THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY OF ATHANASIUS

IN HIS CONFLICT WITH CONTEMPORARY HERESIES.

by

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A Thesis presented in part fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, in the Faculty of Divinity.

VOLUME TWO.

Edinburgh, March 1963.
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Variable print quality
CHAPTER IV - DE SENTENTIA DIONYSII.

As we have argued above, (1) this is the earliest of the great anti-Arian writings of Athanasius, having been written about 335 A.D., the occasion being the attempt of the Arians to claim Dionysius, Athanasius' own celebrated predecessor of about 80 years before as Bishop of Alexandria, an Arian; they cited a very compromising statement (quoted by Athanasius in ch. 4: 485A of this work, and which we have already ourselves cited in full) of Dionysius which required careful explanation. Dionysius had, apparently on complaints by his subordinates, been denounced by his namesake, Dionysius of Rome, in a statement criticising certain unspecified members of the Patriarchate, which statement, he intimated to Dionysius, referred to the Bishop of Alexandria himself. The episode is of great interest to the study of the Roman supremacy, but neither Athanasius, our principal authority, nor any other primary source, helps us greatly on the matters on which Westerners are specially interested.

1. The first chapter is introductory, promising a refutation of the Arians' claim. The next chapter needs full quotation, as it is the first specific condemnation of Arianism in Athanasius: Commencing at PGXXV 481A: "Firstly, from the Scriptures, John says (gen abs.), 'In the beginning was the Logos, while David sings ἐκ προσώπου of the Father, 'My heart hath uttered a good word (νόημα), Whom they allege to be in thought only and originated ex nihilo. (2) Further, whereas John once more says in the Gospel, 'All things were made by Him, and without Him there was not any thing made,' and elsewhere, 'All things

(1) See pp.316-20.
(2) καὶ ἐπιτώοιν εἶναι, καὶ ἐκ ὄσκ ὄνων γένεται Θεόν.
were created in Him,' how will they ... (say) ... that the Framer of all things is a thing made, and that He is a creature in Whom all creatures have come into being and subsist? (3) Nor, secondly, is any religious argument from human reason (4) left as an excuse. For what man, Greek or barbarian, presumes to call one, Whom he confesses as God, a creature, or say that He was not before He came to be? (5) Or what man, when he has heard Him Whom he believes to be God alone say, 'This is my beloved Son,' and, 'My heart hath uttered a good Word,' will venture even to say that the Logos from the heart of God has come to be ὑμᾶς, or that the Son is a creature and not the very offspring of the speaker? (6) Or again, who that hears Him Whom he believes to be Lord and Saviour say, 'I am in the Father and the Father in Me,' and, 'I and the Father are One,' will presume to put asunder what He has made one and maintained indivisible? At first sight, this appears to place equal weight on Scripture and Reason (λογισμὸς); so far, the later word Piety, εὐσεβεία, is not used. However, on further examination, the emphasis is overwhelmingly on the side of Scripture, and when Athanasius introduces Reason, he quickly returns to Scripture, Reason is very little more than the capacity to understand Scripture according to the plain meaning of the words of it; it is actually less complicated than the final Athanasian principle of exegesis. The only other element in reason is the capacity to avoid the gaffe of simultaneously confessing something to be God and treating the same entity, with the greatest possible emphasis, as a creature. There is no sign of the great principles of analogy that are so important for the later anti-Arian theology of Athanasius, even though they had already been treated incidentally as early as the "Contra Gentes" in

(3) ἐγένετο καὶ οὐνέσθηκεν.
(4) ἀπροφανὸς λόγος ἐστὶ.
(5) οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γενηθεί.
(6) ἴδον τὸν λέγοντος γένεια.
passing; least of all is there any trace of a rational argument for the Trinity; there never is in Athanasius from start to finish. Arianism is treated, perhaps in an excessively simple manner at this early stage of Athanasius's development, as non-Scriptural, and that is all; even the question of a "pious" or "ecclesiastical" sense of Scripture in, say, Newman's sense, does not arise.

3 The next chapter continues the denunciation of the Arians' appeal to Dionysius, being on a par with the Jews' appeal to Abraham; in any case, he neither was expelled from the Church nor did he leave it gratuitously. In ch. 4, Athanasius, after quoting the prima facie incriminating extract from Dionysius of Alexandria, (7) makes the case that it was a letter dictated by special circumstances and should be judged accordingly, and that it was never intended to be a spontaneous and definitive expression of a faith or belief.

Athanasius explains that the letter was written because the Church in Libya and the Pentapolis was in the hands of the Sabellian party, with the result that "the Son of God was scarcely any longer proclaimed in the churches" (485C). So Dionysius wrote to (485C - 488A) "expound from the Gospels the human attributes (8) of the Saviour, in order that, since these men waxed more boldly in denying the Son, and in ascribing His human attributes to the Father, he accordingly, by demonstrating that it was not the Father but the Son that became man on our behalf, might persuade the unlearned that the Father is not the Son, and so in the end lead them gradually to the true Godhead of the Son and the knowledge of the Father . . . ." This passage is interesting, in that it reveals that the objections to Sabellianism of Athanasius are the same as the traditional ones, that it was in fact

(7) Which we have cited in full, above, p. 380.

(8) τὰ ἀνθρώπινα - here as usual the original of "human attributes".
Patri-passian; Athanasius's enthusiastic ascription of this motive to Dionysius indicates that he agrees with this objection, which would have been even more natural to a definite Origenist like Dionysius. Although he never really clinches or elaborates this argument, there is more than a hint that in some way the Incarnation necessitates the fact that the Being Who became incarnate should be personally or hypostatically distinct from the Being Who is the fons et origo Trinitatis. Very closely related, not to say intermingled, with this objection is another, that is, that as Sabellianism worked out in practice, it violated the rule that theology, and above all the preaching of the Church, should be Christocentric, or at least should give an adequate place to Christ.

The next stage is to defend Dionysius from the charge of Arianism before Arius, and we shall again quote at considerable length because the method adopted by Athanasius furnishes important evidence of Athanasius's basic theology: "... For the one (sc. Dionysius) is a teacher of the Catholic Church, while the other (sc. Arius) has been the inventor (ἐφευρέτης) of a new (.numpyς) heresy. And while Arius to expound his own error wrote a Thalia in an effeminate and ridiculous style like Sosades the Egyptian, Dionysius not only wrote other letters also, but defended himself on the points on which he was suspected, and showed that he felt rightly. But if ... he made his defence by putting right (ὑποβάλλω) his first statements, but he made his defence without altering them, (9) it must be clear that he wrote the suspected passages economically. (10) ... (and so we have no more right to complain than to complain of the nasty medicines of a physician) ... ." No paraphrase or explanation of this passage is necessary, except to note

(9) ἡ πολούναινα τοῦ οὗ μεταβεβληθείν

(10) κατ' οἰκονομίαν, that is, that the statement be interpreted as being not absolutely true, but relative to the conditions and purposes. See Robertson's note, and also Newman's note on C. Ar. III: 45 and also "Ignorance assumed economically by the Lord" (Newman: Select Treatises . Vol. II (1881 ed.) 161-172.
that, in the manner of a counsel for the defence, Athanasius puts the best construction on Dionysius even - in view of what the latter actually said - straining the bounds of relevance.

Next, Athanasius turns to a discussion of the theology proper of Dionysius proper; if he is to be suspected of Arianism, what about the passages of Scripture in which Christ is described as a man? Acts 2: 22 & 4: 10 & 13: 22 & 17: 30 & 7: 56 are cited.

The problem before us, says Athanasius, is, did the Apostles believe that Christ was man and not God; if not, why did they talk in this way? No; their reason was: "For inasmuch as the Jews of the day thought that Christ was coming as a mere man of the seed of David, and would neither believe that He was God nor that the Logos became flesh ... the blessed Apostles began by proclaiming to the Jews the human attributes of the Saviour; in order that by fully persuading them from the visible facts and from miracles that were done, that the Christ had come, they might go on to lead them to faith in His Deity, by showing that the works which were done were not man's but God's."

After quoting, in support of this, Acts 3: 15, Matt. 16: 16, I Pet. 2: 25 & 3: 22, Heb. 1: 3, Philipp. 2: 6, he continues (492B): "But what can it mean to call Him Prince of Life, and Son of God, and Radiance (λαμπρός), and Express Image (ἐμβληματία), and Equal to God, and Lord (Κύριος), and Bishop of Souls, but that in the body He was Logos of God, through Whom all things came to be, and is indivisible from the Father, as is the Radiance in relation to the Light?" This is essentially the kerygmatic form of the principle already propounded as the actual policy of Christ, and the actual facts about the revelatory side of His work, as in the "De Incarnatione". (11) The line between Deity and Humanity still coincides with that between action and the possibility of human perception of action; (12) the other

(11) Chs. 15, 16, 18, 19.
(12) See above, pps. 120ff. 143ff. 218ff.
element in the older correlation, the correlation with the distinction between action and passion, does not arise yet here, and depends on the exhaustive Arian exegesis of Scripture with which Athanasius has not yet been confronted. The main changes are, that the Arian controversy is already forcing more attention on the Humanity of Christ, that the human element to which accommodation has to be made is not man in general, but the Jewish Messianic hope, and the first signs of the metaphor for the relation between Father and Son, which became later the cornerstone of Athanasius's Trinitarian doctrine.

The next few chapters are the most significant of the work, in that they are Athanasius's justification of Dionysius. They are presented as the motivation of Dionysius, but they are more like Dionysius as interpreted by Athanasius, or even Athanasius himself simpliciter: "And Dionysius accordingly acted as he learned from the Apostles. For as the heresy of Sabellius was creeping on, he was compelled... to write the aforesaid letter, and to hurl at them what is said of the Saviour in reference to His manhood, and humiliation, (13) so as to debar them, on account of the human attributes(14) from saying that the Father was Son, and so to render easier for them the teaching concerning the Godhead of the Son, when in other letters he calls Him Logos, Wisdom, Power, Breath, and Radiance of the Father... As then the Apostles are not to be accused, on account of their human words about the Lord - because the Lord has become man - but are all the more worthy of admiration for their good management and the timeliness of their teaching, (15) so Dionysius is no Arian on account of his Letter to Euphranor and Ammonius against Sabellius. For even if he did use humble phrases and examples, yet these too are from the

(13) λόγος τοῦ κυρίου καὶ ἐνεργεῖν
(14) οὐ λέγει τοῦ λόγου
(15) οὐ λέγεται τοῦ οἰκονομίαν καὶ τῆς ἐν καρπῷ διδασκαλίαν.
Gospels, and his justification for them is the Saviour's coming in the flesh. (16) . . . For just as He is Logos of God, so afterwards, 'the Word became flesh', and that while, 'in the beginning was the Word', the Virgin at the consummation of the ages conceived, and the Lord has become man. And He Who is indicated by both statements is one person, (17) for 'the Word became flesh'. But the expressions used about His Godhead and His becoming man (εὐανθρώπησεν) each have their own respective interpretation according to their context in each case. And he that was writing of the human attributes of the Logos also knew what concerns His Godhead; and he who expounds concerning His Godhead is not ignorant of what belongs to His coming in flesh (18). . . . When therefore he speaks of the Lord weeping, he knows that the Lord, having become man, exhibits weeping as a characteristic of man, but raises up Lazarus as God; (19) and he knew that He hungered and thirsted corporeally (σωματικῶς), but Divinely (Θείως) He fed 5,000 persons with five loaves; and knows that while a human body lay in the tomb, it was raised by (Παρὰ + gen.) the Logos Himself as God's body.

Dionysius . . . wrote, on account of Sabellius, concerning what was said humanly (21) of the Saviour . . . (e.g. John 15:1, Heb. 3:2, Prov. 8:22) . . . But he was not ignorant of the passages, 'I am in the Father and the Father in Me', (22) and, 'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father.' (23) For we know that he mentioned them in his other letters. For, while mentioning them there, he made mention also of the human attributes of the Saviour . . . . (As Scripture says, Philipp. 2:6-7 and II Cor. 8:9). . . . while there are high and rich descriptions

(16) τὴν τοῦ σωματος ἐνσαρκόν παρουσίαν.
(17) καὶ εἰς μεν ἐστὶν ὁ ἐστίν ἐστιν ἐν συμφορεῖς ἐμανόμενος
(18) τὰ ἰδία τῆς ἐνσαρκίας παρουσίας
(19) ὁ Θείως, τοῦ μὲν κλεισίν τοῦ ἐνθρώπου, έχεις "τοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦ Θεοῦ
(20) Better than Robertson's "physically."
(21) ἐνθρώπως.
(22) John 14:10.
(23) John 14:9.
of His Deity, there are also the expressions, humble and poor, that concern His coming in the flesh. But that they are used of the Saviour as man (\(\alpha\nu\theta\rho\mu\nu\pi\iota\nu\omega\)), can be seen on the following grounds: It is necessary to stop here, since the topic of the Homoousion is introduced at this stage. This passage is the first expression, in the later definitive anti-Arian form, of the Athanasian doctrine, and exegetical principle, of the Humanity of Christ. It is quite clear, even at this stage, although lacking in the richness and development of the later "Contra Arianos"; there are two distinct ways in Scripture of speaking about Christ, which are in separate references, and should be clearly differentiated from each other, Christ as God, and Christ as man. In general, the old correlations between Deity and Humanity, on one hand, and Action and Passion or Action and the Revelation of the action to man, on the other. It is as man that Christ hungers and thirsts, and again, it is the Body of Christ and not the Person of Christ that dies and is buried, while it is as God that Christ raised Lazarus, and also His own body. However, there are visible the first signs of the breakdown of this sort of correlation, since Athanasius has to assign, both to the Deity and the Humanity of Christ, passages which are of the same propositional or other form, e.g. "I am the True Vine", (24) which Athanasius, on his principle, has to assign to the Humanity, is basically identical formally with "I and the Father are One", (25) which of course refers to the Deity. The other incidental characteristic of this passage is that, apparently, the title "Son" does not refer self-evidently to the Deity of Christ; by contrast, the others, Logos, Wisdom, Power, Breath (of God), Radiance (\(\alpha\rnu\gamma\mu\alpha\mu\alpha\nu\delta\mu\alpha\)) refer self-evidently, as


it were, to the Deity, and are to be taken as proofs that the Son is actually God and that the title Son, which is relatively, in this connection, the unknown, is to be taken in this sense. We have already discussed why this reasoning is appropriate to criticism of the Arians, who used the title Son, as a title, in preference to any other. (26)

This also shows, again, that Athanasius's mind was still on the Arian controversy, as this sort of argument would be actually inappropriate to Sabellianism in what we know of its classical form. The fact that their title for their monadic god, or fused Persons of the Trinity, was Σωτηρ, Son-Father, rather than Logos-Father, or anything else, shows that for them the title Son was naturally associated with the Deity of the Second Person, as they saw it in the doctrine to which they were opposed.

To continue with Ch. 10, at the point where we broke off (near end of 493C): "The husbandman is foreign in essence to the vine, while the branches are ὑμοῦσι καὶ συγκλειδίαν and are in fact inseparable from the vine, and they and the vine have one and the same origin (χένεσιν). If then the Son is διοικετὴς with us, and has the same origin as we, let us grant that in this respect the Son is diverse in essence from the Father, (27) as the vine is from the husbandman. But if the Son is other than (παρὰ + acc.) what we are, and He is Logos of the Father while we have come to be from the earth and are descendents of Adam, then the expression ought not to be referred to the Deity of the Logos, but to His human presence, (28) since thus also has the Saviour said, "I am the vine, ye are the branches, My Father is the husbandman." For we are akin (ὑπὸ ἑνεσιά) to the Lord according to the body . . . . And just as the branches are διοικετήσια to the vine and are from (ἐξ) it, so also we, having our bodies homogeneous (διογενή) with the body of the Saviour, receive of His fulness, and have It as

(26) See above pp. 430-6.
(27) Ἕλπτιος Κατοικίαν τοῦ Πατρός
(28) Παροικίαν
our Root for the resurrection and salvation. But the Father is called the Husbandman, for He it was Who through the Logos cultivated the vine, namely, the Humanity (τὰ ὑπόστασις) of the Saviour, and by His own Logos prepared us a way to a kingdom . . . .

The next chapter is a further continuation of the above, devoted mainly to a brief exegesis of Heb. 1:4, which is a shorter form of C. Ar. I: 53–64, the thing that is "made better than the angels" being the salvation effected by the human ministry of Christ; the following chapter is a summary of the book so far.

The main feature of this section is the first introduction of the Homoousion, and in fact of the whole concept of o-heartedness in its later systematic or Trinitarian sense, but it is necessary, for full appreciation of the position, to understand the context. As a by-product of the exegesis of John 15:1, which Dionysius of Alexandria made his main passage, Athanasius discusses the relation between the vine and the branches, and it is in this context that the Homoousion arises, for the first time in Athanasius. The term is used to describe the relation and the unity of these, and as an equivalent the term ὁμογενής is employed. This evidently has the literal etymological meaning, "of the same origin", rather than the reduced meaning of "one of a class" that the word Homogeneous suggests to us, since Athanasius says so specifically and at length. This, while we are on this subject, is a very important advance in the doctrine of the Humanity of Christ, even though it is not spelt out at length, at any rate on the most likely interpretation of the passage and the one that would obviously be necessitated by the verse of Scripture. If Athanasius is thinking in terms of humanity as a whole in the most general sense, either as an abstract generic universal or as a Platonic concrete constitutive...
universal, with Christ in His humanity as a member of it, there is nothing very significant here, but if he is thinking in terms of the special redeemed humanity (necessarily in the constitutive sense), to which John 15:1 is patently referring, this marks a major change from the older notion of Ὁμοούσιος as the mode of salvation. (29) This is never given up in Athanasius, but alongside it we now find the notion of salvation as a partaking of the New or Redeemed Humanity which is the great re-creation of Christ and in Christ in the literal sense of in His Incarnate Person; it is a constitutive whole of which we are the branches and Christ is the Stem as well as its unity as a whole, described as the Vine as a whole. Since Athanasius has already sharply distinguished between the passages that refer to the Deity and to the Humanity of Christ and referred this passage to the Humanity as a whole, the Vine refers to the Humanity of Christ and not to the whole Chalcedonian Christ. Incidentally, the words in which Athanasius refers to the unity of origin of the Humanity of Christ and ours refer to origin and not biological begetting, since they are spelt with one throughout, on the unanimous agreement of all MSS. Thus, the distinction of essence and origin between God and the Humanity of Christ, described as the Vine, would be very like what we later meet in Athanasius and describe as the Categorial Distinction between God and creaturely reality. (30)

It is only in the light of this analysis, and by implication, that the concept of the Homoousion is applied to God, and the notion is as yet little developed. Leonard Hodgson, in his study of the

(29) See for example the classical statement, De Inc. 54: 192B.
(30) See below, pp. 599-604, 658, 10900, references, 1237-8, references.
Trinity, (31) has suggested that there are two important types of unity that have to be understood and differentiated before one can make sense of the Trinitarian unity of God, arithmetical unity and constitutive unity. One must add another type, generic unity, and in a way criticise the notion of arithmetical unity. In one sense, arithmetical unity is a presupposition involved in all types of unity, and if there is anything more involved, it is best treated under the heading of the simplicity of God. This criticism may not apply to a treatise on the unity and triplicity of God, but apply to the study of the Homoousion as such, where it is already accepted that the Father, Son, and Spirit, or Father and Son, are in some way hypostatically distinct. On this basis, the Athanasian version of the Homoousion, as revealed here, would emphasise mainly the constitutive form of unity, together with a certain less element of arithmetical unity, the Aristotelian πρῶτη οὐσία, generic unity in the normal sense, the Δαστηρία οὐσία, and what we have called categorial distinctness of God compared with creatures, which would be the equivalent of the philosophical notion of οὐσία as concerned with Being itself. Finally, there is as yet no attempt to quote Nicaea on the matter, probably because it would have side-tracked him from the task of justifying Dionysius.

The second part of the book is a review by Athanasius of Dionysius's apologia. We shall quote from the beginning of Ch. 13, since it shows the way in which Athanasius regarded Dionysius, but afterwards we shall take no more than a cursory glance, since the section is entirely citations from Dionysius and comparisons with Arius, to the discredit of the latter. It is interesting from the outset to notice that the "other letters" to which Athanasius refers in Chs. 9 and

(31) The Doctrine of the Trinity (Croall Lectures 1942-43).
10 are apparently his apologia when challenged, and there is no attempt to cite any material which specifically does not date from the controversy, beyond a general statement (19: 508C) that Dionysius had said the same sort of thing in other letters that he had previously written; Routh (Rel. III: p. 380) suggests, as quoted approvingly in Robertson's footnote, that these may have been to other bishops who had questioned his teaching. "The following is the occasion for his writing the other letters. The Bishop Dionysius having heard of affairs in Pentapoli, and having written, in zeal for religion . . . his letter . . . some of the brethren of the Church, of right opinions but without asking him, so as to learn from himself how he had written it, went up to Rome, and they spoke against him in the presence of his namesake Dionysius the Bishop of Rome. And he, upon hearing it, wrote simultaneously against the partisans of Sabellius and against those who held the very opinions for uttering which Arius was cast out of the Church . . . . And he wrote also to Dionysius to inform him of what they had said about him. And the latter straightway wrote back, and entitled his books, 'Refutation and Defence'." The extracts quoted from Dionysius together come to something very like the later Athanasian doctrine, with a few variations. The Logos is co-eternal with the Father (passim, esp. "ο ὁ Λόγος ἀληθινός" 15: 501c). He is Light or Day from an ever-shining Sun (Ch. 15, 16: 504B, 19: 508B, 22: 512C, 24: 516C), a River from a Well (18: 505C, 19: 508B, 22: 512C, 24: 516C), a Son from a Parent, and eternally such (15: 504A, 18: 505B), a Word (λόγος) never mindless (νοέως) issuing forth from and revealing a Mind (νοέως) never wordless (λόγος) (23 & 24 passim). The Homoousion is admitted, in spite of everything (18: 505B & ff.). All these are the stock-in-trade of the later Athanasius except possibly that of the Logos in relation to the Θεός, which is not emphasised since it would tend to suggest the dangerous doctrine of the Θεός ἐν Λόγῳ and the Λόγος
or perhaps even the Two-Logos theory of Asterius. More questionably, there is a tantalising passage (17: 505A) which runs:

"Thus then we dilate (παραπονέων-the very word that was so notorious in the theology of Marcellus of Ancyra!) the Monad indivisibly into the Triad, and conversely summate (συγκεφαλισμένον) without diminution the Triad into the Monad." This passage may be given an orthodox sense, but it also pointedly suggests either the position of Marcellus of Ancyra or the idea that the Trinity is essentially subjective, or both.

Undoubtedly the great absentee from these extracts is the interpretation that Athanasius actually made of Dionysius in the earlier chapters; there is not one word to the effect that his offending expressions in his Letter to Euphranor and Ammonius referred only to the Humanity of Christ, and this failure of Athanasius to find any support for his own interpretation is most significant. The extracts quoted are a real change in position, and the most that Dionysius does in explanation, in the true sense, is to refer to the Greek ambiguity between philosophers as the Makers of their discourses and as their fathers (20: 509C & 21: 512B), which we have already discussed fully.

It is difficult to agree with Robertson (Introd. to De Sent. Dion., L.N.P-N.F.) that *Dionysius in his 'Refutation and Defence' merely restated, and did not alter, his theological position is open to no doubt. Athanasius, not the Arians, had the right to claim him as their own."(32) This critic has already correctly made statements which imply that Dionysius of Alexandria was not explaining his former position, but actually recanting it. "The defence of Athanasius, that Dionysius referred to the Human Nature of Christ, is scarcely tenable. It is not supported by what Dionysius says, rather the contrary: and if his language did not refer to the Trinity, where would be its

(32) p. 174, new paragraph.
relevancy against Sabellianism? (underlining mine - author). The words 
ν ὀς ὁ ὄς ἤν, and ὅ ὁ πρὶν γεννηθα, he does not explain, but
professes his belief in the eternal union of the Word with the Father."(33)

Incidentally, if we regard the "Refutation and Defence" as a recantation
and not as a restatement, a capitulation to a man who was not a
Sabellian but who represented a tradition with marked tendencies in
that direction, Robertson's statement that he changed his emphasis from
ὁς ὁ ὄς ἤν to ὁ ὄς ἤν as διοικεῖ ὁ ὄς, becomes doubtful.(34)

Robertson's final judgment on Dionysius of Alexandria may stand: "... he was not absolutely consistent in his language; he failed to
distinguish the ambiguities which beset the words ὁς ὁ, ὁ γεννηθα, and
even ὁς ὁ and ᾿ὁς, and that he used language (ὁς ὁ πρὶν γεννηθα
and the like) which we, with our minds cleared by the Arian controversy,
cannot reconcile with the more deliberate and guarded statements of the
'Refutation and Defence'. "(35) In view of this, it is clear that

Athanasius' statements at the beginning of chapter 13 are those of a
defence counsel trying to describe what was really a humiliating
incident in the life of Dionysius of Alexandria in a way which would
cover up his humiliation as much as possible, without any outright
falsification of the facts.(36)

Having maintained, without success, that the Doctrine of the
Humanity of Christ was the real point of issue in the theology of his
illustrious predecessor, Athanasius finally repeats and confirms his
own position: "... And in truth this is the effective way to
subvert the madness of Sabellius, not to start from expressions that
indicate the Deity of the Logos ... lest they, perverting what is
well said, should use such expressions as a pretext for their
unblushing contentiousness ... but to emphasise what is said humanly

(33) End of previous paragraph.
(34) loc. cit. just before passage cited above p. 33.
(36) Apart from Robertson, op. cit. there has been very little study
of Dionysius of Alexandria. For further citations see above pp.
377-83.
(ἀναπτύξεως) of the Saviour ... For insofar as these are lowly expressions, so it becomes clearer that it was not the Father that became man. For it follows that when the Lord is called the Vine there must be also a Husbandman; and when He prayed, He that prayed was one, and He that heard was another, one the Vine, and the other the Husbandman. For whatever expressions are cited as distinguishing the Son from the Father, are used of Him on account of the flesh (37) that He bore for our sakes. For things originate are distinct ἀπὸ φύσεως from God. Accordingly, since, the flesh being originate, 'the Word,' as John says, 'was made flesh,' although He is by nature (ἀπὸ φύσεως) proper (ὁ υἱός) to and indivisible from the Father, yet by reason of it (ἀπὸ φύσεως — sc. flesh) the Father is said to be removed (ὑποκείμενος) (38) from Him. For He Himself permits what is peculiar to the flesh to be said about Him, that it may be plain that the Body was His own and nobody else's. ... (ἄτιον that) it was not the Father that became flesh, but His Logos, Who also redeemed the flesh and offered it to the Father ... (Thus we can understand) the Deity of the Logos, how He is Logos and Wisdom, Son and Power, Radiance and Express Image (Χαράκτης). For here again it is a necessary inference, that, as the Logos exists, there must also exist the Father of the Logos, and as Wisdom exists, there exists also its Parent (γνώσεως), and as Radiance exists, so the Light (φως), and that thus the Father and Son are one."

After repeating that it is the Humanity of the Saviour that refutes Sabellianism, and the Deity of the Logos that refutes Arianism, concludes with a rhetorical peroration; the Doxology is either non-existent or missing from our present text.

The extracts cited confirm in general the position of Athanasius on the issue of Sabellianism, that it is positively the human attributes of the Saviour that compel us to accept that the Son is personally distinct from the Father, that it would have been inconceivable and impossible for the fons et origo Trinitatis to be

(37) ὁ ὸρός ἀπὸ ὑποκείμενος τῷ Υἱῷ ὁ τῷ Πάπας ἐξετα αἰματίας, τάδε διὰ τὴν οὖρα
(38) Better than Robertson's "widely distinguished."
incarnate, to condescend to our level, to suffer, etc. On the other hand, there is the tendency to use the sort of ambiguous statement used in the "De Incarnatione", that the division between the Persons of Father and Son is said to be the case on the ground of the Incarnation and the flesh of the Saviour. Now, it would be possible for a Sabellian like Marcellus of Ancyra to make this statement with a Sabellian intention; we know that he actually did say this in the context of Prov. 8: 22, LXX, which he interpreted as referring to the Humanity of Christ and used this interpretation to prove that, as the sufferings of the Incarnate Christ could be referred entirely to the Humanity, Sabellianism need no longer involve Patr iPAssianism, and therefore the major argument against it no longer applies. On this basis, the references to the personal distinction of Father and Son would be part of the mythology, to use modern concepts, surrounding the fact of the Incarnation. But Athanasius's very defence of Dionysius of Alexandria appears to exclude this sort of interpretation in advance. [The alternative explanation is that the Incarnation is revelatory of the Personal Distinction, and when Athanasius says that statements indicative of the latter are made on account of the flesh, he would mean that the flesh is our revelatory authority for making true theological statements about the Persons of the Trinity.] If we interpret Athanasius in meliorem partem, we could say that this would also be true about the statements between above, in "De Incarnatione", (39) and below, in "Contra Arianos" I - III, (40) concerning scriptural teaching about the Person of Christ suffering, etc., because it was

(39) e.g. Ch. 18.
(40) III: 26 - 58, passim.
His own body that suffered. That is, one would like to say that what Athanasius means is that, by reason of the Body being that of the Logos, Scripture not only says that the Person of Christ suffered, but says it truly and not mythologically. Unfortunately, although we can still regard this as the stronger presumption, we cannot be positive about it, in view of the widely changing circumstances of Athanasius's life.

Having concluded our close study of the "De Sententia Dionysii", let us now make our general resume of the theology of the work. According to our general method, we shall begin with the study of the prolegomena to dogmatics, that is, the general sources of doctrine, for Athanasius. The only clear source is Scripture; the

(41) Virtually all the Western analyses of Athanasius's theology tend to represent him in one of two ways, either as a disciplinarian or a pragmatist; occasionally, if the critic does not like the Trinitarian dogma, Athanasius is also described as a rationalist. The former is mainly but not exclusively Roman Catholic, the latter is mostly Protestant (including Anglican), but is by no means unrepresented in Roman Catholic study, probably because of the very considerable differences in terminology, etc., between Athanasius and the definitive position of the Western Church. By the former major alternative, we mean that Athanasius taught what he did because that was the proper teaching of the Church; under this we subsume all interpretations which emphasise the role of Tradition in the Lerintian, Tridentine, or other Roman Catholic sense. By the second alternative we mean the position that Athanasius's theology was dictated by the necessity of proving that salvation did actually come to us; at times, this view amounts to the contention that Athanasius was not really a systematic theologian at all — of all libellous nonsense! Both positions are typically Roman (in the most general sense) and Western, and both have been terribly dangerous prejudices and, in fact, diriment impediments to the real intellectual study of Athanasius.

The general run of Western interpretations conforming to one or other or both of these types, we shall select eight for citation, three Roman Catholic and five Protestant. Newman (Select Treatises . . . 1881 ed. Vol. II, "Athanasius", 51 — 59; see also "Rule of Faith", 250 — 253) is quite definite on the supreme significance of Tradition: (loc. cit. 51) "The fundamental idea with which he starts in the controversy is a deep sense of the authority of tradition, which he considers to have jurisdiction even in the interpretation of Scripture, though at the same time he seems to consider that Scripture, thus interpreted, is a document of final
Justification for the Deity of Christ is simply the Scriptural teaching

appeal in enquiry and interpretation." See also Newman's notes on the text of the anti-Arian writings, virtually passim. Möhler previously took a similar view, although there was a fair amount of pragmatism: (Athenasius der Grosse . . . p. 111–2): "Er hatte den Grundsatz bei der Interpretation der heiligen Schrift, dass man die Grundanschauung von Christus und seinem Erlösungswerke, wie sie die Kirche darbiete, mit sich bringen müsse, und alles Einzelne in diesem Geiste auflassen solle." (p. 113): "Die heilige Schrift ist darum wie er sagt, zur Verkündigung der Wahrheit hinreichend, allein die Kirche schliesst ihren Sinn auf." (ibid footnote on C.G.1, which states the sufficiency of Scripture): "Diese Stelle muss mit anderen verglichen werden." (p. 116, footnote): "Im Kampfe mit den Arianern kam überhaupt die Lehre von der Tradition häufig zur Sprache. Cf. Basil, De Spir. Sanct. 10 & 27." On p. 366, Möhler, as almost his last word, returned to this point, saying that the Arian controversy was a great stimulus to the recognition of Papal authority.

Atzberger, once again in his more Aristotelian way, stresses the importance, for Athanasius, of natural theology (Die Logoslehre des hl. Athanasius . . . , p. 34 ff.); this includes the intuitive method, which is what we have classified as the subjective natural theology. Later, (p. 40 ff.) he considers the question of whether there is a natural proof ("natural" having the same meaning as in "natural theology") of the Trinity, but gives a cautious negative answer. Reason, Scripture, and Tradition are all present (p. 41), e.g. dialectical arguments against the Son's creatureliness. The great importance of the question of analogy in the mature theology of Athanasius as a whole is rightly recognised (p. 44), but Atzberger finds it not particularly helpful. To give a better account, the objective sources are described as Scripture and Tradition (45 ff.). Later, p. 55 ff. the latter is subsumed under the heading of "Der Beweis aus dem christlichen Glaubensbewusstsein" (faith-consciousness). Under this heading are discussed the impiety, virtual paganism, lack of the unity of God, and adulteration of the Trinity in Arianism, and also its failure to prove our salvation. Atzberger's final conclusion, again argued as a good Thomist would argue, is that for Athanasius the principal basis was the unity between Reason and Revelation in general, as particularly represented by the unity and identity of the Greek rational Logos with the Logos of Scripture that became flesh. P. 75: "Bei Athanasius sind diese drei Momente (sc. philosophy, C.T., N.T. - author) in der Weise verbunden, dass der historische Christus erscheint als der philosophischen Logos, das alttestamentliche Wort, die Weisheit, u.dgl." And again, in his general conclusion (229 - 232), p. 230: "Es stand ihm (sc. - Athanasius) fest, dass es eine Einheit gebe zwischen den Sätzen des Glaubens und den Resultaten menschlicher Forschung, dass der Glaube nicht gegen das Wissen sei, aber auch das Wissen nicht gegen den Glauben sein können. Dieses ist der tiefe Grund, warum er festhält an der Identität des (philosophischen) Logos mit dem (in der positiven Offenbarung gegebenen) Christus . . . . Von dieser Anschauung aus,
on the subject. There is nothing like a sine Scriptura traditio, or a

die Athanasius allerdings nicht so fast streng apologetisch beweist, als vielmehr durchgehends vorausgesetzt, sucht er nun mit Hilfe der platonischen Philosophie sich die Ideen des Christentums begrifflich zu vermitteln ... (as distinct from the super-Aristotelianism of the Arians) ...". But primarily Athanasius is a man of faith.(232) The only criticisms that Atzberger makes of Athanasius are that he does not sufficiently indicate the difference between the philosophical Logos and the Incarnate Logos (81), and again, between the Old and New Testaments (Appx. 232 ff.), the latter distinction being treated by Atzberger as substantially the same as the former. This is the same issue, as compared with Möhler and Newman, treated in an Aristotelian and Thomistic way.

Our selection of Protestant authors opens with Voigt ("Die Lehre des Athanasius von Alexandrien ...), who wrote (op. cit. Introd.) in deliberate opposition to Möhler on one hand and Baur on the other, who regarded Nicaea as the triumph of Greek rationalism. Rather unwisely perhaps but with more justice than has often been allowed, Voigt tried to present Athanasius as a Protestant, and an orthodox Lutheran at that. Quoting Ad Serap. I: 28 & 33, C.G.1, De Decr. 4 & 19, he says, as against Möhler (p. 12): "Er (sc. - Athanasius) ordnet vielmehr die Tradition der heiligen Schrift vollständig hinunter." Later, pp. 34 - 36, he emphasises the importance of the Trinity as the basis of faith (referring especially to Ad Serap. I: 28), and in this context then stresses the pragmatist argument, as we have termed it. The arguments of Athanasius against the Arians are (203 - 204) "zuerst vom soteriologischen, dann vom rein rationellen, endlich vom exegetischen Standpunkt." At the conclusion of the section on Pneumatomaehism and its refutation, he gives a general summary, in which the pragmatist argument is very prominent, and also much play is made of the Christian "consciousness", in the 19th century idealist way: "Wie die Bekämpfung der arianische Lehre vom Sohne, so hat auch sie (sc. - struggle against the Tropici - Auth.) ihre Stärke vor allem in drei Dingen, nämlich in dem Bewusstsein der Heiligkeit des göttlichen Wesens, die schlechterdings keine Vermischung derselben mit der Kreatur gestattet, ferner in der Zuversicht des christlichen Glaubens, die sich nicht im festen Anschluss an das Wort Gottes als an die Autorität, die aller Unsicherheit und allen Schenkungen der menschlichen Gedanken ein festes und zuverlässiges Reich der Wahrheit gegenüber stellt." Böhringer (Athanasius und Arios ... pp. 477 - 552) enunciates the arguments of Athanasius under three heads, "biblisch-exegetisch" (including citations of Patristic authorities), "dialektisch-rationelle" (i.e. arguments of the "ontological" type, and "religios-dogmatische" (only 5 pages; appears to be what we have called the Pragmatist argument). In the same tradition, Bornhäuser ("Die Vergottungslehre des Athanasius und Johannes Damascenus ...") follows the same course; (p. 91): "Athanasius begründet die Gottheit Christi aus der Schrift und aus der Erfahrung ... (p. 92) Die Lehre von der wesensgleichen Trinität und von der Gottheit Christi ist entstanden als die notwendige Konsequenz der religiösen Verehrung, welche die
tradition that fuses with Scripture in such a way that it regularly

Christenheit ihrem Herrn Jesus Christus darbrachte." This is
another form of the pragmatist argument.

These orthodox German-speaking Protestants are basically pragmatists
on the whole, but they do, in a rather naive way, do justice to
Athanasius's respect for Scripture. With Harnack, however,
pragmatism reigns supreme. (All quotations from this author are
from the English translation of his History of Dogma) Vol. III
p. 144 (in italics in original): "Athanasius's importance for
posterity consisted in this, that he defined Christian faith
exclusively as faith in redemption through the God-man who was
identical in nature with God, and that thereby he restored to it
fixed boundaries and contents... it was the efficient means of
preventing the complete Hellenizing and secularising of Christianity.'
P. 142: "Athanasius was no scientific theologian in the strict sense
of the word." Again, Vol. IV, p. 25: "The Theology and Christology
of Athanasius are rooted in the thought of redemption... He has
come in order to make us divine, that is, to make us by adoption
sons of God... The adoration of Christ, which according to
tradition has been practised from the first, and which has not been
objected to by their opponents, already, he says, decides the whole
question. God alone is to be adored; it is heathenish to worship
creatures. Christ therefore shares in the Divine substance.
Athanasius did not draft any system of theology or Christology.'
The basic theological principles are quite accurately described
(Vol. IV, pp. 26 ff.) as; (1) the gulf between created and uncreated
reality - in agreement with Arianism; (2) the Logos is no longer
connected with the World-idea; (3) the Father and Son are only one
Godhead and one God; (4) the humble passages in Scripture are
referred to the Incarnation. In between all this, Harnack states
that the Homoousion was an impossible attempt of rational
theological construction to avoid what he regards as the inevitable
dilemma, either Sabellianism or subordinationist polytheism (III:
72), and, on the same matter, "it was Athanasius who first
arrived at the contradictio in adjecto in the full sense of the
phrase." (IV: 46). It is pleasant to record that, along with so
much erroneous material, Harnack at least notices in a sort of way
what we shall indicate, in the next paragraph but one, as the main
point of Athanasius, when he describes his great achievement as the
"reduction" of theology, that is, concentration, as distinct
from Augustine the enricher of theology (III: 140), and also, that,
without being able to give a definitive refutation, he notices that
there is something wrong about the Roman Catholic emphasis on
Athanasius as a traditionalist in their own sense: (III: 112,
footnote): "Athanasius appeals to tradition... although he is
able to construe it ideally only and does not quote any authorities."

As our last example, we may take Robertson (Introd. L.N.P-N.F.).
Unfortunately, he is completely pragmatist; (p. lxix) "Athanasius
was not a systematic theologian; that is, he produced no many-sided
theology like that of Origen or Augustine. He had no interest in
theological speculation, none of the instincts of a schoolman or a
philosopher. His theological greatness lies in his firm grasp of
controls the exegesis of Scripture. Even Reason is simply the capacity

eventriological principles, in his resolute subordination of
everything else, even the formula of the Homooousion, to the central
fact of Redemption, and what this implies for the Person of the
Redeemer," But on the question of Scripture and tradition he is
completely sound. He points out (loc. cit. lxvii) that, for
Athanasius, "the supreme and unique revelation of God to man is
in the Person of His Divine Son"; the Old Testament being a typical
anticipation of it, the New Testament the subsequent witness.
Later (lxviii), "on the sufficiency of Scripture for the
establishment of all necessary doctrine Athanasius insists
repeatedly and emphatically. (C.G.4, De Inc. 5, De Decr. 32, Vit.
Ant. 16 etc. etc.) and he follows up precept by example . . . .
There is no passage in his writings which recognises tradition as
supplementing Scripture. Tradition is recognised as authoritative
in two ways; (1) Negatively, in the sense that doctrines which are
novel are prima facie condemned by the very fact (De Decr. 7 (n.2)
& 18 Orat. I: 8, 10; II: 34, 40, De Syn. 3, 6, 7; Ad Epict. 3), and
(2) Positively, as furnishing a guide to the sense of Scripture . .
. . His language exemplifies the necessity of distinguishing, in
the case of strong Patristic utterances on the authority of tradition,
on different senses of the word. Often it means simply truth con-
tained in Scripture; . . . (such doctrine for Ath.) is not a secret
unwritten body of teaching handed down orally, but is to be found
in the documents of antiquity and the writings of the Fathers . . . ."
The remainder of the section, which need not be cited (lxvii
-lxxiv) points out, rightly, that while Athanasius considered the
authority of the Church important, his own writings reveal, by later
standards, an inchoate situation which Athanasius himself made no
attempt to straighten out, in the authoritarian and disciplinarian
sense.

In addition to all this, the reader may refer again to the chapter
on Arianism, in the sense that the principles of Athanasius would
be the opposite of those of the heresy, and especially to the
section on Platonism and Aristotelianism and the citations made
there. When this is done, one cause of the trouble becomes
immediately apparent, that the previous generations of commentators
have not understood the difference between the unitary principle
and the topical principle, and have regarded the latter as the
only method that deserves the name of systematic, or to be regarded
as really intellectual. Robertson's extracts show this particularly
clearly. The result is that the characteristics in Athanasius
have been attributed to disciplinarianism or pragmatism, or even
to sheer lack of system, which are really due to the unitary
principle.

We have taken the position that Athanasius does not really teach the
document of the sine Scriptura traditione. Now, it is true that
in the two passages from Basil of Caesarea that Köhler cited in the
extracts quoted above in this note, i.e. De Spiritu Sancto, chs. 10
and 27, this doctrine is clearly and unambiguously taught. But it
is absolutely beyond question that Athanasius is the greater
theologian by far, even on the Spirit, and the theologian that
penetrates correspondingly closer to the heart of the question. Whether it is right, under these circumstances, to interpret the more uncertain statements of the greater theologian by the definite doctrines of a man who was his friend, junior colleague, and successor, but who was, without any reflection on himself, his inferior intellectually and generally, or whether it is on the contrary right to attach added significance, for that very reason, to the uncertainties and silence of the greater theologian, is a case of "de gustibus non est disputandum". The author accepts the latter alternative, perhaps through prejudice, although it can most decidedly be justified on the ground that the idea of the sine Scriptura traditiones is the easy way out of one of the most difficult problems of theology.

Although Möhler is not quite right to say that it was the Arian controversy that was the cause of the recognition of Tradition in the relevant sense, the question is most important and in fact topical in this context. The Doctrine of the Trinity is the final and supremely difficult test of the Protestant principle of the supremacy of Scripture, and the fact that historically the Protestant upholders of that principle have in the main all been orthodox on the Trinity only makes it a piquant paradox. There is something peculiar about the relation between the Trinity and Scripture, as witnesses the curious treatment of the issue as embedded in Volume I of Barth's Church Dogmatics. Although the matter is far too difficult for any further attention now, one incidental remark must be made, since at the time of completion of this thesis, the end of 1962, is highly topical. There appears to have been a proposal at the current Vatican Council to principally interpret the "et" in the Tridentine doctrine of Scriptura et Traditio conjunctively, as distinct from the more popular disjunctive interpretation; it is held that the primarily conjunctive interpretation would be more acceptable to Protestants since the primarily disjunctive interpretation heightens the possibility of a doctrine based on Tradition without any Scriptural authority. The extracts that we have quoted from Newman and Möhler, however, indicate a view of the "et" that is basically conjunctive, which these two theologians put forward with alacrity as the position of Athanasius, and which they recognise as being highly favourable to the Roman Catholic position and equally antagonistic to the Reformation, at least as much as the disjunctive interpretation of the "et". This is what one would expect from the general position of Newman and Möhler, as distinct from the later Thomism and Aristotelianism shown by, say, in this context, Atzberger. But the point now is that it would be a grave mistake to consider that the conjunctive "et" is in any sense a new interpretation, since these examples show that it has been a regular element in the Roman Catholic tradition, even when, as in the recent past, it has been less in evidence than the more Aristotelian or Thomist disjunctive interpretation. See also Barth Ch. Dogm. E.T. Vol. I, Pt. II: pp. 544 - 572.
what are presented as sheer blatant theological gaffes. (42) There is nothing as yet about such things as analogy, which later play such an important part in this connection. Indeed, one good thing can be said for what appears to be, prima facie, the intellectual dishonesty of Athanasius in reading his own position into Dionysius, and that is, that it here amounts to an exegesis of Tradition—that is, the theology of Dionysius of Alexandria—in terms of Scripture! (43) For there is no doubt that Athanasius, as might be natural in a young controversialist, did commit what is normally the intellectual crime of reading his own position into the writer whom he is ostensibly studying, since Athanasius's defence, that the offending passage referred to the Humanity of Christ—which was of course Athanasius's own position—can be found nowhere in the extracts from Dionysius's "Refutation and Defence", which he wrote to defend himself against the accusation of Arianism, and which Athanasius cited to show his defence.

However, all this immediately brings up the question of Rome, or rather the Papal supremacy. Now, on Athanasius's own showing, certain members of Dionysius of Alexandria's own Patriarchate appealed to Dionysius of Rome, and the latter secured what amounted to the capitulation of the former. Was the capitulation simply due to shame, or was it due to the actual authority de jure of Rome? Athanasius does not tell us, except that his whole treatment implies the former, that is, that his predecessor had left himself open to misunderstanding and felt himself compelled to correct it even to the point of over-correcting. Did the original appeal to Rome correspond to any actual regular status? We know that there was some sort of tradition of the

(42) See, in one way chs. 1-12 as a whole, but especially ch. 2, and also chs. 7–8. (43) which is almost what Athanasius says in ch. 9.
primacy of the Roman Church, attributed to its double-Apostolic foundation; it was certainly assisted by its size, wealth, proximity to the Imperial Government, and its cosmopolitan and metropolitan character; it presumably included many persons who were accustomed to command; if anything, the lack of such a regular institution as a General Assembly, General Council, or even College of Cardinals — even one based on Rome itself — would have positively assisted this sort of unofficial supremacy. On the other hand, it can be said in opposition, in this case, that the enemies of Dionysius of Alexandria would have appealed to Rome even if its primacy had been insignificant, since its association with Sabellianism or Sabellianising tendencies was then notorious, and it would have been the inevitable leader of the party that was opposed to Dionysius of Alexandria. On the whole, however, the balance is in favour of the conclusion that the contestants in this dispute did recognise some form of Roman supremacy.

On the other hand, the very effect of this last finding is that the more we have to admit that Dionysius of Alexandria recognised the Roman supremacy, the more we have to admit that Athanasius did not. Athanasius literally does everything, including basing his defence of his predecessor on a contention that could not possibly be sustained and which obviously appeared to be impossible, rather than say that he was forced to surrender to the authority of Rome. In fact, Athanasius goes out of his way to present Dionysius of Alexandria as a man who always fully preserved his theological status and honour, and minimises, or even entirely suppresses, the humiliation that was almost certainly

(44) See, e.g. Irenaeus Haen III: III: 2. The question will be treated at the relevant place in all histories of dogma, e.g. Harnack Hist. Dogm. (E.T.) Vol. II: 1 - 169.
involved to some extent at least. Neither here nor anywhere else in Athanasius's writings is there anything remotely resembling the celebrated definite statement of Irenaeus concerning the Roman supremacy as a regular part of theological prolegomena. (45) Even though it is probably true that Athanasius accepted, during his Second Exile, the Roman fast of forty days at Lent, as distinct from the very much shorter Alexandrian fast of a week, this does not affect the issue, since here in the Festal Letters, as elsewhere, he never cites the authority of Rome. (46) He quotes with relish the support that he obtained from the bishop and Church of Rome in the Second Exile, but he does so in a matter-of-fact way. (47) After this, there is literally nothing on Rome. (48)

(45) i.e., once again, Haer. III: III: 2.
(46) For this question, see F. L. Cross, "The Study of St. Athanasius", pp. 16 - 18, and references there. On this basis, for example, it has been suggested that the Letter for 331 according to the Festal Index (a fast of 40 days) really belongs to 342 (where the Julian and Egyptian dates correspond, also the Nicene Easter, and where the Letter, according to the Index, prescribed 6 days.) But it is fair to say that this also proves that no tradition as postulated by Cross and others was known to the compiler of the Festal index; he certainly received no help along these lines from Athanasius as regards the contents of the letters. This again shows that, even though there was some recognition of a Roman supremacy, this was relatively inchoate, its recognition was by no means unanimous, and there was almost a continuous gradation between what would be almost Papalism and complete non-recognition.

(47) See "Apologia c. Arianos" 20 - 35 for the Letter of Julius, and, for a discussion unfavourable to the contention that Athanasius accepted the Roman supremacy, see Robertson, Introd. lxxvi. He points out that the imperious tone of the letter, which in any case was moderate compared with some of its successors (see esp. chs. 34 - 35), was simply what Julius himself said; the whole Apology is essentially a quotation of documents, and we have already noticed, in their bitter condemnation of Eusebius of Caesarea, an authenticated case in which Athanasius, at any rate in his later work, did not follow the line of these documents even where he had quoted them with relish. The attempt of the Eusebians to appeal to Rome, ch. 20, is presented by Athanasius as an impudent attempt to enlist one of his natural supporters on their own side.

(48) Of course, this silence can mean one of two things, or perhaps three; either the question of Papal supremacy did not arise or Athanasius did not wish to admit it; or, it was so accepted as not to need any
Even where Athanasius describes Dionysius, in contrast with
Arius, as a teacher of the Catholic Church, it is evident from the
context that Athanasius is not thinking of it in the Roman (classical
and Papal alike) disciplinary sense, but in a sense far more like the
Greek Orthodox attitude to the Church, and even more like what would
result if the Church of the future, as it should, regarded its
theologizing in a way analogous to the way in which a scientist regards
his research. What Athanasius is saying is that the whole way of life
of Arius, his arrogance, his manner of presentation of theological
truth (?), was such that he could not be right; Dionysius on the other
hand, by his whole demeanour, showed that he was to be treated with
respect even where he made a mistake, since he would surely see the
truth if it were pointed out to him by his fellows or even by further
attention to the Sources of Revelation, to put this in a modern way.

Three further observations must be made here, for what they
are worth. Firstly, we are adopting the hypothesis that this work
dated from 335, and is the first of the anti-Arian treatises of
Athanasius, for reasons independent, as far as possible, of all
theological considerations, including this one. This leaves open the
theoretical possibility that Athanasius, as a hypothetically provincial
Alexandrian, did not see the point of the Papal supremacy yet, but
accepted it when in the West during his subsequent Second Exile, although
this would be hard enough to justify from Athanasius's later writings.

Special mention. For Athanasius, the former is the correct
interpretation, since, even if he recognised the special authority
of Rome, the Arians patently did not, in their theology. Nor did
the Eastern party represented by Athanasius's more respectable
opponents in the earlier years, and later by the Semi-Arians. A
theologian who went to as much trouble as Athanasius did (C. Ar. I: 37 - III: 58) to refute Arian exegesis would certainly have
explicitly mentioned the Roman supremacy, if he had believed it
even in the sense of Irenaeus.

(49) Ch. 6, apud'init.' sicur, was relatively reviving at the end.
But it would be quite impossible to accept even this tenuous possibility on the basis of the Benedictine dating of this work, which most scholars have accepted, according to which it was written about 350 or later, following the "De Decretis". Secondly, the evidence here, and it is confirmed by the rest of the history of the fourth century, suggests that the prestige of Rome and its Bishop suffered relatively a considerable decline. In spite of the part that it played in the support of Marcellus and Athanasius about 340, it counted for much less at this time than it did either in the third century, or in the era that began with Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo. In part, this is due to a decline in Rome generally. The Church of Rome was losing the type of authority that belonged to the Church of "no mean city", and it had not yet gained the authority of the Church of a city that was almost a ruin, but already a legend. But the main cause, and one which we can confirm from Athanasius's own handling of this sort of issue later, is that the Church had just acquired the institutional apparatus of the General Council, however brokenly and poorly it functioned in the decades after Nicaea; these Councils and Synods not only were not domiciled in Rome, but appeared to meet anywhere but in Rome. This not only caused the further decline of Rome; it is also a sign that either Rome had already declined greatly by 325, or its earlier pre-eminence has been exaggerated. Thirdly, although there is no firm evidence for this, it is possible, as a speculation, that a great deal of the ferocity with which Marcellus, especially, was attacked by people like Eusebius of Caesarea, and, in a later generation, Basil of Ancyra and the Semi-Arians generally, was due to a sort of Eastern Nationalism directed against Rome and the sort of theology which was so markedly associated with it. With Constantine, the East, with its ancient and traditional glory, was relatively reviving at the expense
of Rome, its former conqueror. This hypothesis would certainly explain some still obscure features of the relation of Arianism to the Court in the later days of Constantine himself, as he became progressively an Easterner, and also, of course, under Constantius. But the very truth of this hypothesis that the East was in its heart in revolt against a de facto and largely passing Roman supremacy would be additional evidence against the idea that Roman supremacy played any part in the regular theological apparatus of Athanasius. A Romanist disciplinarian would be very nearly as hostile to Eusebius of Caesarea and the Semi-Arians as he would be to the Arians themselves. But the truth is that Athanasius, although the significance of his gestures of reconciliation to the Semi-Arians has been much exaggerated, more often than not took great care to differentiate between the two types of position, frequently in spite of great provocation. (50) The offence of the Arians was in general their heresy and not their canonical disobedience; or, insofar as anything ecclesiastical enjoyed specially privileged authority, it was Nicaea and Nicaea alone. (51) If there is any evidence for the hypothesis that Eastern Conservatism was motivated by Eastern Nationalism, Athanasius has not deigned to supply us with it; he was simply not interested. Actually, Athanasius himself and his Patriarchate were as powerful in their own right as anything else during this period; and in terms of the hypothesis that we are discussing, this would actually be part of the very same Eastern revival.

In short, the evidence of Athanasius is very much against the Roman supremacy as a regular principle of theology, even to the extent that it is with Irenaeus, least of all as in modern Roman Catholicism.

(50) See above pp. 311 and below pp. 1114-5.
(51) Cf. De Decr. 4, init.
Another very interesting absentee from Athanasius, as far as this first anti-Arian work is concerned, is what we have termed theological pragmatism, that is, the view that the Doctrine of God must be what it is, because that is the condition of our salvation. These are both of course typically western, and of course, very un-Greek, views, and together form what might be called the Western misrepresentation of Athanasius. No, with Athanasius, the reason why we must accept God as Trinitarian (or proto-Trinitarian) and the Logos as God is simply the fact that this is true, and if any authority is required, it is simply the sources of revelation, supremely Scripture. This is one of the ways in which theology loses if it forgets that Athanasius is a Greek and tries to read him as a Westerner. The Doctrine of God is the sternest test of a theologian's devotion to truth, in the literal sense. It is no accident that the greatest theologians in history on this Locus have been Tertullian, Athanasius, Augustine, Aquinas, and Barth. All but one are Westerners, but they are Westerners with a special and unusual close relation to Greek thought. Tertullian was after all the first Latin Father, and utterly dependent on Greek work; with him may be grouped Hippolytus, the Westerner who actually wrote in Greek, and Novatian, who was closely connected with both. (52) Augustine was a Neo-Platonist in his early days; in fact, what we are suggesting is probably the full theological significance of his Neo-Platonism. Aquinas had to work in the first days of the great Aristotelian revival of the Middle Ages, and was the age's principal Aristotelian, and Barth has been similarly involved with Hegel and his successors, whose philosophy is the greatest revival in history, not to say apotheosis.

(52) We are thinking especially of the Trinitarian and anti-Sabellian writings of this group.
(to use the word improperly!) of Greek thought. The same principle works when applied to theologians of the second rank, in this regard. Certainly, the Greek spirit is useless in theology without a great leavening of Western discipline and pragmatism, but in these circumstances, is it fair to deny to Greek thought, which was the fundamental secular heritage of Athanasius, what belongs to it?

The next stage, according to our schema, is to consider the actual Trinitarian doctrine that results. Here, we are struck by the most intimate connection between Trinitarianism and Christology that defeats any neat schema on the lines of the loci theologici. There is very little yet about the Spirit, so that the doctrine is in substance and form alike virtually a Binitarianism. Athanasius and the Dionysius of Alexandria that is cited by Athanasius are in almost complete agreement on the metaphors and descriptions to be used for the intra-Trinitarian relationship; Father - Son; Intelligence (νοῦς) - Word (in Dionysius, but not in Athanasius, probably because of its notorious association with the old doctrine of the Λόγος ἐν θεότητι and Λόγος προφορικός); Source - River; Light (φῶς) (or perhaps Light-source, or even Sun) - Radiance (ἀναδύσεια - the physical fact and modern concept of Radiant Energy is the exact equivalent of this concept). The first is the best and was the ultimate survivor, but the third and fourth are, descriptively, the most important in the Athanasian writings. However, as their use is not fully developed till the "De Decretis", we shall postpone a general criticism of them till then. Correspondingly, there is relatively greater emphasis on the notion of the Father of the Logos than in the earlier works, where admittedly it is first mentioned. (53)

The passage at the end of ch. 26 where the position is justified appears

(53) C.G. 41 - 47.
to be a gratuitous affirmation for something that requires argument. The somewhat rationalistic form in which it is presented would give colour to this, but it is best interpreted that, in His revelation and self-authentication, Christ appears, in His pre-existent state and in His Deity, as not only a personal or hypostatic entity, but also as the Son of a Father, etc. Contrary to the Sabellian theology, the Son is a distinct entity from the Father in the way that sons are from fathers, or that radiant energy is from its source, etc. The third aspect of the Trinitarian theology of Athanasius, and one of its main justifications, is that it was not the Father that became incarnate, but the Son. On the face of it, this is identical to the classical, and correct, objection to Sabellianism that it was Patripassian. That is, even if in some respect God could come down and endure the humiliation of creaturely life, and the death of a sinner, it would be quite impossible for the fons et origo Trinitatis to do so.

Does all this amount to an effective refutation of both Arianism and Sabellianism? Or, on the contrary, if it is interpreted in such a way as to refute the one, does it not run the risk of leaving open the way to the other? On the side of Arianism, there is not quite the rigorous insistence that the Radiance cannot be different from the light that we find in the later writings. On the other hand, it would be possible for a Sabellian with as much ingenuity as Arius or Asterius or Eusebius of Nicomedia to interpret this theology in a Sabellian sense. What would be easier than to say, for instance, that Radiance and Light-source were simply the same thing in an expanded and concentrated form respectively? One does not need the physics of Einstein to make this statement; the Greeks had a full intellectual equipment to do so, however much it would have lacked scientific basis. In fact, this is
very nearly what the Sabellianising Marcellus of Ancyra actually said, with his doctrine of dilatation and contraction of the Deity. The same can be seen, in classical Greek philosophy, in the substantialism of the Milesians; the very point for Thales about water as the general substance was that it could expand, as water vapour, and condense, to form a large number of different things in a relation that pointedly resembles the modern concept of dynamic equilibrium. Dionysius tries to refute this by showing that the Father and Son absolutely co-exist temporally; (classical Sabellianism, as we know it, appears to have involved some form of temporal succession of the states.) In doing so, and in a quite worthy attempt to show that, in the analogy employed, the correlation holds negatively as well as positively, Dionysius falls into the relativist error of stating that the Sun ceases to exist when it has set; however cogent this might be popularly, this mistake was made at a time when the astronomers of Alexandria were aware of the true state of affairs. But it would have required only a slight further development of the concept of dynamic equilibrium to nullify this sort of defence.

Similarly, there is some doubt whether the line taken by Athanasius in the "De Sententia" on the human sufferings of Christ would, without further amplification, suffice to repudiate Sabellianism. If some of the expressions used in the "De Incarnatione", like the Logos giving His body to death, (54) were taken seriously, this line would be insufficient as an argument. If the rigorous correlation between suffering and the body were kept, it would be possible to argue that the suffering would not interfere with the Deity of Christ and in that way Sabellianism would not involve Patripassianism. The thing that would

(54) De Inc. 20: 132A.
warn (and did – cf. the beginning of ch. 5 of this work) that something was wrong is that this sort of theology would have forfeited all claim to be Christian in any sense. But here again it appears that this was the position actually taken by Marcellus of Ancyra, and the actual reason for his great emphasis on the Humanity of Christ in, say, his exegesis of Prov. 8: 22 LXX. (55) Thus, there is a well-authenticated case of a theologian who followed Athanasian principles and got a heretical result. This is why, quite apart from Athanasius's personal friendship with Marcellus, the former was deemed by the Eastern party to have implicated himself in the latter's heresy, in spite of his own denials here; perhaps the need to deny Sabellianism was yet another reason for Athanasius's tenderness towards Dionysius of Alexandria. But what is really needed to make the position rigorous is, firstly, a Trinitarian theology which is based on the Father-Son relationship, which is less susceptible to interpretation in a quasi-Sabellian way, and a modification of the doctrine of the impassibility of God. There is a sense in which God is impassible, in that the Greek mind would find it very difficult to separate the passibility of God, that is, God being on the passive end of any activity, with the idea that there was something actually superior to God. However, for suffering to have any significance to a genuinely personal being, it must be suffering involving the whole person, and a rigorous idea of the impassibility of God would exclude this. One thing that would solve the difficulty is the realisation that, in the case of Christ, the suffering is directed teleologically, not by the activities of external men, but by the Love of God Himself. This was not fully understood until Barth in any case, and is probably something

that Western theology as a whole can see much better than Greek theology. It would be unfair to expect Athanasius to see this perfectly until the whole of his theological work was done.

There is very little reference to the Holy Spirit in this work. The only reference that originates with Athanasius is an offhand reference in 11: 496C to τοῦ Πνεύματος ἡ Χρυσή, the supplying of the Spirit, as one of the effects of the new salvation in Christ. This hardly merits consideration as Trinitarian theology at all. There are three references in the extracts of Dionysius of Alexandria quoted. In 15: 504A, Πνεῦμα is used, along with διάνεμον, etc., as a Scripturally sanctioned title of Christ. In 17: 504C, in the context of the unity of the Trinity, Dionysius says: "'I added ἔχων Πνεῦμα (no article - author), but at the same time I added ὁ Θεός καὶ διά τίνος ἕκας.'" and a little later, 17: 505A: "'But in their hands (sc. Father and Son) is the Spirit, Who cannot be deprived (στρέκομαι - author's own translation) either of the Sender or the Bearer.'" These statements are patently uni-processionalist in the classical Eastern Orthodox sense, and, as we shall see later, this is appropriate to the type of Trinitarian theology based on emanation, in the sense in which Athanasius understood the φύαλισμος relationship, as compared with the more personalist Filial type of Trinitarianism of Augustine.

In making our lexicographical summary, we shall omit all instances which are quoted from Dionysius. As for the titles of the Second Person, we shall confine ourselves to Logos and Son, since they are now unquestionably the prevalent ones from the point of view of the Trinitarian theology proper. Following Müller's classification first, and then the classification that we have elaborated: LOGOS: Godhead (Θεός of the L.: 10: 496A; 26: 517C & 520B; 27: 520C - in each case it is the proper state of the Logos which is referred to by certain
Scriptural passages. Relation between Father and Son: Denial of Two-
 Origin: Logos of the Father: 10: 496A (refers simply to pre-existent
state); 14: 501A (Christ is Logos inseparable from Father); 26: 520B 
(also denial of Sabellianism; not the Father but the Logos became flesh).
Logos of God: 8: 492B (Deity of Christ, as testified in Scripture, as
distinct from Humanity); 9: 492C (pre-existent state). 24: 516B (Christ
is θεος! God accdg. to pre-ext. state); 25: 517B (only the Eternal Logos
is L. of G.). Logos as Offspring, etc.: 25: 517B (ιδιον ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ
Πατρὸς γένημα); 25: 517B alterum, L. προελθὼν from the F. (in each
case these have been cited above under denial of Sabellianism).
Intimate connection between Father and Logos: Eternity: 21: 512A (F.
of His own Logos); 21: 512A alterum (humble expressions do not refer
to pre-existent Logos). Incarnation: John 1:14 directly: 26: 520B bis,
27: 520D. Assumed flesh, etc.: 21: 512A (ἐγεννημένος, φύσις); 12: 497B
(L. is ἐν τῇ σάρκϊ). 12: 497B alterum (ἡ ὑπελεύσθη γενόμενος). ἐνανθρωπίς
πιστοί ὁ διά; 9: 493B (humble expressions referred to ...). Perfect
Divinity and Humanity of Incarnate Logos: 9: 492C (already cited under
Logos of God; 9: 493A (D. of A. was aware of both); 9: 493B (Body raised
by the Logos). Same L. author of our reconciliation: 10: 496C (i.e.
through Christ's humanity). Heretical uses: 12: 497B (not ἴδιον, θεός, θεός,
ο ἀνθρώπος); 19: 508B (divided from the F. with regard to pre-Incarnate
state); 23: 513A ter (2nd p. not ἴδιος but participates in another L.,
and is called ο ἀνθρώπος); 24: 516B bis (Arianism - refer to pre-
existent state); 13: 500A (κατετίθη, as in Arianism); 19: 508C (γεννήθη
by will of God); 27: 520C (like us men).
Of these 38 references, no fewer than 26 refer to the pure pre-Incarnate
Logos in His purely intra-Trinitarian relation, nine refer to the Logos as
the subject of the actual act of incarnation, two to the Logos as
what Chalcedon described as the Hypostasis of the Incarnate Christ, and one, 26: 520B, in which Sabellianism is refuted by the fact that it was not the Father but the Logos that became flesh, is assigned to both the first mentioned groups. All the heretical uses come in the pure pre-Incarnate group, in this reckoning.

Son, Ὑιοίς: In each case, the section of Müller on the identity of Son and Logos is omitted. **Relation of Son to Father:** Son implied by title Father: 21: 512A. Son not Father identically: 5: 488A & 9: 492B (close association in each case with Incarnational proof). All other orthodox uses subsumed by Müller under: **Son of God, having become Man, is and remains S. of G. and S. of M.:** 3: 488A (Incarnate Christ shows Himself Son of the Living God); 5: 488A and 9: 492B (Godhead of the S.); 19: 508D (not F. but S. that took the created body); 19: 508B alterum (therefore said to be created); 26: 520A (only flesh of Son foreign to F.); 24: 516B (Son is ζητήσων ὑπαρξάω to πάντα). **Heretical uses:** (quoted or denied): 20: 509B (not Κηρύγγεια) 21: 512A (not one of the creatures); 25: 517B (not one among many but sole and true and natural S. of F.). 23: 513A (? - not true Son); 23: 513A alterum ( ? - S. not truly but Θεός !); 19: 508B (S. is ?- Αὐτόπροτον ... τῆς πάντων πάντων ουσίας); 5: 488A (Sab. s deny son, i.e. independent existence). There are only 17 uses of the title Son, which is relatively more than in the "De Incarnatione" but still in a very definite minority compared with Logos as a title. Of these, 11 definitely refer to the pure pre-incarnate and intra-Trinitarian state of the Second Person, including again all the relatively more numerous heretical cases, one refers to the Son as Agent of the Incarnation as an event that has actually taken place, two can be placed under both of these last two headings, and three are the Hypostasis of the Incarnate Christ. This usage resembles that of Logos, except that heretical uses, cited or denied, are more prominent, and
there is, if anything, a slightly greater tendency for the word Son to be used where the Incarnation is involved than when it is not.

As to the other Trinitarian terms: ὄνομα is not used at all. ὃσιμα occurs eight times; 10: 493C (Husbandman foreign κατ’ ωσίαν to Vine) 10: 496A (Son denied to be other κατ’ ωσίαν than the F.): 12: 497A (Arians deny L. to be ἴδιος τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας); 19: 508B (S. denied to be ἀλλοτριον ... τῆς τοῦ Π. οὐσίας); 24: 516B (S. ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας of the F.); 24: 516B alterum (S. is inseparable τῆς τοῦ Π. οὐσίας); 24: 516C (Radiance not from different οὐσία to Light) (also in this section River not ἐπηρεασμών to source); 25: 517B (L. is ἴδιον ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Π. γένεσις - D. of A. as interpreted by Athanasius). The first two cited represent the adverbial use of οὐσία like the normal Athanasian use of Φύσις. The other six, as appropriate to a post-Nicene work, are some variant of the Nicene ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός; however, as the issue will be definitively treated by Athanasius in the later "De Decretis", we shall defer any further full criticism, beyond the statement that ὃσιμα here obviously means the innermost centre of being of the Father.

The Ἐνομολογια(56) is also much less developed than in the later writings, and, surprisingly, the Nicene use much less significant that with the expressions ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός, ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ Πατρός οὐσίας γένεσις, etc. The primary meaning appears to be the sense in which the Vine and the Branches are Co-essential, and it is in the context of this that the Deity of the Logos and His co-essentiality with the Father are discussed. From this it appears that the principal meaning is in terms of constitutive unity, with other types, unity of

(56) We shall defer our major comments on this and allied matters till our consideration of the "De Decretis".
origin or co-eternity, perhaps generic unity, perhaps arithmetic unity, in the background. Now, there is a sense, ultimately, in which constitutive unity plays a part in the understanding of the Trinity, since, per impossible, God would not be God if He were not Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and even the Father would not be God if He were not Father of the Son, and (with the Son) the Source of the Holy Spirit. But it was the opposite side of this, the sense in which constitutive unity is false, that both the Arians and Athanasius had to maintain against such heretics as the Manichees; there is a sense in which we deal with one particular Person of the Trinity, to put this ontological truth in a pragmatist form. Each Person is whole God; it is not as if each Person is merely as it were an anatomical organ, the three of which go to make up a viable Being. God is an inseparable unity of Three such Persons. The truth is that, when each Person supremely acts in e.g. the Economy of Salvation, He acts as having His appropriate relation to the other Two; e.g. the Son always acts as Son of the Father and Co-Source of the Spirit; the Spirit as proceeding from Father and Son.

There are only four uses of the word, ἐγνώσεστε; 24: 516B, 25: 517B, 26: 520B bis. In the first two the Logos has Divine status ἐγνώσπε, in the third, things originate are alien from God ἐγνώσπε, and in the last, the Logos is Divine κατά ἐγνώσπε. These are all the adverbial or dynamic uses, and in all cases the word refers to what is true aboriginally about a thing, as distinct from what is true adventitiously. There is no mention of a ἐγνώσεστε in the Chalcedonian sense. ὄντα would in one of its uses be synonymous with ὑπόστασις provided it were used, and in another with ἐγνώσεστε as it is used here.

The only other doctrines that figure in this book are Christology, which has of necessity been largely discussed already,
together with a corresponding modification in the soteriology. The principal difference is the greatly increased emphasis on the Humanity of Christ, as compared with the earlier works. In one sense, this is due to the difference between this work and the primarily aetiological "De Incarnatione," but in another sense this very difference is clearly due to the intervention of the Arian controversy. As we have already mentioned, the line taken by Athanasius was not original, having been known to have been adopted by Marcellus of Ancyra, with a suspect result, and also, with almost as great certainty, by Eustathius of Antioch, who is now suspected with having had tendencies in the same direction. But Athanasius uses this principle to explain all the references to the suffering, etc., of Christ, without Sabellianizing consequences. The fairly strict correlation between the Deity and action, and the Humanity and Passion, or the mere revelation of action, is maintained in this work, where anything definite is said on the matter, but there are signs that the correlation is breaking down, because Athanasius has to deal with Scriptural statements that are in the same form whether they refer to the Deity or the Humanity of Christ, like, of course, John 15: 1 itself. This would ultimately force (although it has not happened yet, and never really did with Athanasius) the theologian to admit, on the one hand, that Christ, within the normal meaning of words, was Man as well as God, and on the other hand, that His action — and indeed majestic activity, see Barth Ch. Dogm. Vol. IV Pt. II — is really human in some way as well as Divine.

Corresponding to this increased emphasis on the Humanity of Christ is a sign of a change of emphasis on the nature of salvation.

(57) apud De Anima, in Theodoret, Dial. I: 56, See above pp. 336, and 342-350
In the "De Incarnatione" salvation is classically \( \chi ν\eta \eta \sigma ν\), divination. Here, owing to the importance of John 15: 1 ff. in the dispute over Dionysius of Alexandria, salvation is far more being a constitutive part of the new Humanity of Christ. (58) There is as yet no discussion of how this constitutive relationship is to be achieved; for this, a doctrine of the Holy Spirit is required. Also, the change is not permanent or complete, and Deification remains important throughout the whole of Athanasius's writings. But this element in salvation is highly significant.

The terms for the Humanity of Christ, on Müller's classification, are, Body, \( \sum\nu\mu\alpha\nu\), 9: 493B (L.'s own Body raised by L.); 26: 520B (Body L.'s own, indicated by bodily things happening to "Him"); 12: 497B (\( \gamma\nu\eta\eta\varepsilon\mu\nu \varepsilon \sigma\)); 9: 493B (\( \varepsilon\lambda\delta\theta\rho\alpha\mu\nu\pi\iota\nu\varepsilon\nu \) lay in tomb); 19: 508D (\( \epsilon\nu\delta\upsilon\varepsilon\tau\mu\alpha\nu\xi\)); 8: 492B (L. in body); 12: 497B (not F. but L. in body).

See also 20: 509A (\( \tau\omicron\omicron\sigma\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\kappa\omicron\nu\), indicated by Scripture); 9: 493B (thirsts, etc. \( \sigma\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\iota\kappa\omicron\sigma\), raises Lazarus, etc., \( \theta\varepsilon\iota\kappa\iota\kappa\iota\)); 12: 497B (\( \sigma\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\nu\) to us illustrated by Vine and Branches).

There are only seven instances, along with one adjectival usage that we shall group with these, one adverbial use which indicates that Athanasius is beginning to think more dynamically, and the last, which is unclassifiable. On our own schema, in one case, the humanity is formally subject, but of an expression that really in its active form is materially passive, in two cases it is the Direct Object of the Logos, and in five we have classified the use as instrumental, although in this case we have included a relatively disparate group, such as the Logos being "in" the Body; in fact, the instance in 26: 520B would be better included

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(58) Cf. Louis Bouyer, "L'Incarnation et l'Eglise-Corps du Christ dans la Théologie de Saint Athanase." esp. 65 - 148. The only criticism that can be made is that it rather too simply, immediately and uncritically maintains that Athanasius regarded this constitutive humanity as the Church.
under the Logos acting or even suffering as a body if it were not for
the fact that Athanasius appears to use this as a justification for
another interpretation.

...flesh, is commoner here, perhaps because of the
prominence of the Johannine incarnational passages of Scripture;
perhaps also because the full contrast between the Deity and the
Humanity of Christ makes for a fuller sense of the humiliation of the
flesh: See the three instances cited above in chs. 26 and 27 where
John 1: 14 is virtually referred to, and also 21: 512A (L. ἀναλημματίζει ἵ.
the imperfections of the flesh as the reason for the humble expressions:
26: 520A & B bis (additional to the references to John 1: 14), and
Ἐνσάρκος παρουσία, 9: 492C (of the Saviour) & 493A, and 10: 493C (in
all cases this is taken to be what the humble expressions are about).
Of these 10 cases, the three for which John 1: 14 forms the basis cannot
be well classified; the Incarnation may be interpreted as making the
Body the direct object of the Logos but the simple meaning of John 1: 14
fits more closely the classification of Christ acting as man, three refer
to the humanity as object of external action (i.e. the general
imperfections of the flesh), one refers to the flesh as direct object
of the Logos, and three (Ἐνσάρκος παρουσία) are closer to the
instrumentalist classification than any other.

Ἀνθρώπος, Man: Second Person became (γίνεται) man: 9: 492C
& 493A; 5: 488A & 12: 497A (not F. but Son became man); 7: 489B (Cht.
proclaimed as man from Nazareth). Heretical position that He was mere
man (noted &/or denounced) 8: 489C bis, 497A. See also τὸ ἐνθρωπίνον
the Humanity: 9: 493A (crying is part thereof); 10: 496B = Vine).
τὸ ἐνθρωπίνον = Humanity: 5: 488A (H. den. Son denied by Sabellians and
attributed to Father), 9: 492B; 9: 493A (τὸν Ἰσχαριώτην) 10: 493C (τὸν Κυρίου
as remembered by Dionysius). 12: 497A (τὸν Κυρίου - shows that not the
F. but the S. became man). 27: 520C (no use for Arian arguments); 27: 521A (differentiated from Godhead). ἵνα ἀντικαταστήσῃ: 5: 485C-488A (expounded by Dionysius); 8: 489C (preached first by the Apostles to the Jews); 10: 496A (the humble passages of Scripture do not refer to the pre-existent Logos but to ...). 11: 496C (human ministry compared to Mosaic covenant). ἐκκόσμησε ...: 9: 493A. ἡ διαμερίσμασις ἐφημένη ἐκ: 9: 492B & 11: 496C. There are no less than 24 instances. Here, the last one refers to the Humanity as the direct object of the Logos. Four have the form γίνεται ἐκρατεῖς, to which the remarks made above about γίνεται ὀπλαῖς also apply; the other 19 refer purely to the Humanity stativally, far more so than with any other of the terms for the Humanity of Christ.

Thus, in general, our analysis confirms that, although the same position is maintained as in the "De Incarnatione", it is becoming less well defined, and there is a perceptible movement towards Chalcedon. Even the tendency to think statively that we have noticed with the word ἐκρατεῖς is also a move in this direction, except insofar as it is a reflection of the Arian controversy, which compelled a consideration of things as they are before theology could return to the more dynamic, soteriological side.

The "De Sententia Dionysii" is the first major anti-Arian work, and shows the youthfulness of its writer, compared with the later works, especially as regards Athanasius's tendency to read his own position illegitimately into the writings of his predecessor. There is much that is as yet absent, the full implications of the Nicene Homocousion, the full doctrine of theological analogy, and Athanasius is not yet capable of dealing with the difficulties of Prov. 8: 22 LXX. But the difference between this work and the later anti-Arian writings, great as it is, is less than that between it and the pre-Arian "De
rnatione", and if the "De Sententia" is a rather simple treatment of these issues, Athanasius has taken the essential step of making the differentiation between the Humanity and the Deity of Christ, as asserted in Scripture, and using it in such a way as to avoid anyilian corollaries. Indeed, in one respect, that salvation consistsurrenity being ingrafted constitutively into the Humanity of Christ, Athanasius is as explicit and as well developed as anywhere later theology.

Found damaged
4.7.89 (Durham Univ)
CHAPTER V - IN ILLUD: OMNIA MIHI TRADITA SUNT.

This opusculum, which in its present extant form begins abruptly, is an exegesis of the verse Matt. 11: 27 = Luke 10: 22:

"All things are delivered to Me by My Father; and no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him." As Robertson says in his Introduction, the abrupt opening, the quotation of the text, with the bare bones of the argument immediately following, and the lack of any exegesis beyond the first principal clause, have led to the inference that the work is a fragment, and the author cannot agree with the statement of Robertson following, that nevertheless the conclusion, which is the chapter on the Trishagion that we have already treated in full, is perfect. It appears just as likely to be another fragment. The exegesis appears to be part of an anti-Arian work that has become lost. If one may hazard a guess, the opusculum "In illud, Quicunque dixerit ...", the exegesis of Luke 12:10 (see also Matt. 12: 31-32), comes from the same source; it is obviously not part of the Ep. IV ad Serapionem de Sp. S., to which it is usually tacked on (as Chs. 8-23), and it is obviously much earlier than the Epistles to Serapion, although nobody has ever doubted its genuineness. The work that we are now treating now, as we have shown above, is almost certainly genuine, and is the second anti-Arian work of Athanasius, dating from some time between 336 and 342.

To commence with Athanasius: "and from not perceiving this,

(1) Πίστεψον προς τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Πατρός μου.
(2) In L.N.P-N.F. "Athenasius".
(3) See below pp. 123, and Appendix, pp.
they of the heresy of Arius, Eusebius and his fellows, commit impiety (ἐρημηστική) against the Lord. For they say, 'If all things were delivered (meaning by "all things" the Lordship of creation), there was once when He had them not. But if He had them not, He would not be of the Father, for if He were, He would always have had them through being from Him, and would have had no need to receive them . . . (But on the contrary) . . . the significance of the expression is not the supremacy over creation, (5) not the presiding over the things made, (6) but is meant to clarify something of the aim of the Incarnation. (7) For if, when He was speaking, they were delivered to Him, it is clear that before He received them creation would have been void of the Logos. What then becomes of, 'In Him all things consist'? But if, simultaneously with the origination of creation, all things were delivered to Him, there would be no need of a delivery, for 'all things were made by Him', and it would be superfluous to deliver to the Lord the things of which He was the Fram[er]. For He was Lord of what was coming to be even in the act of making them. But even supposing they were delivered to Him after they were originated, look at the absurdity. For if they were delivered, and upon His receiving them the Father retired, then we are in peril of falling into the mythologies of some people that He handed over to the Son and stood aside Himself. Or if, while the Son has them, the Father has them also, we ought to say, not 'were delivered', but that He took Him as a partner . . . (But) this is even more monstrous, for God is not imperfect, (9) nor did He take the Son to help Him because of need, (10) but being Father of the Logos, He makes all things through Him, (11) and does not hand over creation to Him, but through Him and in Him exercises providence over it . . . (see Matt. 10: 29 & 6: 30 & John 5: 17) . . . For the expression . . . describes the Dispensation according to the flesh. "(12)

(4) ἐκ
(5) ποιούσιν τὴν Κρίσιν; Or does this mean the equivalent of πρῶτος τοῦ πατρὸς.
(6) προτέρως τῶν παραγωγῶν.
(7) προτέρως τῆς οἰκονομίας. We have differed from Robertson.
(8) κενά, and his whole concept in the direction of the Sun.
(9) εν ἀσίας
(10) οὕτω δὲ ἦν Χρέαιν προσάλεξετο τῶν Φρεσκὸν ἔτω τῆς Παντοκράτορος.
(11) ἐν ἀσίας κατὰ θεον οἰκονομίας. οὕτω δὲ αὐτόν ἕκαστο σκέπασιν τοῦ Παλατίου.
Both sides, at that stage, evidently agreed that the things of creation. Besides, both sides took quite seriously the fact that were delivered, is aorist, and therefore refers to an event that is to be considered narratively, as distinct from, say, statively, which would be the case if the tense were perfect. Thus, it followed that there was a moment of time when the Logos assumed a certain fresh relationship to creation. The Arians knew only one such relationship - lordship or logical supremacy over it in the most ordinary or "natural" fashion (in the Barthian pejorative sense of the latter adjective); therefore, it is this that the Logos assumed, in a definite event, presumably not having had it before. Athanasius's criticism is, within the universe of discourse in which he is operating, conclusive. Firstly, if the delivery were at any time later than the moment of creation, then creation would be irrational, or chaotic in the worst sense. This would appear, at first sight, to be an illicit introduction of the concepts of rational philosophy, but the matter is much the same if we consider it Christologically. If the whole grace of God is in Christ (which, as we shall see, is what the Greek Logos doctrine must finally mean), including His whole predestination for all things, the idea of a creation without Christ would be the idea of a creation utterly without the Divine mercy, which is far more serious than any ordinary irrationality. On the other hand, the use, or unreal hypothetical use, of such an adjective as about the world shows that there is still some trace of the old Greek correlation between the Logos and the world, and that Athanasius had not yet modified his basic concepts in the direction of the Contra Arianos, where is treated primarily as something (in the most
general sense) in God, so that it is God Who is considered (in an unreal hypothesis) as hypothetically \( \omega \). Similarly, to come to the second point, a divorce between the Logos's being the Creator of the world and being its Lord is dismissed as inconceivable. Not even the doctrine of sin postulates such a divorce. Sin is essentially mysterious in the worst sense, but whatever it means it does not mean that the Logos has acquired a state of imperfection such that it cannot exercise its dominion till after it has progressed to a higher rationality, this is the sort of thing that only the Arians, Hegelians, and Marxists could say. Of Athanasius's criticism of the third possible view, that God took in the Logos as a partner, we cannot accept it quite so wholeheartedly. The Athanasian view that God is neither too weak nor too far removed from the world to create and sustain it except at several removes is a great improvement on the Gnostic doctrine of a series of mediators who are progressively less divine, and his criticism will always be absolutely decisive against any idea of the absolute impossibility of God confronting the world, whether in the Gnostic-Neoplatonic or the Epicurean form of the idea. On the other hand, a modern personalist like Buber, Macmurray, the Karl Barth of Dogmatik, Vol. III (esp. Pt. II), and the Anglican Social Trinitarians, would have the right to reply that a Person of the Trinity, even the Father, Who (per impossibile) "went it alone", would in truth be supremely \( \omega \) and, in short no God, in fact, in the deepest sense of the word, a nullity. Probably, the Cappadocian Fathers would also have understood the point. The fact that, for Athanasius, God could create on His own but always creates \( \omega \), per Verbum, is a sign that Athanasius has not yet clearly thought out fully the personal distinctness of the
Father and Son; along with their unity, and this is associated with the importance of constitutive unity in Athanasius's interpretation of the Homocousion in the previous work. However, this argument of Athanasius is absolutely conclusive against the idea that God had to take as a partner into the very essence of His majesty something that was not Him. This is what the Arians virtually said in their doctrine of creation through the Logos; the Manichaean, Gnostics, and other heretics had their notions of a God (?) who was imperfect and had to synergize with what was not Himself; and of course, this principle achieved its definitive expression in Hegel. This is the first attempt to express one of the major paradoxes of theology; God does not work, in His eternal majesty, with or through anything not Himself, but always works with and through the Logos. This is a genuine root of Trinitarianism. Finally, we may remark that, however much we may doubt about Athanasius's personalist conception of the Logos when he talks intellectually and systematically, there is no doubt when he talks Scripturally, and a dramatic instance is provided in the very next chapter where he discusses further the only alternative that remains, that such a verse of Scripture, since it cannot refer to the eternal and aboriginal state of the Second Person, must refer to the Incarnation.

Here follows an intensely dramatic account of the economy of salvation, Biblically based, and in the tradition of Melito of Sardis, Irenaeus, and the Athanasius of the De Incarnatione, complete with the Euphuistic and antithetical arrangement of the subject matter: "For whereas man sinned and is in a fallen condition; death prevailed from Adam to Moses, the earth was cursed, Hades was opened, Paradise shut,

(13) See above, pp 525-526. We shall consider this aspect of Creatio ex nihilo when we consider the Athanasian criticism of the Two-Logos doctrine of Asterius.
Heaven offended, man, finally, corrupted and brutalised, while the devil was exulting against us - then God in His loving kindness (ὅκιν) His own image should perish, said, 'Whom shall I send, and Who will go?' But, while all held their peace, the Son said, 'Here am I; send Me.' And then it was that, saying 'Go Thou,' that He 'delivered' to Him Man (τὴν ἀνθρώπινην) that the Logos Himself might become flesh, and, by receiving the flesh, might put it right (ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν) in all respects. For to Him, Man was delivered, as to a physician, to heal the bite of the serpent; as regards life, (14) to resurrect what was dead; as regards light, to illumine the darkness; (as regards) being Logos (15) to renew (τὸ πατριανὸν ποίημα). Since then, all things were delivered to Him, and He was made man, immediately all things were set right and perfected. Earth receives a blessing instead of a curse, Paradise was opened to the robber (16) Hades cowered, the tombs were opened and the dead raised, the gates of Heaven were lifted up to await Him that 'cometh from Edom'. . . . (see also Matt. 11: 28 and John 3: 35) . . . . (All things were) given, in order that, just as all things were made through Him (17) so on Him all things might be able to be renewed. For they were not 'delivered' unto Him, that being poor He might become rich, nor did He receive all things that He might receive authority which He lacked, but rather in order that as Saviour He might set all things right. For it was fitting that while the very beginning of creation should take place through Him, which was to bring them into being (18), the rectification should take place in Him (καὶ ἀρχήν) - there is a difference in the phraseology. For in the

(14) These and similar words are datives in apposition to
(15) λογος ἀνθρώπινης, probably, the Logos that has true or ultimate existence even as God is ὁ θεός.
(16) Ἰδίος - i.e. the penitent thief on the Cross. Migne follows this which is in Cxx. Reg. Seguer. et Basil only.
(17) διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὡς - note perfect indicating that the things to be renewed were already in existence.
(18) Ἰδίος ἄνθρωπος ὁ θεός· ἰδίος ἄνθρωπος εἰς ἐν αὐτῷ ἔφερα.
beginning they came to be through Him; but afterwards, when all had fallen, the Logos has become flesh, and put it on, in order that in Him everything might be put right. Himself suffering, He put us at ease; himself hungering He nourished us; and descending into the underworld He brought us up. At the time when everything was coming to be, their coming to be consisted in a fiat, like 'let (the earth) bring forth'; 'let there be'; but at the rectification it was fitting that all things should be 'delivered' to Him, in order that He might be made man, and all things be renewed in Him. For man, being in Him, was quickened: for this was why the Logos was united to man, namely, that the curse against man may no longer prevail. (on Ps. 71 LXX: 1) ... (it requests for man's sake) ... that both the judgment (κρίσις) of death against us may be delivered (παραδίδωσιν) to the Son, and that He may then, by dying for (σφαίρα) us, abolish it for us in Himself. ... (on Ps. 87 LXX: 7 & Ps. 137 LXX: 8) ... For He bore the wrath (θυμός) that was against us ... 

"Thus, then, we may understand all things to have been delivered to the Saviour, and ... there had been delivered unto Him what He did not previously possess. For He was not man previously, but became man for the sake of saving man. And the Logos was not in the beginning flesh, but has become flesh subsequently ... (John 1: 1; Col. 1: 20 & 2: 14; Eph. 2: 15-16) ... 

This concludes the soteriological section proper. It is almost a perfect summary of the De Incarnatione, and not much more need be said about this aspect. On the Christology and Trinitarian theology of this chapter, Robertson (in the only note on this section) has said: "This dramatic representation of the Mission of the Son stands alone in the writings of Athanasius, and, if pressed, lends itself to a conception of the relation of the Son to the Father which, if not Arian, is at least contrary to the more explicit and more mature conception of Athanasius as formulated for example in C. Ar. II: 31 (P.G.XXVI 212C-213A). The same idea appears in Milton's 'Paradise Lost' ...". And

(19) ἐξήγεται οὖν ἐν τῷ σινήλι. 
(20) Πάσης θύμος ἂν τὸν Αἰδήν παραδίδωσιν. Πάσης θύμος = fiat, is the LXX word for an Old Testament Divine Commandment.
again, in Newman's "Arians", Ch. 1, sect. 3, note on p. 103, 1st ed. (21)"

(such language) . . becomes offensive as being dwelt upon as if it were literal, not figurative. It is Scriptural to say that the Son went forth from the Father to create the worlds; but when this is made the basis of a scene or a pageant, it borders on Arianism. Milton has made allegory, or the Economy, REAL."

This criticism is understandable, especially as Milton's sympathies with classical Arianism are well known. Of course, Newman's last word should have been "essential" since, as Chalcedon knew, the Human Nature of Christ is just as real, although not as "essential" in the Trinitarian or Athanasian sense, as the Deity. This slip of Newman, as well as this criticism as a whole, is indicative of his tendency to over-value the simplicity of God in a way that is more consistent with rationalism than with the Christian and Trinitarian God. It is legitimate to reply that, firstly, all the material used here is strictly Scriptural, secondly that the drama in the obedience of Christ is actually the well-known typological contrast between the disobedience of Israel (or even of mankind as a whole) and the perfect fulfilment of the Law by Christ and in Christ, which was well known to the typological exegetes of Athanasius's own period, for example, Irenaeus, to take a non-Egyptian example, thirdly, that, however exaggerated the drama might be, it is no more than an exaggeration of what one may reverently describe as the intra-Trinitarian life. The reasons for the dramatic quality of this extract are that Athanasius is retaining his previous soteriological emphasis, but, to a far greater extent than in the "De Incarnatione", he has had to account for the part played by the Father in the drama of salvation, also, the general position, in terms of the later controversy, is still Infralapsarian rather than Supralapsarian;

(21) Note referred to at the end of Robertson's note just cited.
the effect of a Supralapsarian position in a man of Athanasius's intellectual environment would be to quieten the drama, since it would give the economy of salvation more of the character of what is eternally true about God and less of the character of an event.

Having finished the Incarnational side of the argument, Athanasius now proceeds to complete the picture by describing, as a contrast, the attributes of God, which the Son eternally shares with the Father: (212B) "That, however, which the Father hath, belongs also to the Son, . . . . For when He became what He was not, 'all things were delivered' to Him. But when He desires to declare His unity with the Father, He teaches . . . . 'All things whatsoever the Father hath are Mine.' And one cannot but admire the exactness of the language. For He has not said 'all things whatsoever the Father hath He hath given unto Me,' lest He should appear to have once not possessed these things, but 'are Mine.' For these things, being in the power of the Father, are equally in that of the Son. We now must investigate what the Father hath. If creation is meant, the Father would have had nothing before Creation, and would have apparently gained from it. . . . (But) just as He is before creation, so before creation He also has what He has, which we also believe to belong to the Son. . . . (so heretics cannot say that) 'if all things are delivered to the Son, then the Father has ceased to have power over what is delivered, having appointed the Son in His place' . . . . (because) . . . although He has given all judgment to the Son, He is not voided of lordship, nor, because it is said that all things are delivered by the Father to the Son, is He any the less over all. . . ."

There is not very much to say about this passage except to notice that it puts forward again the distinction between the Deity of Christ, as what He had aboriginally beyond Creation, and has now, and will have to all eternity, and the Humanity, which is originated by a definite act in time. The Scriptural linguistic, and exegetical difference to which this corresponds is that between gifts etc., being
given, παρεσέθυ - aorist, to the Son, and what the Father and, by implication, the Son, has, present tense, no event. It is as simple as all that. In the next extract, commencing at 3: 213D, Athanasius amplifies the Divine Nature and describes how it is shared by Father and Son. "... (The Arians err in) separating ... the Only-Begotten from God, Who by nature is inseparable from Him(22), even though in their madness they separate Him by their words, not perceiving ... that light (τὸ φῶς) can never be separated from the Sun, in which it resides by nature.(23) ... (to use the best analogy for the indescribable) ... .

4  "As then the light from the Sun which illuminates the world would never be supposed ... to spread light without the Sun, since the Sun's light is united to the Sun by nature, and it is as if the light were to say, 'I have received from the Sun the power of illuminating all things and of giving growth and strength to them by the heat that is in me; no one will be mad enough to think that the mention of the Sun separates Him from the nature which is from him(25) that is, the light (τὸ φῶς); thus it would be pious (εὐσεβεῖς) to perceive also the Divine Essence of the Logos is united in nature to His own Father.(26) ... (The text shows that the Saviour) is ever with the Father. For "whatevsoever He hath" shows that the Father wields the Lordship, and the "are Mine" the inseparable union. ... In Father are everlastingness, Eternity, Immortality(27) ... not as

(22) τὸν ἡμετερόν τὴν φύσιν.
(23) τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ φιλικόν.
(24) κοινωνέω, present participle. Κοινωνέω was later characteristic-ally used of the Spirit in this way. See Athanasius Ad Serap. I:20 apud finem and Shapland's note; also Rodzianko, "Filioque and Patristic Thought," pp. 295 - 308 of "Texte und Untersuchungen" LXIV; the reference is on p. 301. The paper is published in English.
(25) τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ φως τοῦ Θεοῦ.
(26) τὴν Θεοῦ ἀρετὴν, τὸν Λογοῦ ἡμερεῖνς τὴν φύσιν τῷ Θεῷ. τῷ Θεῷ.
(27) τὸ Χριστοῦ τῷ Χριστῷ τῷ Ἐμπρωτ."
adventitious attributes (ἀπόστρωσις) of Him, but are things which reside in Him as in a fountain (Πηγή), and in the Son too. When then you wish to perceive what concerns the Son, learn what is in the Father and believe that that is also in the Son. If then the Father is a Creature (Κτίσμα) or a thing made (ποιήμα), these predicates (Τεκωτα) are also in the Son. And if it is permissible to say of the Father, 'there was once when He was not', or 'ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων', let this be said also concerning the Son. But if it is impious (ἀτιμία) to say that these predicates are in the Father, may it be deemed impious also to say that they are in the Son. For what is the Father's is also the Son's. . . . (Matt. 10: 40; John 14: 9) . . . as Everlastingness, Immortality, Eternity being no creature (28) are in the Father, it follows that one should think thus of the Son too. For as it is written (John 5: 26), 'As the Father has life in Himself, so gave He to the Son also to have life in Himself.' But he uses the word 'gave' in order to point out the Father Who gives. And, as again Life is in the Father, so also it is in the Son, so as to teach the inseparability and the eternity . . . For, . . . by thus mentioning the Father He . . . (avoids) . . . being thought to be the Father Himself. For He does not say, 'I am the Father', but, 'whatsoever the Father hath'.

5

"(The Son is Father only in sense of Is. 9: 6, LXX) . . . The Only-begotten Son of God, then, is at once Father of the Coming Age, and Mighty God, and Ruler. And it is shown clearly that all things whatsoever the Father hath are His, and that as the Father gives life the Son is likewise able to vivify whom He will . . (John 5: 25) . . and the will (Θέλημα) and design (Βουλήμα) of the Father and Son are one, since their nature (Φύσις) is one and indivisible (29) . . . (This verse controverts both the Arians and the Sabellians) . . . For this is why the Only-Begotten, having life in Himself as the Father has, also alone knows (οἶδα) Who the Father is, as He is in the Father and has the Father in Him. For He is Image (Σωματικόν) and it follows that, because He is His Image, all that belongs to the Father is in Him. He is an exact Seal, showing in Himself the Father, (30) living Logos and true, (31) Power, Wisdom, Sanctification, and our Redemption (32) . . . (Acts 17: 28; Luke 10: 22) . . .

(28) Τὸ Κτίσμα, τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων, τὸ ἀεί, τὸ μὴ κτισµα.
(29) μὴ συσταδορος.
(30) Ἐφραὴς εἶ χρήστην, ἐποτυπάς ἐν αὐτῷ, δεικνύς τὸν Πατέρα.
(31) Λογος Σωματικός Αληθινος (Migne's punctuation)
(32) Ἐπιστασυς και ἐπιστροφήν ἡμών.
To begin, we here have a further presentation of the distinction between the passages referring to the Humanity and to the Deity of Christ. Admittedly, there is some uncertainty in its application, as is shown by the handling of John 5: 26, in which the aorist τῇ is simply taken as a prophylactic against Sabellianism, like the exegesis, in fact, of the title verse of the opusculum in C. Ar. III: 35-36; in fact, the exegesis here of John 5: 26, which Athanasius wishes to refer rather to the Deity of Christ, would be rather what we would expect if the verb were the perfect, ἔδωκε, if the classical tense system still applied, and in fact, when Athanasius, immediately on quoting the verse with its aorist, explains the use of the verb ἔδωκε, he cites the perfect. There appears to have been no known textual variant to harmonise this, either in the Fourth Gospel or in Athanasius. It would have been consistent with Athanasius’s later methods to apply this verse too to Christ’s Humanity; for instance, God would have given the Humanity, and us in It, the privilege of enjoying eternal life and bliss in exchange for the living death of our fallen state. But this is relatively unimportant beside the important question which now arises for Athanasius, which he has to discuss, the equally necessary other side of recognition of what properly belongs to the Humanity of Christ. It needs to be clarified now, how we are to recognise what sort of things really belong to the Deity of Christ.

In this process, Athanasius develops a rudimentary but quite definite doctrine of the Theistic Attributes, which are fully shared by Father and Son. These attributes that are mentioned are Everlastingness (τὸ ἐκ νεότητος), Immortality (τὸ ἀναπνεομένος), Eternity (τὸ ἄγνωστο), and non-creatureliness (τὸ ἐκ θάνατος). These are in a sense the formal attributes of Deity. They are emphasised here because they are the ones most relevant for the Arian controversy, but also for another
reason, which indicates a problem of theology which has not been felt as such in most later ages, but which is a very serious issue for Athanasius, especially in the Contra Arianos, and which probably ought to be taken more seriously by modern theologians (Barth takes at least a step in the right direction, (Ch. Dogm., Vol. II, Pt. I). In contrast with this attribution of the formal attributes to the Father - in comparison, Barth treats them much less formally even if one corrects for his great length - the more material attributes of Wisdom, Power, Logos itself in its contemporary meaning, not to mention the even more material concerns that He is "our sanctification and redemption" which indicate other important attributes of God, they are all treated, at the end of Ch. 5, as titles of Christ. Admittedly, Athanasius has called the Son the "exact Image" of the Father, so that everything true of the One must be true in exactly the same way of the Other, but the difference in emphasis is unmistakeable. In the same section, he treats ὁλέμα, will, and ἀδίκημα, counsel, as attributes of both Father and Son, but later, in the "Contra Arianos", especially III: 58-67, they are treated exactly as Logos and Wisdom as connotative and denotative titles of the Son. By most Western standards, Athanasius here fails to differentiate between the Second Person as Wisdom, say, and Wisdom as an attribute of all Persons. The best place for a definitive and critical consideration of this matter is when the Two-Logos-Wisdom theory of Asterius is denounced by Athanasius in Co Ar. II: 38 ff., and nothing will be said at this stage, beyond that this is particularly natural to a close follower of the early Plato (or Platonic Socrates), to whom the Forms were both qualities and other things in our more familiar substantive sense. One other important point deserves mention, Athanasius's denial that there are any ἀλήθεια

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in God; Robertson's translation of "adventitious attributes" is adequate only if the English reader remembers that it means literally what it originally said. What is really being said is that God shares no attributes with outside beings in such a way as to make Him a member of a class - in fact, Thomas Aquinas's well-known statement "Deus non est in genere aliquo"; nor can God have any properties due to anything outside, or due to membership of any class. That is, His attributes cannot be formally caused, in the normal sense; God cannot be (in the most literal sense!) the MINOR TERM in any AAA Fig. 1 syllogism.

The actual Trinitarian doctrine here enunciated is very much dependent on the \( \phi\xi\tau\omicron\alpha\omicron\sigma\varsigma\ ) metaphor, which we shall consider in greater detail later; this is no change on the position in the "De Sententia Dionysii". The Son is the Exact Seal of the Father and Exact Image of the Father, and this is associated with the possession of all attributes and features in common. Already, there is a slight change in the use of the sealing metaphor. The Second Person is still, as in "De Incarnatione", the Seal, but it is now the seal that shows the Father, rather than that that stamps with the Father, and is thus presumably positive with regard to the Father.

The important part of the last chapter has already been discussed in full; (33) it is an appendix on the Trishagion, which includes an important use of the phrase \( \tau\omicron\sigma\alpha\omega\nu\omicron\alpha\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron\varsigma\alpha\iota\varsigma\omicron\zeta\varsigma\omicron\ ) . The Doxology is present in the form in which we have the work, and it is Trinitarian: "... to Him belongs the Kingdom, even the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, now and to all eternity. Amen."

To summarise the theology of this book: As regards Athanasius's fundamental theological methodology, there is little if any change;

(33) See above, pp. 32-33.
the only detectable principle is that Scripture should be coherent and true to itself. On this basis, there are two ways in which Scripture speaks of Christ as God and as man, and these must be both kept distinct in nature and held together in theology, which must be consistent with both. The line of cleavage is the same as that between what is true eternally of the Second Person, and what happened to Him as an event. This is almost no change from the position in the "De Sententia", and apart from this, the only thing that can be determined is simply the principle of piety, εὐλογεῖν, or cognate words, which is tantalizingly brief, and never explained at greater length. On these bases, the verse in question, Matt. 11: 27, which speaks of all things being delivered, παραδόθη, aorist, must apply to the Incarnation and the Commission to do the work of salvation, and, in a subordinate way, to all creation with regard to the special relationship which the Second Person assumed thereat. Where, as in John 16: 15, there is no event but merely continuous tenses, the verse is applied to the Deity of the Son, and the "all things" are either the Theistic Attributes or the general majesty of the Second Person.

To turn now to the actual Doctrine of God that results, there is developed a doctrine of the Theistic Attributes, but the attributes assigned to the Father are the merely formal ones of eternity and non-creatureliness. The more material attributes, like Wisdom, etc., are special titles of the Second Person, and this raises, without solution, one of the main problems of Athanasian theology, the relation between, say Wisdom as a Divine attribute and Wisdom as the Second Person. The principal title of the Second Person, as we shall in the lexicographical section below, is Son, but the chief descriptions of the intra-Trinitarian revelation are still Source-River, and especially, Light-
Radiance, and it is again emphasised that it is the nature of such a light-source as the Sun to emit light.

There is still no reference at all to the Spirit, save in a routine way in the Doxology. There is still a trace of the tendency to assimilate the functions of the Second Person with what later theology assigned to the Third. At the end of Ch. 5, the Son is still described as "our Sanctification", which is usually applied to the Spirit, although we have already given our reasons why Athanasius, as regards an important aspect of the doctrine of sanctification, is correct in ascribing it to the Logos. Again (2: 212C), salvation is "in Christ", which is of course thoroughly Scriptural, but he pointedly contrasts it with Creation being "through" the Second Person, the distinction being associated here with that already made in the "De Incarnatione" between Creation by fiat of what did not exist, and Redemption of entities that already existed and therefore, as is said now, having to be taken "into" Christ for their redemption. This is pointedly different from the later position of the Letters to Serapion, passim, according to which all things are, and happen, from (ἐκ) the Father through (ἐν + gen.) the Son-Logos, and in (ἐν) the Spirit, a formula which is absolutely uniform unto monotony.

There are only 7 uses of Logos as the title of the Second Person; Müller's classification breaks down in this small work where so many of the uses are dictated by the text for exegesis, so they will be largely ignored: 1: 209A (creation would be void of the Logos on a theory rejected) 1: 209B (Father of the L.); 2: 212 A & C (aa. Logos takes flesh as in John 1: 14); 3: 213A (see previous ex.s, but also not originally flesh); 4: 216B (Divine ὁ τέκνος of L. united to Father); 5: 217C (ὁ θεός of Father). Of these, 3 refer to His pure intra-Trinitarian status, one to His work, pre-incarnate, in creation, and the other 3 to the Logos as the Agent of the Incarnation. ὁ θεός, Son, is much commoner: 2: 212A (Son's commissioning); Work together in Creation (as John 5: 17) : 1: 209C; Imputation of weakness to Father:
3: 213C bis (was it abdication of Father to deliver the Son?);
1: 209C (not as if F. needed S. for creation). Unity of essence (in
something like generic sense, as dictated by Texts): 2: 213A; 3: 213B,
in effect against Father: 4: 216 C & D (already cited above); 6: 220A.
Of these 17, two (1: 209C, each) refer to the work of the Son in
creation, 2: 212A we refer best to the Subject of the Incarnation
considered prospectively, and the remaining 14 all refer to the intra-
Trinitarian status of the Son. This is a striking, though largely
temporary, reversal of the previous position whereby the Logos is the
term of choice for the pre-Incarnate Logos. Probably the change is due,
in this instance, directly to the Scriptural passages under discussion;
perhaps also an effect of the highly personalised and dramatized
presentation of the Mission of the Son in Ch. 2.

Essence, is used only once, in the instance in 4:216B
cited above under Logos; here it stands for the innermost personal
centre of being of the Second Person, in a way synonymous with the
later meaning of ὁ ὁμοίως τοῦ κατοικοῦ, which word is also only used once, in
6: 220A, which we have already discussed in full. ὁ ὁμοίως τοῦ κατοικοῦ, nature is
commoner: 3: 216A, Radiance is in the light ὁ ὁμοίως τοῦ κατοικοῦ; 4: 216A, Light
from the Sun ὁ ὁμοίως τοῦ κατοικοῦ; 4: 216B, Sun cannot be separated ἀπὸ
ὁμοίως τοῦ κατοικοῦ, that is, what is out of it by nature, that is, Radiance;
4: 216B (see above under Logos; the essences are united ὁ ὁμοίως τοῦ κατοικοῦ). Also,
for similar heretical use, 3: 213D; the Arians deny Son Who is
inseparable ὁ ὁμοίως τοῦ κατοικοῦ. All these uses are the familiar adverbial and
dynamic uses. Similarly, not applied to God, angels are superior to
us καὶ ὁ ὁμοίως τοῦ κατοικοῦ, adverbial accusative, 6: 220C. There
are three uses in the more traditional absolute way, as a true noun,
two of the Divine nature and one of that of men; 3: 216A (we must be
careful of intruding on God's ὁ ὁμοίως τοῦ κατοικοῦ; 6: 217D (we
glorify with the Trishagion ὁ ὁμοίως τοῦ κατοικοῦ ὁ ὁμοίως τοῦ κατοικοῦ). These two
are fairly synonymous with the later Trinitarian 'Συζητήσαντες', interpreted in the usual way. Finally, 6: 217C, Athanasius sarcastically suggests that the Arians investigate their own human Ἰσπαρώμενος. These reveal little change in the use, so far, of Ἰσπαρώμενος.

There is very little change in any of the other doctrines. The most important advance is that God does not need an intermediary for creation, that is, an intermediary that is not God, but always creates per Verbum. The Christology and soteriology remain the same as before; in spite of the heightened dramatic representation in Ch. 2, the soteriology remains much the same as in "De Incarnatione", and even the greater emphasis on salvation as ingrafting into the Humanity of Christ, in the "De Sententia", is less prominent here, since it does not lend itself to the dramatic treatment, which is probably the effect of the fact that, for the first time, Athanasius has had to see salvation as the act of both Father and Son. Conversely, for the same reason, Salvation as a Mighty Act of God is more prominent than anywhere else in Athanasius, before or since, and the penal, substitutionary, and sacrificial aspect is less prominent. As for lexicographic analysis of the Christology, there are only four instances, all of πρόσωπος, flesh, for the Humanity of Christ, in the exact sense and virtual citation of John 1: 14; 2: 212 A & C; 3: 213A bis (2 linked uses).

Robertson, in his Introduction, (34) points out that Athanasius's treatment of this verse is different from his later treatment in C. Ar. III: 35 ff. in which it is simply used to show that the Father and Son are personally distinct in the sense denied by the Sabellian heresy. Thus, Athanasius shifted the ground of attack from the minor, that the

(34) L.N.P-N.F. p. 86.
"all things" include the Divine Sonship, to the enthymematic major, that if "all things" were delivered to Him, once He did not have them. The case is actually more complicated than that, since this type of anti-Sabellian argument is very prominent here, but not applied to the same text, and besides, Athanasius is not as clear-cut as Robertson suggests. But there are significant differences, and we shall discuss them when we come to the relevant passages in the "Contra Arianos", that is, II: 31 ff., and 38 ff. (on the Two-Wisdom doctrine of Asterius), and III: 35 ff.
These works are of historical nature and require no further handling here. The former is what its name implies, an encyclical protesting against the violent and uncanonical intrusion of Gregory into his See by the Arians. The latter is an account from Athanasius's own point of view of the events of which he was accused before the Second Exile, the affairs of Arsenius and Ischyros, and other alleged misdeeds, and his relations with Marcellus of Ancyra. We have already referred to Athanasius's relations with the Roman See, and especially its contemporary occupant, Julius, which is the most interesting and important question for the theology of Athanasius.\(^1\) The Apology is liberally supplied with documents, which account for most of the length of the work.

\(^1\) See above, pp. 540-547.
As we have shown above, this is in order the next major anti-
Arian work of Athanasius, and dates from 346 to about 351. (1) The body
of the book is a defence of the Nicene formulae for the Son, especially
the Homoousion, and to a less extent the ἐκ τῆς ζωής τοῦ Πατρός; the
preceding chapters on the right meaning of the Sonship of the Second
Person have this as their proper climax. Appended is a major section
on the Arian term άχενητον that we have already discussed completely
and at length. (2) The authenticity of the work is unquestionable. (3)
The book has a rather more restricted field of subject matter than the
other anti-Arian works, even those of comparable length, there being
fewer excursions into Christology (as Western theology understands it),
or soteriology on a large scale, although it is still important to note
any incidental references to other doctrines. This difference in subject
matter must always be remembered in any critical comparison with the
other anti-Arian writings.

In the original 1857 edition of Migne's Patrologia Graeca,
the group of leaves that should have borne the column numbers 417 to
448 inclusive was mis-paginated 425 to 456 inclusive, with the result
that cols. 417-424 were not there at all, and 449-456 were duplicated,
as the following group was correctly paginated. This error was
corrected in the 1887 edition. In all citations here, the corrected
pagination, and not the erroneous pagination of 1857, has been followed.
The first five chapters need not detain us at all; they are

(1) See above pp. 314-315.
(2) See above pp. 284-308.
(3) So is the date, with the exception that it is usually placed a few
years later.
introductory and historical, and numerous excerpts from them have been cited in the appropriate places. Chapter 3 gives the usual version of the proceedings of Nicaea, ending with a declaration that Acacius, a notorious Arian leader at the time of writing, and episcopal successor to Eusebius of Caesarea, had no business to bask in the glory of his predecessor in view of the latter's acceptance of the Nicene decrees. (4)

The next two chapters, however, deserve more extended citation. With reference to the change of front of Eusebius of Caesarea at Nicaea, Athanasius continues (beginning of Ch. 4): "Are they not then committing a crime even in thinking of gainsaying so great a Council, and an Ecumenical Council too? (5) Do they not commit a transgression in daring to affront the definition rightly made against the Arian heresy and testified even by those who had previously taught them impiety?"

After accusing the Arians of inconstancy, which, says Athanasius, is worthy of secular Greeks and not of Christians, he continues by contrast (4: 421C): ... "For what our Fathers have delivered that is truly doctrine and this is truly the token of Doctors, to confess the same thing as each other, and to vary neither from themselves nor from their fathers. . . . the holy and actual heralds of the Truth agree with each other, and do not differ among themselves. For though they lived in different times, yet they follow the same path as each other, being prophets of the One God, and preaching (εἰς ἑλκίσσοντας τῷ πάθει) the same Word harmoniously. (Ch. 5) And what Moses taught, that Abraham preserved, and what Abraham preserved, that did Noah and Enoch acknowledge . . . . For Abel too witnessed in this way, knowing what he had learned from Adam, who himself had learned from that Lord Who said . . . . "I give no new commandment unto you, but an old commandment which you have heard from the beginning." (6) Wherefore also the blessed Apostle Paul,

(4) Newman, in his note on this passage, should not have deduced from this that Athanasius was writing against the Acacian party, "of whom he does not seem to have had much distinct knowledge."

(5) τῇ ἔργῳ καὶ ὁμοθεμνημένῳ συνοικίᾳ

(6) 1 John 2: 7.
who had learned it from Him, 
... forbade that deacons, let alone bishops, be double-tongued, (7) nay, in his rebuke of the Galatians, declared as a general principle, 'If any one preach any other Gospel to you than that ye have received, let him be anathema, as I have said, and say again. If even ourselves or an angel from heaven preaches to you other than what you have received, let him be anathema.' (8) Since then the Apostle thus speaks, let these men either anathematize the Eusebian clique ... or if they acknowledge that their subscriptions were good, let them not laugh at such a great Council......" The remainder of the chapter deals with their persistence in heresy, leading to the main argument of the book in further refutation. In spite of the prima facie appearance of the first sentence, this passage cannot be cited in support of the Tridentine or even the Lerintian doctrine of Tradition, since the only witnesses to the Tradition cited are the dramatis personae of Scripture. The question is the constancy of the Scriptural witness, and quite literally nothing else. The only part to be played by the later Church is presumably to agree with itself and with Scripture, as the Arians did not. The position of Athanasius, as indicated in this extract, is far closer to the Protestant doctrine of Scripture than to any "Catholic" position. The only position of the latter character that can be found in Athanasius is the conciliarist, which is clear here in the respect that he demands be paid to the Council of Nicaea by reason of its regularity and truly ecumenical character. Unfortunately, perhaps, Athanasius does not indicate the connection between this conciliarism and the supremacy of Scripture, nor does he ever manage to do so. Perhaps it is only Western Church History that has compelled an urgent appreciation of the position.

At this stage, Athanasius begins his attack on Arian theology proper, by quoting the statement that we have cited above to the effect

(7) See 1 Tim. 3: 8; almost "double-thinking" in Orwell's sense.

(8) Gal. 1: 9 and 8 in that order.
that the Son enjoys all His titles indicative of Sonship only improperly, 

καταχρηστικῶς (9) In reply, Athanasius (425B & f.) maintains that there are two senses of the word "Son", the adoptive sense, as in Deut. 13: 18 & 14: 1, which view the Arians appear to accept, and the (biological or natural) sense, "according to which Isaac is the son of Abraham, and Jacob of Isaac, and the Patriarchs of Jacob . . . . If (He is Son) in the first (sense), the way in which people are sons, who βελτιστεύως προτύπω (10) obtain προσωποποιήσαντας (11), and receive the power (12) to become sons of God . . . , then He apparently would not differ from us at all, nor would He be Only-begotten, seeing that He also would have received the award of sonship (13) from His virtue. For even if, as you say, He had been accepted through it having been foreknown that He would be worthy, (14) and had, simultaneously with coming into existence, received the Name and its glory, there would still be no difference between Him and those who receive the name after their activities (προφητεύως) . . . (e.g. Adam, though in Paradise from the first, was no better than Enoch, Paul, or even the penitent thief on the Cross . . .). No further paraphrase is necessary.

Having shown that the Arians would be hard put to establish any difference between the Son and creatures in general, Athanasius considers various ways in which the Arians try to do so. After quoting an Arian argument that we have already cited, that the Son was made by God alone and the rest through the Son, (15) Athanasius replies (428B):

(9) We have quoted this passage in full, above p. 418.
(10) This phrase means quite literally, "progress".
(11) Literally "the grace of the name". Actually, the Name as an act of pure grace (i.e. as distinct from right).
(12) εξουσία: power de jure.
(13) προφητεύως, nominative: the title, "Son", the opposite of καταγωγή, legal or judicial condemnation.
(14) προφητεύως, nom. in apposition with "Son".
(15) Quoted above p. 418.
"... If on account of the toil God was content to make only the Son Himself, but no longer worked when it came to the others, it is impious (ἀπωθαίνεται) to say such things about God ... (Is. 40: 28). Rather is it He Who gives strength to the hungry, and refreshes those who toil, through His Logos. Again, it would be impious to suppose that He disdained to make the creatures that came after the Son, as if it were something menial, for there is no pride (τυφλός) in God ... (here follows a catalogue of His direct actions in the O.T.) ... However, ... 'He made us, and not we ourselves.'(16) He it is Who through His Logos made all things great and small, and we may not divide the creation, so as to say, this is the Father's, this is the Son's, but they are of one God Who uses His proper Logos as a Hand, (17) and in Him does all things ... (Is. 66: 2 & I Cor. 8: 6) ... Thus He, always as now, speaks to the Sun and it rises, and commands (ἐνέλλευσεν) the clouds and it rains upon one place ... and He bids (κελεύει) the Earth to yield its fruits, and fashions Jeremiah in the womb. But if He now does all this, surely at the beginning He did not disdain to make all things through the Logos, for the above are but parts of the whole." This passage largely duplicates the argument of In illud, Omnia mihi tradita sunt, Ch. 1, but at a level of greater complexity. Likewise, the problems of Creatio per Verbum are still evident, more so than ever, as is shown by Athanasius's talk of the Father "using" the Logos, which implies a degree of subordination normally repudiated by Athanasius. The concept of the Logos as the Hand of God is normal in the Fathers, especially Ireæus, Haer. IV praef., where both the Son and Spirit are the two Hands of God, and Hilary, De Trinitate VII: 22. Newman's note on this passage points out that the Hand metaphor implies consubstantiality, but in this case the meaning of the Homoousion would still be primarily in the sense of constitutive unity which is becoming less and less prominent for Athanasius. Athanasius also

(16) Ps. 100 (A.V.): 3.
(17) οὐ χεριὶ χρημενον ἡγεῖται Λογὶ.
emphasises the part played by the speaking of God in creation. This is of course an essential part of the doctrine of creation, since its opposite, which it must exclude, is creatio ex materie, but it is uncertain here how much Athanasius identified this act of speaking with the Logos as the Second Person, since the context indicates that what Athanasius has primarily in mind here is the continuity of God's action in creation. The Arian theology, if both Father and creaturely Son (?) are taken seriously, is a form of Deism, which is being rejected here as un-Scriptural.

In another passage, 8: 429C - 432B, embedded in a later argument, Athanasius returns to this topic, pointing out that what the Arians are claiming for their creaturely Son is really no more than what was the real status of Adam, and points out that Adam enjoys no ultimate superiority, or even distinction, in His relation to God, since God's creative activity is the same with other and later men (Jer. 1: 5, Is. 66: 2 & 44: 2, Ps. 119: 73, Is. 49: 5).

The remainder, the early part, of Ch. 8 deals with the Arian argument that God could not have created the world on His own as the world could not have endured the naked majesty of God; hence, there was a cosmic necessity for a Mediator in nature. (18) This is met by Athanasius by the ἐν Φεleep argument in its classical form, which does not need detailed citation, that is, that another Mediator would be needed to create the Second Person, and so on ad infinitum, so that creation could never start; the alternative would be that even one intermediary is superfluous. Of course the reason for the cogency of this argument was that there were only two types of entity for the Arians, Creator and creature, and there was, as for all true Christians, nothing

(18) Referred to above, p. 355.
intermediate in nature. Athanasius denies the premise that a mediator is necessary in the Arian sense, and of course in doing so he has reopened the question of how Christ is ontologically the Mediator between God and Man, which problem was not finally solved till Chalcedon. He finally clinches the argument, later, in 9: 432 B, by pointing out that, presupposing that Creation is per Verbum, there is simply no evidence that even the Arians can supply, for even a second member of such a series of Mediators.

The next passage from 9: 432B - 10: 433A, is one that we have already cited in full in another context, (19) about the argument that the Son had the supremacy because He participated in God directly \((\text{\textit{\mu}e\textit{\nu}ep\textit{\kappa}\textit{\alpha}\textit{\nu}\textit{\varepsilon}\textit{\iota}+\text{\textit{\gamm}a}\text{\textit{\epsilon}t\textit{\iota}}\text{\textit{\omicron}}+\text{\textit{\epsilon}t\textit{\iota}}\text{\textit{\omicron}}\text{\textit{\eta}}\text{\textit{\omicron}}\text{\textit{\iota}}\text{\textit{\nu}}\text{\textit{\omicron}}\text{\textit{\iota}}\text{\textit{\nu}}})\) in the usual manner of the Platonic Socrates, here and elsewhere), whereas the other creatures rather participated directly in the Son; Athanasius answers by saying that after all, we are God's sons, not the Son's sons, that this does not really differentiate the Son in kind, and when this is recognised, differences in degree really do not matter. This is interesting in that it corresponds to the Final Argument for the Immortality of the Soul in the "Phaedo", (20) where the Platonic Socrates introduces the notion of methexis on methexis, according to which a thing can be hot through participation directly in heat, but also through participation in fire, since fire participates in heat in a peculiarly intimate way, such that, inter alia, the opposite, cold, is absolutely and invariably excluded. Similarly with cold and snow; and the soul is immortal since it excludes death in this way. This is interesting in its own way as the first

(19) See above pp. 367.
(20) Sect. 102-106.
account in the history of philosophy of the middle term, the AAA.

Fig. 1 syllogism, and, from a different point of view, formal causality,
but it is not an argument that the Arians could very well use, since
their whole position would be undercut by it, either by the re-
introduction of a series of gradations between Creator and creature
which might amount to a smooth, infinitely divisible transition, or by
the obliteration of the original distinction. Incidentally, the
Socratic argument has the same effect on the Theory of Forms itself;
it breaks down the rigid dualistic distinction between Forms and
particulars, and thus makes the theory as a whole untenable.

These passages of refutation all have this feature in common,
that they are relatively simple expressions of what we may call the
categorical argument, which in this form means that the Arians cannot
have it both ways; the Son-Logos must be either God or a creature like
the rest of us, if that is the way in which the Arians subdivide
reality. He cannot simultaneously be a creature in exactly the way
as we are creatures, and be cosmologically supreme in any real sense;
conversely, the ascription of any such supremacy would be the ascription
of Deity. In this way, Athanasius turns the Arians' main premise, which
they have in common with all Christians, against them with a vengeance.
Later on, this sort of argument is developed to a much higher level of
complexity.

Having shown that the Arian arguments to the contrary are no
arguments at all, Athanasius gives his conclusion (10: 4330), that "it
remains then to say that it is according to the other idea, whereby
Isaac is son of Abraham, for what is naturally begotten from one and
does not accrue from without, that Nature recognises as a son,(21) and

Newman's note on this passage, beginning, "The force lies in the
word φυγε, naturally, which the Council expressed more definitely
that is what is implied by the term.

But, once this meaning of Son has been accepted, Athanasius is faced with the grave problem of analogy in theological statement. (22) This happens precisely because the process of generation involves almost everything human, and this means the human "passions", which are, to so great an extent, the mark not only of our creaturehood but of our fallen state. There is the sexual passion in which children are begotten. Generation in all higher animals, because it is sexual, requires the co-operation of two members of the species. There are the pains and dangers of childbirth, and the often exhausting demands and anxieties of family life. There are some things which can be done much better with a family, but much that cannot be done, or done well; it is not for nothing that the Roman Catholic Church keeps its priesthood celibate. Above all, family life does leave a person much more vulnerable to the need, for instance, to conform to the world. It is fashionable, and in its way

by the term 'essence'." admits what has been our case, that the main use of ὑποεύθειας has been to describe what is aboriginally true, as distinct from what is true only at a later time, or which becomes true; for a Greek, this would coincide with the difference between what was true by Essence and what becomes true by accident. Unfortunately, the continuation of the note, in which passages from the later Fathers are quoted, "Newman's anxiety to affirm the full privileges of the Christian, blurs owing to the very distinction that Athanasius insisted on drawing, that between the Son by nature and even the best of Christians, who merely becomes a son by adoption, and concerning whom the last thing that Athanasius would say would be that he was a son either in ὑποεύθειας or in ὑποτρόφια.

(22) It is astonishing that the only commentator on Athanasius who has been prepared to allow that Analogy plays an important part in the theology of Athanasius is Atzberger, op. cit. p. 441, and even he, perhaps under the spell of the conditioned reflex that associated the theology of analogy with Thomas Aquinas and Thomism, he had little to say.
correct, to dismiss this line of argument as based on the Greek ideal of the irresponsible aristocrat rather than the Hebrew-Christian idea of man in the image of God as a responsible worker, whether the Greek ideal is the Platonic philosopher-kingship, the Epicurean freedom from bother, or the Stoic perfect equilibrium of emotion in spite of what would most seriously bother lesser men. But there is more in this than we often allow, and in this context it was after all the Word of God, and not a Greek philosopher, who said to womankind that "in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children". Thus, Athanasius would have felt this as a serious problem in three ways, as a Greek intellectual, as a faithful follower of Scripture, and as a representative of the Patristic tradition. He would have felt that even the most restricted meaning of and other words of that group, the meaning which we find in our own expression "passive voice", was unworthy of God, and quite rightly, and therefore that "sonship" could not be predicated univocally of God and man. Commencing immediately at 10: 433B: "Is then the Son's generation one of human affection? By no means; for God is not as man, nor men as God. For men were created of material, and that passible, but God is immaterial and incorporeal. And if the same expressions are present in Holy Writ applied to both God and man ... (we must be careful) I Cor. 2: 15) neither to conceive the things of God humanly, or the things of man as being about God ...

"For God creates, and 'to create' is also applied to men; and God is Existent, and men are also said to be, as they have also received this from God to keep. Yet does God create as men do? Or is He Existent as men are? God forbid! For we take these expressions in one way when applied to God, and quite otherwise when applied to men. For God creates by calling what is not, into being, without needing anything, but men operate on some underlying material, first praying, and then gaining the wit to make from the very God Who formed everything through His own Logos. And again, men,
being incapable of self-existence, are in places and circumscribed (περὶ χύσεων), and their consistence is (συνεστάθεις) in the Logos of God, but God is self-existent, (27) surrounding (περί εἰκαν) everything but being surrounded by nothing; within everything according to His own goodness and power, outside everything according to His own nature (28) . . . so is man's generation in one way, and the Son from the Father in another way. For the offspring of men are in some way members of their begetters, since the very nature of their bodies is not an uncompounded one, (29) but is fluid (ἐφωτιγμένη) and has the character of a synthesis of parts; (30) and again, men excrete (στροφείων) when they beget, and they gain by accretion from the food that they ingest; and by reason of this cause men become fathers of many children as the occasion arises, but God, being without parts (λεγομένη), is Father of the Son without partition or passion, for there is neither effluence (στροφείων) from the Incorporeal nor influx (ἐπηδέον) into Him, as with men. And, being simple (συνεστάθεις) in nature, He is Father of the One Only Son. And this is why He is Only-Begotten, and is, alone, in the bosom of the Father, and the Father declares Him alone to be from Him (Matt. 3: 17 & pls.) . . . And He too is the Father's Logos, from which can be understood the impassible and impartitive nature (31) of the Father, in that not even a human word is begotten with passion or partition, (32) much less that of God. Wherefore also, He sits as Logos at the Father's right hand, for where the Father is, there is His Logos, but we, as things made, stand in judgment before Him; and while He is adored, (παντοκράτωρ) as He is the Son of the Father to be adored, we adore, confessing Him to be Lord and God, since we are creatures and other than He.

(25) οἷς ἐναλήθη ἔκατον παραγόντων ὀφθαλμόν τιθέμενον
(26) τὴν ἑπτὰσατάραν οὖσαν - literally, the "know-how".
(27) οὗτος ἐστιν πᾶς πάθησιν
(28) καὶ εἰς τὰς μὲν ἐκτις κατὰ τὴν ἐκάστοτε δυναμικὴν καὶ ὑπάρξειν, έκ
(29) οὐχ ἐπὶ πάθη πάσιν
(30) εἰς μερῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν
(31) τῆς ὁμογένειας καὶ μεταφυσικῆς
(32) λόγος, ὁ χρυσός τῶν αρχῶν ἐκτις πάσιν καὶ μετεργάτης βεβαιός.
"(Can such a Son be a creature or not eternal?) ... For in this again the generation of the Son exceeds and transcends the thoughts of men, that we become fathers of our own children in time (τοῦ υἱοῦ του·), since we ourselves, being first of all non-existent (οὐκ ὢν τεῖος), next have come to be."

The first subject for consideration is the nature of the analogy involved, from the formal point of view, and it turns out that the doctrine of analogy here presented is about as well developed as any in the history of theology. This has been hardly ever appreciated, but it is really not surprising in view of the Arian misuse of analogy. It is a pure example of what J.F. Anderson calls "analogy of proportionality" the most difficult and involved type of analogy. According to this type of analogy (to take this particular case), it is a comparison between the relationships God the Father Sonship God the Son, and Human Father Sonship Human Son, and the distinctive point is that the difference between God and Man affects not only the terms of the relationship, Father and Son, but also the relationship, Sonship, itself, as a relationship and as a process. This section of

(33) J.F. Anderson, "The Bond of Being," a defence of the Roman Catholic theology against charges such as Barth's on the Analogia Entis. It is, in the main, a commentary on the position of Thomas de Vio Cajetanus as an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, and on the underlying passages in Thomas Aquinas. On his nomenclature, there are three important types of analogy, the Analogy of Inequality, the Analogy of Proportion, and the Analogy of Proportionality. In the first type, the feature in question is present completely in both analogates, but to an unequal degree. Hegelian analogy would be of that type. The second type, for J.F. Anderson, is the common or garden analogy, by which some features are completely in common to both and others completely not in common; where an individual feature which cannot be predicated univocally is discussed, certain sub-features of this feature are either in common or not in common. It is probable that a correct formal doctrine of analogy will include all these elements if it is to be of service theologically, but, as we shall see in the case of Athanasius himself, other elements are necessary, and above all it must be remembered that no doctrine of analogy will enable us to reduce the analogy and eliminate the analogical element from all theological statement. This is an essential corollary to the Mystery of God. Not even the Analogy of Proportionality, which is the nearest approach insofar as such an expression has any meaning, enables us to do this.
the "De Decretis" is the first time that this important form of analogy has been systematically treated in the history of logic, which is another indication of the great change that was forced on theology at this stage. In this form of analogy, both Divine and human sonships are regarded as genuine and acceptable forms of sonship in general, as distinct from the position beforehand, whereby the human sonship was the normal form and the Divine sonship a relatively obscure entity that had to be explained as being different from the former type. However, we shall see that Athanasius finds the analogy of proportionality inadequate, and we see adumbrations even here of a higher doctrine, perfectly developed in the Contra Arianos, in which the common naive position is not only neutralised, but completely reversed. (34)

Analogy of proportionality, as stated above, leaves one problem, and that is, of course, what is the difference between God and man which controls all such internal relationships? The problem is particularly serious, because it appears that even Scriptural terms have to be interpreted analogically. Unfortunately, this is one of the difficult points at which, not surprisingly, the theology of Athanasius is open to attack, since, from this and other extracts it appears that the criterion is something dangerously like, to say the least, the rationalistic concept of the simplicity of God. (35) The point is that, as God is One and absolutely simple, so must the Sonship be an absolutely

(34) See C. Ar. I: 19-21 and below pp. 636-7.
(35) For the Simplicity of God, see above, pp. 61-3. It is interesting to note that Athanasius never pays the Arians the compliment of having believed, however mistakenly, in the Simplicity of the Father, or even indicated that he was turning such a belief against them. This shows again that the Arians were not Patricentric, but, in a way Logocentric.
simple act, unchanging, and numerically one; correspondingly, since men are multiple both extensively and intensively, human generation is essentially a multiplicity of acts which begin, proceed, and end. It is not necessary to accept quite literally all the details of Athanasius's analysis of this situation. In fact, it would be fair to say that it shows too much trace of the rational theism and solitarism that was dominant in the times just previous. And, once we believe that God is One and also that God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we cannot accept, in the rational sense, the "absolute simplicity of God". It is true that Athanasius is emphasising rather the absolute simplicity of the Father and the Son severally as Persons. Also, it is evident that, for him, "God" still tended to be "God the Father", an ambiguity on which moderns have no right to look with any indulgent superiority. (There are arguments for the case that in the Ancient Church the operative word that expressed Deity was, in practice, not $\Theta\iota\omicron\upsilon\alpha\omicron$, but the $\Pi\iota\tau\omicron\sigma\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\nu$ of the various Creeds, and that it was the Arian controversy that forced clarification). On the other hand, as we have pointed out before, the Greek word expressing complexity, $\Sigma\omicron\upsilon\rho\omicron\nu\iota\omicron\tau\omicron$, which is again used here, cannot be used to express genuine Trinitarian complexity because it carries the idea of a conflation of originally quite discrete entities, and the corresponding corollary that such an object could, if not in mechanical fact, then certainly in idea, be dismembered again and the parts treated or considered totally in abstraction as separate entities again. (It is in fact only with God that these do not follow). Again, is it immediately obvious that God, even an absolutely simple God, could only do one such action? If this doctrine of the simplicity of the Divine operation is carried too far, it would make inconceivable any description of God's providential care of the world, or rather of all the creatures in all
their diversity. Even if we (quite rightly) deny that this notion should apply at all to God's gracious dealing with creation and restrict it to the intra-Trinitarian acts that express God's absolute nature, yet there is a big qualification even here, in that the Father not only begets the Son but emits (along with the Son) the Spirit. Now these are, in fact, in one sense different acts and in another sense a unitary act, so that the question of repetition does not arise. But the point is that Athanasius himself, when he comes to deal with the Holy Spirit, has to make this differentiation - and, not surprisingly, by no means succeeds perfectly. But whatever conclusions we reach about the relation between the simplicity and the triplicity of the Triune God, the Doctrine of the Trinity, properly developed, cannot be a severe qualification of the absolute simplicity of God, and in particular much further argument is needed when the Holy Spirit is under discussion. But it is only fair to add that, even from the most modern point of view, there is more in this question of the uniqueness of the Son than the effects of rationalism or the relativistic error into which Athanasius prima facie falls. Macmurray points out that, as far as personal relationship is concerned, that the most typical communities are those with only two members (that is, personal members). (36)

Whatever one may think of applying this sort of analogy to God, there is something not in accordance with the Divine nature in a community consisting of three, the Father and two brothers. A humorist once said that he was convinced that all men were brothers after seeing the way in which brothers fought each other. In fact, it is doubtful whether there is one case in Scripture of two brothers leading active lives

(36) "Conditions of Freedom" Dunning Lectures for 1949. pp. 70 ff.
together in which there did not occur at least one major quarrel. Examples are Cain – Abel, Ham's subjection to Shem and Japheth, Esau – Jacob, Joseph and his brethren, Aaron – Moses (in re Goldcalf, etc.). Jonathan – Ishbosheth (relations with David), Adonijah – Solomon (to say nothing of Absalom), even James and John; although there is no direct statement that they considered themselves rivals, they were both "pushed" by their mother, which makes a fraternal quarrel by no means improbable; Mark 9: 34 may quite likely have been about such a disaster.

We may think what we like about Athanasius's statements about the katabolism, anabolism, and metabolism of men being the reason why they beget a multiplicity of sons; in fact, it might be said that a Being Who begets without partition, fission, or katabolic degeneration would, for that reason, be capable precisely of begetting without limit, since such a procedure could not lead to exhaustion. And it is also questionable how much even the categories of personalist thought can be applied to God. But it is not inappropriate to remark that, whatever we may think of Athanasius's philosophical background, his argument, if it has any force in the first place, does not lose it in a different philosophy. For us, it is at least as unthinkable for God to be involved in the relativities of fraternal differences as it was for the Greeks for God to be involved in the relativities of succession and duplication. The same thing applies to the παρενέργεια or παρενέργητα in which human parents generate their children. Athanasius's reminder on this point has a message for our own day and generation. Perhaps we specially need reminding that, if human sons are characterised by the Oedipus complex, there is surely a corresponding complex in their fathers; some sort of subconscious dread that the child will supplant or otherwise be a threat to him. Psycho-analysts have paid relatively
too much attention to childbirth and childhood as it concerns the 
child, and not nearly enough to these two things as they concern the 
parent. But, in any case, before we look askance at the Greek phobia 
of passions in this connection, let us remember the Oedipus complex, 
its obverse counterpart in the parent, and the virulent ramifications 
of this and other similar passions in all family life. We could think 
too of other similar feelings associated with bearing children, over and 
above the requirements for a gross reproduction rate of one, for 
instance, the feeling, often only too well founded, that the superfluity 
of children are necessary in case the others die off, etc. There will 
be more of these matters when we come to consider the similar but 
distinctly different material of the Contra Arianos. This sort of 
view should not be criticised as reading into a past generation our 
own psychological knowledge. The Hellenists of the fourth century may 
not have had our scientific system, our scientific method, our 
scientific precision, or our scientific self-assurance, but they were 
pungently familiar with all the infidelities, jealousies, and lusts 
that poison human family life, and, even in a matter of details it 
was after all not Freud but Sophocles who first set down Oedipus in 
black and white, and it was not modern Vienna but ancient Athens that 
first feasted upon this legend as if it were the latest revelation of 
ultimate truth. We need make no apology for quoting Freudian 
principles. The fact is that he is almost the first thinker since the 
fourth century to give family life and its categories the prominence, 
in his own system that it must have in an adequate Trinitarian theology. 
It is a shocking reflection on the history of theology that if almost 
any person practises free association with the Trinity as the starting-
point he will instinctively think of mathematics and logic (or para-
mathematics and illogic); his first thought ought to be family life.
The Trinity is the true, the sole, Holy Family. In comparison, other families, as Athanasius said, are generated in passion and schism. Roman Catholic moral theology in particular, when it extols family life, should remember this caveat. All this of course is further exemplification of the sinfulness and brokenness of human life, far more telling than the mere signs of our creatureliness that are usually adduced in this connection, and they can be added to what we have said by way of introduction to this section. Even if he could not have been a Freud, it is better for us to assume that Athanasius would not have been entirely unaware of these matters, especially in view of later developments in his theology.

This passage marks a major stage in the development of the Trinitarian theology of Athanasius, in that at and after this stage the key concept in his systematic and deliberate exposition of the Second Person is "Son". Logos and other concepts tend to explain it and correct the mistaken impressions to which it might give rise. The first result is what appears to be a strengthened denial of the Gnostic or Manichaean idea of emanationism - the δημιουργία - as a doctrine of the origin of the Son. Newman's note on this word is interesting. After citing Exp. Fid 1 and C. Ar. I: 21 as parallel disclaimers, as well as his predecessor Alexander (in Theodoret, Eccl. Hist. I: 3: 743), and his successor, Cyril of Alexandria, Dial. 4: 505E & Thesaur. 6: 43, but he points out that Athanasius quotes, with approval, this very concept (the word in each case is δημιουργία), in the passage from Theognostus quoted in this book, ch. 25: 460C, where it is applied directly to the Son, and in the passage from Dionysius of Alexandria in De Sent. 23: 513B, where it is used of the analogy of the word (in general) as an άνθρωπος of the intelligence. The former is just an incidental quota; in the latter
case, it bears the great part of the burden of the Trinitarian theology proper that is being maintained, Athanasius's own great contribution being in Christology. Thus the extract from Dionysius is more significant. Newman in his note virtually admits that this passage represents some change not only in the theology of Athanasius but in the general theological tradition (as compared, say, with the Logos theology of later Origenism), and this is very much clearer on the dating that we have adopted for the "De Sententiä", as compared with Montfaucon's, whatever we may think of the "Expositio Fidei".

Another feature of the Trinitarian theology should be noticed in conclusion, as it confirms the change in emphasis in Athanasius's theology. Even where he is speaking of the generation of the Son in contrast with the generation of human sons, which are repetitive acts which begin and end, he lays surprisingly little emphasis on the Eternal Generation of the Son, as we meet it in, say, Origen. His emphasis is rather on the eternal co-existence of the Father and Son. This is a sign that the confrontationist type of theology of the Son is beginning but only beginning to replace the earlier emanationist type. (37)

To complete the picture, it must be noted that, in doing all this, Athanasius goes much further in his consideration of the differences between God and the creatures, and we must finally concern ourselves with his account of creaturely reality as distinct from God. This has been adumbrated before in Athanasius, (38) but here, for the first time, it is clearly expressed. This roughly corresponds to what we propose to call the categorial argument, so it is necessary to

(37) Of course, we are using "emanationist" in a different sense from the Manichaean and Gnostic sense condemned by Athanasius. See above pp. 44-U 7.

(38) Cf. C.G. 41, where the context is actually the Logos concept.
indicate the meaning of the word "categorial". We shall use it for what is concerned with the highest level of generality. This applies to, for example, the original sense of the term as used by Aristotle, as he himself shows when he says that the categories are genera of Being. (39) Even though Aristotle has actually repudiated the idea of a summum genus by the arguments like those used by Plato in Part II of the "Parmenides", and repeated later in the "Sophist", this statement is really significant, if it means that Categories are features which a thing has in virtue of its mere existence, and are thus differentiated from terms in the logical sense, which lack that universality. The same may be said of those Supreme Forms, \( \mu \varepsilon \gamma \iota \varepsilon \kappa \nu \tau \), of the "Sophist", which have the character of blending with everything, like sameness, difference, unity, etc.; in fact, in this Dialogue, Plato is really giving the first account of categories. Again, all the things (?) discussed in Hegel's Logic are really categories, since they are developments of Being itself. The author, incidentally, disagrees with the present Oxford Linguistic use of the term "category mistake", although the concept is a most useful one. "Saturday is in bed", is not a category mistake, however ridiculous it sounds, since it is a false statement the falsehood of which depends on, and can be proved inter alia from, the ordinary E proposition that no astronomical phenomena are personal; a mystic poet or astrologer who hypostasised days could actually make sense of it. On the other hand, "Goes is in bed" is a true category mistake, since "goes" is, on one view anyway, a combined logical copula and predicate. "The Absolute has a cold" would probably be a genuine category mistake too, if it is believed.

(39) Cf. for the following, Plato, "Parmenides" 135-166. "Sophist" 241 ff. and Aristotle Metaphysics B (Book III) 998B and H (Book VIII) 1045B for similar arguments. For \( \mu \varepsilon \gamma \iota \varepsilon \kappa \nu \tau \), see "Sophist" 253-6, Aristotelian categories as genera of being. Met. (Bk. V) 1017a.
that the highest level of generality cannot be a constitutive entity.

The difference between categorial arguments in philosophy and in theology is due to the fact that there is an absolutely significant gap between God and all creaturely reality, so that there is no level of generality which includes God and creatures and which transcends the difference. Thus, the thing that is truly categorial is the categorial argument, in the sense in which we are using the expression now. This is what Athanasius said in so many words when he said that God even exists (ὡς εἰκὼν, etc) in a different way from creaturely existence. This is actually a repudiation of all natural theology in the familiar sense, although Athanasius still accepts it, and also of the doctrine and practice of analogia entis, which Athanasius later repudiates properly. God, without being any the less personal, is simple and indivisible, as we have seen above, and is also absolutely omnipresent in presence even if absolutely distinct by nature. Newman, in his notes on Ch. 11, did not need to point out that this last doctrine, while being - as it actually is - the same as in the De Incarnatione ch. 17, contrasts with the more normal Patristic doctrine that God is everywhere substantially as well as in other ways. Athanasius is not denying this; what from the general point of view, including our own, Athanasius is denying is that God has a frontier, in the ordinary popular sense, that there is any region, class, or constitutive entity of which God is a member, and that God has, in the modern scientific sense, an environment which is on equal or superior terms to Him. Correspondingly, the statement that God is outside everything according to His nature excludes, not God's universal presence, even substantial universal presence, but pantheism. To complete the picture, God, as distinct from man, has the power of creatio ex nihilo, whereas man is dependent on pre-existent material, and the human act
analagous to creation is a long, laborious and complex act in which the dependence of man on what is outside himself, not least on God, is evident at every stage. Athanasius emphasises this part of the argument, because it is one thing that the Arians did understand, ostensibly at any rate, as is shown by their descriptions of the "creatureliness" of the Son; they knew very well that God's creation was creatio ex nihilo, as distinct from man's, and if they were aware of the difference here, they should have been aware of the difference in other ways.

On the other hand, creatures are essentially complex, in the most pejorative sense that is known to Athanasius, as a Greek. They have a frontier, a limit, an environment with which they interact, now with mastery, now in subordination. They have a definite place which they occupy, and nowhere else. Their very existence is not secure, and they are dependent on each other, and supremely on God. They interchange with their environments, and have to replace losses. Above all, they are complex in the sense of being divisible, and are inconstant and subject to change. These differences are in a sense due to the difference in the very mode of existence of creatures itself, which is secondary to God's own mode of existence. It is almost as if Athanasius, when he says that all these differences follow from the difference in being, implies that these two sets of characteristics can be proved ontologically. Whatever one may think of this way of describing the matter, it has certainly the point in its favour that no other statement can be general enough to indicate the full scope of the differentiation. Although the material here expounded is only used for a proof of the difference between God and man, and not for the full categorial argument as it is met later in,
say, C. Ar. II: 18-30, it is the material for such an argument, and, although it looks strange to see the statement that, because men are essentially complex etc., therefore they must in principle beget many sons and a succession of sons, this sort of reasoning is more inevitable and cogent than appears at first sight. (40)

(40) The author is irresistibly struck by the resemblance between what Athanasius presents as the truth of all creaturely life per se, and the radical pluralism of his Professor of Philosophy in Sydney, the late John Anderson. Professor Anderson, a Clydesider in origin, was a philosophical atheist, and his atheism was the most cogent that the author has ever experienced as a system; indeed, since leaving Sydney he has not come into any contact with any philosophy that gives him the unmistakeable feeling that it can refute this atheistic system, whether on its own premises or on any theory of the nature of philosophy which is based on its supremacy. He differs radically from the positivists and linguists in allowing a place, in fact the supreme place, for metaphysics and the metaphysical system, but does not allow that metaphysics proves the existence of any metaphysical entities, specifically the God of natural theology, and the supreme constitutive unities of Hegel and Marx - he criticised Marxism for what it has in common with a religion, both in theory and in practice. In fact, it is the positive function of metaphysics to disprove the existence of such entities - a positive and not a sceptical conclusion. The thing that metaphysics proves, at the highest level of generality, is logic and the whole system of logical relations. John Anderson has the same relation to Hegel (or Bradley, who is simply Parmenides all over again) as the Eleatic Stranger in Plato's "Sophist" has to Parmenides and the Eleatic School. If one wished to remain closer to Hegel, John Anderson's system is what would result if the transition from Necessity to Freedom in, respectively, the end of the Second part and the beginning of the Third Part of Hegel's Logic was invalid; - and it is only valid on the assumption that every stage in the Logic is referring to a Parmenidean One Thing at a higher level of complexity - and the categories of Part III, like the syllogism, where they were admissible at all, were deduced from the first two parts. Perhaps an even closer correspondence would be with the Kantian Antitheses of the Antinomies of Pure Reason, in the "Critique of Pure Reason."

For Professor Anderson, since Being is the highest level of generality, and is a relation and not a constitutive or substantial entity, it is really the logical copula and all the logical relations connected therewith. Therefore, all things exist in a way corresponding to the proposition in logic. That is, all things are members of a class. There is only one way of being, and there are no ultimate entities, whether ultimately big or ultimately small. Therefore, all things have an environment and an inside, which is itself complex, infinitely complex. No thing can be exhaustive, that is, every genuine term has a genuine logical opposite, a logical opposite with a real extension. Everything in principle interacts with its
As we have seen above, the analogy of proportionality, as environment and its internal environment as well, and is in a relation of dependence on or reciprocity with the environment. Reality is dynamic, that is, everything can be expected to change as it interacts with the other things. Finally, no thing has any ultimate superiority over anything else, in spite of what we take to be such relations. The great principles in which this system culminates are: universal (but not holistic!) determinism, atheism, and the universality of "inquiry", which is the epistemic form of what we have been describing as ontology; in fact, he suggests that the reason for postulating ultimate entities in any form is to act as a barrier to inquiry.

The author has been much impressed by this system, and the reader will have noticed many signs of his indebtedness to it. In fact, he is quite convinced that it is the systematic form of the atheism of the scientist, and that everything that the atheistic logical positivist or linguistic analyst wants to say can be said much better and more convincingly by Professor Anderson. It is a great misfortune that, for various reasons, his system has never been presented to the wider world as a whole. (The recent posthumous collection of his journal articles, "Studies in Empirical Philosophy," Sydney, 1962, does not meet this need.) In view of all this, the author was astounded to find virtually the entire Andersonian doctrine in Athanasius, not, of course, as the general truth, but as the truth about creaturely existence as opposed to God, and it is expressed far more lucidly in Athanasius than in any other writer of any age, language, and tradition! And the great majority of the material is where we should expect it, in C. Ar. II: 18-82, where Athanasius is attacking the idea that there can be any creature that can be ultimately supreme over the rest, even as John Anderson, though gratefully accepting the atheism of Marx (and learning from his account of the mendacious principle) nevertheless attacked him for remaining a Monist.

The reason why this sort of position has produced atheism should be evident by now; it is the principle of the supremacy of philosophy, or, in other words, that there is a real highest level of generality that includes both God and the creatures. And this is exactly what Athanasius, with his unerring instinct on these matters, says. His statement that God and creatures do not exist in the same way is simply a denial in advance of any such common "bond of being". This is also the ultimate significance of the Barthian position denying natural theology, analogia entis, etc. Athanasius does not deny natural theology in the Barthian sense, but it is fair to say that, since the results of this natural theology went the whole distance in Marx and the rest, and did not stop half way, as in Arianism, he would have had a far clearer warning, however dubious his interpretation of Marxism, that the whole tradition of natural theology that reached its apotheosis in Hegel must ultimately reduce not only the Logos but God as a whole to the level of the creature.

P.S. - Professor Anderson was a classicist in general outlook (as utilitarianism was a violation of his conviction that truth is absolute and not relative), and he believed that the best and clearest examples of philosophical problems were supplied by the classical Greek philosophy,
used by Athanasius, leaves a real problem, of the nature of the
difference which controls the distinction in the analogy, and we have
suggested that, as analogy is involved in the interpretation of
Scripture, the problem is particularly serious here. Perhaps Athanasius
feels himself that the obvious solution, as we have expounded it, is
too rationalistic, and immediately sets out to see if there is not a
better solution, of a more Scriptural character. Thus, Athanasius
turns his attention to exegesis, at first on the Trinitarian question
proper, but later on a more diffuse range of topics. To confirm that
the Son exists eternally, Athanasius now quotes Scriptural analogies:
"the sacred writers have given us a certain image from things seen"
(οἱ δὲ τινὶ διδωκαίων ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν, 12: 4360); the
passages concerned are Heb. 1: 3 (εἰκόνα τινα διδώκας ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν, 12: 4360)
Ps. 36 ¶ 9, Baruch 3: 12 (Fountain of Wisdom), Jer. 2: 13 (Fountain of
living waters). "And mean (οὐκ ὁδοῖ) indeed and very dim (ἀνωτέρω) is this
illustration compared with that with which we are concerned, but yet it
is possible to understand something above man's nature (ὑπερβολῶ), instead
of thinking that the generation of the Son is the equivalent of ours.
For who can even imagine that the Radiance was ever not, so that he
should dare to say that the Son was not always (41) or that the Son was
not before His generation? or who is capable of separating the Radiance
from the Sun or to conceive the fountain as ever barren of life? (42)
that he should madly say that the Son is ἔσται ὁ δόξη τῶν ἔρημων, Who says, "I am
the Life," or alien to the Father's essence (43) Who says, "He that
hath seen Me hath seen the Father,"? . . . . it is (ἐπιφανῆς) absurd and

(40) the Pre-Socratics and Plato rather than Aristotle. The author
thankfully acknowledges the helpfulness to his thesis of his
emphasis on this period in his lectures and courses.

(41) οὐκ ὁδοῖ
(42) ἔσται ὁ δόξη τῶν ἔρημων;
(43) ἐπιφανῆς, ἐπιφανῆς οὕτως.
impious (διαβολικός), when Scripture contains such images, to conceive about the Lord from other images which are neither in Scripture nor have any religious bearing." (44) This extract is an anticipation of the section from Ch. 15 onwards, in which the relationship between the Sonship of the Son and the other metaphors that describe Him, and will be discussed at the appropriate stage. In the last sentence, there is brought up again the question of the criterion of correct theological thought, which is denoted again as piety, ἐν ἔπαθε, but not further described in detail.

At this stage, Athanasius says, the Arians have to bring out their apparent trump card, Prov. 8: 22. "... (but this passage) has a religious and very orthodox sense (45) ... For what man of right understanding does not perceive, that what is made and created is external to the maker, but the Son, as the argument indicated above, exists not externally, but from the Father that begat Him, for man too creates (Κτίσει) a house but begets (γεννᾷ) a son, and no one would put it in the reverse way and say that the house or the ship was begotten (γεννᾷ) by their builder and that the son was created and made (Κτίσει) by him; nor again that the house was an image of its creator but the son was unlike his begetter, but rather will he confess that the Son is an image of the father, but the house is a work of art (46) ... (Contrast Gen. 1: 1 with Ps. 110: 4 & Ps. 2: 7 and Prov. 8: 25; and John 1: 3a with John 1: 18) ... If then son, not creature, if creature then not son; for great is the difference between them, and son (γενς) and creature (Κτίσμα) cannot be the same unless His essence be considered at once from God and external to Him."

In these preliminary remarks, Athanasius prima facie flies in the face of the wording of Prov. 8: 22, LXX, which is favourable to Arianism, on grounds which appear at first sight to be either an
inadequate appreciation of the real difficulties of harmonising Scripture, or a plain refusal to face facts. Because, on a priori grounds, the exegesis of the Arians cannot be true, therefore it is not true; this will be recognised by any scientist as the most pernicious and inadmissible attitude possible. However, we cannot discuss it here yet, but will postpone it till the consideration of C. Ar. II: 18-82, where Athanasius, speaking at much greater length, makes a far more convincing show on an extremely difficult problem. It is more pleasing to note that Athanasius here makes the very simple but very sound point, that the Arians ought to have understood but wantonly refused to, that there is a fundamental difference between making a thing and begetting it, and that no one in ordinary speech would describe a piece of furniture that he made as his son in the same way as the word would apply to the member of his family.

Having rejected the tempting Arian exegesis as impossible, Athanasius faces the question of what is the real one, and adopts the line which he first elaborated in the "De Sententia," that all passages like Prov. 8: 22 LXX, which appear to speak of Christ as a creature, refer to the Incarnation. In the rest of the chapter, the Incarnation is treated soteriologically along the lines of the "De Incarnatione Verbi Dei." (440B) "... wishing to annul our death, He took to Himself a body from the Virgin Mary, that, by offering (προσφοράς ὑπὲρ οὐκ ἔργου) this to the Father as a sacrifice on behalf of all (47), He might deliver us all, who by fear of death were all our life subjected to bondage. That person (προσφοράς ὑπὲρ οὐκ ἔργου) is that of the Saviour but it was said when afterwards He spoke after taking the body, 'The Lord created me as a beginning of His ways unto the works.' For as to be everlasting (48) and to be in the

(47) ἐπεὶ θέλησε ἑαυτῷ ἔργον σωτηρίαν ἐπιτάγνωσιν
(48) ἐπεὶ θέλησε ἑαυτῷ ἔργον σωτηρίαν
Father's bosom is perfectly consistent with the Son, as He is Son of God, so when He became man the statement fitted Him, 'The Lord created Me.' For then it is said of Him that He hungered, that He thirsted, and asked where Lazarus lay, and suffered and rose again. And as, when we hear of Him as Lord and God and True Light, we understand Him as being from the Father, so, on hearing the "He created" and the "servant" and the "suffered", we should not ascribe them to the Deity — for it would be a different sphere — but we must interpret these by the flesh that He bore for our sake, for to it these things are proper and this flesh was nobody else's but that of the Logos... The Logos became flesh in order to offer up this body on behalf of all, and in order that we partaking of His Spirit, might be deified, which could not have befallen us had not He clothed Himself in our creaturely body, for thus is the derivation of our title Men of God, and Men in Christ. But as we, receiving the Spirit, do not lose our proper essence, so the Lord, when He became man for us and bore the body, was no less God; for He was not lessened by the envelopment of the body, but rather deified it and rendered it immortal."

