Abstract of Thesis

The aim is to understand Aquinas' discussion of the Gifts as they are presented within the larger philosophical and theological context of the *Summa Theologiae*. This involves a dual process of analysis: understanding his interpretation of the Gifts by reference to the context in which they are treated; and using Aquinas' treatment of the Gifts to highlight the unity and significance of his theological principles within the larger presentation.

Part One is a detailed analysis of *Pars Prima Secundae*, question 68. From this close study wider issues emerge: the notion of both intrinsic and extrinsic principles of man's activity, that is reason and God; and Aquinas' use of two models, that of movement, (*motio*) and disposition, (*habitus*). The significance of these two models is discussed in relation to developments within Aquinas' theology of grace.

Part Two looks at the metaphysical background to question 68. One chapter examines the model of movement in Aquinas' theology. The other two chapters study the relationship between the extrinsic and intrinsic principles of man's activity by examining Aquinas' use of the *De bona fortuna*, cited in question 68, and by looking at the interconnections between reason, law and grace in Aquinas' thought.

Part Three examines Aquinas' detailed treatment of the seven individual Gifts in the *Pars Secunda Secundae*. Again the study stresses the need to analyse the Gifts from within the context of Thomas' whole moral theology.

Aquinas' treatment of the Gifts cannot be appreciated if wrenched out of the context in which it is presented. The strength of his work lies not in dependence on the text of Isaiah or on the tradition of the Gifts of the Spirit but on his use of the basic principles which also structure the whole *Summa Theologiae*. 
ST THOMAS AQUINAS' TREATMENT OF
THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IN
THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE.

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Declaration

This work has been written solely by

j farrell
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Abbreviations

Abbreviations for the works of St Thomas are as follows:

**Summa Theologiae**, without title: Ia, Pars Prima; IaIIae, Pars Prima Secundae; IaIIae, Pars Secunda Secundae; IIIa, Pars Tertia. Part, question, article and reply are given as follows: e.g., Ia,q.5,a.4,ad3um; Prima Pars, question 5, article 4, reply to the third objection.

**In. Sent.** Scriptum super libros sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi. Book, distinction, question, article, solution and reply, e.g. In III Sent.,d.23,q.1,a.1,ii,ad3.

**S.C.G.** Summa contra gentiles. Book, chapter, e.g. S.C.G. III,c.49.

**Mic. Ethics** Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.

**E.E.** Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics.

**M.M.** Aristotle, Magna Moralia.

Other works

**D.S.** Dictionnaire de spiritualité.

**D.T.C.** Dictionnaire de théologie catholique.

**P. et M.** O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, Louvain, 1942ff.


INTRODUCTION
SECTION ONE: THE TEXT

1. THE TEXT OF QUESTION 68, ARTICLE ONE

   a. The Context: 'Consequenter, considerandum est de donis'
   b. The Question: 'Utrum dona differant a virtutibus'
   c. 'Responsio: Dicendum quod ...'. Thomas' analysis of the problem.
   d. The State of the Question.
   e. Thomas' answer to the Question - 'Inspiratio autem significat quandam motionem ab exteriori ...'
The aim of this dissertation is to understand Thomas' discussion of the Gifts of the Spirit as they are presented within the larger philosophical and theological context of the *Summa Theologiae*. This involves a dual process of analysis: understanding his interpretation of the Gifts by reference to the context in which they are treated; and using Thomas' treatment of the Gifts to highlight the unity and significance of his theological principles within this larger presentation.

Thomas dealt with the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in his *Commentary on the Sentences* and in his *Commentary on Isaiah*. These works fall outside the scope of this dissertation. Similarly, Thomas' treatment of the Gifts has been the subject of centuries of study, prayerful meditation and intellectual argument and debate. These too are beyond the scope of our study, except in as much as we have learnt from them. Various scholars have written on the history of the Church's use of the Isaian prophetic text and on the course of theological speculation on the 'sevenfold' Gifts. These too lie beyond the area of this study, except in as much as we have learnt from them.¹

This dissertation concentrates on the *Summa Theologiae*. The basic premise is that the treatise on the Gifts in that text is not a monograph but part of a larger work. Thomas' theology of the Gifts cannot be properly appreciated if it is detached from the wider theology in which it is embedded. The strength of his work on the Gifts lies not in his use of the Isaian prophecy but on his use, in this area, of the same basic principles which also structure the whole *Summa Theologica*.

These principles interlink his work on the Gifts with other major areas of his anthropology and theology. It is in this light that Thomas' treatment of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit have been studied in this dissertation.

Section One is a detailed analysis of Prima Secundae, question 68. From this close study wider issues emerge: the notion of both intrinsic and extrinsic principles of man's activity, that is, reason and God; and Aquinas' use of two models, that of movement, (motio), and disposition, (habitus). The significance of these two models is discussed in relation to developments within Thomas' theology of grace.

Section Two looks at the metaphysical background to question 68. One chapter examines the model of movement in Aquinas' theology. The other two chapters study the relationship between the intrinsic and extrinsic principles of man's activity by examining Thomas' use of the De bona fortuna, cited in question 68, and by looking at the interconnections between reason, law and grace in Thomas' thought.

The Third Section is an examination of Thomas' detailed treatment of the seven individual Gifts in the Secunda Secundae. Again, the study stresses the need to analyse the Gifts from within the context of Thomas' whole moral theology.

The Latin text is that used in the Blackfriars edition, (ed. T. Gilby), the Leonine edition. There are no serious textual problems in this area of study.
We should begin by looking at the force of this term, consequenter: in other words, at how this question fits into the structure of the Prima Secundae. Throughout the Summa, there are occasional previews of blocks of related questions which serve to articulate the framework of the books. By 'articulate' here, I mean that such previews both hinge the work into its sub-sections and make the overall trend and direction of the Summa explicit. Now the four prologues obviously act in this way, but, to take the Prima Pars as an example, so do the introductions to q.1, q.2, q.3, q.14, a.27, q.29, q.39, q.44, q.47, q.50, q.65, q.75, q.103, q.106. Let us look now at the similar articulations of the text in the Prima Secundae as they concern our present quaestio.

The Articulation of the Prima Secundae

Prologue:

Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum: postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem (cf. 1, q.2 introd.), restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.

q.1 introd.

Ubi primo considerandum occurrat de ultimo fine humanae vitae; et deinde de his quae homo ad hunc finem pervenire potest, vel ab eo deviare (q.6): ex fine enim oportet accipere rationes eorum quae
ordinantur ad finem. Et quia ultimus finis humanae vitae ponitur esse beatitudo, oportet primo considerare de ultimo fine in communi; deinde de beatitudine (q.2).

q.6. introd.

Quia igitur ad beatitudinem per actus aliquos necesse est pervenire (cf q.5,a.7), oportet consequenter de humanis actibus considerare, ut sciamus quibus actibus perveniatur ad beatitudinem, vel impediatur beatitudinis via (cf q.1 introd.). Sed quia operationes et actus circa singularia sunt, ideo omnis operativa scientia in particulari consideratione perficitur. Moralis igitur consideratione, quia humanorum actuum, primo quidem tradenda est in universali; secundo vero, in particulari (2-2).

Circa universalem autem considerationem humanorum actuum, primo quidem considerandum occurrit de ipsis actibus humanis; secundo de principiis eorum (q.49). Humanorum autem actuum quidam sunt hominis proprii; quidem autem sunt homini et aliis animalibus communes. Et quia beatitudo est proprium hominis bonum, prorsus quius se habent ad beatitudinem actus quae sunt proprie humani, quam actus qui sunt homini aliisque animalibus communes. Primo ergo considerandum est de actibus qui sunt proprie humanis; secundo de actibus qui sunt homini aliisque animalibus communes, qui dicuntur animae passiones (q.22).

Circa primum duo consideranda occurrunt: primo, de conditione humanorum actuum, secundo de distinctione eorum (q.18). Cum autem actus homini proprie dicatur qui sunt voluntarii, eo quod voluntas est rationalis appetitus, qui est proprius hominis: oportet considerare de actibus inquantum sunt voluntarii.
q.22 introd.

Post hoc considerandum est de passionibus animae ...

q.49 introd.

Post actus et passiones, considerandum est de principiis humanorum actuorum, (cf q.6 introd.). Et primo, de principiis intrinsecis; secundo de principiis extrinsecis (q.90).

Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus; sed quia de potentiiis in Prima Parte (q.77) dictum est, nunc restat de habitibus considerandum. Et primo quidem, in generali; secundo vero, de virtutibus et vitiis, et aliis huiusmodi habitibus, qui sunt humanorum actuum principia (q.55).

Within this sub-section of the Summa which q.49 introduces there is one particular further division of the text which relates directly to the Gifts, and so it will be included here.

q.55 introd.

Consequenter considerandum est de habitibus in speciali (cf q.49 introd.). Et quia habitus, ut dictum est, (q.54, a.3), distinguuntur per bonum et malum, primo dicendum est de habitibus bonis, qui sunt virtutes et alia eis adiuncta, scilicet dona, beatitudines et fructus (cf q.68ss); secundo de habitibus malis, scilicet de vitiis et peccatis (q.71).

Now to return to the general structure of the IaIIae:
q.90 introd.

Consequenter considerandum est de principiis exterioribus actuum (cf q.49 introd.). Principium autem exterius ad malum inclinans est diabolus, de cuius tentatione in Primo (q.114) dictum est. Principium autem exterius movens ad bonum est Deus, qui et nos instruit per legem, et iuvat per gratiam. Unde primo de lege; secundo de gratia dicendum est (q.109).

This is the context in which the questions of the Gifts of the Spirit are situated. In this thesis we shall use this context to try to understand Thomas' treatment of the gifts in the Summa and we shall use the study of the Gifts as a thread to draw out the interconnections of his thought.
(b) Quaestio: Utrum dona differant a virtutibus; Are the Gifts distinct from the Virtues?

This title of the question opens up the entire problem. Thomas has analysed the virtues and the notion of habitus already. If the Gifts are the same as the virtues then any further discussion is redundant. If they are merely refined forms of the virtues then the subsequent discussion might be edifying but not disturbing. On the other hand, if they are totally different from the virtues, then the principles of Thomas' anthropology, as presented so far, are not sufficient and a wider basis is needed to support moral philosophy and theological anthropology. But if the Gifts are distinct from the virtues and yet allied to them, does this point towards another dimension of the moral philosophy he has so far expounded; a dimension not yet focused upon, but essential to a proper understanding of it?

1. IaIIae, q.49-67. 2. See the first objection and its answer.
(c) Responsio: Dicendum quod ..! Thomas' analysis of the problem.

He begins, as is so common in his approach, by setting out how the important terms are to be understood in his answer to the question.

'So far as the meaning of the words is concerned ...'
He will not base his discussion on current terminology. Any such attempt is vitiated, as he himself points out, by the fact that the virtues of faith, hope and charity, and the infused moral virtues of prudence, justice, courage and temperance, are virtues that are "given" by God, 'infused' and not 'acquired'. So Thomas, as in a scholastic debate, concedes this point.

'Unde secundum hoc (secundum rationem nominis) donum a virtute distinguui non potest.'

It is important to realise what line of approach Thomas has renounced here because it is all too easy to return to this line of thinking while reading his further discussion of the Gifts. If he has conceded this point, then to follow his thought correctly, we also must abandon it.

Thomas does not build up his theology of the distinctiveness of the Gifts on the basis of their origin as gift from God. Where he uses this notion he will use it equally of the Gifts and the infused virtues and he will, in fact, see the Gifts as secondary to the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity.¹ The concept of 'gift' cannot then be used as a distinguishing factor.² The

¹ IaIIae,q.68,a.8  ² In Comm.on Sent.III, d.34, q.1, a.1, ad.2. Thomas admits that 'gift' can be used of all that is given to man from God but still thinks that the concept can still be used to distinguish all the virtues from the gifts of the Spirit. Here he renounces that attempt. See M.M. Labourdette, 'Dons du Saint-Esprit, IV, Saint Thomas et la théologie thomiste', Dictionnaire de Spiritualité 3, col. 1615.
vital distinguishing factor which Thomas will use will not be some-
thing in God but something in man: something anthropological and
not theological.

What can this last assertion mean? It is obviously contro-
versial and far from clear; justifiable as yet only in the provoca-
tion it might offer to help us see just how much Thomas has conceded.
What it actually means and how accurate it is, will be clear only
when we have finished our study of Thomas positive exposition.

Edward O'Connor, discussing the theology of the Gifts of
Anselm of Laon, points out just how dominant this concept of 'gift'
was to the early scholastics in this area.

'So far as the Gifts are concerned, however, it should
be noted that the very notion of gift seems to have
been the controlling factor in Anselm's synthesis.
That is to say, he determines the role of the Sacred
Seven from the term which had come to be applied to
them since the 9th century, rather than from what is
said of them in Scripture or even in the patristic
writings. So decisive is this concept of gift that
the Gifts seem to function practically as an equiva-
 lent for grace in Anselm's crude system. Even in
later theologians, until about the time of Thomas,
the theology of the Gifts seems to be governed largely
by this concept.' (1)

So Thomas has given up what appears to be his strong card.
He admits that, having conceded so much, some of his contemporaries
and predecessors have decided that there is no difference between
the virtues and the Gifts. 2

'Et ideo quidam posuerunt quod dona non essent a
virtutibus distinguenda'

And yet, having renounced the apparently strongest line of defence,

2. William of Auvergne, (died 1249) took this line in his later
years, and the Oxford scholastic Richard Rufus, (writing c. 1250)
also. See O'Connor p. 105 and D. Lottin, Psychologie et morale
aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles III, pp. 357, 411.
he continues to propose an important distinction between the Gifts and the virtues. Why? Or rather, what is the reason he gives here?

'Sed eis remanet non minor difficultas, ut scilicet rationem assignent quare quaedam virtutes dicantur dona, et non omnes; et quare aliqua computantur inter dona quae non computantur inter virtutes, ut patet de timore.'

The weakness of this defence is highlighted rather than camouflaged by the phrase, non minor difficultas. Are there any real difficulties? Can the problem not be dismissed as no problem at all; as merely a matter of rhetoric? Long before Ockham there were theologians who could take this option. 1 Why then did Thomas not do so?

This is a very serious question because it raises an anxiety about Thomas' sincerity in his presentation of the Gifts, and consequently an anxiety about the significance of this dissertation. One possibility that can be suggested to account for Thomas' possible "theological insincerity" here is that he is so conservative a theologian that he could not allow any of the terminology he had inherited to lapse. One can cite the example of his discussion of the Beatitudes in this respect: there he confines himself to a traditional framework based on a piece of Augustinian rhetoric; 2 despite all its difficulties and limitations, Thomas never allows himself to break free of its terminology and its obvious artificialities. But if Thomas is conservative he is not an unthinking conservative and even in this case of the Beatitudes he can use old wineskins to present new thought: the very first line of his exposition of the Beatitudes shows an Aristotelian teleological thrust which links this apparently...

---

insignificant question with the central question of the IIa para, IaIIae, q.1-5 on the whole purpose of human existence and activity, "Beatitude".

... beatitudo est ultimus finis hominum vitae ...

A link forged between St. Matthew and Aristotle; "beatitude" and "Beatitudo". The charge against Thomas therefore might be, not that he is an unthinking conservative but that his desire to preserve all the elements of the theological legacy led him to confine his own thoughts in unwieldy and unsuitable terminological frameworks. This is Lottin's view. It is a position made stronger by our knowledge that the Summa was designed as a basic text-book for men beginning their formation within this theological tradition of scholasticism. Are we misled then, if we take Thomas' exposition of the Gifts as a serious theological statement? Is he merely trying to get the jig-saw pieces of scholastic categories to form a single coherent pattern, unwilling to admit that some pieces just do not belong and should be jettisoned?

It is not clear how this charge can be met by any simple and direct answer. On some issues - including the important one of charity and also of the nature of the human soul - Thomas was prepared to break quite radically with the patristic 'authorities', and with his predecessors and contemporaries. The question before us is how we are to read this text? The weakness of the charge against

1. IaIIae, q.69,a.1. 2. See the final chapter of this dissertation, p. 301f. 3. Lottin, op.cit. p. 144. 4. IaIIae, q.23,a.2 where he disagrees with both Lombard and Augustine. 5. Is,q.75. For the condemnation at Paris see, among others, Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol II, 1950, pp. 430-434 in a section entitled "Opposition to Thomist 'novelties'". See also E. Gilson, "Pourquoi S.Thomas a critiqué S.Augustin", Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, t.1, 1926, pp. 5-127.
Thomas lies actually in its strength, in the very simplicity of its underlying hypothesis, which is that Thomas used his considerable intellectual genius to underpin a minor point of the tradition. Does this attractively simple hypothesis account for the several different essays on this topic which Thomas attempted during his career, of which this is the most mature? It may or it may not. It does not seem that a direct answer to this charge can be found. Rather, it seems as if the charge can be met only by presenting an alternative hypothesis based on reading Thomas' text as a serious theological statement. This alternative hypothesis would need to do more than explain the text; it would need to show up the positive insights gained by taking Thomas' exposition seriously, pointing out insights lost if the text is seen, in our modern terms, as 'insincere'.

To refocus our discussion on the text before us, let us probe the significance of the reference to the Gift of Fear.

'........ ut patet de timore.'

There is more in this casual example than at first meets the eye. We might see the problem here as merely one of classification. The tradition has called some elements of the Christian Life virtues and Gifts, some just virtues, some just Gifts. Is this important or merely a question of labelling? The question remains open until we look at Fear. There is no way in which Fear can be classed as a virtue in either a Greek classical sense or in the Christian modification of that classical legacy, or at least, the latter only with

1. With the Lombard's text, and in Thomas Commentary on the Sentences, this problem raised by the notion of religious fear in introduced at the very beginning of the treatise on the Gifts and takes up a great deal of the space of the treatise. In Sent. III, 34 and 34, q.2. And in the Secunda Secundae Thomas devotes twelve articles to this topic: far more than to any other Gift, IIaIIae,q.19.
some difficulty. The 'erratic' of Theological Fear poses a problem: as it is classed among the Gifts it might be that the Gifts present some dimension of man's nature which the virtues do not relate to directly.

The reminder that Christianity's use of language of the virtues has classical roots also reminds us that already, long before Thomas, two systems had already been interfused - the Biblical and the Greek. Indeed one solution to the difficulties here might be to accept that the semantic jig-saw pieces of scholasticism actually belong to two separate jig-saw puzzles, one Greek, one Biblical; all that is needed is to separate them out. This might be a modern, Biblical approach, but it is not Thomas'.

We should also bear in mind, Thomas' bitter attack on the Averroist theory of equal but incompatible truths. It is not that he is unaware of the difference between faith and reason, or even of the primacy of Revelation. Indeed it is his reliance on the Scriptural text which leads to his break-through, the ending of the semantic log-jam, in the fifth paragraph of the corpus:

'... debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturae ...'

Thomas is, after all, a Master of the Sacred Page. But this same paragraph, which presents the germ of his answer, is itself a marvellous example of the unity of his vision: it begins with scripture and ends with Aristotle:

What is it then that Thomas is searching for in these first few paragraphs of the corpus?

'Unde alii dixerunt dona a virtutibus esse distinctu-
genda; sed non assignaverunt convenientiam dis-
tinctionis causam, quae scilicet ita communis
esset virtutibus quod nullo modo donis, aut e
converso.'

'A notion which is common to the virtues without applying in any way
to the Gifts, or conversely.' Note here the common Thomistic term
convenientia. What is its significance? He is not just playing
with words but, as we shall see, is searching for clarity of expres-
sion which will fittingly and accurately describe the range of prin-
ciples in man's activity.

The distinction between the Gifts and the virtues was first
affirmed by Philip the Chancellor only a generation before Thomas.¹
The distinction which he is defending, therefore, does not go back
very far in the tradition, even though Thomas himself seems to claim,
for example in the sed contra, that it has a venerable antiquity.
This lack of historical perspective on the part of the scholastics
is one of their major weaknesses, and is so alien to our own general
cultural awareness since the rise of scientific history in the 19th
century. Nevertheless we should hold back from a patronising atti-
dude because the matter is not quite so simple. The general ques-
tion of the relationship between the Gifts and the virtues goes back
to Anselm of Leon in the beginning of the 12th century,² but the
problem took on a new dimension and a new urgency only a generation
before Thomas, in the 1220s, in Paris, with the introduction of an
Aristotelian notion of virtue. This threw into flux all earlier

attempts to state this relationship. What Thomas and his contempo-
raries are attempting to do is to re-establish such a relationship
but now within a whole new conceptual framework. Our present con-
cern of the theology of the Gifts is a minor area within a problem
which Thomas is so often, and quite rightly, identified with; namely,
how Christian theology is to absorb valid insights from outside itself.

It might be as well to note here that it is possible to sepa-
rate out three stages in scholastic thought on the relationship be-
tween the Gifts and the virtues. The first, up to the time of the
writing of the Sentences by Lombard, understands the Gifts as pre-
ceeding the virtues; the second, from roughly 1150 to the end of
the century, when, following Lombard, the Gifts and virtues are seen
as identical; and the third, up to the 1270s where the Gifts are
understood as subsequent to the virtues. By Thomas' time this latter
view was almost universally accepted and he is arguing in this context. 2

(d) The State of the Question (Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4)

Thomas presents a status quaestionis. This is not a catalogue of all that has been said on this topic, but is a summary of various views analysed along the main approaches and the main dualities of scholastic thought. The first is an attempt in terms of metaphysics based on the duality of reason and will. The second one uses the auctoritates and is played out along the theme of purgative and perfective powers; a negative dimension of resistance to sin and a positive one of the actions of the virtues. The third takes Scripture as its starting point and distinguishes virtues and Gifts in terms of moral philosophy and Revelation; the merely natural and the super-natural.

This status quaestionis is not to be taken with too much emphasis: according to Lottin, such prefaces to the magisterial utterance were common form. Nevertheless, if this summary of views is not unique in form it still has its interest, even in terms of its form, in that it is so short. Although he makes no claims to be exhaustive, Thomas has missed out some important views. It is a schematic presentation rather than a catalogue. The Summa is, after all, a basic text-book for beginners. Why these three examples? There is actually a fourth which he mentions at the very end of the corpus:

'Et hoc est quod quidam dicunt, quod dona per-fic-tiunt hominum ad altiores actus quam sint actus virtutem.'

1. On the Gifts of the Spirit, see P. et M., IIIe, ch. XVI, pp. 329-456; Labourdette, col. 1616. 2. For example, that the Gifts are prior to the virtues, (Anselm of Laon), or subsequent to them, (Stephen Langton). On the different lay-out of the status quaestionis in the Commentary see A. Gardeil, 'Dans du Saint-Esprit, 1. Partie doctrinale et speculative', Dictionnaire de théologie catholique IV, col. 1774.
This is a position he himself accepted prior to the writing of the Duna and which he is still prepared to accept in the terms of his new exposition. But let us first look more closely at these three.

The first is an argument based on metaphysics.

'... posuerunt quod dona perficiebant liberum arbitrium secundum quod est facultas rationis, virtutes vero secundum quod est facultas voluntatis ....'

This first argument raises the important element of liberae arbitrium. As we have already seen in the overview of the Prima Secundae above, this is one of the major underlying presuppositions of the Secunda Pars, although Thomas has discussed it already in Prima Pars, q.83. Perhaps merely to see its relationship to the Prima Secundae and to the matter in hand, the following quotation might suffice of Thomas' view of liberae arbitrium in Ia,q.83,a.1,ad.3um.

'... liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum.'

And, further, from Ia,q.83,a.4:

'... et liberum arbitrium, quod nihil aliud est quam vis electiva.'

We will see later that Thomas' mature presentation of the interconnections of Reason and Will differs from the rather unsophisticated "black-and-white" presentation here. At this point Thomas merely has to point out the inadequacy of this approach within its own terms. His own positive exposition of the intellectual Gifts will be within a much more complex and subtle analysis of man's freedom. It is, after all, man's freedom which is the point at issue here.

The shape of the presentation might make us think that we are only

1. For the development of Thomas' own thought, see O'Connor, pp. 110-131. On the scholarly and historical problems associated with the last line of the text see below p.100 on the change in Thomas' thought between the Commentary and the Summa.
watching the scholastics playing with the building-blocks of their trade but the matter in reality is far more serious. Although Thomas will not accept the reasoning offered here, he will agree that the Gifts — all of them — perfect the power of "free choice", (liberum arbitrium). If he can show this, then both philosophically and theologically, the Gifts are of major concern and are not peripheral.

Thomas here is not attacking any one theologian. All the scholastics, including himself, accepted the distinction between the four intellectual Gifts and the three others,¹ and actually all agree that this distinction cannot be used as a lever to separate the Gifts and the virtues.² The point of producing the argument here is to rule out a superficially attractive but inevitably unfruitful line of approach and to raise issues which will need to be dealt with in a satisfactory solution.

The second argument is based on Patristic authority.

'Quidam vero, considerantes quod Gregorius dicit ...'¹

The second approach begins with the presentation of an auctoritas, Gregory the Great. Nor is it just by chance that Gregory is mentioned here and not some other authority; his Gloss on Job and his Gloss on Ezekiel were the two most important focal points for the discussion of the Gifts. Augustine's De Sermone Domini in Monte and a small quotation from Ambrose's De Spiritu Sancto, (quoted as the sed contra of article 6), were two other important texts.³

¹. For example, Philip the Chancellor, see text cited in Lottin, P. et M., III, p. 366. ². For example, William of Auxerre, see text cited in Lottin, P. et M., III, p. 345, and, arguing for the identity of the Gifts and the virtues, Praepositinus of Cremona, ibid., p. 339. No author ever seriously questioned this distinction, although Philip the Chancellor raised the possibility of it, but only dialectically, O'Connor, p. 7, referring to Lottin, P. et M., III, p. 362. ³. F. Vandenbrouke, in D.S. XXII, col. /
Ambrose's text was very important for the Lombard who used it to affirm the identity of the virtues with the Gifts, but Thomas uses it, in article 6, to explain the continuation of the Gifts in heaven; of these authoritative texts it is the least important for Thomas. As for Augustine, his influence is dominant in the overall structuring of questions 68, 69 and 70, rather than in the internal argument of q.68. His rhetorical device of linking the Gifts with the Beatitudes - to which St Albert had added the Fruits of the Spirits - controlled Thomas' exposition at this point in the Summa. But as regards q.68, it is undoubtedly Gregory who is the authority that Thomas has to contend with. A bare list of the times that Gregory is cited makes this clear. A list which is all the more striking in that there is not a single reference to Gregory in q.69 or q.70 - Augustine and Ambrose are used there.

Question 68,

article one: objection one: Moralia I.27² The Gifts referred to as virtues
sed contra: Moralia II.49

article two: objection three: Moralia II.49 the preventative role of the Gifts.
corpus: Moralia II.49 our present text.

article three: objection one: Moralia II.56 only in the Mediator does the Spirit abide for ever.

objecion three: Homil. in Ezek. I.1 the spirit of prophecy is not always present in the prophets.

3(con). 1588, gives a slightly fuller list regarding Augustine:
De Sermone Domine in Monte, I., 3,10; II., 11,38 PL 34,39-40.
Cuestiones Evangeliorum, I., 8, PL 35.
De Doctrina Christiana, II., 7,9-11, PL 34,39-40.
Gregory: Moralia in Iob, I., 27,38,32,44-45,48, PL 75,544,547-549.
II., 49,76-78, and 56,89, PL 75,592-593,597.
Ambrose: De Spiritu Sancto, I., 16,156-159, PL 16,740.

1. O'Connor, pp. 90-92 includes a translation of this important text. On St Albert, ibid., p. 107. 2. The references are taken from O'Connor where the reference to Migne can also be found.
ad primum : Moralia II.56  Gregory himself answers this. In essential Gifts the Spirit abides in the Elect.

article five: objection three: Moralia I.32  Interconnections of Gifts and virtues.

ad tertium : ibid.  Gregory makes his position clear in a passage before this quotation.

sed contra : ibid  the Gifts are intercon- nected.

article six : objection one : Moralia I.32  Note how Thomas paraphrases Gregory, and uses the term 'Gift' which is not in his text.

objection two : ibid

objection three: Moralia VI.37  How Gregory is to be understood.

ad primum

ad secundum

ad tertium

It is noteworthy that Gregory is not mentioned in either article four or article seven where the questions relate more directly to the relevant passage in Isaiah.

article eight: objection two : Moralia II.49  Thomas inserts "id est donis".

objection three: Moralia I.35  The virtues are superior to the Gifts.

corpus : Moralia I.27  Thomas inserts "id est septem dona".

ad tertium : Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicere intendit

It is this last reference which is most illuminating: et hoc est quod Gregorius dicere intendit; 'this is what Gregory means to say'. Thomas' tactics here are quite clear but if we briefly look at the other examples we might see something of how he wrestles with the auctoritas of Gregory. In the answers to the objections in articles three and five, he uses Gregory's own text against the quotations taken from it. In other words, he appeals to a wider reading
of Gregory. This is not just the obvious point it might seem, given that Scholastics relied on florilegia as moderns rely on secondary sources: he is basically only saying that the texts are taken out of context. The references in articles six and eight, however, lead us on to the crux of the problem, which is that Thomas wants to re-read a patristic authority within the terminological framework of scholasticism. Gregory nowhere uses the term 'Gift' and its special scholastic reference to our present topic arose only with the Carolingian theologians. Similarly Gregory does not use the term 'virtue' with the scientific rigour and the Aristotelian reference of the thirteenth century Scholastics: nor does he use it to refer to faith, hope and charity but only to the cardinal virtues. Hence it is in his own anachronistic terminology that Thomas paraphrases Gregory in the first objection of article six:

'Dicit enim Gregorius quod Spiritus Sanctus contra singula tentamenta septem DONIS erudit mentem.'

And in article eight, the second objection, admits his eisegesis:

'... et sic eandem mentem septem mox virtutibus (id est DONIS) temperat ...'

What conclusions are we to draw from this? One obvious point is that Thomas is working within a tradition. He is not the first to tackle the problem of the Gifts and, like his predecessors and contemporaries, he begins by confronting the accepted auctoritas. Scholasticism arose out of trying to find theological coherence in the collections of patristic and scriptural texts which had been preserved and collated in the Carolingian period and again in the Renaissance of the 12th century. The authority accredited to the "Sancti" of the Patristic period was such that the Scholastics rarely

1. O'Connor, p. 94.
found the courage to fault them directly. We are bound to find this subservience dismaying at times but, nevertheless, it cannot just be written off as intellectual cowardice. The Church had accepted that the Fathers and Doctors of the Church had reached various insights into the mystery of God's working with men in Christ. The Scholastics accepted this but were not content with just a collection of such insights - as had their Carolingian forerunners - but aimed for a systematic and coherent corpus of such truth. It was in this way that the scientia of sacra doctrina, of theology was born. The tools of this scientific theology of the Schools - in contrast to the lectio divina of the monasteries¹ - were philosophical; and thus the science of philosophy was reborn.

The Scholastics are quite rightly not noted for their sensitivity to language. Their language is almost mathematical in its limited and technical vocabulary. Yet this exact and stunted terminology grew up precisely out of an awareness of the complexity of language; out of the recognition that the 'Saints' and 'Authorities' did use different expressions to formulate similar insights into the mysteries of the faith. What the Scholastics lacked above all was a historical sense. Where they could, they read back into the texts - often just snippets and quotations collected in florilegia - their own questions and presuppositions: where they could not, they had to use their considerable philosophical and semantic talents to re-read them in conformity with the thrust of their own theological expositions. The underlying concern of the Scholastics was to present in a scientific way the sometimes poetic insights of the Fathers. Hence that peculiar - but not unusual - combination of logic, analogy

¹. On this, see J. Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, tr. C. Misrahi, 1961. On Gregory in particular in this Monastic Culture, see chapter 2, pp. 33-44.
and mathematics we find in article eight:

'... Unde Gregorius dicit quod negue ad denarii perfectionem septem filii, (id est septem dona) per- ventunt, nisi in fide, spe et caritate fuerit omne quod agunt.'

And in the sed contra to article five:

'Sed contra est quod ibidem Gregorius praemittit. dicens, Illud in hoc filiorum convivio perscrutandum videtur, quod semetipsos invicem pascunt. Per filios autem Iob, de quibus loquitur, designatur dona Spiritus Sancti. Ergo dona Spiritus Sancti sunt connexa, per hoc quod se invicem reficiunt.'

Thomas was working in a tradition of scholarship then, and, in regard to our present question, the tradition focused on Gregory. All the Scholastics developed their theories of the Gifts by questioning the meaning of Gregory's allegorical expositions. John of La Rochelle's anachronistic paraphrase can be taken as typical:

'Sancti distinguunt inter virtutes et dona. Unde Gregorius Tobit in Glossa distinguuit ibi 7 filios Iob intelligens 7 dona, per tres filias tres virtutes theologicas, per quatuor angulos quatuor virtutes cardinales; ergo videtur quod non sunt idem dona quod virtutes ...' (2)

It is interesting to note that 'dona', 'virtutes theologicas' and 'virtutes cardinales' are all technical theological concepts of the 13th century read back into the patristic text. Thomas, working within this tradition is bound to come to terms with the authority of Gregory. He is not arguing against Gregory directly but against possible contemporary interpretations of Gregory which will clash with his own theory. It is necessary

for Thomas to show how the older texts from the Moralia are to be re-read alongside his newer textbook, thus pre-empting appeals back to Gregory against his own position. To a large extent the problem is one of terminology for Thomas, and the scholastic apparatus of objections and answers is sometimes used solely for providing terminological clarity - thus the answers in a.5, ad.3um., and a.6, ad.1um. Despite the great respect, almost subservient, to authorities, this dialectic does allow the scholastic room to develop his own insights within the old wine-skins of the tradition. We can take O'Connor's summary as our own:

'Thomas' work was on the one hand, deeply rooted in tradition and, on the other hand, so original that it revolutionised the theological approach to the Gifts.' (1)

To return now to the immediate reference to Gregory before us, Philip the Chancellor was most responsible for the development of this particular elaboration of Gregory's text, although Hugh of St Victor, much earlier, had suggested something similar.2

'... dixerunt quod virtutes ordinantur ad bene operandum, dona vero ad resistendum tentationibus. Sed nec ista distinctio sufficit.'

What we have here is a theory playing with a basic duality of medieval thought: the virtues produce good actions, the Gifts prevent bad ones. It is a theory that occurred to most writers but none of them accepted it as a valid way of distinguishing Gifts from virtues.3 There were several variations on the theme however, including an attractive one from Bonaventure who suggested that the Gifts healed the effects of sin.4 The problem with this attractive theory,

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as Thomas points out is that it either undermines the significance of the virtues -

'Quia etiam virtutes tentationibus resistunt, induc-entibus ad peccata quae contrariantur virtutibus: unumquodque enim resistit naturaliter suo contrario.' -

or, given this understanding of the virtues, makes the Gifts redundant. Thomas has a stronger role for both the virtues and the Gifts: he will present both as having perfective and purgative roles. The reference to charity here is again not insignificant. It hints at Thomas' positive development of this central infused virtue as 'in-forming' all the virtues and Gifts. 1

The third approach is based on scripture and develops in three stages. The first is the interpretation of the Isaiah text as a Messianic prophecy: it follows from this that the text should first be applied to Christ, and then, only through Christ, to Christians.

'Alii vero considerantes quod ista dona traduntur in Scriptura. secundum quod fuerunt in Christo, ut patet Isa ...'

Secondly, it is then put forward that the Gifts are given to conform men to Christ whereas the virtues relate to conforming men to the standards of human morality, 'ad bene operandum'.

'... dixerunt quod virtutes ordinantur simpliciter ad bene operandum; sed dona ordinantur ad hoc ut per ea conformemur Christo ...'

This is the weak point of what seems to be a simple and attractive argument. It presents a great rift between human morality and Christian morality. Now obviously the two are not identical - martyrdom for the faith shows that - but Thomas will not allow that 'nature' and 'supernature' are, as it were, two layers, one on top

1. article 8, ad. 3um., but also IIaIIae,q.23 and chapter 9 below on Charity and the Gift of Wisdom.
of the other. As opposed to this simple picture, Thomas will hold, firstly, that by 'virtue' he includes the theological virtues as well as the cardinal virtues; secondly, that these latter, the cardinal virtues are re-structured by grace; and, thirdly, that the Gifts gear up man's whole moral being into a new projection. For Thomas, it is not just that grace perfects and does not destroy nature; it does not just 'lie on top' of nature but perfects it from within. Hence the whole theme of the Christian life as a conformation to Christ is much more complex than the position given here.

The third stage of the argument narrows the emphasis. The Gifts are said to relate to conformity to Christ specifically regarding his suffering.¹

'... praecipue quantum ad ea quae passus est, quia in passione. eius praecipue huiusmodi dona resplenduerunt.'

Thomas' reply to this is that various virtues as well as Gifts were manifest in Christ's passion; his humility, his meekness and above all, his love. Hence, the Gifts and the virtues cannot be isolated in this way.

'... hoc etiam non videtur esse sufficiens.'

This third approach, though inadequate, has thrown out some important elements which, as in a kaleidoscope, are not yet in a fixed pattern, but which, nonetheless are suggestive of a rich theological development. Bonaventure and Philip the Chancellor, among others,² accepted the position outlined here, and Thomas himself will give an exposition of the grace of Christ in the tertia pars.³ But by that time, Thomas will have completed his philosophical psy-

1. see Lottin, III, pp. 361, 378, 389, 401, 417, 444.
2. O'Conner, pp. 103-105.
3. De gratia unionis, q.2-6; de gratia eius secundum quod est singularis homo, q.7; de gratia eius secundum quod est caput Ecclesiae, q.8.
chology of man as the 'Image of God'. His theology, moreover, unlike Bonaventure's, is theocentric and not Christocentric. This is not to disparage the unique role of Christ but to give justice to the mysteriousness both of God and of man. In this schema, Christ is not seen as the answer to questions which man never asked, but as the way, the truth, and the life by which man, as the image of God, returns with more than his own fullness to his source, God.

'Quia igitur principalis intentio huius sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitio tradere, et non solem secundum quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principio rerum et finis earum, et specialiter rationes creaturae ... ... ad huius doctrinae expositionem intendentes, primo tractabimus de Deo; secundo de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum; tertio, de Christo, qui secundum quod homo via est nobis tendendi in Deum.' (3)

The Christocentrism of Bonaventure, Hugh of St Victor, or of modern theologians is attractive but, in the Summa, is left to the Tertia Pars, and is there located within a greater theocentric vision. Our present task remains with a less elevated analysis of the God-given motivations within man.

One theme which this third approach has exposed is the one of whether the Gifts relate to man's passivity rather than to his activity. Philip the Chancellor had presented the role of the Gifts as rectifying man in the things which he had to endure or suffer. He could do this because not only are Gifts like Fear or Fortitude passive, but, in an Aristotelian sense, Understanding is a passio, and Wisdom is a 'savouring' of Divine Truth. Now Thomas will say a great deal which sounds similar to this but it is important to

1. Introduction to the IaIIae - see above p. 3. 2. For a good discussion of this see Gilby, vol 48, Introduction by R.J. Henmassey, esp. p. xv. 3. Ia,q.2 introduction. 4. O'Connor, p. 104. 5. ibid., footnote.
make it clear that he is saying something quite different. For him, the Gifts are principles of action in man. Their passivity relates to their origin not to their function. They are receptivities by which man acts. They are not principles of endurance.

That the discussion above has been disjointed cannot be denied. We have followed the text, lifting up phrases like stones to see what lies underneath them. In doing this we have followed a method which Thomas himself, as an educator, disapproved of; we have not followed the ordo disciplinae:

'... non traduntur secundum ordinem disciplinae, sed secundum quod requirebat librorum expositio, vel secundum quod se praebet occasio disputandi; partim quidem quia eorundem frequens repetitio et fastidium et confusionem generabat in animis auditorum.' (1)

The path will be clearer from now on as we move to Thomas' positive exposition of his case. Nevertheless, we have discovered something of the dimensions of the context within which he was working.
We now turn to the kernel of the question: Thomas' positive exposition of the nature of the Gifts. I will first paraphrase the argument state by stage. This is a dangerous procedure in that the paraphrase may cover up important complications in the text, but it seems best to get a simple over-all picture, and then to look in detail at the various parts of the text itself.

The argument takes place in two stages - marked by two paragraphs in the Gilby edition.

1. (A) To distinguish the Gifts from the virtues we ought to follow Scripture's own terminology and we find in Isaiah that the text speaks of "spirits" and not "gifts".

(B) By this use of the term "spirits" the text would seem to make us understand that the seven Gifts are in us by divine "inspiration".

(C) Now by "in—piration" we understand a motion coming from outside man. 'Inspiratio autem significat quandam motionem ab exteriori.'

(D) There are two principles of motion in man; one is intrinsic to him, reason, and one is extrinsic to him, God. The Gifts, therefore, relate to that motion which is extrinsic to man, God, as the virtues relate to that which is intrinsic to him, reason.

I have not attempted to translate motion because I wish to draw attention to its central significance and because I intend to devote a later chapter specifically to it. In section (D) I have slightly elaborated and extended Thomas' own treatment by anticipating what follows in the second argument. This second argument can be seen as examining in what particular way the Gifts and the virtues relate, respectively, to God and to human reason. This argument too is in two parts: first a general metaphysical argument and then its particular application.
2.(1).(A) For a thing to be moved it must be in some relationship with the thing which moves it.

(B) It will be moved "well" by that which moves it in as much as it is in disposition to be moved by that mover.

(C) The "higher" the mover, the more perfect must this disposition be in relation to the mover.

Now this series of statements bristles with difficulties. It presupposes a whole metaphysical system which is alien to us and which we need to examine. In (A) I have used the loose term "relationship" to gloss over what Thomas might mean by the "proportion" necessary between mover and moved, but this is obviously the key to an understanding. It is in the light of this "proportion" that the term "disposition" in (B) is to be understood and the phrase "to be moved well" must therefore mean more than successfully, but with ease, with fluency, without violence, "proportionately". But if the term "proportion" is the key, what can "higher" mean in (C)? Presumably, another sort of proportionality between the moved and an "unusual" mover? A sort of proportionality which does not come into play in the "usual" relationship between this moved and its usual movers? But these are all points we shall look at later, let us carry on to try to grasp an over-all view of the argument.

There now follows the application of the argument of 2.(1). to what was presented in argument 1.

2.(2).(A) The human virtues perfect man as it is in his nature to be moved by reason in the things he does both interiorly and exteriorly.

(B) In the same way the Gifts perfect man to be moved by God by giving him dispositions to be moved by this higher mover.

(C) The Gifts dispose man to be moved readily, (prompte mobile) by divine inspirations.
Section 2.(2). (A), appears to relate to man as moved within the proportionality of his reason-directed movements: part (B) relates to the "unusual" proportionality of man as moved by the "higher" mover, God: and part (C), referring back to section 2.(1). (C), presents the Gifts as making man perfectly open to such movements so that he is moved promptly.

Argument One

Thomas breaks the log-jam of terminology by moving the discussion away from the term "Gift" on to the term "spiritus". This is a decisive shift. By jumping from "Gift" to "spirit" he can now jump from "spirit" to "in-spiration" and from there to the important phrase 'motio ab exteriori', the solid ground of his theory and the very heart of the matter. Before moving on there, however, let us first examine Thomas' 'log-jumping' skill.

'Debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturae ...' Thomas quite accurately claims Scriptural support for his first move. He is, after all, a Master of the Sacred Page and has, by this stage in his career lectured or provided a commentary on most of the New Testament and much of the Old Testament. But the break-through here cannot be accounted for merely as the recognition of a hitherto unnoticed detail in Isaiah's text. The whole mood of his later theology reflects the type of change taking place here. Many commentators on Thomas have noticed a change in his later works from a static notion of grace to a more dynamic one; a shift in emphasis from created grace to uncreated grace, to put it in other words.¹ We are witnessing such a change here in the move from 'donum' to

¹. see below, chapter 3.
"motio ab exteriori". An Aristotelian philosophy of motion will be used to develop this, as we shall see in a following chapter.\(^1\)

It is the present writer's contention that this opening reference to Scripture is not idle or peripheral. Thomas' insight into the dynamism of grace was developed by his use of Aristotelian physics but it has its roots in a deeper penetration of the New Testament writers, notably Paul and John, and of the Patristic writers, especially the later Augustine.\(^2\) In this wider understanding of Scripture Thomas could now find greater significance in the exact words of the Isaiah prophecy. For the time being, let these assertions stand, the point at the moment is merely to pause to allow some dignity to this opening phrase; it may be that it is not just a pious overlay to a philosophical transposition but a hint of a new reading of Scripture as a whole and the dynamism attributed to the Spirit in both Paul and the Old Testament.

Given that the term in Isaiah is "spiritus", a simple reading of the text, Thomas claims, leads us directly to the notion of inspiration.

"Ex quibus verbis manifeste datur intellegi quod ista septem ... sunt in nobis ab inspiratione divina."\(^3\)

But is it so 'manifestly' clear? For the young Thomas, in the early commentary on Isaiah, it did not lead so clearly on to this line of thought.\(^4\) At that early stage he immediately understood the Gifts of "Spirits" as 'aids to the virtues', as had Albert and Philip the Chancellor before him.\(^4\) Then the text was slotted into an existing entitative theology of grace; now it is being used to introduce a quite different approach.

1. Below chapter 6. 2. Below p. 72ff. 3. For the evidence of an early date for this Commentary on Isaiah, see O'Connor, p. 110. 4. ibid.
The key to this new approach is "inspiratio", which he immediately develops as 'motio ab exteriori'. What lies behind this term inspiratio? It is interesting to note the fact that after this first article of question 68, Thomas never uses this term again in relation to the Gifts. Instead he replaces it with the term instinctus. Like a key, Thomas uses "inspiratio" to open up the question and then he has no further use for it. Its main use here is to move the discussion on to the metaphysical principle of "motio ab exteriori". What is more, as a common and well established term, in theological usage, he is using the known and familiar to introduce the unknown and unfamiliar. This latter is O'Connor's view in an Appendix he dedicates solely to this change in terminology,¹

'After a minute examination of the way Thomas uses these terms, my conclusion is that instinctus was chosen in order not to specify in any way whatsoever the nature of the Holy Spirit's action. Inspiratio, the term traditionally used for the action of spirits upon man, designated a type of action ...... Instinctus, however, does not designate a type of action at all. It refers to that by which an action is provoked or elicited. In present context, it does not designate the action of the Holy Spirit directly, but only indirectly, as that which somehow initiated the human action under consideration. Moreover, it is free from all associations with which the term inspiratio has been coloured by a long theological tradition about divine (and diabolical) inspirations. Hence when a man is said to act by the instinctus of the Holy Spirit, all that this means, so far as the force of the word is concerned (we are not concerned here with the doctrine), is that the action was brought about by the influence of the Holy Spirit. Nothing whatsoever is specified about the nature of the influence, or the form it has taken, e.g. whether it was an impulse, invitation, illumination, strengthening, or the like.' (2)

What O'Connor does not mention here, is that the term instinctus also probably occurred in the text Thomas used of the De Bona

We will look at the term *instinctus* again when we deal with the influence of that book.

So Thomas' log-jumping is not totally finished when he arrives at *inspiratio*; another leap will take place when he replaces *inspiratio* with *instinctus*. For the moment, however, *inspiratio* allows Thomas to enter into the first major stage of his exposition.

Whereas other Scholastics, as we have seen, tried to analyse the relationship between the virtues and the Gifts in terms of the faculties of reason and will, or of perfective and purgative virtues, or in terms of nature and super-nature; Thomas uses his metaphysical structure of the two principles of *motio* in man. Having already, by this stage in the *Prima Secundae*, established the nature of the virtues, he can use them as a pattern to explore the nature of the Gifts as counterparts within a different ordering – hence just as the virtues are *habitus*, so are the Gifts, but not in the order of reasoning but of receptivity. Then, in the *Secunda Secundae*, having already established the nature of the Gifts, he can unite

1. O'Connor, pp. 144-145, see below p.164.  
2. First mentioned in the important articles, which we shall examine below, IaIIae,q.9,a.4 and a.6. Also IaIIae,q.49 intro. Fully discussed in IaIIae,q.90 - q.114.  
3. IaIIae,q.68,a.3.
virtues and Gifts in the dynamism of the Christian life under grace. 1 Together they will account for the perfection of man's activity and receptivity under grace.

As for the internal principle of man's motto, our over-view of the Prima Secundae, 2 has shown that it is a basic axiom of Thomas' philosophy that man's autonomy is based in his reason. It is as a free agent, by the exercise of his intellect and his intellectual appetite, the will, that man images God.

'Quia sicut Damascenus dicit homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur secundum cuod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum.' (3)

To talk about men's intellectuality is to talk about his freedom; to talk about man as he is a 'self-mover', an autonomous agent and not merely a passive recipient of 'movement'. Thomas has spent the latter part of the Prima Pars and most of the Secunda Pars analysing the ramifications of man's intrinsic principle of motio. Now, with the Gifts, he is pointing out that this is not the full analysis of man's being. Within - and that must be stressed - within man's freedom of thought, action and will, there is not a single principle of man's autonomy but another principle of motio, an extrinsic principle, 'quod est Deus'. The question of what this means will occupy us for some time to come.

Argument Two: part one; the general metaphysical structure.

'Manifestum est autem quod omne quod movetur necesse est proportionatum esse motori; et haec est perfectio mobilis inquantum est mobile, dispositio qua disponitur ad hoc quod bene moveatur a suo motore.'

What does Thomas mean by this 'proportionality' which must exist

1. See below, section three, p. 223ff 2. see above pp. 3-6. 3. IaIIae, Introduction.
between the mover and the moved? It does not seem as if he means more than a certain kind of relationship. In Ia, q. 12, a. 1 in the fourth objection, Thomas uses similar language of proportionality but, in this case, regarding the proportionality necessary between knower and known.

"Praterea, cognoscentis ad cognitum opertet esse aliquam proportionem, cum cognitum sit perfectio cognoscentis. Sed nulla est proportio intellectus creati ad Deum; quia in infinitum distant. Ergo intellectus creatus non potest videre essentiam Dei."

Thomas replies:

"Ad quartum dicendum, quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad aliteram secundum quod duplum, triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse proportio creaturae ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum: et secundum hoc intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum Deum."

It seems as if it is in this second sense that we are to understand 'proportionality' - 'any kind of relationship which one thing may have to another' - but here we are to understand it within the terms of movement. If this is so, then he appears to be saying no more than that we can account for why a tree is uprooted by a strong gale but not by a gentle breeze by talking in terms of the different relations between them.

But there is, however, something more, and this becomes clear when we look at the term dispositio. This relates to the relationship the moved thing has towards the mover in an actual motion. To talk about the 'perfection' of a motion is not to say that one action (a tree falling) is more perfect than another (a train moving) but

1. See on 'proportionality', IaIIae, q. 9, a. 4, ad 3 and Ia, q. 80, a. 2.
2. In Aristotle, ἄνθρωπος.
refers to the particular motion as such - the train will move better if it is in good working order, the tree will fall with less effort if it is rotten. To put it in Thomas' terms: the perfection of the mobile qua mobile, (and in no other respect), depends on its dispositio to be moved by this particular mover. Dispositio is the key factor in this analysis of motion. A well-oiled piece of machinery is better, as a moving piece of machinery, than a rusty one: a more receptive listener will be more open to new insights than a bored or antagonistic listener. It is difficult for us to grasp how Thomas can use this analysis in terms of motio and dispositio to cover such a wide range as natural changes, planned effects and emotional states and human understanding, but that is what he does. For him this analysis is all-embracing. Where the notion of proportionality comes in, is that a 'mobile' may be 'well-disposed' in proportion to one type of mover but not to another. The Gifts will be seen as habitus which provides the dispositio in man for movement by the divine external principle of his motio. The virtues provide the dispositio within the proportionality of his reason-directed motio but not in regard to this external principle.

Thomas' argument continues:

'Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto necesse est quod mobile perfectiori dispositione ei proportiones sit ...

'The higher the mover the more perfect must be the disposition by which the mobile is proportioned to it'. Why should this be so? And what does 'higher' mean here? What has to be assumed to make this contention valid? It might, after all, be suggested that the more powerful the mover is, the less important is the dispositio of the thing moved. A very strong wind can destroy both healthy and
rotten trees alike: and the faith which can move mountains needs no element of mobility in the mountains themselves. What is Thomas assuming to such an extent that he gives no place at all to such a viewpoint?

What is presupposed, is a whole cosmology already sketched out in the *Prima Pars* and in book three of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. God's Providence governs all creatures without exception and without any possibility of frustration. But this Providence does not work violently but as a harmony through the natural workings of the God-given natures in creation. And this harmony is not just one between God and his creation but, within creation, is hierarchical in structure.¹ 'Higher' causes give 'lower' causes their ability to act; hence, in creation, no one thing is the sole explanation for its action, even less its being. When any one thing acts, all the 'higher' causes which account for its being brought into being, its preservation, and its stimulation to motion at this particular time, all these — in terms of this harmony — are involved in an analysis of the particular act itself. What we have here is the opposite of the 'laboratory conditions' method of our modern sciences. There most of the operating factors are eliminated so that the working of one particular factor can be examined, for example temperature and atmospheric pressure will be kept at a constant level, various gases might be removed from the atmosphere, etc. Here the opposite is the case. One might say, then that Thomas allows for three possible types of explanation for any phenomenon — and all of them valid. One would be in terms of the natural working of any one thing — an explanation in terms of the sciences of physics or psychology or

whatever. A second would be an explanation in terms of God the
Creator who creates, conserves and governs all things. And a third
would be in terms of this cosmic and hierarchical harmony by which all
things are in a sense involved in any one thing. The influence of Pseudo
Denis, and the whole Neo-Platonic tradition is obviously dominant in
this latter position. It is in the third book of the Contra Gentiles,
that Thomas presents a union of these last two types of explanations.
There, in discussing God's providence, the whole universe of crea-
tion is seen as inter-linked within itself and as such—precisely
as such—is interfused with the will and the power of the divinity.
Hence while God's providence is immediate to every creature, the exe-
cution of that providence takes effect through the working of second-
dary causes. 1

'Cui vero ad providentiam divinam pertinet ut
ordo servetur in rebus; congrus autem ordo est
ut a supremitis ad infima proportionaliter descen-
datur; oportet quod divina providentia secundum
quandum proportionem usque ad res ultimas perven-
iat. Hae autem proportio est ut, sicut supremae
creaturae sunt sub Deo et gubernantur ab ipso,
ita inferiores creaturae sint sub superioribus et
regantur ab ipsis.' (2)

'Virtus autem inferioris agentis dependet a virtute
superioris agentis, inquantum superius agens dix
virtutem ipsam inferiori agenti per quam agit;
vel conservat eam; aut etiam applicat eam ad agen-
dum, sicut artifex applicat instrumentum ad pro-
prium effectum; cui tamen non dat formam per quam
agit instrumentum, nec conservat, sed dat ei solum
motum. Oportet ergo quod actio inferioris agentis
non solum sit ab eo per virtutem propriam, sed per
virtutem omnium superiorum agentium: sit enim in
virtute omnium.' (3)

We will examine this vision of cosmic, hierarchical, harmony in more
detail below. 4

But while we must bear in mind the activity of God, and the

1. S.C.G., III, c. 77. 2. S.C.G., III, c. 78. 3. S.C.G.,
III, c. 70. 4. below p. 133ff.
action of these 'higher' causes, we must not forget that each thing has its own proper and natural activity, within this causality; its own proprius effectus. God governs his creation through the hierarchy of causes and through the distinctive principles of activity which he has implanted in each distinctive nature. It is axiomatic with Thomas that God does not frustrate the various natures of his own creatures. The quotation from the Book of Wisdom —

'Et disponsit omnia suaviter'

—is one of Thomas' favourite texts. Even in the case of supernatural grace — in fact, especially in this case — this holds true.

'Creaturis autem naturalibus sic providet, ut non solum movet eas ad actus naturales, sed etiam largiatur eis formas et virtutes quasdam, quae sunt principia actuum, ut secundum seipsas inclinantur ad hujusmodi motus. Et sic motus quibus a Deo moventur fluent creaturis connaturales et faciles, secundum illud Sap., 'Et disponsit omnia suaviter'. Multo igitur magis illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale aeternum infundit aliquas formas, seu qualitates supernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum aeternum consequendum ...' (2)

The key notion comes across in the phrases; 'connaturales et faciles'; 'suaviter'; and, 'suaviter et prompte moveantur'. God does not use violence on his creation. He does not need to, because it is his creation. He does not wish to, because he loves it. Each thing moves in the harmony of God's providence with a motion 'connaturales et faciles'.

Given all this, we can now assess why the notion of dispositio is so important. To avoid all ideas of violence when the highest and first mover acts on a creature, we have to posit a dispositio

1. Wisdom 7, v. 1. For its use see: Ia, q. 22, a. 2, q. 103, a. 8, q. 109, a. 2; IaIIae, q. 110, a. 2; IaIIae, q. 23, a. 2, q. 165, a. 1; IIIa, q. 44, a. 4, q. 46, a. 9, q. 55, a. 6, q. 60, a. 4. 2. IaIIae, q. 110, a. 2. 3. ibid. 4. Ia, q. 22, a. 2, see also IaIIae, q. 112, a. 3.
for such movement on the part of the creature.

'Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto necesse est quod mobile perfectori dispositione ei proportionetur ...'

What we are talking about here is not the general action of God through 'higher' causes and the natural activity of things, but a direct stimulus from God. This will be violent unless the creature is in 'proportion' to this movement, that is, unless it has a different kind of relationship of disposition to God other than its usual one.

Now so far we have taken the absence of violence as the key factor in this theory of motio but in the example he now gives, to clarify this last assertion, another dimension of the theory seems to come into play.

'... sicut videmus quod perfectius oportet esse discipulum dispositum ad hoc quod altiorem doctrinam capiat a docente.'

It is not violence but receptivity which is the key notion. The matter here is not that the teacher will try to cram knowledge into the pupil but that if the subject matter is more difficult - 'altior' - then the pupil will need to be more sensitive, more receptive. With less difficult subjects, the pupil's ordinary ability might be adequate (i.e. in proportion) to the task; with 'higher' subjects, he will be adequate for the task only if his receptivity and sensitivity are stretched to the utmost.

Now although this case of the pupil is only an example it does show the drift of Thomas' thought. The motio we are talking about here, between God and man, is not the same as the way God would act towards inanimate objects - like holding back the Red Sea. God deals with his intellectual and, therefore, free creatures in a way, as we would now expect, which is in conformity to their nature.
Grace is not something impersonal but a relationship - a 'proportionality' - between God and man which Thomas characterises as one in which,

'... in qua Deus dicitur esse sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante'. (1)

Argument Two: part two.

Thomas now moves on to apply what he has established so far. We have already covered much of this.

