,1 Ibid., 162f.:

"Dem entspricht es, dass Gregor bei der Auferstehung eine Vergeistigung der φύσις annimat, die an eine Auflösung wenigstens hart herankommt... Es ist für den positiven Aufbau der Theologie Gregor's von grösserer Tragweite und steht mit der uns beschäftigenden Frage direkt in Beziehung, dass Gregor auch in seiner Psychologie sich noch enger als Basilius an Origenes angeschlossen hat. Denn auf den Einfluss des Origenes ist es zurückzuführen, wenn Gregor (ohne Trichotomist zu werden) innerhalb der ψυχή den φύσις als das Geistige im engeren und eigentlichen Sinn auszeichnet. Das spiritualistische Interesse ist damit noch schärfer zugespitzt als bei Basilius."


200,4 Cf. supra, 65ff. and 117ff.


201,1 Cf. supra, 66, and 122f.
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