This account, except in one respect, is substantially a repetition of the soteriology of the 'De Incarnations', and shows as yet very little change. Unfortunately, the reference to the flesh (or, perhaps, the act of taking it on) by the word το τρείστομης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, cannot be reconciled on any interpretation with the Chalcedonian Christology in its perfect development. In chapter 22, beg., Athanasius uses the operative word το τρείστομης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, in a way which apparently, though not quite certainly, indicates that it referred to that complex of more incidental qualities and even non-detachable accidents which do not figure in the

(49) το τρείστομης... τον
(50) εἰς τὸ τρείστομης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
(51) εἰς κατάστασιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐφράζομαι
(52) το τρείστομης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.
Essence of the thing, and on this basis it might be maintained that in referring to the body of the Incarnate Christ as His τὰ ἐπίκειται, Athanasius was referring to the Human Ἰπερηφανία of Christ in the Chalcedonian sense. But he says in the same chapter 22 that it is an insult to suppose that God Himself has any such thing as a τὰ ἐπίκειται. Hence, Athanasius cannot be supposed to be talking about the Chalcedonian Human Ἰπερηφανία except on a hypothesis which would mean that he denied the Chalcedonian Divine Ἰπερηφανία. (The Point has been already discussed above). The thought of Athanasius is still closer to what later became Apollinarianism than to the later Chalcedonianism. The important advance on the earlier formulations is that, for the first time, we find a reference to the part played by the Holy Spirit in human sanctification and deification. This is in fact the first free reference in the writings of Athanasius to the Third Person. Even this is not altogether certain; the context of the reference, at the very end of the chapter, and the antithetical contrast and correspondence between our partaking of the "Spirit" as fleshly creatures and Christ taking flesh though He is God, indicates perhaps that τὰ ἐπίκειται may be no more than the Divine nature as a whole and our partaking of τὸ ἐπίκειται Ἰπερηφανία Ἰπερηφανία (i.e. of Christ) may not be saying much more than the ordinary statement that we are "deified" (ὅτι ἐν οἷς ἔχωμεν), as it is as Christ's deity that we partake of God at all. But even this verbal change is of interest, in spite of the uncertainties of interpretation. Opitz points out, quite rightly, that this is the first time that the part played by the Spirit in deification is mentioned.

The next section is entitled by Newman, "Proof of the Catholic sense of the word 'Son'." It is primarily concerned with the relation of the title "Son" to the other titles and metaphors by which the Second Person is described in Scripture. Here and in the
Contra Arianos, it is quite true, as Newman said in a most important observation that he repeats passim, that Athanasius uses these metaphors to correct each other, and to supply what the other lacks. "... We have learnt from Divine Scripture that the Son of God ... is also the very Logos and Wisdom of the Father ... (1 Cor. 1: 24, John 1: 14), so that the Logos being the only-begotten Son — in this Logos and in Wisdom, heaven and earth and all that is therein were made. And we have learnt from Baruch ... that God is the fountain of this Wisdom (IF the Arians deny these, the conclusion follows) ... that God was once wordless and wisdomless (53) ... (and) ... that the Fountain begat not Wisdom from itself (54) but has acquired it from without, ... whence it would follow that there is no longer a fountain but a sort of pool, as if it received water from without, usurping the title of fountain.

"How full of irreligion (λειτουργία) this is ... (is obvious) ... But since they mutter something about Logos and Wisdom being only names of the Son, we must ask them then, if these are only names for the Son, He must then be something else besides them. And if He is better (μεγαλύτερος) than the names, it is not lawful to denote the Better by the less, but if He is less than the names, He would have to have in Him also the ground for the more honourable appellation (55) which is just as great an irreligion (λειτουργία) as any above. For ... (in view of John 10: 30 etc. — 14: 9 & 10) ... it is the height of madness to say that He has been exalted by anything external." This interesting little digression shows quite clearly that Athanasius could see behind the Arian theology the novel principle of radical progress of an evolutionary character, although as yet he has no means of expressing it; he is much clearer on this sort of thing in the "Contra Arianos". Here, however, he appears to confuse true internally directed progress with improvement under external stimulus. The reason, of course, is that evolutionary progress in the optimistic sense was a complete novelty then. The

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(53) λειτουργία καὶ ἐσπαράκλησις ἡ ἀνάπτυξις Πνεύματος.

(54) λειτουργία ἡ ἀνάπτυξις Πνεύματος ἡ ἀνάπτυξις Πνεύματος.

(55) λειτουργία ἡ ἀνάπτυξις Πνεύματος ἡ ἀνάπτυξις Πνεύματος.
Greeks never thought along these lines; their philosophical interest was in what remains constant, as the permanent substrate of all change, and any deviations from this were in the direction of cyclic or even pessimistic thought and feeling rather than progressivism. Neither Heraclitus nor the Athenian relativists were particularly optimistic, the Platonic Socrates, in "Meno," did show some sign of this with his idea of latent knowledge being progressively elicited, but his idealist emphasis on the "forms" and their quasi-personal supremacy even over persons aborted any progressivist deductions from the Doctrine of Reminiscence. Aristotle was interested, in a relatively neutral way, in biological generation and growth, which always ended in senescence and death. Lucretius, in "De Rerum Natura", approached the modern doctrine of evolution, without its optimistic overtones, Stoical doctrines of cosmic development, the ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν etc., were cyclic, while the pessimism of Plato in "Republic," Books IX and X is well known; what he might have called (but did not) the Logos of the State was perfect in the beginning, and the only thing that could happen to it as a result of its real activities and manifestations was a deterioration that was ultimately complete. Athanasius, as his attempts to argue the point show, simply could not conceive how a creature could be improved except under what was essentially an external influence; in this regard he resembled all Greeks, at any rate in their explicit philosophy, and all orthodox Christians and Scripture. This principle may have been a latent danger in Greek thought, but its idealism, as we have said, was a brake to its uninhibited expression. This was the case even, to a certain extent, with Hegel. It took what might be called the left-wing side of Hegel, along with his anti-idealist and materialist successors, the Marxists, Darwinians, and others, to give evolutionary optimistic continuity its definitive expression. Their very materialism made this
principle more seductively prominent in their teaching. And, unless we are mistaken, it was the very idealistic over-emphasis on the state of creatureliness that enabled the Arians to give the first hints of a doctrine of radical progress in the creature.

Athanasius continues; now that their designations of the Son are really self-contradictory, the Arians are reduced to another argument, attributed first to Arius, (444A) "Many words speaketh God; which then are we to call Son and Logos – only-begotten of the Father? . . . . First, in speaking thus about God, they almost take God to be a man, speaking and reversing His first by His second words (λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ), as if one Logos from God were not sufficient for all creation at the Father's will, and for His providential care of it. For His speaking many words would argue some weakness in all of them, with each needing something to be supplied from the other. But the fact that God used one Word (56) . . . . both shows the power of God, the perfection of the Logos that is from Him and the religious understanding (57) of those who believe thus.

" . . . . if they once grant that God produces words, they would know that He was Father, and, . . . . let them consider that, while they are unwilling to grant one Word of God, they imagine Him to be father of many; and while they are unwilling to deny that there is actually a Logos of God, they do not confess that it is the actual Son of God. . . . . For if God is the Father of a Logos at all, wherefore is not He that is begotten a Son? And again, Who would be Son of God but His Logos? For there are not many words (πολλαί ὁ θεός) or each would be imperfect; but one is the Logos that He only, may be perfect, and because God being One, it is necessary that His Image also be one, that is the Son. For the Son of God, as may be learnt from the Divine Oracles themselves, is Himself the Logos of God, and the Wisdom (σοφία), and the Image (εἰκόνα) and the Hands (προδρόμου) and the Power (δύναμις). For the Offspring (οις γενομένοις) of the Father is One, and these are tokens of His generation from the Father. For if you say Son, you have declared

(56) τὸ δὲ θεός λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν Ἐορτάσαν
(57) ἢ ἑκάστη ἔκτεταρτη οὖσα εἰκόνα
what is from him by nature (τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνωτέρω ἀντικείμενον); if you think of the Logos, you are thinking of again what is from Him and what is inseparable. (58) And, speaking of Wisdom, you mean no less what is not from without, but from Him; and in Him; and if you name Power and Hand, you again say what is proper to the essence and in speaking of the Image, you signify the Son, for what can be like (ἐν οἷς) God but the Offspring from Him? Surely whatever be through the Logos are also founded in Wisdom (59), and all these have been made by (ἐν) the Hand and have come to be through the Son . . . . (As proof of the personal identity of the Son, Logos, Wisdom, Power, Hand, Athanasius takes together Is. 48: 13, Is. 51: 16, Ps. 104: 24, Prov. 3: 19, John 1: 1-3, Heb. 1: 1-2, I Cor. 8: 6, Col. 1: 12-17.) . . . For all things are created by the Logos, so, because He is the Image so are they also created in Him . . . . (60)

The first thing to be noticed about this section is that, in the words of Newman, (notes to ch. 17): "All the titles of the Son of God are consistent with each other, and variously represent one and the same Person. 'Son' and 'Word' denote His derivation; 'Word' and 'Image' His similitude; 'Word' and 'Wisdom' His immateriality; 'Wisdom' and 'Hand' His co-existence . . . ." (See notes to ch. 24: "The point in which perhaps all the ancient heresies concerning our Lord's Divine nature agreed, was in considering His different titles to be those of different beings or subjects, or not really or properly to belong to one and the same person; . . . .") This is completely true, but some expansion and clarification needs to be made. Firstly, it is even more important to notice that all these titles refer to the same Person in the same aspect and at the same stage. Such heretics as Paul of Samosata, perhaps, and Marcellus of Ancyra, certainly, would have been

(58) τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνωτέρων ἀντικείμενον
(59) ἐν οἷς ἐν οἷς
(60) εἰς ἀρχῆς ἀνωτέρων, ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἐγόνοις, ἐν ὁμοιότητι
quite capable of plausibly arguing that "Word" and "Son" referred to numerically the same Person in their systems, even though the former title referred to the Pre-Incarnate Christ and the latter to the Post-Incarnate Christ. We have already remarked on the same tendency in the De Incarnatione Verbi Dei. This is finished now; all these titles are presented as aspects of the one thing; the eternal Sonship of the Second Person, or rather, the Second Person as eternally Son of God. There is now no tendency to use one title of the pre-Incarnate Son and another of the post-Incarnate Son. However, all titles used, except, significantly Son and Image, had originally a cosmological reference, which comes out in the handling of the Scriptural evidence in ch. 17. For various reasons it would have been impossible at the time to say the same thing about the titles that represent Christ's saving work, but at the end of C. Ar. II, Athanasius does make a beginning of doing even that. When we have noticed this, we can see another even more important feature, that all these terms have their correlates in God and in God alone in the strictest sense. This applies especially to the title Logos, where this represents a most significant change. Already (15, 449B) we find, for the first time, the important argument that for the Arians to say that there was once when (he) was not, when '(he)' is the Logos and Wisdom of God, is to say that God was once and wisdomless. Logos and wisdom are regarded now as being essentially God's. This cannot be fully discussed at this stage, until (in C. Ar.) Athanasius finally treats of the doctrine of Arius and Asterius of the anhypostatic wisdom of God; it is as if only at that somewhat later stage did he fully understand the significance of this change in his theology. But it can be said already that the whole atmosphere of natural theology prevailing in the Contra Gentes would have been meaningless, if not dangerous, for the later Athanasius. The Logos is no longer something that we deduce from the
order of the world, whose essential correlate is the world, and which can be said to be the Logos of God only in the sense in which creation itself is "of God" or "God's", which conclusion the Arians drew with alacrity; it (or rather He) is now treated as the Logos of God in the most absolute and serious sense possible, as to do, just as much as anything can be, with the holy, mysterious and eternal Godhead.

Having considered the formal significance of the titles of Christ, let us consider their material significance and the part that it plays in his argument. Incidentally it may be mentioned at the outset that, owing to the extremely rigorous typological and allegorical exegesis of the Alexandrian school, the whole discussion was far more serious as between Athanasius and Arius than it would have been in the background of other exegetical traditions. Every reference to God's creating "through the word" (whether ὄνομα or ἡμίονον in Scripture) would have to be a direct reference to the Second Person, where a more lax exegesis would simply regard some of them as referring to creatio ex nihilo as distinct from the manipulation of pre-existent materiae. Similarly with all the references to "wisdom", "power", "Hand", etc. This is even more important to remember in connection with aspects of this question that we have deferred to the Contra Arianos. However this may be, for Athanasius the terms in question were beyond question applicable to Christ, in the most direct way possible. We have already seen how Newman regards all these metaphors as correcting each other. This would be partially true of ch. 17, where the relation between them all is summarised, but in some ways it would be more accurate to say that each analogy confirms the perfection of all the others, and it would be even more accurate to say that in each case the other analogies confirm that the analogy in question is one of proportionality, in the sense described above.
For Athanasius, "Son" means a Being Who is from the Father by natural generation (natural, that is, for the being of God), as distinct from being manufactured, by some act directed ad extra, or, worse still, a being resulting from external constraint. Here we come to the most serious defect in Athanasius, and in Greek theology in general; the defect that critics ought to attack when they attack Greek "physicalism". There is no mention, either here or in the remainder of Athanasius, of love as a constitutive factor in the notion of Fatherhood and Sonship. This is the greatest contrast, too, with Augustine, the greatest early Latin theologian, in spite of his occasional equivocations in favour of the idea of self-love. This is why we always consider a Logos theology as inferior to a Son theology; a person may be "father" of a Logos in any of its senses, but nobody has ever spoken of a person as having, in any normal meaning, love for such a Logos. (62) This is the reason for the general Greek tendency to assimilate the two metaphors, which we see reflected at the beginning of ch. 17, with a revival of the notion of a person as the "begetter" of his words. As we shall see, this safeguards theology from certain risks that may attend on the Logos doctrine in some of its phases, and we have already seen that Athanasius's relative lack of interest in the process of generation of the Son, his treatment of the Sonship, in Newman's words, as an "eternal unchangeable fact" as distinct from an "act", (63) marks a considerable advance in the direction of making the "Son" concept normative. But the fact that Athanasius, when not dealing specially with the "Son" concept, is so strongly interested in

(62) Athanasius's repeated emphasis on the \( \Phi \) of God does not contradict this conclusion, since the word obviously refers primarily to an opus ad extra Trinitatis.

(63) See notes on C. Ar. I: 14.
assimilating a person's fatherhood of his son and of his logos, is a sign that he is still essentially a Logos theologian rather than a Son theologian. Of a piece with this is his tendency to use the word of the Son as related to the Father, an organic word which would be an insult in the mouth of even an earthly father if used to address his own son (Basil said just this against Eunomius's use of this word for the Son, c. Eun. II: 6-8. Newman, notes to De Decr. 21, approves of Basil's objection to the use of and virtually allows its force against Athanasius, who commonly describes the Son in this way). Now, what meaning does he apply to Logos? We learn from this title primarily and in short, says Athanasius, that the Son is from the Father and inseparable from Him; in ch. 11: 4413, he has already said that we also learn from the title Logos the impassibility and indivisibility of God, since not even a human word is begotten . Now that Athanasius has brought in the general or human concept of word, it is fair to conduct the argument on this basis. When we do so, we see that, on the ordinary meaning of "word", Athanasius's claim is unfortunately just not true. Admittedly, all words, even human ones, are in some sense immaterial, and we can all learn the immateriality of the Son from the title Logos. But, although the early Platonism of Athanasius may have made him tend to accept this proposition uncritically, the rest of what he is interested in, the impassibility and impartitiveness of the Divine generation, simply does not follow at once from its immateriality, in the sense that even human words are immaterial. In the first place, a word or logos in its ordinary meaning must be about some thing; so the metaphysical features of the realm of words would be determined by and express the corresponding features of the realm of things. This is not just modern philosophy; it was the explicit fundamental principle of Parmenides, and almost certainly implicit in
the later logic of Plato (in the dialogues such as the "Sophist") and in Aristotle. Thus it is the normal thing rather than the exception for human words to be multiple, to have in an important sense multiplicity of essence, to be undoubtedly generated (unless one seriously accepts the theory of Reality of Bradley, or Parmenides himself), and also to be generated in the sense that they are determined primarily by the object about which discourse is taking place. This criticism does not apply to the word in the sense of existential personal communication, which theologians of the type of Karl Heim have developed and treated as the normative concept in the understanding of Christ, but there is just as serious a criticism to be made. The word of existential communication, spoken by a personal being, is always spoken at and with another personal being, and is thus also always relative to another, unless it is reflexive to the speaker; thus, to make this concept of Word fundamental in an account of the Second Person (especially as there is normally not a definite doctrine of the Third Person in such theologies, and as the Spirit is in any case not adapted, as normally understood, to supplying the deficiencies in this approach) means that either the Father is solipsistic and reflexive, or that the theology is ultimately committed to Hegelianism, since it would mean bringing the Other into the essence of the Godhead, and the only other can be creation; or, of course, both these stages can be thought as existing consecutively, before and after creation (which would almost pointedly resemble the doctrine of Marcellus of Ancyra). What is even worse, we have the evidence of the human words which simply express a man's public position, say, as distinct from his being as a whole, threats or promises, etc., uttered under a strong temporary emotion or the influence of illness or drugs, and withdrawn or
regretted later; worse still, there are confessions or retractions made under torture or other overwhelming external pressure - it would not matter much whether they were withdrawn or not; worst of all, men do commonly tell half-truths or even outright lies. Men in all generations, including most emphatically Athanasius's, have been only too familiar with all these groups of words, and if there is one thing that can be said about them it is that they are generated in the exact sense in which Athanasius used this phrase, in spite of his denial of its application to human words. We are not deducing from this criticism that "Word" cannot be a title for the Second Person, since all theological description is necessarily analogical, especially, in the sense of the analogy of proportionality. But what is the case is that in its usual meaning the concept "Word" has to be treated analogically in the same way in which that of "Son" must be treated, indeed as Athanasius did, and for exactly the same reason. In fact, there is just as much and the same negative component in the "Word" analogy, taken in this sense, as in the "Son" analogy, there may be more, since the gravest aspect of sinful man is that he is radically a liar. Athanasius actually understands this perfectly well, as is shown by his repeated warnings against importing into theology notions of the multiplicity and inconsistency of human words, and in fact he does insist precisely that the Word concept must be treated analogically, as the "Son" concept must be. Thus it is highly probable that the point of using the Logos concept as a corrective of or an aid to the Son concept comes from an importation into "Logos", in spite of the above, of something like its metaphysical meaning, the metaphysical or at least the practical Reason. This is something which, besides being immaterial, is essentially one, only one, and indivisible. Also, as the Greeks understood it, it had a position
of logical supremacy over all things. Indeed, strictly speaking, it would be supreme, as the Logos of God, over God Himself, Who expressed it. The logos of a thing was always understood to be more fundamental than the thing itself. Of course, the idea of the Father as the "begetter" of the Logos safeguards against assuming that about God. But it is certainly true to say that Logos as Reason, Fundamental Basis, Explanation, etc., would be an insurance against the Arian type of subordinationism, as long as, as we have said before, the Logos was regarded strictly as the Logos of God and not primarily as the Logos of (in the same sense) the world, human behaviour, etc. Newman (notes ch. 16) points out that this is the very argument of Athanasius that the Arians could not see, that is, in his own words, the title Logos for them "did not express His perfection". Thus, they were left with only the subordinate senses of "word", from which they deduced His essential imperfection along the lines that we have just described, and which they also used in the case of the "Son" title. (See, e.g. Epiphanius, Haer. 73: 12). We must qualify Newman's assertion that the Greek term for this inferior sense of "Word" was ἐνθεσμός. This was undoubtedly true at a certain stage of the Greek language, but at the time of Athanasius the latter word was falling into obsolescence, as we have shown above, and is even more significantly shown by the fact that Athanasius never makes this verbal contrast when he discusses the contrast between the One Indivisible Word of God and the multiple, syllabic words of men. Very much the same considerations apply to the notion of "Wisdom" as applied to the Son, and there is not much difference in the case of "Power". With "Hand" the position is rather different, in that it implies subordination, and emphasises an almost purely constitutive unity of the Son with the Father and constitutive meaning of the Homoousion, but for this very reason it safeguards the
supremacy of the Father, and is also a very effective counter to
Arianism.

The next seven chapters are a consideration of the Homoousian
in the sense adopted by the Council of Nicaea, with special reference to
the conciliar proceedings. Athanasius begins with an account of the
insertion of the Homoousian in the Creed of Nicaea, which is quite
different from that of Eusebius's diocesan letter. (64) According to

(64) A historical note is not out of place here. There is a tendency
to depreciate the value of Athanasius's testimony on this matter,
on the ground that he was an interested party. For example,
Opitz's note on 20: 452B: "Athanasius gibt hier keinen
historischen Bericht über die Verhandlung in Nicäa, dazu gleich
ch. 33, sondern eine Argumentation von seinem Standpunkt aus."
Ch. 33 is the Letter of Eusebius of Caesarea, which Athanasius,
according to his own statement at the end of Ch. 3, intended to
append to the "De Decretis" (and which we are not discussing at
all, of course). Kelly, "Early Christian Creeds", 220-226, is an
adequate tu quoque to this statement; even if Kelly may have
exaggerated in saying that the sentence passed upon him in Antioch
in December, 324, forced him to vindicate his orthodoxy as a
suppliant to the whole Church (and we have only the evidence of the
Syrian word as to whether he was definitively excommunicated or
only subjected to a lesser denunciation), he at least had to defend
his own position against a very powerful party which had obtained
a great victory at his expense, even if it had fallen short of an
excommunication reversible only on recantation. As Kelly points
out, Eusebius's account, according to which the Creed of Caesarea
was read out, Constantine pronounced it good but suggested that
the Homoousian be added, and the addition of the Homoousian
resulted in a formally different creed which Eusebius had to
justify against Manichaean, Gnostic, Samosatene, and Sabellian
interpretations, certainly conceals a great deal and has the
obscurities of a man who had an interest in a certain amount of
concealment. In fact, as the Letter of Eusebius, at the beginning
shows itself, its purpose was probably not to give any sort of full
account at all, but to defend himself against the charge that he had
wantonly capitulated to a party whom he had previously denounced as
Manichaean, Samosatene, etc. In fact, the accounts of Eusebius and
Athanasius can probably be read together, however facile this sort
of conclusion may sound, and even though certain difficulties
would still remain. Certainly, the fact that Athanasius was
prepared to quote the Letter of Eusebius in full and verbatim is a
sign that he did not feel any serious inconsistency between it and
his account, but rather that the authors had different interests
and were therefore concerned with different facets of the issue.
On Eusebius's own showing, there remains the problem of why an
assembly predominantly Eastern adopted the viewpoint of, presumably the
Western minority (certainly Hosius of Cordova), and certainly of a
Athanasius, it was the end result of a hard battle to exclude Arianism somewhat suspect, though powerful, dissident Eastern minority, the Eustathian party in Antioch, and do so to the extent of adopting a word that had been banned by reason of some association with the most notorious heretic of the third century whom Athanasius himself continued to execrate only just less than Arius. The tempting deduction from Eusebius's Letter that it might have been due to Constantine's Western origin biasing him towards the more Western of the parties (in contrast, speculatively, to his later Eastern connections after 323 or so) simply cannot be substantiated, since Eusebius's own theological convictions did not alter in any relevant way, nor did his adulation of Constantine; there is no hint in his works (or any other's) of any such change in Constantine as a matter of serious theological thinking, and, in view of all this, the answer to any such hypothesis is that, whatever we may think about Eusebius's intellect, he was not such a fool as all that. The only reasonable solution is that the efficient cause of the adoption of the Homoousian is what Athanasius said it was, general revulsion from the brazen blasphemy of the Arian extremists, and a realisation that if the heresy could only be refuted at the cost of a half century or more of Church tradition, so much the worse for the tradition.

All this, of course, still leaves the position of Constantine obscure, but the author asks leave to make one other point which may throw light on even this matter, since it concerns an aspect of Arianism in which he is particularly interested. Whatever one may think of the idea that it was in fact a sort of proto-Marxism appropriate to the different conditions at the time, there is no doubt whatever that Arianism in its beginnings was a genuinely revolutionary movement in some way or other, and that the early Arian leaders directed their propaganda especially to the proletariat, not only in secondary ways, but as a matter of deliberate policy. Even in its later phase, Arianism retained, to an unusual extent in the later Roman Empire, the capacity to stimulate largely by necessity too, and direct the energies of mobs. The first thing that Constantine might well have noticed about Arianism was simply that it was dangerous, or worse still, that it was dealing with a potentially dangerous force in an unpleasantly unfamiliar way. After all, Constantine as a sovereign was far more absolute than any of his predecessors, and largely by necessity too. Thus, it was not until it was completely defeated at Nicaea, and Eusebius of Nicomedia began to act at Court (one is reminded of Lenin's political skill, his N.E.P., and his utilisation of his enemies the peasants as his levers for revolution), that the Court swung over to Arianism.
rigorously. After their preliminary revulsion from the Arian party, they tried the phrase "from God" (ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ) (19: 449D), but the Arians found that that phrase was used Scripturally of processes of creation and even creaturely realities. Again, when the orthodox party (20: 449C-D) said that the Logos was True Power and Image of the Father, as in all things Exact and Like the Father, (65) and ἀπ报案τον, and Eternal (ἐι) and in the Father indivisibly (ἀπαντὸς) the Arian party replied that, according to Scripture, man was the glory of God (I Cor. 11:7) and even the caterpillar and locust are called the "power" of God (Joel 2:25), and that even men are promised eternal life with God and in Him (Rom. 8:35, II Cor. 4:11, Acts 17:28). This meant that the Homoousion was the only thing left. Three passages may be quoted in full from this section to show the meaning of the Homoousion: 19: 449B-C: .... " (Whereas God is) it was by Him that all things were brought into being, not being before, through His Logos (66), for which reason is said "from God", but the Logos, since He is not a creature, is said to be, and is, alone from the Father, and it is a sign of this sense that the Son is from the Essence of the Father (ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ), for to none of the things originate does this apply ..... (Paul, I Cor. 8:6, shows) ..... that the Son is other than everything that came to be from God (ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ), for the things that came to be have come to be through His Son (ἐς τοῦ) ..... not as if all things were from the Father as the Son is. For neither are other things as the Son, nor is the Logos (ἐς τοῦ πατρὸς) one of all things for He is Lord and Framer of all: and for this reason did the holy council declare expressly that He was from the Essence of the Father, that we might believe the Logos to be other than the nature of things originate (67) being alone truly of God (ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ) ..... " and in 20: 452B-C: " ..... But the Bishops ..... were again compelled on their part to collect the sense of Scripture, (68) and to re-say and to re-write what they had said

(65) ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ πατρί
(66) πατρὸς 
(67) πατρὸς τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ πατρὸς 
(68) πατρὸς τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ πατρὸς
before more distinctly still, that is to say that the Son is One-in-
Essence (οὐδὲν ἐπεταθήμενος) with the Father, so as to indicate that the Son
was from the Father not merely like, but the same in likeness, and to
show that the Son's likeness and unalterableness was different from
such of the same copy as is ascribed to us (69), which we acquire from
virtue on the ground of our observance of the commandments. For among
bodies those that are like each other can somehow separate (ἁλλαθήμενος) andecome far off from each other; (like Seth, who was ὁ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐν τῷ
πατρὶ ἀποτελέσθαι (pattern) of his father Adam) . . . but since the
generation of the Son from the Father is not according to that nature
of men (70), and is not only like (λεγόμενος ἐξ) but is inseparable from the
essence of the Father, (71) and He and the Father are One, as He has
said Himself, and the Logos is ever in the Father and the Father in the
Logos, as is the radiance in relation to the light (72) . . . . (The
Council adopted the Homoousion, and anathematized the Arian formulæ)
. . . ." and again in 21: 453B: " . . . the Logos is from the Father
(λογος ἐξ θεοῦ), and alone is an Offspring (φυγαί), to Him and natural
For whence may one conceive the Son to be, Who is Wisdom and Logos, in
Whom all things came to be, save from God Himself . . (See Ps. 45 Ἡ: 1,
Ps. 110: 3, John 8: 42, John 6: 46, & 10: 30 & 14: 10 & 1: 18). (There will
be no note on these passages, as they are best considered in conjunction
with all the other chapters on this topic). However, the next section has
a peculiar interest of its own to such a degree that it requires
independent notes.

"If then anyone considers God to be compound (τὸ ἐπεταθήμενος), as
accident is in essence (74) or to have any external envelopment (75) and
to be encompassed (ἱππάθημεν ἐπεταθήμενος) or if there is aught about Him that

(69) ὁ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἀποτελέσθαι
(70) λεγόμενος ἐξ
(71) οὐδὲν ἐπεταθήμενος
(72) ἐξ ἐξ ἐξ θεοῦ
(73) φυγαί
(74) ἐπεταθήμενος
(75) ἐπεταθήμενος
completes the essence so that when we say "God" or name "Father" we do not signify the invisible and incomprehensible essence, but something about it but judge God corporeal, and they falsely say that the Lord is not Son of the Father Himself, but of what is about Him. But if God is simple, as He indeed is, it follows that in saying "God" and naming "Father" we name nothing as if about Him but signify His Essence itself. For though it is impossible to grasp what is the Essence of God, yet if only we understand that God is, and seeing that Scripture indicates Him by means of these titles, we, with the intention of indicating Him and none else, call Him God and Father and Lord. When then He says "I am that I am" and "I am the Lord God" or when Scripture says 'God' we understand nothing else by it but the intimation of His Incomprehensible Essence Itself, and that He Is, Who is spoken of ... (Thus the only possibilities are Son from the essence of the Father, from the Father, or, a creature admitted to sonship because of his virtue). This is a most important passage. Undoubtedly, the original intention of the Council of Nicaea, according to the Athanasian story, was to establish that the Son was really and aboriginally Son of God, and so said that He was of the Father, using to mean something like what (of an ordinary person) came later to mean, the innermost centre of one's being. The argument is that as God is absolutely simple, and therefore there is in Him literally nothing else but this essence, this simple centre of being, the Son must

(76) οὐκ Περὶ διετον τω συμπληρωματικην ητην ησυχιαν ητω 
(77) Πηγη 2ος. και η καταληπτει την ουσιαν 
(78) ου των περι διετον 
(79) ου γαρ των Περι διετον 
(80) Εκ της ουσιας ου και Εκ της ουσιας ου. Exod. 3:14-15 LXX. 
(81) This argument almost exactly duplicates Anselm's Ontological Argument as interpreted by Karl Barth, that is, as referring to God's holiness as involved in His very Name. The only difference is that Athanasius is speaking of God as He actually is, even more than Anselm. See Barth "Fides Quaerens Intellectum" and Ch. Dogm. Vol. II Pt. I, indices and references.
be from this Essence if He is from the Father at all. This chapter cannot be accepted at face value, or, in a sense only as a sign of the lack of clarity in the theological thought of the middle fourth century on certain issues that were definitively formulated at a later stage. In particular, if God is literally nothing else but the Essence, is Athanasius denying Chalcedon? Or, at the very least, what is the of God which was in Christ in apparently the same sense as the human, which was distinct from, and certainly on a lower plane than, the Divine, and presumably also the Divine, which the Chalcedonians certainly intended to distinguish from both? Certainly, Athanasius would have had to deny the sort of satellite system of properties and non-detachable accidents that would be understood according to the early Platonic philosophy as accepted by him, because it always tended to see a quality as essentially another thing, and this made any genuine doctrine of the Divine attributes inordinately difficult. This tendency has strongly survived in Eastern Orthodoxy and has led to the doctrine of the "uncreated energies", and even in Western theology it has led to a concentration on the formal perfections of God, or at least to Barth's "Perfections of the Divine Freedom" as distinct from the "Perfections of the Divine Love". This also links up with the tendency of Athanasius, in the De Incarnatione, to see the frontier between God and Man in Christ as coincident with that between action and passion. But there is another profound sense in which Athanasius was completely right, and not only right for his own time but for our own time too. An essential, which would presumably be an encapsulation by accretion, or any overtone, or the idea of God as would be quite impossible. (82)

(82) See Newman's notes on these sections and (in "Select Treatises..." Vol. II, 1881 ed.) notes on p. 457, and 466 - 468.
There is a true sense in which everything concerning God does concern His Essence alone. In this sense, even His activities, which we describe analogically, are quite unique. Therefore, if we or anyone else speaks about God at all, we are committed to speaking about His innermost and inconceivable (!) Selfhood. It was one of the great merits of Athanasius that he saw the full extent of this difficulty, and therefore the full extent of the Divine mystery, as a mystery confronting man. And he says that it is in a very secondary sense the Church in Council, but in the primary and decisive sense Scripture, that leaves us no option in this regard. It is a little difficult to see straight away why Athanasius included this section. Probably, however, he felt that, if he said what needed to be said, some Arian would make (or even already made) the following subtle reply that would be well within the reach of the fourth century and yet is completely relevant to the modern atheistic scientists and realists, logical positivists, and linguistic analysts: The very idea of God involves absolute simplicity, as you admit. But something that is absolutely simple cannot be described. Therefore, if you are going to use any significant language about God, it cannot be about God Himself in the sense in which the Council of Nicaea maintains it, but it must be about some peribole about which language is applicable. Behind this lurks the further argument; you were right in the first place; God is absolutely simple in the very notion of Him; therefore, this can only be part of the created sphere; therefore, in describing the generation of the Son and the Paternity of the Father, you are already completely in this field; therefore, the Logos or Son is a creature. Of course, the consequence of this, as the far more consistent moderns recognise, is atheism pure and simple, since any argument of this kind about the Son or Logos applies really in the same
way about the Father; in the Contra Arianos, Athanasius says so in so many words. What is being said now is that God as He essentially cannot have such a phenomenal sphere in the Kantian sense (which would be a very good modern equivalent of the περιβάλλον); nor can He have, as we have said before, either a frontier, or an environment, or be "in genere aliquo". He cannot have a sphere which is explicable on the same scientific and logical principles which apply to everything else, in contrast to an absolutely unrevealable "essence", id. Ding-in-sich, which is ineffable on all bases, most of all that of Scriptural revelation. Athanasius turns the simplicity of God against all such notions, using the very principle which, for others necessitated them, to destroy them. The examples from Greg. Naz. Orat. 28: 9, and Augustine De Trinitate 5:6, quoted by Newman in his note on in this chapter, in which it is denied that even God's immateriality and ingenerateness are predicated essentially, shows that the matter is rather more complicated than Athanasius would have it (they also raise the question whether even the via negativa is adequate to describe the essence of God), as they point to the difference between the Divine essence and the Divine attributes, as properly understood. And the fact that Athanasius affirmed the right doctrine for reasons some of which were wrong, Platonic, is shown by his continued concentration on the formal elements of God in his discussion of the Divine Essence. And we are not even quite sure that Athanasius considers these ways of speaking proper or improper or in what sense they are. But in general we must credit Athanasius with having seen that Scripture does reveal the whole essence of God, even if it reveals It as a mystery; in some ways he is a rationalistic Platonist, while in others he is remarkably close to the stand later taken by Barth, as he is here.
"Again, the illustration of the Light and the Radiance has this meaning. For the saints have not said that the Logos is to the Father as fire kindled from the heat of the sun, which is wont to be extinguished again; for this is an external work and a creature of its author, but they all preach Him as Radiance, to make clear thereby to signify His being from the Essence proper and indivisible and His oneness with the Father. For this will also preserve His truly being, for how could He be such, unless He was the proper offspring of the Father's essence? For the same principle is necessary to preserve His identity with His own Father. Thus in fact, as our argument is clearly pious, (the Homoousion should be accepted)... Indeed, if we say that the Logos is from the essence of God... what does this mean but the truth and eternity of the essence from which He is begotten? It is not different in kind, so that nothing strange or unlike should adulterate the essence of the Father. Nor is He like only outwardly lest He seem to be in some respect as wholly to be other in essence, as bronze, gold, silver, and tin each shines. For these are foreign and of other nature from each other, and are separated off from each other in nature and power, nor is brass proper to gold, nor is the pigeon from the dove; but, though they are considered to be like, yet they are from each other. If then it be thus with the Son, let Him be a creature as we are, and not otherwise; but if the Son is Logos, Wisdom,... It is interesting to notice, as a sign of the confusion that prevailed on this point (see Newman's note on this chapter) that Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. 61 and 128, and Tatian, c. Graec. 5, adopt the very doctrine associated with the name of Hieracas, which Athanasius is here rejecting, and reject the Athanasian doctrine, which Newman admits may have sounded Sabellian to some ears. Athenagoras, Tertullian, Ap. 21, Origen, Peri Arch. 1:2, and Theognostus, as quoted in ch. 25 of this book, say the same as Athanasius. Is this a definite statement from Athanasius that there is only one Essence in the later Trinitarian sense?
Image of the Father, and Radiance He must certainly be ἐπιφάνεια.
... (the alternative is an instrument different in nature and essence. (90)

"Furthermore, let every corporeal reasoning be banished on this matter, and transcending every imagination of senses let us with pure understanding and with the mind alone (91) apprehend the genuineness of Son in relation to Father, and the Logos's proper relation towards God (92) and the unvarying likeness of the radiance in relation to the light (93); for as the words "Son" and Offspring" are neither said to be human nor are human, but are appropriate to God, in like manner, when we hear the Homoousia, let us not fall into human sensation (94) and imagine partitions (ἐπιθέσεις) and divisions (διαίρεσις) in the Godhead but thinking on an incorporeal basis (τῇ ἀκατορσίᾳ) let us not divide the oneness in nature and the identity of light (95), for this is proper to a son (ὁγονίαν ὁσοῦν) with regard to a Father, and this shows that God is truly Father of the Logos. . . . . Who will dare to say that the radiance is unlike and foreign to the Sun? rather who, thus considering the Radiance relative to the Sun, and the identity (ταυτότητα) of the light, will not confidently say, 'Truly the light and the radiance (ἀκατορσίας) are one, and the one is manifested in the other, and the radiance is in the sun, so that whosoever sees the one sees the other.'? But when the faithful see such a unity and natural propriety (96) what could they

(90) ἐπιφανείας Καὶ ἐπιφανείας
(91) ἔπειτα ἐπιφανείας ἐπιθέσεις. Παραδείγματα καὶ ἐπιθέσεις ἐπιφανείας.
This appears to be the worst feature of Platonism - its intellectualism. An interpretation in meliorem partem would be to regard νοῦς here as being simply that which discurs spiritual things, in the Pauline sense.
(92) ὁ γονίας τῆς ἁμαρτίας, καὶ ὁγονίας τῆς προς τὸν Θεὸν ἐπιφανείας.
It can be seen here that Athanasius still feels the similarity or identity much more in connection with the title Logos than with the title Son.
(93) Καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἀναφέρει τῷ ἀπαντήματι πρὸς τὸ φῶς.
(94) καὶ τῇ ἐπιφάνειαν ἀναφέρει.
(95) τῇ ἐπιφάνειαν τῷ φωτείας καὶ τῇ ἐπιφάνειαν τῷ φῶς.
(96) τῇ ἐπιφάνειαν ἐνοτήτα καὶ φυσικήν ἐνοτήτα.
call it but coessential offspring? (97) And what should we suitably consider God's offspring but Logos and Wisdom and Power? It would be a sin to say that this was foreign to the Father, and it would be a crime even to imagine that this was not eternally with the Father. For by this Offspring (98) the Father made all things, and extended His providence unto all things; through Him He exercised His love to men (99) and thus He and the Father are one. (100). . . . For if He partakes in fulness the Light from the Father (101) why is He not rather that which others partake (τοῦ ὑπὲρ Ἀνθρώπων) lest there should be any medium between Him and the Father? Otherwise, it is clear that no longer would all things have come to be through the Son, but by him of whom He also partook. On the other hand, if He is the Logos, the Wisdom of the Father, in Whom the Father also is revealed and known, frames the world and without Whom the Father does nothing, it is evidently He Who is from the Father, for all originate things partake of Him, as partaking of the Holy Ghost (102). And being such, He will not be ἡγησία ἐν οἷς ἡγησία, nor in the least a creature, but rather a proper Offspring from the Father, as is the Radiance from Light. (103)."

In this passage, where the Homoousion is discussed, we see a distinct change from previous passages in, say, the De Sententia. There the main meaning of the Homoousion was constitutive unity. Here, however, we are dealing with an exceedingly complex concept in which almost every conceivable meaning of the word contributes. The first thing

(97) οὐκ ὕπερ ἐν οἷς ἡγησία
(98) Simple dative, presumably instrumental.
(99) ἡγησία ἐν οἷς ἡγησία
(100) Here follows a passage that we have cited above, p. 36, to the effect that the separation of the Light from the Radiance is virtually Samosatene.
(101) οὐκ ἔχει ἐν οἷς ἡγησία, ἡγησία μετὰ τοῦ Πατρός. The second free reference in Athanasius, of any importance, to the Third Person.
(102) ἡγησία μετὰ τοῦ Πατρός. The second free reference in Athanasius, of any importance, to the Third Person.
to notice is that, according at any rate to Athanasius's interpretation of the Council of Nicaea, the Homoousion was inserted first of all to clarify the question of the origin of the Son, that is, in what sense He is "from God". The doctrine that was being attacked was that the Son was only "from God" as an honorific title, or even in the sense that all creatures are, since their creation is God's work. What the Homoousion meant in the first place was simply that the Son is truly and absolutely from God. But when one has said this, one is committed to much more. In the first place, the Son must be from the absolute inner centre of God's being if He is to be "from God" at all, since there is nothing else in God except this. There is no phenomenal sphere around God, or anything corresponding to it, where such processes can occur in abstraction from the noumenal centre, nor has God bodily organs that can produce secretions from which the soul can remain in a large degree aloof. Thus, to safeguard the absolute unity and simplicity of God, the Homoousion was absolutely necessary. It is unfortunate that at this point Athanasius did not see that for this very reason he was committed to the personal aspect of sonship, much more than the biological. But to return to the first aspect of the Homoousion, the generation of the Son from the Father was a real fact in the common or garden sense of the word "real", and that is the reason for his repeated use of the word \( \phi \) and its word family to describe this generation. It was not till C. Ar. III: 58-67 that Athanasius for the first time had to face the question rigorously what was really meant by the Son's generation being "natural" to God, in reply to the Arians who were clever enough to try to turn upon the orthodox the doctrine, which is after all Athanasian (see "De Incarnatione" pass.) that God is actus purus. But for the time the use of physical language about the generation of the Son served its
purpose of proclaiming that it was as such strictly genuine. But the main difference between this and the earlier presentation of the Homoousion is the emphasis on the Homoousion as exact generic likeness, or qualitative resemblance. The relationship is one of the Logos being Τῆς Ἰδιότητος with the Father (20: 452B); He is characterised by τῆς Ιδιότητος (acc. case) πρὸς τὸν Ἐξωτικὸν Πατέρα (23: 456D, and τὴν Ἰδιότητος τοῦ Ἰδιότητος, πρὸς τῷ Φατέρα (24: 457E), and, like radiance from the Sun, cannot be from the Father (24: 457C). This resemblance is perfect and absolute (καὶ ἰδιότητος), and is specifically not as one metal or one species of bird, resembles other metals or species of birds (23: 457A) which pairs of resembling things are specifically described as καὶ ἰδιότητος to each other. The close association of this concept of absolute likeness with the generation of the Son, which we shall meet again in the Contra Arianos, indicates that these two aspects are not unconnected, and that the concept of the Homoousion is more profound than simple specific resemblance, even where such appears to be the principal or even the exclusive exclusive aspect under discussion. Athanasius distinctly notices that reproduction normally takes place only within the one species, and the offspring remain within that species (23: 457A). This furnishes the clue to the deeper meaning of the Homoousion. The best familiar analogy would be the chromosomal pattern in an organism, according to modern scientific genetics. Or rather, it is what this chromosomal pattern would be if reproduction were asexual and there were never any mutation. Also, as Athanasius himself says so strongly, there would be no question in God of a somatic apparatus in which the effect of heredity would be modified by environment, etc. But the chromosomal pattern, being in some ways a qualitative system and in other senses exercising a determinative and dictatorial power over the
qualities and activities of the organism, is, taken the way all analogies must be taken, probably the best way of expressing a most important part of what was meant here by the Homoousion. This idea of generic or family likeness reaches its culmination, for Athanasius in the likeness of radiance, ὁμοούσιος, to the Sun that "begot" it; but seeing that we have already noticed how the sexual nature of reproduction (that is, the fact that heredity is a compound of half the father's genes and half the mother's. The ancient Greeks did not know this, but they would certainly have noticed that the mother was necessary, and that children did occasionally resemble their mothers) would be an impediment to the perfect likeness of a human child and his father, might not one reason for Athanasius's great liking for the more emanationist metaphors be the quasi-asexual character of the "begetting" that is involved? (In asexual reproduction genetic changes cannot arise except by mutation). The close association between the Homoousion as the species-identity of the Persons, and begetting of the Son, remained always very close. But now we come to a fourth meaning of the Homoousion, which is closely related to the Homoousion in its sense of constitutive unity, of even perhaps of numerical unity. The generation of the Son is such that He and the Father are inseparable (23: 456D). Now, the strongest reason for Athanasius's partiality to the metaphors of Sun and radiance, Fountain and stream, is that they preserve this inseparability. In the passage from Dionysius of Alexandria quoted in the De Sententia, ch. 15, the writer points out, in a passage that is very bad astronomy but succeeds in making the point in question, that when the Sun ceases to be, there is no light, but when the Sun comes to be again (that is, at dawn) so does its light or radiance; and thus the Sun and radiance are co-temporal; thus the analogy shows that the Father and Son are co-
eternal. (Even with the obvious gross relativistic error removed, this analogy is correct, under any astronomical conditions conceivable to us; it is the nature of the Sun to give out light.) To suppose that this analogy could indicate the spatial inseparability of the Father and the Sun would be difficult even on the basis of astronomy as it was in Alexandrian times, but the point was certainly made somehow as far as temporal inseparability was concerned. It is one of the most unfortunate features of the "Son" analogy that a man cannot become a father till a certain biological stage. The doctrine of Athanasius here closely approaches the later classical περί μητρότητος, or the more stative Latin circuminsessio. Another further result of this shift is a move in the direction of only one πρόγονος of God, in something like the later sense. In ch. 23: 457A, Athanasius speaks of the Homoousion of the Logos and the Father as "confirming the verity and eternity of the essence from which He (i.e the Son) is also produced". This is something like the later doctrine, except that, after the older fashion, the essence, and thus the Divine unity, is especially associated with the Father rather than being associated in much the same way with all three Persons. Even more apposite is his treatment of the notion of light, Φώ, in ch. 24. In 457B, the reference to the undistorted likeness between the radiance (αὐτός ἡ μετρότης) and the light (Φώ), suggests that the light occupies the place of the Father in the analogy. But a little way on (457C), it is, more appropriately, the Sun, and Athanasius speaks rather of the unity of the nature (or natural unity?) and the identity of the light (τόπος ἡ περί μητρότητος τοῦ ἄνω); the latter part of this phrase is repeated within a few lines; and almost at once, with an obvious reference to what has gone before, we find that Christians see and believe in "such a unity and natural
identity" (ἡ ἔνωσις ἡ ἐνόμις καὶ φυσικὴ ὁ ἰδιοτήτα). Evidently, it is the light that is the constant thing between the Sun and the Radiance; in other words, the essence that is referred to in the doctrine of the Homoousion is analogous to Light as the common essence whereby the Sun and its Radiance are co-essential. This is sound and quite easily comprehensible to a modern mind; in fact, it is just about what an Einstein would say (mutatis mutandis) about the Sun and its radiance. And it is only fair to notice that Athanasius's preference for emanationist metaphors is due to their clearer representation of the contemporaneity or co-eternity of Father and Son, which was after all the great point at issue with the Arians. But this confirmation of this type of metaphor creates grave difficulties when Athanasius comes to examine the Holy Spirit, since he has to use φως as the paradigm for the Spirit in this type of analogy. In short, the concept of the Homoousion is exceedingly complex. All the traditional interpretations, constitutive unity, generic unity, and even arithmetical unity, are present, as well as another element, a quasi-biological unity or biospecific unity associated primarily with the generation of the Son. The change from the previous presentations is a far greater emphasis on generic or specific unity at the expense of the constitutive or merely arithmetical unity, but it is so intimately associated with the quasi-biological factors connected with the Son's generation that it would be most inaccurate to say that the Homoousion is merely absolute qualitative likeness. And finally we find traces, and more than traces, of what the author considers to be the strongest and final sense of the Essence of God and therefore of the Homoousion; the inner centre of God's being which is the thing par excellence about God that is completely mysterious and which in the nature of things has no real analogy at all in the human field. The unifying factor in all this
complex picture is almost certainly the relation of the One Essence to the generation of the Son; and it is probable that idealistic conceptions of essences as, perhaps, the progenitors of the things containing them, made it much easier to link all these meanings without apparent discontinuity than it would have been for a present-day theologian. (105)

The modern study and controversy on the Homoousion begins with the contention of Zahn, in 1867, and Harnack a little later, that there is a clear-cut division between the Homoeousion, as it was interpreted by Nicaea and its original defenders, and the Homoousion as it was understood at the Council of Constantinople, 331, and in the Nicaeano-Constantinopolitan Creed. The contention is that the Early Nicenes interpreted it in the constitutive, or in what amounted to the Sabellian sense, whereas the Nicaeano-Constantinopolitan Creed was virtually the successor, not of Nicaea, but of the Semi-Arians like Basil of Ancyra, and therefore interpreted the notion of Essence, and the Homoousion, in the purely generic or qualitative sense. The dividing line is supposed to have come midway in the theological life of Athanasius, so that the earlier Athanasius was a Nicene in almost the postulated Sabellian sense, up till and including the "De Decretis", but that, in his later works, beginning with the Letters to Serapion or the "De Synodi", he began to interpret the notion of Essence and the Homoousion in a generic sense. Zahn, Marcellus von Ancyra, p. 23, says of the early Nicene position, including the early Athanasius, "Es war dann auch nicht als feindliche Umdeutung, sondern als die den ursprünglichen Sinn festhaltende Auslegung zu verstehen sein, wenn die Semiarianer unter Basilius von Ancyra in ihrem nach klaren Begriffszerscheidungen ringenden Schreiben übersetzen..." See pp. 10-32 for Older Nicenes and 87 ff. for the Cappadocians. For Harnack, see H. Dogm. (E.T.) Vol. IV, p. 35-36 for the "Old Nicene" view, and pp. 75 ff. for the "Neo-Nicene" or "Young Nicene" view, that is, the Cappadocians and the orthodoxy of Constantinople as in succession to the Semi-Arians. On the Semi-Arians, p. 75: "... these theologians did not, like Athanasius, advance from the unity to the mystery of the duality, but, on the contrary, still started from the duality and sought to reach unity by making the Father and Son perfectly coordinate." Again, 80, "It was not the Homoeousion that finally triumphed, but on the contrary the Homoousion doctrine, which fixed the terms of agreement with the Homoousios... But Athanasius himself contributed to the revolution", though (p. 81 footnote) "he did not yield in any point, i.e. in De Synodis." On pp. 98-99, he supports his case by the argument that, in the Nicaeano-Constantinopolitan Creed, the Nicene is wanting, that it "represents the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit in a form which could not have appeared unacceptable even to the Pneumatomachi", (p. 98), and that the creed is more closely related to the Creed of Jerusalem, as in Cyril of Jerusalem's Catechetical Lectures, than to the actual Creed of Nicaea. An extreme supporter of this interpretation of Athanasius who is
The next three chapters are quotations from Theognostus, otherwise not disposed to follow the general theological line of Harnack is Shapland, see Index on διανοούσιος, etc., in his edition of Athanasius's Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit, although in fairness to him it must be said that he was dealing with the work in which the Zahn-Harnack thesis is most plausible.

This hypothesis has been attacked by all Roman Catholic and much Anglican scholarship since. The first important answer was a highly technical analysis by J. Bethune-Baker entitled "The Meaning of Homoousios in the Constantinopolitan Creed", in Cambridge Texts and Studies, VII (1901), which is vitiated by his insufficient readiness to consider the question of whether Athanasius changed his position. Prestige, "God in Patriotic Thought," ch. VIII (Individuality and Objectivity, pp. 157-178), IX (Object and Substance - 178 - 196), (The Homoousion - 197 - 218), and XI (Identity of Substance - 219 - 241), continued the attack on the Protestant side, but he is inclined to use such phrases as "substantial identity" (see esp. p. 217) without realizing that, to a modern reader anyway, they are among the most question-begging phrases that can be used, and therefore they must be exhaustively defined and analyzed. Since he is in the main attacking Harnack, he seems to come down on the side of numerical identity (See pp. 224-235 for his analysis of the Cappadocians in roughly that light). The following are fair samples of his argument: "'Homoousios' implies 'of one stuff', as against Arius, and 'of one content', as against the retort, already as old as Paul of Samosata, that thereby was implied the existence of two gods." (p. 215). "The employment of 'Homoousios' by Athanasius to express substantial identity was a new development for Greek thought" (p. 219 beginning, but for Latin precedents, see pp. 219 - 221.) On De Decr. ch. 20 (p. 214): "It is impossible to read this long statement carefully without observing that the unity of the Godhead and the identity of the Son's Ousia with that of the Father are as strongly in the mind of Athanasius as is the doctrine that the Son is God in the same sense as the Father is God." On De Decr. ch. 23 (p. 230 f.): "The principle has to be preserved that the Son is immutable and unchangeable, and how otherwise could He be such unless He is ὁμοουσιος τοῦ πατρός; For this title, like that of Radiance, must be taken as maintaining His identity with His own Father."

Among the older Roman Catholics, Atzberger pursues his usual cautious and quasi-Aristotelian line, but in the main is definitely against the Harnack-Zahn hypothesis. See, "Die Logoslehre des hl. Athanasius ..." Op. cit. pp. 81-93, he emphasizes the difference between "De Synodie" and the Semi-Arians, and accepts De Syn. 34-35, and especially De Decr. 22, as the standard for Athanasius. He quotes Aristotle, Metaphysics I: VII (2): 1, as proof that for even Aristotle, ὁμοουσιος was not entirely generic: ὁμοουσιος ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἐστὶν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀρχή, τῷ κόσμῳ διά. Later, 106 - 128, he returns to the subject, and comes down on the side of the Homoousion as referring to numerical unity, but not to the extent of compromising the numerical duality of the Father and the Logos-Son. p. 117: "Es kann nach dem Vorausgehenden in keinem Zweifel mehr unterliegen, dass Athanasius die Einheit des Vaters und des Sohnes als eine numerische Wesenseinheit auffasste." On the other hand, he says (110-111) that Athanasius is not definite in his terminology, compared with the later Cappadocians, and that the consensus of orthodox Patristic opinion leans further towards the generic side:
There are two Roman Catholic studies of recent times that demand our attention. One is a pair of articles by J. Lebon, "Le Sort du 'Consubstantiel' nicéen," in "Revue de l'Histoire Ecclesiastique", Pt. I (on Athanasius) in LXVII (1952): 3-4: pp. 485-530, and Pt. II (on the Cappadocians) in LXVIII (1953): 3-4: pp. 632-683. In the former article, Lebon maintains, against Harnack, that in Athanasius is always concrete and never abstract (i.e. purely generic), the unity is numerical and that Athanasius is constant in these particulars. For his handling of the "De Synodis", see pp. 502-508.

Lebon notices the intimate relation between the Homousion and the generation of the Son from the Father (508 - 16). In conclusion, (527-9) he reiterates that, for Athanasius, the Homousion always stood for a concrete numerical unity, and that (footn. p. 529) whenever Athanasius ever spoke of an apparently generic unity, he was thinking in terms of a Platonic concrete universal and not an Aristotelian abstract universal or genus. The core of his case in the second article is that the same applies to the Cappadocians, especially with regard to their illustration from three men, which really depends on the Platonistic solidarity of the human race (loc. cit. pp. 644-5). In the earlier article on Athanasius, he also (loc. cit. 496-502) makes the point that Basil, whom he interprets as accepting Athanasius rather than Hilary on the excommunication of Paul of Samosata and the simultaneous ban on the Homousion, would have accepted Hilary if he had been the sort of theologian postulated by Harnack.

Lebon, as we have seen, goes some of the way, but not far enough, according to us, in recognising the association between co-essentiality and generation. The last contribution that we shall study, and probably the best, goes apparently further. It is "Comment le 'Defenseur de Nicée a-t-il compris le dogme de Nicée?", a thesis at the Universitas Pontificalis Gregoriana, 1936, and later published in French at Louvain, by Hauret. The author has been unable to read the original book, but has seen a good and presumably faithful review of it by Lebon in "Revue de l'Histoire Ecclesiastique," 1937: 351-353. According to the review, Hauret established by painstaking analysis that the phrase that is normative for the meaning of the Homousion is "... l'entité du logos...". This is accepted by Lebon as good so far as it goes, but only part of the truth, as he would have preferred Hauret to argue more on the basis of the simplicity of God. In a sense, this criticism could be correct, since Athanasius has a lot to say on this very matter himself, though not in such direct connection with his mature doctrine of the Homousion as Lebon would have it. This is indicative of a tendency in Roman Catholic theology to overstress the simplicity of God; cf. Newman's note on De Decr. 22 (as cited above), in which he appears to say that qualities and attributes can only be imputed to God relatively to our own knowledge of God and its imperfections, whereas God in himself is absolutely simple. On the other hand, there is nothing in Newman so crass as the application of this principle to the Trinity that we find occasionally in Protestant writers (and, of course, sufficiently denied
the Nicene theology and against Arianism (and Sabellianism). All

by Newman, notes on C. Ar. II: 39 & III: 28); this is the only
construction that the author can honestly place on the conclusion of
Prestige, "God in Patristic Thought". (p. 301), where he says, in
language which, for him at any rate, is unusually redolent of German
Idealism: "In God there are three divine organs of God-consciousness,
but one centre of divine self-consciousness. As seen and thought He
is three, as seeing and thinking He is one." Opera (active connotation)
ad intra Trinitatis sunt divisa!

What is to be thought of all this controversy? In the first place,
there is certainly a change in Athanasius between, at the extreme limits,
the "De Sententia" and the Letters to Serapion, but no stage at all
fits in very well with the picture drawn above. In the earlier writings,
like the "De Sententia", and therefore the Homoousion, had its
meaning mainly constitutive, but this is incidental, and by general
agreement the definitive treatment in the early "Old Nicene" stage was
in this work, in which, as we have shown, it would be doing a grave
injustice to Athanasius to represent him as being interested in mere
numerical unity in anything remotely resembling the sense of Sabellius
and Marcellus of Ancyra. Incidentally, the presentation of this stage
in Roman Catholic scholarship is far closer to the truth, and does far
more justice to Athanasius, than the average Protestant study, and
particularly Harnack and Zahn, however right they might have been about
certain other members of the Old Nicene party, like Marcellus of Ancyra
and perhaps Eustathius of Antioch. On the other hand, Harnack and Zahn
and their followers make a similar mistake, in the opposite sense, about
the later theology of Athanasius on the Homoousion, as represented in
the Letters to Serapion, but, as a matter of fact and contrary to
widespread opinion, NOT the "De Synodis". Inspite of Roman Catholic
assertions to the contrary, Athanasius does say things in these Letters
which seem to be about the Homoousion in a purely generic sense, but a
close examination of the context indicates that Athanasius has something
completely different in mind, that is, a completely mature and developed
form of the categorial argument and the categorial distinction between
God and creatures. We shall show this at the appropriate place below.
Once again, incidentally, the Roman Catholic interpretation is nearer
the truth. The above is, for the author, the true position as it
affects Athanasius. The author has been unable to give the Cappadocians
more than a relatively superficial examination compared with his study
of Athanasius, but he feels that an intensive study of these writings
would yield similar results, which would also differ from the general
run of interpretations. In conclusion, this controversy, in its
familiar form, probably should never have arisen, and certainly should
never have arisen in its application to Athanasius if people had come
to his works with a fresh mind, prepared for rigorous analysis, instead
of simply regarding him as the orthodox theologian par excellence, which
is the worst possible way to handle a man of Athanasius's intellectual
standing.
these writers belong to the Alexandrian Origenist and post-Origenist school, which has been suspected, and was suspected at the time, of being excessively subordinationist, with the exception of Dionysius of Rome, who was introduced as the great namesake and rival of the Alexandrian archbishop, to show the unity of theology on this point.

The remainder of the book is a treatment of the Arian arguments concerning the word ἀγνώριστος, unoriginate, which was the standard philosophical term for ultimate entities. We have already exhaustively quoted from these chapters concerning the actual exposition of the problem, compared them with the corresponding passage from "Contra Arianos", I: 30-34, and critically evaluated the argument. 

To recapitulate, Athanasius shows, first, that if the word ἀγνώριστος, etc., is to be used at all, that is, if God is to be regarded as ultimate, there is one sense in which the Father is ultimate compared with the Son, that is, as the Father Who generates eternally the Son, but there is another sense in which both Father and Son are co-eternal, both of equal rank, and both equally God; that is, the position of the Father with regard to the Son does not in the least compromise the dividing line between God and creatures, and in that sense both Father and Son are co-ultimate. Among other things, this means that the element of ontological priority in the concept of causality must be, with God, dissociated from that of temporal priority, with which it is always linked in ordinary causality. Not only this; the fact that the ultimacy of the Father with regard to the Son does not involve a crossing of the line separating Creator from creature leads Athanasius to his second great point, that is, that the notion of ultimacy, the ἀγνώριστος, is dangerous even in its corrected meaning, is still dangerous, because in its ordinary sense it is a title of God.
the correlative of which is in creaturely life. One of the main achievements of Athanasius was to break the correlation between God and the creatures, and to insist that all the correlates of, say, God the Son, were to be found entirely within the Trinity. (105)

In so doing, Athanasius insisted that the appropriate titles for the First and Second Persons of the Trinity were Father and Son respectively, and this is a major stage in the rise to prominence of the title Son at the expense of Logos. As the lexicographical analyses have shown, Athanasius has frequently spoken of the Logos of the Father, but at this stage his superior grasp of the problem of correlation pushes him further towards the title Son, as being the natural and therefore the necessary correlative of the title Father. It only remains to quote the final extract from this section as it is in this book, where the corresponding modification in the soteriology: 31: 473C: "For He has bid us to be baptized, not into the name of Unoriginate and Originate, nor into the name of Uncreate and Creature, but into the name of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, for with such an initiation we too are made sons truly and, using the name of the Father, we

(106) It is this principle that Harnack in one way describes so accurately and in another way so gravely misrepresents in his famous statement that (H. Dogm. E.T. Vol. IV., p. 26): "The idea of the Divine, which in Christ redeemed men, is severed from the world-idea; the old Logos doctrine is discarded; Nature and Revelation no longer continue to be regarded as identical. The Logos-Son-Christ is at bottom no longer a world-principle but, on the contrary, a salvation-principle." It is not right to insinuate that the only alternatives are natural theology and neo-Marcionitism, with which Harnack later expressed his sympathy, and the opposition between a "world-principle" and a "salvation-principle" must be expressed much more carefully than this. Hoss answers this sort of reasoning, but too briefly and, if one might say so, too facilely, when he says, (Studien... 57-58): "Ebeneshalb aber ist der weitere Satz Harnacks, der Logos sei im Grund nicht mehr Weltprinzip, sondern Heilsprinzip, nicht richtig. Er ist vielmehr beides, Welt- und Heilsprinzip."
also recognise from that name the Logos in the Father. But if He wills that we should call His own Father our Father, we must not on that account measure ourselves with the Son according to nature, for it is on account of Him that the Father is so called by us; for since the Logos bore our body and came to be in us, God is called our Father. For the Spirit of the Logos in us names through us His own Father as ours, . . . (Gal. 4: 6)."

The last chapter is a peroration, in summary of the material of the book, The Doxology is: " . . . because to God and the Father is due the glory, honour, and worship, with His co-existent Son, and the All-holy and life-giving Spirit, now and unto endless ages of ages. Amen."

The passage that we have quoted shows a significant change in the soteriology, corresponding to the greater importance of Son as the proper title of the Second Person. In the "De Incarnatione", the primary way in which salvation is considered is as Deification, which is the usual state of affairs in Athanasius, although we have seen a modification, in the "De Sententia Dionysii", chiefly due to the exigencies of the exegesis, in the direction of salvation as constitutively participating in the New Humanity of Christ. Now, we go part of the way towards the older concept, but the stress is not so much on sharing the Divine Nature as on adoption to sonship. But, even though we have full privileges as adopted sons, Athanasius points out that we must on no account confuse the natural and aboriginal Son with our own derivative sonship; in fact, this extract looks very like a summary (or rather, in view of our chronology, a short adumbration), of the argument of C. Ar. III: 10–25, (108) In the first place, our

(107) See below, pp. . . . for full treatment.
adoption to sonship is absolutely dependent on the atoning work of Christ, and it is interesting to notice that it is at this point Athanasius again introduces the Spirit as a further condition for our adoption, if, that is, (as is not absolutely certain) Athanasius regarded the Spirit of the Son, as in Gal. 4:6, as referring to a third hypostasis.

We begin our resume of the theology of Athanasius in the "De Decretis", as usual, with a study of the basic prolegomena to theology. The basis of Athanasian theology is completely Scriptural, the only other factor that can possibly be mentioned being the authority of Nicaea, but this latter is subordinate to Scripture, although the antithesis is not made at all in the manner of the Reformation; after all, there had been only one Council of the really authoritative kind, and Athanasius is, with the greatest energy and determination, defending its positions as Scriptural. His argument as to why the Council adopted the Homoousion and the πίθανος, indicates that Athanasius feels that there is a real problem in justifying them, and his conclusion is that the Council had to adopt these un-Scriptural expressions as a final expedient to counter what was, evidently and Scripturally, a blasphemy. Athanasius, while being thoroughly Scriptural, is as far as possible from being a fundamentalist in the most extreme sense, in that he understands fully that there may be times when it is necessary to appear to go outside Scripture to express and vindicate, in reality, Scriptural truth. But, the section in chs. 4-5, which is Athanasius's definitive treatment of the fundamentals of the issue, he never goes outside Scripture for his list of witnesses to the "tradition".

On the other hand, this book sees some most important
developments in the Athanasian position on analogy, as one of the basic general problems of all theology, and even perhaps of exegesis. The question of why the Son is Son in the natural sense, although so much that applies to human sonship cannot apply to God, brings him at once to the full extent of the problem. In his solution to it, Athanasius gives the first full treatment of analogy in the history of theology, and it is as well developed as anything in, say, Aquinas. Nothing less than what J. F. Anderson has described as the Analogy of Proportionality satisfies the necessities of the case, that is, that in God, the relation itself between Father and Son differs from the human relation, as God differs from man; that is, we cannot say that the Father (or, to argue in the other direction, the Son) is God, as a human father (or son) is a man, and extrapolate to the other Person by using the same human relationship. (109) But this apparently raises the problem of our actual knowledge of the difference, and so Athanasius returns to Scriptural exegesis, and his next approximation is to consider the various metaphors of Scripture and their relation to each other. The position that he finally adopts is that each metaphor, like Son, Logos, Wisdom, Power, Hand, Source-River, Light (or light-source or luminous body) -Radiance, corrects what is incorrect in the others. (110) But, in a

(109) See Chs. 11-12, and above, pp. 51-53.


See also Newman's note on the passage of Theognostus cited in ch. 25 of this work: "It is sometimes erroneously supposed that such illustrations as this (i.e. Light-Radiance - Author) are intended to explain how the Sacred Mystery in question is possible, whereas they are merely intended to shew that the words we use concerning it are not self-contradictory, which is the objection most commonly brought against them. To say that the doctrine of the Son's generation does not intrench on the Father's perfection and immutability, or negative the Son's eternity, seems at first sight inconsistent with what the words Father and Son mean, till another image is adduced, such as sun and radiance, in which the alleged inconsistency is seen to exist in fact. Here one image corrects another; and the accumulation of images is not, as is often thought, the restless and futile attempt of the mind to enter into the Mystery, but is a safeguard against any one image, nay, any collection of images being supposed sufficient..."
sense, this still leaves the same difficulty, which appears now as one of determining what to accept and what to reject in each analogy. If the answer is, as it appears to be in Athanasius, what is worthy of God, there is danger of either a tautology or of falling into the same old position of rational theism, which is present in the use of the Analogy of Proportionality. In passing, Athanasius turns to the difficult problem of the exegesis of Prov. 8:22 LXX, but there is no real change from his previous position. (111)

However, when we turn to the Trinitarian theology, and here we find that, for the first time, Athanasian theology revolves around the concept of Son as the primary title for the Second Person. Since this book deals almost entirely with the intra-Trinitarian relationship — there is no work of Athanasius more ruthlessly on the one topic — we need not attempt the exhaustive analyses of Logos and Son that we have attempted hitherto; it suffices to say that there are 103 instances of Logos for the Second Person of the Trinity as against 70 for Son, without the Scriptural references that, in the "De Sententia" or "In illud, Omnia mihi tradita sunt . . .", would have forced a tendency to use the word "Son". This, as distinct from the earlier picture in, say, "De Incarnatione", where "Son" is rare, about corresponds to the final equilibrium in Athanasius. The reason for this change is that, for the Arians, the title "Son" was their favourite, as a name as distinct from a description, insofar as they used any title at all; their main title seems to have been an understood subject of a verb or noun qualified by a participle, as in the case of Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς θεοῦ υἱός: in this case, the assonant effect indicates that the phrase is complete and that no subject

(111) Chs. 13-14.
was expressed. Thus, Athanasius opens with the Arian statement that the very title Son could be only an empty honorific for "creature".

The problem for Athanasius was now to show that the title Son conveyed orthodox theology and not Arianism. After indicating that on the Arian view there cannot be any real difference between the Son and ordinary Christian men and that any attempt to introduce such a difference lays one right open to the infinite regress of argument, Athanasius shows by elimination that the Son must be Son of God the Father by nature, as against our sonship by grace and adoption; by the by indicating that such prima facie Arian passages of Scripture as Prov. 8:22 LXX must be interpreted as applying to the Humanity of Christ, or to Christ as man, as an entity, and the Incarnation as an event. But his work is far from being done, as it is perfectly obvious that there are some aspects of common or garden human sonship that do not apply and cannot apply to sonship in God; in particular, a son by nature of the Eternal Father must be eternal in the same way. Faced with this problem, Athanasius as a first step gives the first account of the analogy of proportionality (He had previously given much the same account in the Contra Gentes, rather less clearly, and it is significant that whereas the former account was in terms of the Logos concept, the account is now given in terms of Filiation). Finally, however, the concept of Sonship is lifted to the correct plane by means of the other Scriptural analogies, Wisdom, Power, Logos and to generation of Fountain - Stream and, in particular, Sun - Radiance which is the principal determination of the relation; with reference to the latter, the concept of light is used, after some uncertainty, to denote what was later definitively expressed as the One Essence of the Godhead.

(112) Hoss, Studien . . . 53-55, is the clearest in his recognition of the primacy of this metaphor at this stage in the theology of Athanasius.
Text cut off in original
During this argument, Athanasius considers two technical concepts of a rather more formal nature, the orthodox Homoousion and the Arian Ἰδιότης. The former shows great development and is now a highly complex idea. Although the older ideas of the numerical and constitutive unity of God are still definitely present, they are by no means the predominant elements now, and the change is directly due to the greater emphasis on the Son concept, or perhaps directly due to the efforts of the Council of Nicaea to clarify beyond cavil this concept. It was primarily an attempt to give a proper account of the origination (both in the quasi-biological and quasi-logical senses) of the Son. In the first place, the word meant that He was genuinely Son as opposed to Son by grace and adoption, and thus, as God cannot be split into an intimate essential sphere and a less intimately Divine outer sphere, call it what we will, such a genuine Son must be ἐστιν ὁ πατὴρ and ὁ Ἰδιότης with the Father. Also, as the character and very essence of the Father is, at the very least, eternity, the Homoousion affirms the absolute eternity of the Son, against the Arians. Associated with the generation of the Son, we have a complete generic and specific identity between the Father and the Son (once again, the term Image, as used of the Son relative to the Father, does not refer so much to Image in the sense of the presumably sigillographically negative matrix from which we are made in the image of God, as the positive Image, completely and positively alike in all respects). The origination and absolute identity of the Son with the Father are intimately associated in a way which is analogous to their association

(113) See chs. 19-24 and above, pp. 624-640
in heredity, according to the modern science of genetics (presuming, that is, an asexual generation). Once again, the doctrine reaches its height in the Scriptural metaphor of Sun - Radiance.

After quoting earlier theologians in support of the Nicene position, Athanasius deals with the \( \varphi \text{v} \varphi \text{v} \text{r} \text{r} \text{r} \), which the Arians used to prove that the Son must be a creature because there cannot be more than one \( \varphi \text{v} \text{r} \text{r} \text{r} \)\). After establishing that in God we must distinguish between the Father's supremacy as the eternal Begetter, and in that sense, eternal Origin of the Son, and the Father's postulated but non-existent temporal priority over the Son, Athanasius establishes the supremely important point, as a sort of climax to the whole work, that the Persons of the Trinity must be called by names whose correlations and free and automatic associations are within the Godhead itself; at all costs, we must avoid names whose natural and inevitable correlative is the created world. Athanasius uses this principle to great effect against the use in theology of the title \( \varphi \text{v} \text{v} \text{r} \text{r} \text{r} \). However, as a matter of theological history, the title Logos itself was an even more serious case of this bad correlation, having been the Logos of the systematically coherent world; this point of view still persists in the ante-Nicene writings of Athanasius himself. In this book, he gives us the outline of a necessary reinterpretation, with his emphasis on the other meaning of Word, Word as generated by the speaker or the mind (which does not last, as it has no real advantages over the Son concept as an effective weapon against the Arians), and, returning to the higher, more metaphysical sense, in his negative statement that a God \( \varphi \text{v} \text{r} \text{r} \text{r} \text{r} \) would be itself an absurdity.\( ^{115} \) However,

\( ^{114} \) See chs. 28-31 and above pp. 284-303

\( ^{115} \) Ch. 15: 441B-C.
this point is not driven home till the Contra Arianos.

Thus we see that Athanasius has raised a number of issues that are of supreme importance in theology, and we see them clearly for the first time. The paramount importance of analogy in theological statements and thought, the fact that by the very nature of God we are committed to describing His mysterious Essence when we talk about Him, and therefore that as we cannot keep silent we must describe the indescribable, and the problems resulting therefrom, the disastrous results of describing God by correlates of the world (a strand in theology which came to its fulfilment only in Barth's denunciation of natural theology) with its corollary that all terms for the Persons of the Trinity must have their correlates therein and nowhere else, and even the first adumbrations of the final definitive Trinitarian doctrine of \( \mu \iota \upsilon \rho \sigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \), \( \tau \rho \sigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \) (although still as far as ever from the definitive vocabulary) - all these are important issues in the De Decretis, not to mention the most highly developed account of the Homoousion and his account of Prov. 8: 22 LXX. However, the most important issue for us is whether Athanasius has developed a theology and a Christology based on the Son concept, or rather, on the Second Person as Son. At first sight, the answer would appear to be in the affirmative, and decidedly so. The very nature of the subject matter would be at once the sign of this and its principal cause. In the "De Incarnatione", by contrast, the "core" of the book (in the American educationists' sense of this term)(116) is the necessity to explain and account for the supreme paradox that the Logos, which everyone knew by ontological knowledge (or as Bertrand Russell would say, verbal

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(116) A "core curriculum" is a curriculum which in its basis is dictated by a definite practical purpose, which is the "core" of the curriculum.
knowledge) to be essentially immaterial, became flesh, according to the blunt four-word statement of the Fourth Gospel and the faith of the Church; the question was propounded in those very words. The effect of Arianism and the orthodox party at Nicaea between them was that the corresponding core of this book was: What is the meaning of "Son", as the principal official, credal, liturgical, and Scriptural title of the Second Person? It might even be propounded thus: Granted that the title Son must be interpreted analogically, what is the nature of the analogy? Is the title an honorific hyperbole behind which there is a much humbler reality, or is the real Son even nobler than this title indicates? On such a basic issue, the De Decretis could hardly fail to be oriented to a large extent around the Son concept. And this is confirmed by the passage almost at the end of Ch. 31, almost at the end of the book. As we have seen, the Soteriology of the De Decretis, such as it is, shows relatively little change compared with the De Incarnatione, but in ch. 31 we find that the process is described as essentially one of $\omega_\infty \omega_n \omega_\infty \omega_n$ primarily, rather than $\omega_\infty \omega_n \omega_\infty \omega_n$ or other notions associated with the earlier works. This change is more prominent still in the Contra Arianos, and is in the very centre of this latter work. However, on closer analysis, the conclusion that in this book Athanasius made the Son concept definitive for the Second Person is true only in a very qualified sense, and in another sense, it is completely untrue; in one paradoxical way, the "Son" concept is less in evidence than ever. There is a definite and marked tendency for Athanasius to use "Son" as a Name in the sense of Bertrand Russell's logic, an "x" in its symbolic representation. The Description, the qualities, etc. of this pure name are filled out from the other metaphors Logos (in its "higher" sense), Wisdom, Power, etc., also the Scriptural pairs of Fountain - Stream and Sun (actually glory, $\mathfrak{So}$, in Hebrews) -
Radiance. It is easy to see how this could have arisen. In part, it was an almost natural exaggeration due to the aim of the work as a whole. In part, it was due to the fact that no one can deny, that these metaphors do better safeguard the absolute and eternal co-existence of Father and Son, as in that relationship to each other; this was the supreme point of issue with the Arians. However, we cannot avoid commenting that in the short summary in ch. 17 of the significance of all the titles of the Second Person, the only significance mentioned of the "Son" is that it indicates what is from God by nature (as distinct from the Arian sense); this is repeated (and explicitly so) as part of the significance of the title Logos, and there is nothing beyond this in the remainder of the book. This compares unfavourably with the accounts given of the significance of all the other titles, and the significance given is the most formal conceivable. What is lacking? It would not be too captious too animadvert here on the most astonishing omission in the whole theology of Athanasius; in fact, in Greek theology as a whole; the almost complete lack of the idea of the Divine Love. John 3:16 and 15:9 are nowhere cited in the principal writings of Athanasius (except for the formal treatment of John 3: 16-19 in Orat. dub. IV C.Ar.: 18; the near-parallel I John 4: 9 is half-cited in C. Ar. II: 62, but again the treatment is formal). This is most surprising when we remember that the Scriptural teaching about the mutual love of Father and Son has its locus classicus in that very Fourth Gospel which was so much the exegetical favourite of Athanasius. Also these passages would refute Sabellianism utterly, and would be at least as effective against Arianism as any other passages; the real point is that the Arian Father would have been not only Κλαστος, absurd, and Αθώος, wisdomless, before the Son's generation; he would be also quite literally love-less, which
would be an infinitely greater scandal to piety and faith, and it
would have been utterly beyond the power of Arius or Eusebius of
Nocomedia or even Asterius to explain it away even by the plausible
arguments that they used in the case of God being \( \lambda \) and \( \sigma \). Unfortunately, Athanasius did not complete his work, nor did Augustine,
though he advanced much farther, and the idea of a solitary God, self-
loving (?) continued to exercise an evil fascination over men. It was
left for the Reformers, perhaps ultimately for the Barthians, to
banish this unscriptural doctrine in the name of Them Who gave to us
men, at great cost, that love which was mutually and eternally Their
own.

It only remains, on this subject, to say a few words on
whether these physical analogies, especially Source-River, and Light-
Radiance, do what they are meant to do. A little examination shows
that even they are just as subject to the need for analogical correction
as any other, and, as a matter of fact, they are if anything less
appropriate on the basis of the scientific knowledge of Athanasius's
day than they are now. Even though the action of running water is
essential for the making of that geological formation known as a river —
as we now know; rivers do after all occasionally run dry, and this has
always been a distressingly common feature of the whole Mediter-
anean area. Also they flood in other seasons, and the size of the flood, as
in the very Egypt that was Athanasius's own land, is a matter of
considerable anxiety. Also, we now know, even more conclusively than
the physicists of Athanasius's day, that it is the very nature of a
body like the Sun — even its mere size has a lot to do with it(117) —

(117) That is, a large sun, by reason of its enormous mass and therefore
of its correspondingly large gravity, can retain its hydrogen and
even sweep it up from outer space, and concentrate it to the point
where spontaneous nuclear fusion takes place.
to emit radiant energy, even though suns do exhaust their fuel at times; also we now know that the transmission of radiant energy, which is the best translation of \( \text{διάφωσις} \), is not dependent on any medium at all.\(^{(118)}\)

But the cosmological controversies associated with the name of Hoyle in this age, do suggest that it is possible, under some circumstances, for this emission of radiation to go into reverse, resulting in concentration rather than diffusion. This is not anachronistic; the Greeks had a full intellectual apparatus, even if nothing else, for understanding this point, which, as a hypothesis, was in fact one of the most notorious features of the theology of Athanasius's contemporary and friend, Marcellus of Ancyra. Even the indivisibility of the radiant energy, or the "day", was in fact already queried by Plato, in the modern manner; the Platonic Parmenides makes this point against the Platonic Socrates.\(^{(119)}\)

In essence, the position of Athanasius still remains Binitarian, as is illustrated by the very metaphors themselves. So, while all this has been happening, there has been very little reference

\(^{(118)}\) There is no such thing as the "ether", and none needs to be postulated. Newman, in the nineteenth century, can be excused for saying (notes on De Decr. ch. 23) that "radiance" is "the light which a light diffuses by means of the atmosphere", as can any earlier commentator who said the same thing. It is less excusable when Shapland (note on Radiance ch. 19 of Ep.I, in his edition of Athanasius's Letters to Serapion, in 1951, p. 109), duplicates the same definition! Modern physics has actually removed what on Newman's definition would be a very serious objection to this analogy! The author is not familiar with the interpretations of this according to Greek or other ancient physics.

\(^{(119)}\) See Plato, "Parmenides", 131. The Platonic Parmenides has objected to the Platonic Socrates that, if a Form is in a number of particulars, and is conceived as a substantial thing, the Form must be divisible, even as a sail that covers many things is, in that way, divisible into portions each of which covers one thing. Socrates objects that another analogy would be that of the (allegedly indivisible) day which illuminates many objects. Parmenides simply dismisses that objection. It must be remembered that, in the First Part of the "Parmenides", Parmenides is not only the principal speaker but the victor in the argument, and that in the Second Part it took Parmenides himself to show that his case was impossible, that is, any refutation of the Eleatic monistic philosophy must depend on the dialectic achievement of Eleaticism itself.
to the Holy Spirit, but the remarkable thing is that (accepting the order of composition that we have determined) we find the first free references to the Spirit, that is, those that are not directly forced by the barest necessities of credal statement and similar reasons, or that are not direct quotations from other writers. In ch. 9 432B, we have ἀνακαλομένον τῇ ἐνεργῇ ἁγιασμοῖς as an introduction to a Scriptural passage; this is a purely conventional usage, and, as usual in such cases, the passage is from the Psalms. However, in ch. 14D, with reference to the Incarnation, especially the relationship between the flesh and the original deity of Christ, Athanasius points out that this is simply the inverse of that process in us which he has already described, and describes here, as deification. No doubt under the stimulus of this antithesis, he now points out that this process is otherwise and more accurately to be described as a partaking of the Spirit, ἐνυφαίνεσθαι τὸν πνεύματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ (of the Son) ἀνεφαίνεσθαι, and ἁγιασμὸς λαμψάτω τῷ, and also that it does not result in our being any the less human as opposed to God. Although it is highly probable from the context that ἁγιασμός means little more than Divinity in general, especially the divine nature as partaken by men, rather as in the "Quicunque dixerit . . ", this passage does indicate that our participating in the benefits of Christ is a more complicated matter than is indicated by the simple process of "deification", even though a fully hypostatic doctrine of the Holy Spirit is not in evidence yet. A more definite advance on this line is 24: 460B (i.e. the Son): ἐνυφαίνεσθαι τῇ ἐνεργῇ ἁγιασμοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἁγιασμὸς τοῦ. We find, at the end of ch. 31, in the context of our own filiation in Christ, a reference to the Spirit which is a direct paraphrase of Gal. 4: 6 and admitted to be so; the Spirit is referred to as "the Spirit of the Logos", and τὸ ἁγιασμός names "His own Father". Although it can be justly said that the doctrine
of the Spirit as a hypostatically distinct Person of the Trinity is rudimentary at best, these references represent the first instances in which the Spirit plays a part in Athanasian theology, and it is significant that they all directly concern the way in which the created world and man in particular partake in Christ. The reason for this is obvious and is one of the most important changes in the theology of Athanasius. When the term Logos meant, however subconsciously, human rationality or the objective rationality of the world, there was no real problem of human participation in it; it could be taken for granted, and that is one reason why the "De Incarnatione" for instance, is, to modern taste, so barren on that topic. But once the correlation between the Logos and the cosmos or human rationality had been broken, and the Logos tightly correlated with God the Father, the problem arose again of our participation in God. And we shall see that this is the way that the Doctrine of the Spirit arose again in theology after its long slumber since Irenaeus. As to the reason why it worked out in that way, it is clear that the reason is simply that it is the correct Scriptural doctrine, or to put it more accurately, a rather too general reflection of the Scriptural belief, as we shall see below in the Appendix. It is almost trite that pre-Athanasian theology neglected the Spirit and assigned its functions to the Logos; it would be just as correct to say that the functions of the ante-Nicene Logos are now increasingly assigned to the Spirit.

As to our analysis of the technical Trinitarian and Christological terms, let us begin with ☩, essence: As would be expected in a work of this character, the most prevalent use by far is as in the Creed of Nicaea:

description of the Son: 3: 420D (+ ἀπόθετοι), 3: 421A (quotes N, + ἀπόθετον),
22: 468C (see 3: 421A). Other closely related formulae, combinations
of one or more of ὑποκάτωται, ὑποκάτω, ὑποκάτωσθε, ἄνευ ὑποκάτωσθε, ἐν ὑποκάτω,
31: 473B. Other uses are: ὑποκάτω as a single entity, usually grammatically
a noun in the nominative or accusative or other case governed by a verb;
22: 453C (ὁ υποκατωταί of God opposite to accident). 14: 440D (Christians do
not lose own ὑποκάτω through participation in the H.S.) 24: 460A (Arian claim
rejected that the ὑποκάτω of the S. is other than the F.) 22: 453D (ὁ ὑποκάτω of God
needs no completion from outside). 22: 456A bis and B bis (the
mentioning and the Name of God signifies His One and Incomprehensible
Essence). The more adverbial uses are as follows: 6: 425A (the Arian
claim that the Son is foreign to the Father ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκάτω), 24: 460A
(Logos foreign ὑποκάτω). 22: 456C (Son is Son not ὑποκάτω but from virtue),
22: 456C (Arians deny Son ὑποκάτω, ὑποκάτωσθε, ὑποκάτω), 23: 457A bis (the ὑποκάτω
denies that the Son is foreign and unlike ὑποκάτω), 12: 437A
(Arians say Son ὑποκάτω, ὑποκάτωσθε, ὑποκάτω οὐκ ὑποκατωταί), 20: 452D (quoted Nicene
anathema against the ὑποκάτω). These instances show that,
although the adverbial or dynamic uses are present, the main use,
ddictated by Nicaea, is for the Essence of God to stand for that
incomprehensible Unity of the Godhead. This is not meant to contradict
the earlier statements that the unity is too complex to be reduced to
either an arithmetical or a constitutive unity, and certainly not to a
generic unity.

<insert}\betaοτηταί is rare, and we have already listed the few uses:

it is safe to say that Athanasius never uses it with any spontaneity at
call, but only when citing from other writers. ὑποκάτω is again fairly
common; the uses are: 6: 425A (Arian claim Son not ὑποκάτω τοῦ ὕποκατωταί
ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκάτω), 9: 429D (Arian Son would be supreme only in honour and not
ἐν ὑποκάτω τοῦ ὕποκατωταί), 432A (Adam like us ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκάτω), 432B (Arian Son not different
from the rest ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκάτω), 10: 433A-B bis (what is begotten from one
ὁ ὑποκάτω, that ὕποκατωταί knows as a son). 432D (Comparative degree does not

(120) Dedication. p. 324.
indicate that ἐὰν ἐν κόσμῳ is other). 11: 433D (God external to the world according to His own ἐν κόσμῳ). 12: 436D (generation of Son above the ἐν κόσμῳ of man), 13: 437 (Scripture knows ἐὰν πάντως of both God and creatures). 17: 444C ("Son" = what is out of one ἐν κόσμῳ). 19: 449C (Logos other πάρει ἐν κόσμῳ φύατον). 20: 452C (generation of Son is other than the human ἐν κόσμῳ). 21: 453C (Logos is ἐν κόσμῳ ἀλήθειας). 22: 456B (Son is ἐν κόσμῳ ἀλήθειας καὶ ἐν ἀληθινοῖς). 23: 457A (similar but non-identical metals alike but separated ἐν κόσμῳ ἀληθείας καὶ ἐν ἀληθινοῖς). 24: 457C (indivisibility ἐν κόσμῳ ἀληθείας (gen. of respect) of Light and Radiance). 29: 472A (the ζωὴν does not remove the ἐν κόσμῳ of the Logos). In most of these instances the forms are adverbial and dynamic, and the use is not very different from the use in earlier books, but there are several instances where the use approaches that of Chalcedon.

There is relatively little in the way of other doctrines, but a considerable amount of new ground is broken. The most important is the doctrine of the categorial distinction between Divine and creaturely reality. God is personal, but is constant, simple, uncompounded, and omnipresent, without a frontier or an environment; this is due to His self-existence. Creatures, on the other hand, are limited both spatially and temporally, compounded, or complex, essentially changeable and dissoluble, and in a relation of dependence on, and in the case of fellow creatures, interaction with, their environment. This is a complete doctrine of radical pluralism as the truth about creaturely existence, with the exception that Athanasius does not yet mention the essential equality of all creatures as part of his systematic exposition of this doctrine, and he does not yet mention that all creatures are members of a class. Both these are cornerstones of his later exposition of this doctrine in the "Contra Arianos".

The doctrine of Creation is just the same as in the previous
anti-Arian writings; that is, it is by the direct action of God, without need for a Being Who is intermediary in nature, and is Creatio ex nihilo, Creatio per Verbum, and Creatio continuata, as in the orthodox doctrine of the later Church.

There is very little change, if any in the Christology. The Christological terms for the Humanity of Christ are: Ἰ. ..., body: 14: 440B bis (each, the Logos took b.), 14: 440D (L. μορφή ζητήθη ἐξ αὐτοῦ), 14: 440D alterum (L. bore b.), 14: 440D tertium (τὸ ἔσοδον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπεμφάνισθη). 31: 473C (L. bore b.). ἐξ ἐνέργειας τοῦ Θεοῦ; 24: 457B (abandon all corporeal reasoning).

flesh: 14: 440C (Prov. 8: 22 LXX measured by the fl. taken for us), 14: 440C alterum (as John 1: 14), 25: 461A (Not F. but L. became flesh), 3: 421A (origin ζητήθη ἐξ αὐτοῦ; Arian arguments really imply Christ did not antedate), 14: 440C tertium (His own fl.), ἄνθρωπος, man: 1: 417A & 14: 440 A & B (Human statements only apply after He became man). 14: 440D (He became m. but still God). 14: 440B (being Son of G. became S. of M.) 16: 444A (Heretical position: Christ solely man). These examples, not frequent enough for a more detailed examination that would be statistically significant, show the same characteristics as in the previous writings, especially the greater tendency to talk about the Logos being, or rather becoming, man, rather than any of the other terms.

As for the soteriology, there is very little alteration from the pattern of the "De Incarnatione". The change in the "De Sententia", the emphasis on salvation as constitutive ingrafting into the New Humanity of Christ, and in the "In illud, omnia mihi tradita sunt," in which salvation is, more than in any writing before or after, the pure Mighty Act of God, appear to have been neutralised. The difference is that whereas in the earlier work salvation was described as Deification, (120) it is now described as Adoption to Sonship as well, (121) and this difference is patently due to Athanasius's greater awareness of the difference between Creator and creature consequent upon the Arian

(120) ch. 14: 440D.
(121) 31: 473C.
controversy. Also, with reference both to Adoption and Deification, Athanasius begins to bring in the part played by the Holy Spirit, for the same reason.

The principal and characteristic achievements of this book are, the presentation of a definitive position on the Homoousion, and also the \( \tau \alpha \iota \theta \sigma \omicron \omicron \mu \circ \eta \omicron \) \( \nu \) metaphor as the determinative description of the intra-Trinitarian relation, the breaking down of the correlation between the Logos and the Cosmos and the tight correlation of the Logos and the Father, and, for that reason, the beginnings of a doctrine of the Spirit, but no more than the beginnings. This last would have been made much more difficult by the naturally binitarian character of the \( \tau \alpha \iota \theta \sigma \omicron \omicron \mu \circ \eta \omicron \nu \) analogy, which is, if anything, a retrogression from the formal Trinitarianism of the passages quoted in chs. 25-27 from Origen and his followers, and the Dionysii. In some ways, this book portrays the definitive anti-Arian theology of Athanasius, especially on the "conciliar" type of issue the supreme representative of which is the Homoousion. The recent German Protestant school of criticism readily accepts this, since it assumes that it is later than the "Contra Arianos I-III". Here, there are a few advances made in the subject-matter of this work, notably in analogy and in the clearer presentation of the \( \tau \alpha \iota \theta \sigma \omicron \omicron \mu \circ \eta \omicron \nu \) argument. But, at the level of most of the best Athanasian scholarship, which regards Athanasius as a Nicene pure and simple, it would be valid to take this work as very near the acme of Athanasian theology. What we find different in the "Contra Arianos" is something other than these things. In the first place, there is, for the first time since Athanasius's young manhood, a
concentration on soteriology, which is only indirectly on the subject of this thesis, because of the problem of Scriptural exegesis, and for the same reason there is the first definitive presentation of the Humanity of Christ in detail. Also, the question of Scriptural exegesis itself is much more evident on the larger canvas. But above all, the great change in the later work is that here, for the first time, Athanasius has really felt the inner logic of Arianism. The author (assuming his own thesis to be correct) would never have believed that Arianism was really an early form of philosophical Marxism on the basis of the "De Decretis" and the earlier anti-Arian writings alone. It was left for the Orations to make this clear, and nearly all the decisive passages that we have quoted in support of this contention come from them. It is perhaps no accident that a high percentage of the material of the Orations, especially II: 18-82, is relevant, in a far more direct way than ever before, to the Church's struggle with Communism. It is to the Orations that we now turn, as the next work of Athanasius.
CHAPTER VII

CONTRA ARIANOS ORATIONES I - III

On the chronology that we have adopted, these great works were the next works of Athanasius in order of writing. We have already given our reasons for the following conclusions; (1) that they were the magnum opus of Athanasius, (2) that they were written consecutively, even if they were issued at different times, and that no other major work was written during the period of composition, (3) that they form a unity of exceptional coherence, and (4) that they were written between 351 and early 356; the latest possible date of publication of C. Ar. III was February, 357.(1) As regards the character of the works, they were meant to be a massive denunciation of Arianism and vindication of the Nicene theology, they were meant to be written "at large" without any specific stimulus, and, above all, they were meant to be purely theological in outlook. That is, they cut down all references to historical and ecclesiastical material to a bare minimum; the aim was to show, in massive completion, the theological and especially the Scriptural basis of the Nicene theology, and conversely, that Arianism had no corresponding basis, rather than to defend at once formulae such as the Homoousion. The result is that five sixths of the whole three books is primarily concerned with the exegesis of key passages of Scripture. It is also evident that the orations, as we have them, are incomplete, that is, that a genuine Fourth Oration was either written and lost, or planned and never written,(2) but that whatever this work

(2) See below, pp. 125'-61.
might have been it was certainly not the work commonly known as Oratio IV Contra Arianos, which will be discussed separately. If we may hazard a guess, it is highly probable that the loss of the Fourth Oration, or Athanasius's failure to write it, was due in some way to the storm that broke on him in 356, that brought on the Third Exile, but the point cannot be fully appreciated till after full consideration of the contents of the Orations as they stand.

The first half of the Oration I is an introductory discussion of the basic concepts involved in the conflict. Chapter 1 need not detain us, being merely a statement of the evil nature of Arianism.

The first feature mentioned of Arianism as a sign of its true nature is that they are always called after Arius as their eponymous founder, an honour that true Christians reserve for Christ; this applies both to the nomenclature as given by others and as given or countenanced by themselves. Newman in his notes makes great play of these chapters, evidently with Lutheranism and Calvinism in mind. As far as the present study is concerned, a Protestant can only pass over Newman with angry silence, and listen to Athanasius with more humility, remembering in the meantime that any answer on this matter would be fully as complicated as the whole question of the interpretation of the Reformation (an urgent necessity in this age), and as impossible here; it could be rejoined that the same criticism applies, with not much less real force, to the disputes between the Dominicans and the Franciscans, the Thomists and the Scotists, and, most of all, to many features of the cult of saints and the attachment of monastic orders to their earthly founders.

Again, says Athanasius, the Arians have repudiated the Apostolic faith for the sake of their own novelties, which are expressed

See Appendix, pp.
in the Thalia, which in its dissoluteness of atmosphere is utterly
different from Scripture. It cannot be implied from this that, for
Athanasius, ecclesiastical piety was any sort of norm for theology in
the way that Scripture is, which, among Protestants, would be the
doctrine of Schleiermacher. What Athanasius meant was that the whole
atmosphere of the Arian heresy was bad, because it was a denial of
Christ (4: PG XXVI: 20A) at least as much as the wording of the "Thalia",
etc., and even in passages where the Arians were ostensibly quoting
Scripture itself. No Protestant need do anything but most heartily
agree with Athanasius's use of this criterion; for that matter, it is
a thing that some Protestants need to learn from Athanasius, to take
the macroscopic view into account at least as much as the microscopic.

These three chapters give a general account of Arianism,
based almost entirely on the "Thalia" of Arius; as we have already
treated this issue completely, they will not require any more
attention. This section concludes with the condemnation of the heresy
at Nicaea and the loathing in which it has been held by right-thinking
people since.

After continuing that the quotation of a few Scriptural
phrases does not exculpate one from the gravity of the charge of
heresy - otherwise there would be nothing wrong with Judaism,
Manichaeanism, or even the serpent in the Garden of Eden - Athanasius
gives one of the classical expositions of the Christocentric principle
in all theology: (28A) "For having committed impiety (διά βασιλείας)
against the Logos of God, he (almost certainly Arius) fell at once in
every particular and lost everything . . . . For how could anyone speak
truth concerning the Father, if he denies the Son, Who reveals concerning

Him? Or how can anyone have correct sentiments concerning the Spirit, while he insults the Logos that supplies It? And who will trust him concerning the Resurrection, as he denies Christ, the First begotten of the dead, for us? And how shall he not err in respect to His incarnate presence, as he is simply ignorant of the Son's genuine and true generation from the Father? The rest of the chapter is another condemnation of the novelty of Arianism; apart from the fact that the heresy is not , which from our point of view is non-committal (see De Decr. 4), nothing need be said. The Christocentric principle would be better described as Logocentric, but centred on the Logos as previously defined by Athanasius, so that its correlations are with God the Father and not with the cosmos, since even the Incarnation is peripheral with respect to the pre-incarnate Logos. Also, the Logos is, as far as our knowledge of theology is concerned, central not only with regard to what might be called miscellaneous doctrines, but also with regard to the doctrines of the other Persons of the Trinity, not only the Spirit, which Athanasius does not yet certainly treat as transcendent in his detailed theology, but also the Father Himself.

In the next chapter, Athanasius contrasts Arianism with the orthodox theology of the Second Person, of which he gives a compendious summary: "He is Very Son of the Father, and natural and genuine is He proper to His essence, Wisdom only-begotten, and Very and Only Logos of God, not a creature or thing made, but an Offspring proper to the Father's Essence. Wherefore He is Very God, existing co-essential with

(5) ουσφημων εις τον τροπον χρηστουν λογον - should be capital.
(6) τον εκ νεκρων διης πρωτοτυχον γενεμουν αρηστουν.
(7) και περι της ενσωματωσεως αυτου.
(8) την εκ πατρος τοιον χρηστων και αληθην γεννεσιν.
(9) See above, pp. 582-3., for a critical discussion of this chapter.
the very Father; (10) while other beings to whom He said, 'I said, "Ye are gods," 'have this grace from the Father only by participation (μετοχή) in the Logos through the Spirit. (11) For He is expression (Χαράκτης) of the Father's Person (ὑποστάσεως), and Light (φως) of Light, and Power (δύναμις) and Image (τύπον) of the Essence (οὐσίας) of the Father. For this too hath the Lord said, 'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father'. And He ever was and is, and never was not. For, the Father being everlasting, His Logos and Wisdom would also be everlasting." Very little need be said about the summary of the orthodox theology that has been not said before, except to note that, once again, the Spirit has come up in the usual way, that is, in reference to our own participation in the Divine nature as supplied by the Logos as distinct from the Logos's aboriginal possession of it. Also, in this section is the sole mention of the Homoeousion in the Orations. In the latter half of ch. 9, there is a further account of Arianism, and in the next chapter, Athanasius calls imperatively for a decision between the way of truth and the way of falsehood. The criteria of the falsehood of Arianism are exactly as at the beginning of the "De Sententia Dicynsii" (chs. 1 & 2), that is, that it is un-Scriptural, and that it not so much offends Reason as perpetrates elementary gaffes, or what ought to be the elementary gaffe of worshipping and ascribing the supremacy to a being that is described, with the greatest emphasis, as a creature. (12)

At this stage, the real work of Athanasius begins. The first question is the eternity of the Son: "... ye think that there was once when the Son was not (ἦν ποτε δὲ οὐκ ἦν ὁ Υἱός). Say, then, what

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was once (13) when the Son was not . . . . If ye say the Father, your
blasphemy is the greater, for it is not pious (θεματις) to say that He
was 'once' or to signify Him by the word 'once'; for He is ever, and is
now, and as the Son is, so is He, and is Himself He that Is, and Father
of the Son . . . . (But if you say the Son, it is a simple self-
contradiction) . . . . you can but answer, 'There was time (χρονος)
when the Logos was not, for the very adverb 'once' signifies this.
And your other written statement, 'He was not before His generation'
(ουκ ην πριν ευνηθεν), is the same thing as your statement, 'There was
once when He was not,' for both the one and the other signify that there
is a time (χρονος) before the Logos . . . . No holy Scripture hath used
such language about the Saviour, but rather 'always' (το αει), 'eternal'
(το αιωνιον), and 'eternally co-existent with the Father' (το συνεκκλεει
αει, το Πατερα) . . . . (John 1:1, Rev. 1:4, Rom. 9:5 cited) . . . . (Returning
to Asterius's exegesis of "Power of God," etc. as in Rom. 1:20, Athanasius
says on it) . . . . in these words he does not designate the Father, as
you often whisper to each other, affirming that the Father is 'His
eternal Power.' (14) This is not so, because He does not say that God
Himself is the Power, but His is the Power. (15) It is quite plain that
the 'His' is not 'He,' but is not something alien, but rather proper to
Him. (16) Study too the sequence of the argument and 'turn to the Lord' (17)
for 'the Lord is the Spirit.' (18) - and you will see that the reference is
to the Son.

"For after making mention of creation, he consistently speaks
of the Framer's Power as seen in it, which Power, I say, is the Logos
of God, through Whom all things have come to be." On the question of
Time, it would be better to return to it later, since Athanasius has
more to say about it in the next chapter. There are two other small
issues. One is the Two-Logos theory of Asterius, which we are postponing

(13) Here, as always, the enclitic ποτε.
(14) το αει
(15) το αιωνιον, και εν ημιλλον αυτω.
(16) το αει
(17) As from II Cor. 3: 16.
(18) II Cor. 3: 17.
till Athanasius's definitive treatment of it in the Second Oration.
The other is Athanasius's tantalizingly brief introduction of
II Cor. 3:17, "How the Lord is the Spirit", for no better reason
apparently than that he took the previous words from II Cor. 3:16.
This shows that the Spirit was forcing itself into the consciousness
of Athanasius, if nothing else.

Continuing, on the question of creation: "If indeed creation
is sufficient of itself alone, without the Son, to make God known, (19)
see that you do not make the mistake of thinking that without the Son
creation has come to be. But if, through the Son it has come to be,
and 'in Him all things consist (συνεστήκεν)', (20) then necessarily he
who contemplates rightly the creation contemplates (ὁρεῖ) also the
Logos that framed it, and through Him begins to apprehend the Father.
And if, as the Saviour also says, 'No one knoweth the Father save the
Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal Him, (21) and if, on Philip's
asking, 'Show us the Father,' He said not, 'Behold the creation,' but
'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father,' (22) ' Paul is right to
have accused the Greeks of contemplating the harmony and order (τοῦ
world, but not reflecting on the Framing Logos within it (for
the creatures bear witness to their own Framer); so that they might
apprehend through them the True God and abandon their worship of
creatures, he said, 'His eternal Power and Godhead', so as to signify
the Son." This difficult and paradoxical passage is perhaps a last
glance at the natural theology of the "Contra Gentes". (23) Here, it
is still presented as being a most desirable part of a theologian's
equipment, at any rate of a man who is in the habit of contemplating
nature, but the statement is categorically made, on the basis of

(19) Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἃπειρὸν ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ γῆν ἀποικία, ἕως ὅταν ἐπισταθήσῃ τὸν Θεόν.
(20) Col. 1:17.
(21) Matt. 11:27.
(22) John 14:8-9.
(23) See above, pp. 81-91.
Jesus's answer to Philip, that it is not the definitively Christian way of knowledge of the Father, which is directly through Christ. Athanasius seems to be insisting on both alternatives, that natural theology is possible and that it is impossible, not in the sense of presenting one alternative as the truth and the other as an unreal hypothetical but apparently treating each with a roughly equal amount of respect. However, at this stage, the antithetical case against natural theology is expressed, along with the natural theology that was treated at length in the Contra Gentes. If there is any conclusion possible on the matter, on the basis of this passage, it would be, firstly, that the difficulties in Athanasius would be in large measure the difficulties inherent in any exegesis of Romans 1, and, secondly, that Athanasius is of the opinion that natural theology, analogia entis, etc., can enable one to deduce God in His cosmological relationships, but it is utterly unable to give any clue as to the Trinitarian character of God, or to any doctrine connected therewith; least of all to the Filial relation of the Son and Father; approximately the position of Thomas Aquinas.) It is true that the Trinity is far more in evidence than in the Contra Gentes; the Logos as Offspring of the Father, introduced in a comparatively offhand way in the Contra Gentes, is here taken in deadly earnestness, but Athanasius's continuing uncertainty between the idea of "God" being knowable from creation alone, the Logos being knowable from creation alone but the Father only through the Logos, and the Logos being knowable essentially through His own self-revelation and the Father as before knowable only through the Logos, shows that he did not yet understand that Creation was itself a Trinitarian doctrine in such a way as to be a diriment
impediment to cosmological natural theology. On the other hand, it must be said, in fairness to Athanasius, that one of the things that for him, we see when we contemplate creation is that it must not be worshipped; as we shall see later, this principle, although always stated by Athanasius, is sheeted home much more effectively in C. Ar. II, but in fact it needed the Arian controversy to make it clear.

In the remainder of ch. 12 and in ch. 13, Athanasius contrasts the Scriptural language about the Logos—Son with that about creatures; in the former case, Heb. 1:2, Is. 40:28, Susanna 42, Baruch 4: 20 and 22, Heb. 1:3, Ps. 90 AV: 17 and 36 AV: 9, Ps. 145 AV: 13, and the ἄρμασιν sentences of the Fourth Gospel and elsewhere, establish that the language of eternity is appropriate to God, that it is used of the Son, and thus that the fact "that the Son is eternal and without beginning, before all ages," (24) must be accepted, (ch. 12 end) without any interval (σταυροῦ) (37B) before Him; in the latter case, Gen. 2:5, Deut. 32:8, John 14:26-29, Prov. 8:23, John 8:58, Jer. 1:5, Ps. 110:2, Susanna 42, prove on the contrary that (13: 40B): "Οὐκ ἦν ποτὲ and πρὶν ἐγενέσθαι and ἐκτέ, and suchlike, are expressions which apply to things originate and creatures, which came to be ex nihilo, but are alien (ἀλλοτρία) to the Logos. But if such terms are used in Scripture of things originate, but 'always' of the Logos, it follows . . . that the Son has not come to be ex nihilo, nor is He at all among things originate, but is Image of the Father and Eternal Logos, nor was He at any time non-existent (οὐκ ἦν) but ever existent (ἀλλὰ ἦν), as the Eternal Radiance of Light which is eternal. (25) Why then do you imagine times (Χρονός) before the Son, or wherefore apply the blasphemy 'after times' (μετά Χρονός) to the Logos, through whom the ages have come to be? For how did time (Χρόνος) or age (ἄιδω) subsist (ὑπὲρ ἀιδων) when the Logos had, according to you, not yet appeared . . . (in spite of John 1:3) . . . Or why, when you mean time (Χρόνος), do you not say

(24) τὸ δίδον τινι τὸ πρὸ πάντως ἐξ οὗ ἐκατόρθον διὰ τοῦ λόγου.
(25) ἢ τὸ δίδον βάλοντος χωρὶς δίδον ἀλλοτρία χρόνου.
clearly, 'There was time when the Logos was not. But, while you drop the word 'time' to deceive the simple, you fail to conceal your own sentiments... For you still simply mean 'times' (γενόσουσι), when you say ἦν πρὸς τοῖς ὅπως ἦν and ἦν οἵ πρὸς τοῦς ἔτη.'

The important thing about this exposition of the Eternity of the Son is that it is entirely Scriptural, that this extract is the heart of the first half of "Contra Arianos" I, and that it sets the whole tone of it. It might appear on first sight that Athanasius is rational and dialectical when he is discussing the general characteristics of Arian theology, as in C. Ar. I: 1-36, and Scriptural only when he discusses Arian exegesis from I: 37-III: 58. It might be deduced that Athanasius in essence accepted some authority, whether reason or piety or Church tradition and discipline, as fundamental, with even Scripture in a secondary position. This is not so; both sections of the "Contra Arianos" are thoroughly Scriptural, and in each, Athanasius acknowledges the fundamental authority of God's own Revelation of Himself in Scripture. The difference is due to two facts; first, that, whereas in the first section Athanasius is discussing Arian creeds, slogans, and other theological teachings, in the second he is discussing Arian exegesis; and in the first section Athanasius had, exegetically, a much easier time than in the second section, of which more later at the appropriate place. There is one other characteristic of Athanasius's argumentation that is shown very clearly here, far more than in any earlier writings, by the great emphasis that he lays on the "I Am" (Ἐσμαι) statements in the

(26) Cf. God's reply in Exod. 3:14, LXX: ἐσμαι ἦμών δέδηκα. The "I Am" phrase, while not identical to it, has a traditional connection with the Sacred Tetragrammaton. Actually, this verb, in the original Hebrew, יִהְיֶה, almost certainly refers to God's revelation rather than his abstract existence, but the way that Athanasius took it was quite general throughout the Greek tradition.
Fourth Gospel and elsewhere, which he interprets ontologically if not exactly in accordance with the Old Testament Hebrew that undoubtedly lies behind the Greek. We have already seen how Athanasius insists that God and creatures do not exist in the same way. It is time now to define this difference more accurately as in Athanasius. In spite of a temporary tendency in his earlier writings to use such Origenistic words as ἐπερχομένους of God, he accepts as axiomatic the idea that being in its perfection belongs to God alone; (the opposite idea is accepted by such diverse groups as the Neo-Platonists, Christian mystics of the type of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, the Existentialists and Paul Tillich, who describe God as "above being", and all kinds of modern atheistic realists and positivists who describe God as below the level of existence,) the Septuagintal ὄς occurs as virtually the title of God in this very passage. (Therefore, these Ἐμῖ statements are primarily revelations of God, and as such must have absolute priority over anything else.) Modern thinkers and theologians would perhaps balk at this analysis, preferring to discuss directly the adequacy of language and rational discourse to take part in the revelation of God, but this problem is more undeniable than ever, and in any case is later discussed by Athanasius in just these terms. God has the priority in His own Revelation, even over the imperfections of the vehicle. The opposite doctrine, which would be implied by the Arian exegesis, that being, propositional language, discourse, would, even in the written and spoken word of God, refer essentially to creaturely existence so that language about creatures

(27) See C.G.2, and above, pp. 35 and 43.
would have the priority, is a course which terminates inexorably, not in Arianism, but in Marxism or post-Marxist atheism.

The next point is the treatment of the issue of time and temporal issues. This is a difficult aspect of theology: what is the relation between time and the eternity of God? In what sense is God co-temporal and in-temporal, as well as being pre-temporal, post-temporal and supra-temporal? Is time another entity, another thing, and as such, in the usual theological tradition, necessarily a creation, or when we talk in that way are we really ever referring to anything more than temporal processes? (All the things that can ever be accepted as standards of time are really other temporal processes, like the mean solar day or year or parts thereof, and also the modern accurate atomic standards: this is recognised as true in the Bible, where a "day" is the discrete period in which a certain job of work must be done and completed, for the night cometh in which no man can work, and then, by extension, the job of work itself.) If we rigidly suppose time, in an abstract general sense, to be created in the way that things are, the danger is that the Scriptural accounts of Creation and the Last Judgment become not only saga in Barth's sense, but myth in Bultmann's sense, and even plain nonsense - even John 1:1. The

(28) According to this way of looking at the matter, there is no word in Hebrew for "time" in the abstract, in the same way as there is no such thing in either Old Testament or Mishnaic Hebrew as the logical copula in the true sense. On the other hand, it would not be at all accurate to conclude that Hebrew did not know time at all, since, by the analogy that we have noticed, they knew very well the difference between the subject and the predicate, and showed that by certain features of their accidence and syntax, especially concerning adjectives. Incidentally, such authors as Plato and Aristotle frequently omit the logical copula, so that their subject-predicate sentence has the same form as in Hebrew, even when they are defining the relationship in the way of traditional logic. In fact, the analysis of Plato's "Sophist" is based on such an omission of the logical copula. (see sect. 254-268, esp. 263).


(30) There is no point in trying to give references for something that
effect of this sort of interpretation on Athanasius would be to make his argument prove too much, that is, that the Arian slogan $\overline{\gamma} \nu \pi o r e \delta r e \ \delta \omicron \kappa \ \overline{\gamma} \nu$ would be literally meaningless, instead of having a meaning that is only too definite and blasphemous. On the other hand, if we accept that, for Athanasius as for the Old Testament as the author of this thesis understands it, words for time always referred to something constituted by the process within that time, we can begin to understand his point. (31) On this basis, there would be one sense in which time was created only with the world, for normally Time requires change for its detection, let alone measurement, but there is another sense in which there was time even before the creation, insofar as we can recognise it as being constituted by what Augustine described as the eternal love of Father and Son, the Spirit. (32) In another and more common sense, this would be eternity as opposed to time, insofar as time is necessarily associated with change. It is almost certain that

is as pervasive of all the writings of Rudolf Bultmann as this. A myth for Bultmann, is a statement about God as an objectively understood Being, especially and normally a Being in a "three-decker" cosmos. This way of looking at God he regards as part of the thought forms of the time, which has nothing really to do with religion. However, as these statements have their own sort of truth, their destiny is, not to be rejected, but to be "demythologized" into what their real significance is, statements about "human existence" in the Existentialist sense. Bultmann appears to have invented the term "demythologization". But the author cannot see that this procedure is anything more than a special case of a general way of handling religious statements, which was also practised, on the basis of an entirely different philosophy and therefore in the opposite sense, by Hegel, and done much more effectively too. As for Bultmann's position in detail, the author cannot deny that there are real difficulties involved in Biblical cosmology and Creation in "six days", but cannot accept Bultmann's solution, since he feels that he uses the difficulties as an excuse for the arbitrary enthronement of Existentialism.

(31) The author feels that this way of regarding "day", that is, that it was constituted by God's discrete act of work and not by astronomy or geophysics, is the best solution of the difficulties involved in Gen. 1:1.

Athanasius, however incoherently, thought along these lines, since he virtually regards, "What time existed when the Logos did not?" as an improper question, the only proper question being "WHO existed, etc.?"

It is now clear exactly what Athanasius meant when (at the beginning of ch. 11) he described the Arian slogan as an even greater blasphemy than to say that there was a time (Χρονός) when the Son was not. The English does not make this clear, since, in the natural English translation, "There was once when He was not," the word "once", which is the critical word, is naturally accented. But the Greek word is Προθε, an enclitic. This was the word which the Arians used to denote what could only be the majestic Eternity of the Father! — for in Scripture the corresponding expressions, as in John 1:1 etc., always refer, not to an abstract eternity, but to God Himself as eternally existing. In part, the Arians worked out this formula to make their blasphemy less noticeable than a definite statement that there was a time (Χρονός) or times before the Logos, partly, it was a genuine reflection of the philosophical difficulties in the notion of a first temporal being with a temporal terminus a quo; the Arians were unlucky that, in the circumstances, the attempt to circumvent these factors only made their blasphemy worse than ever. (33)

The next chapter opens with another Arian objection, that if the Father and Son co-exist, they must be brothers. This is at once dismissed by the simple statement that the language of Scripture is that of Sonship and not of brotherhood, and above all, there is nothing

(33) We may refer here to Newman's Excursus on Προθε and its meaning in the Nicene Anathema. It will be found in his editions of the Select Treatises of St. Athanasius in Controversy with the Arians, and has been reprinted in the L.P.N.F. This is a discussion of the thesis of Bishop Bull, Defensio Fidei Nicaeanae III: 5-8, in which he said that Athanasius and the Nicenes, in opposing this Arian phrase, meant that there was a time before the generation of the Son, but that the Son did exist during that period, since the "generation" was simply the change from the Second Person as the (eternal) Λόγος to the Son as Ἰησοῦς Χριστός.
from which the two Persons have a common origin, but the Father is the Origin (ἐγένετο) and Begetter (γεννήτωρ) of the Son (41A); this is simply another statement of the need to disjoin temporal priority from intra-Trinitarian origination, which we have already seen in Athanasius's treatment of the ἐγένετον. (34) The remainder of the three chapters is a treatment of issues that have been fully covered in the "De Decretis": (35) and which we shall therefore mention in passing: The eternity of the generation of the Son follows from the eternity of God, as distinct from the transitoriness and compositeness of men. It is also implied by the other Scriptural titles of the Son, especially Wisdom, and Radiance in relation to Light; without the Logos-Wisdom-Son, God would be Logosless (λόγος) and Wisdomless (σοφία). There is all the

Bull gives a whole series of Patristic ante-Nicene references for such an interpretation of the generation of the Son, which can serve for our purpose as another very good collection of evidence for the confusion of Patristic thought on this matter (see above pp. 481-3). Newman, quite rightly, takes the opposite view, saying that for Athanasius, as for the Arians, the generation of the Son could only be His origin, and that therefore the phrase is synonymous with ην τοτε στε ούκ ἦν. Therefore Athanasius attacks the Arian use by denying that there was ever any time anyway before His generation, thus enunciation by implication, though not in so many words, the doctrine of the Eternity of the Generation of the Son. On the other hand, one can join issue with Newman's treatment of the issue, as regards his attempt to whitewash completely the whole ante-Nicene theology; it must be admitted to have been a potent cause of confusion, which the Arians exploited to the full in this particular as in other ways in connection with the Arian heresy.

(34) See above, pp. 284-308
(35) Chs. 11-12 and 15-23. See above, pp. 610-37
(36) λόγος means exactly what Jean-Paul Sartre means by "absurde".

The vogue of this concept, apparently in reaction to excessive rationalism in theology, is highly dangerous, since it exactly corresponds to the centaurs and other monsters in heathen idolatry. It is not only Thomas Aquinas but Karl Barth (contrary to his popular reputation) who affirms that God is the supremely rational being, and that irrationality in the sense being criticised is not a quality of God as opposed to an alleged rationality of creatures, but one of the most damnable features of human sin (See the section on sin in Ch. Dogm. Vol. IV: Pt. II).
difference in the world between the Son's relation to the Father and the way in which creatures participate in the Deity; the Son completely partakes in the Father, and as such is the complete Image of the Father, so that he that has seen the Son has also, completely, seen the Father; therefore, in the last sentence of ch. 16, Athanasius reaffirms that Arianism is really a blasphemy against the Father, not only in the sense that it is a denial of the Father's Paternity, but that it really denies His Deity.

However, the passages concerning sanctification and participation deserve closer attention, since they raise certain new issues. Beginning at 15:44B: "If then, as you say, the Son is ex nihilo, and was not before His generation, He of course would Himself also be called Son and God and Wisdom only by participation, (37) for thus other things both consist (Συνεπημέγες) and are glorified by sanctification. (38) You have to tell us then, of what He is partaker. All other things partake of the Spirit, but, according to you, of what is He partaker? Of the Spirit? Nay, rather does the Spirit Itself receive from the Son, (39) as He (the Son) Himself says, and it would be absurd to say that the latter was sanctified from the former . . . . (But if what is participated be) something external provided by the Father, (40) He would not then be a participator in the Father, but of something that came to be externally, and would no longer be even second after the Father, but Son of that (other) thing . . . . (But the Son is Son of the Father directly, by Scriptural evidence, and unless Father and Son directly share the same essence, one has to postulate an absolutely unknown third entity between their essences) . . . . (ch. 16) (Therefore we must say that) . . . . what is from the Essence . . . .

(37) Ἰδίως ἡμεῖς δοξάσαμεν.
(38) Ἐν υἱῷ ἡμῶν ἔφυγεν ἡμᾶς ἡμᾶς.
(39) ἐὰν ἂν ἑαυτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ὑπάρχαιν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ λαμβάνει.
(40) ἐὰν δὲν ἐστὶν ἑαυτόν ἐπιφύλαξεν παρὰ τῷ Πατρὶ.
of the Father, is entirely the Proper Son; for as to the statement that
God is wholly participated, it would be the equivalent to say that He
also generates, and what does generation signify save the Son? (41) And
thus all things partake of the Son Himself according to the grace of
the Spirit that comes to be from Him, (42) and it becomes clear from
this, that the Son Himself participates in nothing, but that what is
partaken from God, that is the Son. (43) For, as partaking of the Son
Himself, we are said to partake of God ... (II Pet. 1:4, I Cor. 3:16,
II Cor. 6:16). And seeing the Son, we see the Father, for the thought
and comprehension of the Son is knowledge (γνώσις) of the Father,
because He is the Proper Offspring of His Essence. And since to be
partaken (μετέχει) no one of us would ever call affection (τῇ ἁπαξ)
or division of God's Essence... therefore that which is begotten is
neither affection nor division of that blessed Essence... ."

In the first place, we notice pointedly the increase in
spontaneous references to the Holy Spirit, two in two chapters. Each
of these is again in the context of the way in which creatures
participate in God, indirectly and imperfectly, and the sense in which
the Son is truly and by nature God. The Spirit is established as the
necessary intermediary by which creation partakes of God, and the
necessity of the mediation of the Spirit for partaking in God is
established as a badge of creatureliness, as distinct from the Son.
Indeed, the main function of Pneumatology at this stage is to emphasise
the indirectness of this participation, and thus to make plain the
difference in kind between the way in which God is in Christ and in
which God is in the Christian. Unfortunately, there is almost no
doctrine yet about the place of the Spirit in the life of the Godhead.
The most that he says is that the Spirit receives from the Son, while
denying that in any way the Son receives from the Spirit. This is a

(41) ἕκ τῆς ουσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς Ἰδέων μετατρέπεται εἰς τὸν Υἱόν, ὁ ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν, γίνεται στήλη τῆς θεότητος, γεννά τῷ Υἱῷ.
(42) οὐκ ἔχει τὸ γνώσις τοῦ Οὐρανοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, γινώσκει τὸν Θεόν τῷ Πατρί.
(43) δυτὶρου ὡς ἐν τῷ Πατρί, οὕτως ἐν Χριστῷ, τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς μεταθέσεως. 

οὗν ἔστιν ἡ ζωὴ.
far cry from the later Cappadocian doctrine of the part of the Spirit in the perfection even of the Trinity Itself, and further still from the Augustinian doctrine of the Spirit as the common link, vinculum, between the Father and the Son, and, more concretely, Their mutual eternal love; on this basis, not only would Father and Son be the co-sources of the Spirit, but also Its primary and essential co-recipients. And Athanasius would have found his language about the equivalence of complete participation and "begetting" a grave embarrassment when he came to write the Ad Serapionem, because it would make it impossible to deny the charge of the Pneumatomachi that orthodox theology made the Son and Spirit brothers; and this embarrassment could not be explained by the unity of the Divine . However, whatever the defects of the doctrine of the Spirit actually presented in this passage, Athanasius was by now sufficiently conscious of the Spirit as a Trinitarian Person to consider seriously the possibility of the Second Person being constitutively a partaker of the Spirit, even though for the time being he absolutely restricts this relation to creation. (The most that Athanasius can be said to do to avoid Tropicism, so to speak, in advance, is that he does not use the concept of participation for the relation between the other Persons of the Trinity and the Spirit, with the implication that the Spirit is in fact ontologically subordinate to the Father and Son. Instead, he uses the relatively non-committal expression that the Spirit "receives" from the Son (at any rate in the text that has come down to us) without the dangerous prefix .) An incidental point is that Athanasius's language about the Son completely participating in the Father looks at first sight to be

(44) See Ep. I ad Serap. I:15 and IV.
hcretical, since it would imply that there was only a difference in
degree between the way in which God is in creatures and the way that
"God was in Christ". Indeed, in modern times, D.M. Baillie has
actually enunciated, or gone dangerously close to enunciating, a
Christology of this kind. (45) However, there are two factors that
would compel one to exonerate Athanasius completely. In the first
place, Athanasius in other places repeatedly treats expressions of
this kind, which are linguistically superlatives or even at times
merely comparatives, or perfections as contrasted with imperfections,
as implying a complete break, so that the difference is one of kind as
well as degree. (46) Secondly, in this particular case, the whole point
of Platonic participation of particulars in Forms is that the
participation, by definition, is not complete; the particulars are
always "striving" towards the perfections of the Forms, but never reach
it. (47) Thus, "complete participation" must involve difference in kind
as well as in degree. Incidentally, Athanasius would agree with the
Platonic Socrates of the "Parmenides", as against the Platonic
Parmenides, that participation by many particulars in the one Form
cannot imply division of the Form. Of course the point is that the
argument of the Platonic Parmenides is perfectly correct if the Forms
are considered as other things, or even as the only true things, as
the Platonic Socrates certainly did consider them; (48) what makes the

(45) See pp. 114 ff. and 125 ff. and McIntyre's review in the "Scottish
(46) See, for example, C. Ar. I: 53-64 and II: 62 ff.
(47) See, for example, "Phaedo", 72-77.
difference here is that, as Athanasius says in season and out of season, God is not to be considered materially.

This chapter opens with a summary of another argument: "... If God be Maker and Creator, and create the works through the Son, and the things that come to be are not to be understood except as through the Logos, is it not blasphemy, as God is Maker, to say that His framing Logos and His Wisdom once were not?" It is the same as saying that God is not Maker, if He had not His own Framing Logos out of Him, but the latter in whom He creates is some that accrues to Him (Επειγάρμοσθε) from without, and is alien to Him (Ενώπιον Άλλο) and is unlike in essence (Ανόμωις κατ' ουσίαν) ... . As a summary, it is pointless either to abbreviate or to paraphrase this passage. On the other hand, of itself it lacks precision, its content needing to be filled out by the Tritos argument, as in the De Decretis 8, and in particular by the numerous passages later on about the question of the predicative and/or hypostatic Word and Wisdom in God, and most important of all, in the concluding chapters at the end of Oration II, in which what is normally the cosmological function of the Logos-Wisdom is treated soteriologically. The author believes that the doctrine of Creatio per Verbum is unquestionably true in its traditional form. But granted the truth of the doctrine—and John 1:3 is incontrovertible on any interpretation—Athanasius's criticism is obvious. (The occurrence of the words Ενωρι and Ανομωις κατ' ουσίαν is not to be taken as a sign that Athanasius was thinking of a later "Anomoean" school of Arianism in contrast to an earlier more moderate school; the extract from the Thalia quoted in De Synodis 15, describes the Persons of the Trinity as being not alike in glories (ουκ άλλαν δυναμεις), and the Son as foreign in essence (Ενωρι κατ' ουσίαν to the Father).

(49) ητι δεμου χριαν αυτον λογον και την λοφιαν μη ειναι ποτε
(50) ιδιον ου δαμιο δημουογον λογον.
We have already cited in full the remainder of ch. 17 in which Athanasius shows that if the Arians try to keep a doctrine of the Trinity at all, they would have to become, so to speak, Hegelians in advance, and would in fact be committed to the view of Feuerbach at that, since the thing that the Trinity would have in common would be really creaturely.(51)

In the next chapter, from which we need not quote, this doctrine is angrily repudiated, and it is counter-affirmed that there is μια θεότης and μια δόξα(48C) in the Triad, which is eternal and unchangeable; therefore the Son is the λογός αἰωνος of the Father (49C).

Once more, Athanasius considers the eternity of the Second Person from His titles: "If God be, and be called, a Fountain of Wisdom and life, . . . (Jer. 2:13 and 17:12-13; Baruch 3:12) . . . this implies that the life and the wisdom are not foreign to the essence of the fountain, but proper to it, nor were they at any time without existence, but were always.(52) Now the Son is all this, Who says, 'I am the Life,' (53) and 'I Wisdom dwell with counsel.'(54) How then would one not be impious in saying 'There was once when the Son was not.'? For it is the same thing as to say, 'There was once when the Fountain was dry, without life or wisdom'. Such a thing would not be a fountain; for what does not beget from itself is not a fountain . . . (How blasphemous, especially as ordinary Christians are promised that they will be fountains - Is. 58:11) . . . . But the Truth witnesses that

(51) See above, pp. 456-458.
(52) γάρ συμνόμησις καὶ τήρησις καὶ κατακεραυνὶς ἐρευνά τὸ οὐτής τῆς πυρός εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐματία, ἄλλα ἀλλὰ εἰσὶν.
(54) Prov. 8:12.
God is an eternal Fountain of His own Wisdom . . . (Ps. 114:24, Prov. 3:9) . . . "The remainder of the chapter is taken up mostly with the obvious argument, that we have already described, that when Scripture speaks of "all things" being created through the Logos, the "all things" cannot be understood as including the Logos Himself, but is ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ ὑιὸν γεννημα. The problem of the extract cited will be discussed in full later.

Continuing along the same lines, Athanasius says that the Son cannot be a creature, since (53A:) "other things, according to the nature of things originate, have no likeness in essence to Him that has made them, but are external to Him, made by His Logos, at His grace and will,(55) and thus admit of ceasing to be, for things originate are of this nature (φύσεως)." Then, he brings up again some of the other titles of the Logos-Son (53B): " . . . the Son is Image and Radiance of the Father, and Expression (Χριστός) and Truth. For if, when Light exists, (56) there is its Image, the radiance, and, when there is a Hypostasis (ὑποστάσεις - in gen. abs. construction), there is an entire expression (διαθέσθηται ὁ λόγος) of this, and if there is a Father, there exists the Truth, (that is, the Son),(57) let them see into what depths of irreligion (ἀπειλήσεις) they have fallen, in measuring the Image ( valida) and Form (ἐιδῆς) of the Godhead by the standard of time (Χρόνον). For if the Son was not before His generation, Truth would not be always in God . . . (but) . . . since the Father was, there was ever in Him the Truth, which is the Son . . . (John 14:6). And the Hypostasis existing, there must of course at once be its Expression and Image(58), for God's Image is not delineated (γραμμή) from without, but God Himself hath begotten It, in which seeing Himself He delights(59) as the Son Himself says, "I was His delight." (Prov. 8:30). When then did the Father not see Himself in His own Image? Or when had

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(55) Χριστῦν καὶ διαθέσθηται διὰ τοῦ πατρὸς γέννημα.
(56) ὑπὸ τοῦ φωτός ἐκβάλλεται.
(57) ὑπὸ τοῦ, supplied in Migne, is omitted in CX. Seguer.; present elsewhere.
(58) τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ τὸν Εἰκόνα αὐτήν.
(59) ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὥσπερ ἐν προφητῇ τριτε.
He not delight . . . .? And how would the Maker and Creator see Himself in a created and originate essence? For the Image must be such as is its Father. (60)

This account of the love of Father and Son is quite frankly narcissistic; further comment or explication is superfluous. This is one of the most difficult and dangerous problems of theology, but it is one that must be faced, above all in our own day, not least because of the racial issue and other ways in which this most powerful impulse affects ordinary life. It is Karl Barth above all theologians who has emphasised the essential sinfulness of Narcissism (esp. Ch. D. III:II pass. esp. pp. 222-289), and this is in him correlated with his uncompromising insistence that the Divine Life itself is based not only on the unity of the Trinity, but on its Triplicity; not only on the way in which the Persons are one, but also on the way in which they are different. Unfortunately Athanasius introduces this extraneous note, in an explicit way, where it does not figure explicitly in the Scriptural references, either in Prov. 8 or elsewhere, and this tendency has been transmitted undoubtedly to later theology, exaggerated by the Arian controversy. This is one of the points on which more attention should have been paid to Barth, particularly by his critics; it is possible that his emphasis is one-sided as well, and that his approach would finally commit himself, in spite of his own wishes, to Hegelianism or some other related position. But not nearly enough has been said about this question. And when we have said this, we can see that the question is also of great interest from the point of view of the Arian heresy as well as orthodox theology. May not Arianism, owing to its wrong insistence that even the intra-Trinitarian life was a life among unlike entities, have been in a strong position to protest against

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the Narcissistic tendencies of men, with all their consequences of
racialism, cultural pride, etc.? This is almost certainly another
resemblance between Arianism on hand and Marxism and left-wing
Hegelianism on the other. One thinks of the ostentatiously good record
of Communism in race relations in this connection. One thinks also of
the origin of both movements in intellectually sophisticated regions
and their spread to be the creeds of the opposite types of community.

The other smaller point of immediate interest is the use of
the word Hypostasis - ὑπόστασις. The one thing that it does not mean
is Hypostasis or Person in the Trinitarian sense, or any sort of πρότη
or διάστασις κ.τ.λ. ουσία, or yet "Subsistence" (pace N.p-N.L.) in any
present sense of this word. It means exactly what it says etymologically
which is, in fact, the meaning Heb. 1:3; that is, what stands under the
phenomenon. Most importantly, it is the precise inverse correlate of
image, ἐικών and expression, ἔκφρασις, again as in Heb. 1:3. It
would exactly correspond to the Object in geometrical optics, as
related with the Image. Its exact theological meaning is what a later
theology meant by "Deus absconditus" as opposed to the revelation of
this God in Jesus Christ. In the first place, this shows that the
fully-developed Trinitarian terminology was far in the future when
this was written, and also shows that the term Hypostasis would have
had at least as many disadvantages for the Greeks as "Person" has for
moderns; one could charge that the Cappadocians, in using "Hypostasis"
in their Trinitarian sense, were being quite un-Scriptural. This is
just in passing. In the second place, this language, and in fact the
whole of chs.19 & 20, raises in an acute form the question of relativism,
the doctrine that things are constituted by their relations. Here, for
the first time, Athanasius raises the question in an absolutely
explicit form, but it would be better to postpone consideration of it
until all the evidence is in, at the end of ch. 29. It is sufficient to notice at this stage that all the attributes of both Persons are treated relativistically, that is, the words Son, Logos, Wisdom, Radiance, Image, Expression (χαρακτήρ), and even Truth, all severally presuppose the First Person as their correlate and origin, and similarly the title Father itself by its very nature presupposes an Offspring to Whom all these terms properly apply.

In the next chapter, Athanasius considers further what it means for the Second Person to be the Image (in the optical sense) of the First. "Now let us examine the Father's qualities, so as to ascertain whether the Image is His. The Father is Eternal, immortal, powerful, Light, King, Almighty, God, Lord, Creator, and Maker." These qualities must also be in the image, if truly he who has seen the Son may see the Father. ... (The Arian Son) ... is not the Father's True Image unless they ... go on to say that the description of the Son as Image is not a token of similar essence, but only a name of Him. But this ... is not Image and not Expression (χαρακτήρ). For what sort of likeness (εμφάνεια) is there between what is ... and Him Who created and brought what is not into being? ... However, the Arians ... devised for themselves arguments such as this: 'If the Son is the Father's Offspring and Image, and like in all things to the Father' (64) then it ought to be that the Son begets even

(61) Αἴδησις εστὶν ὁ Ἐλάμπαρ, Ὀνύματα, ὄνυματα, φῶς, Βασίλειος, Παντοκράτωρ.
(62) ἐν πονήρα, Ὀνύματα, ἔμφασις, καλλιέργεια. An instance of uncertainty as to the meaning of the Homousian, and one of the few instances in the theological writings of Athanasius that can unequivocally be cited in favour of his support for a Semi-Arian viewpoint. This sort of expression is disowned later as being grossly unsatisfactory, in ch. 41 of the very "De Synodis" in which Athanasius is often falsely assumed to be approaching the Semi-Arian party.

(63) τοὔτω Κτίσαντας τὰ δύκιν δύτα Εἰς τὸ Ἐκκλησίαν.
(64) ἐν πονήρα, καλλιέργεια, παντελῶς τοῦ Κύρου. Another case of Athanasius's support of what later became a Semi-Arian phrase. This is bound up with the whole question of his unwillingness to mention the Homousian in this work, in the way in which it was mentioned in, say, "De Decretis".
as He is begotten, and becomes father of a son . . (etc. ad infinitum)

' (On the contrary, this is to) conceive material and earthly ideas
concerning the Father (65) ascribing to Him separations (τοιών)
effluences (ἐνορίων) and influences (ἐπιτρέποντος). Therefore, if God
be as man, let Him also become begetter as man is, so that the Son
should also be father of another, and the same generation happen from
each of them in succession, (66) so that the succession they imagine
grows into a multitude of gods. But if God is not as man, as He is
not, we must not impute to Him the attributes of man.) For brutes and
men, from their origin in creation, are begotten by succession; and the
son, having been begotten from a father who was himself begotten,
himself appropriately becomes in his turn father to a son, inheriting
from his father that by which he himself has come to be. (67) Hence in
such instances there is neither a father in the proper sense (πατήρ)
nor a son in the proper sense (ἔμμελες), nor fatherhood and
sonship keep their respective characters, for the same person is son
of him who begat him, and also father of one who is begotten from him.
But this is not so at all where the Godhead is concerned; for God

(56) σωματικά καὶ χρώμα περὶ διὰ τος τοῦ Πατρὸς.

(66) καὶ οὖν καθεξής ἐπὶ ἀλληλον γίνεσθαι.

(67) Τα μὲν ἄλοια ἂν καὶ οἱ πλατεῖς ἐκ συμμετοχῆς ἔρχονται
(Roman-Robertson translates the ἐκ as indicating origin of time;
it is better to take it as indicating ground) κατὰ διός ἔλθην ἀλληλον
χειρονομεία. καὶ οἱ χειρονομοί ἐκ χειρονομοῦντος Πατρὸς ἔρχονται εἰς εἰρήνην καὶ
κάτω ἐκτένους κατειργάτης Πατρὸς, ἐκεῖνοι εἰς πατρὸς ὑπὸ εἰκος ἐκ λατυρον καὶ
κατακεκλεισμένοι.
(If the last sentence means what it appears to mean, what does a
man get from his father, such that in virtue of it he is what he
is? His essence? Or his chromosome complex? or rather half of it!)
Here, as before, Athanasius patently says that because of the
creaturely nature of man, man begets, in succession. This is the
natural view of a scientist, or a philosopher, especially a
"realist" like the author's Professor John Anderson (see above pp. 633-635).
But what is the relation of this to Gen. 3:16 etc., where
man is apparently doomed to this sort of succession by reason of
sin. This is the most serious case of a feature of Athanasian
theology that we have already noticed above (pp. 103-112 and
111-216); a failure to account adequately, to a Westerner at any
rate, for the relation between man's humiliation as a creature and
in a sinner. Perhaps his earlier emphasis on Σωματικά masked this
problem. Not that other theologians have been very successful here,
but the whole nature of Athanasius's theology makes his failure
particularly obvious.
is not as man; (for the Father is not from a father; therefore) does he not beget one who will beget as a father; nor is the Son of the Father by effluence (ἐνακμάτω); nor has He been begotten from a father who has been begotten; therefore, neither is He begotten so as to beget. (68)

Thus he who asks why the Son is not to beget a son, let him inquire why the Father had not a father. But both suppositions are absurd and full of all impiety. For as the Father is always Father and could never at any time become a son, so the Son is always Son and could at any time become a father. For it is rather in this respect that He is shown to be Expression and Image of the Father, in remaining always what He is and not changing, but thus receiving from the Father to be one and the same. (70) If then the Father change let the Image change, for so does the Image and Radiance stand in relation to Him that begat it. (71) So if the Father is ὑπερτοποιημένος and remains just as He is, the Image necessarily remains what He is, and will not alter. Now He is Son from the Father, and He would not become anything else but what is proper to the Father’s Essence. (72) In vain then have the foolish ones conceived this, wishing to separate the Image from the Father so as to equate the Son with things originate. (ends 573).

The passage just quoted is one of the most important and significant in Athanasius. At least three supremely important issues, or types of issues, crop up here, the epistemic, formal, and material issues as they affect the nature of God. In each case, the issues were

(68) διὸ γὰρ ἐκεῖνηται ἐὰς ὅ ἐγεννήθη.
(69) ἠκέπαν — here again the usual word in Athanasius its present reference is to the failure to apply the analogical corrective to all our descriptions of God.
(70) ἐκάνεικας τοῦ Πατρὸς τὴν παραγωγήν.
(71) πρὸς γὰρ τὸν ἐκεῖνην ἐκτὸς ὅ ἐστὶν αὐτὸν καὶ ὃ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶς.
(72) τοῦ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκτοκίνησιν.
adumbrated rather than fully treated, and Athanasius never fully rose
to the same level again; in fact it can be said that no other
theologian did, until Karl Barth. To take the epistemic issue first,
it concerns the place of analogy in theological thought. Previously,
in the De Decretis and again below, in say ch. 28 of this Oration, the
doctrine of analogy is that we call the Second Person Son, etc., but
all these concepts include essentially something that makes them
unsatisfactory and which must be corrected from other concepts. This
is the usual picture of "dialectical theology", according to which,
when we say that God is "good", goodness has its essential meaning in
the human sphere, and thus can be understood of God only by
introducing and supplementing something else, which can only be from
the logical opposite of good (non-good), if not in the case of some
attributes from the popular opposite or contrary. But here, for just
a short while, we see a better notion in Athanasius, which is summed
up in the statement that it is only in God and not in Man that we have
properly (Κυρίων) Fatherhood and properly Sonship. This is the final
and perfect development of the doctrine of the theistic attributes and
also of the principle of analogy, as Barth says (Ch. D. II:1, pp. 178-
256 esp. 235 ff.) After all, it is not God's goodness, or the Sonship
of the Second Person in relation to the Father, that contains
antithetical elements, and can only be understood by introducing from
what it is not; it is our goodness as such that is constantly
adulterated and corrupted by evil or amorality; it is our sonship in
relation to our own earthly parents that is always collapsing into non-
sonship, as we shall see below. Thus, to take the instance in question,
we cannot dialectically modify the notion of sonship by means of any
extraneous idea to make it apply to God the Son; if we do so, we shall
be further than ever from the truth. Fatherhood and Sonship apply
perfectly to God, and it is men who are illogical and dialectical in this and in every other regard. What is it that convinces us that this is the way that these terms apply? Athanasius is not yet certain; he sometimes still speaks as if the multiplicity of differing analogies is sufficient to effect this; sometimes (as in the context of this chapter) it is a general overall picture of God as the Eternal, the picture owing as much to natural theology as anything else, although this would be a reversion to the earlier type of theory, as it would concede to the Arians the point that the natural meaning of all these expressions is in the creaturely sphere. (In the last analysis, the only possible answer is that it is by the direct self-revelation of God Himself that we know that God the Father is the only proper Father and God the Son the only true Son.) Athanasius never explicitly comes to this Barthian conclusion, but he does go as far as to say that all the analogies he uses are used because they are basically Scriptural, and (below, ch. 23: 60C) he does quote Eph. 3:5.

But, it might be objected, and plausibly so, this argument of Athanasius gains its force simply from a logical error which is a sort of reverse side of relativism. In relativism, things are held to be constituted, in their very innermost being, by their relations as distinct from their truly internal qualities, a denial of the status of the latter; in the practice in question here, relations are denied their correct logical status by maintaining that they have not ultimate sense unless they can be treated as qualities and be subjected to the law of contradiction in the same way as qualities are. (Both forms of argument are characteristic of Idealist logic and metaphysics.) This brings us to the second group of issues, the question of relativism in relation to the Doctrine of God. Of course, Athanasius's tendency to concentrate
on the issues of logic and mathematics (or should we say, para-logic and para-mathematics?) inherent in the Trinitarian question lays him open to this charge, here as elsewhere. But it would be more profitable for our generation to note the times when he begins to speak of the relation between the Trinity and family life, as does Augustine, and it is the curse of the general run of theology that our free associations do not run in this direction. If we think along these lines and interpret Athanasius in meliorum partem, we find that there is far more behind this argument than suspect logic. Freud (and Sophocles) would have understood Athanasius here much better than most.(73) A father who knows that at best he must become senile and die and be supplanted by his son, and a son subject to all the jealousies and psychological cross-currents inherent in the Oedipus complex, can be said to be father and son only in the most corrupt sense, and the fact that this corruption is all-pervasive is also characteristic of human beings, so that Athanasius's apparent logical fallacy that the relation can never hold at all unless it is free from the prospect of temporal change and decay is in this case and to this extent the literal truth.

When we examine the issue of relativism from the other side, we obtain the same result. We have already noticed that in general, and especially in the passage just cited, Athanasius treats all the titles of the Son, and the correlative of the Father, relativistically. Here the same applies to Father-Son, a point which Athanasius explicitly and forcefully confirms below (29:72b). Now when we come to examine all the metaphors from this point of view, we find that in many cases they can be queried, for example, a word that is occasionally not spoken, a fountain that only yields water at certain seasons, etc. We have already

(73) See footnote above in previous chapter.
discussed this question in full. These metaphors are all at least as much in need of analogical correction as that of Father-Son. However, it can be seen at this stage of the argument that this analogy has an important advantage over the others that is not obvious in the earlier stages, in that, although a man can be successively and simultaneously both father and son, family life as a whole is a necessary part of human life. As we once knew, then forgot, and are now painfully rediscovering in the best psychological circles, deprivation of family life or its equivalent is virtually deprivation of humanity as a whole. It is this fact that Newman begins to recognise when he points out, in his note on this passage, that whereas men who are father and son differ in being individuals, God the Father and God the Son differ simply in being Father and Son. Newman should have gone further, and pointed out that this is not only the empirical and present truth about God, but also the normative or eschatological truth about man, and that individualism within the family is not only blasphemous about God but also sinful in man. Unfortunately, there is the "Catholic" tendency in Newman to regard family life as in essence belonging to man's creatureliness, or even as a compulsory badge of this status, while for God mystical unity after the style of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite is taken as the truth. Otherwise, why do they describe as the "Holy Family" only the earthly family of Mary, Joseph, and the Incarnate Christ? Surely this title has been pre-empted from all eternity by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This is a good place to notice the other main point of intra-Trinitarian relation that is made here; it is virtually the same as Augustine's characteristic teaching, in the De Trinitate, that all three Persons are absolutely alike in all respects except relation, (74)

(74) See "De Trinitate", II: 6, and Part II: From.
that is, for example, that the Father and Son are absolutely alike in all respects except for the plain and unadorned fact that the Father is Father and the Son is Son. But the very context in the Orations compels us to examine the matter more closely. It is evident that, without such a doctrine, there will follow a forward infinite regress once the absolute likeness of Father and Son is taken seriously. The Arians saw this with glee; Athanasius saw that special precautions were necessary against it; both recognised that it made theology absurd. At first sight, it is in a sense conceivable that once we recognise two Persons in rank in the Godhead, we can recognise any other finite number, even an infinity (provided that we had revelational authority, which we do not). No statement could be rationally cited against this conclusion; even the claim of John Macmurray that the most typical (and therefore normative) personal communities are those with only two persons (which would, on the Augustinian theology, denote God) is not a rational argument, as, even if it is not itself essentially dependent on Divine revelation, its application to God certainly is. However, it can be said that if we admit this basis of plurality we are faced with the grave question of whether the subordination of a member of this series to its predecessor is finite, infinitesimal in the Newtonian sense, or absolutely zero. In the first case, some member or other would have merely human status, and we would be right back in classical heathen mythology. The second case is much more complicated, but to say the least it would impugn the finality of the revelation and the saving work of Christ, as would the first. In the third case, all members would be in fact equal, but in this case the blasphemy that one member could rebel against and annihilate the previous members would be possible, because such an event would not alter in any way the completion
of such an infinite series; once again, this is pagan mythology. But the only conclusive argument is that such nonsense is excluded by the Revelation itself.

In spite of all this, there is some plausibility in the Arian claim that a Son Who did not Himself generate would not be an Image of the Father; in spite of Newman's claim to the contrary (in the note on this passage), such a Son would leave something unfulfilled, or rather, this would be the case in a theology which laid as much emphasis on generation as contemporary orthodoxy did. (It was probably the element of relativistic error and Platonism in Athanasius's presentation of the case that made his refutation appear more complete). To put the thing right, Athanasius would have had to go much further along the line of confrontationism as distinct from generationism or even emanationism; more emphasis on the Sonship as a Fact rather than an Act; less quasi-obstetrics and more family life. When we do this, we see that we are quite right to feel that the Son should be, in a sense, the Image of the Father in His Fatherhood, as well as being like the Father in all (non-relational) respects; that is, that the generation of the Father has a fulfilment and a counterpart in the Son over and above the mere brute fact that He is the Son; but that this fulfilment and counterpart is not any reduplication of the generation in the Son, but His response in love to the Father and to His Love, and, ultimately, the whole perfection and pervasion of the Divine Perichoresis. It is obvious that this imperatively demands the Filioque, as, in fact, we find it in Augustine. (75)

To turn finally to the material side of this passage, we find that the changes which we have noted above are apparently associated with the most unambiguous declaration in Athanasius of the absolute

(75) Once again, De Trinitate XV: 19:37.
supremacy of the Father-Son analogy of the Godhead, Athanasius does not say anything much about his reasons, but in fact he does not bother to say that only in God is the radiance from a light-source properly so, etc. It is only the Father-Son relationship that is described thus. The reason for this is not far from the surface; it is almost certainly the very fact that fatherhood and sonship are inadequately and corruptly represented in man; in other words, this is the only analogy that could be treated in this manner. As metaphysicians and logicians have now seen, it is ridiculous to talk of ordinary things striving to be something which they ought to be, but are not, or not quite; in other words the disjunction between norms and plain facts is here meaningless. But this disjunction, so absurd otherwise, is the very essence of humanity in this age, on the Christian understanding. It works both ways; sinful man has fallen from God's ways and standards, and, on the other hand, God has restored that norm to actuality in Christ, and has promised that the perfect restoration shall become valid for all life. "Beloved, now we are the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that, when he (i.e. Christ) shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see him as he is." (I John 3:2). At this point we come full circle, back once again to the doctrine of analogy with which we started, and both the formal and the material aspects of this issue can, in the last resort, only be treated eschatologically. (Fortunately, this is true on any possible meaning of this much-debated and much-abused word; it is even better to say that on every possible meaning of the word it is actually and simultaneously true.) The very disjunction from the empirical state of man, and what God has prepared for us and which man has not yet in any way perceived, saves us from the logical difficulties in the use of analogy. Or rather, we do not really argue from the analogy between our own sinful selves and God, we really apply to God those standards
which God has revealed and implanted in our hearts. Even the right to use analogy, in the most formal aspect, is utterly dependent on God's gracious work in Christ for us. It is this that Barth means when he maintains that the only proper analogy is the analogia fidei. Even as the doctrine of justification by faith is an utter denial of justification by works, even by our faith considered as a work, so it is also with analogy. One may be sceptical of such pure Barthianism from the mouth of Athanasius, and he certainly does not say so in so many words, but this whole type of theology is implicit, and not far below the surface at that, in the line taken in chs. 20–22 of the Contra Arianos. It should be noted that, as we have shown throughout this discussion, all these points hang together, and together represent the highest stage of development of the theology of Athanasius, where he comes nearest to making the Son concept absolutely normative and supreme over all the others; we have shown what this type of theology would be when it is fully developed, and noted, among other things, that it would involve the Filioque. Unfortunately, Athanasius never rises again, in this respect, to quite the same height, and his position on the Filioque in his one undeniably authentic work on the Holy Spirit, the Letters to Serapion, is gravely equivocal at best, and actually resembles the Eastern Orthodox position far more than the Western. It will be our task to analyse the reason for this.

The remainder of ch. 22 has already been cited in full; it deals with the various Arian arguments, as used especially in the marketplace and other similar environments, where people who respond best to simple-sounding arguments are liable to be deceived by the sort of plausible material that Athanasius quotes. It concerns two issues, the use or abuse of analogy, and the real meaning of "creating" and "making".
Although they are presented in this way, they are by no means kindergarten subjects, but among the most important questions in theology and philosophy, at every level of development.

Athanasius's answer to the Arians' plausible misuse of analogy is swift; it would, if followed consistently, carry them to conclusions which they would be the last to accept: "... When they thus speak, they should have inquired of an architect whether he can build without available material (76); and seeing that he could not, God would have been likewise unable to make the universe without material already available. Or ... whether he can be without place ( cp. τοῦ) ; seeing that he could not be, therefore God would likewise be ( cp. τοῦ) in one place. ... Or why, when they hear that God has a son, do they deny Him on the basis of observations among themselves, whereas if they hear that He creates and makes, they no longer put up human objections (77). They really ought to think along human lines in the case of creation as well, and supply God with material, so as to deny that God is really Creator ... . But if the bare idea of God (78) transcends these thoughts, and one believes and knows, on the very hearing, that He is ( cp. τοῦ) not as we are, but is as God, and creates not as man creates (79), but creates as God, it is also plain that He begets also, not as men beget, but rather begets as God, for God does not imitate men, but rather is it the case that men are called the fathers of their own children ... (then follows quotation of Eph. 3:15) ... on account of the Father, Who alone is truly Father of His own Son.

This is a very clear expression of the higher doctrine of

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(76) χαίρεις εἰς ἀληθώς σποκειμένης
(77) τὰ νόθου τιμίαι τις ἀληθίνως ἔστιν
(78) ἡ πρωτεύον οἰκου ἐννοεῖν
(79) ἐκ τῆς θείας τοῖς θείαις ἐννοεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῆς ἔννοιαν
(80) θείας ὀρθῶς ἐννοεῖν in each case.
analogy that we have described as being present in the last few chapters, although in this section Athanasius reverts in the main to the former doctrine. It can also be seen here, more clearly than ever, how unerringly Athanasius diagnoses the fault in the Arian use of analogy, or rather the blind spot in their whole theology; they knew very well what the difference was between creation by God and making by men — did they not describe the Son as created ex nihilo? — and yet they sought to ensnare other people by quietly failing to allow for the same difference in the case of the generation of the Son of God!

Having again affirmed the transcendence of God, Athanasius accuses the Arian talk about "him who is" etc. of being far too general, abstract and imprecise, and that the whole concept of Being, Making, and Becoming must be made more precise; (61A) "For He that is can make things that were not (τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐδρασμένων) and things that were (τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐκθεσμωτέρων) and things that were before (τὰ πριν ἐκθεσμωτέρων). For instance, the carpenter, the goldsmith, and the potter, each according to his own craft, operates on material which exists and is there before themselves, making what vessels he pleases, and the God of the Universe Himself takes dust of the earth which already exists and has come to be by Himself, and fashions man; and as for the earth itself, it was formerly non-existent, but afterwards has been made and brought into being through His own Logos. (81) If then this is the meaning of their question, it is clear that creation was not before it came to be, but that men operate on existent material, and thus that their argument obviously does not hold, since "what is" becomes, and "what is not" also becomes (82) as we said." Here, Athanasius treats in full, for the first time, the important logical problem connected with Being and Becoming. He is profoundly convinced that, among creaturely entities, the analysis classically given in Plato's "Sophist" is the true one. According to this analysis, which grew out of the problem of what is meant by a non-

(81) εἰς τὸ ἐξέχωμεν περιποίησαι διὰ τοῦ προέκυψεν ἔτος.
(82) γενέσθαι καὶ ἕνωσαι, γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔρχεσθαι.
existential statement, an existential statement is really a statement that two Forms or predicates blend; in terms of normal logic, that an I proposition is true; for example, "Mermaids exist" is, in correct logical form, "Some women are fish-tailed". Similarly, a denial of existence is really the contradictory E proposition (as Plato puts it, the Forms do not mix); for example, "Mermaids do not exist", is, in logical form, "No women are fish-tailed"; but in no circumstances is the proposition really about a non-existent entity, since both women and fish-tailed things exist, Plato recognising with his Sophist opponents that a proposition about genuinely non-existent entities was an absurdity. Similarly, Plato interpreted Becoming, for which he saw

(83) See sects. 257-268, particularly. The outer shell of this Dialogue is the attempt to define a Sophist, and it becomes clear that an essential element in the definition is that he purveys mendacity. But the objection is raised that it is logically impossible to make a false statement, as such a statement would concern a non-existent entity, and it is impossible to make a statement with any meaning at all about non-existent entities. Plato's solution, in his own terms, is that a statement about a non-existent entity is really a statement about the mixing of Forms (or, as we would now say, terms) that do not mix. But each of these Forms, or terms, or qualities etc., must be real. Thus, there is a man Theaetetus (see sect. 263) and some things fly like birds, but the form Theaetetus and the form Flying do not mix, that is, the statement "Theaetetus flies" is a statement about a non-existent entity in the only way that, ordinarily, we talk about such things, and it is also, ipso facto, an error or a lie. Thus, Plato, through the "Eleatic Stranger", has accounted for non-existence, and also for error and mendacity. Plato does not treat the problem of Becoming in such exact detail, but understands that it is something that has to be accounted for, since a full account of reality must include, or, mutual interaction, or change, or causality. Hence, the analysis of Becoming that we are giving here follows immediately from Plato's analysis of non-existence. It goes without saying that this analysis of Becoming is also that of the author's philosophy teacher, the late John Anderson. (See above pp. 603-5.)