'Manifestum est autem quod virtutes humanae perfectiones secundum quod homo natus est moveri per rationem in his qua interius vel exterius agit. Oportet igitur inesse homini altiores perfectiones secundum quas sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus movatur. Et istae perfectiones vocantur dona: non solum quia infunduntur a Deo; sed quia secundum ea homo disponitur ut efficiatur promptus ab inspiratione divina sicut dicitur Isa., 'Dominus aperuit mihi aurem; ego autem non contradico retrorsum non abii'.

The reference to Isaiah echoes the pupil-teacher example which immediately precedes this passage and re-emphasises the point we have just made. We are not discussing God's movement of irrational creatures but God moving his rational creatures freely by means of a receptivity to him. Moreover what we said about love and knowledge is focused here in the term prompte which is used elsewhere in reference to the virtues as well as the Gifts.

'Alia autem difficultas est circa opera virtutem in interioribus actibus, puta quod aliquis opus virtutis exerceret prompte et delectabiliter. Et circa hoc difficile est virtus; hoc enim non habenti virtutem est valde difficile; sed per virtutem redditur facile ... ... Hoc autem est difficillimum non habenti virtutem, sicut etiam Philosophus dicit quod, 'operari ea quae justus operatur, facile est; sed operari ea eo modo quo justus operatur, 'scilicet delectabiliter et prompte', est difficile non habenti justitiam. Et sic etiam dicitur I. Joan., quod 'mandata ejus gravia non sunt'; quod exponens Augustinus dicit quod 'non sunt gravia amanti, sed non amanti sunt gravia'. (2)

1. Ia,q.43,a.3 see also below p. 261ff. 2. IaIIae,q.107,a.4.
Part of the fascination of this passage is the fusion of Aristotelian moral philosophy and Augustine's theology of the dynamism of love.

The delight which the virtuous man has in the reason-governed activity of the virtuous life is paralleled in the love, (caritas/amicitia Dei) which the friend of God has in the exercise of the Gifts and the virtues. Thomas will make it clear in this very question 68, that it is love, caritas which is the root of the Gifts, \( \text{secundum quod homo habet quamdam societatem spiritualem cum Deo} \). The point being made here is the same as one made by a modern theologian who is also concerned to redress the balance between created and uncreated grace.

'Here his (God's) work is really himself, since it is he who is imparted. Such grace, from the very start, cannot be thought of independently of the personal love of God and its answer in man. This grace is not thought of as a 'thing'. It is something that is only 'put at man's disposal' in that act of 'letting oneself be disposed of' which is the proper gift of the freest grace, the miracle of love.' (3)

But the theological virtue of charity is the root not only of the Gifts but also of the infused virtues and we must be careful not to put at risk Thomas' hard-won distinction between them. The promptitude of the theological virtues is based on a love which is working through man's rationality: the promptitude of the Gifts is based on the same love but is not rational. It can hardly be less than rational, but how can it be more than rational? We can be reassured that we are following Thomas' own line of thought because he continues his exposition in this way:

'Et philosophus etiam dicit in cap. De Bona Fortuna, quod his qui moventur per instinctum divinum non expedit consiliari secundum rationem humana, sed quod sequuntur interiorem instinctum; quia moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana.' (4)

1. q.68,a.4,ad.3, a.5, a.8. 2. IaIIae,q.109,a.3,ad.1um. 3. Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. IV, 'Nature and Grace', p. 177. 4. IaIIae,q.68,a.1.
But if we are following Thomas' own line of thought, it is not clear where we are being led. Can we rationally claim that there is a principle of human action better than reason? Thomas — and the author of the De Bona Fortuna — think that we can. Thomas' own rational exposition of this claim does not appear in our own article but primarily in his treatise on Law,¹ but there is one small reference to it in his reply to the second objection.

Here, Thomas is dealing with the argument that as the vices are contrary to both the virtues and the Gifts, the Gifts cannot be distinct from the virtues. He replies:

'Ad secundum dicendum quod vitia, inquantum sunt contra bonum rationis, contrariantur virtutibus, inquantum sunt contra divinum instinctum, contrariantur donis. Idem enim contrariatur Deo et rationi, cujus lumen a Deo derivatur.'

'For one and the same thing is opposed to both God and reason'; few theologians could proclaim this with such assurance. What underlies Thomas' ability to do so? For him, the two principles of human activity are seen as working in harmony; the intrinsic one of human reason, and the extrinsic one of God. God and reason are not to be seen in opposition to each other but the 'light of reason' is to be understood as derived from God. We will need to look more closely at the nature of this 'derivation.'² It is significant that the answer to this objection is not at the moralistic level of the objection itself but at the metaphysical level of these two principles.

It has become clear now, after this examination of the text, that Thomas' exposition of the Theology of the Gifts succeeds or fails on the basis not of his scriptural exegesis or his moral theory, or his adherence to Patristic authorities, but on the basis of his meta-

¹. See below p. 196ff. ². below, Ratio, Lex et Gratia, chapter 8.
physics relating to these two principles in man. The Gifts seem to relate to both these principles. It is then, to the more general metaphysical arguments which underlie this text that we shall have to turn in Section Two.

Before leaving this section, however, there is one matter in need of clarification. It is clear from the text that the Gifts relate to the external principle of motio in man but is it as clear that they relate to the internal principle in man also? At the beginning of this chapter, I made the following claim:

'The vital factor which will be used ... (to distinguish the Gifts from the virtues) ... will not be something in God but something in man: something anthropological not theological.

Although the Gifts relate to this divine principle of motio, they are something in man and not in God. It is in article three of this question that Thomas makes this clear and it is significant that this article is without any precedent in any of Thomas' works or in the writings of any other earlier theologian. One is reminded here of the comment of a modern Thomist that the mysteriousness of grace in Thomas' later theology is not its divine nature but its human nature; the single divine motio of grace creates in man a whole diversity of created effects. Article three raises the question, 'utrum dona Spiritus Sancti sint habitus'? Thomas answers that they are habitus and his viewpoint is presented most succinctly in the answer to the second objection. The objection itself is:

'Praeterea, dona Spiritus Sancti perficiunt hominem secundum quod agitur a Spiritu Dei, sicut dicitum est. Sed inquantum homo agitur a Spiritu Dei

2. O'Connor, p. 16 footnote. For a detailed discussion of this article see chapter 4, p. 82ff below. 3. C. Ernst, The Theology of Grace, 1974, p. 53.
se habet quodammodo ut instrumentum respectu eius. Non autem convenit ut instrumentum perficiatur per habitum, sed principale agens. Ergo dona Spiritus Sancti non sunt habitus.'

Thomas replies:

'Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de instrumento cuin non est agere, sed solum agi. Tale autem instrumentum non est homo; sed sic agitur a Spiritu Sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberi arbitrii. Unde indiget habitu.

In whatever way the Gifts perfect man's actions it is man who is acting; he is not just 'moved' but 'moves' himself; and he does this through the exercise of his liberum arbitrium. As habitus, then, the Gifts are part of man's intrinsic principle of motio.

'Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus'.

The fascination of Thomas' theology of the Gifts is that the Gifts are presented as 'loci' where the two principles cohere. As habitus they belong to man as part of his freedom as a self-determining agent, yet, of their nature, they relate to man as moved by something extrinsic to his own nature.

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1. IaIIae,q.49, introduction. Above p. 3. 2. IaIIae, q.45, intro., see above p. 5.
2. QUESTION 68, ARTICLE TWO
In this second chapter we will examine article two of question 68: utrum dona sint necessaria homini ad salutem. In article one Thomas has shown that for a man to receive the promptings of the Holy Spirit it is necessary for him to be open and docile to such promptings, and it is presupposed throughout this quaestio — and never argued — that the Gifts alone provide this receptivity. But what is the role of this receptivity within man's movement towards God? Is it an added extra of the Christian life, reserved perhaps for mystics and saints? Is it part of a particular form of the Christian life, for monks and nuns, in a way akin to the distinction between the gospel precepts and the gospel counsels? Or is it a receptivity necessary only for extraordinary acts of goodness? Thomas answers in the negative to all these questions. The receptivity and docility which the Gifts give to man under grace are an essential part of his graced being. Without the Gifts a man cannot achieve salvation. This is a very strong claim and one not made by any scholastic before St Thomas.

Thomas' basic argument can be restated briefly. If there are areas of human endeavour where man's reasoning — his intrinsic principle of activity, (motio) — is not sufficient and the promptings of the Holy Spirit are necessary, then, given that the Gifts are the dispositions which make man receptive to the Spirit's promptings, the Gifts of the Spirit are also necessary in these areas. It remains only to show that man's movement towards salvation is precisely such an area where reasoning alone is not sufficient. This is the burden of article two.

1. q.68,a.2,ad.1um.  2. ibid.  3. O'Connor, p. 11, footnote 'a'. 
The matter is however slightly more complicated. We need to analyse not only man's faculty, *(potential)* of reasoning but also the dispositions, *(habitus)*, within that faculty. This is clear from the very positioning of question 68 within the *Prima Secundae*; it follows on from, and indeed forms part of, Thomas' analysis of the various kinds of *habitus* in man's faculties.¹ By this stage in the *Summa* it has already been established that man's reasoning perfected by the acquired virtues is insufficient in his movement towards his supernatural destiny.

'Dicendum quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur ... Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas ... Una quidem proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudinem hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest, secundam quamdam Divinatia participationem; secundum quod dicitur, quod per Christum facti sumus consortes divinae naturae. Et quia hujusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde optet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem; non tamen absque adjuvatorio divino. 'Et hujusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae.' (2)

The question of the role of the Gifts is therefore tied up with the nature of these infused theological virtues. More precisely, the question of the necessity of the Gifts for salvation thus becomes a question of the reasons for positing the insufficiency of these theological virtues. How can it be that this 'participation in the Divinity' is insufficient? Thomas already hints at an answer.

1. See the overview of the *Prima Secundae* on p. 5 above, especially on q.55, '... de habitibus bonis, qui sunt virtutes et alia eis adiuncta, scilicet donis ...'. 2. *Talae*,q.62,a.1.
even in this passage which emphasises the elevated status of these theological virtues: 'non tamen absque adjutorio divino'. What is the nature of this further divine help? Why is it needed? It is this question in mind that we need to approach the argument of article two.

Within the thought of St Thomas, it is a common procedure to employ a three-fold analysis of the metaphysical structure of the being and activity of any living thing. This analysis proceeds firstly in terms of the essence or nature of the thing, then as regards its potentialities or powers or faculties, which it has because of having such a nature, and, thirdly, the characteristic activities and acts which flow from it having such powers.¹ Man, in this schema of 'nature', is said to have a rational soul, the powers of reason and rational appetite (will), and is thus capable of voluntary activities.² Now the argument of article two of question 68 can be reconstructed in terms of this tripartite division of essence, powers and acts: paragraph two deals with the essence of the soul, paragraph three with its powers or faculties, and the answer to the second objection with the acts which flow from the graced dispositions of the theological virtues and the Gifts within the faculties of man. It cannot be claimed that this is the most obvious way of analysing this text but it is one which will bear considerable fruit by highlighting presuppositions within Thomas' discussion of the question.

Firstly, as regards the essence or soul of man:

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¹. Most clearly presented, on angels, Ia, q.54,a.3; on man, Ia,q.74, and, with qualifications, on God, Ia,q.14, Prologue. On the history of this line of thought within 12th century scholasticism, see Lottin, P. et M., I, p. 483-501; also T. Suttor in Gilby, vol. 11, p. 262, and F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, (1950) vol. 2, p. 376 ff.

². Ia,q.77.
To understand this passage we need to look ahead to Thomas' presentation of the nature of grace in IaIIae, q. 110. There grace is seen as creating a new nature within man in consequence of the re-birth or re-creation of man in Christ. Thomas denies that grace merely affects man's potentialities but, following this tripartite schema, holds that it relates primarily to the essence of man. As potentialities follow from essence, so the new en-graced potentialities of man are to be understood as flowing from a new quality in his essential being. The theological virtues and the infused moral virtues are derived from this new form of being, man's new nature. Thomas goes so far as to call this new nature a 'deification' of man, but this is qualified in two ways. Firstly, man's original nature is not destroyed. Grace, perfecting and not destroying nature, is not actually a new essence but a new quality within the original essence of man: it is an accidental form and not a new nature strictly speaking. And secondly, God does not absorb men into his own Being: He does not make them gods but god-like, 'secundum quamdam similitudinem naturam divinam'.

... Deus deificet, communicando consortium divinae naturae per quamdam similitudinis participationem...' (8)

1. IaIIae, q. 68, a. 2. 2. IaIIae, q. 110, a. 4. 3. ibid, and adjum. 4. IaIIae, q. 112, a. 1, and In Ionnem, 15. 2. 5. Man is by nature capax Dei, even though the actuation of this capacity comes as a gift over and above his nature. 6. IaIIae, q. 110, a. 2, ad2um. On the difference between 'accidental' and 'substantial' forms see IaIIae, q. 110, a. 2, ad3um. and Ia, q. 77, a. 6. An 'accidental' form does not cause existence but causes what already exists to exist in such-and-such a way or manner. 7. IaIIae, q. 110, a. 4. God Himself is not the formal cause of the soul's graced activity but its efficient cause. As such he creates this new accidental formal cause of man's graced potentialities, dispositions and acts. IaIIae, q. 110, a. 1, ad2um; a. 2, ad2um; q. 111, a. 1, ad1um. This is why Thomas breaks with the Lombard on the nature of Charity, IIaIIae, q. a. On 'divinisation', see H.T. Comus, 'Divinisation: St. Thomas', in D.S., col. 1426-1432. 8. IaIIae, q. 112, a. 1.
Man participates in the divine nature but, true to the modal logic of the participation model, participates in it in a human mode, (as the angels participate in it in an angelic mode). Man shares in the life of the Deity then, not in its fullness, but in a human, derivative and partial way, and he holds it not by his own nature but as a gift, fragile and at risk.

'...dicendum quod omnis substantia vel est ipsa natura rei, cujus est substantia, vel est pars naturae ... Et quia gratia est supra naturam humanam, non potest esse quod sit substantia aut forma substantialis: sed est forma accidentalis ipsius animae. Id enim quod substantialiter est in Deo, accidentaliter fit in anima participante divinam bonitatem ... Secundum hoc ergo quia anima imperfecte participat divinam bonitatem, ipsa participatio divinae bonitatis, quae est gratia, imperfectiori modo habet esse in anima quam anima in seipsa subsistat; est tamen nobilior quam natura animae inquantum est expressio vel participatio divinae bonitatis, non autem quantum ad modum essendi.' (1)

As a result, the potentialities, or rather, the dispositions or habitus within it, of man's original nature are more 'certain' than those of his divine 'nature'. Thomas, in our present text, gives two examples to clarify the point.

'Sicut sol, quia est perfecte lucidus, per seipsum potest illuminare; luna autem, in qua est imperfecte natura lucis, non illuminat nisi illuminata. Medicus etiam qui perfecte novit artem medicinae potest per se operari; sed discipulus ejus, qui nondum est plene instructus, non potest per se operari, nisi ab eo instruatur.' (2)

The ability to succeed in an action is presented here not as a matter of autonomy but of a continuous relationship of dependence on the originary source of the ability to so act. What Thomas is pointing out is that a man under grace does not have an inherent facility as regards the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, such that

1. IaIIae,q.110,a.2,ad2um. 2. IaIIae,q.68,a.2.
he does not need tuition, assistance and support in exercising them.

Now in the text before us, there is no discussion of grace in the essence of the soul. The text concentrates solely on the effects of grace upon the powers of man. The advantage we have gained by looking ahead to question 110, is that we are now in no danger of misunderstanding Thomas as he opens up his argument. When he writes, 'imperfecte enim diligimus et cognoscimus Deum', he is not suggesting that this imperfection is merely the result of sin of one sort or another but that there is a radical and intrinsic insufficiency in the theological virtues. The imperfection lies not primarily in our actions but in our 'possession' of these virtues: they do not come to us as if 'second nature' to us, as do the acquired virtues. We might recall Thomas' approval of Averroes' maxim on virtues - 'habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit' - which Lonergan translates as, 'one merely has to want to, and the thing is done, if one has the habit'.

What we lack as regards the theological virtues is a certain spontaneity of use of them. The Gifts of the Spirit will be seen as providing this spontaneity or promptitude.

Hence, in this second paragraph of article two, Thomas can say: -

'Et quamvis haec secunda perfectio sit major quam prima, tamen prima perfectiori modo habetur ab homine quasi plena possessio; secundum autem habeatur quasi imperfecta; imperfecta enim diligimus et cognoscimus Deum.' (2)

Our use of q.110 has allowed us to locate the root of this imperfection in the relationship of grace to the essence of the soul.

The third paragraph of article two might be read as merely a continuation of the argument of the second paragraph but the discus-

1. In III Sent., d.23,q.1,a.1. Cited by Lonergan, p. 43.
2. IaIIae,q.68,a.2.
sion here is not in terms of our imperfect 'possession' of the theo-
logical virtues, but in a second intrinsic imperfection in that they
relate to the potentialities of the human soul, reason and the rati-
onal will.

'non sufficit ipsa motio rationis'.

If man participates in the divine nature, he does so in a human mode.
Man alone of all sub-lunar creation is capable of this participation
- capax dei - precisely because of the kind of nature he has, viz.
a rational soul.¹ Man's human mode of participating in the divine
nature is therefore expressed, exercised and articulated in terms of
his natural human powers of reason and will.² The characteristic
activity of man, which follows from the interplay of his powers, is
that of judgement, liberum arbitrium.³ Now Thomas, more than most
theologians, is loath to understate the dignity of man's nature, but
he sees man's intellectuality not as the peak of creation but as the
lowest form on intellectual life in creation.⁴ Man's decision making
has to take place under the conditions of time and space, by analysis,
by comparing and contrasting ideas, volitions and information.⁵
Even at its best, then, and under grace, man's intellectual ability
and his judgement cannot be certain and secure. Within the condi-
tions of time and space, and dealing with matters proportionate to
his nature, man's judgements are adequate and sufficient but not cer-
tain. But in relationship to his supernatural destiny, to which
grace gives him access, their deficiency is even greater.

¹Rationi humanae non sunt omnia cognita, neque
omnia possibilia, sive accipiatur ut perfecta
perfectione naturali, sive accipiatur ut per-

1. Ia, q. 8, a. 3. On homo capax Dei, see Ia, q. 12, a. 1.; IaIIae,
q. 3, a. 8.; IaIIae, q. 2, a. 3 and T. C. O'Brien in Gilby, vol. 31, pp. 70-
73. 2. Prologue to IaIIae above p. 3. 3. ibid. 4. Ia, q. 55,
a. 2; q. 58, a. 3. 5. Ia, q. 58, a. 3; a. 4; Ia, q. 85, a. 5.
fecta theologicis virtutibus. Unde non potest quantum ad omnia repellere stultitiam, et alia hujusmodi, de quibus ibi fit mentio. Sed Deus, cujus scientiae et potestati omnia subsunt, sua motione ab omnia stultitia et ignorantia et hebitudine et duritia et ceteris hujusmodi, nos tutos reddit. Et ideo dona Spiritus Sancti, quae faciunt nos bene sequentes instinctum ipsius, dicuntur contra hujusmodi defectus dari. (1)

Reason and the rational appetite, no matter how elevated by the theological virtues are, by their mode of operation, unwieldy and uncertain.

'Sic igitur quantum ad ea quae absunt humanae rationi, in ordine scilicet ad finem connaturalis homini, homo potest operari per judicium rationis ... Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio secundum quod est aliquidet imperfекте formatо per theologicas virtutes, non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio Spiritus Sancti ...' (2)

So Thomas has shown the insufficiency of the theological virtues by reference to their 'root'—man's qualified participation in the divine nature in the essence of his soul—and by reference to their operation through man's characteristic mode of operation, 'dividendo et componendo'. He has shown that man's graced life is not to be seen in terms of strict autonomy but of a continuous relationship of dependence and tutelage. It is here precisely that the Gifts come into play. Before concluding however, we should look at three other points embedded in this text.

In the second paragraph there is one clause which disturbs the flow of argument and it may be important to focus on it for this reason. It occurs at the very centre of the argument.

'... non tamen exclusa operatione Dei, qui in omni natura et voluntate interius operatur.'

1. a.2, ad3um. 2. a.2, corpus.
Why does Thomas introduce this qualification? What is gained by it? What follows immediately after it is a statement of the need to situate 'created grace', (in the essence and the powers of the soul), within a wider context of 'uncreated grace', (the operation and the promptings of the Spirit). What this insertion seems to be pointing to is something like a parallel in the natural order: all created causalities need to be understood as acting within the over-arching causality of God's Providence. Now again and again Thomas stresses the reality of 'secondary' causes. Each nature or form has a capacity for action in accordance with its particular nature or form. Nothing needs to be added, within the natural order, for this capacity to be actuated. But, that any nature exists, continues to exist or acts to fulfill its nature, is itself also a manifestation of the operation of the First Cause. All things, in as much as they move from potentiality to actuality in any respect, exhibit both their own natures and the operation of God. This is the sense of the inserted clause but what is its purpose? We need not go any further into the metaphysics behind this clause at the moment: we shall look at this in detail later and it is not the main thrust of the argument here. The purpose of this insertion is that it makes explicit the distinction between this general operation of God in all things and the particular operation of the Spirit in those who have received the infused theological virtues. We are presented then with a general picture of the divine 'movement' in all things, and within this general model, an important distinction between this gene-

1. Ia, q.103, a.7; q.104, a.1; q.105, a.5; IaIIae, q.109, a.1. God is the efficient, exemplar and final cause of all things, Ia, q.44, a.1. As for the human will, see, IaIIae, q.9, a.6 and also above, p.190. 2. See below, chapter 6, 'Motio', esp. p.133ff. 3. Labourdette, D. de Sp. 'Dons', col. 1618.
eral efficient causality of God and the particular operation of God in those who have the infused virtues.\(^1\) The special movement of God through the receptivity of the Gifts is not to be confused with this general operation of God in all creatures. This is the point of this insertion. In regard to the 'accidental' form of grace in the essence of man's soul there is this yet further need for God's special operation; and this need is of absolute necessity for salvation.

This tells us something of the diversity of the single operation of God in his creatures but it also tells us something about the status of the infused nature and powers of man under grace. The two examples given by Thomas are examples of dependency and tutelage: the moon in relation to the sun, and the medical student and his professor. Bouyer gives a good twentieth century account of what Thomas is presenting here.

'... The fact that sanctifying grace is a habitus in the Thomistic sense, does not mean that it gives us a separate, independent power of acting supernaturally without further need in every instance of a special intervention of God; the exact opposite is the case. Sanctifying grace does not conceal the necessity of a particular actual grace for each meritorious act. The habitus of sanctifying grace, far from establishing us in some sort of autonomy in regard to God, involves precisely a permanent hold of God, not only in our actions, but on the source of our being, in so far as this could have been alienated from God by sin, and has to become his again, in the strictest possible sense, in Christ. In consequence, sanctifying grace, so far from conferring any power of our own to perform independent supernatural acts, is simply a disposition maintained in us by God to act no more than under the impulse of actual grace. (2)

This seems to be what Thomas is saying here, although two qualifications have to be made. Bouyer seems to see sanctifying grace purely as a habitus whereas for Thomas it is both habitus and motio;\(^3\) and

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1. See Boulliard on this, below p.106. 2. L. Bouyer, The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism, (1956), p. 207. 3. IaIIae,q.110, a.2; q.111,a.2.
Bouyer sees this need for the impulse of actual grace as arising from man's sinfulness and alienation, whereas Thomas, as we have discovered, sees the need as a metaphysical one.\(^1\) The relationship of dependence and tutelage arises from this.

Now just as a qualifying clause was inserted into paragraph one by Thomas, so here, in the second paragraph, there is a sentence which in itself adds nothing to the theme of the argument but yet is placed at the very centre of it.

\textit{'Si tamen etiam in hoc homo adjuvetur a Deo per specialem instinctum, hoc erit superabundantis bonitatis: unde secundum philosophos, non quicumque habebat virtutes morales acquisitas habet virtutes heroicas vel divinas.'} (2)

Again we need to press for the significance of this sentence.

The idea of divine or heroic virtues is part of the classical legacy to the West. Thomas refers here to 'philosophers' and not just to Aristotle. Presumably, as Albert his master did before him, he is referring to Plato and to the Stoics as well as to Aristotle.\(^3\) Nevertheless at the only other point in question 68 where Thomas mentions these divine or heroic virtues he refers explicitly to the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}.\(^4\) The attractiveness of the idea Aristotle presents can be seen from a reading of the text itself.

\textit{"Let us now make a fresh beginning and point out that of moral states to be avoided there are three kinds - vice, incontinence, brutishness. The contraries of two of these are evident - one we call virtue, the other continence; to brutishness it would be most fitting to oppose superhuman virtue, a heroic and divine kind of virtue, as Homer has represented Priam saying of Hector that he was very good, "For he seemed not, he The child of a mortal man, but as one that of God's seed came."

Therefore, if as they say, men become gods by excess...\(^1\) IaIIae,q.109,a.2. \(^2\) IaIIae,q.68,a.2. \(^3\) O'Connor, 14, n. 7. \(^4\) IaIIae,q.68,a.1.}
of virtue, of this kind must evidently be the state opposed to the brutish state; for as a brute has no vice or virtue, so neither has a god; his state is higher than virtue, and that of a brute is a different kind of state from vice.

Now since it is rarely that a god-like man is found - to use the epithet of the Spartans, who when they admire anyone highly call him a 'godlike man' - so too the brutish type is rarely found among men (...)' (1)

A passage like this stimulates the theological imagination. The question is however whether it can be used as anything more than such a stimulus. Can it be a useful conceptual tool? And, if it can, does Thomas employ it as such here?

The scholastic tradition had already used the notion of 'divine virtues', following Macrobius however rather than Aristotle. Within the Summa Thomas employs this line of thought in dealing with the theological virtues. There the 'divine' virtues are, strictly speaking, the exemplars in the mind of God, or, speaking less precisely, the theological virtues in man. What we have here, however, is the same term used in a different sense, used in relation to something more perfect than the acquired virtues in the natural order.

The sentence itself is ambiguous. The phrase, 'superabundantia bonitatis' could refer to either man or God. We can provide two paraphrases:

A. Man's reasoning is sufficient as regards his connatural end. If, even in this area, God inspires some men, by a special prompting, (heroic or divine virtues, as the philosophers call them - virtues not possible to all who have the acquired moral virtues) it is because of the excellence of their lives. In the case of the

2. O'Conner, pp. 106, 113. 3. IaIIae,q.54,a.3.; q.61,a.5; q.62, a.1,ad2um. 4. IaIIae,q.61,a.5; q.62,a.1,ad2um.
supernatural end of man, no activity of reasoning is sufficient without the prompting and movement of the Holy Spirit from above.

B. Marx reasoning is sufficient as regards his connatural end. If, even in this area, God helps man by a special prompting, this will be out of his superabundant goodness; hence according to the philosophers not everyone who had the acquired moral virtues had heroic or divine virtues. In the case of the supernatural end of man, no activity of reasoning is sufficient without the prompting of the Holy Spirit from above.

In neither of these options are the Gifts equated with the heroic or divine virtues. They are compared to them only in as much as both are given over and above the acquired moral virtues as a result of a special 'instinctus' from God. As with the parallel case in the first paragraph, there may be an attempt here both to point out and yet distinguish an action of God within the natural order, albeit unusual, with a further action of God in the supernatural order, through the Gifts. There are similarities but they must be kept as distinct phenomena.

We can follow a theme through article one and article two within which Thomas tightens up his use of the notions suggested by this motif of the divine or herioc virtues. In the last sentence of article one, Thomas concludes:

'Et hoc quod quidam dicunt, quod dona perficiunt hominem ad altiores actus quam sint actus virtu-tem.'

This is reinforced by the reply to the first objection where there is a reference to the Nicomachean Ethics. Now the first objection of
article two follows this line of thought:

'Dona enim ordinantur ad quaedam perfectionem ultra communem perfectionem virtutis.'

The reply to this objection takes up the last line of the corpus of article one, but asks in what way are the Gifts directed to 'higher acts' than those of the other virtues? In keeping with the gains of the argument in article one, this question is answered in terms of the principle of their operation. They are 'superior' not in terms of their object but in terms of the mode of achieving their object: not that more perfect things are done but that things are done more perfectly. Now the ease with which Hector acted perfectly, according to Priam, can be taken as a model of the Gifts: we have already noted the use of the terms 'suaviter' and 'prompte' in article one. But this model cannot be used to present the Gifts as 'super-erogatory', as matters of counsels rather than the precepts of the gospel life, as a perfection available only to a few.

If the Gifts were super-virtues then Thomas would be adding yet another layer on the already elaborate edifice of infused and acquired virtues. But the Gifts, though 'good dispositions' and in that sense "virtues", relate to something outside man, the 'movement' of the Spirit. Arguing for the ultimate insufficiency of all the virtues, even at the height of their perfection, Thomas is using the Gifts at this stage to point to a perfection which comes as a 'motio' or an 'instinctus' from outside man and not anything in man. In article three Thomas will argue for the nature of the Gifts as habitus but it is significant that here, before that stage in the argument, he argues for them in terms of the motio of the Spirit. It is significant too that the idea of the divine or heroic virtues is used at this stage and not in article three.
The phrase, 'heroic or divine virtues' was of more use to Thomas as he understood and presented the Gifts in the Commentary on the Sentences.¹ There the Gifts were seen precisely as super-Virtues which acted according to a divine and not a human standard. There, this passage from the Nichomachaen Ethics is explicitly referred to at the centre of Thomas' analysis of the Gifts.² Here, in the Summa, it is used only in these two passages - an aside within a text and in a reply to an objection, a reply which as we have noted, is further modified in the subsequent article. Now, in his late theology, Thomas holds that man can never have such a perfectly divine mode of operation: his participation in the divinity is never that 'secure'.³ As we have seen in our analysis of the metaphysics of grace in the essence of the soul, man always has an 'imperfect possession' of his divine nature. The Gifts do not complete man's divinised nature, but, accepting its inevitable incompleteness, point to the constant need for divine assistance in the life of grace.⁴ This is the crux of the argument of article two.

The divine or heroic nature of the Gifts cannot be reduced to a perfection available only to the few, for those already perfect in the acquired or infused virtues; they cannot be reduced to an optional extra of the Christian life, like gospel counsels rather than gospel precepts.⁵ The basic drift of the arguments of articles one and two is that of the need for the constant movement of the Holy Spirit in all who have the infused virtues. The Gifts as dispositions of receptivity to this necessary 'motion' are consequently themselves radically necessary for the Christian life. Article two has

¹ See below p. 97ff for a discussion of this. ² III. Sent. 34.1.1. ³ IaIIae,q.68,a.2. See also De Veritate, q.27, a.5,ad3sum, and p. 51. ⁴ See above p. 54. ⁵ IaIIae, q.68,a.2,1st obj.
proved its point: the Gifts are necessary for all for salvation.

That our interpretation of Thomas' use of the phrase 'heroic or divine' virtues is correct can best be shown in terms of the overall argumentation of articles 1, 2 and 3. It can also be confirmed however by the way Thomas uses the phrase in the Tertia Pars. We have claimed that Thomas uses the phrase as a convenient stimulus to thought but that he corrects it and refines it as a theological tool and uses it sparingly as such. On the question of whether Christ, as the most perfect man, had the common run of virtues or the 'heroic or divine virtues', Thomas reduces the status of these super-virtues to that of describing the common virtues in a sublime state of perfection.

There is one other important matter in article 2 which could be overlooked because of over-familiarity with the terms used. This movement which supplements and aids the theological virtues is attributed to the Holy Spirit and not just to the Godhead. On the one hand this is obviously a matter of custom and the tradition of study on the Isaian Gifts, and one might think that too much should not be made of this. But, on the other hand, Thomas' later theology has a distinct and central role for the 'mission' of the Holy Spirit in the economy of divine predestination. The Spirit is said to abide in us by charity, but the role of the Spirit is not just one of 'abiding' but of energising, providing a dynamism, a motio within creation and Providence as a whole but also, especially within the realm of grace and Predestination.

1. IIIa, q.7, a.2, s.2 and ad2um. 2. The New Law of the Gospel is described as 'gratia Spiritus Sancti, quae datur per fidem Christi'. IaIIae, q.106, a.1. 3. See especially S.C.C. IV, chs. 19-22 where the motus hominis ad deum is appropriated to the Holy
Thomas in terms of Aristotelian notions of movement, but the root of his theory lies in scripture and the patristic legacy. We should not then, take the scriptural quotations in article 2, as merely casual embellishments.  

'Cui Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt, si filii, et haeredes,' (Romans ch.8, v. 14, 17)  

'Spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in terram rectam'. (Ps. 142, 10)  

What we have in this article - and it is of central theological significance - is a statement of the insufficiency of 'created' grace, and the absolute necessity of 'uncreated' grace, the direct intervention of the Spirit. The significance of this will be clear when we have examined the development of Thomas' theology of grace and seen this article in that context. In the Summa, Thomas hardly uses the theological tool of 'appropriation' to describe the actions of the Triune God in his creation. The present writer would agree with modern critics that this is a regrettable feature of the Summa, but, to digress a little, it is illuminating to look at how Thomas deals in a quite different fashion with this same point in the Summa Contra Gentiles.  

'Ex hoc etiam quod Spiritus Sanctus per modum amoris procedit, amor autem vim quamdam impulsivam et motivam habet, motus qui est a Deo in rebus Spiritui Sancto proprie attribui videtur ...  

... Parsus: rerum gubernatio a Deo secundum quamdam motionem esse intelligitur, secundum quod Deus omnia dirigat et movet in proprios fines. Si igitur impulsus et motio ad Spiritum Sanctum, ratione amoris, pertinent convenienter rerum gubernatio et propagatio Spiritui Sancto attribuitur ...  

... Item, vita maxime in motu manifestatur; movens enim seipsa vivere dicimus, et universaliter quaequequaque seipsis aguntur ad operandum. Si igitur, ratione amoris, Spiritui Sancto impulsio et motio competit, convenienter etiam sibi attribuitur'  


1. see above p. 137ff.  2. For example, on the Divine Government of Creation, Ia,q.103-9.
vita ... et in symbolo fidei nos in Spiritum Sanctum vivificantem credere profitemus." (1)

Thomas has shown the insufficiency of infused created grace as regards both the essence and the powers of the soul. Man's participation in divinity is such that along with the habitus of grace, we have to posit the permanent need for the constant movement of the Spirit. Our detailed examination of the two 'insertions' into the major arguments of the article have allowed us to distinguish this movement of the Spirit in the case of the Gifts from both the general efficient causality of God in all things, and from the special inspirations of the Holy Spirit of gratia gratis data. Thomas' theology of grace uses both the models of habitus and motio. In article three he will turn his attention to the receptivity to the Spirit in man and hold that this too must be a habitus, but before moving on to that article, we shall look at the wider context of Thomas' later theology of grace to see how this balancing of habitus and motio in question 68 takes place within this larger reorganisation.

3. 'MOTIO' AND 'HABITUS'. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
EMPHASIS ON 'MOTIO' IN THOMAS' LATER THEOLOGY OF
GRACE
It is difficult for those of us whose knowledge of scholasticism is limited to St Thomas to appreciate not only how he was an innovatory genius within his theological tradition but also how recent and how innovative in itself that tradition was, in comparison with the religious writers of the twelfth century. Let us begin then with some of the major achievements of early thirteenth century scholasticism which Thomas inherited.¹

Among others, Philip the Chancellor, (died 1236), William of Auvergne, (died 1249) and William of Auxerre, (died 1231), by introducing certain new theoretical constructs into scientific theology brought about a revolution in the discipline, allowing old questions and confusions to be re-located and resolved. We can place these achievements under three headings. Firstly, the concept of the 'supernatural' allowed a coherent articulation of the relationship of grace and 'nature'. Secondly, these theologians established, as a basic model, the Aristotelian schema of 'nature' with the tripartite division of essence, powers and acts, which we have already looked at. Thirdly, they introduced the Aristotelian concept of


habitus, (hexis), a settled disposition, and so concentrated all attention in the theology of grace on to the concept of virtue. All the great scholastics of the thirteenth century built on these foundations using and developing further these basic paradigmatic theoretical tools.¹

By articulating a concept of the 'supernatural' the Parisian theologians had resolved the dilemma of distinguishing grace from 'nature'. One twelfth century writer had actually asked why, if everything was a free gift from God, why was not everything called 'grace'?² The other side of the coin to this, was a pessimism, acutely conscious of man's 'fallen' state, which doubted the possibility of any sort of 'natural' goodness without grace.³ The achievement of Parisian theologians was to create the theorem of the supernatural.⁴ This is not to say that grace was not seen as supernatural before this: what it means is that now the theoretical construct of the 'natural' could be elaborated without confusion between man within and outwith the Christian dispensation of grace. In this way, there could be a place for a natural love of God quite distinct from 'grace', although not independent of the action of God.⁵

From the 1220's onwards, the scholastics were concerned with the reordering and development of their discipline in the light of these advances. As regards questions on grace, we can do them the injustice of presenting the general outline of their thought as seeing grace as a 'supernatural habitus in the essence of the soul'. The Aristotelian notion of habitus served two main purposes: it pointed to grace as a settled disposition and not just a transitory motion;

1. Lonergan, pp. 1-39; Ernst, pp. xv-xvii. 2. Lonergan, p. 14. 3. ibid., pp. 14-15. 4. Lonergan, p. 13. 5. For Thomas on this, see IaIIae,q.109,a.1, a.2, a.3, as the marvellous culmination of this development.
and, as a virtue it was an operative disposition by which one had the ability to act perfectly in a certain area of activity. Given the tripartite metaphysical structure we have already examined it could thus be shown that grace must first be in the essence of the soul:

'Oportet ergo quod primum donum quod gratis homini infunditur, hunc habeat effectum ut per ipsam essentiam animae in quoddam divinum esse elevet, ut idonea sit ad divinas operationes.' (1)

The virtues in man's potentialities or powers flow from his new 'divinised' being - agere sequitur esse - and, through the virtues, man acts meritoriously.2

Now obviously this over-view is something of a caricature. Bonaventure, for example, placed grace in both the essence and the powers, but this can still be seen as a disagreement within the same paradigm.3 What we can say about the general movement of theological thought is that grace is primarily seen as something entitative; an esse spirituale gratuitum,4 a habitus faciens esse bonum.5 This is the Western adaptation, under the influence of Aristotle, of the Greek Patristic notion of 'Divinisation'.6 Sanctifying grace is habitual grace. In as much as mention is made at all of operative grace it is restricted to the act of infusion of the habitual grace at the moment of justification, or it is left to the peripheral and miscellaneous collection of gratia gratis data, acts of providence, charisms and admonitions.7 The discussion of grace, then, is almost totally in terms of created grace. As Thomas' career progresses,
however various modifications are introduced. By the time of his later writings, the notion of habitual grace remains central but it is now sited within a wider context of the dynamism (motio) of uncreated grace, and habitual cooperative grace is set alongside cooperative and operative actual grace. We have seen something of this already in our discussion of article two above, but to appreciate its significance we need to follow through the thread of its development.

Thomas' awareness of the limitations of the tradition he had received can be followed along two lines. The first is in terms of the insufficiency of the engraced virtues in man, the second in the problem of justification and the whole question of Pelagianism.

In the Commentary on the Sentences, (1252-56) Thomas holds that the internal change brought about by sanctifying grace is sufficient to give man the ability to act meritoriously through the virtues. Having been given a new (second) nature, the justified man is perfectly equipped and can avoid sin. This position, however, is modified in the de Veritate, (1256-59). Thomas now seems to focus on the actual difficulties of living under grace. Even with the divinised dispositions of grace, man still lives in a world surrounded by temptations; to be perfect he would need to be constantly on his guard and such constant vigilance is an impossibility. Along with the supernatural dispositions, then, man also needs some form of divine assistance. In addition, Thomas also presents a further refinement of the participation model: although man participates in the divine life, no set of dispositions can make him as impeccable and perfect as God. Only if God were the source and principle of his activity would man act perfectly. Along with the created disposi-

1. Lonergan, pp. 60-61. 2. ibid., p.51.
tions of grace, it is necessary then to posit also divine interventions to aid the activities of those dispositions. We can see here the beginning of a movement of thought which will culminate in the treatise of the Gifts in the Summa Theologiae.

But the development seen here is only one case of a wider development which centres rather on the beginning of justification and, consequently, Thomas' increasing awareness of the ramifications of Pelagianism. The difficulty caused by theology's focusing on the essence of the soul and its in-formation by grace is clearly seen in the question of the initium justificationis. As man cannot prepare himself for grace, Thomas, along with his contemporaries, held that God moves man's will to prepare for grace by external acts of providence, such as admonitions, misfortune or sufferings. In this way man is led to prepare himself to accept sanctifying grace by the act of his free judgement. The emphasis here is on God's intervention through external acts of providence and man's response in terms of liberum arbitrium. As Ernst writes:

'It would be difficult to defend his (Thomas') early views from the charge made by Haxnack, that all the medieval theologians were semi-Pelagian in their treatment of grace.'

But Thomas soon moves on to attempting a more sophisticated analysis, the focus of his attention moving away from liberum arbitrium to an analysis of what is presupposed by it, that is, the rational appetite, the will. Given this more sophisticated analysis—which we shall look at in detail later—Thomas now posits on the part of God's intervention an activity internal to man. Already, in the De Veritate, Thomas mentions a 'divinus instinctus secundum quod Deus in mentibus hominum operatur.' By the time of the second

1. ibid., p. 43. 2. II Sent. d.29,q.1,a.4. 3. Ernst, p. xvii. 4. Below, p. 176ff. 5. De Veritate, q.24,a.15.
Paris Regency - in the Qdodlibeta Prima (1269) -- the beginning of
corversion is attributed solely to this internal operation and any
other view, presumably including his own earlier ones, is now termed
'Pelagian'.

All commentators now agree that before 1259 Thomas had little
awareness of the problem of Pelagianism and certainly had not had
access to the decrees of the Church Councils condemning it. At
the time of writing the Commentary on the Sentences, he seems to under-
stand Pelagianism as a view that held that the natural virtues alone
were sufficient for the Christian life; a negation of the supernatu-
ral order. But by the time of the Contra Gentiles (1258-64) and
the Summa Theologiae (1268-73), his attack on Pelagianism is stated
in terms not only of needing to posit a divine operation intrinsic
to man at the moment of justification, but also as the need to envi-
sage a divine motus throughout the whole spectrum of the realm of
grace. Significantly, his analysis is stated in terms of Aristotelian physics - 'motio moventis praecedit motum mobilis'. Thomas
achieves his movement away from semi-Pelagianism by giving priority
to motion rather than 'form', and by emphasising the intrinsic na-
ture of the 'divimus instinctus' by which man is affected by this
motion. Are these elements interlinked?

1. Quod I., I,a.7. 2. Deman's review of Bouillard
in Bulletin Thomiste VII, pp. 46-58, is highly critical but acknow-
ledges that Thomas' ignorance of semi-Pelagianism before this time
is now established beyond doubt. 3. Lonergan, p. 60. 4. S.C.G.,
III, 149. 5. ibid. 6. Ernst, p. xxiv. 7. The term
'Semi-Pelagianism' appeared around 1594 at the time of the 'De Auxi-
ilis' controversy. 'The theologians of the thirteenth century who
knew nothing of the Council of Orange, were not only unfamiliar with
the term 'semi-pelagianism' but made no distinction between Pelagia-
nism and semi-Pelagianism', H. Rondet, Gratia Christi, tr. T.W. Guzie,
New York, 19 , p. 145n. See also, Bouillard, pp. 92-102; H. Jaquin,
'A quelle date apparait le terme semi-pelagien?' R.S.P.T., 1907,
pp. 506-508; and also the article, 'Semi-Pelagians' by E. Amann in
D.T.C., XIV, col. 1796-1850.
So far we have outlined the movement of Thomas' thought in terms of his growth out of the limitations exercised by the paradigm which the scholastic tradition offered him. There were, however, other influences outside scholasticism which helped to focus his unease, gave him the intellectual tools to elaborate a new paradigm, and encouraged him with its enlargement. The ground we are about to cover is by no means untrod territory. Bouillard and Seckler have done the basic detailed research and scholars including Schillebeeckx and Chenu have incorporated their results into their own work. The following paragraphs are in many ways a compendium of their writings along with others. We can begin with a quotation from Schillebeeckx using Seckler.

'Seckler proceeds from Bouillard' correct finding that, during his first period in Italy (1259-60), Aquinas, either indirectly or directly came across the documents of the ecclesiastical condemnation of Semi-Pelagianism. From a certain point onwards (in the middle of the period in which he was writing his third book Contra Gentiles), three ideas which are not found in Aquinas' earlier works suddenly make an appearance in his writing: greater stress was placed on God's initiative; an auxilium divinum was seen to be directly active in the human will; and the older doctrine of habitus fidei, faith as a habit, was subordinated to a more dynamic view of justification, so that the movement of God, the motio divina, came to occupy a central place. (2)

It is possible to suggest five inter-connected influences on Thomas during this Italian period. It would be foolish however, to imagine that a mind as complex as St Thomas' can be analysed by a mere list of influences upon it, or that each of such influences can be studied

adequately in isolation from each other, or that Thomas merely ab-
sorbed their ideas and did not radically restructure what he received
from them. Nevertheless, the following were important.

1. A reading of the works of St Augustine, especially the
de Praedestinatione Sanctorum.¹

2. An intensive study of the Bible, read now in a diffe-
rent light.²

3. His discovery of the de Bona Fortuna.³

4. A reading of the Conciliar texts on Semi-Pelagianism.⁴

5. A wider reading of the Greek Fathers.⁵

As for the first two of this list, this is no new discovery
of twentieth century scholarship but was noted by Soto in the six-
teenth century.

'cum II Sent. opinionem communem insecutus affirmas-
set tum quod ... tum quod ... postmodum eloquia sa-
cra et Patrum, cum primis Augustini, sententias medi-
tatius explorans, utrumque retractavit.' (6)

It is difficult - and presumptuous - to attempt to analyse so as to
isolate, the influence of scripture of a mind so religious as St Tho-
mas'. Ernst warns us, on this very topic:

'In the growth of a mind like St Thomas, intellec-
tual and religious insights proceed jointly in an
interplay more complex than any dialectic.' (7)

The interplay of philosophy, Augustinianism, and scriptural

¹. Chenu, p. 236, and Bouillard, pp. 109-114 for arguments
to show that Thomas was reading Augustine's texts rather than glos-
ses at this time. ². See below p. 73, 76. ³. Bouillard, Seck-
ler and Schillebeeckx, see below p. 74 and chapter 7. ⁴. Seck-
ler, see above p. 71. ⁵. Weisheipl, pp. 163-176. Weisheipl
points out, p. 171, that Thomas was working simultaneously on the
Summa Contra Gentiles, Contra Errores Graecorum and the Catena Aurea.
The latter involved him in commissioning Latin translations of the
Greek Doctors, p. 173, of whom he quotes fifty seven in the course
of the work, p. 173. See also below p. 76. ⁶. De natura et gra-
tia, II, 3; cited by Chenu, p. 236. ⁷. Ernst, p. xviii.
meditation can be seen in a relevant passage from the Commentary on John, chapter six, on verse 44: Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum'. Thomas discusses whether this 'tractus' by the Father is to be seen as something coercive and violent. He dismisses this and says the Father draws men, 'persuadendo, ratione ... demonstrando eum esse filium suum ... aliquid trahit alium alliciando ...'.

Then he refers to Augustine who presents a psychological analysis of man's will seduced by the beauty of truth.

'Si enim, ut Augustinus dicit, trahit sua quemque voluptas, quanto fortius debet homo trahi ad Christum, si delectatur veritate, beatitudine, justitia, sempiterna vita, quod totum est Christus? Ab isto ergo si trahendi sumus, trahamur per dilectionem veritatis ...' (2)

But - and this is the significant point - Thomas does not just passively receive and report from the various influences upon him, he creatively restructures what he receives. Immediately after this reference to Augustine, Thomas presents a transposition of Augustine's psychological solution into ontological terms. We can see also here how far he has moved from his views in the Commentary on the Sentences.

'Sed quia non solum revelatio exterior, vel objectum, virtutem attrahendi habet; sed etiam interior instinctus impellens et movens ad credendum, ideo trahit multos Pater ad Filium per instinctum divinæ operationis moventis interius cor hominis ad credendum ...' (3)

There then follows, among two others the important quotation

'Cor regis in manu Domini: quocumque voluerit inclinabat illud.' (Proverbs 21, v.1).

An example of a similar movement can be seen in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, on chapter eight, v.14 'Quicumque enim spiritu Dei aguntur, hi sunt filii Dei.' Here we will merely quote Thomas.

1. In Joan, c.6,lect.5. 2. ibid. 3. ibid.
... potest sic intellegi, 'Quicumque ...', id est, reguntur sicut a quodam ductore et directione, quod quidem in nobis facit spiritus, sc. inquantum illuminat nos interius quid facere debeamus. ... Sed quia ille qui ducitur, ex seipso non operatur, homo autem spiritualis non tantum instruietur a Spiritu Sancto quid agere debeat, sed etiam cor eius a Spiritu Sancto movetur: ideo plus intelligendum est in hoc ... Illa enim agi dicuntur, quae quodam superiori instinctu moventur. Unde de brutis dicimus quod non agent, sed aguntur: quia a natura movuntur, et non ex proprio motu ad suas actiones agendas. Similiter autem homo spiritualis non quasi ex motu propriae voluntatis principaliter, sed ex instinctu Spiritus Sancti inclinatur ad aliquid agendum ... Non tamen per hoc excluditur quin viri spirituales, per voluntatem et liberum arbitrium operentur, quia ipsum motum voluntatis et liberii arbitrii Spiritus Sanctus in eis causat ...' (1)

Here the 'instinctus Spiritus Sancti inclinatur ad aliquid agendum', is presented as something which is not contrary to free judgement or freedom of the will because it is prior to the movement of the will. This is a highly significant development. The focal point of analysis is no longer man's free choice or judgement, but the very spontaneity of the human will which precedes any deliberation, and the 'instinctus divinus' will be said to operate at this primary fount of human autonomy.

The term 'instinctus' here shows that our several sources are interlinked. Seckler's great discovery was to find that both the Liber de Bona Fortuna, and the conciliar decrees against Semi-Pelagianism both used the term 'Instinctus'. Together these texts and Thomas' use of the intellectual tool which the term 'instinctus' provided, allowed him to develop a metaphysical analysis which was more profound and, which at the same time, undermined Pelagianism. We shall see this from our detailed study of the de Bona Fortuna. 

The conceptual framework which Thomas created around the term 'instinc-

1. In ad Rom., c.8, lect.3. 2. See chapter 7.
led him to change radically his understanding of the autonomy of man, positing a receptivity in the will itself, even prior to the exercise of free judgement. Let us quote Schillebeeckx's approval of Seckler's research:

'It struck him, (Seckler), that the transition of Thomas' texts was quite abrupt. The evidence of this is to be found in many different elements, both in the terminology and the contents of his writings at this time. Suddenly one finds repeated references to *pelagian* (Semi-Pelagianism), each time connected with a quotation from the Eudemian Ethics (for the first time in Contra Gentiles III, c.89,147,149). Bouillard, however, had not noticed that the concept *instinctus* also appeared at this very point in Thomas' works in connection with the act of faith. And it is a remarkable fact that the term 'instinctus' played a part both in the Church's documents condemning Semi-Pelagianism and in the Latin translation of the Eudemian Ethics. The word 'instinctus' is the only connection that can be established in Thomas' thought between anti-Semi-Pelagianism and these Ethics of Aristotle. Just as the danger of Semi-Pelagianism was averted in the writings of the Church Fathers by an appeal to the *instinctus divinus*, so too did this same term play a similar part centuries later in the works of Aquinas.' (1)

The references to Eudemian Ethics in this passage are to be taken to refer to the *Liber de bona fortuna*. Schillebeeckx goes on to point out, as we have done, the creative inter-reaction of these various influences on Thomas.

'On the basis of the Bible, the affirmation of the instinct of faith was given scope in Aquinas' doctrine thanks to his knowledge of the later works of Augustine, an ontological structure thanks to Aristotelianism and finally an anthropological form thanks to the Roman philosophy of law and Stoic ethics.' (3)

We shall deal with this latter element in the chapter, 'Ratio, Lex et Deus.'

But there is yet another factor, another dimension to the

growth of Thomas' thought at this time. A dimension in which we might see the influence of Greek thought, especially Pseudo-Denis, along with scripture, especially Ephesians, but a factor which really arose out of the very task that Thomas had set himself in the Summa Contra Gentiles. There his aim was to exhibit the harmony of the Christian universe as a whole. Divine Providence reaches from end to end of the universe and is the absolutely certain cause of every kind of celestial or terrestrial cause and of every combination of such secondary and derivative causalities, whether seen as fortuitous, accidental, coincidental or purposive. The theological concern of grace - the realm of Predestination - is now seen as a special part of divine Providence as a whole: that part which is concerned with rational creatures, angels and men, who by their nature are capable of more than their nature. To achieve what is beyond their natural potentialities, such creatures need an auxilium divinum, which Thomas identified as grace. In this total vision of the universe, all the various 'finalities', rational and sub-rational, are seen as part of dynamism, a motto, issuing from the 'missions' of the Trinity; behind all of them and in all of them is an energising drive which unites all of them into an 'assimilation' to God, their source and origin, by the fulfillment of their natures. This drive and dynamism is seen as love.

While he was writing the Summa Contra Gentiles, he was also composing his major commentary on the de Nominibus Divinis of Pseudo-Dionysius; and his theological conception of grace finds its place in a larger context, Dionysian in pattern, of return by assimilation to a source. In the chapter of the Contra Gentiles (III 150) in which he identifies the divinum auxilium with grace, he cites the opening of Ephesians (1.5):

"Who has predestined us to the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the purpose of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, in which he has graced us in his beloved Son."

It is tempting, but probably misleading, to ask whether it was the renewed appreciation of the movement of thought of Ephesians which led to the exploitation of the Dionysian procession of amor or eros, or vice versa. (1)

Here we should not try to isolate and identify any particular philosophy. Rather it is a matter of appreciating a widening of horizons, a change in perspective. Within this vision of a cosmic whole, Thomas could co-ordinate all the achievements of his predecessors and his new insights into one masterly whole.

This Neo-Platonic cosmology is not just a poetic conception. Its detailed operations are analysed by Thomas in terms of Aristotelian physics. Again the basic theme is that of motion, and we shall look at this in detail in chapter 6. At the moment, to give a summary over-view, we can say that Thomas accepted, with various theological modification, the Aristotelian system of a First Mover, celestial spheres and terrestrial process. He also accepted the Platonic idea of universal causes, that is, causes which are the cause of any effect within a given category subordinate to that cause. All lower causes are therefore said to be 'instruments' of higher causes within the same category and this is to be understood in terms of their 'participation' in the causality of the higher causes. What is called 'Fate' then, is "the order of secondary causes: it is their disposition, arrangement, seriation; it is not a quality and much less is it a substance; it is in the category of relation." (2)

1. Ernst, p. xviii. 2. S.C.G. III, q. 77-83, q. 91-95; Ia, q. 110-q. 119. 3. Lonergan, p. 84; S.C.G. III, q. 94; Ia, q. 116; IIIA,q. 62, a. 4, ad4um.
In terms of grace, this general instrumentality shows itself in man’s nature as both self-mover and moved. There are therefore two dimensions to grace in relation to man and angels: the divine dynamism of grace effects intellectual creatures as 'mens mota et non movens, AND ALSO as 'mens mota et movens'. The first is operative grace, the second, co-operative grace. The interplay between the theological virtues and the Gifts of the Spirit exists within this field. As we shall see, in article three, when we talk about the Gifts of the Spirit we are not only talking about the movements or impulses from God, but also about the settled dispositions of receptivity within the faculties of man under grace which allow him to cooperate receptively with these instincts or promptings. We need then to appreciate not only the movement of the Spirit but also the nature of these created dispositions in man.¹

To conclude this section on the development of Thomas’ concept of grace, let us look at a key passage to illustrate his final achievement: IaIIae,q.110,a.2.

¹. In our analysis of article one, we pointed out the central importance of the term 'dispositio', see above p. 36ff.
virtutes quasdam, quae sunt principia actuum, ut secundum seipsas inclinetur ad hujusmodi motus. 
Et sic motus quibus a Deo moventur fiunt creaturis connaturales et faciles, secundum illus Sap., 
Et disponit omnia suaviter. Multo igitur magis illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale aeternum infundit aliquas formas, seu qualitates supernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum aeternum consequendum; et sic donum gratiae qualitas quaedam est.

The title to this question is, 'utrum gratia sit qualitas'. It is a question then which fits into the thirteenth century tradition of speculation about grace as we have discussed it here. What is significant is that Thomas now describes grace first of all as a movement by which God moves the mind and will of men. He then quotes a basic Aristotelian dictum from the third book of the Physics.

The rest of the article deals with habitual grace but this is now clearly sited within an over-all context of movement. The significance of the 'dispositions' for action of nature and of grace - forms or habitus - is that they allow this movement caused by God to be a self-movement on the part of creatures.

'... sed etiam largiatur eis formas et virtutes, quasdam quae sunt principia actuum, ut secundum seipsas inclinetur ad hujusmodi motus. Et sic motus quibus a Deo moventur fiunt creaturis connaturales et faciles ...'

And once more he quotes the text which more than any other sums up his serene confidence in the harmony of creation in its relationship with its benign Creator.

'Et disponit omnia suaviter.'

Grace is not nature, and Thomas never confuses them; yet his confidence in the order of creation is such that he can present them as analogous forms of self-actuation.

'Multo igitur magis illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale aeternum infundit aliquas formas, seu qualitates supernaturales, secundum quas
suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum aeternum consequendum ...

This article highlights the achievements of St Thomas. A harmony is presented between God, his providence in creation, his predestination as regards to men and angels, and their dignity of self-actuation within this predestination. In a later article dependent on this one he will further distinguish between operative and cooperative grace in regard to both the divine 'movement' and the habitual graced form in men.¹

In this chapter we have seen how this synthesis was not presented to Thomas by his tradition but is the achievement of his theology after years of study and teaching; a synthesis of his insights after several decades. Having now seen something of the inner momentum and structure of his later theology of grace, we are in a better position to appreciate the significance of article three of question 68 - utrum dona sint habitus.

¹ IaIIae,q.111,a.2.
4. QUESTION 68, ARTICLES THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SEVEN AND EIGHT. THE GIFTS AS 'HABITUS'
At one level it is not surprising that St Thomas describes the Gifts as *habitus*. Given the scholastic tradition which he inherited, and which we have looked at in chapter three, the notion of *habitus* was an obvious, ready-to-hand, intellectual tool. One might seriously claim therefore — as many commentators have done — that the notion of *habitus* is presupposed in all his earlier writings on the Gifts, and presupposed too by his contemporaries. Nevertheless, if this is so, it still remains a fact that neither St Thomas in those earlier works, nor any other scholastic actually treats the subject explicitly. Here an entire article is dedicated to the matter. It follows from this, so it seems to the present writer, that whether the Gifts were *habitus* or not was of no major or crucial significance to others but that in the context of the *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*, that the Gifts are *habitus* is of central and crucial importance, not only for the understanding of the Gifts themselves, but to safeguard the two basic axioms of Thomas' theology of grace; the freedom of man under grace and the infallible efficiency of God's Predestination. The reason for this is that if it becomes necessary to posit the insufficiency of the infused virtues without further divine prompting and assistance — article two — then it becomes necessary both to suggest such promptings and necessary to remove any suggestion of violence in such 'in-spirationes'.

The Aristotelian concept of *habitus*, (*hexis*), will be used to overcome any notion of violence. But, what is more, as this model of *habitus* is sketched out and developed in the course of articles 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8, the key theme of article 1, that the Gifts give man a

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1. Lonergan, p. 44.
dispositio, a receptivity to the impulses of the Holy Spirit, will be
given further refinement and specification. 1 We can trace this develop-
ment along four themes interlinked with the habitus model.

1. that the receptivity provided by the Gifts is not a transi-
tory, occasional docility but a permanent, abiding dimension
of man's graced being. (article 3)
2. that as the various habitus of man's moral life affect all
his potentialities, so do the Gifts of the Spirit. (arti-
cles 4 and 7).
3. that as these moral virtues form a unity under the virtue of
prudence so are the Gifts and all the infused virtues united
under the theological virtue of charity. (articles 5 and 8)
4. that as ramifications of charity, all the infused virtues
and Gifts make man connaturally responsive and cooperative
to the operation, (motio) of God. (article 8)

article three

We can begin by looking at the objections and Thomas' answer
to them. The second of these is the most significant. Is man
'moved' by the Spirit as a man might move a stick to hit a ball or to
clear a drain? Is man merely used by the Spirit without any form
of cooperation on his part? The third objection presents a situ-
tion, that of prophecy, where this is precisely the case. 2 Are the
Gifts of the Spirit similar then to the Pauline gifts of 1 Corinthians
12.8-10, which Thomas analyses as gratia gratis data, that is, charisms
given for the salvation of others? 5 The answers to all these object-

1. Article six will be discussed in relation to the Beatitudes
and the Fruits of the Spirit, see below p. 297. 2. At least as
Thomas analyses it, see IIaIIae,q.171-q.174. 3. IIaIIae,q.111,a.1,
a.4,a.5. IIaIIae,q.171-178. The clear distinction made between 'sanc-
tifying grace', gratia gratum faciens, and 'freely bestowed graces'
tions repeat the conclusion of article two; the Gifts of the Spirit are to be understood as part of *gratia gratum faciens*, 'sanctifying grace', graces necessary for one's own salvation. The answer to the first objection is a neat interweaving of the authority of Gregory with Thomas' reasoned argument of article two: the Gifts of grace necessary for salvation, (and the Gifts of the Spirit are such), are abiding dispositions and not transitory impulses.

But the answer to the second objection is the crucial one. In the case of the Gifts of the Spirit, man acts from his extrinsic principle of activity and not from his intrinsic principle of reasoning, (article one). If he does not have the initiative in this action, is he then, acting merely as a servile instrument? If man is merely such an instrument under these impulses from the Spirit then he has no need of any *habitus*. Thomas replies:

> "ratio illa procedit de instrumento cujus non est agere, sed solum agi. Tale instrumentum non est homo; sed sic agitur a Spiritu Sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberi arbitrii. Unde indiget habitu" (1)

This is a crucial statement but it needs to be clarified. Although the Gifts do not operate through man's free judgement, as do the infused virtues, and although man has no initiative in regard to the Gifts yet, precisely because he does have free judgement and all that is implied in that, he cannot be seen as a mere tool. Man is not only acted upon but acts from himself.

At this point we need to be absolutely clear about the distinction between the infused virtues, which operate from man's intrinsic principle of activity, and the Gifts which operate from his extrinsic principle.

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(3 con.) *gratiae gratis datae*, is itself an achievement only of Thomas' mature theology of grace: as late as de *Veritate*, q.27 this distinction was not made, see Lonergan, p. 25.

1. a.3,ad2um.
'Cette grâce (des vertus) nous laisse une large part d'initiative, elle dépose en nous des puissances d'activité; mais il nous appartient de déployer cette activité, comme nous voulons, à notre gré et selon nos procédés; la grâce, dans ces vertus bien en train, peut-être plus coopérante qu'opérante. Mais la grâce des dons est fort différente; elle est foncièrement une grâce opérante; on peut dire qu'elle sa réserve toute l'initiative et qu'elle seule règle de mouvement; elle dépose en nous des puissances de passivité et de receptivité; elle fait de nous les sujets de la divine inspiration, elle nous rend aptes à subir la touche du divin, pati divine.'

But what is the nature of this 'passivity'? Is it of an absolute kind? This question has provoked a controversy among the commentators. A. Gardeil has emphasised the passivity of man in relation to the Gifts of the Spirit and M. Labourdette has taken him to task over his interpretation of this ad secundum of article three. Our own interpretation, which coincides with Labourdette's, will be based not on the term liberum arbitrium, the term used here, but on what is to be presupposed by that term, man's rational appetite, the will.

Certainly the Gifts are not 'cooperative' with grace in the way that the virtues cooperate with grace. Reason and will are not 'activating' but receptive in the activity of the Spirit in man through the Gifts. But is Thomas not presenting some more subtle notion of a receptive form of cooperation by affirming the Gifts are habitus? We can clarify and develop the argument here by referring to some texts earlier in the Prima Secundae. In these questions on the voluntary nature of the will's activity, Thomas is probing whether any 'external' intervention in the will is necessarily violent.

If we apply this to the activity of the Gifts, we must posit a voluntary movement of man's own will; man is not just acted upon - that would constitute violence - but allows himself to be acted upon. We must posit then some form of cooperation on man's part, and as this cannot be cooperation by deliberation - that is the role of the virtues - it must be by some form of action as it were by second nature, in other words, by a habitus.

'... non semper est motus violentus quando passivum immittatur a suo activo, sed quando hoc fit contra inclinationem interiorem passivi.' (2)

The will, therefore voluntarily takes up and accepts a drive, an instinct, which did not originate with itself; and it does this because it is given a new kind of disposition within itself which is as if by second nature. We can posit such a kind of habitus because the will is not just active by nature but also passive. And by passive here we do not mean in relation to the intellect - that would take us into the area of deliberation and the realm of the virtues - but a voluntary passivity at its most originary level, (*quod exercitium*).

'... voluntarium potest aliquid dici dupliciter: uno modo secundum actionem, puta cum aliquis vult aliquid agere; alio modo secundum passionem, scilicet cum aliquis vult pati ab alio. Unde cum actio infertur ab aliquo exteriori, manente in eo qui patitur voluntate patiendi, non est simpliciter violentum, quia licet illi qui patitur non conferat agendo, conferat tamen volendo pati; unde non potest dici involuntarium.' (3)

The subject contributes to the deed by his acceptance though not by

1. IaIIae, q.9, a.4, ad2um. 2. IaIIae, q.6, a.4, ad2um. 3. IaIIae, q.6, a.5, ad2um, see also Ia, q.83, a.1, ad3um.
his efforts'. This is the type of 'passivity' we are to envisage in the case of the Gifts of the Spirit. By saying this we are not claiming that the Gifts are part of 'cooperative' grace because these habitus of receptivity are prior to man's reasoning and free judgement. Nevertheless, it is fitting that even in the area of 'operative' grace, other than the case of the moment of justification, man's dignity as a creature capable of being the principle of his own acts, should receive the inspirations of God in a way that is voluntary. The relationship between 'operative' and 'cooperative' grace in regard to the Gifts of the Spirit, is described with great clarity by W. J. Hill:

'This divine motion, (in the gifts) is called gratia operans, wherein man is totally moved by God so that he does not move himself, i.e., the will's action does not proceed in virtue of a prior discursive process of mind, the basis for man's self-determination in the use of the will. This is only in the very inception of the total act; once the divine initiative is received passively but freely, (for the will consents to its own act) the human person becomes the active cause of his own consequent activity and the divine causality prolonging itself into these latter phases is called gratia cooperans.' (2)

The point we are emphasising at the moment is that, 'the divine initiative is received passively but freely,' since, 'the will consents to its own act'.

Thomas is using the common intellectual tool or concept of habitus but he is using it in an unusual area of analysis. To move from the known to the unknown, in the corpus of the article he immediately introduces the model of the moral virtues. It is commonly accepted that these are permanent dispositions within the virtuous man by which his emotions are receptive to the drive of reason and

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1. On this distinction between 'operative' and 'cooperative' grace, see IaIIae,q.111,ja.2. 2. W. J. Hill, in Gilby, vol. 33, (IaIIae,q.17-22), pp. 167-168. 3. For a full analysis of this, see below p. 172.
the rational appetite, (the will). Now the Gifts are presented as being similar receptivities but ones which relate to the extrinsic and not the intrinsic principle of man's self-activation.

Now the concept of habitus or hexis belongs to Aristotelian moral theory. According to this philosophy there is a crucial distinction between analysing a single, isolated moral act, and analysing a moral life; a man can do a good moral deed without possessing the habitus or disposition to do it, but he cannot lead a good moral life without such a disposition. Aristotle takes the example of justice. It is easy to do what the just man does but it is not easy to do it as he does it; that is, at all times and with promptitude and pleasure, as if by second nature. The habitus of justice is a constant and permanent will and ability to render to each man what is his due. It is not a transient emotion or act but a constant disposition so to act. The habitus or virtue of justice is not merely doing 'the just thing' but being just.

Now if the Gifts are to be understood as habitus then their operation is not to be seen as a series of discrete, disconnected responses to the divine initiative but as a permanent dimension of receptivity within the being of man under grace. Our analysis of article two has shown that, according to Thomas, man can never have a completely divinised being in the sense of 'possessing' such a divinised nature. The Gifts do not complete man's divinised nature but, precisely as relating to its inevitable incompleteness, point to the constant dependence of man on God's assistance. In this way, by introducing the notion of habitus, article three has given a further refinement to the conclusions of articles one and two.

Articles four and seven: the range and diversity of the Gifts.

The analogy between the receptivity of the moral virtues to reason and the receptivity of the Gifts to the initiative of the Spirit is now taken as a basic model of explanation for the rest of this question. In article four it is used to show the extent and range of the Gifts of the Spirit. As the command of reason governs the appetitive faculties of man, through the receptivity of the moral virtues, so the promptings of the Spirit govern both the appetitive and the rational faculties of man through the receptivity of the Gifts of the Spirit. The range of these receptivities is therefore larger than that of the moral virtues because all the faculties of man are open to the promptings of God.

'Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quidam habitus perficientes hominem ad hoc quod prompte sequatur instinctum Spiritus Sancti, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt vires appetitivas ad obedientium rationem. Sicut autem vires appetitivae natae sunt moveri per imperium rationis, ita omnes vires humanae natae sunt moveri per instinctum Dei, sicut a quadam superiori potentia. Et ideo in omnibus viribus hominis quae possunt esse principia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt virtutes, ita etiam sunt dona: scilicet in ratione et in vi appetitiva. (1)

The same powers of reasoning and appetite which are perfected by the intellectual and moral virtues are brought to an even greater perfection by these other dispositions, (habitus), which are the Gifts.

To put this in other words, the potentialities of man's nature are totally perfected only the virtues and the Gifts together. This will be Thomas' explicit teaching throughout the Secunda Secundae. 2

Here, in the Prima Secundae, he arranges each of the seven forms of receptivity of the Gifts alongside one of the seven types of activity of

1. article four. 2. See Ila IIae, Prologue. We shall discuss the changes between the arrangement of the Gifts in the Prima Secundae and Secunda Secundae, below on p. 223.
the potentialities of man's nature. The arrangement of the Gifts can be set out in tabular form¹

### REASON

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<td>judgement ... ... ...</td>
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<tr>
<td>the Gift of UNDERSTANDING</td>
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<td>the Gift of WISDOM</td>
<td>the Gift of KNOWLEDGE</td>
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### APPETITE

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<th>re. others:</th>
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<td>... ... ...</td>
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<td>against concupiscence</td>
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<tr>
<td>the Gift of PIETY</td>
<td>the Gift of FORTITUDE</td>
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<tr>
<td>the Gift of FEAR</td>
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This scheme may strike us as forced and over-systematised, but the point Thomas is making is an important one: the Gifts, while not within control of man's powers, are rooted in his nature, in the very powers of his autonomy. The divine initiative to which the Gifts make man receptive is not received by him as a supernatural formlessness, but as a mysterious impulse from within his own sensibilities, purposes, understanding and interrelationships. The diversity among the seven Gifts comes from the fact that the divine initiative elicits acts from the particular powers of man; these acts are therefore both divine in origin and yet characterised by the human activity of these divine powers.² The basic axiom established by article four and used in article seven is:

'dona ad omnes potentiarum animae perficiunt hominem, ad quos perficiunt virtutes' (3)

We can see this as an example of Thomas' dictum: on grace, that grace does not destroy but perfects nature.⁴ Here even the irascible and concupiscible appetites of man are endowed with an abiding receptivity to the divine initiative. There is no part of man's autonomy,

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1. article four and seven. 2. Labourdette, p. 205. 3. a.7. 4. Ia,q.1,a.8,ad2um.
perfected by the virtues, which does not also exhibit the dimension of free consent to the movements of the Spirit. Only in this way, through this dimension of man's dependence on the movement of the Spirit, is man's divinised nature complete. How we are to understand this interrelationship of the virtues and the Gifts in detail and in practise can be left until we analyse Thomas' discussion in the Secunda Secundae. In question 68, Thomas asks more general questions: how are the Gifts related to each other, and how are the Gifts related to the virtues in general? These questions are posed in article five and article eight.

Articles five and eight.

In these articles Thomas advances the discussion in two stages. The first is that the Gifts are not to be understood as discrete receptivities such that a man might have one and not another, but rather, like the moral virtues united by prudence, are to be seen as forming an interlinked whole covering all man's human activities. The second is that they, and indeed all the infused virtues, intellectual and moral, are united as ramifications of the theological virtues.

Within Aristotle's moral theory, where the moral life rather than individual moral acts are the focal point of discussion, it is argued that the moral life is not only an interconnection of all acts within a moral life but also an interconnection of all the virtues within such a life. A man cannot be just unless he also has the dispositions of temperance and fortitude, which are subordinate to justice, and unless he also has the disposition of prudence which

1. see below section 3. 2. On the distinction between what a man does and his moral, human activity, see IaIIae,q.1,a.1.
governs justice. Man's rational control over himself - over his lower appetites is neither infallible nor dictatorial. He needs, within his appetites these various dispositions of receptivity in regard to the ordering of his rational will. With these receptivities he can respond in his wholeness to what he sets himself as his purposive activity. The virtuous man then, acts in his wholeness, with the whole drive of his appetites, and not as a man divided against himself. As a result he achieves his aims, his purposive activity, with sureness, constancy and promptitude. The crucial virtue here is that of prudence which unites man's moral and intellectual virtues. This is what Thomas presupposes in his concise argument in article four. As the virtue of prudence perfects man's practical reasoning and also unites all his appetites within his purposive activity, so charity both perfects man's openness and receptivity to the Spirit and also unites all the receptiveness and capabilities of man's nature under grace.

'Dictum est enim supra quod sicut vires appetitivae disponuntur per virtutes Morales in comparatione ad regimen rationis, ita omnes vires animae disponuntur per dona in compartione ad Spiritum Sanctum moventem. Spiritus autem Sanctus habitat in nobis per caritatem, I1 Hid Rom., Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis: sicut et ratio nostra perficitur per prudentiam. Unde sicut virtutes Morales connectuntur sibi invicem in prudentia, ita dona Spiritus Sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in caritate; ita scilicet quod qui caritatem habet, omnia dona Spiritus Sancti habet; quorum nullum sine caritate haberi potest'. (2)

The argument here is designed merely to show that the Gifts are united under the theological virtue of charity but given a wider reading of Thomas' thought in the Summa - on the nature of the infused virtues, on charity and on grace - it is clear that here we have only

1. We shall discuss the virtue of prudence in more detail later, see below, p. 271ff. 2. Article 5. 3. IaIIae, q. 62, a. 4; IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 8; IaIIae, q. 110, a. 3, a. 4.
a particular aspect of a larger view, that charity is 'the mother and root of all the virtues'. All the infused virtues and receptivities, the Gifts, the intellectual and moral virtues and 'informed' faith and hope, are all ramifications of charity.

But charity for Thomas is not synonymous with grace. Charity is a virtue, an infused disposition within man's will; it presupposes then man's new divinised nature in the essence of his soul. Yet it is by his potentialities of intellect and will that man expresses his nature, and so it is by the activity of the theological virtues in man's faculties of intellect and will that he expresses and establishes his union with God, not only in terms of this 'created grace in his essence but also in terms of the 'uncreated' movement of the Spirit within him.

Now up to article eight, Thomas has used this model of the relationship between reason and the moral virtues in terms of the receptivity of the latter. Now he, reverses, as it were, this line of argument while keeping to the same model, and looks at how reason itself is perfected by the intellectual virtues of wisdom, knowledge, (scientia), understanding and prudence. Obviously the analogue here, in terms of the Gifts of the Spirit, cannot be some perfection of the Holy Spirit. What must be presupposed is what is stated in the ad3um of article four.

'... animus hominis non movetur a Spiritu Sancto, nisi ei secundum aliquem modum uniatur: sicut instrumentum non movetur ab artifice nisi per contactum, aut per aliquam aliam unionem. Primo autem unio hominis est per fidem, spem et caritatem. Unde istae virtutes praesupponuntur ad dona, sicut radices quaedam donorum. Unde omnia dona pertinent ad has tres virtutes, sicut quaedam derivationes praedictarum virtutum.' (4)

1. IaIIae,q.62,a.4. 2. IIaIIae,q.23,a. . 3. see above, p. 49ff 4. a.4,ad3um.
The movements of the Spirit to which the Gifts are receptive are themselves then part of an already existing relationship between God and man under grace. What is it that structures this relationship, this union? Faith, hope and charity; the theological virtues. The analogue to the intellectual virtues in article eight is then the theological virtues.

\[ \text{Virtutes quidem theologicas sunt quibus mens humana Deo conjungitur; virtutes autem intellectuales sunt quibus ratio ipsa perficitur; virtutes autem morales sunt quibus vires appetitivae perficiuntur ab obediendum rationi. Dona autem Spiritus Sancti sunt quibus omnes vires animae disponuntur ad hoc quod subdantur motioni divinae.} \]

Sic ergo eadem videtur esse comparatio donorum ad virtutes theologicas, per quas homo unitur Spiritui Sancto moventi, sicut virtutum moralium ad virtutes intellectuales, per quas perficitur ratio, quae est virtutum moralium motiva'. (1)

The Gifts are ramifications of the life of the infused virtues, setting up a dimension of receptivity to the movements of 'uncreated' grace within the relationship and union established by these virtues. The Gifts work with them and with all the other virtues, covering the whole range of man's potentialities, as receptivities within the realm of man's extrinsic principle of self-actuation, the Spirit of God. Here we can see how Thomas holds in a synthesis his ideas of grace as a habitus and grace as a motio, an auxilium divinum.

We can set out the conclusion of article eight in tabular form.

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<tr>
<td>reason</td>
<td>God/The Spirit</td>
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<td>perfected by the intellectual virtues</td>
<td>in union with man through the theological virtues</td>
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<td>the appetitive powers perfected</td>
<td>the perfection of all man's capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by the receptivity of the moral virtues</td>
<td>by the receptivity of the Gifts in all these faculties</td>
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1. a.8.
Thomas uses the model of the moral virtues to explain the permanent nature of the Gifts as habitus (a.3), their range and scope (a.4, a.7), and their link with one another (a.5), and their place within the whole life of grace (a.8). No one before Thomas had ever considered using such a parallel and Thomas introduces it here for the first time in his own writings. Yet, on consideration it is not surprising that this model was never used before because it depends on the breakthrough Thomas made in article one. There he analysed the Gifts along the fundamental duality of the intrinsic and extrinsic principles of man's self-actuation: a duality which structures the whole of the Prima Secundae. This is his greatest achievement and the model we have looked at in this chapter is dependent upon it. What this analogy with the moral virtues adds to its parent model is a clarification of how we are to understand the Gifts in action, as they were outlined in article one. The impulses of the Spirit are not to be seen as merely transitory motions unconnected with the rest of man's moral or 'theological' life. They occur within a way of life rooted in the friendship-knowledge and love between man and God which is structured by the theological virtues. They evoke a cooperative receptivity within all of man's autonomous drives; a receptivity which is a permanent disposition within his freedom under grace.

But, as with all analogies, there are some difficulties with this particular one. Thomas uses it as a framework of exposition, as an aid to understand the Gifts, but it is not itself a demonstration of how the Gifts actually do exist. But if this analogy were merely a pedagogic device in article three, then Thomas would not be

1. O'Connor, p. 16; footnote 'a', p. 123. 2. See above p. 5. 3. O'Connor raises this difficulty, O'Connor, p. 123.
able to use it to establish his arguments in the subsequent articles. It seems then that we must take it that this analogy is designed to show how the Gifts actually do operate, even though Thomas never actually proves this. Or perhaps, rather than seeing the matter in terms of 'proof', we might see his presentation of this analogy as a theory which alone provides space and makes sense of the totality of his insights regarding all aspects of man's divinised and moral life.

There is one final question however which Thomas does not deal with directly. If man consents to the action of the Spirit within the receptivity of the Gifts, can we posit the theoretical possibility of his refusal to consent? Or, to put a similar question, can man choose when and where to be receptive? The answer to both questions is in the negative and it follows quite clearly from an understanding of the real nature of the Gifts and their difference from the virtues. A man cannot choose to use the Gifts or not because 'choice' refers to the area of deliberation and the interplay of the reason and will in the realm of the virtues. The operation of God through the receptivity of the Gifts is prior to such a response. That a man does receptively consent to the movement of the Spirit is itself a result of the life of charity and this in turn presupposes the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit in him. If a man does not have charity he does not have the Gifts. If he does have charity then he both has the Gifts and freely consents to the impulses of the Spirit within him. What can be suggested however, is that just as a man can grow in the life of charity, so along with this growth and in proportion to it, a man's sensitivity to the Spirit would be heightened. This would seem to make sense even though Tho-

1. q.68,a.4,ad3um; a.5; a.8,ad1um, ad3um.
mas never raises these particular issues himself. The basic principle would seem to be that to have the Gifts is part of what it means for someone to have the theological virtues. In as much as one fails to lead a life of 'faith working through love', which is the life which the theological virtues establish, so one 'binds the Holy Spirit.'

1. q.68,a.4,ad3um. 2. IaIIae,q.108,a.1.

- The Commentary on the Sentences
- The Relationship between the Treatise on the Gifts in the Commentary and in the Summa
- The Significance of the Change Between the Commentary and the Summa
The Commentary on the Sentences.

As we have already noted in chapter one, the scholastics before Thomas — and indeed, after him — had no consensus on the interpretation of the Gifts and on how to relate them to the infused and acquired virtues.¹ In his early work of the Commentary on the Sentences, Thomas had already produced an original analysis.

'... dico quod dona a virtutibus distinguuntur in hoc quod virtutes perficiunt ad actus modo humano, sed dona ultra humanum modum.' (2)

This distinction, set out in terms of 'modo humano' and 'ultra (supra) modum humanum', is the key to his analysis. We can see it as a further ramification of the notion of the 'super-natural' which Philip the Chancellor introduced into the discipline of sacra doctrina: man has a 'natural' and in keeping with his human nature, and a 'super-natural' way of life, by grace.³ Thomas' original approach is that he stresses that the infused virtues and the theological virtue of faith operate within the 'human mode' and that there is therefore an inherent weakness in their activity.⁴

'... quia modus operandi qui est in virtutibus, est secundum conditionem humanam, quaevis substantia habitus sit ex divino munere ...' (5)

Here we have a foretaste of what he puts more clearly in the Prima Secundae where he shows the absolute necessity of the Gifts because of the insufficiency of the infused virtues.⁶ In regard to the virtue of faith and the gift of understanding, he writes:-

'Connaturalis enim modus humanae naturae est ut divina non nisi per speculum creaturarum et aenigmati similitudinem percipiat; et ad sic percipienda divina perficit fides, quae virtus dicitur. Sed intellectus donum, ut Gregorius

¹. See above p. 8ff.  ². III Sent., 34.1.1.  ³. See above p. 65.  ⁴. Others traced this imperfection to the effects of sin, not to an intrinsic imperfection. Only Albert, before Thomas, drew attention to this as a possible line of approach. See O'Connor, p. 107.  ⁵. III Sent., 34.1.1.ad2.  ⁶. See above p. 47ff.
The four intellectual Gifts perfect man's reasoning by offsetting the inherent limitations of his human mode of understanding by giving him a mode of operation and insight which is 'quodammodo divina'.

The three other Gifts provide divine standards which supplant those of merely human reasoning. Together these provide a new standard or measure for man's purposive activity; a standard and measure which is divine and not human.

'Dicendum quod modus unicuique rei ex proria mensura praefigitur. Unde modus actionis sumitur ex eo quod est mensura et regula actionis. Et ideo cum dona sint ad operandum supra humanum modum, oportet quod donorum operationes mensurentur ex altera regula quam sit regula humanae virtutis, quae est ipsa Divinitas ab homine participata suo modo, ut jam non humanitus, sed quasi Deus factus participatione, operetur.' (3)

Through the Gifts, man is given a divine standard for his behaviour and a divine mode for his understanding. As in the Summa, the root of these Gifts is seen to be charity which unites man to God in such a way that he participates in the divine life itself. The Gifts are part of the overflow of this participation in divinity. If man is to achieve his super-natural end, it is necessary for him to have a standard for his life which is higher than the one that reason - even perfected by grace - can provide: it is necessary for him to have God as his 'rule' and 'measure'.

1. III Sent. 34.1.1. 2. ibid. 3. III Sent. 34.1.3. 4. ibid., see also III Sent. 36.3. 5. III Sent. 36.3. ad4.
The relationship between the treatise on the Gifts in the Commentary and in the Summa.

Now there are obvious points of continuity between the analysis of the Gifts in the Commentary and in the Prima Secundae. The question is whether the differences are significant or not. The great commentators of the first part of this century were vehemently opposed to any suggestion of a major change in Thomas' thought.¹ Lottin writes:

''Les formules de la Somme n'expriment donc rien d'essentiellement autres que les formules du Commentaire.'" (2)

In this, as R. Garrigou-Lagrange makes quite explicit, they were doing no other than following their predecessors from the fourteenth century onwards.³ John of St Thomas, the acknowledged authority on Thomas' treatise on the Gifts, quotes freely from both texts as if they were written at the same time and in the same work. The common methodology of the tradition of commentators was to take the notion of a 'super-human' mode from the Commentary and use this as the basic tool for understanding the treatise in the Summa.⁴

The first challenge to this widespread assumption came in an article written by J. de Guibert in 1922. He held that the crucial phrase, 'modus supra (ultra) humanum', was no longer used in the

Summa, and that this corresponded to a major change in Thomas' understanding of the Gifts. He claimed therefore that the definitive treatment of the Gifts in the Summa was quite different from that of the Commentary, 1

R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O. Lottin, M. Labourdette and others have strenuously denied these claims, using two sets of counter arguments. Garrigou-Lagrange denied that the term 'modus supra humanum' is totally absent from the Summa and pointed out that similar phrases do occur in the text:-

'dona exceedunt communem perfectionem virtutum ... quantum ad modum operandi', (2)

and, regarding the use of wealth and honour:—

'A quibus quidem retrahitur homo per virtutem sic ut moderate eis utatur: per donum autem excellentior modo ut scilicet homo totaliter ea contemnat.' (3)

Lottin, on the other hand, was prepared to accept that the phraseology had changed but held that the thought remained substantially the same.

'la formule ultra modum humanum du Commentary des Sentences a disparu: mais il serait aisé de prouver que la théorie de la Somme théologique reste donc dans la ligne de pensée du premier écrit de S. Thomas.' (4)

More recent commentators like M. Labourdette also accept this underlying continuity. 5 Labourdette points out that in the last line of the corpus of q.68,a.1, Thomas does not deny the argument of 'certain ones' who present an analysis of the Gifts similar to his own earlier one.

'... et hoc est quod quidam dicunt quod dona perfi—
ciunt hominem ad altiores actus ... quam sint
actus virtutem.' (1)

Labourdette accepts however that there is a development of thought
from the Commentary to the Summa. The general consensus at present,
then, would seem to be that Garrigou-Lagrange's identification of the
thought of the Sentences with that of the Summa is now untenable, but
that the continuity is greater than the discontinuity.

'Dès Sentences à la Somme, il y'a un très réal appro-
fonnissemcnt de la pensée et J. de Guibert a été bien
inspiré de souligner l'évolution du vocabulaire;
mais c'est un approfondissement dans la même ligne,
le passage d'un conséquence à son principe 'Modus
a mensurae causatur'. La mesure d'un acte vient de
la notion qui le règle.' (2)

The point being made here is that the two texts are consistent with
each other: the earlier one focuses on the activity of the Gifts,
the second, on the two principles presupposed by grace working through
reason and through the Gifts. O'Connor agrees with this and presents
an excellent summary.

'Th us it is evident that the two expositions are
fundamentally compatible. The commentary con-
trasts the human mode of action with one that is
superhuman and divine; the Summa contrasts a
human principle of movement with one that is di-
vine. The latter gives the ultimate grounds for
the former. The earlier approach was that of a
moralist and psychologist, observing the contrast
between two ways of acting; the latter is that
of a theologian and metaphysician, designating the
ultimate source of these two ways. (3)

We are therefore to see the two expositions as two different theo-
logical approaches to the same topic. We should also bear in mind
that the two texts belong to two different genres of theological litera-
ture. The first is a commentary patterned alongside its parent text,
the second is a free creative exposition aiming to be a textbook of

1. Labourdette, Cours., p. 199f. 2. Labourdette, D.S.,
col. 1617. 3. O'Connor, p. 119.
the whole of theology in its order and interconnections as Thomas sees them. Thomas never wrote a monograph on the Gifts of the Spirit. This is a simple fact which it is only too easy to lose sight of: his treatises on the Gifts are always part of a larger whole. We cannot, then, take a comparison of the two texts to be a simple matter.

However, if we rule out that the two expositions are neither identical in substance, (Garrigou-Lagrange), nor incompatible, (Guibert), we must decide whether the development between them is merely a development along a trajectory, (Lottin), or a major and significant change. It is time for us to present our own interpretation.

The significance of the change between the Commentary and the Summa.

The term 'supra humanum modum' was not merely a common phrase in the Commentary on the Sentences, it was the structuring principle of the argument. That it does not occur explicitly, and does not occur implicitly in the major arguments of the Summa, is significant. It has been replaced by another structuring principle, that of the two sources of movement in man. It is now redundant. Where it is echoed implicitly, it merely serves as exposition for some minor point.

Against all this, however, one might refer to the point raised by Labourdette. He cites the last line of the corpus of article one, of question 68, to prove continuity between the two expositions. He shows that this last line is identical with a phrase Thomas uses in the Commentary. The only difference is that there Thomas adds, 'Et haec opinio inter omnes vera videtur'. Labourdette claims that the fact that this line is missing in the Summa shows that Thomas now wishes to qualify his acceptance of it. 1 My own interpretation is-

1. Labourdette, Cours, p. 199.
that Thomas neither affirms nor denies the validity of this particular exposition. He merely notes it as a possible interpretation which, in some respects, is not too far from his own. He does not think it is wrong, like the three earlier views which open up the corpus, but it is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. He now has a better way of explaining the matter. He keeps it, but it is now 'fossilised' within a newer theory which can accommodate all it provided and be more fruitful.

Thomas' use of his new model, that of the two sources of movement in man, is not confined solely to his treatment of the Gifts of the Spirit. On the contrary, the whole second half of the Prima Secundae is sited within the working out of this model. In the Commentary, Thomas had little freedom to manoeuvre; here, after a decade in which his theology matured, and in a situation where he had freedom to be creative in structuring the over-all exposition of his theology, he places the Gifts within the discussion of man's autonomy. The Gifts are now explicitly defined as habitus, just as the other elements within man's intrinsic principle of movement, which are dealt with in this section, are defined as either habitus or potentiae. This alone must make us read q.68 in a different light from the exposition of the Commentary on the Sentences. The earlier work has been described as that of a 'moralist or psychologist', and the later as that of a 'theologian or metaphysician'. This could be partly accounted for by the genre of the two works, but this would not be sufficient. We have seen that Thomas' theology of grace developed during the period between these two works. Can his treatment of the Gifts not be seen in this context

1. See above p. 5. 2. IaIIae, q.49.
and seen therefore as a similar deepening of awareness? Above all, his later theology of grace centres on the theme of motion. The Creator moves his creation by his providential and predestined purpose; he gives connatural 'forms' of motion to his rational creatures; he acts within them, in their interiority and freedom, to prompt them, guide them and sustain them. It is within this context that Thomas presents his treatise on the Gifts. He does not only give a more metaphysical analysis: he gives a metaphysical analysis based on motion.

We have briefly analysed the development of Thomas' thought on man's divinisation in chapter 2 above. Whereas in his earlier work Thomas sees this as completed in the infusion of the virtues and the Gifts, in his later works he accepts the inability of man to be fully conformed to the divine nature from his own graced resources.\(^1\) In the Commentary the Gifts complete man's divinised nature; in the Summa, accepting the inevitable incompleteness of divinisation in terms of 'created' grace, the Gifts are presented as an inherent openness to the Spirit, by whom alone is man fully conformed to God. In the Summa man is divinised not by receiving 'super-virtues' which act in place of reason, but by receiving dispositions of receptivity to the inspirations, instincts or impulses of the Spirit in all his faculties, by which he becomes still more radically dependent on the movements of the Spirit acting within him.

Let us recapitulate the flow of the argument in article one. There Thomas moved the discussion through a series of terms. First, 'dona' was replaced by 'in-spirationes', and then 'inspirationes' was replaced by 'instinctus'. It is this last term which Thomas

\(^{1}\) IaIIae,q.109,a.9, see Lonergan, pp. 42-44.
uses constantly from this point onwards in relation to the Gifts but it is the term 'inspirationes' which allows him to introduce the fundamental arrangement of the study along the lines of the two principles of self-activation in man. Or rather, perhaps we should reverse this statement and say, in the light of the entire context of the Prima Secundae, that the Gifts are introduced into this structuring arrangement. In either way, the term 'inspirationes' is the conceptual key:—

'Inspiratio autem significat quandam motionem ab exteriori'. (1)

The rest of the articles of q.68 fill out this basic framework and while they do introduce important new themes — that the Gifts are habitus, their relationship with the infused virtues and the analogy with the moral virtues — these are secondary and subordinated to what is established in article one.

Article one, then, replaces the structuring principle of 'ultra modum humanum', with that of the two principles of movement in man. We may see this as a move from a moral level to a metaphysical level, but it is not sufficient just to note such a transposition. We need to pull out the significance of this change. Why is the whole Prima Secundae based on a metaphysics of movement and not on a moral or psychological analysis? Above all, our questioning has to focus on the significance of the model of movement in Thomas' mature thought.

Now we have examined this already in chapter 3 above, and we will look at these questions in detail in Part Two. Our present task is merely to see the change between the Commentary and the Summa within this wider context and so grasp its significance. H. Bouill-

1. IaIIae,q.68,a.1.
lard in his book, Conversion et Grace, was the first to show how Thomas' thought changed in his mid career. Despite his insights however, Bouillard overstated his case and many commentators were concerned that he seemed to fail to distinguish the general movement of providence in all things with the divine instincts and impulses of grace. Schillebeeckx, more recently, has attacked Seckler for confusing 'instinctus divinus' at the origin of man's willing in any respect, with the 'instinctus fidei' of grace. We might add ourselves, that so to confuse the various differentiations of the divine motion in creation and predestination is to neglect the hard-earned distinction of the 'super-natural' which Philip the Chancellor introduced into scholastic theology. Nevertheless, Bouillard replied to his critics in a masterly fashion, part of which we shall quote.

'(La motion divin) ... n'est ni le concours naturel, ni la grâce actuelle, au sens de théologiens modernes, mais leur commun dénominateur, leur genre commun non encore différencié ... la motion universelle est analogique ... Il n'y a a qu'une. Mais, comme elle est'analogue' en meme temps qu'universelle, elle sa diversifie sans perdre son unite. Elle est grâce quand elle ordonne a la grace sanctifiante.' (4)

Without going into too much detail here, we might say that Bouillard is pointing out the importance of the cosmic sweep of the divine movement initiating movement within creatures. This happens in different ways in different kinds of creatures and in a different way in man under grace within the supernatural order from how it occurs

within man's dynamism within the natural order. These differentiations must be accepted while also accepting Thomas' vision of the unity of this over-all dynamism. In this respect the *Summa Contra Gentiles* is Thomas' masterpiece.¹

Now, as regards the Gifts, it is clear that the exposition of the Commentary makes no use of the notion of divine inspirations while the whole weight of the exposition of the *Summa* is based on how the Gifts make man docile to these 'inspirationes' within the order of grace rooted in the virtue of charity. While being careful not to confuse nature and supernature, as Seckler has done so, it is fruitful to locate the particular question of the divine *instinctus* in the realm of the Gifts within the larger context of God's initiatIory impulses within man's natural dynamism outside the area of grace. Here too we can locate changes in Thomas' mature thought and these changes are not without significance for the changes in his presentation of the Gifts.

It is significant that the Commentary relates all the Gifts to man's rationality. The four intellectual Gifts perfect man's understanding in a more-than-rational way. The three other Gifts do not inhere in man's appetites, as one might expect, but present the will and the other appetites with a standard other than that of reason: they act in place of reason. At this stage, the will is seen as passive in relation to the intellect.² It is the inadequacy of reason therefore which the gifts overcome in the Commentary. Hence no gifts are assigned to the two theological virtues located in the will, that is Hope and Charity.

¹. On the idea that it was precisely the task of composing this overview of the unity of God's dealings with all his creatures which led Thomas to envisage the unity of the divine motion(s), see above, p. 76. ². Lonergan, p. 94; Ia,q.80,a.2.
Now by the time Thomas is writing the Prima Secundae, he has developed a much more subtle and complicated notion of the will. No longer is it seen merely as passive before the intellect, (quod specificationem), but, at a deeper metaphysical level, one has to posit an active power within the will itself, (quod exercitium). Furthermore, for several years, before the writing of the Secunda Pars, Thomas had been studying, as it were, the archeology of the human will and had found it necessary to posit further, behind the activating power of the will, (quod exercitium), a receptivity to the divine instinctus. The human will, at its most originary level, was 'open-ended', open to divine initiatory impulses. This analysis is of man in nature and not under grace but, as grace builds on nature and brings it to natural and supernatural perfection, this analysis has implications for the working of grace in man.

The picture of man which Thomas presents in the Secunda Pars is, then, a much richer, more complex and more mysterious one than that of his earlier works. At the very originary level of man's self-actuation and purposive activity, man is mysteriously open to the divine movement. More subtle too is the analysis of the stages of man's act of choice, the focal point of his freedom. It is a description of man's movement towards beatitude by means of his free acts of intention and choice which open up the Prima Secundae and structure its entire development.

Now the explicit statement that the Gifts are habitus in article three of q.68 is of major importance here. The activity which the Gifts account for is not just the result of divine prompting, it
is also to be understood as a human response to that prompting. The activity resulting from the Gifts is not just divine, it is also human. This is why O'Connor is right, but not completely right when he pinpoints the essential difference between the Summa and the Commentary.

'The commentary contrasts the human mode of action with one that is superhuman and in fact divine; the Summa contrasts a human principle of movement with one that is divine.' (1)

The Summa does not contrast a human principle against a divine one, it contrasts a human principle with a divine one working through man's human potentialities. This q.68 on the Gifts also forms part of the analysis of the intrinsic principles of human activity.

'Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus.' (2)

The Gifts are habitus. They are intrinsic principles of human activity which yet relate specifically, in their docility, to the extrinsic principle of human activity. They are then not just divine but also human.

This seems to be a point which none of the commentators have focused upon and yet it is a point which links the treatise on the Gifts not only into the anthropology of Thomas' maturity, but also into his later theology of grace. It places the treatise on the Gifts, in fact, within the flow of thought of the Prima Secundae.

We can quote a passage from one of the central articles on grace - q.110.a.2 - and show the similarity of thought there and here in the Gifts.

'Creaturis autem naturalibus sic providet, ut non solum moveat eas ad actus naturales, sed etiam

1. O'Connor, p. 119. 2. c.f. the introduction to q.45 which forms the major articulation of the latter half of the Prima Secundae; see above p. 5. 3. O'Connor raises the issue but does not develop it. O'Connor, pp. 122-123.
Here we have an explicit parallel between man under nature and man under grace. In both cases there is the idea of a motion which is both divine and human; a motion which is both from man's own self-actuation - secundum seipsas inclinentur - and from God - a Deo moventur. The theme of motion is counterbalanced by the use of the Aristotelian category of 'quality' (formas seu cualitates), the genus of which habitus is a species. In this way, the two movements, divine and human, are understood as a single motion; one which is described with the same words used of the Gifts - connaturales et faciles, suaviter, prompte. As regards the single yet diversified movement of grace, the 'end' is the eternal supernatural good - ad bonum aeternum supernaturale - which man cannot achieve by his own potentialities, but which, under grace, he can achieve through his own potentialities. It is this last point we are trying to make here. It means that, given this wider context, the treatises on the Gifts in the Commentary and in the Summa, are quite different.

The second major change between the Commentary and the Summa follows on from this. If the phrase, 'ultra modum humanum', is the structuring key of the earlier exposition, a common refrain, and development of this is the other phrase:

1. IaIIae,q.55,a.4.
What 'inspiratio' or rather 'instinctus' is to the Summa, the phrases, 'regula' and 'mensura' are to the Commentary. The Gifts in the Commentary act as substitutes for human reason; they provide different standards, (regula) for man's purposive activity. Now just as in the Summa the human principle of motion is not contrasted solely with a divine principle but with a divine and human principle, so, in this respect also, the Gifts are not contrasted with reason. The Gifts do provide an appreciation, a value, an instinct, which reason alone cannot provide - this is not denied - but the analysis of the Summa is more subtle and more difficult to grasp hold of. The Gifts do not act in place of reason but prior to reasoning and therefore can act also within human reasoning. It will take us some time to make this clear.

Firstly, it is quite obvious that the notion of 'measure' or 'standard' is significantly absent from question 68. As O'Connor remarks, this is all the more outstanding in that Thomas uses these terms frequently elsewhere in the Secunda Pars, especially in the relationship between reason and the Lex Aeterna, and, in a topic even closer to our own, in his study of the acquired and infused virtues. Thomas does not merely fail to use such terminology in question 68, it seems to the present writer that he systematically refuses to use it. We can ground our argument by examining q.68, a.1, adIIum. Here the flow of the argument leads almost inevitably to a parallel between the 'measure' of reason and the 'measure' of

1. *III Sent.*, 34.1.3; 34.2.2.1 and elsewhere. 2. O'Connor, p. 121.
the Spirit. But Thomas does not complete this obvious symmetry.

'Unde si volumus. definitionem (donum est bona qualitatis mentis qua recte vivitur) restringere ad virtutes prout distinguuntur a donis, dicemus quod hoc quod dicitur, qua recte vivitur, intelligendum est de rectitudine vitae quae accipitur secundum regulam rationis. Similiter autem donum, prout distinguuntur a virtute infusa, potest dici id quod datur a Deo in ordine ad motionem ipsius; quod scilicet facit hominem bene sequentem suos instinctus.' (1)

Instead of positing a divine standard akin to the standard of reason, Thomas uses the notion of responding to the divine 'instinctus'.

He deliberately uses this undefined term and does not specify in what form man's response to this might be. It seems to the present writer that there is a great reluctance to specify too exactly how the Gifts might operate in terms of morality or psychology. Yet most of the commentators take it that Thomas has completed the symmetry of this passage. 2 We can take John of St Thomas, as the classic authority, on this very text.

'Nam D. Thomas in hac quaestione LXVIII, articulo primo ad tertium, distinguens dona a virtutibus penes definitionem, dicit quod in definitione virtutis prout distinguitur a dono, quando dicitur quod est qualitas qua recte vivitur, inquit, quod debet intelligi, qua recte vivitur secundum mensuram rationis; si ergo in hoc distinguitur definitio virtutis a definitione doni, oportet quod in definitione doni intelligatur, qua recte vivitur secundum mensuram divinam, quae est altior mensura rationis'. (3)

John of St Thomas is obviously reading the principle of the Commentary - modus a mensura causatur - into the text of the Summa.

Now we must be careful not to allow our case to be overstated.

What John of St Thomas is concerned about is the 'formal object of the Gifts.' For him God is not just the efficient cause of the movement is man through the Gifts, he is also the 'regulating and

1. IaIIae,q.68,a.1,ad3um. 2. I exclude O'Connor from this list, and am indebted to him for the following example, O'Connor, p. 123. 3. Joannis a S. Thoma Cursus Theologicus in Summam Theologica D. Thomae, IaIIae,q.LXX,disp.XVIII,art.2, Paris, 1885, t.VI, p. 596f.
measuring principle.¹

'Eodem modo dona sunt dispositiones quaedam, seu habitus dis-
ponentes intellectum, et voluntatem ad sequendum instinctum
et motionem Spiritus Sancti non solum ut moventem, sed ut
regulantem, et mensurantem objectum, ita ut constituat for-
male objectivum talium donorum, et specificativum, nempe bo-
num, sue verum ut regulatum, et mensuratum non ratione, sed
illustratione, et mensuratione divina ...'. (2)

Now we can agree with this conclusion. Our disagreement is based
on the use of a phrase like, 'regulating and measuring principle'
in order to establish it in relation to the text of the Summa. Our
mutually acceptable conclusion - that man is given an appreciation and
insight greater than that naturally available to him - is reached on our
part by the use of the term instinctus. And this corresponds to Thomas' own usage. We can take part of article four as a further example.

'Dona sunt quidam habitus perficientes hominem ad hoc quod
prompte sequatur instinctum Spiritus Sancti, sicut virtu-
tes morales perficiunt vires appetitivas ad obediendum
rationi. Sicut autem vires appetitivae natae sunt moveri
per imperium rationis, ita omnes vires humanae natae sunt
moveri per instinctum Dei ...'. (3)

Here again, Thomas does not complete the parallel between reason and
the Spirit by applying the same terms to both. Instead he uses the
vaguer notion of 'a ready following of the instincts of the Spirit'.
Instinctus is a far less defined term and is not something that
either works with or without reason but is prior to it. Thomas,
in the Summa is not concerned with the 'formal object' of the Gifts
but with the originating principle at work in them. There is no
disagreement on this; it is a divine principle. Is it purely a
divine standard or the collaborative assimilation of the divine in-
stinctus, (in whatever form it must take) within the realm of human
potentialities? This latter is our own understanding of Thomas' refusal in the Summa simply to contrast reason and Spirit but rather

1. ibid. 2. ibid, p. 597. 3. q.68,a.4.
reason and the Spirit working through all man's potentialities.

'Et ideo in omnibus viribus hominis quae possunt esset principia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt virtutes, ita etiam sunt doni; scilicet in ratione et in vi appetitiva.' (1)

This would also account for the changes in Thomas' various re-arrangements of the Gifts. In the Commentary, they provide divine standards for the contemplative and active lives; in the Summa they are the working out of the divine instinctus in the two faculties of man's nature, reason and will; and, in the Secunda Secundae, this is further refined to be this same operation with the operation of the infused virtues.

To make the debate more concrete we might say that Thomas holds in the Summa that the operation of the Gift is determined not just by the nature of the giver but also by that of the recipient. This is clear in the case of the Gift of Counsel, a Gift which, perhaps more than the others might be seen as over-riding man's normal connatural form of operation.

'Est autem proprium rationali creaturae quod per inquisitionem rationis moveatur ad aliquid agendum; quae quidam inquisitio consilium dicitur; et ideo Spiritus Sanctus dicitur per modum consilii creaturam rationalem movere. Et propter hoc consilium ponitur inter dona Spiritus Sancti.' (2)

The Gift of Counsel is envisaged here not so much as an alternative to reason but as an activity of human decision-making which has its origin outside of man's own deliberative abilities. The mode of activity is human but the roots of it are divine.

'Ad tertium dicendum quod filii Dei aguntur a Spiritu Sancto secundum modum eorum, salvo scilicet libero arbitrio, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis; sic inquantum ratio movetur a Spiritu Sancto, vel instruitur de agendis competit filiiis Dei donum consilii.' (3)

1. IaIIae,q.68,a.4. 2. IIaIIae,q.52,a.1. 3. IIaIIae,q.52,a.2,ad3um.
There is only one point at which Thomas uses the notion of regula in relation to the Gifts and that is in their connection with the theological virtues.

Unde sicut virtutes intellectuales praeferruntur virtutibus morales et regulant eam; ita virtutes theologicae praeferruntur donis Spiritus Sancti, et regulant eam.' (1)

This may be a matter of loose speaking, or, more likely, it seems to be a matter of Thomas extending the analogy between the moral virtues and the Gifts beyond its limit. All analogies have limits and this analogy is a fruitful one when Thomas uses it in terms of the modes of receptivity attributed in different regards to the moral virtues and to the Gifts. Here, however, he changes the usual focal point of the model and speaks not of the elements of receptivity and docility but those elements to which they are receptive; that is, in each case, the intellectual virtues and the theological virtues. The resulting model seems to suggest a domination which is alien to both the role of reason over the other faculties, and to the relationship between charity, faith, hope and the Gifts. Certainly one cannot accept this passage at its face value. To suggest that the theological virtues, which work through human reasoning, govern the dispositions of the same faculties which make them sensitive to the instinctual promptings of the Spirit, would be to destroy Thomas' basic theme of the two principles, God and reason. The only way in which we can interpret this passage is in the light of the rest of question 68.

The theological virtues unite man to God. They establish the relationship between man and God in charity, (above all), in

1. IaIIae,q.68,a.8. 2. Reason's government of the other faculties is not that of a despot, see below p.183. 3. O'Connor, pp. 38-39.
faith and in hope. The Gifts, which reveal a wholly other dimension of receptivity to the Spirit are not given to anyone who has not received these other 'gifts' of the infused virtues. The two dimensions of man's graced abilities are to be seen, then as working through what is established by faith, hope and love.

What this passage emphasises is that the inspirations of the Spirit in man do not come as impersonal forces but come about within a union, 'secundum aliquam modum uniatur', a union structured by the theological virtues and above all, by love, by charity-friendship.

The Gifts are ramifications of charity, flowerings of the life of friendship with God, expressions and manifestations of the union of love between man and God.

This cannot be seen in terms of domination, nor even of measure. Rather we need to return to the 'notion' of 'dispositio' of article one and see it now within the structuring relationship created by charity. This is the purpose of this analogy. The basic theme of the treatise on the Gifts in the Summa is that of receptivity to motion from outside oneself: but a motion which is not alien but from within this already existing relationship of love. What is being articulated is not conformity to some standard, even a divine

1. IaIIae,q.68,a.
2. IaIIae,q.68,a.4,ad3um.
3. IaIIae,q.68,a.5.
standard, but openness to the infinity of God and the expression of this openness in the almost infinite diversity of human existence.

"In the gift of the holy Spirit, the position of the human mind is of one moved- rather than of mover." And therefore here ... there can be no question of how and how much. It would after all, be absurd arrogance to attempt to discover the 'rules' by which the Holy Spirit of God permeates man's reflections and decisions. We can at most say that the quasi-infinite variety of choices which operate in the realm of natural prudence and make any general and abstract pre-determination possible, must be multiplied by an utterly new infinity in the supernatural order. This emerges clearly when we recall how incomparable and unique the life of every single saint is. Here then is the truest applicability of the dictum of Augustine: 'Have love, and do what you will.' (1)

The 'gift' of the infused theological virtue of charity - in which all the Gifts are united and rooted - is, in a sense, the most basic receptivity of man under grace. It is, as A. Gardeil puts it,

'... la porte d'entrée permanente du Saint-Esprit dans notre activité surnaturelle.' (2)

In the Commentary there is nothing of this notion of habitual responsiveness within the relationship of grace. It can be seen as the achievement of the synthesis of habitual and actual grace, of created and uncreated grace; as a synthesis of the models of nature and movement.

SECTION TWO: THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND TO QUESTION 68

6. THE MODEL OF MOVEMENT: 'MOTIO'

- 'Motio'
- 'Actus Primus' and 'Actus Secundus'
- Secondary Causalities and the Certainty of Providence
- The Cosmic Sweep of the Divine Movement
Our problem here is not to attempt too much. Our analysis of Thomas' theology of the Gifts so far has led us to see the importance he attaches to the concept of motio. It will become clear in the following discussion that Thomas takes over Aristotle's theory of motion: indeed our sources are his commentaries on the Physics and the Metaphysics. But Aristotle's theory of motion is itself the material for a doctoral thesis; it has its own complications which we cannot afford to go into in great detail.

While using Aristotle however, Thomas' analysis of motion follows on directly from the most basic principles of his own metaphysics. God alone is actus purus, total actuality. Matter alone is total potentiality. All beings other than God are describable in terms of actuality and potentiality. ¹ Meyer gives a neat introduction:

'Act denotes actuality and if things are exclusively act, any further becoming is impossible. Since, however, every creature possesses potency and privation, and since there is a real distinction between substance and accidents, the necessary conditions are given for change and becoming something else. We have becoming of a thing whenever something new is predicated of a thing, whether this new thing is the thing itself or some property, whether it is a condition or a relation of a thing.' (2)

Potency and act are two of the primary categories by which being is understood and, as prior to movement, are to be used in understanding it. But not all change, mutatio, is to be called motion (motio), because both Thomas and Aristotle understand motio as occurring within a subject, and the change from non-being to being (generatio) and the change from being to non-being (corruptio), are not changes within a substance but the beginning or the destruction of a substance. Motion, then, refers to change within a substance or subject. ³

As we can distinguish between substance and accidents, so we can distinguish between types of motion. Regarding the thing moved, we can say it is moved essentially when the whole thing is moved according to its natural, formal, potential; or in a secondary sense, when we say the whole is moved because a part is moved, e.g. we say a man is healed when his blind eye is healed. Accidental movement, similarly, involves the movement of a part of a greater whole, e.g. a sleeping man in a moving boat is moved per accidens. The same schema applies in regard to the cause of movement. An agent acts essentially as a fire heats by its nature; it acts, 'moves', in a secondary essential sense by one of its parts, as when fire smoke kills house plants. It acts per accidens by one of its parts, as we might say a fire causes community togetherness. 1

Now the concept of motio must be further limited. Motion is not to be seen as another category along with the ten categories into which all being is to be divided. It is not a category distinct from them but the actualisation of what is potential in three of the categories; that is, the categories of quality, quantity and place. Within each category a thing is describable within a reference to two contraries: thus within the category of quantity a thing is describable as lesser or greater, and within the category of substance something is a form or a privation. Change can only be described within these categories and within these contraries. There can, then, be no one description of change for all the categories but only descriptions within the terms of each one and so there are as many kinds of change as there are kinds of being. To put this in technical scholastic language, change is not a category but a post-predicament. 2

Now although change, mutatio, relates to all the categories, motion relates to only three of them. Motion refers to change within a subject and not the coming to be, or ceasing to be, of a subject; therefore the category of substance does not provide termini for a description of motion but only of generation and corruption. Moreover, just as action and passion are used to account for motion, so is the concept of time because motion takes place within a subject and therefore within time. This leaves only the three categories mentioned above and the category of relationship. But Aristotle and Thomas will not allow a relative change to be called a motus in the strict sense, because to say, for example, that a son outgrows his father is not to imply any change in the father. So, the concept of motio is restricted to change within a subject in regard to the categories of quantity, quality and place. 1

Thomas makes Aristotle's definition of motion his own:

'Now since each class of things is divided by potentiality and actuality, I call motion the actualisation of what is potential as such.' (2)

This definition is not quite as simple as at first appears. 3 The crux of the problem is how we are to understood this last phrase, 'potential as such', potential qua potential. The subject of motion is not the thing itself but is the potential the thing has to be moved in this particular way. Motion is an actualisation of this potential and not an actualisation of the thing itself which has this particular potential. A piece of bronze is perfectly actualised as bronze; if it is made into a statue this change, this motio, is not the actualisation of its potential to be bronze, but the actualisation of its

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potential, as bronze, to be a statue. Motion, then, is the actualisation of a particular potential process and not of form. The word 'process' is used here because just as motion follows from form so it ends with form. For example, once a house is built, the process of building is ended. The form of the house is now actualised but the actualisation of the potential, the motion, took place in the building process. Each stage in the building process was an increasing actualisation of the potential. Motion of its meaning, is no more than an imperfect actuality because as long as the motion, the process, lasts, the potential is still in potential to further actualisation; only in rest is final actualisation achieved. Motion is always to be understood as 'poised between a prior potentiality and a further actuality'.

Any motion can be described, then, in terms of the starting point from which the motion began, (the terminus a quo), and the terminus to which it proceeds, (the terminus ad quem).

There are two other basic points to be clarified. The first concerns our descriptions of the relationship between the mover and the moved. When something is moved we can describe this as the actualisation of this particular potential in the moved, and, as we shall see, we can also describe it as the actualisation of a potentiality to cause motion in the mover. Now as there are two actualisations here, are we to posit, therefore, two motions or only one? Aristotle and Thomas claim that there is in fact only one motion which can be described in two different ways as the actualisation of two different potentials. To elucidate their claim they draw a parallel with the relationship between the number one and the number two;

there is one relationship here but it can equally be explained in terms of halving or doubling. 'Inasmuch as motion is predicated of the subject in which it is found it constitutes the category of undergoing; but in as much as it is predicated of that from which it comes, it constitutes the category of action'.

The second point raises a matter of semantics. In English the verb 'to move' is both transitive and intransitive: I can move a chair or I can move out of the room. In Latin the intransitive sense of 'move' is expressed by using the passive mood of the transitive verb. There is therefore in Latin no easy way of distinguishing between 'it is moving' (intransitive), and 'it is being moved'; the verb form 'moveri' serves both. It is therefore important to take note of Thomas' use of the terms motus and motio.

'Motio has an active sense, designating the cause of movement, whereas motus has a passive sense, designating movement undergone by something. Thus, S.C.G. III, 149 says, "The motio of the mover precedes the motus of the mobile."' (3)

Given all this as fundamental, the question before us now is what causes movement? We have isolated movement from the wider concept of change to mean change within a subject within time. It is relevant to ask, therefore, why a particular motio takes place at a particular time or in a particular space.

Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. This axiom is basic to Thomas' thought. It follows on from the definition of motion given above.

"Now since each class of things is divided by potentiality and actuality, I call motion the act-

alisation of what is potential as such." (1)

Movement is the actualisation of a potentiality. A thing can at one and the same time be potential in one respect and actual in another, but cannot be both in the same respect. Therefore that which is potential cannot actualise itself in respect of its potentiality; it must be moved by something else. T. Gilby, commenting on the 

`prima via`, points out the formal analysis of this axiom:

'Note that this (axiom) should be taken with formal precision; it means that the passive is not as such the active, not that one and the same thing or substance may not initiate its own movements within a particular frame of reference, as is the case with living things.' (2)

We will deal with the case of living things - 'animating' things - below, but first we need to see how in the single situation of `motio`, `actio` and `passio` are conjoined but not confused. Thomas presents his argument in its briefest form in the Contra Gentiles:

'Nihil idem est simul actu et potentia respectu eiusdem. Sed omne quod movetur, inquantum huiusmodi, est in potentia ... Omne autem quod movet est in actu, inquantum huiusmodi: quia nihil agit nisi secundum est in actu. Ergo nihil est respectu eiusdem motus movens et motum. Et sic nihil movet seipsum.' (3)

The important phrase here is, "in the same respect".

Movement per accidens, as outlined above, presents us, at the moment, with no major problems as regards this axiom. A man in a bus is moved by something other than himself; a man's hand is waving because he is moving it. But what of movement per se? Obviously there can be violent movement per se - the tree can be felled, the rock can be thrown - and there the thing is clearly moved by something

1. In Meta. XI, lect. 9.  2. T. Gilby, in Gilby Ed., vol. 2, p. 193, Appendix 6.  3. S.C.C. I, 13.  4. see above p. 119.  5. There are some difficulties here which, for the present purpose, we need not go into, but see A. Kenny, The Five Ways, pp. 13-15.
else. But how can there be movement per se which is not violent and which supports this axiom? Thomas claims that even in inanimate objects there is a natural (non-violent) motion which is per se and which is caused by something other than the particular potentiality which is in a process of actualisation. A rock, for example, has a natural tendency to move downwards. One could therefore, to preserve this basic axiom, posit two possible movers. Firstly, the Creator, who gave it this particular tendency, and who, by conserving its existence, preserves its natural potentialities and allows for their actualisation at any moment. Thomas takes the natural tendency of the thing as an intrinsic principle of its motion; but this itself does not solve the problem of why the rock moves 'here' and 'now' and not 'there' and 'then'. It is important to clarify that Thomas does not say, as some scholastic commentators have claimed, that God adds something to the natural tendency in order to make it act - this would destroy any meaning of natural tendency. Hence, secondly, and more usefully, one can posit a 'mover' in the removal of the obstacles which prevent the natural tendency, of gravity in this case, from operating, e.g. the roof 'moves' when the supporting pillars are taken away.

Whereas inanimate objects have natural tendencies then, which will inevitably initiate movement unless there is some external impediment, living things have a much wider range of potentialities and are moved not just by the removal of impediments to natural movement but are, in some sense, the source of their own motion. But how can there be self-movement if all movement is initiated by something other than what is moved per se? Interestingly enough, Thomas here differs

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1. see Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, ch. 4, pp. 63-91.
from Aristotle's own theory in the *Physics*. Aristotle's theory there is not 'everything in motion is moved by something else', but 'everything in motion is moved by something'.\(^1\) Aristotle therefore holds that animals and other living things are moved by themselves. Thomas however holds that all living things are moved by their souls, by their *anima*, by that which makes them what they are and which is the source of their 'animation'.\(^2\) This is obviously a more difficult theory and one is tempted to ask whether it is not a case where Ockham's razor might be applied, but we cannot, at this point, enter into a study of the Thomistic notion of the *anima* in great detail.

For our own purposes we can ask what is it that Thomas gains by not following Aristotle. If all living things are moved by their souls, then any activity, any motion of living things can be analysed not as motion *per se* but as motion *per accidens*. Only God is a mover *cuod a nullo movetur*.\(^3\)

The essential form of a living thing is its principle of activity. Anything moves in that it has active and passive abilities (*virtutes*) which follow from its form, for only in this way can it animate, move, itself. The actuality of a thing is first of all its essential form, (*actus primus*) and, secondly, the activities, (*operatio* or *actus secundus*) which flows from this. Only in God are essence and existence, being and operations identical: in man we have to posit a threefold division into essence, powers and actual acts. It is, in man, the powers of the soul (*potentiae*) and not the soul itself, which are the *immediate* principles of activity and these are primarily the powers of intellect and will.\(^4\)

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2. Ia,q.75,a.1 and IA,q.18,a.1. 3. Ia,q.2,a.3.
4. Ia,q.77 and q.78. The other powers, which man shares with the animals, and which therefore do not mark out his distinctive diffe-
is essential to the actus secundus of a living thing because if the thing were actual in every respect then no motion would be possible or necessary. 1

'Dicendum quod impossible est dicere quod essentia animae sit ejus potentia. ...'

Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus. Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operacionis principium, semper habens animam actu haberet opera vitae, sicut semper habens animam actu est vi-vum. Non enim inquantum est forma est actus ordina-tus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generationis. Unde quod sit in potentia ad alium actum, hoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquan-tum est forma, sed secundum suam potentiam. Et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus ordinatus ad actum secundum. 2 (2)

This distinction of the essence and powers in man, and all creatures, is vital both to Thomas' metaphysics and his theology of creation. God is who he is because he simply is his doing: God acts per essentiam; he is total actuality without any further potenti-ality. Man acts per potentiam: his soul, his essence, moves his po-wers, (potentiae), as an actualisation (actus secundus) of potenti-a-lities he possesses by his existence (actus primus). For man, any 'doing' is being-in-act and this is not a permanent state nor a self-actualisation of his being.

The introduction of the terms actus primus and actus secundus leads us on to an analogical extension of the notion of motio, and, in our general study regarding the Gifts it is this analogical use of the term which is employed and not the strict use which we have exa-mined so far.

'Motus, which can be translated 'movement' or 'mo-tion in its proper sense denotes a process of de-velopment, from a state or condition imperfect in regard to a further completion, it is a process

(3 cont. ). rence from them, are the vegetative and sensitive powers and the power of local motion.

1. Privation is however a principle of motion per accidens and not per se – see Meyer, p. 260. 2. Ia, q.77,a.1.
undergone by an imperfect being, thus a passage from potentiality to actuality. But because knowing or loving are thought of as processes going on, motus is applied to them in a transferred sense. So used, it signifies 'the act of a perfect thing', i.e. the expression of the vital resources of the knower or lover, not a process from potentiality to actuality, but the exercise of the endowments of a high degree of actuality.' (1) Thomas himself quotes Aristotle in justification of this extension:

'Secundum quod dicit Philosophus in De Anima quod sentire et intelligere sunt motus quidem, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti.' (2)

and, regarding contemplation:

'... operatio intellectus, in qua consistit essentialiter contemplatio, motus dicitur secundum quod motus est actus perfecti, ut Philosophus dicit in II De Anima.' (3)

Here we have an application of another basic Thomistic dictum: *agere sequitur esse*, the manner of a thing's acting follows its mode of being. 4 In this way the notion of *motio* can be extended even further to include all expressions of life and spontaneous activity, in contrast to what is dead or inert or in potential only. Moreover, as the immanent acts of knowing and willing in man are forms of 'movement' which characterise his dignity, by a further extension, *motio* can be applied even to God's immanent self-expression. 5

**Actus Primus and Actus Secundus.**

'omne quod movetur ab alio movetur'.

This is the basic axiom we are dealing with, and we have seen how Thomas sees the anima of living things as the animating force, the active mover in the self-moving of living beings, with the powers (potentiae)

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2. IIIaIIae,q.179, a.1,ad3.
3. IIIaIIae,q.180,a.6.
4. Meyer, p. 264 who cites Ia,q.89,a.1; S.C.C., III, 69; De pot. IX 1,ad3.
5. Gilby in Gilby, vol. 2, appendix 6, p. 192. See also Ia,q.9,a.1,ad1; q.1,a.2,ad2; q.27,a.1; q.58,a.1,ad1.
of the soul as the potentialities which are in the process of actualisation which we can term a *motio*. Each thing acts according to its form; its *actus secundus* follows the kind of *actus primus* it is. And each thing acts for the purpose of fulfilling itself, for achieving greater actuality. We have thus introduced the notions of formal, and now, final causality. The question remains of efficient causality and this is an important question because if things are moved—whether in the strict sense or in the extended sense—they are moved in time. The problem arises of why they are moved here and now and not there or then; in other words what activated this particular motion at this particular time?

In the lowest grades of life, that of plants, movement is regulated by the fixed direction of the natural form and the movement is stimulated by external factors—light, heat, soil type, etc. In animals the stimulus to movement is a form of knowledge acquired through the senses: the more refined the sense mechanism, the more refined will be the response patterns—thus the different forms of *motio* in a mussel and in a wolf. With man, however, the stimulus to movement, while presupposing the sensory abilities of animals, is governed by his intellectual powers. Man is able to prearrange and predetermine his purposes; he can create his own meanings and significances. Thus the world he 'senses' is full of historic, cultural and personal significances and it is in the light of these that he exercises his further freedom, not of just responding but of determining whether to act or not. This freedom and majesty of man we have already looked at in the prologue to the *Prima Secundae*.

Given this view of man, it is clear that although man's potentiality to movement can be stimulated by simple sensory elements—he
moves his finger when it is too near a flame - in general, his particularly human principles of action are his powers of intellect and will. The will, in fact, is often referred to by Thomas simply as motus; it is the driving power, the dynamism which moves all the other powers of the soul, except the vegetative. But the human will is more than the innate appetitive drives of the animals: just as man's intellectuality distinguishes his perception from that of the sensory knowledge of the animals, so his appetitive drive is an 'intellectual appetite', which works on the presentation of 'objects' understood as good and desirable. The intellect, therefore, is the power which can be seen as the initiator of human motio. But we must beware of oversimplifying the complex relationship between the will and the intellect; for example the will can move the intellect to desire to understand something more deeply. Moreover, as we shall examine in chapter 7, we also need to posit the will as an agent of motio prior to the intellect: this will be important for our own topic of the Gifts, but let us first sketch out a simple analysis of man's self-movement, before we complicate it in this way.

The simplest sketch of man's self-movement is set out by Thomas in IaIIae,q.9,a.1, and, for the present, we need to go into no greater detail.

1. Ia,q.82,a.4. For the phrase "cognitio... et motus" see e.g., Ia,q.75,a.1, and also IIIa,q.8,a.1, obj1, where the Augustinian influence is clear. 2. IaIIae,q.8,a.1; q.9,a.1. 3. All the questions of IaIIae,q.6-17 are concerned with this complex interrelationship.
It is the first of these kinds of motion which we will have to exa-
mine in more detail later as having special reference to the Gifts.
Thomas carries on, in this present article, to associate this motio
with the will, because the activity of the will is man's purposive
activity and by willing the 'end', the purpose of the activity, the
will actualises the potentialities of man's abilities. Here the
will alone is seen as the efficient cause of man's action but let
us, for the present, take the second form of motio as our norm, where
the understood object, grasped by the intellect, is the efficient
cause of man's volition and therefore of all his activity.

'... id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et con-
venientis, movet voluntatem per modum objecti.' (2)

But the sources of human action, the intrinsic principles of
human activity, are not only the faculties, (potentiae) of intellect,
will, memory, etc., but are also the habitus.

'... considerandum est de principiis humanorum act-
uum; et primo de principiis intrinsecis; secundo
de principiis extrinsecis. Principium intrinsecum
est potentia et habitus.' (3)

The human will is not just found to be in act or in potentiality but
also, as having a disposition, having a habitus. Now how this fits
into our present discussion of motio is clear in the terms in which
Thomas defines habitus.

'habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam alicujus in
potentia existentes ad aliquid, sive ad naturam,
sive ad operationem vel finem naturae.' (4)

'... subjectum habitus non est nisi ens in poten-
tia.' (5)

Motio was defined above as the actualisation of what is potential as

1. IaIIae,q.9,a.1. 2. IaIIae,q.9,a.2. 3. Prologue
to IaIIae,q.49. 4. IaIIae,q.54,a.1. 5. IaIIae,q.50,a.6.
such: here we have the potentialities of the intellect and will.

It should also be kept in mind that Thomas will describe the Gifts of the Spirit in terms of habitus.

Anthony Kenny lists the range over which Thomas uses this term habitus in the Prima Secundae q.49-q.54:

'... we are told that habitus includes sickness and health, beauty and toughness, virtues such as justice, courage, temperance and charity, vices such as intemperance and insensitivity, traits of character such as mildness or modesty, knowledge of principles of logic or of scientific facts, knowledge of the Bible, knowledge of foreign languages, beliefs of any kind, gifts of intelligence, memory and imagination and the possession of concepts.

We are told that different men have different habitus, and that dumb animals do not have habitus, though the effects of training in them look very like habitus.' (1)

Given this list, Kenny takes the English term, 'disposition' to be the closest translation of the term habitus.

'The notion of disposition is best approached via the notions of capacity and action. Human beings have many capacities which animals lack; the capacity to learn languages, for instance, and the capacity for generosity. These capacities are realised in action when particular human beings speak particular languages or perform generous actions. But between capacity and action there is an intermediate state possible. When we say that a man can speak French we mean neither that he is actually speaking French, nor that his speaking French is a mere logical possibility. When we call a man generous we mean more than that he has a capacity for generosity in common with the rest of the human race; but we need not mean that he is doing something generous at the moment of our utterance; States such as knowing French and being generous are dispositions. A disposition, said St Thomas, is half-way between a capacity and an action, between pure potentiality and full actuality. (q.50, a.4).'' (2)

A man, within the wide limits of his human nature, forms himself, by acquiring through his actions, or by being given by God,

various 'dispositions', virtues or vices. A man makes himself for
good or for evil. These dispositions, 'half way between a capacity
and an action', determine whether or not a man can move towards the
fulfillment of his potential as a human being through his various
activities. Vices are dispositions which limit the range of a man's
possibilities: by them a man diminishes his freedom and becomes more
and more determined by his own physical and psychological drives.
Virtues are patterns of behaviour by which a man's freely chosen aims,
fixed upon by his will and not determined by his psychology, are ac-
chieved with mastery, ease and with spontaneity.¹ The moral education
of the virtuous life is the task of freely ordering one's own inner
nature so as to acquire the ability to act within all one's human
potentialities. A habitus is not a habit: it is more like the spon-
taneity of a highly trained musician: it is an ability to do the
things one freely wills to do.

'Une habitude se contracte, un habitus se cultive'²

'Un véritable habitus s'entourera d'habitudes; en
lui-même il en est fort différent: il facilite
un acte précisément par le côté où il est volon-
taire. Ce qu'il accroît, c'est la domination
de la volonté sur les facultés qu'il rend de plus
en plus souples et dociles à la motion de la vol-
onté et de la raison.... Le vertueux est tout le
contraire d'un homme de routines; c'est même
l'homme le plus imprévisible, parce qu'il ne réa-
git pas à l'événement selon des automatismes plus
ou moins durcis, mais selon la décision chaque
temps inventée et nouvelle de sa prudence.... Il
est même beaucoup mieux que l'homme simplement
"consciencieux" en qui se découle la raideur d'une
adaptation difficile à des règles qui ne sont pas
encore entrées dans sa spontanéité vivante.' (3)

Both Thomas and Aristotle hold that a man moves himself towards
his fulfillment, his beatitude, by his actions.⁴ The notion of habi-

¹ For a fuller discussion of this, see below, p.283 ff.
² M. Labourdette, Dictionnaire de spiritualité, 'Dons', col. 1613.
150; Taliae,q.3,a.2.
tus' is an essential part of how they see the working out of this fulfillment. In as much as Thomas holds that this fulfillment of man's potentialities is of a super-natural nature, man needs, as we have seen already the infused habitus of grace. These infused dispositions, 'half way between a capacity and an action', are central to Thomas' theology. One prime example of the use of this notion is in regard to faith: a baptised infant has the disposition, habitus of faith but not yet the activity of the life of faith.

This discussion of moral philosophy and theology has not moved us away from the theme of motion in Thomas' thought. In fact we should recall that this model of movement is not only common in the Secunda Pars, it is its structuring principle and its subject matter; the 'motus rationalis creaturae in Deum'. We need now to place all that has been said so far into a larger context, that of the movement of God's providence and predestination within all creation.

Secondary causalities and the certainty of Providence.

St. Thomas, again and again, emphasises the reality of the causalities exercised by created things. God has given creatures the dignity of being the cause of changes within creation, each according to its own nature. Nothing needs to be added to them by God for them to fulfill their natures. Any hint of 'Occassionalism' is sharply attacked by him.

'detrhere actiones proprias rerum est divinae bonitatis derogare.' (5)

But also any notion of Deism, of God being remote from his creatures and not involved in their activity is also attacked. These created

1. See above p. 47ff.  
2. IIIa,q.69,a.6.  
3. See above p. 3-6.  
4. See S.C.G., III 70.  
5. S.C.G. III 69.
causes of movement and change exist within a divinely ordered and
divinely governed cosmos. Each thing has its own capacity to change
and act and be acted upon, but not as independent of God. Things
act from their own nature and from God.

'I... quantumcumque natura aliqua corporalis vel
spiritualis ponatur perfecta, non potest in suum
actum procedere nisi moveatur a Deo; quae quidem
motio est secundum suae providentiae rationem ...' (1)

We are not to see this as the coincidence of two equal causalities -
as if God added 'heat' to fire to cause it to burn. God is a trans-
cendent "cause" not another causality within creation. There are
not two effects here but only one.

Thomas characterises God's "causality" within the real secon-
dary causalities of his creation in four ways; and all of these must
be taken together - God does not just move things and cause them to
change by merely conserving them in being.

This conservation in being and nature is, however, the first
aspect of his activity, (motio) in creation. Created things act,
(actus secundus), in as much as they exist according to a definite
nature or form, (actus primus). But existence is proper only to
God. The conservation of any one thing in being is not so much a
mere 'letting be' on God's part but a continuous creative act proper
to Him alone. At each moment in time, therefore, he not only 'moves'
to conserve each thing in being, but also in its potentiality to act,
(actus secundus), and to be acted upon, (privation) according to its
nature. He is 'in' each thing by his power. 2

Secondly, God acts in each thing by 'application'. For man,
the world around him seems to be full of coincidences and accidents
as well as exhibiting certain orderings. Aristotle had used this

1. IaIIae,q.109,a.1. 2. Ia,q.8,a.3.
basic experience to argue against any form of determinism. Aquinas uses it to show the compatibility of divine providence, infallible in its purposes, and creaturely contingencies. What appears to man as coincidental or the working of 'fate', is part of the divine plan: nothing is outside God's ordering. God brings together various created agencies for them to operate upon each other. He 'applies' them to their activities by means of proximity, relationship, disposition and contemporaneity.

But if this were all that were to be said, then God's causation of 'movement' in creatures would still be something external to them. Thomas' vision of the ordering of creation is an unique combination of the Aristotelian cosmic system of first mover, celestial spheres and terrestrial process, with the Neo-Platonic idea of universal causes. All lower causes act in as much as they participate in the causality of a higher nature, that is, the celestial spheres, angels and, the highest and unmoved mover, who causes all lower movements, God. We must understand this as a hierarchy and not a series. It is not the answer to a question such as 'what does fire need to heat water' but what has fire needed to be such that it can heat water. If we understand this method as the direct opposite of our modern scientific methodology of 'laboratory conditions' we might be able to comprehend it. Modern science operates by eliminating all other factors except the relevant ones for the experiment; here we are to grasp the interconnection of all things, and an interconnection which is hierarchical in nature. Each thing acts by participating in the causality of a higher nature, or reversing this, each thing is an instrumental cause of the higher nature. Now each created

1. On fate, see Ia, q.116.
thing, no matter what its hierarchical status, is similarly an instrument of God's causality. All events and changes, then, are the result of God's providence. Or, rather, if we take providence to refer to the divine 'plan' and God's government in creation to be the putting into action of that plan—a division appropriate only to our human thinking and not to the singleness of God's Being-in-Act—then all events and changes take place as instruments of his government of creation. God acts in the activity of all things both mediatively—through the hierarchy of causes and immediately as the universal mover of all things.

'Deus non solum dat rebus virtutes sed etiam nulla res potest propria virtute agere, nisi etiam agat in virtute ipsius.' (1)

All created agents then, act in that they act within God's activity: a divine activity in and through all things which created agents participate in as cooperators by reason of the supreme goodness and generosity of God. As E. Gilson writes of this combination of Aristotelianism and the Neo-Platonic tradition:

'... a universe like Aristotle's demands as its cause a God like the God of Denis the Areopagite. Our highest glory is to be coajutors of God through the causality we wield ...' (2)

The fourth, and final way in which Thomas characterises the movement of God within all creaturely changes is in terms of final causality. All creatures exist in potentiality and are therefore open to 'movement' in as much as they are in potential and not fully actual. God alone is Actus Purus, and alone, then, is the source of all change. But also as Actus Purus, He is also that which all beings strive to become like through their operations, according to their own

natures. In striving to fulfill themselves they strive to imitate in their own mode, his fullness of Be-ing. In this, as in all else, they exhibit the purpose of his providence. All the various causalities of creation form a single symphony, a dynamic unity, and God is the common end of all that exists.

The cosmic sweep of the divine movement.

Our discussion of the relationship of divine causality and creaturely causalities has had to be sketchy because of space. Nevertheless, it is only within the context of this over-all vision of the single yet variegated dynamism of providence that the Gifts of the Spirit can be understood, as Thomas presents them. These Gifts are analysed by Thomas by using the model of 'motion'. But this use is only a small part of the dominance of this model in a far larger area.

'... rerum gubernatio a Deo secundum quamdam motio-nem esse intelligitur, secundum quod Deus omnia diriget et movet in proprias fines.' (2)

The whole of creation is presented as being in motion, in restless motion, like trees in the wind or the waters of a river, but not, like debris in a wind-storm, in directionless, meaningless movement of chaos but - for those with vision - ordered and governed and purposefully moving towards its consummation. The drive, the motus, of this cosmic growth is the Spirit of God, the 'life-giver'; the principle of vitality: 'et in Spiritum Sanctum Dominum et vivificantem', as the Creed puts it. As the existence of all things arises only out of the divine goodness, which is 'appropriated' to the Holy Spirit, all things are seen as in a movement of return to that goodness.

1. S.C.G. III, 17, 18, 19, 20. Ia,q.44,a.4. 2. S.C.G. IV 20. 3. See, Thomas' commentary on this article of the creed in the Compendium Theologiae, I.147.
which is their source. ¹

... rerum gubernatio a Deo secundum quod Deus omnia diriget et movet in proprios fines. Si igitur impulsus et motio ad Spiritum Sanctum, ratione amoris, pertinet, convenienter rerum gubernatio et propagatio SpirituiSancto attribuitur.

... vita maxime in motu manifestatur; moventia enim seipsa vivere dicimus, et universaliter quaecumque a seipsis aguntur ad operandum. Si igitur, ratione amoris, SpirituiSancto impulsio et motio competit, convenienter etiam sibi attribuitur vita; dicitur enim (Joann. VI.64): Spiritus est cui vivificat; et (Ezech. XXXVII.6) Dabo vos bis spiritum, et vives; et in symbolo fidei nos in Spiritum Sanctum vivificantem credere profitemur. Quod etiam et nomini spiritus consonat; nam etiam corporalis vita animalium est per spiritum vitalem a principio vitae in cetera membra diffusum.¹ (2)

The influence behind this theological perspective is not only that of Aristotle - in his theory of motion - but also that of the Greek Fathers and especially Pseudo-Denis and the Damascene.³ With this wider perspective, Thomas not only goes beyond the static categories of grace of his scholastic predecessors, but also, in a certain sense, returns to a perspective of grace older than Augustine's. This is quite clear in the Contra Gentiles, but also evident in the Summa. The 'Fall' of Adam is no longer the context within which grace is discussed - although grace is said to be both sanans as well as elevans - but rather grace is introduced within this over-all movement of the divinum auxilium or Lex Aeterna which moves through all things.

But just as Thomas does not dismiss Augustine, far from it, but reintegrates Augustinianism within this larger perspective of cosmic movement, so also does he take up the achievements of the scholastics before him. Man's participation in this movement of love

must be a continuous one; a stable and not intermittent participa-
tion. It is therefore by habitus of grace that man is moved by God. Moreover, as man reaches his Beatitude through his operations, the human motus, (passive) of the divine moto, (active), cannot be seen as a total passivity. There must be a human movement as well as a divine one, not in any Pelagian sense, because the divine movement is all-embracing, but in the sense of co-operation and participation in causality. Hence the theme of the Secunda Pars, that man, as a rational animal, as the 'image of God', is a self-determining agent, free to initiate and enact prudential and providential purposes.
7. THE DE BONA FORTUNA

- Problems Relating to the Text
- A Modern Reconstruction of the De bona fortuna
- A Brief Commentary on the Reconstructed Text of the De bona fortuna
- St Thomas' Use of the De bona fortuna
  1. The Receptivity of the Will at its most original level, quoad exercitium
  2. The De bona fortuna and the role of Rationality
  3. Divine Providence and the Act of Choice
The De bona fortuna.

Problems relating to the text.

In IaIIae, q.68,a.1, at precisely the point where he introduces his own solution, Thomas refers to a particular work of Aristotle:

"Est enim considerandum quod in homine est duplex principium movens: unum quidem interius, quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius, quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est; et etiam Philosophus dicit, in cap. de Bona Fortuna".

The centrality of the distinctions made here in this quotation is now clear. There can therefore be little need to justify focusing our attention for a short time upon the text explicitly referred to at this point. Thomas, in fact, makes another explicit reference to it at the end of the same article.

"Et Philosophum etiam dicit, in cap. de Bona Fortuna quod his qui moventur per instinctum divinum non expedit consiliari secundum rationem humanam, sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum; quia moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana."

The first question before us is what exactly was the De bona fortuna? Thomas refers to it as if it were a book in common circulation in his time but no other, earlier scholastics mentions it and Thomas himself either did not know of its existence, or, at least, never makes an explicit reference to it, before writing Summa Contra Gentiles, book III, chapter 89. Lottin states that the De bona fortuna was put together about 1266, but he gives no evidence to back up this statement. Deman argues, from the evidence of book III of the Summa Contra Gentiles, that Thomas became aware of the work in 1259 or 1260.

The book itself is obviously a compilation of the Magna Moralia II, 8,

(Bekker edition 1206b 30 - 1207b 19), and the *Eudemian Ethics* VIII, 2, (or, VII, 14 in some editions), (Bekker edition, 1246b 37 - 1248 b 11). For this reason modern editors, from the sixteenth century onwards have omitted the work from editions of Aristotle's work and it is therefore almost impossible to find the work in print.²

There are Latin manuscripts extant which appear to date from the fourteenth century but as Thomas never quotes the *De bona fortuna* verbatim we cannot determine what translation or translations he used.³ No Greek manuscripts have been found - although there is one fourteenth century Greek and Latin manuscript - so we cannot assess whether the original compilation was in Greek or in Latin.⁴ When Deman was doing his pioneering work on this text in 1928, only one manuscript tradition was known, that referred to as the *Habitum autem utique*, version, which was printed in Venice in 1482.⁵ Since then, however, the editor of the *Aristoteles Latinus* has shown that there are at least two distinct, (yet not fully independent), translations represented among the extant medieval manuscripts.⁶ The editor points out that it is not possible to ascertain which of these two traditions is older.⁷ The translation *Habitum autem utique* is by far the most widespread, and therefore O'Connor suggests that it is the one more likely to have been used by Thomas, but there can be no certainty of this.⁸

But even if we were to accept the translation *Habitum autem utique*, and thus use the 1482 printed text, we would still be faced with major difficulties. O'Connor has studied this printed edition

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and describes it as 'very literal and in places unintelligible'.

'It is practically unintelligible. This seems to be due in part to mistakes made by the editor. But it is due also to the fact that the translation itself, like so many medieval translations of Aristotle, is slavish, mechanical and unintelligible. Finally, the original Greek text from which all translators have had to work is very poor. F. Susemigl, one of the chief modern editors of the Eudemian Ethics, speaks of VIII, 2, from which the greater part of De bona fortuna is drawn, as capiti corruptissimo, and adds that in many places it is impossible to recover the original sense with any certitude.' (2)

O'Connor, therefore, despite all his arduous work on the 1482 edition, finally decides, in the main, to make use of modern Greek and English editions of the Magna Moralia and the Eudemian Ethics.

We shall take the same option in this chapter and perhaps with less need of justification, because our aim here is not quite the same as that of O'Connor in his excellent Appendix on the De bona fortuna. O'Connor's aim is to try to estimate how this work influenced Thomas' thought and terminology, especially how it might have led him to use the term instinctus in relation to the Gifts of the Spirit. For this reason he is led to use scholarly hypotheses, based on the various translations still extant, to speculate on what the actual words of Thomas' translations might have been. Our project is quite different, although we will use O'Connor's work below. In the main, our plan for this chapter is to present Thomas' actual use of the De bona fortuna, in the Summa and other works. If we present and analyse Thomas' use of this work, then we will have a firm foundation upon which to construct theories about its influences on him.

What is more, as Thomas never quotes the work verbatim but always gives a paraphrase, we are not too dependent on any extant manuscript because our basic data is his paraphrase; that is, what he actually produced rather than what he might have read. The major part of this chapter will follow later but, first of all, we will present a reconstruction of the *De bona fortuna* from the Loeb editions of the *Magna Moralia* and the *Eudemian Ethics* and follow this by a brief commentary highlighting certain themes which might prove significant for our study.
A modern reconstruction of the De bona fortuna.

The following text is given as a guide only. It combines what seem to be the best modern editions in Greek and English of the two original Aristotelian works. ¹ The reconstruction is made up of Magna Moralia, II.8, (Bekker, 1206b 30 - 1207b 19), and the Eudemian Ethics, VIII.2, (or VII.14 in some editions, (Bekker, 1246b 37 - 1248b 11).²

VIII. As we are discussing Happiness, we are next to speak of Good Fortune or Luck. For most men suppose that the happy life is the fortunate life, or at any rate includes Good Fortune. And perhaps they are right. For without external advantages life cannot be happy; and they are in Fortune’s control. We are obliged, therefore, to speak of Good Fortune; and in fact to define its nature, seat, and province.

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2 78. On the first approach and survey, these questions present some difficulty. On the one hand, we can hardly assert that Fortune is part of Nature. For
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2123 aitía, toútou ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πόλον ἢ ὡς ὑπαίτις ποιήσῃ. 2124 τικὴ ἔστιν, ἢ δὲ τῆς χάριτος οἰδέσσατε, ἀλλ' ἀνάκτως καὶ ὡς ἐτυχεῖ, διὸ ἡ τύχη ἢ τῆς τοιοῦτος λέγεται. οὕτω δὲ νοῦν ἡ τύχη ἢ λόγον ὁδῷ καὶ γὰρ ἑνταῦθα οὐχ ἤτοι τὸ τετυμένον καὶ τὸ δέι ὑπαίτις, ἢ δὲ τύχη οὐ. διὰ καὶ οὐ πλασόν γοῦν καὶ λόγος, ἑνταῦθα ἐλαχίστα τύχη, οὐ. δὲ πλείστη τύχη, ἑνταῦθ' ἐλαχίστον γοῦν.

'Αλλ' ἀρά γε ἡ εὔτυχία ἐστὶν ὡς ἐπιμελεῖα τις ἢ. θεῶν; ἢ τοῦτο ὁν ἀν δόξας οἴδαμεν: τῶν γὰρ θεῶν ἀξίωμα: κύριον ὁτα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ἀξίωσις ἀποίημεν καὶ τάγαθα καὶ τὰ κακά, ἢ δὲ τύχη καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης ὡς ἄληθῶς ἡν ἡ τύχη γίνεται. εἰ δὲ γε τῷ θεῷ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀποίημεν, φανερὸν αὐτῷ κρίνεται: ποιήματι οὐδὲ δίκαιον: τούτῳ δ' οὐ προσήκον ἔστι [τῷ] θεῷ. ἀλλ' μὴν ἔστω γε τοῦτον εἰς οὐδὲν ἀλλ' τῆς τύχης ἢ τε τάξεῖ, ἢν δέθω ἢ τοῦτον ἢ τι ἢ ἡ, νόσος μὲν δὴ καὶ λόγος καὶ ἐπιστήμη: 15 παντελῶς ἀλλ' ὑποθέσσαν τι ἑοίκειν εἶναι. ἀλλ' μὴν οὖν ἡ ἐπιμελεία καὶ ἡ ἐυσύνετα παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξας ἢν ἐναι εὐτυχία διὰ τὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐγγίζεται, οὕτω δὲ τῷ τῶν φαύλων οὐκ ἐναποτελεῖ οὕτω: λοιπὸν τοῖν ταῖς ἐπιστήμοις τῆς εὐτυχίας καὶ τῆς φύσεως.

'Εστι δ' ἡ εὔτυχία καὶ ἡ τύχη ἢ τοῖς μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὖν, μηδ' αὖν αὐτοὶ κύριοι ἀρέν καὶ δύναται

MAGNA MORALIA; II. viii. 2-5

whenever Nature causes, it is wont usually if not invariably to reproduce. With Fortune it is never so. Its results are produced without order, and "fortuitously"; this being indeed the reason why we speak of Fortune as the cause of such events. On the other hand, it is surely impossible to regard Fortune as a kind of intelligent Perception or rational Ruling; rational, for their domain also exhibits an orderly sequence and invariability which Fortune lacks; so that where there is most of Intelligence and Rationality, there is least of Fortune or Luck; and most of the latter where there is least intelligence.

Can Good Fortune, then, be a kind of Divine providence? This we cannot believe; for we look to God, as controlling good and evil things, to apportion them in accordance with desert; whereas Fortune and its gifts are bestowed in very truth "fortuitously." If we attribute these gifts to God, we shall make Him either an incompetent judge or an unjust one; and this is alien to His nature. And yet apart from these three (Nature, Intelligence, God) there is nothing to which Fortune can be ascribed; to one of them, accordingly, it must clearly belong. Now Intelligence, Reason and Knowledge appear to be something wholly foreign to it; nor again can we regard the providence and benevolence of God as Good Fortune, seeing that this latter befalls the bad as well as the good; and it is not likely that God provides for the bad. It remains, therefore, to choose Nature as that which is nearest akin to Good Fortune.

Now Good Fortune and Luck operate in a sphere it is beyond our competence, where we have no control.

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* Reading 37 ἐκ ἢ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πολέος (Bonitus).
* Or reading ὡς ἐκ τοῦ χάριτος, "which of Fortune lacks."

* For νοῦς in the general sense of note on vi. 33 above. λόγος, if it is to be distinguished from νοῦς, is the reasoned ruling or decision which νοῦς makes.

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* Contrast St. Matthew v. 45. The author seems here to diverge from the view of Eud. (VIII. ii. 24).
not can take effective action. It is on this account that no one speaks of the just man in being just, nor the courageous or any other man of virtue (as owing his virtue to Luck); since the possession or absence of these qualities is within our own competence. There are, however, other advantages which we can attribute more appropriately to Luck. We may say for example that the man of good birth is fortunate; and similarly any man endowed with the kind of good things that is beyond his control.

6 Yet even this is not the proper application of the word. There are more senses than one in which we term a man fortunate. We do so when he has happened to achieve something good beyond his own calculation; and when he who might reasonably expect to lose has gained instead, we say that he too is lucky. Good Fortune, then, appears to consist in the enjoyment of some good which reason would not expect, or the avoidance of some ill which it would anticipate. It is, however, in the good we receive that Luck is more clearly and appropriately recognized. To receive something good is essentially a piece of luck; to escape something evil is so incidentally.

8 Luck, then, is a natural instinct, not guided by reason. For the fortunate man is he who has an unreasoning impulse towards good things, and moreover obtains them. But this comes by Nature; Nature has implanted in our soul something which impels us irrationally towards our advantage. And should you ask one who is thus favoured why he thinks fit to act as he does, he will tell you he does not know, but merely sees fit to do so. His case is like that of men inspired; for they too have an unreasoning impulse towards some particular act.
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1307 b

Τὴν δὲ εὐτυχίαν ὅποι ἔχομεν οἰκεῖῳ καὶ ἴδιῳ 10
ἀνόματι προσαγορεύμεν, ἀλλ' ἄτια πολλάκις φαίμεν,
eἶναι αὐτὴν. ἡ δ' ἄτια ἀλλατρίῳ τοῦ ὀνόματος, ἡ
γὰρ ἄτια καὶ οὐ ἔστων ἄτια ἄλλο ἔστων, καὶ ἄνω
ὕμων τῆς ἐπιτυχίανουσας τῶν ἄγαθων ἄτια 10 λεγομένη, ὅ
κοι ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἑαυτὴν ἐν τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἐπιτυχίας:
καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός εὐτυχία, ἢ καὶ οὐ καὶ ἡ
toιαύτη ἐστιν εὐτυχία, ἀλλ' ὁ ὁ πρὸς γε τὴν εὐδαι-
μονίαν ἡ τοιαύτη ἢ ἡ πρὸς εὐτυχία ὑποκείμενα, ἢ ἡ ἐν
αὐτῇ ἡ ἀρχή τῆς ὑμῶν τῶν ἄγαθων ἐστὶ τῆς
ἐπιτυχίας?

1. Ἐπει ἂν ἄτια ἡ εὐδαιμονία ὅποι ἔχειν τῶν ἐν τέκνοις 12
ἀγαθῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται ἀπὸ τῆς εὐτυχίας, ὁποῖον
ἀρτίως ἐφαμεν, συνεργός ἢ ἐν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ.

MAGNA MORALIA, II. viii. 10—ix. 2

10 Being unable to find a fitting and appropriate or through
term for Good Fortune, we often speak of it as a external
Cause; but Cause is something quite alien to the
content of the term we seek. Cause and its
consequence are two different things; and the
Good Fortune we speak of as Cause is quite apart
from any impulse which attains advantages. In this
way we speak of the Cause of our escaping ill, or
again of our receiving something good when we do
not expect it. Such Good Fortune as this differs from
the other kind, and appears to arise from the vicis-
situdes of circumstance; it is Good Fortune only
incidentally. If, then, this latter sort is also "Good
Fortune," in so far as Good Fortune is a factor in
Happiness, the other kind has surely more right to
the name: the kind which in a man's own self
originates the impulse which leads to the attainment
of advantages.

12 Since then Happiness cannot exist without some
outside advantages, and these latter are the fruit of
Good Fortune: it follows that Luck or Good Fortune
is an auxiliary to Happiness.

1 Reading ἐξαίτα λεγομένη.
2 Or, reading ἀνά with Scaliger, "which contains in its
own self the origin of that impulse which leads . . .".

* In "a piece of good luck" we cannot distinguish cause
and effect: or rather, as Bud. (VIII. ii. 10) puts it, if it is
a cause, it is a cause of which we can render no rational
account (ὁδεῖαν ἑορτὴν ἑδροτέννη λογοφηνον).
II. 'Etpe $\delta'$ ou' $\mu$10n $\eta$ $\phi$ro\'h$\eta$ $\pi$oi$\iota$ $\tau$'h$\eta$ $\epsilon$up'ra$\gamma$\iota$ $\kappa$\$ $\delta$'v$e$th$\iota$, 'all$\alpha$ fah$e$in $k$ai tov$e$ $\epsilon$u$\gamma$.
194 a $t$$\nu$h$e$in $e$u $\pi$r$\acute{a}$t$e$in $\omega$ $k$ai $t$' $\epsilon$u$\tau$h$\iota$ $\epsilon$'pipoi$ou$th$\iota$ $\epsilon$up'ra$\gamma$'h$\iota$ kata$\iota$ $t$' $a$u$\tau$ $t$'h $\epsilon$'pi$st$his$\iota$, $\theta$$\omicron$ k$e$pe$th$\iota$.

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1. II. But wisdom is not the only thing which $\epsilon$ $h$ $\gamma$ $\omega$ $\alpha$, acting in accordance with goodness causes welfare, fortune.

111: also speak of the fortunate as faring well, which implies that good fortune also engenders welfare in the same way as knowledge does; we must therefore consider whether one man is fortunate.
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1847 a ὁπ' ἐστὶ φύσει ὁ μὲν εὐτυχις ὁ δὲ ἄτυχις ἦ τοῦ, καὶ ποῖς ἔχει περὶ τούτων. ὃς μὲν γὰρ ἐλαί τινας 2 εὐτυχια ἀφρονεῖς γὰρ ὄντες καταρθοῦσιν ταλμοὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ τύχη κυρι, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐν οἷς τέχνη ἐστι, ταλλοὶ μὲντοι καὶ τύχη ἐνπάρηξε, οἷον ἐν στρατηγικῇ καὶ κυβερνητικῇ. πάτερον ὁν ἀνά τινας ἢ ἐξας οὐδεὶς οἶκαι, οἱ υἱοὶ ποιήσει ἐναι πρακτικῶν ἐστί τῶν εὐτυχιατῶν; νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἄτυχι ἄστι δὴν ἄντων ἢ δὲ ψύσει ποιῆσει τινας ποιησι, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς διαφέρουσι τοῖς ταξὶ ποιητοὶ ἔχειν, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς εὐτυχια καὶ ἄτυχις. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὁ φρονεῖς καταρθοῦσι δῆλον, οὐ γάρ ἔλογος ἐφράσεις ἀλλ' ἔχει λόγων ἡ διὰ τὴν ἄστι πράττει, οἱ δ' οὐκ ἂν ἔχοντες εἰσεν ἀν διὰ τοῦ καταρθοῦσι, τέχνη γὰρ ἐν ἄντων ἢ δὲ φανεροὶ ὅτι 5 ὄντες ἀφρονεῖς, οὐχ ὃς περὶ ἄλλα (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὁλόθων ἄτων, οἷον Ἰσοφυσίας γεωμετρικῶν ἄν, ἀλλ' περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔδειξε βλέπτε καὶ ἀφρονεῖ εἰσακριβοῦ, καὶ πολὶ χρυσαν πλέων ἀπόλυσεν ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ ἔναν θυμισμένην πεντακοσιολόγων δι' εὑρήσεως, ὡς λέγουσι) ἀλλ' ὃς καὶ καὶ ἐν οἷς εὐτυχια ἀφρονεῖς, περὶ γὰρ ναυκηρίαν ὅδε οἱ διερπάτων εὐτυχια, ἀλλ' ἡμαστέρεν εὖ κιβωτων ποιῶσα ὃ μὲν οὐδεὲν, ἄλλος...

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. II. 1-8

nate and another unfortunate by nature or not, and 2 how it stands with these matters. For that some men are fortunate we see, since many though foolish succeed in things in which luck is paramount, and some even in things which involve skill although also containing a large element of luck—for example strategy and navigation. Are, then, these men fortunate as a result of a certain state of character, or are they enabled to achieve fortunate results not by reason of a certain quality in themselves? As it is, people think the latter, holding that some men are successful by natural causes; but nature makes men of a certain quality, and the fortunate and unfortunate are different even from birth, in the same way as some men are blue-eyed and others black-eyed because a particular part of them is of a particular quality. For it is clear that they do not succeed by means of wisdom, because wisdom is not irrational but can give reason why it acts as it does, whereas they could not say why they succeed 6—for that would be science; and moreover it is manifest that: they succeed in spite of being unwise—not-unwise about other matters (for that would not be anything strange, for example, Hippocrates was skilled in geometry but was thought to be stupid and unwise in other matters, and it is said that; on a voyage owing to foolishness he lost a great deal of money, taken from him by the collectors of the two-per-cent duty at Byzantium), but even though they are unwise about 9 the matters in which they are fortunate. For in navigation it is not the cleverest who are fortunate, but (just as in throwing dice) one man throws a
ARISTOTLE

1347a  δ' ἐξ βαλλει καθά ἂν φύτευτες εὐφυξίας. Πιθήκοι
φλεισθεῖσαν, ὠσπέρ φασίν, όπως ἔκοψαν, καὶ ἔχομεν ἑκατέρον
οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ κατορθῳδων, οὐκ ὁπλίων καθά πολλὰς, γιγνόμεν
γυμνάν ἀμείωτας πολλάκις διαπληγέων, ἀλλ' οὔ ἐκ τοῦ
αὐτοῦ ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ κυβερνήσαν ἀγαθάν; ἀλλ' ἄλλοιο
'εὐφυξίας τοῦ δαίμον τοῦ δαίμων ἐκεῖ κυβερνήσαν. ἀλλ' ἐκ
ἀτομον θεῶν ἔδειξεν φαλέων τοῦ τουιότου. ἀλλ' μὴ τῶν
βαλλεόντων καὶ τῶν φρονιματων, εἰ ἐκ
1347b ἀναγείρῃ καὶ φύτευτες νῦν ἐπιτροπὶς τινὶ κατορθοδῷ
tα δὲ διὰ μήτο ἐστὶ ποὺς αἰνεῖον ἐν εὐφυξίαις. ἄλλως
μὴ ἐν γνωρίμους αὐτὰ ἢ τοῦ ἂν ἀπαίσιον ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ
ἐπί το πολύ, ἢ δὲ τύχη τοῦ ἄντωτον. εἰ μὲν οὖν το
παραλόγια εἰςπυγχάεις τίχερκες δοκεῖ εἰναι, ἀλλ',
eἰπερ διὰ τύχην εὐφυξίας, οὐκ ἂν δοξεῖτο τουιών,
1347c εἰναι τα ἄτοιν οἶνον αἰτία τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ το πολύ
ἐτι εἰ εἰτοι τοιοοῖ ἀπεγυγχάεις ἀποπυγχάεις, ὡσπέρ ἄτι
γνακῶς οὐκ ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς
1347d εὐφυξίαις, οὐ διὰ τύχην εἰλικρίνειον ὡς ὡς ἀλαν εὐφυξίαις,
eὐφυξίαις ὡς εὔσοις αἰτία τύχης ἀγαθίας

EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. II. 6-9

blank and another & six a man is fortunate according
as things were arranged by nature. Or is it
because he is loved by God, as the phrase goes, and
because success is something from outside? as for
instance a badly built ship often gets through a
voyage better, though not owing to itself, but be-
cause it has a good man at the helm. But on this
showing the fortunate man has the deity as steers-
man. But it is strange that a god or deity should
love a man of this sort; and not the best and most
prudent. If, then, the success of the lucky must
necessarily be due to either nature or intellect or
some guardianship, and of these three causes two
are ruled out, those who are fortunate will be on
by

nature. But again, nature of course is the cause of
a thing that happens either always or generally
in the same way, whereas fortune is the opposite.
If, then, unexpected achievement seems a matter of
fortune, but, if a man is fortunate owing to fortune,
it would seem that the cause is not of such a sort
as to produce the same result always or generally
further, if a man's succeeding or not succeeding
is due to his being of a certain sort, as a man does
not see clearly because he has blue eyes, not fortune
but nature is the cause; therefore he is not a man
who has good fortune, but one who has it as it were
a good nature. Hence we should have to say that
the people we call fortunate are so not by reason
of fortune; therefore they are not fortunate, for the
fortunate are those for whom good fortune is a cause
go of good things.

* Or, with Jackson's emendations, 'another & six according
as nature determines, so here a man is lucky because his
nature is such.'
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EUDENIAN ETHICS, VIII. 11. 9-12

But if so, shall we say that there is no such thing as fortune at all, or that it does exist but is not a 10 cause? No, it must both exist and be a cause. Consequently it will furthermore be a cause of goods or evils to certain persons; whereas if fortune is to be eliminated altogether, then nothing must be said to come about from fortune, in spite of the fact that, although there is another cause, because we do not see it we say that fortune is a cause—owing to which people give it as a definition of fortune that it is a cause incalculable to human reasoning, implying that it is a real natural principle. This, then, would be a matter for another inquiry. But since we see that some people have good fortune on one occasion, why should they not succeed a second time too owing to the same cause? and a third time? and a fourth? If the same cause produces the same effect. Therefore this will not be a matter of fortune; but when the same result follows from indeterminate and indefinite antecedents, it will be good or bad for somebody, but there will not be the knowledge of it that comes by experience, since, if there were, some fortunate persons would learn it, or indeed all branches of knowledge would, as Socrates said,* he forms of good fortune. What, then, prevents such things from happening to somebody a number of times running not because he has a certain character, but in the way in which for instance it would be possible to make the highest throw at dice every time? And what then? are there not some impulses in the spirit that arise from reasoning and others from irrational appetite? and are not the latter prior? because if the impulse caused by desire for what is

* Plato, Bucidyemus 270 c.
Or we =.

The pleasant exists by nature, appetition also would merely by nature proceed towards what is good in every case. If, therefore, some men have good natures—just as musical people though they have not learnt to sing have a natural aptitude for it—and without the aid of reason have an impulse in the direction of the natural order of things and desire the right thing in the right way at the right time, these men will succeed even although they are in fact foolish and irrational, just as the others will sing well although unable to teach singing. And men of this sort obviously are fortunate—men who without the aid of reason are usually successful. Hence it will follow that the fortunate are so by nature.

Or has the term "good fortune" more than one meaning? For some things are done from impulse and as a result of the agents' purposive choice, other things not so but on the contrary; and if in the former cases when the agents succeed they seem to have been caused badly, we say that in fact they have had good fortune; and again in the latter cases, if they wished for a different good or less good than they have got. The former persons then may possibly owe their good fortune to nature, for their impulse and appetite, being for the right object, succeeded, but their reasoning was foolish; and in their case, when it happens that their reasoning seems to be incorrect but that impulse is the cause of it, this impulse being right has saved them; although sometimes on the contrary owing to appetite they have reasoned in this way and come to misfortune.

Or, with Jackson's additions, just as untaught musical geniuses, without professional knowledge of singing.
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. 11. 16-20

16 But in the case of the others, then, how will good fortune be due to natural goodness of appetite and desire? The fact is that the good fortune here and that in the other case are the same. Or is good fortune of more than one kind, and is fortune two-fold? But since we see some people being fortunate contrary to all the teachings of science and correct calculation, it is clear that the cause of good fortune must be something different. But is it or is it not good fortune whereby a man formed a desire for the right thing and at the right time when in his case human reasoning could not make this calculation? For a thing the desire for which is natural is not altogether uncalculated, but the reasoning is perverted by something. So no doubt he seems fortunate, because fortune is the cause of things contrary to reason, and this is contrary to reason, for it is contrary to knowledge and to general principle. But probably it does not really come from fortune, but seems to do so from the above cause. So that this argument does not prove that good fortune comes by nature, but that not all those who seem fortunate succeed because of fortune, but because of nature; nor does it prove that there is no such thing as fortune, nor that fortune is not the cause of anything, but that it is not the cause of all the things of which it seems to be the cause.

19 Yet someone may raise the question whether right-reasonable fortune is the cause of precisely this—our forming a desire for the right thing at the right time. Or, a condition on that showing, will not fortune be the cause of everything—even of thought and deliberation? since it is not the case that one only deliberates when one has deliberated even previously to that

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EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIII. 11. 20-23

deliberation, nor does one only think when one has previously thought before thinking, and when on to infinity, but there is some starting-point; therefore thought is not the starting-point of thinking, nor deliberation of deliberating. Then what else is, save fortune? It will follow that everything originates from fortune. Or shall we say that there is a certain starting-point outside which there is no other, and that this, merely owing to its being of such and such a nature, can produce a result of such

21 and such a nature? But this is what we are investigating—what is the starting-point of motion in the spirit? The answer then is clear: as in the universe, so there, everything is moved by God; for in a manner the divine element in us is the cause

22 of all our motions. And the starting-point of reason is not reason but something superior to reason. What, then, could be superior even to knowledge and to intellect, except God? Not goodness, for goodness is an instrument of the mind; and owing to this, as I was saying some time ago, those are called fortunate who although irrational succeed in whatever they start on. And it does not pay them to deliberate, for they have within them a principle of a kind that is better than mind and deliberation

23 (whereas the others have reason but have not this) : they have inspiration, but they cannot deliberate. For although irrational they attain even to the prudent and wise—swiftness of divination: only the divination that is based on reason we must not specify, but some of them attain it by experience and others by practice in the use of observation:

* See 1347 b 26.
and these men use the divine. For this quality discerns aright the future as well as the present, and these are the men whose reason is disengaged. This is why the melancholic even have dreams that are true; for it seems that when the reason is disengaged principle has more strength—just as the blind remember better, being released from having their faculty of memory engaged with objects of sight.

24 It is clear, then, that there are two kinds of good fortune—one divine, owing to which the fortunate man's success is thought to be due to the aid of God, and this is the man who is successful in accordance with his impulse, while the other is he who succeeds against his impulse. Both persons are irrational. The former kind is more continuous good fortune, the latter is not continuous.

1 III. We have, then, previously spoken about each in the virtue in particular; and as we have distinguished their meaning separately, we must also describe in a mixed fashion the virtue constituted from them, to which we now give the name of nobility. Now it is manliness and others by habituation have this capacity of consulting God in examining things, and of discerning aright both the future and the present; and those also have it whose reason is disengaged in the manner described.

* Jackson (with some hints from the Latin version) emends to give 'just as blind men,' who are released from attention to visibles, remember better than others, because the faculty of memory is thus more earnestly addressed to what has been said.

* The ms. reading gives 'we were already giving the name,' but if that is correct, the passage referred to has been lost.

* καλοκαγαθία, like 'nobility,' connotes both social status and moral excellence; so καλοκαγαθία may be rendered 'gentleman.'
A brief commentary on the reconstructed text of the De bona fortuna.

To begin with, we must accept that we are dealing with some of the most textually corrupt passages in the entire Aristotelian corpus. What seems to be Aristotle's thought is itself difficult but the fragmentary manner in which it is now presented to us exacerbates what would in any case demand serious intellectual effort. The text is made up of a mass of snippets of arguments which can overlap, end suddenly, or just disappear. As a result we are given thoughts and ideas on the topic of fortune or luck, or some development from such thought and ideas, but no consistent line of argument. On the contrary, the reconstituted text of the De bona fortuna quite clearly presents variant conclusions within itself—such as whether divine providence is the cause of fortune or not, for example. It will be better then to treat the text of the De bona fortuna, as it is reconstituted, as one treats the fragments of the Pre-Socratic philosophers, and not as a coherent text unified in itself.

Despite all these difficulties, however, the ideas that the text provides are amazingly suggestive and one can appreciate how Thomas might have responded to them. It will be the scholarly, rather than the speculative task of the latter part of this chapter to show how Thomas actually did use them. For the time being, we will glance over some of the themes which emerge.

One problem which reoccurs at several places in the text is whether we are to take Good Fortune as referring to outward circumstances, over which the fortunate man has no control, or as referring to a man's own impulses or actions over which he has, or takes,
no rational control. The text sometimes seems to take one option, and sometimes the other. On the whole we will concentrate on the second.

One theme which is consistently followed, is that Fortune cannot be understood in terms of rationality or man's reasoning processes. "Fortune is not a kind of intelligent perception or a rational ruling." Fortune operates in a sphere beyond our competence where we have no control or effective action. What is more, it does not operate according to any regularity. Because of this, the question is raised as to whether we should seek to understand Luck or Fortune in terms of causality at all. If we say something is "caused" by good fortune, we might mean, in the case of external circumstances, that the circumstances caused the good fortune; in the case of a man's own actions we might mean that he did whatever he did by his character, or his nature, spontaneously, and it happened to be lucky. But in both these explanations, something other than luck or fortune is seen as the cause. To say and mean, 'It was caused by good fortune', is to say that there was no cause and these events just happened and turned out to be fortunate. To say something is "caused" by good fortune is to say that it was not caused according to any rational plan or project but that it just happened: it is to admit that we cannot give a rational explanation for why it happened in what turned out to be the right place, at the right time, in the right way, for the fortunate man. And if there is no rational explanation, then there can also be no prediction of when such good fortune is likely to happen again— it is purely fortuitous.

1. *Magna Moralia*, (henceforth referred to as MM) sections 1, 10 and 12, and *Eudemian Ethics*, (henceforth referred to as EE) section 23. 2. MM 2. 3. MM 1-2, EE 4-5, MM 5. 4. MM 10, EE 10-11.
So, Aristotle rules out any way of equating fortune with some form of reason, and this leaves him with understanding fortune in terms of either nature or divine providence. At various points the text rules out the notion of a divine origin for fortune because this would make God either incompetent or unjust, or it would imply that God had favourites. The sole possibility remaining — if divine providence is ruled out — is that fortune pertains to nature.

But two objections are raised against this. Firstly, that nature produced things in a regular fashion whereas fortune is irregular and unpredictable. Secondly, that if fortune is an aspect of nature then it is nature and not fortune which is the cause of the fortunate activity of the fortunate man: he succeeds because he has this particular sort of character or nature and one would therefore expect, and predict, that such a man would normally — naturally — be fortunate.

The enquiry, therefore, comes to an impasse. It is ruled out that Good Fortune pertains to the reasoning faculties of man but there are serious objections to equating it with either divine or natural causality. Hence the speculation has to move to a different level. Section EE 12-13 reopens the question along quite a different line of approach.

... are there not some impulses (συναισθήματα) in the spirit that arise from reasoning and others from irrational appetition? and are the latter not prior? because if the impulse caused by desire for what is pleasant exists by nature, appetition also would merely proceed by nature towards what is good in every case. If therefore, some men have good natures — just as musical people, though they have not learnt to sing, have a natural aptitude for it — and without the aid of reason have an impulse in the direction of the natural order of things and de-
sire the right thing in the right way at the right time, these men will succeed even although they are in fact foolish and irrational, just as the others will sing well although unable to teach singing. And men of this sort obviously are fortunate - men who without the aid of reason are usually successful. Hence it will follow that the fortunate men are so by nature.'

This fragment is open to the objections outlined above; that on this understanding a man is fortunate by nature. What is significant, however, is the attention drawn to the non-reasoning appetitive drives in man. If a man's nature were equipped with such a non-reasoning drive that what he desired was the right thing at the right time and in the right way, then he would have no use for reason or wisdom: in fact these would cripple his natural rightness.' Fragment MM 8 echoes a similar line of thought.

'Luck, then, is a natural instinct, not guided by reason. For the fortunate man is he who has an unreasoning impulse towards good things, and moreover obtains them.

There are four points here. Good Fortune is said to be a natural impulse, and this, secondly, is further described as a non-reasoning impulse, presumably prior to reason; thirdly, it is said that this drive is towards good things; and, fourthly, that it is successful, that it attains what it aims at. The fragment continues:

'... But this comes by nature; nature has implanted in our soul something which impels us irrationally towards our advantage. And should you ask one who is thus favoured why he thinks fit to act as he does, he will tell you he does not know, but merely sees fit to do so. His case is like that of men inspired; for they too have an unreasoning impulse towards some particular act.'