Now, this is the view that Athanasius unreservedly accepts as the truth, not about Becoming generally, but about Becoming, making, etc., as it affects creaturely life of itself. Creatio ex nihilo is the prerogative of God. Incidentally, this would be another case of the highest principle of analogy that Athanasius has elaborated above, in chs. 21-22: it is only God Who supremely and truly creates; men simply rearrange pre-existent things. And, as usual, Athanasius expresses this so much more lucidly than any philosopher, even any Greek philosopher. But his aim here is probably simply to show the complexity of the notion of Becoming, and that one cannot accept any arbitrary logical or ontological picture of it that would apply to the whole field of God and creatures, even if there were any such genuine field.
he had to give an account and which he understood now to be of genuine philosophical and logical interest, as a change in this blending of forms, this process being allowable and actually necessary in virtue of the interacting feature of reality. Thus, the true logical form of the statement, "X comes into existence," would, on this analysis, be to replace X by the complex term Y Z, Y and Z being appropriately chosen, and then to say "Y non-Z becomes Y Z." For example, the correct form of the statement that "a chair comes into existence" would refer to wood or other pre-existent material, which was at first relatively amorphous, but which then was given a certain form. Even statements about the becoming of men in the biological sense would be really statements about the changes of spermatozoa and ova, etc., or, from another point of view, about the indirect intussusception and metabolism of what was formerly humus (how very like, if not quite like, the "dust of the earth" that Athanasius actually mentions!). This must be what Athanasius means when he says that what already exists can come to be. One difficulty is a certain ambiguity in our terminology. This is much more serious in Latin than it is in either Greek or English, since the verb Facio has no passive in the primary tenses, the place being supplied by Fic, I become, which is itself defective in the perfect tenses, the place being supplied by the perfect, etc., passive of Facio - factus sum, etc.; thus there is no distinction between "to be made" and "to become". Greek is like English except that there is no separate expression or periphrasis like those by which we distinguish "to become" and "to come to be". On the other hand, these ambiguities are not of decisive logical and metaphysical importance. In all these cases, we are really describing the same process, the only difference being that we are interested in different aspects in each case. When we say, "A
comes to be" (A \( \xi\nu\varepsilon\tau\alpha \), (84) without complement), it is simply a sign that our main or sole interest is in the final outcome of the process. "B becomes A" (\( \xi\nu\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\mu\alpha \) with both subject and complement) means that our interest is in both the initial and final states, or perhaps, as the case may be, in the final state and that field which both the initial and final states have in common. Where we use some part of "to make", etc. (\( \pi\nu\iota\iota\nu\nu\nu \), (K.T.\( \lambda \) ) it is because our interest is, inter alia, in the fact that the whole process is efficiently caused, normally on this formulation by a personal agent, who may or may not be the object of our interest and specification. Here again, when there is no complement, we are interested in the final as opposed to the initial state; when there is a complement, we are also interested in the initial state. Much time has been spent on this, since both now and later it is a supremely important part of Athanasius's case, in two ways. Firstly, Athanasius establishes correctly that it is possible to use the language of becoming, etc. about a thing without prejudice to its previous existence. This is vital when it comes to confuting the Arian exegesis of Heb. 1:4, etc. In the exegetical section, Athanasius discusses these logical points at greater length, but it is advisable for us to comment on them at this earlier stage. The second point is that, as Athanasius implies without ever quite stating specifically, there is no change or becoming in the created order that does not involve something pre-existent, so that, in these processes, it is always in some sense correct to say that something becomes that already is. He has previously in many places said this pointedly about human acts of making, but he has never before analysed the matter so clearly, thoroughly, and generally. (The only doubt that a modern man might

(84) This is the form in Classical Greek; the N.T. and Patristic form would be \( \xi\nu\varepsilon\tau\alpha \) .
feel is whether Athanasius should not have been more severely critical of the notion of artistic "creativity", in the way in which such people as Marx and Freud maintained that artistic "creation" was simply another manifestation of human activities, feelings, and features that were already pre-existent. Perhaps he did not need to; (see once again the Platonic Doctrine of Reminiscence) but the really important point which Athanasius again most decided implies, even if he does not say so completely explicitly, is that creatio ex nihilo is essentially an illogical and unscientific notion in the popular sense; that is, it cannot figure as the general principle of ordinary creaturely life. We can only know it by knowing the revelation of God; otherwise, it defies all philosophy and all physics. Once this has been established, we are obliged to follow the Divine Revelation in the details of the application of the principle, and not to apply it where the revelation excludes it. For this reason, the remainder of ch. 24 is a proof that Scripture positively prohibits us from applying this notion to the relation of the Son to God the Father.

24 "But if they speak concerning God and His Logos, let them ask, 'Was the God "Who is" ever Λόγος?' And 'As He is Light, was He rayless?' (5) Or 'Was He always Father of the Logos?' Or thus again, 'Has the Father "Who is" made the Logos "who is not", or does He always have with Him His own Logos, which is the proper Offspring of His Essence? .... Who indeed can ever bear to hear them say that God was ever ἐκ Λόγου? .... (It is intolerable for them to say), ... that God was not always Father but became so afterwards so that they might have the delusion that His Logos once was not, since the proofs adduced against them are so many ... (viz. esp. John 1:1, Hcb. 1:3, Rom. 9:5).

25 After affirming that the Arian questions of ch. 22 are as
blasphemous about the Son as the same questions applied to the Father.
Himself, Athanasius now gives his positive doctrine against the Arians;
much of the subject-matter is old material, and we shall particularly
emphasise Athanasius's answer insofar as it concerns the problem of
making and becoming: (at 64A, near end:) "Whereas God is, He was
eternally;" since then the Father is ever, His Radiance ever is,
which is His Logos. And again, God Who is hath from Himself the Logos
which also is, and it was not a case of the Logos not existing
before and being added later, nor was the Father ever Δογματικος. For
this impudence against the Son also involves blasphemy against the
Father, as if He devised for Himself a Wisdom and Logos and Son from
without for whatever of these titles you mention, it signifies
the Offspring from the Father, as has been said . . . . As then, if
one saw the Sun (τὸν Λαόν) and inquired concerning its Radiance in
these words: 'Did that which is make that which was, or that which
was not,' he would not have his reason functioning, but would be in a
state of dizziness, because he fancied that what is wholly from the
Light is external to it, and was asking when and how and whether it
was made, so likewise, one would be even madder to make this sort of
speculation and query concerning the Father, for it is to conceive the
Logos from the Father as external to Him, and to say, 'He was not before
His generation' idly calling the natural offspring a work.

This account is very similar to the corresponding material in the De
Decretis, and very little need be said, except that it is now forcefully
affirmed, but as yet with little explicit reason, that the blasphemies
of Arius are equivalent to the corresponding hypothetical blasphemies

(66) τὸν ἐστιν ἐν χειρὶ καὶ Θεῷ.
(67) τὸν Θεόν ἐστιν, ἐν χειρὶ καὶ ὕπαυξις τὸν λόγον ἐν καὶ ἐν.
(68) ἐκείνης ἐν ἐνοπλίας ἐν ζωή τοῦ λογίου καὶ λογίου τοῦ ζωῆς.
(69) τὸ πάντα ἐγείρεται ἐν χειρὶ.
about the Father. The chief thing conveyed by this passage is sheer incredulity that anyone should not see at once the distinction between creation and generation. One minor point; when Athanasius cites the Sun (Light)-Radiance analogy in 64R, he uses the Sun for the first time as the counterpart of the Father, as he does in the Ad Serapionem; however, he still treats Light, ὑφής, as virtually synonymous with the Sun, or the Pons or Origo of the Godhead, and there is no sign yet of his later treatment of ὑφής as analogous to the Holy Spirit. The end of ch. 25 (64C) gives Athanasius's final summary of the matter: "... The Father Who was made the Son Who was. For 'The Word became flesh'; and whereas He was the Son of God, He made Him in consummation of the ages also Son of Man, unless forsooth, after the Son of Stone, they affirm that He did not exist at all, till He became man..." The last clause quoted has already been fully discussed.

Athanasius has already established that where men and other creatures make, they can only make by manipulating pre-existent material. On the other hand, with God as Agent, there are three other possibilities, or rather, actualities; Creatio ex nihilo, God the Father as the Eternal Origin of the Eternal Logos which of course is not really a "making" at all, and the final possibility, the unique event of the Incarnation as an act of God. This has its logical form in common with

(90) See Ad Serap. I: ch. 19.
(91) οὐ γὰρ πάρεξ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ἀληθείαν ἐποίησεν
(92) John 1:14.
(93) καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐκτείνοντος θεοῦ εἰσαγωγὴν εἰς συντελεῖσθαι τῶν εἰκών καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
(94) See above, pp. 367ff.
(95) Athanasius has fully treated this issue in De Decr. 26-31, and is to treat it again, much more clearly, C.Ar. I: 30-34. See above, pp. 244-308.
the logical form of ordinary making, since the Second Person or Son of God, Who was previously not Son of Man or not man, became or was made Son of Man or man by the Act of God. On the other hand, in the case of human making, the pre-existent material pre-existed only in relation to the process of making in question, since it originally went back to an act of Creatio ex nihilo: but the Son of God pre-existed, not only in relation to the Incarnation, but absolutely, being eternally with God. Correspondingly, concerning creatures as patient (that is, at the passive end of the process), there are two possibilities or actualities, to be created ex nihilo by God, and to be caused to become other things in interactions with the rest of creation and, above all, by the Act of God, since God can also act on pre-existent material; with the Son as patient, in an analogical sense, there are the two actualities of His eternal generation from the Father, and the Incarnation. Thus, it appears that when Athanasius admits verbs of becoming and making as applied to the Incarnation, these words have a twofold sense, in reference on the one hand to the fact that the Son of Man also pre-existed as Son of God (and did not cease to be Son of God), and on the other hand to the fact that the Logos took our creaturely humanity and lived our creaturely life. This is the first time that Athanasius has given this exhaustive analysis of Becoming and Making, and it is no accident that this has taken place in the work in which he is later to devote so much attention in detail to Scriptural exegesis, where the same linguistic question often recurs.

The beginning of the next chapter is a statement, which we do not need to quote, that to consider, with the Arians, that God required something unlike Himself to create the world, is really to degrade the Father to the level of the creatures, since it is of the essence of the creatures, and not of God, to be incomplete and to require
completion from outside themselves; this general point is discussed more fully in Orat. II. After this, he continues with the correct use of analogy (658): "... (In the first place) one ought not measure the generation from God by the nature of men (96) ... (But) it is as well to meet them on the same ground, thus: Plainly, if they inquire from parents concerning their son, let them consider whence is the child that is begotten. For even if the parent did not have the son before he begot him, he had him not as something external or foreign, but as something from himself and proper to his essence and his exact image (97) ... so that the former is beheld (εἰκόνα) in the latter, and the latter contemplated (εἰκόνα) in the former. For if, in the human examples, they select the time factor as applied to the generatrices (98) why do they not select from the same sources that the children's relation to their parents is that they are natural and proper to them (99)? Those who ask of parents, 'Had you a son before you begot him?' should add, 'And if you had a son, did you purchase him from without as a house or other possession?' And then you would be answered, 'He is not from without, but from myself. For things that are from without are possessions, which pass from one to another, but my son is from me, proper and similar to my essence (100) and did not become mine from another, but begotten of me; wherefore I am wholly within him, while I remain myself what I am.' (101) For so it is; though the parent be distinct in time, as he is a man who has himself come to be in time, yet he too would have had his child always co-existent with him, had not Nature impeded it and interdicted the possibility. For Levi too was already in the loins of his great-grandfather before his own actual generation or that of his grandfather.

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(96) τὴν ἑκόνα· (97) εἰκόνα εἰκόνα· (98) τὴν ἑκόνα· (99) τὸν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ ἡμέραν τὰς πηγὰς τῶν ἑκόνων τρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς. (100) καὶ τὰς ἑκόνας οὕτως γὰρ καὶ σῶσθαι. (101) διὸ καὶ οὕτως ἐκόνα, ἔνας ἑκόνα, καὶ ἐκόνα· οὕτως ἐκέλευ.
When then the man comes to the age at which nature supplies the possibility he immediately, by nature no longer in a position to impede him \( \left( \frac{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν}{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν} \right) \) becomes father of the son from himself.

"Therefore, . . . . let them likewise confess concerning the Logos of God that He is simply \( \left( \frac{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν}{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν} \right) \) from the Father. And if they ask concerning the time factor, . . . . let them say what is to impede God from always being Father of His Son . . . (They will see the truth) . . . if, as they questioned women on the subject of time, so they inquire of the Sun concerning his radiance and of the fountain concerning what is from it. They will find that these, though an offspring, always co-exist with those things from which they are. And if parents such as these have in common with their children nature and duration, (102) why, if they suppose God to be inferior to the things originate do they not drag their impiety \( \left( \frac{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν}{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν} \right) \) into the open? But if they do not dare to say so openly, and the Son is confessed to be, not from without, but, but a natural \( \left( \frac{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν}{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν} \right) \) Offspring from the Father, and that there is no impediment to God (for God is not as man, but is more than the Sun, or rather, God of the Sun), it follows that the Logos is from Him and is ever co-existent \( \left( \frac{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν}{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν} \right) \) with the Father, through Whom also the Father made what was not and brought it into being (103) . . . . (Thus) . . . . the Son is not ex nihilo, but is eternal and from the Father . . . ."

The next chapter is a further treatment of the relation among all the titles of the Logos, each signifying various elements which correct each other. This is almost identical with the account of the "De Decretis" ch. 17 ff., except that the Logos title is even more definitely associated with the impassibility and impartitiveness of the generation, even as even human words are allegedly begotten that way; therefore, it would be better to ask somebody about his words than his antecedence of his son. Another additional point is that Athanasius

\( (102) \frac{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν}{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν} \) - an interesting case of the approximation in meaning of

\( (103) \frac{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν}{\lambda ν \epsilon σ ν \gamma ν} \).
(69D - 72A) has to make it clear this time what the difference is between God's relation to Wisdom and men's, thus: "For, whereas men are receptive of wisdom, God partakes in nothing, but is Himself the Father of His own Wisdom, of which those who partake are given to be called wise."(104) The form of the Greek indicates that, for Athanasius, to describe Wisdom as a quality in God would involve the ontological subordination of the Father to the wisdom, as a Platonic Particular is subordinate to a Form, and in the way in which wise men are subordinate to their wisdom, which is inadmissible with God. This will be further discussed later.

These passages that we have cited above are, in the main, a return to the characteristic doctrine of analogy found in De Decretis 17 ff., according to which all titles are only partially correct, all have their defects, but all correct each other's defects. (105) It represents a declension from the supreme doctrine that we find enunciated, even if incompletely, in C. Ar. I: 21-22. (106) On the other hand, the influence of these earlier chapters is sufficiently great for Athanasius to make the title Son much more significant than in the corresponding sections of the "De Decretis", even though he says still, in ch. 27, that the perfection of parenthood, for the purposes of this argument, is not found in men but in physical entities like a sun and its radiation. But, nevertheless, Athanasius, in ch. 26, actually gives a highly idealised version of human generation, saying even that one can see a father (human) in his son, a statement which by common observation must have been known at all times to be only very approximately correct, at best. We would say now, in view of

things like this, that once again this is really an idealised description of what human generation would be like if it were asexual. Another closely related feature of this account is the Traducianist passage at the end of ch. 26, which is put in for the obvious purpose of diminishing the unlikeness of human generation in time, and the eternal generation of the Son from the Father. Athanasius does this, even though this position, that sons in some way coexist embryonically in their fathers for several (or even an indefinitely large number) of generations back, would, by reason of its pointed resemblance to the \( \text{λόγος ένδυναμούμενος} \) idea, have certainly embarrassed Athanasius. (These Traducianist passages are pointed reminiscences of the passages from the Epistle to the Hebrews on the Priesthood of Melchizedek, chs. 5-7, esp. ch. 7). Of course, one other most important reason why Athanasius emphasises the notion of sonship more than in the previous writings is that he has just been discussing the correct meaning of "to make", and, again in ch. 26, he makes once more what should have been the obvious point about the difference between making, which is operating on external matter, and generation, which is from the very centre of one's being; that a son cannot be a thing made, since a thing made consists of another essence in the same sense in which a son consists of the essence of his parents. (107)

(107) Or possibly the ex nihilo, considered as being that of which creatures consist relative to their origin by the act of God, could be considered as a third state. The danger with this is that it will be deemed a special case of the alternative "of God", and the fact that this is how the Arians ostensibly or really considered it is proved by De Decr. 18 ff. The Idealist and Apologists' tendency to overvalue the pre-existence of creatures as ideas in God made things worse still. The answer is that here we have to be particularly careful to dissociate origin, considered dynamically, from origin, considered essentially. Dynamically, the creatures can be considered to be from God; essentially, this is quite absurd, as the Arians in their perverse way saw. But this does not mean that there can be no Son of God,
Now that we have, side by side, the whole picture of the Arian misuse of analogy and Athanasius's orthodox doctrine, we can now see clearly what is Athanasius's criterion for determining what parts of the analogy are to be accepted and what parts are to be rejected; what parts correct, and what parts are corrected. This principle is apparently the equivalent of the ontological principle that we have extracted above, that God alone truly is.\(^{(108)}\) It is also the equivalent of what we shall see below to be the hermeneutic principle applied to Scripture, that language that refers to God has absolute priority over creaturely language,\(^{(109)}\) which principle we have already seen that the Arians inverted in practice.\(^{(110)}\) Similarly, in the interpretation and combination of all these analyses, the Athanasian principle is patently that those elements which point to God, or rather to a clearly transcendent form of reality, must have absolute priority over elements which merely pointed to the familiar lower plane. Thus, for Athanasius, the fact that the origin of the Son is in the very heart of the Father's being and the corresponding fact that His generation is natural, as distinct from either a result of external force or, as we shall see later, a mere act of will, is the thing that even if He is clearly testified in Scripture; all it means is that a human son cannot be a thing made, as a table or chair is a thing made, since to consist of material (or even scientific, technical, or artistic form) is completely different from consisting of the essence of the parents. A fortiori, the Son of God cannot be a creature, since there is an infinitely greater difference between being made (dynamically, and therefore in this case essentially) out of nothing, which is what creatures are as regards their creation by God, and consisting of the essence of God, as does a true Son of God.

\(^{(108)}\) See, C.Ar. I:12\textsection 2, and above pp. 601-3, 671-3.

\(^{(109)}\) See below, pp. 524-5 and 745-57.

\(^{(110)}\) See above, pp. 441-3.
must be deduced from His title Son, and where there are other elements in this title which suggest that He is radically subordinate to the Father, so much the worse for these other elements. In other words, anything which suggests that the Son is fully God is to be accepted without let or hindrance, and nothing else can be admitted as evidence against it. (111) If this seems arbitrary and prejudicial of the issue, any other course would ultimately deny the integrity and even the possibility of Divine Revelation and make atheism the only tenable position. All these remarks apply, of course, within the sphere of the doctrine of analogy contained in ch. 28 of this book and in the De Decretis.

Thus, we have two systems of analogy, corresponding to two distinguishable theologies of the Trinity. In the first place, we have the simpler doctrine that each of the major Scriptural analogies corrects the others; in Athanasius, this has the effect, or at least the tendency, of making the Son analogy formally supreme only, while the material supremacy goes to the more emanationist type of metaphor like radiance from the Sun or a stream from a fountain, or Wisdom conceived as proceeding from God, and Word or Logos, in both its common and metaphysical senses, having the same relation to the First Person; generation or Filiation is regarded emanationally. (112) So far we have had little to observe directly the correlations between this type of theology and the theology of the Holy Spirit, but it would make it difficult to draw a clear distinction between the relation of the Son

(111) It is obvious from the above how this principle, too, was completely inverted by the Arians.

(112) Of course, we are using this word and others like it in the sense that we have explained above, and not in the sense in which it is denounced by Athanasius; see above, p. 410.
and of the Spirit to the Father, and also markedly favours the Eastern Procession as against the Filioque, as to speak or think of an emanation of an emanation would strain the analogy unbearably. On the other hand, there is the theology which recognises that these so-called human concepts really, in their absolute form, truly represent God, that it is man and not God who is elusive and uncertain, and that what we call analogy as a theological method is utterly dependent on what can only be described as God's act of katalogy. This goes with the supremacy of the personalist Father-Son analogy for reasons which have been already stated. And although this cannot be seen yet, it leaves the path clear for a significant doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as an essential Being, on Augustinian lines, which doctrine would necessarily involve the Filioque. (113) Athanasius, in ch. 21, rose to this second higher doctrine, but, although it still exercises its influence in the subsequent chapters, we are by ch. 28 back to the former position. Why? Apart from the possibility that Athanasius might merely be transcribing, with few alterations, a passage from his former work, the reason probably is that, in the first place, the latter doctrine is, by its very nature, the culmination of theology and thus is difficult to grasp until all the evidence is in, and in the second place it does not offer such an immediately obvious refutation of Arianism. It is more plausible to refute Arianism by insisting on the absolute coexistence of, say, radiant energy with solar bodies than to use the analogy of sonship which is at first sight intractably associated with the temporal priority of the parent. (114) It is only after the matter has been

(113) See Augustine, "De Trinitate", XV: 19:37.

(114) This is a further special case of the general relation between the type of constancy exhibited by the sub-personal world, the lack of constancy of the personal world, and the higher type of constancy of God. It must be admitted that, whatever may be the
examined further that it is clear that these physical analogies would not convince a Bergson, a Hoyle, or for that matter a Marcellus of Ancyra, and that Arianism is far better repudiated by the concept of the personal love between Father and Son, with the corollary that on the Arian doctrine there was once when God was loveless. After all, it is not impossible to regard the Logos and Wisdom of God as a quality or in the Samosatene or Asterian way, but for God to love necessarily demands a Trinitarian God.

It is often said, for example by such divergent and opposed theologians as Lossky (115) and Barth (116) that the difference between East and West over the Procession is associated with the tendency of the former to think in terms of the Triplicity of Person, and the Westerners to think in terms of the Unity of the Essence or nature. This is not the whole truth, and to the extent that it is true, it may be a result of their differing positions on the Filioque question rather than the cause. As against ante-Nicene Greek credal theology, which is

theoretical objections to the use of sub-personal analogies for the constancy of God, this is often the only sort of analogy available, and, besides, it is most emphatically Scriptural; vide, the large number of times in which God is described as a "Rock" (see any Concordance). On the other hand, the great danger of this way of speaking about God, without the most careful qualification, had already manifested itself in the Arian controversy, as is shown by the argument that the Logos must be ὁ δόγματος, an ethical being in the personal sense (see C.Ar.I:22 & 35 init.), on the ground that the only other alternative was that the Logos have that sub-personal constancy. It is surprising that Athanasius never discusses analogy with this aspect directly in mind. Probably even he had never been able to see the question that the Arians had really raised, which is not surprising, since they had raised it for the first time in systematic, reflective theology or philosophy - the question of the personality of the Absolute, or more accurately, of a being who was regarded by one half of their dualism as absolute and by the other half as a pure creature. Classical Antiochene theology never got further than the importance of personality in man.

undoubtedly primarily interested in the Three Persons, ante-Nicene Greek intellectual theology was just as primarily interested in the Divine nature in its unity, and in the directly Trinitarian portion of the De Trinitate, as distinct from the section on the Vestigia Trinitatis, Augustine was at least as "dithesistic" if not "tritheistic" as any Cappadocian and more so than Athanasius. More probably the true answer is the one given above. For some reason beyond our immediate field, the principal heresy in the Greek world was Arianism, and the theologians who elaborated orthodox doctrine in the days immediately before the Council of Constantinople, when the Greek Process became authoritative, were conditioned by the need to answer Arianism or the analogous heresy of the Holy Spirit. This would have disposed them to accept the emanationist and physicalist rather than the confrontationist views of the Trinity, and thence to prefer the Greek Procession. On the other hand, the Latin world, when heretical, tended to lapse rather into Sabellianism; to answer that heresy would have led straight to the more personalist and confrontationalist type of Trinitarianism which we see in Augustine (and to a much less extent in Athanasius dub. Or. IV C. Ar.), which involved the Filioque.

In this chapter, Athanasius further clears up the distinction between God's creation and His paternity. "But observe, say they, God was always a Maker, nor did the power of framing accrue to Him. Does it follow, then, that, because He is Framer, His works are eternal too, and that it would be wicked to say of them that they were not before they were generated? ... what likeness is there between Son and Father that they should apply to the operative's function \( \text{ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐνόπλωσεν} \) what applies to the paternal function \( \text{ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐπίσημο} \)?

\( (117) \) Καὶ οὐκ ἐπιτίθεμεν αὐτῷ τὸ ἐνόπλωσεν ἡ σύνεξις.
A thing made is external to its maker, but a son is an Offspring proper to the essence; and therefore a thing made need not always have been, because the workman frames it when he wills; but an offspring is not subject to the will, but is proper to the essence. And a man may be, and may be called, maker, even though the works are not as yet, but he can neither be nor be called father, unless a son exists. (As to why God did not always make, the most that can piously be said is) although it was always possible for God to make, yet the things originate could not have been eternal, for they are ex nihilo, and were not before they came to be. But how can things that were not before they came to be co-exist with God Who ever is? Wherefore, God, looking to what is good for them, made them all when He saw that, once they had come to be, they were able to last. And as, though He was able, even from the beginning to send His own Word, He yet did not send Him till the consummation of the ages so also He made things originate when He willed and when it was good for them. But the Son, not being a thing made but proper to the essence of the Father, ever is; for, since the Father ever is, so must that which is proper to His essence ever be, that is, His Logos and Wisdom. And that the creatures should ever not be in existence does not disparage the Maker, for He hath the power of framing them when He wills, but for an offspring not to eternally co-exist with the Father is a disparagement of the perfection of His essence. Wherefore the things made were framed when He willed, through His Logos; but the Son is always the Proper Offspring of the Father's Essence.

There are two main points for consideration in this passage:

(118) Τὸ προηγομένον ἐξαρχῆς ποὺ περιλαμβάνεται... οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ... ἐπεὶ τὸ γὰρ προηγομένον σωματικόν δὲν εἶναι ἀληθῆ... ὅπως εἶναι ἀληθῆ... ἐπεὶ δὲν εἶναι ἀληθῆ... γιὰ τὰ σωματικά... τὸ προηγομένον... καὶ προηγομένον... ὡς... ἀληθῆ... οὐκ... ἀληθῆ... εἰ... ἀληθῆ... ἀληθῆ... ἐπεὶ... οὐκ... ἀληθῆ... εἰ... ἀληθῆ... ἀληθῆ...

(119) Ἔχει ὅτι τὸ... συναντά... δὲν... συναντά... ἐπεὶ... δὲν... συναντά... ἐπεὶ... δὲν... συναντά... ἐπεὶ... δὲν... συναντά... ἐπεὶ... δὲν... συναντά...

(120) Ὁ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὸ... τὴ...
firstly (see Newman's note) that it is the essence of the creatures to be ex nihilo, therefore that they could not have been eternal, therefore God could not have been eternally exercising creatio ex nihilo. This is all well and good. The second point is far more complex, bringing up again the whole relativist issue, in two distinct but closely related ways. Athanasius observes, as a general truth, that creation or making is an act of will and thus external to the nature of the creator, whereas generation is not of the will but of the very essence of the begetter. This distinction (it will be discussed at much greater length in Or. III: 58–67) but the point should be made now) represents a clear error in Athanasius, taken as a general rule, since, to put the thing in later and more Aristotelian terms, it denies contingency in human (or other biological) generation. Now if there is one thing that is obvious, it is that human generation is contingent in the normal sense, and if there is one place where this is recognised it is the Old Testament, where it is subject to Divine Providence as a contingent event, not as a necessary one. (In Gen. 38, the possibility of deliberate restrictive birth control is recognised, even though it is deemed sinful). The non-contingency of the Divine Generation is the very thing for which there is no analogical equivalent within the created order. The situation is just as questionable when we consider the other side of the issue, the claim that by normal usage one is called creator or rather maker even before the existence of the works he makes, but cannot be called father till the child is actually generated. It is actually most doubtful, to put it mildly, whether a person is ever called a maker, ἄρτος, until he has begun to actually make something, and even if certain logicians, including Aristotle, talk of mere potentiality, "By their fruits ye shall know them," is a sufficient Scriptural warning against this point
of view. Where this way of thinking acquires its plausibility is the fact that artistic and technical output is intermittent in character, so that we do call a man a maker or a poet in the intervals between his individual works, but this is the great element of human creativity and manufacturing that cannot be applied to God, because His Creation is continuous, including as it does the continual providential superintendence over the created order. Thus God's relation as Creator has the same continuity, once it starts, as human parenthood, once it starts. It only remains to add that if there is one theologian who must have been aware of this, it is Athanasius himself, with his emphasis on the continuous sustaining activity of God as the essential other side of Creation itself (see esp. C.G. 41-43). Thus, this argument from normal usage cannot establish the point that it is intended to establish. As far as this argument is concerned, once we have established that God is always a Creator, but only potentially, there is nothing left to invalidate the Arian interpretation of His Fatherhood; once we have denied this, there is nothing to invalidate the corollary of the eternity of creation. The fact that there is a fundamental difference between the two is a factum brutum of revelation. The interpretation in meliorum partem of this chapter is that it is a further attempt to establish the contention that in God, fatherhood and sonship, family life in general, even considered relativistically, is the ultimate truth of life, according to the higher Trinitarian and analogical theory that we have extracted above. In this case, the close association in this chapter between this position and the fact that the Son is "proper to the essence" of the Father, suggests a most interesting conclusion, that is that Athanasius was beginning to see the Essence of God as something different from all philosophical and
attributive notions and as something bound up with the whole family life of the Trinity; in this way he would go even beyond Augustine, who still regarded the Fatherhood and the Sonship as "relations" and as different from the common essence of the Persons. All this suggests an existential rather than quasi-attributive interpretation of the One Essence of the Trinity, and that it should not be contracted with the Triplicity of the Persons nearly as much as it is in traditional theology (including, for example, Tarnan's notes on ch. 21 above). This sort of speculation is exceedingly dangerous, since one can so easily read an extraneous position into Athanasius, and at best it remains something germinal and implicit in this line of Athanasian theology, and the explicit Athanasian line at present is the more "physicalist" line.

30 These chapters, in which Athanasius treats of τὸ ἅγιον, 34 or The Unoriginate, as applied to God, have already been cited completely and treated exhaustively above. (121) To recapitulate, the Arian argument was that there could be only one Unoriginate or ultimate, and therefore the Son could not be co-eternal with the Father. Athanasius answers, much more clearly than in the corresponding section of "De Decretis", chs. 28-31, that there are two meanings of this phrase, firstly, what has no other thing as its ground of being, and secondly, what is eternal, the other two possible meanings being irrelevant, what can exist but does not yet, and what can never come to be. The two relevant meanings normally go together, since temporal priority is always involved in causal priority. But with God, these two elements, or what is analogous to them, have to be dissociated, so that in one sense there is only one Unoriginate, in the sense that

(121) See above, pp. 283-308.
the Father, since He generates eternally the Son, can be called His Origin, but in the other sense, that of co-eternity, the Father and Son are both co-unoriginate or co-ultimate. But, even when this correction has been made, the ἐγέρων is still a bad term to use about God, since it was originally a philosophical expression which denoted God's relation to creatures. Therefore, all its correlations and correlatives were in the creaturely sphere. Athanasius insisted that this must be broken, and that the only titles that should be used about God are those that find their correlations exclusively within the Godhead. This means par excellence, Father and Son. This is one of Athanasius's greatest achievements and one necessary to safeguard the majesty of God, for otherwise there would be a natural correlation between God and the creatures; ultimately, the world would be implied, as God's correlative, by the very existence of God Himself. This is the very thing that Athanasius has been trying to deny in ch. 299, however unsatisfactory his detailed argumentation may be (unusually so for Athanasius). This new emphasis on the strict correlation between the First and Second Persons to the exclusion of the correlation between the Logos and the cosmos patently favoured the Son theology as distinct from the Logos theology, and the fact that it did so is a sign that Athanasius always remained, to a certain extent, subconsciously under the influence of the older idea, whereby the Logos was really the Logos of the cosmos, in the Greek sense. The material which Athanasius introduces for the first time into this section, or which he treats so much more clearly here as to be virtually treating for the first time, can be grouped under three heads, a denunciation of Asterius's Two-Wisdom doctrine.

(122) As an example of the dire necessity of this point being made, even such an acute and orthodox a theologian as J.V. Longmood Casserley actually fell into the error of correlating the eternal generation of the Son with the fact that God's creation is creatio continua. See "The Christian in Philosophy", p. 220.
the need to dissociate temporal from ontological priority in the sense in which the latter occurs in the Trinity, and the insistence, which is here much plainer and more insistently expressed, that the Image, etc., of the Father must be exactly like the Father. This last means that it is not only temporal priority that must be dissociated from the quasi-causality in the Father's origination of the Son, but also the bare minimum of qualitative and other differences that are the inevitable concomitants of such a relationship among all creatures. Thus, there would be always many other differences between a father and a son simply as consequences of the fact that one is father and the other son; in fact, with the infinite complexity of creatures, there would be discoverable any amount of difference that we cared to determine, simply by investigating far enough. This would still apply even if the generation were asexual and the genetic patterns of father and son were identical. But, in God, Father and Son are absolutely alike except for the bare fact that the Father is Father and the Son is Son.

The next two chapters concern the Arian contention that the Logos is ἀοτρικός, by which the Arians meant a combination of two things, that He was a personal ethical being, and that He was progressive, in what is the true modern sense. We have already cited and discussed in full the bulk of ch. 35, in which Athanasius enunciated and denounced the Arian doctrine. We shall begin quotation at 35: 85A: "Put away with such madness of the Arians, and let the truth shine out . . ."

(123) See above, pp. 459-464. It is noteworthy, in addition, that the related abstract verbal noun ἀοτρίζω, alteration, which is derived by the normal laws of vowel shift, and which is used in this chapter, is our termination "tropic", in such words as "heliotropic", meaning the tendency of plants to grow in one direction, that is, towards the sun. The termination refers, not simply to a process, but to a regular and directed, or even teleological, process. This meaning is present in Classical Greek as a possible meaning, or perhaps even as an element in all the meanings of this word,
For must not He be perfect who is equal to God? And must not He be
unalterable who is one with the Father, and His Son proper to His
essence, and the Father's essence being unalterable the proper offering
from it must be unalterable too. And ... if they slandering in mute
alteration ( стар ) to the Logos, let them learn how their own reason
is in peril. ... For this is why he that has seen the Son has seen
the Father, and why the knowledge ( γνώση ) of the Son is knowledge of the
Father, (36) Therefore the Image of the unalterable God must be
unchangeable ( αορίστος εἰκών ). ... (Heb. 13:8, Ps. 102:26-29, Deut. 32:39)
... Even if it can be said that this is meant to refer to the Father,
yet it suits the Son too to say this, especially because after becoming
man He indicates his own identity ( γνώση ) and unalterableness to
those who reckon that He has changed ( ἁλεώς ἀλλα) or become something
else on account of the flesh. More trustworthy are the saints, or
rather the Lord, than the perversities of the impious. For Scripture,
as in the above-cited passage from the Psalter, signifying under the
name of heaven and earth that the nature ( γνώση ) of things originate
and all the creation is alterable and changeable yet excepting the
Son from these, shows us thereby that He is in no wise a thing originate,
nay, it rather teaches that He changes ( ἁλεώς εἰκών ) other things but
is Himself unchanged ... (Heb. 1:12) ... And fittingly; for things
originate, being δυναμεως δυναμεως, and not being before they originate
( πρό τοις εἰκών ) because in truth these came to be after not being, have
a changing nature, (12h) but the Son, being from the Father, and proper
to His essence, is unchangeable and unalterable even as the Father
Himself. For it would be sin ( αθέως ... τοις εἰκών ) to say that, from the
essence which is unalterable, there is begotten an alterable Logos and
a changing wisdom. For how can He be any longer Logos, if He is

(123) although it usually refers to change in general. Incidentally, in
this section where orthodox doctrine is being discussed, προς τοις εἰκών, and
ἀλεως ἀλλα, etc., are used as literary parallels. This is not
decisive evidence against our treatment of the former word above.
The point is that the relation is one between a more specialised
form of change, and change in general, respectively, and the
argument of Athanasius here applies, not only to the specialised
form of change implied in the word προς τοις εἰκών, but to change in general.
See Liddell and Scott, under προς τοις εἰκών, etc.,

(124) "Unalterable", in this chapter, is always the translation of the
appropriate part of προς τοις, and related forms, patristic notandas.
The corresponding periphrastic form ἀλεως ἀλλα, is similarly
"changeable".

(125) ἀλεως ἀλλα. Here as usual. In this instance the voice is
probably middle, but in other cases later it is passive.
ΤΡΕΠΤΩΣ? Or how can what is changing (τὸ ἈΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΔΕΝΩ) be any longer wisdom? Unless perhaps, as accident (ἡ ἈΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΔΕΝΗ) is in essence, that is, as in any particular essence a certain grace and habit of virtue exists accidentally, which essence is thus called Logos and Son and Wisdom in such a way that these can be subtracted from it or added to it. (126) . . . (But for Christians) He is truly Logos and Son and God and the Wisdom intended is true wisdom. For what alters and changes and has no stay in one and the same condition, (127) how can that be true? But the Lord says, 'I am the Truth'. (128) If then the Lord Himself speaks thus concerning His own unalterableness (τὸ ἈΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΔΕΝΩ), and the Saints have learned this and testify it, may, and our notions of God acknowledge it as religious, (129) whence did these men of irreligion draw this novelty? From their heart as from a seat of corruption did they vomit it forth."

Here we have Athanasius's last word on the contention, that he has made frequently, that the Son is the Image (by now presumably positive) of God must be absolutely like the Father. At this stage, some of the arguments that were formerly obscure are now clear, so this is the best time to gather them all together. The main authority is undoubtedly Scripture; "the saints" are the Scriptural witnesses only, as usual. It is noteworthy that, in 36: 550, where he says that the saints are more trustworthy than the perversions of heretics, Athanasius immediately qualifies it with the words "or rather, the Lord", which indicates that, for him, the essential thing about the Scriptural

(126) Ἡ Ἐν Ιησοῦ Χριστῷ ἡ ὑπάρξεως συμπεριλήφθη καὶ τὰ ἠλλοτριοδένη.
Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμήν. This would be a variant of either Paul of Samosata or D. H. Bailey.

(127) Τὸ ἐπ τοῦ ἔργου καὶ ἀλλοτριοδένου τῷ θεῷ ἀναφέρεται οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἑτέρῳ.


(129) Οὐ θεός ἡ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εὐθεῖα παρέξετο.
authorities is that they are witnesses to Christ.\(^{(130)}\) There is no
mention of ecclesiastical or traditional authority, even the Council
of Nicaea which figures in the corresponding passage in "De Decretis".\(^{(131)}\)
The only doubtful point is whether Athanasius, in his penultimate
sentence, does not leave too much open for speculative natural theology
by admitting our "notions" (ἐννοία = almost, "inmost ideas" in the
sense used by Descartes in the "Meditations".) to an excessively
authoritative position. As these notions are our notions of the
unchangeableness of God, and as the relation between the unchangeableness
of the real God and the unchangeableness of the God of natural theology
and Greek rationalism is a most difficult question which has only now,
since Firth, been given its proper attention, we shall say no more.
Probably, this sentence should be interpreted in meliora partim, that
it denies the Arians even the wretched excuse that they were being
misled by the respectable philosophical tradition. Here again we notice
the sheer novelty of Arianism; every respectable philosophical and
theological tradition known to Athanasius regarded it as a matter of
ontological or even verbal or a priori knowledge that the absolute
being should in principle be the unchangeable entity to which all
change must be referres, and in this Athanasius heartily concurred. This
would apply specially with a being called Logos, which was of course
one of the standard terms for an ultimate entity,\(^{(132)}\) and the very
similar wisdom, and Athanasius deduces, from the very nature of these
titles, that the Second Person cannot change. The Arians of course

\(^{(130)}\) Ch. 36: 350.
\(^{(131)}\) Ch. 4, beginning.
\(^{(132)}\) See Appendix, pp.
would really agree; they had to say that the Son was Logos and Wisdom merely improperly (Κατά Χριστίνας).

In the light of this, we can now see clearly how, materially, Athanasius justified the position that the Image of the unalterable God must also be unalterable. It is much clearer than in what we have called the rudimentary study of theistic attributes of both Father and Son in the "In illud, omnia mini tradita sunt..." (134) or even the section on the Homoeousion, interpreted genetically (not generically), in "De Decretis". (135) The principle is, apparently, an equivalent of the highest doctrine of analogy which Athanasius evolved above, in chs. 21-22 of this work. (136) As applied to the Son as Image, it would be that images after all ought to correspond exactly, and any failure to correspond is not something contained in the notion of image, but a true deficiency in this case. And in this case, there would be no reason for any such non-correspondence; even on the Arians' own ostensible basis they would find it hard to establish sufficient reason. There would be, originally, nothing else (save the Spirit) except Father and Son, and certainly the Image is not, even on an Arian basis, made out of alien material which might cause a distortion. It is the distortions which have to be explained, not the exactitude of the correspondence. Thus, the Image of God should be reckoned to be exact in likeness, and of course among the main features that are absolutely and exactly in common between Father and Son is the unalterableness of God.

(133) See Arian passage in De Decr. ch. 6, init., quoted above, p. 416.
(134) See above, pp. 686-87. 570-6.
(135) See above, pp. 631-40.
(136) See above, pp. 636-72.
This concludes the section of the Orations against the Arians devoted to a general study of the theology of Arianism and the orthodox answer to it. Although there is much more material of similar character later on (especially II: 18-43, III: 1-20 and 58-67), it is accurate to say that the Orations change their character from this point on. Now begins the tremendous exegetical section in which Athanasius returns to the subject matter, once again, of the "De Incarnatione". The Christology and soteriology that predominate here are not the direct subject of the thesis, and will not be treated in such great detail, but will require more than a passing mention, for two reasons, firstly, that it is necessary in such a unitary theologian as Athanasius to see how the Arian controversy affected his position on other matters, and, secondly, the fact that, as we have already shown, the increase in interest in the Spirit is closely bound up with these changes. The section that we have just closed, at the end of ch. 36, closely corresponds to the contents of "De Decretis", the matter in some instances almost exactly duplicating. We shall not give yet any detailed resume of this section, but shall rather wait until the end of the "Contra Arianos" I-III, but it is in order to mention the ways in which this section differs from the earlier work. The thing that is present in "De Decretis" and absent here is the Homoeousian, and we shall consider the significance of this change later. On the other hand, such phrases involving ὀνόματι as ἡ ἡμεία τοῦ Πατρός ἀυτῶν ἃνυπόθεν or portions of it, and ἐκ τῆς ὀνόματος etc., are fully represented, along with such lesser expressions as ἀπερίχλακτος ἐκάντιον and ὄνομα κατ' ὀνόματι and ὄνομα κατὰ πᾶντα which were later used by the Semi-Arian party but which Athanasius accepts, at least provisionally, as making his point about the absolute Deity of the Logos. (137) The principal

(137) See the lexicographical analysis, which begins with the next paragraph.
additional developments are, first, the very high doctrine of analogy of chs. 21-22, according to which it is God who has such things as fatherhood and sonship supremely, they are really the norms which creatures are unable to express perfectly, and a much clearer exposition of the reasons why the Image of God cannot but be completely God too. Also, Athanasius's treatment of the issues of causality and correlation in his study of the Ζητήσεις is a great improvement on that of the "De Decretis". Finally, Athanasius devotes a great deal of attention to the difference between making and begetting, and especially to the logical and theological account of Becoming (and its causative, making), which is, as it turns out, an essential preliminary to the solution of the exegetical problems that he is about to face in the latter five sixths of the work.

The lexicographical analysis of the Contra Arianos I-III will be divided into 7 sections corresponding to the changes in subject matter; I: 1-36, the general discussion of Arian theology; I:37 - II: 184.1.6, which concerns almost entirely the exegesis of Incarnational and soteriological passages of Scripture; II: 18: 184C: 1.6 - II: 43, which concerns further general problems necessitated by the difficult exegesis of Prov. 8: 22 LXX; II: 44-82, the exegesis of this verse and related

(138) If any one should rejoin that it is anachronistic to quote, or even to think of, Freud in this connection, the answer is that, owing again to the astonishingly rationalistic Western attitude to the Doctrine of the Trinity, Freud is almost the only philosopher (or theologian) to give family life anything like the importance that it has even for the expositions of Trinitarian doctrine on Athanasius and Augustine, let alone in Scripture. The only comparable figure since has been John Macmurray, and he had no predecessors since, for the sake of argument, Patriotic days.

(139) See above, pp. 720-24.
(140) See above, pp. 224-308.
(141) See above, pp. 698-705.
verses (with further material on the issues of the previous section); III:1-25, exegesis of some more strictly Trinitarian passages from the Gospels; III: 26-58: 445B: 1.3, the exegesis of the Scriptural passages concerning the Synoptic Christ; III: 58: 445B: 1.3 - III: 67 (the end), on the general question of the Son coming to be at the Will of the Father. This wide range of subject matter will give Athanasius's definitive use of all these terms that we are investigating in detail. We shall omit the passages of C. Ar. I: 30-34 which are exact quotations from De Decr. 28-31, and what are, or appear to be, quotations from the "Thalia" or other heretical writings; we shall also omit the references to the Logos which indicate that He is identical to the Son, since in these cases the titles duplicate.

(F. has His own L.), 25: 64B alterum (L. not accrued externally), 31: 76C (L. same kind as Begetter), 33: 81A ("Father" denotes God in correlation with L.), 34: 84A (L. recognised in F.), 13: 40B (the "ex nihilo" is other than L.), 19: 53A & 27: 66C (eternity of L.).


Of these 83 uses, no less than 62 simply refer to the basic relation between the First and Second Persons, 16 refer to the cosmological and creative work of the Second Persons, 16 refer to the cosmological and creative work of the Second Person, 2 refer to the Logos to be incarnate (these are, the Logos revealing Himself to the men of the Old Testament, and the reference to the Logocentric principle in theology), 1 to the Hypostasis of the Incarnate Christ, and 2 to the work of God among post-Incarnation Christians (including the supply of the Spirit, since this is how the Spirit was regarded in this connection). There are no references to the Second Person as the Agent of the Incarnation as an event actually taken place, or to the Synoptic Christ as a whole.


Principle of Creation, i.e. through the S.: 12: 36B. Not necessary for knowledge of God (which is possible for natural theology alone; classified under Second Person to be incarnate); 12: 37B. Nature of Son exceeds everything human and creaturely: 13: 40B & 16: 45C & 27: 60C (not ex nihilo). 16: 45B (not by affection). 21: 57A (not an efflux). 33: 80B & 35: 85C (not to be included in the "all things" created through Him). The Incarnation: 10: 32A (Iα. J. Xt. is God and Son of the F.), 25: 64C (single use only having been S. of G. He became S. of Man).

Words attributed to the Son (i.e. the Gospels): 15: 44C, 19: 52A, 20: 53C bis. Spirit receives from the Son (which we refer to the intra-Trinitarian status of the Spirit): 15: 44B. Son has middle place (in Trinitarian confession): 31: 84A. The Arianism (true doctrine): 31: 76B (Son is unoriginate in one sense), 31: 76B (even though S. not unoriginate in other sense, is never a thing originate). 33: 80B (F. not called unoriginate relative to Son). In addition, there are 14 Arian references to the Son, which, all, without exception this time, have the same character as those to the Second Person as Logos: 4: 20C, 3: 28A bis, 11: 33B bis & C, 12: 37B, 13: 40B, 14: 42C & 41B & C, 15: 44A quater & B bis & C bis, 17: 48B, 18: 45C, 19: 52A, 20: 53B, 21: 56A bis & B & B-C,
22: 57B & C, 25: 64B bis & C, 26: 65A, 28: 69C, 30: 73B, 31: 77A, 32: 77C, 35: 84B & C & 85A, 36: 88A & B. Of these 123 uses, 110 refer to the simple relation between the Persons of the Trinity (or to the simple Arian doctrine in implied contrast), 5 refer to the creative and cosmological functions, 2 to the Incarnation considered prospectively, 1 to the Second Person as Agent of the Incarnation as an accomplished act, 1 to the subject or hypostasis of Christ, and 4 to the Synoptic Christ as a whole (this excludes "Son of Man", which cannot be included here.

Apart from the fact that "Son is now commoner than "Logos", the usages of the two terms are identical except that there is still a greater tendency (about four times as great) to use Logos for the creative and cosmological activities of the Second Person.

Of the terms ὄνομα, ἐπωνύμιον, and ὄνομαζοντος, there are only three instances of the last-mentioned, so that they will be kept to the end; this word remains rare throughout the Oration. ὄνομα is common; we shall, for convenience’s sake, arrange the instances somewhat differently from Müller. Substantia et natura rationalis (Müller), or ὄνομα generally, without any Trinitarian association: 26: 65B & C (any son is ὅιος τῆς οὐσίας of his father), 29: 72B (any son is ὅιος τῆς οὐσίας ἑαυτοῦ), 36: 88A bis (accident in relation to essence). All the other uses have Trinitarian connections. ἐπωνύμιον: 9: 32A & 17: 48A (Arians claim Son unlike, ὅνοματι κ. θ. to Father), 20: 53A (Arians deny S. like θ. to F.). or Son different from created essence: 26: 69B (Logos, Wisdom, Radiance indicate θ.; this is probably better interpreted as referring elliptically to the S. being from the E. of the θ.). Same in Father and Son (i.e. mainly variants of the Nicene phrases): ὅιος (or ὅιον) τῆς οὐσίας of the Father: 9: 28D, 16: 45C, 20: 53A & B, 22: 57B, 29: 72C bis (in one case ὅιον τῆς ἐπωνύματος), 35: 85A & 36: 88A (in each case "of the θ.") omitted). ὅιον τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας ἑπωνύματος: 9: 28D, 17: 48B, 29: 73A. ἐκ τῆς θ. τοῦ Π. ἑπωνύματος: 15: 44A, 16: 45A. ἐκ τῆς θ. τοῦ Π. ἑπωνύματος: 16: 45B. ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Π.: 15: 44C (opp.
(some phrase = "Son"). See also 28: 69B ("Son" = τὸ φύσει καὶ ἐξ οὗ ἐγένετο ἢ π. ο. ˘j). Other uses in this grouping that do not involve phrase phrases: 9: 29A (True Image of Father's Essence = Χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως), 16: 45B (Begetting of S. not a division of E. of F.), 16: 45B alterum (Son's complete participation not a division of E. of F.), 20: 53B (The Arians separate what is full of the F.'s Essence). Arian uses, not included above: 14: 41B (pace the Ans. the E. of the F. never incomplete - i.e. through there being no son; parallel to φωνή), 17: 43 (Arianism implies a Trinity of different φύσει and οὐσίας), 20: 53C (how can P. see himself in created and originate οὐσία;), 21: 56A (Arians exclude F. & S. to be of δόμος οὐσίας), 29: 73A (οὐσία of F. insulted by Son being not eternal).

In these Orations, there is now sufficient material to enable us to develop and use a certain schema; we are omitting any uses that do not refer to the Trinity. The first group is that where the word refers primarily to arithmetic and constitutive unity, normally of the Father; the second is very like the above, but where the primary reference is to the Son's generation from the innermost centre of the Father's being; we include in this group all cases in which the Son is "from" the Essence of the Father, or is the Offspring, γενετής, of the Father. Group Three is indeterminate between Groups 2 and 4, usually consisting of the phrase Ἰδιὸς τῆς οὐσίας, without the ἐκ or the γενετής; in this case it is better interpreted as belonging to Group 2. Group Four is where οὐσία has a generic sense, and the last is the adverbial or dynamic sense, in which such phrases as κατ' οὐσία refers to what is aboriginally true rather than what is accidentally true or only becomes true. The incidences of these 32 instances are: I - 2 cases (at most), II - 10, III - 12, IV - 4 (at most), V - 3 (if the Arian statements that the Son is unlike the Father κατ' οὐσία are to be included here). These results indicate that the Athenasian use of is the same as the position that we have elaborated above on the Homoeousion in the "De Decretis".
DIVINE NATURE

Nature: Divine nature: 14: 41B (D.N. always perfect, because He begets not in time, parallel to οὐνόμαστι). D.N. common to F. & S.: 9: 28D (Son is True and Φύσει), 15: 44A (Arians deny θαύματος λειτουργίαν of the F.), 27: 66C (Φύσει parallel to εἰσπορεύματα), 28: 69B (ποτε Φύσει τὴν οὐνόμαστι καταγεννημα). Heretics deny true Nature of Christ (i.e. Divine nature): 17: 48C (Arianism implies Trinity of different natures and essences (in parallel)), 16: 46C (Arians divide Triad into different Φύσει), 25: 64C (Arians claim θαύματος λειτουργίαν as creature), 28: 69G (the Φύσει generation denied by the Arians), 22: 57C & 35: 84B & C (Son is ἀπαντήσεως Φύσεως), 35: 85A (S. is ἀπαντήσεως Φύσεως). Human nature (never of the Son, but always in general contrast with Divine nature): 14: 41B, 15: 44A, 26: 65B & 68A bis, 28: 69A ter, Nature of all visible things (similarly); 20: 53A, 36: 88A (All these last usages are truly noun- usages, and not in adverbial phrases, etc.). Other miscellaneous uses: 11: 33A (ποτε signifies time, Φύσει, i.e. by the laws of language), 7: 25A (the whole Φύσις of men, i.e. = mankind), 26: 65B ("generation", that is, in general, should imply θαύματος λειτουργίαν), 27: 68B (Such parents as the Son have co-eternity and θαύματος λειτουργίαν in their generative relation).

In our analysis, we shall pay particular attention to any parallelism between οὐνόμαστι and Φύσει. Obviously, the latter word has none of the unitary significance of the former. Thus there are only three groups, or perhaps more accurately only two. Firstly, the noun use, referring on the one hand to Divine nature and on the other to human or creaturely nature generally. In this context it is correct to include under the last-named the instances in which the word is used for scientific law, etc. Here, the word has a generic sense, or perhaps, more accurately, a categorial sense within the meaning that we have adopted. The other division is the adverbial phrases, κατὰ Φύσιν, Φύσει, etc., which refer unquestionably to what is aboriginally true as distinct from what only becomes true. Of these 26 uses, 3 refer to the Divine Nature (with which we have included two in which the Arians are said to divide the Trinity into differing natures), 16 to human or creaturely natures (including all cases in which the Arians impute this, in a noun form, to the Son as His sole nature), and 7 in the adverbial sense. This shows
an approximation, relative to what has gone before, to the Chalcedonian use, except that there is a marked unwillingness yet to use the word in this sense about the Divine nature.

There are very few terms for the Humanity of Christ. 7: 24C: Christ endured ὑπαρκτικός ὑπερτύπωσε (insults) for us. 36: 85C: Heretics say that Christ changed itself εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Became man; 25: 64C and 36: 85C. Became Son of Man: 25: 64C. Λέγεται εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον of the Son: 8: 28B. In the first case, the humanity is the object of external action, in the last, the Logos is acting through the humanity; in the other four cases, the classification is in doubt, but since the principal context is the question of the sense in which the Logos itself as Second Person was changed or "made" something else by God (while still remaining Son of God), these are best classified with the group where the Logos acts "as man", which use has in common with Chalcedon that the Humanity and Divinity are both equally natures of Christ.

"But since they misrepresent the Divine oracles, and forcibly misinterpret them according to their private sense (142) it is necessary to give them an answer that would vindicate (ἐκθέτω ταύτα) these passages and show that they have an orthodox sense (143) and that it is the other party whose sentiments are wrong." This and similar passages are welcomed by Cardinal Newman and "Catholic" students generally as a sign that Athanasius supported the rights of a self-subsistent Church theology to interpret Scripture, at any rate, a Church theology not entirely dependent on Scripture itself, on the grounds that Scripture is, in its ipsissima verba, ambiguous and in need of explanation and even, in some cases, "vindication". Admittedly, this talk about vindicating Scripture, proving its correct sense, etc. is at first sight deeply suspicious. But is it, in its actual Christological context, really

(142) Καὶ τὸν ἄλλον νὰ ὑποτάσσω.
(143) ἐπιθέω... τὴν διάβολαν.
any more "Catholic" than Luther's statement that anything that
testifies of Christ is canonical, though Judas, Caiaphas, and Pilate
say it, and that anything that fails to testify of Christ is to be
rejected, though Peter and Paul say it? (144) And, in view of the
continued use of Scriptural passages, especially from St. John's
Gospel, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the traditional Christological
testimonies of the Old Testament, in the above portions of the "Contra
Arianos", as well as in the establishment of positive theology in the
remainder of the Orations and in the anti-Arian writings generally,
are Athanasius's remarks about the correct or straight sense of
Scripture really so much more than a call to demonstrate that Scripture
does not contradict itself, which every true Protestant exegete accepts
as his duty and privilege? The question is, in fact, rather more
complicated than this, but it will have to be deferred to Part II of
this thesis, and meanwhile we can go on and recognise that the above
Protestant analysis is nearer the truth about Athanasius than the
"Catholic" one.

Prima facie, the Athanasian denunciation of exegesis ἄκρα τούτου
ὑπὸν νοῦν, is a more serious matter, but it can be disposed even more
effectively. Protestantism will have to stamp out the self-imposed
canard that it has any interest in the "private interpretation of
Scripture". The correct Protestant doctrine of interpretation of
Scripture is, in fact, the same as the modern doctrine of scientific
research at its best. The scientist must be free alike of popular
prejudice and authoritarian discipline. But he must submit his mind
to the discipline of the facts of his field of study as they are. What
is more, as we are increasingly coming to understand, he must publish
his findings and submit them, as a check on his submission to his
discipline, to the critical scrutiny of his fellows of like mind, and

(144) Pref. Eps. James and Jude (1522), quoted by Karl Barth, Ch. Dog.
must do so in the humble expectation of such scrutiny and, if necessary, correction. Of course, there are many differences between science and Christian faith and religion, but this is not yet the place to outline them. But Protestants would not go far wrong if they accepted this doctrine of Scripture, which is probably about as far as we can get. Private interpretation of Scripture, κατὰ τὸν Ἰδιον νοῦν, is an atrocious violation of the truth, like faking experiments and trying to compel one's fellow-scientists to accept the results (?). In fact, it is the very charge that the best Reformed theology, like that of Calvin and Barth, brings with such force against Roman Catholicism, and the whole "Catholic" tradition insofar as it follows the same procedure; the charge is, not that they are too free in applying to others what is after all the most essential notion of heresy, but that they were in fact heretics, interpreters κατὰ τὸν Ἰδιον νοῦν, on an enormous scale, and that they had gone so far as to elevate heresy into a sort of all-pervasive anti-theological principle. True Protestant and Reformed theology need have nothing to fear from the Contra Arianos.

This passage marks a transition in the structure of the Contra Arianos; perhaps a transition in the history of theology as a whole. Now that Athanasius had made his criticism of the bases of Arian theology, he was faced with the fact that much of Scripture spoke creaturely language about Christ, and was thus exploited by the Arians for their own position. This matter demanded the most urgent attention, and in fact almost the whole of the remainder of Orations I-III is concerned with refuting the Arian exegesis of these passages. For all the thoroughness with which the question is treated,

(145) It is very likely that the sort of position here advocated does correspond to the practice of the early Church. See I. Cor. 12 (esp. v. 10) and 14 (esp. v. 26).
the great principle of Athanasian exegesis can be summarised very simply: they all refer to the humanity taken by Christ at the Incarnation. To complete the repudiation of Arianism on its own ground, Athanasius had to give a full account of the almost virgin field of the Humanity of Christ, and so pave the way for the next century of theology. One necessary result of this was to return once again to the subject matter of the De Incarnatione, since the Humanity of Christ involved the whole economy of the Incarnation. It will be one of our tasks to examine the differences between these two treatments of the work of Christ, in the light of the whole development of Athanasius and of theology in general in the intervening period. On the other hand, the line of exegesis here taken was, on our chronology of the Athanasian writings, by no means new, having been foreshadowed in the earliest anti-Arian writings; (146) in fact, it dates at least from Marcellus of Ancyra (147) (and the fact that he said the right thing for the wrong reason was undoubtedly a grave embarrassment to Athanasius.) But the treatment of this issue in the Contra Arianos is so much the definitive treatment that we hardly need to glance back at the earlier works as regards the handling of the basic exegetical issue. In fine, it is evident already that the Arian controversy was, on the human level, the efficient cause of the revival of Christology. A theology that is, like the earlier Fathers, not sufficiently ruthless in its differentiation between created reality and God, cannot have a Christology in the orthodox sense, since it can never feel the problem properly. The Arians were aware enough in a sense of the essential lowliness of created reality as compared with God, and they saw that Christ had to be

(146) See "De Sententia Dionysii", chs. 8-12, and "De Decretis" 13-14.
(147) See Eusebius of Caesarea, "Ecclesiastical Theology" III: 2 and 3.
interpreted along those lines in a way that did not admit of compromise, but their choice, that He was a creature, gave them even less reason for a Christology. It was only when, as with Athanasius, theologians had accepted the Arian and Scriptural gulf between creatures and God, but had affirmed that the Second Person was on the Divine side of it, that the Scriptural evidence compulsively raised the Christological question as we understand it. Similarly in modern times the decay of Christology has been associated with the prevalence of Hegelian and other liberal theology, which once again assimilated God and Man, and its revival in the present as the basis of theology itself is associated with the realisation, for which we have not least to thank modern atheism from Feuerbach onwards, that however far the essence of humanity grows, it will still be just as creaturely as ever, and will never be any nearer to the Deity.

Finally, we must examine this transition from the standpoint of Biblical theology. It appears, at first sight, that Athanasius has elaborated a doctrinal system with independent status and then forced refractory Scripture into that mould. But this would be an unfair judgment, as we have already seen. In the first place, it is more likely that the order of treatment of the issues corresponds to some feature of Arianism, whatever we might think of Newman's suggestion (notes on Or. II: 18) that Athanasius may be in fact answering some Arian magnum opus in the order in which it was written. Secondly, in spite of certain tendencies in the direction of a rationalistic conception of the unity, etc., of God as the standard, which we have noticed above in our notes on ch. 36, in the main Athanasius's treatment of theology in the earlier section is thoroughly Biblical, and any appearance to the contrary is because Athanasius had to answer the bases of Arian theology first, which is in turn almost
certainly because Arianism is in a subtle sense not an exegetical heresy, but due to a quite fundamental error in the *prolegomena* to theology. In the third place, the great length of the refutation of Arian exegesis is not the obfuscatory verbosity of a man without a case, but the repetition of a man building up a new topic of theology. Athanasius’s treatment here of the Humanity of Christ differs from Origen’s by reason of its far greater practical and soteriological interest, and from that of Irenaeus (and Origen too) by the far more rigorous and exhaustive distinction between God and the creature which had to be made once the Arian controversy had started.

In the light of this, we can see that the *Contra Arianos* is actually a model for all exegetical theology. It fills the worst gap in the traditional proof text method, that it ignores the passages of Scripture which apparently contradict the doctrine that is to be proved. This aspect is fully and faithfully tackled by Athanasius, with wonderfully rewarding results, and it can be said, without exaggeration or anachronism, that, in the *Contra Arianos*, exegetical theology is really scientific, in the best modern sense. The lesson for Reformed theology, when it is in difficulties over the proof text method, is not that it must recognise the supra-Scriptural authority of the teaching Church, but rather the reverse, that it must bring a greater thoroughness and, in the best sense, disinterested, to its exegesis. Even as scientists often make great discoveries by studying apparent failures in their experiments so was Athanasius led on to a most important new field by the study of the "discrepancies" of Scripture. If Reformed theology is more thoroughly true to its own nature and calling and does likewise, it will have a like reward.

Let us now go on to consider the sections, in detail, in which Athanasius refutes the Arian exegesis of those passages of
Scripture in the latter half of the First Creation and almost the whole of the Second and Third. It is probable that the amount of material necessary to this task considerably exceeded the original expectations of Athanasius. The first passage is Philipp. 2: 9-10. The Arians took the Δικαιοσύνη in verse 9 as indicating reward for virtue; therefore, they said, the Logos is a creature. We have already discussed how Athanasius treats this exegesis with the contempt that it deserves, by showing that its implication, if anything, is the doctrine of Paul of Samosata, and we shall not discuss the matter further. (148) But the Logos had His full glory before the Incarnation, and here and further throughout this section Athanasius quotes or refers to several of the Old Testament and other passages that had always been accepted as testimonia to this effect: Gen. 18, Exod. 3, Dan. 7:10, John 17:5, Ps. 18:9-13, John 1:1-3, Col. 1:15, Ps. 64:1, Ps. 20:7, Heb. 1:6, Ps. 72:17 & 5 (LXX text), and, supremely, the whole passage, Philipp. 2: 5-11, to indicate that the very idea that the Logos could have received His glory as a reward for anything, most of all during His incarnate life, is completely un-Scriptural. Having now eliminated the Samosatene interpretation, Athanasius now gives the proper interpretation of the passage in question: (commencing at 33: 92B)

"Therefore, if, even before the world was made, the Son had the glory, and was Lord of glory and the Highest, and descended from Heaven, and is ever to be worshipped, it follows that He did not have promotion from His descent (149), but rather Himself promoted the things which needed promotion; and if He descended to effect their promotion, therefore He did not receive in reward the name of the Son of God, but rather He Himself has made us sons of the Father, and deified (Θεομοιος)

(148) See above, pp. 368-370.
(149) i.e. from His works on earth.
men by becoming Himself man.

Therefore it was not that He became man. Now, if He were called Son and God only when He became man, whereas before He became man God called the ancient people sons and made Moses a god to Pharaoh,(150) it would follow that He was called Son and God later than they are. How then are things through Him and He before all? Or how is He the first-born of all creation(151) if He has others before Him who are called sons and gods? And how is it that these other partakers do not partake of the Logos? . . . how in that case can anybody at all know God as their Father? For adoption (υἱὸς Θεοῦ) could not take place apart from the true Son . . . (Matt. 11:27 quoted) . . . And how can there be deifying apart from the Logos and before Him? . . . (John 10: 35) . . . And if all who are called sons and gods, whether in earth or in heaven, were adopted and deified the Logos, and the Son Himself is the Logos, it is plain that all are through Him, and He Himself before all; or rather, that He Himself alone is True Son (γεννημένος), and He alone is True God of True God, and He does not receive these prerogatives as a reward of virtue or is something other than these, but is these φίλος καὶ κατ’ οὐσίαν. For He is Offspring of the Father’s Essence, so that there is no doubt that the Logos is ἀριστερός, in accordance with His resemblance to the Unalterable Father.

Hitherto we have met their irrational conceits by using the true conceptions implied in the Word Son.(152) . . . (But to clinch the matter out of Scripture, we now quote in full Philipp. 2:5-11 . . . if, being God, He became man, and descending then from on high He is still said to be exalted, where does His exaltation come in in His capacity as God?(153) For it is plain, that since God is Highest of all, necessarily His Logos must also be highest(154). Where then could He be exalted higher, who is in the Father and alike in all things(155) to the Father? . . . . For though the Logos has descended

(150) P 82:1, LXX.
(151) πρωτότοκος πάσης τῆς κτίσεως Col. 1:15.
(152) τάς περὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ έννοιας - that is, virtually, the "Begriff of Sonship.
(153) ποι ὁ υἱός σου Θεός εἶναι;
(154) The relevant case of υἱός in each instance.
(155) ὁμοίος καὶ πάντα
in order to be exalted . . . . what need was there for Him to humble Himself to seek what He actually had? And what grace did He receive who was the Giver of grace? Or how did He receive that Name for worship who is always worshipped by His Name . . . .

41 . . . . It is not a riddle, but a Divine mystery. 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God', (156) but for our sakes (σιν τήν) afterwards 'the Word became flesh'. (157) And the term 'highly exalted' (158) does not signify that the essence (οὐσίας) of the Logos was exalted, for He always was, and is, 'equal to God', but the exaltation is of the manhood. Accordingly, this is not said before the Logos became flesh, so that it might be plain that 'humbled' and 'exalted' are spoken of His human nature (159), for where there is humble estate (τὸ ταπείνων), there may be exaltation as well, and if the 'humbled' was written on account of His taking flesh, it is clear that 'highly exalted' is also said because of it. For it was this that man needed, because of the humble estate of the flesh and of death. Since then the Logos, being the Image of the Father and immortal, took the form of a servant, and as man underwent for us death in His own flesh (160), that thereby He may offer Himself (ἐλυτων) on our behalf through death to the Father; therefore also as man He is said to be because of us and for us (161) highly exalted, that as by His death we all died in Christ, so again in the same Christ we might be highly exalted, being raised from the dead and ascending unto heaven . . . .

And as He Himself, who sanctifies all, says also that He sanctifies Himself to the Father for our sakes, not that the Logos may become holy, but that He Himself may in Himself sanctify all of us . . . . (the same applies to exaltation. Here follows the exegesis of Ps. 24:7 that we have already noticed above, in De Inc. 25.) . . . .

42 And so too the words 'gave Him' are not written because of the

(156) John 1:1.
(158) ἐπερευσθέν, Philipp. 2:9.
(159) ἐπὶ τοῦ Λόγου τοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.
(160) καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑπερευθείς διὸ ηγήθης ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ σαρκὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ.
(161) διὸ διήθη καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν.
Logos Himself, for even before He became man He was worshipped by the angels and the whole creation in virtue of His being proper to the Father, but because of us and on our behalf also this is written of Him. For as Christ died and was exalted as man, so, as man, He is said to receive what, as God, He always had, that such a gift of grace might reach us too. For the Logos was not impaired on receiving a body, that He should also seek to receive a grace; rather did He deify what He put on, and more than that, 'gave' it graciously to the race of men. For as He was ever worshipped as being the Logos and as existing in the form of God, likewise, being what He always was even after becoming man, He none the less had creation under-foot, and bending their knees to Him in this Name, and confessing that the Word's becoming flesh and undergoing death in the flesh had not happened against the glory of His Godhead, but 'to the glory of God the Father'. For it is the Father's glory that man, made and then lost, should be found again, and when dead should be made alive and should become God's temple. For whereas the powers of heaven were ever worshipping the Lord, as they are now worshipping in the Name of Jesus, this is our grace and high exaltation, that even when He became man, the Son of God is worshipped, and the heavenly powers will not be astonished at seeing all of us, who are of one body with Him, introduced into their realms. And this would not have been, unless He who existed in the form of God had taken on Himself the form of a servant, and had humbled Himself, yielding His body even unto contact with death.

43 Behold then, what men used to consider the foolishness of God on account of the Cross has become more honoured than anything else. For our resurrection is stored up in it, and no longer Israel alone but henceforth all nations acknowledge the True God, the Father of Christ. And the illusion of demons is come to nought, and only He Who...
is really God is worshipped in the Name of Christ. For the fact that the Lord, even when come in a human body and called Jesus, was worshipped and believed to be God's Son, and that through Him the Father was known, shows... that it was not the Logos considered as Logos but we ourselves who received this great grace. For because of our relationship to His body we have become also God's temple, and in consequence are made sons of God, so that even in us the Lord is now worshipped, and beholders report, as the Apostle said, that God is in them in truth... (John 3:12 & I John 3:24)... And this too is evidence of His goodness towards us, that, while we were exalted through the Highest Lord being in us, and while for our sake grace was given to Him on account of the fact that the Lord Who supplies grace became man, He, the Saviour, on the other hand, humbled Himself in taking our body of humiliation, and took a servant's form, putting on that flesh which was enslaved to sin. And He indeed has gained nothing from us for His own improvement... but rather were we improved from Him... (John 1:9)... (And by Ἐσ, wherefore, Paul)... did not imply any reward of virtue, nor progress through struggle, but rather the cause of the exaltation bestowed upon us (169). And what is this but the fact that He Who existed in form of God, the Son of a noble Father, humbled Himself and became a servant instead of us and on our behalf. For if the Lord had not become man, we should not have been redeemed from sins and raised from the dead... (another admissible meaning is that)... it by reason of His becoming man indicates His resurrection from the dead... although as man He is said to have died (170), yet as being Life He was exalted by resurrection... He descended corporeally; He arose because He was God Himself in a body... (the Wherefore signifies)... the cause why the Resurrection took place, and why, while all other men... have died and have remained dead, He alone rose in integrity from the dead. The cause is this... that being God, He has become man. For all other men, being merely born of Adam, died, and death

(168) Διὰ οὐρανοῦ πρῶς τε σύμμετρα εὐγενείαν
(169) το άγιον της ες ης ημών εναντιών ειρήνης.
(170) ὡς ἄνθρωπες λειτουργοὶ τε κοινωνεῖς.
(171) Κατεβάζει κάρ συμμετίκος.
reigned over them; but He, the Second Man (172) is from heaven ... and this man is said to be from Heaven and heavenly, because the Logos descended from heaven; wherefore He was not held under death. For though He humbled Himself, yielding His own body to come in contact with death, on account of the fact that it was susceptible to death, yet He was highly exalted from the earth, because He was God's Son in a body. ... (Acts 2:24). To man, it was not possible to succeed in this: for death is proper to men; wherefore the Logos, being God, became flesh, that, being put to death in the flesh (Θανάτῳ ἐστιν), He might quicken all men by His own power.

But since He Himself is said to be 'exalted' and since God gave Him and the heretics think this a defect or affection of the essence of the Logos (173), it becomes necessary to explain how these words are used. He is said to be exalted even from the lower parts of the earth, because death is ascribed (λέγεται Εἶναυ) even to Him. Both events are said to be His, since the body (τὸ σῶμα) which was raised from the dead and assumed to heaven was His and nobody else's. Again, as the body was His and the Logos was not external to it, it is properly said that when the body is exalted He Himself is exalted through the body as a man (174) ... if the Word become flesh, the resurrection and exaltation are necessarily ascribed to Him as to a man, that the death ascribed to Him (175) may be a redemption of the sin of men and an abolition of death, and that the resurrection and exaltation may for His sake remain secure for us. ... (The fact that the grammatical subject in each case is "God" shows that) ... it is not the Father that has become flesh, but His Logos who has become man, and receives after the manner of man from the Father, and is exalted by Him ... And it is plain ... that what the Father gives, He gives through the Son (δί' αὐτοῦ). And it is truly paradoxical and astonishing; the Son Himself is said to receive the grace which the Son gives from the Father (176), and the Son Himself is exalted with the very exaltation

(172) δεύτερος ἀνθρωπός - as in the well-known doctrine of Irenaeus.
(173) ἐλήλυμεν Εἶναυ ἐκ τῆς πάθους τοῦ Λογοῦ ὁσίας.
(174) Εἰκότως ὑφομένου τοῦ σώματος, ὥστε ἄνθρωπος διὰ τοῦ σώματος μουσώδαι λέγεται.
(175) Θανάτῳ λεγόμενος οὐτοῦ.
(176) παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς - and so in the remainder of the chapter.
which the Son bestows from the Father. For He Who is Son of God, the same has become also Son of Man; as Logos, He gives from the Father, for all things which the Father does and gives, He does and supplies through Him, and as Son of Man, He Himself is said after the manner of men to receive what proceeds from Him (τὸ πατρὸς Εὐαγγελίον), because His body is none other than His, and has the nature of being receptive of grace...

For he receives, according to the exaltation of the humanity (τοῦ ανθρώπου); the exaltation was its deification. But the Logos Himself always had this, in accordance with His own Paternal Godhead and perfection."

We have quoted at great length from these chapters, since they show the Athanasian position with exceptional clarity as well as being the first of his great exegeses. In later portions of this work, we shall not quote at length, in most cases, mentioning simply special points as they arise. The Arian method of exegesis has already been discussed and dismissed with the contempt it deserves, so no further comment is needed, except to notice once again the apparently incurable Arian fixation with the idea of progress, βελτίωσις, and even the amazingly modern notion of progress as a fully self-conscious activity involving struggle and conflict (βελτίωσις προκύμας - 43: 1018), which, as we have strongly suggested above, is the idea that the Arians were trying to formulate with all their talk about the Logos as an ethically changeable being, etc. Having dismissed all this in due fashion, Athanasius now turns to the proper exposition of the passage. We have already made certain introductory remarks about his exegetical and hermeneutic principles (177), but some further observations are necessary here. As we have already said, it is not true that Athanasius forced Scripture into a Procrustean bed of ecclesiastical tradition or self-originated metaphysics. This is shown even by the first 36 chapters

(177) For Arianism, see above, pp. 441-3. For Athanasius, see above, pp. 524-5, 733-8
of the "Contra Arianos" I, with their great range of Scriptural quotations, and is shown even more effectively by the even greater concentration of Scriptural testimony which he adduces in this section itself against the Arian position. Whatever we may think of the Old Testament testimonies, the point is that this is the way that everybody, from St. Peter in Acts onwards, to say nothing of Christ Himself, used the Old Testament, as properly referring to Christ. (178) The issue is nothing less than the integrity of Scriptural witness. If there is disagreement in Scripture prima facie, we cannot be satisfied. But there is a further principle. When the disagreements are of the type characteristic of the Arian controversy, statements about God have absolute priority over statements about creaturely reality. To put it a little better, the priority belongs to statements in Scripture which reveal God, or Christ as God, over those which simply reveal Him as man. In other words, there is a genuine revelation of God in the words of Scripture. The absolute primacy of Christ in revelation must NEVER be interpreted in such a way as to imply that the statement "Christ is God", is either logically tautologous or meaningless (as distinct from tautologous according to the basis of right theology); such a position would be sitting shot for the blasphemous arguments of Arius, or, more to the point now, of Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud. If there is conflict between the ascription of Deity to Christ and the description of His human life, so much the worse for the latter. Or rather not quite; but it is the latter that must be unconditionally subordinated. The former are absolute and constitute the absolute standard; the latter must be interpreted in a way which is consistent with the former and which does not in the slightest compromise their absolute validity. And what is

more—and this is not only something which Protestant scholarship must uncompromisingly affirm but also the plain meaning of Athanasius—these testimonies are valid in themselves, according to the plain unvarnished words as witnessing to Christ, NOT as interpreted by the Church according to an a priori schema, unless the hermeneutic principle mentioned here, which is really the irreducible minimum for any Christian theology at all—is described in this most suspect way. It was this principle, supremely, that the Arians broke, and Communism and modern atheism generally are simply the ultimate development of Arian practice in this regard. They regarded the ταυτικα λέγεις the statements which showed that Christ was a creature, as ultimately and absolutely true, indeed as the only sort of statement that could be true; it was the statements concerning His Deity that had to be explained away. For Athanasius, this was blasphemy, and he was therefore faced with the formidable task of expounding such statements in a way that would be absolutely consistent with the full Deity of Christ.

This principle is that all these passages apply to the Humanity of Christ, to Christ as Μαν (μαν διὸ θεομος). This is applied in an extreme and thorough way. The exaltation cannot refer to the Deity at all, any more than the details of the earthly life can, since one of the characteristics of God as such is that He is quite literally unchangeable, and also that as God, the Logos was absolutely like in all things to the Father. Thus there can be no distinction whatever of rank between the Father and the Son, the superlative ουσίας, highest, applying to both in exactly the same way. As to whether Athanasius had in mind the type of subordination of the Son to the Father implied in the relation of Sonship and the fact that the Father is the fons et origo of the entire Godhead, is a matter which it would be a waste of time to discuss, and if Athanasius had tried to do so, it would have
got in his way with a vengeance, but it is certainly true that for Athanasius the Son was in a position from which exaltation was literally and absolutely impossible, and that He always was, always is, and always will be, in that position. Thus, the language of Philipp. 2:9 could not but refer to His humanity.

It is necessary to analyse further, however, the question of whether this is the only possible interpretation of this passage. A modern Christian would say no. He would say, in the first place, that the impassibility and unchangeability of God cannot be interpreted in such a way as to compromise God's carrying out, as a genuine personal act to which He genuinely commits Himself, a plan of action in time, or Divine suffering provided that its teleological direction is completely and utterly by the Divine Love, and so on. Thus, there would be a sense, not inconsistent but absolutely consistent with the Divine glory of the Logos, in which the self-kenosis of Christ referred to His deity; this is the stand taken by all Western theology, and supremely by Karl Barth, in whom, as we have said before, the original Athanasian position is now completely reversed. Correspondingly, the Exaltation of Philipp. 2:9 is, in the same sense, the restoration of the status quo ante, with the addition that now the whole work of Incarnation and Atonement has been fulfilled in Christ; in other words, the Resurrection, considered primarily as the Resurrection of Christ Himself. (The giving of the Name that is above every name, and the subsequent worship would, on this basis, be expressions of the fact that it is only in the whole work of the Incarnate Christ that Revelation takes place at all, and that in a very real sense men had no right to worship Christ except in the light of everything from Christmas to Easter Day; the worship of anything else, even if it can go by the name of "Christ" or the "Logos", is the abomination of heathenism.) Any worship of "Jehovah" or "The Word" in the Old
Testament can only be valid on the most rigorously typological interpretation, that is, that the whole Old Testament is significant only as it points forward to the Incarnate Christ. The Old Testament worship can be only a pre-echo of that of the New Covenant. Even if, as a matter of fact, and from the point of view of God, the Logos had His glory unchanged from all eternity, it would be true to say that, from the point of view of men and on the basis of anything that man knew, could know, or for that matter had a right to know, the Logos as yet had no glory, no Name that could be taken in any way by men, and no true worship. Before the Resurrection, all these were completely hidden, and in principle could only be revealed afterwards. (179)

(179) This is something like the position taken by, for example, Calvin.

(180) οὐκ ἐπὶ ἁπάντα τῆς Θεοτόκου ἀντὶ γογγοῦν : 100A.
exaltation of humanity; that is, it is unmistakeably referred to the Humanity of Christ. There are at least four closely related reasons why the exegesis which we have favoured above could not have been the basis of Athanasius's argument, quite apart from the obvious fact that it would have confused the issue against Arianism. In the first place, he was too thoroughly committed to the impassibility of the Godhead, and whatever else could be done, he found compromise or modification on this point impossible. Again, he was certainly too deeply committed to the traditional exegesis of the Old Testament, which tended to see Christ in the Old Testament simpliciter. Whatever we may think about this over-simplified exegesis, it would be almost as difficult as in the former case for Athanasius to modify his views at this stage, and the feat would be in any case impossible under ancient conditions for one who was not, in his basic interest in history, an Irenaeus, an Augustine, or a Joachim of Flora. Thirdly, Athanasius was too thoroughly committed, for better or worse, to the Logos asarkos/as in some respects the even more essential state of the Logos than the incarnate state, and this was the very last thing to be compromised in the Arian controversy. It must be remembered that, on the supposition of a certain interval between the writing of the middle of c. Ar. I and the end of c. Ar. II, which would have certainly been the case even though these were consecutive and in fact continuous works, Athanasius was not yet a Supralapsarian in his view of the Incarnation, for the reason that he had not yet faced in all its manifold implications the exegesis of Prov. 8:22 LXX. He would still have accepted, or at best imperfectly modified, the Infralapsarianism of the "De Incarnatione". (181) This would have militated against his interpreting the pre-Incarnate Logos

(181) See above, pp. 105-7 and 217-18.
in the light of the Incarnation. But the fourth reason is in some ways  
the most decisive and is certainly the most complex, and, as it has not  
yet been discussed, we must now turn to it in greater detail.  
The keystone of the type of exegesis that we have, in the main,  
preferred to that of Athanasius, is that whatever be the absolute truth,  
man cannot know and worship the true God except in the light of the  
entire and completed work of Christ. In other words, relative to man,  
He was not God and King, He did not bear the Name that is above every  
Name, He was not exalted, before the Resurrection, which was necessarily  
preceded by the Cross. The point is that this is essentially a  
relative statement, relative to our faulty and even fallen point of  
view. (The one thing that it is not, and can never be accepted as being,  
is an absolute truth, since, as Athanasius so rightly observed, to  
accept it as such would be to deny the pre-existence and ultimately  
the Deity of Christ; not only the Deity, but any sort of special cosmic  
status whatever.) But, prima facie, and as the author of this thesis  
believes, in truth, this statement is the plain meaning of Philippians  
2: 5-11. Therefore, an important part of the meaning of a major  
Scripture passage is a relative statement! Modern philosophers,  
thoughts, and exegetes feel (or should feel) that it is all right  
to accept such relative statements as long as one does so with one's  
eyes open, and does not surreptitiously succumb to relativism in toto  
as a bad philosophy (and an even worse theology). The relative statement  
must be seen as such, analysed as such, and analysed in its relation to  
what is absolute. (If these qualifications are observed, this sort of  
relative statement is correct, and is in fact absolutely essential to  
the study of the theology of the human response to God's grace.) But if
there is one thing to which the Greeks of Athanasius's day were allergic, it was a relative statement. With the exception of the Athenian Sophists, who were thoroughly despised and rejected on that account, the whole Greek tradition from start to finish was completely unanimous on this point; either a statement was absolutely true or it was not worth making. (This of course refers to the question of the relative truth or otherwise of statements in the form in which they are made, as distinct from relational statements, that is, absolute statements about the relationship between two or more things, which is quite a different issue; these statements are just as absolutely true as absolute statements about things and qualities. Nevertheless, the Greek mind for some time had real difficulty in dealing with relations.) This is particularly so in the philosophy of the Platonic Socrates, whose refutations of the Homo mensura theory of Protagoras and the Sophists and relativism in general are one of the standard pieces of philosophical argument in history. The "Euthyphro", for example, originates as an attack on relational definition of a thing that is essentially qualitative, like piety, the example chosen - in other words an attack on the notion that something qualitative can be definitively constituted by its relation or relations, which is one aspect of the relativistic confusion between qualities and relations - as well as a systematic analysis, the first in history, of the properties of relations and of their place in logic. A still more opposite example is the Gorgias, in which dialogue "Socrates", after listening to a tirade from the Sophist of that name to the effect that evil is mightier than good because of all the evil that a strong man can inflict on his weaker "good" fellow, deftly points out that what Gorgias is saying has no meaning, on the ground that the only way in which evil can affect the soul is qualitative and not relational, that is, if the soul is evil; otherwise, no further question can arise.
To go beyond the Socratic Dialogues, the Platonic Socrates of the Theaetetus begins by the classical refutation of Protagoras's famous dictum. (182) Even though what we have said above is still true, that the Greeks were, at their best, genuinely interested in relation and change, they were always particularly careful to make statements of this kind as absolute statements, and also to relate them to something genuinely absolute. The fact that, in this as in other regards, Athanasius followed this early Platonic line is shown by his treatment of "deification" and adoption in ch. 39. He appears to accept the correlation that to participate in the Logos is deification, and adoption-to-sonship (υἱόθεσις) has some similar relation, not defined more closely, to the Son considered under this title. The case is more straightforward in the first case, but for that very reason the second is the more interesting. This passage is significant in many ways, but the point at the moment is that he accepts as obvious that sonship cannot be purely relative, that it cannot simply be a case of the thing that is described as son coming to be, or even being, in a particular relation with the thing described as the father; there must be, in this sort of case, something absolute that is at the basis of these relative sonships, to which these are relative. This he finds, of course, in the archetypical sonship, which is the sonship of the Divine Son. It is true that any modern theologian would reach the same conclusion by a different method, perhaps by the social theory of the Trinity and the necessary conditions for the Divine Love to be truly Divine. And in this case, regardless of the merits or demerits of the Platonist philosophy in general, it is certainly correct in this case. Sonship is the sort of thing such that adopted or secondary sonship could have

(182) Sect. 152-186.
no meaning whatever of itself, and essentially exists in cases where the son is son absolutely and naturally. (But in general the Greeks were absolutists (the word is used in a logical sense, as the opposite of relativist) even to a fault, occasionally to the point of making difficulties for themselves in fields of theology where what would otherwise be relativism is necessary.)

Thus, Athanasius could not accept any relative meaning of the exaltation of Christ, of the type that we have suggested as the obvious and natural meaning. It had to be, without any reservation whatever, an absolute statement. The only interpretation that satisfies this condition which does full justice to the Deity of Christ is that the exaltation and other similar statements about Christ apply to the Humanity, and not to the Deity at all. As the same applied to a large number of passages of Scripture, this meant that, for the first time, for decades, a theologian had to elaborate a systematic doctrine of the humanity of Christ, and for this reason the Contra Arianos mark the great watershed in the history of fourth-century theology. The Age of the classical Christological controversies began. It is true that, as we have observed, the type of exegesis so characteristic of the "Contra Arianos" can be seen at at least one place in the "De Incarnatione" (ch. 25, end, as we have already noted). It was also the stock-in-trade of Marcellus of Ancyra, who used it to prevent the use of certain passages against his Sabellianizing theories; Athanasius may (or may not) have learnt the method from him in his young days. It was always used by Athanasius throughout the Arian controversy against the Arians, and we have already shown that these other works in which this principle was used were in fact earlier than the Contra Arianos. But this is the first time that the implications of this type of exegesis were worked out in full detail, and the result was a minor theological revolution.
The first effect of all this was to bring Athanasius back to the Christological and soteriological subject matter of the "De Incarnatione". As this does not constitute the direct subject of the thesis, we shall not consider it in such detail. However, we shall have to compare it with the corresponding material in the earlier work, noticing any differences, and noticing how such differences are related to the development of the Trinitarian theology during the intervening Arian controversy.

The Christology is treated very much as in the De Incarnatione, with, that is, the general tendency to talk about the pre-Incarnate Lord "taking a body" and the sufferings, etc., being "said to be" His, culminating in the expression in 42. 100A: λέγοντας ζημίαν δύναμιν εἰκεν ἵτι ὁ Ὀσος, ἵνα εἰς ἡμᾶς φθοχα καὶ ἡ ὁρισμένη χάρις, that is, the event metonomically described took place so that we might have that grace. But even here it must be said that conditions are slightly different;

Athanassius does refer to the Incarnation in this way, but his subject matter in this section refers far more to something where there is far more reason to describe it in this way; Christ's receipt of the glory that was really already His. And of course there is one decisive difference from the Christology of the "De Incarnatione." There, the correlation was fairly strictly maintained between the corporality and humanity of Christ and passivity and/or instrumentality, the activity being correlated with the Deity. Here, we already find a change. (The emphasis on the exaltation of Christ's Humanity, which was relatively late in the "De Incarnatione" (183) is now in the very centre of the picture, from the outset.) In the etiological sections of the De

(183) See above, pp. 223-4.
Incarnatione, exaltation was purely of the Deity, with humanity as the means for its revelation and operation. Here, in contrast to the relative lack of clarity on this point in the former work, exaltation (or exaltation other than that which God will give to none other) is something which is essentially the property of the Deity, but in the Person of Christ is given to His Humanity, and through it to us men. Thus the participation of the Humanity in the glory of the Divine Second Person already goes far beyond the former somewhat instrumentalist relation. As yet, this is stated only in formal or general terms, but already we find a change that will inevitably soon involve the old correlations of the activity and passion of Christ. Soon, the Humanity will be connected with the glorious activity of the Lord, and thus the doctrine of the active Humanity of Christ will come to fruition. If the theology of the "De Incarnatione" can be interpreted in meliorum partem as a first approximation to the Anhypostasia of the Humanity, the doctrine that is developing here is certainly the first approximation to the Chalcedonian Hypostasis; the Humanity is genuinely a hypostatic or personal Humanity, though the Hypostasis is entirely God; and the human acts of Christ are genuine human acts, although their origination is completely Divine. One should not paint an exaggerated picture. The older theology is still there, and it will often be fair to say that it is the older theology at its worst. The issue in fact was not fully solved till the Apollinarian controversy, after the death of Athanasius. But it is here that we see the beginning of the doctrine of the active humanity of Christ, under the new circumstances necessitated by the Arian controversy which compelled a new and rigorous distinction between God and creatures, and thus between the Deity and Humanity of

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(104) As in Chalcedonian Christology.
Christ.

So much for one side of what might be called the paradoxical Christological correlation (as in Karl Barth), as distinct from what might correspondingly be called the natural correlation as in the De Incarnatione between Deity and majesty - activity on the one hand and Humanity and humility - passivity on the other. We have found the beginnings of the methodological correlation between Humanity and exaltation. What about that between Deity and Humiliation? The answer is that this correlation is never specifically made; at any rate, we do find it mentioned, but after all this is an exegesis of Philip. 2:5-11, and the interesting thing is not that it is mentioned at all, but that so little is made of it. Probably Athanasius felt that to try to make much more of it would cast the sort of reflection on the Deity of Christ which was pathognomonic of Arianism. In general, the "humiliation" refers simply to the mere fact that the Logos has taken a body, etc., without any further examination of this beyond the point reached in the "De Incarnatione". If the Exaltation can only be correlated with the humanity, so much more, in a slightly different sense, must the humiliation. However, it is possible to interpret the remarks of the latter part of ch. 45 as suggesting something like the missing doctrine; they may mean that it is a supreme act of grace that the Lord, Who had these prerogatives and this glory from the beginning, is prepared to put Himself into a position where it can be rightly said that He receives them, although a more likely interpretation here as elsewhere is that the real act of grace is that we, or the Humanity of Christ, and through it we ourselves, are the real and proper recipients of this grace.

Thus, there is a considerable, but by no means complete, change in the treatment of the relation between the Deity and the

(184) See the Christological sections of Ch. Dogm. Vol. IV Pts. I and II and also IV: I: pps. 128-154 (E.T.) where the correlation is discussed.
Humanity of Christ. There is a corresponding change in the way in which the various activities of Christ are described. The usual description in the "De Incarnatone" is that the Logos took a body, permitted it to suffer, etc. (185) Here, however, we find, mixed with expressions characteristic of the earlier period, another type of description of the Incarnation, the sort which formerly used to occur only under the most direct stimulus of Scripture, and not generally or spontaneously. Christ, or the Second Person, is described, as Himself descending (the appropriate part of ἐκτεθήκεν) (38: 89C & 92B bis, 40: 96A bis, 44: 101C), humbling Himself and other expressions in Philipp. 2: 8 (we shall quote only those instances which are not direct and express quotations of Philipp. 2: 8 : 41: 96C, 42 end, 43: 101A, 44: 104B. We omit the instance in 40: 96A, where it is denied that the Logos would humble Himself as a means to His own further promotion.), becoming man or flesh (γενεσθαι δικηρυματος ουσίαν) usually in aorist or perfect tense; after John 1: 14) (38: 89C bis, and last words of ch., 39 init. bis, 40: 96A, 41: 96C, 42: 100A bis, 43: 101A, 43: 101B - ἰδοὺ θανάτων καὶ ἐπὶ θανάτων γένεσθαι) 43: 101B, 44: 104A & C, 45: 105A bis, 45: 105B - ἵνας γεγονεὶ καὶ γίνεται δικηρυμα). Finally, most important, there is a spontaneous tendency to use language which indicates that the sufferings of Christ were real and hypostatic; the body, etc. is mentioned, but as the respect in which the whole Christ suffered rather than the sufferer itself (42: 100A: ὁ δικηρυμα τῷ Χριστῷ ἐπεθύνε καὶ ἐμφάνισε. 42: 100A: ἐνεμοῦν ἐπεμαθέντων ὀρκί. 44: 101C: κατ' ἐμαθέσθαι ὀρκί. 45: 104C: ἐνεμοῦν ὀρκί). Incidentally, we might notice how much more frequently the word δικηρυμα is used to denote the Humanity of Christ than was the case in the "De Incarnatione". It is true that, in ch. 45, Athanasius explains his use of this sort of language by falling back into the older attitudes - or should we say that he justifies the new
theology in terms of the old? - but in the main it is true that this section of the "Contra Arianos" is a watershed in the description of the Humanity of Christ. The matter will be examined more fully in our lexicographic analysis of the whole section, I: 37- II: 18.

The same will apply to the titles of the Second Person, or rather to the titles Logos and Son in particular. At the moment, a general examination indicates that, in the main, the titles are as in "De Incarnatione", with Logos as the favoured title for the pre-incarnate Second Person, and such titles as Saviour, Lord, etc., for the Incarnate Christ. (186) However, we can even now comment on the occurrence, sporadically, of these other titles for the Second Person in cases where Logos is the normal designation; for the pre-incarnate Second Person: Lord of glory, Κύριος τῆς ὑποβολῆς, 38: 92B; Lord, 41: 97, 101B & C. King of glory, Βασιλεύς τῆς ὑποβολῆς, 41: 97C; and even Saviour, Ἰησοῦς, 43: 101A.

There is also a corresponding change in the soteriology of Athanasius, as expressed in this section. In many ways the soteriology, which is so intimately interwoven that it would be very difficult to separate out, is a repetition of that of the "De Incarnatione", (187) but there is an all-important difference. In the former work, the ontological or ἐξίσωσις aspect, the Humanity of Christ, is present but is on the periphery. (188) Here it is the very centre of the soteriology; the important thing, right from the start, about the Incarnation was that it resulted in the Exaltation of Christ's Humanity, and through

(187) See above, pp. 120-125, 154-55, 222-224.
(188) See above, pp. 186 and 222-224.
it of our own, although there is still no detailed description of how our humanity is connected with Christ's; this is still largely taken for granted. The nearest that Athanasius gets is the simple statement that it happens because we are ὑμᾶς ἕν, of one body, with Him, or on account of our τοῦτο τῷ σωμάτι συγκυκλοὐν. Actually, this does not primarily refer to the simple generic fact that He is a man, but rather to the constitutive unity that we are to have in Christ which is His special work; this would be the position of the "De Sententia Dionysii" (189); the point is that we are to partake constitutively of the New Humanity of Christ. But the distinction would not be so evident in the writings of Athanasius owing to the influence of Platonism, he would tend to consider humanity, in any case, as a Platonic form. However, the point is that, though the doctrine of the Humanity of Christ is not quite as definite as one would like, it is so important for Athanasius that he maintains that it conditions, not to say distorts, Scripture's way of describing things (42: 97ες καὶ ἐπὶ ἑμῶν τοῦτο πᾶν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἔγραψαντο; that is, the thing described thus in Scripture as Christ's receiving of grace really happened purely for our own benefit; again, the very meaning of the words of Scripture is ultimately our own benefit). Again, if the latter half of ch. 45 bears this interpretation, Athanasius not only thought of the ἤμα, the kinsman, as being the humanity or the body which Christ took, but Christ even in His pre-Incarnate state, Who puts Himself into the position of (in a secondary way) receiving the grace which it was His aim that we should receive. Correspondingly, the other aspects of the Atonement, as previously described, suffer a relative de-emphasis (although they still remain); this is particularly

(189) See especially ch. 10, and above pp. 524-5.
noticeable with regard to justification. The relative reduction in the penal categories is naturally associated with the developing link between the Humanity of Christ and exaltation, as compared with the former one between the Humanity and the suffering. Although the "De Incarnations" is Cross-centred, the Resurrection plays a prominent part; the "Contra Arianos" is unreservedly Resurrection-centred.

What is the reason for these changes? Undoubtedly the Arian controversy, both in its very nature and its details. It must be remembered that the Arians were genuinely interested in what Athanasius calls the exaltation of Him whom they deemed to be a creature; certainly if our interpretation of Arianism is correct, and the fact that so many of the Scriptural passages which they quoted concern not only creaturely reality but the exaltation thereof - in fact, this section on Philipp. 2: 9-10 is in almost every way a type for this whole question of Arian exegesis; the more one examines the controversy the more evident it becomes that the idea that the Arians were trying to express was that of radical progressiveness in the creature. (190)

In doing so, the Arians uncovered a real interest of Scripture, however perversely; Scripture is really concerned with the progress of humanity in Christ - the only difference from Arianism (and Communism, etc.) is that the progress, though in essence complete, is not radical, in that it utterly depends on the power and the presence of Christ in His Deity. Under these circumstances, Athanasius had no choice but to follow Scripture; the Active Humanity and the glorious Humanity had to come to the fore, and thus one half of the former correlation was broken. The other half of the correlation was still maintained; in other words, Athanasius never came to the stage of basing his methodology on a

(190) See above, pp. 418-420 and 459-464.
correlation between the Deity and the humiliation, but there are signs, that he was beginning to think in this way. The reason, of course, is again the plain sense of Scripture. And above all, the controlling fact here is that, in the very nature of things, the reason that forced Athanasius to a reconsideration of the Incarnation and the Atonement was the Arian exegesis of Scripture, and therefore Athanasius was in direct contact with Scripture from the very start and all the time, in a way that applied only occasionally in the "De Incarnatione". The combination of all these effects had some unfortunate consequences, primarily in the relative obscuring of the other aspects of the Atonement, such as in particular Justification and the penal aspect generally (although it is not entirely forgotten), but their general effect is something for which we must be thankful.

This is confirmed by the other effects of the Arian controversy on the Trinitarian theology as such. As we have already shown, the effect of this was to force Athanasius to think of the Deity of Christ, or His eternal, pre-Incarnate state in far closer correlation with God the Father, and to undermine the correlation of the Logos with the cosmos which was implied in all earlier theology. As long as there was any residual tendency as there still was in the "De Incarnatione"), to consider the Incarnation just as a special case of the general working of the Logos in the cosmos, however unusual a case it might be, there was no need, in the long run, to go beyond the idea that the Humanity was necessary simply for certain humble operations that were precluded from a completely glorious Logos; in other words, the virtually instrumentalist doctrine of the Humanity of Christ. [This was all very well when Logos, in fact if not in theory, meant Logos of the World. But it could not work once the Son theology had begun to

(191) See above, pp. 304-6
replace the Logos theology; the tendency to use the title Son in this section confirms this. This title has no natural correlation with the cosmos, and even though the title Logos still remains the favourite title in this respect, it was itself progressively being interpreted away from its older sense, in such a way that here too the essential correlation was with the Father and not the world. Under these circumstances it is fair to say that even without the direct stimulus of Arian exegesis, Athanasius would have had to make changes. The Humanity of the Incarnate Christ would have had to be the essential and ultimate means of the Logos's operation in and with the Universe, at any rate with the human universe. Taken to its logical extreme, this produced the extreme Supra-lapsarian Incarnationism of the concluding chapters of "Contra Arianos" II, which Barth recognises as the most extreme expression of this position in theology, save only his own. (192) But the point of interest at the moment is that, even though he had not yet gone to this extreme, he would have had to bring the Incarnate Humanity of Christ into all the aspects of the Incarnation, including most emphatically the acts of it in all their glory. The shortest way of putting it is that, once the distinction between Deity and Humanity is made rigorously, the latter must in some way share in glory, as Humanity. The true glorification of man depends, both conceptually and actually, on the proper distinction between God and Man, not the negation of it.

There remain three or four smaller issues to mention before we pass to the next section. There are as yet only two references to the Holy Spirit: in 37: 89A-B, on the subject of the contrast between what are sons by nature (i.e. the Only-begotten Son) and those who are

sons by virtue and grace (ἐπὶ ἔργησι καὶ θρησκείας— that is, all men who are "sons of God"), the latter are compared to those who have received the Spirit by participation.\(^{(193)}\) He continues, "And of course since these were not sons by nature, therefore when they altered the Spirit was taken away,\(^{(194)}\) and they were disinherited; and again on their repentance the God Who thus at the beginning gave them grace will receive them and give light and call them sons again."

This is essentially a conventional reference to the Spirit after the fashion of such early writers as Hermas, who tended to regard the Spirit purely as a pleasant privilege, and therefore as a reward to be given for worthy behaviour and withheld otherwise. It is thus one-sidedly identified with grace itself, and with its euphoric aspect at that. This must never be denied, as long as it is remembered that this is no more than one side of one dimension of the truth. The other reference is again a conventional reference, 41: 97C, where the quotation of Ps. 88 LXX or 89: 17-18, taken as a prophecy of the Resurrection, is introduced thus:

\[Τὴν ἐξ ὑμῶν \ldots οὐκ ἔσων προδειχθεὶς τῷ θεῷ \ldots λέγω.\]

This is the traditional function of the Spirit in inspiring Christological testimony in the Old Testament.\(^{(195)}\) Closely related to this is the reference to sanctification in 41: 97A, which we have already quoted, where sanctification is treated in exactly the same way as the exaltation of Christ is treated in general in this section. This portion belongs rather to the next few chapters of the C. Arianos I, and the issue will be fully discussed there.

\(^{(193)}\) οἱ κατὰ μετοχὴν θρησκείας ἀβεντέρ (Is. 1:2 LXX quoted).
\(^{(194)}\) τρεῖτοιν δύναν ἐλπίνει δοθεῖν τῷ θεῷ τῷ πνεύμα
\(^{(195)}\) See Appendix, pp.
Another issue to be noticed now is certain features in this section that link it closely with the Crat. IV c. Arianos. It is pointed out (33: 39C-D) that the Logos and the Son are numerically the same Being (see Crat. IV passim, esp. chs. 18-24), and in his emphasis throughout that the form of the passage in question indicates that the Person Incarnate was not the First but the Second, which culminates in 45: 105A. This whole issue will be discussed in full later, but we must note these references at this stage. We can observe that Athanasius’s use of the words “exalted” and “gave Him” in Philipp. 2:9 as evidence against Sabellianism is proof that his interpretation of these verses as applying to the Humanity of Christ is not so rigid as he would maintain that it is. In spite of himself, and in spite of the necessities of the case, he cannot altogether avoid thinking about these verses as showing something within the Godhead as well as something purely within creaturely reality, or in creaturely reality in the sense that the Incarnation was. This is in one way an inevitable result of the Son theology coming to the fore, as we have described above, not only as the basis of the Intra-Trinitarian relations proper, but also as the archetypical basis of our own sanctification, exaltation, and Christian life in general (cf. ch. 39). And in spite of what we have said above about the predisposition of the Greeks to prefer qualities to relations (without altogether neglecting relations), Athanasius cannot avoid the fact that Sonship is a relation in the way that, say, the older concept of rationality was not, and that therefore even the ultimate and archetypical Sonship of and in the Godhead needed two Persons for it to exist.

There is yet another matter, not connected with the Trinity,
which is of sufficient interest to claim our attention before we finally leave this section. The beginning of ch. 44 runs thus: "This then I consider the sense (διαλογισμός) of the passage (i.e. its essential reference to the humanity of Christ), and that a very ecclesiastical (ἐκκλησιαστικός) sense. However, there is another way that one might remark on it, to say the same thing in a parallel way (that is, that it refers to the Resurrection) ...." This is taken by "Catholic" theologians as supporting their doctrine of ecclesiastical tradition which had genuine authority even in the exegesis of Scripture. We must repudiate this opinion, not only because of our Protestant convictions, but because it manifestly fails to fit the facts of history.

It is true that Athanasius is saying that there is some essential connection between the Church and Faith, or between sound Churchmanship and right belief. But the Romanist position is of course untenable, for historical reasons, as we have said above, in the form presented by theologians like Newman. The Greek Orthodox form of this position is more likely to be in the mind of Athanasius, where the connection is mystical (although concerning chiefly the Episcopate) and traditional rather than legal, organisational, and a matter of codification. But a better candidate still for the meaning of Athanasius is this issue as treated by Karl Barth (Ch. Dog. Vol. I, Pt. II, pp. 630–660 Eng. ed.). As is well known, Barth called the first edition of Volume I of the Dogmatics "Christliche Dogmatik", but in the second and definitive edition changed it to "Kirchliche Dogmatik". This may be partly due to some contemporary misuse of the title "Christian", but not entirely so; he felt that on the issue in question there must be a real, positive, and affirmative Protestant and Reformed doctrine. This doctrine, as elaborated by Barth, is that

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(196) See above, pp. 20–22
(197) Cf. for example, Lossky, "The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church", ch. 9.
true Christian theology and faith must not only be an individualistic matter, but it must be for the Church; it must point to the Church's own proclamation of and commitment to its Lord; it must concern itself with these matters; and finally and most important of all, it must be capable of being confessed ecclesiastically. The great sign of the essential nullity of Liberal-Protestantism was that it neither did nor could cause anybody to confess it. This is exactly what Athanasius says in the middle section of the De Synodis about the bankruptcy of Arianism and also of all attempts at compromise which involved repudiation of Nicea; his enemies concocted creeds enough, but they were never satisfied; they could never find a point of rest, and their complete lack of confessional stability was the exact equivalent of the Liberal theologians' never even making a start.

The next passage of Scripture for consideration is Ps. 45: 7-8. Since this again concerns the exaltation of the Humanity of Christ, all the principles of controversy and exegesis that Athanasius used in the previous case are used here, and for the same reason all our own comments made above also apply. That is, the Messianic Kingship of Christ and His consecration and anointing with the Spirit to this end apply primarily (ordin operandi) to the Humanity of Christ, and secondarily (primarily in order of purpose) to the anointing of ourselves. However, the passage requires some further attention, since it is the first really systematic attempt in the theology of Athanasius to deal with the Holy Spirit, and the detailed citations from these chapters will be on this theme. It must be mentioned at the start, by way of recapitulation, that, apart from purely conventional references, the Spirit played no special part in the earlier theology of Athanasius. Now, however, Athanasius had reached the stage where scattered
spontaneous references were beginning to appear, which we have noted at the appropriate time. (These began at the point where the correlation between the Logos and the Father was firmly and unmistakably established, and therefore the question of human participation in the Logos was no longer so simple as in the old Logos theology.) This was confirmed by the fact that all the references involved this issue in some way, and usually quite directly and explicitly. (193) Here, likewise, the Holy Spirit is brought up almost spontaneously in the exegesis of a passage concerning the Messianic anointing, which is assimilated to the notion of partaking the Spirit. Athanasius continues, "... The Psalmist has spoken of us all as partakers of the Lord (199), but if He were ex nihilo and one of things originate, He Himself would have been one of the partakers (μετέχοντες). But since he hymned Him as the Eternal God (Ps. 45:7), and has declared that all things partake of Him... He is other than things originate, and He only the Father's veritable Logos, Radiance, and Wisdom, of whom all things originate partake, and are sanctified by Him with the Spirit. (200) And therefore He is here anointed, not that He may become God (Θεὸς γενήθη) for He was so before this; nor that He may become King, for He had the Kingdom eternally, existing as God's Image... but on our behalf is this written as before. (201) For according to the dispensation of Israel, the kings became kings at the time of their anointing, and were not kings before, like David... (etc.)... but the Saviour, on the contrary, being God, and ever ruling in the Father's Kingdom, and being Himself the Supplier of the Holy Ghost (202) is here said to be anointed, that as before, being said as a man to be anointed with the Spirit, (203) He might prepare for us men, not only resurrection and exaltation, but

(193) See above, pp. 654-6, 678-9.
(199) μετέχοντες τοῦ Κυρίου.
(200) Λόγος ἀληθινός ἀποκλίνως καὶ σοφὸς ὡς τῇ γενήτατι πάση μετέχει καὶ ἐνδείκνυται παρὰ αὐτῷ τῷ Πνεύματι.
(201) ὁ δὲ ἡγεμόνας καὶ τὸ ἴδιον δεσπότης ἤτοι.
(202) τοῦ τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ Σωτῆρος χριστός ὡς αὐτός.
(203) ὁς ἑξηρωτίσθης λεγόμενος τοῦ Πνεύματι Χριστοῦ.
the indwelling and intimacy of the Spirit (204). . . . (John 17:18-19 quoted). (In saying this He shows that He is not the sanctified but the Sanctifier. For He is not sanctified by something else, but He Himself sanctifies Himself, that we may be sanctified in the truth (ἐν ἑαυτῷ Θείῳ) . . . .)

If then for our sake He sanctifies Himself and does this when He has become man, it is quite clear that the descent of the Spirit which took place on Him in the Jordan, was one which took place on us, because of His bearing our body (205). And the purpose of its taking place was not the improvement of the Logos, but again it was for our sanctification, that we might participate in His anointing (206). . . . (I Cor. 3:16) . . . For when the Lord, as man, was washed in the Jordan, it was us who were being washed in Him and by Him (207). And when He received the Spirit, it was we who were made by Him recipients of it (208). Therefore not as David or the rest was He anointed with oil, but in another way above all His fellows, 'with the oil of gladness,' which He interprets to be the Spirit . . . (Is. 61:1. Acts 10:36). . . . When then were those things spoken of Him but when He came in the flesh (Ἐν φαρμακι ἐνθάντεσθαι) and was baptized in the Jordan, and the Spirit descended upon Him? . . . (John 16:7, 16:14, 20:22 partly quoted) . . . . He Who as Logos and Radiance of the Father supplies to others (209) is now said to be sanctified, because He has now become man, and the body that is being sanctified is His. From (ἐκ) Him then we have begun to receive the unction and the seal . . . (I John 2:20, Eph. 1:13) . . . . Therefore the statement is on account of us and on our behalf . . . (and it cannot apply to the Logos as such - Ps. 45:7 . . . . And if, as the Lord Himself has said, the Spirit is His and takes of His, (210) and He

(204) τὸν τοῦ πνεύματος ἐνοίκησιν καὶ οἰκείωσιν.
(205) δὴ τὸν φάρμακι ἐν τῷ ὑπερθείρον σώματι.
(206) ἦς τοῦ Χριστοῦτος ἑαυτῷ μεταλάβωσιν.
(207) Τοῦ καὶ κύριου ἐν ἀνθρώπου λογοκενοῦ εἰς τὴν ὁράσεαν, ἥκειν ὁμοίως ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ παρὰ ἑαυτῷ λουσάμενοι.
(208) ὁ παρ' ἑαυτῷ γινόμενοι δεκτικοί.
(209) ἀλλοι ταξιαν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἐπιτίμησιν τοῦ θεοῦ.
(210) ἑαυτῷ ἐστιν τῷ πνεύμα, ἐκ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ λυμβανεί. 
... (As before, nothing in the incarnate life of Christ could have involved His improvement) ... For when our Lord Jesus Christ came among us we were improved, in being liberated from sin, but He is the same, and when He became man ... He did not alter (ἐπιτίμη) (Is. 40:8; ὁ λόγος πρὸς ἐνμα LXX). Surely as, before His becoming man (ἐκ νήματος) He, being the Logos, supplied to the Saints the Spirit as His own (ὁ λόγος τεύχει), so also when He became man He sanctifies all by the Spirit, and says to His disciples, 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost.' ... (cf. Moses and the Seventy, Ps. 51:11, John 15:26, Heb. 13:8) ... Therefore, Jesus Christ ... remaining ἐπιτίμης, is the same Who gives and receives, giving as God's Logos, receiving as man (212). It would not be, then, the Logos, insofar as He is Logos, Who is improved, ..., but men, who have in Him and through Him their origin of receiving them (sc. the gifts) (213) For when He is now said to be anointed in a human aspect (ἐκ νήματος), it is we who are anointed in (ἐν) Him; since also when He is baptized, it is we who are baptized in Him ... (John 17:22 quoted) ... Because of us then He asked for glory, and 'took', 'gave', and 'highly exalted' have been said so that we might take, and it might be given to us, and that we might be exalted, in Him, as also for us (ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν) He sanctifies Himself, that we might be sanctified in Him.

... (The "wherefore" as before does not involve the notion of reward, but what might be paraphrased thus:) ... 'Since Thou art God and King, therefore Thou wast anointed, since none but Thou couldest unite men to the Holy Ghost (214), Thou the Image of the Father,

(211) ἐς ἐκ νήματος τοῦ Κήρυκα ἀνόμων
(212) διὰ συγκεκριμένης ἐγένετο λόγος ἐκ μορφῆς λαμβανόμενος 
(213) ὃς ἐκ νήματος τοῦ λαμβάνειν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ 
(214) συνελήφθη τοῦ ἐκ νήματος τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ.
in which we were made in the beginning; for Thine too is the Spirit.'
For the nature of things originate could not be trusted for this
purpose, as both angels had transgressed and men disobeyed. Therefore
there was need of God - and the Logos was God - that those who had
fallen under a curse should be set free by Him Himself. If then He
was ex nihilo, He would not have been the Christ, but one among all,
and even He would be a partaker (215). But whereas He is God, being
Son of God, and is eternal King, and exists as Radiance and Expression
(Χαριανός) of the Father, therefore He is fitly the expected Christ . . .
. . that as through Him we have come to be, so also in Him (Ἐν αὐτῷ)
all men might be redeemed from their sins, and by Him (μετὰ αὐτοῦ) all
things might be ruled . . . .

What is there to wonder at . . . . if the Lord Who gives the
Spirit, is here said to be Himself anointed with the Spirit, at a
time when under the demands of necessity He did not refuse in respect
of His manhood (216) even to call Himself inferior to the Spirit . . .
(i.e. Matt. 12: 24-28). Behold, the Giver of the Spirit here says
that He cast out demons in the Spirit, (217) but this statement is made
only on account of the flesh. For since the nature of men was not
sufficient of itself to cast out demons, but only by the power of the
Spirit, therefore as man (ὡς Ἰδρωτός) He said, 'But if I through the
Spirit of God cast out demons.' Of course too He signified that the
blasphemy against the Holy Ghost turns out to be greater than that
against His humanity (ὃς Ἰδρωτός) . . . (Matt. 12: 32, and
in explanation, Matt. 13: 55) . . ., but they who blaspheme against
the Holy Ghost and ascribe the works of the Logos to the devil, shall
have inescapable punishment. The Lord spoke like this, as man (ὡς
Ἱδρωτός), to the Jews, but to the disciples He showed His own
Divinity and majesty, and indicating that He was not inferior to the
Spirit but equal, He gave the Spirit . . . . (John 20: 22, John 16:13-14)
. . . (The case is similar with Is. 61:1, showing that) . . . . we . . .
need the grace of the Spirit for sanctification, and . . . . are

(215) μετὰ αὐτοῦ - i.e. a participator in the Platonic sense.
(216) διὰ τὸ Ἰδρωτόν ἐν σώματι.
(217) ἦταν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ και παρὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐδεί τῷ Πνεύμα ἄνωθεν καὶ διὰ τοῦ
Νόον, οὐ καὶ τῷ Πνεύμα ἐστὶ.
unable to cast out demons without the Spirit's power. (Through whom then and from whom beheld it that the Spirit should be given but through the Son, Whose also the Spirit is.) And when were we enabled to receive It, except when the Logos became man? ... (As with the previous passage, so here) ... we should not otherwise have partaken (μετέχοντί) of the Spirit, but that the Giver (ὅπως - as elsewhere) of the Spirit, the Logos Himself, spoke of Himself as anointed with the Spirit on our behalf. And therefore, He being said to be anointed in the flesh (αὐτiciary) for the flesh being first sanctified in Him (Eναυσίζω), and He being said to have received for its sake as man (218), we have the subsequent grace of the Spirit (219) receiving 'out of His fulness'."

In the first place, the basic exegetical problem and its solution is exactly the same as in the previous passage, and thus very little more needs to be said except that all the principles that we have outlined there also apply here, and the same also applies to the characteristics of Athanasius's handling of the matter, even down to the minute details. The essential point at issue is the doctrine of the Spirit proper, and even before any detailed analysis is made, the most significant fact of all emerges; that the Spirit emerges at this point in theology as a special manifestation, even if the special manifestation par excellence, of what has already been discussed more generally as the exaltation of men in Christ. These two elements are so intimately intertwined in the extracts just cited that it is impossible to separate them in citation without mutilation. This finally confirms the hypothesis that we have put forward above, that the efficient cause of the revival of interest in the Spirit was the question of how to account for human participation in Christ on the basis of the newer theology of the Second Person necessitated by

(218) διὸ δὴν εἰληφέναι ἐπὶ Ἰωάννου
(219) ὡς δὲ ἐπακολουθοῦσαν ἐχόμεν τῇ πον ἔναυσίζων Χρίστου.
the Arian controversy. (220) It was only when this preliminary revival had taken place that the onset, in turn, of the Tropicist heresy demanded a more accurate definition of the Spirit. There is a very real sense in which, at this stage, the correlations of the Spirit are still in fact felt to be in the human sphere rather than in the Trinity (or divinity!). This is the whole atmosphere of this passage, and the author of this study is saying this with his eyes open, to, for example, the isolated statement that, in contrast to His statements to the Pharisees on blasphemy against the Spirit, Christ's own intimate teaching referred to His equality to the Spirit (50: 116B-C); the emphasis is on the contrast not with the subordination of the Spirit to the Son, but with a hypothetical subordination of the Son to the Spirit, which was of course rejected. It is the sort of formal statement which must be made to satisfy the baptismal confession, but does not yet control the whole treatment of the subject. (In general, the aspect of the Holy Spirit which is brought up here, and therefore the first to come to prominence in this new stage of theological history, is that the Spirit is something corresponding analogically to the charisma of the Hebrew Kings, simultaneously the outward and visible sign of their actual kingship and the initial enabling sign. And this kingship is interpreted in exactly the same way as the "exaltation" in Philipp. 2:9. That is, it cannot apply to the Logos as such, since the passage refers to a dynamic act, a change, to put it in that way, involving the anointing, which cannot refer to the Second Person for the best of all reasons, that He has the majesty in full already.) It can only refer to the

(220) See above pp. 506-10
Humanity of Christ and, through it, to our own humanity and ourselves. In this sense, and only in the sense, can the man Jesus of Nazareth be said to have been anointed with the Spirit according to the Scriptures.

Thus, there is a sense in which the doctrine of the Spirit here is far more like what were called in later Eastern Orthodox theology the Uncreated Energies of God than the Third Person of the Trinity. (221) What is more, this emphasis on the Spirit as pure grace, as being sub-personal in every sense of the word Person including its Trinitarian sense, must have been general in theology at that time, insofar as there was any effective theology of the Spirit, since, for one thing, Athanasius spontaneously introduces the Third Person in connection with these verses of Ps. 45, in which the word "Spirit" does not directly occur; and for another thing, he introduces it in an off-hand sort of way which suggests that he is not arguing the matter out, but is following a principle that was agreed in some way by all, perhaps even by the Arians. On the other hand, one caution is necessary here. Although they were prepared to exploit these verses for the sake of their theology of the Logos, there is no reason to assume that they really deduced even a relative glory of the Holy Spirit relative to the Logos; we have already given reasons for rejecting this conclusion. (222) The cross inconsistency involved here is not a point against this; in fact, it is fully consistent with the characteristics of Arian exegesis as a whole, as we have seen above.

The language concerning the relation between the Spirit and—

(221) As expounded, e.g. by Lossky "The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church", ch. 4. For Western criticism, see, e.g. Barth. Ch. Dog. Vol II. Pt. I pp. 331-332. (E.T.)

(222) See above, pp. 504-5.
and the Son is comparatively fluid, as the following list will show. We partake of the Logos, 46: 105C-D (here, as always, "partake" = μετέχειν, or similar word). All originate things partake of the Second Person, and are sanctified by Him (τοῦ ἁλοῦ - probably the late construction for agent, but it may be τῷ governed the location of the source.) with the Spirit (τοῦ θεοῦ - evidently a dative of instrument 46: 108A). Later, it is said that we partake of the Spirit, 50: 117A. Similarly, we partake (μεταλαμβάνει - aor. subj. as the purpose of the Descent of the Spirit on Christ) in His anointing, 47: 108C. We receive from Him (λαμβάνει εἰς ἑκεῖνον) i.e. Christ, 47: 109B the nearest approach to a statement on the lines of the later Latin Procession, since what we receive is the Spirit, the indwelling and presence of which is the height of grace, 46: 108B. Sanctification takes place τῷ the Second Person, 46: 108A, 47: 109C. The Spirit is the Spirit of the Logos-or-Son, 47: 109, 49: 113B, 50: 117A. The Second Person is the Supplier (46: 108A), Giver (Δῶτο, 50: 117A), Giver (appropriate part of verb δῶται, used appropriately - 47: 108C bis, 50: 117A). The Spirit, as the Fourth Gospel says, does not speak of itself, but is sent by the Son, and receives what is the Son's (receive = λαμβάνει, without the prefix μετά; does this again suggest that the Spirit is not Platonistically subordinate to the Son?) (what is the Son's = ἐξ θεοῦ θεοῦ). τῷ, governing in the genitive case some word representing the Second Person, is used in connection with the Spirit, etc. 46: 108A, 47: 109B bis, 50: 117A, in which last example it is coupled with ἔξω + gen. (which is really of the Son, although as it stands the sentence is in rhetorical form); here, unfortunately, the difficulty previously mentioned about τῷ applies. On the other hand, things are redeemed in the Logos (ἐν - the preposition later reserved
to the Spirit), and ruled ἐν the Logos.

This language certainly shows that Athanasius did think of the Spirit in the closest connection with the Son, and we might at first sight deduce that Athanasius really believed in the Filioque. (223) Unfortunately, later on, in the Epistles to Serapion, Athanasius's language almost exactly fits the Greek Procession, (224) and the problem is to reconcile the two. The truth probably is that there is a subtle but quite basic difference between the two treatments. Here, the Spirit is essentially the highest grace, as we have said above; at any rate, this is the centre of interest. In the Epistles, and in all later Greek theology, the Spirit is fundamentally the Third Person. The Tropici presented Athanasius with an entirely new problem in exactly the same way in which the Arians revolutionised orthodox theology as a whole. The Epistles to Serapion are the first systematic treatment (with the doubtful exception of Origen and the probable exception of Irenaeus) of the Spirit as the Third Person. As yet, the Pneumatic doctrine even of Athanasius, was still in the state of ambiguity which, as applied to theology as a whole, was pre-Arian and pre-Nicene. (With the Spirit as basically the highest grace, it would be the most natural thing in the world for Athanasius to keep it (conceptually and doctrinally!) in strict subordination to the Son, regardless of what conclusion he might have reached when he came to consider the Trinitarian problem proper.) It is in terms of this background that the phrases in their various contexts which mean "Spirit of the Son" should be interpreted, that is, as the highest grace of the Son, the phrase itself being too imprecise to be

(223) For a presentation of this view, based, among others, on these passages under discussion, see Shapland's edition of the Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit, 35-44.

interpretable except in the light of a context.

There are two interesting instances where the New Testament doctrine, especially that of Paul, seems to be inverted. In 47: 1090, the Logos gives the Spirit to the worthy, τοῖς ἄγιοις; this is the conventional idea of the Spirit as a reward for virtue, which obviously was exploited by the Arians in their exegesis of the passage under discussion. This is a one-sided emphasis on the euphoric aspect of the Spirit and is in direct conflict with the Pauline doctrine. Again, it is the function of the Logos to join man to the Holy Spirit, 49: 113B. This is true, and may be taken as the other side of the coin, but the primary emphasis in the New Testament is the other way round; the function of the Spirit in uniting men to Christ, especially as the condition of our faith in Him and the proclamation of Him to others. (225) These two statements in their one-sidedness are perfectly explicable on the basis of the idea of the Spirit as the highest grace. In fact the tendency to under-value the Spirit ontologically (by, e.g. illicit subordinationism or even the denial of His Deity), and the tendency to over-value the Spirit axiologically (e.g. the statement in 49: 113B, or Origen's exegesis of Blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (226)) seem to go together in some paradoxical way, and this seems to be general in the theology of Origen and his successors.

The question of Blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, in ch. 50, is interpreted in a manner quite consistent with the rest of Athanasius's exegetical method. The Dominical statement that blasphemy against the Spirit brings inevitable punishment is treated simply as a conventional and hyperbolic way of saying that mere humanity is powerless to do great


works except by the power of the Spirit, and yet Christ, in becoming
man, had, for our sakes, accepted this our humanity alone with this and
other restrictions. Athanasius does not allow himself enough space to
make the points perfectly clearly, but the implication is that in this
sense, and this alone, Christ did His works only in the power of the
Holy Spirit, and the blasphemy of the Pharisees lay in confusing this
Divine Power with the Devil. More than this we cannot say now; the
matter will be more fully discussed in the Appendices, where we shall
briefly study the "Quicunque dixerit" (or Ad Serap. IV: 8-23), a work
which, in spite of the almost overwhelming critical problems around it,
is one of Athanasius' gems.

This concludes the principal exposition of the Doctrine of the
Spirit in the "Contra Arianos"; from here on, references continue to
increase in frequency, but all that is needed is to discuss each as it
arises. This emphasis on what might be called the euphoric character
of the Spirit precludes perhaps, and certainly obscures, other aspects
of the doctrine of the Spirit. Athanasius — and this is especially
noticeable in ch. 50, where blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is
discussed — can make even now nothing of the part played by the Spirit
in the Incarnation itself; (227) this would really be a special case,
or rather the special archetypical case, of the Spirit as the essential
condition of the union of the Logos and man, an issue which we have
already mentioned above. (228) There is nothing about the Spirit as
related to the Christ who is corporeally and proximally basent between
the Ascension and the Second Advent, or the Spirit as the essential
condition for the proclamation of this Christ and the mission of the
Church. The ecclesiastical and sacramental sides of the doctrine of

(227) See De Inc. 8 and 9, and above pp. 125.
the Spirit are still far away— as far away as ever in Athanasius.

Finally, there is nothing about the Spirit as the Judge; after all the Ἴνή of the Old Testament is not only the sea breeze but the sirocco!

On the other hand, the element of the Doctrine of the Spirit which is emphasised so much here is most important, and one that we, in particular, must never forget in these sour days, when the dictates of "realism" lead the doctrine of the Spirit away from this aspect in the direction of its antitheses. It is also something which we shockingly fail to understand; after all, in the time and place of the Bible, an anointing with oil had the same function in relation to one's bodily comfort and working efficiency alike as a shower or a cool change after a heatwave—the Hebrew Ἴνη again!—this latter something only too familiar in hot countries, however incomprehensible in a place like Britain. And finally, it is the aspect of the Spirit that will remain when all else is past and gone. The hour will come when there will be no more mission of the Church, when we shall see our Lord by sight and not merely by faith through the Spirit, and when the judgment will have come and gone, but the faithful everywhere will to all eternity share the joy of Him Whose kingdom shall have no end.

51 This concludes the major topic on the verses in question.

52 However, Ps. 44 or 45: 8 raises once again the ethical issue, i.e. the Arians used it to show that the Logos was ἅρματος, Athanasius on the contrary maintaining that the verse proves Him ἅρματος. Since this is the first time that the strictly ethical meaning of these words has come up, we must also pay attention here. "... For since the nature (φύσις) of things originate is ἅρματος, and some transgressed while others disobeyed, ... and their behaviour (παράγεις) is not steady, but it often happens that one who is now good later changes (περισχέεται) and becomes something else, so that one who was lately righteous soon turns out unrighteous; therefore there is need for one who is unalterable, so that men may have the immutability (καταβαλέται) of the righteousness
of the Logos as an image and type of virtue. . . . For since the first man Adam altered (ἐπαναγέννησις) (229) and through sin death came into the world, therefore it was fitting for the second Adam to be Unalterable . . . that even the serpent's deceit might be baffled. . . . Therefore appropriately the Lord, eternally by nature ( φυσικῶς) unalterable, loving righteousness and hating iniquity, should be anointed and Himself sent, that He, being and remaining the same, should, by taking this alterable flesh, condemn sin in it. . . . (Rom. 8: 3,4,9.)". In this chapter, the immutability of the Logos is brought into relation with Aulen's "classical" Patristic doctrine of the Atonement, the Atonement as a mighty act, with rather less reference to the legal and forensic aspect. The most interesting thing about this chapter from our point of view, however, is that it represents an approach to the Anselmian point of view, much closer than anything in the "De Incarnatione". Here, with reference to Athanasius's treatment of justification, we have shown that he does not show us rigorously as Anselm why the nature of the act of reconciliation (in the Chalcedonian sense, as distinct from the actus purus of the reconciliation) should involve God as well as man. (230) This deficiency is corrected here, but with reference, not to the legal and forensic aspect, as in Anselm, but with reference to the might and power of the reconciliation. That is, the very quality and nature of the acts of Christ must be fully permeated by the unchangeability that is of God alone; otherwise, reconciliation considered as God's Mighty Act must fail. This is the Anselmian type of doctrine applied to action where Anselm applied it to passion, which would be natural seeing that he started from the juridical side of the matter. Both sides are necessary for a full doctrine of reconciliation.

The second interesting point in this chapter is the insistence that the ethical constancy that is required is an absolute prerogative

(229) Here, a misdirected change!
(230) See above, pp. 111-125, and 222-3.
of God and God alone. This is the rationale of the point made in the last paragraph. Here, the greater moral and ethical sense of Latin and Western theology tends to lead it astray, and the less interest in this matter in Greek theology saves it from the exaggerated moralism with which we Westerners are only too familiar. What Athanasius says, or goes very close to saying, is the very Barthian doctrine that, when confronted with both good and evil at once, it is ONLY God that can consistently cleave to the good and repudiate the evil; if any creature acts under the delusion, as Adam did, that it is either possible for him to perform this feat of himself or that it would do him any good to try, he will inevitably ruin himself by choosing evil. (231) Therefore the necessity for our Redeemer to be God shows up most decisively at the very point where it is at first sight most dubious — with the activities of Christ, considered as ethical deeds, the very field which everyone would "naturally" take to be peculiar to creaturely existence. This is a further development in Athanasius's idea of the penetration of God into human life in a far deeper and more material sense than in the "De Incarnations", where the characteristic notion is the presence of the Logos in, or by the instrumentality of, the body. This is again the effect of the Arian controversy, as we have described above.

Thus the Son is Ἰησοῦς and Ἰουλίανίωτος, and the next chapter is an explanation of this. Mostly, this chapter is a repetition of ch. 36, the specific point being that, as the Image of the Father, the Son must be unchangeable and unalterable in exactly the same way and to the same extent. However, there is one statement that needs particular attention, since it confirms the estimate that we have already made of the Arian sense of the word Ἰησοῦς. (120B) "Not as being subject to laws and having bias to one side or the other does He love the one..." (232) See Ch. Dogm. Vol. III. Pt. I pp. 261-268 on Gen. 2: 17 etc.
and hate the other, so as not to choose the one through fear of falling away, and be otherwise considered alterable too; but as being God and Logos of the Father, He is a just Judge and lover of virtue, or rather its dispenser (χρηστός)." The statement is repeated, later (121A) 

"... God is said to love righteousness and to hate robbery of unrighteousness, not as if having bias to one side, and as if he were capable of the contrary (σεκτικός τὸν ἐναντίον) so as to select the latter (Τοῦτο) and not choose the former (ἐκείνο), for this belongs to things originate, but that, as a judge, He loves and takes to Himself the righteous and withdraws from the bad." There seem to be two distinct or distinguishable arguments here. Firstly, the Logos is ἀρέστος in the sense of being unchangeable, in contrast to created beings, who are in every way changeable, and cannot be relied upon to continue in the one path. But, intimately mixed with this, the words of Athanasius appear to have a different and partially incompatible significance. Admittedly, the phrase translated, "having a bias to one side or the other", is not easy to interpret, but not only is this denied as an attribute of the Logos, but also the idea of the Logos being subject to laws (ὑποκειμένος τοῖς νόμοις). If there is one thing that the former meaning of ἀρέστος excludes, it is being subject, effectively subject, to laws in this sense. Thus it appears that Athanasius was not only denying the posse non peccare of Augustine - with the implication also that the being concerned could sin too - which alternative was rightly rejected by Augustine - but also the alternative which Augustine accepted, the non posse peccare, and the "hating evil" in that sense. (233) For the Logos to be ἀρέστος in this sense could only refer to something like the modern doctrine of permanent and necessary progress, and if one is to pick any one solution that could reconcile both the above aspects, this would have to be the solution.

(233) See, for example, Augustine, Enchir. 36.
What is the reason for these difficulties? And what can be learnt from them? In the first place, there is the metaphysical question which is put very well by the modern logical positivists, that any significant statement must be formally contradictable. Thus, for example, the statement that God is good would have no meaning unless the opposite, that God is evil, is at least logically conceivable. This is an irreducible difficulty in theology, but in this form it should not have ultimate material significance. But the second difficulty is more serious. In creatures, there appears to be a psychological difficulty corresponding to the metaphysical one. Even the mere act of rejection of evil involves some sort of contact with evil. One of the things that Athanasius is affirming is that God cannot have even that much contact with evil, and that His rejection of evil is something for which there is no analogy in man, the nearest approach being the choice made by a judge or an assessor between a good and an evil party before him. The case is even more pointed in the light of the modern doctrine of ambivalence, by which a pathologically vehement rejection of evil is an expression of a secret affinity to it; Athanasius, here as elsewhere, would have understood Freud perfectly. Incidentally even if one thinks in terms of a being that is good and progressive by a sort of scientific law, it is possible for the law to work differently or even be reversed in certain circumstances, as Athanasius himself observed in connection with another such supposed law, that of "progress". (C. Ar. I: 17, end). A third factor, even more significant, is that these difficulties are at a maximum in the field of ethics, which in its basic aspects is one of the most difficult of all topics. These difficulties are most acute when we are considering the ethical and personal activities of a supreme being. This problem is familiar enough in our day with the Idealists' discussion of whether the Absolute is
personal, and we cannot study the matter further, except to say that one cannot blame either Arius or Athanasius for finding this subject hard to handle. However, and this is the fourth point, the Arians introduced gratuitously some further confusions and difficulties in their use of ethical theory to prove that the Logos is a creature; as we have said, this argument, in its Arian form, is so bad that there must have been something more in it than is obvious to the naked eye, and have given our reasons for suggesting that the thing that they were trying to express but which they could not because of its complete novelty was the idea of radical progress. (234) The author hereby apologises for his apparently excessive concentration on these modern doctrines, but he believes in good faith that this sort of interpretation is the only one that makes sense of the apparent difficulties and inconsistencies which close examination reveals in chs. 51 and 52.

Faced with this situation, Athanasius, not surprisingly, is not perfectly consistent in his own reply, but he must be given full credit for his analysis, which is given with such deceptive simplicity, of the relation between God and ethical categories. We have already described it, and noticed how he rejects in advance even the Augustinian doctrine, and by the use of a happy analogy preserves the superiority of God over moral categories as they are usually understood, while also preserving His truly and Divinely ethical character and repudiating the sort of superiority over ethics which would make God virtually amoral. No, God rejects evil, but also He utterly rejects it as that it cannot play any part in faith or theology. And Athanasius reaffirms that, as the Logos is the Image of the Father, He must have

(234) See above, pp. 419 - 420 and 459 - 464.
the same constancy and the same relation to ethics as the Father, and for good measure adds a warning that if the Arians use Ps. 45:8 in this way, they would have to admit that other passages, e.g. Ps. 5:5, 11:7, 86 or 87:2, Mal 1:2-3, Is. 61:8, would also prove the Father to be πρεσβύτερος in the Arian sense (52: 120B-C).

The next passage discussed is Heb. 1:4, which need not detain us long. Beginning by pointing out that the indispensable first stage in all exegesis to understand properly the time the person and the issue referred to in the passage, Athanasius insists again that this verse is about the Humanity of Christ, and refers to post-Incarnation time. Even then the expression "having become greater than the angels" (Κρείττων γενόμενος τῶν ἄγγιλων) cannot offer them any comfort, since, as he has said before, the γενόμενος patently does not refer to absolute becoming but to a simple change of state of a Being who already exists, this change being no more than a special aspect of the Incarnation; to that extent, the verse must be interpreted as applying to the Humanity of Christ. Even so, the grammatical construction and idiom Κρείττων . . . . . γενόμενος, does not imply that the entity so described is co-ordinate with the angels, since in the LXX Κρείττων without a further adverb of degree to modify it, indicates a difference in kind as well as degree, in a way which elsewhere corresponds to the full difference between God and Man; thus, even the Humanity and the Economy of the Logos partakes in some way of the uniqueness of God Himself. Thus, Heb. 1:4 cannot controvert the expressions in Scripture, both in this verse's immediate context and elsewhere, which indicate the absolute Deity of the Logos. Again, "having become a surety" refers to the Humanity and Economy of the Incarnation, the whole process of which is our guarantee of bliss, and Athanasius finally warns the Arians that the same sort of language is also used in Scripture of the Father, so
that they would be bound to come to the same conclusions about Him too. These are all treated in the same way as in the two previous sections, and do not require any closer attention.

There is only one reference to the Holy Spirit, in 56:129B, where Athanasius is discussing the propriety of the use of the description ἐνυτροφός about creatures; this happens not at all in their own nature, but on account of their participation of the Son in the Spirit. Apart from the fact that this shows that the phrase ἐνυτροφός is becoming standard, this simply confirms both the present stage of the theology of the Spirit and Athanasius’s use of the word φύσις, as we have said with reference to chs. 37-45.

Incidentally, this is one of the cases where Athanasius clearly distinguishes ἐνυτροφός and ἐνυτρντος. The former is the normal term, which in fact corresponds to the language of the passage concerned, and is an appropriate term for creatures; the latter is appropriate only to the Son, and can be extended to creatures only in the secondary and participative sense. The ἐνυτρντος is introduced by Athanasius only to clear up a possible source of confusion. In 55: 128A, πνευματικός is used, in association with ἀλήθιος as a characteristic of God; in 60: 137C, πνεῦμα is used twice, with reference to the Pauline contrast between flesh and spirit. In 62: 141A, the expression λειτουργικὸν πνεῦμα is used of angels, etc.

The only individual passage that remains to be noticed is in 53: 121C: "making the language of Scripture their pretence, but instead of the true sense sowing upon it their own heretical poison." Here there is no question of Athanasius supporting an interpretation of
Scripture according to ecclesiastical tradition as against a naively literal one; the contrast is between the true meaning and the poison that belongs essentially and only to heresy, which is not only not the tradition of the Church but which is not in any sense Scriptural at all, and which they read into the words of the Bible. He says in so many words that they simply took certain expressions, wrenched from their context, as the excuse for conclusions which they were already determined to find.

The next passage is Heb. 3:2 "Being faithful to Him that made him." This is the beginning of the Second Oration, but since all the passages treated have been mentioned previously in the First Oration, it is certain that Athanasius's statement, in the first chapter, that he hoped that Orat. I would be enough, is largely rhetorical. The first chapter is a retrospect and prospect, after which Athanasius continues the task of refuting the Arian exegesis of Scripture. However, the verse that is now to be considered involves the absolute use of Πνευμάτων about Christ, and this demands the use of greater care in showing that the Arian exegesis is impossible. Although Athanasius has already shown the proper interpretation of this sort of passage, that it refers to the Incarnation, he here decides that the general basic theological issues require further attention.

The argument proceeds: "If then He be not Son, let Him be called a work (Πονήματος), and let all that is said of works be said of Him, nor let Him and Him alone be called Son and Logos and Wisdom; neither let God be called Father, but only Former (Φησίαλωρός) and Creator (Χρηστός) of things which by Him came to be; and let the creature be the Image and Expression (Χαρακτήρ) of His framing will, and let Him be without generative nature (237) so that there be neither

(237) Δύνατον μὴ ἐστὶν γεννητικὴς φύσεως.
Logos nor Wisdom nor Image nor Expression of His own Essence. For if there is not Son, there is not Image. But if there be not a Son, how then do you say that God is Creator, since all things that come to be, come to be through the Logos and in Wisdom, whereas you say that He hath not Him in and through whom He makes all things. For if the Divine Essence (ἡ θεία ousía) be not fruitful itself, but barren, . . . as a light that lightens not, and a fountain dry, are they not ashamed to speak of His possessing framing energy? And while they deny what is by nature (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν) how do they fail to blush in preferring what is by will (τὸ κατὰ βουλήσιν)? For if He frames things that are external to Him and that before are not, in willing that they be, and becomes their Maker, much more will He be Father of an Offspring from His own Essence. For if they attribute to God the willing about things that are not, why do they not recognise what exceeds will in God? Now it surpasses will that He should by natural generation be Father to His own Logos (238), if then that which is first, which is according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν) did not exist, . . . how could that which is second come to be, which is according to will? For the Logos is first, and then the creation . . . for through Him did creation come to be, and God, being its Maker, plainly had His framing Logos not externally, but proper to Himself . . . If He has the power of willing (τὸ βουλεύει) and His will is effective (ποιητικός), and His will is enough for the sustaining (συντασθεῖν) of things originate, and His Logos is effective and a Framer, that Logos must surely be the Living will (ζωὴ βουλῆ) of the Father, and ἐννοοῦσις ἐνεργεία, (239) and True Logos, in whom all things both consist and are well governed. . . . He who harmonises is prior to the harmony and the things harmonised. And thus . . . God's creating is second to His begetting. For 'Son' is something truly from that blessed and everlasting Essence and proper to it (240), but what are from its (se, the Essence's) will come to be is sustained from without (241) and are.

(238) Τὸ περικεφαλαίαν ἂν εἶναι δύναται τὸν ἱδίου λόγου. In spite of Montfaucon, "est eum ex natura patrem proprii Verbi esse", and Newman-Robertson, "that He should be by nature and be Father of His own Word," we have taken περικεφαλαίαν to be a perfect active infinitive of φυώ in its original sense of "to generate"; "to have generated naturally". The stative meaning of the perfect infinitive referring to the continuing result of the action, makes it virtually a parallel to the latter part of the phrase.

(239) "essential energy". This may mean "energy that has a separate personal existence", as if the ἐννοοῦσις was synonymous with ἐνυπόστασις or referred to the πρῶτον εὐσίδ, that is, of the Son, but in this context it more likely means that the energy actually was the full
framed through the proper Offspring from it.

3 As the argument has shown the great absurdity of those who say that He is not Son of God, but a thing made, we must in fine confess that He is Son." The remainder of the next two chapters consists of an illustrated account of the ambiguity of Scripture in this and other similar respects, sons, for example, being occasionally described as servants and servants honorifically described as sons, without in the least obscuring the difference between membership and non-membership of the family. Thus, by analogy, the Arians have no right to take such a verse as Heb. 3:2, as an excuse for their doctrine.

4 "This being so, when persons ask whether the Lord is a creature or a thing made, it is proper to ask them first, whether He is Son and Logos and Wisdom . . . For a thing made could never be Son and Logos, nor could the Son be a thing made." Athanasius now repeats the argument that as, by Scripture, all creation was through the Logos and in Wisdom, the creation of the Arian Logos is unaccountable.

5 Further, he continues, according to Eccles. 12:14, all things made are to be judged, but this cannot apply to the Son, as He is the Judge. Again, the "faithfulness" of the Logos refers to the immutability and reliability that has been shown above to be the unique characteristic of God and God alone.

6 At this stage, Athanasius considers the context in greater detail, the reference of the passage being the High Priesthood of Christ, and here we must examine the matter again in greater detail. "(at 160C) . . Now the Apostle is not discussing things before the Creation when He thus speaks, but when the 'Word became flesh' . . .

(239) (cont.) Essence of the Father and was not an external work, part of a Periplus of God (See De Decr. 22).

(240) ἠγίον καὶ ἀληθὸς ἐκ τῆς μακαρίας ἐκείνης καὶ ζεί τοὺς ζωὸς ζωότας.

(241) ἐσώθεν συνιστάμενα.
Now when became He 'Apostle' (Heb. 3:1), but when He put on (ἐνδυσάτο) our flesh? And when became He 'High Priest of our profession', but when, after offering Himself for us (242) He raised His Body from the dead, and as now, Himself brings near and offers to the Father those who in faith approach Him, redeeming all, and for all propitiating God (243). It was not, then, that he wished to signify the Essence (οὐσία) of the Logos, nor his natural generation from the Father (244) ... but to signify his descent to mankind, and the high priesthood which 'became' (245) as one may easily see from the account given of the Law and of Aaron. I mean, Aaron was not born a high priest, but a man, and after a while, when God willed it, he became a high priest. But he did not just become it, nor was he known as such by his ordinary clothes, but He put over them (the priestly regalia) ... and went in them into the holy place, and offered the sacrifice for the people, and in them, as it were, mediated between the vision of God and the sacrifices of men. It was the same with the Lord also; 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,' but when the Father willed that ransom (λυτρόν) should be paid on behalf of all and grace should be given to all then truly the Logos took earthly flesh, as Aaron his robe ...  

Here, it is made clear that the word "became" refers to Christ becoming High Priest without prejudice to His Deity, as Aaron did without prejudice to his previous humanity, and the entire context of the verse is quoted, Heb. 2:14 - 3:2, which confirms the Athanasian exegesis and shows the Arian interpretation to be nonsense.

The remainder of this section is a final discussion of the exegesis of this passage in terms of the economy of salvation, especially of the Priesthood of Christ. The word 'faithful' refers essentially not
to anything ethical, but to the absolute efficacy and reliability and
durability of the priestly work of Christ, in contrast to the provisional
and unsatisfactory character even of the Aaronic priesthood and its
sacrifices, and finally there is a brief summary of the Atonement in
the general pattern.

There are three points here that require special discussion,
which we shall do in reverse order. The line of exegesis is less
plausible here than with the other verses of Scripture already treated,
and the basic exegetical method of Athanasius is palpably under an
increased strain; not that the Arians are any more in the right than
usual. This is still so in spite of the context, which is Athanasius's
strongest argument. However, one feels that in some ways it would have
been more plausible to interpret the (πάντορα) αὐτόν as being a loose
use of language, which is the line that Athanasius began by adopting,
in chs. 3 and 4, but which was later subordinated to his more
characteristic line that the "making" refers to the humanity of Christ,
and especially the Priesthood. (246) An alternative to this, and in fact
the explanation which the Church, at any rate in the West, has generally
adopted, and the explanation which one feels comes more naturally anyway,
is that the προμονταρεῖς καὶ refers to some form of what later became the
Doctrine of the Active and Passive Obedience of Christ. Of course, if
the scandalous προμονταρεῖς be taken at full value, the obedience would
have to be essentially the human obedience of the Incarnate Christ, or
the obedience of Christ would have to be in an equivalently close and
intimate relationship to the Incarnation and to His Humanity. Thus,

(246) The question of "making" was fully discussed previously in general,
either one could say that the acts and passions of obedience were, enhypostatically, human acts, or that they were kenotic acts of the Logos, concerning which the use of the offending participle being used figuratively would symbolize the fact that the kenosis consisted in the Incarnation. Why did Athanasius reject these solutions? The first and most obvious reason is that he was in a groove from which he could not escape, at this stage; he was already committed to this sort of exegesis, and he could not break away at this point. Polemically, he was in the position where any change in exegetical principle would have spoilt the effect which he meant to convey— and which he certainly meant to be cumulative. Besides, and this is where we must sympathise with Athanasius, he felt, with good reason, that the passages of Scripture used by the Arians went together, as a matter of plain fact, and that the rigorous application of the same principle in all cases was no more than what was imperatively demanded by the truth. The second reason, which is even more important, is that Athanasius, as we have already seen, always uncompromisingly opposed any kenotic theory of the Incarnation; (247) such a theory would be indistinguishable from the idea of a Logos that was Ἀλλοιωμένος, if not πρέπος. Thirdly there is the virtual truism that, for better or for worse, Greek theology and culture was always less intensely conscious of ethical categories than Latin theology and culture, with its Western successors, and the confusions and disastrous conclusions which arose from the Arians' use or abuse of ethical categories did not help Athanasius at all. As we have seen, he is at his strongest on this matter when he is criticising

(247) Cf. the "Extra Calvinisticum." De Inc. 17, and see above pp. 147 – 151.
ethics, in circumstances where it ought to be criticised. But he would have been quite incapable of saying, for instance, what Barth said, that the loving obedience of the Son to the Father is a constitutive factor of the Godhead Itself. This would be confirmed by the fact that in his Trinitarian theology proper, a key role is still played by the concepts and metaphors of Image, the Χαράκμή (i.e. of the Father as ὅπως Χριστός), and Ἰματίαμα (of the Father as φως). (248)

These all tended to postulate the relationship between the Second and First Persons in terms of a quasi-physical or natural duplication rather than the filial terms of the Fourth Gospel. The "Son" theology has not gone far enough yet to take a position of dominance. Finally, if Athanasius was not yet ready to admit filial loving obedience into the Godhead, he was equally unprepared to link with the Humanity the measure of activity in obedience necessarily associated with the word πάθος. The old correlation of the Humanity with passion as distinct from action is visibly breaking down, and is broken down to the extent of admitting a sort of imputed active obedience which is the fons et origo of the active humanity of the Christian. (249) But it is still powerful, particularly with regard to this sort of passage, as distinct from what might be called the passages of the Messianic Kingship, where the correlation cannot be maintained. This is shown in these chapters by Athanasius's use of the comparison between the Humanity of Christ and the official regalia of Aaron the High Priest. Yet even this represents a distinct change compared with the earlier theology, and it is to this that we now turn.

(248) See above, pp. 629-37, 647, 705-14.
(249) See Barth, Ch. Dogm. Vol. IV. Pt. I pp. 177 (E.T.)
On the issue of the High Priesthood of Christ, the doctrine of Athanasius was very simple; it was something that belonged to the incarnate life of Christ. The Humanity of Christ has the same relation to His Deity as Aaron's obligatory priestly regalia to his original and continuing humanity. In further consideration of this matter, we shall have to consider critically Newman's note (Notes on C. Ar. II: 8). His notes are in general of great value, but this is one of the cases in which he must be criticised: "The Arians considered that our Lord's Priesthood proceeded His Incarnation, and belonged to His Divine Nature, and was in consequence the token of an inferior divinity. The notice of it therefore in this text did but confirm them in their interpretation of the words 'made', etc. For the Arians, vid. Epiphanius, Haer. IXIX:37. Eusebius (Caes.) too had distinctly declared, 'Qui videbatur, crat eumus Dei; qui occultabatur sacerdos Dei.' Adv. Sabell. I: P.G. XXIV 1048E. Vid. also Dom. Ev. I: 10: P.G. XXII 69A and IV: 16: 324C and V: 3, pass.; and also C. Marc. I: P.G. XXIV 725-729 and Eccl. Theol. I: 8 & 13 & 20: 11-13. . . . (The contention is supported by quotations from Cyril of Jerusalem, Ambrose, Clement of Alexandria, and Philo, and opposed by Nestorius, ?-Cyril of Alexandria, Augustine, Fulgentius) . . . . The Catholic doctrine is, that the Divine Word is Priest in and according to His Manhood. . . ." Newman is perfectly correct, if we make one additional qualification, in his description of the correct doctrine of the Priesthood of Christ, on which all the main branches of the Christian Faith agree, but the former half of the statement indicates the tendency of Newman to judge the Arian controversy with the later Christological heresies in mind, and not to appreciate the difference between the theology before and after 362 or so. A closer reading of the passage cited suggests that Epiphanius was not really discussing at all any Arian doctrine of the Priesthood of Christ; he simply said that the Arians did not do anything at all with the verses of Scripture in question except to deduce that the Logos was a creature. It is Epiphanius who then deduces the correct
doctrinal from them; in fact, this section is an exact summary of these eleven chapters of Athanasius. As far as Eusebius of Caesarea is concerned, Newman's facts are correct, but the interpretation or insinuation based on them is not. An examination of the context of all the passages of Eusebius cited indicates that they all have an anti-Sabellian context, and that they are all exegetically justifiable comments on either Gal. 3:20, or (or should we say both... and) the references to the Melchizedek Priesthood of Christ in Ps. 110:4β and its citations in Hebrews. A typical passage runs (Dei. Ev. I: 10: 89b): Μόνος δι Θεού διά τὸν πάπα τοῦ Θεού προκόσμος, καὶ άρχεον τὸν ἄλος καὶ καλοκαίρες. τὰς θεοίν ἰμοιοτατία σος προβατον καὶ άλλον ἐκ τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ αἰειμνίου ἠφοίτον ἐξωλος, τοῦτο γάρ ἐπὶ μαρτύρια τίς παντοκράτορα ἀναμένει, καὶ τίς Καθάραν γε αὐτῶν... περιηγης.

There are two things that might be said about the Eusebian doctrine. The first is that he was trying, however unsatisfactorily, to do justice to the Supralapsarianism of the Bible, which Athanasius in fact had to bring back at the end of this Oration. The second is that it is simply another, and perhaps more Biblical, way of expressing the very correlation of the Deity with action and the Humanity with passion which was the tendency of Athanasius himself in the "De Incarnatione", a trend which was not begun to be reversed till, on our chronology, after the death of Eusebius. To look at the matter generally, Priesthood is essentially an active function, which can only be doubted on the basis of a misuse of the special case of Christ, where the Priest and the Victim are personally one. Therefore, it could not pose any greater problems, if it were ascribed in any way to the Deity, than the doctrine of Christ as the Mediator does generally. This is not to deny that the earlier theology had left itself open on this sort of point. But it is an error to maintain that Eusebius fell into the traps any further than any of his
orthodox colleagues. By his tendency to accept him as an Arian, Newman and others following him fatally obscure the distinction between the commonplaceess, misdirected energy, etc. (for argument's sake) of Eusebius of Caesarea, and the malignity of Arius particularly, and also his followers. In that way they have contributed to the Church's failure to take the full measure of Arianism, with all its disastrous consequences.

From one point of view, Athanasius's doctrine as enunciated here, that the Humanity of Christ is analogous to the priestly vestments of Aaron, is in one sense a continuation of his earlier point of view, but in another sense it shows a considerable advance. In one way, the regalia might be regarded as the instrument of the Priesthood, but in another sense it is the indispensable sign of what the Logos was or became. In other words, it represents far more a what than a how.

We have the concept of a new action of the Logos which is essentially related to His Humanity that He took, and it is no longer a case of the Logos using the Humanity to repay a debt or to reveal just what He already was. The Priesthood is an active function, and as such is primarily associated with the Deity of Christ, but here, once again, in a rather different way this time, do we find activity being increasingly associated in a secondary way, with the Humanity of Christ. Athanasius here advances not only on Eusebius of Caesarea, but also de facto on his own previous point of view, in treating the Humanity of Christ as the priestly vestments instead of concentrating attention on the Humanity of Christ as the Victim.

The final question is that of the relation between God's "fruitfulness" as the Father of the Son, and His creative capacity. In a sense, Athanasius is inverting Arian, and pre-Arian, theology and
using this very principle against the Arians. We have already seen how one of the most dangerous features of the theology of the second and third centuries was to confuse the creation of the world and the generation of the Son, and in particular to equate creation itself with some generative change happening to the Person or Essence of the Logos Itself. (250) The Arian movement was both the result of this bad principle and a protest against it, in its refusal to recognise any relation at all other than that of Creator and creature. The first reaction of Athanasius was to insist on the difference between these two relations, and the validity of each. Now, Athanasius appears to have completely reversed the position of the earlier theology, and made the relation of creation dependent on the filial generation within the Godhead. This represents a true reversal, because in the former case the primacy tended to go to the relation of creation, since it was the more obvious relation and the early Logos theology was definitely cosmological. Here, in ch. 3, Athanasius goes to great pains to make clear that the dependence is the other way. However, there is one decisive difference. It always remains, without possibility of gainsaying, a relation of one event being dependent on another event. The former is still, as ever, the event that began the time series of created life as we know it; the latter is absolutely eternal, so that assimilation remains impossible. On the other hand, it can fairly be asked whether the teaching of Athanasius on this point is really totally immune from inverting itself again into the earlier, dangerous doctrine. And also, why did Athanasius, having a perfectly sound position before, not leave well alone? One possible answer would be that he felt the force of a

quasi-Platonistic feeling that even the relation between Creator and creature was, in the Platonic sense, unreal,\(^{(251)}\) so that it could not have any real existence of itself, but could only be the projection of some absolutely existing relation in the Godhead. This is debatable, but it suggests a possible correct answer which we in our age would happily propose, and which probably represents the deepest thought of Athanasius, even though it requires a modification of his language.

It is conceivable for "God the Father", if he were hypothetically on his own, without generation or procession, to be still able to create the world, and even man himself, in spite of Athanasius's statement to the contrary. But this sort of creation would have nothing to do with anything worthy of the name of the Christian God. It would be an act of pure creation in the barest possible sense. It would be completely unaccompanied by any outpouring of grace. The truth behind Athanasius's statements that if the Father were barren or as a dry fountain we cannot ascribe to Him creative energy, is that this is true, not so much of creative energy as such (speaking purely hypothetically), but it is absolutely true of the grace that is the essential thing that makes creation worthwhile for the creature. A god who was essentially and eternally a Lonely God could never love His creature, even if He could create him. It is this that lies behind his renewed emphasis on creation being through the Logos and in Wisdom, from which it is more obviously and formally deduced that a Lonely God cannot be a creator.

Considered in this way, Athanasius's remarks are a major move towards the contention that it is only as He is Trinitarian that God is God, even though some of the expressions, for example, that "God" is productive when it is strictly the Father that in this case is meant,

\(^{(251)}\) Perhaps because the creatures are ex nihilo?
are still formally inadequate or incorrect on the basis that the term God includes all Three Persons. He is pointing out here, in particular, that God's Trinitarian (or is it Binitarian at this stage? there is yet no explicit place for the Spirit,) nature is essential to His operations ad extra Trinitatis. This is really one of the ultimates of theology which cannot be adequately described in terms of anything else at all. It is particularly interesting to note that the hypothetical and rejected concept of a Lonely God is not described as the natural norm compared with which the Trinitarian God is a paradoxical deviation; it is described metaphorically in terms of sterility and barrenness, and his metaphor of a dry fountain is, in that part of the world, about the most pejorative that can be imagined. The reason why Athanasius became dissatisfied at this stage with merely differentiating between creation and filial generation is evidently that at this stage, after a long period of exclusive concentration on the doctrine of God in its narrower sense, the necessities of refuting the Arian exegesis had forced him back, once again, to the issues of soteriology and grace which he had treated in the "De Incarnatione". Once this had happened, it was not enough to think of creation simply as such; it was again necessary to think of the grace that went with it. It is true that there is as yet no detailed formulation of this corresponding to the older idea of all creation being rational in virtue of its creation through the Logos. But Athanasius is soon to elaborate the corresponding doctrine again, in the Epistles to Serapion, when he speaks of all things, including creation, being done in the Spirit. This still has a somewhat formal quality compared with, say, a perfectly developed Augustinian type of formulation, but at this stage the whole thing becomes finally and explicitly Trinitarian. It is true that Athanasius is always prevented from stating quite expressly the doctrine that we have deemed to be at
the root of his thinking, because of his continuing predilection for
the physical analogies for intra-Trinitarian relations like
source - river, etc., which always work against the express recognition
of love as the intra-Trinitarian relation, but, within this restriction.
Athanasius emphasises as well as could be done the gracious privilege of
creation of participating, in its measure, in the blessings of the
Divine life.