1. EE 23.
The metaphor of inspiration will be looked at shortly. The point being made is that there is a pre-rational drive in man towards what is for his advantage and perhaps the fortunate man has a natural non-reasoning drive which is so perfectly attuned to the natural order of things, and presumably to the particular circumstances surrounding him in a given situation, that he does not need to use his reasoning faculties.

This 'dream' of the totally fortunate man is an attractive and suggestive one, but for our study of St Thomas' thought, the significance of these passages, (EE 12-13 and MM 8), lies in the way the point made here is further developed in EE 20.

'Yet someone might raise the question whether fortune is the cause of precisely this - our forming a desire for the right thing at the right time. Or on this showing will not fortune be the cause of everything - even of thought and deliberation?'

The enquiry now is not about the generally fortunate man but about how any man comes to the right decision in a particular circumstance. The enquiry ceases to be an empirical one and becomes a metaphysical one: EE 21 crystallises the question:

'But this is what we are investigating - what is the starting place of motion in the spirit?'

We are not now asking about the source of fortunate activity but about the source of any form of human activity, rational or non-rational. Why does a man begin to deliberate about something he has not deliberated about before? Why does a man have a particular drive towards something when he has not experienced this particular drive before this moment.

1. An answer to this question might lie in seeing the external object or stimulus as determinant. For Thomas this has its place but one still has to ask why the will, in its freedom determines to respond or to refuse to respond to the possibility the stimulus provides.
It is significant that all Thomas' paraphrases of the De bona fortuna are taken from the sections we are now dealing with. Obviosely here is the germinating seed which the De bona fortuna provided for his thought. EE 21 continues:

'The answer then is clear; as in the universe, so there everything is moved by God; for in a manner the divine element in us is the cause of all our motions.'

It is clear, as we shall see, why St Thomas was to use this text first of all in an argument against the 'Pelagiani'. It continues:

'And the starting point of reason is not reason but something superior to reason. What then can be superior even to knowledge and intellect, except God?'

If the investigation is now into the starting point of motion in the spirit, then it is no longer enough to posit either reason or a natural drive. 'Everything is moved by God'. As we shall see, with such an axiom, Thomas, confronted by the task of presenting a coherent cosmology, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, could unite all things and all motions within creation into the single unity of the divine plan. The question remains however of how human freedom can be preserved if God and/or a pre-rational impulse are presented as the origin of human motion.

There is yet one further development possible from the scattered arguments of this text; a development more of a theological nature than of a metaphysical or empirical kind.

'Or is it because he is loved by God, as the phrase goes, and because success is something from outside? as for instance a badly built ship often gets through a voyage better, though not owing to

itself, but because it has a good man at the helm. But on this showing the fortunate man has the deity as steersman. But it is strange that a god or deity should love a man of this sort and not the best and most prudent.' (1)

Here we seem to have an obvious correlation with the Gifts of the Spirit as Thomas will present them in the Secunda Pars. It is this very text which Thomas is referring to in IaIIae,q.68,a.1, when he introduces his theory of the two principles of motio in man, one intrinsic, (reason) and one extrinsic, (God).

'... et etiam Philosophus hoc dicit, in cap. de Bona Fortuna.'

The other passage from the De bona fortuna in q.68,a.1., which Thomas paraphrases at the end of the article, is found in EE 23.

'And it does not pay them to deliberate, for they have within them a principle of a kind that is better than mind and deliberation (whereas the others have reason but have not this): they have inspiration (ἐνακοίτητι or ἐνδοκοίτητι) but they cannot deliberate.'

Thomas' paraphrase is:-

'Et Philosophum etiam dicit, in cap. de Bona Fortuna, quod his qui movetur per instinctum divinum non expedit consiliari secundum rationem humana, sed quod sequuntur interiorem instinctum; quia movetur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana.'

It is as well to point out that whereas Thomas is talking in terms of the originary impulse to any movement in man, Aristotle, in this particular passage is referring to the activity of deliberating.

But the importance of this passage and its paraphase is not just that Thomas uses it at this important juncture, at the culmination of his argument in q.68,a.1. If we follow O'Connor, we might see its importance also in how it was translated in the medieval latin text which Thomas might have used. In the printed latin edi-

1. EE 6-7. 2. O'Connor, pp. 144-147.
tion of the De bona fortuna of 1482, the term ἐνθυμεών or ἐνθυμήν - even the modern critical editions cannot determine which is correct - is translated as 'divinos instinctos', and in some of the earlier manuscripts is translated as 'divinos instinctus'.

O'Connor comments:

'[One cannot help but wonder whether this may not have been the source of his terminology for the prompting of the Holy Spirit, instinctus divinus and interior instinctus, which appear in this article.]

It is, in fact, precisely at this point where he uses his paraphrase, that Thomas first introduces the term instinctus to replace the term inspiratio. And with this change in terminology Thomas has completed the groundwork of his theory of the Gifts, and from there onwards, throughout the rest of the Secunda Pars, he discusses the Gifts in terms of this 'instinctus'.

In an Appendix devoted entirely to this matter, O'Connor concludes in the following way. The length of the following quotation reveals the present writer's debt to his work.

'Thomas chose the term (instinctus) in preference to another which was available to him, namely inspiratio, inspiration. The choice seems to have been quite deliberate ...
This choice is all the more striking in that inspiratio was a term well established in theological usage, whereas instinctus as a noun had received comparatively little use in any context.
Nevertheless, he does not simply replace the one term by the other. In IaIIae,q.68 he begins his exposition of the nature of the Gifts by declaring that they are in us by divine inspiration, and goes on to explain that their effect is to make man promptly mobile to divine inspiration. With that, however, the term inspiratio drops out of the discussion almost completely, and is replaced by instinctus ...
After a minute examination of the way Thomas uses these terms, my conclusion is that instinctus

1. O'Connor, pp. 144 and 146. 2. ibid., p. 145.
was chosen in order not to specify in any way whatsoever the nature of the Holy Spirit's action. Inspiratio, the term traditionally used for the action of spirits upon man, designated a type of action ... Instinctus, however, does not designate a type of action at all. It refers to that by which an action is provoked or elicited. In present context, it does not designate the action of the Holy Spirit directly, but only indirectly, as that which somehow initiated the human action under consideration. Moreover, it is free from all the associations with which the term inspiratio has been coloured by long theological tradition about divine (and diabolical) inspirations. Hence, when a man is said to act by the instinctus of the Holy Spirit all that this means, so far as the force of the word itself is concerned (we are not concerned here with doctrine), is that the action was brought about by the influence of the Holy Spirit. Nothing whatsoever is specified about the nature of the influence, or the form it has taken, e.g. whether it was an impulse, invitation, illumination, strengthening, or the like.

When, on the other hand, the term inspiratio is used at the beginning of this treatise, it does not refer to anything other than that same influence which, however, it designates directly, contrary to Thomas' usual preference. Why then is it used at all? Presumably for dialectical motives: to introduce the topic in the usual and traditional language before replacing it with language which was both unusual and, because of its abstractness, more difficult. (1)

With this comment from O'Connor, we will pass on to look at how Thomas used this text at various important junctures in his mature theology. This study will not be taking us away from the study of the Gifts of the Spirit but rather will highlight the issues involved in Thomas' mature theory regarding their importance.

St Thomas' use of the De Bona Fortuna.

St Thomas uses the De bona fortuna explicitly in the following passages. There are difficulties regarding the date and place of the writing of the various texts but as these difficulties are of no serious concern to our own project we can be content to accept Weisheipl's conclusions.¹

Summa Contra Genitiles, III, c.89, c.92. (Naples/Orvieto, c. 1261-3).

De Malo, q.3, a.3, obj. XIa and resp.; q.6, a.1. (Rome 1266-7).

Summa Theologiae, Ia pars, q.82, a.4, ad3um. (Rome/Viterbo 1266-8)

Quaestiones de quolibet, Ia.7. (Paris 1269).

Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, q.9, a.4; q.68, a.1; q.80, a.1, obj. 3 and ad3um; q.109, a.2, ad1um. (Viterbo/Paris 1268-70)

De Sortibus, 4 (Paris 1271).

Deman, in his study of Thomas' use of the De bona fortuna, begins by citing two texts dealing with the same problem, and, in contrasting them, shows how Thomas' use of this work led him to deepen his insight into the metaphysics of the actus humanus. The first test is De Veritate q.22, q.12, which can be dated 1258-9: utrum voluntas intellectum et ceteras animae vires moveat. Deman focuses on the second objection and its answer.

'Si voluntas movet intellectum ad suum actum, tunc sequitur quod intellectus intelligat quia voluntas vult ipsum intelligere. Sed voluntas non vult aliquid nisi intellectum. Ergo prius intellectus intellectit ipsum intelligere quam voluntas illud vellet. Sed antequam intellectus hoc intelligeret, oportet ponere quod voluntas illud vellet, quia ponitur intellectus a voluntate moveri. Ergo est abire in infinitum; vel dicendum quod voluntas non movet intellectum.'

¹ J.A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, his life, thought and work, 1973, pp. 355-402. I have also used the Indices of the Leonine Edition Opera Omnia, vol. XVI, to ascertain that there are all the relevant references.
And the answer Thomas gives is:-

'Ad secundum, dicendum quod non est procedere in infinitum; statur enim in appetitu naturali quo inclinatur intellectus in suum actum.'

This simple answer is replaced by a far more elaborate one when the same problem is posed in Deman's second text, Prima Pars, q.82,a.4, ad 3um.

'Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statur in intellectus sicut in primo. Omne enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praeceedit apprehensionis: sed non omnem apprehensionem praeceedit motus voluntatis. Sed principium consulandi et intelligendi est aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus, ut etiam Aristoteles dicit in VII Ethicae Epistemae: et per hunc modum ostendit quod non est procedere in infinitum.'

The most significant change here is the absence of any reference to 'natural appetite' in the later answer. This does not mean that Thomas no longer sees any role for 'natural appetite', but it no longer can serve as a satisfactory answer to the question: the same question posed in EE 21 - 'What is the starting-place of motion in the spirit?'; τίς ἡ τῆς κινήσεως ὀρχή ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Thomas continues to display his noted 'intellectualism', giving priority quite clearly to the act of understanding over the act of volition, but the will now is seen as moved at its most originary level not by the human intellect, for that would involve the regression ad infinitum, but by this 'higher intellectual principle', which is God. The source of all decision-making and understanding is 'aliquod principium intellectivum altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus'. It is no coincidence that Thomas refers to the De bona fortuna here because he has universalised the ideas Aristotle thrashed out in dealing with the particular problem of good fortune, (see EE 21 and page 162 above).
Deman uses contrasts like this one between *De Veritate*, q. 22 and the *Summa Ia*, q. 82, not only to show up the significance of the *De bona fortuna*, but also to attempt to date when Thomas first read or used this text. His conclusion is that between writing *De Veritate* q. 22 and the *Summa Contra Gentiles* III, c. 89, Thomas first came across this work: in other words, at the beginning of his move from Paris to Italy around 1259-60.\(^1\) To back up his case, Deman cites a whole host of Thomas' earlier works indicating passages where one would expect Thomas to use the *De bona fortuna* and arguing from the absence of any references to it before 1259-60, that Thomas was not acquainted with it.\(^2\) Certainly what can be stated is that if Thomas did know this work it does not seem to have had any significance to him until around 1260. As we noted above in chapter 3, other factors, especially his reading of the Greek Fathers and the documents of the early Western Councils against Pelagianism and his subsequent awareness and rejection of semi-Pelagianism, might have stimulated his interest in the *De bona fortuna* as a useful tool for his later theology.\(^3\)

We will be examining each of the references to the *De bona fortuna* in turn but we will take a thematic approach. Thomas used the *De bona fortuna* to develop a sophisticated analysis of the intrinsic receptivity of the human intellect and will. We will therefore follow through his use of this text under three headings:

1. the receptivity of the will at its most originary level, *quoad exercitium*.
2. the *De bona fortuna* and the role of rationality.

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1. Deman, p. 42. 2. ibid., pp. 42-43. For corroborating evidence see the references to Bouillard, Weisheipl and Schillebeeckx below, p. 71. 3. above p. 74ff.
1. The receptivity of the will at its most originary level, 'quoad exercitium'.

The argument here will be developed by examining in turn four texts in which St Thomas explicitly uses the De bona fortuna. They are:

- Prima Secundae q.9, a.4.
- Summa Contra Gentiles, III c.89.
- De Malo q.VI,1.
- Prima Secundae q.105,a.2,adjum.

Prima Secundae q.9,a.4.

We have already looked at Prima Pars q.82,a.4. There Thomas gives what might be called an 'intellectualist' answer to the question of what moves the will to act: in other words, he posits the priority of intellect over will, even though he further refines his basic model by presenting as the originating intellectual apprehension, an intellectual principle higher than human understanding, God. In our next two texts however, this Aristotelian model of the passivity of the will before the intellect is renounced. In the De Malo and the Summa IaIIae, Thomas presents a distinction between the specification of the will and the exercise of the will. The intellect causes the specification of the will - in this the priority of the intellect is retained - but the actual exercise of the will is the result of its own self-motion. The will therefore has its own freedom of movement, quoad exercitium, to act or not to act, no matter what the stimulus from the intellectual apprehension. Only as regards absolute beatitude is the will determined, quoad exercitium, of necessity.¹ Lottin suggests that Thomas was concerned to develop a metaphysical structure which allowed

1. IaIIae,q.9,a.4; q.10,a.2; q.13,a.6. See Lonergan, pp. 93-97.
more freedom to the will because of the doctrine of determinism taught by the Parisian Averroists from the 1250s onwards.¹

But if the will is free, regarding whether to act or not to act, what motivates the will to act or not to act? What wills the will to will? Here it is the De bona fortuna which provides the catalyst for Thomas' mature thought. In Prima Secundae q.9,a.4, the question posed is: utrum voluntas moveatur ab aliquo exteriori principio? As regards the determining of the will by the intellectually grasped object, quaed specificationem, the external object does move the will, but, if the will is free, quaed exercitium, then neither the intellect nor anything external can determine it. But Thomas questions this, the obvious development from his own theory.

'Sed eo modo, quo movetur quantum ad exercitium actus, ad hunc necessse est ponere voluntatem ab aliquo principio exteriori moveri. Omne enim quod quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia indiget moveri ab aliquo moveante. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum.'

Here we see an application of Thomas' general theory of motio, which we looked at above.² Thomas accepts that the will can be said to move itself in that in deciding on a certain 'end' the person concerned wills also the 'means' to that end, but what initiates the fixing on a certain purpose? He gives the example of a man who decides to become healthier and who takes the appropriate course of action: the question still remains, what initiated this project?

'Sed quia non semper sanitatem actu voluit, necesse est quod incoeperit velle sanar ab aliquo movente. Et si quidem ipsa moveret seipsa ad volendum, oportuisset quod mediante consilio hoc ageret ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita, hoc autem non est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponerequod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu

¹. Lottin, 'Liberté humaine et motion divine' R.T.A.M. 7 (1935), pp. 52-69, 156-173. ². See above ch. 6, especially p. 722.
alicujus exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles concludit in quodam cap. Ethic. Eudemicae."

It is interesting that the term 'instinctus' occurs here as in our own text on the Gifts of the Spirit. Gilby has an interesting footnote at this point on the by now familiar argument against regression ad infinitum.

'It is not argued that you have to come to number 1 within a series of events, but that you have to go outside them. Thus, applied to the present question, you have to look to act that is not deliberate to explain a set of deliberate acts, and to a mover from outside to explain the will's automatous activity'. (1)

This is precisely the way Thomas answers the objections to his conclusion.

The first objection is a serious one: if one is led to posit an external principle to the will's own act, does this not destroy the voluntary nature of the will's motio? Thomas begins his reply by agreeing:

'Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de ratione voluntarii est quod principium eius sit intra.'

He does not deny that there is an intrinsic principle to the will's activity, only that this alone, on examination of its own structures, is sufficient.

'... sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinsecum sit primum principium non motum ab alio. Unde motus voluntarius, etsi habeat principium proximum intrinsecum, tamen principium primum est ab extra, sicut et primum principium motus naturalis est ab extra, quod scilicet movet naturam.'

The will now is presented as only one case of a general law. All created natures fulfill their natures by means of their own intrinsic principle of motio, and this principle is brought into activity by

1. Gilby ed. vol. 17, p. 72. 2. see IaIIae q.6.
the first moving principle, which is external to it. The will, which by nature acts in a voluntary manner is brought to act in a voluntary manner by the extrinsic first moving principle; 'ex instinc-
tu alicujus exterioris moventis ut Aristoteles concludit'.

But is not any such form of external stimulus inevitably a vi-o-
lation of the will's freedom? This is the second objection in this article and it is important to us if we are to understand how the Gifts of the Spirit might operate in the human will. Thomas replies:

'dicendum quod hoc non sufficit ad rationem violenti quod principium sit extra, sed oportet addere quod nihil conferat vimpatientis, quod non contingit dum voluntas ab exteriori movetur; nam ipsa est quae vult, ab alia tamen mota. Esset autem mutus iste violentus, si esset contrarius motui voluntatis, quod in proposito esse non potest, quia sic idem velit et non vellet.'

What we are to picture here is not a mere passivity on the part of the will, still less a reluctant inertia, but a sort of active recep-
tivity. The extrinsic principle does not work 'against the grain' of the will, but with it. When, as elsewhere, this extrinsic prin-
ciple is clearly identified as the Creator God, we are not to envisage an alien force violently moving the human will, but the Creator pro-
videntially working through the very natures he has created.

However, in this article, Thomas does not call the external principle of motio, 'God', as he does in Prima Secundae, q.68,a.1, but, at most, characterises it with the Aristotelian title of 'First Mover'. Now this is important because it highlights the fact that Thomas can give two types of argument to illustrate the relationship between the human will and the Creator God. In the next passage we will examine, Thomas' argument will rest on the nature of the ordered

1. corpus of this article. 2. IIaIIae,q.23,a.2; Ia,q.104, a.4 corpus,ad1um,ad2um; Ia,q.104,a.5.
structures within creation and how their relationships are used instrumentally by the Creator; and later still, we shall present another example of the same structures, regarding the human intellect this time, in the relationship between the *Lex Aeterna* and human rationality.¹

But here, in this article, another type of argument has been used; one based on an examination of the *intrinsic* nature of the human will, resulting in the need to posit a radical receptivity at its most original level. The answer to the third objection concludes this argument and opens up a vista of the other, cosmological, argument.

> "Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas quantum ad ali-quid sufficienter se movet, et in suo ordine, sicut agens proximum; sed non potest seipsam movere quantum ad omnia, ut ostensum est, unde indiget moveri ab alio, sicut a primo movente."

The will is its own master in its own frame of reference, but that frame of reference is not the whole picture; let us move on to the wider vision.

*Contra Gentiles III, c.89.*

The very title of this chapter links it in with our discussion so far: *Quod motus voluntatis causatur a Deo, et non solum a potentia voluntatis.* The context of the chapter is a discussion of Divine Providence. Thomas' claim is that Providence rules all things; absolutely nothing is independent of God's purpose and power. This obviously raises the problem, regarding the will, of man's freedom.

Thomas opens this chapter by accepting that some Christian writers have tried to preserve the notion of human freedom by holding that God causes man to will, but does not cause him to will this or that particular thing. In other words, man has absolute freedom of choice.

¹. see below p. 196 ff.
and God's providence works on this freedom only through the influence of external events on man. Thomas himself, at an earlier stage in his career, held a view similar to this, but by the time of his stay in Italy and his second Paris Regency, he was denouncing such a theory as Pelagian.\footnote{1} If such a theory was accepted, then God's providence would be restricted to external events and the area of man's free acts of choice would be autonomous, free from God's sovereignty.

Note that what Thomas, at this point in the Summa Contra Gentiles, is primarily interested in, is not how the human will operates, but in the universal ordering of Providence and how the will has a place true to its own nature within this cosmological sweep. Hence divine causality, because of its absolute infallibility, must extend not only to the power of the will but also to its acts. He defends this claim by reasserting an even greater one. This larger claim is based on his preceding exposition of the ordering of the cosmos as a whole, (chapters 67 and 70).

\footnotesize
\begin{quote}
\textbf{Item: Deus non solum dat rebus virtutes, sed etiam nulla res potest propria virtute agere, nisi etiam agat in virtute ipsius, ut supra (c. 70) ostensum est. Ergo homo non potest virtute voluntatis sibi data uti, nisi in quantum agit in virtute Dei.}'
\end{quote}

God not only gives powers to created things, but no thing can act by its own power proper to itself, unless it is acting through God's power. It follows from this, applying it to the question in hand, that man cannot use the power of the will natural to him except in so far as we posit the activity of God.\footnote{2} Every movement of the will, therefore, is caused by the will of God.\footnote{3}

\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
\item see Lonergan, p. 101 and p. 39 for references and a discussion of this. \textit{See also} above p. 70.
\item \textit{S.C.G. III, c. 148.}
\item For a modern trenchant defence of this theological viewpoint, see H. McCabe, 'God', \textit{New Blackfriars}, 1980, pp. 408-414, 456-470; \textit{1981}, p. 4 - 16.
\end{enumerate}
Here we have then a point like that in IaIIae,q.68,a.1, where two major themes are linked together, viz. the profoundity of man's volition and the unchallengeable sovereignty of God in his Providence. One relates to an Augustinian interest in the archeology of the human will; the other to a Dionysian vision of the ordered relationship between God and his creatures. Given this, it is significant that precisely at this point, to bind the two together, Thomas quotes the De bona fortuna.


De Malo,q.VI.1 and Prima Secundae q.105,a.2,ad1um.

In the last line of this paraphrase of the De bona fortuna, Thomas presents God as the first principle of our willing and of our acts of deliberating, taking counsel and making choices. In this reference to the activity of decision-making he is being true to the general drift of the De bona fortuna: but this is not the usual way he uses that text. Aristotle is concerned with the problems of choice and correct decision-making, but Thomas uses the text as if it referred to questions about the will. Why is this? What lies behind it? That Thomas does use the text in this way is highlighted in our present text, (De malo,q.VI.1.), entitled, 'De electione humana seu libero arbitrio'. After presenting various theories, he introduces his own solution with a rather casual reference to the De bona
fortuna, almost as if the text were well-known and quite self-explanatory.

'Relinquitur ergo, sicut concludit Aristoteles in cap. de Bona Fortuna, quod id quod primo movet voluntatem et intellectum sit aliqua supra voluntatem et intellectum, scilicet Deus.'

It cannot be claimed that this is clearly what the text of the De bona fortuna presents — if it can be said to present anything clearly — but this is certainly what Thomas has got out of it. He has read it creatively rather than critically and, in this way, it has become a central element in his thought. What is significant about this passage is that the attention is not focused on the faculty of free-judgement itself but on what is presupposed by it — the basic powers of the intellect and the will.

There are two points to made here: one relates to Thomas' 'eisegesis' of the De bona fortuna; the other to the way his understanding of liberum arbitrium has changed by the time of his later thought.

In both cases there is a similar movement in Thomas' work, in this later period; a movement away from dealing with individual problems in isolation — free judgement or good fortune — to a deeper metaphysical penetration of the underlying and presupposed principles. And in both cases, this deeper metaphysical, rather than moralistic, analysis, is particularly evident in regard to the human will. Lonergan gives a good summary of Thomas' creative eisegesis of the De bona fortuna.

'By juxtaposing Aristotle's theory of chance and fortune with Aristotle's theory of prudence, Eudemus has been faced with the difficulty that not only the imprudent sometimes make good out of sheer luck but also the prudent have to be lucky. For the prudent man in the concrete is prudent because he takes counsel; but even if he takes counsel about taking counsel, one cannot suppose an infi-
nite regress. What accounts for the initium consiliandi? Erasmus answered by dividing men into three classes, the imprudent, the ordinary prudent and those favoured few whose initium consiliandi comes from an instinctus divinus..."  

This would seem to be a fairer exegesis of the De bona fortuna than Thomas' in the De Malo, but Lonergan continues, making the point that we are trying to emphasise.

"... But St Thomas with his firmer grasp of wider principles saw that the need of some divine influence was universal; indeed the problem of the initium consiliandi was but a particular case of the more general doctrine of Aristotelian promotion. And thus it is that we find St Thomas attaining precision in his account of the initium consiliandi only in the measure that his theory of the will and of its promotion develops'. (1)

As regards liberum arbitrium, this is not the place to develop a major analysis of this difficult concept. The point to be made is that liberum arbitrium alone - as an isolated problem - is not the focal point of Thomas' mature thought on the actus humamus. Indeed, if we follow Lonergan, there seems to be a progressive de-centering of this concept.

"... in his Commentary on the Sentences he rejected St Albert's view that the Liberum arbitrium was a third faculty distinct from both intellect and will. In the second place this term liberum arbitrium loses its place of importance; it had its origin in the Stoic autexousion and it persisted until the Prima Pars with distinct questions devoted to it and to the will; but in the Prima secundae there are sixty-three articles in a row, and though all treat of the will, the term liberum arbitrium fails to appear in the title of a single one." (2)

Instead of focusing on the freedom of the act of judging, then, Thomas' later thought focuses on what is presupposed by it, the freedom of the intellect and the freedom of the will quoad exercitium. Already, in the Prima Pars, Thomas had taken the decisive step of pla-

1. Lonergan, p. 100. 2. Lonergan, p. 93.
cing liberum arbitrium in the will and not in the intellect because its characteristic act, choice, electio, is in the will. He no longer sees it as inevitably bound up with rational deliberation - as Aristotle does in the *Nicomachean Ethics* - because he posits it of angels who know by pure intuition. In the Prima Secundae, however, in q.6-17, there is an even greater development. There the term is, as it were, 'deconstructed' and its characteristic act, i.e. electio, is seen not as simply correlated with it but as part of a whole host of elements - *consensus, consilio, uti.* - all of which involve the interaction of the will and the intellect, so that Thomas can say, regarding *consensus*, that the intellect assents to a choice in as much as it is moved to do so by the will. So far has he moved from the notion of the passivity of the will before the intellect!

The important point being made within this obscure litany of scholastic terminology, is that if we have correctly posited a receptivity of the will, then it follows, given also this more sophisticated analysis of the act of electio, that within the act of choice - in which man's freedom as an agent is exhibited - that there is also a receptivity. We posit then a receptivity within man's most characteristically autonomous act. For the moment, to sum up, we can say that within any act of choice we have to posit two initiatory movers; man's intellect, *quoad specificationem*, and, in the will's own self-movement *quoad exercitium*, an extrinsic principle, *quod est Deus*.

That this summary is consistent with Thomas' own solution, and that he used the *De bona fortuna* to articulate it, can be shown by one

1. Ia,q.83. 2. on this, see the footnote by K. Foster in Gilby Ed. vol. 9, pp. 178-179. 3. IaIIae,q.13-15. 4. IaIIae, q.15,a.1,ad3um.
further quotation, IaIIae,q.109,a.2,ad1um. Here Thomas is presenting his theology of man's need for grace and the objection raised is that man is master of his will and therefore can will good without the need of grace.

'Utrum homo possit velle et facere bonum absque gratia: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo est dominus suorum actuum, et volendi et non volendi, propter deliberationem rationis, quae potest flecti ad unam partem vel ad aliam. Sed quod deliberet vel non deliberet, si hujus etiam sit dominus, oportet quod hoc sit per deliberationem praeecedentem. Et cum hoc non procedat in infinitum, oportet quod finaliter deveniat ad hoc quod liberum arbitrium hominis moveatur ab aliquo exteriori principio quod est supra mentem humanam, scilicet a Deo, ut etiam Philosophus probat. Unde mens hominis etiam sani non ita habet dominium sui actus quin indiget moveri a Deo; et multo magis liberum arbitrium hominis infirmi post peccatum, quod impeditur a bono per corruptionem naturae.'

The interesting element in this quotation for our own purpose at the moment is that here Thomas speaks not of the will or the intellect being moved by God, as the external principle, but the liberum arbitrium being moved in this way. Once again, it is significant that Thomas refers back to the De bona fortuna at this crucial point.

2. The De bona fortuna and the role of rationality.

'On the other hand, it is surely impossible to regard Fortune as a kind of intelligent Perception or rational Ruling; for their domain also exhibits an orderly sequence and invariability which Fortune lacks; so that where there is most of Intelligence and Rationality, there is least of Fortune or Luck; and most of the latter where there is least intelligence'. (1)

The De bona fortuna quite clearly rules out any idea that reason could be the initiating source of human motion in the fortunate man as fortunate'. Its very significance is that it calls into question the ratio-

1. MM 2.
nalist ethics of the Aristotelian system of the virtues. But, the De bona fortuna cannot be read as a coherent text and in answering the central question of what initiates *moto* in the fortunate man, it presents two quite distinct answers; one regarding the a-rational or pre-rational in man; the other, relating to the supra-rational. EE 12-13, provides us with the first:—

'*... are there not some impulses (ἀφιμὴ) in the spirit which arise from reasoning and others from irrational appetition? and are not the latter prior? because if the impulse carried by desire for what is pleasant exists by nature, appetition would also merely by nature proceed towards what is good in every case. If therefore some men have good natures... and without the aid of reason have an impulse in the direction of the natural order of things and desire the right thing in the right way at the right time, these men will succeed even although they are in fact foolish and irrational...'* (1)

As for the second, we can take EE 21 as an example:—

'*But this is what we are investigating — what is the starting-point of motion in the spirit? The answer is clear; as in the universe, so there, everything is moved by God; for in a manner the divine element in us is the cause of all our motions. And the starting point of reason is not reason but something superior to reason. What then can be superior even to knowledge and intellect, except God.*' (2)

Thomas quite clearly favours the latter, as we have seen, but he does not totally dismiss the former, even though, as we saw in the first example from Ia,q.84,a.4, he cannot accept 'natural appetite' itself as a sufficient solution to the problem in hand.³ The De bona fortuna, in fact, sets up two disjunctions: one, a distinction between the irrational impulses in man and reason; the second, a similar distinction between human reason and a divine instinctus. Thomas' achievement is to negate these disjunctions and present, as it were

1. EE 12-13.  2. EE 21.  3. see above p. 167.
within one 'flow' of Divine Providence, the harmony of the pre-ratio-
nal, rational and supra-rational in man. Two areas of research are
therefore forced upon us. Firstly, what is the relationship between
man's rationality and his a-rational or pre-rational powers? And,
secondly, what is the relationship between his reason and the supra-
rational power, 'quod est Deus'? Once again we must be aware that
Thomas does not use the De bona fortuna within its own terms but with-
in the terms of his own wider metaphysical analysis. Indeed we might
give the next few paragraphs, dealing with our first question, the
title, 'How Thomas does NOT use the De bona fortuna'.

The appetitive inclination of any thing follows from the nature
of the thing that it is, it is therefore called 'natural appetition'.
In creatures endowed with sensitive and intellectual powers by nature,
the type of inclination is bound up with the kind of knowledge they
possess. Thus plants and animals, endowed with sensitive natures
respond directly to sense-stimuli within the fixed pattern of their
natural inclination. The higher animals, however, endowed with a
more complex and integrated kind of sense-knowledge — per sensum
et aestionem naturalem — share in some form of voluntary activity
which only intellectual beings possess to the full, that is, purposive
activity. 2 We can say therefore that man, as an ensouled body, has
three kinds of inclinations; — a natural one, (he is influenced by
gravity, for example), a sensitive one, (he is drawn by what he per-
cieves), and a rational one, called the will, (by which he is drawn
to what he understands as good and/or convenient, and to which, in his
freedom, he can decide to act upon or not).

1. To call this latter "animality" would pre-determine the
question by presenting man as animal plus reason. As we shall see,
Thomas and Aristotle present a more sophisticated model in which man's
"lower" powers are human and not animal: they participate in his rea-
soning. 2. IaIIae, q.6,a.2.
Two questions are therefore before us. How does the rational appetite, the will, govern the sensitive inclinations? and do these latter have anything to offer towards the fully human act, the actus humanus? Thomas follows Aristotle in the Nicomachean rather than the Eudemian Ethics. There, in the last chapter of book one, Aristotle writes:

"But there appears to be another element in the soul which, though irrational, yet in a manner participates in rational principle. In self-restrained and unrestrained people we approve their principle, or the rational part of their souls, because it urges them in the right way and exhorts them to the best course; but their nature seems also to contain another element beside that of rational principle, which combats and resists that principle ... But this second element also seems, as we said to participate in rational principle; at least in the self-restrained man it obeys the behest of principle — and no doubt in the temperate and brave man it is still more amenable, for all parts of his nature are in harmony with principle.

Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as a whole, is double. One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; the other, the seat of the appetites and of desire in general does in a sense participate in principle, as being amenable and obedient to it, (in the sense in fact in which we speak of 'paying heed' (άκοα ἀκοή) to one's father and friends, not in the sense of the term 'rational' in mathematics). And that principle can in a manner appeal to the irrational part is indicated by our practice of admonishing delinquents, and by our employment of rebuke and exhortation in general.

If on the other hand it be more correct to speak of the appetitive part of the soul also as rational, in that case it is the rational part which, as well as the whole soul is divided into two, the one division having rational principle in the proper sense and in itself, the other obedient to it as a child to a father." (1)

Aristotle and Thomas have a view of man's rationality which is at quite a distance from Descartes 'res cogitans'. The key notion seems

1. Nicomachean Ethics, I.13, translated by D.P. Chase, Everyman Series, and, for Thomas, see Ia11ae,q.24,a.1,ad2um; Ia,q.81,a.3.
to be the concept of 'participation', so that the a-rational inclinations in man are open to sharing in his rational appetite, the will.

On the one hand, the sensory impulses have a role to play - man's understanding is, after all, based on what he receives through the senses - and, on the other hand, reason is to control and not dominate, in some tyrannical sense, the whole of his being. On this last point Thomas has an attractive paraphrase of Aristotle.

'... sicut Philosophus dicit, ratio, in qua est voluntas movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem; non quidem despotico principatu, sicut movetur servus a domino, sed principatu regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines reguntur a gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere voluntatem; et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri. (1)

There is then a place for the inclinations of the sense-faculties, but it is only in as much as these inclinations are under the supervision of reason - to accept or check them - that these have moral significance. In themselves they are more or less powerful drives towards certain choices but it is man's reason and rational will which determines the choice and it is this determination, whether to accept or reject, which gives the resulting action a moral content. The weakness of the first argument from the De bona fortuna, (EE 12-13), is that it makes the act of a fortunate man an a-moral act and therefore one lacking in full humanity: it would make man the instrument used by his appetites or inclinations (δυνατὰ) rather than seeing man as using all his receptivities and potentialities and acting in his wholeness. What is more, this argument overlooks the fact that just as man, in his natural inclinations, is absolutely fixed, so man, in his appetites, is relatively determined into fixed patterns of response.

1. IaIIae,q.9,a.2,adsum, see also, q.17,a.7. 2. Ia q.81,a.3,ad2um.
Only through his use of reason is man free and capable of responding adequately to the whole complexity of situations which confront him. The first argument, therefore cannot stand by itself but can still be useful to establish the role of the a-rational inclinations within the act of choice. As we have seen, Thomas is increasingly fascinated by the freedom of man's rational appetite, the will, even as regards reason itself. His later thought on the act of choice, election, will therefore be highly nuanced and will be at quite a distance from Cartesian or Nietzschean philosophies of rational man and his will-power.

So, the φυτά of the De bona fortuna are relegated to a role as part of a greater whole. The first argument of the De bona fortuna claimed that it was the instinctual promptings of man's pre-rational inclinations which leads a man to make fortunate choices without using reason. Thomas has made reason dominant but left a place, within the rational act, for such inclinations. For him, after all, man's understanding is based on what he receives from the senses and not from the external senses only but from the unified internal senses of the vis aestimativa, the sensus communis, the imaginatio and the vis memorativa. These elements which form man's ratio particularis can have a major effect on the determinations made by the will and intellect. As Thomas rather laconically remarks:

"... actus et electiones hominum sunt circa singularia; unde ex hoc ipso quod appetitus sensitus est virtus particularis, habet magnum virtutem ad hoc quod per ipsum sic disponatur homo ut ei aliquid videatur sic vel aliter circa singularia." (2)

But even here we are not to think in terms of irrational φυτά but in terms of the habitus which the ratio particularis, as participating

1. Ia,q.78,a.4. 2. IaIIae,a.9,a.3,ad2um.
in reason, has acquired.

'Quamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus sensitivis apprehensivis possint ponti aliqui habitus, secundum quos homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus. Unde etiam Philosophus dicit quod consuetudo multum operatur ad bene memorandum; quia etiam istae vires moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis.' (1)

Consistently, then, Thomas focuses on reason and on the habitus which perfect it and all the other powers which, in whatever way, participate in it. For Thomas, the man with virtuous habitus is the freest and least predictable of men. Working through what is reasonable in any particular set of circumstances, (Prudence), and not through fixed habits or emotional reactions or convention, he is more open to the unexpected.

The significance of this constant preference for habitus rather than ἐφαι in regard to the Gifts of the Holy Spirit is brought out in article three of question 68: utrum dona Spiritus Sancti sint habitus. As Gilby points out, this article is 'one of the most important and most original elements in his theory of the Gifts'. 2 But its originality does not lie in how Thomas has used the De bona fortuna. On the contrary he has refused to use its model of the a-rational of man, and instead, Thomas has dared to use the model of habitus, from the Nicomachean Ethics even within the supernatural order. The Gifts are not "drives" but habitus. And the reason he gives for this is the same as the objection raised against this first argument on p. 180 above: if the Gifts were non-rational drives man would be used by them as a tool or instrument.

'Tale autem instrumentum non est homo; sed sic agitur a Spiritu Sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberis arbitrii. Unde indiget habitus.' (3)

1. IaIIae,q.50,a.3,ad3um. 2. Gilby Ed., pp. 18-19 footnote. 3. IaIIae,q.68,a.3,ad2um.
If then everything other than reason is thus integrated by habitus into man's purposive self-orientation, it remains to see how this autonomous activity of man yet relates to a higher ordering without the destruction of its freedom and rationality. It has already been noted that the term 'participation' has an important role even in Aristotle's thought. For St Thomas, heir to a rich Neo-Platonic tradition, the term is even more important. Just as the higher integrated interior senses of men and the higher animals participate in rationality in a limited way, so man's rationality is but a derivative participation in a higher intellectuality. Man is not the centre of the intellectual universe. This is the 'Copernican Revolution' which Thomas' treatise on the Angels is designed to bring about in our minds. We are not to see man as the intellectual creature par excellence, but as the lowest form of intellectual life within creation. God alone, as Actus Purus is total self-Intelligibility, and the angels, intellectual of their very being, understand by intuitive intellectual insight. Angels immediately comprehend the intelligible forms of what they understand, but man has to work on what he perceives through his senses, and starting from a limited insight, he has to strive to understand more, not by intellectus but by ratio. Only in man do we have to posit an intellectus possibilis and an intellectus agens; only man, of all intellectual creatures, has to strive laboriously to understand by reasoning and not by insight, 'discurrendo et componendo et dividendo'. Man's rationality is not, then, the pinnacle of creation – as we tend to assume in our modern anthropocentric cosmology. Rather it is a limited participation in the intellectual life seen

1. see above p. 183 on Nicomachean Ethics, I, 13. 2. Ia, q. 50-64. 3. Ia, q. 58, a. 4; q. 58, a. 3; q. 79, a. 8, a. 2, a. 3.
most clearly in creation in the case of the angels; and this itself is only a derivative example of the pure self-intelligibility of God, expressed in the Verbum Dei, and the Divine Ideas.¹

Given this 'Copernican Revolution', the significant phrase from the De bona fortuna, 'an intellectual principle higher than reason', presents fewer difficulties.


Here we will examine Thomas' use of the De bona fortuna in the following texts: Summa Contra Gentiles III, c.92
    De Sortibus, c.4.
    De Malo q.3, a.3.
    Prima Secundae q.80, a.1, obj.3 and ad3um.
    Quaestiones Quolibetales q.1, a.7.

Let us begin by analysing chapter 92 of book III of the Summa Contra Gentiles entitled; Quomodo dicitur alicuius bene fortunatus et quomodo adjuvatur homo a superioribus causis. In great contrast to the chaotic way in which the ideas of the De bona fortuna are expressed, Thomas, in this chapter, presents a complete and coherent overview of all the 'a-rational' forces acting upon rational man. The solution is not presented in terms of either one influence or another - nature or the divine - as in the De bona fortuna, but as a whole hierarchy of possible influences which can operate independently or in unison.

¹Cum igitur homo sit ordinatus secundum corpus sub corporibus coelestibus, secundum intellectum vero sub angelis, secundum voluntatem autem sub Deo,

1. Ia,q.34,a.3; a.14,a.3.
Man is neither the pinnacle of creation, nor an isolated self-enclosed unit within it; rather, he is open and receptive to various 'higher' influences. As regards the influence of the celestial bodies, Thomas deals with the question posed by the De bona fortuna, in what way can nature be said to be the cause of good fortune?

'Tquamvis autem Deus solus directe ad electionem hominis operetur, tamen actio angeli operatur aliquid ad electionem hominis per modum persuasionis: actio vero corporis coelestis per modum disponentis, in quantum corporales impressiones celestium corporum in corpora nostra disponunt ad aliquas electiones. Quando igitur aliquid ex impressione celestium corporum, et superiorum causarum secundum praedictum modum inclinatur ad aliquas electiones sibi utiles, quorum tamen utilitatem propria ratione non cognoscit, et cum hoc ex lumine intellectualium substantiarum illuminatur intellectus eius ad aliquid eligendum sibi utile, cujus rationem ignorat, dicitur esse bene fortunatus; et e contrario male fortunatus quando ex superioribus causis ad contraria eius electio inclinatur ...'

The influence of nature, then, is not over man's reason and will, but only over his senses and passions; it is therefore only an inclination - though it could be a very strong one - towards certain choices. Even angels do not so influence man as to determine his choices - to accept this would be to destroy man's freedom. The difference between the influence of the celestial bodies and the angels is that whereas the celestial bodies affect passions in man's senses, in his physical body, the angels similarly dispose a man towards certain choices, but by presenting intellectual considerations to his mind. These can either be a suggestion with the reasoning why it is good, or they can be just a suggestion. In the latter case, Thomas, quite clearly echoing the De bona fortuna, (MM 9), writes:
'Quandoque enim illuminatur intellectus hominis ab angelo ad cognoscendum solum quod aliquid est bonum fieri, non autem instruitur de ratione propter quam est bonum, quae sumitur ex fine; et ideo quandoque homo aestimat quod aliquid sit bonum fieri, si tamen quaereretur quare, responderet se nescire; unde quando pervenit in finem utilem, quem non praeconsideravit, erit sibi fortuitum. Quandoque vero per illuminationem angeli instruitur etiam quod hoc sit bonum, et de ratione quare est bonum, quae dependet ex fine; et sic quando perveniet ad finem quem praeconsideravit, non erit fortuitum.'

It is clear from the last sentence of this quotation that Thomas quite clearly sees the problems raised by the experience of good fortune as only more sensational examples of a wider problem; that of the interrelationship between man's free, rational, and therefore moral choices and his openness to other 'exterior' causalities. It is not the presence of external influences which determines whether an act should be termed fortunate or not, because such influences are commonplace. What determines the characterisation 'fortunate' is how man might act under such influences without the full understanding of the meaning of his choices.

(Perhaps at this point a certain danger should be pointed out. It is not the purpose of this chapter to prove that the De bona fortuna was responsible for all, or even a great part, of Thomas' later theology. The fact that we are concentrating on this particular text at the moment might give that impression. Rather the point is to show that it was an important book, that it provided important ideas, by which Thomas could unite in a synthesis insights from many sources; Augustine, Pseudo-Denis, Damascene and others. It is becoming clear, as this chapter progresses, that the De bona fortuna is being used within larger models provided by such sources.)

If the angels and the celestial bodies can influence a man to-
wards certain choices, and can strengthen his carrying out of those choices, God alone can determine his choice and infallibly support what man has decided to do. God alone, as we have seen in p. 174 above, can act directly on man's will not only ad specificationem, but ad exercitium. His Providence, then, is absolutely certain, and no part of creation, not even man's free acts of will and choice are independent of it.

'Sciendum est etiam, quod vis activa spiritualis naturae sicut est altior quam corporalis, ita etiam est universalior: unde non ad omnia ad quae se extendit humana electio, se extendit dispositio coelestis corporis. Rursus virtus humanae animae, vel etiam angeli est particularis in comparatione ad virtutem divinam, quae quidem est universalis respectu omnium entium. Sic ergo aliqual bonum accidere potest homini etiam praeter propria intentionem, et praeter inclinationem coelestium corporum, et praeter angelorum illuminationem; non autem praeter divinam providentiam, quae est gubernativa, sicut et factiva entis in quantum est ens: unde oporetet quod omnia sub se contineat. Sic ergo aliqual fortuitum bonum, vel malum potest contingere homini, et per comparationem ad ipsum, et per comparationem ad coelestia corpora, et per comparationem ad angelos; non autem per comparationem ad Deum. Nam per comparationem ad ipsum non solum in rebus humanis, sed nec in qualibet alia re potest esse aliquid casuale et improvisum.'

We are gradually changing the focus of attention away from the De bona fortuna onto wider issues, but that the book was of significance to Thomas in this area is clear from two lesser issues which arise from his vision of the universal sway of Providence: on how consulting lots can be a valid way of making decisions, as in Acts of the Apostles, ch. 1., v. 26; and, on the role of the devil as an external principle of man's actions. In both of these cases Thomas explicitly quotes the De bona fortuna. As for the first - De Sorti-
Thomas begins by saying that how one answers the question depends on how one understands the course of human events, as fixed, as free, or as guided by Providence. If man’s actions are free and totally autonomous, then:

> "Manifestum est autem quod humanarum rerum eventus plurimi ab actibus humanis dependet, unde nec eventus humanarum rerum per praedicta possunt praenosci."

But if Providence rules through such activities, then there is a Providential ordering not accessible directly to human reason. Such an ordering might be made manifest to a man not by the use of his reason but by using non-rational means – like Lots – which Providence uses to help a man choose not in terms of his own reasoning but in terms of a higher order, the order of Providence. Thomas uses the De bona fortuna at this point both to show that man might receive a non-rational prompting to consult lots, and that, in a more general way, man’s purposive activities are themselves, in their freedom, taking place within the wider ordering of Providence.

> 'Hoc autem non solum auctoritate divina firmatur, sed ex sententia philosophorum patet. Aristoteles enim in libro de Bona Fortuna sic dicit: inomin principiun non ratio, sed aliquid melius. Quid igitur erit melius scientia et intellectu nisi Deus? Et propter hoc bene fortunati vocantur, qui si impetum faciant, diriguntur sine rationes existentes; habent enim principium tale, quod est melius intellectu et consilio.' (2)

As regards the role of the devil in determining or influencing human choices, the De bona fortuna is taken as a basic starting point for the discussion in two of the major texts. In the De Malo q.3,a.3,

1. On the conditions under which it is valid for the Christian to consult lots, see IIaIIae,q.95,a.8. The De bona fortuna is not referred to here but this is a piece of pastoral advice rather than metaphysics.  2. De Sortibus c.4.
the eleventh objection begins:

'Praeterea Philosophus II Ethic. Eudemiorum inquisit quid sit principium operationis in anima, et ostendit quod oportet esse aliquid extrinsecum. ... Hoc autem principium in bonis quidem dicit esse Deum, qui non est causa peccati, ut supra ostensum est. Cum ergo homo incipiat agere, velle et consiliari ad peccandum, videtur quod oportet hujus esse aliquam extrinsecam causam, quae non potest esse alia nisi diabolus. Ipse ergo est causa peccati.'

This parallel between God and the devil as extrinsic causalities, has a certain neatness about it, but obviously cannot recommend itself to a member of an Order still fighting Manicheism.

'Ad undecimum dicendum quod Deus est universale principium cujuslibet consilii et voluntatis et actus humani ... sed quod error et peccatum et deformitas accidat in consilio, voluntate et actione humana, hoc provenit ex defectu hominis. Nec oportet hujus aliam extrinsecam causam assignare.'

But in a similar reply in the IaIIae,q.80,a.1,ad3um, he presents a more sophisticated response which allows some area in which the devil does operate.

'Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus est universale principium omnis interioris motus humani; sed quod determinetur ad malum consilium voluntas humana, hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana; et a diabolo per modum persuadentis vel appetibilia proponentis.'

The devil is put in his place - not another God, but an angel, who can only use those means open to angelic powers. Thomas is consistent in using the hierarchical scheme sketched out in the Summa Contra Gentiles.

In the corpus of this last article cited above, Thomas repeats the refrain now so familiar. The human will can be moved ad exercitium; 'ab eo quod interius inclinat voluntatem ad volendum. Hoc autem non est nisi ipsa voluntas, vel Deus.' As we have seen from
Thomas' overview of the various causalities which operate within God's Providential order and purpose, this way in which God acts within the motivations of the human will is only one, (the most amazing and difficult to grasp), of the ways he uses all created natural causalities 'instrumentally' to fulfill his will. This technical term of 'instrumentality' should not suggest that God uses his creatures as mere tools, destroying their natures. This point has to be made especially in regard to the human will. IaIIae,q.6,a.5 raises the question whether any extrinsic action is not, of its nature violent, and therefore a violation of the human will. In the ad secundum, he replies:

"Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut naturale dicitur quod est secundum inclinationem naturae, ita voluntarium dicitur quod est secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Dicitur autem aliquod naturale dupliciter: uno modo quia est a natura sicut a principio activo, sicut calefacere est naturale igni; ali modo secundum principium passivum, quia scilicet est innata inclination ad recipiendum actionem a principio extrinseco ... Et similiter voluntarium potest aliquid dici dupliciter: uno modo secundum actionem, puta cum aliquis vult aliquid agere; ali modo secundum passionem, scilicet cum aliquis vult pati ab alio. Unde cum actio inferatur ab aliquo exteriori, manente in eo qui patitur voluntate patiendi, non est simpliciter violentum, quia, licet illi qui patitur non conferat agendo, confert tamen volendo pati: unde non potest dici involuntarium."

The principles outlined here do not just refer to the human will but are of general application. Anything has a natural inclination not only to act in a certain way but to be open to receive certain forms of stimuli - 'innata inclination ad recipiendum actionem a principio extrinseco'. It is in this way that the human body is open to the influence of the heavenly bodies by virtue of its own nature. Given the hierarchical structuring of the cosmos within divine providence, then any nature has a certain openness to motio from a higher nature.
As we shall see, within the Neo-Platonic model of participation, each rank within creation is not isolated in itself but is participated in, and participates in, the rank below and above it. This intrinsic openness to being fulfilled by means beyond one's own intrinsic resources is technical referred to as potentia obedientialis, 'obediential potency'.

Now as regards the human intellect, man is open to the influence of the angels, but as regards the human will itself, man is determined by no created powers at all. In this lies the root of his freedom. As regards the will, then, we have to emphasis crucially important points. Firstly, in that the proper activity of the will is voluntary by nature, it is not enough to talk about a kind of 'openness' but we must envisage a positive receptivity on its part: a kind of receptivity which involves a voluntary act of the will rather than a static acceptance. Secondly, the extrinsic agent of the will's receptive voluntary activity is no agent within creation, it is not another agent alongside other agencies, it is God alone.

To conclude, we can take our final case of Thomas' use of the De bona fortuna as something of a confluence of the various themes we have looked at; a confluence, moreover, which takes place in the area of grace, thus refocusing the present discussion back on to the concerns of chapters one to five. In the Questiones Quodlibetales q.1,a.7, the question is put: Utrum homo absque gratia per solum naturalem arbitrii libertatem possit se ad gratiam praeparare. Having explicitly attacked the 'Pelagiani' he goes on to emphasise the priority of the divine movement of grace to the 'created' habitus of grace.

1. IaIIae,q.9,a.4 and a.6; Ia,a.105,a.5; S.C.G. III c.147, c.88, c.89; Ad Romance 8, lect. 3.
... sed ad hoc quod homo praeparet se ad habitum consequendum non indiget alio habitu, quia sic esset procedere in infinitum. Indiget autem divino auxilio non solum quantum ad exteriora moventia, prout scilicet ex divina providentia procurantur homini occasiones salutis, puta praedicationes, exempla et interdum aegritudine et flagella; sed etiam quantum ad interiorem motum, prout Deus cor hominis interior movet ad bonum ... Et quod hoc necessarium sit, probat Philosophus in quodam cap. de Bona Fortuna. Hoc enim agit voluntate; voluntatis autem principium est electio, et electio-nis consilium. Si autem quaeratur qualiter consiliari incipiat, non potest dici quod ex consilio consiliari inceperit, quia sic esset in infinitum procedere. Unde oportet aliquod exterius principium esse quod moveat mentem humanam ad consiliandum de agendis. Hoc autem oportet esse aliquod melius humana mente. Non ergo est corpus caeleste, quod est infra intellectualam virtutem, sed Deus ut Philosophus, ibidem, concludit. Sicut ergo omnis motus inferiorum corporum, quae non semper moventur, principium est motus caeli, ita omnium motuum inferiorum mentium principium est a Deo move. Sic ergo nullus potest se ad gratiam praeparare, nec ali- quid boni facere, nisi per divinum auxillum.1 (1)

1. Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q.1,a.7. The De bona fortuna is used in a similar way, but only implicitly referred to, in Ilad Corinthios c.3, lect. 1.
8. RATIO, LEX ET GRATIA

- Lex et Ratio Practica
- Grace: Lex Nova, Lex Evangelii
It has become clear by now that Thomas' analysis of man's activity in terms of the two principles of movement in man is the basic structuring model both of the *Prima Secundae* and of his treatment of the Gifts of the Spirit.¹ The intrinsic principle of movement, (motio), is man's reasoning; the extrinsic principle moving man towards the good is God. These two principles however are not to be seen as alternatives but as complementary: a point which he makes quite clearly in question 68 itself.

"Ad secundum dicendum quod vitia, inquantum sunt contra bonum rationis, contrariantur virtutibus, inquantum autem sunt contra divinum instinctum contrariantur donis. Idem enim contrariatur Deo et rationi, cujus lumen a Deo derivatur." (2)

What we need to do now is to examine in more detail how it is that reason and God - the intrinsic and extrinsic principles of man's dynamism - can be so closely and harmoniously associated: idem enim contrariatur Deo et rationi. In doing so, we will not only be increasing our understanding of the significance of Thomas' presentation of the Gifts in the *Prima Secundae*, but also, we will be preparing the ground to understand the interrelationship between the virtues and the Gifts which is the theme of the *Secunda Secundae*, which we will examine in Part Three.

It is in question 90 of the *Prima Secundae* that Thomas begins to analyse the extrinsic principle of man's motio.

"Consequentur considerandum est de principiis exterioribus actuum. Principium autem exterior ad malum inclinans est diabolus, de cujus tentatione in Primo dictum est. Principium autem exterior movens ad bonum est Deus, qui et nos instruit per legem et iuvat per gratiam." (3)

¹. See above p. 5 and p. 29  .  ². IaIIae,q.68,a.1,ad2um.  ³. IaIIae,q.90, intro.
Some points have to be made here. First of all, what is to be taken as the meaning of 'principium exterius'? The Gilby translation uses the phrase, 'the objective principle of human activity', in order to oppose it to the 'subjective principle' of human reason while trying to avoid any idea of external imposition. Certainly, 'extrinsic' is not to be taken as 'external', in that God works within man just as much as does man's own reason and will. In regard to seeing law as such an 'objective principle' Gilby points out.

"Principle, that from which anything in any manner starts. A real principle is a cause when a relationship of dependence is involved. 'Objective' is inserted in the translation so as not to suggest an externalism not proper to law as such. The response to positive law imposed on us may be 'artificial' but the Eternal Law and the Gospel law of grace shape inner voluntary acts springing from persons born in human nature and reborn in the Spirit. (2)

We are not then talking about, primarily, external conformity to public order with which we normally associate the idea of law, but, as our central focus, the directing of inner voluntary acts. It is important to bear in mind that we are talking about principia: we are trying to answer questions about the origins of certain actions, and not the distinguishing characteristics of their final form. Meyer gives a neat summary of Thomas' thought on principia.

"In company with Aristotle and Averroes, St Thomas attempted to define clearly the line between principle and cause. According to the Aristotelian concept, principle is something primary, whether in the order of being, of origin, or of knowledge; it is that from which something proceeds in some way, (a quo aliquid procedit quocumque modo). The concept of principle also contains the idea that it does not depend on anything else and that everything else in that particular genus depends on it. Every cause is a principle but not every principle is a cause. The concept of principle

1. IaIae, q.9,a.6; q.10,a.4. 2. Gilby Ed., vol. 28, p. 2, footnote.
is the broader of the two ... Cause always implies the essential distinction between itself and that which it causes, but the principle may be consubstantial with that of which it is the principle." (1)

Another point to be made is that Thomas is restricting the discussion to the 'principium exterius movens ad bonum: the devil, as a creature, an angel, tempts man towards evil in a way that is not parallel to the way God moves man towards the good. Restricting the discussion then to man's movement towards good as originating in a 'non-subjective' principle, Thomas distinguishes two kinds of ways in which God acts as the 'non-subjective' principle of man's activity.

"Deus qui et nos instruit per legem et iuvat per gratiam." (3)

'God who helps us by grace and, through law, builds us up, trains us, equips us or prepares us'; and through both law and grace moves us ad bonum. We shall follow through this distinction in this chapter: first, looking at the relationship between human reasoning and lex; and then at the interrelationship between reasoning (ratio), lex and grace.

Lex et Ratio Practica. 4

Immediately, the notion of movement, which we looked at in chapter 6 comes once more to the fore. In question 93 of the Prima Secundae Thomas presents two ways of discussing the wisdom of God. In terms of divine wisdom making things we can call it 'Art' but in terms of divine wisdom moving all things to their appropriate 'end' we call

Lex or law. ¹ This teleological thrust will underpin all our subsequent discussion, but what is the role of man's intrinsic principle within this teleology of the good? Thomas has earlier quoted the Pseudo-Denis.

"In actibus autem 'bonum' et 'malum' dicitur per comparisonem ad rationem, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, 'Bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse malum autem quod est praeter rationem". (2)

We are forced to ask therefore, what the relationship between law and reason might be if they both relate to the good. And this is the first question Thomas asks - utrum lex sit aliquid rationis.³ His answer is:

"Dicendum quod lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum quae inducitur aliquid ad agendum vel ab agendo retrahitur. Dicitur enim lex a ligando, quia obligat ad agendum. Regula autem et mensura humanorum actuum est ratio, quae est pricipium primum actuum humanorum ... Rationis enim est ordinare ad finem, qui est primum principium in agendis secundum Philosophum". (4)

The 'end', (or, finis, or telos), is the first principle of our acting, according to Aristotle, and it is the function of reason to plan for an end. The idea of purpose is the key note here, in human acts, in all kinds of law, and, generally, in practical reasoning as a whole.⁵

It is clear that we need to examine the interrelations between 'bonum', 'ratio', 'lex' and 'finis', as Thomas uses these terms. The first point to be made is a crucially important one regarding the term 'ratio'. Thomas is quite clearly referring, in this section on 'Lex', not to ratio speculativa but to ratio practica, 'quae ordinatur ad opus'.⁶ The 'object' of practical reasoning is not a state

¹ 1aIIae, q.93,a.1. ² 1aIIae,q.18,a.5. ³ 1aIIae, q.90,a.1. ⁴ 1aIIae,q.90,a.1. ⁵ See J.E. Naus, The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to St Thomas Aquinas, Rome, 1959. Also 1a,q.79,a.11. ⁶ 1aIIae,q.94,a.2.
of affairs as it exists but the state of affairs which a man aims to bring into existence. We are not to understand this as applied speculative reasoning - as technology is applied science - but as the human reason working in quite a different fashion. The 'truth' of practical reason is not the conforming of the mind to the nature of reality 'outside' the mind, as in speculative reason, but the achievable project of conforming the world to what the man aims to bring about in the world. To put this in other words, the 'object' of practical reasoning is the 'finis' of its project which it conceives of as a 'good'.

The second point - again, crucially important - is how we are to understand 'bonum' as Thomas uses it. Against all modern presuppositions we are not to understand it as relating primarily to morality. Morality, for Thomas, has an important but secondary role in human affairs. When he discusses the term 'bonum' in q.6 of the Prima Pars, he defines it in terms of completion or fullness of being. Only God is complete Be-ing, Actus Purus, and so only God is absolutely Good. As for created beings who lack this absolute existence in as much as they exist they are good. Within their limited existence, all creatures aim at the fullness of their particular nature and this is their 'good': 'omnes appetunt suam perfectionem adimpleri'.

All creatures then, strive towards a greater flourishing of their nature: 'bonum est quod omnia appetunt'.

Now man, as rational, uses his rationality to achieve his particular fulfillment - eudaimonia, beatitudo, 'human flourishing'. This

1. And this goodness, and existence, is real and inherent - see the important article, Ia,q.6,a.4. 2. IaIIae,q.1,a.7. 3. IaIIae, q.94,a.2. 4. A term used extensively by Finnis apt because of its implication of activity and not static 'happiness', see Finnis, p. 130.
has two consequences. Firstly man chooses his projects — or, regarding his 'animality', choose how to accept and gear the natural determinants of his nature, viz. how to survive, when and in what circumstances to have children, how to organise and structure society.\(^1\) And, secondly, man as rational, is not determined to any one particular scheme or project of action. Man, unlike the animals in their fixed sensory-responses, can choose among whole hosts of patterns of apparent 'goods', and in this freedom of choosing lies his freedom.\(^2\) Only when confronted by the absolute and utter Goodness of God is man incapable of choosing any other project or 'good'.

It is significant that morality has not yet entered into our account so far. Whilst reason and law are geared towards producing virtue or morality, the virtuous life is not understood by Thomas as an end in itself but the means by which human flourishing is brought about. Here Thomas breaks with Aristotle by presenting the necessity of positing a further level of human flourishing beyond that of the life of the virtues. For Aristotle, eudaimonia, human flourishing, might be regarded as 'the effective possession in action of a rational over-all plan of life'.\(^3\) But, for Thomas, the soul's nature is such, as potential to all things, that it cannot be its own self-fulfillment but can find total fulfillment, in its infinite potentiality, in the infinite goodness of the Summum Bonum.\(^4\) The virtuous life, then, is a life whereby all the potentialities of human nature are geared within, and not towards, man's reasonableness; for this is not the purpose of life but the means by which that purpose can be achieved.

1. See the three levels of natural law in IaIIae,q.94,a.2.
2. Ia,q.83,a.3. 3. J.M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, pp. 96-97, 121-125, cited Finnis, p. 130. 4. IaIIae,q.2,a.7. Grisez, p. 362 has some interesting comments on the difference between Aristotle and Aquinas on this.
viz. total human flourishing, *beatitudo*. Reason, (and law), is the measure and rule of means towards the end. Moral good, (i.e. that which is in keeping with reason working towards an end), is a means towards this non-ethical 'Good'. Morally bad actions are therefore seen as less perfect means, and even counter-productive ways, of fulfilling the aim of human flourishing.  

"In actibus autem 'bonum' et 'malum' dicitur per comparationem ad rationem, ut Dionysius dicit, 'bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, malum autem quod est praeter rationem'. Unicuique enim rei est bonum quod convenit ei secundum suam formam, et malum quod est praeter ordinem suae formae. Patet ergo quod differentia boni et mali circa objectum considerata, comparatur per se ad rationem, scilicet secundum quod objectum est ei conveniens vel non conveniens. Dicuntur autem aliqui actus humani vel Morales secundum quod sunt a ratione." (2)

But morality is not simple rationality: there are pre-rational drives in man as part of his nature and these form the basic data on which reason is to work as the measure and directing rule. In this way the potential acts of man become 'human acts', undertaken purposively, freely and voluntarily, in accordance with his rational nature.

Having established this interrelationship between the terms, 'bonum', 'finis' and 'ratio practica', let us move on to see how these terms are used in relationship with *lex naturalis*. Again the crucial point to bear in mind is that we are discussing *ratio practica* not *ratio speculativa*. In IaIIae,q.94,a.2, Thomas begins his main argument by pointing out the difference between these and drawing a parallel from one to the other.

"In his autem quae in apprehensione hominum cadunt quidam ordo inventitur. Nam illud quod primo cadit

1. IaIIae,q.18,a.5,ad2um.  
2. IaIIae,q.18,a.5, see also IaIIae,q.71,a.2.
sub apprehensione est ens, cujus intellectus inclu-
ditur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit. Et
ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est quod non
est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur super
rationem entis et non entis; et super hoc princi-
pio alia fundatur, ut dicit Philosophus in IV Meta.
Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in appre-
hensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod
cadit in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae
ordinatur ad opus. Omne enim agens agit propter
finem, qui habet rationem boni et ideo primum prin-
cipium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra
rationem boni; quae est, bonum est quod omnia appe-
tunt. Hoc est ergo primum principium legis, quod
'bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitan-
dum'; et super hoc fundatur omnia alia praeepta
legis naturae, ut scilicet omnia illa facienda vel
vitanda pertinent ad praeepta legis naturae quae
ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona
humana". (1)

Just as the first principle of theoretical reason, based on the intell-
ligibility of being, is the principle of non-contradiction, so the
first principle of practical reason, based on the intelligibility of
the 'good', (as we have presented it here as, 'that which all things
strive for'), is 'the good is to be done and sought for, and evil is
to be avoided'. We must be clear that this principle is to be under-
stood as a principle and not as a premise to every argument. Just
as the principle of non-contradiction is not used explicitly in every
argument of theoretical reasoning but is presupposed as a necessary
structuring principle for any argument to function, so in the case
of this principle of practical reasoning. We should stress here
again, that by practical reasoning we do not mean theoretical reason-
ing applied to the world but man anticipating and acting towards what
he aims to achieve and bring about: 'ratio practica quae ordinatur
ad opus'. What is being claimed here is that this basic principle
is presupposed within all such orientations towards any project:

1. IaIIae,q.94,a.2. On this article, and on what follows,
see two important essays by Grisez and Donagan in Aquinas: A Collec-
'bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum'.

Now this basic principle is common to both practical reasoning and to **lex naturalis**. Are we therefore to take these as synonymous? The answer is No. Natural Law, in the restricted sense in which Thomas uses it, is man's practical reasoning in relation to the drives which man experiences in himself by nature; those things, *quaes ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana*. Practical reasoning does not work for man as if within a colourless range of limitless possibilities but within the realities of man's inclinations.

"Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum mala et vitanda.

Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationem naturalium est ordo praecipitamentum legis naturae. Inest enim primo inclinationi homini ad bonum secundum naturam in qua communicat cum omnibus substantiis; prout scilicet quaelibet substantia appetit conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam; et secundum hanc inclinationem pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur et contrarium impeditur.

Secundo inest homini inclinatione ad aliquas magis specialias secundum naturam in qua communicat cum caeteris animalibus; et secundum hoc dicuntur ea esse de lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est commixtio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et similia.

Tertio modo inest homini inclinationi ad bonum secundum naturam rationis quae est sibi propria; sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat; et secundum hoc ad legem naturalem pertinent ea quae ad huiusmodi inclinationem spectant, utpote quod homo ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet conversari, et caetera huiusmodi quae ad hoc spectant." (1)

Grisez has a comment on this passage which it will be worth while to quote in full.

1. IaIIae,q.94,a.2.
"Here Aquinas indicates how the complexity of human nature gives rise to a multiplicity of inclinations, and these to a multiplicity of precepts. It is noteworthy that in each of the three ranks he distinguishes among them an aspect of nature, the inclination based upon it, and the precepts that are in accordance with it. Nature is not natural law; nature is the given from which man develops and from which arise tendencies of ranks corresponding to its distinct strata. These tendencies are not natural law; the tendencies indicate possible actions, and hence they provide reason with the point of departure it requires in order to propose ends. The precepts of reason which clothe the objects of inclinations in the intelligibility of ends-to-be-pursued-by-work - these precepts are the natural law. Thus natural law has many precepts which are unified in this, that all of these precepts are ordered to practical reason's achievement of its own end, the direction of action toward end". (1)

Natural law, then, is the set of principles by which man's activity of practical reasonableness is self-consistent with his own means and ends. Augustine at one point grieves over the blindness of his fellow-men:

"Man has undoubtedly the will to be happy, even when he pursues happiness by living in a way which makes it impossible of attainment. What could be more of a falsehood than a will like this". (2)

It is this aim of self consistency with all his nature in man's reasonableness that the precepts of the natural law underpin: the good is 'quod conveniat ordini rationis'.

"Cum enim rationis sit ordinare, actus a ratione deliberativa procedens, si non sit ad debitum finem ordinator, ex hoc ipso repugnat rationi et habet rationem mali; si vero ordinatur ad debitum finem, convenit cum ordine rationis, unde habet rationem boni". (4)

The interplay of the terms, 'conveniens' and 'debitum' here is signi-

1. Crisez, p. 358. Also V.J. Bourke, 'Right Reason as the basis for moral actions', in Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo VII Centenario vol. 5, Naples 1974, pp. 122-127. Bourke holds that 'right reason' is the central notion in Thomas' moral philosophy and not natural law which is dependent on the notion of 'right reason'.
2. Civ. Dei., XIV.4. Augustine has a different notion of natural law which we will not go into here.
3. IaIIae,q.18,a.1,ad3um; a.5, a.8.
4. IaIIae,q.18,a.9.
ficant. The terms are deliberately vague because Thomas, like Aristotle, did not expect scientific exactitude within the complexities of moral philosophy.¹

Lex, like reason, is a principle of ordering within man's activities. Unlike Augustine, who sees lex as a negative, curbing factor on man, a remedy for sin, Thomas sees lex as a positive directing influence, a potestas directiva, not essentially a potestas coactiva.² For this reason lex, although it can be stated in imperative formulas, can also include counsels of a non-obligatory kind.³ The focal point of lex, as of ratio practica, is the 'end' aimed at, and, in the light of this 'end', some things can be seen as necessary for its achievement and some things as helpful but not necessary. Lex, as an expression of ratio practica, is an expression of reason as prescribing not asserting. As such it is said to prescribe direction or tendency, or said to 'communicate a tendency', or 'give a rule or canon whereby actions are framed'.⁴ Like so many major terms in Thomas' thought it is to be used analogically, regarding every level of creation, and can even be within the discipline of theological language, to the Trinitarian life of God and to the Trinity's relation to creation.⁵

As regards creatures lower than man, they receive direction passively, and so are said to be used by law rather than use it themselves: Thomas holds that this is to speak of lex improperly rather than essentially.

¹. On the whole question of whether natural law theory does or does not illicitly derive 'ought' statements from 'is' statements—a debate we cannot go into here—see, especially, Finnis, pp. 33-36 and Grisez, p. 380; also IaIlae, q.94,a.2. ². IaIlae,q.93,a.6; q.95,a.1. ³. Grisez, p. 366. ⁴. The latter expression is Hooker's, in Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, i.3.1., quoted by Gilby, vol. 28, p. 7. ⁵. On Verbum, Ia,q.34,a.3; on the Ideas, Ia,q.15 and q.44,a.3. On the Verbum in relation to Lex Aeterna, IaIlae,q.93,a.2. On the Spirit as Lex Nova, IaIlae,q.106,a.1.
For this reason, Thomas uses the term *lex naturalis* strictly only in relation to man.

"... etiam animalia irrationalia participant rationem aeternam suo modo, sicut et rationalis creatura. Sed quia rationalis creatura participat eam intellectualiter et rationaliter, idea participatio legis aeternae in creatura rationali proprie lex vocatur: nam lex est aliquid rationis ... In creatura autem irrationali non participatur rationaliter: unde non potest dici lex nisi per similitudinem". (1)

By 'natural law' we do no mean then what creatures do naturally but rather the way in which man's natural drives are directed by reason. Man is purposive even at a pre-rational level.

"... omnis operatio rationis et voluntatis derivatur in nobis ab eo quod est secundum naturam ... Nam omnis ratiocinatio derivatur a principiis naturaliter notis; et omnis appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem derivatur a naturali appetitu ultimo finis; et sic etiam oportet quod prima directio actuum nostrorum ad finem fiat per legem naturallem." (2)

Natural law is the ordering by reason of the natural drives of man. But it is at the same time more than this. Precisely as such an ordering by reason of what is natural to man it is also a participation by reason in a greater ordering, that of the *Lex Aeterna*. This is the hub of our own interest in this topic. Here the 'hinge' between man and a greater divine ordering is man's rationality - his intrinsic principle of *motio* - but with the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, the 'hinge' between these two levels of analysis is something other than reason. Now both the Gifts, as part of *grace*, and *Lex*, while an expression of *ratio*, are both said to be 'extrinsic' principles of man's *motio*, his self-motivation. We need to see, therefore, why man's intrinsic principle of *ratio* is not sufficient by itself.

In the conclusion of q.90,a.4, of the *Prima Secundae*, Thomas

1. IaIIae,q.91,a.2,ad3um, also q.91,a.6.  2. IaIIae,q.91,a.2,ad2um, also, q.94,a.2,ad2um.
sums up the points he has made:—

"Et sic ex quatuor praedictis potest colligi definitio legis, quae nihil est aliud quam quaedam ratio-nis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata". (1)

The only two points which we need to take up here are that the law is instituted for the common good and is made by one in authority. Too much of our discussion so far could convey the impression that Thomas sees man as an isolated agent: nothing could be further from the truth, although one must admit that the central article on the natural law — IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2. — seems to be one of the few places where this communal dimension is explicitly stated. As part of his very nature man is seen as a social being, and so law, and ratio practica, must include the interrelations between men, in order to achieve the fullness of human flourishing. Now too often, and yet for good reasons, we see social, positive law as curbing and restraining, but Thomas, true to his basic insight, claims that the law is primarily not negative, but educational.

"Deus qui et nos instruit per legem et juvat per gratiam". (2)

Law, in its objectivity outside man's mind is not only an expression of practical reasoning but also an education of it through man's inter-personal relations. It exists not just to manifest the rules of practical reasonableness but to produce them and bring them about. Practical reasonableness — the life of the virtues — does not come easily to man.

"... homini naturaliter inest quaedam aptitudo ad virtutem; sed ipsa virtutis perfectio necesse est quod homo adveniat per aliquam disciplinam". (3)

Each man has to be educated by others. Unlike the animals, no man

1. IaIIae, q.90,a.4, 2. IaIIae,q.90; intro. 3. IaIIae, q.95,a.1, see also IaIIae,q.55,a.1,a.2,a.4,ad2um,ad3um,ad4um.
is born complete in the ability to achieve his own potential for fulfillment. Each man grows into his full moral self only through his social education. The virtuous man is the freest man but he achieves this freedom of practical reasonableness only through discipline.

"Sicut etiam videmus quod per aliquam industriam subvenitur homini in suis necessitatibus, puta in cibo et vestitu, quorum initia quaedam habet a natura, scilicet rationem et manus, non autem ipsum complementum, sicut caetera animalia quibus natura dedit sufficienter tegumentum et cibum. Ad hanc autem disciplinam non de facile invenitur homo sibi sufficiens, quia perfectio vitutis praecipue consistit in retrahendo hominem ab indebitis delectationibus, ad quas praecipue homines sunt proni et maxime juvenes, circa quos est efficacior disciplina. Et ideo oportet quod huiusmodi disciplinam, per quam ad virtutem pervenitur, homines ab alio sortiantur". (1)

Law here, in this educative sense might appear to be merely a curbing of man's wayward and wasteful tendencies but it serves primarily to awaken him to further possibilities of development and human flourishing. Man's freedom exists within his practical reasonableness: yet this itself exists and acts within the objectivities of man's nature and his existence within society and history. The individual's practical reasonableness exists and is educated within an existing societal framework, with all its traditions, customs and educative processes; as it were, within practical reason's own externalised 'exo-skeleton' of the structure of law.

Given this particular view of law as an extrinsic principle of man's motio, it is not too amazing to find a Thomist like Thomas Gilby claiming that to be lawful is to be free. There are obvious difficulties here: we are all only too aware of evil laws and of whole

1. IaIIae,q.95,a.1. 2. Strictly speaking, man's freedom, for Thomas, is located in electio, choice, the exercise of liberum arbitrium, freedom of decision. Ia,q.85,a.3.
societies which corrupt and deprave man; but these difficulties can be met within Aquinas' outlook; the point at the moment is to articulate Aquinas' model of law in its clearest presentation. Gilby writes:

"To be lawful is to be free, for to be lawful in the proper sense of the term is to act with responsibility in accepting the law and making it your own; to be under the law otherwise is to have the law only in an extended sense, and, in man, is to suffer its force or to be punished". (1)

What is involved here is a positive assent to the reasonableness of the extrinsic law in such a way that it becomes part of one's own self-determining practical reasonableness. This assent is to be a positive and not merely a neutral one. It is to be seen as a widening of one's own horizons.² (If we have difficulty in grasping this in terms of civil, positive, law, then perhaps we might understand it in terms of the way a monk or friar might see the constitutions or laws of his religious order: Thomas would hold, however, that the model is also to hold of civil society.) As for the wicked, Thomas claims that they are subject to the law - in our normal, modern, way of understanding this - on two counts. Firstly, because their natural instinct for what is virtuous, the exercise of practical reason, is depraved, or rather diverted or deflected by vice, and, secondly, that their natural knowledge of what is a 'bonum' is obscured by their passions and their habits of sinfulness.³ For the good, however:

"In bonis autem uterque modus invenitur perfectior: quia est supra cognitionem naturalem boni superadditur eis cognitio fidei et sapientia; et supra naturalem inclinationem ad bonum superadditur eis interior motivum gratiae et virtutis". (4)

1. Gilby, vol. 28, p. 170. 2. Synderesis is the habitus of consenting to one's own larger fulfillment by consenting to the basic principles of natural law, its act is called conscientia; see Ia,q.79,a.12, a.13 and IaIIae,q.94,a.1,ad2um. 3. IaIIae,q.93,a.6. 4. IaIIae,q.93,a.6.
Now, in a way, we have perhaps made too large a jump here, in the argument. The quotation refers to the infused theological virtue of faith and its corresponding Gift of the Holy Spirit, sapientia, in relation to knowledge of bonum, and to grace and the (presumably) infused moral virtues, in relation to man's inclinationes. But this quotation does fit into our discussion here because it relates to this central notion of assent or consent by ratio to lex. Grace, as gratia sanans, frees man to use his practical reasoning correctly; as gratia elevans, it equips him with a greater knowledge and insight than reason can provide of the wider form of lex, the Lex Aeterna, and it equips him also with the ability to freely consent to the educative tendency of that lex.

Our discussion of the relationship between ratio and lex has moved on to the introduction of the notions of assent and freedom. From this point we could anticipate the culmination of St Thomas' treatise on lex, the 'law' of grace, the Lex Nova, the new law of freedom.

"... et hoc modo spirituales viri non sunt sub lege, quia per caritatem quam Spiritus Sanctus cordibus eorum infundit, voluntarie id quod legis est, implet. ... ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi est libertas". (1)

But what we need to examine first is how this working out of human practical reasonableness within the extrinsic principle of Lex Naturalis (and Lex Humana), is also to be seen, in the larger context of creation and providence, as not an isolated activity within creation but as a 'participation' in a larger ordering, the Lex Aeterna.

We must admit that Thomas' approach to this topic is the reverse of the one we have followed so far. We have moved on from discussing human practical reasonableness in terms of the natural law

1. IaIIae,q.93,a.6,ad1um. T. Gilby rightly points out at this point that the Fear of the Lord is yet also a Gift of the Holy Spirit; on this, see below p. 291ff.
and human laws and now we are moving on to see how we might make a
deeper sense of this in terms of a larger ordering. Thomas does the
opposite. At his inauguration as a Master in Paris in 1256, he took
as his text, 'Rigans montes de superioribus suis; de fructu operum
tuorum satiabitur terra', as his theme of the unity of theology.¹

The same approach is the over-all plan of the Summa; he moves from
God to creation, and from the Lex Aeterna to Natural Law and Human
Laws. Appreciating this movement of thought can help us to see the
significance of his treatise on the angels. Here, Thomas provides
a brilliant exposition of the nature of understanding in the angels
and in man. This treatise is nothing other than a 'Copernican Revo-
lution' in terms of epistemology. Man's intellectual activity,
through reasoning, is not at the centre of the intellectual universe
but is at its fringe. Man's understanding is almost as much akin
to the lowly sense-knowledge of the animals as it is to the purely
intellectual understanding of the angels. It is at a far greater
distance from the centre of the intellectual universe, the Triune
God's own self-understanding in the Verbum Dei.² If we are to move
on to examining the nature of the Lex Aeterna, we must beware of pro-
ceeding too quickly. Human reasoning – dividendo et componendo –
is not the norm of intellectual life and the Lex Aeterna is not to
be understood as rationality writ large: rather, human rationality
is to be seen as an imperfect and derived 'participation' in that Lex
Aeterna.³ 'Participation' is a philosophical model which already
had a long history to it before St Thomas' time, and his own use of
it is still open to much debate.⁴ It is used by Thomas in two main

¹ Weisheipl, pp. 101-102, see also IIIIæq.45,a.1,ad2um on
the Gift of Wisdom where Thomas uses the text, 'de sursum descendentis',
(James 3.15).
² See Ia,q.34. On angelic and human understanding
see especially Ia,q.58,a.3, a.4.
³ Ia,q.31,a.2.
⁴ The litera-
ture on the concept of participation is extensive. The two, now classic,
ways. Firstly to express causality of a particular kind, 'exemplar causality'; and, secondly, following on from this, to allow for a play of similarity and difference between the exemplar cause and the derived imitative existence of that which shares in a lesser way in the nature of the exemplar cause. Because of this play of both similarity and difference within the participation model, we cannot claim to understand the Lex Aeterna because we understand the various forms of lex — of nature, of natural law, of human and divine law — which 'participate' in it in derivative ways. All we can claim is that we can make sense of them in terms of it. It is a 'second order' concept: 'it must not be treated as a theory which could guide investigation and verification of suggested norms in any of the four orders (in which laws operate); rather it is a speculation about why those norms whose holding has been appropriately verified or established do hold'.

"The Thomist theory of participation is not a report of experience, but a theorem in the general explanation of all states of affairs by reference, ultimately, to creative uncaused causality". (2)

Within the uncaused causality of God which the Lex Aeterna model postulates would be included not just the various forms of lex, and the norms of the arts and the laws of natural sciences, but also what is considered from a human standpoint as matters of coincidence or good or bad fortune. Just as it would be wrong to apply the norms of science to legal reasoning, or legal reasoning to the artist's inten-

(4 con.) works are: L.B. Geiger, La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, Paris, 1942, and, C. Fabro, Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin, Louvain, 1961. The present writer has found the easiest entry into the topic through a very clearly written article; T.A. Fay, 'Participation: the transformation of Platonic and Neo-Platonic thought in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas', Divus Thomas, 76, (1973), pp. 50-64. For further references see the bibliography under the names Geiger, Fabro, Ho, Greenstock, Kondoleon, Little, Marion, Philippe and Wright. Also Finnis, chapter XIII, pp. 371-413.

1. Finnis, p. 390. 2. ibid., p. 402.
tion for his work of art, so it would be wrong to apply simply one form of derived participation – for example – rationality – to 'picture' the over-all model of *Lex Aeterna*.

Now, given all this, Thomas can claim that the moral goodness of a human act depends more on the *Lex Aeterna* than on human reasonableness. He can say this without taking back anything we have discussed so far,

"Dicendum quod in omnibus causis ordinatis effectus plus dependet a causa prima quam a causa secunda, quia causa secunda non agit nisi in virtute primae causae. Quod autem ratio humana sit regula voluntatis humanae, ex qua eis bonitas mensuretur, habet ex lege aeterna, quae est ratio divina; unde in Psal., dicitur, 'Multi dicunt, Quid ostendit nobis bona? Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.' Quasi diceret, lumen rationis, quod in nobis est, intantum potest nobis ostendere bona et nostram voluntatem regulare inquantum est lumen vultus tui, idest a vultu tuo derivatum. Unde manifestum est quod molto magis dependet bonitas voluntatis humanae a lege aeterna quam a ratione humana; et ubi deficit humana ratio, oportet ad rationem aeternam recurrere". (1)

The metaphor of light used here might be elaborated in terms of our own metaphor of the Copernican Revolution. Human practical reasoning is not a 'sun', a self-sustaining form of enlightenment, but a 'moon' which enlightens only in as much as it reflects the light of the true 'sun', the *Lex Aeterna* in the *Verbum Dei*. Thomas is not here attempting to undermine human reasoning; indeed in the next article he gives grounds for holding that a mistaken conscience is binding:

"Unde dicendum quod simpliciter omnis voluntas discordans a ratione, sive recta, sive errante, semper est mala". (3)

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1. *IaIIae*, q.19, a.4. 2. See also *IaIIae*, q.109,a.1.,ad2um, where Thomas criticises Augustine's theory of illumination. Our own model of the 'moon' is misleading if it suggests that reason does not have its own natural light and is totally passive. 3. *IaIIae*, q.19,a.5.
Rather he is seeing human reasoning as a form – albeit derived and limited – of the divine 'ratio', and, as such, he is asking us to imagine a situation where human reasoning might be insufficient and man would need to rely directly upon the wider realm of intellectuality within which his reason is situated.¹ There are cases, especially in the Christian life where such a situation does arise, but the norm is clearly to have human reasoning working within the ordered relationship with the Lex Aeterna.

"In his vero quae aguntur per voluntatem, regula proxima est ratio humana; regula autem suprema est lex aeterna ... Manifestum est autem ex prae-missis, quod omnis actus voluntarius est malus per hoc quod recedit ab ordine rationis et legis aeternae, et omnia actus bonus concordat rationi et legi aeternae". (2)

Reason is called the proximate, or homogeneous, standard, while the Lex Aeterna is called the supreme or prime standard of human conduct.

Grace: Lex Nova, Lex Evangelii.

It is possible to suggest occasions where man's conduct might be ruled not according to reason directly – his proximate or homogeneous standard – but by this prime or supreme standard, the Lex Aeterna. It is precisely in this area that we find the Gifts of the Spirit located.³ In the following text on the infused virtues the point suggested is that human reason can function only within a narrow spectrum within the Lex Aeterna. By consenting freely to the educative tendencies of the Lex Aeterna, man can act beyond the range of his own reason by relying on the same external principle which underpins his own rationality.

¹. Strictly speaking 'ratio' should not be used of God, see Ia,q.14,a.1,ad5sum, q.14,a.7 and q.85,a.5. ². IaIIae,q.21,a.1. ³. IaIIae,q.68,a.2. a.2. See chapter 2 above.
As regards intelligent creatures - men and angels - the Lex Aeterna is not completed by their consenting to their natural fulfillment, but by their consenting to share in a form of life which is beyond their own abilities, that of God himself. Here the derived form of the Lex Aeterna is expressed as the Lex Divina, which itself, for men, is historically articulated as the Old Covenant and the New Covenant.

This New Covenant, this new canon of direction, is given to men only as part of a relationship of knowledge and love which we call grace. The infused virtues and the Gifts structure and develop this relationship but it is essentially the gift of the Holy Spirit.

"Et ideo principaliter lex nova est ipsa gratia Spiritus sancti, quae datur Christi fidelibus." (3)

"... principalitas legis novae est gratia Spiritus sancti quae manifestatur in fide per dilectionem operante". (4)

As we have noted above, man can either be subject to the rule of lex, in which case it is only in an improper sense that he can be said to

1. IaIIae, q.63,a.2.  2. IaIIae, q.91,a.4.  3. IaIIae, q.106,a.1.  4. IaIIae, q.108,a.1.
have the law, or he can freely consent to the ordering of lex and so open himself to a greater form of human flourishing and fulfillment. This consent needs to be a positive and receptive one and not a merely neutral acceptance. In terms of the New Law of the New Covenant it is only by union with the Holy Spirit, in the relationship of knowledge and love which is called grace, that man can consent to this new ordering and tendency and so act divinely and humanly beyond his rationality. As man freely consents to his own rational direction of his inclinations by the habitus we call virtues, so he can freely consent to this more-than-rational direction by the theological virtues of charity, faith and hope, and the infused virtues which flow from them, including the Gifts of the Holy Spirit.¹

"... animus hominis non movetur a Spiritu Sancto, nisi ei secundum aliquem modum uniatur ... Prima autem unio hominis est per fidem, spem et caritatem. Unde istae virtutes praesupponuntur ad dona, sicut radices quaedam donorum". (2)

For Thomas the movement of thought from law to grace seems to be an easy and smooth one. ‘lex’, at its highest, seems to be transformed into something beyond itself; annihilated in its completion and become grace.³ It seems to the present writer that the term ‘lex’ had some meaning for Thomas which we, with our modern categories of thought, find almost impossible to grasp. For him the movement from law to grace appears to require little or no explanation.⁴ For us, at times, it almost defies explanation. Yet in as much as this

1. IaIIae, q.110, a.2, a.3, a.4. 2. IaIIae, q.68, a.4, adiun. 3. The relationship between IaIIae, q.106-108, and IaIIae, q.109, is far from clear. See also in S.C.G. III, 147-150 where vivinum auxiliwm becomes ‘gratia Dei’. 4. St Thomas was quite aware of St Paul’s theology constructed on the battlefield between his own concepts of ‘law’ and ‘grace’: he was also aware – lovingly aware – of St Augustine’s stress on the difference between the spirit and the letter of the law. But St Thomas’ concept of ‘lex’ is none of these.
topic baffles us, so much do we fail to grasp what is hidden in Thomas' presuppositions; vital presuppositions which are the architectural foundations of his vision of the whole cosmic order of providence and predestination.

An attempt at gaining some insight can be initiated by recalling some of the major themes which have already emerged. Firstly it is only too easy for us, as modern readers, to fail to appreciate that within Thomas' view of man there is presupposed both a communal dimension and a teleology.

"We cannot begin to understand St Thomas until we realize that for him man is fundamentally characterized in two ways: no man is entire unto himself (homo est animal sociale) (1) and every man is goal-seeking (proprium est naturae rationalis ut tendat in finem quasi se agens vel ducens ad finem) (2), and, further, that these two features of his being are so intimately interconnected that his being has to be thought of not merely as a being-with but as a being-towards, or, compositely, as a being whose destiny it is consciously to enjoy sharing being-towards. Because every man is not merely goal-seeking but made for community, he will want the goal he seeks to be a shared one, a community goal: his fulfillment is to be found in his doing his bit for a common good along with others doing their bit, his satisfaction is to come from playing his part in the symphony of society". (3)

The notion of friendship, then, is not something suddenly added to the notion of law from outside it; it is presupposed throughout. This communal dimension of law is precisely what distinguishes it from man's reasoning. 4

We might probe further into the theme of friendship by referring back to the classical—as opposed to scriptural—origins of this theme in our Western tradition. Aristotle remarks,

1. Ia,q.96,a.4; IaIIae,q.90,a.2, q.94,a.2; IIaIIae,q.57,a.1, q.58,a.1-2. 2. IaIIae,q.1,a.2. 3. M. Lefebure, Gilby, vol. 38, p. xix. 4. Above p. 208ff.
"Lawgivers seem to make friendship a more important aim than justice". (1)

The reason given for this is that justice is the virtue of rewarding deserts within an already constituted community, but friendship is required for that initial constitution. For Aristotle, and for Thomas, the polis is a koinonia. This is so different from our modern, bourgeois, liberal view of the state that it is only by an effort that we can appreciate and remember it. When Thomas introduces charity - amicitia Dei - as the foundation of the new community of mankind and God, he is taking up all that the Western tradition, pagan and Christian, presents at its best and showing how it is enlarged, increased and divinised by grace.

It is in this new koinonia, this new commonwealth, of mankind and God, that justice is transformed back into love.

"... when man are friends they have no need for justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality". (4)

This is Aristotle not Aquinas. Thomas extends this divine gift of friendship not only to be the foundation of the new 'law' of grace, but also the foundation stone of the whole creation.

A second theme that has emerged is that of consent to the law. Only the man who appropriates the law into himself so that he acts spontaneously 'has' the law and is not 'under' it. This is all the more true with the new 'law' appropriate to the glorious liberty of the children of God.

"Quicumque ergo agit ex seipso, libere agit; qui vero ex alio motus, non agit libere. Ille ergo, qui vitat mala, non quia mala, sed propter mandatum Domini, non est liber; sed qui vitat mala quiamala, est liber. Hoc autem

Man's consent to appropriating into his own spontaneity the new 'law' of grace is a response of love and joy. The new 'law' of the gospel may appear to be more burdensome but Thomas quotes Augustine:

"... non sunt gravia amanti, sed non amanti sunt gravia" (2)

This spontaneity, joy and promptitude is a result of the infused virtues - and the Gifts of the Spirit - which are ramifications of charity.

Moreover, consent within this new 'law' is not as a consent to means towards an 'end' - as in other forms of 'lex' - but is consent to the 'end' itself.3

"Natura enim diligit Deum super omnia, prout est principium et finis naturalis boni: caritas autem, secundum quod est objectum beatitudinis et secundum quod homo habet quamdam societatem spirituallem cum Deo. Addit etiam caritas super naturalem dilectionem Dei promptitudinem quamdam et delectationem ...". (4)

This self-appropriation of the new 'law' is to be seen in terms of 'play' rather than 'duty'.5 Just as a man works for an 'end' but 'plays' - tennis, chess, listens to opera, enjoys company, etc. - for the sheer delight in it, as an 'end in itself', so the 'play' of the new 'law' of friendship is said to be already a foretaste of the total human flourishing of Beatitude.6 In a sense, it has no 'end', no purpose beyond itself.

1. In 2 Cor., cap. 3, lect. 3. 2. IaIIae, q.107, a.4. 3. Hence the theological virtues are said to have God themselves as their 'objectum', IaIIae, q.62. 4. IaIIae, q.109,a.3,ad1um, a.4. 5. My terminology is obviously modern but can be justified in terms of Thomas use of Augustine's emphasis on joy and delight, and on the distinction between the 'spirit' and the 'letter' in IaIIae,q.106,a.1 and elsewhere. 6. See below p. 301ff.
Finally, all forms of 'ex' are teleological as well as communal. The life of friendship with God, though begun on earth, in via, will be completed only in heaven, in patria. There all the potentialities of human flourishing will be actualised in the activity of beholding the Beatific Vision. This is not an 'end' within the natural order but the 'end' of the whole created order itself.

"... quae haec beatitudo non est aliquid naturae, sed naturae finis". (2)

We have studied the extrinsic principle of man's movement towards the good as expressed in terms of law and grace. This has expanded our awareness of the context in which the Gifts of the Spirit are said to operate. The teleological theme has emerged as a dominant one. Law, like the Gifts of the Spirit, has been presented as educative; giving direction to man's further fulfillment within and beyond the scope of his own capabilities. The notion of consent is crucial here, both, as we have seen in earlier chapters, in the receptivity which the Gifts provide, and, in terms of law, in the major distinction between 'having the law' and 'being under the law'. This freedom which a man has who 'has the law' is sited within a communal dimension expressed, in terms of grace, as amicitia, the shared life of friendship. We have seen too how the use of the model of 'participation' has allowed all the various forms of law - natural, human and divine, - to be presented as harmonious derivations from the Lex Aeterna. Our discussion of Natural Law has shown too how all man's potentialities and drives are taken up in these higher orderings of

1. This tension will be the subject of the final chapter dealing with the teleology implicit in Thomas' treatment of the Gifts of the Spirit, below p. 291ff. 2. Ia,q.62,a.1.
reason, law and grace. Earlier, in chapter 4, we noted how the various individual Gifts of the Spirit relate to the whole spectrum of man's potentialities and drives, as do the acquired and infused virtues. With this larger context for our subsequent discussion, we can now pass on to Thomas' treatment of the Gifts in the Secunda Secundae where he studies this interrelation between virtues and Gifts in the whole harmony of man's movement towards fulfillment to which God invites him.
SECTION THREE: THE GIFTS IN THE SECUNDA SECUNDAE

Introduction
In the prologue to the *Secunda Secundae*, Thomas outlines his plan for dealing with all matters relating to morality in general under the headings of the three theological and four cardinal virtues. The discussion of each virtue will be followed by a discussion of the Gift which Thomas considers to correspond to that virtue. This means that in the *Secunda Secundae* we cannot have an adequate understanding of either virtue or Gift if we try to understand them separately. The virtues perfect man's free use of his natural powers; the Gifts do the same but from a source outside man himself. These two movements are not to be seen as alternatives, nor even as parallel movements. There is only one activity under study here - that of man's autonomy. But this autonomous activity needs to be analysed in terms of its two principles, man himself, and God. The interplay between virtue and Gift, which is a theme of the *Secunda Secundae*, reflects the interplay between activity and receptivity within man's life under grace.

What should also be borne in mind is that Thomas never identifies the *instinctus* of the Spirit in the Gifts with any definite kind of inspiration. He deliberately uses the term *instinctus* to avoid specifying any one way in which the Spirit is active through the Gifts. We are therefore not looking for any one form of activity which we can contrast with that of the virtues. At times it may be pre-rational or pre-volitional, at others, the Spirit may work within and through the activity of the virtues, as in the Gift of *consilium*. We are dealing then with one single human activity but seeing it, as it were, in two dimensions.

1. Prologue to the *Prima Secundae*: 'restat ut consideremus ... de homine secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem'.
2. The basic division of the *Prima Secundae*, see IaIIae,q.49, intro, and above p. 3 .
3. See above, p. 33 .
4. See below, p. 280ff and above, p. 114.
There are significant changes between the two parts of the Secunda Pars regarding the roles of various individual Gifts: the cases of the gifts of piety and understanding, (intellectus) being the main examples. Previously, Thomas had followed the main scholastic interpretation on the virtue and Gift of piety, seeing it as having a twofold function, one in regard to God and one in regard to men as the image of God. In his earlier works Thomas had emphasised the latter aspect, as had Albert and Bonaventure. In this way, piety was seen primarily as compassion. In the Secunda Secundae, however, its richer theocentric nature is stressed. This, as O'Connor points out, is a return to the insight of Augustine. But this particular change in detail is only an example of a change in mood in which the Gifts are discussed in the Secunda Secundae. Here all the Gifts are discussed in a more theocentric trajectory. This is manifestly clear in the dominant role assigned to the theological virtues.

In both his Commentary on the Sentences and in the Prima Secundae Thomas had assigned no Gifts to the theological virtues which unite man and God. In the Commentary on the Sentences he had followed the arrangement of the parent text and divided the Gifts between the contemplative and active lives. In the Prima Secundae this division is transposed into a division between the reasoning and appetitive faculties of man with the former further divided between man's speculative reason and his practical reason. In the Secunda Secundae, however, it is precisely the theological virtues which provide the basis for his arrangement of the Gifts.

1. III Sent. 34.3.2.; IaIIae,q.68,a.4. See O'Connor, p. 127.
2. IaIIae,q.68,a.6,ad3um. 3. IIaIIae,q.121,a.1. See below p. 291.
Commentary on the Sentences

Principle - According to the needs of the two lives.

**Contemplative Life**

- discovery: *intellectus*
- judgement: *wisdom*

**Active Life**

- discovery: *consilium*
- judgement: *scientia*
- executive action
- regarding others: *piety*
- irascible emotions: *fortitude*
- concupiscible emotions: *fear*

Prima Secundae

Principle - According to the functions of the faculties.

**Speculative Reason**

- apprehension: *intellectus*
- judgement: *wisdom*

**Practical Reason**

- apprehension: *consilium*
- judgement: *scientia*

**Appetite**

- regarding others: *piety*
- regarding oneself against fear: *fortitude*
- against concupiscence: *fear*

Secunda Secundae

Principle - According to the virtues.

CHARITY is the root of all the infused virtues and Gifts. Allied with it is the gift of WISDOM.

HOPE, working through charity, is allied with the Gift of filial fear, or FEAR OF THE LORD.

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1. This table is partly based on one given by O'Connor, O'Connor, p. 130. With three of the Gifts, the Latin name has been left untranslated — *intellectus*, *scientia* and *consilium*. Any modern English translation would be misleading and by retaining Thomas' own terminology it is easier to remember his own interpretation of them and to see them as terms used also in his epistemology and general philosophy and not as uniquely 'religious' terms. On *consilium* in particular see below, p. 280.
FAITH, working through charity, is allied with:

**INTELLECTUS**, as understanding and insight,

**SCIENTIA**, as judgement through created things.

(Man's judgement through divine realities is perfected by WISDOM).

The Infused Cardinal Virtues:

**PRUDENCE**, as perfected practical reasoning directing all the moral virtues, is allied with the Gift of **CONSILIUM**.

**JUSTICE** is allied with the Gift of **PIETY**.

**COURAGE** is allied with the Gift of **FORTITUDE**.

**TEMPERANCE** is allied, in a secondary way, with the Gift of **FEAR OF THE LORD**.

So it is now within a clearly theological context that the actions and motivations of man are discussed. The same theocentricism which caused the change regarding piety, caused an even greater change with the Gift of understanding (**intellectus**). The 13th century tradition had limited this Gift and the Gift of wisdom, (**sapientia**), to the area of divine contemplation, and limited knowledge, (**scientia**) to the use we make of temporal goods and our earthly activity.¹ This corresponded to the division between contemplative and practical understanding which Thomas took as his basis in the Commentary on the Sentences. Peter Lombard had in fact made this division authoritative and all the Scholastics followed it. Now, however, Thomas undermines it.² The Gift of **intellectus** is now said to be engaged with practical matters as well as with truths to be contemplated. The traditional strict division between divine matters and human matters is thus removed. Both are now seen within a theocentric whole.

₁. See O'Connor, p. 125. ₂. IIaIIae, q.8, a.6. See below p. 246ff. ₃. IIaIIae, q.8, a.5, ad1um.

Dicendum quod operabilia humana secundum quod in se considerantur non habent aliquam excellentiae altitudinem; sed secundum quod referuntur ad regulam legis aeternae, et ad finem beatitudinis divinae, sic altitudinem habent, ut circa ea possit esse intellectus. (3)
Man's activity is the matter for the Gift of intellectus because it is a manifestation of the Lex Aeterna and an expression of man's purposive drive towards Beatitude. Nothing here is taken away from man's humanity, rather it is enhanced by being fully acknowledged both in itself and within this larger framework of the divine plan of Providence.

One further introductory point ought to be made regarding the Gifts in the Secunda Secundae. Although Thomas assigns each Gift to a virtue, and although he is concerned to show that each Gift is distinct in its nature, yet it does seem as if we are not to understand this schema as presenting seven discrete sectors of the moral life. Just as the virtues are interrelated in a complex but hierarchical unity, so are the Gifts. But the way the Gifts relate to each other, and to their corresponding virtue, is polymorphic. Charity and wisdom are united as the triumph of personal communion between man and the three persons of the Trinity. It is not clear how wisdom can be said to 'perfect' charity in any way; rather it is a manifestation of the unity of the will (charity) and the intellect, (wisdom) in the triumph of grace. Thomas is no longer bound by his own schema. 1 Similarly, fear does not 'perfect' hope, but, as being the first of the Gifts creating a basic docility to the Spirit, is a vital aspect of the virtue of hope. What seems to follow from this approach is that no one pairing of virtue and Gift is to be taken as a fixed molecule of the moral life. The Gifts interrelate so that one can say that just as fear of the Lord is the first Gift, opening up man's responsiveness and docility, and being a permanent dimension of this; and as wisdom is the culmination of the Gifts, so consilium is not so much a distinctive

1. IaIIae,q.68,a.4.
entity as the mode in which the Holy Spirit moves the rational creature to act. What the Gifts of the Spirit seem to be, then, is a series of aspects of what is meant by man's openness to the Spirit's promptings. The discussion of each Gift is, as it were, an essay in some dimension of man's openness to the sanctifying Spirit.

Yet, having said all this, and appreciating the use both of Aristotle's moral philosophy of the virtues and the larger theocentric vision and dynamism, still a certain unease remains. One might question the justification for categorising all man's moral life, in all its complexity, into this schema of seven virtues, four of them Greek and philosophical, three of them Christian and theological. And yet how is one to present an ordered analysis of the Christian moral life? Thomas, in his Prologue, is well aware of the difficulties and presents this as the scheme he will use in this text-book.¹ It has the advantage of being orderly and, uniting philosophy and theology, it presents a clear educational method for beginners in theology. But the real problem lies not so much in the basic structure but in its further development in relation to the Gifts. Along with each virtue, opposing vice and associated precept and corresponding Gift, Thomas also links to each Gift a particular beatitude and an associated fruit of the Spirit. It is here that one feels that the desire for order and clarity of presentation is controlling the material, and Thomas himself admits to certain hesitations.² Augustine had united the Gifts from Isaiah with the Beatitudes from Matthew.³ The Scholastics had further incorporated the fruits of the Spirit into this ordering.⁴ The detailed working-out of this scheme cannot but appear forced and artificial.

¹. Prologue IIæ IIae. ². IIæ IIae, q. 121, a. 2; q. 139, a. 2. ³. De sermone domini, 1.4. P. L. 34., 1234-1235. There is a translation and discussion in O'Conner, p. 91. ⁴. O'Conner, p. 107.
Nevertheless, even though the precise assignment of particular Gifts, beatitudes and fruits cannot bear too much weight and may be the result of a scholastic emphasis on systematisation, yet there is a deeper metaphysical structure underlying this systematisation. Thomas' basic model for analysing human activity is in terms of the schema, essence-powers-habitus-acts-fruition.\(^1\) The beatitudes correspond to activity flowing from the perfecting habitus of the virtues and Gifts in man's faculties: the fruits correspond to the accomplishment of this perfect activity.\(^2\)

One further point is that, in the Secunda Secundae, Thomas is not writing a monograph on the Gifts, or even on the virtues. The Gifts cannot be understood as if they were isolated erratics but only as embedded within man's whole movement towards God, ad patriam. A study of the Gifts inevitably involves then certain forays into Thomas' treatment of related areas, for example, on the virtue of faith. Moreover we must also respect Thomas' use of analogy: that certain concepts can be transposed, with qualifications and modifications, from the human, to the angelic, to the divine level; and from nature to grace. It is in this way that Thomas presents the intellectual Gifts and virtues of wisdom, intellectus and scientia.\(^3\) Unless we appreciate these wider visions, which Thomas presupposes, we cannot appreciate his particular treatment of the individual Gifts.

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1. See above p. 49 and below p. 302. 2. See below p. 303. 3. Prologue IIaIIae.
9. THE INTELLECTUAL GIFTS ALLIED WITH FAITH AND CHARITY

- The Gifts of *Intellectus* and *Scientia*
- The Gift of Wisdom
Thomas associates the Gifts of scientia and intellectus with the theological virtue of faith. Of the other two intellectual Gifts, wisdom is associated with the supreme and prime virtue of charity, and consilium with the infused virtue central to the moral life, infused prudence. We shall deal first with the Gifts relating to faith.

The Gifts of Intellectus and Scientia.

Obviously we cannot give a full account of Thomas' treatise on faith and so we will restrict our discussion to the major central topics and to points which relate particularly to the Gifts of the Spirit. Thomas associates the two intellectual Gifts of scientia and intellectus with the virtue of faith and so these will be our prime area of study. However, if we are correct in claiming that Thomas now treats the seven Gifts as interconnected and, as it were, seven modes of the Spirit's activity in man rather than seven distinct areas, then we cannot just correlate these two Gifts alone with the virtue of faith. Above all, just as faith is vivified only in as much as it is united with charity, so faith and all the Gifts are united with charity and wisdom. Nevertheless, having said this, the association between these two intellectual Gifts and the virtue of faith is obvious. Faith is, above all, a form of knowledge.

But if faith is a kind of knowledge, it is knowledge that is based on neither a direct apprehension of its object of knowledge, nor on demonstrative proof of the existence of that object. It is knowledge of another kind.

'Alio modo intellectus assentit alicui non quia sufficienter moveatur ab objecto proprio, sed per quandam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam partem magis quam in aliam. (1)

1. IIaIIae,q.1,a.4.
Faith, then, is in a way akin to opinion in that it cannot rationally prove the correctness of its stance. It differs from opinion however in that it does not waver in an uncommitted fashion. On the contrary, it is precisely committed to the stance it has taken. In this way it is akin to knowledge or logical reasoning in that it involves full assent to the position that it arrives at. Faith, of its nature, is then intellectually unsatisfying because it is impossible to both 'know' and 'believe' at the same time.¹

As regards faith in God, the assent of faith is faith in God as Veritas Prima.² It is faith in what Truth itself has revealed about Truth itself, God, and, in a secondary fashion, about what pertains to God.³ God as Veritas Prima is both the medium and the message of faith, both the content and that which evokes the assent of faith.⁴ For Thomas, Christian faith is not directly faith in the Bible, the Church or the articles of faith, but faith in God.⁵ Everything else, within the area of faith, is a result of man's human need to express what is simple in itself in terms of propositions, articles and images.

It is in believing God and believing in God that man has faith; the rest, the articles of faith, follow from this.

But how does God educe man's other-than-rational assent to a rational stance? Firstly, why is it necessary for man to assent to what is beyond his rationality? Thomas answers this question in

¹ IIaIIae, q.1, a.5.  ² IIaIIae, q.1, a.1.  ³ IIaIIae, q.1, a.1.  ⁴ IIaIIae, q.1, a.1.  ⁵ Put at its clearest in IaIIae, q.115, a.4, obj3 and ad3um.  ⁶ IIaIIae, q.1, ad2um.
terms that belong to a cosmological scheme with which we are now very familiar.

Dicendum quod in omnibus naturis ordinatis invenitur quod ad perfectionem naturae inferioris duo concurrunt: unum quidem quod est secundum proprium motum; aliud autem quod est motum superioris naturae ...

... Sola autem natura rationalis creata habet immediatum ordinem ad Deum. ... Natura autem rationalis, inquantum cognoscit universalem boni et entis rationem, habet immediatum ordinem ad universale essendi principium. Perfectio ergo rationalis creaturarum non solum consistit in eo quod ei competit secundum suam naturam sed in eo etiam quod ei attribetur ex quaedam supernaturali participatione divinae bonitatis. ... Ad quam quidem visionem homo pertingere non potest nisi per modum addiscendis a Deo doctore, secundum illud Joann., Omnis qui audit a Patre et didicit venit ad me. Hujus autem disciplinae fit homo particeps non statim sed successive secundum modum suae naturae. Omnis autem talis addiscens oportet quod credat ad hoc quod ad perfectam scientiam perveniatur, sic etiam Philosophus dicit quod oportet addiscendem credere. Unde ad hoc quod homo perveniatur ad perfectam visionem beatitudinis paexigatur quod credat Deo tamquam discipulus magistro docenti. (1)

Man therefore needs to be a pupil, and a docile pupil, to have insight into what is beyond him. What he cannot establish by his own intellect he must take on trust from Truth itself as a beginner needs to accept on trust what his teacher tells him. The picture given here is of a life of faith rather than a single act of faith: a picture of God continually instructing man not at one instant - statim - but throughout a life of faith - successive, secundum modum suae naturae. This picture of a constant and close tutorship is identical to the one presented in regard to the Gifts in question sixty-eight. Faith is not an act but a virtue, a habitus; a permanent disposition within man's understanding. It is a settled pattern of appreciation with which the divine reality can be assented to.

1. IIaIIae,q.2,a.3. 2. IaIIae,q.68,a.1,a.2.
"Ita etiam per habitus fidei inclinatur mens hominis ad assentiendum his quae conveniunt rectae fidei et non aliis". (1)

Like the Gifts, faith is a habitus which sets up a pattern of receptivity to further divine impulses. Like the Gifts, it is infused by God. It is part of 'habitual' grace in man which makes him receptive to the movements of 'actual grace'.

But if we are to see how God educes man's assent to what He teaches, then we need to say more, and, interestingly enough, the language here is again similar to that used of the Gifts. The content of faith comes *ex auditu*, by preaching and teaching, but the assent of faith comes not just from an intrinsic conviction of what is preached, nor just from man's free judgement - that would be Pelagian - but from a movement of assent within man caused by God.

"Et ideo fides quantum ad assensum, qui est principalis actus fidei, est a Deo interius moveante per gratiam". (3)

There are then two motives for belief, but the internal one is the most important.

"... ille qui credit habet sufficiens inductivum ad credendum; inducitur enim auctoritate divinae doctrinae miraculis confirmatae, et, quod plus est, interioer instincctu Dei invitantis. Unde non levis ter credit". (4)

The central activity of faith is the habitual responsiveness of man to the instincctu Dei invitantis.

But if faith, like the Gifts, is an infused habitus, and if, like them, it is a habitus which permanently disposes man to be receptive to the impulses of God within him, it differs from the Gifts in that it operates solely within human rationality and the human will.

1. IIaIIae, q.1, a.4, ad3um. 2. See IaIIae,q.109,a.9. and below p.246. 3. IIaIIae,q.6,a.1. 4. IIaIIae,q.2,a.9,ad3um.
Despite the grandeur of faith, Thomas is quite clear that faith is a strain and an intellectually unsatisfying form of knowledge and one which will undoubtedly pass away in patria. For this reason he re-interprets the traditional phrase, *credere est cum assensione cogitare*. It was thought that the phrase, and the ideas behind it, were Augustine's, but it is of twelfth century origin. Thomas reinterpreted it in terms of Aristotelian epistemology. While accepting that faith is vivified when united with charity, and while accepting that the will is involved in the act of faith, Thomas also stressed the intellectual nature of faith. He has no place for an understanding of faith in terms of blind love or blind faith, voluntarism, or Kierkegaardian existentialism. He takes *cogitare* in the traditional phrase to refer to the Aristotelian understanding of man's mode of intellectual activity, reasoning.

"cogitatio proprice dicitur motus animi deliberantis nondum perfecti per plenam visionem veritatis". (2)

There is an incompleteness in human ratiocination which is completed when full understanding, (*intellectus*) is achieved. In regard to faith, however, cogitation is intrinsically incomplete and unsatisfied, inherently imperfect. A quotation from the *De Veritate* will make the point clearer than the relevant passage in the *Summa*.

"... *fides habet aliquid perfectionis, et aliquid imperfectionis: perfectionis quidem est ipsa firmitas, quae pertinet ad assensum; sed imperfectionis est carentia visionis, ex qua remanet adhuc motus cogitationis in mente credentis. Ex lumine igitur simplici, quod est fides, causatur id quod perfectionis est, scilicet assentire; sed in quantum illud lumen non perfecte participatur, non totaliter tollitur imperfectio intellectus: et sic motus cogitationis in ipso remanet inquietus". (3)

1. For an excellent and detailed discussion on this phrase, see T.G. O'Brien, in Gilby, vol. 31, pp. 205-215. 2. IIaIIae,q.2,a.1. 3. *De Veritate*, XIV, 1, ad5um.
What then does the Gift of intellectus add to the virtue of faith with which it is linked? Thomas begins with a dubious piece of etymology, taking intelligere to mean intus legere, that is, "to read within", to penetrate to the basic essentials of a particular matter. He contrasts the activity of man's senses with his intellectual understanding of what his senses provide.

"nam cognitio sensitiva occupatur circa qualitates sensibiles exteriores, cognitio autem intellectiva penetrat usque ad essentiam rei. Objectum enim intellectus est quod quid est, ut dicitur in de Anima". (2)

In question eight, article seven, he returns to this comparison when he linkes this Gift with the beatitude, 'Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God'. The cleansing of the heart in regard to inordinate affections is achieved by the other Gifts and virtues which pertain to man's affectivity, but as regards the vision of God there is a second, an intellectual, cleansing.

"Alia vero munditia cordis est quasi completiva respectu visionis divinae; et haec quidem est munditia mentis depurateae a phantasmatibus et erroribus, ut scilicet ea quae de Deo proponuntur, non accipiantur per modum corporalium phantasmatum, nec secundum haereticas perversitates; et hanc munditiam facit donum intellectus". (3)

What needs to be assumed here is that it is basic to Thomas' epistemology that man's intellectual understanding is always dependent on his senses. The world which surrounds man and with which he is in contact through his senses, is not immediately intelligible to him.

Man's creative intellect must work on his sense experience, (phantasmata), to provide him with ideas, (species), by which he understands reality. These ideas, it must be stressed, are not what man understands, (id quod intelligitur), but that by which he understands reality, (id quo intelligitur). Even in regard then to his natural

1. IIaIIae,q.8. 2. IIaIIae,q.8,a.1. 3. IIaIIae,q.8,a.7. 4. On this see Ia,q.79.
environment, man does not have an immediate intuition of reality but
acquires understanding only through a process of intellectual activity.
Within this process man is dependent on sense-data, imagination, lan-
guage, concepts, ideas and symbols; all of them in themselves rooted
in sense experience. Simple understanding then, intellectus, is not
itself such a simple matter and needs to be checked, correlated and
disciplined to avoid error and mistakes. Moreover human understanding
is not just a matter of simple apprehension but of understanding com-
plex states, events and propositions. Here the process is more ex-
tended involving the use of reasoning.

"Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intel-
ligibilem apprehendere. Ratiocinari autem est
procedere de uno intellecto ad alium ad veritatem
intelligibilem cognoscendam". (1)

Reasoning is a movement from a simple understanding to a perfect under-
standing. The angels, as purely intellectual beings, do not use this
process of comparison and analysis, but it is natural to man, a ratio-

tal creature. (2)

But the Gift of intellectus is compared with our first insight
into the nature of things, our first apprehension of their reality,
and not to discursive reasoning. Hence the contrast with sense ex-
perience, which may or may not correlate with reality outside us.
The Gift of intellectus, then gives an assurance of the reality of the
things of faith; a certitude about the reality beyond the images,
symbols and creeds of the faith. (3)

But should we not ask whether this penetrative certainty about
the matters of faith is actually compatible with faith? Have we not
moved out of the area of faith into that of knowledge? Yet as Thomas

1. Ia,q.79,a.8.  2. ibid., also, IIaIIae,q.8,a.1,ad2um,
Ia,q.54-q.58.  3. IIaIIae,q.8,a.8,ad1um.
made clear in the preceding questions it is impossible both to believe and to know at the same time.\footnote{1} The Gift of intellectus must be understood as operative within faith and not outwith it. This is the important point raised in article two of question eight.