One small point yet remains for discussion; Athanasius returns
to the question of analogy. In 3: 152C, a passage already cited
completely above in two parts, we read, "For terms do not disparage His
nature; rather does It draw to Itself those terms and change them.
For terms are not prior to essences, (οὕσιων) but essences are first,
and terms second." In ch. 6, the matter is discussed in more detail
with reference to the specific passage, where it is emphasised that
"faithful" has two meanings in Scripture; applied to men, it has the
ethical meaning that the Arians tried to apply here; applied to God,
the essential meaning for us is that we can absolutely trust Him. The
thing to be noticed is the absolute objectivity, not to say objectivism,
of Athanasius. Not only is he denying the idea that a statement can
only be true if it fits our terminology. He is also going much further
and denying that this is even a condition for our knowledge of its truth.
The essence itself of the thing to be known or described will itself
make itself known in spite of any deficiencies in our means of knowing.
It is the real absolute objective truth that is significant and that
must always have the last word, not our categories or our vocabulary.
Athanasius is saying that this is even in some way true of ordinary
things; a fortiori, how much more true and certain it is of God. Thus,

(252) Οὐ θεωρεῖ λέξεις τήν φύσιν παραπονοῦνται. Ἐισὶ μὲν η φύσις τὰς
λέξεις εἰσὶ ἐνυπή εἰκοςτα μεταβαλλει.
even though all our knowledge of God is analogical, it is really in
the end, by the grace of God, perfect. And, since it is the nature
of God that attracts the term to itself, the one thing that man must
not and dare not do is to try to make the correction himself, for example
by postulating the contrary or contradictory negation of the affirmative
term and presuming to reconcile that in a higher ($y$) synthesis. (253)
If the words of Athanasius mean anything at all, they mean that the
agent of this correction is the Essence Itself of God Himself, in the
most immediate sense. This also rules out the entirely arbitrary
"Catholic" interpretation of Athanasius, whereby the prima facie meaning
of the Scriptural language is modified by something primarily manifested
as Church tradition. There is very little trace of this in the anti-
arian writings of Athanasius; if the Romanist interpretation were true,
one would expect it to be loud and clear on every page. If one attempts
to answer this by maintaining that this tradition is a work of the Holy
Spirit, the answer to this is that Athanasius's language of essences, etc.,
means that it is not only a work of the Holy Spirit, but is in some way
reserved to God Himself in a way that "Catholic" tradition seriously
compromises. It is true that Athanasius has not yet developed properly
the doctrine of the Spirit, and is unable to express this quite clearly;
in fact, this side of his theology never came to the stage of development
of his theology of the Second Person. But in fact what Athanasius has in
mind is what Calvin and the Reformers meant, or should have meant, by the
testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti, a phrase which, perhaps through
one injudicious word, was soon perverted into a subjectivism which

(253) we are interpreting this in the light of the higher doctrine of
analogy elaborated above in C. Ap. I: 21-22, of which this is in
a sense the continuation. See above, pp. 686-96
destroyed its force. It is this that Athanasius used in his interpretation of this passage, even though his detailed application of this principle, in ch. 6, is, in terms of the language of the Scripture passage, the most questionable exegesis in the whole of Athanasius. After all, ἀνακτόριστον τὰ πνεύματα ἀποτελεῖ is almost precluded, by its very form, from having the meaning of πνεῦμα which Athanasius maintains is appropriate to God. In fact, on his own methods and principles, Athanasius would have done far better to interpret the verse as referring to the human obedience that Christ took, so that we too might in Him have the power to be faithful to Him that made us. The only conceivable reason for his failure to adopt this exegesis is that he felt the correlation between Deity and action as having to be modified, but did not yet have the courage to think along lines closer to the later kenotic theory. Later, in the Third Oration, the direct citation of Gospel verses by the Arians confronted him far more directly with the problem.

The next verse which the Arians used to cite is Acts 2:36.

1:11

This verse is almost identical in significance with Philipp. 2:9-10, and is treated in almost exactly the same way, so that no detailed citation is necessary. However, there is one change, which indicates Athanasius's greater confidence in his exegetical principles; also, perhaps, the more severe test involved in the statement in Scripture, "God hath made this same Jesus Lord..." (254) When we were discussing the Athanasian exegesis of Philipp. 2:9-10, we pointed out that Athanasius appeared to avoid what would be, to our minds, the most natural interpretation, that the exaltation of Christ which was referred to in Philippians consisted in the fact that man was now to recognise, for the first time, what the

(254) Κύριον ἀπεστέλλα καὶ Χριστὸν ἐστί Κυρίον τοῦ Θεοῦ.
Logos had always, but which needed the Incarnation etc., for its general recognition. We gave several possible reasons why Athanasius may have been unwilling to accept this exegesis. Here, Athanasius accepts this as an element in his exegesis, although it is embedded within his more general exegesis. See ch. 14: 176A-B: "... (when we were lost in sin) ... then, as 'He became a house of refuge' and a 'God and defence' (sc. to the Israelites in Egypt), so also He became our Lord (Κύριος Ἰησοῦς). For then did He have His beginning of being, but we began to have Him for our Lord" (255). See also ch. 12: 172C-173A: "Thus then the Father has 'made' Him Lord and King in the midst of us, and towards us who were once disobedient it is plain that He who is now displayed (Βασιλεύς Κυρίου) did not then have a beginning of becoming King and Lord, but begins to show His own Lordship, and to extend it even over the disobedient." Also 13: 176A: .. His beneficence 'becomes' (εἰς ἐκδότον) towards each individual. And 14: 177A: .. (in becoming God .. What He ever is that He becomes to those who need Him) (257), (so Christ) .. what He ever is, that He then is made according to the flesh, and having redeemed all, He thereby becomes again Lord of the quick and the dead." This is the only instance of this type of exegesis, and it was certainly directly evoked by Athanasius's citation, in ch. 12, of Acts 2:22, where the doctrine in question is expressly stated.

There are two minor and one major reference to the Spirit.

14: 176A: (in our fallen state we) .. according to the ineffable

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(255) ἄγας ἄρκην ἐξομεν τοι εὑρίσκων Κυρίον οὐρανίων.
(256) ἄγας ἄρκην ἐξει τοι την κυριότητα ἐμποτο δεικνύειν.
(257) τιπο το στιν λει τούτο κα κατα άνθρωπον ἐκδοτο.
(258) τούτο κα τοτε κατά άνθρωπον πεποίηται.
(259) ἐκδοτο κα τοτε.
sighings of the Spirit made intercession. 14: 176C: . (Christ's work, inter alia, was) . in order to hallow all with the Spirit. (260) The major reference occurs at the very end of this section, 18: 184D-C: " . he meant His Kingdom and Lordship, which was made and which came to be according to grace and for purposes connected with us (261). For while saying this, he was not silent about the Son of God's everlasting Godhead which is the Father's, but He had said already, that He had also poured the Spirit upon us. Now, to give the Spirit with authority (μετ' ἐσούσιας) is not the act of a creature or a thing made, but is a gift of God. The creatures are sanctified by (πάρε + gen.) the Holy Spirit. But the Son, not being sanctified by (Πάρε) the Spirit, but rather Himself gives it to all (262), is shown to be not a creature, but True Son of the Father. And yet He Who gives the Spirit, the same is also said to be made that is, to be made, Lord among us on account of His manhood (263), while giving it because He is the Logos of God. For He ever was and is as Son, so also Lord and Sovereign of all, being like the Father in all things, and having all that is the Father's . . . ." This throws into sharper relief than ever the relatively undeveloped state of the Athanasius doctrine of the Spirit at this period. Not only does he (quite correctly) say that the Spirit cannot be given, but only received, by the creatures, but he also seems to be saying that, or implying that, the essential relation of the Spirit to God is that It is given by God, in such a way that there is a strict and exhaustive antithesis between these two parts of his doctrine. Even though he only goes so far as to exclude (rightly) the Logos's receipt of the Spirit by way of sanctification, which is of course appropriate only to creatures, the whole tone of the passage indicates that he had
simply not thought of any sense in which the other two Persons receive or benefit from the Holy Spirit, like, e.g. once again the Augustinian doctrine of the Spirit as the mutual love of Father and Son, or even the symmetrical Perichoresis in its simplest form. This would be an essential part of any mature Trinitarian doctrine, especially since Athanasius is at such great pains to show that a hypothetical First Person without the Second would be completely futile. It would be unfair to say that Athanasius denied what he should have affirmed; it is rather that the problem had not come anywhere near the forefront of his consciousness.

Since the section from I: 37 to this point is a complete unit, we shall make a complete lexicographical analysis here:

occurred), 17: 164A (Arian statements should not be said about L. of G.), 18: 164C (L. gives Spirit as L. of G., i.e. to men).

**Intimate and absolute connection between Logos and Father:**


**L. Incarnate: Complete Divine and human natures:** I: 45: 104C (Body not external to L.). 48: 112B bis (not L. as L. that was improved), 50: 116B (ascribers of works of L. to devils blaspheme against H.S.), 61: 140C (Son says John 14:10 as L. and Image). 61: 141A ("having become" does not prove L. a thing originating) 62: 141B bis (each, "having become" not of Essence of the Logos but of Incarnate work). II: 9: 165A (Heb. 3:2 of the Economy accdg. to the Manhood of the L.), 10: 168B-C (L. not in body as a thing originate is), 12: 172A (L. not thing made), 12: 172A
alterum (ἀλτέρον) of the L. must be said to be crucified, etc.),
14: 176C (Id. by nature). Jesus Christ, Saviour etc.: Logos Incarnate:
II: 14: 172B (not "He made Him Logos," but "He made Him Lord"). Some L.
author of our Reconciliation: I: 39: 92C (even O.T. people participated
in L.), 39: 93A (necessary for deification), 39: 93A alterum (Adoption
and deification through the L.). 60: 137D (L. took our judgment), II:
14: 176C (liberation of mankind comes to be ἡμῖν).

Arians (or other heretics if stated) (or pointed rebuttal of):
Deny L. to be God: II: 2: 149B bis (each, if Anth. say so, let there be
no Logos). Reject divine attributes, give humble ones: I: 51: 117B
(Nature of L. is originate). Deny L. Himself: II: 4: 153C bis. L. a
creature, etc.: I: 63: 144A (2 refcs.) (Creaturally expressions not
pace Anth., to be referred to L. since same expns. refer to F. as to L.),
64: 145B (ἐνεργός does not refer to L. pace Arians), II: 5: 156C (pace
Anth. not thing made), 6: 157B (if Logos is thing made He will be judged).
8: 164A (2 refcs.) (Heb. 3: 2 does not mean that L. as L. is made).
11: 169B. 11: 169C (Stoics appear to rank L. with the rest of the
creatures). See also: II: 11: 169B (Father made for Himself Logos).
I: 58: 133B (Scr. forbids Arian designations of L.), I: 45: 104C (on
Philipp. 2: 9; Incarnation not pace Arians a diminution of the Essence of
L.). II: 15: 177B (not L. but a mere man, that came to be in flesh).

There are 141 examples, a comparable density to the preceding
section. Of these, 70 refer to the simple relation between the Persons
of the Trinity, (Group I), which is still high considering that the whole
section is Incarnational in subject matter, 14 to the creative and
cosmological function of the Second Person before, or independent of, the
Incarnation (Group II), 2 to the Agent of the Incarnation considered
prospectively (each of these is the Old Testament revelation of the
Logos) (Group III), 47 to the Agent of the Incarnation as an actual
event, (Group IV), 3 to the Hypostasis of the Incarnate Christ, (Group V),
none to the Synoptic Christ as a whole, (Group VI) and 5 to the
continuing post-Incarnational work of the Logos (Group VII). On this
matter, there are many cases that in a sense need to be included in Group I and Group IV, since it is very common to meet sentences of this type: Such-and-such a passage of Scripture does not refer to the Essence of the Logos, but to His taking flesh; occasionally the places of the noun and pronoun are reversed. The author may not be correct in doing this, but in these and all similar cases he has put the instance into the group corresponding to the occurrence of Logos (or Son) as a noun; since, for reasons that may or may not be irrelevant, the great predominance is on the side of Group I in these cases, it is probable that the large relative number of occurrences credited to this group is an artefact. Insofar as this is not an artefact, the reason is that Athanasius has been impelled to elaborate his incarnational theology to refute the Arian application of statements about the Humanity of Christ to His Essence.

γιος, Son: Son same as Logos (most instances omitted, as cancelling each other out, but the following are included, as they figured under other headings under Logos): II. 5: 157A bis, 6: 157C, 12: 172B. Intimate Relation between Father and Son: Generation (simply expressed, genuine, true Son etc.); I: 39: 93A (True Son), II: 3: 152B (2 expls.) (If He is Son, the Son is not from the outside but from the Begetter), 4: 153B (Son genuine and by nature), 11: 169B (Ans. must remember that they speak of the S. of G.). Origin of the Son (in reln. to F.) explained: 56: 129A (genuineness of S.), 56: 129B (we are "generate" by participation in the generate Son), 58: 133B bis (Son is ἐπεροούσιος and ἐπεροοφύτις to things originate). II: 2: 152B (there is a S. of G.) 4: 153 (Ps. and Prov. give right doctrine on S. of G.) Technical formulations: I: 56: 129B (ἐστιν δόξα ἐποίησεν ἀληθῆς ἐκ τῆς ἰδιότητος), 58: 133B (γενενήματι τῆς τοῦ Π. οὐσίας). 3: 152B (the title "Son" = ἰδιότης καὶ ἀληθής ἐκ τῆς μεγαρίδαις οὐσίας καὶ δει οὖν τοις οὐσίας)

Same nature in F. & S.: I: 40: 93B (hitherto we have used the notion of "Son"), 40: 93B alterum (ἐφεπυρή), 61: 140A (the genuineness of S.), 61: 140A alterum (He who sees S. sees F.), Unity of operation: Unity of essence: I: 45: 105A grace given from F. through S.), 61: 140A (rules
F.'s kingdom), 63: 144B (defence through Son, said to be from God, incl. O.T. - classified in Cp. III). Nature of S. greater than all created n.: I: 39, 92C (S. not called God by reward), 41: 97C (Son HeSelf is "justice" in Ps. 59: 16), 55: 128B, 56: 129A (the word "Son forestalls the Arians, 56: 129B bis (Heb. 1:4 does not mean Son originate), 57: 132 bis (S. transcends angels), 58: 133A eternity of Son, 59: 136B (office bet. S. and creatures cf. Heb. 2: 1-3), 61: 140A (Godhead of S.), 61: 140C (S. is to be worshipped) 61: 140C Alterum ("Become" of Son = "Is and has been"), 62: 141A (Heb. 1:5 differentiates S. from creatures), 63: 144A (S. not among things originate) II: 5: 156C (S. not creature, etc.) 17: 164A (S. of G. not thing made), 18: 164B (eternal and paternal Godhead of S.). Son author of reconciliation: I: 61: 140A (The "better", i.e., better thing, came to be through the S.). Having become S. of M., is and remaining S. of G.: I: 42: 100B (S. of G. worshipped even after became man), 43: 101B (being noble S. of F. He humbled Himself), 44: 104B (was exalted, because S. of God in body), 45: 105A-B (2 expls.) (grace given by Son - S. is said to receive) 45: 105B (2 expls.) (see previous case, but Exaltation), 45: 105B (one expl.) (being S. of G. becomes S. of M.), 49: 113C (S. of G., God, Radiance, Expression), 55: 128A (sojourned), 55: 128A (2 expls.) (in propn. as S. differs from slave, the greater is S.'s slave-like work), 60: 137C (S. of G. came into the world), II: 5: 156C bis (each, S. not thing made), 6: 160C (S. of True God remains faithful, A.D.), 10: 168B (on Heb. 3:5, Moses a servant, but Christ a Son), 11: 169A (not thing made, but ὤγος Offspring of F.), 14: 176B (God "made" His own S. to take flesh, etc.), 16: 181A (Chnt. is S. of G.), 16: 181B ("made", i.e. to rule, means that we are to acknowledge S., and through Him the F.), 17: 181C (S. like F.), 18: 184B (Peter knew Him to be God's Son, cf. Matt. 16:16), 18: 184 (2 expls.) (S. not sanctified but True S. of F.). Words attributed to Christ, as "Son": I: 38: 92A (Jn. 17:5), 39: 93A (Matt. 11:27), 58: 133B (Jn. 14: 28, referring only to the fact that He is generated), 61: 140C (says, as man/as God). Spirit is sent by Son: I:50: 117A (best included in post-Incarnate work).

Arian uses: Ex nihilo, et.: II: 1: 148B (Son is ἄνω ὁ ἐγγεντικός), Ans. deny true (and κατὰ φύσιν) generation of the Son: II: 4: 153C. Son only in secondary sense: I: 37: 89A (2 expls.) (said to be S. but not true S.), 38: 89B (Saviour not true S. or God). By depriving S. of nature,
Ans. insult both F. & S.: II: 17: 154A (pace Ans., S. of G. not made by God) F. has created S. for Himself: II: 11: 169B. bis. Son equal or less than us by nature: I: 56: 129C (Son virtually equated with angels), 62: 141A (2 expls.) (If Son is of angels, S. must be ministering spirit). Son created by F.: II: 1: 148A (Creature & thing made), 4: 153C (φύτευμα thing made), 5: 157A. Arians deny Son simply: II: 2: 149B quater. Not eternal: I: 38: 89B & C (Did not have name of Son from beginning), 38: 89C & 39: 92C bis (was Son only A.D. or after Res'ni). (by implication of the opposed orthodox doctrine, the last five are referred to the simple relation between Second and First Persons).

There are 95 uses of Son here, which is less than the number for Logos, this being probably a partial reversion towards, but not to, the usage in "De Incarnations", corresponding to the change in subject matter. (265) Of these, 72 are in Group I (pure intra-Trinitarian relationship), 1 in Gp. II (cosmological work of Logos-Son), none in Gp. III, 7 in Gp. IV (the Agent of the Incarnation as an act accomplished), 10 in Gp. V (Hypostasis of the Incarnate Christ), 3 in Gp. VI (the actual Synoptic Christ as a unity; these are "Son", as distinct from "Son of Man", which we always exclude here), and 2 in Gp. VII (the post-Incarnational work attributed to the Second Person). This distribution resembles that of Logos in this section, again with the exception that there is almost no use of the title Son for the cosmological function of the Logos, and also the incidence of Logos in Group IV was certainly swollen by the direct influence of John 1:14 (see also below under ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; also perhaps it was under this head that the residual influence of the "De Incarnations" was at its maximum.

(265) See above, pp. 207-8.
creature, "made" is proper), 3: 152C alterum (if is offspring "made" is improper). 17: 181D & 18: 184A bis ("Become lord over thy brother" not said of Essence or Δυρχή γενεσεως of Jacob). Καροοσιαν: I: 38: 89B (Ans. say Son has not God for a fatherΚ.ο. 38: 89B alterum (but that S. has only God for creator Κ.ο.). 39: 93B (S. has everything Κ.ο. = Φορει.). Νανανιαν: II: 11: 169A (Son Ω. Offspring; opp. by Economy).

Substantia vel natura Divina τοιος της of F.: I: 58: 133B (omit. of the F. and add as part δουλειας); therefore treat as referring to generation. της τοιος της των ουσιων της γενεταρ 56: 129B. γεννημα της του του ουσιας 39: 93B & 58: 133B. See also II: 149B (For Ans. S. is not τω του πατερα. Δοτου) and 152B (title "Son" = what is Τυνα and truly from that blessed and eternally existent Essence): also 2: 149C (E. of F. is hypothetically not fruitful). Essence of Son different from created essence: I: 57: 132B (not to be compared with that of angels, etc.). In all other cases under this head the statement is of the type: This passage of Scripture does not show the Essence of the Second Person is created, but they refer to the Humanity, etc.): I: 41: 96C, 58: 133C, 59: 133C, 60: 137B, 62: 141B bis, 64: 145B & C, II: 7: 161A, 9: 165A, 11: 169A, 12: 172A, 13: 173B & C, 18: 184B. The only additional example is I: 45: 104C (Ans. consider the Incarnation to be depletion or affection of the E. of the L.). The total number of occurrences is 23 which refer directly to the Godhead to which must be added 8 which have general reference but which are used for analogies to the Trinity). Of these 1 is in what we have called Group I (Essence as the centre of unity of the Person), 6 in Gp. II (same as Gp. I, but with unambiguous reference to generation therefrom, in the special reference), 17: in Gp. III (ambiguous as between Gp. II and Gp. IV), none in Gp. IV (where E. has an undoubted generic significance), and 4 in Gp. V (adverbial uses). Group III has one instance of the Son being τοιος της ουσιας of the Father, which is probably better linked with Group II as it is the prevailing group rather than IV: the other 16 are all the denials that the humble references to Christ refer to the Essence of the Second Person, where the ambiguity is between Group IV and Group V or even Group I. On the face of it, a denial that the Essence of the Second Person is created or
creaturely would be subsumed under the generic difference, although categorial would be better even here, but this use has a definite affinity with Group I, and, although this is not so obvious, an even more important affinity with the adverbial uses, as the contrast is being here also made between what is aboriginally true of the Son, and what became true as a result of the Incarnation.

**Πάρση.** Nature: Nature or natures of Christ: I: 43: 105B (Christ's body has the φύσις of receiving grace), 51: 120A (The Lord - i.e. Christ - is φύσις ὑπερτοῦρας), 52: 120B (Christ is φύσις just and pious), 55: 128A & C (n. of Chrs. different from creatures), 59: 136A (excels φύσις O.T. predecessors), 62: 141B (greater φύσις than creatures), II: 4: 153B (He is φύσις Logos), 14: 176C bis & 177A bis (φύσις Lord), 16: 181B (pre-inc. Logos is φύσις ἐκείνης). Divine Nature common to F. & S.: I: 39: 93B (Logos has everything φύσις = Κατ' ουσίαν), 40: 93B (φ. of F. is unchangeable), 52: 121A (φ. of Image must be as F's), 58: 133B (Jn. 14:28 does not prove that F. & S. are foreign to each other's φύσεως), II: 4: 153C (Arians deny the φύσις generation of the S.), 5: 157A (Son is genuine φύσις), 9: 165A (S. is φύσις Only-begotten). Heretics deny Divine N. of the Second Person: I: 37: 88C (S. is πρεστίς φύσεως), 38: 89D (heretical use of Philipp. 2:9 would prove Chrs. only man φύσεως), 51: 117B (n. of Logos πρεστίς), 56: 129C (n. of angels), 62: 141A (S. would not differ from angels κατ᾽ θνήν φ.) II: 2: 149B (on Arian basis God not of generative φύσεως), 4: 153C (φύσις ἐκείνης). Spiritual natures etc.: I: 57: 132B (Chrs. other than the φύσεως of angels). True human n.: I: 37: 89A (what (in general) is from someone & κατὰ φύσιν true is Offspring), 37: 89A alterum (grace of adopted sons is in lieu of n.), 37: 89B (men not sons of God Κ. Φ.), 50: 116B (human n. insufficient to cast out demons except in Spirit), II: 4: 156B (II Kings 20:18 is of Offspring φύσεως), 5: 156D ("making" sometimes used metaphorically of φύσεως children), 10: 168B (Moses Φύσις man), 17: 184A (Jacob Κ. Φ. creature). Nature of all creatures, etc.: I: 49: 113B (n. of cs. is not trustworthy), 51: 117B (Ps. 45:8 does not signify n. of L. to be πρεστίνην), 56: 129B (we are generate not on accnt. of our own n. but by participation in S.), 57: 132B (S. is ἐγερούσιος παρὰ τὴν οὐν οἰκείων φύσιν), 58: 133A (Scr. shows φύσιν of things originate), 58: 133A alterum (creatures have such a φύσιν).
II: 17: 184A (such things not said even of \( \text{kata} \phi \nu \sigma \nu \) χειμωνοις; in spite of text it should be χειμωνοις, i.e. obliteration of the distinction between what is aboriginal and what becomes). Nature of all things: 57: 132A (different sorts of things not comparable on account of unlikeness \( \tau \gamma \phi \nu \) \( \chi \epsilon \omega \nu \)), 59: 137B (Son and creatures \( \text{αλλα} \) \( \pi \rho \delta \text{α\’} \phi \nu \) \( \tau \gamma \phi \nu \) - acc. of respect), II: 3: 152C (confession of what is \( \text{κφ} \)), II: 3: 152C (Expressions do not abolish \( \tau \gamma \phi \nu \)), 3: 152C alterum (on contrary, nature modifies the expressions). Other uses: II: 2: 149C (Ans. say Son not Son \( \text{κφ} \), but \( \text{kata} \) \( \betaουτηπου \)), 2: 149D (Son \( \text{κφ} \) not referred to by Heb. 3:2), 3: 152D (Even occasional use of "servant" does not destroy the genuineness of the n. of sons), 3: 153A (Solomon son of David \( \text{φιστε} \)), 3: 153B (such "slaves" in Pss. and Prov. \( \text{εο} \) \( \text{φιστε} \) and genuine son), 4: 156A ("slave" etc., used metaphorically does not destroy the n.), 5: 156C (natural and children, ref. as in last exp.), 7: 161A (\( \text{φιστη} \chi \nu \) \( \text{εννησιν} \) \( \text{φιστε} \) from \( \text{οσισκω} \)). Of these 56 instances, 10 refer, in the noun sense, to the Divine nature, 10, in the same way to human or creaturely nature, whether generally or as in Christ, 32 are adverbial uses (including the adjective \( \text{φιστηκο} \)). There are four noun uses which apply to "nature" in the most general sense, and they are best classified under Divine nature, making a total of 14, since they are used to analogically illustrate truths about the Divine nature, especially of Christ.

To turn now to the Christological vocabulary: \( \Sigma \omega \mu \kappa \), body:

Ch't.'s own: I: 43: 100C (our kinship with). Imperfections: General:
II: 7: 161B (Mary mother of b.), Suffering (L. suffers \( \tau \gamma \phi \nu \)) (our behalf) I: 60: 140A. Death: I: 42: 100B (yielded body to touch death), 44: 104B (allowed death to touch His b.). Burial: I: 47: 112A (of the b. of the L.) Bearing our sins: I: 62: 144A (on the Tree \( \tau \gamma \phi \nu \)). In Christology: I: 45: 104C (His own, which was raised . . . ), 45: 105B (His own - acadg. to the body received grace), 47: 109B (His own - sanctified by the II. Sp. given by Himself). Type of Union: I: 43: 100C (J. Ch't. was God in the b.). Originate, etc.: II: 8: 164A (put on originate b.), 14: 176B (put on human b.), Human, etc.: I: 44: 101C (Ch't. rose as God in body), 44: 104C (Exalted us as S. of G. in body), II: 10: 168B (in body), 12: 172C (God in body), 10: 168B (Log. not in body for the reason that originate beings are, i.e. not as a condition of existence). True Flesh, etc.: I: 42: 100A (Log. not diminished by
taking b.), 43: 101A (humbled Himself in taking our humble flesh),
47: 112A (accepting our mortal body); see also I: 47: 108C (He bore our
b.). Exaltation of body: I; 45: 104C (2 exs.) (when the b. was raised
the L. is said to be exalted ἁλλ' ὅσον σώματι, II: 7: 161A (He raised
b. from dead). See also: II: 10: 168A (Heb. 3: 1 ff. refers to σώματι
tηροῦσα), 12: 172A (τῆς σώματος of the L.). I: 44: 101C (For He came
down σώματικῶς). I: 53: 124A (Humble expressions refer to the ἐνσώματος
tηροῦσα of the Saviour). Of these 28 examples of σώματι or its
equivalents, none are in either Group I (Human term being the subject in
all senses) or Group II (subject of a verb which really is a passivity);
there are 3 in Group III (both grammatically and actually object, or
its equivalent), 9 in Group IV (Second Person as subject, humanity as
object), 14 in Group V (Logos acts (or is enabled to suffer) through or
by instrumentality of humanity (or equivalent expressions)), none in
Group VI (The L. becomes, or acts as man, etc.), and two in the last
group, which simply refer to the Humanity simpliciter.

ἔργα, flesh: Lower part of man: I: 43: 101A (He put on
flesh enslaved by sin), 60: 137C (He prepared flesh to be receptive of
the L.). Incarnation itself (in form of John 1:14): I: 41: 96C bis,
165A (our own fl.), 8: 164A (like ours). In the fl.: I: 47: 109A &
II: 15: 177B (known ἐν σώματι). ἐνσώματω τοῦ: I: 51: 120A (taken by S.),
προσληψις of fl.: I: 41: 96C, II: 14: 176C (taking of fl. did not
enslave the L.). Ῥύχα ἐφέσω: I: 41: 97B (Ps. 24: 7 said on acnt. of
flesh He bore). Other expressions: II: 9: 165A (partakes in flesh -
μετεξέσθαι, best classed with becoming fl.). II: 14: 177A (made
He is said to be anointed in fl.), I: 50: 116A (If Cht. says that He casts
cut devils through the L. it is said on acnt. of fl.). I: 60: 137B
("Becoming" to be ascribed to fl.). 41: 96D (L. endured death in His
own fl.), 42: 100A (ditto, σώματι). 44: 104C (L. put to death σώματι).
I: 38: 89C (on Arian reasoning He would not have improved fl. but been
(in each of above, of 2nd Person): I: 49: 113C, 53: 124A, 62: 144A, II: 7: 160B. There is a total of 40 examples, of which none are in Christological Gp. I, 1 in each of Gps. II and III, 12 in Gp. IV, 12 also in Gp. V (which are all, except one, direct reminiscences of John 1: 14), 14 in Gp. VI, and none refer to the Humanity simpliciter.


Heretical uses: I: 38: 89D (any attempt to use Philipp. 2 would mean the Chrt. was man by nature and nothing more), 38: 92A (It was not that, being man, He became God). II: 15: 177B & 16: 177C & 180C (Chrt. mere man), 16: 181B (worship as to Christ must not be given to mere man).

We can even now notice the principal lexicographic differences as compared with the overall picture in the "De Incarnatione". (266)

There are two in number, the enormous development of Group VI, and the change to Flesh, and particularly Man, as the principal terms for, for the sake of avoiding begging the question, what the Son took or became at the Incarnation. In "De Incarnatione", Body is overwhelmingly the characteristic expression, others being the more or less rare exception.

Now, these two differences are patently related. Body, as a term or concept, is quite ill-adapted to Group VI, whereas Man is, in its own nature, well-adapted. It would appear, at first sight, that Flesh was as ill-adapted as Body, but the difference here is the direct result of the influence of John 1: 14. This is confirmed by the fact that

(266) For lexicographical analyses of this work, see above, pps. 162-4, 174-6, 178-9, 199-200, and, in summary, 216-222, especially the table on p. 221. The Christological vocabulary is too sparse in the intermediate works to be fully analysable.
references in Group VI to Body are almost all in this form, while in
the case of Man, other forms also figure. What are the reasons for
this change? Firstly, there is the effect of Scripture. Unfortunately,
we cannot include John 1:14 in this, because this verse itself would
have been almost as evident, at least, to the Athanasius of the "De
Incarnatione" as to the later Athanasius, and its influence on the
language of the earlier work was nil (in fact, this verse is never even
quoted). What we do mean is the cumulative effect of all the Scriptural
passages that refer to the humble nature of Christ, which the Arians
quoted ad nauseam. After all, as we have said, these statements are
active in form, and demanded a concept of the Humanity of Christ that
was more than the instrumentalism of the earlier work, more than "the
Logos took, or fashioned, a body". But there is another reason, just as
important if not so obvious, without which Athanasius could never have
consciously appreciated John 1:14 at its full value the way that he
does now, and did not before. That is, in his general refutation of
Arian theology Athanasius had to examine exhaustively the whole logical
(and theological) principle of Becoming and Making with the result that
for the first time he could give an intelligible account of how the Logos
could "become" at all while being eternally with the Father, and how He
could "become flesh", while never one whit ceasing to be what He eternally
was, that is, God.(267) It is probably true that John 1:14 was

(267) The objection is often felt that God is not man, therefore the Son
of God could not remain God when He became man. Now, it is normally
most scandalously improper to use propositional language, especially
with the signs of quality and quantity of proposition, about God
Himself, but the author does so with much trepidation, because the
point that must be made here is actually much clearer if propositional
language is used, however improperly. The argument is actually
an E A E Figure I Syllogism whose major premise is "No man is God"
(and vice versa, the converse of an E proposition being equivalent).
Now, this is not really an analytic proposition, and once it is
appreciated as synthetic it can be seen to be not quite true, or
rather true with one exception - Jesus Christ. This is simply a
logical form of the theological statement that the separation of
smouldering all the time in Athanasius's subconscious mind, but it still remains true, as far as Athanasius's consciously articulated theology was concerned, that he could not have really made sense of this verse of Scripture without having cleared up this most important formal point. This of course does not mean that Scripture is subordinate to logic; what it does mean is that this is a point that is common to both Scripture and the slogans of Arian theology, and the latter, which drew attention to the problem in the most ostentatious fashion, were really divine judgment for the neglect of this in the exegetical field.

18: Now, at last, Athanasius has come to the most difficult passage of all. Prov. 8: 22 LXX, which, owing to a famous mistranslation in the Septuagint, provided the Arians with their trump card. (268) The God and man cannot be deemed to exclude the Incarnation. This should not be strange, since it is the commonest thing in the world to find that what we thought was an invariable law of science has exceptions, and therefore has to be reformulated to allow for them. Materially, the question becomes more difficult, although formally it remains the same, when we come to deal with the detailed activities that are incompatible in the Godhead and the Manhood, such as knowing and not-knowing, which Athanasius had to deal in detail in C. Ar. III: 26-58.

(268) Shapland's note on this verse (in his edition of the Letters to Serapion, p. 162, note 1 on Ep. II: 7) is the best brief summary. "For the importance of Prov. 8: 22 to the Arians, see Theodoret, H.E. I: 5, Epiphanius, Haer. LXIX: 12, etc., Hilary, De Trin. IV: 11, and the testimony of Eunomius in his Liber Apologeticus, ad fin., and apud Gregory of Nyssa, Adv. Eunomium, III: 573; cf. also C. Ar. I: 53, II: 1 & 47, where it is made plain that their exegesis of Scripture is built upon it. Their interpretation was anticipated to a certain extent by Origen, De Princ. IV: 1. In taking the εἰκόνες to refer to the sacred humanity, Athanasius follows the line adopted by the Nicene from the beginning of the controversy; cf. Exp. Fid. I, Eustathius of Antioch apud Theodoret, Dial. I: 90, and Marcellus apud Eusebius, C. Marcell. II: 3. And, among other writers, by Epiphanius, Haer. LXIX: 21, Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. XXX: 2. Didymus, De Trinitate III: 846 etc. ps-Basil, Adv. Eun. IV: 704, and Gregory of Nyssa, C. Eun. III: 584B. Another line of interpretation appears to start from Dionysius of Rome, apud Decr. 26, who takes εἰκόνες as equivalent to οὐσία. This is followed by Eusebius (Eccl. Theol. III: 2) with references to the Hebrew and versions other than the LXX. Basil, Adv. Eun. II: 20, also interprets from the Hebrew. But in De Princ. Prov. 3 he regards the υἱός of Proverbs as the personification of God's
LXX Κύριος έκτισε με ὑπὲρ τοῦ Κόσμου εὗερα, corresponds to the M.T., of which it is a mistranslation, ἐκ τῆς ὕπατος ἐκβάλλεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνθρώπινην τῆς Κρίτης. Unlike Eusebius among his contemporaries, Athanasius does not attempt to use the Hebrew, which would have solved the problem at once, since ἔλεγον corresponding to εὐκτίσεως, really means "possessed me", the perfect basis for the orthodox Christology in a verse that has been immemorially applied to the Second Person, through the title of Wisdom, the direct subject of the verse. (269)

But his acceptance of the Greek as authoritative, and probably as the only version that he knew intimately, posed the most difficult exegetical problem of all. The first affect of this is to compel Athanasius to take another long and hard look at the general reasons why the Arian exegesis, so particularly tempting at this point, is impossible. In fact, Athanasius has to spend

wisdom in nature. An independent explanation is offered by Hilary, de Trin. XII: 35 and De Syn. 16, who takes εὐκτίσεως of the generation of the eternal Son, as a corrective to the analogy of human generation. For yet another explanation (referring it to the Church - author), see De Inc. et C. Ar. 6. Rejecting the authenticity of this last work, we find that Athanasius consistently adhered to the explanation given here."

Two additional comments must be made on Shapland's note in the light of Athanasius's own work. In the first place, the doctrine attributed by Shapland as the property of Dionysius of Rome and Eusebius of Caesarea was a most important element in Athanasius himself. We have shown (see above, pp. 9f) that, although Athanasius was not willing to adopt this line at once, the later passages of Scripture treated are usually referred to the establishment of the Lordship of Christ, in relation to men's worship and its appropriateness, as well as to the Humanity of Christ, although the latter in the narrower sense remains predominant. That is, what was "made" was not only the mere Humanity of Christ, but also the Logos in the sense of John 1:14, and besides, the whole process of reconciliation which is the etiological basis of the Incarnation and the sole basis on which we have the right to know God as Lord at all. Cf. C. Ar. II: 53 beg., in particular, and virtually the whole section 44-82 passim. Secondly, the question of created wisdom in relation to the primary Wisdom which is the Second Person is again one which Athanasius raises, C. Ar. II: 76-82 (and see below, pp. 9/12-20).

(269) The usual meaning of ἱππίσ is "to buy" or "to acquire". The noun ἵππος means "wealth, possessions, cattle". But it is still true that the more usual meanings "buy", etc., can be excluded much more easily from the Hebrew, leaving the element of possession or permanent enrichment as the surviving element. After all, not even the Arians could maintain that God purchased His allegedly created wisdom from somebody else!
the next 25 chapters on this sort of introductory and general matter before he begins the exegesis proper. These chapters consist of a recapitulation of what he has already said about why the Logos-Wisdom-Son cannot be a creature. However, some very important new matter is given here, and some other issues are treated far more fully and definitely than before, so these chapters must be studied in detail. The remainder of ch. 18 is introductory; the argument proper commences at ch. 19, beginning.

One point can be made at once. If this is compared with C. Ar. II: 11, it appears at first sight as if Athanasius has simply walked into a trap; he has maintained that there is no place in Scripture where, even on the surface, the Logos-Son-Wisdom etc., is described as "having been made", or where it is said that "God made the Son etc.", and lo and behold, here is Prov. 8:22 LXX! Everyone agreed that Wisdom, that is, the Second Person, was the Speaker, who says \( \text{Kurios } \varepsilon \kappa r \tau \sigma \) \( \mu \varepsilon \) On the other hand, it must be said, and Athanasius could easily have said it, that this, as the formal structure of the sentence, is radically incomplete, and there is a noun \( \dot{\rho} \chi \nu \) in apposition with the accusative \( \mu \varepsilon \) which is really the accusative equivalent of the nominative complement. On this basis, the \( \varepsilon \kappa r \tau \sigma \) would be no more than a synonym for \( \varepsilon \nu \tau \eta \sigma \varepsilon \), after which, in one sense of its meaning, this construction is normal and has been already discussed by Athanasius formally and definitively above in C. Ar. I: 23-25. Thus, Prov. 8:22 LXX would require no special handling beyond the treatment given to Acts 2:36 and other previous passages. But Athanasius for some reason probably lacked the confidence to say this straight out. It was a providential lack of confidence if this was the case, because it compelled a still deeper analysis of certain issues, and the result is much additional valuable material, and the kernel of Athanasius's
case is a remarkable statement on relativism(270) which is actually in
many ways the material equivalent of the formal logical point that we
have just been discussing.

Athanasius takes as his starting-point the celebrated
proposition that the Arians gave to his predecessor Alexander, in the
earliest days of the heresy; "He is a creature, but not as one of the
creatures, He is a thing made, but not as one of the things-made; He is
an offspring, but not as one of the offsprings."(271) This, to
Athanasius, is pure hypocrisy and double-talk, as well as going against
the Only-Begotten, He now discusses how this Arian statement is false,
and in so doing raises a most important issue, in a surprisingly modern
way: (188A) "For is any one of the creatures just what another is,(272)
that you should say this of the Son as if it were something special? .
(Follows an account of the Hexaemeron) . . And 'the invisible things
are ... understood by the things that are made' (Rom. 1:20):
and neither is the light as the night, nor the sun as the moon; nor the
irrational things (Δουλεία) as the rational man, nor the Angels as the
Thrones, nor the Thrones as the Authorities (εξουσία); yet they are
all creatures, each of the things that came to be according to its kind,
exists and remains in its own essence, as it has come to be.

Let the Logos then be excepted from the things made and as
Creator be restored to the Father and be confessed to be Son by nature
(φύσι), or if He be wholly a creature, then let Him be assigned the
same rank (τάξις) as the others have in relation to each other, and
let each of them as well as Him be confessed to be "a creature but not
as one of the creatures . . etc.". For you say that an offspring is
the same as thing made, writing κατά τύχηνος λόγος ττην (274) For
though the Son excel the rest in comparison (την εξουσία), still He
would be a creature nevertheless, as they are. For even in the things
themselves that are by nature creatures(275) one thing may be found

(270) See C. Ar. II: 51 ff., and below, pp. 879-890.
(271) Κρίμα εστίν, όπποι δέπαν την κτίσματος, κ.τ.λ. προμαχην οιχήματ.
(272) Πολον ώρα και επιστώς την κτίσματος προστομίου οτίν, ειναι γίνειν και ετερώδη.
(273) Εξεχάνοιν δε τον γενομενων κατά λόγον την εις ουταν, κατα ενοροποιείται.
(274) See Newman's note here.
(275) Εν δ' ουτοις ποις φιότερ κτίσματι.
excelling another. Star, for instance, differs from star in glory, and all the others differ in relation to each other when compared together (κατὰ συγκρίσειν), but it is not the case for that reason that some are lords, and others servants to their superior (276) nor are some works causes (κύριοι) so that others come to be by them (277) but all have their nature such that they come to be or are created (278).

(Ps. 19:1, I Esdras 4:36 quoted). But if the whole earth hymns the Father and the Truth . . . and He Himself says, 'I am the Truth', it follows then that the Logos is not a creature, but alone proper (Ιδίος) to the Father, by Whom all things are disposed (προέκειται) . . (Prov. 8:30 LXX & John 5:17). And the word ‘hitherto’ shows His eternal existence, as Logos, in the Father, for it is proper to the Logos to work the Father’s works and not be outside Him.”

The next few chapters treat of certain general and Scriptural issues, most of which have been already discussed before and do not require quotation detail. In the first place, in view of John 5:17, the Son would have to be His own creator, or all creatures would be able to create ex nihilo, which he cannot. The only conclusion is the correct orthodox doctrine. (192D): "How then does He create through Him, unless He be proper Offspring of His Essence, and did not, as the others, come to be ex nihilo?" Similarly, with regard to Matt. 11:27, the Arians would have either to deny the verse or to say that all creatures can know the Father directly. Again, Scripture severely and absolutely differentiates between the Son and everything else, and does not make this merely comparative; He alone is entitled to worship as no creature is. (cf. Ps. 2:7, Matt. 3:17, Acts 10:26, Rev. 22:9, Judg. 13:16, Heb. 1:6, 24 Is. 45:14, John 13:13 & 20:28. Then there is the Arian argument that the Son is included in the "all things" that were created; this is

(276) τὸ μὲν κύριον, τὰ δὲ τῶν βελτίστων δουλεύει.
(277) τὰ δὲ κύρια κυριεύω. What Athanasius really means is that no creature can really create, i.e. ex nihilo.
(278) τὸν κυριεύων καὶ κρίσεων ἡμῖν ἐσμέν. The translation that we have adopted is better than that of Newman & Robertson.
unsound, as God could create the rest of creation at the same time as He created the Arian "Son", and if the other things could not endure the direct action of God, neither could the "Arian "Son". The idea that the whole of creation was too much for the direct work of God is an insult to the God Whose providence extends to the least things (Matt. 10:29 & 6:25-30). Then Athanasius repeats the Infinite Regress Argument in its classical form; on the basis of the Arian doctrine, there must be either an infinite series of mediators of creation, or the cosmos could not exist at all. At this point, the beginning of Ch. 27, Athanasius deals with another Arian argument, which brings him back to the issues of Chs. 19 and 20, and therefore we quote again. "But again they allege this: 'Behold, through Moses too did He lead His people from Egypt, and through him (διὰ γεν. in each case) He gave the Law, yet he was a man; so it is possible for like to come to be through like.' ... (But) ... Moses was not sent to frame nor to call into being what was not (τὰ μηνόν), or to fashion men like himself (279), but merely to dispense words (ῥηματό) to the people and to Pharaoh. And this is a very different thing, for to dispense (διακοινεῖν) is of things originate as servants, but to frame and to create are of God alone and of His proper Logos and Wisdom. Wherefore, concerning the matter of framing, we shall find nothing but the Logos of God. ... But as regards ministrations, there are not one only, but many out of their whole number (280). For there are many Archangels, many Thrones, and Authorities and Dominions (Κυριοίστεροι), thousands of thousands, and myriads of myriads, standing before Him, ministering and ready to be sent. And many Prophets, and Twelve Apostles, and Paul. And Moses himself was not alone, but there was also Aaron with him, and besides, seventy others were filled with the Holy Spirit. And Moses succeeded by Joshua the son of Nun, and he by the Judges, and they by not one, but by a number of kings. If then the Son were a creature and one of things originate, there must have been many such sons, just as there is a multitude of the others. But if ...
... while the creatures are many, the Logos is one, the Son differs from all, and what He has is not equality with the creatures, but propriety to the Father. Hence there are not many Logi, but only the One Logos of the One Father. 'But behold,' they say, 'there is one sun only, and one earth. Let them maintain that there is one water and one fire, and then they may be told that everything that came to be is one according to its own Essence but in relation to the ministry and service committed to it, by itself it is not adequate or sufficient alone.

Behold there are many lights, and not the Sun only, nor the moon only, but each is one in essence, and yet the service of all is one in common, and what each lacks is filled by the other, and the necessity of lighting devolves upon all. Thus the sun has authority to shine throughout the day and no more, and the moon throughout the night, and the stars together with them accomplish the seasons and the years, and come to be for signs, each according to the need that calls for it. Thus too the earth is not for all things, but for the fruits only, and to be a ground to tread on for the living things that inhabit it. And the firmament is to divide between waters and waters, and to be a place to set the stars in. So also, fire and water, with other things, have been brought into being to be the constituent parts of bodies, and in short no one thing is alone, but all things made, as if members of each other, make up as it were one body, namely the world. If they then thus conceive thus of the Son (they would have to consider) the Logos to be a part of the universe and a part insufficient without the rest for the service committed to Him. But if this is manifestly impious, let them acknowledge that the Logos is not of things originate, but is sole proper Logos of the Father, while the Framer of what came to be."

(281) τη μεγ. κρίματα πολλά, καὶ δε λόγος εἰς ἐστι
(282) οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐκείστων ἰδιότης καὶ μόνιον συντρίπτει
(283) ἐν... καὶ οὕτως, καὶ δε κοινὴ πάντων ἐστὶν ἡ λειτουργία.
(284) εἰς τῶν σωμάτων σύστατην.
(285) ἢ λειτουργία πάνω πολλά, καὶ προς ἀνθρώποιν ἄντι μὲν, ἐν καθεστῶ σαμα, τὸν κόσμον ἀποτελοῦσιν.
Nearly all the material in these above sections has been treated before, but there is one supremely important new issue, and that is what might be called the radical pluralism of creaturely life. Athanasius has already touched above (286) on these matters, but the treatment here is so definitive as to constitute an almost new departure. This is a matter of the greatest interest, since the contemporary form of atheism is essentially pluralistic; that is, it consists of a rational denial of the possibility of any form of monism at all, from which atheism follows on the ground that any belief in God, whether rational or revelational, is really a form of the excluded principle. Hume's criticism of the Argument from Design can be subsumed under this heading, since it depends on the contention that in the normal empirical way we can know what design means only by contrast with other things that are not designed, a special case of the principle that every genuine term has its genuine logical opposite with a real extension; hence, if design be a real notion and not some metaphysical monistic principle, it cannot figure in a theistic proof, since all such proofs must necessarily involve the highest level of generality. (287) This is not so immediately obvious for, say, the argument of the modern positivists that the existence of God is unfalsifiable, and therefore unverifiable, but a little examination shows that what these philosophers are really saying is that the theists are treating God as a thing that can be known, etc., and can interact with other things as if it were a real object that can be the subject of experimentation, but also as something so general as to be above even the formal possibility of falsification; hence, this argument does

(286) See De Decr. 11, and above pp. 590-605. including
(287) the footnote on Professor Anderson, the author's philosophy teacher
(287) See, in addition, above, pp. 82-85.
fall into the class in question. The interesting thing is that this argument is used against Marxism at least as much as against Christianity; there is a whole school of atheistic anti-Communists who denounce the latter, not for its differences from Christianity, but for its resemblances to religion; they hold that the monistic principle in Marxism can have meaning only if it illegitimately, and in spite of its own ostentatious professions, functions as a de facto god.

Most of Greek theology was monistic, either of the substantialist or of the Logos type. Even Platonic-Socraticism tended to become monist, as in the Republic. There is, however, a definite strand of the sort of radical pluralism that we have in mind, represented mainly by the late, anti-Eleatic Plato of the Sophist; in this Dialogue, Plato criticizes the philosophy of Parmenides as the reductio ad absurdum not only of Eleaticism but of substantialist monism in general, and therefore treats the most general concept of Being as not a substance or even a system in the usual sense, but ultimately as the logical copula, and the summation of the whole series of logical relations associated therewith; that is, Being is essentially a relation between things, and these things are the original Platonic Forms, treated now purely as terms of propositions. This line is also to be found in Aristotle's denial that there is such a thing as a sumnum genus (although there is incidentally the problem of what the connection is between this side of Aristotle and his celebrated and almost definitive natural theology).

The interesting thing here is that Athanasius clearly teaches as radical and well-developed a pluralist doctrine as has ever been enunciated, but what makes it so worthy of special attention, and so completely different from any other pluralism, is that it is treated not as a general truth but as the truth of creaturely existence as such.
Thus, from the start, Athanasius rigorously excludes any possibility of his pluralism involving any reflection on the existence, uniqueness or glory of God. Again, Athanasius presents his doctrine both formally and materially as Scriptural truth — and rightly so. The temporal aspects of pluralism are discussed later, but otherwise the treatment of the issue is surprisingly complete. The point of departure is the Arian phrase that the Logos was "a creature, but not as one of the creatures". Athanasius points out that in the only sense that is worth considering this phrase applies in exactly the same way to any creature at all, since no creature is quite like another. Although this is treated expressly with reference to the difference between one genus of things and another, there is no doubt that Athanasius also means this principle to apply to the difference between, say one man and another even if there is no immediately obvious distinction, since he says definitely that no creature is quite like any other. This is all very close to the doctrine of the infinite genetic complexity of creatures. What is even more important is the fact that above sense is the only accepted sense of the Arian expression in question. If this means anything, it means that Athanasius does not regard even "creature" as a genuine genus, at any rate, a genus that is in the least significant. This amounts to an uncompromising denial of the possibility of a summum genus, even a summum genus that involves only creatures and leaves God on one side of its own field of relevance. This appears to be, at first sight, of merely rationalistic interest, but it has the vitally important corollary, which Athanasius did not draw but would have drawn if he had had the occasion, that there can be no real general knowledge of what constitutes creaturely life; the only things that we can know are things about light, stars, suns, animals, plants, thrones, archangels, and, to go forward in time, ships and shoes and
sealing wax and cabbages and kings. There would be an interesting connection here with what we have deduced as the Athanasian principle that there is a genuine revelation of God in the ipsissima verba of Scripture, even where these are in propositional form, and that it was most improper for the Arians to take this as a revelation about creatures; if what we have just said is true, it is the Divine life, not creaturely life as such, that is revealable. There is no significant sumnum genus even restricted to creatures, let alone one that applies to all "entities". There is, in other words, no generic unity of creatures within the creaturely field; Athanasius later shows that there can be no systematic unity either.

The second important aspect of the matter, for Athanasius, is that, if no creature is really quite like another, neither is any creature, in the real sense of the word, unique. This is meant to controvert the Arians, for if there is one property that the Arian Logos-Son/etc. must have, it is absolute uniqueness. No creature has this property, and this conclusion is worked out both extensively and intensively. Even Moses, says Athanasius, was no more than one among many Divinely commissioned leaders of Israel; there were many Judges, and many prophets, and many Kings. How much more does this apply in other fields of creation. Even with the most difficult case (on the then traditional geocentric cosmology), that there is only one sun and one moon, Athanasius at least is able to apply the principle intensively, saying that the Sun owes its properties to fire (potential energy of the hydrogen nucleus, to modern physics!) — at any rate this is probably what Athanasius had in mind when he immediately brought up the question of fire and water. Fire of course can affect many bodies. But even such a "fundamental" thing as fire is in reciprocal relation to other things in a way comparable to the relation of other things to fire.
Thus while nothing is quite like anything else, everything has the property which Thomas Aquinas so rightly stated not to apply to God; that of being in genere aliquo.

The third pluralistic principle of creaturely existence is that every creature is limited. No creature is omni-competent, omni-present, or omnipervasive. Each creature has an Outside as well as an Inside. Athanasius means Outside in the sense of an environment with which the body concerned is involved in a complex series of interactions, like the ground in relation to plants and animals that are relatively dependent on it and are upon it, but are not part of it strictly, and are distinct from it. He also goes further in treating of the Outside as what is beyond the sphere of influence (at any rate the important or direct influence or the special influence in which we are specially interested at the moment) of the body. For example, there are certain things that are not directly illuminated by the sun, for example, objects at night. Thus, there are some things that any creature cannot do; it is forever incomplete; forever dependent on other creatures, at least, to do what it cannot. Thus, there can be no systematic unity of the world of the type that the Arians postulated; if it were still within the creaturely field, as the Arians would have had it, it would be just as incomplete in principle, as the sun or a man or the scientific laws of bodily cohesion. Thus, a Logos that is a creature is a contradictory notion, at any rate if any connection with monotheism is to be maintained, since it would be both completely universal and incomplete, being unable to apply over all reality and needing other things to complete it; besides, it would inevitably be in genere with others of its kind. This is incidentally the standard criticism that is universally made of Marxism, both by Christians and atheistic pluralists; if the Marxist laws of historical necessity are purely creaturely, as Marxists bigotedly
maintain them to be, there must be something that they are not, and what is even more important, some place where they do not apply or are outweighed.

The most interesting principle of pluralism which we find here, and the one which we have left to the last, is the anti-hierarchical principle. What Athanasius says, in so many words, is that the gradations of rank of creatures with regard to each other are not of ultimate significance compared with the fact that all are creatures. It is not in the least as if Athanasius reduces all things to the dead level (literally: ). Differences of degree are admitted. Some bodies are larger than others, more powerful in various ways than others; even the relation of master and slave is admitted as empirically valid. But even these relationships, which may involve the exercise of exceedingly great powers by one thing over another, even without apparent reversal, pale into insignificance beside what they all have in common. Or, to put it more correctly, the distinctions between creatures are overwhelmed by the distinction of all from God. There is one relation that is expressly excluded from this relativisation; the relation of Creator and creature. It utterly transcends the relation of the Sun to the solar system, or the mightiest ruler to his slaves, or anything else. In some way, κατὰ φύσιν, they all have something in common of infinitely more significance, and this is not any common quality or other logical feature; it is the factum brutum that they were created by God. This is most interesting, since for all their generalisation, the Greeks all seemed to have the hierarchical principle in their outlook, e.g. Aristotle's attitude to slavery, the Platonic Republic, etc. It is particularly interesting in contrast to what is otherwise the favourite philosophy of Athanasius.
Platonic-Socraticism, with its ultimate hierarchy of Forms and material things. And it is even more interesting to notice that, in the days of the successors of Constantine, when social hierarchy had unprecedentedly hardened, that we find the first germ of the mature doctrine of Christian equality. In a sense, it was the Arians who first insisted on the equality of all creatures and on the absolute significance of the relation of Creator and creature, but it was only Athanasius who could make it viable. N.B. The outline given in the last few paragraphs may in fact owe more to the author's philosophical training than to his exposition of Athanasius. (288) But even if there is any distortion, it is not great, and it would still show Athanasius to be one of the classical exponents of pluralism. We must at this stage, however, stress again the differences between what we find here and rational pluralism. The principal difference is that, although it is undoubtedly denied that created things are such that any one of them can be a complete system, there is still a suggestion of the whole summation of nature forming a complete system, for example, the idea of the sun giving light by day and the moon completing the system by giving light by night. However, a closer examination of the chapters that we have quoted indicates the reason for this. It is precisely the fact that Athanasius is not considering the Universe as autonomous. The issue was brought up in the first place by a discussion of, and comparison with, the Arian doctrine of the Son-Logos; since they were as yet incapable of proceeding to the limit and repudiating the Father too, they were left with a Father who was essentially disinterested in the creation of the world and left it to the Son as his minister - an illogical declension into Gnosticism that is a sign of the contradictory

(288) Of course, all these principles mentioned in this section are most emphatically present in the philosophy of Professor John Anderson.
position in which Arian doctrine, for all its coherence, had placed itself. Therefore, Athanasius discussed the pluralism of creaturely life largely from the point of view of service, and of the creature as minister that is, to God. But the result of this is that when Athanasius talks of creatures being completed by each other, what is completed is not any autonomous creaturely system, but the Divinely appointed ministry. What must be made clear in all this, and what Athanasius does affirm but not, unfortunately here, and not so clearly as he might, is that no number of different creatures can complete a ministry or anything else without God Himself also supplying the completion from Himself. *Kai ta pantα en dunam surএγγραφη.* (Col. 1:17)

This brings us at once to the difficult, complicated, and most important question of whether Athanasius still leaves open the possibility of natural theology. The evidence is best discussed a little later. But the second, and supreme difference between the Athanasian doctrine and rational pluralism is that the former is not a rational truth about all things but a Scriptural truth about created beings. This is made abundantly clear by his use of Scriptural language and illustrations. The full significance of this, too, must also wait a little while; in fact, in the further discussion, this will turn out to be the same issue as that of natural theology.

It will be seen that, within these very sound and necessary limits, Athanasius presents as complete a doctrine of pluralism as can be devised, that is, as the truth of pure creaturely reality. Its completeness is particularly plain when we also remember what Athanasius has said in other places about the changeability of all created things, in contrast to the complete stability and reliability which is of God alone. *(289)* We could also add the doctrine, in Athanasius virtually

*(289)* This and the complexity of creatures were the main points actually discussed in De Decr. 11 and elsewhere.
passim, of the possibility of all created being, in contrast with the
impassibility, in its true theological sense, of God. In conclusion,
all these pluralistic features are pointedly contrasted, not only with
what faith always believes about God, but, at least by implication,
with what the Arians as much as anybody believed necessarily about the
Second Person, that He is one, that He is absolutely unique, that He
is absolutely transcendent over the creation. What Athanasius is
actually saying is that if the Logos is confessed to have these
qualities He must be confessed to be God, for no creature can be like
this, and both the Arians and Athanasius agreed that there is no
third type of being apart from God and the creature. And once again
we cannot help noticing that this argument of Athanasius pointedly
duplicates the essential argument against Marxism, which is put with a
fair measure of vigour by the atheistic pluralists, and in a curiously
tentative and almost defeatist way by Christians. The point is that,
in postulating the monistic principle as it appears in Marxism, the
Communists are quite literally worshipping and serving and — sacrificing
to — a god, and all this talk about "dialectical materialism" and
"scientific socialism" is so much obfuscation. (290) Communists can
avoid this criticism, but only by depriving Marxism of its most
distinctive features, including most emphatically its eschatological
elements which are the source of its fascination and power. The first
necessity for the Church's theological battle with Communism is to ram
this point home as thoroughly as Athanasius rammed the corresponding
point home against the Arians.

(290) We have seen that, according to the Thalia, Arius maintained that
the Son had no knowledge that mattered concerning the Essence of
the Father, or even His own essence as a creature, but that the
later Arians, like Eunomius (see Socrates, Eccl. Hist. IV:7),
maintained that even ordinary men had, in principle, perfect
knowledge of God. These positions are, of course, dialectically
antithetical, resting on the common presupposition that the
Second Person is a creature in exactly the same way as we are.
One final point of great interest; the difference between God and creatures is obvious with regard to such points as omnipresence and omnicompetence. It is also in a way too quite obvious that God is unique. But it is not so obvious regarding the other great point of Athanasius, that is, likeness. Besides, what we find in Athanasius, which we often do not find, is that it is only in God that we find true uniqueness. Only God is truly unique; everything else is a member of a class. But the treatment of the issue by Athanasius in ch. 19 indicates that the lack of true uniqueness in creatures (least of all any idea of the uniqueness of "the individual") is, in some paradoxical way, closely associated with the lack of true, or rather, perfect, likeness between any two creatures. Although the point is not made strongly, this is a plain contrast with the perfect likeness of the Father and Son. With all other creatures, even the differences in relation would be associated with a whole range of other differences. But the Father and Son and Spirit are absolutely alike except for the mere fact of their relations of origin. Only the One Essence, the One Godhead, is absolutely unique, and the only entities that are absolutely

Arius reasoned that, as we do not, by hypothesis or datum, know God ourselves, neither does the Son; Eunomius, on the contrary, that, as the Son knows the Father perfectly, therefore so should we, of ourselves. The interesting thing is that in Marxism both these principles are present, or their equivalents, in a state of higher synthesis, each of course being itself pushed to a further extreme. The Arian principle is Marxist atheism in its epistemic form and mode of expression, that there can be no Revelation of God. The Eunomian principle is represented by the Marxist talk about "scientific" Socialism, etc.; the meaning of all this is that it is possible for men to know perfectly, by the ordinary means of investigation appropriate to lesser things, everything that for Marxists is ultimate, in a manner that is no less certain and effective and powerful than scientific knowledge in the ordinary sense. The reason why these two positions can synthesize in Marxism is, of course, the total atheism of this later philosophy or rather para-theology.
like each other are the Three Hypostases or Persons.

28: At this stage, Athanasius considers another Arian argument, quoting from Asterius: "'But, though He be a creature and of the things originate, yet as from (πρᾶγμα) a teacher and craftsman has He learnt framing, and thus ministered to God Who taught Him.' ... (this is absurd, because) ... If framing is a thing to be taught (διδάσκων), let them beware of saying that God Himself is a Framer not by nature, but by science (291) so that He could lose this capacity. Besides, if the Wisdom of God acquired the capacity to frame by teaching, how is He still Wisdom, when He needs to learn? And what was He before He learned? For Wisdom could not be in need of teaching. He would surely be some empty thing (292), and not Essential Wisdom (293), but would have the name of wisdom through progress (ἐκ προκόπης), and would only be wisdom as long as it kept what it would have learned. For what has accrued not by any nature (μὴ φύεσθαι νῦν) but from learning, can also later be unlearned. ..."

29: Athanasius again points out that this sort of doctrine imputes jealousy — why only one favoured creature — and weakness — why did He need an assistant — to God; and he continues with the correct doctrine corresponding to the false Arian doctrine in question; "but being the Image and Wisdom of the Father, He does the things of the Father ... (John 5:17)." He adds that the Σῶμα Λόγου is on no account to be interpreted as if the Logos were an intermediary; after all, the mere will of God is enough.

There is very little that needs to be mentioned about this section, except that it illustrates once again the contradictions to which Arianism was reduced in its attempt to maintain a sort of otiose Father, especially their inability to maintain the supreme distinction between Creator and creaturely reality that was obviously so important.

(291) μὴ φύεσθαι, ἐκ προκόπης.
(292) Καὶ δὲ τὸν Ἰησοῦν.
(293) ὄνομας σοφίας — See note (291) above, p. 1136.
initially to them. We can also note once again the obsession with the progress of the Logos, ("learning to create," etc.), without the possession of any philosophical concepts adequate to the expression of this idea. The other two principles of importance, the absolute way in which the Second Person is Wisdom, and the correct sense of \( \delta \lambda \tau \gamma \) \( \Lambda \nu \), will be considered at great length soon.

The mention of the Second Person's creativity brings Athanasius to another section, in which he maintains that the Arian doctrine, in its most extreme form, amounts to the statement that the Logos was really constituted by human needs, etc., which was exactly the same sort of thing that Feuerbach later said of God as a whole, but was then unique in theology and philosophy. However, we have already fully quoted and commented on this passage (29: 209A-31: 212B), so there is no need for further attention. After this, Athanasius turns to his positive doctrine of the Logos. In the above twelve or so chapters, there is only one reference of any kind to the Holy Spirit, formal reference to the Seventy of Num. 11:24 ff. It is noteworthy that as soon as Athanasius returns to the direct discussion of the Logos of God in His cosmological relationships, the references to the Holy Spirit fall off.

After his criticism of the idea of the Logos being a creature, Athanasius now considers, once again, the Logos doctrine proper. Much of the matter is a repetition of matter previously discussed in the anti-Arian writings, including the earlier chapters of the "Contra Arianos", but there is a difference, that there is more emphasis on the Second Person as Logos than at any other place in Athanasius, and also this is the locus classicus for the treatment of the Asterian doctrine of the Two Wisdoms. It is almost certain that the reason for this slightly different emphasis is the passage of Scripture being treated. This passage of course is mainly cosmological in reference. If this
represents anything more than a chance conjunction, it shows that the
older cosmological significance of the title Logos remains influential:

"For since the Logos is Son of God proper by nature to His Essence, and
is both from Him and in Him (294), as He Himself said, the things framed
could not have come to be except through Him. For as the light (τὸ φῶς)
enlightens all things by its radiance (τὸ ἐνθύμησιν), and without
its radiance nothing would be illuminated, so also the Father, as by a
hand, in the Logos wrought all things (295), and without Him makes
nothing. . . . (Gen. 1:3, 9, 11, 26, Ps. 32 LXX:9). . . And He spoke,
not that, as in the case of man, some under-operative might hear, and,
on learning the speaker's will, go away and do it. For this is proper
to the creatures, but it is improper to apply this in thought or word
to the Logos. For the Logos of God is Framer and Maker, and He is the
Father's Will (296). Hence it is that divine Scripture does not say that
one heard and answered, as to the manner or nature of the things that He
wished made, (297) but God only says 'Let it become' and it adds, 'And
it became thus'. For what He thought good and counselled, that forthwith
the Logos began to do and to finish. (298) For when God commands others,
whether the angels, or converses with Moses, or commands Abraham, then
the hearer answers, 'Whereby shall I know?' or and the other, 'Send
someone else,' and again, 'If they ask me, "What is His Name," what
shall I say to them?' and the Angel said to Zechariah, 'Thus saith the
Lord,' and he asked the Lord, 'O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not
have mercy on Jerusalem,' and waits to hear fair and comforting words
(λόγους). For each of them has the Mediatorial Logos (τὸν μεσιτήριον Λόγον)
and the Wisdom of God, which makes known the will of the Father. But
when the Logos Himself operates and creates, there is there no question
and answer, for the rather is in Him, and the Logos is in the Father,

(294) Ἰδίος φώςα τῆς ένοστά τοῦ Θεοῦ δ ἡ Λόγος ἐκ δόξου τέ εστιν, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ εστιν.
(295) ὅσα δὲ ἥξιν της τοῦ Λόγου ἐφεξῆς ταῦτα. See Newman's note
on these words for references in Irenaeus and other earlier
Fathers to the Logos as the Hand of God.
(296) Ἰστι Χρ. δ. Λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ Δημιουργός, καὶ ποιητικός, καὶ αὐτός εστιν
ἐπὶ πάντας Βούλη.
(297) ἡκουστε καὶ οπερινατο δι' αὐτῶν ποιητικ βουλησι τή χρυσαμενέσι.
(298) τὰ χρ. βούλησι καὶ βοληθέν ευθας ἐγένετο τῷ Λόγῳ καὶ αὐτηρίζετο.
but it suffices to will and the work is done; so that the "He said" is a token of the will for our sake and the "and it was so" denotes the work which is done through the Logos and Wisdom in Whom also is the Will of the Father. And 'God said' is explained in the Logos. (299) (Ps. 114: 24, 33 LIT: 6, I Cor. 8:6)."

This interesting passage is, at first sight, an unequivocal statement of what is commonly taken to be the Hebraic doctrine of the Logos - 7277. The clearest expression of this is the last sentence quoted, along with the supporting Scripture passages cited in Athanasius; the sentence in question, which we have left in Greek above, is, "The words, 'God said', are explained in, or by, the Word." On this basis, the Second Person would be both a Son and a Word in the ordinary, or communicative, sense, in a way very much analogous to that in which an electron is both a particle and a quantum of exceedingly short waves, to use a modern analogy which incidentally also befits the ultimate and transcendent status of the Logos, analogous to that of the electron. If this last sentence is held to be the determinative factor in the exegesis of the whole chapter, there is a formidable case for the contention that the mature doctrine of Athanasius was the same as that propounded by such a modern theologian as Karl Heim, (300) that Logos, Word, etc., has as its primary meaning with reference to the Second Person something analogous to the ordinary sense of spoken word. This has always been present as an element in the earlier theology of Athanasius, especially in the anti-Arian writings, and it can be argued that the Greek doctrine of Logos showed itself to be such a dangerous temptation to Arianism (which, as we have shown repeatedly above, is

(299) 33 LIT: 6.
clear from Athanasius himself) that, if there was to be any doctrine
at all of the Second Person as Logos, Athanasius would have no choice
but this "Hebraic" one, not only for the sake of fidelity to Scripture
but because of the immediate necessities of his position. But there
is another side to the matter which the author feels needs to be
mentioned. The Old Testament evidence in particular, which is so
important, is far more complicated than has often been assumed, and some
of the presentations of it amount to direct perversion. Also, the
contemporary type of Word theology has some unsuspected difficulties of
a general nature as well, which are quite comparable with those of the
theologies which it opposes. Corresponding to these points, the
interpretation of Athanasius in this chapter has more to it than
meets the eye, and there are certain paradoxes in this type of theology
which show quite clearly here, more than anywhere else. The author,
being somewhat refractory in character, asks leave to make this case;
the former, or general, half will be made in the Appendix, but we can
now turn to Athanasius himself.

In the first place, it is highly probable, as we have said
before, that the Greek form of Logos doctrine (and, ? Alexandrian
Wisdom doctrine) still exercised a considerable, if largely unexpressed,
influence, since the renewed emphasis on the Logos as the title par
excellence of the Second Person dovetails so nicely with the return
to a primarily cosmological interest. (301) The Hebraic הַלּוֹגָס , as it
is usually taken, is not so neatly cosmological, having as it does
Revelational and soteriological import as well. Admittedly, in this
Oration chs. 73-82, Athanasius at last says clearly that the
cosmological relations of God are subordinate to other features of a

(301) See below pp. 108-24, and above pp. 74-78, 204-209, 430-436.
soteriological character. But this is not till the very conclusion of the exegesis of Prov. 8:22, or rather till the exegesis of the context of Prov. 8:22, or more exactly still Prov. 8:23, and the handling of the Supra-lapsarian and Infralapsarian question shows that in this equally important respect there was a considerable change even at ch. 73. (302) To add to this circumstantial evidence, there is also the fact that, after all, the starting point of Athanasius was the "Contra Gentes", notoriously a cosmological and "Greek" work. This may be all circumstantial evidence, but is not to be entirely ignored. To all of this we might add that this is based on a doctrine of analogy, that all the analogies supplement what is insufficient in the others and correct what is inaccurate in the others, which Athanasius certainly held at one stage, but which he showed unmistakeable signs of transcending in favour of the doctrine that the "analogies" are after all accurate about God — it is creatures which, owing to their unreliability, cannot be accurately described by these descriptions. (303)

What is even more important is that there are certain evident difficulties in making the Logos the principal title of the Second Person which show quite clearly in this chapter. The outstanding point is that what may be called the dialogical aspect of the operation of the Logos is the thing that Athanasius expressly repudiates in the strongest terms, as applied, that is, to the opera ad intra Trinitatis. Perhaps, this fact might lose its full force, since Athanasius is specifically drawing the contrast between the intra-Trinitarian relation and the relations between a person and one genuinely and essentially subordinate to him. But the fact remains that Athanasius gives an eloquent description of the dialogical relation as one that

(302) See above pp. 904-25.
(303) See above pp. 686-96.
occurs between master and servant, and makes no effort whatever to supply the analogical correction which would allow him to describe the dialogical aspect of the Divine life itself. Indeed, the typical dialogue, for Athanasius, appears, judging from his comments in this chapter, to involve two things; first, one of the persons is in a relation of subordination which is directly relevant to the matter in hand, and secondly, that the subordinate, without in the slightest degree actually changing the relationship, shows insubordination by arguing about his superior's orders! Both of these are antithetical to the relation between Father and Son, which is shown for Athanasius supremely by John 14:10a, which is virtually quoted direct. Therefore, dialogue as a basic element of the Divine life itself is actually rigorously excluded. The statement that when other people heard the "words", in the ordinary sense, from God, it was in virtue of the mediation of the "mediatorial Word" confirms, in a sense, the importance that Athanasius attached, in this context, to Hebraic form of Logos-doctrine, but it also strengthens the paradox in the doctrine to which we are now drawing attention, and in fact it strongly illumines the central paradox which we shall treat below. There is a strong hint here that the essential form of communion between Father and Son is a wordless communion, in which communion of will is most prominently emphasised and is most directly relevant in this regard. It is to be noted that what Athanasius says is that the significance of the words "He said" is in the title "Logos", and not vice versa, which would be the position of, say, Karl Heim. That is, the meaning of the title "Logos" conditions the use of verbs of speaking, and the title is primary, the verbal activity in creation secondary.

The central difficulty with this form of Logos doctrine, which cannot be dispelled by any analogical correction, is that a word,
in the ordinary sense, is what is spoken to somebody else. It is possible to get rid of the difficulties of temporal priority, etc., involved in the title "Son", and still have something for which the title is genuinely appropriate, but if these difficulties are eliminated with the title "Word" in its ordinary or "Hebraic" sense, there if left something so far removed from the original sense that the title is inappropriate, in this particular way. And it is this paradox which unfortunately is shown all too clearly in this chapter, as is shown by what we have noted above. The difficulty is also shown by the features that Athanasius rightly enunciates as the differentiae of the Word of God, as compared with word in general; the Word of God is operative (δημοπρατος), factitive (in the active sense -ποιητικος), and the Will (βουλη) of the Father. All this is of course supremely true of the opera ad extra, beginning with creation, but what of the eternal being of the Logos within the Godhead? The first two differentiae are obviously impossible here anyway, and the third would be in fact impossible for Athanasius. He later spends nine chapters of C. Arianos III (58–67) showing that acts of God by will cannot concern His essential and eternal nature, indeed, that will and nature are in this respect opposed; and this was directly provoked by the Arian assertion that the Son came to be at the will of the Father, and therefore must be a creature. (304) There is of course a sense in which the sort of statement that Athanasius repeatedly made about the absurdity of God being λογος wisdomless, like a dry fountain or a non-radiating sun, also apply about Will, so that a will-less God would also be absurd. But to a degree and in a way that does not apply in some of these other cases, Will is

(304) See below, pp. 1029–49.
essentially will to do something ad extra. Athanasius could have escaped from this difficulty by a strict and rigorous Supralapsarianism and Predestinationism, in other words, the doctrine of Karl Barth and nothing less. (305) But although Athanasius is recognised as having moved in this direction, he falls far short of the required rigour, even in C. Ar. II: 73:82, and this development is not over the horizon yet. And the comment can justly be made even on Barth that in treating Predestination as about the eternal decision of God to be the God of Grace in Christ, he is making the term mean something distinctly different from what it usually means.

In conclusion, the so-called "Hebraic" concept, or what commonly goes under that name to-day, carries the dangerous risk of relativism, that is, of describing the absolute and eternal nature of God in terms of something which has essentially its meaning in terms, and only in terms, of the relation of God ad extra, and the dilemma involved is quite clearly shown in Athanasius's account here. This is most important for him, as his supreme interest in the Arian controversy was to differentiate between the eternal Deity of Christ and His post-Incarnational Humanity, and also between the eternal Essence of God, and His (non-eternal) will, activity, etc., ad extra. Also, Athanasius has twice, with reference to the word ἀποθέωσις, warned against a very similar mistake. (306) A good illustration of the results of this sort of theology is supplied in recent times by G. A. F. Knight, who, from this starting point, not only finally reverts to something dangerously like the Hegelian relation between Creator and creature, but expressly says about the whole of God exactly what the Arians meant when they described the Logos as ἀποθέωσις (307) (As he was writing in the

(306) De Decr. 28-31 and C. Ar. I: 30-34. See above, pp. 284-308.
twentieth and not in the fourth century, the whole of God and not just
the Second Person was involved). The strongest solution that Athenasius
actually adopts, on the Logos side, is in the Scriptural title of the
Son as λαμπρος, radiance, or ἀρμός, light, or light-source. This was
previously the high point of the Logos theology of Athenasius, and is
again emphasised here. Although this word is still relativistic, and
appears to be even more so than some of the others, it is in actual
fact less so; after all, a sun or other light source still emits radiant
energy regardless of whether there is anything else which can be
illuminated or not. But in the long run the only title really free from
all these objections, as the primary title of the Second Person, is Son.
It is interesting to notice, in conclusion, that the Son theology would
permit us to account fully for a genuine dialogical relation between
Father and Son,(and thus within the Trinity and the eternal life of God
itself of course, some analogical correction would be necessary); and
the interesting corollary follows that, on Western theology, Word in
this dialogical sense would be the eternal and proper name not for the
Second Person but for the Third! But the irony of the position, which
is clear in this chapter, is that the more Logos is treated as the
primary and absolute title of the Second Person, the more difficult it
is to account for any dialogical element in the Divine life itself.(308)

The next few chapters are about issues, in the main, that
Athenasius has already discussed in his earlier works, or earlier in
the Orations and therefore we do not need to discuss them so
exhaustively; at most, certain sentences will be quoted and commented
upon. However, special attention will be paid to the "Two Wisdoms"
doctrine which Athenasius rejects. " (beg. ch. 32) It is plain from

(308) For what precedes, see also above pp. 483-485.
this that the Arians' fight with us is not about heresy, but μὴν πρὸς τὸν τύχαν τὸν (309), they actually fight against the Godhead itself. . . . (Matt. 17:5, Prov. 8:25 LXX, Heb. 1:3, I Cor. 1:24, Ps. 36:9, Ps. 114:24, Jer. 2:11 etc. John 1:1, Luke 1:2, Ps. 117:20 quoted to indicate that the Logos is not foreign but proper to the essence of the Father). . . . For such illustrations (310) and such images (Εἰκόνας) has Scripture propounded, that, in view of the inability of human nature (ὤν ὁ δημιουργός τὸ ἀληθὲς) to comprehend God, we might be able to form ideas even from these, however poorly and dimly.

. . . and as Creation itself is sufficient (Ἀρχὴν τῆς ζωῆς) for the knowledge of the existence of God and of Providence . . . (Wisd. 13:5). . . and we learn from this without asking for φῶς, (311) but, hearing the Scriptures we believe, and surveying the very order (τὸ ὅραμα) and harmony of all things, we acknowledge that He is Maker and Lord and God over all, and apprehend His marvellous Providence and hegemony over all things, so in like manner, what has been said above about the Son's godhead is sufficient (Εἰκόνας τῆς γεν. ἃς. θλ.). . ." The first sentence indicates that Athanasius felt that the heresy was really at bottom, a form of atheism, since whatever is said about the Son will have to be said about the Father; the passages that he quotes indicate that the Logos is the Logos of the Father in the sense of being Radiance and Image and Expression. The latter portion has been quoted in full because of its bearing on natural theology; the statement, in the strongest possible terms, that creation is sufficient for the knowing of the mere existence of God and His Providence appears to be an admission of natural theology, but later he appears to add Scripture as being in some way

(309) The best modern translation would be: "while they concoct a certain image of themselves for us," in the contemporary pejorative use of the word "image" in the context of Public Relations.


(311) That is, voices, presumably by way of the sort of testimony from natural forces postulated by W.S. Gilbert's Lord Chancellor in "Iolanthe". What Athanasius appears to be saying here, although there is still much uncertainty, is that one has not the right to practise natural theology except on the authorisation of Scripture.
necessary for this knowledge; it is definitely necessary for the
knowledge of what later became known as the intra-Trinitarian relations.
The final position appears to be the same as the classical Roman
Catholic position that there is a field of revelation in which Scripture
and other supernatural agency is necessary, but the existence of God
and providence, etc., can be revealed by a process structurally
analogous to natural law, in which Scripture has its place alongside
purely natural concepts. The whole matter is complex in Athanasius
and indicates that his thought is in transition, although the portion
here is the same as in I: 12.(312)

33 Continuing, Athanasius in the next chapter substantially
repeats his former argument that in the Scriptural analogy of Sun and
Radiance, we have a form of begetting that does not involve a division
34 of the essence, and continues with another previous argument that the
occurrence of such "generation" in the creaturely sphere shows that we
must not suppose that there is temporal posteriority and division of
35 the Essence, as there is with human sonship. Nor should we be confused
by the corresponding difficulties concerning the syllabic evanescent
and non-operative nature of the human word. Rather is the Logos of
36 God eternal because it is the Coessential Offspring of the Eternal
God. If one is perplexed about matters that are not for men to know,
one should keep silent and not concoct doctrines that conflict with
the Scriptural evidence that has been given us.

37 The next chapter, and onwards, has to be quoted in more detail,
as it concerns the doctrine of the Two Wisdoms, etc., propounded by

(312) See above, pp. 668-70.
Asterius, who was always far more concerned to apologise for Arianism in terms of traditional concepts than Arius himself, "Wherefore I wonder how, where God is One, these men introduce, after their private notions, many Images and Wisdoms and Logos, and say that the Father's Proper and natural Logos is other than the Son, and that in it He created the Son too and that He who is Son is only in idea (κατ' ἐπινόην) called Logos, as Vine and Way and Door and Tree of Life: and that He is also called Wisdom by name (ὢνομάτη), and that the proper and true Wisdom of the Father, which co-exists with Him unoriginately, is something different; in this wisdom He also made the Son, and named Him according to His participation in it. They have not contented themselves with expressing this verbally, but Arius composed in his own 'Thalia', and Asterius wrote, what we have stated above, as follows, ... (Here follows the Asterian exegesis of 'Power of God' and 'Wisdom of God', which we have already dealt with above, pp. 350-354, in which we have also quoted the extract from Asterius which Athanasius quotes in continuation, in ch. 40.)"

In these passages the Asterian doctrine of the Second Person of the Trinity being Wisdom by participation in an aboriginal impersonal Wisdom in the Father is expressed. The first part of ch. 38, which we have again cited in full, with comment, above, pp. 468-9, is a denunciation in advance of the practice of deriving theological truth by "universalisation" of, or abstraction from known creaturely reality. We shall begin full citation again at 38: 228B, when Athanasius begins his reply to all this nonsense: "Is it not monstrous of them to say that Wisdom co-exists with the Father, yet not to say that this is the Christ, but that there are many created Powers or Wisdoms, of which one is the Lord Whom they go on to compare with the caterpillar and the locust? And are they not profligate who, when they hear us say that the

(313) ἐν οἷς καὶ τοῦ γίγν. 38τοµ ἔφοβηκα.
(314) τοῦ ἀποκαλυθέντος τοῦ ὑποτηληστήν ἐμπρόσθ. And also below, mutatis mutandis. There are no textual variants here.
(315) ἐν οἷς καὶ τοῦ γίγν. ποιητίς, ἀλογίστα καὶ ἡμετροθεί αἰκίνους σφίτων ἀμετόν.
Logos coexists with the Father forthwith murmur, 'Are you not speaking of two Unoriginates?' yet, in speaking of 'His Unoriginate Wisdom' do not see that they themselves have already incurred the charge which they so rashly urge against us? Moreover, what folly is there in that thought (διανοήσις) of theirs, that the Unoriginate Wisdom coexisting with God is God Himself! For what coexists does not coexist with itself, but with something else, as the Evangelists say of the Lord that He coexisted (συνή) with His Disciples; for He was not together with Himself, but with His Disciples — unless indeed they say that God is Compound (συνθέσεως), having Wisdom a constituent or complementary part of His Essence (316) this Wisdom is itself also unoriginate, and they moreover introduce it as the Framer of the World, so as to deprive the Son of the framing of it. For they try to say anything but the right sentiments about the Lord.

For where at all have they found in Divine Scripture, or from whom have they heard, that there is another Logos and another Wisdom than this Son, that they should concoct such a doctrine for themselves? (317) which God has spoken to the saints through His own and true Logos, (Ps. 119:101). Such things the Saviour accordingly signifies to be other than Himself, when He says in person, 'The words (λόγος) which I have spoken to you.' For certainly such words (λόγοι) are not Offsprings or Sons, nor are they so many framing (διαγραφοί) words, nor so many Images (ἐικόνες) of the True God, nor are so many that became man on our behalf, nor it is as if it was one of many such that became flesh according to John, but He was preached by John as the only Logos of God (1:3 & 14). Wherefore of Him alone, our Lord Jesus Christ, and of His unity with the Father, the testimonies are written and set forth, both of the Father signifying that the Son is one, and of the saints, aware of this and saying that the Logos is one, and that He is Only-Begotten. And His works are also set forth, for all things, visible and invisible, have come to be through Him, and without Him was not one thing made. But they have no thought of anything or anybody else,
nor do they frame to themselves words (λόγος) or wisdoms, neither
whose name nor whose deeds are indicated in Scriptural sources, but
are mentioned only by them. For it is their invention and Christ-
 opposes surmise, that they exploit the name of the Logos and the
Wisdom, but in concocting to themselves others they deny the true Logos
of God, and the real Wisdom of the Father. . . .

40 Therefore if neither in the Divine oracles is there found
another Wisdom besides this Son, nor have we heard of any such from
the Fathers, yet the Wisdom that co-exists with the Father and is
proper to Him and the Framer of the World has been confessed and been
written about by these men, this must be the Son Who even according to
them is eternally co-existent with the Father. For He is Framer of
all, as is written, 'In wisdom hast Thou framed them all.' Nay,
Asterius himself, as if forgetting what he had written before, afterwards,
when urging the Greeks, in Caiphas's fashion does not mention many
Wisdoms, but involuntarily confesses but one, in these words . . .
(follows the passage that we have fully quoted above, p. 352);
Athanasius gives his considered judgment on it as follows:) . . . "Is
it anything marvellous that the Arians should battle with the truth,
seeing that they fall out with each other and fight about their own
principles, at one time saying that there are many wisdoms, at another
maintaining one; at one time classing Wisdom with the caterpillar, at
another saying that it coexists with the Father and is proper to Him;
now that the Father alone is Unoriginate, then again that His Wisdom
and Power are unoriginate also. And they fight with us for saying that
the Logos of God is ever, yet forget their own doctrines, and say
themselves that Wisdom coexists with God unoriginately . . .

41 But let the other heresies, including the Manichees, also
know that the Father of the Christ is One, and is the Lord (βεβαίως)
and Maker through His proper Logos of the creation. And let the
Ariomaniacs know in particular, that the Logos of God is One, being the
Only Son proper and genuine from the essence of the Father, and having
with His Father the indivisible unity of Godhead. (318). . . Since, if
it were not so, wherefore through Him does the Father create, and in Him
is revealed to those whom He will, and illuminate them? Or why too in
the baptismal consecration is the Son named together with the Father?

(318) Ἰησοῦν καὶ τὸν Πατέρα ἐνόμισε τῆς Θεότητος.
For if they say that the Father is not sufficient, the answer is impious, but if He is . . . what is the need of the Son either for framing or for the holy laver? For what community is there between creature and Creator? (319)

This is a most interesting section of the Contra Arianos, and there is more in it than meets the eye. There are two main objections cited by Athanasius to the position of Asterius; firstly, if, and as, God is one, His Logos must be one also; secondly, that if the Logos—Wisdom of God is to have any real pre-eminence and indeed be the Logos of God at all, it must be what the Platonic Socrates would have called ῥήτορος, or what Athanasius actually calls Ἀυτογογ, Ἀυτοσθοφίν, (320) etc.; in other words, no relativity can enter into the essential being of the Logos, which would be involved in the Asterian doctrine of the Logos—Wisdom being rational and wise in virtue of participation in a quality, in the same sense as we are wise through participation in the Logos and Wisdom of God. The usual arguments are given for the absolute unity of the Word of God, but we can notice at this point the very much greater emphasis on the Revelational or "Hebraic" doctrine of the Logos in this connection, in the surrounding chapters, where one of the main arguments for the absolute unity and uniqueness of the Son-Logos is the factum brutum of Scripture (Matt. 11:27) that He is the sole Revealer of God the Father. This fits in nicely with his great emphasis on the Scriptural metaphor of ἡφαίστεια and ἀλαόμολος as the classical description of the relation between Father and Son respectively, the Radiance being of course the essential and unique revealer of the Sun or light-source.

However, there are certain matters that require more detailed attention. In the first place, this revelationary emphasis, although

(319) Ποιὶ ὡς Κοινωνία τῆς Κτίσματι πρὸς τῷ Κτίστῃ ὕπορευε. (320) See "Contra Gentes", ch. 46, ἀπὸ τὸ ἔσοδον.
important, is not the principal one. Although Arius did say in the "Thalia" that we know the Unoriginate through him who had an origin, in the Euphuistic style characteristic of him, the same is by and large true of the Arians. If they had taken this line, Athanasius would have had to deal far more thoroughly and exhaustively than he did with the most difficult problem in theology, the relation between the "words" of Jesus and Jesus Christ as the "Word" of God in the revelatory sense, and also the question in an even more general way, of how the Humanity can reveal the Deity that is, at the level necessitated by the general character of the "Contra Arianos," a level higher than the instrumentalism of the "De Incarnatione". In fact, when Athanasius treats of Matt. 11:27 in Orat. III:37 ff., he does not discuss the issue at all; of course, he is actually discussing no more than what, on our present system of versification, is Matt. 11:27, whereas the issue under discussion is raised in the latter part of the verse. When Athanasius above raised the issue, he gave the bald Scriptural evidence rather than the exhaustive discussion that would have been expected; or, more accurately, he introduced the uniqueness of Jesus as the Revelation of God as another proof of the general uniqueness of the Son, rather than as the cardinal topic that it has become in contemporary theology.

But the really important issue is the scornful rejection by Athanasius especially in ch. 38, of Asterius's doctrine of the Second Person being wisdom through participation in the character of wisdom in God, on the ground that the latter is thereby virtually made another thing; it is now time to analyse this fully. It is important to notice at the outset that among other things Athanasius is arguing ad hominem. After all, as Athanasius said, Asterius himself talked about the impersonal wisdom "co-existing" with God and therefore committed himself to treating and regarding it as another thing, from which the usual
dialectical and theological difficulties follow, for example, infinite regress. However far Athanasius fell into illicit Platonisms or other pitfalls, Asterius fell just as far or even further. Unfortunately, the corresponding statement in Arius's Thalia, that Wisdom existed as Wisdom by the will of the most Wise God, is far more carefully constructed and avoids this particular difficulty, so that much more careful examination is necessary. On the surface it appears that both Athanasius and Asterius were both following the earlier Platonic Theory of Forms and regarding the hypothetical qualitative wisdom in God as another thing. It is highly probable that this was actually the case. But a closer examination indicates that there is more in this difficulty. It is in fact very much more difficult to distinguish logically between qualities and things or substances than, say, Aristotle and his followers supposed; certainly with sub-personal beings. An example of this in modern philosophy is Berkeley's criticism of substance in this sense, (321) which has been generally accepted since, or the same difficulties noticed in connection with Kant's Ding in sich. An even better example, this time from Greek philosophy, is Plato's final treatment of this issue in the Sophist, if the views of the Eleatic Stranger are his own. Here, substances, like the person Theaetetus in the example that is actually cited, is treated as a Form (in the later sense, rather different from that in the Socratic dialogues) in the same way as a quality or activity like Flying; logically, the issue of the truth or falsehood of the statement "Theaetetus flies" is the issue of whether or not these two forms, whose relations are purely synthetic (except in the case of the categorial ones) and which have

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(321) See, "Principles of Human Knowledge", I: 7-33. Of course, the subjective idealism that Berkeley deduced from his criticism of Substance, and of the Lockelian distinction between Primary and Secondary Quality, is not accepted.
no analytic or formal connections, happen to be able to blend or co-exist with each other or not; in this case the latter is true. On this sort of basis one would have no choice but to regard the Asterian quasi-qualitative wisdom as another entity in the same way that God is the one entity. The case is even worse with the alternative, or more Aristotelian formulation which Athanasius rejects with equal scorn at the end of ch. 38, that God consisted of His Essence and Wisdom as a quality. The very point of this distinction (if it can be made, which is another matter) is that the quality is in a looser relation to the thing than the essence, a synthetic rather than an analytic one; even more specifically, not only must the quality be in essence independent of the essence, but must also exist in the same way in some things other than the essence in question. Thus, even more than before, it must be another thing.

Besides, there would have to be things other than God that partook of this wisdom, and this is an important clue to the issue that was actually in question at the beginning of ch. 38, where Athanasius states that the Arians openly accepted that the Son was called Wisdom "on account of" things wise, that is, the other portion of the extension of the genus wise, and that the inevitable extension of this principle to the title of Son reduces it to an absurdity. This is an obvious violation of two of Athanasius's basic principles which date from the earliest stages of the Arian controversy, and possibly antedated it — the principle later expressly formulated by Thomas Aquinas that "Deus non est in genere aliquo" and that the same applies

(322) See esp. 257-268.
(323) Cited on pp. 468-9 where an even more interesting and sinister explanation is given as to the probable real point at issue.
to the Logos even on Arian principles themselves, and that the titles of the Second Person, if He is to be deemed to exist before all creation even in the Arian fashion, must have their meanings and correlative and opposites of all kinds in relation to the Father and not to the created cosmos. It is quite likely that the Arians were prepared to make these predications of the Logos in this crassly univocal sense in spite of all the theological and dialectical difficulties that followed.

When faced with this sort of argument, Athanasius appeals to the Biblical evidence, and in somewhat more general terms, the important principles would be two; both have already been met in Athanasius's writings already. Firstly, there is the principle that what we know as God's Wisdom, or anything else that is God's, cannot be known by this method of abstraction, universalisation, etc., which would keep us in the created field if only because we are more familiar, prima facie, with wisdom in created beings, but is on the contrary, like God's Fatherhood, the supreme standard by which all earthly wisdom or wise beings are to be judged, and according to which all are found wanting. Secondly, there must be a direct revelation of God; revelation cannot be considered as something which is gained by intellectual operations on the facts of creaturely life. In fact, we can see from this that these two principles go together.

Thus, the conclusion is in short that Asterius and the Arians are unable to avoid talking about wisdom of a sort co-existing with God, and prohibitive difficulties can only be avoided by treating this as absolutely identical with the pre-existent Second Person. The Second Person is this Wisdom, and no other wisdom is conceivable, and certainly there is no Scriptural basis for such an entity. There is one serious
defect in such an approach. There is after all a genuine doctrine of the Divine attributes, and if there is one thing that must be sayable about God, and about each person of the Trinity individually and severally, it is that they are wise, in the ordinary qualitative sense. Athanasius appears to be denying this in his attack on Asterius. But there are two very important arguments in favour of Athanasius. One is that, as we have said above, his answer to Asterius is completely correct ad hominem, and that this shows that when we examine the matter more thoroughly there is a real difficulty in applying attributes to God even if we do not accept the traditional doctrine of the absolute simplicity of God (as enunciated, in fact, by Newman in his notes on these chapters). When a quality is attributed to something, the quality must be different from the thing in that it has a different intension and extension; this, or at any rate the latter, cannot possibly apply to God in the usual way. All theologies of the Divine attributes must be particularly careful on this point. The other point is that Athanasius's treatment of the issue has one supreme virtue, which is indeed the virtue of the defect that we have noticed. By taking in full earnest the traditional description of the Second Person of the Trinity as Wisdom and by insisting that the converse is also binding on theology, Athanasius has made a decisive step towards a vital principle that has been lacking in traditional theology, that the Divine attributes must be understood primarily in terms of the Trinitarian nature of God and the intra-Trinitarian relations. In this regard, he has gone further than any other theologian, with the possible exception of Augustine, probably because the Arians raised the issue with such brutal clarity; much further in fact even than Karl Barth, who clamours for such a treatment of the issue but whose doctrine of the Attributes in C.D.II:I, in its detail, pays less attention to this than one would expect. The
main criticism that must still be made of Athanasius is the common one that, although he is formally Trinitarian his theology is in detail still in fact binitarian, for the simple reason that the Holy Spirit has not yet begun to play a major part in his theological interests. (324)

The very last sentence in the extracts which we have quoted asks: what is there in common between God and the creatures? This sentence now claims our attention because of its significance for the question of natural theology. We have already seen that the original Athanasian position, from the Contra Gentes onwards, was that the existence of God (or the Logos) was rationally deducible from creation alone, in the manner of classical natural theology as found in, say, Thomas Aquinas, although Scripture was absolutely necessary for any further doctrine or faith. The extracts quoted above in C. Ar. I: 12: 36B-C and II: 32: 216B-C(325) show quite clearly that this view is still

(324) The only scholars who have, to the author's knowledge, commented on this matter are Bähringer, "Athanasius und Arius . . .", and Atzberger, "Die Logoslehre des heiligen Athanasius. . .", and both are critical; they are, respectively, Protestant and Roman Catholic. Bähringer, op. cit. p. 98, says simply that Athanasius gets out of his difficulties too easily: "Indem nur aber Athanasius auf die naivste Weise dem hypostasirten Logos sofort wieder die eigenschaftliche Macht und Weisheit des Vaters substuirt, weiss er so den christlichen Monotheismus ganz leicht zu retten." Atzberger is far more thorough in his criticism, and attributes it to a failure to analyse properly his conceptual apparatus: (loc. cit. p. 128): "Wie wir schon öfter bemerkt haben, schied er in seinem Beweisverfahren zwischen Philosophie und Theologie nicht aus. Aber gerade der Mangel einer Unterscheidung spekulativer und positiver Elemente hat auch eine gewisse Unbestimmtheit seiner Lehre von dem Verhältniss des Logos zum Vater zur Folge . . . (especially) dass er an manchen Stellen den Logos zu sehr als die wesentliche Vernunft und wesentliche Weisheit dargestellt zu haben scheint." He continues that this is counteracted by the ascription of the title Son to Christ, but that this is not quite satisfactory. Continuing, loc. cit.: "Der tiefer liegende Grund aber dieser Unzulänglichkeiten liegt in einem Mangel an erkanntnistheoretischen Voruntersuchungen. Insbesondere vermissen wir bei Athanasius eine eingehende Untersuchung der Begriffe von Wesen, Wesenseigenschaft, und Person . . . (and he adds that the same applies to all his contemporaries). . Die Folge davon ist, dass man sehr leicht die persönlichen Eigentümlichkeiten der göttlichen Hypostasen mit den
expressly adopted by Athanasius. But we now see that the effect of the Arian controversy, with its tremendous emphasis on the distinction between God and creatures, on both sides of the controversy, is forcing Athanasius towards the opposite view, the repudiation of natural theology in any form at all, although he can never bring himself to say this. To understand why this is so, we must bear in mind that natural theology is really a species of metaphysical philosophy; some would say that these two are identical. Now metaphysics is essentially based on the problem of what all things have in common; if anything, this is even clearer in Greek philosophy than in modern philosophy. Thales began philosophy by asking this question and giving the answer, water; and all later philosophers followed essentially the same course. This applies most pointedly to Heraclitus, the originator of the Logos doctrine, for him, Logos was the correct answer to the same question. Thus, the notion of what things had in common, for which the word \( \text{Koinv\, } \) and its derivatives, particularly \( \text{Koinwv\,} \), were expressly used, is thus the cardinal concept in philosophy (See, for example, Heraclitus, and Plato, Sophist). By denying that there is any \( \text{Koinwv\,} \) between God and the creatures, Athanasius is here really undercutting the whole of philosophy in its theological application and natural theology. If there

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Eigenschaften des göttlichen Wesens vermengen kann. Diese Klippe scheint auch Athanasius nicht immer vermieden zu haben. Denn immer wo er einen Unterschied in Gott findet, setzt er denselben sofort als einen persönlichen an.

The effect of whole commentary on this passage of the author is to admit, from the point of view of mature theology, that Atzberger's charge is true, but that even Athanasius's apparent mistake also indicates an even more important truth, that the attributes of God Himself depend on His Trinitarian form. In a way, Atzberger had a right and a duty, particularly from his Aristotelian and Thomistic standpoint, to say what he did say, but in another way it was unfair of him to expect Athanasius, who lived in times of great urgency and who knew no tradition of any such enterprises, to make any such examination, by way of prolegomena, of the notions of Essence, Person, etc., before proceeding to the task at hand.

(325) See above, pp. 668-70 and 844-6.
is no κοινωνία, there is no philosophy that can include both God and creatures, no analogia entis, no level of generality, to use the more familiar English term, which can include God. And this would have been immediately clear to any educated Greek speaker, much clearer even than to a modern scholar. Besides, the more that God is considered as truly active and personal, as distinct from being merely some higher level of reality, the clearer it is that this doctrine of Athanasius demands the rejection of natural theology. It could be maintained in some sense that what Athanasius is here saying would be perfectly consistent with the most highly developed and sophisticated natural theology that we find in Hegel, which accepts and in fact glories in the corollary of all natural theology that "God" is purely and simply the systematic unity and κοινωνία of all things; on this basis, κοινωνία between God and things would be rejected as a category mistake, in the true sense of this expression. But this back door for natural theology would be excluded by the earlier material in Or. II: 18 ff., in which he apparently goes so far as to maintain that, for the creatures, even their being creatures does not constitute a summum genus, or for that matter any form of systematic unity at all. Besides, this Hegelian systematic relation would be another form of κοινωνία. The conclusion from all this is that, although Athanasius formally maintains the validity of natural theology, there is sufficient material in the Contra Arianos for a thoroughgoing refutation of it.

To complete this section, Athanasius raises another issue which is of extreme interest, that of Arianism in relation to baptism and especially to the baptismal formula. There has been a more or less steady and imperceptible transition towards this issue at the end of the last extract quoted, but this is no reflection on the systematic
sense of Athanasius, since, as we shall see, the two sections dovetail into each other to a surprising degree. "Or why is a thing that has been made reckoned with Him who made it in the consecration of us all? Or why, as you hold, is faith in one Creator and one creature delivered to us? For if it was that we might be joined to the Godhead, what need would there be of the creature? But if it was to unite us to the Son as a creature, it would be superfluous according to you to name the Son in baptism, for God who made Him a son would be able to make us sons also. Besides, if the Son is a creature, the nature of rational creatures being one, (326) no help would come to creatures from a creature, since all need grace from God. . . . The Son is named with the Father, not as if the Father is not all-sufficient, not without meaning (327) or by chance, but since He is God's Logos and Proper Wisdom, and being His Radiance (328) He is ever with the Father, and therefore it is impossible that, if the Father gives grace, He should not give it in the Son (329) for the Son is in the Father as Radiance in the light. For, not as one in need, but as a Father in His own Wisdom hath God founded the earth, and made all things by the Logos that is from Him (330), and in (327) the Son confirms the Holy Washing. For where the Father is, there is the Son, and where there is the light, there is the radiance; and as the Father works what He works through the Son . . . (John 5:19) . . , so also when baptism is given, whom the Father baptizes, him the Son baptizes, and whom the Son baptizes, he is consecrated in the Holy Spirit. And again as when the sun shines, one might say that the radiance illuminates, for the light is one and indivisible and cannot be detached, so when the Father is or is named, there plainly is the Son also. The Father is named in baptism; then the Son must be named with Him.

(326) μίας οὖσας τῆς φύσεως τῶν λογικῶν κτισμάτων
(327) οὔτε λήπασιν - i.e. as a factum brutum.
(328) μετὰ τοῦ Πατέρος.
(329) ἐν τῷ Βρίσκω. Cf. the ἐν τῷ Πνεύμα of Ad Serap. I passim, as another instance of language used about the Second Person which was later used of the Third.
(330) τῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ.
Therefore ... (John 14:23 and 17:22). ... And again the grace given is one, given from (τῷ) the Father in the Son ... (Rom. 1:7, I Cor. 1:5). ... For the light must be with the ray (μετὰ τῆς δόξης), and the radiance must be seen together with its own light." This is a reaffirmation of the Trinitarian doctrine that he has elaborated above, based on the analogy of φως and ἀνάλυσις. We need not notice it further except to remark on the greater emphasis, which is demanded by the context, on the fact that the two (or three) Persons must go together. This is the doctrine of the περικύκλωσις, which again will be discussed much more fully later, in the Third Oration. Athanasius states the principle both objectively and absolutely, and epistemically and descriptively. Newman in his note correctly stresses the difference between this, the fact that the Father in His existence demands the Son as the Coessential Second Person, and the other aspect of the case, that the Father as regards His mention, demands the Son as the correlative.

In continuation, Athanasius, after pointing out that the Jews, by repudiating the Son forfeited the Father too, condemns Arian baptism on these grounds (at 236C): ... for if the consecration is given to us into the Name of Father and Son, and they do not confess a true Father because they deny what is from Him and like His Essence and deny the true Son, and name another of their own framing as created ex nihilo, is not the rite administered by them altogether empty and unprofitable? ... For the Arians do not baptize into Father and Son, but into Creator and creature, and into Maker and thing made. And as a creature is other than the Son, so the baptism which is supposed to be given by them is other than the truth, though they pretend to name the Name of the Father and the Son. ... On this account therefore our Saviour does not simply command to baptize, but first says 'teach', and then as follows, 'Baptize into the name of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost,' that the right faith may follow upon learning, and together with faith might come the consecration of baptism."

The final chapter of this section compares the Arians to other heresies which take the name of God, etc., but are radically unsound in doctrine; the Arians are even worse, since they wantonly declare the
Son to be a creature in the face of the Scriptural declarations that He is the exact Image of the Father, etc.

Newman points out that the prima facie sense of this passage is that heretical baptism is invalid, not without a hint that he regrets the contrast with what later became orthodox doctrine on this matter. However, the situation is a little different, in spite of Athanasius's references to others in ch. 43, who also render their own baptism invalid. There is something peculiarly serious about this case which would probably have influenced Athanasius in his judgment, and which makes it (and also perhaps too much serious earlier heresies as those of Marcion and the Gnostics) much worse than such later heresies as Donatism or even Entychianism or Protestantism and Roman Catholicism as each sees the other. The Arian doctrine that the Logos-Son is a creature is such a serious perversion that it makes it impossible for the Arians, in taking the Names, to mean the same thing, in the sense in which it is possible for Protestants, Roman Catholics, or Donatists or for that matter a wicked priest in the act of baptism. To postulate a rigorous distinction between Creator and creature, and then to fly in the face of it by naming both Creator and creature in baptism, corrupts everything. And behind this issue there is another matter of great interest. We have already noticed how Athanasius goes a long way towards making the whole doctrine of the nature of God depend on the Trinity, and drawn an interesting comparison with Karl Barth, whose theology is in many ways similar to that of Athanasius, and similarly situated in relation to the contemporary scene. And here again we find the same similarity. Both theologians are maintaining that the Trinity has a sort of absolute primacy over everything else in the Faith, so that if one is wrong about this one cannot be right about anything else. The difference
is in the field in which this primacy is manifested. It would be
impossible to give here any sort of analysis of the much-discussed
section of C.D. IV: I: p. 340 ff., in which the Trinity is discussed in
the context of Revelation as a whole. In Athanasius, the primacy of the
Trinity is fairly and squarely in terms of its place in baptism, which
is for Athanasius the first crossroads of the Christian Faith and life;
if one takes the wrong turning here, everything else must be wrong.
It might appear from this that Athanasius was giving primacy to something
that is in the field of ecclesiastical tradition, but the very form of
Athanasius's argument is purely from Scripture. It is as a quotation from
Matt. 28:19 that the baptismal formula is introduced.

Athanasius's handling of the matter shows several things about
this Scriptural passage itself. In the first place, it was used as the
baptismal formula from time immemorial, so that not even the Arians, nor
presumably even some very much earlier heretics, could disturb it, or
fail to give formal assent to it. It was Trinitarian long before the
explicitly Trinitarian theology of Athanasius and his successors and the
later Church was explicitly formulated. It was Trinitarian even in the
days when the rest of the theology of the Church was in such a state that
the Arians could wreak all but mortal confusion in the Church. It was
finally, explicitly Trinitarian as distinct from Binitarian even in the
days when Christian theology, even to a certain extent Athanasius
himself, almost forgot the Third Person. Thus, if it had been a
tradition, it must have been very early, almost contemporaneous in fact
with the Gospels as written records, or at least with the latest portions
of the Canon. Thus, the handling of this question by Athanasius, which
shows itself even more clearly in the Ep. I ad Serap., indicates that we
can emphasise the lateness of Trinitarian theology only by arguments
that abundantly prove the earliness of Trinitarian faith, tradition, and liturgy, to say nothing of the occurrence of Matt. 28:19 in Canonical Scripture. One may disagree on the question of whether the verse is Dominical or not, perhaps, but if one denies that it is, the contention may be made that this is no more than another case of the general principle that the Holy Spirit could not have been recognised for certain till after Pentecost, in the same way that the Son could not have been certainly known with absolute accuracy B.C. In another way, it is the question of why Acts and the Epistles and Revelation are canonical Scripture, even as the Gospels are. Thus, there are no good grounds for denying that the verse is in some sense Dominical, and that at any rate the equivalent of Trinitarian theology in faith, tradition, liturgy, and above all, in Scripture, is canonically binding and does genuinely go back to Christ.

The only reference to the Holy Spirit is one directly provoked by Matt. 28:19, in ch. 41:236: ὁ Ἱ. Κ. τοῦ ἡμών ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἐνεργεία τοῦ πνεύματος τῶν ἁγίων. The text is garbled, but the English translation which is to be presumed is given above. It indicates the traditional and liturgical close association between the Holy Spirit and confirmation or chrismation, and in a sense is a sign that the Holy Spirit is not yet considered a Person of the Trinity with quite the same rank as the other, two, since the ἐπίχυτος does not apply quite completely and symmetrically, as it does later in Ep. I ad Serapionem.

As the last 25 or so chapters constitute a definite subdivision of the Orations as a whole, another lexicographical analysis, on the usual terms, is appropriate here. LOGOS: Uncreated, etc.: 18: 184C, 20: 188C & 189B, 21: 192A (would have been unable to create if creature),
22: 192A, 24: 197C (Scr. correlates L. with F., not with "all things").

Everything earthly & human alien to His nature: 22: 192D (How can He be L. & Wdm. of Father if not Proper Offspring of His Essence but ex nihilo?), 36: 224A (we must not investigate how L. is from the F.).

Origin: L. of the Father: 22: 192D (How does God create through Him if He is not His L. & Wdm?), 27: 204C (One alone is the L. & Image of the One F.), 28: 205 (2 expls.) (L. not of things originate but Sole Proper L. of the F.), 37: 225A (Asterius etc., state the Proper and natural L. of F. to be other than Son). L. of God: 22: 192C (L. of the creating God known from His works), 27: 204A (Framing is only for God & His own L. & Wdm.), 27: 204B (one could find no one for framing but L. of G.), 30: 209B (L. of G. accord. to Ans. created for human needs), 30: 209B alterum (for Ans., God counsels enecg. His L. with us in mind), 31: 212 A-B (L. did not become ἀπ’ ἄλλων but we δίδακα), 31: 213A (L. of G. ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἐκτίθενται), 31: 213B (+ Wdm.) (human beings as addressed by God have the intermediary L. & Wisdom of F. which makes known . . . ), 33: 217A (From Him and proper to E. of Him whose L. He is), 35: 221B (L. of G. existent & eternal, like F.), 35: 221B alterum (L. of G. not προφορικός), 35: 221C (general supremacy of L.; see Heb. 4:12 sqq.), 36: 224A (we must not ask why the L. of G. differs from our word), 36: 224B (ἴδος ἐζήτου), 36: 224C (one & the same), 36: 224C alterum (endures unchanged eternally), 36: 225A (one), 38: 228B (Ans. consider to be L. of G. in name only), 39: 229B (Sole L. of G.), 39: 229C (Ans. deny true L. of G.), 40: 232 C (L. of G. is eternal), 41: 233A (One), 41: 233C (+ Wdm.). ἐντόθι ἐγκράτειας etc.: 22: 192D (How can He be L. & Wdm. if not (ἰδον ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμοῦ;)

Creator attributed to L.: 20: 169B (δημοτὴς), 31: 213B (Κτίστης), 20: 169B alterum (it is proper to L. to work the F's works), 27: 204B (as John 1:3), 30: 209C (Ans. say that we could not have come to be by the L.), 31: 212B (we could not come to be without the L.), 31: 213B ("And God said" explained ἐνυπνήθη).

Incarnation, etc.: Nil. Heresy: Ans. deny L. to be God:
39: 229C (exploit names of L.). Different from S. or only S. conceptually or vice versa: 34: 220C (How can S. be L. or L. Image of F.?); 37: 225A (True Son only L. Κτίστης), 39: 229A (Asterian L. other than S.).
Reject Divine attributes, give humble ones: 21: 192C (on basis of Arianism, let L. make ex materie), 30: 209B (on same basis, He would have come to be on account of us), 38: 228A (apparently called L. on account of rational beings). L. not sole creator: 22: 192C (we would have to look for another L.). Called Creature, etc.: 21: 192A (would not have created, if creature), 26: 201B (is of originate ζωή), 26: 201A (could not be created if a creature & no other L.), 28: 205C (L. would be part of the universe and incomplete). There is a total of 82 examples, of which 45 are in Group I, 36 in Group II, and only one in Group III, with none in any of the others. This complete predominance of the intra-Trinitarian and cosmological uses reflects the subject-matter of this section.

Ἰδιός, Son: Son the same as Logos (omitted, except where reference has been already included under Logos:) 39: 229A (where did the Arians hear of another L. than the Son?), 41: 233A (L. is alone S. Ἰδιός ἐκ θεοῦ from the Essence of God). Generation: Simply expressed: 34: 220A (G. has a S.) Origin of S. & F. explained: 33: 217B (Offspring, not external), 35: 221B-C (γεννημένος, not τῷ προστάτῃ), 36: 224A (it is wicked to dare to ask such questions of the generation of the S. of G.), 20: 188C (Let L. be confessed to be ζωή; Son). Same description of F. & S.: 32: 216C (testimony to Godhead of S.), 41: 233A & C & 236A (F. & S. named together, esp. in baptism), 41: 233C alterum (Wherever is F. there is S.), 41: 236A alterum (wherever F. is or is named, there must be or be named S.). Same nature, etc., in both F. & S.: Godhead the same: 22: 192D (Ἰδιότως ἄνδρας καὶ δύοντος κατὰ καθήκοντα) because of John 14:9), 23: 196A (Ἰδιός ἐκ θεοῦ), 24: 197B (proper to S. to have
what F. has), 34: 220A ("Son" = τὸ ἐν οὐρανῷ παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ὁ υἱός) 39: 229B (F. signifies that Son is one), 41: 233A (what need for Son for creation if F. can create himself (i.e. the Arian Second Person)?) 43: 240A (Ans. do not have τὸ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ υἱός ὁ Θεός Son). Unity of Operation shows unity of Essence: 29: 208B (cf. John 5:17), 25: 201A (F. creates with the Son), 25: 201A alterum (Cn. ἐν οὐρανῷ χρήσκεται), 41: 233C (Cn. by Logos, Baptism ἐν οὐρανῷ), 41: 235C alterum (giving of grace), 41: 236A (F. works through S.), 41: 236A alterum (baptism), 42: 236B (grace from ἡ ζωὴ ἐν οὐρανῷ). Nature of S. exceeds all creaturely nature: 24: 197A (S. not creature but ἐν οὐρανῷ ὁ Θεός), 27: 204C (differs from "all things") 36: 224A (generation known only to F., S.), 42: 237A ("Creature" is alien from S.). See also 23: 196A (In Matt. 3:17, the F. shows that the S. is His own). 41: 236A (S. & Spirit work together in Baptism).

Heresy (especially Arianism); Ans. separate Son from Logos, Wisdom, etc.: 34: 220C (How can S. be Logos, etc.?), 37: 225A bis (each case, S. is created in the true L. or Βαπτισμός). Reject true Son: 42: 236B (if Jews reject True S. they do not have F.). Deny ἂν ἴησος etc.: 22: 193B, 42: 237A. Deny true Generation: 38: 228A (not proper to E. because of generation). Son only in moral or secondary sense: 38: 228A (S. on account of those adopted?), 42: 237A (Ans. take F. & S. only because they cannot avoid it). Friends insult F. by postulating necessity of S. to create: 24: 197A (2 expls.) (God could create only S.; needs S. for rest of crn.), 25: 200B (F. made S. only), 25: 200B alterum (2 expls.) (F. worked S. only), but the rest ἐν οὐρανῷ, 25: 201A (2 expls.) (S. work of F.; creatures work of S.), 24: 200A (by what did God make S.?), 29: 209A (created S. to frame us), 30: 209C (S. alone came to be by ἡ ζωὴ ἐν οὐρανῷ the F.). (This group has normally been placed in Group II, by reason of the implied or expressed contrast with the Arian creation of everything else by the Son, or with the true Doctrine of God the Creator). Son as Instrument or Subordinate Operative: 29: 208B (Ath. denies crn. of S. for sake of operation concerning other creatures), 30: 209C. Son is equal to or less than us in nature: 19: 188A (Son would have to be one among many brothers), 19: 188A bis alterum et tertium; (each, to say that S. is creature, but not one of the creatures, does not ascribe any peculiar pre-eminence), 28: 205C (if they thus conceive the S.), 30: 209A (S. came to be on our account), 30: 209B (S. would be our Image), 30: 209B (F. would not have willed S. primarily,
but rather us), 30: 212A (creature made for us is called "Son").
Creature (Kινήματα) etc.: 22: 193B (one of everything), 24: 197B,
29: 208B, 41: 233B (2 expls.) (if we are united with S, that is a
creature, the naming of the S. in Baptism is superfluous), 41: 233B
tertium (If S. is a creature), 42: 237A (In Arian baptism, F. & S.
also 27: 204C (2 expls.) (many such sons of S. a creature).

Of these 72 occurrences, 45 are in Group I, 21 in Group II, one in Group VI,
and 5 in Group VII. The occurrence of the last group is due almost
to the references to the efficacy of the baptismal formula.
Otherwise, the usage exactly corresponds to that of the word Logos.

Oυσία. Essence: Id cuod est, substant.: 19: 188B (Each thing
originate is and remains ἀληθές ἔσοντας as it has been made). 33: 217A (Radiance does not diminish the E. of Light), 33: 217B (ditto,
of the Sun), 33: 217C (Radiance is proper to the E. of Light).

Substantia et natura rationalis: 33: 217C (let Ans. say that word is
not proper to the essence of mind, that is, not only in God), 34: 220A
(2 expls.) (Earthly sons are not parts of the E. s of their begetters,
nor do they diminish the Es. of their begetters).

Κατ' Ουσίαν: 23: 196A (Son is proper Κ. ο. to Π.), 27: 205A
(all creatures are (individually Εν Κατ' Ουσίαν - the context
indicates that the reference is mainly generic), 27: 205B (ditto,
Εν Κ. ο.), 43: 240B (Arian S. is ἄνωθεν Κ. ο. to Π.). Substantia vel
natura divina: E. of the F. 26: 201B (Arian doctrine that L. alone
could be made by the Unoriginate and most unmitigated E. of the F.).

Same in F. & Π.: ἄδειας πρὸς οὐδεὶς ποιεῖν Πατρός: 22: 192C-D, 31: 212B,

Κάτω οὐσία: 34: 220B. Ἡγήμων οὖσας: 22: 192D. Χριστὸς ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας:
41: 233A. (22: 192C-D has τῆς Κατ' Πατρός οὐσίας as a parallel, and
(each, How can He be ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας and not part of Him?), 38: 228C (Wisdom
woven into or complementary to Ε. of Π.). E. of S. alien from F.: 38: 228A (Ans. deny ἡκατον τῆς οὐσίας ἄνωθεν Π. τοῦ
which is on account of
the generation). 42: 237A (Ans. deny the ἡκατον τῆς οὐσίας, which = the True Son). There are 17 instances which refer to
God, and additionally 9 which refer to creaturely reality. Of the
former, only 2 refer to Group I (four of the latter refer correspondingly)
8 are in Group II, 5 in Group III (+ 2 of the latter), none in Group IV
(i.e. Essence in its unmistakeable generic meaning; three of the latter
class are in this group), and 2 in Group V.

**Φύσις** Nature: Divine nature is one & common to F. & S.:

- 20: 188C (Let L. be confessed to be ζωή Son), 24: 197A (Second Person is Proper Offspring of the Ε. of Θ. of ζωή Son), 31: 212B (Proper ζωή to the Ε. of Θ.), 36: 224B (the generation is ineffable and ζωή proper to God).
- 43: 240B (Arians do not have the Son Proper and ζωή from Him).

Heretics deny Divine nature: 19: 185A (He is ζωής φύσις), 26: 201B (He is of originate n.), 26: 201-C (Since creatures and the Son arc, for them, one and the same μη ἐγείρθη φύσις, the Tritos applies). 26: 201C (same argument and construction in abbreviated form), 28: 208A (For Ans. the creativity of the S. is not φύσις but learned), 37: 225A (For Ans. there is another Proper and ζωή L. of F.).

**True Human Nature:** 21: 192B (man, conscious of his n. asks help of God), 33: 217C (Why do the Arians intrude into what is above their n.?).

- 35: 221A (We are to think beyond the n. of men about God), 35: 221B (we have the n. of not-being), 36: 224A (God not to be measured by our own n. & weakness), 41: 233B (Since the n. of rational creatures is one, union with a creature is worthless).

Nature of all creaturely things:

- 29: 208B (μης ἐγείρθης φύσις (gen. abs. const.) can come into being through God alone), 29: 209A (God, willing to create the Originate N.). 20: 189A (everything has a n. of coming to be and being created). Of these 20 uses, none refer to Divine nature in the Chalcedonian sense (except if one implies a contrast with Human or Originate Nature in the Arian uses), 12 refer to Human or originate Nature, in all cases generally, without special reference to Christ, and 8 are adverbial uses, in all cases referring to the intra-Trinitarian relationship.

**The Christological vocabulary for the Humanity of Christ is almost negligible.** 39: 229B, there is a reference to the Incarnation, in the form of John 1:14 (Ως), it being added that it was not a plurality of words that became άνθρωπος for us, In 43: 237C, the lesser
Christological heresies are contrasted with Arianism, to the detriment of the latter; of the former it is said: "For these other heresies lie against the truth in some particular aspect, either erring concerning the Lord's body (σῶμα), as if He did not take flesh (σάρξ) from Mary, or as if He had not died at all, nor become man ... and only seemed to have a body (ζωὴ λαμβάνων σῶμα)." These examples are of themselves statistically insignificant.

C. Ar. Having emphasised again the general grounds on which the Arian interpretation of Prov. 8: 22 LXX is impossible, Athanasius now turns to the formidable task of justifying an exegesis in terms of orthodox theology, in the face of what prima facie is the plain meaning of the verse. By a remarkable theological tour de force he succeeds in going a long way, without being absolutely convincing, from the purely exegetical standpoint. After a rather tendentious claim, on the authority of John 16: 25, that proverbial language is so obscure that the prima facie meaning is for this very reason suspect, he goes on:

"If then, what is written is about an angel, or any other of things originate ... let it be said, 'created me', but if it be the Wisdom of God, in (ἔγνωκέν) whom all things originate have been framed, that speaks concerning itself, what ought we to understand save that 'he created' means nothing contrary to 'He begat'? Nor ... does it reckon itself among the creatures, but it signifies a certain sense (νοεῖ), as in proverbs, not openly, but a hidden sense ... , while soon after it itself gives the meaning of 'he created' in other but parallel expressions, saying, 'Wisdom made for herself a house.' Now it is plain that our body is Wisdom's house, which it took upon itself in becoming man; hence consistently does John say, 'The Word became flesh' (John 1: 14) and by Solomon Wisdom says of itself, carefully (μετὰ τοῦτο = ἡ ἡγεμόνι) not, 'I am a creature', (ἡ γενηθήσας οὐρά) but only, 'The Lord created Me a beginning of His ways for His works,'; not, 'created me that I

(331) John 1: 14.
might be, (332) and not 'because I have the beginning and origination of a creature.' (333)

For in this passage the Logos has spoken by Solomon to signify, not the Essence (οὐσία) of His Godhead nor His own everlasting and genuine generation from the Father (334) but His manhood and economy towards us. (335) And . . . He has not said, 'I am a creature,' or 'I became (ἐγεννήθη) a creature,' but only, 'He created.' For the creatures, having a created essence (336) are of things originate and are said to be created. . . . but the mere term ἐκτεινεῖ does not necessarily signify the Essence or the generation, but indicates something else as coming to pass in Him (337) concerning whom it speaks, and not simply that He who is said to be created is a creature both in nature and in essence (338) . . . (as examples of this, Ps. 103 LXX: 24, Rom. 8:22, Rev. 8:9, I Tim. 4:4, Wisdom 9:2, Mark 10:6, Deut. 4:32, Col. 1:159-17 quoted . . .

These passages are sufficient to remind us . . . that things which have by nature the created essence (339) are described as creatures and said to be created; on the other hand, that the single expression 'He created' does not just denote the Essence and the origination (340) . . . (is shown in Ps. 101 LXX: 19, Ps. 51:12, Eph. 2:15, 4:24). For neither did David speak of any people created in essence, (Καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐξουσίου), nor prayed to have another heart than that which he had, but he meant the renovation and restoration according to God, nor did Paul signify two persons created in essence (Καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐξουσίου) in the Lord, nor again did He counsel us to put on any other man, but He called the life according to virtue the 'man after God', and by 'created in Christ' he meant the two people who are renewed in Him. . . (Similarly with Jer. 31:22, LXX reading, ἑκάστῳ numeration) . . . in thus speaking he does not mean any essence of a creature, but prophesies

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(332) εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἑκτεινεῖ.
(333) Εἰς ἑκτεινεῖ καὶ ἐκείνῃ ἐκάτω.
(334) τὴν ἐκ πατρὸς ἐντού καὶ ἅψιον ἐκείνῃ.
(335) τὸ ἐκτεινεῖν καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐξουσίου.
(336) Καὶ τὴν ἐκτεινεῖν τῆς ὑμῶν.
(337) Τῇ ἐπιφάνεια τῇ περὶ ἐκείνῃ.
(338) καὶ τῇ σωσίας καὶ τῇ ὑμῶν.
(339) τῷ φιλεῖ τῇ ὑμῶν ἐκτεινεῖ.
(340) τὴν ὑμῶν καὶ τῇ γένει. The last word, having only one V without variants, cannot mean pace Newman and Robertson, "mode of generation."
the renewal of salvation among men which has taken place in Christ for us . . . . Accordingly, do not accept 'He created' as indicating creature, but of the humanity which came to be around Him (341) . . . (why insist on the literal interpretation, concludes Athanasius, here, in the wrong place, when you interpret all these other passages metaphorically?).

For this very passage proves that it is only an invention of your own to call the Lord a creature. For the Lord, knowing His own Essence to be the Only begotten wisdom and Offspring of the Father, and other than the things originate and the creatures by nature (φύσει), says, in love to man (342), 'The Lord created Me a beginning of His ways,' as if to say, 'My Father hath prepared for Me a body, and has created Me for men in behalf of their salvation.' For as when John says, 'The Word became flesh,' we do not conceive the whole Logos Himself to be flesh, but that He put on (εν χαρακτηρισθε) flesh and became man; and on hearing, 'Christ hath become curse for us,' (343) and, 'He hath made Him sin for us who knew no sin,' (344) we do not just conceive that Christ as a whole has become curse and sin, but that He has taken on Him the curse which lay against us . . . . so if in the Proverbs it is said, 'He created,' we must not conceive that the whole Logos is creature (φύσι) but that He put on the creaturely (Χριστοῦ) body, and that God created Him for our sakes, preparing for Him the created Body, as it is written, for us, that in Him we might be capable of being renewed and deified . . . . For the Proverbs say, 'He created,' but do not call the Son creature, but Offspring; and according to the above distinction in Scripture between 'He created' and 'creature', they acknowledge what is by nature proper to the Son, (345) that He is Only-begotten Wisdom and Father of the creatures, and when they say, 'He created', they say it not applied to His Essence, but signify that He was becoming a beginning of many ways . . . .

This is the basis of Athanasius's exegetical case, expressed with his usual lucidity, so that explanation is needless. The simplest

(341) τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν χαρακτηρισθεν σωμάτων
(342) φιλανθρωπε 
(344) II Cor. 5:21. 
(345) ἔστων φύσει πρὸς Ἰησοῦ.
summary in one sentence would be that it rests on a distinction which is
made and followed through with the greatest rigour, between what might
be called noun-language, the predicate ἔργον, etc., which by its very
nature must indicate what is always true of a thing, what is essentially
ture, true by nature, true ab initio, and so on, and verb-language,
ἔσχατος, etc., which by its very nature can only represent what is
temporary or accidentally true; thus, even if Prov. 8:22 LXX is
taken at its face value, it can only refer to some temporary happening
to the Logos or action of the Logos, that is, in practice, the
Incarnation and its sequela; and thus, it cannot be used as evidence
that the Logos is eternally and essentially a creature. If anything,
according to Athanasius, the reverse holds. To the modern mind, this
case, although plausible, is somewhat overstrained, and the final irony
is that Prov. 8:22 LXX is dangerously close to the sort of expression
which Athanasius, as recently as Orat. II: 11: 169B-c, said did not
exist in Scripture! For us, if a thing is said to be created, that is
the equivalent of its being a creature, and after all the verse, in the
LXX, does say "created Me", the "Me" being Wisdom, as the Second Person,
and it is most difficult to gainsay this against the use of the personal
pronoun. However, the point must be made, in favour of Athanasius, that
not only Athanasius but Greek thought as a whole at that time, was far
more essentialist than modern thought (to avoid the question, which is
still intensely controversial, of what was the case with Biblical
thought) and therefore Athanasius's point would be much more cogent.
Besides, the very thing that Athanasius had to emphasise in the
controversy was the distinction between what was eternally true of the
Logos and what was true only after the Incarnation, and the fact that
both were equally essential to theology, and that both must be
recognised for what they are not confused. In a sense it can be said
that, insofar as the Incarnational element had to play a major part

the theology, Athanasius was struggling against the older Greek

philosophic and rationalist tradition, which would either reject it
altogether or accept it wrongly as evidence for the pre-existent essence

of the Logos being originate. The other point is that whatever we may

think of Athanasius's reasoning generally, it certainly hit home against

the Arians ad homines; they presumably accepted the same essentialist

way of thought, at any rate on the issue of the Divine or creaturely

essence of the Logos, and after all it was they who insisted on

transforming the verb-language of Prov. 8:22 LXX, into the noun-language

that the Logos was *κρίσιμον, τοίμα*, etc. (346)

Having given an outline of his main exegetical principle,

Athanasius now makes a most important digression, which amounts to a

completion of his exposition above, in chs. 18-31, of the essential

pluralism of creatures. He turns, appropriately in view of the verse

under discussion, to the issue of temporal priority, which he has not

yet touched, and causal priority, which so far he has done no more than
touch, as well as going over some of his previous ground again. "For if

He is Offspring (*γεννωμάτως*), how call you him creature? For no one says

that He begets what He creates, nor calls proper offsprings (*τα ἱδία

γεννωματά*) creatures. And again, if He is Only-begotten, how does He

become 'beginning of ways'? For of necessity, if He was created a

beginning of all things, then He is no longer alone, since He has those

who came into being after Him. For Reuben, when He became a beginning

of the children, was not only-begotten, but even though He was indeed

first in time (*χρόνοι πρῶτοι*), in nature and relationship (347) he was one

among those who came after him. Therefore, if the Logos is also a

(346) See also above, pp. 819-21.

(347) τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς χρόνον, *καὶ τὴν γενεάν*, i.e. in his capacity as a member

of Jacob's family.
beginning of the ways', he must be such as the ways are, and these must be such as the Logos, though in time he would be created first of them. For the beginning of a city is such as the other parts of the city are, and also the members, being joined to it, make the city a whole and complete unity, as the many members of the one body; nor does one part of it make, and the other part come to be, and be subject to the former, but the whole city equally has its government and constitution from him who made it. (346) If then the Lord is in this sort of sense 'created' as a 'beginning' of all things, it would follow that he together with all other things would make up the unity of creation (349), and he would neither differ from all the others, though he become the 'beginning' of all, nor is he, Lord of them, though older in point of time, but he is the same manner of framing (350) and the same Lord as the rest. Nay, if he be a creature, as you hold, how can he be created sole and first of all, so as to be beginning of all? . . . (Here follows a repetition of the previous statements about the generic pluralism of created beings; in the difficult case of Adam, the solution is that "in him was involved the succession of the whole race." (351)

. . . . (Once again, on the basis of Rom. 1:20, the same principle is extended to the world of the invisible cosmic powers). . . . Therefore if the Logos be creature, he would not be first or beginning of the rest; yet if he be before all, as indeed he is, and is himself alone First and Son, it does not follow that he is as to his Essence (τή οοςία) the beginning of all things, for what is the beginning of all is reckoned amongst all. And if he is not such a beginning, neither is he creature, but it is quite plain that he differs by Essence and nature from the creatures, and is other than they and is Likeness and Image (διοικών και εικών) of the sole (μόνον) True God, being himself sole also. Hence he is not ranked with the creatures in Scripture . . . (Ps. 66:6, 89:6, 119:35). . . . For the One creates and the rest are created, and the One is the Proper Logos and Wisdom of the Father's (348) ἡ ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ πεπουληθέντος εὔπορος ἑκεῖ τὴν ἐπιμελήσει καὶ συνειστυχεὶν
(349) μάν τὴν κρίσιν ἀποτελεῖν - or, fulfil creation as a unity.
(350) οὖν τὴς διάμόρφωσις . . . λόγον.
(351) ἐν διάτυπω ἡγεῖται ὁ λόγος τῆς διάδοσις πάσος τοῦ κείστων. Λόγοι = laws, or principles, or perhaps even embryonic forms, of the succession of the human race.
Essence, and the things that came to be and previously were not, have been made by the same Logos."

In considering this objection, it is important to understand exactly what Athanasius was saying—and also the Arians. It is rather different from the point of view stated classically in, say the Antitheses of the Antinomies of Pure Reason in Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason". Here, it is contended that it is impossible to conceive the first, or the last, members of a temporal or a causal series, inter alia, since such members would have to possess the same characteristics as the others, and would therefore have in all cases a before and after, would be caused and would cause alike. Incidentally, this should not, when put in this way, cause any added theological difficulty at all as regards the concepts of creation and eschatology, since everyone agrees

(352) In many ways the Antitheses are collectively the best equivalent, in a classical modern philosopher, of the radical atheistic pluralism on which the author was brought up philosophically, see pp.63-5 above. They have been mentioned here, since they are particularly relevant to this problem. The Four Antitheses are, that it is impossible to conceive any real totality of things, as this would inevitably have something beyond it; correspondingly that it is impossible to reach the end of any process of division of any thing, since all things are infinitely divisible, that it is impossible to reach the end of a causal series to a First Cause, since this would itself have to be considered as caused, and that it is impossible to conceive, for a similar reason, any temporal limit to the world or any First (or Last) Thing. The corresponding Theses that there is an integral totality of things, that there are ultimately small particles, that there is a First Cause, that there is a temporal limit to the universe, are the stock in trade of monism, natural theology, and atomism. Kant does not choose between these two alternatives, remaining in the position that the arguments for both, as arguments of pure reason, are equally cogent, and that the impossibility of solving this dilemma is the effect of the inadequacy of pure reason.
that the first and last members of the series are acts of God and not of the cosmos, and that, however we interpret God's "causal" actions, the notion cannot involve the normal type of causal series. The Arians were themselves prepared to accept what later became the position of the Antitheses (and, of course, of Feuerbach, Marx, and their successors), to the extent of maintaining dogmatically that the Beginning of the Ways, in both the temporal and causal sense, must be a creature in exactly the same sense as other things, and, for that matter other "ways", that is, other creaturely activities and events; after all, the verse in question, as they accepted it, seemed to say so in so many words. But they were quite prepared to recognise that there could be such an initial creature, both temporally and causally, and that it could thereby enjoy real pre-eminence and even the right of worship. Indeed, they felt that this relation to the rest of creation was sufficient for the pre-eminence of the Logos, in the full Christian sense. What Athanasius does when confronted with this is in a sense to clinch the full case of what later became the Kantian Antitheses, although of course only as the truth about creatures in relation to each other, and with a considerable difference in emphasis. The starting-point is that the Arians have already accepted that the "beginning of ways" is completely a creature. The point that Athanasius makes again so forcefully is that, once this Arian dogma is accepted, one must go further and deny that such a creature can have any real pre-eminence, even if there were such a thing, the possibility of which Athanasius for the moment hypothetically accepts, on the analogy of, say, a foundation-stone (to use an analogy similar but not identical to the one actually chosen). In fact, such a foundation-stone would be just as stony, just as dependent on the laws of statics and dynamics, just as reciprocally related to the others, just as
incomplete in itself, just as much a more part of a complete system, as any of the stones later added. Above all, it would have its own principle of its own creatureliness, and the fact that the Greek for this is τὸν τὴν δημοστήριον λόγον (48: 249Β) indicates that Athanasius had in mind, here as well, the τῆς τοῦ argument although it is not stated in so many words. On the same analogy, the pre-eminence of a foundation-stone, whatever it is, does not extend so far that it can build the building; both it and its successors are where they are only in virtue of outside agency, and in this regard all are alike. In the true sense, the pre-eminence can be ascribed only to the outside Agent, the founder of the city as distinct from the foundation stone. The second half of the case is that, so far from these questions even arising, no creature, as he said before, can even have the sort of pre-eminence enjoyed by a foundation-stone; in fact, so keen is he to denounce this idea that he does not allow even Adam this position in relation to mankind, even at the cost of treating Adam as a concrete universal for all mankind, even before the Fall, when on any ordinary exegesis of Gen. 2 and 3, the question of succession had not yet arisen, since it was itself a consequence of the Fall and of the mortality of man. (353) And what is more, Athanasius seems to treat such a being pluralistically where the natural exegesis, even if succession be admitted, would be to treat him monistically; that is, Adam's containing of such an embryonic succession would mean that he would have to be regarded as a genuinely complex and divisible entity, in the same way in which a machine, for example, is. Thus, on both counts, the only way in which He can have any real pre-eminence is for Him to be more than a creature, which of course can

(353) Gen. 3:16. This is another example of the indefiniteness of Athanasius on the difference between the effects of the creaturely character of man and his fallen nature. See above, p. 687 (fn. 67)
only mean God, since there is no third possibility; therefore Prov. 8:22 LXX as it stands cannot refer to the eternal being of the Logos.

One other interesting point. In some places in the above section, Athanasius appears to accept that the activity of God can itself be a "beginning of ways"; in others, he seems to accept the contention that such a beginning can only be a creature or creaturely force like anything else. Is this something on which we have a right to demand clarification? Or is this ambiguity irreducible or even intentional? In other words, is Athanasius saying, or half-saying, that the "beginning of ways" can only be He, who is both completely God and completely creaturely man? Now, Athanasius is still an Infralapsarian even at this stage, but if our speculation is justified, this is the first glimmer of the later Supra-lapsarianism which comes out finally in the last chapters of Crat. II, in the analysis of the context of Prov. 8:22, especially verse 23. (Crat. II: chs. 73-82), esp. 75-77.

Having, as usual, established the impossibility of the Arian interpretation of the verse in question, Athanasius now develops his own, consistent with the Deity of Christ. Here again, the "created Me" must refer not to the essence of the Logos, but to the great historical event in which He was intimately concerned - the Incarnation and all that followed it. This will be summarised here in rather less detail, although even at this stage fresh points of great general interest arise, primarily owing to the text itself. "Your reckless assertion then that the Son is a creature, is not true, but is only your fantasy; . . . For he (sc. Solomon) has not called Him creature, but God's Offspring and Wisdom . . . (Prov. 3:19 & 7:1). . . And the very passage proves your irreligiousness (δουλεύω Βελήν). . . If He is before all things, yet says 'He created Me' - not 'that I might make the works', but 'for the works (Εἰς έπαρξον), then either 'He created' is something that follows Him, or He would appear to be after the works, finding them already established before Him on His creation; He would also
come to be (354). And if so, how is He still before all things? And how would all things be made through Him, and in Him would all things consist? (355) But it is not so. . . . For the Logos of God is not creature but Creator, and says in the manner of proverbs, 'He created me', when He put on created flesh (356) (also). . . . being Son and having God for His Father, for He is proper Offspring, yet He names the Father Lord (Kύριον), not that He was a servant, but because He took on a servant's form. . . . (see Matt. 11:25, and Ps. 86:16; in each case the two halves of the verse are not taken as parallel but as referring to each of the two contrasting aspects). . . .

Fittingly then, we being servants, He too calls the Father Lord, as we do, and this He has so done from love to man (φιλωθεν-σεις), that we too, being servants by nature (Kατα φύσιν), and receiving the Spirit of the Son (τον Πνευμα τον Υιον), might have confidence to call Him by grace Father, Who is by nature Lord (τον θεόν Κύριον). But as we, in calling the Lord Father, do not deny our natural servitude (την κατα φύσιν συλλειτυντι) . . . . so, let them not deny the eternity of His Godhead. . . . For the passage in the Proverbs, as I have said before, signifies not the essence but the manhood (το ενθρωπισμον) of the Logos, for if He says that He was created 'for the works', He shows His intention of signifying, not His essence but the Economy that took place 'for His works', which comes second to being (357). For things which are in formation and creation are made specially that they may be and exist (358) and next they have to do whatever the Logos bids them, as may be seen to be the case with all things. For Adam was created, not so that he might work, but that first he might be man; for it was after this that He received the

(354) Relative pronoun according to the syntax of the Greek. Newman & Robertson have "for the sake of them"; perhaps "on the basis of them", cf. Rom. 5:12, would be more accurate and more incisive.

(356) οτε την Χριστον ένεσθεν το σφραγι
(357) την εις τη έργα αυτου οικονομιαν γινομενην οπερ δευτερον εστιν του ειναι
(358) τη να γνώμεναι και Χριστομενα προηγουμεναι ενεκ του ειναι και του σφραγον πεποιηκα.
command to work. And Noah was created, not for the sake of (διά + acc.) the Ark, but first that He might exist and be a man, for it was after this that He received the commandment to prepare the Ark. And the like will be found in every case on investigation - thus the great Moses was first made a man, and next was entrusted with the government of the people. Therefore here too we must suppose the like; for you can see that the Logos was not created into existence (359), but 'In the beginning was the Word', and He is afterwards sent 'for the works' and the Economy towards them (μὴ τοῦ τῶν οἰκονομίαν). For before the works were made, the Son was ever, nor was there any need yet that 'He' should be 'created', but when the works were created and the need arose afterwards for the Economy for their restoration (εἰς διάφορα), then it was that the Logos took upon Himself this condescension and assimilation to the works (360), which He has shown us by the word . . . (Is. 49:5 LXX)

See here, too He is formed, not into existence, but in order to gather together the tribes, which were in existence before He was 'formed'. . . (The above points are made again with reference to the verse just cited, and the parabolic analogy is cited of kidnapped servants being rescued by their lord's son disguised himself as a servant) . . . (On Heb. 2:7 and Ps. 2:6 LXX). . . And as, when He shone in the body upon Zion, He had not His beginning of existence or reign, but being God's Logos and everlasting King, He vouchsafed that His Kingdom should shine διάφορα also in Zion, that, redeeming them and us from the sin that reigned in them, He might bring them under His Father's Kingdom, so, on being established for the works (361), He is not established for things which did not yet exist, but for such as already were and needed restoration."

Much of this material is a repetition of what has been said before, but there are two points that deserve special mention. The first is the statement that if the Logos is held to have been created, in nature and origin, for the works, εἰς τῇ ἐργῇ, the works must be

(359) διὰ εἰς τὸ εἶναι κτισταμένον.
(360) διεσκέψαν ἐλάπτων εἰς τῷ συγκαταβάσθαι καὶ ὁμοιώθηκαι πρὸς τις ἐργα.
(361) καθιστάμενος εἰς τῇ ἐργῇ.
assumed to have pre-existed the Logos. It is a little doubtful whether Athanasius can attribute this signification to the actual Greek text as interpreted in the Arian fashion, because the preposition in question would quite easily mean that he was created in order to bring things into being which were as yet non-existent even if present in idea to God. However, even if Athanasius's argument does not strike home in the strictly temporal sense, it is still potent in the causal, logical, and epistemological senses. That is, a Logos of the type speculatively postulated above in this paragraph, and which for that matter was professed by Asterius, would still have its whole character teleologically determined by creaturely reality. For the same reason, the correct order of revelation would be from the obvious and well-known creaturely realities to the relatively unknown Logos, in a manner which is all too familiar to us. This is the reason why the analogia entis is so dangerous, since it reverses the true order of revelation, which is in essence from God Himself, as Athanasius came to see earlier in the Orations. These results would inevitably follow from the Greek form of Logos doctrine as it prevailed in modern natural theology which culminated in Hegel, and which broke down into the various forms of modern atheism; as we have said above, there are grounds for considering that the same thing happened with the Logos doctrine in the ancient world, where Arianism was the final result. This is why Athanasius is so uncompromising in his insistence on the absolute primacy of the Logos over all creation, and the Logos as God, too. We can set passages of this sort alongside those in which Athanasius insists that all the correlatives of the Second Person are to be within the Godhead and not in creaturely reality, and in which he begins to see that in the analogical description of God, it is His attributes that are sure and certain, not man's. All these are the results of a rigorous acceptance
of the full deity of the Logos which was, as it was clearly shown during the controversy, the only alternative to the atrocious impiety of Arianism. (362) It is only when a man is already a man, that the question of his relation to his fellows can even arise, and this applies to all his relations, whether passive or active. It even applies, says Athanasius, to the question of a man's doing the will of God. The same applies of course to all creatures. The idea that a person or a thing can be constituted by relations was as much anathema to Athanasius as it is to any modern neo-realistic and pluralist. We have already seen that Athanasius was almost certainly in line with the absolutism, that is, the anti-relativism, which was the main element in Greek philosophy from start to finish; on this basis, things did have relations, and relation was a problem of metaphysics and logic, but relation and relations could never be constitutive of things, or of reality as a whole. The opposite idea, which was not lacking in the ancient world, tends to be characteristic of the more flexible monistic systems like Hegelianism, and in the ancient world, Stoicism, according to which a person or a thing is real insofar as it is related to its environment, being constituted by these relations. It was of course also a feature of the relativistic Athenian sophists. (The author's first philosophy teacher has described the Sophist Gorgias as the "super-Eleatic". While the Eleatic proved that there can be only one absolute reality, Gorgias proved that there could be no such reality; therefore, everything exists relatively.) Traces of the opposed relativistic tradition persisted in the early Platonism or Platonic Socraticism that was the favourite philosophy of Athanasius in his

(362) This is actually a more intense form of the argument of Athanasius above in Crat. II: 29-30, see pp. 464-8.
earlier days, since the Particulars were real only in virtue of the
relation of participation in the Forms. A comparison between Athanasius's
earlier logic and metaphysics and his present teaching indicates that
he has unreservedly come down on the Pluralist side; he has traversed
the whole distance between, say, the "Phaedo" and the "Sophist",
and, perhaps, even further, to the modern pluralists. (363) In fact, he
is the most consistent pluralist in Greek thought, and this insistence
that even a creature is primarily what it is in itself is the greatest
sign of this. Of course, the above remarks apply only as being the
truth of creaturely life, and the principle in question cannot con-
stitute any sort of argument for atheism. This whole issue is one of
the major issues of all theology, and will be considered more fully and
generally at the end of our detailed study of the Crations.

53 "He created' (ἐκτισε), then, and 'He formed' (ἐπήλασε) and 'He
set' (κατέστησε), having the same meaning, do not denote the beginning
of His being, or show that His essence is created, but His beneficent
renovation which came to pass for us ... (John 8:56, Prov. 1:27 & 30)
... " Here this point is again repeated at length. In spite of
Stulken, this sentence does not indicate any uncertainty in Athanasius's
exegesis, but is rather the inevitable consequence of his full
discussion of the issue, including the parallel passages of Scripture;
and thus it is not evidence for the earlier composition of the Crations
compared with the De Decretis, but rather the reverse. (364) Athanasius
now continues with his account of the whole economy of the Incarnation
and Reconciliation; what he says is largely a repetition of what has
gone before, and as such will need no further comment, except that there

(363) See also above, p. 603.
(364) See above, pp. 279-281.
is another general question of great importance brought up for the first time. Except for this and a few other issues, most of the material, although most fascinating and edifying in itself, does not directly concern this thesis, and will be taken as read. (at 260B): "For it became Him, being other than the works, or rather their Framer, to take upon Himself their renovation, that whereas He is created for us (ἐστὶς ἔστι), all things might now be re-created in Him. For when He said, 'He created', He immediately added the reason, mentioning 'the works', that His creation for the works might signify His becoming man for their renovation. And this is usual with Divine Scripture, for when it signifies the genesis of the Logos according to the flesh, it also puts down the cause (ἀρχὴν) for the sake of which He has become man, but when He speaks or His servants declare any thing of His Godhead, everything is in simple diction and absolute sense (366) and nothing is said involving causality (367). For He is the Father's ἀποταμωτός, and even as it is not on account of any cause that the Father exists, neither may we seek the cause of the Radiance. (compare John 1:1 with 1:14, the co-ordinate taken as the equivalent of a rationale, and Philipp. 2:6 with vv. 7-8).

And the Lord Himself has spoken many things in proverbs; but when giving notices about Himself, He has spoken absolutely (ἀποκλείσθω, μένως) cf. John 14:6, 9, 10, 10:30, 8:12). In no case setting down the cause or the why and wherefore, lest He should appear to be second to those things for the sake of which He was made; for that cause would necessarily have precedence, without which not even He Himself would have come to be. For instance, Paul, 'separated an Apostle for the Gospel, which the Lord had promised afore by the Prophets', was thereby made subordinate to the Gospel of which He was made minister, and John, being chosen to prepare the Lord's way, was made subordinate to the Lord. On the other hand, the Lord had no reason previous to Himself for being Logos, except that He is Offspring and Only-begotten Wisdom of the Father, but when He becomes man, he proposes a cause why

(365) ΤΑΠΑΝΤΑΣ ΕἺΣ ΑΥΤΩΝ ὈΛΥΜΠΙΑΣΙΟΝ
(366) ἑτέρος ἅπθει, ἀποκλειμένη τῇ διανοίᾳ
(367) οὐδεν μετὰ συμπεπλεξμένης ἀρχῆς.
He is to take flesh. For man's need preceded his becoming man, apart from which need he would not have put on flesh ... (The need is shown by John 6: 33-40, 12:46, & 18:37, & I John 3:8) ... 

There follows a summary of the Atonement on the usual lines, with special emphasis on the fact that it was caused by our need. The creation in Christ of the new humanity, which is in the last analysis what is really "created", plays a prominent part, with an exegesis of Eph. 2: 14-15: (264C - 265A) "But if in (ἐν) Him the two are created, and these are in His body, reasonably then, bearing the two in Himself, He is as if Himself created [368] ..."

The point that Athanasius makes here is the complement of what was said in chs. 50-52. There, the point was made, that not even the existence of a creature can be considered instrumentally - much less God! - nor can it be considered to be constituted by its causes, purposes, etc. Now, the form of Prov. 8:22 LXX is such that the event referred to by the words "created Me", is constituted by certain quite definite plans of God. In a sense it can be said that any act of Divine creation is constituted by the will of God, but in this case that will is simply the mysterious superabundance and overflowing of the Divine love and grace, which is quite different, and does not invalidate Athanasius's argument. In these chapters, he confirms the point adumbrated above, that Prov. 8:22 LXX cannot refer to the essence or original nature of the Logos, even on the hypothetical supposition that He is in fact a creature. Therefore, it cannot be used as evidence for the Arian theology, and thus the general considerations adduced earlier, and the Scriptural witness to the Deity of Christ, have unimpeded force. The positive aspect of all this is that the sort of thing that is constituted in this way by purpose is some event that

(368) ὃς ἄλλος ἐστιν Κριστὸς.
happens to someone, or a deed that someone does. Examples from Scripture are quoted to indicate that events of the latter sort have explanations, to which they are causally and ontologically subordinate, as distinct from what is true by origin and nature of a being — a fortiori, as distinct from the eternal essence of God and the Logos (as is shown by examples from John). Therefore the verse in question refers to such an event. One last thing to be noticed is that the emphasis on the contingency of the Incarnation, as distinct from the eternal Deity of the Logos, means that the earlier Infralapsarianism of Athanasius still remains for the time being as his main explicit position; the Incarnation would not have taken place but for the parlous position into which man had culpably stumbled. This is in spite of the tendencies towards a more Supralapsarian position that we have noticed already, which will come to fruition at a later stage. (369)

However, one further principle is needed to complete the circle of Athanasius's argument, and it is brought up now: "For if, as they hold, the Essence of the Logos is of created nature, and therefore He says, 'The Lord created Me,' as a creature, He was not created for us (δι' ἐμαυτῆς). But if He was not created for us, we were not created in Him (ἐν ἐμαυτῷ), and not having been created in Him we would not have Him in ourselves (ἐν ἐμαυτοῖς), but we would have Him externally (ἐξ ἐμαυτῶν), as if we were receiving instruction from Him as from a teacher. And it being so with us, sin would not have lost its reign over the flesh, as it would be inherent (ἐμενευόμενο - participle) and would not have been cast out of it. But the Apostle opposes such a doctrine. . . (Eph. 2:20). But if we were created in Christ, then it is not He Who is created, but we in Him; and thus the word ἐκτισός is for our sake (δι' ἐμαυτῆς). For because of our need the Logos, though being Creator, endured words which are used of creatures. . . . (This is amplified in the context of the Atonement, and the contrast is again made between this and the absolute language proper to His Deity; Prov. 8:25, which has no aetiological

(369) See above, pp. 105-7, 217, and below 904-12.
elements, is cited as another and very apposite example of the latter).

Athanasius has already shown that if the "creation" of the Logos is to be understood as relative to something else, it cannot refer to the essence or original nature of the Logos, but only to a later event. Here, this principle is taken much further. So far, Prov. 8:22 is understood as referring to the creation of the Logos-Wisdom in relation to plans and purposes, or perhaps in relation to the very being of the works. In the above chapter, this is deepened so that the relation of the έστιν ἐπημενον is the whole relationship of grace between Christ and the New Creation, especially Christian manhood, as renewed in Him; Christ's whole condescension to involve Himself intimately in and with creatures, and to take them up, by grace, into Himself; His complete giving of Himself for the creature that the creature may share completely in His love by grace. All this is impossible for Arianism, for two reasons, according to Athanasius. In the first place, if one takes Prov. 8:22 LXX, and, by implication, every other similar passage, to refer to the essence and origin of the Logos, they are all wasted, and there is nothing left to refer to the gracious condescension of Christ; the Scriptural witness to its happy fruits would be left stranded, and saving faith would be as the seed choked with thorns. Secondly, to complete the argument — this is not quite explicit yet, but is certainly implicit in view of what has already been said in the last few chapters, and becomes clearer later — even if by an exegetical tour de force we could try to preserve the idea of the Arian creaturely Logos acting for us, in the ultimate sense, this would be impossible. No creature could do this. It follows from everything else that Athanasius has maintained that such a creature as the Arians postulated would be literally too busy just being himself. To be "created for the works" is not something that we have the right to
expect from any creature, fallen or unfallen, sinful or sinless. The only possible source is God in Christ. Otherwise, "the morality of service", as Macmurray describes it, becomes a ghastly and cruel perversion of the truth. In the ultimate or perhaps penultimate sense, we serve by the grace of God-in-Christ who gave Himself for us.

Athanasius's treatment of this issue in this way raises three other interesting questions. In the first place, it is implicit - in fact, in view of what Athanasius says about the absolute nature of Scriptural testimony to the Deity of Christ, it is almost explicit that, if it is an insult to regard even a creature as being "created for the works", a fortiori it is blasphemy to regard God in His Deity as "being for the works". Every argument of Athanasius rejects this conclusion. Thus, it would follow that God could be only "for the works" only insofar as He, that is, the Logos, was "created", in the Athanasiian interpretation of Prov. 8:22 LXX. That is, in this respect, the logic of Athanasius's position imperatively demands the Supralapsarian doctrine of the Incarnation, in spite of the fact that in other ways the Infralapsarian interpretation is still the more plausible. Unless this change were made, God E.C. or before the Fall would have to be regarded as completely ungracious. The second point is that this treatment cannot but represent a powerful modification of the instrumentalist doctrine of the flesh or even the humanity of Christ which we have noticed earlier in the "De Incarnatione", which is not only the "natural" way of looking at the matter, but would be the result of the hierarchical doctrine of reality of early Platonic-Socraticism, as in the "Phaedo". The change that we have noticed would be correlated with the change in metaphysical emphasis away from the hierarchy of Forms and particulars to the other tradition (like that of, say, the
Plato of the "Sophist") of egalitarian pluralism as the truth of creaturely life as such, and, what is even more important, by the deepening of theological insight which dictated this change. At the earlier stage, the servility that interests Athanasius is simply the natural subordination of matter to the Logos; the body suffers, etc., and it serves its tasks in Christ's work of salvation simply in virtue of its normal state. But Athanasius now understands that when, say, Paul speaks of Christ taking the form of a servant, or Proverbs of His being "created for the works", this certainly includes His taking flesh in the usual way, but in another sense it involves a state of servility that far transcends anything that can be a property of creaturely reality as such. It would be literally something to which only God could condescend. That is, the correlation is not between servitude and the creaturely nature of Christ, but between servitude and the Divine nature. (370) It is true that Athanasius does not tidy the matter up in this way, and in the main follows his older position still. But it is right to say that these are the immediate implications of the changes in position that Athanasius explicitly accepts.

Lastly, it is most instructive to compare this chapter with the opening of the "Philosophical Fragments" of Kierkegaard, where the same contrast is made between the relation of teacher and pupil and the intimate internal relation between Christ and the Christian. Both writers are attacking what was for each a venerable tradition of intellectualism, which in the case of Athanasius was the basis of the whole theology of his illustrious predecessor Clement of Alexandria.

For all the virtues of Kierkegaard, it cannot be denied that there is an excess of that element that leads his critics to shrug him off as "that gloomy Dane", which contrasts with the assurance of Athanasius. This is correlated with the fact that in the latter case this stage has been reached at a late stage in a long argument based initially on Christ as God, and that this has at every stage been in the forefront of Athanasius, in contrast with Kierkegaard, who starts with the human aspect of the problem and whose whole argument depends on this starting point. (371)

Athanasius now returns to the difference between language describing creation and language describing begetting. As examples of the former, he cites Gen. 1:1, Ps. 119:73 (contrast Ps. 2:7, and 45:1, and John 1:1) also Matt. 19:4, Ps. 102:25, Ps. 74:2, Gen. 2:3. He notices the difference in the use of the word "beginning", which means when it is used in connection with creation, that God began to create.

(371) See "Philosophical Fragments", which Kierkegaard meant as a short definitive exposition of his position, and "Unscientific Postscript" which was meant to be a postscript to the Fragments, but which is about eight times as long; it is a further development of his position. The question, as put at the beginning of the Fragments, is, "Is the Socratic relation between man and man, whereby one man simply assists another to learn independent facts, without either personal communion or confrontation, the ultimate in personal relationship? As it obviously is not, what is?" The effect of Kierkegaard's starting from the human aspect of the problem is that he never seems to be able to envisage the elimination of guilt and its ruinous effects from the development of such relation. If Athanasius had known Kierkegaard, he would have answered that this was the inevitable impasse of such existentialism, that men cannot confront each other of themselves in any redemptive way, that it is right and proper for a man per se to be just himself, that it is only in Christ that such confrontation is possible, and that men can only do it insecor as they are "in Christ", who is the only possible starting point, both actually and as regards our analysis, for such an enterprise.
Therefore the creatures began to be made; but the Logos of God, not having a beginning of being, certainly did not begin to be, nor began to become, but was ever. And the works have their beginning in their being made (ἐν τῷ πρώτω γενέσθαι), and their beginning precedes the things that come to be, but the Logos, not being of things that come to be, turns out to be rather the Framer of the things that have beginning. And the being of things originate is measured by their becoming (372), and from some beginning does God begin to make them through the Logos, that the non-existence of these before their origination might be known, but the Logos has His being in no other beginning than the Father who is according to them without beginning (ἀπόρχως), so that He too exists ἀπόρχως in the Father, being His Offspring, not creature.

Continuing, Athanasius considers the Arian citation of Deut. 32:6: 17-18 as an analogous case to Prov. 8:22 and 25 (LXX in all cases); in the former case, "begetting" and "creating" are both used of men; in the latter, of the Logos. Here, Athanasius points out in reply that the men are not only creatures by nature, but sons by grace after their creation. In the latter case, the fact that the Logos is begotten "before all the hills", and that this strong expression is not used in Prov. 8:22, indicates that begetting has the priority in this case. There is nothing in the last four chapters that is completely new or needs special comment, although in some cases old arguments are repeated from a slightly different angle.

In the next chapter, Athanasius starts with a most apt summary of the difference between the language of creation and generation, as applied to men, and to the Logos, and then follows with a study of Christ's title ΠΡΩΤΟΤΟΚΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΡΙΣΗΣ (373) which had to come up some time. "... God, being first Creator, next... becomes Father

(372) ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΝ ΓΕΝΗΤΩΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΕΝ ΤῊΙ ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ ΜΕΤΡΕΙΤΑΙ.
(373) "Firstborn of the Creation": This is the Athenian form of the title, which is a sort of general mean of its occurrences in the N.T., as well as the form that indicates the point in the Arian controversy. The chief occurrence is ΠΡΩΤΟΤΟΚΟΣ ΠΑΤΟΣ ΚΡΙΣΗΣ in Col. 1:15.
of men, because of His Logos dwelling in them. But in the case of the
Logos it is the reverse; for God, being His Father by nature (ὁγεί),
becomes afterwards both His Creator and Maker, when the Logos puts on
that flesh which was created and made, and becomes man. For as men,
receiving the Spirit of God, become children through Him (374), so the
Logos of God, when he himself puts on the flesh of man, is then said
to have been both created and made. If then we are by nature (κατὰ φύσιν)
sons, then he is by nature creature and thing made, but if we become
sons by adoption and grace (ὁγεί καὶ κατὰ χάριν), then has the Logos
also, when in grace towards us he became man, said, 'The Lord created
Me'. And in the next place, when he put on a created nature (τὸ κτίσμα)
and became like us in body (375) fittingly was he called therefore both
our brother and 'First-Born' (πρωτότοκος). For though it was after us
that he was made man for our sake, and our brother by likeness of body,
still therefore he is called and is the 'First-born' of us (376) because,
all men being lost according to the transgression of Adam, His flesh
was saved and liberated before all others, as it was the body of the
Logos, and henceforth we, becoming incorporated with it (377) are saved
after its pattern (Κατακείμενο). For in it the Lord becomes our Guide
to the Kingdom of Heaven. (John 14:6; 10:9). Whence also He is said
to be 'Firstborn from the dead' (πρωτότοκος, ὑμῖν ἐκ τοῦ νεκροῦ), not
that he died before us, since we were dead before him, but because,
having undergone death for us and abolished it, He was the first to
rise, as man (ὁ πρῶτος ὁμοιός), for our sakes raising His own Body.
Henceforth, having risen, we too from him and because of Him rise
in due course from the dead.

But, if he is called Firstborn of the Creation, still this
is not as if he were equated with the creatures, and only first in time—for
how could this be, since he is Only-Begotten?—but it is because
of the Logos's condescension to the creatures (378), according to which
he has become 'brother of many' . . . . (here follows a distinction
between the Scriptural descriptions of Christ as Μονογενής, with

(374) διαδότου — it is impossible to differentiate whether the pronoun
refers to the Son or the Spirit.
(375) ὑμῖν δόμιος κατὰ τὸ σώμα.
(376) πρωτότοκος, ὑμῖν — the exact syntax is important for the argument.
(377) ὑπὸ σύσσωμαν τοῖς ξανθοῦσι
(378) διὰ τὴν προσ τὰς κτισμάτα ὑμῶν καταβο.
regard to the Father (John 1:14, I John 4:9, Ps. 119:89, I Cor. 1:24, John 1:1, Matt. 3:17, & 16:16), and as πρωτότοκος with reference to creation). . . . If he is Only-Begotten, as indeed he is, 'First-born' would need some explanation, but if he is really First-born, then he is not Only-Begotten. For the same cannot be both Only-Begotten and First-born, except in different relations (379), that is, Only-Begotten because of His generation from the Father, . . . and First-born, because of His condescension to the creation and His making the many His brethren. Certainly, those two terms being inconsistent with each other, one should say that the attribute 'only-Begotten' has justly the preference in the case of the Logos, in that there is no other Logos or no other Wisdom, but He alone is very Son of the Father. Moreover . . . it is said of Him, not in connection with any reason (380), but absolutely, 'The Only-Begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father,' but the word 'First-born' has again the creation as a reason in connection with it (381) (Col. 1:16) . . . But if all the creatures were created in Him, He is other than the creatures, and is not a creature, but the Creator of the creatures.

Not then, because He was from the Father was He called 'First-born', but because in Him the creation came to be . . . (Here follows a linguistic claim corresponding to that which we have already noticed in Grat. I: 53:64, that a phrase of the type in question is really a superlative, and in that form in Greek it indicates absolute transcendence of the Son over the creation; corresponding to the previous assertion concerning corresponding phrases in the comparative degree; if, as the Arians maintained, Scripture had wanted to give Him merely temporal priority, it would have said, πρωτότοκος . . . τῶν ἄλλων Κυρίων - cf. Gen. 35:23 LXX, or πρωτότοκος . . . ἐν πολλοίς ἀδελφοῖς which is actually said in Rom. 8:29, where the question is of the humanity of the Incarnate Lord. The chapter concludes with a repetition of the impossibility of the Logos being His own creator)

The final absurdity, for Athanasius, of the Arian interpretation of the πρωτότοκος is that, on its basis, the Logos would be brother of

\[
\begin{align*}
(379) & \text{προς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο} \\
(380) & \text{οὐ μετὰ τίνος συμπεπλεξεμένης αἰτίας} \\
(381) & \text{συμπεπλεξεμένην ... αἰτίαν}
\end{align*}
\]
things without reason and life(362), and returns to the first meaning, which refers to the Resurrection.

There are three interpretations of the ΠΡΩΤΟΤΟΚΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΡΙΣΙΩΝ and ΠΡΩΤΟΤΟΚΟΣ generally, that Christ is first-born in the sense that his humanity was the first to be raised from the dead, and thus in that sense the First-born of the New Creation - thus, Christ was First-born from the point of view of his humanity, for the benefit of earthians, his exalted humanity at that; secondly, that he was first-born of creation in the sense that, though fully God, he condescended to creaturely life - the exact converse of the former sense; and thirdly, the supreme sense, in which the superlative indicates his absolute and ultimate transcendence over creation. Strictly speaking, these meanings are exegetically incompatible with each other, or rather, the third with the other two, since the superlative form of the phrase, which in the third case is held to imply transcendence of essence, is in the first two held to admit comparison in what is for us the normal sense, that is, a comparison of degree of things essentially the same; if this were not so, the first two meanings would fall to the ground. This is an unfortunate case of Athanasius's methods overreaching themselves. However, it was probably inevitable that all three meanings would suggest themselves. They could probably have been reconciled adequately by a greater emphasis on the way in which even the creaturely nature of Christ partakes, in its measure, of the uniqueness of God, but this may be asking too much of Athanasius at this stage. Apart from this, all the explanations fit in well with the general pattern of Athanasian theology and require no further special comment. Of course, he accepts the Arian contention that if Christ were first-born.

(362) ΤΩΝ ΘΛΟΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΛΥΤΟΧΩΝ.
in the purely temporal sense he would have to be a creature like the rest—only he denies the minor while accepting the enthymematic major—and this concludes the doctrine of the essential pluralism of creaturely life.

The final topic for Athanasius is to discuss what is meant by the Logos being "Beginning of the ways" (δρώγη τὸν ἄρχον). This if of course treated as a case of Christ being "the Way"; the first way, through Adam, was ruined by the Fall; Christ is the second, the efficacious Way; the "ways" are thus the whole of the New Covenant and its benefits, which in the last analysis is the New Creation in Christ. The treatment of this comes under the Doctrine of Reconciliation, which is beyond the direct scope of this thesis; there is in fact nothing to add to what we have said before of Athanasius's doctrine in the "De Incarnatione", with the modifications that we have already noted in the earlier portions of the "Contra Arianos". (383) It is interesting to notice that the argument that Athanasius hypothetically considers, and rejects, in De Inc. 44, that God could have undone the Fall by a mere fiat, was apparently adduced by the Arians; apparently this was for the purpose of counteracting the Athanasian type of exegesis, which was thus clearly current before the Orations were written in their final form. Athanasius, in ch. 68, quotes the objection as an Arian argument, and, while admitting it as a possibility (Anselm, alone of the Fathers, appears to have denied that it was even that, see Newman's note—this is consistent with our comments of the difference between Athanasius and Anselm), denies that it would have been possible in terms of the plenitude of grace. The discussion resembles that of De Inc. 44, with greater assurance.

(383) See above, pp. 222-4 and 755-62
In the next two chapters, embedded in further discussion on the Atonement, Athanasius at last makes, in duo form, the sort of statement that is often regarded as being in the forefront of his whole theology, in the form in which it is made. (69, beg.) "Again, if the Son were a creature, man would have remained mortal as before, not being joined to God; for a creature would not have joined creatures to God, as it would be itself looking for someone to join it, nor would portion of creation have been creation's salvation, since it would need salvation itself." And at 70, beg.: "But this would not have come to pass, had the Logos been a creature; for with a creature, the Devil, himself a creature, would ever have continued the battle. . . . For man would not have been deified if joined to a creature, or unless the Son were very God. . . ." (here follows too the point that the flesh of Christ must be our own true human flesh). These statements are only too true, and they are also true in the contrapositive form in which they are made, that is, that if Christ had not been God, we would have had no connection with God. Unfortunately, this sort of statement has often been cited as the most typical expression of Athanasian theology, and the deduction has been made that he was a sort of theological pragmatist, a man who was not interested in mere dogma, but merely in the salvation of men, conceived as deification; correspondingly, the impossibility of this on the basis of Arianism would be the beginning and end of Athanasius's case against this great heresy. Admittedly, this emphasis is in a way embedded throughout Athanasius's writings, but to say that it is his basic principle of thought, to make him a kind of theological pragmatist, is grossly unfair to what he explicitly said. The great scandal of Arianism was that it was simply false. The thing to note about Athanasius's introduction of the pragmatist argument here is its lateness; at a time when Athanasius needs everything possible for an unusually difficult argument.
Admittedly, there is one place before where Athanasius momentarily touches on this type of argumentation, above, in C. Ar. II: 41: 233B. But this is itself late enough, and it was directly due to the fact that he was going to discuss baptism, which is the rite deemed to represent our joining to Christ. Pragmatism is as far as possible from being the first thing that came to Athanasius's mind; we shall return to such interesting points in our resume of the theology of this work.

The last two chapters in this section are in the nature of a summary and a peroration, and need not detain us.

In conclusion, let us summarise the results of our investigations of Athanasius's exegesis of Prov. 8: 22 LXX. In general, he follows the usual line of referring it to the incarnate life of Christ, and to the humanity that He took. The differences in this case are, firstly, the text itself and its place in the locus classicus for the cosmological side of theology, and secondly, the fact that it was the most severe challenge that Athanasius had to face; after all, it did run, Κύριος ἐκποιηθήκε μετὰ ἁρχὴν δόξαν δυναμός εἶναι ἔργα δυναμός, which version he accepted without question. His case rests on what might be called an essentialist outlook, that is, a strict distinction between what is eternally and aboriginally true, and what is only temporarily and accidentally true. This essentialism shows itself in another way, in that what is true aboriginally and essentially is also true absolutely, and can in no sense be constituted by any relations. On the other hand, what is accidentally true, while still being in one sense an absolute fact (and not a relative truth in the sense understood by, say, Protagoras), is in another way to be understood in terms of relations, whether these relations be passive relations, things happening to the thing in question, or active relations, that is, plans, policies, etc.
Lin. 9tic., Jlyp the distinction is shown by the former truths being expressed by nouns, substantival or adjectival, the latter type of truth by verbal modes of expression. Thus on both counts it is impossible that Prov. 8:22 LXX refer to the aboriginal essence of the Logos, and therefore it must refer to the Incarnation, and the only thing that can be "created" and so described in the verse in question is the Humanity of Christ, and, on Athanasius's general principle, our own new humanity in Him; from this Scripture goes on to refer this "creation" to the essential Person of Christ by communitio idiomatum.

But this is only one half of the picture. To understand the significance of the other half of the picture, it must be remembered again that Athanasius completely and unreservedly accepts the doctrine of pluralism as the truth of creaturely life per se. The final sign of his acceptance is that he will not even allow the essence of a creature to be constituted by relations. He actually goes so far as to say that a man is essentially a man before he is even a servant of God. But, by the form of Prov. 8:22 LXX, the Logos-Wisdom, as a "creature", is completely constituted by a purpose, and completely gives himself to "the works". Therefore, on this count, the only entity that can possibly fit the requirements is the Incarnate Christ. An entity that is essentially a creature would have to be himself and could not initiate the process of self-giving, and a fortiori God in His bare purity would be even more committed to being just what He absolutely is. This leaves only the Incarnate Christ.

Just occasionally, Athanasius's exegetical methods and principles let him down, but in general he builds up an astonishing case, and especially his case for pluralism as the true Scriptural doctrine of creaturely existence is most formidable, although it is not
often recognised in this way. In this section, by dealing with the temporal side, Athanasius completes his case. A little reflection will show that this is the natural result of the rest of Athanasius's theology. \[\text{If pluralism were not the truth of creaturely existence,}\]

if each creature was, as a creature, something other than just what it is in itself and was constituted by relations, the creatures would form a Stoic or Hegelian constitutive system, and there would in fact be a Logos that was a creature and would have a real existence from creaturely reality alone. Now, if there is one thing that Athanasius always had to deny, it was that. One of the motives of his anti-Arian theology was to establish in season and out of season that all the essential relations and correlations of the Logos, all that were eternally and aboriginally and essentially true, were within the Godhead. Thus, creaturely pluralism was an essential part of his whole case. This has forced him to abandon the less consistent pluralism and the hierarchical doctrine of reality of the Platonic Socrates, and accept to the full the equalitarian pluralism - within creaturely life - of the later Plato, or even further, the doctrine of the modern neo-realist schools. \[\] This has produced another change in the outlook of Athanasius, which we have fully described above. He started from the natural and early Platonist conception of created matter being naturally servile. Now, he sees that created matter of any sort cannot be a servant in the sense that Christ-as-created was a servant. This implies a further change in the correlations towards that between Christ as a servant and His Deity; \[\text{the Humanity and the Deity are both necessary conditions for this, but, paradoxically enough, the prime condition is the Deity, in an even more profound way than that proposed by Barth in Church Dogmatics IV:1.}\] This conclusion may not have been drawn by Athanasius in so many words, but it is even so only just below the surface.
Next, we must consider the effect of his exegesis of Prov. 8: 22 LXX on his treatment of the Supra- and Infra-lapsarian issue. We have seen above that Athanasius has so far followed the "obvious" line of Infralapsarianism, that is, that the Incarnation was an extraordinary act of God to meet an extraordinary need. The first effect of his exegesis was to reinforce this trend. After all, it is the Divinity that is the essence of the Logos; the Incarnation and the Humanity of Christ are accidental, and the verse as interpreted by Athanasius says in so many words that they were relative to needs and plans in the way that no entity in his essential nature is, even a creature. But on the other side there are elements in this section that are beginning to force Athanasius in the other way, towards Supralapsarianism at last. As we have noticed, the line that we have just described not only succeeds, but actually succeeds too much. It makes it clear that the self-giving grace of God can only be imparted in the Incarnate Christ; in fact, Athanasius reiterates, in ch. 64, that the creatures could not have endured the naked majesty of God. In another context, this would have led to gnostic Gnosticism and dualism, but in this context is the great safeguard of the absolute primacy of the Incarnation, since the Incarnation and the Atonement have been already in the forefront of Athanasius's writings. This is a special case of the more general point that here Athanasius has interpreted what is in

(384) These terms specially refer to a dispute in Protestant theology in the 17th century—see Barth, Ch. Dogm. Vol. II, Pt. II, pp. 127-145 (E.T.) for a full study of the dispute both in its historical context and its general significance. It is unnecessary to say that Barth is a Supralapsarian in the sense that Athanasius expressed in chs. 73-77. But the terms Supralapsarian and Infra-lapsarian are capable of general application to any theology.
the more obvious way a cosmological passage in such a way as to give
the Incarnation and Atonement the place of honour as the controlling
basis of the interpretation. This cannot but lead on to Supralapsarian-
ism, a trend which we shall see coming to fruition in the next few
chapters.

We have noted, and praised, the pluralism of Athanasius as
the truth of creaturely life. Where he is on much more dangerous
ground is to extend the pluralistic principles to cover, and to
demote, even the relation of the creature to God, (except insofar as
the very term creature undeniably involves such a relation; in view
of what we have said about Κτήσις not being a genuine summa genus
of itself for Athanasius, (355) it is at least arguable that Athanasius
did regard the relationship to God as being inseparable from the notion
of being a Κτήσις; however much he excluded the idea of a creature being
constituted by any more detailed relationship). This pluralistic
doctrine was made, as we have shown above, against a background that
was still explicitly Infralapsarian. Whether it would have survived a
change in the direction of Supralapsarianism and Predestinationism of
the type which actually took place in the chapters immediately following
is a different matter. It probably would not be viable in the form
presented here - at any rate it could not have been presented with the
assurance of chapters 18-72. If the whole purpose of God in grace
towards us, as revealed and realised to us in the economy of Christ, is
treated rigorously as being eternally decreed by God, it would appear
that we must accept that man in particular (as well as creation as a
whole) is constituted in his real being by his relation to Christ - a
return to the earlier Logos-theology, but tremendously enriched by the

(355) See above, p. 827.
intervening conflict with the Arians with the deeper study of the
Incarnation that it caused. The thing that must still be avoided is
the idea that man has the natural capacity to coalesce to form a
constitutive unity, of the sort that might be termed the Logos, etc.
That is, it must always be affirmed that the transcendence of the Divine
Logos over creation— and this applies too to the celebrated principle
Deus non est in genere aliquo, which at this point is for modern theology
at any rate insufficient and requires further clarification—is not
merely a categorial transcendence but has an absoluteness to be found
nowhere else. This would not be a serious difficulty if the postulated
change of position were to take place. The real difficulty is that men
do, in fact, refuse what God has prepared for them for the foundation
of the world, but since we have now reached the intractable problem of
the ontogeny of sin, further discussion is impossible.

However, the pluralistic position as found here in Athanasius
will always be an important corrective to the highly dangerous tendency
to consider Christian men and communities solely or even principally in
terms of their relation or prospective relation to others within or
without the Church, instead of remembering that they must not only show
salvation to others but enjoy it in themselves and for what they are
themselves. No matter how much this morality of service (386) is at times
a necessary corrective to the lazy euphoria of much "Christian" life, the
love that abideth is not constituted by giving one's goods to feed the
poor or giving one's body to be burned, for even at the best the time
shall come when the need for these will disappear.

While all the above discussion has taken place, there have
been seven references to the Holy Spirit: 50: 253B: "For in the
prayer of David the Holy Spirit marks the same distinction (Ps. 86:16,
i.e. the distinction between God as Father of the Son and Lord of

(386) As described and criticised, by John Macmurray, "Freedom in the
Modern World", ch. 10.
903.

creation). 51: 253C: "we too, being servants by nature and receiving the Spirit of the Son (τὸν πνεῦμα τοῦ Υἱοῦ ζωῆς - πνεῦμα not spelt with capital), might have confidence to call Him by grace Father. 52: 257B: This again the Spirit foretells in the Psalms, saying, (Heb. 2:7, based on Ps.8) . (refers to God's kingship in Christ). 57: 263C: This too the Holy Spirit has signified in the Psalms saying, .. (Ps. 102: 25 & 74:2). 59: 273A: But this is God's kindness to man, that according to grace He afterwards becomes Father of those whose Maker He is; becomes, that is, when men, His creatures, receive into their hearts, as the Apostle says, 'The Spirit of His Son, crying, "Abba, Father!" And these are they who, having received the Logos, gained power from Him to become sons of God; and they could not become sons, being naturally creatures, otherwise than by receiving the Spirit of the natural and true Son. 273C: but afterwards, on receiving the grace of the Spirit, we are said thenceforth to be begotten also. 61:277A: For as men, receiving the Spirit of the Son, become children through Him (δι' αυτοῦ - no clue as to the Trinitarian Person possible), .. . . (so is the Logos said to be created after the Incarnation). 71: 300A: This too the Spirit hath declared in the Psalms. . (33:4, i.e. the Deity of the Logos). Four of these references are routine quotations of Scripture, in each case of passages from the Psalms, like the two earlier cases in the Contra Gentes. At this stage the question arises, in view of the Epistle to Marcellinus on the Psalms, (387) whether Athanasius had in mind the relation of the Spirit to the subjective (in the Barthian sense) response of the believer, but this does not arise yet; all the passages are Scriptural testimony of an objective (again in the Barthian sense) response of the believer, but this does not arise yet; all the passages are Scriptural testimony of an objective (again in the Barthian

(387) In this beautiful Epistle, Athanasius points out that the Psalms are inspired not only in the sense of the remainder of the Bible, but in an additional sense. We can read, and be inspired by, the words of Moses, or even of our Lord, but there is one thing that we cannot do with them; use them as our own words in our prayers or responses to God. This further thing we can do with the Psalms, and the body of the latter consists, in a surprisingly modern, not to say Western, way, of an exhaustive catalogue of emotional states with the corresponding Psalms.
The other four all refer to the appropriation of the grace of Christ by the believer and the part of the Spirit therein; specifically in this case to the way in which believers become sons of God in a secondary and derivative way, by the grace of the original and essential Son of God. This corresponds to the observation that we have made before, that with the Logos unreservedly associated naturally with the Father, the question of man's participation in Divine grace becomes a problem, and the doctrine of the Spirit was revived first in order to deal with this matter.

After dealing with Prov. 8:22 itself, Athanasius now continues with the context of Prov. 8:22; especially in the first place with Prov. 8:23 & 25. In some sense these verses are even more critical, since they place the "creation" of wisdom apparently in the place where the Arians would have it. It is this difficulty that finally impels him to a Supralapsarian theology, since if the "creation" of the Logos-wisdom really refers to the Incarnation, the latter would in some sense have to be before the foundation of the world. In ch. 73, Athanasius repeats by way of introduction the old principle of the difference between what is eternally and aboriginally and absolutely true of Christ and what happened later concerning Him, which was relative to some other purpose. In the next chapter, he also repeats previous matter, that the foundation of a thing is on the same plane as the other parts of it, and can only be considered a foundation in relation to the other parts; thus, for Christ to be the foundation in this sense can refer only to His incarnation and humanity. The same exegesis, incidentally, is also applied to the Vine and the Branches, since they

(368) See the whole sections on the Son and the Spirit in terms of revelation, in Ch. Dogm. Vol. I, Pt.II.
are both alike botanical structures. At the commencement of ch. 75 begins the passage which Karl Barth quotes at length as being the only adequate approach in all theology to what he considers an adequate doctrine of predestination: 

"Nor let the words 'before the world' and 'before he made the earth' and 'before the mountains were settled' disturb anyone; for they accord very well with 'founded' and 'created'; for here again allusion is made to the Economy according to the flesh. For though the grace which came to us from the Saviour appeared, as the Apostle says, just now and has come when he sojourned among us, yet this grace has been prepared even before we came into being, nay, before the foundation of the world, and the reason why is something kindly and wonderful. It besecmed not that God should counsel concerning us afterwards, lest he should seem to be ignorant of our affairs. The God of all things, creating us through His own Logos, and knowing what is good for us better than we, foresaw that, after being made good, we should then be transgressors of the commandment and be thrust out of paradise for disobedience - and, being loving and kind, He prepared beforehand (προτεσθόμενον) in (ἐν) His own Logos, through whom also He created us, the Economy of our salvation; that though by the serpent's deceit we fell from Him, we might not remain utterly dead, but having in the Logos the redemption and salvation that were before prepared for us, we might rise again and abide immortal. . . . (here follows a glance back at the exegesis of "beginning of ways", etc., and quotation of II Tim. 1:8-10 and Eph. 1:3-5). . . .

Now then has He chosen us before we came into existence, but thus, that. . . we were represented in Him beforehand? And

(389) See Ch. Dogm. Vol. II, Pt. II (pp. 100-110) (E.T.). See also op. cit., pp. 76-93 for a study of why the Doctrine of Predestination is to be linked with the Doctrine of God as He is in Himself and not with Creation or even primarily with Reconciliation on the basis of the traditional schema of Loci theologicci. If one repudiated the pragmatic interpretation of Athanasius, one would have to say that Athanasius, almost alone, anticipated Barth in placing the Doctrine of Predestination in this context.

(390) Χρηστὸς καὶ Θεοματιστὴς.
(391) οἵας τὰ ἄνων ὑπέρ ἡμᾶς.
(392) φιλάθρωπος καὶ ὑγιάθος ὑπ᾽ ἐμὲ.
(393) ἐν ἀντών μοιν προτεσθόμενοι! The last word could well be translated "typified", in something like its usual theological sense.
how, before men were created, did He predestinate us at all unto adoption, but that the Son Himself was 'founded before the world', taking on Him that economy which was for our sake? Or how, as the Apostle goes on to say, 'have we an inheritance, being predestinated', but that the Lord Himself was founded 'before the world', inasmuch as He had a purpose for our sakes to take on Him through the flesh (394) all that inheritance of judgment which lay against us, and we henceforth were made sons in Him? And how did we receive it 'before the world was', when we were not yet in being whereas we later have come to be in time, but that in Christ was stored (ἡ προεξελεγμένη) the grace which has reached us? . . . (Matt. 25:34). . . How then, or in (ἐν) whom, was it prepared before we came to be, save in the Lord who 'was before the world' was founded for this purpose, that we, being built upon Him, might as well-compacted stones partake the life and grace which is from Him? . . . (Concretely this means for our resurrection). . . Therefore fittingly the Logos, on coming down into our own flesh, and being created in it 'as a beginning of ways for His works' is laid a foundation, even as the Father's will was in Him before the world (395), as has been said, and before land was, and before the mountains were settled, and before the fountains burst forth; that, though the earth and the mountains and the shapes of visible nature (396) pass away in the fullness of the present age (397), we on the contrary may not grow old after their pattern, but may be able to live after them, having the spiritual life and blessing which before these things had been prepared for us in the Logos Himself according to election. For thus we shall be capable of a life not temporary, but ever afterwards abide and live in Christ, since even before this, our life has been founded and prepared in Christ Jesus.

Nor was it fitting that our life should be founded in any other way than in the Lord Who is before the ages, and through Whom the ages were brought to be, that, since it was in Him, we too might be able to inherit that everlasting life. For God is good, and being good always,

(394) ἦστε αὐτῶν προεξελεγμένοι Εὐειν... διὸ οἰκος
(395) οὕτως ἦσον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ βουλήμα τοῦ Πατρὸς.
(396) τὰ ορισματὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν
(397) ἐν οἵῳ διευθετοτοῦ ἐνεστῶτος δίωνος
He willed this, as He knew that our weak nature (φυσιν) needed the succour and salvation which is from Him. And as a wise architect, proposing to build a house, also makes plans to repair it, in case at any time it should become dilapidated after it has been built, and in planning about this makes preparation and gives the workers material for repair, and the means of repair antecedes the house; in the same way, the renewal of our salvation is founded before us in Christ, so that in Him we could be also recreated. And the will (προθέσει) and purpose (προσφέρει) were prepared (προορίζεται) 'before the world', but have taken effect (398) when the need required, and the Saviour came among us. For the Lord Himself will be for us in the heavens instead of everything else, when He receives us into eternal life. (Hence, as before, this verse cannot show that the Logos is a creature).

This change to Predestinationism and Supralapsarianism was inevitable at some stage in the Arian controversy, especially in view of Prov. 8:23 and 25. It is interesting to observe the way in which Athanasius is apparently pressed progressively to the limit, which is reached at this point. Athanasius has previously dismissed various passages in which Christ is said to be "made", on the ground that the very syntax of the passages proves that the verb cannot have been meant absolutely. Then he is confronted with Prov. 8:22 LXX, where ἐξητισε is, according to the syntax, used absolutely; this is again explained, with rather more difficulty, as being properly a reference to the Incarnation, which is still interpreted in the Infralapsarian manner. Now, in Prov. 8:23-25, the "creation" of the Logos-Wisdom is explicitly placed before the foundation of the world; therefore, since Athanasius must still refer it to the Incarnation, the only thing left is to adopt the Supralapsarian position and say - with complete Scriptural justification, as Athanasius shows - that the Incarnation and the Economy of salvation figures in the eternal counsel of God, antedating even the

(398) ἄρη ἑρχον ἅρχον
Creation; that is, to put it exactly where Barth put it in Church Dogmatics, Vol. II: Pt. II. He even makes the point, for the first time, that the eternity of our future life in Christ must have, as its necessary complement, the eternity or at least the pre-existence, in the counsel of God, of the salvation that is to bring us this gift. This of course is the well-known controversy between the Supralapsarians and Infralapsarians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Of course the subject is not discussed in Athanasius with the same thoroughness of detail and with the same emphasis, but this is solely due to the way in which it came up in Athanasius, in the context of the Arian heresy and what was at first sight the purely cosmological side of the theology of the Second Person. Of course, the earlier statements of Athanasius that the Incarnation and Atonement would not have taken place but for sin and the Fall still stand, and this means that Athanasius is in a difficult and paradoxical position; perhaps this is in the nature of the case. The whole question of Supra- and Infra-lapsarianism, both in its Athanasian and post-Reformation forms, bristles with difficulties which we cannot discuss here. Athanasius's actual solution, to compare the actual course of events with the plans made by an architect, etc., as an insurance against the most unfavourable contingencies, seems at first sight somewhat over-confident and facile, but is probably the best answer possible, especially as the statement is definitely made that God knew our infirmities, and that extra precautions would become necessary at some time. The only thing that is really doubtful - and this is the trouble at the root of the controversy - is whether the weakness of human nature is the same thing as human sin, even sin as presented in the De Incarnatione, let alone in writers such as Anselm. But this is a minor blemish on a most significant extract.
It is to be correlated with the tremendous emphasis in this portion of the Contra Arianos on the exaltation of our humanity in that of Christ; inevitably the prime emphasis would be on sin as weakness.

However, the most interesting aspect of this passage is that it represents in a sense that final culmination of the whole Logos doctrine; the same applies to the title Wisdom, and the rest of the cosmological theology that is traditionally attributed to Hellenism or to the interaction between it and the Old Testament. In this sense, Logos would be the plan that systematically unites the universe; incidentally, this idea is not entirely Greek, since the Rabbinic doctrine of the preexistence of the Torah, when combined with the fact that it is inevitably God's plan for the world, closely resembles the Logos of early Patristic theology; in fact, we shall later show that it is an accident that the translation of πρὸς in the LXX was Ἰορθος and not Ἰορθος (399). The habitual modern attack on the "Hellenistic and rationalistic" Logos doctrine is in essence correct, but much of it is suspect in detail, since it is motivated by a sort of crypto-Marcionism which denies that God can have anything to do with creation and its order at all. It is even worse when God is considered to be essentially irrational or "absurd", which word, in the sense used by Jean-Paul Sartre, is the perfect equivalent of the Greek Ἰορθος which for Athanasius is so obviously an impossible attribute of God. No; the only correct view is the traditional one that the supremely rational creature is, in fact, God, and God alone.

This is not a justification for natural theology; on the contrary, it soundly and completely rules it out, since to judge the rationality of God by our own would be to adulterate it. But we cannot deny the

(399) See Appendix pp. and the section "Logos und Thora" p. 138 of the article "Logos" etc. of Kittel's "Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament", and also Bibliography appended thereto.
rationality of God, and in fact this is supremely affirmed by the very theologian who is often accused of (or even praised for!) denying it—Karl Barth. The same applies to the theological idea of the unity of the world, and of a unifying principle involved therein. The only thing that this can be is God's Economy and Plan of salvation in Christ, whether as actually enacted or as the Eternal Decree. Once again, this does not justify rational monistic cosmology as a theological doctrine; rather does it again rule it out completely. There is no such element in creation as such, and the pluralism uncompromisingly asserted by Athanasius remains the complete truth of cosmology as such. Apart from Christ, there is no material unity in the world, either actual or prospective. It is the destiny of the world to be made one by the saving work of Christ and the spread throughout it of the Word, in that way and in that way only.

This appears to be a revival of the sort of Logos doctrine that prevailed in earlier theology, even in the "Contra Gentes". But the differences are that now the Logos principle, in this sense, is interpreted uncompromisingly in terms of the incarnate and saving work of Christ, and also that the starting point is completely reversed. In the "Contra Gentes", as in natural theology, the argument starts from the nature of the world; here, the argument starts from the Second Person Himself in all His Deity and majesty, as already given in revelation, and thence it is shown how He is the Logos of the world in the old sense.

Thus, the categories of natural theology are completely replaced by those of revelation and salvation.

The above shows how the title Logos in the Greek sense is a most appropriate secondary title of the Second Person. To go on and maintain that it is a correct title for God as He is eternally we should
have to invoke the principle that the grace which God gives to us cannot contradict His own nature, but must be a reflection of the Divine life itself. This is the strongest and most favourable interpretation of the principle of *θεόποιημα*, deification, on which Athanasius usually lays so much stress, although the sort of application that we are postulating is not made directly here by Athanasius. Thus, in a real sense, this plan of salvation, God's eternal election of Himself as the gracious God, is part of His very essence, and systematically must be placed in the locus of the Doctrina De Deo (which is exactly what was done by Karl Barth, Ch. Dog. Vol. II: PtII). In this way, Logos would be a perfectly appropriate title to apply within the description of God as He is Himself. The special application of this title to the Second Person is associated with the fact that the Second Person is specially the Person that carries through the work of reconciliation, that is, that God's eternal gracious decree is in Christ. It is true that, in spite of the above, the feeling still remains that the best and most ultimate title of the Second Person is Son rather than Logos or Word. But the fact remains that the traditional attack of modern theology on the "Greek" Logos doctrine has gone too far, and what is imperatively needed now is a revival of it in such a way as this. This would enable theology and faith to see God's sovereignty over creation, and the working out of His purpose in history in real and not merely formal terms, and put it in the proper relation to His eternal predestination. One of the things that Athanasius was certainly saying - note the passages of Scripture which he cites - as well as Barth when he follows him at this point, is that the proper reference of the doctrine of Predestination is to God's eternal election of grace in Christ. And finally, as we have said before, a Logos
doctrine of this kind would be so different from the rationalistic Greek doctrine that no criticism on the grounds of Hellenism can be made. Of course, we have discussed the issue in terms of Logos, because this title is the principal one of its kind applied to the Second Person. Of course, exactly the same applies in terms of the title Wisdom, in the cosmological sense which is uppermost in Prov. 8:22-30, and of course Athanasius's argument is actually in terms of this latter title.

If Christian cosmology is developed along those lines on Athanasian principles, the question will at once arise of the distinction that must be made between God's eternal Will and plan as it is in itself and the way in which it works itself out in created nature. In these terms, Athanasius does not get as far as this, but it is noteworthy that the next topic for discussion is the distinction between Wisdom in the absolute and the created wisdom in the world, or the wisdom that Absolute Wisdom, the Second Person, stamps upon the creaturely cosmos: "Now the Only-begotten and Very Wisdom (δύοσοφα) of God is Creator and Framer of all things, for 'in Wisdom hast Thou made them all', he says, and 'the earth is full of Thy creation'. But that what came into being might not only be (Θεοπραγματευμένον), but also be good (Καλός ὅπως πράγματευη), it pleased God that His own Wisdom should condescend to the creatures, so as to introduce an impress and semblance of Its Image on all in common and on each (400), that what was made might be manifestly wise works and worthy of God. For as our ὑποφανέστησις is an image of the Son of God as Logos, so is the wisdom which is implanted in us an image of the same Son as Wisdom; in which wisdom we, having the power of knowledge and thought, become receptive (ἀκτινοθείης) of the All-framing Wisdom, and through It we are able to know Its Father... (I John 2:23 & Matt. 10:40). ... Such an impress then of Wisdom being created in us, and being in all the works, fittingly does the true and framing Wisdom take up (ἐκλεγμένη) its impress into itself, and say, 'The Lord created Me for His works,' for what the
wisdom in us says, the Lord speaks as if it were His own; and, whereas He is not Himself created but Creator, yet because of the image of Him created in the works He says this as of Himself. And as the Lord Himself has said, 'He that receiveth you, receiveth Me,' because His impress is in us, so, though He be not of things created, yet, because of the image of Him created in the works, He says, as if of His own person (ἐγὼ ἀπόφησιν ἥκως), 'The Lord created me as a beginning of His ways for His works.' And this impress of Wisdom in the works has come to be, that . . . the world might recognise in it its own Creator, the Logos, and through Him the Father . . . (Rom 1: 19-20). . . . But if so, the Logos is not a creature but what is referred to in Proverbs is the wisdom which is and is said to be in us."

(This chapter is largely a repetition of the predecessor; Athanasius proves that there is a wisdom in creation as an image of Absolute Wisdom, and that the former is referred to in the disputed passages. Athanasius then returns to the sealing metaphor last treated in the De Incarnatione) . . . (316A): "And as some son of a king, when the father wished to build a city, might cause his own name to be printed on each of the works as they were being made, in order to make sure that the works would remain by means of the appearance of the name on each of them, and also to enable them to remember both himself and his father from the name. Having finished the city, he might be asked concerning it, how it was made, and then would answer, 'It is made securely, for according to the will of my father I am imaged in each work, for my name was made in the works,' but in saying this he does not signify that his own essence (ὃσικτ) was created, but the impress of himself by means of the name; . . . (similarly with Wisdom in Proverbs). . . .

Again, one should not be startled that the Son should be speaking of the impress that is within us as if it were Himself . . . since when Saul was persecuting the Church, in which was His impress and image, He said, as if He Himself was being persecuted, 'Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou Me?' . . . . (The point is made again about the distinction between Wisdom in the absolute and the impress of Wisdom) . . . And He says, 'beginning of ways,' since such wisdom becomes a sort of beginning (ἀρχής τῶν) and as it were a foundation (στήλη ἑωρκισ) of the knowledge of God; for a man, entering as it were upon this way first . . . (Prov. 1:7). . . then ascending in thought and having perceived
the Framing Wisdom which is in creation(401) he perceives in It (ἐν ὑμῖν—presumably Wisdom) also Its Father . . . (John 14:9 & I John 2:23). . . And He says, 'Before the world He founded Me,' since in its impress the works remain settled and eternal(402) . . . (The distinction having again been established between absolute and created Wisdom, it is again stated that the Second Person cannot be a creature) . . .

But since He proceeds to say, 'When He prepared the heaven, I was present with Him,' we ought to know that He does not say this as if without wisdom the Father prepared the heaven or the clouds above. . . (in view of John 1:3) . . . but this is what He says, 'All things took place in Me and through Me, and when there was need that Wisdom should be created in the works, in Essence (ἡμεῖς ὁ θεός) I was indeed with the Father, but by a condescension to things originate I was disposing (ὁμογενῶς) the impress from Me over the works, so that the whole world as being in one body (ὁς ἐν σώματι) might not be at variance but in agreement with itself! All those then who with an upright understanding according to the wisdom given them(403), come to contemplate the creatures,' are able to say for themselves, 'By Thy appointment all things continue,' but they who despise this must be told, 'Professing themselves to be wise they became fools,' . . . (Rom. 1:19-25 & I Cor. 1:21) . . . For no longer, as in former times, has God willed to be known by an image and a shadow of Wisdom, but He has made the True Wisdom itself to take flesh . . . (Here follows a brief account of the Atonement) . . .

Hence the whole earth is filled with the knowledge of Him; for the knowledge of Father through Son and of Son from Father is one and the same, and the Father delights in Him, and in the same joy the Son rejoices in the Father . . . (Prov. 8:30) . . . And this again proves that the Son is not foreign but proper to the Father's Essence . . . When then was it that the Father did not rejoice? But if He ever rejoiced, He was ever, in Whom He rejoiced. And in whom does the Father rejoice, except as seeing Himself in His own Image, which is

(401) ἐπείγομένων τῇ διανοίᾳ, καὶ νοῆσαι τῇ ἐν τῷ Κτίσι τημορινήν σοφίαν
(402) ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ δεῖ μένει τῇ ἔρημῇ.
(403) διδόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ, κατὰ τὴν ἐκτισμὴν δοθείαν σοφίαν.
His Logos? And though in sons of men also He had delight . . . . not because joy was added to Him, but again on seeing the works made after His own Image; so that even this rejoicing of God is on account of His Image. . ( . . Here follows the peroration of this particular section, where the basic conclusion is stated again). . . . "

Now that the exegesis of Proverbs has brought Athanasius up against his great problem in its most general cosmological significance, not just as applied to the Person of Christ, he has had to consider the difference between created and uncreated reality within the field of grace as well. This is the problem which we have said would confront Athanasius if he gets to the stage of discussing in detail the historical working out of the economy of salvation after Pentecost within the created world; he never reaches this stage, but in a sense discusses the problem in an even more general form. He does so in terms of the Christological analogy, according to the Christology which he has already so thoroughly elaborated. (Corresponding to the relation between the Logos and the Body of Christ, there is a created wisdom in creatures which is a τρόπιον, impress of the Absolute Wisdom, the Εἰκών, image.)

With this normal but not quite complete distinction in vocabulary Athanasius safeguards himself from confusion, the latter being so to speak the sigillographic negative or matrix and the former the positive final impression. At first sight this is the old Platonic distinction all over again between Forms and particulars, but a closer examination shows that this is not the case. Created wisdom would, on this schema, be a third thing between the form and the particulars. (404) In a sense, created wisdom and absolute wisdom are alike in being wisdom and not wise beings, but what has changed the whole position is that between these two has been introduced the chasm between God Himself and created reality,

(404) See above, pp. 587-88.
which as we have seen before Athanasius and his enemies agreed in taking in deadly earnestness. The same point also differentiates Athanasius's treatment of this issue here from the very similar treatment of the relation between the Logos and the world in the "Contra Gentes" and the "De Incarnatione", where the difference between the Logos or Wisdom of God and created rationality or wisdom has not yet been established. In the earlier theology, the general action of the Logos on the world was immediate; now, it is mediate through the additional created wisdom, analogous to the Humanity of Christ in the particular economy of the Incarnation. This created wisdom is regarded as being involved in the communicatio idiomatum in exactly the same way as the Humanity of Christ is.

This treatment of Wisdom in this general way brings it very close to what later became the Doctrine of the Spirit which still shows that the later development of Pneumatology as a definite doctrine had not yet occurred. This treatment of Wisdom in a Pneumatic way is interesting in view of the element in the second-century Patristic tradition which did actually identify Wisdom with the Spirit, and in some ways this is where it most naturally belongs. (405) Incidentally, there is no mention of Third Person, expressly as such, in these last five chapters of Oration II, and only one routine reference in the preceding five. (This is probably another sign that Athanasius is still tending to treat under the heading of the Second Person issues that should be under the Third.) However, there is a much more serious side to this question. As things are at this stage, we have the Divine Pre-existent Second Person, and the created Body or Humanity of Christ, and the relation between the two has been clearly and emphatically established.

And we have Wisdom Itself, also Divine, and the created wisdom, in a Christologically analogous relationship. The Absolute Wisdom has some traditional affinity, the tradition being not entirely unjustified, with the Third Person, but is now firmly identified with the Second Person by all sides in the controversy. Finally, there is a Scriptural and liturgical tradition of the Third Person, which for long had largely ceased to play any part in deliberate theology, and was only now beginning to return; and in its return it was almost entirely associated with the subjective reception of the grace and activity of the Logos which was becoming in itself more and more correlated within the Godhead rather than with the created world. May not this be a most dangerous root of the Tropicist or Pneumatomachic heresy which broke out so suddenly only a few years later? It would have been the easiest thing in the world to identify the Holy Spirit with the created Wisdom or created grace on which Athanasius lays so much stress, and the very thoroughness with which he differentiates between Divine and created grace would make the end result all the more serious. There is no direct evidence in the Ad Serapionem I-IV that this took place, but would Athanasius have left such evidence in any case? The question still remains hypothetical, but this section reinforces the feeling that we have already had that it was the very success of Athanasius against the Arians that provoked Tropicism, or the "Arianism of the Spirit", in such an acute form in Egypt, so soon after this time. We shall return to this topic a little further on.

While on this matter, there are two less important points to be mentioned. The first is that in ch. 79: 316B-C, Athanasius revives the sealing metaphor. This had always been one of the great traditions of theology on the liturgical side, and had always had special associations with the Spirit; however, in early Athanasius, as for
example in "De Incarnatione" 14, its prime association was with the Second Person. In the Epistles to Serapion, Athanasius revives the traditional association with the Spirit, but still associates it at this stage with the Second Person. However, there is a most instructive change between his earlier and later treatment of the issue. What we have here is a combination of the metaphor of protection by the direct presence of the king, in De Inc. 9 – latter half, and sealing in its most general sense, as in De Inc. 14. Here, these two aspects are taken together. The chief purpose of the sealing or the impression of the Royal image is specifically to protect the creatures against the powers that would destroy them, by the mediate presence of the King. This is a sign of the greater maturity of thought in Athanasius, in two ways. Firstly, it does more justice to the part played by mediation in all the operation of God – mediation, that is, in the Trinitarian and Christological sense, not the Gnostic or Neo-Platonic sense. The fact that he introduces not only the Prime Agent, but also His Son, is another sign of the same change, which of course was directly due, humanly, to the struggle against Arianism. The second point is that, in treating the sealing and protecting motives together, Athanasius is deliberately referring to the well-known eschatological idea of the Christian being sealed against the Day of Redemption. This is a first sign of a revival of eschatological interest in the field of theological dogma – which unfortunately did not go nearly as far as one would have liked. It is no accident that Athanasius has just been brought against the question of God's historical Plan for salvation in the preceding chapters, an indication of the close relation that exists, or ought to exist, between Predestination and Eschatology.

The other minor point on this issue concerns Athanasius's mention of Paul's encounter on the Damascus road, at the beginning of ch. 80. The reply of Christ is taken as meaning that created Wisdom, Christologically analogous to the Body of Christ, is specially upon the Church. Thus, the interpretation of Prov. 8:22, in Athanasius dub. "De Incarnatione et contra Arianos," that what was created was actually the Church, is foreshadowed here, and its occurrence in the later work is not quite such a contra-indication of Athanasian authorship as has often been assumed. Still, in balance the evidence is still against the authenticity of the "De Incarnatione et contra Arianos," since Athanasius would not even have made this alteration in his exegesis at the age of over sixty years without a major change of theological interest, and the very title of this work is against a sufficient change, as far as the work is concerned; if such a change had in some way occurred, Athanasius would probably have explained it in greater detail. (407)

The other major issue in this passage is its significance for the problem of natural theology. Athanasius, in the "Contra Gentes," was almost a pure natural theologian. Later, as we have noticed, Athanasius still formally used the language of natural theology while his general theological approach became less and less compatible with it. The issue of natural theology is how we can see in the creatures that they are created by God, and thus to rise from contemplation of creatures to vision and understanding of God. The opponents of natural theology, supremely Feuerbach the atheist and Barth the Christian, point out, rightly so, that a pure natural theology does not carry one in the least beyond the created universe, and therefore, for Barth, revelation, which

(407) See Appendix, pp.
means concretely Jesus Christ, is the only source of knowledge of God. The cruder anti-Barthians reply to this that, in doing so, Barth denies the doctrine of God the Creator, and even if they do not go so far as this, many people feel that this sort of theology makes the doctrine of God the Creator unexpressible. Thus, the solution of Athanasius is of the greatest interest. He expresses the doctrine and our awareness of it in terms almost reminiscent of natural theology, that is, that we see the creatures and thence rise to God their Creator. But this is not a natural faculty in man, but is directly dependent on the created wisdom in man, analogous to the Body of Christ, and by this analogy the whole of our knowledge of God is kept on a Christological basis. Knowledge of God through the creatures can only be \( ύποθετείσθαι \) κατὰ \( μὴ \) ἔμνοις δοθείαιν σοφίαν – 81: 317C; it is by flouting this special gift that man becomes the fool that says that there is no God.

Again this specially created wisdom that is the proper 'beginning of ways' and the foundation (στοιχεῖον \( \xi \) \( \iota \) \( \omega \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \) \( \omicron \)) of our ascent from the creatures to God, and if a little after this point Athanasius seems to revert to the language of natural theology, this must be judged in the light of the fact that the indispensable basis is not a natural faculty in man, but a special creation that is just as much so as the Humanity of Christ, to which alone it is analogous. (It is noteworthy too that Athanasius interprets Rom. 1: 19-25, which opponents of natural theology have often felt as a serious difficulty, as acquiring its whole sharpness from the fact that Christ has come, as the True and Absolute Wisdom, rather than from the presence of any noble faculty in man, in the strict sense.) This is probably the most satisfactory solution to the problem of natural theology that has been propounded in theology.

One other lesser point; in the last chapter, ch. 82, Athanasius again raises the issue of God the Father and God the Son in their mutual
enjoyment, which he previously raised in Orat. I:20. The presentation
still has the Narcissistic overtones that we noticed before, (408) but
it is improved here by pointing out that, like an "absurd" (ἀστείον) or
wisdomless God, a loveless or joyless God cannot be admitted, and at
least it is made clear that the joy must be in another. Hence the
Father and Son must eternally co-exist.

During the last ten chapters of Orat. II, there is only one,
routine reference to the Holy Spirit, 74: 304B: "Therefore, according
to His manhood He is founded, that we, as precious stones, may be able
to be built upon Him, and may become a temple of the Holy Ghost which
dwelleth in us. Also, in 76: 309B: We share the grace prepared before-
hand for us, ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἑξελογίαν πνευματικήν.

These two passages that have been the objects of our attention
from the last ten chapters are of great prospective importance, and we
must attend to this before we proceed further. To begin with the
latter passage, chs. 78-82, first; the risk of Tropicism is one that
is inherent in the whole traditional treatment of the Spirit as being
especially associated with subjective revelation, a treatment which in
this generation has been confirmed by Karl Barth. Ultimately, the Spirit
must be as objective as the Son. In addition, corresponding to the
Humanity of Christ, there must be something in man that can only be
called created spirit. We shall see when we come to treat of the
Epistles to Serapion, that Athanasius does begin to treat this issue,
but does no more. In fact, it must be treated as rigorously as
Athanasius has just treated the distinction between the Eternal Son
and the Humanity of Christ, and perhaps one of the greatest defects of
the doctrine of the Spirit as it has historically developed, is that this
distinction has not been made. We must be thankful that Athanasius has

(408) See above pp. 633-5.
here shown us the right direction. One remark that one cannot resist the temptation of making, even at this stage, is that such a principle would greatly facilitate the solution of the ever-present problem of perfectionism, and, one might add, its opposite, the relative pessimism of, say, Reinhold Niebuhr in our day. This applies to both the Holy Spirit in relation to the Church and the Holy Spirit in relation to the individual believer. It still remains true that the Spirit is the Person of the Trinity with which both the Church and the individual are in the most direct contact, but where it comes to the detailed order of the Church and the ordinary life and commerce with the world of the individual, it is a case of the created spirit which is the analogue of the Humanity of Christ, and to which Athanasius is really pointing when he speaks of created Wisdom. Perfectionism, whether as an infallible Church or in the form of the perfect believer, corresponds to the Eutychian heresy, as it denies that the Church's or the believer's detailed human plans and decisions still bear the marks of our fallen creatureliness even as the Body of Christ, and though preserved by God nevertheless await for their perfection the redemption of all creation. But this created wisdom or created spirit is not on its own; as the Body of Christ is preserved by the presence of the Deity, and is its body and can do nothing without it, so must it be with the created wisdom or grace in the Church and the believer, and this should preserve us from either letting the Church be a personality of its own, which is ecclesiastical Nestorianism, or from that pessimism which is really a denial of the Incarnation.

The former half of this passage, chs. 73-77, is, as we have said, really the climax of all Logos theology in the Greek sense and in all its future forms in our age that are related to it. As we have noted,
the true meaning of Christ's title as Logos in the Greek sense — an aspect of theology that we cannot afford to do without — is that Christ is the Way which God predestined for the salvation of the world, and that in this age our history is not to be a meaningless jumble of happenings, but a systematic following through of this Way until He come again. Thus, along with the work of Irenaeus, this passage is the true foundation of the Christian doctrine of History. What the development of proletarian revolution is to a Marxist, the predestination of ourselves in Christ is to the Christian. As Karl Barth has said, this passage remains as a unique enunciation of this principle in theology. Augustine had a strong sense of history, and also a strong sense of predestination, but as Barth truly remarks, they are not firmly grounded in Christ in the way that they are in the "Contra Arianos", either as regards their place in the scheme of theology or as regards their content. Where Barth's comment on this passage is in error is to regard it as the typical Athanasian theology. Rather was it a culmination of it, a height which he reached on this occasion, and reached only once. In any case, its place in the Athanasian theology was largely determined by the course of Arian exegesis and the necessities of its refutation; one may say that it was largely accidental. Or on second thoughts this may not be so; the fact that such a passage can be evoked at this stage of the Arian controversy does corroborate our suspicions about what the Arian heresy was in embryo — even though only in embryo and certainly without the conscious understanding of its protagonists, even if in this respect Athanasius himself saw surprisingly far. It shows quite certainly that Arianism was no isolated heresy of a definite locus theologicus, but one of those rare errors which fundamentally affect the whole of theology and involve all its parts. Be all this as it may, the effect of the Arian controversy was to bring Athanasius against the question of predestination and history.
This passage represents the turning point within the "Contra Arianos," in the same way that the "Contra Arianos" is a great watershed in theology as a whole. Having dealt with the question at issue in five chapters, Athanasius has patently had enough of the cosmological and historical sides of theology. The remainder of the "Contra Arianos" I-III concerns the intra-Trinitarian unity of Father and Son, and the more strictly Christological portions of the theology. Probably the theology and life of that time lacked the power to confront Athanasius with the problem of history and development in the pervasion and the detail in which we have to face them. In a sense it is fair to say that the triumph of Athanasius at this point was a little too easy, theologically. As with Athanasius himself, so with theology as a whole. It is one of the tragedies of theology that it lost interest in the classical form of the Logos doctrine at the very stage when Athanasius had just begun to put it right. Any remoteness which later theology acquired, whether academic, polemical, or mystical, is due to this error in the successors of Athanasius, and not to Athanasius himself. The revival of this side of theology had to await the Filioque controversy, and we are still suffering from the effects of past neglect.

Now, we are for our sins under the scourge of Marxism, not to mention the other post-Marxist forms of unbelief. To rise to this challenge and judgment, the Church - while preserving and strengthening the traditional topics of its theology - and without these theological statements obscuring in the least the Church's and the believer's calling to witness and love - must take up the doctrines of predestination, history, and eschatology, severally but primarily as a unity, and take them up where Athanasius left off in ch.77. It may be neither possible
nor necessary nor desirable to ape the prophecies of Marx, but they indicate a faithful attention to these topics that puts so much Christian theology to shame. They must be treated Christologically and Christocentrically in the most rigorous sense, as Athanasius did or began to do. And in one particular future generations of theologians must take the hint from Athanasius. As Athanasius, in chs. 77–82, clearly distinguishes between absolute wisdom, the Second Person Himself, and created wisdom which is its impress in the world, we must ourselves make the same distinction between the original and absolute Plan, the Way, the Eternal Decree which is in Christ and is Christ Himself, and the created ways of which it is the beginning and in which it works itself out to fulfilment in the world. If this is kept in mind, we need have no fear that our involvement in the world will cast any reflection on the transcendent glory of God.

The chapters from 44 onwards to here again constituting a distinct unity, another full lexicographical analysis of these would be fitting: Logos: Called God in the same sense as the Father: 56:268A as John 1:1 70:296C(L. is ὄφει... and True God). Godhead of the L.: 45:241C(L. does not signify ἡμι οὐσίας ης θεότητας Λόγου or His eternal generation through Solomon), 53:260B (Prov. 8:22LXX, in contrast with discussions of His Godhead does not give the Κατὰ Ὀλίγη γένεσιν. of the L.), 72:301A(Heretics say that Pr.8:22 is of the G'head of the L. and not of His ἐνσωμάτωσις Uncreated, &c.: 60:276C (other than "all things"), 63:281A (if creature, Scripture would have been different), 65:285A (not Κατὰ φύσιν creature), 71:297A, 77:309C (L. of G. not creature). 77:312A (Prov. says L. not ὄφει: creature), 78:313A (not or. ἄνθρωπος). Everything earthly and human alien to His nature: 54:261B (Ld. has no
cause of His being L.), 56:265B (creaturely language not appropriate to Him as L.). Relation between L. & F.: Origin: L. from (EK) the F.: 50:263A. L. of the F. (often + wisdom &c.): 56:265B (certain language appropriate to... as such), 70:296A (if it had not been His ΦΩΣ, καὶ ἀληθινὸς ΛΟΣ that put on a body...),
71:300A (L. & W. of F. Frame of the works), 82:320C (F. sees Himself in own Image, i.e. the L.), L. of God: 50:253A (not creature, but Creator), 52:257C (being L. of G. and Eternal King He vouchsafed that His Kingdom should shine on Zion), 56:268A, 57:266B (and Only-Begotten Son), 57:269B (has no beginning), 61:276C (God becomes our Father through indwelling of His L.), 61:277A (When He puts on human flesh, L. of G. said to be created also), 65:285A (L. of G. put on created flesh, etc.), 66:288B, 71:297B (If L. of G. a work, how is He created?) 72:301A (L. of G. not creature but True Son), 80:316B (Only-Begotten L. of F. = Ἰησοῦς θεός Wdm.). Χάριν, ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς &c.; 49:252B (He is Proper L. & Wdm. of the E. of the F., 62:230B (Τὸ τοῦ μονογένους ὢν has preference over all other language in connection c. Him), 67:292A (ὁ L. and Image of the F.'s E.), 82:321A (S. is Proper Offspring of the F. and True L.). Intimate and Absolute Connection bet. L. & F.: Eternity: 51:256A (As John 1:1 & 3), 57:269B (L. has no beginning except in F.), Logos in O.T. sense: 67:292A (must be treated as 2 expls.) (judgment declared in Logos, i.e. O.T.; therefore fitting that reconciliation by same L.). Other common Virtues, Perfections, &c.: 61:276C (God is F. of L. first and then "Creator") in sense of Prov. 8:22), 71:300A (not included in call to praise God), 71:300A alterum (not a work and does not praise God but is praised c. F.), 72:300B (L. and Wdm. indicated in Scripture as Proper to God).
Work in Creation: Creation \( \xi \varphi \tau \Lambda \bar{v} \gamma \) : 49:252A, 57:269B, 59:273B, 75:305B. Attributes of Creator attributed to L.:

L. \( \hat{\eta} \mu \mu \nu \rho \sigma \varsigma \) : 57:269A, 70:296A, 78:313A. 

Incarnation: 

Other expressions: 64:284A (The L. in starting to frame the creatures, condescended to things originate, i.e. made His first condescension, a type of the Incarnation), 51:256A (L. \( \pi \rho \sigma \sigma \tau \alpha \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon \) ), 63:281C (creatures depend on L. as their Beginning).


Incarnation of Logos: 

Other expressions: 74:304B (2 expls.) (L. as L. has none like Him, in contrast to effects of Incarnation), 76:309A (L. \( \hat{\epsilon} \pi \beta \alpha \nu \nu \nu \) into our flesh, is said to be founded), 66:288B (L. \( \pi \rho \iota \iota \iota \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \) \( \sigma \mu \mu \) L. \( \sigma \nu \chi \kappa \alpha \tau \beta \lambda \iota \varepsilon \varepsilon \) : 51:256B (L. gave Himself to condescension), 64:284B (condescends again in Incarnation). See also: 62:277C (L. \( \sigma \nu \chi \kappa \alpha \tau \beta \lambda \iota \varepsilon \varepsilon \) of L.), 61:277A (the L. having become man, says Prov. 8:22LXX, apparently a Hebrew Prophetic Perfect use), 74:305A (as if "He surrounded Me, being L. with earthly body). 

The Logos Incarnate: Both Human and Divine Natures: 51:256A (Prov. 3:22LXX not of E. of L. but of Humanity), 61:277B (flesh liberated as it became body of L.), 74:305A (on Prov. 3:23, L. was before His "founding") .

Heretical uses: Pre-existent L. called Creature, &C.: 49:252A, 56:265A (creaturely E. of L.), 60:276A (L. is \( \omega \omicron \omicron \alpha \kappa \iota \) \( \phi \omega \sigma \varsigma \) creature), 67:269C, 70:296A (Salvation impossible if L. a creature).
71:297A (denied) 72:300B (if L. a creature, would have needed another such being for His creation).

Of these 84 uses, 40 are in Group I, 16 in Group II, 5 in Group III, 17 in Group IV, 4 in Group V, one actually apparently in Group VI (in 56:265B, the Logos enduring creaturely language—and presumably the things thereby indicated), and one in Group VII. This selection is very interesting, as these chapters are about the average. We have seen that in the first great Incarnational section, 1:37-11:18, there is an apparently greater predominance of Group I, but this is due to the number of cases in which both Group I and Group IV would fit, but in which the noun Logos (and, for that matter, Son) was associated with the former, so that they have been credited there.

Son: Examples of Logos=Son already included under Logos: 56:268B, 67:289C, 72:301A, 49:252A (if hypothetically Logos of all creatures is First and Son). Generation: Simply Expressed: 50:253A (ί. Υ. of F.), 59:273B (it is the Son that the F. sees in us, not us, whereby the F. calls us sons), 64:234B (Only-Begotten), 70:296A (we would not be saved except by being joined to God & the True Son), 75:301B (we must search how the S. is "founded", see Pr.8:23; solution, the plan for the Incarnation. Same Description of S. as F.: 59:273B (2 expls.) ("Father" appropriate to Son and "Son" to F.), 82:320B (2 expls.) (knowledge of F. through S. and of S. Πατὴρ Παρός), 59:273C (ἐννάννυ ὢν indicates "Son"). Common qualities & Unity of Relation: 50:253B (has F.'s Power), 51:256B (Pre-existence of S.), 68:269B (Eternity of S. + ἐννάννυ τοῦ ), 82:320A (S. rejoices in F.), 82:320C (How can the Son delight except as seeing Himself in F.?). Nature of S. exceeds all creaturely nature: 47:246B (not creature but
Offspring), 47:243C (It is δόξα, proper to S. that He is Wisdom and Father of the creatures), 56:268A (not creature), 56:268B (aa, distinction bet. Scriptural language appropriate to creatures and to S.), 63:281A (other than creatures), 71:300A (not among "all things" in Dan. 3:34LXX), 77:312A & B (Exmpls.) (Who hearing the Only-Begotten S. of G. say "beginning of ways" would not investigate how the 0-B. S. of G. can be the beginning of other ways?), 82:320A (κύριον ηγής του Π. ούσιας), 82:321A (not or. ηγής or ούσια). 59:273B (F. calls sons those in whom He sees His own S.). Having become S. of M. is and remains S. of G., 51:253C (takes form of a servant), 69:293A (God sends His own S.), 73:301C (if He were S. the tyranny of the Devil would be at an end, because of the work of the Atonement), 73:301C alterum et tertium (aa, Jews of the day were angered because He called Himself S. of G.). Words attributed to Christ: 80:316B (of Prov. 8:22 LXX as referring to the created impress of Wisdom as Second Person). Son in relation to Spirit: 51:253C (Sp. of S.), 59:273A bis & 61:277A (men adopted, &c. through receipt of Sp. of S.) Arian uses (in all cases creature, not true S., &c.): 44:240C, 50:252C, 69:293A, 70:296B, 80:317A. The total number is 47. Of these, 30 are in Group I, 2 only in Group II, 4 in Group III, 3 in Group IV, 2 in Group V, none in Group VI, and 6 in Group VII. As usual, there is far less use of "Son" than Logos in Group II, and a striking use of it in Group VII, owing to the increased tendency to refer to reconciliation by participation in the Spirit, which is regularly described as the Spirit of the Son.

Oυσία, Essence: Id quod est, substant: 45:241C (Prov. 8:22 does not signify the Essence or the Generation), 46:244B (Creatures have a created E.), 46:245A (Jer. 31:22 not of Oυσία, Tivδι of
creatures), 64:284B(E. = "being", i.e. = ἐστιν). Sub
stantia et natura rationalis: 45:244C(creatures have created E.),
46:244C(in general use, "He created" &c. not always used of the E. and
the origination), 46:245B(Prov. 8:22 does not refer to the Essence and
origination of the L.), 81:317B(τὸν μὲν οὐσίαν with the F." —
acc. of respect). 46:244C(Ps. 102:18 LXX
speaks of recreation of the people, not of creation K.Ø.), 46:245A
(neither does Paul speak of those K.Ø. being created), 64:284A
(2nd. Pers. has no connection K.Ø. with creatures), 74:304B(we are
linked to Him not K.Ø. of the Godhead, but by the Humanity),
80:317A(Prov. 8:25-6 does not mean that He was created K.Ø. to-
together with the works). 45:244A(+ φύσει): Scripture
denies that He is in this sense creature), 49:252A(+ φύσει; Son
other than creatures, thus), 60:276A(+ φύσει) (if L. creature
thus), 49:252A(not first of creatures thus), 64:281C(absurd to say
that He is first-born of creation thus), 71:297A & 80:317A & 82:321A
(not thus or τὸν φύσει creature), 78:313A(L. not creature thus).

Substantia vel Natura Divina: Same in F. & S.: 49:252B(L. is proper to
F.'s E.), 56:268B(from the F. proper to the E.), 67:292A(proper L.
and Image of the E. of the F.), 82:320B(proper to the F.'s E.), Essence
of Son different from created E.: 45:241C(Prov. 8:22 LXX does not
refer to the E. of His Godhead or generation from F.), 47:245C(Ld.
knowing His own E. to be Only-Begotten Wdm. & Offspring of F.),
47:248C(Prov. 8:22 not about E.), 51:256A bis (as, Prov. 8:22 not about
E., but, respectively, the Humanity and the Economy for the works),
53:260A(E. of L. is not Kτισματὸν), 66:285C(Prov. 8:22 not of E.
but of Bodily τῇ φύσει), 67:289A(Prov. 8:22 not of E. but of
bodily origin), 79:315B & 316B & 80:316C(each, Prov. 8:22 &c. not of
creaturely), 70:296B(deny that S. is \( \tau \delta\iota\nu \ \tau \eta\nu \ \varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\alpha\varsigma \) of F.). Of these 40 cases, 33 definitely refer to the Essence as in the Trinity, and the other 7 to Essence in general in a way analogous to Essence in God; in each case we shall give the figures from the cases that refer to the Godhead, with the additional general cases in brackets afterwards. One (+1) is definitely in Group I, 4 in Group II, 14 in Group III, only one (+4) at most in Group IV, and 13 (+2) in Group V.

**Divine nature**: 61:277A(Father, being \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) God, later becomes Creator), Nature or natures of Christ: 49:252A (differs from creatures \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) ), 51:253C( \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) Lord), 61:284A(creatures could not have endured His unveiled n.), 70:296B (Flesh is \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) human), 70:296B alterum et tertium (Salvation is union of what is \( \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha \ \phi\upsilon\sigma\nu\tau\iota\nu \) of Godhead with \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) man), 70:296C( \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) God), 71:297B(other \( \tau\nu\nu \ \phi\upsilon\sigma\nu\tau\iota\nu \) than the works - acc. of respect). Divine nature one and common to both: 47:248B(what is \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) proper to S.), 50:253B(the \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) and true Child of God), 59:273A(Spirit of Him Who is \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) and genuine Son), 70:296B & C(aa Salvation impossible unless He is True and \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) Logos of God), 70:296B alterum(Salvation impossible unless Son is from the F. \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) ), 72:301A(L. is True Son and \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) genuine of F.), 73:304A(Scriptural witness is of His Godhead and \( \pi\alpha\tau\rho\iota\kappa\eta\varsigma \ \phi\upsilon\sigma\nu\varepsilon\nu\varsigma \) ). Heretical uses (cited or denied) (all Arian in general): 45:244A(Son does not affirm that He is \( \tau\eta\ \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) \( \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha \ \tau\eta\nu \ \varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\alpha\varsigma \) creature), 47:248C(Id. not \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) creature), 61:277A (2 expls.) (If we are \( \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha \ \phi\upsilon\sigma\nu\tau\iota\nu \) sons, let Him be K. \( \phi\) creature), 65:285A(not \( K\cdot\phi\) creature), 70:296B(deny that Son is from the Father \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) and proper to His E.), 71:297A( \( \tau\eta\ \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) \( \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha \ \tau\eta\nu \ \varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\alpha\varsigma \) creature), 77:312A(Id. not \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) creature), 80:317A( \( \tau\eta\ \phi\) creature), 80:317A alterum and 82:321A(Not \( \tau\eta\ \phi\upsilon\sigma\varepsilon\) or \( \tau\eta\ \phi\) creature).
True Human Nature: 51:253C (K.φ. slaves), 53:253C (K.φ. slavery not denied), 58:272A ("made" denotes what is human K.φ.), 58:272C (sons not φοσει but θεσει), 59:273A (we are φοσει creatures), 59:273B (we are K.φ. creatures), 59:273B alterum (we are not φοσει sons), 59:273B tertium (God not φοσει our Father), 59:273C (we are K.φ. things made), 59:273C alterum (Scr. warns us against forgetting γενεσιν της φωσειν του θεου φωσεως). 60:273C ("Creature" and "Offspring" differ τη φοσει and meaning of words), 77:309B (weakness of our nature). Other uses: 46:244B (Creatures have φοσει a created essence), 47:245C (E. of Son other than the φοσει creatures), 48:249A (Reuben was just one among his brothers τη φοσει και τη σωματεια, even though the eldest), 50:253B (τη φωσει of things originate). Of the total of 45 uses, two refer, in the substantival use, to the Divine Nature, three to human or creaturely nature, and no less than 40 are the adverbial type of use of the oblique (usually) cases of the noun φοσει or of equivalent phrases involving the same noun.

Since this section is again quite strongly soteriological and Incarnational in content, the words for the Humanity of Christ are again much in evidence. Σωματι, Body: On its own: 61:277A (L. became like us και το σωμα), 61:277B (the flesh became the L.'s body), Imperfections of flesh: 47:245B (Prepared body cf. Heb.10:5, Ps.40:7), 65:285A (L. took sin of Adam in the blood of His own body), 66:285D (Death proper to body), 69:293B (sacrifice of His own b.) 47:248A (bore our sins on the Tree τη σωματι), 61:277B (Adam's flesh became b. of the Ld.), 47:248B (L. put on creaturely body), 70:296B (Put on the b.) 74:305A (Father surrounded "Me" with earthly body), 55:264A (How could reconciliation take place if He had not had a dying body?), 47:248A ("F. prepared a b. for Me"), 44:241B (b. which He accepted should be
house for Him) 70:296A (received the human and originate b.), 74:305A (He put on our b.), 74:305A alterum (He threw earthly b. around Himself), 66:288B (He surrounded Himself with imperfect b.), 63:288A (He bore our b.), 61:277C (He raised His b.), 55:265A ("the twain" recreated in His own b.).

See also: σωματικός: (Prov. 8:22 of bodily origin), σωματικής:
52:257C (His Kingdom shines corporeally on Mt. Zion) & 67:289B (Prov. 8:22 said "corporeally") 66:288C (Prov. 8:22 refers to). Of these 25 instances of the word (including the uses of related parts of speech reduced to their equivalent forms), none are in the Christological Groups I, III, or VII (that is, the Humanity referred to absolutely), one is in Group II, 15 in Group IV, 6 in Group V, and 3 in Group VI, which last is rare for the word σώμα.

οδός, flesh: Humanity in general: 53:260B (Prov. 8:22 refers to the Κατὰ ὄρθον origination of the L.), 74:304C (we are like Him Κ.νν σ.), 74:305A (we are saved because of likeness of flesh).

66:285C (φορέω), 76:309A (ἐπιβαίνειν εἰς our fl.). 53:260B (L. said words in the fl.), 65:288A (L. put on created fl.), 71:297A ("εἰς σῶμα ζητοῦσιν God made me become man"). Imperfections of flesh: 47:248A (L. not simply fl.), 61:277B (Adam's flesh became body of Ld.), 63:281A (we are His brothers through likeness of fl.), 63:281B (ditto, through οὐκ ἑξελείην of fl.), 66:288A (Saviour "created" Κατὰ σῶμα, 69:293C (Devil's works destroyed in the fl.), 76:308B (plan is for Son to take the judgment of man through the fl.). See also ἐναρκτός.

Προσωπία: 55:264A & 72:301A. Out of a total of 43 instances, there are none in Groups I-III, covering the external and qualitative relations of the Humanity of Christ; all the uses of the word σῶμα in this section that come under these heads having primarily a reference to flesh generally; 25 are in Group IV, 4 in Group V, 8 in Group VI, and 7 in Group VII, where the reference is simply to the Humanity of Christ without relation to anything else.


Ἀνθρώπωσ human: 66:288A (received human fl.), 70:296A (received human body), 70:296B (it was true human fl. that He took from Mary).

Ἀνθρώπωσ or plural thereof = Humanity: 45:241C (L. does not signify His Essence etc. but τῷ Ἰ., 46:245B (opp. Essence), 51:256A (Prov. 8:22 LXX does not signify Essence.... but τῷ Ἰ.), 74:304B bis (Founded Κατὰ τῷ Ἰ.). See also 52:257C (His Kingdom shines ἐνθρώπωσ on Zion), 53:260A & 60:276C (Ἐναρκτός 57 Σ of Second Person). Of these 34 uses, 6 are in Group IV, 26 in Group VI.
and 3 in Group VII, the predominance of Group VI being usual in the case of this word; the other groups are unrepresented. Except that ὅς ἤ, body, is commoner than before and ἄνθρωπος, man, less so, there is no important difference from the use of words as in I:37-11:18. The only other term used is ὀἶκος, house, on one occasion only, 44:241B, The Body is a house of Wisdom, etc.

C.A. Athanasius now deals with passages that concern the detailed intra-Trinitarian relationship between Father and Son, and the exegesis, or mis-exegesis, of these by the Arians. The first is John 14:10: "...I am in the Father and the Father in me. The words that I speak unto you I speak not of myself, but the Father that dwelleth in Me, He doeth the works." After a few words of introduction, Athanasius gives the standard Arian interpretation and objection to the orthodox exegesis: "How can the one be contained in the other and the other in the one? Or how at all can the Father which is greater be contained in (ἐν εἰς) in the Son which is less?" Or, 'What is so wonderful if the Son is in the Father, seeing that it is written even of us, "In Him we live and move and have our being."?' Athanasius has finished his argument on passages that apparently gave the Arians an occasion for their heresy. As we have said before, the Arian principle was essentially a primary denial of the Deity of Christ. Therefore, passages which appeared to describe Him as a creature were accepted as normative, and therefore passages that referred to the Deity of Christ were to be demythologised in terms of the former position. It is, in a sort of way, to the Arians' credit that they did not shirk

(409) δοῦς ἐν εἰς εἰσιν...(...κ.τ.λ.......ἐν ὑπερτεριαν). This is an approach to the later systematised doctrine of the Perichoresis.

(410) See above, pps. 441-443, 733-39, and 745-54.
this essential part of their task, as the first 25 chapters of the
Third Oration bear witness. So far, Athanasius has had the difficult
and therefore most fruitful job of interpreting the former type of
passage in terms of the latter, since for him statements concerning
God have, rightly, the priority over statements concerning creatures.
When it comes to dealing with the Arians' interpretation of the sort
of Scriptural statement which we find in the first half of John 14:10,
his task is much easier; he has only to state the Arian objection to
show its absurdity, and, in view of the course taken by his theology
so far, little further argumentation is needed. In this case, the
Arian objection as quoted here is nothing more or less than a blank re-
refusal to recognise the passage, which is obviously symmetrical – that
is its whole point –, together with a quibble that has relevance only
to one side of the symmetry and totally ignores the other. Athanasius
comments immediately as follows: “And this state of mind is consistent
with their perversity, in that they think God to be a body and do not
understand what is 'True Father (ληθείονε Πατρός)’, and
'True Son’, nor what is 'Light Invisible (φῶς λόρατον)’, and
'Eternal’, and Its 'Radiance Invisible (λόρατος περασάμενος...
λόρατον), nor 'Invisible Subsistence (λόρατος Σωστίστως)’,
and 'Immaterial Expression (Χαρακτήρ λοւματος)’, and
'Immaterial Image (Σηκών λούματος)’. For, did they know,
they would not dishonour and ridicule the Lord of Glory, nor interpreting
things immaterial after a material manner (λούματα συμβλητικὰ),
pervert good words.....For when it is said, 'I in the Father and the
Father in Me', They are not, therefore, as they suppose, discharged
into Each Other (ἐντεύβησθε ομογένεια) as in the case
of empty vessels, so that the Son fills the emptiness of the Father, and
the Father fills the emptiness of the Son, and each of them is neither complete nor perfect (for this is proper to bodies, and therefore the mere assertion of it is full of irreligion), for the Father is full and perfect and the Son is the Fulness (Πλήρεως) of Godhead.... (The point is again made of the difference between the Son, who is, say, Life absolutely, and human people, who have it by participation)....

This is in some ways a rather obscure passage, as any passage must be which is a comment on the Arian interpretation of John 14:10. But the point is that the verse in Scripture is symmetrical about the Father and the Son, and the Arians wantonly interpreted it asymmetrically. What Athanasius is presumably saying is that if the passage is interpreted so that "I am in the Father" suggests the subordination of the Son to the Father, the Father must also be subordinate to the Son and incomplete with regard to Him; and vice versa. Therefore there must be a reciprocal relation between them so that each is incomplete, requiring to be filled by the other, or the orthodox doctrine must prevail that they are both symmetrically equal in power, glory, and fulfilment, and therefore are both completely God. Note that the Arians were the last people to maintain the former doctrine, which Athanasius hypothetically presented to reject— that is, as long as they were still constrained to retain a Father of sorts. The last clause that we have quoted, that the Father is full and perfect, and the Son is the Fulness of Godhead, belongs to the next few chapters, and the question which it raises will be discussed later.

Turning to the second half of John 14:10, Athanasius quotes (411) Πληρεως γηρ και τελειος.
the exegesis of Asterius, which follows the prima facie line that this verse denies that the words and works were in any real sense Christ's at all. He points out that by the Unanimous testimony of Scripture, the same is the case of ordinary men receiving words or commissions from God. Therefore, says Athanasius, "But if the Lord had meant this, His words would rightly not have been, 'I in the Father and the Father in Me,' but rather, 'I too am in the Father and the Father is in Me too,'.....", which, says Athanasius, is not so. Turning to the positive interpretation of the passage, he continues at once: "For the Son is in the Father... because the whole being (ούμεν τὸ εἶναι) of the Son is proper to the Essence of the Father, as radiance from Light, and as stream (ποταμός) from fountain, so that whoso sees the Son sees what is proper to the Father, and knows that the Son's Being, being from the Father is thus in the Father. For the Father is in the Son, since the Son is what is from the Father and proper to Him, as in the radiance the Sun and in the word the intelligence and in the stream the fountain; for thus he who contemplates the Son contemplates what is proper to the Essence of the Father, and understands that the Father is in the Son. For whereas the Form and Godhead of the Father is the Being of the Son, it follows that the Son is in the Father and

(412) For a citation, with brief comment, of Asterius's actual words as quoted by Athanasius in this chapter, see above, pp.355-6.

(413) ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς
(414) ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ.
(415) ἐάν ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ "τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς οὖσα τὸ εἶναι πρῶτον For "εἶναι", there is - see Migne - a variant reading ἐϊναι less strongly attested. It would mean "the peculiar or definitive property"; this would leave the meaning substantially the same, without committing Athanasius so definitely to the Platonic associations of the former word, and without, also, the Platonic idea of the superiority of the Form - here, the Son - over that whose Form it is, which may have deliberately been introduced to balance the natural subordination of the Son to the Father.
the Father in the Son. On this account and fittingly, having previously said, "I and the Father are one," He added, "I in the Father and the Father in Me," in order to show the identity (ταυτοτης) of the Godhead, and the unity of the Essence (418). For they are one, not as one thing divided into two parts, and these nothing but one (419), nor as one thing twice named, so that the same person turns out to be at the one time Father and at another time Son – for holding this Sabellius was judged a heretic. But They are two, because the Father is Father and not also Son, and the Son is Son and not also Father; but the nature (φως) is one, for the off-spring is not unlike (οὐκ ἀνωμοίων) him that begat it, for it is his image (Εἰκὼν), and all that is the Father's is the Son's. Therefore neither is the Son another god (Διὸς θεὸς); for He was not procured from without, since there would indeed be many, if a godhead were procured foreign to the Father's; if then the Son is other, as an off-spring (422), still He is the Same, as God, (423) and He and the Father are one in propriety and peculiarity of nature (424) and the identity (ταυτοτης) of the one

(418) τὴν ἑνότητα τής οὐσίας.
(419) οὐχ ἐστιν ἐνας παλαις εὐεργετής μεν θεοῦ διαγράφων, καὶ μὴ ἔστων ὁ πατὴρ ἐνας.
(420) Gr. ἐπενοηθή, Montf. effectus est.
(421) Gr. ἐπενοηθή, Montf.excogitaretur.
(422) ἐπερεῶν ἐστιν ἡ γεννημα.
(423) ταυτον ἐστιν ὃς θεὸς.
(424) η ιδιότητι καὶ οἰκειοτητη τῆς φύσεως.
Godhead, as has been said. For the radiance also is light (φως),
not second to the Sun, nor a different light (ἐπερον φως), nor
from participation (μετουσία), but a whole and proper off-
spring of it. (425) And such an offspring is necessarily one light, and
no one would say that there are two lights, but the Sun and radiance are
two, yet one the light from the Sun enlightening in its radiance all
things. So also the Godhead of the Son is the Father's, whence also it
is indivisible; and thus there is one God and none other than He. And
so, since they are one, and the Godhead itself One, the same things are
said of the Son as are said of the Father, except His being said to be
Father — for instance that He is God, 'And the Word was God,' Almighty,
'Thus saith He which was and is and is to come,' Lord, 'One Lord Jesus
Christ,' that He is Light, 'I am the Light,' that He wipes out sins,
'that the Son of Man hath power upon earth to forgive sins,' and so with
the other attributes. 'For all things,' saith the Son Himself,' whatsoever
the Father hath, are Mine,' and again, 'And Mine are Thine'.

And on hearing the attributes of the Father spoken of the Son,
we shall therefore see the Father in the Son, and we shall contemplate the
Son in the Father when what is said of the Son is said of the Father also.
And why are the attributes of the Father ascribed to the Son, except
that the Son is Offspring from Him? And why are the Son's attributes
proper to the Father, except again because the Son is the proper Offspring
from His Essence? And the Son, being the proper Offspring of the Father's
Essence, fittingly says that the Father's attributes are His own also;
whence on saying, 'I and the Father are one,' He suitably and consist-
tently adds, '...that ye may know that I am in the Father and the Father
in Me,'... (and)....'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father,' and

(425) ὁ λον ὁ λον αὐτοῦ γεννησα
there is one and the same sense (\( \psi \omega \pi \)) in these three passages. For he who understands in this sense that the Son and the Father are one, knows that He is in the Father and the Father in the Son; for the Godhead of the Son is the Father's, and it is in the Son, and he who has comprehended this has been convinced that 'He that hath seen the Son hath seen the Father', for in the Son is contemplated the Father's Godhead." Then there follows an illustration from the respect paid to the Emperor in his image, and the practical equivalence of these two. Newman in his note finds this analogy embarrassing, since emperor-worshippers never worshipped the statue, but always the Emperor, and continues by referring to the Iconoclast and Iconodoule controversy. Of course, Athanasius has repeatedly said, with reference to other analogies, that it is only because the analogous thing is necessarily material that the analogates are of other essences or substances, and, again Newman would have been saved his embarrassment if he had remembered that even in the case, for instance, of the coining of the realm, it is most illegal and contumacious to make an image of the sovereign, which requires the direct authorisation of the sovereign himself. The corresponding truth is that the making of God's Image is absolutely reserved to God Himself, which is the reason for the Second Commandment and also the reason - the Anhypostasia of the Humanity of Christ is to be borne in mind - why the 'Catholic' argument that the Incarnation mitigates the rigour of the Second Commandment is false. Athanasius continues, "Since then too the Son is the Father's Image, it must necessarily be understood that the Godhead and propriety of the Father is the Being of the Son." (426)

And this is what is said, 'Who being in the form (\( \mu \omicron \rho \omicron \phi \gamma \)) of God,' and 'The Father in Me.' Nor is this Form (\( \mu \omicron \rho \omicron \phi \gamma \))

(426) \( \Theta \omicron \omicron \mu \iota \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigmadimensions:2438.0x3283.0
of God merely partial (ἐκ μετρου), but the Fullness of the Father's Godhead is the Being of the Son (427) and the Son is wholly God (ὁλος Θεός). Therefore also, being equal to God (τὸ ὑπὲρ Θεόν), 'he thought it not robbery to be equal to God;' (428) and again, since the

(427) τὸ πνεύμα τοῦ Πατρὸς Θεοτόκου ἄνευ τοῦ άχον

(428) οὐχ ἔπαι θπόν ἡμισάρτος ἐνδικτωθής Θεόν.

here, as cited from Philipp. 2:6; there are no variants, at least of any significance, either in Athanasius or the Epistle. It is obvious that Athanasius is reading this verse as the older school of orthodox commentators, including the translators of the A.V., read it; that is, He thought it not robbery to be equal to God, in the simplest sense of "thought", for the simplest of all reasons, that is, that His equality with God the Father was what He always had anyway, by generation, by nature, and by right, and from all eternity. Calvin takes the ηνγιστει as hypothetical: "would not have judged....". On the other hand, almost all modern exposition takes this verb as indicating a decision to act; that is, He decided not to make a hoard of His equality with God....&c. This is obviously due to extreme Kenoticism in theology, and some of the accounts verge on frank Arianism. Apart from the basic exegetical point that this is a curious translation of the verb ηνγιστει! it is very probable that if one began to take such a Kenoticist point of view, it would be impossible to avoid, ultimately, slipping into Arianism, if this is a legitimate comment to make on an exegesis; Athanasius would certainly have said that to even imagine, as the two possibilities (with the insinuation that they are the two exclusive possibilities), that the Logos would hold onto his position like a robber, or renounce it in the Kenoticist manner, would be as good as being an Arian; it would be like the idea that the Logos must be ῥηνς ἐπιστόμων or be mechanically determinate, as wood and stone.

All this may appear to be the cantankerous remarks of a theologian usurping the functions of the exegete, but these remarks are important as this is one of the few places where Patristic evidence can be properly cited to determine exegesis. (With reference to the above, see the Arian exegesis of Philipp. 2:9, &c., discussed in C.A.1:37 ff.). We have already seen how zealous and industrious the Arians were to prove their own case by exploiting to the maximum every apparently favourable passage of Scripture, and by operating even upon the apparently unfavourable ones. Now, the modern interpretation of Philipp. 2:6 would have been a great opportunity for them, far better than in fact the line they actually took on Philipp. 2:9 in the same connection. Therefore, if there had been any tradition that the Greek of Philipp. 2:6 could mean, or had ever meant, what modern scholarship says that it did - we can virtually say, if this were the correct interpretation - it would have left a trace in Arianism. (This is meant to be the biggest understatement in this thesis.) Therefore, we would have certainly heard about it from Athanasius. Instead, we find complete silence on this matter. This means that, at the very least, no tradition of such a Kenoticist meaning survived till the fourth century. And the idea that the meaning of the language was
Godhead and the Form of the Son is no other's than the Father's, this is what He says, 'I in the Father.' Thus, 'God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself,' for the propriety of the Father's Essence is that Son in whom the creation was then reconciled with God. Thus the things that the Son then wrought are the Father's works, for the Son is the Form of that Godhead of the Father which wrought the works. And thus he who looks at the Son sees the Father; for in the Father's Godhead is, and is contemplated, the Son; and the Father's Form which

(429) τὸ γὰρ εἴδως τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς Θεότητι ἐστιν ὁ Υἱὸς. Eidos is the technical Platonic term generally translated Idea, or, better and more recently, Form, which we have adopted as standard here.

(430) τὸ γὰρ Εἴδως τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς Θεότητι ἐστιν καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς.

(431) Feminine gender, that is, the Godhead, ἡ Θεότητι.

(432) Εἰν γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ Θεοτύν ἐστιν καὶ ἐστάθη αὐτῷ ὁ Υἱὸς.

(423 Contd.) able to change in such a way as to leave no trace of any tradition, anywhere, of such a hypothetical original meaning - for this is what would be demanded - is not one that should be accepted. Thus, the Greek of Philipp. 2:6 never bore, and never could have borne, the sort of meaning that modern commentators prefer, and the older orthodox interpretation is linguistically correct. After all, the Arians and Athanasius did speak Greek, and in a form very little different from the New Testament.

The author must make it clear, as a Protestant, that these remarks are not meant to deprive him of the right, say, to accept Luther and Calvin against all earlier exegesis, including the Greek Fathers, because it after all is possible for a certain issue to be a theological and exegetical blind spot, even for millennia, even for Greek speakers. But this is not one of these cases. It is not as if no one raised this sort of question. It was being raised, in fact, in a hypertrophied form, in all sorts of other places. We are not dealing with an argument from silence in the sense of something which did not happen; we are dealing with something that did happen, and happen only too noisily, and the noise was audible, not in some hypothetical Arian work annihilated by later censorship but in Athanasius himself. In these circumstances, the argument from silence indicates a positive and not a sceptical conclusion.

(429) τὸ γὰρ Εἴδως τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς Θεότητι ἐστιν καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς. This phrase has been translated in this way, following Robertson, owing to the context, which indicates that it carries this Platonistic meaning without the specific use of the technical terminology. Its occurrence here suggests that this may also be better in other places than to take the phrase substantively, as if some such word as were understood.
is in Him (sc. the Son) shows in Him the Father; and thus the Father is in the Son. And that propriety and Godhead (ὁ ὑφεί ἐστίν καὶ Θεόν) which is from (ἐκ) the Father in the Son shows the Son in the Father and His eternal inseparability from Him; and whose hears and beholds that which is said of the Father is also said of the Son, not as accruing to His Essence by grace (καὶ ἐν ὑπάρχει) or participation (μετεπήλθε), but because the very Being (δύναται ὅτι ἐνί[--]οι) of the Son is a proper Offspring of the Father's Essence, will fitly understand the words, as I said before, 'I in the Father and the Father in me;' and, 'I and the Father are one.' For the Son is such as the Father is, because He has all that is the Father's. Wherefore too He is implied (συμονοικεϊται) together with the Father. For if a son does not exist one cannot say father, whereas when we call God a Maker we do not necessarily intimate the things that come to be; for a maker is before his works. But when we call God Father, at once with the Father we signify the Son's existence. (At this stage we shall break off, since we are in transition to the next point, the exegesis of John 10:30 etc., and all that is implied in the unity of God).

Newman's note on the opening portion of ch. 6, which we have quoted here in extenso, is as follows, "Here first the Son's ἐν τῷ ὑπέρ is the ἐν τῷ ὑπέρ of the Father, then the Son is the ἐν τῷ ὑπέρ of the Father's Godhead, and then in the Son is the ἐν τῷ ὑπέρ of the Father. These expressions are equivalent if Father and Son are, each separately, ὁ ὑπεί ἐστίν, ὁ ὑπεί ἐστίν, see infr. ch. 16, note. St. Greg. Naz. uses the word ὁ ὑπεί ἐστίν (Exod. 33:23) which forms a contrast to ἐν τῷ ὑπέρ, for the Divine Works, orat. 23:3." This observation is sound, but in some ways it is more relevant to the later theology which stood on the work of Athanasius than to the work of Athanasius himself.
There are many statements in these chapters where this sort of symmetrical relation among the Persons of the Trinity, so characteristic of later theology, is expressed, notably the first sentence of ch. 5, where incidentally the type of inclusion which is considered is the quasi-intensive and not the quasi-extensive type, which is perhaps to be correlated with the revelational emphasis in other portions of these chapters. It is also fair to observe that the symmetrical statements are most prominent in the latter portion of the extract under discussion. But throughout the main part of these four chapters the weight is undeniably thrown on the middle of the three statements which Newman mentions in his note, that is, that the Second Person, or the Being of the Second Person, is the Form, or specifically the $\textit{Eidos}$, the very word used by the Platonic Socrates, of the First. At the end of ch. 3, the Form, $\textit{Eidos}$, is also described as the Godhead, $\textit{Theos}$, of the Father, in exactly the same relation to Father and Son. This shows that something like the Platonic relation between Form and thing was intended by Athanasius. On this basis, the Second Person would be actually on a level superior to that of the First, and even though for both Athanasius and anybody else it was quite impossible to go so far, this would be still a clear corrective against any assumption that the Second Person would be inferior, especially in the Arian sense. This tendency has been adumbrated by the repeated statements by Athanasius that God without His Logos and Wisdom, conceived in approximately this sense, is inconceivable. But the reason why this version of intra-Trinitarian relationship is now enunciated so much more clearly is that Athanasius has just had to concern himself so intimately with the Christological testimonies in Proverbs, which all parties to the controversy, and certainly all parties that had ever existed within the theological tradition of Alexandria, accepted as applying simpliciter to the Second
Person, that is, to His hypostatic or substantial Being. This raises one question, which can no longer be postponed, and prompts one interesting observation.

The question is, in what sense is Christ, according to Scriptural testimony, the "Wisdom of God"? For us, the primary witness must be the New Testament, especially the classical passage, I Cor.1:24 and context. (The same results will in essence by obtained if the investigation is extended throughout the New Testament.) It must of course be reiterated at once that Athanasius was a thousand times right as against the Arians, in particular in this case Asterius, whose outrageous exegesis of this passage was, with the sole exception of Athanasius of Anazarba on the Hundred Sheep, probably the worst in history; what would Paul have said if anybody had tried to tell him that the Son was on the same level as men and locusts, and that this was what he himself had really meant to say, however unskilfully? Paul, who believed that for a Christian to seek the power and wisdom and salvation of God even in the Holy Torah itself was a mortal insult to his Master!! Of course Christ is the Power of God and the Wisdom of God and the only Power and Wisdom of God. But, in view of the context of I Cor. 1:24, one wonders if a change is not called for in the Athanasian exegesis. Paul is here not primarily interested in the pre-incarnate Christ or the Logos of John 1:1-3; his primary interest is "Christ crucified", in the weak things of the world which, at the call of God, overcome the mighty. Thus, it would be a closer approximation, at first sight, to speak of the predestined Economy of the Incarnation and salvation as the Wisdom of God; best of all, of the Power and Wisdom of God as Christ as Incarnate

(433) This is somewhat different from the issue discussed above, see pp. 846-856, in connection with C.AR.II:38 ff., on whether Wisdom in general, is qualitative or hypostatic. What we have to consider now is what is the nature of any qualitative element in Wisdom, and the relation of this to the Second Person.
fulfilling the Economy of the flesh, or as destined to do so. This is very much the same point as we have raised concerning the term Logos.

That Athanasius was undoubtedly influenced by these possibilities is shown by the immediate juxtaposition, at the very end of C. Ar. II, of the passage in which the final Athanasian doctrine of Predestination is expounded, and that in which the problem of created wisdom, in relation to Absolute Wisdom, is treated. However, there was an overwhelming reason why Athanasius could not have followed what we would take to be the more natural line. After the appalling example of Asterius, he could have no truck at all with any idea that the Wisdom of God was anything but the Second Person in the most brutally direct sense. Otherwise there would be too great a risk that the Wisdom of God would be something that could dwell in other things just as well as in the Second Person, so that instead of being the sign of His absolute exaltation above all creatures, it would be a sign that He was consubstantial with them — which is just the point that Asterius made. For that reason, Athanasius had to follow the line which he took even to the extent of going dangerously close to what for us is an apparent absurdity.

The interesting observation that we must now make in connection with the position under discussion is that it appears in some curious way to be the Binitarian form of the doctrine of the Spirit later put forward by Augustine. In the later writer, the Spirit is what the Father and Son have in common, and the difficulty suggests itself of how to discriminate between the way in which the Father and Son have the Spirit in common and the way in which they have the Trinitarian Essence of God in common. If this is reduced to binitarian terms, with the Logos considered emanationally rather than filially, the position taken by Athanasius here is what would result, whereby the Second Person is ontologically
the Form of the First (the formal equivalent of Augustine's statement that the Spirit is what the First and Second Persons have in common); the close relation between the emanative interpretation of the relation between Father and Son is also closely related to the normal Augustinian, and also the universal later, doctrine of the Spirit. When we bear Augustine in mind, we see the greatest weakness, once again, of Athanasius's exposition, or rather the greatest weakness that results from the fact that theology even in the 350's was not as aware of the Spirit as it might be; the fact that as we have already noticed, the sort of physical analogy used here does not lend itself to the adequate representation of the Divine (i.e. intra-Trinitarian) Love. After all, does a source love the outflowing stream or the Sun its radiant energy, and if a man or community is primarily in love with the "extension of his own personality", is this not a great evil? It might be objected that with Augustine and later theology, the emanative type of relation is the norm for half of the intra-Trinitarian relations, but the difference in the case of Augustine is all-important in the present connection; what is emanated or "procedit" is precisely the love, the mutual love of Father and Son, from both to both.

We have concentrated so far on the weaknesses of Athanasius's exposition. However, it must be said once again that the statements of the type that the Son is the of the Father have one very strong point, which we have already noted in the more particular connection of the Son's being the Wisdom of God in the straight, ever naive sense. This is that they make it clear, as hardly another theologian has done before or since, that the theistic attributes, even the Essence in the qualitative sense (which in later theology was never described by the word but by , and was very clearly
distinguished from the Trinitarian οὐσία, is absolutely dependent on the Persons and not vice versa. With men, there is a regular reciprocity between men and these impersonal or supra-personal entities, and our concern with the status of the individual, or even the undoubted fact that in some way men make their principles, should not blind us to the sense in which men are conditioned and even made by their qualities, principles, and rules. With God, the theistic attributes are absolutely dependent on His Person, and as He is Trinitarian, they depend on the Three Persons and their relationships.

To compensate for at least part of the weaknesses of what we have discussed above, Athanasius lays great stress once again on the generation of the Son from the Father, which is treated in the emanational way which has already been established so signally in De Decretis 23-24. Here again, and perhaps even more clearly than in the former position, the essential relationship is intimately associated with the generation of the Son from the Father; to use a modern analogy, it is like the chromosome pattern as it is involved in asexual generation. Again, appropriately enough as we have said before, the controlling Scriptural metaphors are Source - Stream, and Light (i.e. here, Light-source) - Radiance. There is no change from the earlier view, and no further comment is needed except that this appears to be established definitively as the main position of Athanasius. The fact that the Second Person is the Offspring or Emission relative to the First effectively counters any tendency to super-ordination of the type postulated above.

(434) See above, pp. 629-37, 646-54.

(435) This is a fair description, although the term Homoousios is not used.
Finally, in connection with the above scriptural metaphors, it is to be noticed that Athanasius here lays great emphasis on Christ as the Revelation of God, quoting (as Newman points out in his note on ch. 5), the classical three passages from St. John's Gospel which are the locus classicus for this element in theology, 10:30, 10:38, and 14:9-10. The doctrine of revelation here propounded is the simple and natural one according to what is normally considered the Hebrew Logos (or rather Ἰησοῦς) doctrine; Christ is the Revelation of the Father, therefore He must, in His essence, be absolutely like the Father. This dovetails with the tendency that we have noticed in the De Incarnatione and have not yet seen fully contradicted, at any rate in this context - that the Body of Christ is the instrument. We see through the Humanity of Christ the Divinity of Christ, and it is at this stage that the Father is revealed, by the Divinity by means of the absolute likeness. This is very natural to someone refuting Arianism, but if one would wish to emphasise more the creaturely nature of Christ, even (and certainly) in the sense of the Chalcedonian formula, one would be confronted at once with the most difficult problems of all theology; how the Humanity could reveal the Divinity, because the Divinity of the Son would be just as difficult to reveal as the Divinity of the Father. Possibly the problem of a revelational interpretation and etiology of the Incarnation is insoluble, and the latter must be basically interpreted soteriologically rather than revelationally.

Now, Athanasius before has made certain remarks along these lines, but this is his first treatment of this issue in such an extensive way. This shows that Athanasius himself attached importance to revelational questions, but also that this importance was not really part of the previous tradition in theology, at any rate the intellectual tradition. The
examples given by Newman of the conjoint quotation of the three Johannine passages quoted in ch. 5, in the notes on C. Ar. III: 5 and 1: 34, all come from either Athanasius himself or his successors, except one instance from Eusebius of Caesarea, and to this extent Athanasius may be considered as the rediscoverer of this important tradition. But above all, as we have already said, Athanasius's relatively simple treatment of this matter is a firm indication that the Arians were not really interested in the problem of revelation. Arius's airy statement in the Thalia that we know the Unoriginate through him who was originate by nature, dismisses the matter rather than elucidates his view of it. The evidence for this conclusion is that if the Arians had been really interested in revelation, Athanasius would have been at once landed in the problem that he did not face here; the relation between the Humanity and the Divinity of Christ in revelation. This would be on an analogy with the whole of his exegetical and hermeneutic method, which concerns itself always with the detailed relationship between the Human and Divine in the Incarnate Christ, and such a thorough treatment, involving the major section of an Oration, would have been imperatively demanded. We cannot quote the statement of Arius that we have mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph as proof that the Arians were at all interested in revelation in any Christian sense - or, for that reason, to disprove the fundamental affinity of Arianism to Marxism and modern atheism generally.

6 The next topic for Athanasius to consider is the Unity of God, or rather the fact that in ascribing Deity in the absolute sense to Christ we do not impugn this unity; in fact Athanasius has been edging towards this topic in the previous section; we take the

(436) See above, pp. 469-472, for a discussion of the Arian doctrine of Revelation, or rather its virtually complete absence, and a comparison with Marxism, etc. We shall return to this matter at large in the Resume of the theology of the Orations, below, pp. 1071-4
Therefore also he who believes in the Son believes also in the Father, for he believes in what is proper to the Father's Essence; and thus the faith is one, in one God. And he who worships and honours the Son worships and honours the Father; for one is the Godhead; and therefore one the honour and one the worship which takes place in the Son and through Him to the Father. And he who thus worships, worships one God; for there is one God and none other than He. Accordingly when the Father is called the Only God, and we read that there is One God, and 'I AM', and 'beside Me there is no god,' and 'I the first and I the last,' this is properly said. For God is One and Only and First, but this is not said to the denial of the Son; perish the thought; for He is in that One, as being the Only Logos and Wisdom and Radiance of that One and Only and First. And He too is the First, as the Fulness of the Godhead of the First and Only, being whole and full God. This then is not said on his account, but to deny that there is anything else such as the Father and His Logos. Now it is clear and evident to all that this is the sense of the prophet.

But since the impious men putting forward even these passages, dishonour the Lord and reproach us, saying, 'Behold God is said to be One and Only and First; how say ye that the Son is God? For if He were God, He would not have said, "I alone," or, "God is One,"' it is necessary to declare the sense of these phrases in

(437) προσκυνών δὲ καὶ τιμῶν.
(438) εἰς δὲ ἀνατέσσιν.
(439) ἔστι δὲ καὶ πρώτος καὶ δύναμις πληρωμα τῆς τοῦ πρώτου καὶ μόνου θεότητος, ὅλος καὶ πλήρης ἐν Θεῷ.
(440) That is, God the Father, as in the Old Testament.
addition....that all may know from this also that the Arians are really contending against God....(It is not as if God were rebuking a rebellious son like Adonijah and Absalom, but)...if he who knows the Son....knows the Father, the Son revealing the Father to him, and in the Logos he should...see the Father, and so if the Son when he came glorified not Himself but the Father....(Luke 18:19, Mk.12:29, John 6:33, 14:23, 5:23) ....if the Son is such towards His Father, what is the difficulty that we must take such a view of these passages? And on the other hand, if the Son is Logos of the Father, who is so wild, apart from these enemies of Christ, as to think that God has thus spoken to traduce and deny His own Logos? .....for this has not been written on account of the Son, but to deny those mis-called gods that are invented by men."

Athanasius continues for a while enlarging on the theme of the last sentence of the last chapter, suggesting as an analogy a man who supposed that a painting could be a true representation of the source of the light itself; he continues (337A, mid.): "Indeed, when God said this, He said it through (δι' αυτοῦ + gen.) His Logos...For the Logos of the Lord came to the prophet, and that is what was heard, nor is there a thing which God says or does, without His saying or doing it in (ἐν) the Logos. So this is not said with reference (δι' αυτοῦ + acc.) Him, O enemies of Christ, but with reference to things foreign to Him and not from Him. For according to the aforesaid illustration, if the Sun had spoken these words he would have been refuting the error, and would have so spoken, not as having his radiance outside him, but in (ἐν) the radiance showing his own light. Therefore such passages are not for the purpose of denying the Son, or with reference to Him, but for the overthrow (ἀπεδείξας αυτοῦ) of falsehood.....
If then the Father be called the Only True God, this is not said to the denial of Him Who said, "I am the Truth," but to the denial of those who by nature (τὸ πρῶτον ὢν θεοῦ) are not true, as the Father and His Logos are. And hence the Lord Himself added at once, "And Jesus Christ Whom Thou didst send." Now had He been a creature, He would not have added this, and ranked Himself with His Creator..., but as it is, by adding Himself to the Father, He has shown that He is True Offspring of the True Father.... (I John 5:20)...." Athanasius concludes with the corollary that such Biblical verses as Is.44:24, and other passages in which "Only" and "First" are applied to God, the Logos of God through Whom all things are made must also be included, as Natural (ὁ Ἔκκλησιάς 3403) True Offspring of the Father. Therefore, once again, He must also be First along with the Father and absolutely share His supremacy.

This is, as usual, a most interesting passage, and there are three important issues; a formal and general one, a material Trinitarian, and an intermediate issue. The formal issue appears trite, but is actually of the greatest importance, as well as of the greatest interest to our own generation. It is that passages of Scripture that refer to the unique Deity of God apply only against false gods, and cannot exclude the Deity of the Second Person of the Trinity against other Scriptural evidence in favour of it. In a sense, this is an extension of what we previously observed to be the basic principle of Athanasian exegesis, as it was involved in the Arian controversy, that passages concerning the Deity of the Logos have absolute priority over passages in which He is described as a creature, and that the latter must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the former. (441) What is new is that Athanasius points out that there is a right as well as a wrong use of the principle.

(441) See above, pps. 441-443 for Arianism, and pp. 745-54. for Athanasius.
that was so signally misused by the Arian heretics. The author feels that here we come to the very heart of the formal issue, that the Arian method of exegesis was actually the procedure that must be adopted to explain and refute, not Christian and orthodox truth, but idolatry and perverted worship. It is these that have to be explained in terms of creaturely reality, and even the power of sin, if we are to explain them at all. The crime of Arianism was to apply this most Christian principle in order to destroy the very faith that was its basis. The original exegetical procedure of Arius and his school can be applied only to the demythologisation of a system of non-Christian theology that was already known to be false. On the principle that we have already shown, that the anti-Revelational doctrines of Marxism and of all modern atheism generally are simply an extension and fulfilment of the exegetical principle of Arius, the same holds good in the later era as in the former; we can only interpret religious truths as mythological representations of creaturely reality if we know independently that atheism must be the truth. For Athanasius, the problem was relatively simple; he only had to draw attention again to the testimonies in scripture to the Deity of Christ, and in particular to what he had already elaborated concerning the Scriptural relationship between Father and Son, to show plainly that this essential first condition for the validity of Arian Scriptural exegesis was not only not fulfilled, but soundly and completely contradicted. In the present age, the problem is very much more difficult, as it immediately involves the criterion of true revelation, perhaps even the criterion of what we are to accept as the truly God. For Christians, there has been always in theory only one answer, that God is primarily and absolutely revealed in Jesus Christ, but the point here is that this answer must be taken
in deadly earnest. This is the reason not only for the extreme prominence of the doctrine of revelation in the theology of Karl Barth, but also for the place of Christology as early as Barth's prolegomena, in the immediate context of the Doctrine of Revelation. (442) A foretaste of these developments is, not surprisingly, provided by the emphasis on revelation in these chapters.

This brings us to what we have described as the intermediate issue. The increasing importance of revelation is at its height here, where it bears the weight of the minor premise in Athanasius's argument, that is, that the Deity of the Second Person, as Logos, cannot be a falsehood but must be true. The argument is that the monotheistic statements and commandments of Scripture could not have been made in such a way that they "traded", or denied, the Logos. (7:336C). It is possible that here we have a further manifestation of the Greek rationalistic view that the Logos of a thing is, if anything, more fundamental and more ultimate than the thing in question. However, the great emphasis on the metaphor of \( \phi\nu\varepsilon \) in a context more definitely revelational than ever, in ch. 8, indicates that the transition to the Hebraic or Prophetic or Revelational Logos concept is almost complete. The argument of Athanasius is quite simply that only God can reveal God and that the Logos then must be entirely God, because, in the first place, all revelation of God is through the Logos even as all revelation of the Sun is through the radiance, and secondly, if the Logos were a creature, all the revelation through Him, even the hypothetical revelation that the Logos was a creature, would be in doubt, thus giving rise to one of the classical self-contradictory logical paradoxes. (This

(442) At the beginning of Ch. Dogm. Vol.I.Pt.II.)
last, if not quite expressed in so many words, is at least strongly implied by the ending of ch. 7). Now this argument is not absolutely certain as Athanasius puts it—and the fact that he does not absolutely clinch it is another sign that the Arians were not theologians of revelation in any way. There are cases in the Bible of people making statements of revealed truth which deny that they themselves have any special status above creaturely reality, for example, John the Baptist's self-deprecation compared with the Christ Who was to follow, the Angel in the Apocalypse, etc. (443) The Arians would have been quite capable of adding, however falsely, Christ's preliminary reply to the Rich Young Ruler (Mk. 10:17 and parallels), although there is no evidence in Athanasius that they actually did do so. (Athanasius's citation of this verse in ch. 7 is, in the context, no evidence of Arian use of it). A complete account of the difference between the former two cases and Christ Himself would have to involve the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but a fairly rigorous argument can be constructed from the materials already supplied by Athanasius: No sort of creature can completely reveal God, nor can any creature completely do the will of God. According to the pluralistic doctrine eagerly accepted by Athanasius in C. Ar. II: 44-72, a creature would spend all its time and energy being itself and fulfilling its own nature and function. This would be the case quite apart from any distortion produced by the Fall. Therefore, it is only some being like the Second Person that can act in any way at all as the Revealer of the First Person. Any idea of revelation being mediated purely and simply by, say, a machine, as we would now regard it, is rigorously excluded. We have, in fact, the first step towards the revelational equivalent of the Anselmic soteriology and

the Christology necessitated by it; for the revelation of God to be
effective, only through Christ as God can the end be accomplished; only
through Christ as man the means. This argument came the more easily to
Athanasius since, as is shown by the context in which he treats the prob-
lem in the "De Incarnatione," revelation means something more than revela-
tion of mere truths; as something intimately associated with what he
frankly calls De

\[ \text{it tends towards an actual imparting of something which for us is utterly peculiar to God Himself.} \]

(444) The same principle applies, if anything more strongly, to the practical question
of Christ's doing the will of God. Here, the mechanistic interpretation
of the obedience of Christ is so energetically repudiated that Athanasius
actually is able to use the well-known passages of Scripture, Mark 10:17,
12:28 (\& par\'s aa), John 5:23, 6:38, 13:20, 14:28, which at first sight
seem to justify the mechanistic interpretation, not only in ways not in-
consistent with the absolute Deity of the Logos, but as their final and
conclusive vindication. If no machine can reveal God, much less can any
machine do His Will; only God Himself can do it. Finally, an interesting
thought is suggested by the above, although Athanasius does not explicitly
make this comparison; for the Arians, the Logos is De

\[ \text{for otherwise "he would be as wood and stone" so that He could not move}
\]

of His own accord and freely. (445) As Athanasius has perhaps already
recognised, this confusion over revelation is a grave internal self-
contradiction in the Arian theology, and if they had laid more emphasis
on the revelational principle, we would have heard from Athanasius along
these lines at far greater length.

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(444) See chs. 11-20, where the Revelatory function of the work of Christ
is closely associated (in esp. ch.14) with the renewal of the Image
of God in man.

The third, or material, question is, What is the nature of the unity between the Father and the Son? We can notice at the outset that, for better or worse, the question still remains in its binitarian form, but this does not affect the immediate issue. The controlling analogy is still that of the unity of the Φωτ (or Sun) and Ἀναμμένον of the Sun, and the answer is very largely dictated by the interest in revelation that we have already noticed. It is instructive to examine Athanasius's doctrine in terms of the three traditional types of unity, the arithmetical, constitutive, and generic. Of these, constitutive unity does not figure at all. In some places, for example, in chs. 6 and 9, the emphasis appears to be on generic unity, although this is as usual brought into the closest connection with the Logos's status as the Offspring of the Father, which means — although Athanasius still does not use the term — the doctrine of the Homoousion which Athanasius elaborated in the "De Decretis"; as we have seen, there is more to this than simple generic likeness — rather is it the sort of likeness that is dictated by, in genetics, a fixed and constant chromosome pattern. However, when Athanasius quotes Scriptural passages on the unity of God, it is clear that they point rather to the arithmetical or individual unity of God, although Athanasius appears to get around this difficulty by suggesting that the arithmetical unity refers primarily to God the Father, and by a strict corollary also to God the Son as involved inextricably because of His consubstantiality. Probably the best solution is in terms of the later distinction drawn by the Cappadocians between οὐσία and ἑξοστοιχία, and the equally important, but not so often recognised, distinction between οὐσία and Φωτίς that was implied in the later Chalcedonian Christological formula. On this basis, Φωτίς would refer to the generic relation between Father
and Son, if it were used as a Trinitarian term, would be something like what we mean by personal distinction (but not to the extreme of romantic individualism), while \( \text{oúσολ} \) would be the supra-personal arithmetic unity of the Persons in the Godhead which is really mysterious to us, and has no analogy in human or creaturely existence. It would do full justice to the typically Athanasian element as described above, but its primary aspect would have to be the Scriptural type of unity. Incidentally, as regards what we mean by personality, there is one sense in which it resides in each Person of the Trinity in virtue of that fact, another in which it resides in Father and Son but not in the Spirit, in virtue of their own proper titles, and yet another in which it can only be a property of the Godhead as a whole, that is, the \( \text{Μία oúσολ} \). However, Athanasius does not begin to make these distinctions, since he apparently feels that he has already done enough for his purposes. This would probably be easier in the Binitarian form in which the doctrine stands at the moment than in its perfect Trinitarian form. Also, he was still close to the atmosphere of Platonic idealism and the Theory of Forms, and that would have made easier the tendency to conflate what were later regarded as arithmetic and generic unity. However, as we shall show at the end of our lexicographic analysis, Athanasius's use of the three terms in question is far from even Chalcedonian.

This disquisition on the unity of God, however, immediately raises the question of the relation between the unity of God and the unity of the Christian with God, which is represented classically in

(446) For our final analysis, see below, pp. 1045 and 1075-81
Scripture in John 17:21, and which the Arians had already misused for their purposes. This is the last problem that Athanasius has to discuss before setting down to the detailed consideration of the Incarnate life of Christ. However, it is a most important question, as it represents Athanasius's final consideration of the problem of analogy, and as we shall show it is very close to the modern discussion of analogia entis and analogia fidei, and, as we shall show, Athanasius here makes an important contribution to the study of this matter, which is in many ways much closer to the heart of the issue than much contemporary discussion.

"However, here too they introduce their private fictions and contend that the Son and the Father are not 'one' or 'like' (δομοιον) in such a way as the Church preaches, but as they themselves would like it. For they say, 'Since what the Father wills the Son will also, and is not contrary either in what He thinks or in what He judges, but is in all respects concordant with Him (συμφωνει αυτω), declaring doctrines which are the same, and a word consistent and united with the Father's teaching, therefore it is that He and the Father are one,' and some of them have dared to write as well as say this." This extract, at the commencement of ch. 10, is one of the few passages which can be construed as giving encouragement to the view that Athanasius had anything like the Roman Catholic doctrine of the sine Scriptura traditiones, but it is fair to reply that this is more than balanced by Athanasius's failure to make any regular use of this doctrine in anything like its

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(447) The only available discussion in English is in Karl Barth's "Church Dogmatics" (E.T.), passim, see under analogia entis in the Subjects Index and Erich Przywarra, his principal Roman Catholic antagonist, in the Names section. Barth regards its proneness to analogia entis as the gravest criticism that can be made of Roman Catholicism, and in fact the decisive criticism.

(448) Ταυτίς ἑνὶς ἐν θοπλαστίδισ
systematic form. The Arian statement that follows is a summary, by implication, of the mechanical theory that we have already discussed unfavourably. Athanasius simply points out that this would make the Son like the angelic world, which contradicts the absolute uniqueness of the Son (\( \mu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu  \) \( \gamma \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu  \) \( \kappa \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu

(449) See also Newman's note on Angels in Vol. II, pp. 7-12, of his "Select Treatises of St. Athanasius in Controversy with the Arians", 1861 edition. Newman notes that, in comparison with the later Church and the Romanist tradition after the Reformation, Athanasius represents a definite restriction of the role and importance of angels.
analogy: "The Ariana, however, ... reply, "... So are the Father and the Son one, and so is the Father in the Son and the Son in the Father, as we too may become one in Him... (John 17:11, 20-23).... If, as we become one in the Father, so also He and the Father are one, and thus He too is in the Father, how do you pretend, from His statement, "I and the Father are One," and, "I in the Father and the Father in Me," that He is proper to and like the Father's Essence? For it follows either that we too are proper to the Father's Essence, or He foreign to it, as we are foreign (καλοτροπίον)...." Athanasius's immediate comment is, "... What is given to man by grace (κατὰ Χάριν), this they would make equal to the Godhead of the Giver. Thus hearing that men are called sons (ὑιοὶ χρηματίσοντας), they judged themselves equal to the True Son by nature such. And now again, hearing from the Saviour 'that they may be one as We are,' they deceive themselves and are arrogant enough to think that they may be such as the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son...."

18 Athanasius proceeds by reiterating the uniqueness of the Son, and again insists that it does not do justice to this to maintain that He was simply first in point of time. But to confirm his point, he now has to clarify the use of analogy for good and all: (3600-361) "It is a custom with Divine Scripture to take the things of nature as images and illustrations for mankind and it does this, to clarify from these physical (κατὰ φυσίν) things the moral impulses of men."
thus their conduct (προτεστ) shown to be either bad or righteous - for instance, in the case of the bad, as when it charges, 'Be ye not like (κατ' θητς) the horse or the mule, which have no understanding.' Or as when it says......, 'Man, being in honour, hath no understanding, but is compared (παρευμεθη) unto the beasts that perish.' And again, 'They were as (τρόμο) wanton horses.' And the Saviour, to expose Herod, says, 'Tell that fox,' but on the other hand, charged His disciples, 'Behold I send you forth as (κατ' θητς) sheep in the midst of wolves; be ye therefore wise as (κατ' θητς) serpents and harmless as (κατ' θητς)doves.' And He said this, not that we may become in nature (τις θητς) beasts of burden, or become serpents and doves; for He hath not made us thus Himself, and therefore nature does not recognise this; but that we might eschew the irrational impulses of the one, and be aware of the wisdom of the other animal, though we should not be deceived by it but rather take on the meekness of the dove.

Again, taking patterns (Εἰκόνας) for men from divine matters, the Saviour says, 'Be ye merciful, as (κατ' θητς) your Father which is in Heaven is merciful'. And He said this too, not that we might become such as (κατ' θητς) the Father, for to become as the Father is impossible for us, as we are creatures, who have been brought into being from non-existence; rather even as He charged us, 'Be ye not like (κατ' θητς) the horse', not so that we should not become draught animals, but so that we should not imitate their irrationality, so did He say, 'Be ye merciful as your Father,' not so that we might become as (κατ' θητς) God, but that we should look at His beneficent acts and do our good deeds, not for men's sake, for for His, so that from Him and not from men we may have the

(454) No θητς in the Greek.
(455) διο οὐδέν ποτε ἐδείκνυεν η θητς.
reward. For as although there be only one Son by nature (φίλος), True
and Only-Begotten, we too become sons, not as He is, in nature and truth
(φίλος καὶ άληθεία), but according to the grace of Him that
calleth, and though we are men from earth and yet called god, not as the
True God or His Logos, but as has pleased God Who has given us that
grace; so also as God (οὐσία καὶ θεός) do we become merciful, not
by being made equal to God (456) nor becoming in nature and truth bene-
factors (Εὐφροσύνη) for it is not our gift to benefit, but
God's - but in order that what has accrued to us from God Himself by
grace, we may impart to others, without making distinctions, but extend-
ing our good deeds liberally towards all. For only in this way is it
possible at all for us to become imitators....(because of the dissimil-
arity between the Son and men).... He is by nature and essence Logos and
True God (457).... but we are adopted through Him by adoption (θεία)
and grace (Χριστός), partaking in His Spirit (458).... and therefore also
He is the Truth.... but we by imitation become virtuous and sons; - there-
fore He said, 'that they may be one as We are,' not that we might be-
come οὐσία ἄνθρωπο, but so that, as He being the Logos is in His own
Father, we too, taking an exemplar (τῷ πατρὶ τινα) and looking
at Him, might become one towards each other in concord and unity of
spirit....."

In the next chapter, Athanasius continues and enlarges on the
same topic, and points out that in imitating God, we have a model that is
quite stable and secure. He then points out that in John 17:21 etc.
the first person plural pronoun is used, not only to strengthen the unity

(456) οὐκ ἔσοδόμενοι τῷ Θεῷ.
(457) φίλος καὶ τῇ ὧσθε Λόγος καὶ Θεός ἀληθινός.
(458) μετέχοντες τῷ Πνεύματος αὐτοῦ.
of Father and Son, but also to indicate their equality. In the next chapter, this is related more closely to the reconciliation in Christ of man to God and man to man. Later in this chapter (at 369A, end), Athanasius continues with his formal study of analogy: "If He had said simply and absolutely, 'that they may be one in Thee,' or, 'that they and I may be one in Thee,' God's enemies would have had some plea, however shameless, but in fact He has not spoken simply, but said, 'As Thou (Καθὼς οὖ), Father, in Me, and I in Thee, that they may be all one.' Moreover, in using the word 'as' (Καθώς), He signifies those who from afar off became as He is in the Father, afar off, not in place, but in nature (φύσις).... whose uses, 'as' (Καθώς) indicates neither identity (ταυτότης) nor equality (ομοιότης), but a pattern of the matter in question, viewed in a certain respect:

23 ...(With reference to Matt. 12:40).... Jonah was not as the Saviour, nor did Jonah go down to Hades, nor was the whale Hades, nor did Jonah, when swallowed, bring up those previously swallowed by the whale, but he alone came forth when the whale was bidden. Therefore no identity or equality is signified in the term 'as', but one thing and another, and it shows a sort of similarity in the case of Jonah on account of the three days. Thus then we too, when the Lord says 'as', we neither become as the Son in the Father nor as the Father in the Son. For we become one as the Father and the Son, in mind and harmony of spirit, and

(459) Τοῦ ἀναλογίου Μεμεισθήσεσθαι Καθὼς Θεωροῦμεν.
(460) ἦλθο μὲν καὶ ἦλθο. That is, the things being compared are really different in identity, and if inequality of rank is admitted, there is nothing to prevent them from being unequal in rank also.
(461) Ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ Καθώς οἶκος Καὶ οἴκῳ, οὕτω γυμνὸς ἐν Θεῷ ἑφοροῦσεν καὶ τῇ τοῦ Πνεύματος ομοφωνίᾳ.
the Saviour would be as Jonah in the earth. But as the Saviour is not Jonah, nor was the Saviour's descent into Hades as Jonah's being swallowed up (462) but it is one thing and another. In like manner, if we too become one, as the Son in the Father, we shall not be as the Son nor equal to Him, for we are noe thing and another. For this is why the word 'as' is applied to us; as it is applied to things that are not of the same nature (μὴ ἴδον), but become as the others when viewed in a certain relation (πρὸς ἀλλ' αὐτῷ). Wherefore the Son is in the Father simply and without any qualification, for He has this by nature (φυσικά), but we who do not have this by (κατὰ) nature, need an image and example (εἰκόνος καὶ παραγγελία), that He may say, 'As Thou in Me and I in Me.' In a final rhetorical conclusion, this is again related to the soteriology as has been elaborated above, and included in this one reference is made to the Spirit in making men one with God.

This exceedingly interesting section is, in a sense, the last word that can be said on the subject of analogy. Athanasius starts off, in the earlier chapters, by a simple description of the ordinary "analogy of proportion", in other words, incomplete resemblance; that is, the two things, A and B, have certain qualities (or relations) X, Y, Z, etc., in common, but whereas A has the qualities (or relations), P, Q, R, etc., B lacks these qualities, that is, is non-P, non-Q, non-R, and has perhaps other positive qualities, L, M, N etc., which A lacks. Now Athanasius says, absolutely correctly, that analogies have a descriptive and kerygmatic value, and when they are used in Scripture it is normally absolutely

(462) οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐκθέσεως κατεταθείς, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Κύριος καθήκειν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. That is, the passive relations in the two cases were not the identical relation.
clear what is meant. But he is pointing out that argument from analogy, in the usual sense, is invalid; that is, we cannot argue from A and B having some features in common to A and B having all, or even any other, features in common. In fact, as Athanasius recognises in his remarks about the non-identity of Jonah and Christ, two beings that had absolutely every feature in common, every quality and relation, would be literally identical. (In fact, even the Coessential Persons of the Trinity are always understood to differ in mutual intra-Trinitarian relations). Later, in chs. 22-23, when Athanasius returns to this subject, he appears to treat a different form of analogy, which could be termed analogy of relation - the relation $A \rightarrow B$ is analogically used to describe the other relation $C \rightarrow D$, and from the analogically described similarity or identity of the relation we cannot infer the identity of A and B, or C and D. But, as things have not only qualities but relations, and are also conditioned by the relations of their parts internally to each other, it would not be correct to make a sharp distinction between these two types of analogy and their misuse.

So far, Athanasius is able to follow strict logic. However, he has to go a step further, which gives rise to certain logical difficulties, but which is absolutely necessary. Some qualities, external relations, or internal relations, to which for better or worse we apply the same term in all cases, behave differently in the case of God and man -- the "analogy of proportionality" as previously discussed. (463) We consider that this analogy, as described by Aquinas, Thomas de Vio Cajetan, and J.F. Anderson, is not a perfect description of the analogy between God and man, since the fact that every possible subdivision, internal relation, etc., of the quality is analogical -- we can never get to univocal

(463) See above, pp. 590-3.
predication no matter how far we analyse - means that we cannot do justice
to the question without some help from the notion of analogy of inequality. But Athanasius does not try to handle this aspect of the matter, and we shall not be further detained by it. The important thing is that one of the things that can only be considered in this analogical way is the unity of God, as compared with the unity of man with man or with God; in scripture, says Athanasius, the use of *Kádoú* is the sign of this sort of analogical statement, and this form of statement also occurs in John 17:21 and similar verses. Seeing that in all the other places, the logical restrictions on arguments from analogy also apply; therefore, the analogy gives us no reason for supposing that the two types of unity are the same.

So far, it has been shown that the two types of unity have the relation of analogy in the formal or logical sense. Is it possible to go any further from here? Athanasius does so, and indicates at once the reason why the analogy, in the logical and formal sense, is justifiable, and how the logical prohibition against argument from analogy applies, again in the logical and formal sense. The reason is identical in both cases; that in the case of God (including the relation of Father and Son), the unity is primary and absolute, and enjoyed by nature; in the case of men, it is secondary, derived from the primary unity, and is enjoyed solely through Divine grace. The formal laws of analogy apply, because the unity is materially analogous, in a way that is really quite unique (but resembles the analogy according to the Platonic Socrates between the Forms and the particulars - that is, since Socrates believed that "equality itself" was equal in a way transcending the way in which equal things in the ordinary way were equal.\(^{(464)}\) In ch. 23, where he

\(^{(464)}\) See Plato, "Phaedo", Sect. 74.
returns to this for the second time, Athanasius describes the unity of God as an Εἰκών and παράδειγμα of the unity that Christ wills for us to have. Now there are two things about this type of analogy that utterly differentiate it from the usual formal types of analogy. In the first place, it is material and essential; it is analogical because things happen analogically and not merely because analogy is the most convenient way of describing a thing or obtaining or propagating knowledge about it. There is always something epistemic and secondary, one might say, epistemic in a second-rate way, about formal analogies; one looks forward to the stage when one is no longer interested in the analogy, when, having transcended the analogy, one can deal in the exact features which the analogous things have in common and the exact features in which they differ, and one does so rightly, because it is in accordance with the way things really are. But there is no transcendence of the analogy between the unity of God and the unity of man in Christ, because analogy is here built into the very stuff of the actual relation. And the second feature follows too from the fact that the analogy is material; that is, that it is materially irreversible. We are, or are to be, one in Christ because of the unity of Father and Son, and according to the pattern of the latter; not vice versa; least of all do these two relationships have a symmetrical and reciprocal relationship. The analogy in question is absolutely asymmetrical. On the other hand, the classical logical form of analogy is obviously a symmetrical relationship; so is the "analogy of proportionality" of J.F. Anderson; the "analogy of inequality" or Hegelian type of analogy, appears at first sight to be asymmetrical, but the ease with which this type of analogy serves evolutionary theory, and the ease with which Hegel, and to a less extent all natural theologians, proceed continuously up a straight line in the development of a systematic ontology, indicates that this type of analogy too
is really symmetrical. It is true that in a certain sense we can use the analogy of Christ to rise to God from the things of creation; for example, it is correct for the theologians who support the social Trinity to quote John 17:21, but we have no natural right to do this; it is a privilege conferred strictly by Divine revelation itself, and only by Divine revelation itself. To apply this to another aspect that Athanasius has already discussed, we can only know anything, through a glass darkly, about the Fatherhood of God in virtue of our knowledge of human fatherhood, because we already know that from the Fatherhood of God is all fatherhood among men named.

This is the truth behind the modern discussion of the relation between analogia entis and analogia fidei. We have already distinguished, with particular reference to Athanasius’s treatment of the problem, the two forms of analogy, and it is essential to keep them separate. It is with reference to the second form that the modern question that we are now to discuss arises. To avoid confusion, it is necessary to remember that the original meaning of analogy, as in Plato’s Republic, was almost certainly what it meant etymologically, an "argument up" the line; the development of Hegel’s ontology from the meanest categories to the Absolute is a perfect example. Since "being", insofar as it has any relevant existence at all, is symmetrically related to all parties, the phrase "analogia entis" means that it is possible to argue symmetrically in both directions between God and man, that is, to practise natural theology in the strict sense. What then does analogia fidei mean? As the phrase "justification by faith" was used by the Reformers and Karl Barth, it primarily denied that men can or needed to contribute anything at all to their justification; the very last thing that Martin Luther meant

(465) See Book VI-509-10, concerning the "divided line" passage.
was that man should contribute his own faith as a different kind of work or deed of his own. (466) No; justification is purely by the work of Christ, and the only thing for man to do or work is to accept with joy and trust what God freely offers him; this is what man's faith is. Similarly, the correct meaning of analogia fidei is that the analogy is not our doing at all, not even the doing of all creation considered collectively, generally, or metaphysically, least of all is it concerned with any metaphysical principle that hypothetically lies behind both God and creatures. It is purely the work of God. In thought as well as in deed, the truth is that we can only rise to God in that God has come down to us. It is really not an analogy at all in the material sense; it is, to coin a word, a catalogy. There is, for us, an analogy between the unity of God and the unity of man with God, solely because God has graciously established the catalogy for us.

There are few places in theology where the absolute primacy of God, God in Christ at that, is so uncompromisingly asserted as in the above passage. Indeed, when he discusses angels, Athanasius goes so far to insist, in a manner crassly ignored by his "Catholic" successors, that God is really the only doer of good deeds (ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ καθαρός). It represents, in fact, the culmination of what we have described as the later doctrine of analogy in Athanasius, that is, that where something is predicated of both God and man, it occurs in its pure and primary form in God, and that its occurrence in man or creatures can only be understood as secondary to, in one way or another, its occurrence in God, in the same way that the fatherhood of God, and not the fatherhood of men, is the normative and pure form of fatherhood. (467)

(466) The misinterpretation of the Reformers here rejected has been the usual one in Protestantism and has done grave damage. (467) See above, pp. 686-96.
This is of course the plain meaning of scripture, especially John 17:21, where the unity of God is absolutely primary, and absolutely primary in the exact way that is specified by Athanasius, which is, as we have shown, the way of analogia fidelis. The only thing left to do is to register appropriate amazement that the Arians did not notice this. If they had had any real and practical and soteriological sense as regards Scriptural exegesis, they could hardly have missed the material primacy of the unity of God. In fact, this is another case of wantonly bad exegesis for the sake of proving a prior prejudice held fanatically. It is most instructive that this attempt to ignore the asymmetry of Scripture and to treat the case as symmetrical—which, according to Athanasius's summary of the Arian argument, they did—resulted, not in some form of Hegelianism, some elevation of creatures to the rank of the Logos, but in Arianism, the demotion of the Logos to the rank of creatures. Once again, there is only one parallel in all history to the effects of following the argument to its conclusion—Feuerbach, including all his successors. In fact, this piece of perverse exegesis reeks, when we read it in our day, of Feuerbach's "Essence of Christianity". If such results are to be avoided, the only way is not to allow the analogia entis to creep in where Scripture imperatively demands analogia fidelis.

So much for the passage in general. However, we must now take a brief glance at Athanasius's treatment of this issue from the point of view of man, since it links up with the two following chapters. It goes without saying that man cannot find unity with God and men of itself, since, according to Athanasius, it does not possess the right unity by nature. Incidentally, we might invoke the doctrine of analogy enunciated above, as Athanasius's final solution of the problems involved in the notion of "deification" (οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἁγιοις γόησθαι); we are said to be "deified" and to be "gods" in the same way as we are said to be "sons"; not
because that is of our essence or nature, but because we receive what God has graciously imparted to us of Himself. In fact, this is what Athanasius himself says expressly at the beginning of ch. 20. Unity with God is something, as Athanasius says in ch. 23, is something that we lack, in nature, and therefore we need an image and example (Εἰκὼν and Παράδειγμα). As for the question of what we are to do with the example, Athanasius, when the problem is first discussed in chs. 19 and 20, emphasises imitation, μιμήσις, as our task, even though he is aware that we can only do even this κατὰ Χρόνον. However, when the subject is taken up again, in ch. 23, it is brought into close connection with the Atonement as understood by Athanasius, and quite rightly so, as man cannot imitate the ways of God if he is still unreconciled. But Athanasius feels that even this does not go far enough, so he spends the next two chapters describing our analogical (or catalogal?) participation in the Divine unity in terms of the Holy Spirit. In the last few chapters, since the beginning of the Third Oration, there are relatively few references to the Spirit; the only one in the first nine chapters is in ch. 1: 324C, which refers as usual to our participation in the benefits of Christ. From ch. 10 onwards, the number of references tends to increase; reference is again made, in the context of the same principle, in 19: 364B and 23: 372B; in 20: 371C (L.N.P.-N.F., end of ch. 19) there is a reference to the unity of spirit (ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος ένόη) which we are to partake, which perhaps has no direct reference to the Third Person. In ch. 15, where he has to deny that the Trinity involves three gods or three Ἴδρασα, Athanasius adumbrates the doctrine of the work of the Spirit that is fully worked out in the Epistles to Serapion: (C. Ar. III: 15: 553B). For there is but one Form of the Godhead, which is also in the Logos; and one God, the Father, existing by Himself according as He is above all, and appearing in the Son according as He
is above all, and appearing in the Son according as He pervades all things, and in the Spirit according as in Him He acts in all things through the Logos". Earlier, in the same chapter (353A) Athanasius says definitely that the Arians (οἱ Ἀριῶνες) believed that the Spirit was ex nihilo (ἐκ τοῦ μη' οὐντος). This shows that when the Arians were brought up against the Trinity, they went on to say, always, that the Third Person was also a creature, but they had, at any rate till Eunomius, c. 355, no great sense of the importance of the Spirit. To return to Athanasius, we are beginning at this stage to find a greater density of references to the Spirit, and the fact that this is taking place during the exegesis of John 17:21 is another confirmation of our theory that the thing that forced the Spirit back into theology was the question of accounting for the unity of God with man, now that the Logos was strictly correlated with the Father, and was no longer equated so closely with human rationality. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Athanasius at this stage is impelled to devote a major

(468) Ἐν ἀρ. εἰδός Θεοῦ τῆς ἑπερ εἰσί μαί καὶ ἐν ποι λογίτ. καὶ Εἰς Θεοῦ δ' Πάρμ, ἐπ' ἐλπίδ. ἐν, κατὰ το οὐ πάντων εἰναὶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἁγ. ἐνεμένους κατὰ το οὐ πάντων δι' ἐκείν., καὶ ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι δι' κατὰ το ἐν ἐπιστ. δι' το λογίτ. ἐν ἔντος ἐν ἐν ἑνεργεῖν. This is a patent foretaste of the doctrine of the Letters to Serapion, passim, that God does everything from (ἐκ) the Father, through (ἐν) the Son, in (ἐν) the Spirit. Newman, in his note on this passage, refers to Ep.1:20, 28, 30, 31, and also III:1, 5 init et fin., and also other later Fathers.

(469) See the extract from the Thalia of Arius, quoted by Athanasius in De Synodis 15, (and for our citation, see above, pp. 404-6, and ff. for comment), where Arius says that he believes in a Triad Three Hypostases not alike in glory and apart from each other, which differ one from another in glory ad infinitum.
section to the Spirit. After opening the next chapter with an oratorical summary of the previous points which serves as an introduction, he quotes I John 4:13 as the final description of how we attain to unity with God in Christ. Continuing: (3733. beg.) "Therefore, owing to the grace of the Spirit that has been given to us (470) we become in Him and He in us, and since it is the Spirit of God, therefore we, through His coming in us, are fittingly considered to be in God, through having the Spirit (ενοτερί τῷ Πνεύματι), and thus is God in us. Not then as the Son is in the Father do we also come to be in the Father, for the Son does not merely partake of the Spirit so as therefore to be in the Father; (471) nor is He a receiver of the Spirit, but rather He supplies It Himself to all; and the Spirit does not unite (συναπτεῖ) the Logos to the Father, but rather does the Spirit receive from the Logos. (473) And the Son is in the Father, as His own Logos and Radiance; but we, apart from the Spirit, are strange and distant from God, and by participation in the Spirit are linked to the Godhead; (474) so that our being in the Father is not our own, but is of the Spirit which is in us and dwells in us, as long as we preserve It in us by true confession....(I John 4:15)....(Once again, Athanasius repeats the difference between the original unity of Father and Son and the secondary unity of man and God)....For He (i.e., Son)...gives to the Spirit (τῷ Πνεύματι διὰ Ιωσήφ) and whatever the Spirit has He has from (παρὰ) the Logos.
25 (John 17:21 was)......a request to the Father.....that the Spirit should be vouchsafed through Him to them that believe,(476) through whom we are seen to be in God and in this respect be linked in Him. (477) For since the Logos is in the Father, and the Spirit is given from the Logos', He wills that we should receive the Spirit, so that when we receive It, we, thus having the Spirit of the Logos which is in the Father, may too turn out on account of the Spirit to become one in the Logos, and through Him in the Father. (479) And if He says, 'as we,' this is again only a request that such grace of the Spirit as is given to the disciples may be infallible and irrevocable. For what belongs by nature (Kat' phugyn) to the Logos in the Father,......He wishes to be given to us irrevocably through the Spirit (di' to' Pneumatos).....(Rom. 8:35 & 9:23)..... It is the Spirit then which is in God, and not us as regards ourselves (Kat' Ehdous), and as we are sons and gods on account of the Logos in us,(480) so shall we be in the Son and in the Father and we shall be accounted to have become one in the Son and in the Father, because that very Spirit is in us, which is in the Logos which is in the Father: (481) So when a man falls away from the Spirit on account of any wickedness, the grace remains irrevocably in those who are willing, if one repents on his fall; but he who falls is no longer in God, because the Holy Spirit and Pneumatos which is in God has deserted him. But the sinner shall be in him to whom he has subjected himself,
as happened to Saul, for the Spirit of God departed from him and an evil spirit proceeded to afflict him...."

Once again, the doctrine of the Spirit has come up in the contemporary theology in the context of man's participation in the Divine nature, life, and grace. The contrast is between God, in which unity and harmony, as between Father and Son, are there aboriginally and by nature; and man, who can only participate in this unity and harmony with Father and Son in a secondary way, which concretely and finally means, through the presence of the Spirit. The latter is a participation, \( \mu \varepsilon \tau \omega \sigma \tau \alpha \) etc. a word which, as we have said time and time again, carries the implication that the participator is essentially subordinate to that which is participated, and which in this form is undoubtedly deliberately contrasted with the \( \sigma \omega \sigma \tau \alpha \) essence, of God. \(^{(482)}\) The natural effect of this would be to revive, with reference to the Spirit, the old vicious correlation in thought between the Logos and the world, and we have already suggested this as a likely etiology for the Tropicist heresy. So much for the general atmosphere of the passage, and this is confirmed by the last sentence that we have cited above, which revives the old doctrine that the Spirit is primarily a refreshing grace given as a reward for faith and virtue, rather than, as in Paul and the New Testament generally, the condition of all belief and of all virtue. On the other hand, to a far greater extent than in the earlier passage on the Spirit, C.Ar.I:46-50, he takes precautions against the errors of this type of theology, thus anticipating the position of the Letters to Serapion. In the first place, the sentence cited above from ch. 15 is a very good first approximation to the later doctrine that which he strongly advocates in the Letters to Serapion and which is usually known by a still later formula, "opera ad extra Trinitatis sunt indivisa"; his language about God acting (\( \lambda \nu \gamma \alpha \kappa \epsilon \varphi \beta \beta \iota \nu \)
in the Spirit is a foretaste of Athanasius's later virtual description of the Spirit as the Living Energy (483) which enlightens and sanctifies. This is a direct repudiation of such doctrines as that of Origen, according to which the Spirit was restricted to the highest work of God in His relations to the highest types of being, to wit, fully sanctified Christians, a doctrine which in some peculiar way seems to go together with his subordinationism of the Spirit. It is a little difficult to see, at first sight, what difference is meant by the Son pervading (διορίκειν) and the Spirit working (ἐνεργεῖν) in all things, or these respective Persons being especially associated with these relations of God; if anything we would draw the distinction the other way, if we were to draw it at all. However, one should not cavil at this, on account of the fact that this is the first attempt to study the matter after generations of neglect. Also, Athanasius goes to great lengths to justify the absolute transcendence of the Spirit as well as the Son, since he says on two occasions in this passage that our unity with God is not only absolutely secondary to the Son's unity with the Father but just as absolutely secondary to the Spirit's Being in the Godhead.

On the other hand, it is true that the procedure of Athanasius makes it difficult to give any account of the intra-Trinitarian relations of the Spirit, such as would be necessary for any completed doctrine of the Perichoresis in the perfect Trinitarian form, let alone a developed doctrine of the Procession in either the Greek or Latin form. The important relation of the Spirit, the one that demands attention at the moment, is the relation of the Spirit to the creature, and all the attention that is bestowed on the relation of the Spirit to the Son, say, is for the negative purpose of denying that the Son is in that creaturely relation.

(483) συναν ἐνεργεῖαιν, Ad Serap. I:20:580A.
Where Athanasius says that our being in God is really the Spirit's being in God, he does uncompromisingly maintain that the Spirit is in the Godhead; once again, we must agree, within the meaning of all the words with the μετά - prefix, that the Son does not participate in the Spirit (μετέχειν, κ.τ.λ.), but the immediate extension of this denial to receiving, λαμβάνειν, is a sign of how little attention was yet paid to the intra-Trinitarian problem. As for the details of His relation to the Son, what is said concerns mainly the practical question of what was later described as the mission of the Spirit, that is, from God to men; the Son supplies the Spirit, the Spirit is given from (ἐκ) the Logos - the context does not allow us to interpret the ἐκ as supporting the Filioque - Athanasius also says that the Spirit is given through (ἐλήλυθε) the Logos. It is probably in that sense that we must interpret the statement that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Logos. The truth is certainly that all these ambiguities and uncertainties were inevitable in view of the way in which the Holy Spirit again became an issue of theology. Unfortunately, this meant that the history of the Arian doctrine was repeated in the case of the Third Person, as we have already described. The problems could not be solved until Athanasius had repeated his work on the Logos in this new connection especially the breaking of the correlation between the Spirit and creaturely life, and here, in the Epistles to Serapion, we shall consider all this in full.

Since the first 25 chapters of C. Ar. III are a definite section, we can make another lexicographical analysis: Logos: Called God in same sense as Father: 16:357A, 19:564B(Ὁμελές is in nature and essence L. and True God). Uncreated, &c.: 18:360B (We are not L. & W. nor He

(484) See the treatment of the Spirit in Orat.I:15, and see also above, pp. 677-9.
created &c), 20:365A (L. unlike us, like F.). Origin: L. of the F.: 6:333C(O.T. monotheism means that there is nothing like F. and His L.), 7:336B(If S. is L. of F., O.T. monotheism cannot be cited against Him), 9:337C(Monotheism against false gods, who are not as F. & His L.), 24:373B(S. is in F. as His proper L. & Radiance). L. of God: 7:336B(Does God speak to deny His own L.?), 8:337A(God spoke monotheistically in O.T. through His own L.), 8:337A(if it was His L. that came to prophets.....), 10:341B(On Arian exegesis of John 17:21, many things would be L. of G.), 11:344A(We are called Image and Glory of God on account of Image dwelling in us, which is L., which was for our sake later made flesh....), 12:345C(L. of God = Angel that delivered Jacob, Gen. 43:15-16), 13:349A(None other did Jacob join to God in prayer, than L. of God, called "Angel"....), 16:356B(God is one, and His L. is one), 16:356B alterum (alone has ἑν καὶ ἑν), 16:356C bis (Suitably He has joined Logos to (John 5:37) to show that L. of G. is Εἰκὼν ἡ ἐντολή, Εἰδος of F.), 19:364A(we are called gods not as the True God & His L.), 19:364A alterum (ιδιός is L. & θεος of God), 22:369A bis (each, John 17:21 means, "I am Thy L. ...."), Generation of L. &c.: 12:345B(If L. not ἀνθρωπος, τοῦ Πατρὸς οὕτως ἔγενεν, then the F. alone would give....), L. = O.T. envoy of God: 8:337A(L. of the LORD came to prophet ...), 8:337A(hereetics deny that this passage was spoken through L.), 14:352B(What G. speaks, He speaks through the L.). Perfect & Immutable Equality, Joined to F. in F. &c. 7:336A(In L. is seen F.), 8:337B(L. οὐν ἀμφότερος, i.e. F.), 14:352B(L. not separated from F. or alien to the E. of F.), 20:364C(in F.), 22:368C(L. has truly and actually τούτων τῆς φύσεως with F.), 25:376A(L. is in F.), 25:376B(....having the Spirit of the L. which is in the F.), 25:376B alterum (what is τὸ λόγον by nature in the F.), 25:376C(Sp. is in the L. which is in the F.), Same Name as F.: 9:340A(In Is. 44:24, the "I only"
also includes Λ.), 14:352B(He who hears Λ. hears Π.), ἀναφαγμα

Εἶδος, Εἶκὼν, σωφία, Κ.Τ.Λ. of Π.: 9:340B(Π. co-exists with Π. as Radiance with Light), 9:340B alterum (this could be said of — ἐτὶ nothing else except the Λ.), 15:353B (one is the Form of the Godhead, which is also ἐν τῷ Λ. ὁ Σ. 21:365C (Sole Λ. & Wdm., Alone in Sole Π.), 6:335B (Sole Λ., Wdm., Radiance of the Father). Work in Creation: Π. did τὸν Λ. 9:340A, 15:353B (The later Trinitarian formulation like that in the Letters to Serapion). ἐν Λ.

8:337B (everything that God says and does He does in the Λ.), Attributes of Creator attributed to Λ.: 15:353A (we affirm the ἁμοῦργον Λ. to be God). Λ. in Relation to Spirit (not mentioned above): 24:373A (2 expls.) (Sp. does not attach Λ. to Π. but rather does Sp. receive τῇ τῇ τοῦ Λ. Λ.), 24:376A (whatever the Sp. has It has from the Λ.), 25:376A (Sp. given ἑκτὸς Λ. Λ.).

Incarnation of Λ.: 22:368C (Ἐν ηῷν ἐξανοτέν), 23:372B (Ἐν ηῷν τοῦ Λ.), 25:372C (John 17:21 means "...Thy Λ. became man, taking a body of these men....") Logos Incarnate: Same Logos author of our Reconciliation: 14:349G (Angels herald gifts given ἀπὸ τοῦ Λ. Λ.), 25:376B (on account of Sp. we become one in the Π. & through Him the Π.), 25:376B (we are sons and gods through the Π. in us).

Heretical uses: (affirmed or denied; Arians unless otherwise stated). Deny Λ. to be God: 15:353A. Reject Divine attributes, give humble ones: 2:325B (2 expls.) (Π. received authority of a Λ.), 10:341A (unity of Π. & Λ. ethical only). Λ. not sole Creator: 2:328A (Π. one of many such), 18:360G (on Arian basis, why are we sprung from one, and Sole Logos at that?). Pre-existent Logos a creature, etc.: 15:353A (one of the "all things"), 16:353C (ex nihilo, creature, and thing made), 18:360B (Let Him not be called Sole Logos, &c.), 18:360B alterum (If Λ. differs in time
alone he must be like us), 24:373C(nor is the L. as we are). See also 16:356C(after Incarnation; the Jews did not receive the Logos). Total, 70 of which 45 are in Group I, 7 in Group II, 8 in Group III (owing to the extensive discussion of the Old Testament witness in this section), 3 in Group IV, none in Group V, one in Group VI, and 6 in Group VII.

γίος, Son; Son = Logos (normally omitted; those included have already been mentioned under Logos): 7:336B(If S. is L. of the F. . . .), 24:373B(S. is in F. as His Proper L., &c.). Generation: Simply Expressed: 3:328B(The Being of the S., being from - ἐκ - the Father, is in - ἐν - the F.), 3:328B alterum (S. is ἀναγνώστηκεν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός':
11:344B(ἐκ Πατρός like F. as Radiance like Sun), 11:344C(Son is thus, see Former expl.), 19:361C(One by nature, True, Only-Begotten), 20:364C(it is as "sons", not as the Son, that we . . .). Status Does not compromise separation of Persons or vice versa: 4:328C(S. not another god), 4:328C alterum(Son is separate as Offspring, same as God), 4:328C tertium (F. is F. and not S.), 4:328C quartum et quintum (S. is S. and not F.). Origin of F. & S. explained: 1:324G(2 expls.) (S. not Son by participation, but as Offspring), 5:329C(ἐκ...γεννηματα), 5:329C alterum et tertium (each, ἦσαν...της ουσίας τοῦ Πατρός γεννηματα), 6:333A(the very Being of the Son is Proper Offspring τῆς πατρίκης οὐσίας), 9:340B(True and Natural Offspring from the F.). Same description of F. & S. (both ontically and epistemically): 4:329A & 5:329B & 6:333A(each same things said about S. as F.), 5:328C(ὁ τοῦ γίος are proper to F.), 6:333A alterum(Son such as F.), 6:333A tertium et quartum (each, Son is signified by term Father), 6:333B("First" does not exclude Son), 9:340B("I alone" indicates Son also). Same Nature of F. & S.: Unity (often κύριος ὁ Θεός or such phrase: 5:332A(F. and S. are one) 7:336B(if Son had such relation to F. - see catena of Scriptural passages), 11:344A(Unity to be referred to Essence
of Son Itself), 11:344B (Unity of F. & S., i.e. in true sense), 11:345A (Unity of F. & S.), 13:349B (2 expts) (When S. is seen, the F. is seen, since He is Radiance of F. Thus F. & S. are one). 20:365A (We shall not be one as F. & S. are one). 20:365A alterum (φιλοσίκην ενότητα of F. & S.). 21:368A (Unity of F. & S. model for us). 21:368A alterum (Unity κατὰ ψυχήν of F. & S.). See also 8:337B (Monotheistic passages in Scripture not for denial of S.) Godhead the same: 1:324B (Son is the Fulness of the F.'s Godhead), 3:328B (Form and Godhead of the F. is Being of S.), 4:329A & 5:332A (each Godhead of S. is the F.'s), 5:332A bis (each, the same is in the Son), 5:332B (The Godhead and Property of F. is Being of S.), 5:332B (S. is Image of F.), 6:332B (Fulness of F.'s Godhead is Being of S.), 6:332B (Son is δόξα Θεοῦ), 6:332C (S. if Form of F.'s Godhead), 6:332C alterum (Son is seen, and is, in F.'s Godhead), 6:332C tertium et quartum (The property and Godhead from F. in S. shows that S. is in F.). Common qualities and Unity of Relation: S. in F. and F. in S. (each instance is a pair of examples): 3:328B, 5:329B & 332A, 20:365A. He that sees S. sees F.: 5:332A, 6:332C, 14:352B. Son in Father: 5:328B bis, 24:373C (+ other than as we are). Other phrases: 3:328A (2 expts.) (S. is in F. because the whole being of S. is proper to F.'s Essence), 3:328B (He who sees S. sees what F.), 3:328B alterum (He that contemplates F. contemplates what is proper to is proper to F.'s Essence), 6:332C (S. is proper to F.'s Essence), 6:332C alterum (Thus is F. in S.), 7:336A (2 expts.) (He who knows S. knows F., as Son reveals Him), 13:349A (Inseparability of F. & S.) 16:357A (S. inseparable Katὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ οἰκειότητα τῆς οὐσίας), 23:372A (S. is in F. without συμπλοκή). Unity of Essence follows from Unity of Operation: 6:332C & 333C (each, Worship in the S. is worship in the F.), 6:333A (Faith in F. is faith in S.), 7:336A (S. in coming, glorifies F.), 11:344C (If S. works, F. works), 11:344C alterum et tertium (If S. comes to saints, F. comes in
S. - i.e. especially in O.T.), 11:345A(One grace from F. & S.), 11:345A alterum(F. gives grace through S.), 11:345A tertium(S. gives Father's grace and peace), 12:345B(gifts show unity of F. & S.), 12:345B alterum(Gifts given through S.), 12:345B tertium(God does not work except through S.), 13:349A(Gifts from F. are through S.), 13:349B(when F. gives the gift is through S.), 13:349B alterum et tertium et quartum (when S. is said to bestow, it is the F. that through S. and in S. supplies), 14:352B (when S. gives the gift is F.'s), 16:357A(One is the faith in - F. & S.), 21:365C(we are in the S. and through Him in the F.), 21:368B (we become one in power of F. & S.), 21:368B alterum (ditto, in Name of F. & S.), 23:372A(we do not come to be in F. as S. is), 25:376B(We are in S. & F. by grace of the Spirit), 25:376C(we shall be deemed to have become one in S. & in F. through the Spirit's being in us). Special principle of Creation and Governance of the Universe: 9:340B(Universe sustained), 9:340C(2 expls.) (To call S. First-born is on account of Son's Δημιουργίας καὶ ωνομασίας Nature of Son greater than all creaturely nature: 1:324C(diff. from Acts 17:28), 19:366A(not as S. is in F. shall we be), 23:372A(2 expls.) (If we become one as S. and F. we shall not be as the S.), 24:373A(different ), 24:373C(what equality have we to S.?). Words attributed to Son; 2:325B(What S. has said - i.e. 4th g., is appropriate to Himself), 2:325B bis (each, Arians deny that He spoke this as Son), 2:325B ("I am in the F." &c.), 4:329B(John 16:15). Son and Spirit: 24:373B(Does not participate in Sp.), Midplace in Trinity: 15:353B(God appears in S. as pervading all things).