Thomas presents two sets of distinctions. As regards understanding, he distinguishes between perfect and imperfect understanding. Perfect understanding, the end of the reasoning process, is impossible within faith where, 'motus cogitationis in ipso remanet inquietus'.\footnote{2}

But imperfect understanding is possible.

"Alio modo contingit aliquid intelligi imperfecte, quando scilicet ipsa essentia rei, vel veritas propositionis non cognoscitur quid sit aut quomodo sit; sed tamen cognoscitur quod ea quae exteriori apparent veritati non contrariantur, inquantum scilicet homo intelligit quod propter ea quae exteriori apparent nonest recedendum ab his quae sunt fidei".\footnote{3}

Now as regards faith, there is also a distinction to be made between those matters which have a bearing towards faith and are open to correlation from the human sciences, such as facts recorded in scripture; and those matters, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, which are strictly of faith alone.\footnote{4} Putting these two sets of distinctions together, Thomas holds that we can have perfect knowledge of the things that bear on faith but only imperfect, though genuine, knowledge of the things of faith itself.

Rather than providing an increase in data for faith, then, the work of this Gift is more purgative than accumulative.\footnote{5} It works within man's life of faith to penetrate through false conceptions of

\footnotesize{1. IIaIIae, q. 1, a. 5. 2. De Veritate, XIV, 1, ad5um, quoted above p. 234. 3. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 2. 4. This is an important distinction and follows a pattern common in Thomas' thought; the most important corresponding pattern of argument is in IIaIIae, q. 106, a. 1 on the New Law and those things which dispose a man towards it or govern the exercise of it. 5. IIaIIae, q. 8, a. 7.}
God and his ways to give a certain strength and assurance within the intellectual inquietude which results from this imperfect but genuine knowledge. The Gift, in relation to the things that bear on faith, and in relation to the symbols and propositions which are the articulations of faith, ensures that these elements are accepted in the right sense: it gives an assurance that we are not mistaken in the meanings we assign to them. Faith works through the limitations of reasoning: this means that believers have to work with limited concepts, fragmentary truths and, at any one time, can only have a certain angle or particular approach to the mystery of the Godhead and His workings among mankind. The Gift of intellectus provides a penetration which unifies this body of truths into a harmonious whole. But this takes place within faith. It does not involve the acquisition of more data but rather a penetration of what is presented by faith.

"... donum intellectus est circa prima principia cognitionis gratuitae". (1)

Just as there are common naturally evident principles of thought which man has and uses to understand and to organise his understanding, so in the life of grace, there are basic principles which establish and structure the life of faith.² By giving an assurance, an instinctus, as to the correctness of the principles of the life of faith, the Gift leads a man to penetrate the meaning of his life in grace, even though he may be unsure, at an intellectual level, of the exact language of the propositions of faith.³ The Gift provides the key to unlock the treasury behind the symbols of the faith. In this way it can be said that faith is enlarged by the Gift, even though nothing is added to faith.

1. IIAIIae,q.8,a.7,ad2um. 2. ibid., and a.1,ad1um. 3. q.8,a.4,ad2um.
The contrary of insight is dullness: not being able to get to the heart of the matter; not seeing the wood for the trees.\(^1\) And 'the heart of the matter' in the life of faith is man's supernatural destiny, beatitudo. A man endowed with the Gift of intellectus may not have scientific insight into the articles of faith, but he can accept them as bearing on his movement towards God, his 'end' or telos, which is salvation.\(^2\)

And this provides the key to grasping how this Gift works within faith. The principal element of the New Law is 'the very grace of the Holy Spirit given to those who believe in Christ'.\(^3\) And this relationship of grace and friendship-love is established in man through the infused virtue of charity.\(^4\) This is made quite explicit in article four of our present question. It is followed immediately by a secondary, but still prime, principle of the New Law; that man is called and led towards a supernatural destiny. The Gift of intellectus penetrates and unites the things of faith in the light of these two principles or rather, this one joint principle. The Gift, like all the Gifts, is based on this relationship between God and man:

"caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum".\(^5\)

A friendly relationship which will culminate in the Beatific Vision.

"Unde nisi usque ad hoc moveatur a Spiritu Sancto intellectus humanus, ut rectam aseptionem de fine habeat, nondum consecutus est donum intellectus, quantumque ex illustratione Spiritus Sancti quaedam praesambula cognoscat". (6)

All the elements of faith are united in this light and so even the most naive of the 'simple faithful' are endowed with it.\(^7\)

So far, we have concentrated on the function of this Gift in

1. IIaIIae, q.8, a.6, ad1um. 2. IIaIIae, q.8, a.4, ad1um, ad2um, ad3um; q.8, a.5. 3. IIaIIae, q.106, a.1. 4. IIaIIae, q.23, and q.8, a.4. 5. IIaIIae, q.23, a.1. 6. IIaIIae, q.8, a.5. 7. IIaIIae, q.8, a.4, ad2um.
relation to the imperfect but genuine knowledge man has of the things of faith. Recalling the distinction made in article two, we can now turn to look at the role of this Gift in relation to those things which lead to faith or flow from it. Thomas does this in article three.

"Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, donum intellectus non solum se habet ad ea quae primo et principaliter cadunt sub fide, sed etiam ad omnia quae ad finem ordinantur. Operationes autem bonae quemdam ordinem ad fideum habent. Nam fides per dilectionem operatur, ut Apostolus dicit. Et ideo donum intellectus etiam ad quaedam operabilia se extendit, non quidem ut circa ea principaliter versetur, sed inquantum in agendis regulamur rationibus aeternis, quibus conspiciendis et consulendis, secundum Augustinum, inhaeret superior ratio, quae dono intellectus perficitur". (1)

Having recalled the distinction of article two, Thomas immediately focuses on what flows from faith, that is, 'good deeds'. Quoting St Paul, he holds that, \textit{fides per dilectionem operatur}: the direction of the life of Christian love through man's activity is also, in a secondary way, a matter for the Gift of intellectus.

In giving the Gift of intellectus a role as regards practical reasoning in this way, Thomas is breaking the pattern of the interconnection of the Gifts which he established in the Prima Pars. He admits this quite explicitly.

"Videtur autem quibusdam quod donum intellectus distinguatur a dono scientiae et consilii per hoc quod illa duo pertinent ad practicam cognitionem, donum autem intellectus ad speculatum; a dono vero sapientiae, quod etiam ad speculatvam cognitionem pertinent, distinguitur in hoc quod ad sapientiam pertinet judicium, ad intellectum vero capacitas intellectus eorum quae propuntur, seu penetratio ad intima eorum. Et secundum hoc supra numerum donorum assignavimus.

Sed diligenter intuenti donum intellectus non solum se habet circa

\begin{enumerate}
\item IIaIIae, q.8, a.3.
\end{enumerate}
speculanda, sed etiam circa operanda, ut dictum est. Et similiter etiam donum scientiae circa utrumque se habet, ut infra dictetur. Et ideo oportet aliter eorum distinctionem accipere". (1)

We can tabulate Thomas' earlier model as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insight (intellectus)</th>
<th>Judgement (judicium)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speculative Reason</td>
<td>Gift of Intellectus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical Reason</td>
<td>Gift of Scientia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gift of wisdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gift of the Spirit's Counselling.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Secunda Secundae, however, this sharp distinction between speculative and practical reasoning is overcome.  

Faith, working through charity, is perfected,

as regards understanding and insight, by the Gift of Intellectus.
as regards judgement from created things by the Gift of Scientia.
as regards judgement from divine realities, by the Gift of Wisdom.

Now we have established already that the Gift of intellectus penetrates to the significance of the things of faith by revealing them in terms of the teleology of grace. But man's goal of beatitude is itself a part of the over-all dynamism of the divine plan: predestination is itself part of providence. A man's own movement towards fulfillment by means of his moral activity is then a working out of the Lex Aeterna. Hence the Gift of intellectus gives man an insight and guidance into the direction and significance of his moral activity by revealing its intrinsic interconnection with the overarching purpose of God. This line of thought takes us back to the

1. IIaIIae, q.8,a.6.  
2. IaIIae, q.68,a.4.  
3. IIaIIae, q.8,a.5 and above p. 239.  
4. Ia, q.22, intro.
Prologue of the Prima Secundae and to our own chapter on Ratio, Lex et Deus. In fact the significance of the three quite remarkable responses to the objections in article three will be lost unless what was developed in that chapter is borne in mind. The similarity in expression and thought is quite clear.

"Ad primum dicendum quod operabilia humana secundum quod in se considerantur non habent aliquam excellentiae altitudinem; sed secundum quod referuntur ad regulam legis aeternae, et ad finem beatitudinis divinae, sic altitudinem habent, ut circa ea possit esse intellectus. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc ipsum pertinet ad dignitatem doni, quod est intellectus, quod intelligibilia aeterna vel necessaria considerat, non solum secundum quod in se sunt, sed etiam secundum quod sunt regulae quaedam humanorum actuum; quia quanto virtus cognoscitiva ad plura se extendit, tanto nobilior est. Ad tertium dicendum quod regula humanorum actuum est ratio humana et lex aeterna, ut supra dictum est. Lex autem aeterna excedit naturalem rationem. Et ideo cognitio humanorum actuum secundum quod regulatur a lege aeterna excedit naturalem rationem, et indiget supernaturali luxine doni Spiritus Sancti".

Thomas is fighting the common presupposition that the Gift of intellectus relates only to speculative and not practical reasoning. What is envisaged here is a participation in the Lex Aeterna, but not a participation in terms of reason, as in the case of Natural Law, but a participation by the direct movement of the Holy Spirit through the permanent disposition of receptivity which the Gift of intellectus produces in man under grace. Now this relationship between the Gifts and the Lex Aeterna has never been stated so clearly before. In the Prima Secundae, the Gifts were said to make man receptive to the promptings of the Holy Spirit and the two principles of motion were described as reason and God, ratio et Deus.

"... dona Spiritus Sancti se habent ad hominem in comparatione ad Spiritus Sanctum sicut virtutes
Now in regard to this particular intellectual Gift - and that it is intellectual is the crucial point - the prompting of the Spirit gives an assurance and a unity of vision into how human deeds are to exhibit the higher ordering of the Lex Aeterna. The present writer has found only one similar reference in the Prima Secundae.

"Praeterea, humanae voluntatis nonest nisi duplex regula; scilicet ratio, et lex aeterna, ut supra habitum est. Sed virtutes perficiunt hominem in ordine ad rationem; dona autem in ordine ad legem aeternam Spiritus Sancti, ut ex dictis patet". (2)

This is a strange passage. It occurs in an objection and therefore must be taken with great caution, but Thomas, in his reply to the false argument which is developed from this passage does not question this presentation itself. On the other hand, it can hardly be taken as a major point of Thomas' thought if it occurs only here in an obscure passage in a far from central question. Nevertheless both sentences refer back to other questions to establish their validity. The phrase, 'the eternal law of the Holy Spirit' is an interesting one and although it does not occur elsewhere does show the unity of Thomas' vision of God moving all things in a single but variegated movement back to him.

For our own purpose at the moment however, what we need to clarify is the relationship between the prompting of the Spirit and the Lex Aeterna. The Lex Aeterna is the cosmic order by which all things are preserved and directed to the fulfillment of their specific natures. This dynamic ordering is not to be seen as something independent of God but a reflection of the divine purpose and will regarding creation.

As we saw in chapter 8, for Thomas all law is teleological and educative:

1. IaIIae, q.68,a.3.  2. IaIIae,q.69,a.1, obj.2.  3. IaIIae, q.91,a.1; q.93; Ia,q.103,a.1, a.2, a.5.
it is a construct of the mind - divine or human - for the direction and guidance of this movement towards fulfillment. Now as there are two principles of human activity, two sources of man's spontaneity, God and reason; so there are two constructs of direction in practical reasoning, the Eternal Law, and human reasoning; the latter being a human participation in a limited way in the former. As law and practical reasoning are geared towards an 'end', the discussion of the Gift of intellectus must take place within a context of providence and finality, or rather, predestination and salvation. The Gift of intellectus, then, is a prompting by the Spirit, (principium exterius) by which man is given an insight into the directing order of Providence (Lex Aeterna) impossible for human reasoning and insight alone. To put the matter at its simplest, we can quote scripture.

"Yet among the mature we do impart wisdom, although it is not a wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age, who are doomed to pass away. But we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed before the ages for our glorification. None of the rulers of this age understood this; for if they had they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory. But, as it is written, "What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, what God has prepared for those who love him, "God has revealed to us through the Spirit. For the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God ... no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world but the Spirit of God, that we might understand the gifts bestowed on us by God". (1)

To make sense of the distinction between the Gifts of intellectus and scientia we need to understand a basic division within St Thomas'

1. I Cor. 2, v.6-12. Thomas' own commentary on this text, (C.II, lect. 1 and 2), is instructive and brings in many of the themes discussed so far: the 'mature' are perfect not only in intellect, 'sed etiam secundum voluntatem et affectum bene disponi ad diligendum et operandum'.
epistemology because the Gift of scientia is taken to be the counterpart in the area of faith to iudicium, or judgement, in general matters.¹

In the Summa, Thomas discusses this topic in Prima Pars, question sixteen, but there is a much fuller discussion in De Veritate.² Truth is defined as the conformity between the thing as understood in the mind, and the thing as existing in reality. Hence, to know this conformity, and not just the thing is to know truth. The human mind can therefore know simply, and, in a secondary fashion, know that it knows. The primary, simple apprehension of what a thing is, is called intellectus, understanding: the secondary activity is called judgement or iudicium. Now we must be careful not to misunderstand 'judgement' as referring merely to conscious 'knowing-that-one-knows'; the data for psychologists or philosophers. By 'judgement' Thomas means that in all our basic ways of putting understanding to use — by language, thinking, analysing, comparing and the rest — we are implicitly affirming or denying the conformity between idea and thing. Anthony Kenny, in a recent book, makes a useful transposition into modern English of the terms intellectus and iudicium. He contrasts 'thinking of x', with, 'thinking that x ... '; and contrasts, 'knowing about x', with, 'knowing that x ... '. The second, 'judgement' always presupposes the first, 'understanding': we cannot assert or deny that the tree is likely to fall without thinking about the tree. Behind all our use of language and all our different ways of thinking then, Thomas holds that we must make two presuppositions. One, that we have some basic insight into what we are talking about, or that we understand the words we are using; and, secondly, that we are implicitly

¹ IIAIIae, q. 9, a. 1. ² De Veritate 1.9, also Perihermeneias 13.26.
or explicitly making judgements by means of these words or concepts.  

Now as regards the intellectual Gifts within the life of faith, it is clear from all this, that the Gift of scientia, (and the Gift of wisdom), presupposes the Gift of intellectus. The latter gives an insight into the things of faith, the Gift of scientia perfects the ability to judge what things are to be believed and what is not a matter of belief. But we also need to distinguish between the judgement perfected by the Gift of scientia from that perfected by the Gift of wisdom.

"... donum scientiae est solum circa res humanas, vel solum circa res creatas". (3)

It relates to what is to be believed in relation to human and creaturely matters for our understanding. Thomas follows the traditional, and Augustinian division between wisdom and scientia. First he quotes Augustine:

"Rerum divinarum scientia proprie sapientia municeps—ter; humanarum autem proprié scientiae nomen obtineat". (4)

And then he also states:

"... cum homo per res creatas Deum cognoscit, magis videtur hoc pertinere ad scientiam ... quam sapientiam". (5)

The Gift of wisdom judges created things in the light of divine realities, but the Gift of scientia judges divine realities through created things.

There is one further break with the general pattern of thirteenth century thought in this question. In the Prima Secundae this Gift is seen as perfecting practical reasoning only; now it relates to both speculative and practical reasoning. J.E. Naus, in a detailed study,

1. The matter is obviously more complex than our presentation here, see A. Kenny, Aquinas, 1980, p. 61ff. 2. IIaIIae,q.9,a.,ad2um. 3. IIaIIae,q.9,a.2. 4. IIaIIae,q.9,a.2, sed contra. 5. IIaIIae,q.9,a.2,ad3um. 6. IIaIIae,q.8,a.6.
entitled, *The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to Saint Thomas Aquinas*, has pointed out the identity of these two forms of reasoning in Thomas' mature thought. He writes:—

"It has been proposed, and we believe correctly, that in his earlier works St Thomas leaned more towards a real distinction between speculative and practical, between scientific and ratiocinative intellects, while in his later works he held their identity". (1)

Our present subject would seem to be exhibiting signs of this wider change, but rather than entering into this large and difficult area, we might just draw attention to Thomas' own explicit reason for the change here.

"Fides autem primo et principaliter in speculatione consistit, inquantum scilicet inhaeret praeae veritati. Sed quia veritas prima est etiam ultimus finis, propter quem operamur, inde etiam est quod fides ad operationem se extendit, secundum illus. Gal., Fides per dilectionem operatur. Unde etiam oportet quod donum scientiae primo quidem et principaliter respiciat speculationem, inquantum scilicet homo scat quid fide tenere debeat. Secundario autem se extendit etiam ad operationem, secundum quod per scientiam credibilium, et eorum quae ad credabilia consequuntur, dirigimur in agentiis". (2)

Faith is not just speculative but is also the source of right direction because the Veritas Prima is also the telos of all human activity - the end or telos in a process of speculative reasoning. 3 Hence, the Gift of scientia is concerned first with giving man a certainty of judgement about what he ought to believe, and, as following from this, it also ensures that these matters of faith become the directing principles of his actions. The scriptural text - Fides per dilectionem operatur - plays a central role in Thomas' treatment of faith, 4 and of the whole new law of grace, 5 and also in his discussion of the Gift of intellectus.

1. Naus, op.cit., p. 19. 2. IaIIae,q.9,a.3. 3. IaIIae,q.8,a.2; q.94,a.2. 4. IaIIae,q.4,a.3. 5. IaIIae,q.108,a.1.
This text and the argument that accompanies it function then as important conceptual tools within the theology of grace.

"... fides ad operationem se extendit ...". (1)

We are seeing here a minor example of a major theme. But whereas in the case of the Gift of intellectus, the text and argument are used to show that there is also a practical dimension to the work of this Gift, here the argument is made to work, as it were, in reverse. The tradition had always presented scientia as involved primarily in man's active life and his practical reasoning. Thomas continues to accept this role, as we have seen. What is new is that he has now said, quite explicitly, that this Gift is primarily – primo et principaliter – speculative.2

But what sort of speculative reasoning does this Gift perfect? A knowledge of God based on insight into what is to be believed and what is not of belief: a knowledge based on grasping the significance and relevance of the doctrines of faith and what follow from them. Whereas wisdom and charity, as we shall see, are united in love with the divine realities they contemplate, the Gifts of intellectus and scientia operate within the discipline and darkness of faith-knowledge. Scientia comes to understand God and his ways through pondering on the nature of himself and his world in the light of faith.3 The light of faith in this regard, does not illuminate spiritual realities but reveals the supernatural significance of human and creaturely realities.4 But this is not to be identified simply with the theological study, scientia divina, because what is presented by this Gift is not just

1. IIaIIae,q.9,a.3. One wonders how this phrase might relate to that phrase attributed to Aristotle, 'intellectus speculative per extensionem fit practicus', see Naus, op. cit., p. 24ff.
2. IIaIIae,q.9,a.3. 3. IIaIIae,q.9,a.2,ad3um, ad1um. 4. IIaIIae, q.9,a.2,ad3um; q.9,a.4.
knowledge but, knowledge of the 'end' of Beatitude.

"... operabilia humana secundum quod in se considerantur non habent aliquam excellentiae altitudinem; sed secundum quod referuntur ad regulam legis aeternae, et ad finem beatitudinis divinae, sic altitudinem habent ...". (1)

It is this last point which will help us grasp the significance of Thomas' thoughts on the beatitude assigned to this Gift. The Gift of wisdom sees the creation in terms of the divine goodness and beauty and with it is linked the beatitude of joy and peace. But the Gift of scientia, in an article in which, as Gilby rightly says, the thought is more poignant than the words, Thomas links the beatitude of mourning and weeping. What seems to be hinted at here is a compassionate discernment of the complexities of love gone wrong, of the convolutions of pride and sin, of man's failings, mistakes and misunderstandings.

If charity and wisdom together give an insight and discernment about the beauty and harmony of the divine plan of providence, scientia grasps the meaning and significance of particular things, events and states of affairs in the light of faith given to the believer; and it sees, as a result, the fracturedness, the incompleteness and the dis-order of the present manifestation of that same divine plan for man and creation. We must repeat that the Gifts do not provide more data for faith or make more things known, they function by making things better known.

One aspect of the Gift of scientia, it would seem, is that it makes things better known by, as it were, a poetic insight into the lacrimae rerum and the 'still, sad music of humanity', into the pathos of humanity and creation in via. It is a knowledge through sympathy and compassion, issuing from the light of faith and resulting in the gift of tears. A knowledge which yearns for the consolation which will be

1. IIAIlae,q.8,a.3,ad1um. 2. IIAIlae,q.9,a.4.
given in heaven, in patria, to the blessed who mourn.

As we shall see with all the Gifts, there is a difference between the work of each Gift in via and in patria.¹ This distinction in regard to the Gift of intellectus opens out the idea that in this life there is also a negative dimension to its operation.

"... duplex est Dei visio. Una quidem perfecta, per quam videtur Dei essentia. Alia vero imperfecta per quam, etsi non videamus de Deo quid est, videmus tamen quid non est; et tanto in hac vita Deum perfectius cognoscimus, quanto magis intelligimus eum excedere quidquid intellectu comprehenditur. Et utraque Dei visio pertinet ad donum intellectus: prima quidem ad donum intellectus consummatum, secundum quod erit in patria; secunda vero ad donum intellectus inchoatum, secundum quod habetur in via". (2)

In this life there is this negative, pruning and disciplining role of the Gift of intellectus by which we appreciate that all our conceptions of God fall far short of his reality. As regards the Gift of scientia, the work of the Gift is manifest in via, in this sense of the disordered nature of creaturely existence. In patria, all things will be re-ordered towards God, and mourners will be comforted.³

The Gift of Wisdom

Thomas, in his prologue to the Secunda Secundae, says that he will discuss the intellectual virtues of wisdom, intellectus and scientia, along with the Gifts which share the same name.⁴ This is not just a matter of systematisation but presupposes his appreciation of the play of similarity and difference within the conspectus of man's moral life: a conspectus which is not disjointed but perfected by grace. We have seen already how Thomas' distinction between the operation of the Gifts of scientia and intellectus follows on from his analysis

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¹. IaIIae,q.68,a.6, and see below chapter 11. ². IIaIIae, q.8,a.7. ³. IIaIIae,q.9,a.4. ⁴. Prologue IIaIIae.
of man's natural reasoning. So, similarly, the Gift of wisdom is presented as distinct from the intellectual virtue of wisdom but is not yet wholly removed from our normal understanding of what we mean by 'wisdom'. Hence, Thomas begins by referring to Aristotle in the opening sections of the *Metaphysics*. Wisdom is the knowledge of the most fundamental principle, the highest cause, the most fundamental reality, and, in the light of this knowledge, the wise man judges all other matters, both theoretical and practical, and in understanding them, he arranges them in their order of significance. One can talk about a man being wise in some particular discipline or craft — a scientist, an architect or a boat-builder — or, at a more general level, one can talk about a wise man per se. For the former, wisdom would amount to a firm understanding of the basic principles and the methodology of the particular craft or discipline: for the latter, it would be understanding all reality in the light of the most fundamental cause of its existence, God. This latter would be, in different ways, the wisdom of the metaphysician, the theologian, and, our present topic, the wisdom of the lover of God.

In the first question of the first article of the *Summa*, Thomas asks not whether what we might call 'natural theology' is possible but whether, given the nobility of this natural wisdom, sacra doctrina is necessary. The burden of proof lies with the claim of theology that a wisdom based on what has been revealed is necessary and that the wisdom of metaphysics is not sufficient. And even when this claim is justified, Thomas still holds that man can find wisdom through reason alone, albeit with very great difficulty.

"Quia veritas de Deo per rationem investigata a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione

1. See above p. 245. 2. In Meta. 1.2.982 a.8. IIAIIae, q.45,a.1.
There is too much at stake for such uncertainty, and *sacra doctrina* provides a greater assurance of truth. But more than this, it deals also with truths unknown except by revelation from God, above all, the gift of the fulfillment of man's super-natural end in communion with God. The wisdom of *sacra doctrina* is a form of judgement based on the highest form of truth, God's own self-knowledge, which he communicates to others in revelation.

But how does this form of wisdom differ from the *Gift of wisdom*?

As we have seen before, the difference between the activity of a virtue and that of a Gift is not a difference in what is accomplished but in the manner of accomplishing its object.²

"Cum judicium ad sapientem pertineat, secundum duplicem modum judicandi dupliciter sapientia dicitur. Contingit etiam aliquem judicare uno modo per modum inclinationis, sicut qui habet habitum virtutis recte judicat de his quae sunt secundum virtutem agenda inquantum ad illa inclinatur, unde et in X Ethic. dicitur quod virtuosus est mensura et regula humanorum actuum. Allo modo per modum cognitionis sicut aliquid instructus in scientia morali posset judicare de actibus virtutis etiam si virtutem non habet.

Primus igitur modus judicandi de rebus divinis pertinet ad sapientiam quae ponitur donum Spiritus Sancti; secundum illud I Cor. Spiritualis homo judicat omnia, et Dionysius dicit, de Div. Nom. quod Hierotheus doctus est non solum discens sed et patiens divina. Secundum autem er modus indicandi pertinet ad hanc doctrinam secundum quod per studium habetur; licet ejus principia ex revelatione habeantur". (3)

Given that the basis of both forms of wisdom is God's own self-knowledge, the means by which this wisdom is achieved differs. In one it is acquired by human effort, by study and reasoning; activities perfected

1. Ia,q.1,a.1. 2. IaIIae,q.68,a.2,ad1um. 3. Ia,q.1,a.6,ad1um.
by the virtues. In the other, it is described as wisdom, per modum inclinationis and is attributed to charity and the Gift of wisdom together.¹

Here, with this phrase we have hit upon a very rich field indeed. As is clear from the example given, this form of knowledge is not restricted to the life of grace. The virtuous man does not have to reason out every point of every action because, by having this virtue, he has an inclination to act in keeping with it. It is a second-nature to him; connatural to him because of the orderliness of his passions under this virtue.

Now this idea of acting per modum inclinationis, is extended to the 'second-nature' of the infused virtues and Gifts of the man under grace. And here a further theme comes in:-

"... Hierotheus doctus est non solum discens sed et patiens divina". (2)

This connatural knowledge of divine matters is said to come about not by notional understanding but by the actual experience of the divine. This is then explained in terms of the infused virtue of charity, that friendship-love which unites God and man.

"Hujusmodi autem compassio sive connaturalitas ad res divinas fit per caritatem, quae quidem unit nos Deo". (3)

Charity and wisdom, then, provide a wisdom per modum inclinationis which is rooted in an experiential union with God. We need to look at this notion in more detail.

The Summa Theologicae, and Thomism in general, presents the appearance of a highly structured and scientific system of argumentation.

¹ IaIlae, q.45,a.1,ad2um; q.45,a.4,ad2um. ² Ia,q.1,a.6,ad3um. ³ IaIlae,q.45,a.2.
It can appear then to be cold and over-rational, having little place for the realm of the emotions, for value-perceptions, and for the nuances and complexities which are the scope of the modern humane sciences, such as literature, history or psychology. At one level, this view of the *Summa* is quite correct. Thomas explicitly limits the scope of his work. In article eight of question one of the *Prima Pars* - *utrum haec scientia sit argumentativa* - he states that the *Summa* is to be developed along purely scientific 'argumentative' lines. He does not deny that God should be approached affectively, but neither does he claim that scientific theology is the whole sum of Christian wisdom. His work is to be a scientific or 'argumentative' study of revealed truths. He does not deny that there is a place for the wisdom of contemporary monastic theology; he is merely limiting himself to the theology of the schools. ¹

Now this the methodology he has chosen: where he could be criticised is if he does not examine, or cannot examine, within the terms of this methodology, the area of affective knowledge. The following paragraphs will show how unfounded any such criticisms would be. Certainly Thomas' analysis of this area is bound to lack the warmth and splendour of Augustine and Bernard, but that he gives space for, and studies scientifically, the area of affective knowledge cannot be denied. ²

Throughout the *Summa* a common theme is that knowledge of the truth is achieved in two ways.

"...cognitio veritatis est duplex. Una pure speculativa. ...Alia autem est cognitio veritatis affectiva". (3)

Fr. Marin-Sola has conveniently catalogued the various phrases by which

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¹. On the methodology of monastic, sapiential, theology, see J. Leclerq, The Love of Learning and Desire for God 1961. ². For all that follows, I am using V. White, 'St Thomas and Affective Knowledge', Blackfriars vol. XXIV (1943), pp. 8-16; vol. XXV (1944), p. 126f., pp. 321-328. ³. IaIIae,q.162,a.3,ad1um; Ia,q.1,a.6,ad3um; IaIIae,q.45,a.2; IaIIae,q.97,a.2,ad2um.
these two modes of knowledge were described by St Thomas and we can begin by merely listing them, adding the translations by Victor White.

Of the first kind of knowledge, it is designated as:
- *per usum rationis* (by the employment of reason),
- *per rationem inquisitionem* (by rational inquiry),
- *per modum cognitionis* (by the method of cognition),
- *cognitio speculativa* (speculative cognition),
- *per studium et doctrinam* (by study and teaching),
- *scientia argumentativa* (knowledge attained by way of argumentation, i.e., by logical processes),
- *scientia discursiva* (discursive knowledge),
- *ex iudicio rationi* (by rational judgement).

Of the second kind of knowledge, this is said to be:
- *affectiva*,
- *per connaturalitatem* (by connaturality),
- *per modum inclinationis* (by the way of inclination),
- *per viam voluntatis* (by way of the will),
- *notitia experimentalis* (experiential awareness),
- *per amorem* (through love),
- *sine discursu* (without discursus),
- *quaeri ex habitu* (as it were arising from a habitus),
- *cognitio absoluta et simplex* (absolute and simple cognition).

(These two groupings do overlap somewhat, for example, *notitia ex habitu* and *notitia experimentalis*, can also be applied to certain forms of purely intellectual activity).

It is important to stress that we have not yet made any mention of affective knowledge of God. The list of phrases above refers to value-perception and affective knowledge as part of man's ordinary knowledge of the world around him and his activity in it. When Thomas does discuss man's affective knowledge of God he moves from the known to the unknown; from the presupposition of such knowledge as part of man's general intellectual abilities, to its more restricted scope in regard to the Creator who is not part of his own creation and not an object for man's sense-based understanding. If then the term 'connatural knowledge' is used analogously, we need to establish its prime analogue, its most ordinary sense in terms of man's natural under-

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standing and judgement before we go on to apply it to the Gift of wisdom.

All that is not God needs to change; needs to become more than it is in order to become itself.¹ Even the angels, who change only once and in an instant are not created with the fullness of their own being.² All other creatures change within the temporal duration of their existence.

"Just because no finite being is sufficient to itself, not its own good, its own end, it has a positive inclination to undergo change; and its inclination will be predetermined by its nature and its properties - by the kind of thing it is ... it is their natural or connatural tendency; it is of their nature so to behave". (3)

Now of all creatures having inclinations connatural to themselves, we can make a basic subdivision: there are those which act without any knowledge and just from nature, (naturaliter), such as plants; and those which act from knowledge of one kind or another, (intentionaliter). Of these latter, animals act through sense apprehension, men through sense and intellectual apprehension, and angels through intellectual understanding alone. Among sentient creatures there is not just an inclination beyond themselves due to their natures but, because of their natures as sentient, an inclination based on apprehension of what is other than themselves. This apprehension involves value perception, even in animals.⁴ In animals, this ability to grasp value and to act upon it is called the vis aestimativa; in man, the rational animal, where it interreacts with intellectualty, it is called the sensus contemplativus or ratio particularis.⁵

¹. For the following, V. White, op. cit., pp. 324-328.
². Ia,q.62. ³. V. White, op. cit., p. 324. ⁴. Ia,q.78,a.4. ⁵. For Thomas, human reasoning is not simply added to man's animal nature but there is an interaction of sense and intellect, appetite and will. Consequently, for Thomas, man's sense-powers are greater than that of animals because of their greater sophistication and complexity.
To move one stage further, connatural inclinations based on sense appreciation are called appetites; inclinations based on appreciation of what is good or not good is called the rational appetite, the will. But the will is found not only in mere potency or in act but also in an habitual condition of acting in a certain way or inclining towards a particular object. Not only can I be drawn to a particular good which I have perceived, or actually be drawn towards it; I may also have a disposition, (acquired or given), to be drawn in this way. This is a habitus of the will; it is something, more than mere potency but less than full act, but it is a positive and more or less constant quality which inclines me to be drawn towards a particular object or set of objects. If the 'object' is a morally good one we call this quality a virtue, if it is morally bad, it is called a vice. These dispositions constitute a second nature' in their possessor. It is connatural or second nature to the just man to act justly because he has a constant inclination to act in this way: to be a just man is not merely to do just things, it is to act justly with spontaneity, ease and pleasure.

A man makes himself. Within the wide limits of his human nature, a man becomes what he makes of himself, either a vicious or a virtuous man, by building up patterns of dispositions. A habitus is not the same as a habit. A habit is a fixed, predetermined pattern of response which limits the freedom of the will to act in unusual ways. A habitus is a disposition of the whole man to act in keeping with the drive of the rational will.

We must therefore posit two kinds of connatural inclinations within man. One kind, following on from his nature as a rational animal: these include not only the tendencies of his animal nature but
also the intellectual assent to the first principles of reasoning.\(^1\)
And the second kind follow from his acquired second nature, arising out of what a man has made of himself in response to his experiences. This is the whole area of moral philosophy for Thomas and, his master, Aristotle. But all this emphasis on 'inclinations' is not to suggest that the life of the virtues is not based on reason. On the contrary, the virtue of Prudence, as we shall see, involves the application of reason to every group of contingent events. But the virtues do not work in a mechanistic way: by them, man is not turned into some form of computer but achieves the perfection and integration of all his humanity, volitional as well as intellectual. How a man has made himself will determine how he appreciates a particular situation and determines how he will use his reason within it and how he will act in response to it.

The activity of reasoning for the virtuous man is in no way then the purely speculative reasoning of the moral philosopher, but the application of reasoning within an area with which the man has a certain affinity or connatural experiential knowledge. Such a man has an affinity with his subject, a discernment by familiarity. Hence, Thomas can claim that sometimes the mind of man tends to the truth by a certain natural inclination, even though he does not see the reason of the truth.\(^2\) Here, we are not far from the model of thought which Thomas uses, at a super-natural level, in relation to the activity of

1. \(\text{IIaIIae, q. 24, a. 11.}\)  
2. \(\text{In Physics, I. lect. 10.}\)
the Gifts.

Given all that has now been said on the idea of judgement by connaturality at a natural level, we now need to apply these same insights in relation to the infused virtues and Gifts. Man by his nature is open to a larger existence than that with which he is born. He has to make himself, by means of the virtuous life, into the fullness of what he is to be by nature, but, interfused with this natural dynamism of man there is a further form of growth. He is called also to a supernatural destiny. The virtuous dispositions of this supernatural life are not however acquired by men through experience but given to them as a gift by God. These are the infused dispositions of the theological virtues, the infused moral virtues and the Gifts of the Spirit: the subject matter of the Secunda Secundae. By these also man acts not just per usum rationis but by connaturality. What is more, within this life of friendship-love between man and God, in this area beyond the capacity of man's natural reasoning powers, it would seem to be the case that man's understanding per usum rationis is less certain than his understanding by familiarity, per amorem.

If we examine metaphysically the very origin of man's desire we must first of all posit some form of inclination. Desire is first of all an inclination and not an experience; it is being drawn to things other than oneself prior to any question of intelligibility. Being drawn to other things is the basic movement in man by which he builds himself up to fulfill his infinite potential as an intellectual creature. Now when we analyse man's rational appetite, the will, we see, in contrast, that the inclination of the will is a bond of attrac-

tion to the intelligible good, to value, in other words. The will is drawn not to a particular good, as are man's sense inclinations, but to a particular thing seen as good, evaluated as good. How is this passive principle of inclination transformed into the active principle of the will, the moving-force, the dynamism of man's life?

For Thomas, the answer, at its most skeletal, is love, Amor. Man is not just drawn towards particular goods by his sense-appetite; love creates a world of purposive ends and purposive activities around man; a human world of significances, values and meanings. It produces a bond of affinity, of relationship, and, at its height, of union, with that which is outside man's own self. All other emotions and the whole activity of man's understanding presupposes love.

Now by this amor intellectus, we assume the interaction of knowledge and will. An object is known and therefore loved and, as it is loved, the intellect is moved by the will to an even deeper knowledge. For Thomas, knowledge is knowledge of an object as it exists in the mind of the knower, and love relates to the object as it exists in reality. But knowledge is prior to love. One can only love what one knows. Nevertheless, something can be known imperfectly, or, only in a general sense, and yet be loved perfectly. It can happen, therefore, that something is loved better than it is known. But there is a dialectic here. The more one loves someone or something, the less satisfied one is with a general, superficial knowledge. Love, then, provides the dynamism by which one moves to a further, deeper intellectual appreciation.

1. IaIIae,q.26,a.1. Thomas divides love into amor sensitivus which is a 'passion', a passive principle in the sense-appetite, and amor intellectivus seu rationalis which is in the will. It is of the latter that we are speaking here. On the various species of love, see IaIIae, q.26,a.3,a.4; on dilectio, caritas, amicitia and concupiscencia.
2. IaIIae,q.26,a.2. 3. IaIIae,q.27,a.4; q.28,a.5; 1a,q.20,a.1.
4. IaIIae,q.27,a.2. 5. IaIIae,q.27,a.2,ad2um.
"Amans vero dicitur in amante secundum apprehensionem, inquantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora ejus ingeditur. Sicut de Spiritu Sancto, qui est amor Dei, dicitur, I ad Cor., quod scrutatur etiam profunda Dei". (1)

This general 'dialectic of love' used throughout the Summa, is applied in particular to the relationship between faith, charity, and the Gift of wisdom. The first kind of knowledge relates to faith, the love is charity, and the deeper appreciation and knowledge, (intellectual but based on love), is the judgement by connaturality which is the work of the Gift of wisdom.

Now it must be made clear that the Gift of wisdom in an intellectual gift even though it is so closely associated with charity. Love provides the dynamism for this growth in understanding and love provides the bond of connaturality, but wisdom is an intellectual virtue. More specifically, the Gift of wisdom relates to the intellectual act of judgement, like scientia, and not to simple insight, like the Gift of intellectus. Sapientis est ordinare. The wise man assesses and judges all things in their correct ordering and relationship. With the Gift of wisdom even the qualities of God are correctly understood by the prompting of the Spirit 'who searches even the depths of God'. Moreover this judgement by connaturality with things divine is not only contemplative but practical as well. In the light of this assessment of things divine, the wise man judges all human activity in its relationship to God and his providence. This judgement of all things, human and divine, is not based solely on reasoning but

1. IaIIae,q.28,a.2. 2. 'The Dialectic of Love in the Summa', Gilby, vol. 1, Appendix 10, pp. 124-132. 3. IaIIae,q.45,a.2. 4. IaIIae,q.45,a.2,ad3um, and see above, p. 245. 5. In Metaphysics, Prologue. 6. IaIIae,q.45,a.1. 7. IaIIae,q.45,a.3. 8. IaIIae,q.45,a.3, a.4.
on connaturality, union and 'experience' of God but it is a form of
teleological judgement and knowledge none the less.

The reasoning Thomas gives for this necessary union of faith
and love, wisdom and charity, of human knowing and loving at their zenith,
is not found, as one might expect, in his analysis of human psychology
in the Prima Secundae, but, significantly enough in his treatise on the
Trinity in the Prima Pars. Just as the scientific methodology of the
Summa can blind us to the role of affective knowledge within it, so
the structure of the Summa as a whole, can blind us to the Trinitarian
dimension of his theology. From Prima Pars, question forty-four, to
the end of the Summa, Thomas discusses creation but this whole analysis
takes place in the light of Prima Pars, question forty-three - de mis-
sione divinorum personarum - the sending ad extra of the Son and the
Spirit. Question forty-three is the cardinal question of the Summa,
articulating the whole. 1 Regarding the intra-Trinitarian processions
of the Son and the Spirit, Thomas, following the tradition which went
back to Augustine, spoke of a procession, secundum emanationem intellec-
tus, and, alia per modum voluntatis, qua est processio amoris. 2 The
basic paradigm, then of the duality within unity of knowledge and love
is found at the very heart of the Trinity. As for the sending of these
two Persons and the created effects of these missions in those creatures
capable of receiving them, Thomas again stresses unity and diversity
within unity.

"... quantum ad effectum gratiae sic communicant
duas missiones in radice gratiae, sed distingu-
unter in effectibus gratiae, qui sunt illumina-
tio intellectus et inflammatio affectus. Et sic

1. The most recent author to appreciate this is P.E. Persson,
Sacra Doctrina: Reason and Revelation in Aquinas, tr. R. MacKenzie,
Oxford, 1970, pp. 91-224. For an older authority, B. Froget, De l'habi-
tation du S. Esprit dans les ames justes, (Paris), 1893. 2. Ia,q.34,a.2;
q.37,a.1.
manifestum est quod una non potest esse sine alia, quia neutra est sine gratia gratum faciente nec una persona separatur ab alia." (1)

At the heart of the Trinity and at the perfection of the Christian life, knowledge and love cannot be separated. Even if the illumination of the mind is appropriated to the Verbum Dei, we are not to understand this as any other than Verbum Spirans Amorem.

"Verbum quod insinuare intendimus cum amore notitia est". (2)

The Begotten Wisdom of God - sapientia genita - unites himself to man through the virtue of love, (caritas), and within this love, gives also the Gift of wisdom; this infused wisdom is not the cause of the charity relationship, it is the effect of it.

And this relationship of love is not just one of friendship but of adopted sonship through the Spirit and the Son. Thomas is quite clearly grounding himself on Romans chapter eight. In receiving the Gift of wisdom a man enters into the state of being a son of God. 3 It is within this intimate relationship of adopted sonship that the connatural knowledge of the Gift of wisdom operates. 4

We are now in a better position to appreciate what Thomas might mean by a man 'tasting' or experiencing God through the Gift of wisdom. Thomas in common with the whole tradition held that God is present in all creation by essence, power and presence, but that he is present to rational creatures by grace in a special way in keeping with their natures, which alone are capax Dei, capable of receiving this more intimate

1. Ia,q.43,a.5,ad3um. 2. Ia,q.43,a.5,ad1um; ad2um. In Augustine, De trinitate IV.20. (PL 42,969). 3. IIaIIae,q.45,a.6. 4. Hence the beatitude "... they shall be called the sons of God" attributed to the Gift of wisdom, IIaIIae,q.45,a.6.
relationship.¹

"Super istam modum autem communem est unus speciales quo convenit naturae rationali, inque Deus dicitur esse sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amat in amante. Et quia cognoscendo et amando creatura rationalis sua operatione attingit ipsum Deum, secundum istum speciale modum Deus non solum dicitur esse in creatura rationali, sed esse habitare in ea sicut in templo suo". (2)

This 'inhabitation' of God, which has its roots in Johannine and Pauline spirituality, refers to the constant presence of the Trinity in the essence of man's soul by grace. It is an abiding presence and not a transient and intermittent one.

For Thomas, however, it is impossible for man to know the essence of his own being: he cannot therefore experience directly the presence of God in the essence of his soul.³ Man knows himself in reflection on his own activity; by reflecting on his own activity; by reflecting upon his powers of willing and knowing.⁴ It is in the same indirect way, in reflecting upon his loving and knowing, that he experiences his relationship and union with the Triune God.⁵ This 'quasi-experimental' knowledge of God is more a matter of a non-conceptual 'touching' or 'tasting' than of direct knowledge.⁶

We can recall what has been established regarding the connaturaliy which flows from the acquired virtues and apply it at this higher level: that as a man has made himself to be, so will his openness and receptivity to new experiences be enhanced.

"Sicut enim gustus dijudicat sapores secundum suam dispositionem, ita mens hominis dijudicat de aliquo faciendo secundum suam habitualem dispositionem, unde et Philosophus dicit quod, qualis uniquesque est, talis finis videtur ei". (7)

The same point has been made by a modern theologian.

"The capacity for answering, in other words, the

¹ 1. IA,q.12,a.1; a.4,ad3um.  ² 2. IA,q.43,a.3.  ³ 3. IaIIae, q.112,a.5.  ⁴ 4. IA,q.87.  ⁵ 5. IaIIae,q.112,a.5.  ⁶ 6. IIaIIae, q.97,a.2,ad2um.  ⁷ 7. IaIIae,q.24,a.11.
sphere of resonance within us capable of taking up and digesting an appeal from outside - or from our innermost depth - influences the magnitude and depth of our experience". (1)

Thomas brings out this notion of a capacity to 'experience' God, to 'taste' and 'touch' the divine, most clearly in his discussion of the vice opposed to wisdom, that is, folly, (stultitia).² He quotes Isidore,

"Stultus est qui propter stuporem non movetur". (3)

'The fool is one who is not moved through dullness'. He lacks the necessary sensitivity and taste: the fool has blunted senses and a dull heart. In contrast, the wise man in his sensitivity and discernment has a certain receptivity and therefore a capacity for discriminating and penetrating judgement. This capacity for experiencing the divine comes from the infused virtue of charity but the intellectual act of judgement, which flows from it, pertains to the intellectual Gift of wisdom. The opposite of the Gift of wisdom is not then simple ignorance but a dullness and coarseness of judgement.⁴ This blunting of one's sensitivity for judgement is sinful: if it is a result of a habitual coarsening of perception by concentrating on things less than God.⁵ In a contrary fashion, as one's sensitivity to divine matters increases through growth in charity, so does one's ability to judge divine things through the Gift of wisdom, and not only divine matters, but all other things in the light of this experiential knowledge of God.

"... ad sapientem pertinet considerare causam altissimam, per quam de aliis certissime judicatur, et secundum quam omnia ordinari oportet". (6)

Our experience of God within the Gift of charity-wisdom is, (as is quite in keeping with Thomas' basic model of movement), the result

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1. E. Schillebeeckx, The Christ 1980, p. 33. 2. IIaIIae, q.46,a.1. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. IIaIIae,q.46,a.2. 6. IIaIIae,q.45,a.1.
of the experience of being moved. E. Schillebeeckx, in an essay which shows perhaps his earliest interest in the notion of experience, writes:

"The experiential aspect of the act of faith, which has disappeared in post-Tridentine speculation about the act of faith, has once again been accorded its proper place ... Neglect of the 'mystical aspect of faith' in the Fathers and the scholastic authors of the High Middle Ages has led to the act of faith being regarded more or less as a conclusion drawn from successful reasoning".

He also adds, concerning the term *instinctus*, so important to our own area of research:

"The *instinctus* in its original Greek meaning of *enthusiasmos*, (with which Aquinas was familiar and which he quoted) might well have provided Seckler with a better indication of the direction in which he should have looked. 'Enthusiasm' implies not only a being attracted, but also an experience, a state of being moved that is experienced in the person himself, but cannot of its own accord be explained by him because a deeper mystery is active within it. Seckler places too low a value on the real aspect of experience that is present in the act of faith. In Seckler's view, grace becomes something like a non-conscious modality of human life, (a typical affirmation of anti-Reformation theology), as though grace were a purely entitative elevation of our existence without our human psychology being affected in the process! There certainly is a nonconceptual element of experience in Aquinas' pre-Reformation synthesis, even though this is embedded in his concepts and affirmations of faith, (the *enuntiabilia*). Insofar, however, as there is an experience in faith, this experience does not refer directly to God's revelations of himself, (this would be the *visio beata*), but to the value and the relevance of the truths to our human existence, to a certain state of being moved in this existence that cannot be explained from a human point of view, but that is experienced as a gift from elsewhere, a gift that on reflection, can only be experienced as a grace - the work of God's Spirit in us". (1)

Schillebeeckx's thought has developed a great deal since 1968 and the

notion of experience is now a central one in contemporary theology. At the moment we can only note this and note also how Schillebeecka explicitly refers back to his Thomistic legacy and, in particular, to the idea of connatural knowledge.2

Charity and wisdom are the perfection of man's whole nature, and, precisely as such, they are also the perfection of man's relationship with his Creator.3 Now - and this is to introduce a whole new area of thought - just as all creatures participate in Being, in God's Being, so rational creatures also participate in God's providence by a participation in operation, in activity.4 In the life of grace, they have the dignity of initiating and enacting prudential and therefore providential purposive programmes. In this too, in their prudential actions, they experience God indirectly. In his Commentary on Corinthians, Thomas writes:-

"... quia Deus est in omnibus rebus per suam actionem, inquantum conjungit se eis, ut dans esse, et conservans in esse. In sanctis autem est per ipsorum sanctorum operationem, qua attingunt ad Deum, et quaedammodo comprehendunt ipsum, quae est diligere et cognoscere". (5)

'God is in all things through his action: he is in the sanctified through their actions'.

The Gifts of intellectus, scientia and wisdom are not just con-

cerned with speculative reasoning but with practical reasoning also.
It is time for us to move on to the fourth intellectual Gift, the
Gift of *consilium*.
10. THE INFUSED CARDINAL VIRTUES AND THE GIFTS OF CONSILIUM, FORTITUDE AND PIETY

- The Centrality of Prudence
- A Receptivity to the Ordering of Reality
- A Receptivity to Advice from Others: *docilitas*, *eubulia*, and the Gift of Consilium
- A Receptivity to One's Own Nature: An 'education sentimentale'
We move on now to the Gifts which relate to the infused cardinal virtues, leaving the intellectual Gifts which are allied with faith and charity, and leaving aside for the moment the Gift of fear which is linked to the theological virtue of hope. To clarify the situation it may be as well to present once more an analytical table of how Thomas arranges the Gifts in the Secunda Secundae.

The Theological Virtues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtue</th>
<th>Gift</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charity, as the root of all the infused virtues and Gifts.</td>
<td>wisdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Faith, working through Charity,  
  a. the intellectual act of apprehension. | intellectus |
| b. the intellectual act of judgement  
  i. from divine realities. | wisdom |
| ii. from created realities. | scientia |
| Hope, working through Charity under the aspect of filial fear. | fear of the Lord |

The Infused Moral Virtues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtue</th>
<th>Gift</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prudence, perfecting practical reasoning, directing the moral virtues.</td>
<td>consilium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>piety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>fortitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperance</td>
<td>fear of the Lord.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the introduction to the Secunda Secundae, Thomas says that all moral philosophy can be reduced to a discussion of the virtues and these in turn can be reduced to seven - three theological and four cardinal virtues. All the moral virtues are assigned in this way to one
or other of the cardinal virtues. Hence, in the table above, we are to take, 'Justice' or 'Fortitude' to refer also to all those sub-virtues which are related to them.¹ The *Secunda Secundae* is a theological treatise in which the natural values of justice, temperance and the rest, are presented with respect and shown to be enhanced and transformed under grace. The Gifts are interwoven with this dominant theme, reaffirming the triumph of grace within man under charity.

We have already discussed the significance of the changes between the various arrangements of the Gifts in Thomas' career.² Let us focus on only one point which is highly relevant to the task in hand at this juncture. Only in the *Secunda Secundae* is the virtue of prudence mentioned in relation to the Gifts. This cannot be because Thomas was unaware of its importance in the *Prima Secundae* because he discusses it there in great detail.³ The problem was, presumably, that in dividing the Gifts between the faculty of reasoning and the faculty of appetite, it was difficult to deal adequately with a virtue which unites both. Now, in the *Secunda Secundae*, prudence and its allied Gift of *consilium* are placed at the centre of the discussion of man's moral life. It is claimed that what charity is to the infused virtues, prudence is to the moral virtues.⁴ And if prudence is central, so then is the Gift of the Spirit's counselling.

What has to be said about this Gift can be said quite simply by referring to question fifty-two, article one.

"Est autem proprium rationali creaturae quod per inquisitionem rationalis moveatur ad aliquid agendum: quae quidem inquisitio consilium dicitur. Et ideo Spiritus Sanctus per modum consilii creaturam rationalem movet. Et propter hoc consilium ponitur inter dona Spiritus Sancti". (⁵)

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¹. An enormous number in the case of these two virtues.  
². Above p.223-229.  
³. IaIIae,q.57-61.  
⁴. IaIIae,q.51,a.2 and q.23,a.7.  
⁵. IaIIae,q.52,a.1.
"Ad tertium, dicendum quod filii Dei aguntur Spiritu Sancto secundum modum eorum, salvato scilicet libero arbitrio, quae est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Et sic inquantum ratio a Spiritu Sancto instruitur de agendis, competit filii Dei donum consiliis". (1)

The Gift of **consilium** is not some particular form of inspiration over-riding the human mode of deciding and acting but it is a further dimension within that particularly human mode of deciding and acting which is referred to as **liberum arbitrium**, free judgement, or, less correctly, free will. Thomas made the same point in **Prima Secundae**, question sixty-eight.

"Tale autem instrumentum non est homo; sed sic aguntur Spiritu Sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberum arbitrium". (2)

The same point is made here more precisely because it is prudence which perfects man's free judgement and the act of choice, (electio), which follow from that judgement and which is the manifestation of man's freedom.

**The centrality of prudence.**

In introducing his analysis of the moral virtues, Thomas makes quite explicit his disagreement with Socrates. Socrates, he claims, held that all the virtues are intellectual: if a man possesses full knowledge then he will be perfectly virtuous.

"Hoc autem procedit ex suppositione falsi. Pars enim appetitiva obedit rationi non omino ad mutum, sed cum aliqua contradictione. Unde Philosophus dicit quod ratio imperat appetitivae principatu politico, quo scilicet aliquid praeest liberis, qui habent jus in aliquo contradicendi". (3)

Man's rationality controls his life and action not as a despot but as a constitutional ruler who governs by coordinating and directing elements

1. IIaIIae,q.52,a.1,ad3um. 2. IaIIae,q.68,a.3,ad2um. 3. IaIIae,q.58,a.2.
and groups which have their own dispositions and drives.

"Sic igitur ad hoc quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis intellectualis, sed etiam quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis moralis". (1)

Thomas is not an intellectualist as Socrates was but follows his master, Aristotle. We have seen how the natural law is not composed of abstract principles of speculative reason built up into a system but is a rational appreciation of man's basic drives and inclinations, and is, precisely as such, a rational participation in the Lex Aeterna. 2 Man's appetitive drives - properly perfected by virtues - and not just man's rationality exhibit the order of providence and predestination. A man may know, speculatively, what is right but he will not use this knowledge, in terms of practical reasoning, unless his appetites are also perfected within their own order of operations. Moreover, it is the will, the rational appetite of man, which is after all, the motus, the driving force in man's nature. 3 We must therefore posit virtues in the intellect, in the appetites, (the moral virtues) and also in the will, (charity and justice). 4

"... aliquis habet habitum scientiae speculativae non inclinatur ad utendum, sed fit potens speculativi verum in his quorum habet scientiam. Sed quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente voluntate. Et ideo virtus quae perficit voluntatem, ut caritas vel justitia, facit enim bene uti hujusmodi speculativiis habitibus". (5)

Prudence is at the centre of the human moral act, (actus humanus) because it involves right reasoning and insight, a docility and receptivity on the part of man's appetites and the right ordering of his rational appetite, the will. Man's acts are purposive; he acts for an 'end'. By his intellectual ability he selects purposes, by his

1. Ibid. 2. Above p. 211. 3. Above p. 169ff. 4. Ia,q.56,a.6. 5. IaIIae,q.57,a.1.
rational will he fixes on them and moves towards them, but it is by the virtue of prudence that he chooses means, in keeping with the end, by which he will achieve his purposes. Prudence then is an intellectual virtue. To be 'good' involves doing good and, in the complexity of man's activities, this involves not only a rightness about 'ends' but about the choice or means to those ends and a rightness too about the manner, the circumstances and the timing of the choice of these means. Prudence is an intellectual virtue because, although dealing with a whole host of other matters, it is primarily concerned with deliberation, choice and putting into action such decisions as are determined in this way. Yet prudence is also a moral virtue, although, as it were, 'materially' rather than 'formally', because, unlike the other intellectual virtues, it is concerned with achieving objectives. Hence it involves the interaction of man's appetites and his rational will so that he will succeed in fulfilling the means to the end upon which he has determined. In this, prudence is aided by the moral virtues of justice, temperance and courage, which, in turn, participate in man's purposive, rational, activity by means of the virtue of prudence.

The whole area of man's prudential activity, that is, the whole area of choosing the means by which best to achieve one's projects, is an area within which certainty is not possible. Inevitably, one has to deal with contingent matters, individual events, and particular, often unique, situations. Thomas, following his master Aristotle, and deeply indebted to the Nicomachean Ethics, is fully aware of this. Within our own text dealing with the Gift of consilium he makes this clear.

1. IaIIae,q.57,a.5. 2 IIaIIae,q.47,a.4.
"Sed quia humana ratio non potest comprehendere singularia et contingenta quae occurrere pos-
sunt, fit quod cogitationes mortuorum sint timi-
daes, et incertae providentiae nostrae, ut dicitur Sap. Et ideo indiget homo in inquisitione consi-
lii dirigere se Deo qui omnia comprehendit; quod
fit per donum consilii ..." (1)

But this need for divine advice in regard to the working of infused prudence is only a greater and particular example of the need for advice and deliberation within the operation of all forms of prudence. Unable to achieve the certainty possible in speculative reasoning, man, in his practical reasonableness, needs to be receptive to advice from others, sensitive to the actual circumstances confronting him in each case, and receptive too to his own potentiality to respond in ways outside his customary manner, receptive to his own sense of what is judicious. The perfection of these three kinds of receptivity are the allied virtues of prudence which Thomas, following Aristotle, entitles, subulia, synesis and gnome. The Gift of receptivity to the Holy Spirit counselling (consilium) is an enlargement of these ordinary receptivities within the relationship of grace. We will therefore discuss the significance and place of the Gift of the Spirit's counselling within the terms of these three kinds of receptivity.