Heretical uses(as usual, affirmed or denied; Arian unless otherwise stated): Reject True Son: 7:333C(How can S. be God....?), Deny Ἰησοῦς &c.: 1:324A(deny true F. or true S.), 3:328A (not feeling that S. is Ἰησοῦς ἐκ Πατρὸς ). 8:337C(an Arian god cannot
be son), 10:341B (for Arians, many things would be sons, like the S.), separate S. from F.: 12:345B (S. differs \(\Phi\nu\sigma\varepsilon;\) from F.), son is son only in moral or secondary sense: 1:321C (Son in F. as in Acts 17:28), 1:324B (denied that F. is in S. as He is in creatures), 2:325B (2 expl.) (Arianism implies that S. is adopted in a Son), 10:341A (2 expls.) (Ans. say F. & S. one, since what F. wills the S. wills), 10:341A tertium (If F. & S. are one on account of will...), 10:341B (all sorts of other things would be sons, as the S.), 11:344B (S. like F. in teaching &c.), 11:344B alterum (S. not \(\Delta\nu\pi\alpha\nu\lambda\alpha\) \(\Delta\kappa\rho\omega\) \(\varepsilon\omega\) \(\kappa\omega\nu\) of F.) 24:376A (Son is son by participation in Spirit and by progress). By depriving S. of His nature, Ans. insult both F. & S.: 1:324B (2 expls.) (? Son fills emptiness of F. and F. emptiness of S.), 7:336A ter (each, Son denied to be like rebellious sons in O.T.), 7:336B (Monotheism not on account of S. but of false gods), Son equal to or less than us by nature: 2:325A-B (Asterius puts S. on common level with creatures), 2:325C-328A (No longer one Son, Log. & Wdm. but one among many), 3:328A (S. would have nothing in reln. to F. but the grace common to all), 15:353A (external to F. and creature, 17:357 A-B (3 expls.) (S. & F. are one and F. in S. & S. in F. as we are), 17:360A (we are equal to the True and \(\Phi\nu\sigma\varepsilon;\) Son), 17:360A alterum et tertium (we are as the S. in the F. and the F. in the S.), 21:365C (If it were possible for us to be as S. in F. John 17:21 ought to read, "That they also might be one in Thee as S. is in F.")) 24:373A (We shall not, pace Arians, be as Son), Sabellianism: 4:328C (Same person is once F. once S.). The number of examples reaches the incredible figure of 160, of which 124 are in Group I, 5 in Group II, two in Group III, one in Group IV, 5 in Group V, none in Group VI, and 23 in Group VII. This great predominance over Logos as a title for the Second Person is very striking, and it is patently due to the implied wording of John
which refers directly to the Father, if not to the Son as such directly. The material result of the form of the majority of this section as an exegesis of John 17:21, is that it is a study of the unity of the Father and Son as two personally distinct Persons. This suggests that in these circumstances Athanasius favoured Son as the title of the Second Person. Logos, and such expressions as Logos of the Father, on the contrary, tended to be favoured when the thought was primarily of the Logos Himself and only secondarily of His relation to the Father. Also, a comparison with the equally striking predominance of Logos in C. Ar. II:18-43, which is dominated by Athanasius's reply to the Two-Wisdom theory of Asterius, suggests that Logos was also the natural term when the personal distinction of the Persons was in the background.

Oũσία, Essence, is much rarer in this section than in some of the others; the occurrences are too few to justify following Müller's classification: 2:325A (2nd pers. is Image τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς) 3:328A (Whole Being of S. proper to F.'s E.), 3:328B (He who sees S. sees τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας τὸ ἴδιον), 6:329C bis (each, Son is ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας χέριμος), 6:323A (F.'s properties do not accrue to E. of S. by participation), 6:333B (S. is τὸ ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας), 8:337C (Arians devise a god outside the E. of the F.), 11:344A (unity referred to E. of Son Himself), 11:344B (Paul taught as the Son, but not like Him Κατ' οὐσίαν), 14:352B (Logos not alien to E. of F.), 15:353A (Arians claim that Son is not τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας), 16:357A (Son inseparable from F. Κατ' τοῦ ἴδιου τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας), 17:360A (Ask, 'How do you intend that He is proper and like F. or E.?) οὐσίας), 17:360A (Ans. say, Either we would have to be proper to E. of F. or He foreign...), 19:364B (Ὁ Μέγις is η ὸσία and Ὀνομα, Logos and True God; we are adopted by grace). There are only 16 instances, of which one is in Group I, 2 in Group II, 10 in Group
III, one in Group IV with a fair degree of certainty, and 2 in Group V.

\[ \text{Nature, is much commoner: Divine nature: } 4:328 \text{C (the nature is one - the offspring is not unlike parent), } 20:365 \text{B (} \text{To ἀμεταβλητον τὴ φύσις of God to be imitated by men), } 20:365 \text{B alterum (the indivisible } \text{φύσιν } ). \text{ Nature or Natures of Christ: } 19:364 \text{B (He is } \text{φύσει, L. etc., } + \text{τὴν ὄουσα }, 24:373 \text{A (S. differs from us } \text{τὴν φύσιν - accusative of respect). Divine Nature is one and common to both F. & S.: } 9:340 \text{A (By adding Christ to Father, John 17:3 shows that He is } \text{τὴν φύσεως τοῦ θεοῦ), } 9:340 \text{B (Son is } \text{φύσει, Kαὶ ἡν Θεων ἔργα }), 10:344 \text{A (Only true Image } \text{φύσει of F.), } 17:360 \text{A (True and } \text{φύσει Son), } 19:361 \text{C (One son } \text{φύσει, True, A only-begotten), } 19:361 \text{C alterum (We are sons, not as He is } \text{φύσει, Kαὶ ἡν Θεων ), } 20:365 \text{A (F. & S. are in each other } \text{φύσει, ), } 22:372 \text{B (S. has attribute of being in F. } \text{φύσει, ), } 25:376 \text{B (What is to the L. } \text{Κατὰ } \text{φύσιν in the F.). Relation between Father and Son ineffable and peculiar to Divine Nature: } 4:329 \text{A (F. & S. one by the } \text{οἰκεῖσθαι τῆς φύσεως ). } 20:365 \text{A (Son one with His own } \text{F. } \text{φύσει and in truth), } 21:368 \text{A (We are one } \text{φύσει and in truth), } 21:368 \text{A alterum (the } \text{Κατὰ } \text{φύσιν unity of F. & S.), } 22:368 \text{C (L. actually & truly has } \text{τοῦτον την φύσεως with F.), Heretics deny Divine Nature: } 12:345 \text{B (Son differs } \text{φύσει from F.), } 16:353 \text{C (φύσεις and operations of F. & S. different), } 16:356 \text{A (2 different gods, 2 diff. natures), } 16:356 \text{B (The gods of the Greeks have the same } \text{φύσιν as the Arian 2nd Per. since both creatures). Spiritual natures etc.: } 12:345 \text{C (Angels creatures } \text{τὴν φύσιν, )}, 14:349 \text{C (Angels other than S. } \text{τὴν φύσιν - both last two cases acc. of respect. True human nature: } 19:364 \text{A (We are not } \text{φύσει doers of good deeds), } 20:365 \text{A (we become one with God by, e.g. learning μὴ ἔχουμεν } \text{φύσεως to be merciful), } 20:365 \text{A alterum (one } \text{φύσει for all }}
men). Nature of visible things in general: 18:361B (Matt. 10:16 not said that we might become \( \tau \eta \phi \nu \sigma \varepsilon \) animals), 9:340B (Creatures have great difference from Son \( \tau \eta \phi \nu \sigma \varepsilon \)), 18:360B (things can have same n. even at different times), 22:369B bis (each, Christ far, not in place, but \( \tau \eta \phi \nu \sigma \varepsilon \)), 23:372A (things not \( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \phi \nu \sigma \nu \nu \) that is, not with same character, can be compared by analogy), 23:372B (we have not \( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \phi \nu \sigma \nu \nu \) the property of being in the F.). 18:360B (Time does not change the \( \phi \nu \sigma \nu \nu \) of a class). "Nature" in familiar sense, used as model for us to imitate: 18:361A bis & 20:365B (all cases, things \( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \phi \nu \sigma \nu \nu \), that is, things that act regularly in accordance with their own nature). See also: \( \phi \nu \sigma \nu \nu \varepsilon \nu \nu \tau \alpha \nu \) of S. to F., 20:365A. The number of examples is 40, of which 8 are in Group I, 4 in Group II, and 28 in Group III, although probably four of the last group should not be there, since they involve the use of \( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \phi \nu \sigma \nu \nu \) to indicate the regularity of nature, which is rather different from the usual adverbial use. None of the cases in Group II refers to the Humanity of Christ, but all to the nature of men or other creatures generally.

Once again, owing to the nature of the section, there are very few uses of the terms for the Humanity of Christ. Again, the number is far too small for Muller's classification to be at all relevant. 

body: 22:369A bis (that all might become one body....), 22:369A tertium (that all may be one according to the body....), 22:369A quartum (I am in them through the body....); all these four, which are paraphrases of John 17:21, are best taken to refer to the Humanity of Christ (as constitutively including Christians) simpliciter. 22:368C (He put on our b.), 23:372B (bore our b.), 23:372C (He, taking a body from them,....) These other three, of course, refer to the Body as the object of the Act of Incarnation. There are a few other cases of the occurrence of \( \phi \nu \mu \delta \) or its derivatives, that have been passed over as they are not Christo-
logical. There is only one case of ὑποκάτωτος flesh, which is Christological, 10:344A, a statement in the form of John 1:14, and also of Man Ἰησοῦ διάφορος, 23:372C, where the Second Person "becomes Man".

26 Having considered the unity of God, in the context of the Johannine testimony, Athanasius now turns to the virtually last topic, the passages of Scripture concerning the life of the Incarnate Christ. These are primarily from the Synoptic Gospels, being Matt.28:18, John 5:22, 3:35-36, Matt. 11:27 (again, see above), John 6:37, John 12:27-28, Matt. 26:39, Luke 2:52, Matt.16:13, John 11:34, Mark 6:38 (the last three being genuine questions of Jesus, implying ignorance), Matt. 27:46, John 12:28, 17:5, Matt. 26:41, Mark 13:32. Since this section directly concerns the incarnate life of Jesus, which we have reluctantly laid aside from direct consideration, we shall not consider this section in great detail, but shall be content with some general remarks. These passages all concern Christ's "receiving" from His Father, or His human suffering, development (Lk.2:52), or ignorance, which constitute an obvious contrast to His Godhead. These verses are all interpreted by Athanasius in the way that we have already expounded, as referring to the Humanity of Christ as distinct from the Deity. Ch. 29 is a classical exposition of the basis of this exegesis. (485) Christ, for

(485) "Now the scope and character (ἐν τοῖς οὐσίων ὑποκαταγόντος) of Holy Scripture, as we have often said, is this:—that the Gospel (ἐν ἐλέησιν τῆς ἀληθείας) which is in it concerning the Saviour is a double one (δύο), that He was ever God, and is the Son, being the Father's Logos and Radiance and Wisdom, and that afterwards for us He took flesh of a Virgin, Mary Ἰωάννης τοῦ Ἡλία, and was made man....(Cf. John 5:39, John 1:1-3, and 14, Philipp.2:6-8).... Any one, beginning with these passages and going through the whole of Scripture upon the interpretation which they suggest (διὰ τῆς διακονίας) will perceive how in the beginning the Father said to Him, "Let there be light, .... ἀγαλματίζω", but in the fulness of time sent Him into the world, not that He might judge the world, but that the world by Him might be saved....(Matt.1:23).
example, was said to be ignorant in that he assumed ignorance. This section has been widely criticised by Harnack, and, following him, by the mass of Protestant German scholarship in immediately succeeding years; the principal representative of this line in the English language has been Raven. The grounds of this criticism are that Athanasius does not recognise a true human nature in the later sense, and that such humanity as he recognises is economic rather than natural, and besides is virtually Apollinarian. (486) Also, Athanasius’s exegesis of Mark 13:32, whereby Christ’s ignorance of the day or the hour of the Second Coming is dismissed as economic on the ground that it would have been impossible for the Logos to be anything but omniscient in view of His cosmological status, is a breach of the basic principles of exegesis. (487) In the first place,

(486) See Shapland’s Note 5 on Ep. II ad Serap. 9 (op. cit. pp. 167-8) cited almost in full, Ch. I, fn. 34, p. 110.

For Raven see, “Apollinarianism”. The Christology of the “Contra Arianos” is studied on pp. 90-96, and the conclusion is that it is still virtually Apollinarian, this representing almost no change from the “De Incarnatione”. On p. 92 the expected severe criticism is made of Athanasius for explaining away the plain sense of Scripture. P. 93: “Just as in the passage quoted His growth is explained away (III:51-52), so His want and weakness and ignorance are all interpreted simply as necessary conditions of the part which He has to play while incarnate, as concessions to the understanding of His followers and as tests of their faith; they are a pretence and nothing more.” Even in the “Tomus ad Antiochenes” Athanasius really remained at this stage (112f.) and even the example of Eustathius of Antioch (117ff, see above, pp. 335-6 and 349-50) could not make him budge.

(487) See C. Ar. III:42-45. The relevant portion of Shapland’s note 2 on Ep. II ad Serap., ch. 9, is as follows: “... For Patristic exegesis the reader should consult the lengthy note in Lebreton’s "Origines du dogme de la Trinite" (Vol. I, Note C – it is not in the English edition). The way for the Arians in their use of this passage had been prepared by Irenaeus (Haer. II: 28:6-8) and to a certain extent by Origen (in Matt. LV). Athanasius’s treatment is anticipated by Eustathius of Antioch, spud Faundus (Pro Def. Tr. Cap. XI:1) and is followed by Basil (Ep. VIII:6) and Gregory Nazianzen (Orat. XXI:15). The former, however, has an alternative explanation (ibid. 7 and Ep. CCXXXVI:2) which has influenced subsequent exegesis, notably that of Didymus (De Trin. III:917 &c.), who clearly regards the ignorance as unreal. These Fathers, inasmuch as they write against the Arians, emphasize the reality of our Lord’s knowledge as Word of God. On the other hand, Gregory of Nyssa, writing against Apollinarius (C. Apoll. 24) insists on the reality of the ignorance as proving the reality of the Manhood. But none of them attempts to show how ignorance and knowledge can subsist side by side in the one Christ. Cyril of
it must be remembered that even though there are two complete natures in Christ, there is only one Hypostasis, and what is often regarded as Athanasius's "docetism" or "Apollinarianism" is better interpreted in meliorem partem as an insistence on what later was recognized as the Anhypostasis (and Enhypostasis). This is shown with especial clarity in Raven, who sets up in opposition to Athanasius a position which oscillates between Christological Hegelianism (or even Hegelianism generally, the doctrine of the absolute identity of human and divine natures), and Nestorianism (cf. Raven's sympathy for Theodore of Mopsuestia). (483) Again, Athana-

(487 Contd.) Alexandria, however, writing against Nestorius, cannot evade this difficulty, and is led to regard the ignorance of Christ as something external and imputed, not actual in the human mind......Cf. 'Thesaurus', XXII passim. Lebrerton thinks that Athanasius's attitude is not inconsistent with that of Cyril, inasmuch as, without committing himself to any opposed opinion, he shrinks from plainly and directly attributing ignorance to the incarnate Lord. But the imprecision of Athanasius's language is surely due to his inadequate psychology. Moreover, such expressions as 'having the ignorance of men in His body', and 'that He might show that, as man, he knows not', vague and unstudied though they may be, are sufficiently definite to be decisive against this view. Similarly, however unsatisfactory it may be to include our Lord's ignorance with His physical παθησις, it does at least imply that the one is as real as the others. See further, Robertson, Introd. lxxxvii."

The reference in Robertson is simply a summary of Athanasius.

(488) The last chapter of Raven's book here cited is a treatment of the theology of Theodore of Mopsuestia, under the title "The Answer to Apollinaris." This Antiochene exegete and theologian, who flourished in the early 5th century, was always, and probably rightly, viewed as suspect because of his tendencies to Nestorianism and Semi-Pelagianism, and was finally declared a heretic at the Fifth Oecumenical Council in 553. He is enthusiastically supported by Raven. Raven's own position is clearly indicated in the following extracts: (op.cit. p.76, "Had he (sc. Lucian of Antioch) lived a century later he might have seen that the two aspects, human and divine, were not irreconcilable, and might have helped to formulate the doctrine of their union." And, op.cit. p.305, "...hampered as he (sc. Theodore of Mopsuestia) by his refusal to challenge the traditional antithesis between God and Man as Changeless and Changeable......" Op.cit. footnote to the passage just quoted: "This is the chief weakness of his theology, for it compels him to separate Godhead and Manhood more widely than a modern student would do." In these citations, underlinings work of the author of this thesis and not in original.
Asius's economism and economic language about the humanity of Christ is best interpreted in the light of the economic purpose of the Incarnation as a whole. That is, if it is accepted that Christ became man, as a whole, for our salvation, it is not a serious matter to apply this principle to all aspects of the humanity of Christ. Admittedly, this sort of thing is dangerously near the later Eutychian and Monophysite heresy that the Son was not subject to the laws of creaturely existence in any general way, but specially subjected Himself in each individual instance, but the tremendous emphasis in the remainder of Athanasius's writings on the Incarnation, considered as a unit and a unity, should be sufficient counter to these heretical tendencies. Incidentally, as a minor point, the word "assumed," as in the expression, "assumed ignorance," cannot carry the pejorative associations that it has in modern languages, but, as a translation of the relevant part of such verbs as λυμβαίνω refers simply to the taking of flesh that was the Incarnation, with all the penumbra that surrounds it. Even more telling is the fact that where Athanasius appears, to modern minds, to break the rules of exegesis, as in the example quoted above on the ignorance of Christ, the argument is completely effective ad homines. Seeing that the thing about the Second Person that interested the Arians was his cosmological status in the absolute sense, it would be just as impossible to impute the sort of ignorance referred to in Mk. 15:32 to the Arian Second Person as it would be to God Himself. If any interpretation of these passages is possible, it must be an Incarnational interpretation of the sort accepted by Athanasius. The same applies to all the other passages of similar character. In fact, the attempt to use the Cry of Dereliction as the basis for an Arian theology would, if followed through, result in the greatest horror in the

(489) Since we have had a good deal to say about Marxism in this thesis, it is necessary to make clear that in this connection the words "economism", "economy", etc. have their theological and not their usual modern meaning; they mean "that which pertains to the dispensation achieved in Christ, as distinct from His aboriginal nature."
history of theology; there would really be no choice save Marcion at his worst, Schopenhauer, or Marx.

Therefore, even though Athanasius often falls into economic or even virtually instrumentalist language about the Humanity of Christ (not greatly different from the position in the De Incarnatione), he should be forgiven such lapses. In fact, we should be thankful that Athanasius did really emphasize the genuine ignorance of Our Lord; this was often in opposition to the later Church, which gives rise to Newman's embarrassed notes on ch. 43; it was undoubtedly this note that primarily prompted the sarcastic remark of Raven that the later Church offended far worse than Athanasius. But this is not the strongest defence that can be made of Athanasius's position. Mixed with his possibly offensive language, there are other cases in which Athanasius employs another formula; Christ has the predicate $E/X$ as $(\omega \omega)$ man, but the predicate $A/X$ as God, where $A/X$ is a Divine action, self-sufficiency, or state of glory, and $E/X$ is the corresponding contrary (not, of course, contradictory) human passion (in the literal or etymological sense), deprivation, or humiliation. Athanasius means to affirm the simultaneous possession of each member of every contrary pair, in the appropriate respect, and so to do justice simultaneously to the unity of the Person of Christ and the separateness and inviolability of both natures, as they were afterwards described. Incidentally, this is in particular contrast to the later kenotic theories. At first sight, this view appears to justify

(490) See above, p. 440, and below, pp. 1004-6

(491) See above, pp. 216-22.


(493) This sort of expression has been used before, but we are discussing it now, since the matter has come up definitively here. See the lexicographic analyses in "De Incarnatione", above, pp. 166-4, 174-6, 178-9, 199-200, 221, and "Contra Arnaoe", pp. 813-19, 932-5 and below, pp. 1023-9, 1096.
the recent criticism that Athanasius, following an obsolete physiology and psychology, regarded knowledge and ignorance as separate substantial entities which could be in the mind, but this does not follow, or need not follow, at all, and fortunately there is a medical analogy which, though very discrepant, does illuminate the point at issue. It applies specifically to the question of the knowledge and ignorance of Christ, where the problem can perhaps be seen at its clearest and easiest; it would be possible, with effort, to give the principle concerned a more general application. In the case of knowledge, the formula would be, Christ was ignorant as man, but knew as God (Christ being, uniquely, both God and man - in the full Chalcedonian sense, for the sake of argument). Now, let us consider knowledge by sense perception, in the case of vision (the same, mutatis mutandis, is true for other senses). The first stage of seeing is the stimulation of the rods and cones in the retina, which are the nerve endings of the optic nerve. Through the optic nerve and beyond, impulses pass to the lower reflex centres in the mid-brain, which directly control, or are involved in, a group of unconscious reflex mechanisms and their neurological systems in which sight plays a part; so far, conscious seeing has not yet occurred. These lower centres are linked by other nerve fibres to areas in the cerebral cortex, and it is when the impulses reach these areas that conscious seeing really occurs. However, there appears to be a further stage; the visual area is linked to other areas which are concerned with such things as visual memory and other mental processes immediately related to vision. Thus, if the optic nerve or optic tract is injured, below the level of the reflex centres, the patient will see, in a certain sense, but the stimulation of the retina will do

(494) Freud, for instance, would have known very well how this applies to action, in view of his familiar concept of a man consciously acting in some way and subconsciously achieving - this word is quite apt - the opposite. The analogical corollaries and cleansings that we shall mention below are just as efficacious here.
him no good at all. If the injury is above the reflex centres, the reflexes will be intact, but the patient will not be able to consciously see. There is a great variety of possibilities; for instance, one person may be blind, owing to a brain injury or otherwise, and be able to move about with the aid of a stick, if his psycho-visual area is intact and he can still make all the mental correlations involved in visual memory; another person who is blind will be unable to move about except with a guide dog, since his psycho-visual area has either been destroyed, or perhaps, say owing to congenital blindness, has never functioned. The point is that in these cases it is literally true that the patient sees, and yet not sees, or sees in one respect and not sees in another. Also, if we want to give an account of this state of affairs, it must be in terms of the anatomy and physiology of the person concerned; in particular, the (abnormal) anatomy of the person's nervous system. This whole principle is even more clearly shown in the field of psychology. The pseudonymous "George Orwell", in his famous novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, gave a shocking description of the perfect totalitarian society, and one of his most unpleasant novelties was generally taken to be the totalitarian party's dependence on the process of "doublethink" - incidentally, "doubleknow" would be an even more accurate description; (495) "To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling care-

(495) See pp. 37-38 of the original edition, published by Secker and Warburg, London, 1949. Actually, this is a most interesting book for a theologian in general, since it is a perfect presentation of the opposite of the saving activity of God. The title of the diabolical ideology concerned, "Ingsoc", should not deceive anybody into thinking that the book is in practice primarily an attack on the Left; in fact, the title was used simply because the British Labour Party was dominant at the time when the book was written, which was patently 1948. It is particularly interesting to notice that the key impulse behind the formation of Ingsoc is - as Athanasius would have appreciated by reason both of his name and of his theology - a desperate, frustrated, and perverse craving for self-acquired immortality (see op. cit. pp. 261-275).
fully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them; to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy; to forget whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it again; and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself." This should have never been found particularly novel or surprising, as it is not markedly different from the familiar Freudian process of repression and rationalisation. As such, it is certainly pathological, but as far as empirical humanity is concerned, so far from being atypical or even uncommon, it is all but universal. We all know how often, in politics, etc., people seem to know a thing with their mind and not with their heart. It is true that all these things are caused by disease, or the disintegration of human personality under the power of sin. While fully aware of the law against the use of sinful analogy in theology, the author craves the liberty, in the providence of God, of suggesting that these phenomena throw some light on what are otherwise intractable problems of Christology - or perhaps it would be better to say that they destroy the idea of a rigorously consistent personality which so often obfuscates the Christological issue. The case that is being put forward here is that the apparent contradictions between Christ's knowing as God and not knowing as man are to be understood - with due analogical caution - as a unique species of doublethink or what we would term doubleknow. As we have said above, it is possible to give an account of this sort of process only in terms of the anatomical or psychological structure of the person in question, and in all normal cases it is a pathological manifestation of the disintegration of what ought to be a unity. In the case of Christ, what we have provisionally accepted as the
Christological doublethink is due not to any pathological divisions in personality, but to the distinction between the Deity and the Humanity of Christ, and — tautologously simple as this may seem — it is completely explicable on this basis. The Orwellian and Freudian doublethink is of the devil and works evil and death; the same thing in Christ is of God and subserves His work of grace; the former is pathological, the latter is truly — in all senses, including the Chalcedonian sense! — physiological. This way of interpreting the problem has the advantage of working also in the case of what appear as single actions, or rather of doing full justice to the real unity, in the Hypostatic sense of Chalcedon, of the Person of Christ. Even the Orwellian double-thinker, or the Freudian rationaliser, for all their personal disunity, remain still one person in their "doublethinking". How much more is Jesus always one Person. It is along these lines that Athanasius should be fruitfully interpreted, and again it is one of the great advantages of Athanasius that he was forced to face the problem in its full rigour.

There is an even more interesting feature of Athanasius's Christology. Karl Barth has recently made a plea that the Chalcedonian Christology in its classical form is inadequate, since it confines itself to static categories, whereas the problem should be considered rather dynamically. Now, the Christology of Athanasius is just the sort of dynamic treatment that Barth appears to want. The emphasis is not on the Deity and the Humanity of Christ as static Natures, but on the activities of Christ "as God" and "as Man". The reason, of course, is that the Arian controversy took a course which compelled unusual attention to Scripture. Admittedly, if one has to think statically, Athanasian Christology must be criticised in terms of Chalcedon. But is is most

interesting to observe how this Christology, which in so many respects is inferior to Chalcedon, in this one great respect has actually by-passed Chalcedon, and supplied the clue for a modern Christology — if only it had been noticed — which would not only satisfy modern man, but would do full justice to Scripture without the introduction of too much extraneous rationalisation. (497)

We have already considered in detail the general opinion of scholarship on Athanasian Christology from the point of view of the "De Incarnatione" (see pp. 110–111, fn. 34). We must now consider the same with respect to the later stages of Athanasius. We have already (see above, pp. 99–100) fully cited Raven and Shapland, the former being the most extreme opponent of Athanasius in the English language, the latter attempting to excuse him, but having to admit some force in the arguments of his opponents. The controversy was started by Bauer, "Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes...." (1841), pp. 576 ff., where he claimed that, for Athanasius, the very presence of the Logos excluded complete humanity and especially the human soul. The context indicates that he is thinking about the "Contra Arianos", since he actually maintains that, having settled the co-essentiality of Father and Son, theology had to establish the co-essentiality of God and Man (op. cit. p. 420 and 559 ff. "die wesentliche Einheit des Menschen mit Gott", p. 420); this is patently the Gospel according to Hegel, and hence Athanasian came in for severe criticism. Voigt, the orthodox Lutheran, in 1861, relied more on the works against the Apollinarians, now known to be spurious, but admitted that the Christology of the "Contra Arianos" was, by itself, suspect ("Die Lehre des Athanasius von Alexandrien....", pp. 122–145). Op. cit. p. 125, "Die Aussagen des Athanasius über die menschliche Natur Christi sind oft sehr Apollinaristischer Art, und mehr als das, sie scheinen nicht selten selbst die psychologische Seite der menschlichen Natur auszuschliessen und dieselbe ganz auf die physiologische Form zu beschränken. Darin gehören all die Aussprüche in denen die menschliche Natur einfach άυτος oder οὐκ οὗτος genannt, und dann noch dazu diese οὗτος oder οὐκ οὗτος oft als Haus (οἶκος) oder Tempel (τόπος) oder auch als Werkzeug (οὖν τὸν) des Logos bezeichnet wird." However, although Athanasius appears, to Voigt, to deny the human soul in these passages, he qualifies his censure by stating (op. cit. p. 126 ff.) that in the later chapters of "Contra Arianos" III, Athanasius, by implication, was really talking about the full humanity of Christ. "Diesen Ausdrucksweisen jedoch treten andere gegenüber aus denen hervorgeht, dass Athanasius die menschliche Seite der Person Christi in keiner Beziehung defekt, sondern vielmehr durchaus vollständig geadelt hat.....(127) Athanasius unter Fleisch oder Leib die volle Natur des Menschen verstand." The conclusion, (129) is that in his earlier years Athanasius used Apollinarian expressions, perhaps under the influence of John 1:14, but modified them later. The defence that οὗτος and οὐκ οὗτος and, a fortiori, οὐκ οὗτος, refer to the whole of humanity, has been well made by Shapland, note 4 to Ep. II ad Serap. 9, (op. cit. p. 167); "Athanasius regularly uses οὗτος and οὐκ οὗτος to
To conclude our somewhat lengthy general remarks on this

designate our Lord’s human nature. But even in his earliest works these
terms are used side by side with, and in the same sense as, Ἰησοῦν
καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἑρμηνείας Χριστοῦ in the Creed of Nicea; though it is
to be admitted that they occur much more frequently in his post-Nicene
works. Later still... Athanasius explicitly asserts that our Lord "did
not take a body without soul, nor without sense and intelligence." (Tom.
ad Antioch. 7; cf. also Ad Epict. 7). This development does not represent
any change in thought. The terms ὁ θεός... and θεόν continue in
general use in his later works, e.g. Ad Epict., and Ad Max., as being
equivalent to "man".... On the other hand, in the relatively early work,
Quicunque dixerit(7), we find him grappling with the question of the union
of the divine and human in Christ, which confronted the Church after
Apollinarianism had been repudiated. This question would not have occurred
to him, had he conceived of the humanity as a mere veil of flesh. Moreover
the terms ὁ θεός... and θεόν have not the same limited
connotation as "flesh" and "body". "By flesh the Bible repeatedly design-
ates human nature in its fulness," Prestige, "Fathers and Heretics"
p.218. The point was not missed by the early expositors, cf. John of
Damascus, De Fide Orthodox. III:1073A. The same thing is, less markedly,
true of ὁ θεός... Cf. Gen.36:6 and Rev.18:13 and above all I Cor.6:
12-20, on which J. Weiss (Urchristentum, p.453) remarks that ὁ θεός
here "almost means personality." See also Le Bachelet, D. T. C. I: 2171.

The plain meaning of the sort of argumentation described above is
that there is something wrong with the whole conception of the soul, as
it has been traditionally understood. If one is not prepared to go to
this extreme, these arguments reduce to special pleading. In any case,
they did not convince others. Harnack said that if Athanasius had oper-
ated on his material in what Harnack considered to be Athanasius’s defi-
itive and correct manner, he would have been a Eutychian, and the sole
reason for his concern with the sufferings, etc., of the human Christ is
that it was there, in Scripture, even though Athanasius could allegedly
make nothing of it. Hist Dogm. (E.T.) Vol. IV, p.147: "In the case of
Athanasius it may already be very clearly seen that it was not religious
feeling... Solely the Biblical testimony regarding Christ (His weakness and
His capacity for being affected in a human way) which led him in the
direction of the Doctrine of the Two Natures. That tradition was a
serious stumbling block. But Athanasius used neither the formula
ὁ θεός... nor the other... ὁ θεός... nor the other... ὁ θεός... nor the other... (Also op. cit. p.223) "Monophysitism... is without doubt the legitimate
heir to the theology of Athanasius and the fitting expression of Greek
Christianity." Later, Stulken, as the theological portion of his
"Athanasiana", wrote an analysis of the Christology of Athanasius, in
which he confirmed the findings of Harnack. After saying (62-3) that we
cannot expect precise Christological statements from Athanasius or from
any theologian before Apollinarius, except Origen, and that Athanasius’s
Christology was ancillary to his Logos doctrine, he analyses the whole
of the "Contra Arianos". On the assumption, which we have had reason to
doubt (see above, pp.349-50), that the attack on the human soul was con-
stitutive to Arianism, he takes the silence on this matter as definite
evidence that Athanasius agreed with them and with Apollinarius; (p.104)
section, there are two observations, one minor, and the other of supreme

Before the controversy got under way, Newman, among Roman Catholics
(or virtual Roman Catholics as he was in 1845) was distinctly embarrassed
by certain aspects of Athanasian doctrine, as we have already seen and as
we shall see later; in some ways he found Athanasius almost Eutychian,
in other ways too Nestorian. But, after some delay when the controversy
had taken shape, Roman Catholicism rallied to the defence of Athanasius.
Some scholars, culminating in Weigl ("Untersuchungen zur Christologie
des heiligen Athanasius", a work which is almost useless owing to the ex-
treme way in which it concentrates on the later Dubia or Spuria, 1914),
admitted such works as the Books against the Apollinarians, but with the
best authorities, they either did not use them or constructed their de-

gence in such a way that it has considerable validity if they are rejected,
as they are unanimously by modern Roman Catholic authorities. See, for
example, Lauchert, "Die Lehre des Heiligen Athanasius des Grossen", 133-4,
Cavalleria, "Saint Athanase, 296-373 (2nd ed. p.215-6), Strater, "Die
Erlosungslehre des heiligen Athanasius", 124 f., and Voisin, "La Doctrine
christologique de Saint Athanase", 1900, in "Revue d'Histoire eccllesi-
tique", 226-249; see 230-6. Their defence was rather like Voigt's,
following most or all of these lines: The terminology used really referred
to the whole of humanity considered intensively, Athanasius in C.ARI. III:
26-58 virtually referred to the human soul, Apollinarianism would make
nonsense of the soteriology therein enunciated, and Athanasius's primary
interest was not Christology in the later explicit and developed sense.
However, recently one Roman Catholic scholar, M. Richard, "Saint Athan-
asse et la Psychologie du Christ selon les Ariens," in "Melanges de
Science religieuse," 1947, pp.5-54, published by the Catholic Faculties,
Lille, has delivered a temperate and cogent attack on the Christology of
Athanasius. He admits, (p.6) that "avant 362....on ne trouve pas, dans
les ecrits authentiques de ce Docteur, la moindre mention de l'ame
humain de Sauveur." After analysing the theses of the Arians, as cited
in C.AR.III:26-58, and finding (p.11) that they are all psychological as
opposed to physiological, he comments at once, with surprise, that "pas
une seule fois au cours de sa longue critique il ne reproche a ses adver-
saires d'avoir oubli l'ame du Sauveur." After following the exegesis
through, he concludes (p.46) that "Saint Athanase n'a pas su reconnaitre
importance. In the former place, it might appear that the field of

au Christ une véritable psychologie humaine." On which he comments later (p.54) "C'est là la faiblesse, la grande faiblesse de la Christologie d'Athanase.....".

This all shows that there may be some difficulty in the traditional way of looking at the matter; indeed, Richard's discussion (op.cit.12-13), not always accurate, of the difference between the Aristotelian soul, "forme substantielle du corps," and the Platonic soul, "une sorte d'ange égaré dans la chair," indicates that he may have felt as much. If the human soul is considered after the fashion of romantic individualism, and perhaps even more so after the fashion of existentialism, Athanasius did deny the human soul of Christ, would have had to deny it on his own theological bases, and would have been justified in so doing on every count. This sort of soul would be in fact the Hypostasis within the meaning of Chalcedon, and such a Christ would be in fact Nestorian. What is even more important, as Athanasius himself proved so well in C.Ar.II:18-72, such a Christ would be "a creature" or "one of the creatures", in the sense rejected by Athanasius, on the ground that such an entity could have no saving efficacy whatever, since it would only be able to be itself. The Anhypostasia is a condition of the universal efficacy of salvation, or indeed its efficacy at all. This is the reason for the tendency that Shapland mildly criticises in Note 6 on Ep.II ad Serap: 9 (op.cit. p.169), where, after a discussion of the relation between the Humanity of Christ and humanity as a whole, he concludes, "It is this fact, that Athanasius is under no necessity to distinguish the individual humanity of Christ from that of mankind as a whole, which lends colour to the statement of Hoss, studien....p.77, that Athanasius understands by the Incarnation, not that the Word became a man, but merely that He assumed "die allgemeine Menschennatur." On the other hand, if the human soul is considered in the modern, more deterministic and "psychological" way, everything that the defenders of Athanasius on this matter have said is absolutely right. Such a Soul would belong to the Nature and not the Hypostasis in terms of Chalcedon. The mediaeval position, say, would be intermediate. But is this sort of psychological determinism correct and scriptural, even if it must be allowed as against romantic individualism?

The same remarks apply about the Will of Christ, and the Dothelate position later became orthodox and Monothelitism heretical. Newman's note on ch. 57 notes, again with a certain embarrassment, that ....here, instead of speaking of two wills, he speaks of the Word's willing and human weakness, terror, &c." If Will is considered psychologically in the present-day sense, there were two wills and Athanasius said so; if it is considered individually or hypostatically, Athanasius did not ascribe a human will to Christ, could not have done so, and should not have done so. On the other hand, this is not the best solution. After all, there is genuine individuality in man, although it is really a privilege of God. Man enjoys it as an act of grace, through his creation in the Image of God. It is along these lines, and along the lines of the recreation of the Image in man by the atoning work of Christ, rather than along the lines of the contrast between the Word willing and the weakness of the human flesh as the Word first took it, that the best solution to the residual problems may be found. Athanasius actually makes this plain in ch. 57, when he speaks of the Logos taking our weakness, terror, etc., not
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Christology in the strict sense is one which is beyond the parallel that we have postulated between Arianism and classical Marxism, but that is not so; at any rate it is not so in the case of Feuerbach, from whom Marx derived his atheism virtually unchanged, even if he repudiated his still idealistic humanism in favour of dialectical materialism. In the "Essence of Christianity" (!) (Passim) it is incredible, until one reads it, the extent to which Feuerbach uses straight Christological material concerning the humanity of Christ to prove his atheism; or, more correctly, treated it as a massive mythological representation the underlying truth of which was atheistic humanism, not, be it noted, a purely humanitarian Christology which left a place for a Father. Apart from Feuerbach's successors and dependents, the only near parallel in history is the Arian use of material from the Humanity of Christ to show that Christ, in His transcendent and non-human character, was still completely a creature! (498)

(497 Contd.)

because they are proper to humanity eschatologically, but because they are to be abolished in Christ, and the perfect human will that is to be created in Christ is to know no weakness or terror. Such a treatment would do full justice, not only to the Chalcedonian Anhypothesis, but also the Chalcedonian Enhypothesis of the Humanity of Christ, and, what is the really important thing, to the Scriptural truth of both positions. For such an adequate solution, the dynamic Christology of Athanasius is a far better basis than the traditional static treatment, which often raises difficulties.

One last objection that may be made to our interpretation of Athanasius, that it "psychologizes" the mystery of the Incarnation: It is not intended to do anything of the sort. The great objection, and the only worth-while objection, to this sort of psychologizing is that it treats the Incarnate Christ as "in genere aliquo", either retrospectively, in trying to study Him in terms of the characteristics of empirical humanity, or prospectively, in regarding Christ as someone Who can be imitated by the Christian simply, and not analogically in the sense of Analogia Fidei. We have done our best to exclude both these errors. In these senses there is no psychology of Christ, as He is unique in essence. But once this has been done, it is wrong to criticise any further on the grounds of psychology. If God has given us the right to speak, with due analogical caution, even about the very mystery of His own Being, we also enjoy a similar right to talk about the Incarnate Christ and His mystery, and such an account would inevitably look like psychology.

(498) see above, pp. 472-3.
The other, supremely important, point is this, and this is the right place to notice it: Not one of the verses mentioned by Athanasius as being cited by the Arians goes the whole way to the Cross. The nearest that the Arians seem to get to it is the Cry of Dereliction, Matt: 27:46. The Arians never seemed to quote the Crucifixion itself, nor, for example, such verses as John 3:16, Mark 10:45 & pars., Rev.5:12 and 13:8 etc.; even though there could have been difficulties of canonicity in the case of Revelation (but not in Alexandria), this book would have been most tempting for the Arians. We have already noticed the extraordinarily rationalistic treatment of such passages as Acts 2:36, and Philipp. 2:9-10, and contexts; the Arians seem to consider the exaltation of Christ as the actual or anticipatory reward for and/or culmination of a very general sort of obedience and progress, without any special reference to the supreme point, the Crucifixion and Resurrection.

(499) Athanasius's Festal Letter for 367 gives a Canon which, for the Old Testament, is almost the same as the generally accepted Protestant Canon to-day, and for the New Testament, is identical with the universally accepted canon since his time. There is no trace of controversy with the Arians on the basis of the Canon of Scripture, least of all in the sense that the Arians did not recognise certain books that he did recognise; even the remarks at the beginning of the Letter are directed against heretics who fabricate additional books and treat them as canonical Scripture.

The Book of Revelation is distinctly subordinationist, and in fact the only recognition known to the author by a Marxist of any affinity with Arianism is Friedrich Engels's use of this book to prove that the early generation of Christians did not accept Christ as God (see Friedrich Engels, "The Book of Revelation", "Bruno Bauer and Early Christianity", "On History of Early Christianity" Journal articles reprinted in English in "K. Marx and F. Engels on Religion", Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1957). He dates it in A.D. 69, the Year of the Four Emperors, on the basis of ch. 17:9-13. In this he is probably following radical New Testament criticism, although the author has not ascertained the matter.

(500) See C.A.1:37 ff. and II:11-18.
conclusion that we can draw from this is a final confirmation of our thesis that the Arian heresy was radically different from a purely Humanitarian Christology in the normal sense. Nothing is easier than to account for the Cross and Resurrection (if one accepts resuscitatory miracles) on the basis of such a Christology; indeed, Acts 2:32, taken on its own, would supply Paul of Samosata (501) or D.M. Baillie (502) with apparently excellent ammunition; also Arius, if he were that sort of heretic. Under these circumstances, the Cross and Resurrection are easy, deceptively easy, easy in the sense of "easy come, easy go." The Arians, on the contrary, were patently embarrassed by the Cross. This is the final proof that their interest was really in a cosmologically supreme being who is nevertheless completely a creature, and is not God. It would be really difficult to think of such a creature dying on the Cross in any way at all, even with a resurrection on the third day. Nor could they be saved by the sort of Incarnational theology of Athanasius, even though Athanasius himself admits that they ostensibly accepted the Incarnation (Ep. ad Adelph. 1: PG XXVI:1073A), because, having wasted all the Biblical passages concerning the Incarnation to prove that the pre-existent nature of Christ was creaturely, they had literally nothing left for a real Incarnational theology. For that reason the Arian acknowledgment of the Incarnation was, as Athanasius described it in the above reference, pretended (δι' ουτού); it was the emptiest gesture that they ever made, even emptier than their acceptance of an otiose Father. (503) It is most significant that the final block to Arianism, at any rate as a valid exegesis of Scripture, is the Cross, the very thing that on first sight would suggest that Christ is a

(501) See above, pp. 361-376.
(502) See above, pp. 679-81. and references there.
(503) See above, pp. 424-441.
creature and could not be God. It is the Cross which, in the last analysis, demands that He be accepted as God as well as man or creature, together with a fully Incarnational and soteriological doctrine. No one could really suffer for the redemption of the world, and return in glory, except God.

This brings us to another small point of interest, which has its natural place at the end of the Scriptural section, but which we might well bring up now; in addition to the abovementioned passages which refer directly to the Cross, are there any other passages, or types of passage, which the Arians might have exploited as material, but did not, and if so, why not? There is one interesting verse of Scripture which does not appear to fit any previous class of passage, which the Arians might have chosen but did not, I Cor. 15:28. When the author was beginning the thesis, he felt that this simply represented the lack of dogmatic interest in the Parousia which unfortunately all parties shared at the time. His study of the subject has suggested, however, a much more sinister possibility. That is, that the Arians were not really interested in God, that is, the Father, being all in all; they were so entranced with the idea of a creature coming into his own kingdom by sheer progress that the idea of the Son handing over the kingdom to the Father would have been a ludicrous anti-climax. Once again, as we have said before, the Arians show themselves to be utterly centred on their pseudo-Christ; this is why their theology was so terrible, in the literal as well as the derived sense of the word. This is the final proof that the Arian Father was really otiose, and that the proper comparison in the case of the Arian heresy is not with the innumerable adoptionists, Samosatenses, or other Humanitarian Christologists of all ages, but with Marxism and modern atheism alone. It only remains to be said that if they had by some mischance attempted to use this verse, Athanasius would have dealt with the
matter as readily as he dealt with John 6:33, etc., above (Orat. III:7).

One section is worth quotation in full detail, the treatment in ch. 36 ff. of Matt. 11:27 and other passages which speak of the Father "giving" to the Son or the Son "receiving" from the Father, on account of the contrast with the In illud. Omnia mihi tradita sunt. (at 35:400B) "...the like passages do not show that once the Son had not had these things. For how could He Who is in Essence (Κατ' ουσίαν) alone Logos and Wisdom of the Father, and Who says, 'All that the Father hath are Mine,' and what are Mine are the Father's, not have had eternally what the Father has? For if the things of the Father are the Son's and the Father hath them eternally, it is plain that what the Son has, being the Father's, were ever in Him. He said this not on account of ever having not had them, but it is that the Son, Who has what He has eternally, has them from (Πατρί) the Father.

(36) For lest a man, seeing that the Son hath all that the Father hath, should, from the exact likeness and identity of what He hath should fall into Sabellianism and consider Him to be the Father. He has said, 'Was given unto Me,' and, 'I received,' and, 'were delivered to Me'. He said this only to show that He was not the Father, but the Logos of the Father, and the Eternal Son, Who because of His likeness to the Father, has eternally what He has from Him, and because He is the Son, has from the Father what He has eternally. Moreover, that the 'was given,' and the 'were delivered,' and the like, do not impair the Deity of the Logos, but rather show Him to be truly (ζητήτως)
Son, we may learn from the passages themselves. For if all things were delivered unto Him, first, He is other than all things which He received; next, being Heir to all things, He alone is Son proper according to the Essence of the Father (509) .... (According to Athanasius, these verses are to be read in conjunction with John 5:26). Now from the words 'hath given' He signifies that He is not the Father, but in saying 'so' (Οὗτως), He shows the Son's natural likeness and propriety in relation to the Father. If then once the Father had not, plainly the Son once had not, for as the Father, 'so' also the Son has. But if this is impious to say... He has always, yet has from (Πατρὶ) the Father .... (Athanasius then repeats the relation between Sun and Radiance as the appropriate analogy.)

After digressing, in chs. 37 and 38, on to the ignorance of the human Jesus in relation to the omniscience of the Logos, Athanasius returns to the matter in hand in ch. 39, and points out that if Christ received anything in time, this refers to His humanity, and its purpose can only be that we humans should receive these gifts in Him, positions which he had previously established: "At 408A) But if the Logos dwelt among us to redeem the human race and the Logos became flesh to sanctify and deify (Θεοποιήσῃ) them (and for the sake of this has He so become), who does not see that it follows that where He says that He has received something, when He has become flesh, He says it, not on account of Himself (οὐ Ἰησοῦν ἄνω τῶν αἰωνῶν), but on account of the flesh? .... (ch. 40, init.): Also the power which He said that He received after the Resurrection, He had before He received it, and before the Resurrection .... (miracles and forgiveness of sins cited) .... From all this it is plain

(508) ΄άλας ἐστι τῶν πάντων ἐν παρέλαβεν.
(509) Ὁ θεός κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πατρὸς.
(510) τὴν πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα τοῦ ξένου φυσικὴν ἐμνοίαν καὶ ἱδιότητα.
that what He had as Logos, He says that He received humanly (\textit{λιποπαράκτικος}) while He had become man and risen again, so that for His sake men might henceforth have power upon earth against demons. Thus we must acknowledge this once and for all, that nothing which He received, did He receive as not possessing before, for the Logos, as God, had them always, but in these passages He is said to have received humanly, so that, whereas the flesh receives in Him, \textit{from it the gift might henceforth abide in us}.

This passage makes an interesting and instructive contrast with the apparently earlier work or fragment, \textit{In illud, Omnia mihi tradita sunt}, where the "all things", \textit{omnia}, \(\tau \tau \alpha \tau \tau\), refer to the Messianic commission.\footnote{\textit{(512)}} As we have already seen, this does not exclude Arianism rigorously enough,\footnote{\textit{(513)}} and by this time Athanasius has had to change his ground; "all things" are now, not the Messianic commission, but the whole Divine nature and privileges thereof, and secondarily, the glorified state that He received on behalf of us men, and for us. In the first case, He would have had to possess them eternally and co-eternally with God, and the use of the verbs of giving and receiving was solely to indicate the real personal distinction between Father and Son in all eternity according to the essential nature of God, and to exclude Sabellianism. In the second case, this is following a line of exegesis that has already been well and truly established. What Athanasius is saying is that if there is any case of Christ receiving in time, this is the only possible explanation. It is evident that these two explanations are in contrast with each other and are even to a certain extent mutually incompatible, and the fact that they are both given

\footnote{\textit{(511)} \(\textit{Τὴν ὁμοοῦ现在很多} \textit{ἐν ὑπό ζωικῷ ὁμοιότητι}.\)}

\footnote{\textit{(512)} See above, pp. 561-579.}

\footnote{\textit{(513)} See above, p. 567-9.}
suggests that either explanation is rather weak and does not do justice to the passages. The explanation that we would instinctively accept is a modified form of the explanation in the In Illud, Omnia mihi tradita sunt..., the "all things" referring to Christ's exercise of His rule in a form appropriate to the completion of the work of reconciliation and redemption. We have already discussed why Athanasius could not easily accept this sort of explanation (see above, in the context of Philipp. 2:9-10) - that is, a dislike of anything savouring of relativism or of a relative statement. In a sense, it is almost true to say that he had had to accept the force of the Arian objection that such passages must refer to what in some sense is absolutely true (in the sense above defined) about Christ. This would be particularly the case about passages which refer to "all things", \( \text{\(\pi\lambda\tau\eta\) } \), which to a Greek would demand an absolutist interpretation. There is the additional factor here that, between these two differing exegeses of Matt.11:27, Athanasius has moved from the original and "natural" Infralapsarian position towards Supralapsarianism, as regards the very Messianic commission itself. One is irresistibly reminded of the doctrine of Predestination in Karl Barth's "Church Dogmatics" (515) which Barth was compelled, against all previous tradition, to place, not in the doctrine of Providence or even of Reconciliation, but in the Doctrine of God itself, that is, as part of the very essential Being of God. Again, there would be the feeling that the "all things" that were given would have to refer to something that would have to be no less than the constitutive factor in the being of the Son. To maintain the exegesis of the In Illud, Omnia mihi tradita sunt, would be to have a Messiah constituted by his relations, that is,

(514) See above, pp. 751-4.

(515) In the first part of Vol.II.Pt.II.
by His Messianic commission, and Athanasius has shown, earlier in the 
Orations, that this is quite unacceptable. (516)

All the above refer to well-defined developments in the theo-
logy of Athanasius that can be traced in the Contra Arianos I-III, and 
which were patently necessitated by the extraordinarily thorough study 
of the matter which Athanasius had to make for his magnum opus, and as 
such they are cogent and sufficient grounds for a change of exegesis. 
The final effect, of course, was to bring him further into the open in 
condemnation of Sabellianism; indeed, as we have shown, the changes that 
he had had to make left what might be called anti-Sabellianism in advance 
the principal exegetical content of such verses as Matt.11:27. Of course 
he had always repudiated Sabellianism in its classical form, according 
to which apparently there were three different manifestations of the same 
God at different times, with no more than one manifestation at any one 
moment. (517) But now he has to emphasise the personal distinction of 
Father and Son, simultaneously co-existing, much more than he did before, 
and make the corresponding slight modification in the Ἰδώρ ἀρνατος 
analogy, interpreting it rather more generically or categorically and 
rather less constitutively. This is probably one reason for Athanasius's 
later tendency to change the interpretation of the Homoeousion to likeness 
rather than constitutive unity, and even away, perhaps, from the more 
definitely Athanasian doctrine that we have mentioned above, although 
this tendency is not nearly as great as has often been made out. (518)

(516) Orat. II: 51 pp. See above, pp. 879-890.

(517) See also our comments on II:38 ff., above, pp. 626-76, and on III:5 ff. 
above, pp. 935-49. For reasons that we have specified there, 
Baur's comment (Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und 
Menschwerdung Gottes..., p.433), that the position of Athanasius 
differed from Sabellianism only in that the titles Father and Son 
apply simultaneously, as against consecutively in classical Sabell-
ianism, is unfair.

(518) See above, pp. 629-40, and below, pp. 1118-32 and 1214-18.
There are two further points that we might notice. First, the standard term for the Divinity and the exalted pre-existent state of the Second Person is Logos, for example, the beginning of ch.49, "The Son then did know, being Logos (Logos οὐ). This passage refers specially to the knowledge of the day and hour of the Second Coming, which Jesus as Logos would have to know on the grounds of His cosmological status as Creator of all things. This sort of passage shows that Athanasius still to some extent thinks of Logos in the old Greek way with its cosmological reference, and is prepared to revive this way of thinking when it can be turned against the Ariana, as indeed it can in this case, since any attempt to use Mark 13:32 cannot but be a grave reflection even on that cosmological supremacy which the Arians were most interested in maintaining. Athanasius makes, at the end of ch.44, a most interesting point to this effect, saying that if the Son knows the Father and does not, as Logos, know future history, that in effect maintains that whereas the Son is not transcended by the Father but is transcended by the cosmos, since to the relevant extent the cosmos is independent of the Logos - hence atheism, if the matter is pushed to its logical conclusion. Secondly, there is Athanasius's concluding statement, 58:445A, that the Arians had shipwrecked themselves through failure to recognise "the ecclesiastical scope" as an anchor of the faith." This statement is quoted by Newman in justification of the "Catholic" doctrine of the Church; we have already considered the matter in the context of Athanasius's use of "ecclesiastical", etc.; on the whole, the evidence is against Newman's interpretation, as we shall show in our general consideration of the Orations.

(519) Ἰουσαπόρον ὑπὸ ἘΚΚΛΗΣΙΑΣΤΙΚῶν

(520) See above, pp. 534-5 and below, pp. 1061-2 and ref.2.
In this section, there is a remarkable paucity of references to the Spirit. In 30:392c, Joel 2:28 is quoted, but only for the purpose of showing that in the Old Testament, σάρξ, flesh, was commonly equivalent to ἰδρώματος, man, or more specifically τὸ ποντὸν ἰδρώματος γένος, mankind. 33:396A is a straightforward off-hand reference to our regeneration by water and the Spirit, in the context of a general description, in the usual form, of the economy of salvation. 44:416A τέρ and B is interesting, in that in the exegesis of Mark 13:32 Athanasius points out that in this passage Jesus did not say that the Spirit was ignorant, and therefore, "first, if the Spirit knew, much more must the Logos know, from Whom the Spirit receives," and next, by His silence about the Spirit, He made it clear that He said of His human ministry, "No, not the Son." 45:417C accuses the Arians of blasphemy against the Spirit, by a process that appears to be the same as in the "Quicunque dixerit" (or Ad Serap. IV:8-23). 47:424A, is a straight reference to the Assumption of Elijah, and was introduced solely for the sake of reference to Elijah's assumed ignorance of the event that he really saw (II Kings 2:1-16). There is only one, or at most two, significant references to the Spirit, and even 45:417C is too off-hand for any certain deductions. The important reference in ch.44 is quite definite. From one point of view it clearly indicates the Deity of the Spirit, in view of what has been already said about the Logos, but in another sense, it continues the general emphasis on the subordination of the Spirit to the Logos, with its remark about the Spirit's "receiving", that is, in this case, the knowledge that is directly due to Deity, from the

(521) Παρὰ οὗ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα λαμβάνει
(522) Περὶ τῆς ἰδρώματος λύτου λειτουργίας.
(523) That is, that Blasphemy against the Spirit is really the opposite of saying, Blasphemy against the flesh, and this means blasphemy against the Deity rather than against the mere humanity of Christ. See Appendix on this work.
Logos (even though the verb is ἀγαπάων and not μεταγηνάων which as we have said above would make the Spirit a creature). This shows that Athanasius was still unable to put fully into practice a high (intra-Trinitarian) doctrine of the Spirit, almost certainly because the Spirit was still thought of primarily as what directly inspires the creature, and there was still a real danger that any high doctrine of the Spirit, especially in relation to the Logos, would blur his argument for the Deity and supremacy of the Logos. This may also be the reason why there is no reference even here to the Conception by the Holy Spirit, which is a yawning deficiency in this section.\(^{(524)}\) Even though Karl Barth has brilliantly and decisively shown (Ch. Dog. Vol. I: Pt. I: 554-556 Eng. Ed.) that the Conception by the Holy Spirit cannot have the slightest effect on the Intra-Trinitarian portion of the Doctrine of the Spirit, this may be not at all obvious immediately until the doctrine of the Spirit is more developed than at this stage of Athanasius's life and work. (A shocking example of confusion on this point in a contemporary theologian is supplied by C. S. Hendry, "The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology," pp. 48-52, in a theologian who is actually criticising Barth's doctrine on the subject, and does so without reference to Barth's own explanation in the long footnote that we have just cited.) Athanasius would have been perfectly capable of making the same point once he gave his mind to it, but probably not yet. Even the example of Irenaeus would not have enabled him to do so, since the latter's emphasis on the Conception by the Holy Spirit was strictly in the context of the refutation

\(^{(524)}\) We have already noted this deficiency in the "De Incarnatione", see above, pp. 125 & 202.

\(^{(525)}\) Because the Conception by the Holy Spirit is simply the first, and in fact the archetypical case of the role of the Spirit in the economy of salvation, in the uniting of God and man and the overcoming of the barrier.
of the details of certain Gnostic systems. Incidentally, the Arians were silent about this issue; if they had tried to use it they would have had to be Paulianists and not Arians.

This concludes the refutation of Arian exegesis, and the substitution of the orthodox interpretation. We have already given reason for assuming that this section is absolutely complete, in that it includes every type of passage, at any rate, that the Arians used. There are only three possible exceptions to this, the Cross, the Conception, and the Eschaton, in all their starkness in each case. From the point of view of what we now know as sound doctrine, and above all from the point of view of Scripture, these are drastic exceptions, but the Arians were probably blind to this. At any rate, in each of these cases, we have been able to indicate very good reasons why the Arians would have found them prohibitively embarrassing, and thus we can say that the exegetical section, as we have it in the Orations, is entirely complete, according not only to what Athanasius wrote, but according to what he needed to write and planned to write.

The lexicographical analysis of these 33 chapters is as follows:

**Logos:** Called God in same sense as Father: 40:409A (Logos had what He is said to receive, being God), 52:433A (Log. & God not measured by stature).

Godhead of the L.: 33:393A (works of Godhead of L. happened through body), 40:409B (subjection of angels marks Godhead of the L.), 41:409B (Do not degrade the Logos, nor detract from His Godhead), 41:409C (humble statements not to be ascribed to the Deity of the L.). *Everything earthly alien to nature of L.: 26:380B (Did not lack anything, being L.), 41:409B bis (These attributes are not of the L., Λόγος ἐστὶν, but of Manhood),

52:432C bis (It was not the L., as He is L., that was the Progressor), 53:436A (It was not said, "The L. advanced", but "Jesus....."), 53:436A alterum (Advancement not of the L.), 55:437B bis (These sufferings not proper to the L., as He is L.). Origin of L.: L. of the F.: 29:385A (Saviour is ever God and Son, being L., Radiance, & Wdm. of F. (and also man), 35:400B (How did the Sole L. & Wdm. of the F. not have eternally what is the F.'s?), 36:400C ("Given" - referring purely to the Attributes - shows that it was not the F. Himself but the L. of the F.), 49:428B, 54:456A (Arians ask, How is He God & Logos of F. if He weeps? (527)). L. of God: 30:388B (became S. of Man), 33:396A (Flesh through the L. of G.), 34:397B (A Christian may say, "...The L. has taken my form...."), 38:405A (Takes our ignorance), 55:440A (clear from His works that He is L. of G. afterwards become man). Perfect and Immutable Equality with the F.: 43:413B (Logos knows everything before its origination). 45:417C bis (L. not ignorant, as He is L.), 46:420C (L. comes, judges, is Bridegroom in parable; so must know), 49:425C (Son knew, being L.), 49:428A (L. has concealed the End from us), Work in Creation: 42:412B. Power of the L.: 33:393B (men exalted according to p. of L.), 41:412A (the grace and p. is of the L. - i.e. in Inc'n), 57:444C (To lay down and receive life is not man's, but of the p. of the L.).

(527) All these and similar expressions, in spite of appearances, have been classified in Group I, as the Arians were not Christologists in the familiar narrower sense.

(528) Classified in Group VII on account of future reference. Knowledge normally refers to the Day and Hour of Day of Judgment; also to fate of Lazarus.
L. in O.T.: 30:388B (L. came into a man, sanctifying Him, &c., contrast with Inc'n), 30:388B alterum (L. of the LORD came to each of the Prophets).

**Incarnation of Logos:** Simply declared, as John L:14: 27:380C, 35:400A, 39:408A (+ come among us), 39:408A alterum & B, 41:409C, 43:413B, 48:425A, 51:429B (+ as God, descended upon earth), 53:433C, 55:437B (+ became man). Other expressions: 39:408A (L. ΕΙΣΗΓΕΝΗΣΕΤΕ), 41:412A (flesh contemplated in the L.), 41:412A alterum (True flesh was in the L.), 52:433A (L. manifested Himself in b.), 53:433C (became man + bore true fl.), 55:437B & 58:445A (each, L. in suffering fl.), 57:444C (flesh remained immortal on account of L. that put it on). The Logos Incarnate: Both complete Human and Divine Natures: 31:389B (Miracles are proper works of L.), 32:389B (L. bare the infirmities of the flesh as His own), 32:389C (the flesh suffering, the L. was not outside it), 32:392B (flesh was the Logos's), 33:393A (if properties of flesh had not been ascribed to L., we would not have been delivered from them), 33:393B (When L. has become man,...the infirmities no longer touch body), 34:396A (the impassibility of the ΦΥΣΙΣ of the L.), 34:396C (infirmities &c., not properties of L. ΚΑΤΣ ΦΥΣΙΝ), 34:396C (L. Himself ην ΦΥΣΙΝ impassible), 34:397A (a Christian may say "I have become the Logos's flesh"), 40:409A (said to receive what He already had, being L.), 43:413B (proper to L. to know things made), 43:413B alterum (Human speech not a diminution of the L.), 43:413C (knew Hour as L., did not know as man), 43:416A bis (if Holy Spirit knew, how much more did L., as He is L.) 45:420A (knew as L.), 53:433C (advancement not external to L.), 54:436C (if it is L. in flesh that speaks...), 56:440C (it was not the L. as L. that wept or was troubled, &c.). Same L. author of our Reconciliation: 31:389C (we are filled with the justice of the L.), 33:393A (infirmities no longer touch body on account of L. in it), 33:393C (we became ιδίος.
Heretical uses (affirmed or denied, normally Arians): Deny L. to be God: 26:330A (How can L. be proper to F. in view of Cry of Dereliction?) 27:331A (How dare you say that He is L. proper to F.'s Essence, if He had a body?), 27:331B (Ans. deny that God is Father \( \psi \iota \iota \iota \varsigma \) of L.), 39:405C (Heretics divide L. from F.). Reject Divine attributes for humble ones: 26:330B (would have known as L. but did not), 42:412B (the L. that knows all things is accused of ignorance of a day). Pre-existent L. called creature, &c.: 44:417B (ranking S. of G. and eternal L. among things originate). Heretical deductions from Incarnation: 27:331B (How can L. be God, who slept as man, wept, &c.), 27:331C (Both Jews and Arians deny Godhead and eternity of L. from Humanity). 35:397C (If one, seeing what was done Divinely by L. denies the Body), 35:397C alterum (if one, seeing what is proper to the body, denies the \( \varepsilon \nu \sigma \tau \rho \kappa \lambda \nu \pi \alpha \rho \ou \sigma \tau \alpha \nu \) of the L.), 35:397C tertium (or L. from the Humanity, they think humbly of the Logos), 35:400A (they ought to look at the Divine works of the L.), 39:405C bis (if L. had not become man, let human attributes be of the L.), 39:405C bis, tertium et quartum (if Logos, as He is L., be He who receives and is glorified), 51:429C bis (If He, being L., progresses, how can He become more than...L. & Son...?), 51:429C tertium (for the L. is these), 54:437A (if L. was terrified, why did He not flee?), 55:437C (why do you not recognise \( \tau \o \nu \varepsilon \tau \nu \Pi \lambda \tau \rho \iota \pi \lambda \gamma \nu \) ?), 57:444A
(who can say that the L. was in terror?), 58:444C(Petty are the Arian notions on the L.). Since this section is so predominantly Incarnational, there is a more uniform distribution according to our system, and possibly Group I should be even less prominent than we have assumed it to be. The total is 116, about average in density; 42 are in Group I, 12 in Gp.II, 2 in Gp.III, 27 in Gp.IV, 22 in Gp.V, one (probably) in Gp.VI, and 10 in Gp.VII.

\[ \text{Son, as title for Second Person: Son-Logos (usually omitted, but following instances occurred under Logos under other headings:)} \]

But 49:425C(Son knew, being L.) 51:429C(If L. advances... what can He become more than... L. ... & Son...? ), 52:433A(L. confessed to be True S. of G.)

Intimate Relation between F. & S.: Generation, simply expressed: 28:384C(He is God's S.), 36:400C(Matt.11:27, rather shows \( \gamma\nu\nu\) S.), 36:401C(as of Light-Radiance, so must we think the more of the S., that is that He has all that the F. has), 53:433C(\( \pi\lambda\pi\rho\kappa\nu\phi\omega\) for such is the S.).

Same Nature or Unity of Relation with Father: Matt. 11:27 shows that Son has everything that F. has while personally distinct:

35:400B (what is the F.'s is eternally the S.'s), 35:400B alterum (what are the S.'s are always in F.), 35:400B tertium(S. having eternally what He hath, hath from the F.), 36:400B (seeing what S. hath eternally from F. one would not be Sabellian), 36:400C(Mt.11:27 shows that reference is to Eternal S.), 36:400C alterum (on account of His being S., He has from F. eternally what He hath, 36:401B bis (as. as F. has, so has S.), 36:401B tertium (S. has \( \pi\lambda\pi\rho\kappa\nu\phi\omega\) ), 36:401C ter (F. having given all to S., has everything in the S., and the S. having, F. again has.), 44:417A bis (If everything of F. is S.'s, plainly the S. knew).

Other expressions: 28:384C (being S. He is inseparable from F.), 36:400C

(529) All such references are in Group I; see above, pp. 1007-11.
(Matt. 11:27 does not diminish Godhead of S.) 36:401A(S. alone is proper 
κατ' οὐσίαν to F.), 36:401A alterum (φυσικὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ 
δομοιοτητα of S. towards F.), 36:401C(S.'s Godhead is F.'s 
Godhead), 44:417 A & B (If S. is Image of F. . . . . . . S. knows, because of 
likeness to F.), 44:417B ter (If S. is in F. and F. is in S., the S. knows, 
being in F.).

Unity of operation implies unity of essence: 50:429A (the S. 
in whom F. asked .... - i.e. Gen. 3-4), 
Special principle of Creation and 
Governance of Universe: 36:401C (God exercises providence in the S.), 44: 
417A (Hour determined through the S.), 44:417A alterum (everything comes 
to be and is determined through the S.), 46:425C (Who is Power of F. but 
the S. ?). Son, having become S. of M. is and remains S. of G.: 28:394B 
(Lord is True and φύσει S. of G.), 29:385A (Saviour is ever S. and 
G., being L. of F.), 31:389A (sent His own Son born of a woman. . . . as 
Gal. 4:4), 32:392C (Saviour not just ordinary man, but the True and φύσει 
S. from G.), 41:412A (to be known as S. of G. through the works), 42: 
412C (context of Mk. 13:32 shows that S. of G. really knew), 44:416A (Ignor-
ance τοῦ ἐκ ἀνθρώπων γενομένου Βιοῦ), 46:421A (even 
though He asked in Matt. 16, revelation came to Peter through S.), 46:421B 
(bias (if through S. is revealed knowledge both of F. & of S.), 52:432C (S. 
has no progressiveness, but is perfect in F.), 52:433B (confessed by 
Peter to be truly S. of G.). Words attributed to Christ: 36:401B (S. says 
that as F. hath so hath He), 44:416B (S. said that He did not know). See 
also 49:425C (on Mk. 13:32, we must be warned both about angels and the S., 
since devils will impersonate both).

Heretical uses (affirmed or denied) (usually Arians, unless 
otherwise stated): 42:412B (S. that knows all things accused of ignorance 
of a day). Separate S. from L. Wdm. etc.: 51:432B (How can they say that
the S. is not θεόν &c.?). Deny the Ἰάνθηνον, &c.: 26:377A (forget, like Paul of Samosata, the S.'s Paternal Godhead), 26:377B (An. claim that if He were S. Κατὰ φύσιν He would have no need to receive), 27:381A (Jews: How could He endure the Cross if S. of G.?). Deny True Generation: 26:377A (How can S. be from F. Φύσιν and like Him Κατὰ οὐσίαν ?). Separate S. from F.: 55:440A. Son = or less than us in nature: 39:408A (If this is said of Godhead, we have no interest in what is given to S.), 55:437B (if heretics want to think that the humble attributes are those of S. of G.), Creature, &c.: 44:417B (among things originate). Not eternal: 26:380B (otherwise, would have known the day), 35:400B (Scripture does not show that the S. ever did not have....), 36:401B (if there was once when the F. did not know, there was once when the S. did not know). The total number is 64, strikingly less than the number for Logos. Of these, 40 are in Group I, 9 in Group II, one in Group III, 2 in Group IV, 7 in Group V, 4 in Group VI, and one in Group VII.

Turning now to the terms of Trinitarian and Christological relationship, Οὐσία, Essence, is rare; too rare for Muller's classification to be relevantly employed: 26:377A (How can the S. be from F. Φύσιν and like Him Κατὰ οὐσίαν ?), 27:381A (How can you say that the L. is proper to the F.'s E.?), 35:400B (The sole Κατὰ οὐσίαν L. & θεόν of the F.), 36:401A (S. alone is Κατὰ οὐσίαν of the F.), 56:440B ("I and the Father are one" shows One Godhead and Τὸ γενόμενον οὐσίαν of the F.). Of these five instances, 2 are in Group III and three in Group V.

Φύσις, Nature, is commoner: Nature or Natures of Christ: 34:396A (the impassibility τῆς τοῦ Λογου φύσεως), 34:396C (Passions not proper to L. Κατὰ φύσιν), 34:396C
alterum (Passions proper to flesh), 34:396C tertium et quartum (each, L. impassible - acc. of respect), 34:397A (Flesh earthly and mortal K.φ.), 34:397B (Corruption K.φ.), 43:413B (ignorance property of human n.), 53:436A (Humanity of Christ gradually transcends human nature), 55:436A alterum (Advancement is of the human in Christ), 55:437B (Passions not proper by nature), 57:444C (Kατὰ τὴν ἐαυτῆς φύσεως the flesh of Christ should not stay dead), Divine N. one and common to both F. & S.; 26:377B bis (Arians say, if He were S. K.φ. He would have no need to receive but would always have K.φ. as son), 23:384B (the Lord is True and S. of G.), 32:392C (Sav. is φύσει a True Son). See also 36:401A (φυσικὴν ἴδιοτὴν καὶ ἰδιότητα of S. in relation to F.). See also 40:409A (vide II Pet. 1:4). Heretics deny Divine Nature: 26:377A (How can S. be from the F. and like Him in essence?), 26:377B (How can He be the True and Power of the F.?), 26:377C (How does Luke 2:52 apply if He is and True and Proper Wdm. of F.?), 27:381B (God not άνθρωπος F. of L.). Human Nature, Nature of creatures, "Nature" &c.; 33:393B (men receptive of suffering ), 34:397A (κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον πάντως ἑτο - i.e. how can natural terrestrial state pass from flesh?), 34:397A alterum (A Christian can say, "I am κατὰ φύσιν mortal.....), 41:409C (Let us consider of what is said, i.e. the humble statements about Christ), 57:444B (Man dies 2αύτην φύσεως ), 57:444D (Arians do not even appreciate the of men). Of these 28 uses, 2 are noun uses referring to the Divine nature, 8 similar uses refer to the nature of man or other creatures or creaturely forces, including four that definitely refer to the Human Nature of Christ in something like the Chalcedonian sense, and the other 18 are adverbial uses.
As might be expected in such a section, the terms that we have selected for the Humanity of Christ are extremely common. 

**Body:**

- Of itself: 31:389B (It was not as if He cured infirmities as one outside b.), 35:397C (or if one sees the properties of the b.)
- Denies the presence in the flesh of the L.: 35:405B (speaks humanly on account of the b.), 39:408A (b. improved through Him, i.e. Logos), 46:420C (Matt. 24:36 said on account of b.), 57:444C

**Imperfections of b.:** 31:389C (He bore our sins on the Cross τοῦ σώματος), 32:392B (The passions of the b. were proper to Him), 32:392B alterum (Pain, suffering, death for us), 33:393B (imperfections no longer touch it on ground of L. that is in it), 33:393C (transferred other passions of the b.), 38:405B (received Him only through the b.), 52:433A (Progress is of the b.), 54:436B (Son said to progress διὰ τὴν προσέγγισιν ἑαυτοῦ)

55:437C (showed the properties of the b.), 55:437C alterum (showed that His body was possible), 55:440A (heretics do not refer them to b.), 56:440B (weeping as the properties of the b.), 56:440B alterum (said on account of b.), 56:440B tertium (Mary mortal, from whom the b. sprang), 56:440B-C (He came to be in weeping, suffering, toiling b.), 56:440C (such things said of Him after the body, i.e. A.D.), 58:445A (let His own b. suffer).

More strictly Christologically: Christ's own: 31:389A

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(530) Classified in this Context in Group II, since the usual form here is that the property is such a verb as "hungering," "suffering," a grammatical active but a material passive.

(531) Such cases as this are here classified in Group VII, the Humanity on its own.

(532) "Passions", here as usual, is the regular translation of τὰ ὁμοιώματα. Modern English readers must be careful here, because ὁμοιώματα does not refer primarily to what we now call the emotional life, in the sense that a man is not human unless he has an emotional life, but simply to "passion" in the sense of the grammatical passive voice, that is, the fact that the thing concerned can be affected or even overwhelmed by an external force.

(533) With a certain trepidation, these and similar cases go into Christological Group I. On the other hand, the probable point for Athanasius about progress was either that it was under the power of external forces, or the original doubly humble state before the progress.
(Having His own b. and using it as organ), 31:389B (the b. in which He bore them in Him was His own), 32:392B (body not somebody else's), 34:396C (body is proper to Saviour), 53:436A (flesh became b. of wisdom), Type of Union: 56:440B (the b. could not come to be in the Incorporeal except through Incarnation), 57:444A (had right to separate Himself from b. and take it up again), Further descriptions: 34:397B (God put on b.), 52:433A & 53:433C (Body grows), Truly has body: 27:381A (Arians say, How can He be L. when He has b.?), 32:392A (bore a true b.), 41:412A, God was in the b.: 53:433A, Threw human body round Him: 55:440A. Takes b. from Mary: 56:440B. Miracles through His own b.: 31:389B, 32:389C, 33:393A (salvation ineffective if works of Godhead of L. not done through b.), 35:397B (does & speaks Divinely through instrument of His b.), 41:409C (works not human even though done through b.), Heretical uses (as usual): 27:380C (Arians might as well ask how the Incorporeal can bear a body), 35:397C (if one seeing what was done Divinely by the L. were to deny the b.), 35:400A (Arians ought to look at the Divine works of L. and deny the origination of the b.), 39:408A (Christ, on Arian basis, would rather owe it to b.), 39:408A (Christ. would rather be promoted through the b. than v. v.) (these last two classified according to the implied contradictory as accepted by Athanasius). See also 31:389B (the Godhead dwelt in the flesh) of which we have, again with a certain doubt, classified this variety under Group VI, but owing to the doubt we have not done so when there is a substantial element conducive to another classification.

Of these 51 cases, 4 are, probably, in Group I, 11 in Group II, none in Group III, 13 in Group IV, 10 in Group V, 7 (possibly) in Group VI, and 6 in Group VII, i.e. refer simply to the Humanity.

flesh: All flesh, in O.T. sense: 30:388C ("flesh" in Scripture, i.e. O.T. = the whole of man) and again 30:388C ("flesh" in O.T.)
Scripture = the human race). These two are omitted from the reckoning of the lexicographical summary. **Lower Part of Man**: 37:404B (Ignorance is proper to the flesh), 52:420G (His humiliation consisted in taking our flesh), 56:440G bis (each, such arguments proper to the fl.), 56:441A (that I. may lighten these very sufferings of the flesh). **Incarnation of the L.** Simply declared, as John 1:14: 27:360C, 33:396A, 35:400A, 39:408A bis & B, 41:409C, 43:413B (+ became man), 48:435A, 51:429B, 53:433C, 55:437B (+ this was not said before the flesh, i.e. B.C. (2nd expl.); see also 34:397A (A Christian might say, "... I became flesh of the Logos... "). Other expressions: 27:381C (Endured through fl. that He had), Takes fl.: 29:385A (from Mary), 40:409A (takes fl. in Himself), 55:440A (takes possible fl.), Godhead dwells in fl.: 31:389A. Accepts fl.: 31:389A, 33:404C. Flesh His (or I. own): 31:389B, 32:392B bis. Second Person is (or becomes) in fl.: 33:404C (+ accepts fl.), 41:412A (Was True God in fl.), 54:436C (If it is I. in fl. that speaks). Flesh in the L.: 31:389C (not outside L.), 41:412A (True flesh was in L.). Bears flesh: 35:397B, 48:425B (raises to Heaven the fl. He bore), 51:429B (Is Jesus man or God: bearing fl. ?, 51:429B alterum (If He is God bearing fl.), 53:433C. Has flesh: 45:420A (like man's), 57:444B, 57:444C (I. had mortal fl.), Put on fl. (ἐνδούσας): 34:396C, 45:417G (ignorant fl.). Other expressions: 32:392A (ἐνδούσας οὐκ ἐπιφάνειας) 31:389B (His flesh served the works of the Godhead), 33:405A (Deified fl.), 41:409C (the flesh is contemplated in the L.), 41:412A (did works through the fl.), 50:429A (cast flesh around Him). 53:436A (fl. became body of Wisdom). See also 33:393B (the fl. being generated from Mary.)

Further Description of Flesh: Imperfections of Flesh: 31:389A (Certain things ascribed to Him, like hunger, etc., of which fl. was
ζ经济发展) 32:392A (gave forth human spittle from the fl.), 31:389B (bore infirmities of fl. as His own), 32:389C (fl. suffering, but not
outside Logos), 33:393B (it is right that the passions of the fl. be ascribed to Him), 33:393A (if the properties of the fl. had not been ascribed to Logos, man would not have been delivered of them), 33:393B (L. makes His own the things of the fl.), 34:396B (six times) (Christ suffered various things סדרק; in each case, the verb is in form active with Christ as subject), 34:396C (suffered on our behalf סדרק), 34:396C alterum (sufferings properties of fl.), 34:397A (no heretic says, "Why does fl. rise, being by nature mortal?), 38:405B (shows that He has fl. that needs these things), 39:408B (this is said סדרק), 41:409C (passions proper to fl.), 41:412A (Truly were the passions of the fl. displayed in Him), 41:412A alterum (Shows from the passions of the fl. that He has a true body), 43:413B (said this as man on account of fl.), 44:416A (Not ashamed of the flesh that was ignorant), 45:420A (Did not know סדרק), 48:425A (fleshly on account of the fl. did not know סדרק" also counted; 2 expls.), 48:425B (it was the fl. that rose....&c.), 53:433C quater (סדרק suffered, hungers, struggles, advances), 53:436A & 54:436B (fl. progresses), 53:436A alterum (fl. not the same as Wisdom), 55:437B (L. in suffering fl.) 57:441C (terror is of the fl.), 57:441C alterum (He had fl. which was in terror), 57:444B (to be troubled is proper to fl.), 57:444C (fl. being corruptible, should not remain mortal), 58:445A (He came to suffer סדרק). Redemption in or by fl.: 33:396A (fl. "logified"), 34:397B (received through His flesh), 53:433B (We are redeemed accdg. to the likeness & kinship to fl. of the L.), 58:445A (He came to prepare the fl. to be impassible & immortal). Heretics: 39:408A (? - that He did not have before descent into fl.), 51:429C bis (fl. would have been cause of His improvement rather than He the cause of the Flesh's improvement). סדרק קס, fleshly: 33:393C (all fleshly weakness transferred to L.).


The total number of examples is 108, far more, as usual, than with σαμα. In spite of John 1:14, and also the prevalence of expressions of the form, He did (or virtually suffered) this, τοῦτο, Group VI does not show great preponderance, the distribution being, 5 in Gr. I, 25 in Gp. II, 3 in Gp. III, 25 in Gp. IV, 10 in Gp. V, 29 in Gp. VI, and 11 in Gp. VII.

"Ανθρωπός. Man: Second Person becomes Man (μνετα).


(κλινεται: 


not just ordinary man, but...), 52:433A (The more the Godhead was revealed, the more did His grace ἐγκλινεται increase before men), 56:440C (things said to be done ἐγκλινεται increase before men). Heretical uses (as usual): 27:380C & 381A (Arians might ask with Calaphas, why, as Christ is a man, does He make Himself God?), 27:381B (How can He be Logos, Who slept, &c. as man?), 30:388A (not correct to say that L. came into a man), 30:388B (See first two examples here), 39:405C (If L. had not become man...), 51:429B (claim that Jesus is a man like other men), 51:429B bis (If J. is a man like others, let Him struggle ἐγκλινεται increase before men), 54:436C (2 exptls.) (If it is a mere man speaking, let Him fear death &c. as a man), 55:437B (Arians would have to judge Him a mere man - i.e. as
Paul of Samosata. ἀνθρωπομοιοί, humanly (like ἀνθρωπος):
444A & B. ἀνθρωπομοιοί, human: 32:392A (gives forth human voice to
call Lazarus), 32:392A alterum (clothed Himself with human flesh), 33:
392A (the spittle was human, with which he cured the blind man), 41:409C
(the triumphs, e.g. raising of Lazarus, were not human), 43:413B (ignor-
ance property of human n.), 44:416B (He said, "I do not know", of His
human ministry), 51:432A (Angels ministered to His human origin), 53:
436A (In its progress, it (i.e. humanity of Christ) transcends human na-
ture), 53:436A alterum (Progress is of the human nature), 55:440A (cast
human body round Himself), 56:440B (took human body), 57:441C (combined
own will with human weakness), 57:444B (it was human to say, "May this
cup pass...." &c.) substantively, ἁνθρωπομοιοί = Humanity:
38:404C (did not shun the h. though being God), 43:413C (John 17:1 said
according to His h.), 45:417C ("I do not know", shows the h.), 51:433B
(Rather did the h. in Him advance), 53:436A (the h. in the Wisdom pro-
gressed).

= Humanity: 26:377A (heretics from false
Conclusions hearing ἁνθρωπομοιοί of Son), 27:381B (Both Jews and Arians deny
Godhead & Eternity of L. from the h.), 34:396C (that no one should be
scandalized from the h.), 35:397C (if one would think humble things about
L. from the h.), 35:400A (Seeing the h. of the Saviour, they call Him
creature), 41:409C (ascribed to Sav. in Gospels), 55:437B (if heretics
want to think humble things about Sav. from the h.). ἀνθρωπομοιοί
= humanity: 41:409C (we must ascribe humble statements to the h.), 43:413B
(proper to ascribe to h. everything that He speaks humanly), 56:440C
(such suffering proper to h.). Of the 109 instances, 4 are in Group I
(chiefly owing to the human progress of Luke 2:52), 7 in Gp.II, none in
Group III, 4 in Gp.IV, two in Gp.V, 70 in Gp.VI, and 22 in Gp.VII. The
great predominance of Group VI is normal.

Having apparently reached this terminal point, Athanasius proceeds, with an expostulation against the heretics for perpetually concocting new issues, to discuss a fresh general point, the Arian claim that the Son must have come to be at the will of the Father. In our critical study of the chronology of the Contra Arianos, we have already considered what the question involved, and we have given reasons for the conclusion that Athanasius is to be taken at his face value, and that, in its acute form, the issue was really raised by the Arianising synods of the early 340's, and to that extent was really new matter. Newman, in his notes on 58:445B, notes that this section is markedly different in style and vocabulary to the remainder of the Third Oration, and is very much more like the other two, and that its cross-references are to the earlier Orations. However, this is completely explained by the reversion to the earlier type of subject-matter, and if we accept Athanasius's statements, this does not introduce any fresh problem. Thus, this passage is to be accepted not as a displaced portion of the earlier Orations, much less of some other work, but as in fact belonging in its ostensible place. (535)

Athanasius begins by quoting the objection; the quotation is direct in form, but probably indirect in reality, corresponding to no known Arian formula directly; (but it has no relevant differences from, say, the formulation in the Macrostich): "'Be it so,' they say; 'interpret these passages thus, and gain the victory in reasonings and proofs; still you must say that the Son has received being from the Father at His will and pleasure." (536) He then points out that this position is indistinguishable from Arianism in its classical form and formularies, and is un-

(536) θελήσει καὶ ὑπολείπεται αὑτῷ ἐκ τοῦ γιόν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός.
Scriptural, the classical testimonies, Matt. 3:17, Ps 44 AV:1, John 1:1, Ps. 36:9, Heb. 1:3, Philipp. 2:6, Col. 1:15, being quoted. Athanasius now continues:

"All these passages tell us everywhere of the Being of the Logos, but nowhere are we told that He was 'of will' (ΕΚ ΒΟΥΛΗΣΕΩΣ) or that He has been made at all. As for them, where did they find Will or Pleasure 'precedent' (ΠΡΟ ΨΩΜΕΝΗ + gen.) to the Logos of God, unless forsooth they have deserted Scripture and slyly followed the impiety of Valentinus. For Ptolemy the Valentinian said that the Unorigin- ate had a pair of attributes, Thought and Will; and first He thought, then He willed, and what He thought He could not put forth save when the power of Will was added. Thence the Arians.... wish will and Pleasure to precede the Logos.... But we, on reading the Holy Oraole, have found 'He was' (ἐστὶ) applied to the Son, and of Him only did we hear that He was in the Father and the Image of the Father; while it was only in the case of things originate, since these things also by nature once were not, but after came to be, that we recognised a preceding will and pleasure... (Ps. 115 AV:3, Ps. 110LXX:2, Ps. 135AV:6)... If then He be work and thing made, and one among everything (ΕΣ ΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ) let Him also be said to have come to be by will, for it is thus that Scripture shows that the things made come to be." Here follows the quotation from Asterius on the matter, which we have already cited above; the gist is that as Will is so obviously superior to Nature, it would be an insult to the Son to say that He was generated in any way except by will. This too was the attitude of the Arianizing Synods that Athanasius is answering; they

(537) δοῦ διόπος ἔχει τῷ ἔγενετον, ἐνοικίων καὶ Θεοίων.
(538) ἐπὶ δὲ μόνων τῶν ἔγενετων.
(539) ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇ φύσει οὐκ ἦν ποτε τῶν.
(540) See above, p. 354.
regarded the only alternative to generation by will to be generation under natural compulsion.\(^{(541)}\) Athanasius comments thus: "In spite of the sophist having introduced abundant irreligion into his remarks, that is, that the offspring (γέννημα) and thing made (ποιήμα) are the same, and that the Son is one of all the existant offsprings, he comes to the conclusion that it is right to say that the works are by will and pleasure.\(^{(542)}\)

Therefore if He is other than "all things", .... and it was rather the case that through Him the works came to be, let not 'by will' (βουλήσει) be said of Him, unless He has come to be in the same way as the things have been established (συνέστη) which through Him came to be. For Paul was previously not an Apostle, but became one afterwards 'by the will of God' and our own calling, which once was not, but now has taken place, is preceded by will...\(^{(543)}\) And what Moses relates, 'Let there be light,'....&..... signifies the will of the Agent.

For the Framer counsels to make things that once were not but happened afterwards from external causes.\(^{(543)}\)

The introductory reference to the doctrine of Ptolemy the follower of Valentinus the Gnostic is interesting, since it shows that the tendency to consider such things as a person's will and counsel as substantially separate entities was widespread. Whatever the difficulties that we Westerners might feel with the Athanasian doctrine that the Son is hypostatically and simply the Will of God, we should recognise that, compared with the tradition of which Gnosticism as a whole was typical, Athanasius is a model in his insistence on the inseparability of the Will.

\(^{(541)}\) See above, pp. 274-9.
\(^{(542)}\) τὰ ποιήματα βουλήσει καὶ ψελήματι.
\(^{(543)}\) Τοι ἡμῶν ἐν ὑπνοίᾳ ἐπιγνώμενα, δὲ ἐγὼ ἐσώθεις ἐπιγνώμενα, δομιουργὸς βουλήσεως ποιήσατο.
and Counsel, etc., from God, as his treatment of the doctrine of Ptolemy shows. After this introduction, Athanasius as usual returns to the Scriptural testimony, and there he finds a strict distinction between what is said about the Son and what is said about all creatures; in the former case, the Son is said simply to have existed; concerning His past, He "was" and nothing else. All the creatures, and all events concerning them, once were not, but came into existence at the will of God. Thus, the Arian, or Arianising statement under discussion is really the same old doctrine all over again, that the Son is a creature. Now, what about the will of God? As the very essence of will is that what is willed is some change or something new, God's will can only arise when an act of creation is in question and always does arise in these cases; therefore once again to say that the Son owed His existence to the will of the Father is the same as saying that once He was not, that He is a creature, etc.

This important principle is already quite clear, and further reference will be made to it later in this section. The quotation of Asterius that Athanasius makes at this point indicates, as Athanasius says himself, that this disjunction is accepted by the Arians, and that this is a formal point on which the two parties agreed. The trouble is that it shows that Asterius and the other Arians had never thought of anything in God higher than His Will.

Continuing (at 452B, beg.), Athanasius now draws out further the contrast with the Logos, Who is already stated to be ontologically, cosmologically, in a sense (if we dare say it) logically, and theologically other than the things that are created through Him: "But He does not take counsel beforehand about His own Logos begotten from Him by nature, (544) for in ( ἐν ) Him the Father makes, in Him frames, the other things, as many as He takes counsel about.... (Jas. 1:18). Therefore the Will of God

(544) τὸν δὲ ἴδιον λογόν ἐστὶν ἑτοῖμον φύσει γεννημένον οὐ προβαλλεσθείν
concerning all things, whether they be born again or brought into being at the first (ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ μεταγενέσθαι), is in His Logos, in (ἐν) Whom He both makes and begets again what seems right to Him...(545)

(I Thess. 5:18). But if the Will is also in Him in Whom He makes, and in Christ is the pleasure (τὸ Θελήμα) of the Father, how can He come into being by will and pleasure? For if He too has come to be....by will, it follows that the will concerning Him consists in some other Logos through whom (οὗ) He also comes to be, for it has been shown that the Will of God is not in (ἐν) the things that come to be, but in (ἐν) Him through Whom (ἐν) and in Whom (ἐν ...) all things made come to be. Next, since it is all one to say, 'by will' and 'there was once when He was not', let them decide to say, 'there was once when He was not, that.... they may understand that to say 'by will' is to place times (Χρόνους ...) before the Son, for counselling precedes things which once were not, as in the case of all creatures. But if the Logos is the Framer of the creatures, and He co-exists with the Father, how can taking counsel precede the Everlasting as if He were not? For if counsel precedes, how are all things through Him (ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινι λόγῳ συνισταμένῳ)? For rather would He be one among all the rest, as He would have been begotten as Son, even as we have come to be as sons by the Logos of truth, and in fine it would be necessary for us to look for another Logos, through Whom He also would have come to be and would have been begotten along with all things, in which God took pleasure (548)

63 If then there is another Logos of God, then let the Son have his...

(545) ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ μεταγενέσθαι — a patent reference to John 3:3, along with II Cor. 5:17.

(546) έν τῷ Λόγῳ δυτοῦ

(547) έν έτέρῳ τινι λόγῳ συνισταμένῳ

(548) καὶ διάκυψθεν μετά πάντων, ὦν ἦθελον ὁ Θεὸς.
origin in a logos (549) but, if there is not, as is the case - whereas all things through Him have come to be - does this not expose... these men?

The first approximation of Athanasius is to say that the Will and Counsel are in the Logos, and therefore He is ontologically and theologically superior to them; this is in accordance with the formula that has become universal, that, e.g. God's plan of salvation is in Christ. However, in his exposition of this, Athanasius goes beyond this point, and we can already see the transition to the view that he finally and definitively presents in the next few chapters. Already we can see his point of departure, which is that the Logos and counsel of God both preceded creation in the same way. The section quoted ends with the well-known argument applied to the Arian dilemma, in the classical way.

Having just rebuked the Arians again ad homines, Athanasius takes the opportunity to complete the picture of their argument, by bringing forth the new point that he had inadvertently failed to mention; at any rate, it was not yet made in such an explicit way before the 340's, although, as we have explained above, a similar disjunction was quite implicit in the Arian talk about the Son being (the alternative being that He was as wood and stone). Let us resume our citation at 453A-B, with Athanasius's rendition of the Arian objection: "Unless He has come to be by will, God would have had a Son by necessity and against His good pleasure." (550) This is actually the old objection that we have mentioned a few lines ago, only here it is applied, not to nature of the Son Himself, but to the act of His generation as an act of the Father. The Arians either were, or affected to be, unable to see any third possibility apart from acts of will and acts externally coerced.

(549) ἔστω καὶ οὗτος Λόγος κέρας
(550) οὐκ οὖν ζωή ἡ καὶ μὴ πολύν ἐκεῖν ὁ Γεν. Βιόν.
This brings Athanasius to the kernel of what he has to say, the distinction between the nature of God and the Will of God (in the sense in which both Athanasius and the Arians understood it, as applying to acts with a definite initiation). We resume our citation at once: "And who is it then who imposes necessity on Him...? For what is contrary to will they see, but what is greater than it and transcends it they do not regard. For as what is beside purpose (τὸ παρὰ τῇ φύσει) is contrary to will, so what is according to nature (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν) transcends and precedes taking counsel. A man by taking counsel (βούλευομένος) builds a house, but begets a son according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν). And what is being built by counsel began to come to being and is external to its maker, but the son is proper offspring of the father's essence, and is not external to him; wherefore he does not take counsel about him, lest he should seem to take counsel about himself. As far then as the Son transcends the creature, does what is by nature transcend the will. And they, on hearing of Him, ought not to measure what is according to nature, by will. However, forgetting that they are hearing about God's Son, they dare to apply human antitheses to God..." Athanasius's solution to the problem is the uncompromising insistence on the primacy of what he termed the Divine φύσιν over the will, a transcendence which applies most definitely even in the case of the will of God. In this, he diverges considerably from the later Church. Newman's notes make this clear: (note on ch. 60): "The 'anteecedens voluntas had been mentioned in Recogn. Clement. For Ptolemy, vide Epiph. Haer. p.215. The Catholics, who allowed that our Lord was θεός, explained it as a συνδρομὸς θεός, and not as a

(551) ἄντικειμένον τῇ βουλήσει
(552) τὸ δὲ μὲν καὶ στερκειμένον
(553) τοῦτον καὶ τῆς βουλήσεως τὸ κατὰ φύσιν.
As Cyril, Trin. ii, p. 56. And with the same meaning St. Ambrose, nec voluntas ante Filium nec potestas, de Fide v, 224. And St. Gregory Nyssen, 'His immediate union, \( \nu \mu \epsilon \tau \sigma \nu \sigma \pi \alpha \nu \varepsilon \iota \alpha \; \sigma \varepsilon \nu \lambda \delta \varepsilon \), does not exclude the Father's will, \( \beta \omega \alpha \kappa \gamma \rho \varepsilon \omicron \omicron \) , nor does the will separate the Son from the Father,' contr. Eunom. vii, p. 296, 7 vide the whole passage. The alternative which these words, \( \sigma \nu \delta \rho \omicron \omicron \) and \( \pi \rho \omicron \eta \rho \omicron \mu \epsilon \mu \epsilon \omicron \nu \) , expressed, was this; whether an act of Divine purpose or will took place before the generation of the Son, or whether both the Will and the Generation were eternal, as the Divine Nature was eternal... (554)

The first major note on ch.62; "Thus he makes the question a nugatory one, as if it did not go to the point, and could not be answered, or might be answered either way, as the case may be. Really, Nature and Will go together in the Divine Being, but in order, as we regard Him, Nature is first, Will second, and the generation belongs to Nature, not to Will. And so supr. Or. I:29, II:2. In like manner, St. Epiphanius, Haer.69:26; vide also Ancor.51; vide also Ambros. de Fide iv.4, vide others, as collected in Petavius, Trin. vi.8, sects. 14-16." The second major note on the same chapter: "Two distinct meanings may be attached to 'by will' ..... either a concurrence or acquiescence, or a positive act. St. Cyril uses it in the former sense, when he calls it \( \sigma \nu \delta \rho \omicron \omicron \) ..... and when he says vide Athanasius infra, that the Father will His own subsistence, \( \Theta \epsilon \lambda \gamma \tau \gamma \zeta \; \varepsilon \sigma \tau \) , but is not what He is from any Will, \( \varepsilon \kappa \beta \omega \alpha \kappa \gamma \rho \varepsilon \omicron \omicron \; \tau \iota \omicron \omicron \) ....

What Athanasius says leads to the conclusion that it does not matter which sense is taken. He does not meet the Arian objection, 'if not by will, therefore by necessity,' by speaking of a concomitant will, or merely saying that the almighty exists or is good, by will, with St. Cyril, but says that 'nature transcends will and necessity also'....(St. Augustine, Trin. 20, prefers) to speak of our Lord rather as voluntas de voluntate,

(554) A reference to Bishop Bull is omitted from our quotation of the note.
than, as Athanasius is led to do, of the will of God." The material collated in these notes patently indicates that the immediate successors, even, of Athanasius, and even more the later Church, in the main attributed the generation of the Son to a modified form of will, as appropriate to God, rather than to the very Nature of God. Why this contrast? Probably a very considerable part of the reason is in terms of the instructive distinction drawn, for example, by Macmurray between the outlook of classical Greek philosophy and the unorthodox Greek mind which arose later in Stoicism and finally became the regulæ ideology of the Roman world. The former mind, which was contemplative and theoretical, corresponded to the heyday of the Greek \( \pi \delta \lambda \iota \varsigma \) in its primary and unsophisticated form, in which a man's actions were un-self-conscious and determined by tradition, or, if we like, nature. The latter corresponded to the uprooting of man from that tight environment into the comparative spiritual void of the Graeco-Roman world, and of necessity it laid great emphasis on the concept of will. We have already noticed the relative kinship of Athanasius to the earlier forms of Greek philosophy, and even his tendency to consider man's sinful state in terms of nature rather than of will; and where he followed Stoicism most in his earlier days, in his natural theology of the Logos, this position became less and less defensible the more he fought the Arians, as we have explained. On the other hand, the Stoical position and tradition was the more influential on the Church as a whole, certainly and especially in the case of the Western Church. Again, in the particular case of the Arian controversy, the Arians had so mangled the notion of the Divine will, and so thoroughly insisted that Will is the sign of a process that is concerned with creaturely entities (is this in fact a Greek position of Macmurray's classical type - the eternal is the unchanging state?) that Athanasius had no choice but to abandon the notion.

(555) See "The Clue to History. pp. 131–144."
of will altogether and concentrate entirely on Nature.

Therefore, for Athanasius, the Nature of God absolutely transcends the Will of God, and the Son is Son by nature. It is quite true that, as Asterius and the other Arians admitted, Will concerns itself with things that are not eternal or not co-eternal with God Himself, but the Nature is what is from the beginning, that is, in the case of God, co-eternal with Himself. This would itself have landed Athanasius in further problems. The very word \( \phi\sigma\tau\varsigma \), like all words from the root \( \phi\nu\cdot \), implied generation from a beginning, and this lies behind even what we would refer to as the fixed and aboriginal nature of a thing. For the same reason there is the close association between \( \phi\sigma\tau\varsigma \) and physical or determinist external law in the modern sense of these terms - the sense which was recognised by the ἀνάγκης φυσικῆς \( \chi\theta\varepsilon\iota\varsigma \) of the Twenty-fifth Anathema of the First Sirmium. And what is worse still, the Physics of Aristotle was a philosophical-physical discussion of the essence and the origin of motion, change of position, and change of state as well. Athanasius appreciates this sort of difficulty when he again raises the question at the end of the passage that we have just quoted, of the analogical character of all theological statements, and it is a pity that he did not make a more thorough statement of the analogical principle as applied to the application to God of the category of Nature. On the basis of what he said before on other topics, Athanasius would have found it quite easy to point out that whereas the nature of created things is of the character mentioned above, the nature of God, God being what He is, is eternal. (Expressions of this sort are scattered throughout Athanasius, but the point is never explicitly made in the context where it is urgently needed). But the point is that for Athanasius it was probably sufficient that Nature was what was aboriginal, as was in accordance with his normal use of the word \( \phi\sigma\tau\varsigma \), and that it was inevitably implied
that the nature of God was absolutely eternal and concerned His eternity purely and simply. (556)

As to the correctness of the doctrine of Athanasius, it is of course absolutely correct in terms of the antithesis that was at stake in the Arian controversy according to which Will is associated with activities in time, a point on which both parties agreed. On this basis, it would be pointless to speak about the absolute unity of Will and Nature in God. On the other hand, if the issue is considered more generally, the statement of classical theology, mentioned by Newman, that in God Nature and Will go together, is certainly correct. It is not only that there can be no question of God willing anything not according to His nature or which is naturally impossible for Him, or of God under compulsion of His nature doing something not according to His will – the Arian Aunt Sally which Athanasius also rejects with alacrity and scorn, expressing to this extent the difference between Nature in God and nature in creatures. One must go further; it is necessary to interpret Nature analogically in such a way as to include the concept of Will, as is necessary in the case of God in His asenity and transcendenteness. (and also vice versa). The same will, as is only too familiar to us, apply to the theological concept of Man as made in the Image of God, with the appropriate limitations. In spite of this, there is much more to be said in favour of Athanasius's method of making Nature the first approximation and, perhaps making later modifications in the direction of Will, than is usually allowed. The author cannot at this stage enter into the well-known controversy between the anthropological determinists and the anthropological existentialists, but he does feel that it would be kerygmatically (and actually) better for the Church to do justice to the former rather than the latter, as the starting point which is contrasted with God's grace. It is possible that many (non-Christian) existentialists are so vocal precisely because the

(556) See above, pp. 79-80, 208-210.
general atmosphere of to-day is determinist (or in a sense physicist) and not existentialist, and they have a sneaking feeling that determinism might be right. This is the same point that we made previously on Athanasius's doctrine of sin and the common criticisms of it. In this respect it is quite true to say that Athanasius has more for the guidance of our own day than his detractors.

(557) P. C. Baur, "Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschenwidung Gottes...", 40ff., severely criticises Athanasius for introducing a dualism between the Will and the Nature of God, on the ground that, on this basis, God would be different after He began to create from what He was before. This criticism is repeated in Bohringer, "Athanasius und Arius...", p. 532: "Gewiss eine Argumentation (i.e. C. Tr. III: 58-67), die nicht ohne ihre Berechtigung ist gegenuber der Einseitigkeit der Ariener, die den Willen von den Wesen Gottes trennten. Es ist aber doch nur das andere Extrem, wenn Athanasius das Wesen Gottes von Willen trennt... (especially since both must go together in salvation)." Baur, unfortunately for himself, gives the show away, and unwittingly vindicates Athanasius, when he concludes, loc. cit. p. 408, that one cannot escape making the world co-eternal with God, which is apparently meant not as an absurd deduction from an Athanasian position that is being shown to be impossible, but the position that he desires to prove; "Ist Gott der Unendliche, so kann auch die Abhängigkeit der Welt von Gott nur eine unendliche sein." The point is that, on the basis on which the Arian controversy was conducted, the question of a real dualism between Will and Nature simply cannot arise. It is Athanasius who is logical and consistent, and the Arians who are the intellectual prestidigitators. The Arian position depends on the principle that will, by definition so to speak, is concerned with what was not eternal but which came to be, and therefore was creaturely; thus, for a thing to exist by the will of God means that it is a creature. On this basis, a Will in God that is in every respect co-eternal with the Persons or with the Godhead would have to be considered primarily as being in the Nature of God, within the meaning of these concepts as they were used by Athanasius, and also by the Arians insofar as they were intelligible and consistent. The real dualism is the Arian idea that the concept of Will, so defined and exploited — was the highest possible thing in God. It is this fallacy that would really make the world co-eternal with God, or shatter His Godhead. This is essentially the same misuse and abuse of arguments in connection with personality that we noticed above, pp. 419-20 and 459-64, and in both cases the final casualty of such theology — speaking subjectively and not objectively! — is, not the Deity of the Son, but the Godhead of God Himself. If it is rejoined that there must be Will in the very Nature of God, the answer is simple; that we must make a distinction between the Voluntas ad Extra and the Voluntas (or Voluntates) ad Intra Trinitatis, analogous to the well-known distinction, "Opera ad Intra Trinitatis sunt divisa, Opera ad Extra Trinitatis sunt indivisa." In addition the Voluntates, besides being divided though absolutely alike, are eternal; the Voluntas ad Extra, like the Opera ad Extra, are not eternal, not co-eternal, or only subordinately eternal (to satisfy Karl Barth, Vol. II, Pt. II of the Church Dogmatics), in relation to the Voluntates ad Intra.
At this stage (4530), Athanastus gives the argument another twist: "The fact that God is good and merciful, does this attach to God by will, or not by will? If it is by will, we must consider that He began to be good, and that it is admissible for Him not to be good. For to take counsel and to choose involves an inclination in both directions, and this is an affection (πλοὶ) of rational nature. But if, on account of the absurdity that follows from these, His goodness and mercy are not from will, let them listen to what they have been saying, 'Therefore by necessity and not at His pleasure He is good.' And who is it that imposes necessity on Him? But if it is unseemly to speak of necessity in case of God, and therefore it is by nature (φύτευ) that He is good, much more and much more truly would He be Father of the Son by nature and not by will.

In this passage, Athanasius extends this principle to God's goodness itself, and it must be admitted that in the light of the Arian use of will it was inevitable; God is good by His very nature and not by will, as even Augustine saw, in spite of his greater emphasis on will than we find in Athanasius; non posse peccare (to be good by nature) was, for Augustine, a higher state than posse non peccare (in other words, to be able to will not to sin). Athanasius ends by affirming that if this applies even to the goodness of God, a fortiori it applies to His begetting of a son. This seems strange to us in our days of birth control and planned parenthood; it would not have been as strange to his own age. On the other hand it is questionable how it would have seemed to the Arians,
as they themselves, in their arguments about the Son being ἐξ ὑμῶν emphasized particularly the association of the will with goodness. At any rate for his day, Athanasius has made another strong argument in favour of the use of the concept of nature as against will, by venturing into the Divine attributes.

63 Athanasius now, at the beginning of a new chapter, repeats the argument that the Father could not have had His origin by will; therefore "it is against reason to entertain such thoughts about the Logos of God." (456B). Again, Athanasius repeats the old principle that for God to take counsel about the origination of the Second Person would imply that once He was Λόγος, absurd, and wisdomless. These substantial repetitions of his previous positions leads Athanasius to his final point in this section: (456C, end) "For being the proper Logos of the Father, He does not allow us to reckon on any will before Him, since He Himself is the Father's Living Counsel (βούλης σῶς), and Power, and Former of all things which seemed good to the Father. And this is what He said of Himself in the Proverbs, (8:14) 'Counsel (βούλης) is mine and security (δομήκλεια), mine is understanding (φρονήσεως) and mine is strength (τοξωτός).'' For as, although Himself the Understanding in which He prepared the heavens, and Himself 'Strength and Power' (for Christ is 'God's Power and God's Wisdom' (I Cor. 1:24)), He here has altered the terms (παρακλήσις) and said: 'Mine is understanding,' and 'Mine is strength,' so, while He says, 'Mine is counsel,' He must Himself be the living Counsel of the Father; as we have learned from the Prophet also, that He becomes 'angel of Great Counsel', and was called the Good Pleasure (Θεημα) of the Father. For thus we must refute them, using human illustrations (ἐνθραυσμοῦ) concerning God.

(562) Οὐκ ἐν προ ἐνυτὸν λογίον τινά φούλην.
Athanasius now repeats again the distinction between the Logos and created things that came to be by will, and also repeats the illogical and polytheistic consequences (the \( \tau \pi \tau \rho \sigma \) again) of having to assume another Logos in whom the Logos was created. He continues: (460A,beg.) "For if will precedes in the Father, the Son's words are not true, 'I in the Father', or even if He is in the Father, yet He would but hold second place, and it would not become Him to say, 'I in the Father', since will was before Him, in which all things were brought into being and He Himself subsisted ( \( \gamma \iota \pi \varepsilon \varepsilon \omicron \gamma \eta \) ), according to you.....

Moreover, if they say that the Son is by will, they should also say that He came to be by understanding ( \( \phi \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \nu \iota \omicron \varepsilon \) ), for I consider understanding and will to be the same. For whatever a man takes counsel about, he also has understanding about it; and what he understands, he also takes counsel about it. Certainly the Saviour Himself linked them together by analogy, as cognate expressions, when He said, 'Counsel is mine and security; mine is understanding, and mine strength.' For as strength and security are the same..., so we may say that understanding and counsel are the same, viz. the Lord. But the impious men are unwilling that the Son should be Logos and Living Counsel, but they make a myth concerning God of an understanding and counsel and wisdom which comes and goes in human fashion like a habit ( \( \varepsilon \xi \varepsilon \iota \omicron \) )....Let everyone rather trust to Solomon, who says that the Logos is Wisdom and Understanding... (Prov.3:19, Ps. 33:6, 135:6, I Thess. 5:18)...The Son of God then is Himself the Logos and the Wisdom, He is the Understanding and Living Counsel, and in Him is 'the good pleasure of the Father'; He is the Truth and Light and Power of the Father. But if the Will of God is Wisdom and Understanding, and the Son is Wisdom, he who says that the Son is by will says virtually that Wisdom has come to be in wisdom, and the Son is made
in a son, and the Logos created through a logos, which is incompatible with God and opposed to the Scriptures."

There is little to be said about this climax of these few final chapters; Athanasius, by juxtaposition of Scripture passages, shows the identity of all the titles, Logos, Wisdom, Living Counsel, Understanding, Will, etc.; they all must refer to the identical entity, the Second Person. Therefore, the Son must not only contain all these, as Athanasius said before, He must be all these. This is Athanasius's final position. On the basis of what we have already seen of Athanasian theology, this is reasonable and correct, and is in fact only an extension and corollary of the old principle that the Son is actually the Wisdom of God in the simplest and strictest sense. We have already discussed this matter fully, and as exactly the same applies in one case as the other, no further study is required.

The next portion of this chapter (464A, past middle), merits a special note on account of its relevance to the later Trinitarian terminology: "For the Apostle proclaims the Son to be the proper Radiance and Expression not of will, but of the Father's Essence Itself, saying, (Heb. 1:3) 'Who being the Radiance of His Glory and the Expression of His Subsistence (Σποστήσας). But if, as we have said before, the Father's Essence and Subsistence be not from will, it is very plain that what is proper to the Father's Subsistence is not from will either, for the Proper Offspring from that Blessed Subsistence must

(563) See above, pp. 846-56.
(564) "Ιδιον διάφορος και χαρακτήρα.
(565) Η ομοιότης τῆς πατρικῆς ουσίας.
(566) Η πατρικὴ οὐσία καὶ ευπορίας.
(567) Το Ιδιον τῆς πατρικῆς ευπορίας.
be such as it and in the same way as it. **Newman's note is as follows:**

> "Οὐσία and ἐπιστάσις are in these passages made synonymous... εὐποίασις might have been expected too in the discussion in the beginning of Orat. III did Athanasius distinguish between them. It is remarkable how seldom it occurs at all in these orations, except in the sense of Heb. 1:3...." We have not in fact been able to find a single instance which was not directly provoked by this verse, and where it does not have the meaning of Heb. 1:3. **(569)** that is, as we have already said, that of "object" in the sense in which this latter word is used in optics, in correlative contrast to "image". This shows that Athanasius was not familiar with the Western use of the word, Tertullian's substantia. We may disagree slightly with Newman and maintain that for Athanasius Οὐσία and ἐπιστάσις are not simple synonyms, but that this relationship is derived, by an easily demonstrable process, from the original disparate meanings. For if the descriptions of Offspring from Essence (Οὐσία) and Image or Character of the Underlying

(569) Müller lists only 12 uses of this word in the whole of the orations, I:9:29A, 20:53B & C, II:52:216B, 33:217B ter, III:1:324A, 65:461B ter, 66:461C. The last three references have just been cited, and, although they are not exactly in the form of Heb. 1:3, their dependence on it is directly indicated by the context. The same applies, at one remove, to the almost adjacent reference, III:66:461C, which we shall cite in the next chapter. All the other references are in the form of Heb. 1:3, except III:1:324A, where it is said that the Arians do not know what is ὡρίδις ἐπιστάσις καὶ Ἱδίκης ῥωματικος καὶ Εἰκών ῥωματικος. The third element is a repetition of the second. Since the parallels are True Father - True Son, and Light - Radiance respectively, this instance is also patently dependent on Heb. 1:3.

For further information, see pp.78, 208, and 324. It is completely lacking in the "De Incarnatione", and, apart from three instances in the "Contra Gentes" which describe the substantiality that Athanasius is denying to evil, the scanty occurrences listed on p.324 are a complete list up till the "Contra Arianos". In the later theological works before 362 that we are treating, there are only four other uses, three from "De Synodis" 33-54 that refer to Arian heretical uses, and one from Ad Serap. I that is also in the form of Heb. 1:3. We shall further consider the matter in our general résumé of the theology of the Orations.
Object (ἐποτόμος) are both used for the relation of Son to Father, the words in question must be, in this context, theologically analogous and virtually synonymous, if both are used. It is Athanasius's use here of the Image metaphor that makes these words synonymous in this case.

The final sentence of ch. 65 is: "And accordingly the Father Himself has said, not, 'This is the Son originated at My will,' nor, 'The Son whom I have by my Favour (Καὶ Ἐξοθικεῖν),' but simply, 'My Son,' and more than that, 'in Whom I am well pleased,' meaning by this, 'This is the Son by nature (ὁυόσε'),' and, 'In Him is lodged My will about what pleases Me.' This is an expression of the usual tendency of Athanasius insofar as he would treat God's pleasure and will, insofar as it concerned created things, as being in Christ in a way analogous to the Humanity of Christ, according to the position that has been so fully enunciated before. However, Athanasius is finally brought up against the question of what is God's eternal Good Pleasure in the Son as God, and with this we conclude our study.

66 "Since then the Son is by nature (ὁυόσε') and not by will, is He without the pleasure of the Father and not with the Father's will? No, verily, but the Son is with the pleasure of the Father, (570) and as He Himself says, 'The Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him all things.' For as He did not begin to be good 'from will,' nor yet is good without will or pleasure (571) - for what He is that is also His pleasure (θελητῶν). - the Son should be likewise; even though He did not begin from will, it does not come to Him either unwillingly or against His purpose. (572) For

(570) Θελητῶν ἐστιν ὁ Γιός παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ.
(571) οὐκ ἤσπευδότατο καὶ ἡθοπεσιν
(572) εἰ καί μη ἐκ βουλήσεως ἡρεμάτο, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἡθοπεσιν, οὔτε παρὰ ἐκνήμην ἐστίν/αὕτη.
as He takes pleasure in His own Subsistence, so also the Son being proper to His Essence, is not without His pleasure. Be then the Son the object of the Father's pleasure and love, and let everyone religiously take account of the fact that God takes pleasure and is not unwilling. For by that good pleasure whereby the Son is the object of the Father's good pleasure, He loves, enjoys, and honours the Father, and one is the good pleasure which is from (EK) the Father in the Son, so that here too the Son may be contemplated in the Father and the Father in the Son." Athanasius then repeats what he said before against the notion of an antecedent will in God before the Son, and about the very Divine attributes being by nature and not by will. He concludes, (464B, middle): "To say, 'The Father's good pleasure is in the Son,' and 'The good pleasure of the Logos is in the Father,' implies, not a precedent will, but genuineness and propriety of nature, and propriety and likeness of essence. For as in the case of the radiance and light one might say that there is no will preceding the radiance in the light, but it is its natural (φύσε) offspring enjoyed by the light that also begat it not in will and consideration but by nature and truth, one might rightly say that the Father loves and enjoys the Son, and the Son loves and enjoys the Father."
In this passage, Athanasius goes much of the way towards interpreting Nature analogically in such a way as to do justice to will and Good Pleasure, as we have suggested should be done. Here however, Nature remains the primary concept, and Athanasius actually says that will and good pleasure indicate Nature in God, in the case concerning the generation of the Son. Again, there is expressed, for the first time clearly a doctrine of the mutual love of God the Father and God the Son, almost in Augustinian terms, although Athanasius was very far from taking Augustine's step of relating this to the Spirit and the Procession. In fact, the processional statement that Athanasius makes, that the good pleasure from the Father in the Son is one, in which both relations of mutual love take place, would definitely follow the Greek Procession, if one were to bring the Spirit in. Indeed, there is no mention of the Spirit in this section. But it is unfortunately on an equivocal note that we must close our detailed study of the Orations against the Arians. This is inevitable, as a great theologian will not avoid bringing himself up against all sorts of fresh problems.

Athanasius has at last been compelled to face the issue, in considerable detail, of the mutual love of Father and Son, with all that it implies. There have already been a few stray references to this, which present the same position as is being presented now. The position in question is that the Divine Love in its essential, original, intra-Trinitarian form, is intimately related to the status of the Son as Co-essential Offspring of the Father, and, as we have explained before, this is essentially a Narcissistic version of what love is (in a most apt sense!)

The status of the Son as Co-essential Offspring, for which Athanasius, in marked disagreement even with such an intimate friend as his successor

(581) See Augustine, "De Trinitate," XV:19:37
Basil of Caesarea, did not shun the use of a neuter noun \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \eta \nu \) is so much the primary notion for Athanasius that this criticism may be justly made. That is, the Intra-Trinitarian relation is constituted by co-essential begetting, and love is a corollary of this, as distinct from the view that it is constituted by love itself. Now the effect of this is that in spite of the vocabulary, -- the basic word is \( \Theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \), to take pleasure in, passim, \( \lambda \gamma \alpha \pi \alpha \nu \) and \( \varphi \iota \lambda \varepsilon \nu \) being each used only once, the whole atmosphere of the passage is far more closely related to Philia than to Agape, as is usually understood, and, if we were prepared to interpret the third famous word in optimam partem, it would be even closer still to Eros. Unfortunately, the question is not purely academic, but we shall have to reserve further discussion till the general resume.

67 In the concluding chapter, Athanasius repeats and summarises the point that the Son is the Will of the Father, and not a creature of will. He animadverts again on the infamous Arian questioning of people in the market-place, and suggests that it would have been right to question, not the mothers but the fathers, as to whether their children are not really begotten of their very nature or are not like them. There follows a last call for faith, and the concluding sentences refer again to the vanity of Arianism: "What pretexts then, and whence, will they be able to find next, unless they borrow blasphemies of Jews and Caiaphas, and take atheism from Gentiles? For the Divine Scriptures are closed to them, and from every part of them they are refuted as insensate and Christ's enemies." (Conclusion of Orat.III). As we have the text, there is no Doxology.

The following is the lexicographical analysis of the last

(583) See Newman's note on De Decr. 21.
section of the "Contra Arianos" I-III. **Logos: Origin of the L.:**  
61:452B (He does not take prior counsel concerning His Proper L. generated from Him ἕνα τινέ.). **L. of the F.:** 59:448B (F. reveals His own L. from Heaven - Mt. 3:17), 63:456C (He being Proper L. of the F. does not permit us to think of antecedent will), 65:460C (Heretics say Son not Proper L. of F. but creature). **L. of God:** 60:448C (no will precedent to L. of G.), 62:453A (Heretics say that L. of G. was not before His generation), 63:456C (Is it not unreasonable to think such things ong. L. of God?). **Perfect and Immutable Equality of L. & F.:** 63:456C (God has His own L. not by will but φύτος), 64:457B (L. is F.'s βουλή καὶ βούλημα), 67:464C (L. is in heart of F.), 67:465A (nothing in F. before L.). **Common virtues, perfections &c.:** 60:448C (Scripture tells us of the Being of the L., but never by will), 61:452B (in L. is Will of the F. concerning all things), 67:465A (in L. is Will of F.), 63:456C (sufficient to know and understand name of L.), 65:460C (L. is Wdm. and Understanding), 66:464B (to say F. takes pleasure in S. & L. takes pleasure in F., means not antecedent will but φύσις ἀνεξοότητα καὶ ὑποτασσὴ ἰδιότητα καὶ εἰσοβλητικα), 66:464B alterum (Let none intrude between only F. and only L.), **Work in Creation:** 61:452C (through L.), 65:460C (in the L.). **Heresy (as usual): Logos diff. from S. or only S. conceptually:** 65:460B (Ans. will not have it that Son is L. & Living Counsel). **L. not sole Creator:** 61:453A (Rather would He by will be begotten a son...as we made sons by L. of truth), 61:453A alterum (we would have to look for another L.), 62:453A bis (If there be another L. of G. let Him be originated Λόγῳ), 64:457C (Let them fashion another L.), 65:461A (2 expls.) (that L. is created through the L.). **L. creature at will of F.:** 60:449A (Ans. want Will & Counsel to precede L.), 63:456B (they dare such things ong. L.), 63:456C (they say that F. wills in order to have L. & Wisdom), 64:461A (Will before L.), 67:465A (2 expls.) (L. came to be ἐν Λόγῳ).
Of these 34 examples, 24 are in Group I, 9 in Group II, and one in Group VII, there being almost no Incarnational material in this section.

\[\gamma\iota\omega\zeta\] Son: Son-Logos (included under other heads under Logos): 65:460B (Heretics unwilling that S. be L. & Living Counsel).

Intimate Connection between F. & S.: Generation of Son: Simply Expressed (True, Genuine, From the F., &c.): 62:456A (God is F. of S. and not by will), 66:461C (Son exists Φύσει and not by will), 66:461C alterum (the Being of the S. is neither from will nor against will), 67:465B (let them stop asking women about the S. of G.).

Origin otherwise explained: 63:456C (S. is ημών οὐσίας γεννημα, not by will), 66:461C (S. is γεννημα ημών οὐσίας, same nature, unity of relation, &c.): 61:449A (We find "was" of the Son), 62:453B (As Son greater than creatures, so what is by n. greater than will), 66:461C (Let S. be "pleased" and loved by F.), 66:464A (S. loves F. with same good pleasure with which He is pleased by F.), 66:464A alterum et tertium et quartum (3 expls.) (one is the good pleasure from the F. in the S., so that from this the S. can be seen in the F., and the F. in the S.), 66:464A quintum (one would be mad to place Will and Examination between F. & S.), 66:464A sextum (It is different to say, He has come to be by will, from saying that F. loves and pleasures S. Who is proper Φύσει), 66:464B (To say, F. pleasures S. and L. pleasures F. means, not antecedent will, but \(\phi\upsilon\omega\sigma\varsigma\ \gamma\nu\eta\sigma\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\ k\iota\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\ k\iota\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\ \delta\mu\omicron\omega\omicron\omicron\), 66:464C (3 expls.) (One would rightly say conq. F. & S. "F. loves and pleasures S.," and "S. loves and pleasures F."), 67:464C (S. in F.), 67:465A (S. is the Father's All), Being S. of H., is and remains S. of G.:

(584) Here as elsewhere occasionally we have had to alter Muller's classification where it is erroneous, or cumbersome by reason of scarcity of material.

(585) For convenience we have coined this to translate \(\Theta\epsilon\\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu\), transitive.
65:461B (Matt. 3:17 virtually means, "My Son υἱός"). Words attributed to Christ: 64:460A (If Will precedes Him, S.'s words "I in the F." are not true), 65:461B (S. proclaims (586) that He is Radiance and Χαράκηρος of the πατρικὴ υοῦς Itsself).

Heretical uses (as usual): Usual Arian designations: 59:443A (To say that S. has come to be by will is equivalent of "ex nihilo" &c.), 60:449C (S. one of all ἐφέγγυαται), 62:453C (deny that S. is true), 64:457C (Creature + ex nihilo), 65:460C (Separate S. from F.), 67:468A (reject Him as S. of G.). Not eternal: 61:452C ("By will" means time before Son), 66:464B (Ar. contention means that F. might not have willed S.), 66:464B alterum (To say of the S. "He might not have been...").

Son equal to or less than us in nature (Here normally refers to the doctrine of Son's origination by will): 59:445C (S. made by F. at will and good pleasure), 59:448A (He who says, "S. has come to be by will..."), 61:453A (Let Him rather be begotten as the Son, as we...), 62:453B (If God has not the S. by will, it is by necessity and without will of F.), 62:453C (Forgetting that they are hearing about God's Son, apply human antitheses), 65:460B (S. is by will of F.), 65:461A (3 expls.) (He who says S. is by will, virtually says S. made in a son), 65:461B (2 expls.) (Matt. 3:17 does not mean, "This is the S. that has come to be from My will," or, "the S. whom I have by my favour"), 66:461C (Even if Arian position denied, does S. exist, the F. not willing it?), 67:464C (Call not the S. a δημιουργός of will), 67:465A (2 expls.) (on Arian reasoning the S. would come to be in a son). As might be expected, Group I predominates overwhelmingly, accounting for 45 out of the total of 49 cases. Two are Group II, and one each in Groups VI and VII.

(586) In Heb. 1:3. Therefore classified in Group VII as Apostolic Witness.
Essence, is again rather rare, too rare for Muller's classification to be relevant: 62:453B (Any son is proper offspring of his father's E.), 63:456C (S. is φύος, ἡ οὐσίας γέννυμα of F. and not from will), 63:456C alterum (F. would seem to be counselling about Himself if He counselled about τοῦ ἰδίου τῆς οὐσίας Εὐαντία). 65:461A (S. is Radiance and Character τῆς πατρίκης οὐσίας Itself), 65:461B (η πατρίκην οὐσία and Hypostasis is not from will), 66:461C (S. is proper to His E. and not against the will of the F.), 66:464B (To say, "Father pleasures the S." does not mean antecedent will but φύος, γνησίωτά καὶ οὐσίας ἰδίοτη καὶ διοικητή), 66:464B (To say that "God might not have willed the S." reaches right to the E. of the F.), 67:465A (Are your children like your οὐσίας καὶ φύος). Of these nine instances, three are in Group I, two in Group II, three in Group III, one in Group IV, and, unusually, none in Group V.

Φύος, Nature again, is much commoner: Divine Nature: 62:456A and 66:464B (each, God is good φύος, opp. by will). Nature one and common to both F. and S.: 61:458B (Does not take prior counsel eno. His proper L. generated φύος from Him), 62:456A (How much more and more truly God is F. of S. φύος and not by will), 63:456C (God does not have His own L. by will but φύος), 63:456C alterum (Son is φύος τῆς οὐσίας ἰδίον γέννυμα), 65:461B (Mt.3:17 = This is My Son φύος), 66:461C (Son is φύος and not from will), 66:464A (Son is proper φύος), 66:464C bis (each. Radiance begotten from light φύος), 67:464C (Truly φύος Offspring). Relation between F. & S. ineffable and peculiar to Divine n.: 66:464B (God is γέννητι καὶ τῇ φύος), 66:464B alterum (To say that F. has pleasure in Son, means not antecedent will, but φύος, γνησίωτά and propriety and likeness of essence). Hereetics deny true human n.:
67:465A (Do you not become fathers ἐν τῇ φύσει, καὶ τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ), 67:465A alterum (Are your children not like your φύσεις καὶ οὐσίαις), 67:465B (even in general, generation is proper τῇ φύσει, and in truth). Nature of visible things &c.; 60:449A (ἡ φύσει, once were not), 62:453C (to will and choose is λογικὴς φύσεως πάθος). Katὰ φύσιν as opposed to Katὰ βουλήσιν, etc.: 62:453B (τὸ Katὰ φύσιν is greater than will), 62:453B alterum (a man builds house, willing it, but generates ἀληθῶς), 62:453C (As much as Son is greater than creatures, so Katὰ φύσιν greater than will), 62:453C alterum (one should not measure τὸ ἀληθῶς by will).

Of these 24 instances, none are noun forms concerning the Divine nature, 4 are similar forms referring to human or other creaturely nature, and 20 are adverbial forms; we have included the forms of the type τὸ Katὰ φύσιν in the last group.

There are only two references to the Humanity of Christ in the Christological sense; 67:465C (even if you do not believe on account of the περὶ βούλησιν τῷ σώματι), and 67:465B (the Arians ἀπόταξαν τὴν ὑπομνήματα against the Godhead - i.e. bring up arguments from the Humanity of Christ).

This is the conclusion of the Third Oration against the Arians. Was there another, and if so, what was it? Was it ever written, or perhaps planned but never written? There is one thing that is quite certain, and that is that the real fourth oration, whatever it was, was not the work that we now know under that title. As we shall see in the Appendices, the "Fourth Oration", whether it is Athanasian or not, cannot be the fourth member of a series whose first three members are Orations I-III. The question is, was there in fact even a fourth Oration? To take the
external evidence first, it is extremely discordant, but it is agreed in all MSS that the Orations I-III are part of a group comprising more than three anti-Arian works. The number may be four, five — as in Photius's "Pentabiblisos" — or even six. The most constant additional member, apart from the "Fourth Oration", is the Epistle to the Bishops of Egypt and Libya, which is certainly even less a member of the series than the "Fourth Oration". Some people regard it as a sort of prologue, placing it first. The dubious De Incarnatione et Contra Arianos is occasionally included also. The former work cannot be placed first, on the chronology that we have provisionally adopted, as it was certainly written in 357. There is nothing more definite than these points, but the evidence from tradition, on the whole (including the ascription of the "Fourth Oration") supports at least a strong tradition that there were more than three works — it is fairly unanimous on this point — and if anything favours the number four.

The internal evidence does not give any sort of indication that there is anything more, in the sense of definite cross-references or promises, but the absence of a doxology at the end of the Third Oration is highly significant; also, the last chapter and its ending is more like the ending of a single Oration than the ending of the whole series — although remarks like this are subjective, speculative and doubtful.

Against this may be said, firstly, that the external evidence is so uncertain that very little can be derived from it, and, in view of the notorious rationalistic streak in contemporary thought (Irenaeus's argument for the Four Gospels on the analogy of the four cardinal points of the compass is a celebrated case), the tradition that there were Four

(587) See above pp. 3-4 and 325.

(588) See above, pp. 242-244.

Orations may have had nothing to do with the bare facts at all. To put it bluntly, there were Four Gospels; therefore, the works in which Athanasius so definitively conquers the dangerous heresy of Arianism must be four in number too. Also, Athanasius may have intended to discuss other matters - assuming that chs. 58-67 of the Third Oration are in their correct place, and are really part of the Orations which indeed they are - but decided that, once he had so finally and definitively established the distinction between what God is or does by nature and what He does by will, this was in fact the appropriate climax and termination of his great work. In this case, we should have to assume that the final chapter or final doxology was lost. On the chronology that we have adopted, the Third Oration would have been written just before the storm burst on Athanasius in February 356, and the difficulties of preserving books against an extremely hostile censorship could have resulted in the loss of the doxology, or the hurried issue of the Third Oration without it. Of course, it goes without saying that for the same reason much more than a doxology could have been lost. These arguments are even more uncertain than those on the other side, and the weight of evidence favours the assumption that something more was written or at least planned by Athanasius.

Let us now reconstruct, if possible, the missing Fourth Oration. Athanasius finished a long time before, half way through the First Oration, his general discussion of the fundamental principles, and as we have said, he had probably completed his planned exposition of contentious Scriptural passages. If we were to take Orat. III:58 at its face value, this would be conclusive evidence, and the internal evidence from the exegetical sections would be highly suggestive even if we could not. Thus, at first

(530) See the whole of Chapter II above, and especially pp. 312-13 for arguments why it was unlikely that Orations II-III were written after February, 356.
sight, the Fourth Oration, as written or planned, would have begun with further points which the Arians had brought up since the controversy proper started, like their statement about the Son's "coming-to-be at the will of the Father". The author has examined the Arian or Arianising Creeds in the De Synodis and elsewhere, and cannot see anything else which he is certain would justify similar treatment, which, that is, had not been treated with perfect adequacy in the earlier stages of the Contra Arianos, but it would be unwise to put one's own judgment against Athanasius' s. This refers of course to specific credal statements. One thing, however, that would have been well worth further study would have been the tendency of the anti-Nicenes to apparently vindicate their orthodoxy and obfuscate the issue by torrential denunciations of Sabellianism and especially of Marcellus of Ancyra and Photinus. This is the clearest feature of the Arianising and the anti-Athanasian creeds between 335 and 359, especially in the 340's. This would have been a genuine new issue, and it would have been worth while for Athanasius to have discussed further where he and his theology stood on these issues. (591) And there is one good candidate for inclusion in the hypothetical reconstruction of the Fourth Oration - Athanasius's last word on what is notoriously missing in the other three, the Homoousion. Now that he has so thoroughly prepared his way, from basic general principles and especially Scripture, it would at last be time to give his final justification for the great Nicene principle.

It is not irrelevant that Athanasius's later Second Letter to Serapion on the Holy Spirit, which in spite of its title is virtually a summary of the "Contra Arianos", includes the Homoousion, firmly integrated with the rest of the summary. The certainty that Athanasius would have had to deal with the question of Sabellianism or Sabellianising would account for the ease

(591) This is the aspect of the middle section, ch. 21-32, emphasised in Newman's notes.
with which what we know as the Fourth Oration became accepted as such, as there would have been a strong tradition that the missing work dealt with these topics; the Fourth Oration is best regarded as an anti-Sabellian or anti-Marcellan work with anti-Arian interpolations.

Now, an interesting fact emerges from this hypothetical reconstruction, insofar as it has any significance at all and is not merely auto-suggestion. That is, that the Fourth Oration would be a complete duplicate of the body of the De Synodus, that is chs. 21-53 inclusive. Or more accurately, that Athanasius would have done, with the perfect ease and calm assurance and clarity of argumentation that we find in the Oration what he did, comparatively clumsily and hurriedly, in the De Synodus; even the great section on the Homoousion is below the standard of the Orations in these respects. This would suggest that the Fourth Oration was planned, but never written in its intended form, or, alternatively, that it was written and lost or destroyed, and that Athanasius knew it. This is pure speculation, although it is an interesting question, in connection with the Epistles to Serapion, when the section on the Homoousion first saw the light.

A little examination shows that some hypothesis such as this is the only reasonable explanation of the absence of the Homoousion from the first three Orations, which is complete apart from the formal mention in 1:9 at the beginning of a brief summary of the orthodox theology. The usual opinion has been (with the acceptance of anything like the chronology that we have adopted), that this was due to Athanasius's theological tact in dealing with the new situation caused by the rise of the Semi-Arians, who reacted strongly from the excesses of the Neo-Arian extremists, but could

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(592) See, for what precedes and follows, the sections on the dating of the Orations, Ch.II passim, and above pp. 35–6 and 204–5 for Loofs's dating of the Orations at c.356. Also the sections on the Homoousion, pp. 629–40, 1314–18.

and also the whole of Ch.IX below.
not take the Homoousion. On the other hand, our findings are almost entirely inconsistent with this usually accepted hypothesis. In the first place, it seems to depend on the Benedictine dating of the Orations during the Third Exile, about 358, since the Semi-Arians defined their position at the Synod of Ancyra at Easter of that year. Our dating, between 351 and 356 and no later, would make this much less likely although not quite impossible. The theological position that later crystallised into Semi-Arianism was always present, of course, and if Athanasius had had less cause to attend to it as a matter of urgency as he had in 358, he would have had less cause to be careful or "tactful"; certainly no more than when he wrote the "De Decretis" a little earlier, in which the Homoousion is the climax. And this brings us to the other point, that when Athanasius has to deal with Basil of Ancyra and the rest, in the "De Synodis", which is, be it remembered, a genuine work of the Exile, he does so, as we shall show later, without any significant change whatever in his interpretation of the Homoousion. Any concessions that he may have made to the Semi-Arian theology here were changes that had already come about in the "De Decretis" (taking, for the sake of argument, the position of Eustathius of Antioch and Marcellus of Ancyra as the point of reference). Athanasius's fraternal greeting to Basil of Ancyra is really a very solemn, if still fraternal, warning that he cannot fight on two fronts in this case, and that, even on his own principles, he has business to be anything but a Nicene.

The probable plan of Athanasius thus, was as follows. It would

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(594) See above, Ch.II, especially, pp.308-15; most especially p.315.

(595) See De Syn. 41 and below, pp.1121-4.
be well if the Homoousion were immediately acceptable. But for various reasons it was not, as it had a Sabellian interpretation. Therefore, he could only begin to argue for it after all the evidence was in, and he had exhaustively prepared his way by considering the whole subject in great detail from first principles. Now, to put the thing in terms of concise formulae along the lines of the Synod of Ancyra on one hand and De Synodis 41 on the other, Athanasius in the process established a large range of formulae, usually connected with Οὐσία, which must be correct from first principles (which meant supremely Scripture), in the sense that the denial of any of them would lead to Arianism of the most blatant type. These would be, say, ίδιος τοῦ Πατρός, εἰκ νοῦ Πατρός, εἰκ τῆς τοῦ Πατρός Οὐσίας, γεννημένος, ίδιος τῆς Οὐσίας, ομοίος κατὰ πάντα, φύσει or ἐκ Θεοῦ Υἱός, etc. All these occur commonly throughout the Orations, alone or in combination, and the resultant combinations are too numerous to mention. If these words have their proper meaning, as distinct from being merely honorific, they would still have to be accepted substantially by the old "Conservatives", since the denial of the Εἰκ τῆς Οὐσίας would mean that there was no distinction between Him and ourselves who are also Εἰκ Θεοῦ in the sense of Acts 17:28, and a similar result would follow with an attempted denial of ομοίος κατὰ πάντα, to choose the two which the Synod of Ancyra actually accepted and which Athanasius found quite enough for this purpose in De Syn. 41 (597). But, as Athanasius shows in the last mentioned place, these

(596) See all the lexicographic analyses of the Orations, above, pp. 730-1, 860-6, 867-8, 929-31, 987, 1021, 1053 and below, pp. 1077-8.

(597) In that case, what becomes of the argument of Harnack that the omission of the Εἰκ τῆς Οὐσίας in the Nicaean-Constantinopolitan Creed of 381 is evidence of a move towards Semi-Arianism, and that the Homoousion, which is present, is to be interpreted as purely generic likeness. (See Hist. Dogm. Vol. IV, p. 98, E.T., with references). Surely, the Εἰκ τῆς Οὐσίας was the very thing that could be accepted, even if the Homoousion could not be, by a Semi-Arian who regarded Arianism as his chief enemy, like apparently Basil of Ancyra, and ex hypothesi, Constantinople.
terms in combination all imply the Homoousion, once the Sabellian, Samosatene, and other objectionable interpretations are rejected. Athanasius vindicated the Homoousion in this way in the "De Synodis", and his treatment of it in "De Decretis" can, with very little straining, be held to be the same. Therefore, it is highly probable that Athanasius intended the same as part of the Orations, that is, a vindication of the Homoousion that was not authoritarian, but based on its correctness on first principles.

In our resume of the theology of Athanasius, we shall of course follow our usual schema, commencing with the general basic prolegomena to theology, continuing with the actual Trinitarian theology that is developed on the basis of the prolegomena, and concluding with the effects of the development of the Trinitarian theology on the other topics. We shall take note of the Athanasian position here, even where there is no change from earlier theology, since the Orations are the definitive source in Athanasius of the theology of the Son. On the other hand, in many places, there will be no more than reference to certain principles which are treated more exhaustively in the general summary; this method has been adopted precisely because of the size and complexity of the Orations, which means that certain elements of theology tend more to be localised in certain places and to be quite separated from other elements.

To begin with the prolegomena. We can comment straight away on two absentees, the pragmatist principle and authoritarianism. The former argument is of course present, but was introduced at only a very late stage in the Orations, momentarily in II:41:233A-B, and definitively only in II:69-70. The latter is present in a few scattered places.

(598) See above, pp. 534-9., for a summary of previous views on these topics.

(599) See above, pp. 896-7.

(600) I:44 beginning, II:41-3, III:10, beginning; see above, pp. 765-7.
but it is far from being one of Athanasius's main principles, and the Ora-
tions as we meet them have nothing even of the specially authoritative
significance of Nicaea, although, as we have said above, it is probable
that Athanasius had intended to say more about Nicaea and the Homooousion
in the missing genuine Fourth Oratioxi. But it is true to say that the
Ora-tions, as we have them, are remarkable in their concentration on theolog-
ical first principles, which for these purposes do not include either prag-
matism or authoritarianism, whether in its traditionalist or Conciliarist
form. Athanasius did believe that if the Second Person were not God, we
would not be reconciled to Him and our reconciliation would simply confirm
our separation from God, and he also believed that the Deity of the Son
was in accord with Church tradition, and that Nicaea with its Homoousion
was specially authoritative. But they were subordinate to first principles,
and it was almost as if Athanasius did not dare to introduce either until
he had made a watertight case already. From first to last in the Orations,
there is not a single citation from a theologian or any other single and
definite recognised authority.

It is this that has been so generally and disastrously ignored
by almost all writers on Athanasius, as we have already discussed above in
full. Protestant writers have wanted to interpret Athanasius as a prag-
matis-t, and when they meet elements in him that do not fit, they tend to
attribute them to either authoritarianism or theological rationalism. Rom-
an Catholic scholarship has tended to adopt the reverse procedure, that is,
to regard Athanasius as essentially an authoritarian who believed in the
Deity of Christ because it was the Church's tradition, or because Nicaea
said so. However, since this interpretation of a theology can be checked

(601) See above, pp. 1054-61.
in terms of documentation much more readily than pragmatism, which is so much more a case of the atmosphere of a theology as a whole, the Roman Catholics have had more immediate embarrassment, in finding, for example, that Athanasius used such Trinitarian terms as Nature and Essence in a way very different from what later became standard, that his Christology was evidently different from Chalcedon, and that he had very little to say about the Spirit for a long time and that, when he did have something to say, he affirmed the Greek rather than the Latin Procession. Thus they have tended to slip back into Pragmatism, or as an alternative, into the position that Athanasius was still essentially a disciplinarian at heart, but spoke loosely on certain matters because the mind of the Church was not made up on them. It is worth while to mention all this again, because these difficulties are at a maximum in the "Contra Arianos".

The effects of all this on the study of Athanasius, especially the Athanasius of the "Contra Arianos", have been one of the tragedies of theological history. Inevitably when scholars looked for something and failed to find it, the idea grew that the Orations were arid, and not worth the attention that was to be devoted to other works; certainly not worth the detailed critical attention generally given to works of this magnitude. Newman is the only exception; even Möhler tended to accept the "De Incarnatione" as the definitive theology of Athanasius, and the Orations as a refutation of Arianism from the standpoint of this earlier theology. Athanasius has been regarded as the orthodox theologian par excellence, and the Orations as nothing more than a gigantic refutation of Arianism pure and simple, the immense quantity of material being simply the expression of (at best) a sanctified rabies theologorum. To regard a man as being simply the representative of orthodoxy (within limitations which were on occasion felt to be quite extensive), is the worst thing that can ever be done to
anybody. The effect of all this has been a tendency to regard the "De Incarnatione" as the definitive theological work of Athanasius, and to depress the serious study of the Orations, except by those who study them with a jaundiced eye. Athanasius as a whole has, as a theologian, been regarded as having no greater authority than the Cappadocians, or even, (of all people!) Epiphanius. Athanasius, the Saint and near-martyr, yes; Athanasius, the theologian, no; and we comfort ourselves with the entirely false reflection that such a practical man could not have made a theologian of the first rank. Therefore, we have missed nine tenths of what Athanasius has to say, not only about Christian theology but about the nature of the Arian controversy, and if our hypothesis about the latter is right, we have wantonly deprived ourselves of a unique source, under Scripture, of inspiration, comfort, and wisdom at the very time when we have needed it so urgently.

Now, what are the true first principles of theology, according to Athanasius? (The supreme thing about the Godhead of the Son is that it is true, in the simplest and most unqualified sense.) It is this element in the "Contra Arianos" that is so often mistaken for eridity. (And insofar as there is a criterion of truth, it is Scripture.) The only possible rival, as far as the Orations as a whole are concerned, is the thing that may be described on the one hand as rationalism and on the other as the simple self-consciousness of the faithful Christian, that it must be true. But even the first half of Orat.I, in which the truth of the Christian orthodoxy is established and the corresponding claims of Arianism refuted, is completely Scriptural in character, every proposition being corroborated from Scripture. (603) Most conclusively of all, the same applies in the cases

(602) See above, pp. 670-73.
(603) See above, pp. 670-73
where Athanasius is establishing positions that are generally taken to be metaphysical in character, notably, the pluralism of creaturely life. (604) (All the elements of this position are illustrated from the Old Testament.) The reason why this does not appear so obvious at first sight is the contrast between the first half of the First Oration, chs. 1–37, and the more obviously exegetical material that forms the body of the remainder of the Orations, in which Athanasius is confuting Arian exegesis. But this contrast is completely explicable on the basis of two factors, neither of which reflects on the primacy of Scripture for Athanasius, but rather confirms it. (In the first place,) the first part of Orat. I does not appear to be Scriptural, at first sight, because Arianism is not a heresy that is in any way concerned with the Scriptural canon, or with any scripture principle analogous to the familiar Reformation dispute concerning the primacy of Scripture or the equality of Tradition. (605) It is rather the result of a major crack in the wits of theology as a whole of which their exegetical principle was merely a manifestation, even if the great manifestation, that is, the idea that truths about God are to be interpreted as truths about creatures. (On the other hand,) the great length of the exegetical sections is simply because they were refutations of Arian exegeses, and also because in so doing Athanasius had to establish what was almost a virgin field in theology, the Humanity of Christ. Thus, they are not to be considered as the arbitrary derangement of exegesis to fit a predetermined pattern, but the filling of what is so often the worst gap in the "proof-text" method of theology - its failure to deal with what is prima facie the Scriptural evidence against the doctrine being established.

(604) See II:18-31, 44-47, 51 etc.
(605) See above, pp. 383-388.
How is Scripture actually handled? Athanasius repeatedly establishes that there are two distinct ways of speaking about Christ, which correspond to His Deity and His Humanity. (606) What often appears to be his arbitrary interpretation of Scripture is simply his insistence that, of the two, the statements about Christ as God should have absolute priority over those concerning Christ as creature, simply because, if the contrary principle were ever allowed, it would mean the end of religious faith, as we have seen in our epoch. Therefore, statements of the latter type are not to be rejected, but interpreted in a way consistent with the statements concerning the Deity of Christ. Therefore, all statements concerning Christ as a creature must apply to the Incarnation, and the Incarnation only, whether to the post-incarnate Christ as a man or to the Incarnation as an act, whichever is appropriate. It goes without saying that all statements of the type, "The Lord created Me..." (Prov. 8:32 LXX), or, "who was faithful to Him that made him..." (Heb. 3:2), the entity that was "made" could only be the humanity of Christ. (607) But the problem can be, and was, approached from another angle, that is, from the point of view of activities rather than entities. In fact, the interpretations of Athanasius are such that both these points of view are always represented. The distinction becomes that between what is aboriginally true or essentially true or true by nature (all these expressions are equivalent), and what becomes true, to an entity that already exists. In making this distinction, Athanasius gives an exhaustive logical analysis, as well as theological analysis, of the relation between Being and Becoming, and states, among other things, that many of the things that are called "coming to be" are simply changes.


(607) This is the only positive and concrete meaning that emerges of "piety", which is Athanasius's apparent description for his theology, especially in reference to the meaning of Scripture.

(608) See above, pp. 745-754.
This applies to all processes wherein a creature is said to "make", since creatures cannot make unless they have pre-existent material. (Now, Athanasius maintains that all the verses quoted by the Arians to prove, generally, that the Logos is a creature can really be interpreted in that way; this even applies to what is apparently the most difficult verse of the lot, Prov.8:22 LXX, since there is an accusative complement which, even though the verb is ἐκτίσει, created, shows that what is really meant is a change in a pre-existent entity. This change is, of course, the only possible one, the Incarnation considered as an activity. Thus, in this sense, what is "made" is that the Son is made man, from having been non-man, i.e. B.C. After these principles have been established in general, they are applied to the verses from the Synoptic Gospels which describe the incarnate life of Christ.

One aspect of this argument deserves especial notice. While Athanasius is in many respects far more dynamic in his outlook than most of his successors, in many other ways he is strongly essentialist in the usual meaning of the term. This may be due to Greek rationalism and the corresponding notion of the unchangeability of God, but on the other hand it may be that this essentialism is really the only correct way of handling the doctrine of God. But this essentialism is applied generally by Athanasius, even to creatures, as when Athanasius says that even men cannot be constituted by any relation, even to God, and that, for example, Moses had to be created as a man, simply, before there was any question of Him obeying or not obeying God. (with the matter in hand, it means that the "real" truths about God and about the Son are what is eternally true.) This is

(609) See I:23-26, also 53-54 on Heb.1:4, and above, pp. 696-705
(610) In III:26-58.
(611) As in II:51. See above, pp. 879-90.
associated with the fact that the passages of Scripture which Athanasius adduces as witnesses to the Deity of the Son are almost invariably in propositional form, and that high up among these are the "I AM" statements of the Fourth Gospel. This incidentally contrasts with the dynamic sort of statement which the Arians adduced. Of course, the statements are not strictly propositional in the sense that no proposition can ever be made about an absolutely singular entity, but, even though the writer does not feel competent to discuss the significance of this any more deeply, it is an instructive paradox that the propositional form is apparently most necessary at the very point where it is, strictly speaking, impossible. Another feature of Athanasius's general Greek essentialism is that he shares with the great Greek philosophers a profound aversion to anything which is, in the true sense of the word, a relative statement, or, worse still, relativism in general. Thus, for instance, Athanasius's final case against the Arian interpretation of Prov. 8:22 LXX, is that, owing to the form of the verse, it would postulate a creature that was, in the real sense, constituted by His relations, that is, His very creation was for the purpose of being the beginning of ways and then execution of the works. Therefore, as no creature, even, can be constituted by his relations, this verse must refer to such an event as the Incarnation. Occasionally, Athanasius's exegetical method is embarrassing. For instance, as we have said, the natural meaning of Philipp. 2:9 is that without the work of the Incarnation the Second Person could not have had, in a sense, the right to be worshipped

(612) T.E. Pollard, in his unpublished thesis, "The Use of the Fourth Gospel in the Arian Controversy", (Diss. St. Andrew's University, 1956) rightly emphasises the importance of Scripture, and especially the Fourth Gospel in Athanasius's theology. But one would, in a thesis submitted in the Department of New Testament, have expected more critical discussion on this point.

(613) See chs. 44-72, and above, pp. 869-904.
as Lord, and His worship as Lord really depends on the completion, or pre-
destination of the future completion, of the work of reconciliation. But
this would make Philipp. 2:9, in the form in which it is, actually a relative
statement, which was inadmissible. Therefore, Athanasius had to strain
his exegetical method by making the exaltation referred to in that verse
be the exaltation of the humanity of Christ. Later, however, when he
is surer of himself, when he deals with, say, Acts 2:36, he adopts the type
of exegesis that we have considered to be the more natural one, and which
he had previously rejected.

The ontological type of argument, or argument from the very con-
cept inherent in the titles Logos, etc., which imply super-materiality,
and Son, which implies that the Second Person is from the essence of the
First in the sense that sons are from the essence of their parents, things
made are of different essences from their makers, and creatures, as regards
their creation by God, are from nothing, is relatively just as prominent
here as in the "De Decretis", and does not need any further mention, except
to say that the treatment is on a more extended scale. But the other
great principle governing Athanasian theology as a whole, that of analogy,
shows quite considerable change. Previously, the typical position had been
the analogy of proportionality, whereby the transcendence of God enters
into the very relation of sonship as well as Persons of the Father and Son,
God begetting in a way appropriate to His immateriality and men begetting
materially. Associated with this, the effect of the other titles of

(615) See Orat. II: 11-18 and above, pp. 802-5.
(616) See Orat. I: 23-29, and 35-36 with special reference to the unchange-
ability of God. See above, pp. 706-24.
(617) See above, pp. 590-3.
God was to suggest the way in which the errors in each title were to be corrected. (618) Athanasius now continues with this type of analogy, which is especially associated with Logos, and also with Radiance (in relation to the Sun), River (in relation to Source), Wisdom, and other related titles of the Second Person of the less personal type. (619) In this treatment, Athanasius makes it clearer that the elements in each of the analogies that are to be accepted are the elements consistent with the idea of deity, which is the analogical form of Athanasius's exegetical principle. But it still leaves the problem that our whole exegesis of Scripture, even, is at the mercy of a rationalistic principle, or what might easily become one, and it appears that Athanasius, too, casts around for a better doctrine. He finds this in the idea that it is only in God that true Sonship, for instance is to be found - for his treatment of this form of analogy is specially associated with "Son" as a title for the Second Person. This has been fully treated above; (620) and it is the highest doctrine of analogy in the history of theology. Athanasius does not consistently keep to it, but it is confirmed later when he comes to treat of the Arian exegesis of John 17:21, which the Arians regarded as showing that the unity between Father and Son was just the same as that envisaged between God and man. (621) Athanasius repeats - after an exposition of the more formal types of doctrine of analogy - that the unity as we see it in God is absolutely primary so that the analogy is in fact materially irreversible. At this stage, we find not only formal and descriptive analogy but material analogy. That is, not only is it necessary to know the unity that is to exist among

(618) See De Decr. 15-17, and above, pp. 609-21.
(621) III:10-25; see above, pp. 960-980.
Christians in terms of the unity of God, but the unity that is to exist among Christians could not exist unless God, by a special act of grace, had come down to us and given us to partake of His unity. As we have said in the appropriate place, this is actually the problem raised by (on opposite sides) Erich Przywara and Karl Barth of the analogia entis and the analogia fidei, and it is actually a much clearer account of the matter than anything in any modern theologian, including the two that have been mentioned.

The reason for all this, according to Athanasius — although he does not further enlarge on it here — is that God differs in His very Being from creatures. God is the Self-Existent; others have being only in a secondary and subordinate sense. Although this may sound rationalistic, probably nothing else so thoroughly indicates the radical gulf between Creator and creature.

This is a satisfactory transition to certain issues that are still very important, but which bulk less large in Athanasian theology. On the matter of natural theology, we find that Athanasius is still prepared to

(622) See De Deor. II, and see above, pp. 601f. Incidentally, Karl Barth made an error to introduce the phrase, "Seinsweise", or, in English, "mode of being", as the equivalent of the Cappadocians' πρωτόφυσις της χρυσής πέμψις, for the Persons of the Trinity. The Cappadocians undoubtedly meant to contrast this with such a concept as "mode of manifestation which would be classical Sabellianism, and so to clarify the distinctness of the Persons. Unfortunately, the only thing that the phrase conveys in modern languages is something like what Athanasius is describing here, that is, the distinction between the way in which God (including, of course, the Second Person Pre-existent) and the way in which creatures exist (including the Humanity of Christ). In fact, πρωτόφυσις της χρυσής πέμψις would, in some ways, have been a better phrase for the Chalcedonians to use for the Two Natures of Christ than φύσις, Nature. If it is objected, rightly, that this conclusion cannot apply to Greek because υπολειπόμενον, etc., can only refer to what is aboriginally true, exactly the same applied to φύσις as used by Athanasius during the whole of his theological life.
admit it, on the lines of the "Contra Gentes"; that is, he is prepared to admit that creation, on its own, is enough to indicate the presence of its Creator. But he goes much further in insisting on the absolute separateness of Creator and creature; in particular, the one thing that natural theology does not entitle us to do is to worship the creation. And, in the last analysis, he undercuts the whole case of natural theology by maintaining, with great vehemence, that there is nothing in common between Creator and creature. This ultimately breaks all bonds or supposed bonds between God and Man, except those that God in His own mercy makes in Jesus Christ. As an interesting comparison with the theological situation of the present day, we meet in place two clearly Barthian principles, Christocentricity and his emphasis on revelation. However, there is this difference. With Barth, the Christ Who is systematically central is the Incarnate Christ; with Athanasius, it is the Second Person, the Eternal (and Pre-Incarnate) Son. Similarly with Revelation, Barth had to face the problem of how the Humanity of Christ could reveal the Deity. This question never came up in Athanasius. For him, the revelation that was important was the Revelation (to use his Trinitarian metaphors) of the Sun by the Radiance, or the Hypostasis by the Character, i.e. the eternal and pre-incarnate Logos simpliciter is the Revelation of the Father. We are here at one of the most difficult problems of all theology, but the manner in which it was handled by Athanasius suggests that the Arians had not really raised the problem of revelation, beyond a few offhand remarks like that in the "Thalia" that we know the Unoriginate through Him that came to be. The reason why is simple. As long as the confusion existed, as in the

(625) II:41 beginning, and III:5-6, and with special reference to the Unchangeability of God, I:35:840-85A. See above, pp.750-1.
second and third centuries, between Logos as the Second Person whether in the Trinitarian sense or in the cosmological sense, and the Reason that is immanent in man in virtue of his rationality or humanity, there was no need for any doctrine of revelation at all. It is interesting to see the issue coming up in Athanasius, probably owing to the revival of Hebraic forms of the Logos doctrine. In modern theology, the thing that corresponds to the ante-Nicene theology is Hegelianism, which put the same principle much more coherently and exactly than it was expressed at the earlier stage. But, probably because of what went before, Hegel expresses the principle in pseudo-revelational terms. He says that Christianity is "the revealed religion", but, a little later, when he explains himself, it is evident that all that he means is that Christianity is the religion in which everything is clear to the believer, without any real reference to any genuine transcendent Revealer; indeed, to postulate such an entity would have been a violation of the Hegelian principle of the absolute identity of the human and Divine natures, and would have been accepted by Hegel as a sign of the immaturity of the religion of the proponent. It is not surprising, on the other hand, that Feuerbach and his successors, including Marx, were able to develop a full doctrine of anti-revelation, according to which what is, prima facie, revelation of God can really be only revelation of creaturely entities and forces. This is why, for Barth, revelation was always a live issue in the way that it never was with Athanasius until he himself began to attend to it. If it had been a live issue with the Arians, Athanasius would really have been confronted with the issue of how the Humanity of Christ can reveal the Deity. In the "De Incarnatione", the Humanity is the means, simply, of the revelation of the Deity; but


(627) See above, pp.469-472.

(628) See chs. 14-18, and above, pp.134-152.
Athanasiusts newly-developed doctrine of the active and glorified humanity would have, ultimately, forced a re-examination of this point. Incidentally, once again, the Revelational position here is in contrast with that in the earlier work, since there it was a case of the Logos revealing Himself, with relatively little emphasis on the Father.

The second major topic is the actual Trinitarian doctrine that results from these basic considerations. There is very little change in the actual doctrine of God. God is eternal, incorporeal, simple and not compounded, unchangeable, and impassible in the usual Greek meaning; but this cannot be interpreted to exclude God the Son graciously taking our infirmities for our sakes at the Incarnation. All the correlations between God and the world are to be rejected, and the correlates of the Persons of the Trinity are to be found only in the Trinity, as Athanasius shows once again in his treatment of the ἀγίασµα issue, which he repeats, but much more clearly than in the corresponding material in "De Decretis". One thing that comes up for further attention in the Orations on the general doctrine of God is the relation between the Will of God and His Nature. This arose in connection with the Arian claim that the Son came to be at the will of the Father. Athanasius answers that there is no question of will at all, in the sense in which the Arians set the terms of the controversy, since thereby will referred to a definite mental act which had a beginning. Therefore, the generation of the Son would have to be by nature, that is, in the Athanasian (and Aristotelian) sense of what is aboriginally and essentially true rather than what comes to be true, in general owing to interaction with other things. Athanasius actually

(629) See above, pp. 698-705

(630) See above, pp. 284-308

extends this to Divine attributes that are normally associated with will, e.g. the goodness of God. God, he says, is good by nature and not by will, because, on these bases, to be good by will admits of the possibility of not being good. At an earlier stage in the Orations, Athanasius had had to give a more extensive treatment of what ethical descriptions meant when applied to God. The danger of course was that one would either produce an immoral or amoral God, or import into God the sense in which ethics ordinarily depends on the creaturely limitations of men. This is again one of the most difficult issues of theology; Athanasius's handling may seem to be arid and "physicist" to some, but the author feels that he has steered clear of both pitfalls surprisingly well. While we are still on the more general doctrine of God, we may point out that Athanasius, in his treatment of the eternity of God, discusses in an interesting way what is really meant by such expressions as "there was time" or "there was once" when He was not. His conclusion is that all such times are constituted entirely by the Eternal God Himself, and thus the only proper expressions to describe what happened before creation (whether of the world or, by an impossible hypothesis, of the Arian Logos) are "God was", or the like.

As for the actual Trinitarian doctrine itself, it is still virtually binitarian, as far as its developed and conscious expression is concerned. There is remarkably little about the Holy Spirit in relation to the Trinity itself, except for a few formal statements. So little is there, in fact, that it is best to postpone consideration of the Spirit until a later stage of this resume, for reasons which will again become apparent

(632) III:62:4530-456A.
(633) I:51-52, and see above, pp. 779-85.
(634) I:11, see above, pp. 666-675.
then. Of course, Athanasius has a firm grasp of the unity of God, but he has remarkably little to say about what Trinitarian theology later described as the One Essence, apparently considering the unity of God to be in the strictest sense ineffable. However, insofar as he does talk about the principle of unity in God, it is still apparently to be found in the Father, although we have had reason to suggest from some of the material that if Athanasius had had to develop it further, he would have had to say that the one Essence would in some sense have to include the whole of the Trinitarian relationships; that is, God would not be God in any sense unless He were Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In this way it is true that Athanasius is an Easterner rather than a Westerner, according to the usually accepted interpretation that the Easterners started from the Persons and then went on to the Nature, and the Westerners preferred to operate vice versa. This of course would make it difficult for Athanasius to sustain his essentialism and his anti-relativism to the extent to which he accepts them; what he would probably have to maintain is that the Persons of the Trinity would be exceptional in this regard; a human being is a human being before there is any question of him being a parent (although family life does have an exceptional position in some ways even among men), but the First Person would be meaningless without Him being Father, et cetera.

In fact, Athanasius's whole use of the word *οὐσία*, essence, in particular, as well as *φύσις*, nature, is much more dynamic than the way in which we have been used to using it. The whole use of the former word has been markedly influenced by the adverbial use, *κατ' οὐσίαν* αι *τῇ οὐσίᾳ*, to indicate what is essentially and aboriginally true (and therefore, in the case of God, eternally true), as distinct from what becomes true of the Second Person. Even such uses as

affected by the adverbial uses, and one of its meanings is precisely that
the Son is eternally and aboriginally from the Father, and was not generated
(or "generated", actually created) in time, either at the Incarnation
or just before the creation of the world. On the other hand, such phrases
also mean that the Son is begotten from the innermost centre of being of
the Father, as distinct from the way in which a creature is ex nihilo as
regards God, or a table or a chair made in a carpenter's shop is of a
different essence from that of the carpenter. This is again, of course,
the dynamic use of $\text{o\v{s}\iota’}$ . There are many statements of the form,
"The Essence of the Son," or "The Son has a $\ldots$ Essence", but they always
deny that this essence is created, and they may almost be considered as the
equivalent of statements that the Son is not a creature in essence, or that
the Son is not from another essence in the sense of the Nicene anathema.(636)
On one occasion, Athanasius makes a statement formally identical with the later
orthodox doctrine, but he uses not $\text{o\v{s}\iota’}$ , but $\text{E\nu\talpha’}$ , the
Platonic Form, when he says that the Form of the Father is the Form of the
Son; he then immediately combines this with two other types of statement;
the Son is the Form of the Father's Godhead, and the Form of the Father is
in the Son. Of course, here again, what Athanasius is doing is trying
to avoid presenting the Essence as a fourth thing of the same kind as the
Three Persons (or the Third Thing in a virtually Binitarian theology; Paul
of Samosata had actually done just that, in support of his heretical doc-
trine.(638) Of course, the Homoousion is missing in the Orations; we have

(636) See the sectional lexicographical analyses, above, pp. 929-31, 787, 1021.
(637) 301-1, 810-12, 867-8.
(637) III-6. See above, pp. 940-51
(638) See "De Synodis" 45:772C-D, and above, pp. 361-66.
already discussed this, and come to the conclusion that Athanasius had intended to vindicate the formula, and in any case, the subsidiary expressions involving the word ὁμοοιοσία, are so common, and to such an extent identical in their use with that of the "De Decretis", that we can safely assume that there is no change here; the Homoousion, and to a certain extent the other expressions involving Essence, are intimately related to the generation of the Son from the Father, so that by far the best analogy is the one familiar to modern biology of the chromosome complex, or rather what it would be if generation were asexual and without mutation. (639)

There are hardly any definite instances of the use of the word ὁμοοιοσία so that it definitely refers to generic likeness. In the case of the related word ὁμοιότης, the generic meaning would of course be predominant in the ordinary nominative and accusative uses, or in other cases where the meaning would correspond. But here, the adverbial uses are even more decidedly predominant, ἀνάξιος ὁμοιότης, κατ' ὁμοιότητα, etc. These are identical with the corresponding forms of ὁμοοιοσία, and refer to what is aboriginally true as distinct from what later becomes true. In this sense, ὁμοοιοσία and ὁμοιότης are synonymous, but in the other sense ὁμοοιοσία would be synonymous with ὄνομα ὁμοιότητας in the Athanasian use. The last-mentioned word is very rare in Athanasius; so much for the contention that he was influenced by Western theology or even cared much about it until the matter came up at the Synod of Alexandria in 362. (641) On the very few occasions on which it was used, it was always directly provoked by Heb.1:3, where Hypostasis means what is meant in

(639) See above, pp. 631-40.
(640) See fn. 637 above.
(641) See Tom. ad Antioch. 4-5, and also see above, pp.324 and 1045.
geometrical optics by the Object, as distinct from the Image. Thus it would be synonymous with what Athanasius would have meant by the Essence, especially the Essence of the Father with reference to such concepts as the Son being from the Essence of the Father, etc..

Our findings on these words can be summarised in the following tables. In all our lexicographic analyses, we are dividing the material as regards, largely, the formal use of the word. In the case of $Ω̄στίδ$, there are five groups, Group I: the reference is primarily to arithmetic or constitutive unity, or to the innermost centre of the being of the Person, normally it is used of the Father, but occasionally of the Son. Group II: Like Group I, but where the primary reference is to the Son’s generation; this includes specifically all phrases including $ἐξ τῆς οὐσίας$ or $γεννηθη$ in association with $Ω̄στίδ$. Group III is like Group II, but rather ambiguous; it is usually in accordance with Group II, but it could be interpreted according to Group IV, if the latter were more prevalent than Group II; this includes such less definite phrases as $Ιδιὸς υἱοθετημένος$ and there are some cases in which the ambiguity is between Group I, directly, and Group IV. Group V is the adverbial uses.

In all our lexicographical analyses, we have divided the Orations into seven sections according to subject matter; they will be referred to in the tables as Sections 1-7. Section 1 is C.AE.I:1-36, the general discussion of Arian theology; Section II is I:37-II:18:184C, line 6, which concerns almost entirely the exegesis of various Incarnational and soteriological passages of Scripture; Section 3 is II:18:184C, 1.6 - II:43, which concerns further general problems like those of Sect.1; Section 4 is II:44-82, which concerns the exegesis of Prov.8:22 LXX, with further material as in the previous section; on the whole it is the nearest to the average of the Orations as a whole. Section 5 is III:1-25, the exegesis of passages that concern the
nature of the unity of the Father and Son. Section 6 is III:26-58:445B:1.3, the Synoptic Christ; Section 7 is the remainder of the Third Oration (to ch.67), on the general question of whether the Son came to be at the
will of the Father.

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In the case of Ϙ Φ Ω Θ Α Ν Α Α Ν ΙΑ, nature, there are only three groups. Group I, substantival uses which refer to the Divine Nature, Group II, the same sort of use referring to creaturely nature, and Group III, adverbial uses. It is noteworthy that there are at most one or two cases of Group II referring to human nature as in Christ after the Chalcedonian pattern; the usual reference is to creaturely nature in the most general sense or as being what the Arians wrongly supposed to be the aboriginal nature of the

Second Person.

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There is a striking fall off in the use of \( \delta u \theta \alpha \) relative to \( \phi u \theta \alpha \) in the later stages of the Orations. The cause is not immediately evident, but it is probably associated with the recession in time from Nicaea and its terminology. Probably Athanasius was standardising his adverbial or quasi-adverbial uses on \( \phi u \theta \alpha \); this would be an indispensable preliminary to the Cappadocian Trinitarian terminology, although there is no sign that Athanasius is at this stage yet.

An incidental point arises at this stage; is there any clue here to why the Cappadocians finally took \( \delta u \theta \alpha \) to be what is one in the Trinity, and \( \delta \mu o \sigma \tau o \sigma \) for what is three? The situation, from 362 onwards, is that the former word had the meaning of \( \pi r e i m \ o u \theta \alpha \) as in Aristotle, for what was meant later by Person, and \( d e \nu e r e i o u \theta \alpha \) for generic likeness, as well as its Athanasian uses. On the other hand, Hypostasis was introduced into orthodox Eastern Trinitarianism from the West as being the exact etymological translation of Substantia, which the Latin theologians used in exactly the same way as \( \delta u \theta \alpha \). Now, in the Athanasian usage, \( \delta u \theta \alpha \), though not having really a generic meaning, tended to be involved closely with the interconnexion of Father and Son, chiefly owing to the influence of the adverbial usage, although it would have been possible, on the basis of Nicaea, to restrict the use of this word to the Father. On the other hand, Athanasius actually never uses, before 362, the word Hypostasis except in the sense of Heb.1:3 (unless he is quoting from other writers or denouncing Arian heretical uses). On the basis of Heb. 1:3, the Hypostasis is precisely what is peculiar, not of course to any one of the Persons of the Trinity on His own, but to the Father on His own, and cannot be used about the Son. And it was probably this that suggested to the Cappadocians, once the influence of the West had become important, to apply the term to what each individual Person had that was peculiar to Himself.
As for the Persons of the Trinity, there are two basic types of theology to be seen here, as usual, the Logos type and the Son type. The former is associated with certain other titles of the Second Person, Wisdom, Power, Hand, etc., and especially with the Light (or Sun) — radiance metaphor which is still Athanasius’s principal metaphor. This is closely associated with the older doctrines of analogy that we have already enunciated. On the other hand, the Son type of theology is more markedly present, and is chiefly associated with the higher type of analogy that we have found to be a novelty in the Orationes, according to which things like Sonship are truly present only in God, and present in a corrupt form in men and other creatures. For that very reason, the title "Son" does not have such a multitude of titles surrounding it as Logos. In our lexicographical analysis of the two titles for the Second Person, we shall divide the material again into seven groups, which will be the same in each case. Group I will refer to the purely intra-Trinitarian and eternal relations of the Second Person. Group II will be the general cosmological relations of the Second Person, of which the most typical example will be Creatio per Verbum. Group III will be the Second Person to be incarnate, that is, the Incarnation considered prospectively; in the Orationes this group includes the Old Testament activities of the Second Person, or what are deemed to be such, since Athanasius so regularly interprets the Old Testament as being the witness prospective to Christ. Group IV will be the Second Person as the Agent of the Incarnation considered as an actual accomplished fact (including such phrases as "The Father made Him become man"). Group V will be the Logos as the Hypostasis of the actual Incarnate.

(642) See De Doctr. 11-13 and 17. C. Ar. 1: 26-29, and above, pp. 570-8 and 706-13.
(644) See the sectional analyses above, pp. 37-30, 905-10, 863-7, 925-9, 980-87, 1015-21, 1050-52.
Christ in the detailed activities, e.g. of His earthly life. Group VI will refer to what might be called the Synoptic Christ as a whole, and Group VII is where the Second Person is used for what might be described as the post-Pentecostal activity whereby the Atonement is made real to men in our age.

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**Son**

| Sect.1 | 110 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | - | 123 |
| Sect.2 | 72 | 1 | - | 7 | 10 | 3 | 2 | 95 |
| Sect.3 | 45 | 21 | - | - | - | 1 | 5 | 72 |
| Sect.4 | 30 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | - | 6 | 47 |
| Sect.5 | 124 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 5 | - | 23 | 160 |
| Sect.6 | 40 | 9 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 64 |
| Sect.7 | 45 | 2 | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 49 |
| **TOTAL** | **466** | **45** | **9** | **14** | **25** | **13** | **33** | **610** |

By a strange coincidence, the total number counted is the same with each word. Logos still predominates in the case of all groups in which the Second Person is Agent in relation to other things, whether Creation or Incarnation. This is undoubtedly the residual influence of the use in the "De Incarnatione", in which Logos is almost the only term for the pre-incarnate Second Person and Son is very rare, and particularly, though
perhaps at another remove, the influence of the formula Creation per Verbum and especially John 1:14. On the other hand, "Son" is the predominant title where the intra-Trinitarian relation is discussed simply, and also, as might be expected, as regards the whole Person of the Incarnate Christ. It is also of interest to notice that, rather surprisingly, "Son" is the predominant title in Group VII, the post-Pentecostal division. This is patently due to the increasing association of such work with the Spirit, and this correlation is particularly marked in Section 5, (and supremely in C.A.R. III:24-25), which supplies the majority of the instances. The general rule governing the predominance of Logos and Son prevails both as regards groups and as regards sections, with one exception which manifestly proves the rule; Logos is the predominant title in Section 3. However, this section deals largely with the categorial argument for the distinction between God and creatures, and where it concerns the Intra-Trinitarian relation, it deals in the main with the Two-Wisdom doctrine of Asterius. For these reasons, it is the most highly cosmological section (in the usual sense) of the Orations. The whole table shows a recovery in the use of Logos as compared with Son, from the level reached in the other anti-Arian works. This is due mainly to the recurrence of material more characteristic of the "De Incarnatione", where it would be expected that Logos would decidedly predominate, as it does. But even if we count only Group I, which would bring it into line with the other anti-Arian writings, there is still a decided recovery in the use of Logos, although, as we have suggested, many of the instances that we have placed in Group I really belong both to Group I and, say, Group IV, and have been placed in Group I since that is the group with which the noun is more directly associated.

Corresponding to the two types of theology of the Second Person, the Logos theology and the Son theology, there are two distinguishable doctrines of the relation between the two Persons. Associated with the Son
theology there is a definite denial of Sabellianism, which is made explicitly on several occasions and more definitely than in the earlier anti-Arian works. (645) But associated with the Logos type of theology, there is a version which to a modern looks very like Sabellianism, or at least a confusion of two doctrines both of which are formally and materially necessary, the doctrine of the theistic attributes, and the doctrine of the Persons of the Trinity. That is, Athanasius does not seem to distinguish between the sense in which the wisdom of God is a quality and an attribute of God, and therefore of each Person severally, and the sense in which Wisdom is a special title of the Second Person. This sort of doctrine is later repeated when Athanasius describes the Second Person as, inter alia, the Form (in the Platonic sense) of the Father. On the other hand, as we have shown in our detailed study of this section, there is far more case to be made out for Athanasius's treatment than meets the eye, since, for Athanasius, as for any Platonist, the Forms tended to be thought of as other things, and thus the difficulties that we tend to feel were not felt by Athanasius. Also, even in our age, the distinction between qualities and substantial entities is one which appears to be so obvious, but which is more difficult to make in practice than meets the eye. Thus, this apparently fallacious reasoning of Athanasius is actually almost the only time in theology where the point is made that God would not be God, and certainly would not have any of the theistic attributes, unless He were Trinitarian, that is, the Attributes are subordinate to the Persons, and dependent on them, and it is not that the Persons would not be what they are but for the attributes, which is the common and naive way of looking at the matter. Similar statements are repeatedly made that a god who possessed no Second Person would

(645) III:4, 35-6, 39. See above, pp. 940-44, 1007-11.

(646) II:37f, and III:5-9. See above, pp. 846-56, 945-60.
be Ἰογός, absurd, or Ἰσοφόρος, wisdomless, which is inconceivable.

The same point is made from the point of view of the Son theology, when it is insisted upon that the generative function of God (i.e. God the Father) is absolutely prior to his creative work; therefore, a god who lacked the Son would be unable to create.

Even though this point is simply affirmed rather than argued, it stands.

On the other hand, with the Son theology, a most important point of a different character arises. We have already stated, in criticism of the Logos theology, that it does not permit us to give an account of the Love of God. In fact, the whole Logos theology, explained as it is, ultimately, in terms of the metaphor of Light and Radiance, is really excessively weighted in favour of physical analogies and, one might say, physicism generally, compared with not only Athanasius's Son theology but also with the average theology of most of Athanasius's successors. A man may love his son, but he cannot very well love his word, in any normal sense of the language, and to love something that can be described as the "extension of his personality", as some Old Testament theologians described the Old Testament Word of God - and the same sort of thing does happen with men - is something that is normally regarded as being frankly sinful, and rightly so. Now, at this stage, Athanasius is at last confronted with the necessity of giving an account of the Love of Father and Son. Of course, it comes up twice in the context of the Son theology, and Athanasius does it in terms of such verses as Prov. 8:30; in his explanation, he says that the mutual delight of Father and Son was conditioned by their absolute likeness, so that each saw Himself in the other. This is perfectly frank Narcissism, and needs no further comment.

(648) See II:2, and above, pp. 796-800.
(649) See above, pp. 652-3.
(650) I:20 end, III:66; see above, pp. 683-5, 1048-9.
Unfortunately, this is not a purely academic question, since it involves the great crack in the wits of the modern Church, the explosive triad of Beauty, Sexuality, and Racialism. What is racialism, in fact, but the ruthless use or abuse of the proposition that love is dependent upon community of essence in something very like the sense which we have rightly or wrongly ascribed to Athanasius, especially as regards the obviously visible characters? It may be that its portentous rise in our day is a protest against a one-sided Agape doctrine of love which at its worst makes love virtually a duty. There may be a true place for Christian Philia or even Eros. It is noteworthy that Roman Catholicism, which by and large notoriously has a "better" racial record than Protestantism, does succeed, in spite of its underlying tendencies to ascetic monasticism and celibacy, in keeping far more of these two concepts in a religious setting than Protestantism. She does so, not only in her cult of the Virgin Mary and in her worship generally, but particularly in her tolerance of extreme mystics who often give expression to what is almost an erotic relation to God. The Reformers were quite right when they saw that this hierarchical solution, this toleration of dangerous emotions as long as they kept to their confined place, was thoroughly bad; in fact, it is historically correct that dissatisfaction on this point was as much a cause of the Reformation as dissatisfaction with the Roman doctrine of grace. But their release of what had been bound, their insistence that every Christian should share fully all the privileges of Christ and also all the responsibilities involved, made it doubly dangerous if anything went wrong. What went wrong in this case was that the later generation assumed that all that was involved was that the clergy share the sexuality of family life, and the result was that there was less feeling for Philia or Eros in connection with God than ever. This is almost certainly the reason why racialism is such a Protestant vice.
What is needed is the renewed understanding that love, not only as Agape, but as Philia and Eros, is also in God, and as we share the Divine Love in Christ we share all three. All three spheres are alike under the gracious lordship of Christ. Christians are still to love their fellows, even those outside, as we love those who are like us, but that likeness is to be constituted by Christ and not by race. The acute problem still arises in theology of what is the relation between the love of the Persons for each other and the love of God for creatures, which is properly expressed by Agape. And those who interpret even the intra-Trinitarian love as Agape have this point in their favour, that it has always the barrier of the relative distinction between Fatherhood and Sonship to transcend. On the important former issue, it would be relatively easy for Athanasius to come to a conclusion in terms of his doctrine of the analogical (or rather katalogue) character of all relationships between God and man, and his earlier characteristic doctrine that salvation is a process in some sense of Deification would also come to his aid. But this is an extremely difficult matter, and it would be prohibitive at this stage to say too much more on the well-worn question of Agape, Eros, etc. But it is a matter of the gravest urgency for theologians and the Church to address itself to this, since it is the essential condition for dealing with the questions of Beauty, Sexuality, and Racialism, which are themselves challenges to theology to get itself on to the right track in this supremely important matter. Perhaps it is necessary to understand yet another of the paradoxes of the Faith, that even though "He hath no form nor comeliness" in the state where He is suffering for us, and that Christians may be called to share that affliction, nevertheless His gracious sovereignty extends over Beauty as much as over anything else, and our destiny is not only to show and share God's glory and God's mercy, but God's beauty, and to feel, for God and for our fellows, not only love as a sort of duty, but the very attraction, erotic if one
likes to call it such, that the Father and Son, according to Athanasius, have for each other. But, to repeat, this field is Christ's, not the world's there is no beauty in a handsome blond Nordic if he commands a concentration camp, to put it negatively.

Thus, to conclude, there still remains a marked tension in Athanasius between what one might call the emanationist type of theology of the Second Person, which surrounds the titles Logos, Wisdom, Radiance, etc., and the Son theology, according to which the compresence of Father and Son is not analogous to a continuous physical process like the emission of radiant energy, but is an eternal Fact; there are simply both Father and Son in a relation of mutual love. Perhaps it is not such a great tension after all, as in human sonship the important relation is personal love, but no account of it would be complete without a great deal of biology, or even something very close to the sort of physics that we have been considering. But we can point out that the former type of theology is a little too prominent still when compared with the latter. One particularly serious result is that it makes it almost impossible to give any intelligible difference between the generation of the Son, so interpreted, and the Procession of the Spirit (at any rate, if the Greek Procession is recognised). This was later a serious embarrassment for Athanasius, when he had to discuss the matter later.

Turning now to other doctrines, in order, we find that there is very little difference in the subdivision of theology called God the Creator, Man, and Sin. There is no special treatment of sin at all, which leaves the "De Incarnatione" as the only place where this subject is treated specially.

Creation is, as always, Creatio ex nihilo, creatio per Verbum,


What is of great interest is a very full development of what we have termed the categorial argument concerning the difference between God and creatures. Here Athanasius goes a long way towards the development of a doctrine of radical pluralism as the truth of creaturely life on its own; we are treating this argument here in this context, since Athanasius's treatment of it is mainly in the context of creatures. No two creatures are perfectly alike, but no creature is quite unique. All creatures are members of a class, all are divisible and complex. All creatures are spatially and temporally limited. No creature is either omnipresent or omnicompotent, but all are limited by their environment and interact with it. But, and this is most important, in spite of the last-mentioned characteristic, no creature can be constituted by relations, and this means that service, as is given in Christ, is essentially the prerogative of God alone and virtually demands an entity like the Incarnate Christ for its accomplishment: a creature would only be able to be himself. There is no real constitutive summation of all creatures, and apparently no generic class of all creatures or summum genus. The reason for this is that on any other doctrine there could be an entity that would be a creature, yet could have the relation of cosmological supremacy as postulated for the Arian Second Person. Athanasius shows his commitment to this doctrine by his pluralistic interpretation of Adam, in the very place where the more natural interpretation, according to Scripture, would be the monistic and constitutive.

Next comes the Incarnation. In the first place, Athanasius is, as before, Infralapsarian in the sense that he believes that the Fall of man was the cause of the Incarnation, and that it would not have happened
but for the Fall. However, he finds it increasingly difficult to sustain this view, as he progresses in his exegesis of Prov.8:22 LXX. For instance, if it is true that, as Athanasius shows from these very essentialist considerations which arc now to be put in question, the only way in which even God can be "for the works" to any extent is by the Incarnation, one would really have to become Supralapsarian and maintain that the Incarnation was in God's plan even before creation. A little later this change is expressly made, when the question of the context of Prov.8:22 LXX, especially Prov.8:23, arises. At this point, Athanasius gives what Karl Barth regards as the only adequate account of predestination in the whole history of the Church. From the point of view of what was later known as Predestination and Election the position as described by Athanasius has the interesting feature that what is predestinated is not the individual elect or reprobate as such, but Christ Himself, and the totality of the work to be accomplished in Him, while what we cannot but accept as a wise silence is preserved concerning the destiny of individuals as such which issue has been the source of so much antagonism to doctrines of predestination in the past. And here the wheel has turned full circle, or more correctly, full spiral, and we are back at the Greek Logos doctrine in its classical form, the Logos as the Logos of the cosmos, only the thing that holds the world together, the One Principle, is not anything immanent in the world, but Christ, and God's Predestination in Him. Since this is not a static state, but a Plan, this for almost the first time enables us to form a genuine Christian doctrine of history. Or possibly not yet; this might be only one necessary condition, the other being a true doctrine of the

(655) See De Inc. 4, beginning, and above, pp.105-6 and 216-18.
(656) II:44-72.
(657) II:73-77. See above, pp.904-12
Holy Spirit, since it is properly the Spirit that is associated with the Age after Pentecost. This was actually shown by the theology of Joachim of Flora. But we can be thankful for Athanasius to show us part of the way, since there is no more urgent task in theology at the present day, and it will still, though in a different way, be just as urgent if this age, through an excess of exhaustion and fear, loses its dynamic and sinks into a stage of quietism. While not going to the blasphemous lengths of aping Marxist predictions, which is merely asking for trouble, Christians must resist the temptation to say that history is "bunk", in the well-known phrase of Henry Ford, or, what is even worse, that it is "materialistic"; such historicist philosophies as Marxism will always be stronger than this sort of criticism. The point is that they attribute to an idol what really belongs only to Christ, but it really belongs to Christ. It is one of the tragedies of history that neither Athanasius nor his successors developed this any further, but perhaps, since this sort of thinking was such a novelty in Greek thought, we should be thankful that Athanasius went as far as he did. It is almost as if this principle was struggling to be born in the environment of the fourth century, since it would have patently made many difficulties for what were established Athanasian principles, notably his anti-relativism and essentialism.

The main member of the group of Other Doctrines in our classification is the Incarnation and the Person of Christ, taken together. The doctrine has been already adumbrated in the earlier anti-Arian writings, but here, owing to the form of the work, it is developed tremendously. The only thing that is really lacking is the Conception by the Holy Spirit, but otherwise there is a complete coverage of the Humanity of Christ from childhood (or rather, adolescence, see Luke 2:52) to the Cry of Dereliction on the Cross, even though it stops a little short of the Death and extends
that far, as to the Infancy, only by implication. 

The Arians took good care that Athanasius was confronted with the full range of the Humanity of Christ. So the Son of God took our humanity. Now, there are two sides of this. In one way, the Son took our infirmities, so that they could be annihilated in Him. He was afraid, so that we might no longer be afraid.

In a sense, this is the doctrine of Melito of Sardis and the Athanasius of the "De Incarnatione", but expressed with precision and exactitude instead of by striking, but less exact, Euphuisms. In this way, Athanasius comes close to the position first definitively adopted by Edward Irving against the whole tradition of the Church but which has since become orthodox in the person of Barth, that the humanity of Christ, though in fact sinless, is really our fallen humanity. The other moment, which is the real novelty of the anti-Arian writings, is that He took our humanity so as to fashion in Himself the New, Redeemed Humanity for us, which we are to partake in glory. Where Christ is said to "receive" a boon, which He as

(658) See C.Am.III:25-58, which are not treated in full in this thesis. See above, pp. 290-293. Athanasius is very strict in his assignment of functions to the Deity and the Humanity. Eg. on Mk.13:32, Athanasius simply says, in its way quite adequately, that Christ did not know as man, but knew as God. Unfortunately, this particular case does not do justice to the wording, which apparently makes the antithesis between the Father and the Son in the Trinitarian sense. Athanasius is also handicapped here by his most resolute refusal to have anything to do with the sort of position that became later known as Kenoticism. Actually it happens that a perfectly sound exegesis can be given in terms of various principles of later theology, as follows: "In the sense that you imply, I know the day and the hour of the Day of Judgment as God, but not as man. That is, as being one with God the Father, Who is supremely associated with creation and general providence, I know such things as how many revolutions of the earth, etc., will take place before the Day. But men have no business to know such things, but only the relation of it to certain definite warning signs, and above all, to the Mission of the Church. Therefore, for your sake I do not know these things as man either. Therefore, insofar as knowledge is of the One Person and not of the Two Natures, I am simply not concerning Myself with such matters at the moment, lest it should interfere with My work, even though I am Son of the Father."


Son of God really, aboriginally, and essentially possessed from all eternity, He is really receiving it as regards His humanity, so that we might receive it, who did not have it before. Now, this presupposes a doctrine of the glorious humanity of Christ, not simply the humanity as an instrument for revelation or the satisfaction of the Law that we find in the "De Incarnatione". The Humanity of Christ must have an active role. Correspondingly, there is a distinct change of emphasis in the way in which the Incarnation is described. Thus is evident, in a sort of way, in all the anti-Arian writings, but it is only here that the occurrences of Incarnational language are frequent enough to enable this to be statistically demonstrated. In the earlier work, the favourite word for the Humanity of Christ was ὑπόθεσις, body, and the favourite expression for the Incarnation as an act is that the Logos took a body, etc. This sort of language is still very much present in the "Contra Arianos". But, corresponding to the new doctrine of the Humanity of Christ which is really personal, though in the manner of the Anhypostasia and the Enhypostasia, there is a new way of describing the Incarnation. The Logos, or Son, "becomes man" (γίνεται ἡμών ὁ Λόγος), and also, by the influence of, and thanks to, John 1:14, "becomes flesh". Correspondingly, in His incarnate life, Christ no longer merely acts, or suffers, by means of or through or in the body; He acts or suffers as a man (ἐστίς ἡμών ὁ Λόγος) or humanly (ἐνθρωπίνως). In one sense, this Christology is incomplete compared with Chalcedon, and in particular it leaves the Apollinarian question of the human soul of Christ as a residual problem. But in another sense it is a truly dynamic Christology which oversteps and bypasses both the Apollinarian issue and Chalcedon, and the paradoxes of, for example, Christ knowing as God and not knowing as man, are not a whit more incomprehensible than those uncovered by modern medicine and psychology in common human life. All the important principles of Chalcedon, the Two Natures, the One Hypostasis, the Anhypostasia
and the Enhypostasia of the Humanity of Christ, are actually present in Athanasius's Christology, in however unfamiliar a form, and as for the Apollinarian issue, it is not so simple as it looks, and the issue itself needs much more careful examination than it usually receives before it can even be discussed in connection with Athanasius. As with Trinitarianism, so with Christology, Athanasius is not theologian for a man whose mind follows the well-worn grooves of formulae.

In our lexicographical analysis of the Incarnation and the Person of Christ, as applied to the three main nouns for the Humanity of Christ, ὄμος, Body; ὄρπα, flesh; ἄνθρωπος, man, and their corresponding words of other parts of speech, we shall follow the classification of the "De Incarnatione", which is identical in each case. Group I: the Humanity is Subject in all senses. Group II: the Humanity is grammatically subject, of a grammatically active verb, but the verb in question is a verb representing a passive state or a state of humiliation. Group III is where the Humanity is object in all senses; this includes subject of a verb in the passive voice. These groups all refer to the Humanity in relation to external environment or the forces of nature, etc., corresponding to what is ordinarily known as the passibility of all creatures. Group IV refers to the Logos or Son being materially subject and the Humanity as object, as in the expression, "the Logos takes a body" (or the corresponding passive, "the body is taken by the Logos"). Group V refers to the Second Person acting (or suffering) in, by or through the humanity. Group VI is the type of expression according to the highest form of Athanasian Christology, where for example, the Logos "becomes" flesh, or man, or acts as man or humanly. Group VII, which we have put last since, like Group I of the terms for the Second Person as such, it hardly occurs in the "De Incarnatione", but, unlike the lastmentioned, it is still relatively uncommon in the Orations.

(661) See above, p<sup>3</sup>00.
refers to the Humanity simply. The uncommonness of this group is an interesting case of the general Athanasian distinction between what is essentially true of the Son, which is ultimate and has no cause whatever, and the Incarnation, which is not eternal and so can be understood etiologically.

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Total, for comparison, all 3 words | 15 | 45 | 8 | 126 | 61 | 254 | 66 | 575 |

Incidentally, the instances of such words as "οἶκος", " ναός", "templē", and "ἐργαλεῖα", instrument, for the Humanity of Christ, of which much has been made by the opponents of Athanasian Christology, are comparatively insignificant, and can be counted on the fingers of one hand. They are used for special effect, and are hardly worth mention in this summary. This table shows the predominance of Flesh and Man against Body, and the very decided predominance of Group VI as a whole, especially where Man is used.

The changes in the doctrine of the Atonement correspond to those in the Incarnation and the Christology. We meet rather less of the legal and cultic-forensic side than we do in the "De Incarnations", and also less of what the former work describes as the revelatory side. The Atonement as a pure mighty Act of God is as prominent as ever. But the side that is most emphasised now is the one primarily concerned with the Humanity of Christ, the fact that Christ assimilated Himself to us for our salvation, so that we may have something, some great privilege from God, that we otherwise could not have. The novelty in the anti-Arian works is that this is often stated to be not so much Deity in the older fashion as the New Humanity. Salvation consists in the destruction and purgation of the older man of sin, and our ingrafting constitutively into the New Humanity of Christ. We are glorified and exalted, for instance, since we are glorified and exalted in Him, He having accomplished this in His Resurrection. The Ora-
tions, incidentally, are even more centred on the Resurrection than the "De Incarnations". But it should not be forgotten that statements of the older type are also common. We are, or become, partakers of the Divine Nature, in the sense of II Pet. 1:4. But here we come perhaps to one of the

(663) Cf "De Incarnations" 1-20. See above, pp. 216-225.

(664) Again, see especially 1:42-43. See above, pp. 751-62
most important differences between the Orations and such earlier works as the "De Incarnatione", and one which is now clearly evident. The Arian controversy had forced Athanasius to make, clearly and ruthlessly, the distinction between the Logos and us men, particularly in the way in which both "are partakers of the Divine Nature". This comes up very clearly in Athanasius's exegesis of John 17:21, when Athanasius has to make clear the difference between the unity in the Godhead, and the unity that Christians are to have with each other and with God, which the Arians erroneously assimilated to the unity within the Trinity Itself. (665) Athanasius in the first place makes the distinction by the use of the Platonic concept of Participation, whereby a thing is, say, good through participation (μεταξύ etc., the operative element in this and all similar words being the prepositional prefix) in the Form Goodness, but only the Forms are perfect; the participation is always imperfect. Whatever one may think of this doctrine as logic, its use by Athanasius certainly safeguards two things, first, the absolute and indeed categorial transcendence of God, Who is participated, over the creatures, who participate, and second, the genuineness of the presence in us of what God gives to us in spite of the fact that it is in a secondary and subordinate sense. (666) But Athanasius probably thinks that this account needs elaboration and is in some respects dangerously naturalistic, and he then points out that it cannot be considered in any naturalistic way, but is the direct consequence of God's special condescension and grace to us: it depends on the whole work of the Atonement. What was primarily, essentially, aboriginally, and naturally true in God has to become true for us. But the final solution to the problem, for Athanasius,

(665) III:10-25. See above, pp. 960-980.
(666) See above, p. 66. The references in the Orations are too numerous for citation.
is that we share in the Divine nature, in this sense, not directly and simply, but through another intermediary, the Holy Spirit, and in a sense this is the concluding issue in our study of the Orations. Although the Spirit is, of course, properly the Third Person of the Trinity, but the dynamic of Athanasian theology has rendered the doctrine of the Spirit incomprehensible unless it is brought up here.

While the Logos was the immanent rationality in man, as well as the Second Person in the Trinity and the cosmologically supreme power, there was no problem in accounting for our sharing in the Divine nature. But, as we have said before, now that the correlations between the Logos and the cosmos and the immanent rationality in man had been broken because of the Arian controversy, and rightly so, it became necessary to account for what had previously been taken for granted. It was this that was the function of the Spirit in Christian theology when interest began to revive in it in the middle of the fourth century. We have already traced the beginnings of this process in the "De Decretis". Here, it is sufficient to say that there is a far greater tendency to refer to the Spirit in all sorts of connections, and a far higher frequency of references to the Spirit, but, except for a few routine references to the Spirit, Athanasius never really gets beyond this stage. The Holy Spirit is mentioned as that of which we participate to become sharers in what is really God's. In fact, it may almost be said that a reference to the Holy Spirit is a sign that the context is one of creaturehood. This appears to have been agreed by both the Arians and Athanasius, as is shown by the section on Ps. 45 AV:7-8. The Arians

(667) See, eg. III:19-25, in order.

(668) See above, pp.506-16.

(669) See above, pp.654-6, and references.


(671) In I:46-50. See above, pp.767-77.
took the presence of the Spirit with the Messianic King as a sign that Christ is entirely a creature, and Athanasius entirely accepted their enthymematic major by attributing the presence of the Spirit to the Humanity of Christ. For this very reason, Athanasius seems to go out of his way to insist on the subordination of even the Spirit to the Son. The Spirit, as he says again and again, "receives" (λαμβάνειν) from the Son and not vice versa at all, although he never uses the words μεταλαμβάνειν, etc., that would imply true categorial subordination. Added to this, there is still a tendency to ascribe functions that were later properly assigned to the Spirit to the Son (or Logos); this is most clearly seen in comparison with the formula that afterwards became standard in the Letters to Serapion, from the Father, through the Logos, in the Spirit.

Under the circumstances, the stage was set for somebody, preferably who accepted the Athanasian achievement on the theology of the Son, to repeat Arianism, this time as applied to the Third Person and not the Second; in other words, for Tropicism. This is the reason why, in and out of season, Athanasius stresses the connection between the two heresies; the arguments for the two are equivalent, and if the Spirit were purely a creature in the most absolute sense, the problem of the relation between creatures and God would arise again. The only possible solution would be that God would communicate with creatures purely by the Logos in the old sense, and this would of course be a reversion to the conditions that produced Arianism, now trebly dangerous since one would be familiar with Arian reasoning and Arian modes of thought. And in fact, Athanasius had to face immediately this particular crisis, and the result was the first effort in the history of theology to define the Spirit as a Person of the Trinity, in the Letters to Serapion.

(672) See I:15, 47. III:24-5.

(673) See above, pp. 483-516.
It is a much more pleasant duty, while we are on this sort of subject, to turn to an aspect of Athanasian theology where Athanasius anticipated the true solution to certain important problems, where he still remains in advance of all theology. It is by the Holy Spirit that mankind, whether the Church collectively or the individual Christian, witnesses to his Lord, performs the work and mission of Christ, and lives the Christian life. But the deeds that are done, the thoughts that are thought, and the plans that are made, are all creaturely as well as Divine. This presents us with the apparent conundrum of having to choose between perfectionism, whether in the Church or in the individual, and pessimism, the idea that man cannot really perform the tasks at all, or at best only perform them as a blind instrument. Now, this problem is analogous to the problem of the Humanity of Christ and the part that it plays in the Incarnation, and this suggests that the solution is analogous. Corresponding to the Holy Spirit in the Church and in the individual Christian, there would be a Created Spirit corresponding to the Body of Christ, which is a concept that does justice to the creaturely factor in the Church. 

Now, no theologian to the author's knowledge, even the Athanasius of the Letters to Serapion, where one would have expected the problem to come up, has ever tried to treat of such an issue, but it is very interesting that, at the very end of the Second Oration, Athanasius comes very close to doing so in his doctrine of the Created Wisdom which is the impress on creatures of the Wisdom that is the Second Person, and is patently analogous to the Body of Christ. Admittedly, the reference is to Wisdom and not the Spirit, but the context indicates that the principle can be readily applied to the Spirit; in fact, there was at one stage a Patristic tradition in the second century that identified Wisdom with the Spirit.

(674) II:78-82. See above, pp. 912-20.
To conclude, there are certain significant absentees from the field of "other doctrines", still. There is very little about the Church, except for the references noted above, and one interesting reference to the Lord's Challenge to Saul of Tarsus, where the Christ that is persecuted is identified with the Church, in a way apparently foreshadowing the exegesis of Prov. 8:22 in the "De Incarnatione et Contra Arianos" (although we do not consider this sufficient ground for the genuineness of this last-mentioned work). It is almost as if any reference to the authority of the Church would interfere with Athanasius's main task. Similarly, there is no reference to the Sacraments to the extent that they bulk in almost all later theology, beyond the references to the importance of Baptism in the context of the deadly results of its corruption by the Arian adulterated Trinity. Also absent is any detailed doctrine of History, even though there is the essential foundation for it, and also of the Last Judgment except formally in connection with the Christological exegesis of Mk. 13-32. We have noticed all these things as absentees from the "De Incarnatione". Perhaps it is unfair to make too much of this, because these issues could become acute only in the context of the Doctrine of the Spirit, and if we Westerners believe that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, we, of all people, should not expect the Doctrine of the Spirit to become a major issue until the Doctrine of the Son has been put right.

To conclude, the Orations are one of the cardinal works of theological history, and constitute a watershed between two great epochs in theological history. They are the definitive and brilliant solution of the

(676) II: 80: 316B. See above, pp. 919.
problem of the relation between the Divine and the creaturely in God's Deed, as it applies to the singular Being, Jesus. It is also— and this is very much the same thing—the solution of the problem of the relation between what does not change, being God, and what changes; it gives the right place to the dynamic. It is Jesus as Man that grows and progresses; not God. Similarly, in the problem that faces us today, we must remember that it is we, Christian humanity, that grows unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ; there is no Absolute progressively coming to perfect self-consciousness, and no development of historical necessity or whatever is the Marxist equivalent of the Hegelian doctrine in question. Henceforth, although Arianism could still persecute, it was finished as a vital creed. It could continue for a while only in the ossified and scholastic form that it took with Eunomius. Henceforth, the chief problems were the question of the Deity of the Spirit, which we have already discussed in full, and the tidying up of the Christology. It is unfortunate that in the process of tidying it up the theologians of a later generation lost some of the finest Christological insights of Athanasius. But from now on, and this includes the last stages of Athanasius's life, these are to be the main problems. For this reason, except for the Epistles to Serapion, which deal with the Arianism of the Spirit and are therefore essential for the full Trinitarian doctrine, and the "De Synodia" which in a sense supplies the treatise on the Homoousion which is missing from the Orations, they represent for our purposes a fitting close.
Chapter VIII - ENCYCLICAL EPISTLE TO THE BISHOPS OF EGYPT AND LIBYA.

This (see Robertson's Introduction, L.N.P/N.F) was written early in the Third Exile, when the nomination of George was already known to the see of Alexandria by the Arians, but before Athanasius knew of the serious persecution that took place soon after. The reference in ch. 22 to the condemnation of the Arians 36 years before has been held to refer to Nicaea, but it may refer to their condemnation within the Patriarchate of Alexandria by Bishop Alexander in 320\(^{(1)}\). The work is a summary of the Arian controversy, and especially of the Contra Arianos I-III, together with certain material appropriate to the more specifically ecclesiastical nature and purpose of the writing. There is very little that, under those circumstances, claims our detailed attention, and there is virtually nothing new here.

Chs. I-3 are introductory. 4-11 are a general account of the impiety of Arianism, with a special warning against being misled by their quotations of Scripture. 12 is a summary of Arian statements, especially from the "Thalia", and 13-18 give the arguments against them, especially the great exegeses of the "Contra Arianos". 19 is an account of the death of Arius, 20-22 describes the present state of the Arian heresy and its supporters, the Meletians and the Acacians (see also ch.7). 23 is the conclusion. There is no especial reference to the Homoousion, or to what later became the Trinitarian terminology. There are only four references to the Holy Spirit, none of which represents any important new development. 1: PG XXV 540A is a routine reference to the gift of

\(^{(1)}\) See above, pp. 5-4 for a further study of the matter.
Holy Spirit as one aspect of grace. 1:540B, we distinguish between truth and falsehood, in spite of deceit, by the grace of the Spirit (ἐν τῷ πνεύματος Χριστοῦ) 2: 541A, we can answer the Devil "in the words spoken by the Spirit against him," i.e. Ps.50 AV:16, and Wisd.15:9. The final reference is in the Doxology, which is the normal Trinitarian form (δέ + gen. of Son, ἐν of Spirit). Chapter 4, in which the Arian quotation of Scripture is discussed, is not a criticism of the absolute authority of Scripture, but, as the references to Marcion and Paul of Samosata as comparable cases, of the misuse of Scripture, or rather the wrenching of parts of Scripture out of their context and the wanton neglect of Scripture as a whole. In the statement, 548A, that the simple person is deceived by perceiving only τὰ λέγομεν, the words, what he misses is not the regula fidel, but simply the meaning of the words, πῶς διάλειται. On the other side perhaps, Athanasius repeatedly emphasises the special significance of Nicaea as an authoritative pronouncement of the Church. The only other statement that need be noticed is in 15: 572C, in the context of the status of the Son as the true Logos through whom all things are created: ὃς μὲν ἐστὶ ἡμῖν Θεόν Ὁ λόγος πατρὸς ἐγώ, φωνὴν τῇ ἐργῇ, ὡς καὶ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς ἀναλόγου θεοπροέδρου. The word ἀναλόγου in particular indicates that Athanasius still supported natural theology, as in the Contra Gentiles, in spite of the developments in his theology that would make this difficult. However, it is probably fair to say that the statement is embedded in material that is utterly Christocentric in the usual way with Athanasius.

There will be no lexicographic analysis; the material is too small and apart from a 5:1 predominance of Logos over Son as the title for the second Person, there are no significant features.
VIII A - APOLOGY TO CONSTANTIUS.

This Apology, written from exile, early in 357, to the Emperor Constantius, is of historical interest only.

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VIII B - DEFENCE OF THE FLIGHT (ἈΠΟΘΟΣΙΑ ΤΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΦΥΛΗΣ ΑΥΤΟΥ)

There are two points of interest in this work, written late 357 or early 358 (he knew of the lapse of Hosius at Sirmium but not of the death of Leontius of Antioch); firstly, the principle, which is the cornerstone of the work, that there is a time for everything, even when it involves having to do different things at different times; there is a time for flight and a time for suffering. Secondly, and of even more interest to us, is the emphasis on the Holy Spirit as the immediate source of the command to do these various things, especially these acts of flight that at first sight represent a deviation from constancy. It is the Spirit that is in charge of their actions, whether they fled or whether they fought.  

Ep.17:PG XXV: 665B: "And if ever in their flight they met their pursuers, they did not merely do this, but ΤΟΙΟ ΧΩΡ ΠΕΝΕΙΝΤΑΤΟ ΛΟΠΟΥΝΤΟΣ ΑΣΤΟΙΣ they then went and met their enemies in righteousness, by which they also showed their obedience and zeal towards God. Such was Elijah, who heard ΠΕΝΕΙΝΤΑΤΟ and showed himself to Ahab .... (also Micaiah, the prophet of 1 Kings 13, Paul's appeal to Caesar). Again, in ch. 13, where there is further reference to the flights of Jacob, Moses, David, Elijah, Peter and Paul, we find that Elijah, who hid from Jezebel, yet (668B) "showed no cowardice ἈΚΟΣΤΑΤΟΣ ΠΕΝΕΙΝΤΑΤΟΣ to confront Ahab and rebuke Azariah." Athanasius states, at the beginning of the next chapter,
that this proves that their flight was not due to cowardice. In 22,673A, the very fact that the martyrs fled once shows that they did not seek death or tempt it, but that when the time came to suffer it, their zeal was \( \pi \tau \rho \iota \tau \sigma \tau \rho \eta \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \mu \alpha \iota \tau \) \( \tau \sigma \tau \rho \). There are two other more or less incidental references to the Holy Spirit: 15: 664A; "And the Preacher speaks confidently: \( \tau \eta \iota \iota \iota \tau \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \mu \iota \tau \iota \iota \iota \varepsilon \iota \iota \iota \iota \), 'For man also knoweth not his own time.' (Ecclesiastes 9:12)." This is a routine use of the Spirit to introduce a Scripture passage, and as usual, it is a passage from the "Writings", but the use is particularly appropriate here, in view of the use made of the Doctrine of the Spirit in this work. The Doxology is Trinitarian, in the usual form, glory to the Father (dative), through (\( \kappa \lambda \beta \iota +\text{gen.}\)) the Son, in (\( \varepsilon \nu \)) the Spirit.

This shows, interestingly enough, that there was this instinctive return to one of the main New Testament aspects of the Doctrine of the Spirit, that is, the Spirit as the One Who guides us, so to speak, "in the dark", as soon as the pressure of persecution on the orthodox became really bad.\(^{(1)}\) Perhaps this even played a part in the revival of interest in the Spirit generally, now that theological developments in the Arian controversy had paved the way. Unfortunately, when we examine Athanasius's reconstruction of Pneumatology, we do not find this element. The reason is that there was still (and is still at this day) the unfortunate and highly Greek antithesis between the doctrine of faith in itself and its proclamation and witness, which must be transcended. Theology exists for the sake of the work and witness of the Church, and also theology must include as part of its subject matter under its discipline, the witness to itself and all that might befall the Church in its

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\(^{(1)}\) See Appendix, pp.
obedience to its calling. To everybody in the Greek tradition (including theologians generally, and not excluding Arius!) this false antithesis is all too natural, and it is here above all that Karl Marx has found the Church out. Therefore it is of great interest that, despite adumbrations in earlier theologians, Karl Barth has been the first to break it down at the fundamental level.

Chapter VIII C - HISTORIA ARIANORUM AD MONACHOS.

This work is a continuation of the historical account of the Arians, from the point reached, in 338-9, at the end of the Apology against the Arians. It was written in the middle of the Third Exile, as it includes the full details of the great persecution in Alexandria beginning in 357, under the Anti-Patriarch George, with the full support of Constantius. In contrast with the respectful tone of the Apology to Constantius, and even the reserve of the Defence of His Flight, Athanasius has abandoned Constantius altogether, and this work is a ferocious denunciation of him as a latter-day principal in Ariomania, and indeed (ch.77) as the precursor, τοῦ προτομοῦ, of Antichrist, persecution having its usual effect in sharpening eschatological sense. In general, the work has only historical interest. The most important part for us is the part that is often considered the most objectionable, ch.38, which denounces the part played by eunuchs in the Court of Constantinople, and maintains that they are excluded officially from all Church courts because their disability gives them an automatic prejudice against sonship and generation and hence against the basic faith of the Church. This, whatever we may think of it, indicates definitely that the instinctive, sub-academic theology of the Second Person was at the time, and always
was, a Son theology rather than a Logos theology.

Chapter VIII D - LIFE OF ANTONY.

This famous work, the authenticity of which was doubted by Gwatkin and Weingarten,(1) is again generally accepted now, on the grounds of the unusually strong external evidence and the weakness of the arguments against it. Unfortunately, there is virtually nothing of interest to us in this work. It might be suggested that Athanasius's interest in asceticism might be a sign that there was something wrong with his doctrine of the Spirit, but there is no clue here. Perhaps, if any criticism is to be made along these lines, it would be in terms of the old tendency to consider the Spirit primarily as a regard for meritorious behaviour, in which case there would be a particularly strong tendency to assume that the most rewarding activity would be ascetism. We actually find this in the exegetical works on the Psalms traditionally attributed to Athanasius. However, it is necessary to support Athanasius on this matter of asceticism generally. The Vita shows no trace of any motive in Antony but sheer obedience to the Lord's command (ch.2). Athanasius has no sympathy with asceticism at its worst. His Letter to Amun is a criticism of deprecation of the body in principle. Again, in the Letter to Dracontius, a plea to the addressee to accept the rough and tumble of an Episcopate, the reason of Dracontius for not wishing to accept was not cowardice but monasticism. When we come to the Vita, we find that the outstanding characteristic of Antony was not his ascetism but his sheer energy, in the highest Christian sense, whether in resisting

(1) See Gwatkin, "Studies in Arianism" 102-9 for unfavourable judgment, and Robertson's Introduction for favourable judgment and general comment.
the celebrated temptations, or in service to travellers, or in working miracles, or in fighting for the Faith against heresy.

Chapter VIII B - THE EARLY LETTERS OF ATHANASIUS.

Apart from the issues that we have just mentioned, the early letters, including those of the Third Exile, the Letter to the Martyrion from Sardica (343-44), the Letter to Alexandria from Sardica (343-44), Letter to Amun, Letter to Dracontius, the two Letters to Lucifer (of Calaris), the First and Second Letters to the Monks, and the Letter to Serapion on the Death of Arius, contain no fresh theological material than requires any attention here.
CHAPTER IX - DE SYNODIS.

The full title of this major historical work is ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΧΕΝΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΕΝ ΤΩ ΑΡΙΜΙΝΩ ΤΗΣ ΙΤΑΛΙΑΣ, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΣΕΛΕΥΚΕΙΑ ΧΕΛΩΝ ΣΟΥΝΟΣ, Chapters 1–14 are a historical account of the Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia, with the historical background, chapters 15–20 are devoted to the origins of Arianism and its character, with special reference to the pronouncements of its two most infamous theologians, Arius himself and Asterius, and chapters 21–32 treat of the manifold evasions and equivocations of the Arian or Arianizing synods from 335 onwards. 33–54 is Athanasius's great final vindication of the Homoousion, with the Doxology at the end of ch. 54, and the last chapter, 55, is a postscript containing the communications between Constantius and the Bishops at Ariminum, which Athanasius had not received by the time that he wrote the early part of the work.

The internal evidence for the date of composition is inconsistent. The early conciliar section, chs. 1–14, was written after the break-up of the Council of Seleucia on October 1st, 359 (ch. 12, end), but, as we have said, before news reached Athanasius of Constantius's rebuff to the orthodox Bishops of Ariminum and his demand that they attend him at Adrianople, which was later inserted as an appendix to the main work; no mention at all is made at any stage of their surrender at Nike. On the other hand, ch. 31 refers to the proceedings of the Arian or Anomoean Synod of Antioch in 361, and to the death bed baptism of Constantius by the Arian Euzoios in that year, which undoubtedly suggests that what we have now is a later recension of the work made after that date. The question is, why did Athanasius change the body of the work in the one case and not the other? Probably Athanasius felt that the
account of the matter of the Bishops of Ariminum, involving as it did actual documents, would be better as an appendix; or perhaps there was even a third recension, Athanasius having decided to wait until he could secure an exact transcript of the correspondence. On the contrary, the matter of the Synod of Antioch makes such a perfect climax to chapters 21-32 that Athanasius would most likely have judged that a change in the body of the work was the best thing to do. Thus the final conclusion is that the work as a whole was written at or about the end of 359, but was amended at least once, possibly twice, after late 361.

It is important to know exactly when the various parts of the "De Synodis" were written, on account of their theological relation to the Letters to Serapion. We have already suggested that there may be a very close connection between this work and the missing genuine Fourth Oration against the Arians, which was either issued and lost, or planned and never issued. The problem applies primarily to the great section on the Homoousion, which is still largely Binitarian in character, and if it is assumed to have been written for the first time in late 359, it comes inconveniently close to the Epistles to Serapion; this question will be discussed further in the appropriate place. However, if our speculations have any substance, it is possible that Athanasius had already written the section on the Homoousion, or at least a preliminary draft, some time before 359, in preparation for the future Fourth Oration, and that he decided to take the opportunity to issue it in the somewhat different and more occasional work that was the "De Synodis." Even if he had never previously got as far as making a draft, he was probably planning the section for a long time in advance, and after all

(1) See above pp. 654-61.
he had previously written at length on the matter in the "De Decretis." Under these circumstances, especially under the conditions of exile in the wilderness, verbal memory, while never quite attaining to the constancy of the written word, can become surprisingly firm and rigid. We moderns - and this applies to all post-Renaissance scholarship - with our far greater reliance on books and written or printed records, have largely lost this faculty of verbal memory independent of written reference, compared with the ancient world, and it would have been still stronger among Greeks owing to their great economy of expression - itself due to their culture but also in part to these same technical limitations. (It is possible that the features of Scripture that have been interpreted as being due to early creeds embedded in it, are due primarily to these technical factors - which of course would still greatly encourage the casting of the material into a form that lends itself to creed formation. Again, if Athanasius had already published a definitive version of the hypothetical Fourth Oration which later was lost or destroyed, the verbal memory would be all the stronger and stricter. Thus, while the section on the Homoousion was not written in its final form till late 359 at the earliest, we cannot exclude its de facto existence in the verbal memory of Athanasius from a much earlier date, perhaps the beginning of the Third Exile.

The author wishes to express disagreement with the general opinion concerning the purpose of the work; however, this is so closely involved with the study of the Homoousion Section that it will be studied in that context.

The first or contemporary section, chapters 1-14, need not detain us at all, and we have already quoted all the significant extracts.
in earlier portions of this thesis. The same applies to chs. 15-20, on
the nature and early history of the Arian heresy. Section 21-32, on
Arianizing Synods requires a little more attention. In form, it is little
more than a catena of their creeds, linked together by the bald statement
that the Arians were not satisfied with the one, so they concocted another.
The creeds range from the relatively innocuous to the dangerous, and, at
the final extreme, to the rabidly Anomoean and "Ex-suk-ontian" creed of
Antioch in 361 which closes the list in the final form of the work. They
include one creed, the First Sirmian, of 351, directed against Marcellus's
disciple Photinus, that is treated as a Catholic creed even by Hilary
of Poitiers (Hil.: De Syn. : 36-69), the great Latin opponent of Arianism,
and this in spite of its 27th Anathema, which Athanasius found so bad
(C. AR III : 58-67). They are all indiscriminately referred to as the
products of Arianism, which is conclusive evidence against the common
idea that this work was primarily meant to conciliate the Easterners who
had vacillated between the two parties. The feature that is emphasised
in Newman's notes on the "De Synodis" is the contrast between the vigor-
ous and unequivocal denunciation of Sabellianism in all its forms, espec-
ially Marcellus of Ancyra and Photinus, and the mildness and even equiv-
oculation of their denunciation of gross Arianism. This is a real and sig-
nificant characteristic of these creeds considered as a whole, and as we
have said it is a topic that Athanasius would have had to consider in a
work on a larger and more leisurely scale than this. However, in this
book, he found the conditions too cramped to make the point clearly. Nor
was he able to differentiate between the relative good and evil in the
various creeds, although he would again undoubtedly have done so in con-
ditions of the "Contra Arianos" I-III. And although Newman was quite
right to make the point that he did, he may have exaggerated its importance
for Athanasius as he wrote.

The important factor for Athanasius is certainly the thing that he actually mentioned, that is, the sheer credal instability of the opponents of Nicaea. This is most important, as it is very difficult for our modern age, with its immense verbosity and passion for "self-expression", to see the point that Athanasius was trying to make. For Athanasius, a creed must be short and concise, and the urge to make minor and verbose modifications while maintaining general agreement is due, not to a wholesome passion for exactitude, but to a pathological instability and lack of assurance. And this criticism applies whatever might have been the case about the composition of the Synods, or of any one of them, and it applies in the same way to the relatively innocent and outrageous formulae alike. The point is that, whether it was the work of the Arians in their underground intrigue, or of the "Eastern conservatives" who were sceptical of the Homoousion, or anyone else, or any deliberate or unintentional combination of any number of these parties, there was no possibility of getting beyond Nicaea, in the sense of abandoning its great achievement. This confessional instability was simply the outward and visible sign and result of their attempt to do the impossible. There was no orthodox alternative to Nicaea that would bring all good men together under its wing. The only alternative was chaos. By their fruits, implies Athanasius, ye shall know them.

A careful analysis of the question of the nature of creeds indicates that the position implied by Athanasius must be correct, even though there is widespread unawareness of the right reason. A creed must be stable and concise because, as a glance at the very wording of the great Christian creeds shows, it is not primarily an affirmation of
belief in *facts*, but of trust in God as a Person (in our modern sense). The formula is not "I believe that" but rather, "I believe in God..... Who....". The adjectival clauses and nouns in apposition to the Three Persons are the indispensable minimum of facts concerning God's own self-authentication to us in His work of grace, and this is in essence true even of the items of the Third Article that appear to be formally different. There is and must be a place for theological elaboration, but a creed, as so understood, is the least suitable place that can be imagined. This is not to say that Athanasius consciously saw matters this way, - in fact, he did not - but it is not too much to suggest that some such principle played its part in the thinking of Athanasius below the conscious level.

This probably represents the mind of Athanasius when he first wrote the work. But the later evidence, which he inserted after the death of Constantius, proved him even more in the right than he had realized, since it dramatically showed the ultimate and inevitable outcome of the whole enterprise. The Arianism swung further and further from the middle point, and the final result was the blatant Anomoeanism of Antioch. Even the chaotic variety of the earlier years was shown to be no longer a real alternative. In the last analysis, the only two possibilities were Nicaea, or Arianism in its most ruthless and uncompromising form. Thus, the conclusion of this section, ch. 32, is not an olive branch, but a passionate appeal to all and sundry to desist utterly from their path and to return to Nicaea.

This section, interpreted on the above lines, is the supreme expression of what might be called the ecclesiastical side of Athanasius's doctrine of piety which he sets in opposition to Arianism. We have
already seen what piety involved, as respect for Scripture as Divine revelation. There have been of course other expressions in which Athanasius says simply that the impiety of Arianism consisted simply in the repudiation of the Council of Nicaea, and they are often taken by "Catholic" scholars as indicating that Athanasius believed in the authority of the Church as a brute fact. But if we accept that De Synodis 21-32 is the definitive commentary on these passages, we find that there is far more to the issue than the sheer authority of the Church conceived according to the Conciliarist principle. On this basis, there is nothing in Athanasius that is in the least incompatible with the Protestant principle of the supremacy of Scripture; indeed the two go together and in a certain sense complementary. The Reformers, all of them, were second to none in their insistence that the Reformation faith be confessed credally and catechetically, and in our day Karl Barth has revived this position (see Ch. Dog. Vol. I Pt. II, pp. 632-660 Eng. ed.). Indeed, De Synodis 21-32 pointedly resembles the sections in which Barth maintains that the essential vacuity of Protestant Liberalism in theology is finally shown by the fact that nobody has ever had the slightest impulse to confess it credally, in the face of its obvious incompatibility with the existing traditional creeds. It is in that sense that Barth regards it as un-eclesiastical, and the importance he attaches to this is indicated by the change of title from "Christliche Dogmatik" in the first edition of Volume I, to "Kirchliche Dogmatik" in the second and definitive edition of the same volume, a change which has remained permanent. The confessional instability and garrulity of the Arianizers plays exactly the same part in Athanasius's argument as the confessional nullity of Protestant Liberalism plays with Barth, and the two are in fact substantially equivalent. (2)

(2) See above, pp. 858-63.
Having called for a universal return to Nicaea and its definitive principle, the Homoeousian, Athanasius at last proceeds to give his final justification for it, which makes a fitting conclusion to his anti-Arian writings. This section will require detailed study, but still in rather more abbreviated form than in the earlier parts of the thesis, since there is a great deal of material that has been fully treated before. Athanasius begins by reminding the reader that people can find terminology offensive, not only because of its inherent qualities, but also because of their own stupidity. The Arians are a case in point, or worse, since their cavil shows that they do not take seriously even the naming of God: (34:733A) "If then, when you name the Father or use the word 'God' you do not signify essence or understand Him as being what He is \( \kappa \alpha \iota \iota \lambda \omega \sigma \tau \alpha \nu \) , but signify something else about Him \( (\pi \varepsilon \pi \iota \alpha \delta \omicron \nu) \) ..... you should not have written that the Son is from the Father \( (\varepsilon k \tau o \omega \pi \tau \rho o \sigma) \) , but from what is about Him or in Him..... On the contrary, continues Athanasius in the next chapter, such reductionism ruins all theology; the truth is that when we hear God pure and simple in Scripture we understand simply (733C) "the Essence itself, simple, blessed, and incomprehensible, of Him Who is.... and if you too have said that the Son is from God \( (\varepsilon k \tau o \omega \Omega \varepsilon o \sigma) \) it follows that you have said that He is from the Essence of the Father\(^{(3)}\)..... it is all one to say rightly 'from God' and 'from the essence'." In conclusion, Athanasius again establishes the differentiation between the Son, Who is "from God" by nature and generation, and creatures who are "from God" by external acts of creation at the will of God. In the next chapter, Athanasius continues in the same way, and again maintains that the Arian claim that

\(^{(3)}\) \( \varepsilon k \tau o \omega \Omega \varepsilon o \sigma \) .
expressions involving Essence, οὐσία, are un-Scriptural; their own
terminology is at least in the same position formally, and materially in-
finitely worse. In any case, he continues, what were Acacius and the
Arians doing admitting, at the Council of the Dedication, that He was
37 "exact Image of the Essence and Power and Will and Glory"? Why
then does this follower of Eusubius of Caesarea, who allowed the Homoousion,
now repudiate all expressions concerning "essence"? The formula admitted
at the earlier Synod, says Athanasius, is surely equivalent to the formulae
that the later Arians are trying to reject.

We pause here to note that so far Athanasius is referring to
the word "essence", οὐσία, and by corollary the Homoousion, in what
we have termed the arithmetical sense, οὐσία as πρώτη οὐσία, referring to the arithmetical singularity of God. This was an important
element in Athanasius's former presentation, and it reappears here with
approximately the same importance. It is evident from our summary of the
last few chapters that this element played an essential part in the polemic
against the Arians. In the next chapter, Athanasius discusses what
we have called the generic aspect of the Homoousion, οὐσία as
δεύτερη οὐσία, and as it is often stated that this element has become
more prominent in the "De Synodis," we shall again quote the relevant pass-
ages. The chapter begins as a continuation of the subject-matter of the
previous one, during which Athanasius mentions that the same party had
previously anathematized those who say that the Son is "unlike", διότι οὐκ αὐτῆς.
Athenasius dismisses this alike as sophistry (760C): "For if He be not
alike according to essence (5), then He is surely unlike; and the Unlike

(4) οὐσίας τε καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ Βουλῆς καὶ ὁδὸς ἀπειράλληκτος εἶναι.
(5) διότι οὐκ αὐτῆς - a phrase which, as Newman points out, would
not be accepted as satisfactory (in the orthodox or Nicene or anti-Arian
sense) by Athanasius, and whose rejection on the opposite ground would be
great and conclusive evidence of heresy of the Arian type.
cannot be an Image. And if so, it would not hold that he who has seen
the Son has seen the Father, since the difference between them would be
at a maximum (6) or rather the one would be totally unlike the other.
And the Unlike cannot be called Like." Athanasius continues by saying
that this means that the Son cannot but be a flawed image, and that this
is un-Scriptural.

This reference to the issue of Likeness in connection with
the Homoousian was not provoked by the necessity of conciliating moderate
Homoeans, but by the extreme Homoeans having undercut their own case by
their previous denial of the "Unlike". In any case, this reference is
not as prominent as the previous ones, and in any case is patently con-
trolled by them; that is, even the Likeness is not ordinary Likeness,
but the peculiar sort of Likeness which is intimately associated with
the whole relation between Father and Son, as was the case with the pre-
vious uses of the concept of Likeness in this connection.

39 In the next two chapters, Athanasius continues in rebuttal of
40 the Arian complaint that their theology is Scriptural while the
Catholic theology was not, and to challenge the Arians again to return
to Nicaea. The statement (39:761B-C) that the Devil quoted Scripture,
but Paul proclaimed Christ even when quoting heathen authors, looks like
a denial of the primacy of Scripture for the sake of some a priori "piety".
But we have already seen that this "piety" was in the main respect for
the integrity of the Scriptural witness, and this, in the Arian controversy,
is always so intimately associated with Christocentricity, the proper
testimony to Christ, and Scripture and Christ as both in their own ways
a genuine revelation of God, that the passage in question is the exact

(6) πλείστης ἡ εἰς ὑμᾶς ὢν Ἰησοῦς Θεοῦ
equivalent of the statement of Luther that, "What teacheth not Christ is not Apostolic, even though Peter or Paul teacheth it. Again, what preacheth Christ is Apostolic, even though Judas, Annas, Pilate and Herod doth it." (Pref. Eps. James and Jude, 1522, as quoted in K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. I Pt. II p.478 Eng. ed.).

Athanasius now makes his significant remarks about who is to be accepted as a friend and who is not to be: "...those, however, who accept everything else that was defined at Nicaea and doubt only about the Homoousion, must not be treated as enemies, nor do we here attack them as Arians nor as opponents of the Fathers, but we discuss the matter with them as brothers with brothers, who mean what we mean but dispute only about the word ( ὅνομα ). For, confessing that the Son is from the essence of the Father and not from other subsistences, and that He is neither creature nor thing made but His genuine and natural offspring and that He eternally coexists with the Father, being Logos and Wisdom, are not far from accepting the phrase Coessential. Now, such is Basil, who wrote from Ancyra concerning the faith. For to say only, 'like according to essence' is very far from signifying "of the essence" ( ἐκ τῆς ὀνόματος ), by which, as they themselves have said, the genuineness of the Son in relation to the Father is rather signified. Thus tin is only like ( ὅμοιος ) silver, a wolf to

(7) ἡν ἀνθυπνη συνοικών ἐξοντος
(8) μη ἐστιν κατὰ σύμμετρον ὁμοτρικήν

portion of the Nicene Anathema. See Newman's Excursus on the phrase, ἐστιν κατὰ σύμμετρον ὁμοτρικήν in the Nicene Anathema, in his edition of the anti-Arian treatises of Athanasius, and also in L.N.F.-N.F.; here he maintains that, in the Anathema, ὀνόματι and ὡς ὁμοτρικήν were then synonymous, as they were virtually throughout Athanasius.
a dog, and gilt brass to true gold, but tin is not from gold; nor could a wolf be accounted the offspring of a dog. But since they say that He is from the Essence (ἐξ ὑπ’ οὐσιάς) and Homoiousios, what do they mean by these but Homoousios? For while to say only Homoiousios does not necessarily convey 'from the essence', to say, on the contrary, 'Homoousios' signifies the meaning of both terms 'Like in essence (συμοιουσίας) and 'from the essence'.' This refers to the Synodal Letter of the Semi-Arian Synod of Ankyra of 358, of which Basil of Ankyra was the chief figure, accompanied by Eustathius of Sebaste and others. This passage is usually taken as indicating that the purpose of the "De Synodis" was irenic, and that Athanasius has already changed the ground of the Homoousion to refer it more to generic likeness. However, there are certain grounds against this. In the first place, this is not suggested by Athanasius's grounds for supporting Basil of Ankyra, that is, that he really accepts the ἐξ ὑπ’ οὐσιάς, that is, the quasi-ontogenic principle, and therefore ought to accept the Homoousion; not that he accepts the generic likeness of Father and Son, and ought to accept the Homoousion. Athanasius's statement rests on such statements as (Migne PG XLII : 413o) ἤ σοφιά οὐσίας τούτων ἀπὸ σοφίας οὐσίας, which are difficult and possibly even corrupt in the Hereses of Epiphanius from which we have quoted them and are our source of the full letter. Epiphanius is quite unfriendly to Basil of Ankyra and all other Semi-Arians - his own name for them - and treats them as the 73rd or 53rd heresy. In any case, Athanasius's argument as seen here, however it may be related to what Basil actually said - it is probably a justifiable inference -

(9) οὔτε δὲ κατάτερος ἐκ τοῦ Ιησοῦ οὐκ ἔρχεται.
(10) See Epiphanius Haer ᾽Αίτ.: II-XI.
indicates that the change in his own position as compared with the De Decretis is quite negligible. The actual letter itself, as we find it in Epiphanius, is indistinguishable in character from the other creeds and formularies quoted by Athanasius as "Arian" in chs. 214-32. There is the same extreme and repeated emphasis on the condemnation of Sabellianism and Marcellanism in particular, the same or almost the same relative lack of rigour against Arianism, or what Newman takes in his notes on the relevant section of the "De Synodis" to be lack of rigour, and what Epiphanius would certainly have taken to be lack of rigour. This creed was in fact issued as much as anything else as a protest against the more extreme Homoean or Anomoean party, and hence some of the more blatantly Arian expressions are condemned, like $\kappa\tau\omicron\delta\omicron\nu$, or the idea that the likeness between Son and Father was as the likeness between man and God (cf. C.A.F. III: 10-25), and for the same reason Basil is treated with respect by the later historians Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret, but this is the only thing that can be said in favour of his Letter. The letter strongly favours terms involving likeness, like the one criticised here, $\delta\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron$ $\kappa\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron$ and anathematizes the $\delta\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron$ in the final Anathema; this he patently interprets in a Sabellian sense, and indeed he had a special interest in attacking this heresy, as he was the successor of the deposed Marcellus of Ancyra and had played a leading part in the condemnation of Photinus.

Again, Athanasius goes out of his way to attack the sort of expression which Basil of Ancyra favoured, and the elements which he condemned as at least insufficient are much more strongly in evidence than the elements that he praised. Thus, the conclusion that suggests
itself is that Athanasius wished to issue a grave warning to Basil of Ancyra as much as to praise him. He is prepared to recognise that Basil had opposed the neo-Arian extremists, and besides Athanasius was in need of allies; these considerations undoubtedly compelled Athanasius to deliver his warning in this veiled and friendly way. But it is a warning nevertheless, as if Athanasius had said, "If you wish to keep free from the clutches of Arianism, and remarks do you credit so far - you must avoid the sort of thing that you say in the body of your Letter and follow the Nicene terminology. In particular, you must not follow the way of futility that your predecessors followed during the last 25 years, attacking Marcellus when the real enemy was Arius; otherwise you will finish the way they have." In the remainder of this chapter and the next, Athanasius gives an exposition of the Homoousion which is indistinguishable from De Decretis 20-23; the last sentence of ch. 42, which is a significant summary of the argument, is "... who so considers the Son \( \chi\varepsilon\nu\nu\eta\mu\delta \), rightly considers Him also as \( \varepsilon\mu\mu\omega\sigma\beta\alpha\nu \). The extracts that we have quoted indicate that the emphasis on the relation between the Homoousion and the generation of the Son from the Father, what we have called the quasi-genetic aspect of the Homoousion, is as much to the fore as ever. Indeed, the analogy from modern genetics can actually throw light on the most difficult aspect of the Homoousion as here propounded; where are we to draw the line between co-essentiality and mere likeness? Genetics gives a quite definite answer; the limit of specific identity is such that within it inter-breeding is possible with the production of offspring also within the limit, while outside it a male and female cannot breed offspring, or in the rare cases in which they do (e.g. mules) the offspring is sterile. Athanasius's references in ch. 41 to wolves not being the offspring of dogs, as an
analogy, suggests that some such principle was actually in his mind. In any case, it indicates once again the close connection between the Homoeousion and the generation of the Son. (11)

43 Athanasius now turns to the question of the banning of the Homoeousion in 269 by the Synod that condemned Paul of Samosata; before doing so, he quotes further from Dionysius of Alexandria as a defender (in spite of the attack by his Roman namesake) of the Homoeousion. As another example of the correct handling of an un-Scriptural term, he discusses the Ageneton. All this has been fully quoted and discussed before, and will not occupy us further, except that the argument of Paul of Samosata appears to have been that, if two personally distinct beings, like Father and Son, were Co-essential, their essences, for this to be so, must both participate in another Essence which would be a genuine third Essence. (12)

48 Athanasius continues by repeating his criticism of the Arian tendency to assimilate the Co-essential likeness of Father and Son, which is as the Radiance is of the Light (13) to the likeness and agreement (συμφωνία) of creatures with the Father. As this has already been treated much more fully in C.Apr.III: 6-25, it does not need to detain us further. Continuing, in the next chapter, "This is why He has equality (τὸ ίσον θεόν) in relation to the Father by titles expressive of unity (14) and what is said of the Father is said in

(11) See above, pp. 629-640
(12) See above, pp. 361-366 for the passages on Paul of Samosata, and pp. 306-308 for the passage from chs. 46-7 on the Ἀγένετον.
(13) μή σπέρ καὶ τὸ παράξενον τῶν φύσεων.
(14) πάντι ἐνείδεσθαι φύσις.
Scripture of the Son also, excepting only His being called Father. (15)

The titles that Athanasius cites are: common possession of all things (John 16:15 and 17:10), the name God (John 1:1), Almighty (Rev. 1:8), Light (John 8:12), Creator and Worker (John 1:3, 5:19), Eternity (Rom. 1:20) John 1:1, 9, Gen. 19:24, Is. 45:5, Amos 5:16, I Cor. 8:6). Receiving of worship (Heb. 1:6, Matt. 4:11, 24:31, John 5:23, Philipp. 2:6). Truth from true, Life from Living, common exercise of such privileges as forgiveness (Deut. 6:4, Ps. 50 AV:1, 118 AV:27, 83 LXX:8, Matt. 9:5, Mk. 2:11, I Tim. 1:17, Ps. 24 AV:7, Dan. 4:3 AV 7:14).

50 Athanasius maintains now that if we maintain that the Son reveals the Father by what is unlike in kind and alien in essence, (16) and still wish to worship the Son, there is no choice but idolatry and polytheism. Continuing, "But if this is shocking, plainly the Son is not ἀνυφομοιονοσίας (unlike in essence) but Ἡμοοοιοσίας with the Father, for if what the Father has is the Son's by nature (ἡφήσακα), and the Son Himself is from the Father, and because of this unity of godhead and nature He and the Father are one, and He that hath seen the Son hath seen the Father, He is fittingly called Co-essential by the Fathers, for it does not belong to one different in essence (ἐτεροοοιοσία) to have such prerogatives." In these chapters there is a certain mention of likeness between Father and Son, especially in chapter 49, but it is in the main subordinate to their unity in the sense that Athanasius expounded in his earlier theology under the title of the Homoousion. The conclusion of ch. 50 shows clearly how little attention Athanasius really paid to the Homoean or Semi-Arian case. He makes it quite clear that the only choice was between rank Arianism or Anomoeanism (the

(15) τοῦ Λέγοντος ἀμοιοιοσίας Πατέρα.
(16) ἐν ἀνυφομοιοιοσίαι καὶ ἀλλοτριοοιοσίαι
latter, after all, is simply Arianism in one word, instead of, say, one bad poem) and Nicaea. Once again, however much credit must be paid to Basil of Ammyra and his party for being shocked by the Arians' excesses, Athanasius is compelled to warn them in no uncertain way that their theology was not really viable.

51 Athanasius returns in ch. 51 to the theological consideration of the argument actually used by Paul of Samosata. Pointing out that this is a Greek philosophical argument and therefore cannot be considered binding as Scripture is, he points out that, in the first place, we must not accept that material analogies hold unchanged with God, citing the similar distinction between our own making, which must be ex materie, and God's act of creatio ex nihilo. Even so, the argument, says Athanasius, is still incorrect even in terms of the most significant material analogy, parents and children. These we accept as being (analogously) co-essential, and there is a common essence, but it is not a third thing in the way that the parent and the child are two things. Least of all does the Arian argument have any substance that the co-essential parent and child have the status of brothers because they are co-essential; Jephthah's daughter and the son of the widow of Nain were genuine only children. This is of philosophical interest as it coincides with an important criticism of essentialism generally. If this is taken seriously, it has interesting implications for the remainder of Athanasius's theology. He might not have heard of the further information concerning the argument of Paul of Samosata till recently, or he might not have seen its importance. (But this criticism, which is sound — and Scriptural — would undercut some other parts of his theology that depend on essentialism, in particular, what he says about the Second Person being Wisdom literally, pure and simple.) This is obviously essentialist, depending for
its certainty on the idea that some such essentiale as Wisdom is actually another thing in some way. Of course, if Athanasius had noticed this earlier, it would have seriously impeded his attack on Arianism. Probably, the end result would have been to force a definite abandonment of the older Logos theology in favour of an unreserved Son theology of the Second Person. But this chapter confirms, if anything, that Athanasius still remained in the position that the most important element in the Homoousion, and indeed, everything concerning Essence, is the Father-Son relation.

52 He then goes on to restate the absolute unity of Father and Son, as Light (φως) or Sun (ἡλιος) and Radiance (ὑδαμόμε) just as in the De Decretis 22-23 and C. Ar. III: 6-9. The great simile to which we have alluded is used in the same way as usual. Once again, be it noted, the only choice is between the Homoousion and the Anomocean position.

53 Finally, in the penultimate chapter of the body of the work, Athanasius at last comes to detailed consideration of the characteristic language of the Homoeans, whether moderate or extreme. "Even this is sufficient to dissuade you from blaming those who have said that the Son was co-essential with the Father, yet let us examine the term 'Coessential' itself, by way of seeing whether it be a proper term and is suitable to apply to the Son. For you know yourselves....that Like is not predicated of essence, but of habits and qualities (17) for in the case of essences, we speak not of likeness but of identity (18). Man, for instance, is said to be like man, not according to essence, but according

(17) ὅποιον οὐκ εἶναι τινος οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ἐν σχέσεις καὶ προστάσεις λέγεται ὅμοιον.
(18) οὗξ ἑμοῖος λέγεται ταυτότης λέξειν. A most pointed direct rebuff to Basil of Anceyra and the other Semi-Arians, in their anathematization of the Homoousion equivalent to Tautoousion, and their corresponding support for the Homoousion.
to habit and character (\(\chi\rho\delta\kappa\mu\gamma\nu\), for in essence men are of one nature\(^{(19)}\)). And again, man is not said to be unlike dog, but to be of different nature (\(\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon\rho\sigma\circ\nu\gamma\varsigma\)). Accordingly, while the former are of one nature and coessential\(^{(20)}\), the latter are different in nature and essence.\(^{(21)}\) Therefore, in speaking of Like according to essence we mean like by participation\(^{(22)}\) for Likeness is a quality which may attach to essence, and this would be proper to creatures, for they by participation are assimilated to God\(^{(23)}\......(I\ John\ 3:2). If then ye speak of the Son as being by participation, then indeed let Him be called Homoiousios by you...... (but this is Arian pure and simple). For things which are from participation are called like, not in reality but from resemblance to reality (\(\varepsilon\mu\omega\iota\sigma\omega\epsilon\varsigma\ η\ς\ θ\zeta\upsilon\epsilon\iota\varsigma\varsigma\)...... Therefore, if this be out of place He must be, not by participation, but in nature and truth, Son. Light, Wisdom, God, and being this by nature, and not by sharing (\(\mu\epsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\sigma\upsilon\alpha\varsigma\)\), He would be properly called not Homoiousios but Homoousios......

Even though Athanasius has been compelled to make certain criticisms of the essentialist position, as we have just seen, he still holds to it, in the main, and in the quasi-genetic context of this discussion, he is right to do so. The fact that something analogous to

\[\text{(19) \(\tau\eta\ k\bar{o} \omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon \delta\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \ \varepsilon\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron.\)}\]
\[\text{(20) \(\delta\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \kappa\bar{i} \delta\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\OMICRON\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron.\)}\]
\[\text{(21) \(\varepsilon\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \kappa\bar{i} \varepsilon\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron.\)}\]
\[\text{(22) \(\epsilon\kappa \mu\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \cdot \cdot \cdot \delta\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron.\)}\]
\[\text{(23) \(\epsilon\kappa \mu\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \delta\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \ \Theta\omicron\omicron\omicron.\)}\]
genetics is still the controlling principle is shown by the close juxtaposition, which is more prominent than ever, between compounds of \( \sigma \omega \beta \eta \) and corresponding words from the \( \phi \nu \) - root, e.g. \( \delta \mu \omicron \omicron \) (and \( \epsilon \tau \rho \omicron \omicron \)) \( \sigma \omega \beta \eta \omicron \) \( \omicron \) compared with \( \delta \mu \omicron \omicron \) (and \( \epsilon \tau \rho \omicron \omicron \)) \( \phi \nu \) \( \gamma \). Incidentally, throughout this work the close correspondence and frequent parallelism between \( \sigma \omega \beta \eta \) and \( \phi \nu \omicron \omicron \) and related pairs of words, is at least as much a feature as in the Contra Ariana; the above instance is the most outstanding, and there is no usage of a different character; this is to be expected, again, in view of the subject matter. (To complete the Trinitarian aspect, there is again no case of the use of \( \delta \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron 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than Plato, and once again, a modern man finds it easier to make sense of it if he remembers genetics than in any other way. But what Athanasius really means is that it is meaningless to speak of likeness in connection with essence, and therefore likeness can only refer to some sub-essential region, almost certainly, in fact, that in which men are like God by participation in His grace in a manner which is proper only to creatures. Thus, statements like the Homoiousion and even \( \text{Kar} \) \( \text{ou} \) \( \text{ou} \) \( \text{ou} \) \( \text{d} \) \( \text{d} \) \( \text{d} \) \( \text{d} \) \( \text{d} \) are ambiguous. Either they mean the Homoiousion, Father and Son have the same essence, or if not they must really refer to this sub-essential field and thus be crypto-Arian at best. So once again Athanasius has introduced the notion of likeness to prove its utter irrelevance to the issue, and so has given his final warning to Basil of Anencyra and his party that there is no alternative but the Homoiousion.

The last chapter is in fact the final appeal to be reconciled fully to Nicaea, and once again the only choice is between the Homoiousion and fully-fledged Arianism. The doxology is \( \text{Christ} \) \( \text{Father} \) \( \text{Son} \) \( \text{Kingdom} \) \( \text{Godhead} \) \( \text{Son} \) \( \text{Father} \) \( \text{Kingdom} \) \( \text{Godhead} \) \( \text{Amen} \).

Once again, we have had to disagree with a received opinion, which dates from Newman and Robertson and has been in general accepted since, that the aim of the "De Synodis" was eirenicon in relation to the moderate Homoceans like Basil of Anencyra. There is no support for this in the text. However moderate its tone might have been ad homines, it is really, as we have said many times, a grave warning, as regards the theological position. The moderate Homocean position is shown again and again as having no future, and the only real alternatives are Arianism
in the most extreme form, or Nicaea, Homoousion and all. When we remem-
ber this, we see that once again the "De Synodis" has a superbly tight
construction. It is true that the theology, with the exception of the
Homoousion, is not expressed with the lucidity and thoroughness of the
Orations against the Arians, and as a hypothetical equivalent of the
missing Fourth Oration it makes its points clumsily by comparison, but
by the standards of the rather different kind of work which was actually
written, more historical and ecclesiastical in its orientation, it is a
magnificent success. After the account of the critical events of Arim-
inum and Seleucia and an account of the development of the Arian heresy,
Athanasius then shows, in the middle section, the essential vanity of
the Eastern conservative attempts to upset the Homoousion of Nicaea, and
that the inevitable result was chaos at the best, or gross and obvious
damnable heresy at the worst. The final section, on the Homoousion is
a masterful exposition of the doctrine, and also likewise a warning that
people like Basil of Ankyra will necessarily find once again that Semi-
Arianism is hopeless and will have to return to Nicaea. Under these
circumstances, Athanasius did not really change his position at all; the
old quasi-genetic interpretation of the Homoousion, which we met in the
De Decretis, is still there, expressed in anything more clearly than ever,
and never more clearly than when Athanasius appears to be speaking of
purely generic likeness. (24)

One final point needs to be noticed. There is no reference at
all to the Spirit. The Homoousion is merely the Homoousion of Father and
Son. And similarly the great simile of φίλαθλος and δόξα της γενεσεως
which is the controlling analogy is in its old Binitarian form. These
are most important points to remember when we consider the relation of

(24) For Athanasius's previous treatment of the issue of the Homoousion,
together with a review of previous work, see above, pp.525-8, 552-5, 629-46
the De Synodis to the Letters to Serapion. Shapland was in error when he alluded to the similarity of the accounts of the Homoousion in the two works, as against the earlier writings. (25) The exact reverse is the case; this account is like the earlier ones and dissimilar to that of the Letters to Serapion. (26) We shall have to consider the reason for the difference, and it was undoubtedly due to the fact that Athanasius for the first time had to consider the Spirit, which radically altered the balance of the picture.

There is very little need of exact lexicographic analysis of this work, or rather of the section on the Homoousion, which is alone of any importance for this. Apart from a predominance of the title Son for the Second Person as against Logos (79 to 30 in chs. 33-54), even a cursory examination of Muller would indicate that the chances of a statistically significant difference is nil. The same applies to the Homoousion, nature, and even more so to the very few references to the Humanity of Christ, which in toto can be counted on the fingers of one hand. However, the term οὐσία is much commoner, and would in any case be of much interest, since, as distinct from the "Contra Arianos" I-III which is the definitive Athanasian work, the Homoousion is the heart and soul of this passage: General references: 36:757 B (the term is not in Scripture), 36:757B & 37:760A (even Eusebians admit term) 53:788B & C bis and 789A (each, Likeness does not apply to essence), \( \text{Kat}^{\circledR} \text{oujta} \): 34:753A (the term "Father" refers to God \( K\)., and not to something less fundamental), 33:760C bis & D (each, if S. not \( \delta\mu\rho\alpha\sigma\sigma\omega\) \( K\)., Arianism must


(26) See also below, pp. 1214-18
follow), 39:761C (Ans. say Christ foreign to God $K·O·$ ), 41:765A (the $δυοιον Kατ' οὐσίαν not what was meant at Nicaea), 45:773C (Arians did not confess Son to be like $K·O·$ or $Kατ' θν εὑσίν$ by which a son resembles a father), 48:780A (neœ'y to conceive the unity - ἕνοςμα - of F. and S. $Kατ' θν οὐσίαν$ ). 52:785C (unity of F. and S. not through likeness of teaching but $K·T·O·$ and in truth), 53:788C bis (each Likeness cannot be $K·O·$ but in form, &c.; these are in addition to the other two references to this subject above. Divine Essence:

Must be one: 35:753C bis (each, is indicated by the Divine Name). One and the Same in Father and Son: Ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ποιο Πατρός

&c. as at Nicaea: 35:753D, 40:765A (even Eusebians conceded it at Nicaea) Set form, virtually quoted: 33:752A, & 35:756A bis, 36:756C, 37:757C, 37:760A, 41:765B quater, 51:785A (Most of these 12 references discuss the necessary following of the Homœousion from this form). $\text{Jesus}$ $\text{the} \ οὐσίας \ ψηφίζεται$ : 35:756C, 39:764A. $\text{Aναπάνως} \ εἰκών$ $\text{τῆς} \ οὐσίας \ ψηφίζεται$ \ (as at Antioch, 341: 36:757B, 37:760A & B, 38:760B and 0 bis. $\text{ψηφίζεται} \ \ Ε-θ. οὐσίας$ : 40:764C. $\text{Jesus}$ $\text{the} \ οὐσίας \ τοῦ \ Π$ : 42:768B (same as, The Offspring from the F.). $\text{χειρὴ} \ \ οὐσίας \ τοῦ \ Π$ : 39:764A. Other expressions: 45:772D (E. of F. is Origin and Root of Son as Offspring). 48:777D ( $\text{οὐσία}$ He is L. & Wdm. of the F. and this Essence is the Offspring of the F.'s E.) 48:780B ( $\text{οὐσία}$ (27) He and His F. that begat Him are one), 52:785C (Has $\text{οὐσίας} \ θνίσιμα$ of the F's. E.) Also, 51:784D (any ordinary son is from the E. of his begetter).

Heretical uses: 34:753A & B & 35:753C (the word "Father" does not refer to the E.; these by implication come under Group II), 45:772C & 51:784D (Three essences). 48:777C (Son is alien $\text{οὐσίας}$)

(27) Inserting the definite article (absent in Migne), following Opitz.
attributes of F.'s ὁμοούσιον, 51:784B (six examples, all referring to the hypothetical ἀρχή ὁμοούσιον of Paul of Samosata; all these are classified by implication under Group IV because of the implied connection with the Platonist explanation of generic likeness), 52:788A (Ann. affirm that there is another ὁμοούσιον of Son). Of the total of 62 examples, 7 are in Group I, that is, Essence as the constitutive centre of the being of a single entity, 27 are in Group II, the same as above, but with the emphasis on the generation of the Son from the Essence of the Father, only one is in Group III which is ambiguous as between Groups II and IV, 13 in Group IV, where Essence is definitely generic, and 14 in Group V, the quasi-adverbial uses of the noun ὁμοούσιον. There is an apparently greatly increased occurrence of Group IV, which appears to support the Harnack hypothesis that the Homoeousion here begins to be interpreted generically, but we have inflated the total by including six references to the ἀπεραιόλακτος εἰκὼν of the Lucianic Creed of 341, which Athanasius quoted with approval but would have not preferred himself, and six references to the heretical notion of the Third Essence Substrate of Paul of Samosata, which should be in this group at best by implication only. Perhaps we can transfer from Group V to Group IV the three instances included in Group V of ὁμοούσιον ἀπεραιόλακτος, but in that case, we should perhaps count as minus values the six instances, not included in this total, where Athanasius declares that likeness or unlikeness has nothing to do with essence. In addition we have not included in any of our totals the four cases where it is admitted that the word Essence or its compounds does not appear as such in Scripture. Thus, our analysis comes out very like those of "De Decretis" and "Contra Arianos", with the distinctive Group II being probably more preponderant than ever.
There are, incidentally, only three uses of $\textit{οὐσίωδης Θεότης}$ none of which are really relevant. 36:757B, the Arian phrase Three Hypostases is stated to be as un-Scriptural as anything they dislike, 40:764B, the Arians claimed that the $\textit{Σώμα}$ was $\textit{εἰς οὐσίωδης Θεότης}$ in the sense of the Nicene Anathema, and in 41:765A, it is pointed out that even the Eusebians accepted the Nicene Anathema as regards this phrase. In conclusion, there are two significant compounds of $\textit{οὐσίωδης}$ that need our attention. In 51:784B, Athanasius states the consequences of the Logos being what He was by participation and not $\textit{εἴσ ημῶν}$ and Image of the Father. Similarly, at the end of ch. 41, Athanasius says that the significance of the title Son would be to indicate that the Second Person is $\textit{ἐνωσία}$ Logos and $\textit{ἐνούσιον}$ Wisdom, as distinct from the sort of $\textit{οὐσίωδης Θεότης}$ Logos that one might deduce from the analogy of human words. Prestige takes this latter to mean definitely that the Second Person was personal in something as near as possible to our modern sense, but the context in both cases, and especially and incontrovertibly the former, indicates that both words mean that the Second Person fully takes part in the Essence of God. This is confirmed by the fact that the only uses for Hypostasis so far in the indubitable works of Athanasius are in the

(38) "God in Patriotic Thought", Introd., p.xxx, and p.201. The alternative here excluded is "immanent in the substance of God", in the Samosatene sense, apparently. Of course, Athanasius's doctrine of the Homoousion excludes this too, and was meant to exclude it, being a far more complex doctrine than either constitutive or generic unity on its own; certainly than "concrete" unity. Here, Prestige tended to read Athanasius too much through the eyes of the Cappadocians, or even through the modern idea of personality. This may be a case of his tendency to assume, methodologically, that certain types of doctrine have special connections with certain periods, while not pursuing this line with the rigidity which at first sight would be crass, but would actually force greater attention to detailed exceptions, etc.
sense of Heb. 1:3, where the meaning is "object" in the optical sense, which would be almost synonymous with (29) Most likely, Athanasius had the whole fulness of his own genetic doctrine of the Homoousion in mind, perhaps influenced to a certain extent by the Samosatene controversy, which he knew he had to treat at this stage. "Personality" here would be personality as a level of being, that is, in this case, the Essence of God, not personality as individuation. All this confirms our view that, on the question of Essence, there has been no significant change since the earlier anti-Arian writings.

(29) See above, fn. 108 to Ch. II, p. 324, and pp. 1046.
Chapter X - THE FOUR LETTERS TO SERAPION ON THE HOLY SPIRIT.

These letters represent the next, and in fact virtually the last stage of the development of the Trinitarian theology of Athanasius. Indeed, they are the first theological treatment of the Third Person, at any rate since the early days, and thus the first anyway at the level traditionally associated with fully developed theology. Their immediate occasion was the outbreak of a heresy which Athanasius called Tropicism, which was completely and indeed militantly orthodox on the Son, yet was an almost perfect duplicate of Arianism as applied, not to the Son, but to the Spirit. As such it seems to have plagued Egypt, and in particular Thmuis, the diocese of Athanasius's friend, Serapion, and these letters appear to be a reply to the latter's urgent request for authoritative guidance. We have already studied these Letters insofar as they reveal the heresy concerned, and, to recapitulate, our conclusions were that the heresy of the Tropici was a perfect analogue of Arianism which almost certainly arose for the same reason, the persistence of a dangerous correlation between the Spirit, in this case, and the cosmos. We have already noticed that, most unfortunately, Athanasius, in the very act of disposing of the corresponding dangerous correlation in the case of the Second Person, came dangerously close to reviving it in the case of the Third, since it is the outstanding feature of Athanasius's doctrine of the Spirit, so far, that the essential concern of the Spirit is the mediation of the grace of the Logos to man; correspondingly, the thing that almost always calls Athanasius's attention to the Spirit is man's secondary and derived participation in union with God and the Divine Sonship, as distinct from the primary and absolute possession of these features by the Logos-Son. The combination of militant heresy of the Third
Person, the militant affirmation that the Spirit is a creature, with their orthodoxy concerning the Son, shows that in some perverse way the Tropici stood on Athanasius's shoulders, and also distinguishes them sharply from such contemporary figures as Eunomius, the latter-generation Arian or Anomoean who additionally said in so many words that the Spirit was a creature; but also, the militancy of their heresy distinguished them too from the un-militant heterodoxy of Origen and his successors, including Eusebius of Caesarea, concerning the Deity of the Spirit, the sort of position that was probably continued after Athanasius's time by the Macedonian party. These questions need not be discussed again in detail. (1)

There is no good reason, either externally or internally, to doubt the authenticity of the four letters (at any rate if we conclude the Fourth Letter at ch.7). The only scholar to entertain serious positive doubts has been Erasmus, who regarded the Third and Fourth Letters only as authentic, on mainly subjective impressions of style. (2) However, this position is quite untenable, since the first sentence of the Third Letter: "Perhaps you will wonder why, when I was charged to abridge and briefly explain the Letter that I had written on the Holy Spirit, you find me, as though I had laid aside my work on that subject, writing against those who are guilty of the impiety of calling the Son a creature.", cannot refer to anything else but the first two Letters, whose authenticity would at once follow (in the absence of any other precisely similar pair of letters!) from that of the Third. The notes in Shapland's edition, especially in the case of the First Letter, indicate

(1) See above, pp. 488-516.
(2) See Shapland, op. cit. 13-14.
rightly that the Epistle has just the type of agreement, organic and not mechanical, with the anti-Arian writings of Athanasius that would corroborate their genuineness.

The important issue of the chronology cannot be dealt with so easily, and here it will be necessary to disagree with traditional opinion, and even the order of the MSS. They are normally held, eg. by Montfaucon(3) and Shapland, to have been written, probably in late 358 or 359, before the "De Synodis". We shall quote from Shapland (op.cit. 16-18), and then comment. "The beginning, at least, of the correspondence falls within the third exile of Athanasius, between February 356 and the death of Constantius, November 361. If, as is almost certain, Patrophilus is referred to in IV:7, then the latter was probably not written much later than the spring of 361.

"From Epiphanius, Haer. LXXIII:26, we hear that one Ptolemaeus was present at Seleucia in 359 as Bishop of Thmuis. Were we entitled to assume from this that Serapion was by this time dead, the problem of dating these letters would be easier. But it is no less likely that he had been exiled or merely deprived. Moreover there is some evidence to show that he was alive after this date. In ps. Leontius, Adv. Fraudes Apollinaristarum, there is a fragment of a letter from Apollinarius to Serapion commending a communication sent by Athanasius to Corinth on the Christological question. This can only refer to the "Ad Epictetum"..... (On any dating of the lastmentioned, this, now accepted as genuine, shows that)..... Serapion could not have been dead by the autumn of 359. As it is, the evidence we have points to a later rather than an earlier date in the exile.

(3) See Migne, Introduction to Athanasius (PGXXXV) vol. xxxviii.
(1) Athanasius was in the desert, eagerly sought for by his enemies (I:1). Apparently Athanasius did not really retire from Alexandria until late in 358. The Festal Index speaks of him as concealed in the city during 357-8. In the late summer of the latter year feeling was running so high against the Arians that George was ejected, and the Orthodox actually regained possession of the churches for a few weeks. Then the attitude of the authorities stiffened, and in December Sebastian entered Alexandria. The Festal Index (xxxii) speaks of a search for Athanasius conducted by Artemius in 359-60. We know that his inquiries extended as far as Tabenne (See Vita Pachomii 88). It seems most likely that Athanasius is here referring to his activities.

These points are all sound, except that Athanasius's statement about his enemies could have been made at any time during the exile.

(ii) "Athenasius does not need to add anything to what he has already written against the Arians (I:2). This must mean that C.Ar. I-III had already been written and circulated. If this work is to be assigned to the third exile, as the older commentators thought, we have an additional reason for putting back the date of these letters. But Stülcken (pp.46-50) has given very cogent reasons for putting their composition much earlier, and Loofs would put it back perhaps as far as 338. But even so, the literary output of the first two years of the exile, bearing in mind the circumstances, was very considerable, and makes it less likely that they were started before the second half of 358."

This point is again well taken, in the main. We have already commented on the theories of Stülcken and Loofs on C.Ar.I-III and disagreed with them; on the other hand, we agree that a date in the third exile is not likely, the most likely date for the Contra Arianos I-III
(iii) The letters are written against certain persons who have left the Arians. (4) It is not stated when this defection occurred, and changes of side were frequent throughout the whole period. But it is at least plausible to assume that it had taken place no long time before Serapion wrote to Athanasius. Such a movement away from Arianism is best connected with the reaction against George's misrule in September-October 358.

This is rather more dubious as it stands. The general character of the Tropocist heresy, as we have seen above, makes this sort of interpretation highly doubtful, as if they experienced the sort of conversion commonly attributed to, say, Basil of Ancyra. Tropicism is a strange reaction for people who have had their fill of violence and thirst for the milk of sweet reason. On the basis of our own analysis of the position, we would do better to suppose what would be primarily a major theological conversion, probably through the indefatigable work and witness of Athanasius himself, but which left just enough of the seed of Arianism left for it to germinate anew.

(iv) The mention of the 'Eunomii' in IV:5 points in the same direction. During his visit to Alexandria, 356-8, Eunomius appears to have occupied a very subordinate position as Actius's secretary. It was only later, after his departure to Antioch, that he came to the front as an Anomoean leader. This point needs no further comment.

(v) Finally, we have to consider the relation between these letters and the "De Synodis". The emphasis on the personal subsistence
of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in I:28; the stringent qualification of διοικητιλ in II:3 init., and the interpretation given to the there, suggesting the equality rather than the unity of the three Persons: these points suggest that the mind of Athanasius was already responding to the impulse that inspired the De Synodis. The reference to Eudoxius, Acacius, and Patrophilus in IV:6 and 7 also suggests a parallel with that work, for these names are equally prominent there. This does not, of course, mean that these letters necessarily follow the De Synodis. Nor can we be certain at what date Athanasius became aware of the possibility of a rapprochment with Basil of Ancyra and the rest. But it certainly suggests that no long time separates them.

"We therefore conclude that the letters can scarcely have been begun before the summer of 358; that much of the evidence leads us to put them several months later in 359 or early in 360. It is less likely that they were written at any later date. It does not seem possible to reach a more definite conclusion."

It is at this point that we must now criticise the conclusions of Shapland. In the first place, the language in the penultimate paragraph about the question of whether they followed the "De Synodis" seems somewhat confused, because the natural conclusion of the remarks in that paragraph is that they actually preceded the "De Synodis", which is actually the conclusion reached in the last paragraph, since the first draft of the latter work was made at the end of 359. This conclusion would agree with that of the Benedictines, which is presumably made on the grounds mentioned in the first paragraph quoted (the letter of Apollinarius not being given much weight). However, there are several reasons why we must dispute this generally accepted chronology.
There are the considerations adduced above by Shapland in favour of a late date. But, most important of all, there are Trinitarian considerations which have emerged in the course of our study. In the "De Synodis", as we have shown above, Athanasius still treats the key Trinitarian metaphor of ἑώρα (or ἤλιος - ἡ βίβλιον) in the old binitarian way, whereas in the Epistles he for the first time tries to modify it in a Trinitarian way, to include the Holy Spirit, with the first term definitely the light-source and the light as it finally reaches us as the Spirit. This is admittedly the sort of argument that we have decided not to admit for any purposes of chronology, but this is the one occasion where an exception should be made. Athanasius knew as well as anyone could know that the credal faith of the Church was Trinitarian; he confessed such a faith; and so, even though his reflective theology was in fact binitarian up to this late stage, he could not conceivably have rested content with the binitarian form of the analogy, even with its apparent scriptural authority, once it had become perfectly clear to him that theology had to become Trinitarian, and hence the great Trinitarian analogy also. Therefore, one would be justified in maintaining definitely that the "De Synodis" was written before the Letters, and probably even before the question of Tropicism was first raised. On the question of the Homoousion, which is the chief point actually made by Shapland, we have already severely criticised the traditional view of Athanasius's doctrine of the Homoousion in the "De Synodis", which constitutes the basis of Shapland's argument. There is not very much difference, if any, between his doctrine in the "De Synodis" and in the earlier works, nor was his purpose in writing this work primarily irenic, contrary to the general opinion.

(6) See above, pp. 1121-14.
we come to examine the treatment of the Homoousion in the Second Epistle. We shall find that, insofar as there is any change, it is between the "De Synodis" and the Second Letter, where the quasi-generic interpretation of the Homoousion really does become more important than before. This is a theologico-critical problem that will have to be treated in its place.

Thus, our conclusion is that the Letters were written late in the Third Exile, and that the second and subsequent letters, at least, were written after the first draft of the "De Synodis", or during the latter third of the exile, after 359; it is highly probable that the same applied to the First Letter as well. On this basis, Serapion would not have been dead at the time of the Council of Seleucia in 359, but rather a refugee or an exile. The principal alternative hypothesis, which we have discussed already, is, if we accept the possibility that Serapion was dead in 359, that the Letters were written earlier, but that the passage on the Homoousion in the "De Synodis" had become fixated in Athanasius's verbal memory at a much earlier stage still - which is, as we have said, possible and by no means unlikely. Other alternatives are that either the letters themselves or their ascription to Serapion as the addressee are not genuine. As we have said above, there is no good reason for the former, and nobody has ever seriously doubted the Letters as a whole - although this has been due as much to lack of interest as to anything else. A thoroughgoing attack on their authenticity on theological and other grounds would be interesting, at least as interesting as, and more plausible than, Dräseke's on the authenticity of the "De Incarnatione" - but this does not mean that there are sufficient reasons. Hoss's doubt on the ground that Athanasius stood

(7) See above, pp. 1112-13
by Nicaea as the essential fides quae creditur and that the Letters would demand new matter for belief, (8) does not really hold water, since it is clear from Athanasius's treatment of the issue, notably in the "De Synodis", that what he meant was not that Nicaea was sufficient, but that it was necessary to accept the Nicene achievement, fully and unreservedly. If anything, whatever its prima facie appearance, turns out in fact to compromise the essential achievement of Nicaea, it must be regarded as falling under the ban of that Council; Athanasius puts it in this way later on in so many words, with reference to the question of the Deity of the Spirit (ad Afros 11). It is evident from the Letters that Athanasius feels, in some way that he perhaps is never able to define quite clearly, that the Tropicist heresy placed the Nicene faith in jeopardy even with reference to the Son, and that if one is a Nicene, one must not follow the Tropici. Any lack of clarity on this matter is what one should expect where the issue is suddenly thrown at Athanasius late in his life without any preparation for it in his previous training or tradition. The author holds that, in the main, criticism of the authenticity of the Letters on theological grounds is untenable. The final possibility is that they might not have been addressed to Serapion of Thmuis at all, as his name in fact does not appear in the text at all but only in the superscription. This is by no means impossible, but it is a very bad principle to take such hypotheses too seriously unless one has to.

The first Letter is a full treatment of the Spirit, primarily from the point of view of Its Deity. The second and third Letters belong together, being a response to a request for a shorter summary of the first. However, the second is entirely a summary of the anti-Arian
theology of Athanasius concerning the Second Person, and it is only in the later third letter that Athanasius fulfils the request literally. We have already considered the significance of this apparent anomaly. (9) The fourth letter is a refutation of the Tropicists' "grandfather" argument, which had been treated in I:15 f., but not in III. There is very little if any new matter in the last three Letters.

The Epistles have had an interesting history. They were not greatly emphasised in the earlier period, beginning in the seventeenth century, when Western theology first became conscious of Athanasius. This culminated in the Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (ed. Robertson) in which they are omitted, most unfortunately, from what is otherwise a complete translation into English of all the important and indubitable works of Athanasius. The whole Oxford tradition of the nineteenth century took a similar stand; for example, they are also omitted from Bright's Later Treatises of Athanasius. It is not entirely irrelevant to suggest that Oxford's great representative in Athanasian scholarship, J.H. (later Cardinal) Newman, would have found them particularly embarrassing on account of their highly ambiguous position, to say the least, on the Filioque, on which Roman Catholicism has always been much more uncompromising than "High Church" Anglicanism that has no overpowering tendency in that direction, and which Newman would have had to defend. One of his main positions has been the regularity and uniformity of the Church's theological tradition even from the earliest times, and his notes on the anti-Arian writings of Athanasius are of such a character as to emphasise Athanasius as a member, perhaps the supreme representative, of this constant tradition. For such a theologian, the Letters would be perhaps an insuperable problem. However, it had to be
faced some time, and the Bonn Conference between the Eastern Orthodox and Old Catholic Churches in 1875 was the first sign. Since then, interest in these Letters has steadily increased with the increasing ecumenical contact between the Eastern Orthodox churches and other communions, especially the Old Catholics and the Anglicans. They have been translated into modern languages in recent decades, and Shapland's English edition, with critical and theological notes, is particularly important. Shapland thinks rather cautiously that the Letters are not inconsistent with the Filioque, and that the heterodoxies of the Filioquists Eusebius of Caesarea and Marcellus of Ancyra were sufficient cause for Athanasius not explicitly following this line. On the other hand, Eastern Orthodox theologians, notably Rodzianko, maintain that the Letters firmly support the Greek procession, from the Father only. Their views will be fully analysed later.

A few introductory remarks about the Filioque would not be amiss here. This was inserted, after centuries of uncertainty, by the Western Church, into the Nicaeano-Constantinopolitan Creed, in 1014, so that the Spirit "ex Patre Filioque procedit", the version accepted in the

(10) "The Letters of Saint Athanasius concerning the Holy Spirit," translated with introduction and notes, by C.R.B. Shapland. The writer had intended to prepare a text, but did not see his way clear to do so. This is the definitive treatment of the Letters to such an extent that it will virtually monopolise our attention. Other authorities have treated them almost as a minor appendix to the Arian controversy, and have usually given a simple summary of the Letters without significant critical comment. Shapland's general position appears to be mainly orthodox, both the orthodoxy of Newman and of Barth. On the other hand, for a man of his theological position, he is surprisingly ready to accept, without adequate criticism, the principles and conclusions of the Liberal German school of Harnack and others, and this applies particularly to the anti-Arian, and most of all to the Christological side of Athanasian theology. The subject matter of Ep.II confronted him with the necessity of studying this subject as closely as the Pneumatology proper. Many of his notes on this Letter, and on these matters, the author has found very valuable for the earlier parts of this thesis.
Eastern Church remaining as $\tau \in \tau \rho \sigma \epsilon \kappa \tau \omicron \rho o\nu\mu e\nu\nu$. The resulting break in the Church became definite in 1054. (Cf. for the following, Barth, Ch. D. I:1, pp. 533-560 Eng. ed.). In the Eastern or chiefly Greek-speaking Church, the early tentative support for the Filioque, e.g. Epiphanius, Ancoratus 75, Ephraem, Hymnus de defunctis et Trinitate, 11, and Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus de Trinitate, 34, was gradually suppressed in favour of the uni-processionalist views which were definitively adopted by John of Damascus and Photius. In the West, however, the principal influence was the unambiguous Filioquism of Augustine. As early as the sixth century it came into general use in Spain, from which it spread throughout the Western world. Now, as Athanasius was the first theologian to treat of the Spirit for a long time, his views would be of the greatest interest, especially since he had a most decisive reason for interest in the origin (in the intra-Trinitarian sense) of the Spirit. The whole Arian controversy, in the form in which it actually occurred, had involved the whole fundamental distinction between the origin $\varepsilon \kappa \omicron \sigma \omicron \nu \mu \kappa \theta \omicron \nu$ of the creatures and the origin $\varepsilon \kappa \tau \omicron \rho o\nu \rho o\nu \sigma i\zeta \upsilon$ of the Son, and this was intimately bound up with the concept of the Homoousion. It was inevitable that the analogous heresy of the Tropici raised similar problems, as we shall see later. Thus, the Procession would have been a problem for Athanasius in the way in which it would not have been for any earlier theologian, even in the cases where it was actually handled. All this makes Athanasius's position on the Filioque a matter of the greatest interest.

This question is not only interesting in itself, but even more by reason of the decisive significance of the doctrine in question. One extreme position on this matter is the attitude of most present-day
Anglicans, especially the "High Church" party, which treats the matter very much as Gibbon thought of the celebrated "diphthong" or "iota". (12) This is in pointed contrast not only to the Eastern Church itself, but also to the Roman Catholic Church, the Reformers, and also Article V of the XXXIX Articles. On the other hand, Karl Barth (loc. cit.) has insisted anew on the supreme importance of the theology of the Spirit, including the Filioque. "It follows that this particular dogma (sc. the Third Article as a whole) must constitute the last stage of the development of the Trinitarian dogma. It had to be achieved, ere the doctrine of grace, which then became the special theme of the Church in the West, could become the burning question, ere the struggle and victory of Augustine over Pelagius could take place. Even the Reformation with its doctrine of justification by faith alone can only be understood against the background of this particular dogma...." (p.536). However, in his estimate of the importance of the Filioque, Barth does not approach the Russian Orthodox L.P. Karsavin, who, as Barth puts it (pp.547-8) "in obscure language makes the Filioque responsible for

(12) The author has been amazed by the repeated spectacle of authors so diverse as Dom Gregory Dix, Peter Hammond, and Lindsay Dewar writing important books on the Spirit, or Eastern Orthodoxy, or ecumenical and historical relations involving the Eastern Churches and their own Church, without as much as mentioning the issue, or, if they do, treating it as a matter of no importance. The books in question are, respectively, "The Shape of the Liturgy," (see esp. pp. 638-39 and indices), "The Waters of Marah," and "The Holy Spirit and Modern Thought".

This is a very serious question for the High Church party in Anglicanism, and it is unfortunate that no one has yet sheeted home responsibility in this matter, if one may use this language. There is in these quarters a sort of theological Philhellenism which is quite compatible (to say the least!) with an adiaphorism on the Filioque, and which is motivated by the desire to find some alternative between the Papalism of the Roman Catholic Church, and Protestantism in the sense which this party rejects. The author will show, in a very few pages, that, once the Filioque has been accepted, or having been accepted has not been repudiated, there is NO such third possibility at all.
the doctrine of the immaculate conception and of Papal infallibility, as well as for Kantianism, the belief in progress and many other evils in Western civilisation (Ostl. Christentum Vol.II, p.356 f.)." Unfortunately, to a greater extent than Barth will admit, it has turned out that this attitude, expressed in a less extreme way, is typical of the Eastern Orthodox Churches as a whole.

Which of these parties is correct? Now, Church History can shed much light on this issue. It is generally agreed now that it is a serious error to assume that the whole period in Western Europe that we call the "Middle Ages" was uniformly dark and sterile, and that the Renaissance came as a sudden blaze of light in the fourteenth or fifteenth century. On the contrary, whatever we might think of life and thought in the earlier centuries, it is evident that Western Europe was in a ferment of activity, and had fully recovered its vitality and dynamism, long before the age of Dante and Petrarch. Indeed, when we consider such things as, for all their faults, the Crusades, the newly-found administrative and military efficiency of the Normans, the struggle over matters of important principle like celibacy, simony, and clerics' ownership of property, ecclesiastics like Hildebrandt and theologians like Anselm, the great monastic movements of Cluny and elsewhere, even the first stirrings of the urban revival in Italy, it is evident that this revival was in full swing as early as the latter half of the eleventh century, and that, if we have to fix a date for its commencement, 1054 would be as good a date as any. It is not too much to say that from that date onwards Western Europe began a new and distinctive era of dynamism that has since then determined all history, a statement which is still true if we remember the Western European ancestry of such ideas as Communism. Is it purely accidental that this is the time when the
Filioque became definitively the Western doctrine, or was it simply because at that time Europe had begun to settle down?

When we analyse the matter, we can see that, for better or worse, it was probably not purely accidental, and thus it is Karsavin and the Eastern Orthodox who are right, and the Filioque initiated one of the major revolutions in history. It was, in the main, not a violent revolution, or even a very fast one, and continuity was always maintained, and never obviously threatened. Nor did it seem to give rise to the heart-searching and the other psychological phenomena so characteristic of the more violently or corrosively destructive type of revolution. There was probably greater feeling of necessary and desirable progress. But in the long term, the charge was considerable, and the longer the term, the greater become the effects that are patently traceable to this great change. And when we work out the sort of change that would naturally develop from the final adoption of the Filioque, the effects remarkably resemble what actually happened.

The earlier idea of Church unity was the spiritual unity of the Church and especially of the Episcopate, as is the case with Eastern Orthodoxy to this day. Correspondingly, there was a highly developed mysticism, typified by pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. Now, for better or for worse (we believe for better), the effect of the Filioque was to subordinate the Person of the Trinity particularly associated with such immaterialism to the Person Who became flesh and dwelt among us, and we not only beheld His glory but even touched and handled Him. Protestants often forget, in their polemic against what they consider to be illegitimate mysticism in the Roman Church, that to the Eastern Orthodox Roman Catholicism seems to be coarse and crude, and that, as for the Protestants,
they outdo Rome at its own game. Thus, however mistakenly, the first natural reaction to the Filioque would be that the older spiritual unity would have to be made visible. This is exactly what happened, immediately. The fact that Hildebrandt followed so quickly was certainly no accident. If one accepts the older doctrine of Church unity, and then adds the Filioque, one would have to postulate that the unity must be represented by someone that is visibly and numerically one, even as Christ was visibly and numerically one. (This warning is meant to apply particularly to the Anglo-Catholics; unless they deny the Filioque they will have to become Roman.) Hence the development of Papalism in its familiar form, and also the whole system of centralised bureaucracy known as Curialism which developed during the next century; hence also the development of legalistic Canon Law and casuistic ethics. The only possible alternative to this, if one continued to accept the Filioque, was to go behind and undercut even the original and Eastern basis of Church unity and to base it on the historic Christ alone, as witnessed in Scripture. This is in fact the Reformation, and the Eastern Orthodox are correct in regarding Protestantism as the final and uncompromising form of the Filioque. Nor does this exhaust the likely, and actual, results of this change. When we remember the significance of the Holy Spirit in the Epiclesis of the Eucharist, we could expect that the Filioque, in its mediaeval context, would demand a more exact, and substantial, definition of the Presence. And in actual fact this time saw too the development of the doctrine of Transubstantiation, which the Eastern Orthodox consider an unnecessary definition of a mystery but which the West defined as a dogma at the Lateran Council of 1215. It is also most likely that from the same source comes the Western interest in justification, the work supremely and uniquely reserved to the Son, however perverted this
interest may have been by the penitential system. The next few decades after the Filioque saw the rise of Anselm, the first great Western mediaeval theologian, whose theology was basically Christocentric and soteriological, and who was also a notable supporter of the Filioque. On another and lower plane, we may regard the materialistic response of the Crusades as another manifestation of the same outlook. Certainly it was also reflected in the interest of the Church in the material order of society and its material place in it. Therefore the subsequent history of Western Europe was for a long time determined by the Church's compulsion to posit a Holy Roman Empire and its equally inexorable compulsion to fight it afterwards; the rise of France, which frequently played de facto the part of the Holy Roman Empire and was involved in the same evil dialectic, complicated the situation but did not essentially alter it. It is this, at least as much as the Reformation that is so often blamed for it, that is responsible for that militarism which has been the curse of Europe. It is also noteworthy that these complications, under God, saved the Reformation on at least three occasions when by all normal calculations its position was hopeless; in 1526, 1630, and 1688. When we add to this the revival of the idea of an exhaustive and positive metaphysics of a theological character, as typified in their quite different ways by Joachim of Flora and Thomas Aquinas — which is in pointed contrast to the via negativa, the apophatic tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy — the picture becomes approximately complete. Henceforth, anyone who wished to assert the older primacy of the Spirit had to be, in the sense in which this word is used by the English literary coterie known as the "Angry Young Men", a rebel. This was the case with Joachim of Flora (1130-1202) and his successors, but in another sense he was the exception that manifestly proved the rule, since the context
in which he revived the theology of the Third Person was not mysticism but the Christian doctrine of — History! (The author believes that he was basically correct in this, but the fact remains that theologically, Joachim did such a bad job in detail that the final culmination of his tradition in Nazism and Communism was unfortunately what was to be expected.) A specialist in European history and philosophy would be able to follow up the threads much further, but we are close enough already to modern life to see that the picture of Karsavin is not exaggerated but the truth.

The author has deliberately drawn the picture in a neutral or even slightly unfriendly way, as, say, a Greek Orthodox might see it. The choice is between this and what Westerners have regarded as the stagnation of Eastern Orthodoxy. But there is no third alternative in the matter, and, without denying our obligation to listen to the Eastern Churches and learn from them, the author is convinced that the Filioque is the truth and the Western alternative must be accepted, with all its faults and discomforts, possibly even a Reformation schism that will be irreducible in this era. But this is not the point now. The point is that whatever alternative is accepted, we are dealing with the most important issue in post-Patristic history, and therefore it is a matter of extreme interest to study the beginnings of the question in Athanasius.

1 The first chapter is introductory, recounting the circumstances which prompted the writing of the Letters; the preliminary remarks concerning the nature of the heresy have already been fully considered. These are continued further in the second chapter, where Athanasius repeats with reference to the Spirit the argument already
made, in greater detail in C. Ar. I:17 and elsewhere with reference to the Son, that their doctrine is really an adulteration of the Trinity. Then follows a first statement of the relation of the doctrine of the Spirit to that of the Son: (PG XXVI 533B) "Indeed, in thinking wrongly of the Holy Spirit, they do not think correctly of the Son either. For if they had thought correctly about the Logos, they would think soundly also of the Spirit, Who proceeds from the Father and belonging to the Son is given from Him to the disciples and all who believe in Him. And in erring thus, they do not keep a sound faith in the Father. For those who 'resist the Spirit', as the great martyr Stephen said, deny also the Son. But those who deny the Son do not have the Father." This first statement indicates the line along which Athanasius's thought will develop. The origin of the Spirit within the Godhead is denoted by the verb ἐκ τοῦ Ἐν Θεόν. See Shapland's Note 13 on this chapter (p.64) for a study of the previous history of this word; Athanasius appears to stand midway between earlier writers who used it in a more general way to include even the origin of the Son, and again the mission of the Spirit, and later writers who confined its use to the origin of the Spirit within the Godhead. The Procession is of the Greek type (although here Ἐν Θεόν and not ἐκ is used), from the Father only, but Its propriety to the Son is emphasised without this concept being as yet examined in any more detailed way. Finally, true knowledge of the Spirit is essential for true knowledge of the Son; again, this is not examined in detail, except that it is said

(13) οὐκόσιν - less question begging than Shapland's "Therefore".
(14) δ' ἐπίθες ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐν Θεόν ἐκ τοῦ Ἐν Θεόν
(15) τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν Θεόν οὖν οὖν
to be analogous to the relation between knowledge of the Son and knowledge of the Father, and the controlling concept here appears to be Revelation.

3. Athanasius continues by saying that the only definite text from Scripture that the Tropioi appeared to use was Amos 4:13 LXX:

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redeemed the soul of the Captive; to show his point both ways. There are so many passages that it would
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The MT is:

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The LXX obviously means "wind" and where the LXX has "his Christ, the MT has "what is his thought". However, here, as usual, Athanasius does not attempt to appeal to the Hebrew, but takes the LXX text as normative; he notices that the Spirit has no article, and formulates the rule that πνεῦμα, with an article, usually but not always with the adjective ἐξίσου, means the Third Person, while it has other meanings without the article. Other means of definition with a definite Trinitarian reference are admitted, as equivalent to the article. This rule is in line with what we have already noticed about Athanasius's emphasis on categorical uniqueness as a criterion of God (see C.Ar.II:18-31), but, as Shapland points out, it has been found impossible to apply it in all cases, and Athanasius himself breaks it once in each direction, in I:33 (John 4:24) and I:8 (II Cor.3:17).
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The next four chapters amplify this point, and are virtually a long catena of passages of Scripture, from all sections of both Testaments as impartially as one can expect under the circumstances.

(16) It is easy to see that the LXX variant resulted from the diacritical dot on the last "Shin" being taken to be in the other place.

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be pointless to list them even, and no special point of exegesis is involved. There is the absolute minimum of comment. We need say very little, except to notice the difference in theological style, between the subtle and sophisticated exegesis of the Contra Arianos and the simple, catenary exegesis of these Letters. This is the plainest sign possible of the lack of development in the theology of the Spirit; in this sort of statement we do not impugn the fact that there is objectively only one right theology for all eternity; we do mean that people were not accustomed to taking the Spirit into account with all their intellect, in the sense that they were long since in the case of the Second Person. The significant comments of Athanasius are as follows:

In ch.4:537B, Athanasius comments on Gal. 3:2, thus, following on citation: "What had they received but the Holy Spirit which is given to those who believe and are being born again (Τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγιοῦ... καὶ ὁμοίως... τὴν ἁγιασμόν) through the laver of regeneration?" Here, Athanasius blunders into the sort of controversy that later exploded at the Reformation and in subsequent disputation between Reformation theology and its "Catholic" opponents as to whether the Spirit is primarily given in a Sacrament and if so whether it is in Baptism or Confirmation. It would be fair for a Protestant to say that even Athanasius is here too inclined to think of the Spirit in terms of the reward for virtue and not enough of the Spirit as giving the indispensable assurance of our justification as an accomplished fact. However, since these Reformation issues depend on the Filioque, as well as being its necessary consequences, we cannot blame Athanasius for this, except to point out that nobody who believes that the Spirit is given in Confirmation, or no, eirenist, can possibly appeal to Athanasius...
Later in ch. 4, and at the beginning of ch. 6, Athanasius refers to the Gospel passages, concerning the Baptism and following events, in which Jesus is related to the Spirit as an ordinary and creaturely man is, explaining them along already familiar lines, that He was baptized in virtue of His humanity. In 6:544A, occurs the passage:

\[ \text{καὶ ἥν ἐν πίστειν Θεόλογον, καὶ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ τελείωσιν, ἐν ἐκ τούτῳ ἐδώκετε οὐαταῖς καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ Πατρὶ, ἐν τῷ Ματθαίου τῷ Παπᾷ, παραγεγραμμένος τοῦ μενινταίς}. \]

(Matt. 28:19). In spite of Shapland and Montfaucon, the author prefers to take the 'γενέας' as referring to the verse of Scripture, the then meaning, "gave the perfect and final summing up of". The other meaning, which refers the 'γενέας' to

(17) For a summary, with references, of the controversy, primarily as it affects Anglicanism, see G.W.H. Lampe, "The Seal of the Spirit", chs. 8, 9, 10; Lampe strongly opposes the view that the Spirit is essentially given in confirmation and favours baptism. More recently, the rejected view has been revived by L. Dewar in his book on the Spirit mentioned above, p. 1150. The implication of the Confirmation party is, of course, that those Protestant Churches without Episcopal confirmation are un-Churches in a new and serious sense. According to Lossky, "The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church", p. 170, (a most valuable book, because if for him all theology must be mystical, "mysticism" correspondingly becomes co-extensive with all theology in subject matter), the question cannot arise in Eastern Orthodoxy. It agrees with one party that the Spirit is essentially associated with chrismation, the rite of confirmation, but normally administers it together with baptism.

A final and most interesting incidental point; Dewar does not mention Athanasius once in the historical section of his book, a most astonishing omission. Athanasius (with the possible and probable qualification mentioned in the last paragraph) appears to come down on the side of the Spirit's association with Baptism. But is not the controversy as a whole, and the acrimony with which it is pursued in its familiar form, literally blasphemous? After all, the Spirit IS the Third Person of the Trinity, and thus GOD.

(18) On the interpretation here adopted, the translation of this passage would be: "And hereby giving the perfect and final summing up of all our knowledge of God, and of our initiation whereby He joined us to Himself, He charged His disciples......"
the Spirit, is the more forced meaning, and actually does what Eastern Orthodox theologians always accuse Westerners of doing, at a point where it has no prima facie justification, giving the Spirit an essentially passive role in relation to the Son.

In the next chapter, we come on to more solid and difficult ground, and we quote in full: "But," say they, 'since the text makes mention of Christ, it is necessary for the sake of consistency to understand the spirit that is mentioned as the Holy Spirit and none other.' So you have observed that the Holy Spirit is named together with Christ! But where did you find that it is separated by nature or alienated from the Son, so that you can say that Christ is not a creature but that the Holy Spirit is? It is absurd to name together and glorify together things which are by nature unlike. For what community or likeness has the creature in relation to the Creator? At this rate you would reckon together with the Son what came to be through Him and link them to Him. It would therefore be sufficient, as has been said, to understand this passage as being about the spirit of the winds. But since you plead the reference to Christ in the text, it is necessary to look at the passage closely, in case we can find a more suitable meaning for the Spirit which is said to be created. What is meant by 'declare unto men his Christ',

(19) 

(20) Shapland's grounds for omitting , as in Rs and Migne, that it is not parallel to the following sentence and reminiscent of Basil, are not cogent, since after all one of Athanasius's main points against both the Arians and the Tropici is that they actually give full supreme honour and glory to beings whom they say are completely creaturely.

(21) 

(21)
but His becoming man? It is equivalent to ... (Is 7:14) ... and other references to His coming. But if it is the incarnate presence (22) which is declared concerning the Logos, what spirit must be held to be created, but the spirit of men which is recreated and renewed?...(Ezek.35:26)...

And when has this been fulfilled, save when the Lord came and renewed all things by His grace? See how in this text also the difference between spirits is made clear. Our spirit is renewed, but the Holy Spirit is not just spirit (23) but God says that it is His Spirit whereby ours are renewed (24) ...(Ps.104 AV:29-30)...

But if it is by the Spirit of God that we are renewed, then the Spirit here said to be created is not the Holy Spirit but our spirit. And if because all things come into being through the Logos you think correctly that the Son is not a creature, is it not then blasphemy to say that the Spirit is a creature, in (20) Whom the Father through (21) the Logos perfects and renews all things? And if, because of the simple statement that spirit is created, they have imagined that this means the Holy Spirit, let them know that the Holy Spirit is not created, but that it is our spirit that is renewed in It.... (This is stated to be analogous to the renewing of the actual fallen man in the familiar way, Ps.51:10, Zech 12:1, Eph.2:15, 4:24, Ezek.18:31-32).

10 Accordingly, if created spirit bears this meaning, the thunder which is established can be suitably understood as the sure word (25) and unshakeable law of the Spirit. It was of this word that our Lord wished James and John to be ministers when he called

(22) της ευσεβείαν τηροντάς...
(23) ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις ἐνμαρτυρι
(24) ἐν δὲ τῇ πανίνι ἐν τῷ σάλῳ τοῦ λόγου τελεσθήκατο ἀκολουθίᾳ.
them Boanerges that is, sons of thunder... (Athanasius cites John 1:1 as an example of thundrous proclamation, and Heb. 12:25-28, against the familiar interpretation, as being fulfilled by the kerygma)... But that kingdom which he calls unshakeable, David in the Psalms declares to be established... (Ps 93:1-2)... So then this text in the prophet (Sc. Amos 4:13 - 'A.H.) signifies the coming of the Saviour, whereby we are renewed and the law of the Spirit remains unshaken." (quotation ends at 556B, mid.)

This important extract is the only place in these Letters in which Athanasius manages to treat the most important issue of created spirit, analogous in its relation to the Third Person with the Body of Christ in its relation to the pre-existent Second Person. We have already, in our comments on C. Ar. II:78-82, discussed the extreme importance of this question, and can make no further comment here except to regret that Athanasius never developed it to the extent that he developed the doctrine of the Humanity of Christ. The fact that it appears to rest on a somewhat forced interpretation of Amos 4:13 LXX, which is at variance with the MT, should not deter us theologically. This exegesis, which Athanasius presents in the form of a possible alternative to the simple one, is evidently the one that really interests him, in spite of its lack of development, which we doubly regret.

In 9:553B, Athanasius again introduces, with reference to recreation and renewal, the formula, through ( ἐν) the Son, in (ἐν) the Spirit, for an operation that has hitherto, in the main, been referred entirely to the Son-Logos, ἐν and ἐν both having been used. This

(25) See above, pp. 904-120
question must be postponed till later. The exegesis of "thunder" in ch.10, as the Word of God, proclaimed, and the new law of the Spirit, is a normal feature of Patristic exegesis. See Shapland's note, and also the Argumentum in Psalmos, and De Titulis Psalmorum, usually attributed to Athanasius, at any rate for the first half of the exegesis.

In the remainder of ch.10, Athanasius deals with the Tropicist argument that there are certain passages of Scripture that appear to demote the Spirit by mentioning it after the angels, or even mentioning the latter without the Spirit at all; the one they quoted was I Tim.5:21. After a digression, Athanasius replies, in ch.13 and the first part of ch.14, that there are examples of Scripture of every conceivable permutation and combination on this matter, and so nothing can be read into I Tim.5:21 in the way that the Tropici tried to. But first of all, Athanasius gives formidable prima facie evidence against the Tropicist exegesis, to wit, that the Spirit is categorically different from the angels; (11:557A): "He is called Paraclete, Spirit of adoption, Spirit of sanctification, Spirit of God, and Spirit of Christ, but never angel or archangel, or ministering spirit, as are the angels. Rather is He Himself ministered to along with (τῷ) the Son by Gabriel....(Lk.1:35)....". (In the Tropicist quotation of θόν τόμν αλλός δ' ξαναγείω εν τοῦ Ιωάν, in Zechariah, passim, Athanasius quotes at length Zech.4:5-6, from which it is clear that "the
angel which spoke to the prophet was not the Holy Spirit but an angel, while the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Almighty, to Whom an angel ministers, Who is inseparable from the Godhead and might of the Logos.\(^{(27)}\)

"But as they make the words of the Apostle the basis of their plea... let them tell us which if all these is the one that is ranked with the Triad. Not one, all told! Which of them is the one that descended to the Jordan in the form of a dove? For 'thousand thousand' and 'ten thousand times ten thousand' are they that minister.... (Similarly with Matt.13:41, 4:11, 13:49, cf. 28:19 and John 20:22 & 15:26, the contrast being between the essential plurality of angels and the essential singularity of the Spirit)..... He did not rank an angel with the Godhead, nor was it by a creature (\(\epsilon\nu \kappa\tau\iota\sigma\mu\alpha\tau\iota\iota\)) that He linked us to Himself and to the Father, but by \(\epsilon\nu\) the Holy Spirit. And when He promised Him, He did not say that He would send an angel, but 'the Spirit of truth that proceedeth from the Father'\(^{(28)}\), and from Him\(^{(29)}\) receives and gives.

12 "Moses knew too that the angels are creatures, but that the Holy Spirit is united to the Son and the Father\(^{(30)}\).....\(^{(Ex.33:1-2 & 15)}\)..... For he did not desire a creature to lead the people, lest they should learn to worship the creature rather than God Who created all things. So, of course, he refused the angel, and besought God Himself to lead them.....\(^{(On Ex.33:17-18, along with Is.63:11-12 & 14)}\).

\(^{(27)}\) Reading \(\alpha\iota\nu\iota\nu\gamma\iota\nu\sigma\iota\nu\kappa\alpha\iota\sigma\tau\iota\iota\nu\iota\) with most MSS, followed by Shapland; Reg. I, Seg., Gobl, Felok. I read \(\epsilon\nu\iota\nu\gamma\iota\nu\kappa\alpha\iota\sigma\tau\iota\iota\nu\iota\nu\) pro \(\epsilon\nu\) followed by Migne - ac Verbi proprius est - and is proper to the Logos.

\(^{(28)}\) \(\pi\rho\iota\rho\iota\tau\omega\nu\pi\tau\alpha\tau\iota\delta\oslash\epsilon\sigma\mu\rho\iota\sigma\tau\iota\ota\) as in John 15:26.

\(^{(29)}\) \(\epsilon\kappa\kappa\iota\nu\) i.e. from the same Person.

\(^{(30)}\) \(\tau\omicron\sigma\iota\nu\kappa\nu\tau\iota\mu\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota\iota\nu\nu\iota\nu\kappa\alpha\iota\sigma\tau\iota\iota\nu\iota\nu\)
cannot perceive the truth from this? When God promises to lead them, He promises no longer to send an angel, but the Spirit which is above angels, and He leads the people. He shows that the Spirit does not belong to the creatures (οὗτος ἄνω θεωρεῖν κτίσματι) nor is He an angel, but is above the creation (δεικνύω μιν κτίσματι) united to the Godhead of the Father. For it was God Himself Who, through the Logos in the Spirit, led the people.... (Cf. Lev. 11:45 &c., and cited Ps. 77:20 78:53, 136:16, Deut. 1:30).... Thus the Spirit of God is neither angel nor creature, but belongs to His Godhead (32). For when the Spirit was with the people (ἐν θυμίᾳ λαβὼν), God, through the Son in the Spirit (33) was with them.

In this section, we find what we have already called, with reference to the Son, the categorical argument. (34) In the first place, angels, even, are essentially plural, and therefore each individual angel is a member of a class; in fact, Athanasius appears to go further than this and maintain that they normally act as a plurality. On the other hand, the Holy Spirit is absolutely singular and unique. Athanasius does not have the time or space here for the full force and extent of his pluralistic arguments as developed throughout C. Ar. II, but he has utilised the most important point. The second point is that the Holy Spirit, as far as creaturely existence is concerned, is active and giving, while creatures are as such passive and receptive. The statement is still made that the Holy Spirit, exceptionally, is in a sense in that latter relation to Father and Son, which is of course a continuation of the statements made earlier by Athanasius (to abort the argument,

(31) Διὰ τοῦ λογοῦ ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι.
(32) ἐν τῷ θεῷ ἔρχεται θύμος.
(33) διὰ γιοῦ εἰς Πνεύματι.
(34) See above, pp. 658, 1090, and references.
of course, that Christ in His essence was a Pneumatic), but this is here overwhelmingly dwarfed by the Scriptural references which indicate that, from the point of view of creatures, the Spirit is active in a way in which creatures can only be passive. (35) And this brings us to the third facet of Athanasius's argument, which is that this activity which is the province of the Spirit as opposed to any creaturely reality is the same as the activity of God Himself. This is actually the argument concerning the unity of which we shall discuss with reference to the important passage in ch. 14, beginning near the end of 565A, which is the next passage to claim the right of full quotation.

14: For the holy and blessed Triad is indivisible and a unity with comm. itself (36). When mention is made of the Father, there is included also His Logos, and the Spirit Who is in (EVT) the Son. If the Son is named, the Father is in (EVT) the Son, and the Spirit is not outside the Logos (37) For there is from the Father one grace which is fulfilled through the Son in the Spirit (38), and there is one divine nature (EVT), and one God Who is 'over all and through all and in all'. Thus Paul also, when he said, 'I charge thee before God and Jesus Christ,' understood that the Spirit had not been divided from the Son, but was Himself in (EVT) Christ, as the Son is in the Father... (Angels are introduced into the Scriptural passages, says Athanasius, so that we might remember the subordinate place of such creatures as angels and even Apostles in the Economy)....

(35) In this clear form, this aspect of the categorial argument is new to Athanasius.

(36) ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁγίας ἡγεσίας ἐμφανίζεται.

(37) εἰς τὸν ἐκτὸς τοῦ λόγου.

(38) ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἁγίου χριστιαντικής.
The relevant portions of Shapland's note on this passage are as follows: ".....As Newman observes, on C.Ar.II:41, what Athanasius says here must be distinguished from the argument, touched on by Athanasius in C.Ar. I:34 and fully stated by Hilary, De Trin. VII:31, that the existence of the Son is involved in the very term 'Father'. Here he goes much further. It follows from the unity of the Holy Triad that the three Persons cannot even conceptually be dissociated. God is known only through His self-manifestation, and that manifestation, as is all the divine activity, is from the Father through the Son and in the Holy Spirit. Hence we can know nothing of the Father, apart from the fact of His relationship with the Son and the Spirit, which we do not know also of the other two Persons. The converse of this, that those predicates and titles which Scripture uses to distinguish the Father from the creatures and the gods of heathenism, cannot be used to distinguish Him from the Son, is argued in C.Ar.III:7-8. It is thus entirely natural that Athanasius should choose this point to introduce what is a main argument in these Epistles, the unity of the Divine Εὐεργέτης. The succession of sentences should be noticed here. Starting from the unity of the Triad, we realize the necessary association of the Son and Spirit in any references that the Scriptures make to the Father. But this necessity itself springs from the fact that God in the Scriptures speaks and acts as one Being. Finally, from this unity in activity we apprehend a unity of essence, one divine nature (Διόνυσια)....."

This footnote is an excellent summary of the Athanasian doctrine of the unity of Εὐεργέτης in relation to the Godhead of the Holy Spirit. Shapland (see also Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, pp. 257-260) interprets this as an argument from unity of Εὐεργέτης to unity of essence, and as such it has been criticised by McIntyre on
the ground that as Athanasius accepted the unity of essence as his highest premise the conclusion should really be identity of essence. (39)

This latter form of argumentation would work better against the moderate Homoeans, or even the Macedonians, than against the extremist Tropici, whose doctrine of the Spirit was of course soundly and completely Anomoean if anything, and, as we have seen — however contrary to what might be called the received interpretation — that the Athanasius of the "De Synodis" regarded such distinctions as that between unity of essence and identity of essence as having obfuscatory significance only. (40) The truth is that the notion of essence is so difficult and uncertain, as applied to the Trinity, that it is advisable not to interpret any passage in terms of it unless the word and concept is definitely employed in the original text, which it is not in this case. At any rate, this disagreement of interpretation indicates the dangers of doing this. Athanasius for the moment confines himself to establishing the propriety of the Spirit to the Godhead. It is true that his conclusion is the equivalent of the Homoousion in some sense but this is as far as it is safe to go with the notion of essence. The other thing that, rightly, emerges from Shapland's exposition of the passage is that in some way the argument is circular. The argument evidently does proceed from unity of \[ \sqrt[3]{\rho} \] to unity of Godhead (to avoid argument), but the original acceptance of the unity of operation

(39) See, "The Holy Spirit in Greek Patristic Thought", by J. McIntyre, being a Paper presented at the "Society for the Study of Theology, 1953, published in the Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol.VII (1954, Dec.) pp. 353-375; the present reference is on p. 357. The Greek Fathers who figure most prominently in his analysis are Athanasius and Basil, and in fact this paper is all round, one of the most important studies of the Letters to Serapion.

(40) Especially in ch.53, see above, pp. 1128-32
appears to be based on an a priori interpretation of the Scriptural passages, since Athanasius says that whenever we see any Person operating, we must deduce the synergy of the other two. This brings us straight to the question of what is the root of the doctrine of the Trinity. It is certainly true, and probably the best interpretation of Athanasius's position, that his argument is spiral rather than circular, with each act of awareness of the unity of heightening our knowledge of the unity of essence, and vice versa, like the interpretation of Barth and McIntyre of the relation between fides and intellectus in the theology of Anselm. But this still leaves the problem of the origin of this process in the way that it is not a problem in Anselm - especially to a Protestant expositor of Athanasius. The position in the Arian controversy was relatively simple. We have already shown that the apparently a priori factor which controlled Athanasius's exegesis of Scriptural passages was simply the demand that Scripture be accepted as consistent with itself, and as a genuine revelation of God, with the vital corollary that its testimony to the Godhead of Christ have absolute priority over the testimony as to His creatureliness (not, of course, in the Monophysite sense! Only once, with a momentary reference to the Baptismal formula - which is of course also Scripture - does Athanasius even begin to take a divergent line in any important place. As for the root of the Trinity itself, there is very little emphasis yet on the Spirit, and the relation of Father and Son, in the orthodox sense, is amply justified on the basis of the analogical meaning of the very title Son (and Logos etc.) and particularly on the key Scriptural metaphor

(41) See respectively "Fides Quaeren's Intellectum", pp. 15-72 (E.T.), and "St. Anselm and His Critics" pp. 7-55.
(42) See above, pp. 745 ff.
(43) As in C.A. II: 41-43; see above, pp. 858-863.
The actual exegesis was concerned in a very clear-cut way with the difference between the Deity and the Humanity of Christ. On the other hand, the problem in the case of the Spirit is not so clear-cut, even if it did not call for the hard labour and grasp of first principles that were necessary to answer the Arians; it was, perhaps unfortunately, much easier to answer the Tropici on Amos 4:13 LXX than the Arians on Prov. 8:22 LXX. The evidence in the present case was much more diffuse.

Whatever principle Athanasius used, it was not that the unity of operation was clearly revealed in every Scriptural passage, or even in any one passage (See Shapland's notes on 1:25(45) for the contrast with the attempts of Didymus to do this). Athanasius is quite prepared to recognise that some and perhaps almost all passages refer to two or even only one of the Persons. If there is a Scriptural principle, it is a more diffuse application of the rule that Scripture be consistent throughout.

On the other hand, there is in these letters more emphasis on the part played sacramentally by Baptism, especially the Baptismal formula, which plays a more prominent part than in the Contra Arianos; it will be treated in full later in the First Letter.

Incidentally, it is possible that in part the direction of the argument may be from unity of operation to unity of essence in the Homoean sense and thence to the Homoousion in the full Nicene or Athanasian sense, but the argument for the last step is simply that there can, in the very nature of the case, only be one Being of the kind that Father, Son, and Spirit are. This interpretation does full justice to what we have called the categorical argument which we have already discussed, and which becomes, if anything, more important still later in

the Letters. It is here that the truth lies in the contention that there is an argument in Athanasius from unity of essence (in a quasi-Homoean sense) to a true identity of essence (in the sense of the Homoousion). In its extreme form, this is the very dangerous rational argument for monotheism, and philosophers and theologians are more and more inclined to recognise that it would be fair to proceed further on the same rationalistic path and ask if the number of ultimate beings is even one in number. Athanasius safeguards himself from this sort of conclusion by keeping close to the actual gracious revelation of God.

15 The next issue to be considered is the Grandfather argument, as it might be called, which the Tropicci presented against the Deity of the Spirit. After an introductory statement that there is absolutely no Scriptural warrant for this, Athanasius gives a typical Tropicci statement of their case: "If He is not a creature and not one of the angels, but proceeds from the Father, then He Himself is also a son, and He and the Logos are brothers. And if He is a brother, how is the Logos Only-begotten? How is it then that they are not equal, but one is named after the Father and the other after the Son? How, if He is from the Father, is He not also said to be begotten, or called Son, but, simply Holy Spirit? But if the Spirit is of the Son, then the Father would be the Spirit's grandfather."

Shapland has a note, which should be consulted in full, in which he points out that the \( \text{εκ τοῦ Πατρὸς εκποροεῖται} \), whether with one \( \gamma \) or two, is not used in the Tropicci objection as quoted by Athanasius, and quotes

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(46) \( \text{εκ τοῦ Πατρὸς εκποροεῖται} \) . The English given will hereinafter correspond to this Greek unless otherwise stated.

(47) \( \text{Εἰ εἴη τοῦ Νομοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ Πάντων} \) .
two examples of the same sort of heretical objection in which this
Eunom. III:6; in each case the form with two \( \sqrt{\text{\textit{X}}} \), the
\( \sqrt{\text{\textit{V}}} \), \( \sqrt{\text{\textit{Y}}} \), \( \sqrt{\text{\textit{Z}}} \)
Ingenerate, as distinct from Unoriginate or Ultimate, is the reading
of the text. Shapland continues that "it is strong proof of the popu-
lar character of Tropicism that the argument should have reached Athan-
asius in this form." Perhaps; but the author would rather regard it
in a different light, as another proof of the essential fanaticism of
the Tropici and of the real, even if perverse, influence of Athanasius
on this party. Any Egyptians or Alexandrians with any interest in
theology would have known that in season and out of season, including
at least three occasions in his writings within the last ten years or
so, Athanasius had effectively ruined the concept of the
\( \sqrt{\text{\textit{Z}}} \) as a weapon of heresy (or of any form of theology), by showing that
it was an ambiguous word with one meaning heretical and one meaning
perfectly sound according to what Athanasius was presenting as orthodoxy.
In each case the argument worked completely with the apparently more
vulnerable variant \( \sqrt{\text{\textit{Z}}} \), without any assistance from the
variant \( \sqrt{\text{\textit{Z}}} \); it was of course no part of the orthodox
faith to say that the Son was in any sense whatever \( \sqrt{\text{\textit{Z}}} \).
When we remember the position of the Tropici, we can see that this sort
of argument, in the state in which it was, would have been quite un-
suitable to a party which showed a combination of quasi-Arian heresy
on the Spirit with a virtually Athanasian orthodoxy on the Son. It is
perfectly obvious to us what reception Athanasius would have given to
the argument if they had tried to use it in the classical form, and it
is almost as certain that they knew it in their hearts too. Under the
circumstances, they came to the conclusion that the more extreme and
"popular" form of presentation was safest.

This conclusion in fact would have been justified; the actual presentation of the argument by the Tropici certainly made it no easier for Athanasius, however less "scientific" it might have been than the language of Eunomius and the later Macedonians, in that it forced Athanasius hard back to first principles. However, it had one unfortunate result, and it is for this reason that we are giving considerable attention to this matter. Athanasius was never really confronted with the objection as it was expressed by Eunomius and the Macedonians, and indeed before them by Eusebius of Caesarea, and of course, first and foremost and definitively by Origen, that the Spirit must be a ζηνετοιοί of the Son. If Athanasius had been confronted by this sort of argument, it is certain that he would have had to reckon with the possibility (and the actuality) that the Spirit actually has an origin in the Son but one which does not involve the Son's temporal priority, least of all does it involve the relation between Creator and creature, even as the Son has this sort of origin in the Father. The analogy with the way in which Athanasius had already treated this issue in the theology of the Son would have impressed this on him. In other words, Athanasius would have been confronted fairly and squarely with the necessity of the Filioque, in an orthodox context. In fact, it is likely that the slightly greater tendency towards the Filioque shown by the later Cappadocians and Alexandrians as compared with Athanasius is due to their greater confrontation with the Origenist form of this heretical argument. But, as it was, Athanasius, the greatest as well as the earliest of the fourth

(48) See De Decr. 28-31, C. Ar. I: 30-34, De Syn. 46-7. See also above, pp. 285-308.
century theologians, never had cause to deal really effectively and
directly with Origen. The result has been disastrous. The author is
not competent to draw the connecting line in its entirety, but it is
perfectly obvious from modern Eastern Orthodox theology that one of the
main reasons for the denial of the Filioque is that it has been bluffed
into the position that the only alternative is Origen. This will be
discussed further later.

In the remainder of ch. 15, and ch. 16, Athanasius repeats un-
changed — and sometimes verbally unchanged — the argument of
C. Ar. I: 19-22 concerning the uniqueness of the Father's Father-
hood and the Son's Sonship, whereby Fatherhood and Sonship apply strictly
and permanently only within the Godhead. We have already commented on
the argument at great length, so that the only further remark necessary
is that of Shapland, note 2 on ch. 16, that to repeat this argument un-
changed in the context of the theology of the Spirit is to give no
positive clue to the Spirit's place within the Trinity. The only state-
ment that approaches this is at the beginning of ch. 17, where Athanasius
says: "For this reason too it is madness to call Him a creature. If
He were a creature, He would not be ranked with (\( \sigma_{\text{\nu\nu\varepsilon\tau\alpha\sigma\sigma\tau\varepsilon\tau\omicron\omicron} \))
the Triad. For the whole Triad is one God. It is enough to know that
the Spirit is not a creature, and is not numbered with (\( \sigma_{\text{\nu\nu\varepsilon\rho\iota\delta\iota\omicron} \))
with things made. For nothing foreign is mixed with the Triad, but it
is indivisible and self-consistent (\( \delta\omega\omicron\omicron\omicron\zeta\varsigma \))." The
remainder of ch. 17 and ch. 18 are a plea to the Arians and Tropici to
accept what are "handed down by faith (\( \tau\iota\iota\tau\iota\tau\omicron\gamma\iota\)}
and are known "by hearing of faith (\( \epsilon\nu\delta\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\omicron \)), (each
17:569C), with due faith, or if that is not possible, at least to keep
silence about what they cannot understand. From this sort of passage the
Eastern Orthodox tradition derives its apophatic ideal at its best; critically, the most interesting deduction from this would be that the Tropici were very different, as we have said, from the later Macedonians, who actually preferred silence or evasion, in pointed contrast to the brutal bluntness of the Tropici. (50)

19 Having reached this stage, Athanasius can no longer avoid some positive statement of the intra-Trinitarian relations of the Spirit, even though he is still much more definite about the Spirit's relation to the Father than to the Son, and since the analogy is the operative concept for him, he at last has to change it into its fully Trinitarian form (and likewise the other similar Source-River analogy) by combining Heb. 1:3 with other passages of Scripture. This passage is the kernel of the Letters: (After a plea to accept only what Scripture says) "...The Father is called Fountain (πηγή) and Light (φως).... (Jer. 2:13 and Baruch 3:10-12, I John 1:5). But the Son, in contrast with the fountain, is called River (ποταμός) 'The river of God is full of water (Ps. 65 AV:9)." In contrast with the Light He is called Radiance (ἀκατάφραστος). As then the Father is Light and the Son is His Radiance.... we may see in the Son the Spirit in Which we are enlightened (51)... (Eph. 1:17-18). But when we are enlightened by the Spirit (τοῦ ἐμφανίσθη στοιχείων) it is Christ Who in Him enlightens us.... (John 1:9). Again, as the Father is Fountain and the Son is called River, we are said to drink of the Spirit (52) .... (I Cor.12:13) .... But when we are made to drink of the

(49) See Lossky "The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church." ch. 2.
(50) See Shapland, op. cit. 27-29.
(51) ἐκτὸς ὁ ὑπερήφανος καὶ ἐν τῷ γίγνεται Πνεύμα, ἐν τῇ φωτίζωσιν.
(52) πίνουν λόγον ἐκ τῆς ἁπάντως.
Spirit, we drink of Christ....(I Cor.10:4).... Again, as Christ is True Son, so we, when we receive of the Spirit, are made sons(53). (Rom. 8:15).... But if by the Spirit we are made sons, it is clear that in Christ (εὐαγγέλιον τῆς Πένθους) we are called children of God...(John 1:12).... Then as the Father, in Paul's words, is the Only Wise the Son is His Wisdom...(Rom.16:27 and I Cor.1:24).... But as the Son is Wisdom, so we, receiving the Spirit of Wisdom, have the Son and are made wise in Him(54)...(Ps.146:7-8).... When the Holy Spirit is given into us, God is in us. (John 20:22 and I John 4:12-13).... But when God is in us, the Son is also in us...(John 14:23).... Furthermore, as the Son is Life..... we are said to be quickened by the Spirit (εὐαγγέλιον τῆς Πένθους) ...(John 14:6 and Rom.8:11).... But when we are quickened by the Spirit, Christ Himself is said to live in us (Gal. 2:20).... Again, the Son declared that the Father worked the works that He did...(John 14:10&12).... So Paul declared that the works that he worked by the power of the Spirit (εὐαγγέλιον τῆς Πένθους) were Christ's works....(Rom. 15:18-19)...."

In extending his basic Scriptural analogies, Athanasius has taken the natural step and come to the natural conclusion; the Father is to the Son is to the Spirit as the light-source is to the radiance is to the light as it enlightens us, in the case of the analogy. In this case, it has been necessary to modify and modernise the terminology, in a way that is still perfectly consistent with the thought of Athanasius, to express his intention quite clearly. However, it is far clearer in the case of the other metaphor, without

(53) Εὐαγγέλιον τῆς Πένθους Ἀληθινοῦ Πένθους

(54) Εὐαγγέλιον τῆς Πένθους Ἀληθινοῦ Πένθους, εἰς τὸν Ἰσόν Πένθους τῆς Πένθους.
any need for modification. The Father is to the Son is to the Spirit as a Source or Fountain is to the River is to the water in the river. Within the way of thought of these two metaphors, the solutions of Athanasius are perfectly fitting. The real point is their relation to the Filioque. Although a plausible case can be made out for the contention that they are not inconsistent with it, they are far closer to the Greek Procession, especially the present interpretation, whereby the Spirit proceeds from (i.e. $\overset{2}{\alpha}$) the Father, through (i.e. $\overset{\beta}{\alpha}$) the Son. The contrast with the position of, say, Augustine, to whom the Holy Spirit is the love whereby each of the Father and Son loves the other, is obvious; such a love, especially if it is to transcend the gradation of status on both sides and is not to be the spirit of, say, imperium, must be absolutely mutual and must therefore, be in accordance with the Filioque. On the other hand, insofar as one can make a distinction between the light as it enlightens us, and the radiance - a real difficulty in extending this analogy from a Binitarian to a Trinitarian sense - it is difficult to see how the Light which enlightens us can have its origin in the Radiance in the same way as it has its origin in the Light-source. The two relations, Father-Son and Father-Spirit, would have to be unreservedly and exclusively either in series or in parallel. Athanasius would have excluded the former, as it would have been the doctrine of Hieracas, whereby the Son (and by implication the Spirit too in relation to the Son) was like a torch kindled from a fire, which represented the Father. However popular this analogy was in earlier Patristic theology, it had been decisively repudiated by Athanasius, and also incidentally by Arius. (55) The parallel relation is the basis of the Greek Procession. Again, this is

clearer in the case of the analogy of the river, where the Greek Procession is the obvious interpretation. It is in fact very difficult to think of the Filioque on the basis of these analogies, and to make them as normative as Athanasius did is in effect to commit oneself to the Greek doctrine. (56)

Athanasiou's supporting Scriptural passages, which are very numerous, are treated in such a way as to confirm the argument from unity of $\frac{\varepsilon \gamma \nu}{\varepsilon \gamma \nu}$ which we have already noticed above, since they all refer to the gracious operation of God in Christ towards us. It is an interesting contrast that, whereas when Athanasius discusses propositional or analogically or metaphorically quasi-propositional passages indicating the nature of the Trinity like Heb. 1:3, he emerges with something indistinguishable from the Greek Procession, the case is different when he discusses the operation of God. Here the argument would, if pressed too far, indicate an almost Sabellian identity between Son and Spirit, and where it does not do so, it rather indicates what we have called the series doctrine of the relation between Father, Son, and Spirit, the position which Shapland, passim, regards as distinctively Athanasian, that the doctrine of the Spirit is derived from the doctrine of the Son. The most interesting case of this, and the clearest, is where he says that the Spirit is the Spirit of Wisdom, Wisdom being the title of the Second Person, and also the Spirit of Sonship. This is undoubtedly meant in the same sense as that in which the Second Person is Logos of the Son. We have already seen how Athanasius uses this latter title to safeguard the Son's immateriality in relation to the Father and to counteract the transcendence of the Father in relation

(56) Cf above, pp. 712-14.
to the Son. (57) The title "Spirit of Wisdom" is intended to have the same function, as Spirit is supremely and by definition that which is immaterial and transcendent. We are hazarding this interpretation even though it is not immediately evident whether Athanasius means Spirit which is behind Wisdom or the Spirit that goes forward from Wisdom to communicate it. Quite certainly both meanings are intended. If this is so, we have the suggestion of yet another argument for the Deity of the Spirit. But, in spite of the above remarks, the Scriptural evidence is not presented in a sufficiently definite way to indicate the exact direction of the argument, beyond, once again, showing the general unity of God by all possible combinations and permutations of the Persons.