Before doing so, however, we need to make two further points. Firstly, the virtue of prudence relates primarily to action, to doing things for the sake of an 'end'. Taking advice and making enquiries is only the first stage of acting prudentially: such preliminary deliberations have to be followed by a decision on a course of action and then the actual undertaking of the action decided upon. Here, however, we are concentrating only on this first stage. Our justification for this is Thomas' own treatment of why this Gift is called

1. IIaIIae,q.52,a.1,ad1um. 2. IIaIIae,q.51.
The Gift of **consilium** is not to be confused with the charismatic Gift of giving counsel to others. It is something man receives which is then subsequently integrated into his cooperation with divine grace in his activity of deciding and enacting.

The second point is that although we are concentrating on these three allied virtues of prudence we need also to be aware of the complexity intrinsic to the virtue itself. As prudence has to deal with empirical, contingent and individual matters, the virtuous man needs to be able to draw on his memory and his foresight, on an insight into what needs to be done and on what is actually before him, and on a docility to advice, teaching, sound reasoning, and on a feeling for caution and circumspection. Thomas deals with all these intrinsic elements of prudence in turn. Man needs to be receptive in all these areas not for some form of contemplative insight but precisely to ensure the rightness of his activity.

**A receptivity to the ordering of reality.**

Josef Pieper, in his book, *The Four Cardinal Virtues*, has done more than anyone else to transpose Thomas' insights on the moral virtues out of their scholastic categorisation so alien to our own thought,

1. IIaIIae,q.52,a.2,ad1um.  2. IIaIIae,q.52,a.2,ad2um.  
The Pauline charismatic gifts are *gratia gratum faciens* and not *gratia gratis data*.  3. IIaIIae,q.49; memoria, providentia, intelligientia, solertia, docilitas, ratio, circumspectio, cautio. See Pieper, op. cit., pp. 10-22, for illuminating discussion of these in modern language.
into modern prose, making them accessible to modern sensibility, it
is as well then to quote him on this topic, having first recalled a
basic dictum which we have already come across several times before:

Bonum hominis sit secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit.¹

"The intrinsic goodness of man - and that is the
same as saying his true humanness - consists in
this, that 'reason perfected in the cognition of
truth' shall inwardly shape and imprint his voli-
tion and action. In this fundamental principle
of Thomas Aquinas is summed up the whole doctrine
of prudence ...

... Whoever rejects truth, whether natural or
supernatural is really 'wicked' and beyond conver-
sion. And from the realm of 'natural' philoso-
phising, the realm which the supernatural 'presup-
poses and perfects' we may call to mind Goethe's
saying: 'All laws and rules of conscience may
ultimately be reduced to a single one: to truth'.

We incline all too quickly to misunderstand
Thomas Aquinas's words about 'reason perfected in
the cognition of truth'. 'Reason' means to him
nothing other than 'regard for and openness to
reality' and 'acceptance of reality'. And 'truth'
to him nothing other than the unveiling and reve-
lation of reality, both natural and supernatural
reality. Reason 'perfected in the cognition of
truth' is therefore the receptivity of the human
spirit to which the revelation of reality, both
natural and supernatural reality, has given sub-
stance.

Certainly prudence is the standard of volition
and action; but the standard of prudence, on the
other hand, is the ipsa res, the 'thing itself',
the objective reality of being. And therefore
the preeminence of prudence signifies first of all
the direction of volition and action towards truth;
but finally it signifies the directing of volition
and action towards objective reality. The good
is prudent beforehand; but that is prudent which
is in keeping with reality". (2)

Leaving aside man's natural grasp of the reality of the created world
to which he belongs, for our present task we need to see how man, en-
dowed with the infused virtues and the Gifts of intellectus and scien-
tia and wisdom sees this same world as providentially organised and

¹. See above p.199 .  2. J. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Vir-
as exhibiting the working out of the divine plan of predestination and the recapitulation of all things in Christ.

Now this move from prudence to providence is not as abrupt a movement of thought for Thomas as it might be for us. The very terms prudentia and providentia are much more closely linked than our translations of them. Thomas, in discussing divine providence can feel free to interchange them.

"Et secundum hunc modum prudentia vel providentia Deo convenire potest". (1)

Prudence is understood as acting to order matters for a particular purpose or end, and, developing an analogy from this human activity, God is said to order all things in creation to the end which he predestined for them. Creation as a whole has a purpose and each thing within creation in fulfilling its nature, is acting within the harmony of this single plan.

What is more, man, given his nature as the 'image of God', fulfills his role in the divine plan in as much as he acts prudentially. As we noted above, as part of the Gift of wisdom, Thomas claims that, 'God is in all things through his action: he is in the sanctified through their actions'. Man's own purposes are not at odds with the divine plan; properly perfected, they are, in themselves part of the enactment of divine providence. This is the significance of the marvellous Prologue to the Secunda Pars. Prudence deals with the choosing of means to fulfill his purposes. This can in no way be understood in terms of the saying 'the end justifies the means': on the contrary, the means chosen are to be an 'incarnation' of the ideals of man's fulfillment within the circumstances of human life. Man fulfills the divine plan not in his passivity but in his activity.

1. Ia,q,22,a,1. 2. Ia,q,22. 3. Above p. 267.
In as much as a man takes himself in hand, enacting and achieving his prudential purposes, he is not asserting his independence from God but entrusting himself more fully into the hands of God. For Thomas this is no paradox but clarity itself.

In our previous chapter on the Eternal Law, we stressed repeatedly that the universe is intellectually, not rationally, structured but can be appreciated by means of man's rationality as having a more-than-human-rational ordering. Similarly, the providential ordering of creation in its dynamism is not a mechanistic one but a prudential one. The receptivity within the human virtue of prudence is then a receptivity to the differing dynamisms within creation. A receptivity to creation as it exists and not as we would fancifully have it to exist. Prudence involves accepting what particular means in these particular circumstances will lead to the good determined upon. Now the infused virtue of prudence opens man to more elevated influences than those of his own immediate created environment. Thomas uses the example of how water naturally falls due to gravity but how it is also receptive to the influence of the moon, thus producing the tides of the sea. Man, in a similar way, is also influenced in his activity by the real world around him with all its interconnecting dynamisms, but is also influenced, in his reason and will, by the 'drift' of providence as God reveals it in the life of grace and charity. There is then a greater 'tidal' influences on man; a 'movement' to which he only becomes receptive through the virtue of charity and the virtues and Gifts which flow from it.

Hence acquired and infused prudence, (perfecting and not destroying acquired prudence), can have different notions of what is to

1. IIIaIIae, q.2, q.3. See also Gilby, vol. 23, Appendix 3, p. 247 ff, 'The Infusion of Virtues'.
be done and, executively, how their projects are to be achieved. Acquired prudence, for example, working through man's practical reasonableness and the dictates of the Natural Law, might quite rightly choose means of self-preservation when faced with danger. The prudence that flows from the relationship of charity, on the other hand, working through insight in to the Lex Aeterna, to be true to itself and not 'sham prudence', might choose the way of martyrdom. Here we see how grace gives the insight that man's reasonableness is itself a participation in an ordering greater than the merely rational and man's drive towards the good is itself a participation in a greater good than that of his own finite nature. In this way, acquired prudence can pose a threat for the Christian if it restricts the determining factors for decisions to naturally experienced realities and works against this enlargening of perspective. 'Christian prudence, however, means precisely the throwing open of this realm and, (in faith informed by love) the inclusion of new and invisible realities within the determinants of our decisions.'¹ Once again we need to appreciate the interconnection of the Gifts in the life of man under grace. Here the Gifts of intellectus, scientia and wisdom are of crucial importance to the proper functioning of prudence and the Gift of the Spirit's counselling. Man moves himself by means of his reason and will, but in this wider dimension of the providence within which his experience of reality is situated, man needs to rely on that other dimension of his autonomous activity, that second principle of his own dynamism by which he is moved rather than the mover. As man's reasoning is a participation in the Lex Aeterna, and his will is a participation in the movement of providence, so his self-movement by

¹ Pieper, op. cit., p. 37.
reason and will is a rhythm sustained within a greater movement, that of the Spirit of God.

"Dicendum quod principium motivum inferius adjuvatur praecipue et perficitur per hoc quod movetur a superiori motivo principio, sicut corpus in hoc quod movetur a spiritu. Manifestum est autem quod rectitudo rationis humanae comparatur ad rationem divinam sicut principium motivum inferius quod movetur ad superius, et refertur in ipsum; ratio enim aeterna est suprema regula omnis humanae rectitudinis. Et ideo prudentia, quae importat rationis rectitudinem, maxime perficitur et juvatur secundum quod regulatur et movetur a Spiritu Sancto; quod pertinet ad donum consilii ...". (1)

"... Et quia in donis Spiritus Sancti mens humana non se habet ut movens, sed magis ut mota ... inde est quod non fuit conveniens quod donum correspondentis prudentiae praecipitum dicaretur vel judicium, sed consilium; per quod potest significari motio mentis consiliatae ab alici consiliante". (2)

Receptivity to advice from others: Docilitas, Eubulia and the Gift of Consilium.

"Dicendum quod consilium proprie importat collationem inter plures habitam; quod et nomen designat. Dicitur enim consilium, quasi considium, eo quod multi consent ad simul conferendum". (3)

We need not dwell too much on Thomas' etymology but on what it shows of his use of the term consilium. Our modern word 'counsel' can too easily be taken as a purely religious term whereas Thomas links it with people sitting down together in a council or assembly to discuss, debate and thrash out the best course of action. For this reason, 'deliberation' might be one word that could be used to translate consilium. 4 Or, drawing on modern pastoral care techniques one might call the Gift, 'the Gift of the Spirit's counselling'. Because prudential activity deals with particular circumstances and conditions, deliberation among several people is more likely to be successful than the

1. IIAIIae,q.52,a.2.  2. IIAIIae,q.52,a.2,ad1um.
3. IIAIIae,q.14,a.3.  4. Gilby does this in Gilby, vol. 17.
judgement of any single individual. No man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of prudence. Hence the need for a docility and openness to advice, especially from one's elders and those of more experience. Developing this a little further, Thomas also presents eubulia as an allied virtue of prudence. This is the cast of mind of making adequate inquiries, proper research, and accepting good advice before one makes important decisions.

Now how is this normal receptivity as part of the deliberating process taken up and given a new existence and new scope in the life of grace? We can examine this by looking at one of the central texts in Thomas' treatment of grace, Prima Secundae, q.109,a.9. At this point Thomas has introduced his two models of grace: that grace is both an habitual gift and also a divine help, auxilium or motio.

"... homo ad recte vivendum dupliciter auxilio Dei indiget. Uno quidem modo quantum ad aliquod habitu-
tuale donum, per quod natura humana corruptur et etiam sanata elevetur ad operanda opera
meritoria vitae aeternae, quae excedunt proportionem
naturae. Alio modo indiget homo auxilio gratiae,
unt Deo moveatur ad agendum. Quantum igitur ad
primum auxilii modum, homo in gratia existans non
indiget alio auxilio gratiae, quasi aliquo habitu
alio infuso. Indiget tamen auxilio gratiae secun-
dum alium modum, ut aliquid a Deo moveatur ad
recte agendum". (6)

The Gifts, as part of gratia gratum faciens, are part of the first type of grace mentioned here. But, by their nature, as we have seen, they provide a receptivity and docility for this second form of grace. There are two reasons for this second kind of need. The first is based on general metaphysical considerations.

"Primo quidem ratione generali, propter hoc quod supra
dictum est, nulla res creata potest inquemcumque actum prodir, nisi virtute motionis divinae". (7)

1. IaIIae,q.14,a.3. 2. IIaIIae,q.49,a.4; IaIIae,q.14,a.4. 3. IaIIae,q.49,a.3. 4. IIaIIae,q.51,a.1,a.2. 5. IaIIae,q.52,a.1,ad1um. 6. IaIIae,q.109,a.9. 7. Ibid.
It is the second reason which concerns us here in the question of how man can decide correctly, free from victimisation from his sinfulness, and seeing reality and truth with clarity.

"Secundo ratione speciali, propter conditionem status humanae naturae; quae quidem licet per gratiam sanetur quantum ad mentem, remanet tamen in ea corruptio et infectio quantum ad carmen, per quam servit legi peccati, ut dicitur ad Rom. Remanet etiam quaedam ignorantiae obscuritas in intellectu ... 

... Propter varios enim rerum eventus, et quia etiam nos ipsos non perfecte cognoscamus, non possumus ad plenum scire quid nobis expediatur, secundum illud Sap., Cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae. Et ideo necesse est nobis ut a Deo dirigamur et protegamur, qui omnia novit et omnia potest". (1)

The thought here is quite clearly closely related to our present topic of the difficulties of human deliberation and the Gifts of the Spirit operating within this area. Man, even under grace, still needs direction and protection from God.

"Et ideo necesse est nobis ut a Deo dirigamur et protegamur". (2)

The words used here deserve closer inspection: we might see them in terms of a maternal and paternal concern and involvement; 'protection' and 'direction'.

3 This is not reading too much into the text because the relationship of grace is neither neutral nor static; it is a continuous involvement of God with the creatures he loves. He leads them, guides them and protects them from harm. Properly understood, the Thomist theory of habitual grace cannot be taken as giving man the ability to act supernaturally independently of God. On the contrary, from the point of view of man, still weakened and impaired by the effects of sin, it establishes a permanent dependence and receptivity of man on God; in all his fully human activity, he is guided

1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. 3. An idea developed by M. Lefebvre in an unpublished paper on this article.
and protected by the love of God. How much more is this the case
with that most characteristic act of man’s freedom, his making choices
after prudential deliberation. \(^1\) Grace is both *gratia sanans* and *gratia elevans*. \(^2\) It heals the effects of sin which disorder the basic
perception of reality and truth, and it ‘elevates’ man to share in
the divine life and cooperate in the divine plan of predestination. \(^3\)
And yet, still within this high vocation of man under grace, and within the healing which grace begins in man, there is still the frailty
of humanity. In a rich, and quite moving, insight, Thomas says, ‘we
do not even know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for
our good’. \(^4\)

Given this continuous protection and guidance by God, doubly
necessary because of the dis-ordering of sin which still remains under
grace, and because of man’s new elevated state, we can appreciate a
central theme in Thomas’ treatment of the Gifts; a theme which is
exhibited in various metaphors, key phrases and scriptural quotations.

"Medicus etiam qui perfecte novit artem medicinae poteat per se operari; sed discipulus ejus, qui nondum est plene instructus, non poteat per se operari, nisi ab eo instruatur", \(^5\)

A receptivity to one’s own nature: an ‘education sentimentale’.

As we have seen already, for man to act virtuously he needs not
only a rightness of reasoning but a disposition in his appetites to-
wards acting in accordance with what is judged to be reasonable.
This does not mean a suppression of the appetitive drives in man but
a controlling of them. \(^6\) We can see that his has both a negative and
a positive dimension.

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1. Ia,q.83,a.3.  
2. IaIIae,q.109  
4. Quoted above, IaIIae,q.109,a.9.  
5. IaIIae,q.68,a.2.  
6. IaIIae, q.59,a.2, where Thomas distinguishes his own theory from that of the Stoics.
When Thomas analyses the virtue of prudence he also contrasts it with related vices, with imprudence, with negligence and with 'sham' prudence, that is, with cunning, guile and cheating. The root of all these vices, he claims, is covetousness and lust: not only sexual lust, which is the most powerful form of lust, but all immoderate straining for possessions to uphold one's sense of security and importance. These passions undermine one's sensitivity to reality and distort one's perception of the truth. Pieper, again, gives us a very clear example of this.

"Thomas adduces true-to-being memory as the first prerequisite for the perfection of prudence; and indeed this factor is the most imperilled of all. Nowhere else is the danger so great as here, at the deepest root of the spiritual-ethical process, the danger that the truth of real things will be falsified by the assent or negation of the will. The peril is the greater for its being so imperceptible. There is no more insidious way for error to establish itself than by this falsification of the memory through slight retouches, displacements, discolourations, omissions, shifts of accent. Nor can such falsifications be quickly detected by the probing conscience, even when it applies itself to the task. The honesty of the memory can be ensured only by a rectitude of the whole human being which purifies the most hidden roots of volition. Here it becomes apparent how greatly prudence, upon which all the virtues depend, is in its turn dependent at its very fundamentals on the totality of the other virtues ...". (1)

Here the infused virtues of justice, temperance and courage and their allied Gifts of the Spirit, piety, fortitude and the fear of the Lord, come in as auxiliaries to prudence.²

But the role of these moral virtues and Gifts is not merely negative. Again and again Thomas, following Aristotle, repeats that the reason governs the other faculties of man not as a despot but as a constitutional ruler.³ Alasdair McIntyre, in a recent book aimed

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1. Pieper, op. cit., p. 15. 2. See the table on p.225 above. 3. Ia,q.58,a.2.
at returning moral philosophy to the study of the virtues, holds that a theory of the virtues can fulfill two roles. Firstly, they can be seen as freeing man from 'victimisation' by his own emotions and desires, but, secondly, they can also be seen as giving man the ability to decide which drives to cultivate and encourage and which to inhibit and reduce. He adds:

"Virtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular ways. To act virtuously is not as Kant was later to think, to act against inclination, it is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues. Moral education is an 'education sentimentale'." (1)

Referring to Aristotle, he points out that excellence of intelligence and excellence of character must go together; otherwise prudence becomes mere cunning and manipulation; a view endorsed by Thomas. 2

However, when we come to examine the three remaining infused moral virtues - justice, temperance and courage -- it is significant that Thomas has very little to say about the Gifts which relate to them. A clue to this slackening of interest can be found in the third answer to q.139,a.1.

"Ad tertium dicendum quod donum fortitudinis ressicit virtutem fortitudinis, non solum quod consistit in sustinendo periculo, sed etiam secundum quod consistit in quocumque arduo opere faciendo. Et ideo donum fortitudinis dirigitur a dono consilii, quod videtur praecipue esse de melloribus bonis". (3)

As prudence is the formative virtue of all the moral virtues, so the Gift of divine counselling and advising is interfused with all those Gifts linked to the moral virtues. This seems to be clear proof that Thomas does not see the sevenfold Gifts as relating to seven discrete areas of activity, but as a sevenfold plenitude, interfusing all man's activities in via, on his way, by faith working through love, to his

1. A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1982). p. 140. 2. IIaIIae,q.55. 3. IIaIIae,q.139,a.1,ad3um.
There is a hierarchy within the moral virtues.

"Bonum autem rationis est hominis bonum, secundum Dionysium. Hoc autem bonum essentialiter quidem habet prudencia quae est perfectio rationis. Justitia autem est ejus boni factiva: inquantum scilicet ad ipsam pertinent ordinem rationis ponere in omnibus rebus humanis". (1)

Justice is the application of the right ordering which reason ascertains in each situation, the exercise of the virtue of prudence.

Prudence and justice then, are dimensions of any human activity. Prudence is located in the intellect; justice in the will, in the dynamism of man's activity. But these faculties of man can be undermined and disordered in their execution by man's feelings and passions. As all these forms of emotional response can be connected under two headings - feelings of fear or aggression, ('irascible' appetites), and feelings of desiring or of abhorence, ('concupiscible' appetites) - there are two subordinate moral virtues which render these appetites docile to prudence and justice. Hence the quotation above continues:

"Aliae autem virtutes sunt conservative hujus boni: inquantum scilicet moderantur passiones, ne abducant hominem a bono rationis. E't in ordine harum fortitudo tenet locum praecipuum: quia timor periculorum mortis maxime est efficax ad hoc quod hominem faciat recedere a bono rationis. Post quam ordinatur temperantia; quia etiam delectationes tactus maxime inter caetera impedient bonum rationis". (3)

Elsewhere, Thomas gives priority to courage over temperance because like prudence and justice it perfects one's relationships with others whereas temperance is primarily concerned with one's own inner ordering; and the common good is greater than the individual good. 4

The Gift of piety is linked to the infused virtue of justice, the Gift of fortitude is linked to the virtue of courage, and the infused
virtue of temperance is perfected by the Gift of the fear of the Lord. For his contemporaries, 'piety' was almost synonymous with 'compassion' for one's fellow men. In the Commentary on the Sentences, Thomas following through his basic model for the Gifts at that time, held that the Gift of piety brought a 'divine measure' to this compassion and mercy between men. Now he returns to Augustine's more theocentric notion of pietas and sees it as a filial piety towards God, the expression of a relationship of adopted sonship which includes all men on the basis of their relationship to God. In as much as this Gift is then linked to the infused virtue of justice, it re-orientates all the many facets of justice into this theocentric ordering of filial piety and respect. But we must beware of failing to appreciate Thomas' view of justice. As we found in the chapter, Ratio, Lex et Deus, Thomas characterises man as being purposive and a social animal. Since the sixteenth century, Western thought has been dominated by 'bourgeois' moral philosophy in which the individual self, (certain only of its own inwardness), exists in a totally neutral area, (society) in which he freely negotiates relationships of dependence and independence, ('freedom'). Medieval man led a communal existence and his presuppositions, his view of man and society, reflect this. Man is seen as existing within a framework of relationships. By his very birth he is indebted to others, to his parents, his kin, his fellow citizens. The virtue, (not the Gift) of piety, is the right ordering of reasoning within this network of relationships. The Gift of piety is then a further dimension of this already rich notion of

1. Piety, IIaIIae, q.121; Courage, IIaIIae, q.139; Fear of the Lord, q.19 and q.141,a.1,ad3um. 2. See O'Connor, p. 127 and IIaIIae,q.68,a.6,ad2um. 3. O'Connor, p. 127. 4. The Gift of piety is explicitly linked with the virtue of justice and not just the virtue of piety. IIaIIae,q.121, introduction.
man in society striving for a common good along with others to whom he is bound by debts of reverence and respect. The Gift of piety, like all aspects of grace in Thomas' theology, must be taken as a perfecting and not a destruction of what is already provided by nature. Hence, just as man is by nature both a social and a goal-seeking being, so the new law of grace involves the gift not only of Beatitude but of friendship. The Gift of piety is the gift of due respect and reverence within the new commonwealth of the adopted sons and daughters of God. ¹

But this commonwealth of God, established in grace, is only fully realised in heaven. There is an eschatological dimension to all the Gifts, but this aspect becomes particularly clear when we examine Thomas' treatment of the Gift of courage or fortitude. Just as the virtue of prudence has to deal with the contingencies of human life, so a man needs courage against all sorts of dangers, fears and anxieties, expected and unexpected. What is clear from this is that the Gift of courage or fortitude is to be seen not as 'aggressive' but as 'enduring'.

"fortitudo importat quamdam animi firmitatem...
... et haec quidem firmitas animi requiritur et in bonis faciendis et in malis perferendis, et praecipue in arduis bonis et malis". (2)

We noted above that the virtue of justice was more than a constant repetition of just deeds, it included a firm and stable disposition to act justly. Similarly, the key note here also is a firmness of purpose in the face of difficulty and opposition. Now as regards the life of grace, what man strives for is beyond his own strength and competence, and what opposes his purpose has the power to destroy

¹. On the idea of the commonwealth of God see St Thomas' commentary on Ephesians.  ². IIaIIae,q.139,a.1.
his life. The Gift of fortitude then involves not just a firmness of mind in resisting fears, but also resisting fear of death, and not just death, but martyrdom. It is, Thomas points out, the ability to face martyrdom which most clearly exhibits the infused virtue and Gift of courage. ¹

"... St Thomas is not principally concerned with the display of courage in attack, but with its display in endurance. Our life is difficult in all its aspects, and even more difficult as virtue increases. We must learn to overcome fear if we are to live fully; fear of personal injury, of loss, of reputation, or property, fear of death above all. If we face death with courage and have come to terms with it, the rest will follow. To come to terms with death we have to know where we hope to end; all else depends on the goal, which for Thomas is eternal union with God in truth and love. The way through this life is one of involvement in God's creation, with the things and above all, with the people, whom we encounter. That is why we need a long view in our difficulties, large mindedness and generosity in our use of material goods; patience and perseverance at all times. That is why, if we are to come through heroically, we need the special assistance of God which we call the Gift of Courage which will lift us to a heroic endurance far above what we could otherwise undertake". (2)

This passage shows how the Gift of fortitude must also be understood as involving the theological virtue of hope. The Holy Spirit inspires a firmness of mind, a confidence, that God will lead a man through danger, and through death, to eternal life. ³ It is this confidence which allows a man to take a long view of his difficulties and encourages him in his patience and perseverance. Obviously the Gift of the Spirit's counselling, (consilium), is not separate from this endurance and, given also the Gift of pity, we can see this Gift as the gift of courageous filial endurance, trusting in God's promises. What is more, along with hope is the Gift of a filial fear of the Lord, a fear of

¹. IIaIIae,q.124,a.2. ². A. Ross, Gilby, vol. 42, p. xxiv. ³. IIaIIae,q.139,a.1.
moving outside the relationship of adopted sonship with God. Filial fear of God and a firmness against creaturely fears are two aspects of man under grace. It is time for us to look at the theological virtue of hope and the Gifts of temperance and filial fear associated with it.
11. THE TELEOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

- Hope and Fear and Temperance
- The Gifts in patria
- The Gifts, the Beatitudes and the Fruits of the Spirit
Hope and fear and temperance.

Previously Thomas had never assigned a Gift to the theological virtue of hope. In the Commentary on the Sentences he held that while God cannot be known by the intellect, dependent on the senses, in this life, he can be the 'object' of charity and hope which are based in the will, and therefore these virtues do not need Gifts to aid them. They already have, intrinsically, a superhuman measure to their operations and therefore do not need a Gift, as Gifts were presented in the Commentary.¹ In the Secunda Secundae, however, in keeping with the scheme outlined in the Prologue, Gifts are now assigned to both charity and hope. But these two Gifts – wisdom and the fear of the Lord – are not assigned to have parallel functions. It is never claimed that the Gift of wisdom perfects or aids charity in any way. Thomas is consistent here; charity does not need a Gift, and we have followed both Labourdette and O'Connor in seeing wisdom as the culmination of all the Gifts, being part of the flowering of all the implications and ramifications of a life rooted in the divine amicitia of charity.² As for the theological virtue of hope, however, Thomas now associates the Gift of fear with it, as preserving, protecting and extending hope. The Gift of fear makes man under grace afraid of separating himself from God on whose help he relies absolutely; and this divine fear, colouring all man's actions and drives, acts as a check against all that would undermine this absolute reliance on God. There seems to be here, a definite enrichment of insight into the range and the dynamics of the theological virtue of hope.

We have already noted that Thomas recovered an older, more theocentric notion of the Gift of piety. What we might call a more anthro-

1. III.Sent.33,1,4; 27,3,3; 34,1,1,ad5. See O'Connor, p. 116.
2. See the discussion on this topic in O'Connor, p. 126.
pocentric notion of the Gift of piety – whereby pietas is a benevolence to one’s fellow man as the image of God – dominated Thomas’ thought until the Secunda Secundae. Now, the Gift of piety is understood not so much as a particular kind of activity but as relating to human prudential and just activity enacted within the awareness of the paternal care and loving guidance of God. It is this filial aspect, re-orientating man’s most characteristic activity which we now take up again in this chapter but now our interest is in seeing within this graced prudential activity a further teleological dimension. Man under grace is still in via, still in movement towards his homeland with God. This is obviously where the theological virtue of hope enters our discussion.

"objectum spei est bonum futurum arduum possibile haberi". (1)

The 'arduous' difficulty of achieving the object of theological hope is that this object, life with God in patria, is beyond the scope of human effort and reasoning. Man is absolutely dependent on God to achieve the good that he yearns for, which is God himself.  

In terms of Aristotelian causality, God is both the final cause of theological hope, its 'end', and also its efficient cause, that by which this end is achieved.  

The Gift of fear relates to God as the efficient cause of theological hope. Obviously it cannot relate directly to the 'end' of hope because man cannot fear goodness itself.  

There is no opposition then between hope and the Gift of fear because what is feared is not loss of what one hopes to obtain by divine aid, but rather fear of disregarding God’s own help to that end.  

As regards both hope and fear we need to be clear that we are

1. IIaIIae,q.17,a.1.  2. IIaIIae,q.17,a.2.  3. IIaIIae,q.17,a.4.  4. IIaIIae,q.19,a.1.  5. IIaIIae,q.19,a.9,ad1um.
distinguishing the emotional reactions from the virtue or Gift which bear the same name and dealing only with the latter. The theological virtue of hope accepts man's absolute dependence on God's guidance and protection to achieve the difficult good that he yearns for, God himself. This virtue and the Gift of fear are both habitual dispositions — habitus mentis — which make man's faculties responsive to the ordering of reason and the Spirit. Now theological fear, as a fear of moving outside the relationship between God and man which the virtue of charity-friendship establishes, can be understood in two ways. It could be seen firstly as a fear of the punishment due to such transgression as a penalty, and this is called 'servile fear'.

Thomas allows a preparatory role for this servile fear in terms of conversion to God out of fear of punishment, but this is to give way to a second kind of fear, 'filial fear'. It is this filial fear which is the Gift of the Holy Spirit. This is not a fear of punishment but a fear which is allied with the Gift of piety by which a man is fearful of offending God as a son is wary of offending his father, not out of fear but out of attachment and bonding. Thomas does allow for a certain continuation of servile fear but he tries to distill away any notion of servitude from this fear of punishment. In keeping with St Paul's treatment of grace in the Epistle to the Romans, Thomas insists that the Spirit the Christian receives is not a spirit of timidity or slavery, but a spirit of sonship which cries out 'Abba, Father'.

In a later question on the relationship between penance and fear,

1. IIAIIae, q.17, a.1, a.5; q.18, a.1; q.19, a.9. Thomas deals with fear as an emotion in IIAIIae, q.41, as a vice in IIAIIae, q.125, and as a gift in IIAIIae, q.19. These are not to be confused. The unique case of the flowering of this Gift in Jesus is dealt with in IIIa,q.7, a.6. 2. IIAIIae, q.17, a.1, ad3um. 3. IIAIIae, q.19, a.9. 4. IIAIIae, q.19, a.2, ad3um. 5. IIAIIae, q.19, a.4. 6. Romans, 8.15; cited in IIAIIae, q.19, a.2, ad3um; a.4, sed contra; a.6, obj.3um.
Thomas gives us a chronology of how man grows in grace from servile fear to the fear that belongs to sonship.

"Alio modo possimus loqui de poenitentia quantum ad actus quibus Deo operanti in poenitentia coope-ramus. Quorum actuum primum principium est Dei operatio convertentis cor ... Secundus actus est motus fidel. - Tertius actus est motus timoris servilis, quo quis timore suppliciorum a peccatis retrahitur. - Quartus actus est motus spei, quo quis, sub spe veniae consequendae, assumitpropos-itum emendandi. - Quintus actus est motus cari-tatis, quo alicui peccatum displicet secundum seipsum, et non iam propter supplicia. - Sextus actus est motus timoris filialis, quo, propter reverentiam Dei, aliquis emendam Deo voluntarius offert". (1)

It is growth in the life of charity, of amicitia Dei, which changes servile fear into filial fear. As charity increases, so the fear of separation from God also increases, but, equally, any idea of servility decreases and is replaced by a filial bonding of love. Charity, hope, filial fear and piety are all then interrelated.

This filial dread of separation from the guiding relationship with God, the only means by which man can achieve his ultimate flourishing and beatitude, has ramifications in all aspects of man's life and re-orders all his activities.

"... timor Dei comparatur ad totam vitam humanam per sapientiam Dei regulatam sicut radix ad arborem". (2)

At every level of his life it makes man receptive and docile to the action of God. In this sense, fear is the first of the Gifts. ³ The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. ⁴ For this reason, the Gift of fear is not only linked, in a primary way, with the virtue of hope, but also, in a secondary way, with the virtue of infused temperance. ⁵ The difficulties involved in responding to God's help in the movement towards him include the temptations of the flesh.

1. IIIa,q.85,a.5. 2 IIaIIae,q.19,a.7,ad2um. 3 IIaIIae, q.19,a.9. 4 IIaIIae,q.19,a.7. 5 IIaIIae,q.141,a.1,ad3um.
The Gift of fear allied with temperance, perfects as it were the ascetical, negative side of this movement of man in via ad patriam. If we take the basic axiom of the natural law as our starting point we can make this clearer. If, 'the good is to be sought after and done and evil is to avoided', then our concentration at the moment is on the evils which are to be avoided on this filial journey of return and assimilation to God.

This ascetical side of the life of grace is dealt with by Thomas not only in regard to the virtues, but, once again, in his central treatise on grace. There he uses the topic of 'justification' to bring out the idea that the movement towards God, quae terminatur in bonum aeternum divinae participationis, inevitably involves a contrary movement away from the life of sin.\(^1\) Our present topic is not then a minor one but part of Thomas' teaching on the new law of grace. The moment of conversion from a state of sin to a state of justice - right ordering - is presented as instantaneous, but man's incorporation of this new life into his own nature, through his activity, takes place in time, throughout the duration of his life in via. Unlike the virtues of prudence, justice and courage, the virtue of temperance does not deal directly with a right ordering in man's relationship with others and with what is around him, but solely with man's own 'internal' right ordering of himself.\(^2\)

Man is a matrix of forces. The same forces of self-preservation, self-assertion and self-fulfillment with which he is endowed by God, can, when dis-ordered, work to his own destruction. When reordered by grace and reason, through the virtue of infused temperance

1. IaIIae,q.113,a.5,a.6,a.9. 2. It therefore ranks as the lowest of the moral virtues, because the common good is greater than the individual good, IaIIae,q.141,a.8. But see also the answer to the third objection in this article, for a modification of this view.
these same forces can be co-ordinated into the unity and wholeness of man's aims and projects. The infused virtue of temperance, working with charity, hope and fear of the Lord, involves a curbing, restraining and a positive re-ordering of man's powerful drives in his own best interest; that is, in the interest of maintaining and deepening his right relationship with God in friendship, by which alone he can achieve what he hopes for.

The Gift of filial fear brings a restraint within all man's activities for a distinctive reason, out of reverence for God, out of filial docility, and, along with the other Gifts and especially wisdom, out of an experiential awareness of the awesome goodness of God. This is a form of fear, of awe, which is not be met with by the virtue of courage and self-assertion; it is the awe of the creature before his Creator and Saviour. The Gift at its fullest perfection, then, is not just a negative, curbing factor in man's life but a positive reverence and submissiveness before God within the tension of familiarity and awe which characterises man's adopted sonship.

Developing this even further, Thomas can hold that even Christ had the Gift of the fear of the Lord, as Isaiah had prophesied.1 Certainly Christ could not fear God in the sense of fearing to be alienated from him, but he was endowed with the Gift in that the Spirit led him, in the deepest way possible to man, to have a reverence for the overwhelming goodness of God. Given this Christocentric model of the Gift at its height, Thomas claims:-

"Et ideo de ratione doni timoris non est illud malum quod respicit timor, sed eminentia illius boni, sicut divini, cujus potestate aliquod malum infligi potest". (2)

1. IIIa,q.7,a.6. 2. IIIa,q.7,a.6,ad1um.
If the Gift of fear is then this filial and awe-inspired docility of man to God and the working of his providence, it follows then that, as the psalmist says; *Initium sapientiae timor Domini*. 1

"Cum enim ad sapientiam pertineat quod humana vita reguletur secundum rationes divinas, hinc oportet sumere principium, ut homo Deum revereat, et se subjiciat; sic enim consequenter in omnibus secundum Deum regulabitur". (2)

"Timor autem castus vel filialis est initium sapientiae, sicut primus sapientiae effectus". (3)

The Gift of filial fear is not the, as it were, chronological beginning of wisdom, but the first manifestation of the life of charity and wisdom.

The Gifts 'in patria'.

In article six of our central question, Prima Secundae, question 68, Thomas asks, *utrum dona Sancti Spiritus remaneant in patria*. For his *sed contra* he quotes from Ambrose's *De spiritu sancto*. 4 This quotation was a stock-piece in the tradition and had been used by the Lombard to show that the Gifts were virtues. 5 Thomas uses it here to prove that the Gifts are at their perfection in heaven: he takes it as a reference to the superabundance of the outpouring of the Spirit in heaven and takes the phrase 'seven spiritual virtues' to refer to the Gifts as he has analysed and described them.

"Sed contra est quos Ambrosius dicit, Civitas Dei illa, Jerusalem coelestis, non meatu aliquid fluvi terrestres abluitur; sed ex vita fonte procedens Spiritus Sanctus, cujus nos brevi satiamur haustu, in illis coelestibus spiritibus redundanter videtur affluere, pleno septem virtutum spiritualium fervens meatu".

The Gifts then should be studied not only as they exist *in via*, but as they exist in heaven. For other theologians who held that the

1. Ps. 110. IIaIIae,q.19,a.7,sed.contra. 2. IIaIIae, q.19,a.7. 3. Ibid. 4. De spiritu sancto, 1.16,157-8, PL.16, 770bc. Labourdette, D.S. 'Dons', col. 1585. 5. IV Sent.1,3,d.34, c.2. 'Haec dona virtutes esse Ambrosius ostendit'.
Gifts were remedies for sins or aids against human weaknesses, it was obvious that there would be no place for the Gifts in heaven. For Thomas, however, the Gifts are seen at their clearest in heaven.

"... sicut patet per auctoritatem Ambrosii induc-tam". (1)

But his thesis does not depend solely on this eisegesis of Ambrose but on his own theory of the Gifts.

"... ratio est quia dona Spiritus Sancti perfi-
ciunt mentem humanum ad sequendam motionem Spi-
ritus Sancti; quod praecipue erit in patria, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus, ut dicitur Iad Cor., et quando homo erit totaliter subiitus Dec". (2)

Given his theory that the Gifts render man docile and receptive to the instincts of the Spirit, then it does follow directly that this receptivity will be at its zenith in heaven. If they are rooted in charity — in a loving experiential knowledge and in a connaturality to the workings of the Spirit — then it is not difficult to accept that they will remain in heaven, and, indeed, that they will exist in a more characteristic way there than in via. But if this is all consistent it is still not clear what nature the Gifts will have in heaven and what relationship of similarity and difference we have to posit between their existence then and their existence as we know it, and have analysed it here. 3

Thomas goes on to provide a list of similarities and differences, using a text of Gregory the Great. 4 However any helpful insights gained from this are counterbalanced by his totally unconvincing reading of this piece of patristic rhetoric as if it were a literal scholastic analysis of the particular matter in hand. Nevertheless, once again,

1. IaIIae,q.68,a.6. 2. Ibid. 3. On the similar problem in relation to the virtues, see IaIIae,q.67. Charity remains, now in perfection; faith and hope disappear but the other virtues remain 'formally'. 4. IaIIae,q.68,a.6,ad2um, text, Gregory the Great, Moralia, 1.32. PL.75,547.
it is not Thomas use of authorities which establishes his argument but the consistency with which he follows through the principles he has established regarding the Gifts. Throughout the Secunda Secunda, when dealing with each particular Gift, Thomas raises the question of how each Gift will exist in heaven. Often he deals with this question within the space of an objection, more commonly it is also raised in a more general way in dealing with the beatitude attached to each Gift, but in the case of the Gifts of fear and consilium, obviously more difficult, he devotes an entire article to the problems involved. The Gifts assigned to the infused moral virtues obviously present more difficulties. In heaven they will not have the same 'matter' to work on: there will be no anxieties or doubts for consilium; no fear of sin or disobedience for filial fear and piety; no difficulties for fortitude to endure. Yet they remain, and according to Thomas' principles, exist in their fullest state in heaven.

Regarding the Gift of consilium, he presents his reasoning in terms of the basic model around which he has structured all his work on the Gifts, that of movement.

"... alia est dispositio ejus quod movetur dum movetur, et alia dum est in termino motus". (2)

Until this point we have been examining the Gifts in the process of man's self-movement by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, now we are trying to establish their nature at the 'end-point' of this movement. Hence, on the Gift of fortitude, he says;

"dona non habent eosdem actus in patria quos habent in via, sed ibi habent actus circa perfruptionem"

1. Courage, q.139,a.1,ad2um. Fear, q.19,a.11. Deliberation, q.52,a.3. Piety, q.121,a.1,ad3um. Intellectus, q.8,a.7. Scientia, q.9,a.4,ad2um. Wisdom, significantly enough is not discussed at all in this context; there is no problem of the continuation of charity-wisdom in heaven. 2. IIaIIae,q.52,a.3.
The 'end' of the movement of the Gifts is the same as the 'end' of man's whole dynamism, the Beatific Vision of God and this is not to be conceived of as a static cessation of activity in rest but as the fullness of human flourishing. To clarify this point we can look at the Gift of intellectus, associated with the virtue of faith. This Gift functions within the obscurity of the life of faith and yet faith will be replaced by knowledge in heaven. Whereas with the Gifts associated with the moral life we had to posit a change in 'matter', here we have to posit a change in 'condition'. As we noted above, the Gift of intellectus works in an 'ascetical' mode in this life.

"... etsi non videamus de Deo quid est, videmus tamen quid non est; et tanto in hac vita Deum perfectius cognoscimus, quanto magis intelligimus eum excedere quidquid intellectu comprehenditur". (5)

How can this continue in heaven? The answer is that it does not continue in this condition in heaven. The Gift of intellectus understands all things in their relation to the Lex Aeterna. In heaven this relationship will be evident and vibrant; on earth it is expressed more properly by negation than by affirmation.

What Thomas is doing then is not merely filling out the implications of the schema he has set up around the Gifts; he is using the Gifts to express the positive active nature of the Beatific Vision. Each of the Gifts is transposed to have a totally positive role and while at first sight this might seem forced and unconvincing, as in the case of fortitude quoted above, still it does present a further

1. IIaIIae,q.139,a.1,ad2um. 2. IIaIIae,q.1-q.5. 3. IIaIIae,q.8,a.5,q.5,a.1,4. See above p. 250. 5. IIaIIae,q.8,a.8. 6. IIaIIae,q.8,a.3,ad3um.
richness within Thomas' idea of the nature of man's final relationship with God. Thus filial fear remains in heaven because the will of the blessed is not characterised by inertia or indifference but by a positive avoidance of non-subjection to God.¹ The awe of the blessed before God is enhanced by this Gift. It is an awe which arises not from insecurity but from perfect security within which their sense of creatureliness before the divine remains.²

As regards the Gift of *consilium*, Thomas introduces a slightly different point. God, he claims, is the cause of our knowledge not only at the time at which we acquire it but for as long as we remain in possession of it.³ The Gift of *consilium* in heaven is therefore to be understood as God's sustaining of the knowledge of the blessed rather than, as in *via*, the enlightening of their ignorance. What this brings out is the radical dependence of the blessed on God.

Now, and this is the crucial point, if the Gifts are seen at their clearest - in their essence - in heaven, then it is this radical dependence on God even, and especially, within man's most characteristically human activity in *via* which lies at the heart of Thomas' work on the Gifts. Just as Thomas uses the treatise on the angels to illustrate the nature of human reasoning, so this model of the Gifts as they exist in heaven throws light on their real nature in *via*.

The Gifts, the beatitudes and the fruits of the Spirit.

Man is to grow in charity as his life progresses, and as charity increases man's docility and receptivity to the Holy Spirit is heightened.⁴ In grace, man knows God, *sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante*;⁵ in glory, homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat.

¹ IaIIae,q.19,a.11. ² IaIIae,q.19,a.11,ad3um. ³ IaIIae,q.52,a.3. ⁴ IaIIae,q.24,a.4,a.5,a.6,a.7,a.8,a.9. ⁵ Ia,a.43,a.3.
perfecte;¹ for grace nihil est aliud quam quaedam inchoatio gloriae in nobis.² While there is a great difference between man's life in movement towards God, in via, under grace, and his life in glory, in patria, when he has reached the term of all his strivings, yet these two should not be so strictly separated as not to see, even in this life, something of the transformation of grace into glory.³ This is the point at which Thomas' treatment of the relationship between the Gifts and the beatitudes enters our discussion.

"cum Beatitudo sit actus virtutis perfectae, omnes Beatitudines ad perfectionem spiritualis vitae pertinent". (4)

Thomas' linking of the Gifts with the beatitudes and the fruits is without doubt a result of the pressure of the tradition of scholasticism.⁵ The Summa is, after all, a basic textbook and Thomas is presenting the basic stock of the tradition into which his pupils are to enter. He accepts Augustine's correlation of the last of the Gifts with the first of the beatitudes and follows it through dutifully. Nevertheless he himself shows, at times, a certain impatience with the limitations this structure imposes on him and he admits that different alignments from Augustine's could be acceptable.⁶

However, having established this, it does not follow that there is no merit in what Thomas presents within this traditional schema. He defines the beatitudes as acts and not habitus. They are acts which the infused virtues and Gifts make possible; the fruits of the way of life created by these infused habitus.⁷ Now taking this analysis

¹ Ia,q.93,a.4. ² IIAIIae,q.24,a.3,ad2um. ³ IaIIae,q.69,a.2,ad3um. ⁴ IaIIae,q.19,a.12,ad1um. ⁵ For details, see O'Connor, pp. 99-109; Augustine, De sermone domini 1.4,PL.34, 1234-1235. There is a translation and discussion in O'Connor, p. 91. ⁶ IaIIae,q.121,a.2 and q.139,a.2. ⁷ All the beatitudes are 'fruits' being outstanding and perfect. The term 'fruit' is wider and includes any virtuous act in which a man takes delight. IaIIae,q.70,a.2.
one stage further, he claims that the beatitudes are more the result of the Gifts of the spirit than of the infused virtues. This tiny point gives us a fascinating insight into the movement of Thomas' thought here. He is not merely correlating beatitude and Gift for the sake of conforming to the tradition, even though that point must not be overlooked and accounts for the unconvincing nature of his account in detail. What he is saying is that the life of the beatitudes, is possible only through that docility and receptivity to the Holy Spirit which the Gifts bring about. The beatitudes, as human acts and part of a human life, cannot be accounted for except by reference to this docility and dependence as a permanent feature of man's life under grace.

What is more, the beatitudes as part of grace and also manifestations of grace as inchoatio gloriae, are forms of human activity which merit the eternal beatitude of the Beatific Vision. There is then in the beatitudes a dynamic tension between present merit and future rewards, between beatitudes and Beatitudo.

"... beatitudo est ultimus finis humanae vitae. Dicitur autem aliquis jam finem habere, propter spem finis obtinendi ... Spes autem de fine consequendo insurget ex hoc quod aliquid convenienter movetur ad finem, et approxinquant ad ipsum; quod quidem fit per aliquam actionem. Ad finem autem beatitudinis movetur aliquis et approxinquant per operationes virtutum; et praecipue per operationes donorum, si loquamur de beatitudine aeterna, ad quam ratio non sufficit, sed in eam inducit Spiritus Sanctus, ad cujus obedientiam et sequelam per dona perficium". (3)

If in our modern empirical mood we were to ask for evidence of the Gifts of the spirit, then, according to Thomas, one would point to those adopted sons and daughters of God in whom the life of grace

1. IaIIae,q.70,a.2. 2. IaIIae,q.69,a.2. 3. IaIIae, q.69,a.1.
had flowered into the activities of the beatitudes. These are flowers which will bear fruit only in heaven; the fruits of the Spirit.

For Thomas, following Augustine, fructus combines the notion of enjoyment, (frui), and completion. A fruit is the attainment of something which has no further point beyond itself, something in which the will finds rest in sheer joy and total satisfaction.

"Et secundum hoc, fructus hominis dicitur ultimus hominis finis, quo debet frui". (4) But even in this life, in via, man, endowed with the infused virtues and the Gifts, comes to some sort of fruition, some sort of inchoatio beatitudinis. It is in this sense that the beatitudes are the fruits of the Gifts of the Spirit par excellence.

"Si autem dicatur fructus hominis id quod ex homine producitur, sic ipsi actus humani fructus dicuntur: operatio enim est actus secundus operantis, et dilectionem habet, si sit conveniens operanti. Si igitur operatio hominis procedat ab homine secundum facultatem rationis, sic dicitur esse fructus rationis. Si vero procedat ab homine secundum altiorem virtutem, quae est virtus Spiritus Sancti, sic dicitur esse operatio hominis fructus Spiritus Sancti ...". (5)

"Sunt enim fructus quaecumque virtuosa opera, in quibus homo delectatur. Sed beatitudes dicuntur solum perfecta opera: quae etiam, ratione suae perfectionis, magis attribuuntur donis quam virtutibus". (6)

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1. IaIIae,q.70,a.2. 2. IaIIae,q.70,a.1,ad 1um. 3. IaIIae,q.11. 4. IaIIae,q.70,a.1. 5. Ibid. 6. IaIIae,q.70,a.2.
CONCLUSION
We have studied St Thomas' treatment of the Gifts of the Spirit in the context of the *Summa Theologiae* and, more generally, in the context of his wider theology and metaphysics. It has been our basic premise that the Gifts cannot be properly understood if wrenched out of this framework. The strength of Thomas' argument is precisely its coherence within his treatment of larger issues which structure the *Summa*: the general and yet variegated movement of God within his creation, in terms of providence and predestination; man's freedom and 'capacity' for God; his intellectual and appetitive powers; the two principles of man's dynamism; the role of the infused and acquired virtues. By taking one strand within the warp and woof of Thomas' theology and studying it in detail and in context, we have presented also something of the unity and diversity-within-unity of Thomas' larger vision. In particular this dissertation has been not only a study of the Gifts of the Spirit in themselves but also an exercise in discerning the articulations of Thomas' theology of grace.

The approach throughout has been sympathetic. Minor difficulties, such as the use of the beatitudes and the fruits of the Spirit, have not been emphasised so as not to distract from the larger attempt to express a certain vision of humanity participating in the life of God. This is not to say that the texts have not been critically examined in detail but rather that, having been so examined, the main arguments are found to be coherent within themselves and within their context. What is more, not only does Thomas' work on the Gifts cohere with his larger programme, but, taken at the value he himself gives it by presenting the Gifts as necessary for salvation, his treatment of the Gifts is itself a structuring element within his theology of grace.

Hence it is at this point that a major question arises.
the Gifts of the Spirit do play an essential role in Thomas' theology, then do his insights into this particular aspect of grace have value only within the structure of his theology? If Thomism is no longer the paradigm of even Roman Catholic theologians is it possible to transfer the benefits of his work on the Gifts into our own type of theological discourse? As a conclusion to this dissertation we shall attempt to sketch out the lines of how such a transposition might be achieved.

Firstly, certain features of his analysis can be jettisoned without damage to his major project. Obviously one could find little justification for continuing the link of gifts - beatitudes - fruits. More controversial however would be any move to ease the analysis away from its moorings in the Isaian text of the Septuagint. The Western tradition had focused on the Isaian Messianic prophecy, with its seven gifts, in the Septuagint, long before St Thomas, and long after him, and still continues to do so. But the doctrine of the activity of the Spirit was never restricted to this one text which was itself interpreted in the light of the whole of the New and Old Testaments, and in the light of the experience of the Church. Even in our own area of research Thomas draws on a much wider notion of the activity of the Holy Spirit to analyse this particular aspect of the Spirit's activity which is characterised by these seven named elements and the title 'the Gifts of the Spirit'. Nevertheless, while it is clear, to modern exegetes at least, that the Isaian text should not be interpreted as designating the members of a certain theological category, it is equally clear that this is precisely what Thomas and his predecessors, and Thomistic successors, have done.

However, while Thomas does concentrate on these somewhat
arbitrary headings of poetic prophecy, he does not allow them to stand uninterpreted. In the Prima Secundae they are integrated into his philosophical anthropology and in the Secunda Secundae they are re-expressed within his theology of grace in terms of the theological and infused virtues. This is an important point. As Thomas expressed his insights into the particular aspect of the Spirit's activity—called, 'the Gifts of the Holy Spirit'—by reference to his philosophical anthropology and his model of man under grace, so might modern writers feel free to transpose them into the ways of thought of their contemporaries. Thomas was bound by the seven names of the Isaian prophecy: there is no need for his successors to feel so bound.

One advantage, however, that the model of the seven gifts gave to Thomas and others was that it did allow them the possibility of a discursive analysis of exactly how, in detail, the Spirit works within man. In a similar way the workings of the Holy Spirit—in this aspect of the 'Gifts of the Holy Spirit'—could be correlated with the various dimensions of man as articulated in any current anthropology. Thomas' insight is that there is within all the dimensions of man's humanity a receptivity which, in grace, is heightened in sensitivity so that man can fully cooperate with the instincts of God. To be faithful to this insight we do not need to be bound by his particular articulations of the major dimensions of what it is to be human.

One might suggest, as possibilities only, notions such as 'masculinity', 'femininity', 'dependency', 'care', 'responsibility', 'insight', 'religious awe before the numinous', 'playfulness', 'solitariness', 'sorrow'. Thomas' insight on the Gifts could be transferred into these or other such notions. The model of the seven-fold presented both the idea of fullness and also definite discrete manifestations of that
pléniude of humanity under grace. Any transposition of Thomas' work on the Gifts should similarly be able to cover all that is thought to be human and also be able to point to the particular manifestations of humanity made receptive and sensitive to the Spirit under each particular aspect. The number seven and the particular terms of the Isaian text need not be preserved as normative but kept out of respect for liturgical custom and common usage within the tradition.

What should not be lost, however, is the distinction between the 'Gifts of the Spirit' as discussed here, and the 'charismatic' gifts listed by St Paul, (I Corinthians, 12.v.8-10). Thomas' own distinction between these is expressed as gratia gratum faciens and gratia gratis data. The latter are gifts given to individual people for the up-building of the Church: they have a direct communal reference and are given to some and not to others. The 'Gifts of the Spirit', on the other hand, are given to all Christians as part of their baptismal birth-right. They are given to each individual because they are indispensable for the salvation of each individual. They are not acquired or transitory but permanent dispositions within the new humanity of man in Christ. This is an essential distinction for modern Christianity. Modern theologies of grace concentrate on the role of the Spirit in general and on the particular charismatic gifts within the Church for the up-building of the Church. Too little attention is paid to a theological analysis of how in detail the Spirit works in the individual Christian. Hence the danger is that the Spirit is understood to be so colourless as to be merely an article of faith, or so extravagantly colourful as to be the preserve of the charismatic. The insights of St Thomas on the 'Gifts of the Spirit' could, if properly transposed, be developed to fill this gap.
The idea of receptivity is central to Thomas' presentation of the 'Gifts of the Spirit'. This is not to be confused with passivity. Nor is it to be opposed to activity. It is a further dimension of man's being in the graced relationship of love and knowledge between man and his Creator and Saviour, his Alpha and Omega, his beginning and his end. Linked in with this idea of receptivity are the two further notions of 'connaturality' and 'invitation'. Man is invited into a relationship in which he participates in the divine life. As he grows in knowledge and love his instincts, reasoning and dispositions become more attuned and sensitive to the ways of God. This is not a matter of passivity but a cooperative endeavour which God initiates in man, and, having initiated, supports, encourages and guides. Man needs to be receptive to this constant divine tutelage in order to grow in his connaturality with God. But man does not become less human by becoming more divine; he becomes more fully human. Because this receptivity, if not passive, is also not colourless or neutral but human, all the receptivities of various kinds which are part of man's complex nature, all his drives and appetites, are made sensitive to resonate to the movement of the Spirit. This receptivity is not just in the intellectual order of suggestion or guidance but permeates like yeast in the dough all aspects of man's nature.

Man experiences the Spirit by reflecting on his humanity as moved. Man's finite nature is of its nature open to the infinity of God. In grace that openness becomes a creative receptivity. Man becomes responsive to a call beyond himself which is yet felt within the depths of his humanity. The wonder of the mystery of grace is not only its divine origin but its human forms. Within the finite structures of his existence man is given a receptivity to the infinite
precisely within those finite structures of his humanity. The mode of operation of the 'Gifts of the Spirit' is determined not by the nature of the divine mover but by the whole complex nature of man.

Basic to this, as a presupposition, is the Catholic and Thomist notion of a real ontology to justification. Man is changed by grace: all the structures and drives of his humanity are both healed and 'elevated', not notionally, but really and radically. Within the 'friendship' relationship of grace he is both restored to himself and called 'higher' to be more than himself by cooperating with God. Here lies the need for that docility which Thomas characterises as 'the Gifts of the Spirit'. As part of the gift of connaturality and as part of the dynamism of God's invitation to man, there needs to be a heightened receptivity within man to the ways of the Spirit. Paradoxically, if understood as if in terms of creaturely causalities, the more man's dependency increases, the more does his self-possession increase.

The Gifts ensure that man is not passive in the hands of God but receptive and cooperative; responding personally, not impersonally manipulated.

But man 'in grace' is not yet 'in glory'. His responsiveness to the guidance of the Spirit is not only a matter of responding by moving towards God, but also of moving away from all that is false and perverting. It involves a sensitivity not only to the glory of creation but also to its tragedy. The essential need for a receptivity such as that characterised by 'the Gifts of the Spirit' can perhaps be most clearly seen mirrored in its opposite: hardness of heart, a dulling of the senses and a narrowing of the mind; all the self-destructive and counter-productive habits in man which victimise him and limit his freedom to respond to what is more than himself. This heightened
sensitivity to the ways of God in man and in creation still 'in trava-
vail' leads not only to an affirmation of all that is good and beauti-
ful and true in creation, but also, as by some poetic insight, the
integration of even sinfullness, suffering, futility and death, even
crucifixion. Even, perhaps especially, in these too, the dark, nega-
tive dimensions of man and creation, man is opened to the Spirit who
moves over the waters.

Man's great gift of intellectual ability and reasoning is, for
Thomas, a participation in the *Lex Aeterna*. The Gifts of the Spirit
have been understood as a further participation in that divine ordering
in terms of a graceful responsiveness. Behind St Thomas' view of man
is a whole Neo-Platonic cosmology. Modern culture lacks any form of
cosmology and modern theology, with a few significant exceptions, shares
in the same cultural blight. It would not be sufficient to advocate a
renaissance of the cosmology behind St Thomas, but neither would it be
sufficient to dismiss it without perhaps using it as an aid to check
the Cartesianism endemic in modern thought. Man does not determine
himself solely from 'within' and there is more 'within' than mere mind
and will. Modern theological discussions on ethics and salvation
might benefit from a larger context in which man is not alone at the
centre of the stage but rather plays an essential part within the con-
cert of creation.

The *Summa Theologiae*, and all St Thomas' theology, is essentially
theocentric. It has been debated whether it is sufficiently Trinita-
rian, but that debate need not concern us here. What has been analysed
in this dissertation is only one aspect of the work of the Holy Spirit.
In themselves the 'Gifts of the Holy Spirit' are further manifestations
of what it means to be 'in grace', to live and grow within the friendship relationship of love and knowledge between God and man. Man is responsive to God because God is so close to him, more intimate to him than he is to his own self. Yet this same God, this same Spirit, is the moving principle in all creation, not only in terms of grace but of nature; of all that lives and all that exists. Thomas' treatment of man's graced receptivity to this movement is only part of this single yet multiform movement by which all that exists is called into being and invited to share in the life of God according to its mode.

God made the angels to show him splendour - as he made the animals for innocence and plants for their simplicity. But man he made to serve him wittily, in the tangle of his mind. ...

... And no doubt it delights God to see splendour where he only looked for complexity.

(Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons)
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