20 Unity of operation is the keynote of the next section, which begins at the beginning of ch. 20: "But if there is such co-ordination and unity within the Holy Triad, who can separate either the Son from the Father, or the Spirit from the Son and from the Father Himself? Who would be audacious as to say that the Triad is unlike itself and diverse in nature (59) or that the Son is in essence foreign (τὸν ἅγιον) to the Father or the Spirit alien (ἀλλ' αὐτός) to the Son?" This is clearly a further case of an argument from unity of operation to the intra-Trinitarian unity, and once again the terminology that indicates the unity between Father and Son (ὁ Υἱός ὁ ἅγιος ὁ Προτάγωνος) is technically more advanced than that which indicates the unity of the Spirit (ὁ ὑπάρχων ὁ Πατροτάγωνος). This is one of the cases where Athanasius emphasises the series aspect of the intra-Trinitarian relation, that is, the relation Son-Spirit in series with that of Father-Son. The third

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(57) See above, pp. 945, 694.
(58) οὐχὶς in gen. abs., i.e. what one sees in the Parthenon.
(59) ἐστι φρονήσις τοῦ ἅγιου τοῦ υἱοῦ.
point of interest is that the vocabulary associated with \( \text{φωσήμα} \) and that associated with \( οὐσία \) are again, as usual, virtually synonymous. Athanasius now gives the other side of the argument. To continue immediately: "How can these things be? If one should make inquiry and ask again, 'How, when the Spirit is in us is the Son said to be in us? How when the Son is in us is the Father said to be in us? Or how, when it is truly a Triad, is the Triad described as one? Or why, when the One in us is the Triad said to be in us?' let him first divide the Radiance from the light, or wisdom from the wise, or let him tell how these things are." After a plea that these mysterious things be treated as true mysteries, Athanasius states further, "Nevertheless we can meet this difficulty, primarily by faith (\( \tauύτερον \)), and next from what has been mentioned above, that is, Image (\( \νεοτέρον \)) and Radiance (\( \τόποι κάθευδων \)), Fountain and River, Substance and Expression (60) As the Son is in (\( \εὐφράστη \)) the Spirit as in His own image, so also the Father is in the Son. For divine Scripture...has given us such illustrations (\( \τιμωρεῖν \)).....that it may be lawful.....to speak more plainly.....and to think legitimately.....and to believe that the sanctification which is derived from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit (61) is one." This is patently an argument from the unity of essence, which is apprehended as a basic principle of all theology and all exegesis in some way that is not quite certain, to the unity of operation, \( \εὐφράστη \). The operation which is decisively significant in regard to the Spirit is

(60) as in Migne. The comma here should not be present. Shapland's "Essence" for \( \varepsilonπόβουλος \) is a bad mistake, as the word obviously still has its meaning as in Heb.1:3.

(61) This stock phrase will not be given hereinafter in the Greek.
sanctification, as the last sentence shows; this is the work that has always been supremely associated with the Spirit. The basis of the unity of essence appears here to be the fundamental analogies of Heb.1, which are expressed in propositional form and thus have the status of direct statements of the Divine Essence. The difficulty is that in the form in which they are quoted they are still essentially binitarian, and Athanasius is patently not sure enough of the Trinitarian form which he has just elaborated to use it in this context, especially where it appears to demand a direct quotation from Scripture.

From this, Athanasius turns naturally to what McIntyre has called the ontological principle in the Greek Patristic theology of the Spirit, that the Spirit is to the Son as the Son is to the Father. He continues immediately, "And as the Son is an Only-begotten Offspring, so also the Spirit, being given and sent from the Son(62) is Himself one and not many, nor one of ( ἐκ) many, but One and the same Spirit (μόνον ἄνευ Πνεύματος). As the Son, the Living Logos, is one, so must the vital activity and gift whereby He sanctifies be one, perfect, and complete(63) which is said to proceed from the Father(64) since it is from ( ἐκ πατρὸς γεν.) the Logos Who is confessed to be from ( ἐκ) the Father, that it shines forth and is sent, and is given.(65)

The Son is sent from (πατρί) the Father....(John 3:16d).....The Son sends the Spirit(66)....(John 16:7)....The Son glorifies the
Father...(John 17:4)....The Spirit glorifies the Son...(John 16:14d and 8:26)....The Spirit takes of the Son...(John 16:14b)....The Son came in the name of the Father. 'The Holy Spirit,' says the Son (John 14:26), 'Whom the Father will send in My name'.

21 But if, in regard to order and nature, the Spirit bears the same relation to the Son as the Son to the Father will not he who calls the Spirit a creature necessarily have the same opinion of the Son? For if the Spirit is a creature of the Son, it will be consistent for them to say that the Logos is a creature of the Father....For as the Son, Who is in (ὁ γιός) the Father and the Father in Him, is not a creature but is proper to the Father's essence, (for this you also profess to say) so also is it not lawful to rank with the creatures the Spirit Who is in (ὁ θυσμός) the Son, and the Son in Him, nor to divide Him from the Logos and reduce the Triad to imperfection." The remainder of this chapter is a transition to the topic of subsequent chapters.

On this section, Shapland's notes are of particular importance. In the first place, the Spirit is said to be one, because this is a necessary corollary of the unity of the Logos. The Spirit is described as ἡ πνεύματος ἡ προσαρμομένη; this expresses the difficulty about the personality of the Spirit, which is a more difficult question than most present-day theologians usually concede. There is one sense in which the Spirit must be personal, and this sense is safeguarded by

(67) ἔκ τοῦ νόμου ἁμαρτίας -cf. C. Ar. I:15:44b, and above, pp. 678-680

(68) ἡ πνεύματος ἡ προσαρμομένη. As we shall show in our commentary, it is necessary, in spite of Shapland's note, to take τὸ ὁν "in part at least, as referring to intra-Trinitarian rank."
the adjective living, living (see Living Will, C. Ar. III: 63 and Living Word, C. Ar. II: 32), but there is another sense in spite of the references in Gregory of Nazianzus and Origen in Shapland's note, and the misgivings of the contemporary Social Trinitarian school, in which the Spirit does not have the personality of the Father and Son (as the titles of the first two Persons are personal, and the title Spirit is not); it is to this that Athanasius's title of is due, although Augustine's amor, love, is better. Shapland's notes on the next section are best quoted, in their relevant parts, "The uniqueness of the Spirit is no less to be established from the fact that He proceeds from the Father. Here, for the first time in the letter, His procession is set forth clearly as a fact within the divine life, as singular as the generation of the Son is shown to be in De Decr. 11. But the emphasis is still upon the Spirit's relation with the Son rather than with the Father. The very procession from the Father is itself apprehended by us from our knowledge of His mission from the Word." And later, after a discussion of the which we omit beyond pointing out that the and all refer patently to the mission of the Son, we quote again, "A study of the Scripture passages that follow discovers no reference to the Spirit's procession, but only to His mission. On the other hand it is not made clear how the sending of the Spirit by the Son can help to establish His procession from the Father. Perhaps Athanasius deliberately chose to be vague as to what the Spirit receives from the Son. Perhaps he regards the mission of the Spirit as actually involving procession from the Son. We may compare infra III: 1, 'He gave the Spirit to the disciples out of Himself.'...." On the formula, the Spirit takes of the Son, Shapland, referring to corresponding
passages in Epiphanius and Gregory of Nyssa, says, "The general doctrine of these writers makes it plain that they thought of the Spirit as receiving from the Son, not only a prerogative or an office, but His divine existence. The same interpretation is suggested by the context of C. Ar. I:15 and III:44, in which he quotes the same words. Here however the parallel passage concerning the Son (John 8:26) indicates that he intends a more restricted reference and that this is to be interpreted in its most obvious sense, that the Spirit receives His message from the Son."

We can agree with most of this. The difficulty about this section is, as Shapland says, how the procession from the Father is established by the mission from the Son, since it is quite true that the passages of Scripture cited, taken as a whole refer to the mission and not the procession. This is actually another form again of the unity of leading to the unity of essence. We already see here the form of the Eastern Orthodox argument that we hear again and again, especially at ecumenical conferences at the present day, that there is a basic difference between the operation of God in which the Spirit receives His mission, directly from the Son, and the essential being of God, in which the essential relation of the Spirit, procession, is from the Father only. The solution to the puzzle is probably that Athanasius's Trinitarian thought had not yet gone quite far enough; also that his real feeling as to the relation between Son and Spirit was that it was one of analogical repetition rather than any closer relation. In establishing the Deity of the Son, we remember, Athanasius had to establish that the Son was "from the Father", or, to put it more correctly,

(69) to which one must add John 16:14.)
he had to establish the coessential and intimate relation that was implied, or should have been implied, by that phrase. In other words, to be Divine meant to be "from the Father". Therefore the Deity of the Spirit required that He be also "from the Father", and it appears from the way in which Athanasius introduced the phrase that "from the Father" was a regular formula in which Deity was confessed. The other side of the matter is that we almost certainly have here another case of what Barth calls "an undigested remnant of Origenist subordinationism." In Origen (and probably also Eusebius of Caesarea), to be "from the Son" meant to be a \( \gamma^\circ \gamma^\circ \) of the Son, as we have already seen, and the Spirit was so described. That may have been all very well when theologians were not as aware of the distinction between creation and generation, and between the created and the uncreated, as they might have been, and, compared with later theology, this was broadly true of Origen. The Arians, with their ruthless insistence on these distinctions (even though they treated generation within the Deity as a null class), destroyed the whole balance of Origenism. This brings us back to the point that we have made above, that Athanasius had never been compelled to criticise the unexpressed major premise of the Origenist doctrine of the Spirit, the notion of what it meant to be a \( \gamma^\circ \gamma^\circ \) of the Son. Under the circumstances he had to conclude that the Spirit was "from the Father".

As for the difficult chapter 21 (in which we disagree with Shapland) the context, and especially the Scriptural passaged cited in the latter part of ch. 20, indicates that it has to be understood on the basis of \( \gamma^\circ \gamma^\circ \) to a far greater extent than meets the eye. We are making this statement in spite of the fact that Athanasius refers to the Spirit having similar "order and nature" \( \gamma^\circ \gamma^\circ \)
in relation to the Son as the Son has to the Father. In the author's view, the only way in which the situation becomes clear in its full complexity is through its historical background. The average intellectual theology (apart in some ways from Origen) had assimilated the Spirit to the Logos (and under the Logos) and rationalised the Logos after the Greek fashion, so that the Logos was both divine and the immanent principle of human reason or even creaturely existence. The Arians made this impossible with their affirmation that the Logos was a creature. The task of Athanasius was to affirm that the Logos in His essential origin and nature was absolutely on the Divine side of the division between God and creatures. At this stage, we have seen that it at once became a problem of how this absolutely transcendent Logos was to be participated by man, and the answer was, increasingly, by, or rather in, the Spirit.\(^{(7)}\) The Tropici now served notice that they were raising the same questions about the Spirit as the Arians raised about the Logos, as it was conceived before Nicaea. What Athanasius is really saying in ch. 21 and the surrounding chapters, is that all the arguments about the Deity of the Son must now also be applied to the Spirit, whether they are arguments about the fulldivinity of the operation and economy of salvation, or about the essential Deity of the Person in question. Occasionally Athanasius makes a false or questionable statement, such as that the Spirit is the Image of the Son and in this sense the Son is in the Spirit (20:577B), which, as Shapland says in his note on 24 (588B), cannot be readily shown directly. These statements, true or suspect,

\(^{(70)}\) See above, pp. 654-6, 1077-1100.
are probably a shorthand way of stating that the total sum of the arguments of the Contra Arianos apply here too, mutatis mutandis. We must always remember that Athanasius was (if our chronology is correct) writing under much more difficult conditions than in the case of the earlier work, and that it was actually the first time in the history of theology that the problem had been faced in this way, and that it was a first draft of the theology of the Spirit for Athanasius in particular, in contrast to the Contra Arianos, which was produced at much greater leisure, and was meant to be the last word on the subject.

In this context, we can also see what was probably meant by the statement that the Tropici are virtually Arians, and would even be better to say so. It means, in the first place, that they were using exactly the same arguments as the Arians. In the second place, if their heresy were admitted, it would leave the problem of how a creature (even though it be the Spirit) were to be associated with God. The only possible answer would be through the Logos, which would be fulfilling exactly the same function and performing the same operation that the Tropici saw in the case of the Spirit. Thus they would be irresistibly forced to use the same arguments of the Logos, in the long run; that is, they would revive naked Arianism. In other words, theology would be back to the position where it was before the Arian controversy started, in a doubly dangerous form. This dynamic tendency in thought is a very real thing in history, and the fourth century is one of the places where it can be seen clearly. Perhaps the best analogy (in a different sense) that is immediately familiar to modern man is - once again - the development from Hegel to Marx. Hegel virtually deified man

(71) See above, pps. 308-15 and 1140-45
in the first instance and then everything by the doctrine of the absolute identity of human and divine natures. The Feuerbachian revolution consisted in rubbing off the highest stage in the process by pointing out that this meant that God was no more than the highest essence of man. But Marx pointed out then that if the same principles are to be kept this means that there is an absolute identity of human and material affairs in economics, and has all but succeeded in rubbing off the next stage, humanity, too. Athanasius was afraid of some such process as this from the reverse end.

Finally, we can summarise this section by saying that the theory here put forward is the only one that can do justice to the feature about the Letters that has so puzzled Shapland, how Athanasius can apparently derive the Spirit from the Son in such a way as to exclude the Filioque, and to present a positive doctrine of the Procession which is exactly the modern doctrine of Eastern Orthodoxy.

22 Athanasius now considers the nature and operation of the Spirit in greater detail, under nine heads. These mainly reinforce what we have called the categorial argument for the Deity of the Spirit. There is not a great deal of comment, and much of it is already familiar, and will thus not require much comment. Scripture passages are introduced freely, in the manner of proof texts, standing on their own, with the minimum of exegetical comment. "The creatures have come to be ex nihilo, having a beginning of existence (τὸ ἐκ ἀόρατος ἁίματος) .... (Gen 1:1) ...... The Holy Spirit is said to be from (ἐκ) God ...... (I Cor. 2:11-12)...... What kinship (τὸ ἐκ ἑυδοκίμων) ...... could there be between the Spirit and the creatures? For the creatures were not,
but God is Existent\textsuperscript{(72)} from Whom the Spirit also is. That which is from \(\varepsilon \kappa\) God could not be from that which is not, nor could it be a creature, lest according to them he\(\overrightarrow{\varepsilon \kappa}\) from whom the Spirit is should also be considered to be a creature. For if, as no one knows the things of man save the spirit within him, so no one knows the things of God save the Spirit Who is in Him, would it not be an insult to call the Spirit Who is in God a creature, Who searches even the deep things of God? For from this one would learn to say that the spirit of man is outside the man himself, and that the Logos of God, Who is in the Father, is a creature. This extract shows the greater pressure on Athanasius's time here, compared with all previous anti-Arian writings, since Athanasius is unable to give full attention to the ambiguity involved in the phrase \(\varepsilon \kappa\), from the essence of God, or from the purpose and will of God, as creatures are\textsuperscript{(73)}. But it is clear that he accepts the former sense, and justifies it by a brief argument that the very verbal or ontological meaning of the concept "Spirit" demands it. As with the notion of Logos, so with that of Spirit, "the Spirit of X" is internal to X, supreme over X, and, what for Athanasius is the most important, is immaterial compared with X. Of course, the Spirit cannot be held to be superior to God, especially since the whole of God is immaterial in the same way, but this at least shows for Athanasius that the Spirit cannot be inferior to the other Persons, since It is described by that very same formula, Spirit of God (simple genitive).\textsuperscript{(74)}

\textsuperscript{(72)} \(\varepsilon \kappa\) is est qui est, ie. "He Who Is".


\textsuperscript{(74)} See above, pp.\textsuperscript{[69]}, for the corresponding position concerning the title Logos.
Continuing immediately (at 581C): "Again, the Spirit is, and is called, the Spirit of holiness and renewal (μνήμον τοῦ ἁγίου γέννημα) ... (Rom. 1:4, I Cor. 6:11, Tit. 3:4-7).... But the creatures are sanctified and renewed.... (Ps. 104:30, Heb. 6:4)...

23 He therefore Who is not sanctified by another, nor a partaker of sanctification (μετατίθητι τους ἁγιασμούς) but Who Himself is to be partaken (75) and in Whom all creatures are sanctified, how can He be one from among the 'all things' or pertain to those who partake of Him? For those who say this, must say that the Son, through Whom (ἐν αὐτῷ) all things came to be, is one of the 'all things'." This is another case of the categorial argument in a simpler form, which would be particularly potent to a follower of the earlier Plato, with his rigorous distinction between what is partaken (the Forms) and what partakes (the particulars, inferior to the former). Continuing at once, "He is called a quickening Spirit (Πνεῦμα θεωρητικόν) ... (Rom 8:11, John 4:14, & 7:39, v. Acts 3:15).... But the creatures... are quickened through Him (ἐν αὐτῷ). He that does not partake of life, but Who Himself is partaken and quickens the creatures, what kinship (οὐχίδες ἐκ τοῦ τελευταίου) can He have with things originate? How can He belong to the creatures which in (ἐν αὐτῷ) Him are quickened by (ἐναντίον) the Logos?" This is again a relatively simple case of the categorial argument. Continuing immediately, "The Spirit is called unction (Χρίσμα τοῦ Λόγου) and is seal (Σφραγίς τοῦ Σώματος) ... (I John 2:27, Is. 61:1, Eph. 1:13).... But the creatures are by Him (dative) sealed and anointed and instructed concerning all things. But if the Spirit is the unction and seal with which (ὁ Λόγος ἐναντίον) the Logos anoints and seals all things, what likeness (εἰκόνας λόγος) or propriety (ὡς Λόγος)...

(75) μετατίθητι τοὺς ἁγιασμούς - gerundival; Shapland's simple passive is inadequate.
could the unction and seal have to the things that are anointed and sealed? Thus according to this argument, too, He could not belong to the 'all things'. The seal could not be from among the things that are sealed, nor the unction from among the things that are anointed, but it is proper to the Logos Who seals and anoints. For the unction has the fragrance and odour of the anointer, and those who are anointed say, when they receive thereof, 'We are the fragrance of Christ.' (II Cor. 2:15). The seal has the form (ωορφια) of the sealer, Christ, and those who are sealed partake (ωορτοικοιοι) of it, being formed (ωορφοιοικοιοι) according to it... (Gal 4:19).... Being thus sealed, we fittingly become, as Peter said, sharer in the divine nature (76) and thus all creation partakes of the Logos in the Spirit. (77) This metaphor of sealing is important insofar as it gives content to the earlier metaphor that the Spirit is the Living Energy (δέσμη) in which God works. The word "seal" is meant in the most literal sense, whereby people are stamped with the representation of Christ. This is probably also the meaning of the various statements, including below, 24:588B, that the Spirit is the Image of the Son. We have already seen that earlier, in the De Incarnatione, this sealing metaphor, in the literal sense, was applied to the work of the Son in recreating us in the image of God and recreating the hopeless, corrupt and useless image in fallen men. (78) On the other hand, here it is the Spirit that re-stamps the image of Christ on us. In other words, the Spirit is the sigillographic negative of the Son, and in Its coming to us it stamps us so that we are positive in relation to the Son. At any rate, this

(76) Kορινθίων Ενθανσμος οπεραναθής
(77) ουτος ο διάφορος οικοικιος ο πεπρωμένος ο πεπρωμένος
(78) See especially De Inc. 14:1200C-D, and above, pp.154-6.
is how it would appear on analogy with the corresponding argument in the 
De Incarnatione, where the necessity of this intermediate stage is one 
of the main features of the argument. As compared with the earlier 
theology, there has been a distinct change, and prima facie it appears 
that an extra stage has slipped in. What has happened is that, with 
the greater Christocentricity of Athanasius as a result of the Arian 
controversy, it is Christ and not a general idea of divinity or divinisa-
tion that is the norm, to Whom we are to be made positive, made in His 
Image. Also, Christ is now positive presumably with regard to the 
Father ( ἀὸς ἡμῶν ἐκ Κωνστάντιους). Even more sig-
ificant is the new emphasis not only on our "deification" but on the 
Humanity of Christ which we are to partake and which is to be our norm. (79) 
Therefore, the necessary intermediate stage is the stage between Christ 
and ourselves, which must be the Spirit. Thus, the Spirit, in form and 
in everything else, cannot be a creature but must be God, by the same 
arguments previously used against the Arian denial of the Deity of the 
Logos.

Continuing, "Further it is through the Spirit ( ἐκ τοῦ τῆς ἡμῶν 
πάντων ἐκ τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν) that we are all said to be partakers ( ἐκ τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν) of God... (I Cor. 3:16-17)... If the Holy Spirit were a creature, we 
should have no participation ( ἐκ τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν) of God in ( ἐκ τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν) Him. If indeed, we were joined to a creature, we should be strangers 
to the Divine Nature ( ἐκ τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν) inasmuch as we did 
not partake therein. But now, the fact that we are called partakers of 
Christ and partakers of God shows that the unction and seal that is in 

(79) See above, pp. 1071-1072
us belongs, not to the nature (ἐν) of things originate, but to the nature of the Son, Who, through the Spirit that is in Him joins us to the Father.... (I John 4:13).... But if, by participation in the Spirit, we become sharers in the Divine nature, one would be mad to say that the Spirit has a created nature and not that of God. For it is on this account that those in whom He is are made divine (εἰσελθούσε). If He makes men divine it is not to be doubted that His nature is of God. This is once again a fairly straight case of the above type of argument, except that it is worth noting that the change adumbrated in De Decr. 14 is now complete, in that the process of "deification", classically associated solely with the Logos in the earlier theology (cf. De Incarnatione) is now associated primarily with the Spirit as the Person with Whom the individual has immediate contact, and it is a process that takes place through the Logos in the Spirit.

By way of introducing another argument, Athanasius quotes two Scripture passages, Ps. 104 AV: 29–30, and Titus 3:5, which associate the Spirit definitively with creation and renewal respectively, which are thus brought into close connection, and he continues, "But if the Father through the Logos, in the Holy Spirit, creates and renews all things, what likeness or kinship is there between the Creator and the creatures? How could He be a creature, in (ἐγώ) Whom all things are created? Such insult leads to blasphemy against the Son, so that those who say that the Spirit is a creature would say also that the Logos is a creature, through Whom (ἐν) also all things are created." No further special comment is needed. Continuing immediately, "The Spirit is said to be, and is, the image of the Son...(Rom.8:29). If then they admit that the Son is not a creature, neither may His image be a creature.
For, as is His image, so also must be He Whose Image it is. Hence the Logos is justly and fitly confessed not to be a creature, because He is the image of the Father. He therefore who numbers the Spirit with the creatures will surely number the Son among them also, and thereby insult the Father also, by insulting His Image. "Little further comment is needed, as we have already exhaustively studied this issue above, in our comment on the Spirit as Seal.

25. After considering the work of the Spirit, Athanasius now considers the ontological features of the Spirit which can be worked out directly from Scripture. "The Spirit, therefore, is distinct from the creatures, and is shown to be rather proper to the Son and not alien to God."

As for that wise question of theirs, 'If the Spirit is from God, why is He not Himself called Son?' we have already shown it above to be rash and presumptuous, and we show it not less so now. Even though He is not called Son in Scripture, but Spirit of God, he is said to be in ("\( \overline{\varepsilon} \overline{\nu} \)) God Himself and from ("\( \overline{\xi}\overline{\kappa} \)) God Himself... And if the Son, because He is from ("\( \overline{\xi}\overline{\kappa} \)) the Father, is proper to His essence, it must be that the Spirit, Who is said to be from ("\( \overline{\varepsilon}\overline{\kappa} \)) God, is in essence proper to the Son."

And so, as the Lord is Son, the Spirit is called Spirit of sonship ("\( \overline{\varepsilon}\overline{\kappa}\overline{\chi}\overline{\nu}\overline{\gamma} \)). Again, as the Son is Wisdom and Truth, the Spirit is described as Spirit of Wisdom and Truth (I Cor 2:8, Rom 8:15, Gal 4:6, I Pet. 4:14)... The Lord called the Spirit 'Spirit of Truth' and 'Paraclete', whence He shows that in Him the Triad is complete. In Him the Logos makes glorious ("\( \overline{\varepsilon}\overline{\kappa}\overline{\chi}\overline{\nu}\overline{\gamma} \)) the creation, and by deifying and adopting it draws it to the Father. But that which joins creation to the Logos cannot be
itself among the creatures, and that which adopts creation cannot be alien (εἰκόνα) to the Son. For otherwise we should have to find another spirit so that by him this Spirit could be joined to the Logos. But this would be absurd. The Spirit, therefore, does not belong to things originate, but is proper (εἰκόνα) to the Godhead of the Father; in Him also the Logos deifies things originate. But He in (οὗτος) Whom creation is made divine cannot be outside (διὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ) the Godhead of the Father." This extract is an excellent confirmation of our previous analysis of the nature of Athanasius's problem and the problem of his contemporaries on the Spirit, that is, that the Spirit arose again as an issue in theology to account for the unity of man, and even of creation in general to God, now that the Logos was so closely correlated with God rather than with creaturely reality. Therefore, all the old arguments about the deity of the Logos again apply, this time to the Spirit. Since Athanasius has had to show that the Son is really God and by the Son we are united to God, the argument has to take the form of showing that the Spirit is proper to the Son and truly unites us to the Son. It is noteworthy that the argument, which is a stock argument of Athanasius on the Deity of the Son, is introduced here and applied to the Spirit for the first time. Again, what we have called the ontological (or verbal) proof from the nature of the concept of Spirit, is again mentioned. It is in this context that the pragmatic argument, as we have called it, is introduced again, and is at last applied quite clearly and unambiguously to the Spirit. That is, the deity of the Spirit is absolutely necessary if we are to have any deification. This again is the sort of passage that has been assumed

(85) ἐν οὗ ἐλευθεροποιήθη ὁ Λόγος ἐκ Θεοῦ.
to indicate that Athanasius was a theological pragmatist, but here again, we might say that this argument is too late, and not prominent enough, to justify the idea that it was the principal element in Athanasius's thinking. (86)

26 Continuing what we have called the ontological features of the Spirit: "... The Holy Spirit is \( \overset{\text{Hephaistos} \overset{\text{2}}{\bar{\text{p}}}}{\text{The Holy Spirit is}} \overset{\text{2}}{\bar{\text{p}}} \text{and incorruptible (Wis. 1:5, 1 Pet. 3:4, Wisd. 12:1). In view of I Cor 2:11, along with James 1:17) the Holy Spirit, being in \( \overset{\text{Ev}}{\text{Ev}} \) God, must be \( \overset{\text{Hephaistos} \overset{\text{2}}{\bar{\text{p}}} \text{and incorruptible (Wis. 1:5, 1 Pet. 3:4, Wisd. 12:1). But the nature (Phil. 1:6) of creatures and things originate in God, since it is outside the essence of God, and came into existence ex nihilo} \)

\( \overset{\text{Ps 116 AV: 11, Rom 3:23, Jude 6, Job 15:15 & 4:18 & 25:5, I Cor. 6:3, & vid. on Devil Ezek. 28:12, & 10:7 & Luke 10:18). But if, while creatures have such a nature (Phil. 1:6), and such things are written about the angels, the Spirit is the same and unchangeable, if He shares the immutability of the Son, with Him ever abiding, what likeness can there be? It would be clear that He is not a creature, nor is He of the essence of the angels, because they are \( \overset{\text{Hephaistos} \overset{\text{2}}{\bar{\text{p}}} \text{but He is the Image of the Logos and is proper to the Father.} \)

(86) See above, pps. 534 & 1061, for a full study of the pragmatist argument and criticism of the interpretation of Athanasius in terms of it.

(87) These words may be conventionally translated "unalterable and unchangeable." For the Arian use of \( \overset{\text{Hephaistos} \overset{\text{2}}{\bar{\text{p}}} \text{, see above, pp.} \)


(88) \( \overset{\text{Ev}}{\text{One of the most prominent Wilber force,} \overset{\text{2}}{\bar{\text{p}}} \text{is associated with the Logos.} \)

(89) \( \overset{\text{Ev}}{\text{But if, while creatures have such a nature (Phil. 1:6), and such things are written about the angels, the Spirit is the same and unchangeable, if He shares the immutability of the Son, with Him ever abiding, what likeness can there be? It would be clear that He is not a creature, nor is He of the essence of the angels, because they are \( \overset{\text{Hephaistos} \overset{\text{2}}{\bar{\text{p}}} \text{but He is the Image of the Logos and is proper to the Father.} \)

(90) \( \overset{\text{Ev}}{\text{But if, while creatures have such a nature (Phil. 1:6), and such things are written about the angels, the Spirit is the same and unchangeable, if He shares the immutability of the Son, with Him ever abiding, what likeness can there be? It would be clear that He is not a creature, nor is He of the essence of the angels, because they are \( \overset{\text{Hephaistos} \overset{\text{2}}{\bar{\text{p}}} but He is the Image of the Logos and is proper to the Father.} \)

(91) \( \overset{\text{Ev}}{\text{And as One of the most prominent Wilber force,} \overset{\text{2}}{\bar{\text{p}}} \text{is associated with the Logos.} \)
a straightforward argument; there is, says Athanasius, abundant (and documented) testimony in Scripture that the Spirit is unalterable, \( \gamma \tau \iota \tau \iota \varepsilon \tau \omega \) , in contrast to the creatures, who are, as everybody knew and accepted, alterable \( \gamma \tau \iota \omega \varepsilon \tau \omega \) . Here the meaning of the operative adjective seems to be simply unreliable, or liable to change or "change and decay" in the simplest sense, but as Athanasius has had much less time to treat the matter here, we need not accept this as evidence against the view that we have accepted above, on the basis of the far more exhaustive and radical treatment of the issue in Contra Arianos I: 17ff. & 35ff., that the word really, in its Arian usage, meant what we mean by "progressive", or at any rate this was the meaning that the Arians were trying to convey, without altogether succeeding, since the notion was quite novel to them.

Continuing immediately, "Again, the Spirit of the Lord fills the universe....(Ps. 139 \( \mu \nu 7 \), Wisd.12:1).... But things originate are all in separate places.....But if the Spirit fills all things, and in \( \varepsilon \gamma \iota \omicron \iota \omicron \omicron \omicron \) the Logos is present in the midst of all things, and if the angels being less than Him, are in their place and are present where they are dispatched, it is not to be doubted that the Spirit is not of things originate, nor is He an angel at all .... but is above the nature of angels." There is nothing that needs special comment here, except that the statement that the Spirit is present in the Logos is an interesting inversion of what would be the usual mode of expression, that the Logos was omnipresent in the Spirit. The reason probably is that the centre of interest, the thing that has to be maintained, is the omnipresence of the Spirit; the omnipresence of the Logos was presumably accepted by the

(92) Reading \( \tau \kappa \lambda \alpha \varepsilon \tau \omicron \omega \nu \varepsilon \iota \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) , the usual reading, followed by Shapland; Reg.I, Seg., Bas., Gob., Felck.I, followed by Migne, read \( \tau \kappa \lambda \alpha \varepsilon \tau \omicron \omega \nu \varepsilon \iota \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) - are inferior to Him.
Tropici, and the argument was to prove the point by accepting the portion of the faith that Athanasius and his opponents had in common; the effect is to emphasise the equality and symmetrical Perichoresis of the three Persons.

Continuing again, "From what follows, also, we may see how the Holy Spirit is to be partaken and does not partake... (Heb. 6:4-5)... The angels and other creatures partake of the Spirit Himself; therefore they can fall away from Him of Whom they partake. But the Spirit is always the same; He is not of those that partake, but all things partake of Him. But if He is always the same and always partaken, and if the creatures partake of Him, the Holy Spirit cannot be angel nor creature of any kind, but proper to the Logos. And being given by the Logos, He is partaken by the creatures. For they would have to say that the Son is a creature, of Whom we have become partakers in the Spirit." This is again a straightforward case. However we should note the contrast between this and some of the passages in the "Contra Arianos" on the Deity of the Son, where the emphasis is laid on the Son's not participating, in contrast to the Spirit's receiving (αὐτῆς ἐνελθοντος) from the other Persons. Here, the point is the relation between creatures and the Spirit. As distinct from the Spirit and the Son, they are in the relation of οὖν ἐνελθοντος to the Spirit, which implies in Plato an essential and in fact categorical subordination to that of which they participate, a relation that would not have been implied by οἷς ἐνελθοντος, even if it had been used of the Spirit in relation to the Son.

(93) τον συντρόφον... ὁ... In this passage, "to partake of" is the regular translation of ἐνελθοντος + gen. in its regular technical Platonic meaning.

(94) Shapland's translation, which we are following, divides this sentence into two at this point.

(95) See C. Ar. I:15, III:24 and III:44. See above, pp. 678-80, 778-30 and 1013-15, respectively.
Continuing at once, "Again, the Holy Spirit is one, but the creatures are many... (After an abbreviation of the illustrations already used in the Contra Arianos).... But because He is one, and still more because He is proper to the Logos Who is one, He is proper to God Who is one, and is Co-essential (οὐχὶ ὁμοούσιος)." And immediately in conclusion to the whole section, "These sayings concerning the Holy Spirit, by themselves alone, show that in nature and essence He has nothing in common with the creatures or proper to them, but is other than things originate, proper to and not alien from the Godhead and Essence of the Son, by reason of which He is of the Holy Triad, and puts their stupidity to shame." The final categorial argument concerning the absolute unity and uniqueness of the Holy Spirit is Scripturally sound, and should be read in conjunction with the full exposition of this argument in connection with the Son in C. Ar. II: 18-31, where Athanasius makes it perfectly clear that the unity of God and the plurality of the creatures is an absolute and categorial distinction. Implicated in this argument is some form of the arguments from the unity of ὁμοούσιος, and also the argument that there is only one that is categorically unique, and that if the Spirit is so, the Spirit must be God. In the last sentence of the argument from uniqueness, Athanasius introduces the Homoousion for the first time in these Letters, and the first of only two occasions on which it is used of the Spirit even by implication. The fact that it is introduced in this context shows that Athanasius still thinks, when he thinks instinctively, in terms of the older doctrine of the Homoousion in which arithmetical unity and family unity, as opposed to generic unity, plays the predominant

(96) ὁμοούσιος
(97) οὐχὶ ὁμοούσιος
(98) This can be either the Old Testament monotheism, or the familiar rational Greek principle that there can be only one ultimate, at most, or perhaps both.
part. This must be remembered in spite of his conscious shift towards
generic unity that we shall notice in our analysis of the Second Letter.

The foregoing has been a more detailed discussion of the theology
of the Spirit under eleven heads, with a comparison of the state of the
creatures: 1. Origin - Spirit, from God, creatures, ex nihilo. 2. Sancti-
fication. 3. Vivification. 4. Anointing and Sealing. 5. Mediation of
our participation in God. 6. Relation to creation and regeneration.
7. The Spirit as the Image of the Son, followed by an excursus on the
Spirit's proper title. 8. The Spirit as \( \chi \tau \mu \xi \tau \rho \omega \gamma \) and
\( \chi \tau \mu \xi \tau \rho \omega \gamma \), in contrast to the creatures. 9. Omnipresence.
10. Participation, considered directly. 11. The Spirit as one and creatures
as many. In general, we can describe these as instances of the categorial
argument. Arguments 2-6 inclusive refer to the operation of the Spirit,
the remainder (even No. 10; cf. Platonism) to Its status as God, independ-
ext operation. Even in the case of the operational features, the des-
cription "categorial" is accurate, since the distinction is that the Holy
Spirit is on the active and glorious side of the operation, while the
creatures are on the passive and recipient sides of the operation (this is
true even of participation, even though it is the opposite as regards
linguistic form). This distinction is absolute in Athanasius, as it was
absolute hypothetically and in principle in Arianism and Tropicism, and
as it should be in all theology; it is the exact theological equivalent
of those logical and metaphysical ultimate distinctions for which the
term "categorial" is used. This argument is of course made in the
"Contra Arianos" passim with reference to the Son, but is very much clearer

(99) See below, pp. 12/4-18

(100) This is the only aspect of the Categorial Argument that is new, in
the clarity that we find here.
Certain of the other arguments, e.g. that the Spirit is one and that the creatures are many, also fit perfectly into our classification as the categorial argument; the same can be said of the argument concerning omnipresence. One of the most important features of Athanasius's argument is that the Spirit has exactly the same sort of transcendence as the Son over the creatures, and this gives point to the statement, which is made at the end of the argument on five out of the eleven occasions (and in such a way as to show that it could have been made on the other six) that on the argument of the Tropici the Son would have to be a creature too (which the Tropici, against the Arians, wished to deny). The form of these statements indicates that Athanasius considered the actual relation of Spirit to God (i.e. Father) to be analogous to and in parallel with, rather than consecutive upon and in series with that of the Son. The operations of the Spirit are mainly those concerned with sanctification. A more correct way of describing this is, from the point of view of the development of Athanasius's theology, is our sharing in the benefits of the Logos. There is a certain stress on the role of the Spirit in creation as such, but where it is introduced, 24:588A, in close conjunction, incidentally, with regeneration, the context indicates that the main reason is to heighten the contrast between the Spirit and the creatures as a whole in the categorial sense. Of course, for this reason, and because Athanasius insists finally that all the operations of God are through the Logos and in the Spirit, he has to say something about the Spirit in creation, and this introduces a modifying factor into his theology, but in the main he follows the traditional line of associating the Spirit supremely with sanctification.

(101) For the categorial argument, see above, pp. 599-605, 1070A, and below, pp. 1237f. and refs.
Having completed the work of the Holy Spirit, Athanasius now comes to consider the Trinitarian doctrine as a whole. There have been many previous references to the Triad as such and as a whole, notably C. Arianos I:17ff, and especially II:41ff, where the question of the validity of Arian baptism into the Trinity is raised. This is again the chief issue in connection with the Trinitarian faith here, and again in an even clearer and more emphatic way than before: "But beyond these sayings let us look at the tradition, teaching, and faith (σημείωμα) of the Catholic Church from the beginning, which the Lord gave, the Apostles preached, and the Fathers kept. Upon this the Church is founded, and he who should fall away from it would not be a Christian, and should no longer be so called. There is then a Triad, holy and complete (Ἁγιός, Καθόλικος, Τριάδος) which is in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit confessed as God, having nothing foreign or external mixed in it, not composed of a Frame and something originate, but entirely creative and it is consistent with itself and in its nature (Τριάδος) indivisible, and the activity (Εν Ευκολεος) of it is one. The Father does all things through the Logos in the Holy Spirit, and thus the unity of the holy Triad is preserved. 'Thus one God is preached in the Church, 'Who is over all and through all and in all'; 'over all' (Εν ολίγος) as Father, as beginning (Οικος), and Fountain (Πηγή), 'through all' (Εν όλος) through the Logos (Εν τω Λογε) and 'in all' (Εν όλος) in the Holy Spirit (Εν τω Τριάδος). It is a Triad not only in name and idea and in speech, but in truth and in actuality (Χαρακτήρ Καθόλικος Τριάδος). For as the

(102) Πατρός, Κοινός, Τριάδος
(103) Ιης τον Κοινός, Καθόλικος, Τριάδος
(104) Εν τω Λογε, Εν τω Τριάδος, Εν τω Τριάδος
(105) Better than Sheppard's 'Form of Speech' - ουκ ευθυγράμματοι ο λόγον και φαντασίας λέγομεν.
Father is ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖνος and God over all. And the Holy Spirit is not without actual existence (ἀνεπερατοκτόνου), but exists and has true being. Less than these the Catholic Church does not hold, lest she sink to the level of the modern Jews after the fashion of Caiaphas, or Sabellius. Nor does she invent more, lest she be carried into the polytheism of the Greeks.... (Matt. 28:19 quoted as basic Scriptural warrant).... The Apostles went, and taught thus, and this is the preaching (Κηρύγγιον) that extends to the whole Church under heaven." This account of the Trinitarian faith of the Church is the most thorough in the writings of Athanasius; the unity of the Trinity and the genuine personal existence (ὑπαρχόντας) of each Person are unambiguously maintained, as well as the unity of operation ad extra. As in the case of all the classical creeds, the confession is the confession of the Three Persons, there being no articulum de Deo. As in the remainder of the letter, it is stated that any attempt to remove the Spirit, or to decrease the number of Persons below three, will, for the same reasons as before, inevitably result in Arianism, with Sabellianism as the only alternative. Similarly, Athanasius is rigorously opposed to any extension of the Trinity. In general, this faith is described as the substance of the Apostolic Preaching, and the later context will make it clear that it is considered as the indispensable foundation of the Christian's whole life as such, so that the doctrine is as far as possible from being the mere theologoumenon that some people consider it to be.

29 Athanasius continues by saying that the Tropicist doctrine means an adulteration of the Trinity by mixing God with creatures. The same arguments are used as in "Contra Arianos", especially I:17, etc., against

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(106) ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖνος ἐγείρεται. Reg., Seguer., Bas.; the others put in the article αὐτοῦ.

(107) ἤπαρχοντας καὶ ἐστηκέν ἐξ ἀληθείας.
the proposition that the Son is a creature, with the additional and very strong argument that if one creature is elevated to the Godhead, all would have to be, with confusion to the Trinity and especially to baptism.

30 The point about baptism, as made in C. Ar. II: 41-43, is repeated about the Spirit, that is, that if one believes that the Spirit is a creature, it corrupts the baptism since the Trinity is adulterated, especially as (597B-C) the holiness (ἐγνατία), eternity (αιωνία), and immutability (τοιχία) must be one, and as "The faith in the Triad... joins us to God". We have already adequately commented on the issue of baptism into the Trinity in our discussion of C. Ar. II: 41ff., and nothing more needs to be added, except to say that the argument is much more central in the case of the Spirit, and the more incidental point that Athanasius's treatment of this issue is important evidence against the school of theology that wishes to associate the Spirit primarily with the rite of chrismation, which is separable from baptism in such a way as to be the equivalent to the modern episcopal confirmation in the Anglican church, or the sacrament of confirmation in the Roman Catholic Church. Athanasius's strongest point is that Baptism is into the Name of All Three Persons in exactly the same way, and therefore all Three must be associated with Baptism in exactly the same way.

This brings Athanasius to the last section of his argument, a recapitulation of the operation of the Holy Spirit to show once again its unity. He is repeating, with reference to the Trinity as a whole, what

(108) Τῆς ἐγνατίας φύσεως
(109) ἡ... τοιχία... προσκεύεται τῷ Θεῷ
(110) See C. Ar. II: 41-43, and above pp. 852-863
(111) For a brief reference to the controversy on this matter, see above, p. 151.
he had previously said with special reference to the Spirit. After quoting I Cor. 12:4-6 as evidence of the unity of the Trinity, Athanasius proceeds:

"The gifts which the Spirit divides to each are bestowed from (προς) the Father through (προς) the Logos. For all things that are the Father's are the Son's also; therefore, those things that are given from the Son in the Spirit (112) are the Father's gifts. And when the Spirit is in us, the Logos also, who gives the Spirit, is in us and the Father is in the Logos... (John 14:23)... For where the Light (αἷμα) is, there is also the Radiance (φως), and where the Radiance is, there is also the activity and radiant grace... (Doxology of II Cor. cited to confirm)... For this grace that is given is given in the Triad from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit. (114) As the grace given is from (προς) the Father through (προς) the Son, so we can have no fellowship of the gift in us, except in (εἰς) the Holy Spirit. For it is when we partake of Him that we have the love of the Father and the grace of the Son and the communion of the Spirit Himself.

31 From this it is shown that the activity (εἰς) of the Triad is one. The Apostle does not mean that the things that are given are different and separate gifts from each Person, but that what is given is given in the Triad, and that all are from (εἰς) one God. Therefore, what is not a creature but is united to the Son even as the Son is united to the Father, who is glorified with (115) the Father and the Son and is confessed as God along with the Logos (116) who is active in whatever the Father

(112) προς τοῦ Λογου εἰς τοῦ Πατρου
(113) αἷμα καὶ φως
(114) ἐν Τριάδι
(115) ἐν τῷ Λογῳ ἐν τῷ Θατρῶν καὶ τῷ Πατρῶν
(116) ἑλεστερισμὸν τῷ Λογῳ οὗτος

- the best description that Athanasius can find of the Spirit on the basis of his great metaphor.

- the word used in the Nicaeano-Constantinopolitan Creed later of the Spirit.
works through the Son is not the man who calls Him a creature guilty of direct impiety against the Son Himself? For there is nothing that is not originated and operated through the Logos in the Spirit." (118) This passage is the climax of the work, and here the final doctrine of the unity of the Divine operation is propounded. In the first place, the idea of division of labour is uncompromisingly repudiated. Indeed, the sense of Athanasius's remarks at the beginning of ch. 31 is even against the traditional doctrine which assigns some operations supremely and primarily to one Person, while preserving the co-operation of all Persons in all works. On the contrary, the intention is that all operations be regarded in exactly the same way. In ch. 30 and the earlier portions of ch. 31, the emphasis is on gifts and their giving, but in the famous last sentence of the quotation which sums up the whole position, the principle is applied to the origination and operation of all things. This applies not only to the creation and the working of substantial objects, but also to all events. All substantial objects are made and operated, and all events take place, from the Father through the Logos in the Spirit. Athanasius has evidently had to take this view, because otherwise the temptation would be irresistible to set up a hierarchy of Divine operations, and a corresponding subordination in the Godhead, as the Origenists did. (119) It would not matter whether the higher operations are given to the highest person, or to the lowest person, as the Origenists did with their doctrine that the Spirit's operation of sanctification was the highest Divine operation, but was assigned to a "εὐεργετής", like some university departments where the professor takes the first year but gives his lecturers a hand with the

(117) ἑλεπτοῖ τούς ἑκάστους ἔργα.
(118) ἐπισκευάσθη οἱ ἔργα. "Operated" is better than Shapland's "actuated".
(119) See above, 
23s, ch. περι, for references.
higher years. Having excluded any hierarchical distinctions within the field of Divine operation, Athanasius has to define the difference of Divine Person in terms of difference in relation to the operation. Some solution of this sort was necessary to avoid Sabellianism of operation and thus to avoid the implicit Sabellianism in fact. The solution was that the operations of God all occurred from the Father (ἐν Κυ), through (κυ + gen.) the Son-or-Logos, in (ἐν) the Holy Spirit. This formula will be discussed in greater detail in our general resume of these Letters, but it can be said now that, although it is new here, it has been the constant way of describing each individual work, and this last sentence, along with a very similar earlier sentence in the previous chapter, represents Athanasius's final, definitive statement which applies this principle as a fixed and general rule to all cases of the Divine operation.

Next, Athanasius (at 601A, middle) cites a number of passages of Scripture, with appropriate comment, to establish his point still more thoroughly: "... (On Ps. 33:6 and Ps. 147:18, which are the loci classic for the Spirit's work in creation, and on I Cor. 6:11, on justification).... For the Spirit is indivisible from the Logos. So when Christ says, 'we will come, the Father and I,' the Spirit comes into our company, just like the Son Who will dwell with us.... (Eph. 3:16-17). But if the Son is in us, the Father is also in us.... (John 14:10). Therefore, when the Logos is in the prophets, they prophesy in (ἐν) the Holy Spirit Himself. When Scripture says, 'The Word of the Lord came', (122) to the prophet in question, it shows that he prophesied in (ἐν) the Holy Spirit.... (cf.

(120) In this set formula, the Second Person is regularly the Logos and not the Son. Probably, this is due to the preponderant tradition of Creation per Verbum.

(121) ἐν ὕποτασσόμενοι τῷ θεῷ (or κυ + gen.) - as regularly in LXX.
Zech. 1:6, 7:12, Acts 1:16, 4:24-25, 28:25. I Tim. 4:1). ... Thus, when the Spirit is said to be in someone, it means that the Logos is in him, bestowing the Spirit. When the prophecy, 'I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh' was being fulfilled, Paul said, 'According to the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ unto me.' And to the Corinthians he wrote, 'If you seek a proof of Christ that speaketh in me,' But if He who spoke in him was Christ, then clearly the Spirit that spoke in him was Christ's (Acts 20:22-23). Hence, if the saints say, 'Thus saith the Lord,' they speak (τῷ Ἰησοῦν Χριστῷ) not otherwise than in (τῷ) the Holy Spirit. And if they speak in the Spirit, they speak the things of the Spirit (ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ Υἱῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ). When Agabus says in Acts, 'Thus saith the Holy Spirit,' it is not otherwise than by the Logos coming to him that the Spirit too bestowed him the power to speak and to testify the things that were awaiting Paul in Jerusalem. So, when the Spirit once again testified to Paul, Christ... was speaking (ἐκ τοῦ λογοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ) to him, so that the testimony that came from the Spirit belonged to the Logos. So too when the Logos visited the holy Virgin Mary, the Spirit came into her, and in the Spirit the Logos moulded the Body and conformed it to Himself... (for the economy of salvation)......

This section is of extreme interest in that it gives the widest selection of the operation of the Spirit in the Letters, and indeed in the whole writings of Athanasius. It begins with the citation of the classical passages concerning the work of the Spirit in creation; the former

(123) Reading, like Shapland, Τῷ Ἰησοῦν Χριστῷ, with Reg. I, Gobl. and Felok. I. The others, with Montf., Τῷ Λογῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ, the same things.
(124) Τῷ Λογῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ καινούργον προὶ Ουτον... the last two words as Seg., Angl., Gobler., Felok. I).
(125) Να τῇ Αγαθῇ Λευκῇ Τῷ Λογῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ, Γενομένης εἰς Τὴν Προμαχότητα τῆς Ἑυλογίας.
(126) Να τῇ ἔνωσις τοῦ Λογοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, τῇ ἔνωσις τῆς Μνήμης τοῦ Θεοῦ.
passage (10:33:6 AV) is the best that can be chosen, apart from Gen. 1:2, on the traditional exegesis. It is surprising that Gen. 1:2 is not cited here in this connection, and is in fact cited in the Letters only in 1:4, and then only as an illustration of the linguistic point that \[ \text{Tiv}_{3} \text{S}_{1} \text{H}_{1} \text{L}, \]
definite, usually with the article, denotes the Third Person of the Trinity (which itself indicates that he had no idea of antedating Barth's controversial exegesis of this verse). This is a sign that Athanasius, by bringing creation into the closest juxtaposition with sanctification, in effect treated it as creatio continuata; this is itself a sign of another feature of Athanasius's doctrine of the Spirit - a certain deadening of his sense of the historical nature (in the usual English sense) of the whole operation of God. This is patently due to the continuing influence of the traditional concentration on sanctification as the traditional operation of the Spirit in previous theology, or perhaps the causal relation may have been the other way around, the cause being a general loss of historical sense. Now, the feature of sanctification as opposed to the other operations of its class is that it is precisely concerned with the immediate present, in contrast with justification, which is concerned with a time four centuries, or two millennia, in the past (a fortiori the same difference applies to the early chapters of Genesis), and to prophetic vocation, which ultimately looks forward to the Second Coming. Then, there follows a passage which, for the only time in these letters, refers to the Spirit's part, along with the Son, in our justification, but there is no more than a reference to the mere presence of the Spirit in this operation; this confirms the suspicion that we have just noted. After this, Athanasius again treats of sanctification in the strictest sense, or rather our participation in the grace of Christ as grace, and now follows, for the first

(128) That is, that the Spirit or Wind was really not the Spirit of God at all, but a sort of wind that sighs over wasteland or empty ocean. See the Scriptural Index to Ch. Dogm., Vol. III, Pt. I.
time, what has been lacking up till now, the consideration of the prophetic ministry of the Spirit. Shapland's comment on this is (op. cit. Introd. p. 38): "...but it (So. prophetic ministry) for him a ministry exhausted in the inspiration of Scripture. This limitation is partly due to the purpose with which he writes. He does not set out to describe the work of the Spirit, but to establish His propriety to God. In his treatment he necessarily selects such points as most directly bear on his main subject." Shapland continues by suggesting that the main reason however was Athanasius's physical doctrine of sanctification and reconciliation, which is related to the theory that we are accepting, although we cannot accept the theory of Harnack (which is followed in the main by Shapland) that Athanasius's doctrine was physical or even pharmacological in the pejorative sense. It is unquestionable that Athanasius was limited by the limitations of his purpose, to show that the operation of Son and Spirit was one; indeed, the reason why Athanasius took up this question in the first place at this late stage, even though it was a little off his main line, was that he remembered that prophecy was a very clear case of both the Second and Third Persons in operation. Again, it is highly inaccurate to say that the prophetic ministry is exhausted in the inspiration of Scripture. It is quite true that the examples that Athanasius picks are from the writers and characters of canonical Scripture. But the prophetic ministry is presented as the important factor, not in the establishment of the canonical corpus, but in the real lives of these individuals and their communities. This is especially shown by the instances from the New Testament, in particular Acts. What is true is that the general concentration on sanctification does limit the presentation of the prophetic ministry, not through any physics in the doctrine of sanctification, but through

(129) See above, pp. 117 and 212. See Bornhäuser, op. cit. pp. 13-14 for German references to Harnack and others.
concentrating interest on the present. Even the fact that the main focus of interest is on the fact that the two Persons work together in and on the prophet in his prophecy, can be also considered as a case of interest in the immediate present, and even where the incidents of personal lives are concerned, the doctrine falls far short of the future prospect of the prophetic office, B.C. to the First Coming, A.D. to the Second. The final operation of the Spirit which is quoted is the first reference in any of Athanasius's writings to the part played by the Spirit in the conception of the man Jesus of Nazareth. In this case, the Logos still is the ultimate agent, as usual, but He is so "in the Spirit". For further reference, see Shapland's note on the relevant passage (especially the point that the Holy Spirit of Luke 10:35 now means what it says, in contrast not only to earlier Fathers, except Irenaeus, but also to earlier statements of Athanasius himself, while "Power of the Highest" is referred to the Logos).

The unity of operation presented here is the same as in the earlier places in the Letter, the work being through the Son (or by the agency of the Son, where only Son and Spirit are mentioned) in the Spirit. Once again, there is this spiral mixture of arguing from unity of operation to unity of essence, and using unity of essence as an exegetical principle to prove unity of operation; probably again the harmony of Scripture as a whole is the controlling factor. This enables Athanasius to avoid the commonly felt embarrassment at the prophetic passages which give almost exclusive prominence to the Logos alongside others that give similar prominence to the Spirit, or at the New Testament phrases "in Christ", and "in the Spirit" respectively; Athanasius completely avoids Sabellianism.

32 Athanasius, nearing the end of the letter, makes a final
condemnation of Tropicism, and in the last sentence extends the principle above enunciated to revelation, whereby the Logos reveals Himself "in the Spirit" and thereby the Father, in the usual way. The last chapter begins with a declaration that the doctrine that he gives here is consistent with tradition, Scripture, and Dominically authorised teaching, and Shapland points out that this is necessary since Athanasius is in appearance going beyond Nicaea. Penultimately, he takes worship in Spirit and Truth to mean that true worship is in the Third Person as well as the Second, and therefore that the Persons are, again, inseparable, and Athanasius concludes with a final warning to the Tropici to cease from their heresy, lest they be guilty of the unforgiveable sin of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. No further comment is needed except that if Newman had read this chapter he would not have been so free with his remark that the emphatic appeal to Scripture is a sign of heresy, since it "doth protest too much", with the anti-Reformation insinuation involved in this remark. We cannot blame Athanasius for his modest appeal here, and if its indiscriminate use in say, creeds, is wrong, it is not because "Catholicism" is right, but because agreement with Scripture is - after the stage of Prolegomena - something that a theology or a creed should show continuously, quietly, and modestly, in its very self-exposition as a whole.

Ep. II Ad Serapionem (9 chapters): This Epistle, though it begins with the statement that it is being written in answer to a request by the recipient for an abridgment of the first Letter, is entirely a summary of

(130) See his last note on De Syn. 23, that is, the final creed of the Council of the Dedication at Antioch in 341. The quotation from Shakespeare is the author's own, and he did not intend a poor pun.
the anti-Arian theology of Athanasius, virtually a summary of C. Arianos I-III (incidentally another proof that C. Ar. IV as we now know it is not part of the same series). The reference to the Holy Spirit in the title of RS and a marginal gloss to B (thus B is presumably older) does not prove quite conclusively (in spite of Shapland's footnote) that originally Epistles II and III were one letter; later scribes and copyists were by no means paragons of common sense and critical acumen, and the opening of Epistle III gives the feel of being the opening of a new letter. However, the question is not really significant. We have already discussed the reason why Athanasius chose to attack the Arians again at this stage, and detailed analysis of the First Letter has confirmed this opinion, that he saw a fundamental analogy, that is, a relation in parallel, between Arianism and Tropicism. There is also an element of the relation in series, especially as regards the operation of the Spirit, but it is not the predominating element.

In chapter I, the subject is introduced, II is a repetition of the argument from the Scriptural metaphors of Light-source and Radiance, and Fountain and River. Chapters III and IV are a repetition of the categorial argument, the categorial and other differences between God and creatures. Chapter V is a discussion of the Homoeousion and related expressions, and Chapter VI treats the distinction between making and generation even in men. Chapter VII is a brief summary of the exegesis of Prov. 8:22 LXX; Chapter VIII of the general Scriptural distinction between the Deity and the Humanity of Christ, and Chapter IX of the exegesis of Mark 13:32 (in conjunction with and contrast to the Johannine passages) as an example

(131) See above, pp. 488-511, 487-1109, 485-8, and below, pp. 1230. To recapitulate, the argument is that the Egyptian Tropici were virtually Athanasian on the Son, but maintained that the Spirit is a creature. What he is trying to show is that the dynamic of Tropicism and of Arianism is the same, that once Tropicism is accepted there is no protection against Arianism on the basis of this dynamic, and therefore that the arguments applying to the Son must be extended to the Spirit.
the anti-Arian theology of Athanasius, virtually a summary of C. Ar. I-III (incidentally another proof that C. Ar. IV as we now know it is not part of the same series). The reference to the Holy Spirit in the title of R3 and a marginal gloss to B (thus B is presumably older) does not prove quite conclusively (in spite of Shapland's footnote) that originally Epistles II and III were one letter; later scribes and copyists were by no means paragons of common sense and critical acumen, and the opening of Epistle III gives the feel of being the opening of a new letter. However, the question is not really significant. We have already discussed the reason why Athanasius chose to attack the Arians again at this stage, and detailed analysis of the First Letter has confirmed this opinion, that he saw a fundamental analogy, that is, a relation in parallel, between Arianism and Tropicism. There is also an element of the relation in series, especially as regards the operation of the Spirit, but it is not the predominating element.

In chapter I, the subject is introduced, II is a repetition of the argument from the Scriptural metaphors of Light-source and Radiance, and Fountain and River. Chapters III and IV are a repetition of the categorial argument, the categorial and other differences between God and creatures. Chapter V is a discussion of the Homocusion and related expressions, and Chapter 6 treats the distinction between making and generation even in men. Chapter 7 is a brief summary of the exegesis of Prov. 8: 22 LXX; Chapter 8 of the general Scriptural distinction between the Deity and the Humanity of Christ, and Chapter 9 of the exegesis of Mark 15: 32 (in conjunction with and contrast to the Johannine passages) as an example

(131) See above, pp. 488-511, and below, pp. 1230-1.
To recapitulate, the argument is that the Egyptian Tropici were virtually Athanasian on the Son, but maintained that the Spirit is a creature. What he is trying to show is that the dynamic of Tropicism and of Arianism is the same, that once Tropicism is accepted there is no protection against Arianism on the basis of this dynamic, and therefore that the arguments applying to the Son must be extended to the Spirit.
of the problem, perhaps the supreme example, perhaps the passage that interested contemporary Anomoeanism most.

With a couple of interesting exceptions, this is so close to being a summary of the "Contra Arianos" I-III that we do not need to pay any more attention to it. In general, it is a balanced selection of the highlights of the material. There is very little change in emphasis, except for a slight change in the direction of the Tropici controversy, and for the fact that some of the deeper and less accessible principles that do show themselves on a searching examination of the "Contra Arianos", owing to its extraordinary thoroughness, cannot be detected in this abbreviated compass. The argument in C. Ar. III: 58-67, on the difference between the Will and Nature of God, is completely omitted, as is the section in C. Ar. I: 30-34, on the \( \lambda \gamma \varepsilon \nu \gamma \tau \alpha \nu \), which is another indication that the Tropici had not used this concept, so that it was not in the forefront of Athanasius's mind. However, there is a good deal of fresh material on the Homoeousion and related concepts, and it is this material that demands our detailed attention.

Outside this Letter, there are only two other references to the Homoeousion in the remaining Letters, the reference in I: 27: 593C, at the climax of the section of the ontological and operational features of the Spirit, where the Homoeousion is expressly applied to the Spirit, and in III: 1: 625C-628A: "And throughout the Divine Scripture you will find that the Holy Spirit, which is said to be of the Son (\( \tau \omega \delta \gamma \varepsilon \delta \gamma \)), is also said to be of God (\( \tau \omega \delta \Theta \tau \omega \delta \)). If therefore the Son, on account of His propriety in relation to the Father and because He is the Proper Offspring of His Essence (133) is not a creature but one in essence

(132) However, it is a fresh work, not a mere abbreviated summary.

(133) \( \delta \ell \eta \tau \nu \pi \rho \delta \sigma \tau \omega \tau \theta \alpha \tau \rho \delta \iota \delta \iota \tau \gamma \tau \eta \nu \kappa \lambda \iota \iota \lambda \varepsilon \iota \nu \gamma \nu \mu \delta \).
with the Father, the Holy Spirit likewise, because of His propriety in relation to the Son, and also because from Him He is given to all and because what He has is the Son's - cannot be a creature, and it is impious to call Him so." In spite of Shapland's note on 1:27:593, this is not a definite ascription of the Homoousion to the Spirit, although it is by implication. But these two passages are no more than routine ascriptions of the title. The passages from the Second Letter are of great importance, as they indicate the interpretation of the title. 3:612B: "Those to whom we are alike and whose identity we share, with these we are one in essence. For example, we men, because we are all alike and share the same identity are one-in-essence with each other. For the same belongs to us all, mortality, corruptibility, τὸ πρόσωπον τὸ ἐν μένοις..." Then follows the categorical argument; incidentally, as we have said, the previous chapter is on the Son's status as ἀνθρώπινος, etc., and does not definitely refer to His generation. After the conclusion of the categorical argument, Athanasius returns to the Homoousion: (5:616A) "Since these things are true and are written in Scripture, who does not recognise that, inasmuch as the Son has no likeness to the creatures but has all that is the Father's, He must be one in essence with the Father? He would be one in essence with the creatures, if he had any likeness or kinship in relation to them. So, likewise, being by essence foreign to things originate and being the Logos Who is proper to the Father - inasmuch as the Logos is different from the former and has as his own properties

(134) ὁμοουσιος τος Πατρος, "One in essence" is Shapland's routine translation of the Homoousion.

(135) Ἰδιν εἶναι ὁμοιος, καὶ τὴν πρωτοτητα-ἐκμεν πρῶτων, καὶ ὁμοουσιος ὁμοιος.

(136) πιστικα διδέων οὕτως ὁμοιος.

(137) ἀλλοτρίων ἐκεῖνου καὶ συμφωνίας ὑπερ ὁμοιος.

(138) reading, with B A, καὶ ἀλλοις ἐκεῖν οὕτως ὁμοιοιος. — see Shapland's note.
all that the Father hath - it follows that He will be One in essence with the Father. Thus the Fathers understood it, when at the Council of Nicaea they confessed that the Son is "one in essence with the Father" and "from the essence of the Father". Well they understood that created essence (κτιστήρ, οὐσία) could never say, 'All things whatsoever the Father hath are Mine! .......(therefore).... it must be that the essence of the Son is not created, but that He is One in essence with the Father. Created essence His cannot be, for this reason above all, that it can receive the properties of God. By His properties, I mean the things whereby He is recognised to be God, that is, 'Omnipotent', 'Existential (δύναμις)', 'Unchangeable' ... lest, by having what the creatures can also have, God Himself should appear to fools to be one in essence with the creatures." In ch.6, beginning 617A, Athanasius reverts to the more familiar familial argument: "Just as we would not call our fathers makers (μητρίας) but begetters (γενναῖος), and as no one would call us their creatures, but sons by nature and one in essence with them, so, if God be a Father, He must be Father of One Who is by nature a Son and One in essence with Him.....Just as one would be mad to say that a house would be one in essence with the builder.... so is it correct to say that every son is one in essence with his father. If then there is Father and Son, the Son must be Son in nature and truth. But this is to be with the Father." In 9:624B: (John 10:30, 14:9 and 10)... signify Eternity and πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα δυναμένον

These passages show a considerable change of emphasis when compared with the almost contemporary "De Synodis", which we have already

(139) δυναμένων καὶ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς,
(140) δεκτικὴ τῶν ζητῶν καὶ ἐν οἴκῳ,
(141) νιόστις, καὶ δυναμένων τὸν πατέρα.
discussed fully. In brief, contrary to the interpretatio recepta, Athan-
asius did not greatly modify his position in the "De Synodis" towards the
Homoousion as primarily referring to generic likeness, whether to concili-
ate (?) Basil of Anorya and his party or anything else. On the other hand,
when we compare the exposition of the Homoousion in "De Synodis" with
what we have just quoted, we find a considerable difference, in fact the
very change, prima facie, that we failed, in spite of the traditional
account, to find in the former instance. The third major passage from
the second Letter is a repetition of the familial and quasi-biological
argument that has, up to now, been the mainstay of Athanasius's inter-
tation of the Homoousion, but the first two are unquestionably very much
closer to the Homoousion as generic or specific identity. This is shown
by the passages themselves, especially the first sentence that we have
quoted from the first of them, 3:612B, where the notion of generic identity
introduces the Homoousion. It is also shown, just as effectively, by the
context, with its reference to the differentiae between God and the crea-
tures. On the other hand, it would be better to make a correction here
to the traditional notion; the Homoousion refers not so much to generic
or specific identity in the ordinary sense, as to the categorial distinc-
tion between God and the creatures. This is, as we have said, a much
more serious matter than generic distinction or identity, although it
may prima facie look like it, since the distinctions between God and the
creatures (insofar as they can be considered according to logical analog-
gies) range the whole distance continuously from the quasi-categorial
to the quasi-qualitative, and even the latter distinctions are incompar-
ably more serious than the qualitative distinctions among mere creatures.
On the other hand, since the supreme categorial distinction between God

(142) See above, pp. 118-32.
and creatures is that He is absolutely unique ("Deus non est in genere aliquo" - Aquinas) and creatures are always in genere aliquo - and Athanasius makes this distinction with exceptional clarity both in the Contra Arianos and in the Letters and above all in this very context - this would bring even this latest amendment to Athanasius's position much closer to the arithmetic element in his earlier position than is evident at first sight. But even so, there has still been a considerable change, in that the Homoousion is, in the principal emphasis, treated categorically as distinct from familiality. Here the discussion must close now, but the subject will be taken up again in a more general way in our resume of the theological developments in these Letters as a whole, since it is only at that stage that the reasons for any change that may have been found, can be properly appreciated.

At this stage, we shall give a full lexicographical analysis of the Second Letter, to notice its contrast, if any, with the "Contra Arianos", and also with the other Letters, since the chief difference from the earlier writings is in the Homoousion. To start with the Second Letter: Logos as title for the Second Person: 5:616B(He is alien from things originate but Proper L. of the F.). 8:620C (one should examine Scripture to see when it speaks of the Godhead of the L. and when of His humanity). Same as Son: 1:609A(When Ans. hear that Son is Wdm. Radiance and Logos of F., they ask "How can this be"), 7:620B(the S. of G., being L., became man), 8:621A(knowing Him to be L.... through Whom all things were made, &c.), 9:624B(He is not ignorant(Mk.13:32), being L. through Whom everything came to be....). Eternity of L.: 2:609B. Arians call pre-existent L. creature, &c.: 3:612B(if so, one would have to call a creature the Fountain Which sends forth the L. .....), 3:612B
alterum, 6:616C, 6:617C. Of these 11 instances, 9 are in Group I and the other 2 in Group II.

Son, is much the prevailing word: Son same as Logos, Wisdom, &c. 1:609A (see above), 6:617B (Ps. 45:1 AV said of Son), Intimate Connection between F. & S.; Generation etc.: 6:617B (3 expls.) (If it is a case of F. & S. it is necessary that S. be S. and in truth), 5:616B (Homousios), 5:616B alterum (S. is and Homousios), 6:617A (If God is F. He must be F. of a S. Homousios). Same attributes as F.: 2:609B & C (each, Eternity), 2:609C alterum & 3:612C (Almighty), 3:612C alterum (Unalterability), Unity of relation, &c. (143). 2:609C (As is F. so is S.), 2:609C & 612A (each, what is in F. is in S.), 2:612A alterum (what is of the F. is in S.), 2:612A tertium (not something in F., something else in S.), 2:612A quartum (F. & S. both true God), 2:612A quintum et sextum (S. in F. & F. in S.), 2:612A septimum (seeing F. in S.), 3:612B (2 expls.) (find if there is any likeness between S. and creatures, or if what is in the S. is found in creatures), 4:613C (S. True, as F.), 4:616A (He is in Him & F. is in S.), 4:616A alterum (On Is. 45:14, who is this God in Whom is God, but the S. Who says, John 14:10), 5:616B (2 expls.) (S. has these things (i.e. attributes), and all the aforesaid of the F. are the S.'s). Unity of operation, therefore Unity of Essence: 4:613C (people are gods by participation in S.), 6:617B (2 expls.) (Daniel knew S. of G. and saw Him quench the flames, vide Song of the Three Children 35). Son exceeds all creaturely nature: 5:616A (S. has nothing like creatures), 5:616A alterum (everything of the F. is the S.'s), 5:616C (Essence of S. not created), 6:617C (S. not to be reckoned with creatures), 7:620A (2 expls.) (If He is S. not creature; if or. not Son), 7:620A tertium (great difference

(143) Almost all of these are misleadingly classified by Müller under the heading, "Unity of Operation..." &c.

Incarnate Son—Pre-existent L.: 7:620A (2 expls.) (If Baptism into F. & S. is valid, the Lord is not to be called creature, but Son), 7:620B (S. of G. being Logos, became man).

Middle Position in Trinity: 6:617A (Faith in F. S. & H. Sp.). Heresy (Arian): 2:609C (there was once when He was not), 3:612A (creature). Of these 46 examples, no less than 38 are in Group I, none in Group II, 3 in Group III, one each in Groups IV, V, and VI, and 3 in Group VII. This is, if anything, an exaggeration of the trend of the "Contra Arianos". The differences between the distribution of the material in the earlier works and here is that the actual percentage on the Incarnation and the work of Christ, whether in Creation or Reconciliation, is less, even if we have allowed for the introduction of material on the Homoousion, which has no equivalent in the Orationes. This would have the effect, as we have seen from our final lexicographic analysis of the Orationes, of increasing the predominance of Son over Logos as the title preferred for the Second Person, and increasing that of Group I over all others, at any rate as the formally and linguistically primary use of the title concerned in each case in turn. But both effects have taken place out of all proportion to any change in the distribution of the material. At this stage, it can be said that "Son" is definitely the preferred title for the Second Person, to as great an extent as Logos was in the "De Incarnatione". Possibly the reason is that the greater development of the problem of intra-Trinitarian relations occasioned by the appearance of the Holy Spirit as a doctrinal issue, made him think more in terms of "Son" even when he would have preferred Logos earlier. It is undoubtedly still the case in the Orationes that, in spite of expressions like Logos of the Father, the preferred title is Son for the Second Person in relation to the First (group I), there being still an appreciable preference for Logos for the Second Person in relation to the creatures, whether it be creation
or Incarnation-and-Reconciliation (probably owing to the influence of John 1:14). The same trend appears, although less marked, in the other three Letters; we shall not give any detailed treatment, except to say that there are 199 instances all told of Son as against 84 of Logos, and except for the monopoly of the latter on the stock formula for the undivided opera ad extra Trinitatis, ς κ το Πνευμα, σ ς το Λογος, the distribution does not appear to be significantly different from what has already been established. as typical of Athanasius.

Jesus, Essence, is of considerable interest: In the Second Letter, there are only five uses: 5:616B(Son is other than creatures), 5:616B alterum(S. is Homoousios and can never say, "Everything that the F. has is Mine."), 5:616C (the E. of the S. is not created, but of the F.), 5:616C alterum (there cannot be as it is receptive of the properties of God). Of these five, two, and possibly three, undoubtedly belong to Group I, Essence as the unitary constitutive factor in the Father or Son; this is evidence against the argument that Athanasius here interpreted the Homoousion in the generic sense, or at least evidence that what is commonly held to be the generic significance of the Homoousion should really be interpreted categorically. In the other Letters, the use is almost indistinguishable from the "Contra Arianos" I-III: I:21:580C (Son is not creature but proper to the E. of the F.), 25:588C (Son is from the Father and proper to His Essence), 26:592A (the nature of things originate is changeable as it is outside the E. of God), 26:592B (He is not of the E. of angels), 27:593C (Spirit has nothing in relation to creatures), 27:593C alterum (Spirit proper and not foreign

(144) Here, as always, the Fourth Letter is held to stop at Ch.VII, i.e. the "Quicunque dixerit" is not included.
to Son's E. and Godhead). III:1:625C (He is Proper Offspring), IV:3:641B (S. is Proper Offspring of the E. and Godhead). 4:641C (Sp. is proper to the E. of the Logos). Nature: is again much commoner than of. There are 6 uses in the Second Letter, 3:612C, 4:613C bis, 6:617A bis & B, all of which are the adverbial form (and all refer to what is aboriginally the case concerning God). It is of greater interest in the other three Letters: Divine Nature: I:16:569A (God has not divided so does not beget as a man)(145) Same in both Father and Son; or any other two Persons: I:21:580B (Sp. has such rank and in relation to Son ...), 24:585C (One would be mad to say that Sp. is of created), 24:588A (If Sp. defies, Its is unambiguously God's), 26:593A (H. Sp. above of angels), 27:593C (He has nothing in relation to creatures), IV:3:641B (Son is Proper Offspring alterum (Sp. not strange), 5:644B (Let Sp. not be separated One n. in Trinity: I:28:596A (Triad like Itself and indivisible), 30:597B (It is necessary that one be its Holiness, Eternity, and Unalterability), Men sharers of Divine Nature, as in II Pet: 1:4: I:23:585B & 24:585C (stated simply), 24:585B (if H. Sp. a creature, we are alien ). True human nature: I:16:569A (The of man has this, i.e. generation successively), Nature of creatures: I:9:552B (Absurd to name and glorify together things unlike of things originate), 17:572A (Ineffability of what is above the of trees known), 24:585C (The (145) That is, by division of essence and in familial succession.
unction and seal in us is not of the \( \phi \nu \sigma \tau \) of things originate),
26:589C(The H. Sp. other \( \pi \chi \rho \dot{\alpha} \dot{\mu} \nu \) of things originate),
26:592A(The \( \phi \nu \sigma \tau \) of creatures & things originate is alterable),
26:592B(Creatures have such a \( \phi \nu \sigma \tau \) - i.e. alterable). Of these
22 instances, 11 are in Group I, i.e. noun uses referring to the Divine
Nature, an unusually high proportion, 8 are uses of the same type referring
to the nature of creatures as a whole or types of creature, like men
(but without any reference to the Chalcedonian Human Nature of Christ),
and only three are the adverbial type of use, which is elsewhere over-
whelmingly predominant, including most decisively in the Second Epistle.
This tendency for \( \phi \nu \sigma \tau \) to approximate to one meaning is the firmest evidence that there is, for what it is worth, for the con-
tention that Athanasius began to regard the latter term generically. This
also represents an approximation to the Chalcedonian use of \( \phi \nu \sigma \tau \),
but only on the Godward side. These changes are probably connected with
the changes in the meaning of \( \tau \delta \) that we have just described.

There is very little in the way of Christological vocabulary of the Humanity of Christ. In the three Letters on the Holy Spirit proper,
there are only four instances, all from the first Letter, 4:537B(Luke 4:1
is spoken, \( \chi \nu \rho \nu \pi \tau \) which He accepted), 9:552C(He becomes \( \chi \nu \rho \nu \pi \tau \) ), 31:605A(The Logos
in the Spirit forms \( \tau \delta \sigma \mu \alpha \). Even in the Second Letter, which
is about the Second Person, there are only two examples apart from the
word \( \chi \nu \rho \nu \pi \tau \) Man; they are each from 9:624A (He had ignorance
in the body) and (He had a human body). The examples of the word Man, or
its related words, are: 4:620B & C bis, 8:621B, 9:624A bis & B. See also 8:621B(Very Good, \( \chi \nu \nu \pi \tau \) — ).
Speaks \( \chi \nu \rho \nu \pi \tau \) : 8:621B, 9:624A bis. See also 9:624A
The overwhelming predominance of Group VI is quite evident, not so much greater than before with regard to the word Ἰσθήμων etc., simply, but much greater than before if one considers that this word is almost the only one used for the Humanity of Christ. It is here that the signs can be seen of a further move towards the Chalcedonian Christology in connection with the Humanity of Christ.

Ep. III ad Serapionem (7 chapters)

The third letter to Serapion is the complement of the second, in which Athanasius, after apologising for having written on the Son after he had been requested for a summary of his previous letter against the Tropici remedies this deficit in part, explaining that we take our knowledge of the Spirit from the Son. On the other hand, this letter treats only of some of the arguments of the First Epistle; there is nothing before ch. 22, and some of the material only from chs. 22-31. Ch. 1 of this Letter deals with the relation between Spirit and Son, or the "series" aspect of it. Ch. 2 deals of the origins of the Spirit and creatures compared, ch. 3 with the Spirit as unction and seal, the consecrating function of the Spirit (on the basis of I Cor. 3:16, not mentioned in quite this way before), and the categorial unity of the Spirit against the plurality of creatures, ch. 4 with the omnipresence of the Spirit and His work in creation, ch. 5 with the prophetic ministry of the Spirit, and chs. 6 and 7 with the traditional and credal Trinitarian faith. There is very little change from the First Epistle, and with one exception no significant change. The exception is that there are a number of references to the relation
between knowledge of the Son and knowledge of the Spirit (I:625A)"....
(in view of John 16:13-14).... and, 'having breathed on them', He gave
the Spirit to the disciples out of ( mexico ) Himself, and in this way the
Father poured Him out 'upon all flesh', as it is written. It is fitting,
therefore, that I should have spoken and written first concerning the Son,
that from (coat) our knowledge concerning the Son we might be able to
rightly have knowledge concerning the Spirit. For we shall find the same
relation of propriety between the Son and the Spirit (as between the
Father and the Son." (146) Again, at 2:628B: ".... it would be well to
show that the Spirit is not a creature, from the arguments form which the
Son is shown to be not a creature." Again, 3:629B-4:629C: "But if
the Son is not a creature because He does not belong to the many, but is
one even as the Father is one, then the Spirit likewise cannot be a crea-
ture - for we must take our knowledge of the Spirit from the Son
(147) For He does not belong to the many but to the one.... (I Cor.12:11 & 13)....
Once more, since we must (coat) take our knowledge of the Spirit from the
(coat) Son, it would be fitting to put forward the proofs from Him (sc.
Son). ....(There follows the argument from omnipresence)". Again, at
4:632A: "Over and above these things, the following will confirm the
condemnation of the Arian heresy, and it will again be recognised that
knowledge of the Spirit is from the Son: (148) (Follows a Scriptural study
of the Spirit in creation)...." It is clear from these passages that
what McIntyre has called the epistemological principle (149) is, to a far
greater extent than in the case of the first Letter, at the forefront of
Athanasius's thinking. That is, knowledge of the Spirit is secondary to
knowledge of the Son, and is necessarily a corollary for it. On the other

(146) 3 ταν απευρεμεν λατεια του θου του μεγαλου του θου
(147) Χριστος δω η κε απο του θου απο του θου απο του
(148) ολοισχορησει δε πελειν εκ του θου και του
(149) See "The Holy Spirit in Greek Patristic Thought", Scottish Journal
of Theology 1954, p.366, and see below, pp.1231-32.
hand, the context of these statements still leaves it doubtful whether
there should be a separate epistemological principle, since the body of
the letter is a repetition of the earlier type of arguments concerning
unity of essence and unity of operation, which are established in general
independently of any mediation through the theology of the Son, directly
from Scriptural evidence. This suggests that the main arguments are the
operational and the ontological arguments, that is, those concerning the
operation of the Persons of the Trinity, and the actual intra-Trinitarian
relations, and that the epistemological principle is secondary and subord-
nate to these. The reason for the apparent importance of the epistemol-
ogical principle in the third Letter is its relation to the Second. The
quotation which most clearly indicates the place of the epistemological
principle is that from 4:622C, which says, rather than anything else, that
as a matter of brute fact, the same principles apply in the theology of
the Spirit as in the theology of the Son.

This is a more significant Epistle than the last two. In the
introduction, (ch.1), it is stated that the "grandfather" argument, which
Athanasius had treated in I:16ff., but not at all in III, is causing trouble
again, and that Athanasius had been asked for a further treatment of it,
and this is the sole topic of this Letter. However, there is a significant
difference in treatment as compared with I:15-16, in which Athanasius is
content to reaffirm the Μονογενής Θεός, Only-Begotten, as the title
of the Son and the absolute singularity and uniqueness of the Eternal
Generation, and to point out that the Third Person is described as Spirit
and not Son. By this stage, Athanasius sees that something more complica-
ted is needed now, and after a brief restatement of the Tropicist argument
and his own previous position, Athanasius continues, "(ch. 3 init.) Once again... it is right for you to be questioned from your own questions. If the prophets speak in the Spirit of God, and the Holy Spirit prophesies in Isaiah... then the Spirit is a Logos of God, and there are two Logoi, the Spirit and the Son. For it was when the Logos came upon them that the prophets used to prophesy. Furthermore... if all things were made through the Logos... and if it has been written... 'Thou shalt send forth Thy Spirit and they shall be created,' then either the Spirit is the Logos, or God has made all things (i.e. in two persons), i.e. in both Wisdom and the Spirit. How then does Paul say, 'One God... of Whom are all things, and one Lord, through Whom are all things'? Again, if the Son is 'image of the invisible Father', and the Spirit is image of the Son... (Rom. 8:29)... then, according to this, the Father is a grandfather. And if the Son came in the name of the Father, and the Son says, 'The Holy Spirit Whom the Father will send in My name,' then thus also the Father is a grandfather. What have you to say to this, you who have a glib answer to everything?" After stating that this sort of confusion is the inevitable result of neglecting Scripture, Athanasius, for the remainder of the letter, calls for a return to Scriptural principles and repeats his previous position, at somewhat greater length, but without introducing any really new matter.

It will be seen that Athanasius has really introduced a new stage into the argument, which appears to be an admission that the Tropicist dilemma is real. But on further examination what Athanasius is really saying is that the dilemma cannot be avoided by the Tropicist method, that is, by the assertion that the Spirit is a creature. The Scriptural evidence unquestionably associates the Spirit with the Son, and especially associates both Son and Spirit in the operations of the Godhead. The Tropici feared (or played on other people's fear) that either the personal
The distinction between Son and Spirit, or the uniqueness of the Son, His status as the Only-Begotten, would have to be rejected. Athanasius replies, correctly, that to call the Spirit a creature has nothing whatever to do with the argument at all; it amounts to a blank denial of the Scriptural evidence and the only thing that it succeeds in doing is to present theology with an adulterated Trinity.

The implications of all this - which can be seen much more clearly here than in the corresponding passage in the First Epistle - is that the only solution of the problem is to recognize that both Persons are equally present in all the operations of God, as well as ontologically equal, but to establish clearly the difference between them, both in the way in which they are present and in their type of ontological status (i.e. the \( \tau \theta \omicron \sigma \omicron \pi \omicron \sigma \varsigma \) \( \tau \upsilon \zeta \varsigma \) \( \omicron \pi \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) of the Cappadocians). The former question, that of operation, has already been settled by Athanasius with the formula that all operations take place through the Son and in the Spirit; independently of any theological judgment that one might make on this formula it certainly is formally adequate, and more than adequate, for this purpose. On the second point, the problem is partly, but only partly, solved by the title Spirit in distinction from that of Son. The difficulty is that Athanasius is not ready to develop any definite concept corresponding to generation, not even the obvious one which Augustine later termed, in Latin, "piration". The furthest that Athanasius goes is to the highly general notion of "propriety" (\( \omicron \upsilon \omicron \gamma \varsigma \omicron \varsigma \)), which of course is familiar enough. 3:641B: "The Son is an Offspring proper to the Essence and Nature of the Father....The Spirit, Who is said to be of God and is in God, is not alien to the nature of the Son, nor to the
Godhead of the Father." (150) And at 4:641C: "Thus the Spirit is not a creature but proper to the essence of the Logos and proper to God in whom He is said to be." (151) On the former passage, Shapland's note, which is completely correct, is: "Nothing in these letters shows more clearly than this how unstudied are the references in Athanasius to the procession of the Spirit. Here he is in urgent need of a term which shall distinguish the relation of the Spirit to the Father, as , in the previous sentence distinguishes that of the Son. Yet neither here nor elsewhere in the letter does he employ ." And again, in a note on the next chapter (on 4:641D), which might well stand as a commentary on the whole argument: "Athanasius here argues for the terms 'Son' and 'Spirit' where later writers, notably Didymus (de Trin. II.447 &c.) argue for , and . The difference of term attests a real difference, even though it is impossible to define it."

The significance of all this is that Athanasius, with his greater confidence and with this being his second examination of the matter, can see that the real issue is to define the difference between the Spirit and the Son, and that it is not sufficient to maintain the Son's status as Only-Begotten, or even the corresponding uniqueness of the Spirit, by themselves. This is shown by his treatment of the Tropostist dilemma. On the other hand, now that the problem must be solved all the more urgently, Athanasius finds the difficulties increased. It is significant that he does not see his way clear to use even the that had served him previously, and which later became the technical term. In view of this, it must be accepted, in spite of Rodziarko,
that this term does not represent Athanasius's last word about the orig-
ination of the Spirit from God, which is simply to fall back on the non-
committal concepts contained in the words ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, etc.,
— unless, as is unlikely, Athanasius expected that the very word πνεύματος
would be recognised as a passive verbal noun — with disastrous results
to later Eastern Orthodoxy — which would automatically supply the concept
of spiratio without any further ado.

The Doxology at the end of ch. 7 is "And one is the initiation
in Jesus Christ our Lord, through Whom (Κυρίῳ) and with Whom
(πατερία) to the Father with (οικονόμῳ) the Holy Spirit be glory and
power to all eternity. Amen." This, besides looking forward to the
future, e.g. the Nicaeano-Constantinopolitan Creed, is conclusive evidence
that the Epistle really ended there.

We unreservedly accept the conclusion of all modern Protestant
scholarship that the In illud, Quicunque dixerit, alias Ep. IV ad Serap.
8-23, is not part of the letter. This is a most important, and unjustly
neglected, work of its own right, but a work which, in spite of the
end of Ep. I, takes blasphemy against the Holy Spirit to be blasphemy
against the Divinity of God and the Divine Nature of Christ, and therefore
to refer primarily (among contemporaries) to the Arians, has no place here,
least of all after the Doxology. It is evidently an earlier work, but the
lack of firm evidence as to its time makes it unusable in a study of the
development of Athanasian theology.

(152) See Appendix pp.
It remains now to give our resume of the theology of the Letters to Serapion, and in doing so we shall, as always, divide the material into three heads - What are the grounds for the acceptance of the doctrines concerned, in this case, the Deity of the Spirit and the basic Trinitarianism as a whole? What is the doctrine itself that results from the considerations just enumerated? What is the effect of the development of the Athanasian doctrine in question on other doctrines? However, certain things need be said in addition. In the first place, this is the first really systematic treatment of the Spirit in theological history. As such these Letters have great intrinsic importance. Secondly, for the same reason, this is the first place in theology (apart perhaps from the recently discovered "Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching" of Irenaeus, which is a commentary on a Trinitarian creed) which can be considered as a systematic study of the Trinity as a whole, since in a sense it is impossible to study Trinitarianism till all three Persons were "in", as far as the theological consciousness was concerned. Thirdly, we have shown in numerous places that the struggle for the Deity of the Spirit was in a sense the same as that for the Deity of the Son or Logos, since each Person was, at the outset of the respective controversy, the Person that was peculiarly and directly associated with creatures and their internality.

(153) Since the paper concerned makes such a point, and rightly so, of its methodology, this is the right place to comment on some important aspects of the paper, "The Holy Spirit in Greek Patristic Thought," presented by John McIntyre at the Society for the Study of Theology, 1953, published in the Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol.VII, 1954, pp.353-375. The authors of chief interest to McIntyre are in fact Athanasius and Basil of Caesarea, and of these Athanasius is the more prominent. The material is subsumed under three great principles, the first being the "logical or deductive principle, that identity of Essence of Persons within the Godhead is to be derived from unity of operation (since), the implication being that since the Holy Spirit is indivisibly united with the Father and Son in the Divine Activity, His own Divine Nature is there by guaranteed." (p.355). The second principle is called the "epistemological or conceptual", which "is that knowledge of any one of the Persons within the Trinity is at the same time knowledge of the other two; and the use made of the principle in relation to the Holy Spirit is that of showing that if
The close correlation that the Arian controversy had established between the Logos and the Father had still left the problem of how the first two persons were to work with, and in, creatures, and in a sense it became absolutely necessary to establish the Deity of the Spirit to protect the Deity of the Logos, since, if the Spirit were the apparently and prima facie Divine Power immediately associated with creatures, and was the Mediator between the Logos and creatures, but itself turned out to be a creature, the Logos would be once again in the same position as the Spirit, and in fact the same position as the Logos Himself was held to be at the outset of the Arian heresy. Therefore, the danger of a reversion to

(153 Contd.)

we conceive of the Father and the Son, we must also affirm the Holy Spirit. " (p.363). The third is called the "ontological or correlative", i.e. "the frequently recurring statement that the Spirit is to the Son as the Son is to the Father." (in some form or other) (p.366). This is a good methodological scheme for the study of an established system of theology. But it is not so well adapted to the study of Athanasius on his own and the development of his theology, and indeed, unless we adopt a more general classification, we shall actually find it impossible to evaluate the connection between Athanasius's theology of the Son and his theology of the Spirit, which plays such a part in the schema. Besides, there are certain problems about the status of each principle. We have already seen (p.150-150) that the premise of the first principle is as dependent on the conclusion as vice versa. As to the third principle, it is an open question whether Athanasius saw the actual relation of the persons as being in series or parallel. And there are serious doubts on the wisdom of elevating the second principle to equality with the other two. After all the very thing that the Arians were trying to maintain (vide Thalia, De Syn.15), and also the Tropici, was that they were worshipping a Triad of Hypostases radically unlike in glory which differed from each other ad infinitum. In a sense it is only after it is established that such a Triad is impossible that it is possible to use an epistemological principle of the type propounded, and then only to develop the doctrine of the Spirit's Person and work in detail, not to establish Its deity in the first place. This must be the view of Athanasius; there is only one philosophical tradition that has ever accepted the primacy of epistemology over ontology, that is, the element in modern philosophy whose principal representative is Kant. The ancient Greeks knew that knowledge had to be acquired, and perhaps be acquired only in certain ways, but the epistemics had to be in accord with the ontology. It is not often enough understood that a position recognizably similar to the formal logic of Aristotle was first presented by Plato in "Sophist" as an ontology. And the importance of Revelation in the Hebrew-Christian tradition cannot be interpreted as the primacy of epistemology in the modern sense.

(154) See above, pp.488-516 and, 1071-1100, 1185-87.
Arianism was real and not a chimera. It is thus quite true to say that Athanasius still wrote these Letters under the shadow (theological, as well as in other ways) of the Arian controversy. Therefore, the exact relation between Athanasius's arguments on the Son and Spirit becomes a matter of great importance; whether he thought that the Son and Spirit were in series with regard to the Father or in parallel. Two other smaller points must be made here. Firstly, these Letters are devoted in the main to an analysis of the Person of the Holy Spirit in relation to the Son. There is, if anything, less about the work of the Spirit than there is about the work of the Son in the "Contra Arianos". This is often taken as a sign of the aridity of Athanasius's treatment of the Spirit, and, if it is permissible to say so, the author did so take it on first acquaintance. But this treatment has the positive virtue of reminding us that the Holy Spirit is just as objective, just as transcendently God, as the Son. In particular, we have shown that the crisis faced by the Church in Arianism is in essence the same as that faced now in Marxism, and that the two opponents are related to each other as the Second Person is related to the Third. We have also shown (and shall further show) that therefore the Church will not handle the latter crisis until it has worked out how the work of Christ is carried on, by the Church and by the Christian, in history; that is, in the Spirit. Unless we accept the Filioque, apparently a purely intra-Trinitarian doctrine, the result will be chaos. If we doubt that the Spirit really proceeds from the Son but proceeds from the Son only economically, we shall in practice never be able to avoid wondering whether this remains always true even economically. If we consider the relation of Father to Son and Father to Spirit as simply parallel, the temptation will be irresistible to consider them, as they affect us, as alternatives. Finally, the Letters show that, in spite of assertions to the contrary, the maturity and development of the Doctrine of the Spirit may differ from that of the
Son in degree, but not to the sort of degree that is virtually a difference in kind.

In view of all this, let us start with the reasons for accepting the Trinitarian doctrines in question, and especially of course the Deity of the Spirit.

We have already seen that, in connection with the proof that the Second Person of the Trinity is not a creature, there is a highly-developed exegetical principle: the contrast between the statements that ascribe Deity to the Son and those that treat Him as creaturely and, specifically, human, together with the principle that the former must be given absolute priority over the latter, since only under these circumstances can there be any revelation of God in Scripture or, in the last analysis, any Christian faith at all. Furthermore, the passages that ascribe Deity to Christ are normally propositional or quasi-propositional in form, like the "I AM (ἐγώ εἰμί)" passages of the Fourth Gospel, Heb. 1:3 and similar passages from the New Testament, or traditional Old Testament testimonies so interpreted, or finally - what amounts to the same thing to a Greek - passages like Matt. 11:27 (according to the interpretation in C. Ar. III: 35-36), which speak of Jesus "having" the attributes of Deity which the Lord will give to none other. All the very numerous and important "creaturely" passages about Christ are to be interpreted consistently with the former type, that is, Incarnationally. (155)

In the Letters to Serapion, where Athanasius comes to treat of the Spirit, there is not such a clear-cut treatment, perhaps because of the unfavourable circumstances of writing, perhaps because of the relative unfamiliarity of the topic, but also and probably primarily because of the less clear definition of the textual

(155) See above, pp. 145-151.
evidence itself, perhaps ultimately because the very nature of the Holy Spirit means that such evidence is less important. In contrast to the definite propositional statements concerning the Son, there are no similar direct statements in Scripture that the Spirit is God, a fact that embarrassed later orthodox theologians even if not Athanasius – see Shapland's note on the beginning of I:31. On the other hand, there is no passage which definitely describes the Spirit as a creature, except, prima facie Amos 4:13 LXX, which the Tropici seized with alacrity. Thus, with the one exception that we have just specified, the exegetical technique of the Contra Arianos I-III was not repeated, and Athanasius had to rely on indirect methods. However, this did not demand as much of his intellectual resources as the problem in the Contra Arianos, with the result that the exegetical technique was at a shallower level. Much of the Letters is merely a catena of proof texts, and four chapters of proof texts in the First Letter are devoted to the establishment of the proposition that with the article or equivalent definition refers to the Holy Spirit; a disproportionate amount. On the other hand, this activity masks the failure of Athanasius, in the company of almost the whole of theology, to shed adequate light on the deeper problem of the Scriptural root of Trinitarian doctrine considered as a whole, of which more later.

The remainder of the points have an epistemic and an ontological aspect, so that they will also be considered under the second head, but at present we shall of course restrict ourselves to the epistemic aspect. To consider first the argument from the very notion of the titles of the Persons of the Trinity, again the argument is less strong in the case of the Third Person than the Second. In the earlier case, there were

many traditional titles of the Second Person, Son, Logos, Wisdom, and the key metaphors of Source-River, and particularly Light (that is, light-source or Sun)-Radiance. Athanasius establishes, in season and out of season, that by the very ontological nature of these concepts the Second Person must be of the essence of the Father aboriginally and by nature, and thus not a creature. The title Son establishes the distinction between the Second Person and a creature in virtue of His origin from the Father in an absolute sense, and the same is also established by the analogy Light-Radiance, which also indicates the inseparability and thus the co-eternity of the two Persons. The titles Logos and Wisdom, that is, Logos and Wisdom of God, emphasise the immateriality and therefore, for a Greek Platonist like Athanasius, the transcendence of the Second Person; indeed, if the words of Athanasius are taken literally by themselves, they actually suggest that the Second Person is superior in the Platonist way to the Father Himself; of course, Athanasius does not wish that conclusion to be drawn and trusts to the rest of his argument to reject it, but he is certainly prepared to allow it to counteract any subordinationism implicit in the title "Son". When we come to the Holy Spirit, this sort of argument is not so well developed, because there is only one such title for the Third Person - Spirit (τὸ Ἐμπλήρωμα). However, there are places where this sort of ontological or rather verbal or conceptual argument is definitely used, and in one sense Spirit is a title of the third group corresponding to Logos and Wisdom, indicating immateriality or even, almost, immaterial transcendence; there had already been a tradition of its use (from John 4:24 &c.) for the nature or even essence of God Himself, which usage had already been the basis of the Quicunque dixerit. The language of Athanasius confirms this, e.g. his ostentatious acceptance of the Pauline "Spirit of Sonship" as the Holy Spirit in the sense of the Spirit

(157) See, e.g., De Decr. 16-17 and C. Ar. I:25-28. See above, pp. 64-20, 70-13
of the Son; similarly with the Second Person as Wisdom and the Third as "Spirit of Wisdom". (158)

The third subdivision, the categorial argument, is far more prominent than in the Contra Arianos, and in the Letters to Serapion it probably bears the weight of the argument. In the earlier writing, it comes to full flower fairly late, part of Athanasius's response to the extreme challenge of the Arian exegesis of Prov. 8:22 LXX. In the Letters to Serapion it immediately plays a most important part in the argument, now that it has been perfected by Athanasius. In the main, the Son, in the Contra Arianos, and the Spirit, in the Letters to Serapion, are absolutely unique and singular, whereas creatures cannot be either of these since they are plural in the pluralistic sense; this is a very prominent line of attack in these Letters. (159) However, there is another facet of this argument too. It is probably implicit in the whole of the Contra Arianos, and certainly where the transcendence of the Son over the creatures is stressed - and occasionally it is mentioned in so many words, as where Athanasius says that the Son is the sole Doer of Good Deeds - i.e. ἐποίησεν τὰ ἀρετὰ ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκουμενῆς, (160) probably in the technical Hellenistic sense in which it was used as a quasi-divine title for certain Hellenistic monarchs - but in the Letters to Serapion it is used explicitly for the first time, so that it plays as big a part as any other argument. That is, there is a division of categorial significance between God as being the active Doer or Giver, and creatures as the passive recipients, and that the Spirit is always stated in Scripture to be on the active side of this barrier. This is probably a better interpretation of much material in the Letters

(158) See especially Ep. I:19, and above, pp. 1178-9
(159) See Ch. 41, De Decr. 11, and C. Ar. III:18-31 and 44-64. See also above, pp. 591-595, 621-635, 659-659. For the Epistles, see especially I:22-27, and III:4-5, and above, pp. 1188-1201.
(160) See C. Ar. III:19:564A.
that is usually held to refer to the argument from the unity of operation,
\[ \varepsilon \vee \rho \gamma \xi \omega \]. Of course there is an implied major in this argument which Athanasius does not express, but leaves to be implied, that there cannot be more than one such unique Divine or ultimate beings, and therefore all Three Persons are One God. However, as we have said before, theology is on dangerous ground here, as this can be a purely rationalistic principle rather than an expression of the truth of Divine Revelation. This brings us at once to the fourth subdivision of this topic.

This is the relation between the unity of the Divine operation and the actual unity of God. Of course it is true that in any case the unity of operation, \[ \varepsilon \vee \rho \gamma \xi \omega \], is de facto derivative from the unity of God's nature and essence, but we must go further than that and challenge the statement for the Greek Fathers that our knowledge of the essential unity of God is derived from our knowledge of the unity of the divine operation - at any rate insofar as it applies to Athanasius. (161)

We have already considered the way in which Athanasius handles the exegesis of Scripture on this question, and come to the conclusion that in a paradoxical way the opposite is also the case, and that it is the unity of essence and nature that is the a priori principle that compels us to interpret certain passages as indicating a unity of operation. In fact, we have probably suggested that this is one of these spiral relationships like that

(161) The principle in question is as expounded by McIntyre, op. cit. p. 355; see above, n.153 for a citation, and some comment. We must add at this stage a criticism of McIntyre's criticism of the traditional handling of the argument, which is that it is from unity of operation to unity of essence. It is maintained (p. 357) that the real order is from unity of essence (apparently in the Homoean sense) and unity of operation, to identity of essence in the Nicene sense. This interpretation may be true for the later Cappadocians, but it cannot apply to the Athanasius of these Letters, since his opponents (see above, pp. 488-516), whatever they thought of the Son, regarded the Spirit as soundly and completely unlike the Father, and for that matter unlike both Father and Son.

McIntyre admits (p. 357) that, as a fact of the actual working of God, the unity of operation is derivative from the prior ontological unity of God, but does not notice how this applies too in the epistemic and exegetical argument of Athanasius as well, as in Ep. I:14.
between fides and intellectus in the theology of Anselm; fides leads on to intellectus which leads on to a deepening and strengthening of fides, which leads on to a higher intellectus, and so on. This leads us straight into the fifth subdivision, but before we start on it, some further observations are necessary. In the first place, the conclusion that we have just indicated shows that the same principle applies to any direct testimony that Scripture may give to the essential Divine unity of Persons directly. But, on the other hand, there is no such testimony. There is no case in Scripture of the Holy Spirit being called God in the direct propositional sense. Even where Athanasius is extending the Scriptural metaphors of Light-source and Radiance, and Fountain and River, to the Holy Spirit, the passages of Scripture that are quoted to justify the extension (i.e. to light-as-it-reaches-us, and Water respectively) are essentially descriptions of the operation of God. It is this that has induced students of Athanasius to believe that he reasoned from unity of operation to unity of essence. This appearance in Athanasian theology is due to the nature of the Scriptural testimony, which again is due to the fact that in this age the work of the Spirit is to be within us, and to testify not of Himself, but of the Second Person - a process which even such an emphatically Eastern Orthodox and Spirit-conscious theologian as Vladimir Lossky describes explicitly as the hiding of His own personal or hypostatic identity. This is the true reason why unity of operation appears to bulk so large in the Athanasian theology. It might be added here that in the same way the common statement that Athanasius was a

(162) See Ep.I:14 and also the passages cited above, no.159. See also above, pp. 1166-70


(164) See Ep.I:19-21, and above, pp. 1175-83, 1175-77
theological pragmatist is just as incorrect as applied to the Spirit as it is applied to the Son.\textsuperscript{(165)} It is true that he does say, with great emphasis, that if the Holy Spirit were a creature, it would not link us to God at all; he would be remiss if he did not remind us of this; but he does not by any means base his argument upon this sort of pragmatist consideration, and indeed he introduces it rather late into the argument, \textsuperscript{(166)} exactly as was the case in the Contra Arianos.\textsuperscript{(167)} We can go from here to say that, apart from Matt.28:19 and a few similar passages, there is no one passage in the Bible that unequivocally indicates either the essential or operational unity of the Three Persons of the Trinity. Therefore, even in the case of the two great Trinitarian metaphors that we have just mentioned, Athanasius has to obtain his conclusions concerning the unity, alike of essence and operation, of the Three Persons, by taking a number of passages together, and here again this raises the question of the a priori ground for the compulsion to interpret the passages of Scripture in this way. Finally, when we compare all this with the corresponding position in the Contra Arianos and the anti-Arian theology generally, we find that in the earlier case the argument from the unity of operation of Father and Son is hardly in evidence at all - except insofar as it is implicit in the whole work. This is because the Arians, in their perverse way, actually accepted the Son as the genuinely and uniquely operative Person - that was the terrible thing about them - , whereas the Tropici recognised two Persons, Father and Son, as operative Persons; also, the work of God in Christ is so intimately bound up with the Incarnation, being that change of state which made Arianism so plausible to some; there

\textsuperscript{(165)} See above, pp. 534f., 1061f.
\textsuperscript{(166)} See Ch.24:585B-C, and above, p. 1192-3
\textsuperscript{(167)} See C.Arr.II:41, 69, 70, and above, pp. 896-7
is nothing directly corresponding, at first sight, and certainly nothing in Athanasian theology as it developed, in the case of the Third Person, and therefore in the Letters to Serapion the issue of the unity of operation had to be developed more directly, without appearing as the soteriological side of the Doctrine of the Incarnation.

We may now consider the final subdivision, which has already been forcing itself upon our attention, the question of the root of the Doctrine of the Trinity. It is evident from the outset that the problem is intrinsically more formidable than it was in the case of the Son, for the very simple reason that three are always a much greater problem than two. In this case, the mere act of refuting Arianism provided Athanasius with all the "Trinitarian" (in fact, virtually binitarian) theology that was required such as the Father-Son relationship, the Logos that proceeds from the Father to reveal Him, according to the metaphors of Light-source and Radiance, etc.. Athanasius introduces the question of the Trinitarian baptismal formula and its consequent intimate association with the whole basis of Christian existence, but as yet it is not specially prominent. But the shifting of attention to the Holy Spirit, and especially the way in which some of the other arguments, which were independently cogent against Arianism, appear to depend on some sort of a priori Trinitarianism when applied to all Three Persons, made the root of the Doctrine of the Trinity a much more serious issue that demanded much more attention. It is of course a very serious problem in all theology, and nowhere more so than in Protestantism, which has normally and rightly accepted it even in spite of the relative lack of Scriptural evidence of the traditional direct proof-text character: This is an embarrassment since it appears to commit one to the Romanist view that this is basic dogma is based on ecclesiastical tradition. In some ways, Athanasius appears to be saying just this, appealing to the ecclesiastical, sacramental, and liturgical
tradition as supremely expressed in the Baptismal formula. On the other hand, there are several qualifications which must be made to this interpretation of Ad Serap. I:28ff.. In the first place, an ecclesiastical and confessional tradition of Trinitarianism was one of the things that even the Arians, and presumably a fortiori the Tropici, actually had in common with the orthodox. The Arians, as was stated expressly in the Thalia, believed in the Trinity, even though the status of the Persons differed ad infinitum, and when Athanasius sarcastically and incredulously draws the Hegelian consequences from this in C.Ar.I:17 he is following to its logical conclusion a real and not an alleged or imputed doctrine. Similarly, the Tropici presumably hoist themselves on their own petard when they actually confess a Trinity which Athanasius rightly says is adulterated, and much of what Athanasius says means simply that they are self-condemned. Secondly, the misologists who masqueraded as theologians in the nineteenth century and later cannot have it both ways. If the Trinitarian tradition goes back to the early Church alone, as distinct from the New Testament, it must be an extremely early tradition, for the whole point of Athanasius's treatment of it is that on his own claim, it extends back to time immemorial, and nobody can remember when it had any independent origin, and was securely and indubitably established in the liturgy of the Church. The significance of this is strengthened and not weakened by the fact that Trinitarianism had not even at this stage developed fully as a mature and consciously understood dogma; this certainly shows that it did not owe its origin to the application of any

(168) See above, pp. 1202-4.
(169) See De Syn. 15.
(170) See above, pp. 456 ff.
(171) See above, pp. 858-873 for comment on Athanasius's treatment of the same issue in C.Ar.II:41-43.
rationalistic principle. Finally, we cannot read our modern criticism into the mind of Athanasius. When he quotes the Baptismal formula, he quotes it as Matthew 28:19, which was an undeniably Dominical statement completely attested, for him, in Scripture, and he would certainly have held that such a statement, associated as it was with the individual's initiation into Christ, would be able to bear a special burden of exegetical responsibility. When we bear in mind too that this is not the only basis, and that another definite reason for Trinitarianism was surely the consistency of Scripture, in all its piecemeal evidence concerning various combinations of two of the Persons, we see that the doctrine of Athanasius is stronger than appears at first sight. But this is still the weakest part of Athanasius's whole argument, even when interpreted in meliorem partem, and modern minds certainly demand a broader basis for Trinitarianism, even where they are in no doubt about the Dominical authenticity of Matt. 28:19. This whole question is the pons asinorum of Protestantism, which it to a large extent has not even begun to cross, except for Karl Barth, and we have already noticed that his great emphasis on the absolute primacy of Trinitarianism even within the Doctrine of Revelation, that is, the prolegomena to theology, is the nearest equivalent of the Athanasiastic status of the doctrine; perhaps it is this very primacy that is responsible for much of the difficulty.

By way of transition to the next section, the question now arises about the relation between knowledge of the Spirit and knowledge of the Son, which of course has nothing to correspond to it in the theology of the Second Person. Athanasius certainly says that our knowledge (\( \gamma \nu \xi \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \) ) of the Spirit is to be derived, or taken, from our knowledge of the Son (especially in Ep. III passim).\(^{(172)}\) He also says, with

\( \text{(172) See above, pp. 124-6} \)
the greatest possible emphasis, that if the Deity of the Spirit is denied
the next stage must be a reversion to Arianism. The problem now
arises, why Athanasius did not deduce the Filioque, or some other form
of the actual ontological origin of the Spirit from the Son. This is the
problem, as we have put it, of whether the Son and Spirit are in series
with the Father or in parallel, or in a different, more complex relation.
Shapland, who rather too easily accepts the series relation, is worth
quoting (notes on 1:25): "... it is through His propriety to the Son
that His propriety to the Father is apprehended. It is one of the charac-
teristics distinguishing Athanasius from later writers, especially Didymus,
that in establishing the divine unity... he is content to relate what has
been said of the Spirit to what has been said of the Son, taking for
granted that therein is established the Spirit's unity with the Father
also; whereas Didymus toils to discover parallel references to all three
Persons. He has, as it were, to see the Trinity seristim every time. No
doubt this difference is partly due to the fact that Athanasius can assume
in his opponents a more definite conviction of the Godhead of the Son.
But it is also due to a difference in approach. Athanasius comes to de-
defend the Godhead of the Spirit from defending the Godhead of the Son. The
one issue proceeds from the other. To Didymus, both are collateral points
in a controversy whose crisis is past, and which he can therefore see as
a whole." With due respect to this far-seeing comment, we say that it
does not go far enough. We have seen that the history of the period
decisively affected the form of the doctrine itself. By the time the
Tropicist heresy started there was a quasi-generic analogy between the
document of the Spirit and the doctrine of the Second Person as it was in
the days before the Arian controversy started, and therefore there was a

generic resemblance between all the arguments used in the Arian controversy to establish the Deity of the Son and the arguments that must now be used to establish the Deity of the Spirit. There is a series element in the statements that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, of Christ, or of sonship, and also in the idea that in a sense the Spirit protects the Deity, or our knowledge of the Deity, of the Son, so that if the Deity of the Spirit is repudiated, the Deity of the Son will have to go also. But again this last is simply analogous to the repeated statement in Contra Arianos that Arianism in the same way involves rejection of the Father, in the long run. Thus, the essential picture appears to be that an epistemic series relation is the basis of a doctrine of an ontological parallel relation, which is confirmed by Athanasius's adoption of the later Greek Procession, a clear manifestation of what we have termed the parallel relation. This may seem illogical, but an example from chemistry will make the point quite clear. The element germanium, a rare element which has just recently become extremely important as the essential constituent of transistors, was not discovered till very late in chemical history. But when Mendeleev propounded the principle of the order and succession of chemical elements which we now know as the Periodic Table, he maintained that there was an element as yet undiscovered which also shared the properties that were in common to carbon, silicon, tin, and lead, and where these properties were different, and in series with each other, this unknown element was intermediate between silicon and tin in the same series. These predictions were actually confirmed, as were others of its kind, with amazing exactitude. Here, to use Athanasius's vocabulary which is strikingly appropriate, Mendeleev was saying that knowledge of germanium must be derived from knowledge of silicon and tin and the other elements.

(174) See above, pp. 506-16 and 1099-1100, 1135-83.
of this group. But neither Mendeleev nor anyone else ever said that in fact and ontologically germanium was derived from silicon and tin. Germanium, or ekasilicon as Mendeleev provisionally called it, was always held to be an element in the same way as tin, silicon, and the others were, and in that sense absolutely co-ordinate with them. The relation is generic and analogical, not constitutive and derivative; if there is any derivation it is that all the elements that we have mentioned have, as regards their chemical properties, a common derivation from principles which we now know to be the laws of nuclear physics. Of course, there was for Athanasius a real possibility of regarding the relationship between Father and Son as a sort of Platonic principal, with the analogous and similar relation between Father (or Son) and Spirit as one subordinate and derived by participation, \( \mu \varepsilon \theta e \varsigma \), etc. But the very act of raising this possibility would have been enough to reject it, since it would have made the Spirit indistinguishable from a creature. This would be an added reason for Athanasius to emphasise the parallel relation as regards ontology, rather than the series relation. And there is also the fact that if the Spirit was derived according to the Filioque, it would not be quite analogous to the Son. Thus, the final picture of Athanasian doctrine is that in some way the very epistemic derivation of knowledge of the Spirit from knowledge of the Son is an added ground, however paradoxical, for acceptance of the progression of the Spirit from the Father only, even as the Son has His origin from the Father only.

This brings us to the second great division under which we shall consider Athanasius's theology of the Spirit, the actual content of the Trinitarian doctrine, that is, as regards the intra-Trinitarian relations of the Persons. In the case of the Son, it appears that the final doctrine of Athanasius appears to be a paradoxical combination of two elements, representing respectively the Logos theology and the Son theology. The
Second Person is in one way the quality of the Father, even the quasi-
Platonic Form of the Father (Athenasius actually uses the word \( \varepsilon \gamma \),
and in another way He is the Son of the Father, with everything that this
implies of personal distinction. These moments appear to be almost equally
strong in the Contra Arianos I-III, and, not for the first time, we seem
to find the most familiar analogy in modern physics, according to which
the electron behaves as in some ways as an exceedingly small particle of
matter and in other ways as a quantum of exceedingly short waves, or even
of pure radiant energy.\(^{(175)}\) Both these elements are to be found in the
theology of the Spirit as revealed in these Letters. The former is seen
in the statements, virtually passim, that the Spirit is the Spirit of God,
of the Son, of sonship, used in such a way as to be almost an extension
of the older use (which we find in, say, "In illud. Quicumque dixerit" ch.
12) of Spirit., \( \varepsilon \gamma \), for the Divine nature, as in Christ.\(^{(176)}\)
Little further need be said about this, as it is not nearly as prominent
here, presumably for the reason that it is much harder to use this sort
of principle twice than to use it once. Relative to the state of affairs
in the "Contra Arianos", this type of doctrine is much less prominent than
the second type, which emphasises the hypostatic distinction (in the
Cappadocian sense) of the Persons and their origin from each other as
eternal events in the Godhead. It is here that the tension in Athenasius
between the series relation between the Persons and the parallel relation
between Son and Spirit becomes most prominent. We have already seen that
he tends to accept that epistemically and operationally the series relation
predominates; the principles that we know of the Son are also true of the
Spirit in relation to the Son now that the Son is accepted as God, and,

\(^{(175)}\) See above, pp. 838 839, with further references.

\(^{(176)}\) See Appendix, pp.
especially, it is by the Spirit that the grace, not primarily of the Father, but of the Son (and of the Father insofar as He is in the Son), is mediated to us. But in spite of this, he tends to deduce from this very fact that the ontic and actual progression of the Spirit is from the Father. As he puts it in the important passage in I:18, the Spirit proceeds from (ἐπὶ τῷ ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ) the Father, because it shines forth from (ἐπὶ τῷ ἐν τῷ Σωτῆρι) the Son. The difference is significant, and it is fair to draw this inference when the two expressions are used in juxtaposition. The latter expression, used for the relationship to the Son, is perceptibly relative to ourselves, or epistemic, compared with the former expression, which is of the two the one that stands for something independent, absolute, and relative only to God Himself. The same thing is true of the repeated statements that the Spirit has the same relationship with regard to the Son as the Son has to the Father. This is how the principle is usually expressed, which makes it appear as if Athanasius had the series relation in mind. But, as we have seen, a better translation of the Greek would in these cases be something like this, e.g. "The Spirit has the same propriety (ἐν τῷ ἐν τῷ Σωτῆρι) in-relation-to (ἐπὶ τῷ ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ) the Son as the Son has in-relation-to the Father." For the word ἐπὶ τῷ ἐν τῷ Σωτῆρι, which is the one that we have picked in this example, we often find, instead, ἐν τῷ ἐν τῷ Σωτῆρι, identity; ἐν τῷ ἐν τῷ Σωτῆρι, rank; or even ἐν τῷ ἐν τῷ Σωτῆρι, nature. (177) Finally, and most important, the context of this sort of passage is always an epistemic discussion of our knowledge of the Holy Spirit, or an operational discussion of the work of the Spirit in mediating Christ to us. In these spheres, Athanasius always admitted the series relation to hold, and the fact that

(177) Cf. Ad Serap. III:1:625A-B and C; also I:21 init., but the expression of the principle is usually indirect.
the Scriptural evidence is solely of this nature has concealed the true position. But a closer examination of the language used by Athanasius indicates that he is not thinking so much of a relationship in series as of the common rank that all three Persons share. The relation of Spirit to Son is emphasised only because our knowledge of the Spirit comes through the epistemic or operational relation of the Spirit to the Son. The conclusions seem to have their frame of reference within the categorial argument rather than anywhere else.

This is confirmed by the fact that Athanasius is actually unwilling to speak of the procession of the Spirit, a most important fact which has been masked by the pernicious tendency to read Athanasius in terms of what later became orthodox doctrine, in which the Nicaeano-Constantinopolitan Procession, whether in the Greek or Latin form, played an exceedingly prominent part. In the earlier stages, Athanasius uses the word \( \varepsilon_{\kappa \pi o \rho \varepsilon \upsilon \tau \alpha} \) for the procession of the Spirit. The procession is of the Greek form, from the Father only, and incidentally there is not even the \( \delta \chi \rho \sigma \tau \iota \sigma \) that modern Eastern Orthodox theology now accepts. We have already discussed the juxtaposition, in I:20, of the \( \varepsilon_{\kappa \pi o \rho \varepsilon \upsilon \tau \alpha} \) from the Father and the \( \varepsilon_{\kappa \lambda \nu \tau \tau \iota} \) from the Son. But normally Athanasius contents himself with such expressions as that the Holy Spirit is proper to the Father or to the Godhead, or to the Son, or is not foreign to these (\( \chi r i o s \), or \( \iota \beta \sigma \tau \iota \), etc. + gen), and he does so even when he has just used much more definite expressions for the relation between Father and Son (Proper Offspring of the Essence, etc. or even the Homoousion). This is particularly significant in the Fourth Epistle, where even the \( \varepsilon_{\kappa \pi o \rho \varepsilon \upsilon \tau \alpha} \) is no longer used, and the weaker expressions hold the field entirely. The importance of this lies in the fact that the whole purpose of the Letter is
to refute the "grandfather" argument, and that here, if anywhere, there
is urgent need of some definite statement of the relation of Spirit to the
other Persons to contrast with the άνάνημα, and in a sense
his failure to do so is an admission of defeat. We must accept this as
Athanasius's final word on the Procession, since it is his second attempt
to deal with the very argument that demands a study of this doctrine, a
heretical argument that had continued to give great trouble to orthodox
theology. Thus, it appears that although Athanasius did occasionally use
the word εἰκοστὸς for the Procession of the Spirit,
whether for Scriptural or traditional reasons, or both, he was decidedly
unwilling to discuss the subject, probably because he did not yet have
the confidence to do so, and his unwillingness and lack of confidence
increased in proportion to the pressure put on him to do so. (178)

The above study of the uncertainties of Athanasius on the Pro-
cession indicates the reason. The whole "grandfather" argument of the
Tropici depends on the idea that the requisite distinction cannot be made,
that the only possible relationship in the Godhead is filial generation,
that therefore if the Spirit is in the Godhead as a hypostatically dis-
tinct entity, It must be either a son of the Son, in which case the Father
is a grandfather (which everyone agreed was ridiculous), or another Son of
the Father, in which case the Son would no longer be Only-Begotten. (179)

(178) See 1:2:533B and 20:580A, and above, pp. 1179-84; see also, for
Contrast Ep.IV., esp. ch.3:641B, and above, pp. 1228-30, and Shapland's
note there cited.

363ff. that this is a severe limitation on any series relationship between
Son and Spirit. Another is the need to make some distinction between the
primacy of various Persons in various works. It works best negatively and
apologetically, in making the point against the Tropici that they had as
little business to adopt their heretical tenet as the rejected Arians had
to adopt theirs.
This is unfortunately but frankly an inversion a fault in Athanasius's own theology, because, as we have already seen, he consistently over-emphasised the processive or emanative aspect of the Son's filial generation, even to the extent of habitually describing the Son as a neuter passive verbal noun which is not Scriptural, of the Father — at the expense of the filial, familial, personal element. Where these come in, it is in a quasi-biological way rather than a personalist way. The ultimate statement that it is the Father's fatherhood that is the essence of all fatherhood is a height that Athanasius does reach along the line of genuinely personalist theology, and we have to be thankful for this, even as we have to be thankful for the biological or organic element for the light it has thrown on the meaning of the Homoousion. Athanasius has to say, and says, so much about these matters that all strata are well represented, in absolute terms, better in fact than in almost any other theologian, but relatively, the personalist stratum is reached rarely — however prominent these peaks may be —, the biological or organic stratum more often, although it is not the main stratum, while Athanasius's theology on this point remains usually below this level, in the inorganic fields that we would now call astro-physics or geology. This is in contrast with the Trinitarianism of Augustine, which is definitely personalist as far as the Father and Son are concerned; the filial relation is an eternal fact rather than an eternal act, and the Spirit is their mutual eternal love, which of course must be one activity proceeding in the same way from Both

(181) See above, pp. 629-40.
Father and Son. It even contrasts strongly with the Cappadocians, with their well-known use of something like the social analogy of the Trinity, even including Athanasius's near-contemporary and friend Basil, who protested that the word \( \text{\textcopyright} \) was an insult when applied to the Son. The final result of this was to produce a theology of the generation of the Son which was difficult to distinguish from a theology of procession, and, although Athanasius is forced by the Tropici to admit this difference, he finds it impossible to give a systematic account of it. The only solution is, in fact, to emphasize the personalist aspect of the relation between Father and Son rather than the emanationist or even quasi-biological aspect, since in the latter case the generation would have a quasi-asexual character which would itself be too close to emanation without a qualification such as we have specified.

The fact that this emanationist sort of interpretation of the Divine Sonship was the one finally accepted by Athanasius is confirmed by further study of the Trinitarian doctrine as developed by him. In the formal summary in I:28f., there is surprisingly little definite on these points, since Athanasius is discussing primarily and almost entirely the triplicity of the Three Persons, that is, the fact that the number of

(182) See again, Augustine, De Trinitate, especially XV:19:37. Of course, there are difficulties in treating the love of Father and Son as a third hypostasis, but they are not so great as they are usually assumed to be (see above, pp. 8-56). And they are nothing like the most unfortunate statement of Hendry, "The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology," p. 45, that the doctrine appears to be the accidental result of the fact that "love" is both a noun and a verb. Surely, Augustine, as a speaker of Latin, knew the difference between amor, amore, amare, amavi, amatum. Hendry, whose book is excellent in many ways, appears to have a complete blind spot on the Intra-Trinitarian doctrine.


(184) Atzberger, "Die Logoslehre des heiligen Athanasius...", pp. 129-134, esp. p. 131, is the only commentator who has noticed this weak spot in Athanasius's theology.
Persons is three; this is the point at issue when the Trinitarian Baptis-
tismal formula is under consideration. But the most important positive
advance in Trinitarian doctrine is (1:19) in terms of the extension of
the two classical Scriptural metaphors that were the basis of his defin-
itive and characteristic doctrine of the Son in relation to the Father,
that is that the Son is to the Father as Radiance, 
\[ \text{ Radiance } \], is
to \( \text{ Light } \), light, or, more accurately, light-source or radiant body —
ocasionally the Sun is substituted —, and again, as a River, 
\[ \text{ River } \], is to its fountain, source or spring, 
\[ \text{ Source } \], these metaphors being
equivalent. It was a matter of no great difficulty, although it involved
conflation of Scripture passages, to extend these to cover the Spirit,
which was, respectively, Light, that is, light as it reaches and illumines
us, and Water. This is certainly the easiest and most convenient
extension of the earlier binitarian theology to cover the full Trinity.
In fact, it would have at least partially solved the problem of the dis-
tinction between the origination and procession of the Son and of the
Spirit, but for the fact that Athanasius’s polemical exigencies demanded
a much more detailed and discrete treatment of the origination of the
Spirit. However, it is quite clear that this sort of doctrine is the
perfect representation of the Greek Procession, certainly the form of the
Greek Procession that the Eastern Orthodox theology is now prepared to
accept ecumenically, procession from (\( \text{ Father } \)) the Father, through (\( \text{ Son } \))
the Son. It is difficult to see how the Filioque can be expressed
in terms of these metaphors, which so naturally lend themselves to the
Greek Procession, and here once again we see how naturally the Greek Pro-
cession follows from the physical analogies and modes of thought adopted
by Athanasius as his definitive expression.

The time has come to consider how Athanasius stood with regard
to perhaps the two major theological formulae of the Trinity, the Homocousion
and the Filioque. Although the latter follows directly from what has just been said, it involves such a complicated study of various traditional views that it would be better to defer it till after the Homoousion. We have already worked out in detail what Athanasius actually said, and the only thing that we need to do now is to explain why he took up his position, in terms of the rest of his theology. As we have noted above, this is the real point at which Athanasius changes his main emphasis in his doctrine away from the previous quasi-genetic one, although it is still by no means out of the picture. At first sight, he appears to present the Homoousion as primarily generic or specific identity, but on closer examination it turns out that the is something different from a genus or species. In its use this argument is closely linked contextually with the categorial argument, which in these Letters has attained exceptional prominence, far more than in the Contra Arianos I-III, and thus it would appear that the which is the same for all three Persons is actually the whole sum and integration of the categorial differences between God and creatures, which of course includes God's categorial uniqueness which provides the connecting link with the earliest form of the doctrine. It is this, rather than identity of genus or species, which has replaced the definitive position of the anti-Arian writings. The other thing that is to be mentioned about the Homoousion here is Athanasius's marked unwillingness to apply it directly to the Spirit. He does so only once, at the end of I:27, and only once again by implication only. On the other hand, there are several occasions where he might well have applied it to the Spirit, including times when he has just applied it to the Son, but he does not do so. This appears to have been a general feature of Athanasius's successors as well. (185)

(185) See McIntyre, op. cit., p.360. For a full treatment of the Homoousion, see above, pp.1244-1255, and further back references there.
From what we have said above, the reason for the general change of emphasis is plain, and it was almost certainly not to conciliate the Semi-Arian or Homoean party - Athanasius would have found less point in doing so here than in the De Synodis. The reason is almost certainly that, in view of the "grandfather" argument of the Tropici, the earlier doctrine, with its quasi-genetics, would have been seriously embarrassing, at least until Athanasius was much surer of himself than he ever became on the subject of the origin and procession of the Holy Spirit. Probably he was shy of using it directly of the Spirit because of the continuing subconscious influence of the older doctrine, even after he had consciously begun to play it down; perhaps, even more likely, the Homoousion was, with his own audience, so intimately associated with the Son relation that to use it directly of the Spirit would have been to invite the "grandfather" argument in the absence of an amount of explanation that would have been prohibitive in the difficult circumstances in which the Letters were written.

Now, at last, we must turn to the Filioque. We have already, in passing, indicated what Athanasius's position on this question was. Beyond all question, the doctrine was of the Greek type, from (ον) the Father only. In fact, there is probably not a single instance in these Letters of Athanasius going so far as to admit of the essential Processio. Against Swete (186) who quotes as an example:

(III:5:633A) ΚΤΩΡ ΕΠΙ ΤΟ ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, ΧΑΤΤΑ, ΠΟΤΑ - see also the almost identical statement

(186) For Athanasius, see "On the History of the Doctrine of the Procession", 90-92. His conclusion is that "their language sometimes falls very little short of that of the Western Church", and "The Filioque is also substantially present in his words." See also, "The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church", pp.211-221, and pp.367-372, on the Filioque. The equivalence of the and the is specially maintained in connection with Epiphanius, H. D. P. 96-98 and H. S. A. C. 224-229.
in III:6:633B-C — the author feels that the \( \zeta \upsilon \alpha \) does not rigorously refer to the Procession in the later sense, but is simply a sign that the series argument is in use, and therefore does not add anything to the paradoxical relation between the series and parallel relations as used by Athanasius. Besides, and this is the really important point, to regard the perichoresis or empowerichoresis as implying a corresponding Filioquist symmetry of origin, the \( \zeta \upsilon \) as implying the \( \zeta \kappa \) in every way, as Swete does, really begs the question as between the Latin and Greek Processions, and in view of Athanasius's own uncertainties on this matter, it is fair to say this even though Athanasius himself appears to have argued in this way of the Son in the "Contra Arius". The very fact that Athanasius is so partial to the series argument as a whole, and yet unquestionably and expressly affirms the Greek Procession, is the very problem at issue, which has to be answered. The same applies to the other argument that might be adduced here. Throughout the anti-Arian writings in general, Athanasius, in particular in the principle of the Homoousion, intimately links the Son's identity of nature and operation, and not least the categorial identity, with the Father, and distinction from creatures, with the Son's origin from the Father. Therefore, it might well be said, Athanasius, in insisting that the Spirit has the same sort of unity with the Godhead and is the Spirit of the Son and brings the Son's grace to us, ought to have brought it equally into juxtaposition with a doctrine of the Spirit's ontological origin from the Father and Son alike, that is, with the Filioque. But this, once again, is the problem at issue, with the added complication here that Athanasius was plainly unwilling to think along these lines now that he had to deal with the Spirit as well.

We shall now discuss certain views on what Athanasius's position on the Filioque actually was, since the evidence is, by itself, not very
easy to interpret. The position that can be dismissed most easily is what might be called the traditional Roman Catholic view, as expounded by, say, Montfaucon. It admits the ambiguity in the Letters to Serapion, but relies on more definitely Filioquist statements in other works which are considered to be genuine, but which most Protestant scholarship considers, with good reason, to be extremely dubious, like the De Trinitate et Spiritu Sancto. At times, as in Montfaucon’s introduction to the last mentioned work, the argument almost amounts to this: Athanasius is the essentially orthodox theologian par excellence, in the De Trinitate et Spiritu Sancto we find the orthodox doctrine of the Filioque, therefore, this work is authentic. This argument needs no further comment. Secondly, there is the argument of Swete, and, much more fully, Shapland, that in spite of the ambiguity, Athanasius’s doctrine is as good as the Filioque. We have already considered the arguments peculiar to Swete. Shapland, in his introduction, (op.cit.pp.40-43) says, "... It is from the Spirit’s propriety to the Son that we apprehend His procession from the Father. Can we go on from this to assert that Athanasius teaches a doctrine of double procession, from the Son as well as from the Father, or, as the Eastern Fathers put it, from the Father through the Son? It must be confessed that Athanasius’s teaching on this point is far less clear and conclusive than Montfaucon supposed it to be. It is made plain that the Spirit proceeds from the Father. ἐκ τοῦ Ἐπισκόπου ὑψίστου had already acquired a technical meaning in this connection. His relation to the Son is set forth by saying that He is sent or given from Him. The preposition Προς is generally preferred here. Athanasius also says, from John 16:14, that the Spirit receives ἐκ του Θεοῦ. A close examination of the passages in which these or analogous expressions occur suggests that, in using them, he thinks primarily, if not exclusively, in terms of the Spirit’s mission in the world. Indeed the interpretation given to
John 20:22 in III:1, that, by breathing on the disciples, Christ gave them the Spirit 'out of Himself', might lead us to conclude that, even in his own thinking, he has not clearly distinguished procession and mission. On the other side, in I:15, when he speaks clearly and unequivocally of the Spirit's being, he confines himself to the statement that the Spirit is 'the Son's'. This is the more significant in that it follows a direct assertion of the Spirit's procession from the Father." Shapland then accounts for this hesitation on the argument that Athanasius had already the example of the heretics Marcellus of Ancyra, who used a doctrine of the double procession to show that, as the origin of the Spirit is one, the Pater Filioque, so to speak, must be hypostatically one, and Eusebius of Caesarea, who adopts against this the petrified Origenist argument that the origin of the Spirit in the Son simply meant that It was a \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \gamma \tau \nu \) of the Son, as in John 1:3. Then, after saying that the Athanasian doctrine of the Perichoresis (which is not so well developed as Shapland and Newman consider it to be) in a sense short-circuited these arguments, he concludes: "Yet if we regard what is implicit, rather than what is explicit, in these letters, we are justified in claiming that the procession of the Spirit through the Son is a necessary corollary to the argument. If, as he argues in C.Ar.III:3-6, the fact that the Son is in the Father involves that the Son is from the Father, must it not be equally true that the Spirit, being in the Son, is from the Son? If it is lawful to argue from unity of operation to unity of essence, must we not acknowledge that He from Whom the Spirit receives the things of the Father no less bestows upon Him the divine life of which the Father is the unique source? Must not the temporal mission rest upon an eternal relationship? By reaffirming the propriety of the Spirit to the Son, Athanasius not only secured, at a decisive hour, the Church's faith in the one Godhead; he fixed the line upon which its Pneumatic doctrine was to develop." These
extracts are excellent where they actually summarise Athanasian doctrine, but the concluding extract, as we have said, either begs the question or evades the issue, which is why Athanasius did in fact deny the Filioque when he ought to have affirmed it.

The next interpretation that we must consider is that of McIn-tyre, in the paper that we have cited throughout this section. This author, unlike most of his fellows, realistically accepts the evidence that is available, and in addition he is prepared, while still remaining within the general framework of Western theology, to understand the issue from the Eastern side, thus avoiding the all but universal mistake of Western theologians of reading Athanasius as if he were an orthodox Westerner; after all, his language was Greek. After pointing out the absence of the Filioque in Athanasius and his successors - and this includes substantially the absence even of the procession through the Son - he puts forward the following suggestions as possible explanations. Firstly, owing to polemical exigencies and the relative lack of development of the doctrine, the Greek Fathers had to be content with the bare minimum on the opera ad intra Trinitatis; "The affirmation of the Filioque... would introduce a subtlety into their thought concerning intra-Trinitarian relationships which is alien to it." Second, the epistemic principles of the Greek Fathers were backward, from the Spirit through the Son back to the Father, whereas the Filioque is best suited to a forward direction of thought. Also, if it be stated that the Filioque is a corollary of the principle of the series relation, as we have called it, "procession" cannot be automatically deduced from the relation of "conjunction". Thirdly, there are the additional explanations that there is a lack of Biblical evidence for the Filioque, and the difficulties that Shapland mentioned concerning the heretical use of the idea that the Spirit has its origin in the Son (analogous difficulties also faced Basil of Caesarea).

(187) "The Holy Spirit in Greek Patristic Thought" pp. 371-5.
(188) loc. cit. p. 372.
Finally, even if the Filioque principle appears to apply epistemically, revelationally, and operationally, there is not automatically a one-to-one correlation between these and the actual Being of the Godhead; this is the very issue that has to be accounted for in the theology of Athanasius. McIntyre concludes this paragraph by stating that the forms of the series argument that are used by the Greek Fathers, as well as the mere fact of the eternity of the Trinity, expressed all that the Greek Fathers needed to express; "The Filioque may be a tidier way of expressing these facts, but it is hard to agree that it expresses any facts other than these." (189)

This is in many ways the soundest of all the interpretations that we have treated or shall treat. The only difficulty of the author of this thesis is his disagreement with the last sentence concerning the theological necessity of the Filioque, of which more later. Again, once the theological necessity is accepted, this imposes a rather different treatment of the reasons for not adopting it; we must look for the factors which blinded Athanasius to theological truth. The possibility must be faced that there is at least a real inconsistency in Athanasius, especially, that grew and grew until it finally shrieked in the definitive Filioque controversy in the eleventh century. And this finally brings us to the last interpretation of the Athanasian position, the interpretation according to the mature Eastern Orthodox theology, whose definitive presentation in Western languages we take to be the paper of V. Rodzianko, at the 1955 Patristic Conference, entitled, "Filioque and Patristic Thought". This paper, as it turns out, refers almost entirely to these Letters, which modern Eastern Orthodoxy takes as the fundamental presentation of the doctrine. By an interesting coincidence, this paper, and the way of thought that it represents, actually throws a light on Athanasius's own

(189) The final sentence of the article.
Theology and its causes, making many things clear that are uncertain even in Athanasius's own text. (The paper is published in Studia Patristica, Vol. II, being Texte und Untersuchungen LXIV, Berlin, 1957; the pagination of this publication, 295-308, will be cited if necessary; the language of the paper as published is English).

The argument of Rodzianko is surprisingly simple. In the first place he rightly recognizes, of course, that Athanasius, when and insofar as he deliberately addressed himself to the problem, followed the Greek Procession. In his interpretation, he takes ἐκ πορείας ἐπὶ ἀναίρεσιν to be the definitive expression of Athanasius for the relation of Spirit to the other Persons. His essential case is based on the fact that ἐκ πορείας ἐπὶ ἀναίρεσις as a deponent verb, expresses a free action, in contrast to the which, as applied to the Son in relation to the Father, is undoubtedly passive. According to Rodzianko, the introduction of the Filioque would compromise the active freedom of the Spirit's nature - this is the best construction that the author can put on Rodzianko's language. "St. Athanasius was the first to deal with the problem: The Spirit is free to make Himself to go out from the Father - as a gift, and not as a son from His bosom - because He is shining forth from the Father's Word who is the only-begotten Son and of one substance with the Father. To use his own words: ἐκ προφητείας ἐκ πορείαις ἐπηρεάστηκα, ἐπὶ ἀναίρεσις ἐπετύγχανα. τῷ ἀνθέον τῷ πατριτικῷ ὑπεράνακτο τῆς ἐν οὐσίας ἀληθευστέος ἐκλεῖστε. (p. 299). The confusion with procession from or through the Son is said to have arisen by the translation of the ἐκ πορείας into Latin by procedit &c., which verb has a passive connotation which is not in the original, and besides also translates other verbs used by the Greeks for the relation of Spirit and Son. Continuing (p. 301): "But those verbs do not describe, as proper terms, the hypostatic relations of the Spirit to the Father.
They are not found, neither in the Scriptures nor in the Creeds.

The Spirit's hypostatic action is one, perfectly simple and not a composition of two. If you insert the -que between the εκπνεοντος from the Father and the εκλαμψαντος from the Son, you either double the Spirit Himself, or introduce the Homoiousian conception of the Semiarians and the Macedonians, or else mix up the Father and the Son in a semi-Sabellian way as one person. His εκπνεοντος from the Father and His εκλαμψαντος from the Son are not parallel, and not added to each other. This is why Athanasius does not link them by but by εκπνεοντος. There is, on the other hand, a difference between the εκπνεοντος and the εκλαμψαντος, just that difference which distinguishes the Father and the Son as Persons. Therefore you cannot on the ground of unity of essence, mix them up into the unica spiratione processio, as well as separate them saying that the εκπνεοντος is "hypostatic" and the εκλαμψαντος is of "one substance" or of a "temporal mission" only.

The patristic idea is quite clear: The Spirit shines forth from the Word because the Word is spoken by the Father; the Spirit makes Himself to go out from the Father because the Father utters the Word, in either case the Father is the only one of the Godhead, the only One Who does the spiration (προβαλεται), which is supralogically implied in the γεννησεται of the Son. That "supralogic" is the mystery of the Trinity itself." The remainder of the paper is taken up with the later history of the development of this basic conception, with special emphasis on the linguistic confusions which resulted from translation into Latin and also the increasing rigor mortis of the later Scholastic Greek itself, and in conclusion there is a plea for the adoption of the formula "from the Father, through the Son" and "proceeding from the
Father, shining from the Son," by the Western Church as the definitive formula of concord and reunion.

Now, it is true that, in so far as the verb \( \eta \kappa \iota \tau \rho \rho \varepsilon \delta \varsigma \varsigma \) is used, it does, as an intransitive verb, put the Spirit on the active side of relationship, in contrast with the corresponding term for the Son, which definitely puts the Son on the passive side of a transitive relation. On the other hand, Rodzianko, as we have seen above, does not consider the question closely enough whether even this verb can be held to be Athanasius's definitive expression, and on this matter we have already indicated grave doubts; it would be better to say that the final tendency in Athanasius was to ignore the Procession altogether. Neither does Rodzianko consider the extent to which the verb actually has a passive connotation. There is very little mention of this verb in Sophocles' Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods. Liddell and Scott do not distinguish it grammatically from the root verb \( \eta \iota \tau \rho \rho \varepsilon \delta \varsigma \varsigma \) and say that it was used in all three possible ways, as a pure passive deponent, which was the original classical way and also the natural derivation, mixed, that is, future middle and aorist passive, and middle. In fact, the mixed use is the normal one in the New Testament. The aorist of \( \eta \kappa \iota \tau \rho \rho \varepsilon \delta \varsigma \varsigma \) is invariably passive - although compared with other aorists there appears to be an unwillingness to use it - and the future is used only in four cases, Acts 13:6 & 25:12, I Cor.16:4, James 4:13, all of which are middle. There is no aorist of the compound \( \varepsilon \kappa \iota \tau \rho \rho \varepsilon \delta \varsigma \varsigma \) and only one future, John 5:29, which is middle, and the other compounds show nothing relevant. Thus, the fact that the deponent verb was partly passive in form would certainly suggest the passive relation to any Greek speaker, even as the last line of the celebrated rimed couplet based upon the only deponent verb in the English language

(190) "To be born." The verb is active in French - naitre.
runs, "Because he had no say in it, he had no say at all!" Quite apart from this, there is the actual use of the word ἐπεξερήσεις τοῦ Πατρὸς by Athanasius in the Expositio Fidei, if it be his, as a description of the Holy Spirit; ἐπεξερήσεις is a passive verbal noun if ever there was one. And again, there is the title ὑπερήψεως itself, which is the passive verbal noun from ὑπερήψω of ὑπερήψω I blow (incidentally, spiration is never used by Athanasius in these letters). Athanasius knew perfectly well that neuter nouns in ἐπεξερήσεις were passive; after all, he had spent a lifetime dealing with ὑπερήψω, ὑπερήψω, and ὑπερήψω in a way which would keep their passive nature well in his consciousness. But this merely increases the piquancy of the paradox, that Athanasius should, in spite of the linguistic evidence in favour of applying a passive relation to the Spirit, avoid the passive relation as much as he did; it is enough that he avoided spiration, whatever interpretation he applied to the ἐπεξερήσεις — perhaps he found that too passive! There are at least two difficulties in the detail of Rodzianko's argument, matters which he takes too much for granted, this time from the Eastern Orthodox side; there is at least a very strong prima facie case that Rodzianko's extreme emphasis on the active status and liberty of the Spirit in Its procession leaves him vulnerable to the arguments of Athanasius himself in Contra Arianos III:58-67, against the Arian contention that the Son came to be at the will of the Father. After all, Athanasius argued in the most general way, that the whole relation between Father and Son was related to the nature of God, as distinct from will, even the will of the Father; nature, for Athanasius, in this sense absolutely transcended both will and necessity, and in our modern terminology it likewise transcends even freedom and activity. (191)

(191) See above, pp. 1029-49.
On this basis, the onus is on Rodzianko to substantiate that Athanasius would not have made this reply to his argument; that he would not have said that the procession of the Spirit was an act of nature, transcending the freedom of even the Father, let alone the Spirit. In fact, Rodzianko himself is aware of the danger here, as is shown by his references early in his paper to those earlier Fathers who interpreted the contrast between the active procession of the Spirit and the passive generation of the Son as implying a contrast between the Spirit merely proceeding from the presence or face of the Father and the Son generated from the bosom of the Father. Secondly, the idea that the Filioque automatically doubles the Procession as an act, and therefore either doubles the hypostasis of the Spirit or conflates those of Father and Son, may be plausible, besides being the same difficulty that Athanasius presumably had between Marcellus of Ancyra and Eusebius of Caesarea, but it is not true necessarily, and in fact not true for the principle Filioquist theology of the Trinity, that of Augustine. For the lastmentioned theologian, the mutual love of Father and Son, which is the Spirit, which proceeds from Both and is received by Both, is and must be nevertheless a single and indivisible act, as it not only unites Father and Son but is the expression of their absolute unity and, what is even more important, co-primacy. There is a sense in which love even within human families is one and indivisible, and in the case of God it is indeed part of the "supra-logic of the Trinity" that this is so without qualification. If the attempt is made to divide the relation of the Spirit to Son from that of Spirit to Father according to the hypostatic distinction of Father and Son - which is in fact what Rodzianko - and Athanasius? - do with their talk of the from the Son - the result would indeed be a division of the Spirit, so that one half would be the Spirit of love duly modified by imperium and the other half the Spirit of love duly modified by that proverbial Prussian quality
that can be only described by the German word-group centring on the word Untertan. Perhaps Augustine, with his Roman training, was poignantly aware of this danger! But these criticisms, serious as they are, are trifles compared with our final criticism of the whole atmosphere of Rodzianko's paper, which is identical with the basic Protestant criticism of the whole Eastern Orthodox position (and 'Catholic' position generally).

Athanasius must not be treated either as the fountainhead and criterion of orthodoxy or the outstanding representative of the tradition which of itself embodies orthodoxy. Such honours (actually the first) belong to Jesus Christ alone. Athanasius must be heard with the most extreme respect, but it is only as a witness to Christ that he may be heard. When we have learned all from his witness, we still have to consider the possibility that he might be mistaken, and that we are called to learn in Christ not only from his truth but from his error. No dogmatics is complete without a principle of self-criticism; no historical theology is complete without criticism.

Thus, the principal argument of Rodzianko appears to be that the adoption of the Filioque would be an infringement of the freedom and honour of the Spirit, and this appears to be the general attitude of Eastern Orthodoxy. When we translate this in terms of fourth century theology, we can see that the argument lies behind this, that we cannot presume a passive relation of the Spirit to the Godhead without introducing a degree of subordination which would annul the Godhead of the Spirit. This was in fact the principle of Origen, with which, as we have seen, Athanasius was never confronted in such a way as to force him to repudiate it with his customary vigour and assurance. It is in this sense that the statement of Barth is completely true that, "possibly an unsubdued remnant of Origenist subordinationism is to be claimed among others as the source of the
error in the Eastern conception." (192) Origen propounded the argument but accepted the opposite conclusion from the Eastern Orthodox, and it is because the latter accepted Origen's argument or understood major, even though they rejected his conclusion, that they had to deny the Spirit a genuine origin in the Son. The theology of Origen was based on the eternal generation of the Son from the Father. But, as far as further progress was concerned, the governing rule was a rigorous interpretation of John 1:3; therefore, the Spirit, not being either Father or Son, could only be one of the \[\eta \nu \nu \tau \rho \nu \tau \rho\] even as everything else came to be through the Logos. That is, the only way in which anything could be passive in relation to the Second Person was through the relation of \[\chi \epsilon \nu \varphi \sigma \tau \iota \nu\] which in the clearer light of the fourth century meant being a creature. This view was standard among all the followers and successors of Origen, notably in Athanasius's own time Eusebius of Caesarea. The other thing to point out is that Athanasius had already evolved the full technical apparatus for answering this argument, in his treatment of the use of the \[\chi \epsilon \nu \varphi \sigma \tau \iota \nu\] by the Arians proper (see De Decr. 28-31, repeated with little modification in C. Ar. I: 30-34, repeated again in its essence in De Synodis 46-47). The principle of course is to dissociate creaturely subordination and temporal priority from origination and logical priority, so that the Father is the fons et origo Trinitatis even though all three Persons are equally and co-eternally God. This principle would have worked just as well with the Spirit in relation to the Son as with the Son in relation to the Father; in fact, it is still necessary even to make intelligible the procession from the Father. The reason why Athanasius did not use it is patently that the Tropici, as we have seen, did not use the word \[\chi \epsilon \nu \varphi \sigma \tau \iota \nu\] in their argument. It would have only been

necessary for Athanasius to have seen this word in his opponents' argument, as Basil did, to have been reminded of his former principle. As it was, Athanasius never had to conquer the heretical doctrine of the Spirit in its Origenist form, and therefore Eastern theology ever since has had the spectre of the exclusive choice between the Greek Procession and Origen.

An analysis of the fully-developed Trinitarian theology of Athanasius yields, or suggests, another reason. As we have already seen, Athanasius has, soundly enough, extended his original Scriptural metaphors of Light-source and Radiance, and Fountain-River, as descriptive of the relation of Father and Son respectively, to Light-source, Radiance, Light-as-it-reaches us, and Fountain, River and Water, the third terms in each case denoting the Holy Spirit. We have already seen how this almost imperatively demands the Greek Procession and makes the Filioque impossible. At this stage we can go further and see if there is anything deeper behind this. Now, this feature of the Letters to Serapion is the culmination of Athanasius's general preference for the physical and geological analogies for the Godhead over the more personalist ones of, say, Augustine. There is a strong suggestion, in terms of the Augustinian doctrine of the Spirit as the mutual love of Father and Son, that the Filioque properly belongs to the personalist (and we believe the true) conception of the Godhead, while if the Godhead is conceived physically, as in Athanasius's favourite analogies, there is no point in the Filioque; in fact, as we can see from, say, Rodzianko, the converse also applies, so that in fact one of the best analogies for Rodzianko's actual view is (with the necessary analogical corrections concerning splitting of essences, etc., which Athanasius had to apply, passim) - the emission of $\gamma$-rays,

(193) See Shapland's Note 4 on Ep.I ad Serap.: ch.15, and see above, pp. 117-14
that is, pure radiant energy of exceedingly high frequency along with the emission of $\gamma$ - particles, or even bigger atoms or ions, by radio-active elements, the conjunction of the emissions being absolutely constant, necessary, and essential. In part, this reflects the fundamental difference between Greece and Rome. Scholars are now at last coming to recognise that, for all its concentration on militarism, imperialism, discipline and organisation, Rome was more interested in personal relations in the modern sense than Greece, and that Roman culture and tradition was personalist in the sense that what survived as the characteristic Greek culture was physicist or abstract philosophical. To take only the clearest manifestation of this, the characteristic subject of Greek education was metaphysics, the characteristic subject of Roman education was - rhetoric, as in the case of, inter alios, Augustine himself. There is another side to the same matter too, although it is not clear to the author what the connection is between this and the point just made. The great heresy in the East was Arianism, and we have already seen, in following through the theology of Athanasius, that, at first sight anyway, the physical analogy was the best adapted to counteract the heresy. Now, in the West, the corresponding great heresy, in fact the endemic heresy of the West for centuries, was Sabellianism in some form, the doctrine of the lonely god par excellence. Would it be too much to say that to refute Sabellianism it was necessary to emphasise the personalist character of the Trinity, even more than the Cappadocians were supposed to do? On the basis of what we have seen in Augustine, this might well be the case.

(194) It would be as well here to look at another prominent Eastern Orthodox writer, Vladimir Lossky. We are citing from various places in his book, "The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Orthodox Church, (E.T.)" and his article, "The Procession of the Holy Spirit in the Orthodox Triadology", published in the "Eastern Churches Quarterly" (a R.C. publication), Vol.7, No.2 (1948)(Supplementary Issue), being Proceedings of the Eastern Churches
When we examine the matter beyond the actual text, we can see

Quarterly Conference at Blackfriars, 3rd-5th Oct., 1947 (pp. 31-53). (This has been published in French in booklet form, the French version being either original or the one which the author wished to be definitive, as it was his principal Western language; it was also the original language of the "Mystical Theology...". Lossky approaches the matter in a more dogmatic way. There appear to be three main arguments (see Index to the former work under heading "Holy Spirit, Procession of..."); the argument that the West mistakenly emphasises the unity of the Nature rather than the Triplicity of the Persons, that the Filioque says too much about what should be a mystery, and that it is an interference with human freedom. The author agrees that the first argument (see references, virtually passim), corresponds to a real truth about a lot of Western theology, but cannot see how it applies to, for instance, Augustine himself: where Augustine treats the Spirit as impersonal, he is certainly doing no more than doing justice to the sense in which the Spirit is impersonal and the Father and Son personal, which, according to Lossky, is admitted by the whole of both Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theology (P.H.S., p. 34; M.Th. 156-73 and 192-5). A typical presentation of the second argument is on P.H.S. p. 35: "All that we know of the Holy Spirit refers to His Economy; all that we do not know makes us venerate His Person...".

Boiled down to its basic essentials, this argument is really that not only is it possible for God to be in Himself other than what He is in His revelation, but that this state of affairs must be presumed on principle; that is, the undoubted fact that the Spirit is sent from the Son all but suggests that He does not proceed from the Son. At its best, the author considers this sort of thing a gross abuse of the apophatic principle. Lossky has a point against the Roman Catholic doctrine that the Persons are "per modum intellectus" and "per modum voluntatis" (P.H.S. p. 44); this is a clear case of theology saying far too much and almost certainly getting it wrong, but the Filioque is not comparable. His attack (P.H.S. ap. fin.) on "relations of opposition" as the basis of Trinitarianism is more interesting. It is not altogether easy to see what is meant, but it appears to be one or both of the following: that the Filioque involves too tight an integration of the Trinity, in contrast with a looser parallel arrangement, and it duplicates too closely what we see subjectively in revelation as interpreted by us leading by a higher synthesis either to Sabellianism or Hegelianism. All that we can say is that these conclusions simply do not follow. An example of the third criticism is in M.Th.... pp. 169-70: "The personal coming of the Holy Spirit - 'sovereignly free', to use an expression from a hymn for Pentecost - could not be conceived as a plenitude, as an infinite treasure suddenly disclosed within each person, did not the Eastern Church acknowledge the independence (as to His eternal origin) of the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit in relation to the Son.... If the Holy Spirit, as a Divine Person, were considered as dependent upon the Son, He would appear, even in His personal advent - as a bond which connects us to the Son. The mystical life would then unfold as a way towards the union of the soul with Christ through the medium of the Holy Spirit. That raises again the place of the human persons in this union: either they would be annihilated in being united to the Person of Christ, or else the Person of Christ would be imposed upon them from without. In the latter case grace would be conceived as eternal to freedom, instead of its being its inward flowering. But it is in this freedom that we acknowledge the Deity of the Son, made manifest to our understanding through the Holy Spirit dwelling in us." The only possible reply to this is - Tu dixisti! Plenitude? - Col. 1:17! Slavery and dehumanisation? Rom. 8:29, Eph. 4:13!! For that matter, this position, which appears to be the general Eastern Orthodox position, is not even Athanasian; see De Inc. 14, and above, pp. 134-6.
a third possible reason for Athanasius's adoption of the procession from the Father only, that is, the nature of the analogy that he would have felt, rather than specified, between Son and Spirit. We have already discussed this fully. In short, we have concluded that the Spirit had for the theology of about 356, epistemically and operationally, the same relation to the Father and Son together that the Logos, interpreted Hellenistically, had in relation to the Father before the Arian controversy. That is, both were the Person with whom the individual man or creature was in the closest relationship, and, correspondingly, both were correlated with creaturely existence, indeed to an excessive degree, in the way that the other Persons were not. An even more striking way of putting this is the common, and correct, statement that for the third century the Logos had taken over the functions of the Spirit. Therefore, as we have said, Athanasius would certainly have felt the analogy, and so, as the Logos proceeds from the Father — and we have to remember too that even the relation of generation was for Athanasius almost identical with procession — so should the Spirit proceed from the Father. In fact, we can go further and say that this analogy would have masked any incompatibility that Athanasius would have felt between his vigorous use of series arguments and his adoption of the later Greek Procession. In conclusion, one frequently has the feeling in the Letters that the phrase \( \varepsilon k \pi \tau o \zeta \tau \iota \phi' \mu' \) is in effect synonymous with "Divine" in the strict sense. This would be another manifestation of the "unsubdued Origenist subordinationism" of which Barth speaks, almost as if Athanasius, whom we must expect to be to some extent the child of his preceding generation, was not yet as unreservedly sure of the absolute Deity of the Son as his successors, thanks almost entirely among earthly theologians to his own struggles, became.

An examination of the question from the theological point of
view shows that the Filioque is necessary, and is a matter-on which a
definite decision must be made. We have already discussed the profound
difference that we have observed historically and empirically as the re-
sult of the adoption of the principle, and it only remains to add that
Church History itself subsequent to Athanasius proves that there was a
real incompatibility and contradiction within the type of theology that
he and his successors followed. The danger is, as Barth says, that the
unity of the Trinity is compromised by the denial of the Filioque, and
even a cursory glance at theology and Church proclamations shows that there
is a real danger of a division of Christianity into two religions, a reli-
gion of the Son and a religion of the Spirit, which are only accidentally
compatible and which are occasionally mutually irrelevant or even incom-
patible. This is the question that must be legitimately put to all Pente-
costalists and pneumatic mystics - and which must, unfortunately, be
answered by traditions such as the Reformed, from the opposite point of
view. Even certain interpretations of the Acts of the Apostles countenance
this division into a Religion of the Son and a Religion of the Spirit -
a grave exegetical perversion of the plain meaning of the Book. The same
considerations apply to the other possible error - which is if anything
worse than the former - that the work of Christ was primarily to release
the Spirit in the sense of removing all impediments to our living the
exalted "spiritual" life in the least definite sense of the phrase. Un-
fortunately, this is the only logical deduction from the position that
modern Eastern Orthodoxy proposes as the irenic (?) formula, that the Spir-
it proceeds from the Father through the Son. The mystical tendencies of
Eastern orthodoxy, as well as the animadversions against Westerners, as in,
say, Vladimir Lossky; for a spirituality which excessively (sic!) concen-

trates on the incarnate humanity of Christ, show the danger only too well. The Western equivalent is the man who entertains the delusion that the work of Christ gives him the right, simpliciter, to practise natural theology in the sense in which this activity reaches its apogee in Hegel, without regard to whether it keeps to the limits of Christ or not. No, it is Jesus Christ Who is The Way, The Truth, and The Life, and the Spirit does not testify of Itself, but of Christ. These matters are dangerous enough already; they become superlatively so if it is remembered that the Spirit, by Its very nature, conceals Its Personality under the personality of the Christian; this appears to be admitted even by the Eastern Orthodox Church, that is, insofar as the name of the Third Person is Spirit and not Father or Son, the Spirit is not openly a Hypostasis or Person in one of the senses in which the Father and Son are personal. Such theologians as Loesky admit this, and recognise the deduction that the Spirit cannot be the hypostatic reality of the Church, going so far as to give this honour to Mary!(197) From the prevalence of Mariology among the Russian Orthodox, as distinct perhaps from the Greek Orthodox, this reasoning appears to be general in the former quarter. On the basis of this sort of theology, the consequences of a denial of the Filioque would appear to be disastrous; only the Filioque can genuinely preserve the supremacy of Christ even to the minimum extent needed to justify the name of the Christian faith.

Against this background, we must now make our final analysis of the problem of the Filioque, and we shall do so under four heads, which are also the four heads under which the sceptical arguments fall; we shall do so with special reference to the doctrine of Athanasius, so as

(196) "Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church" pp.64-5.
(197) "Mystical Theology........" pp.193 ff.
to determine how the arguments on both sides apply to him. In the first
place, we must observe that, now that we have isolated certain factors
which would have distorted Athanasius's theology away from the Filioque,
there is now a relative presumption in favour of the positive arguments
for this doctrine, but it would be unfair to be guided too much by it.
The four arguments in question are: the relation between God in His Self-
revelation and God as He is in Himself; the relation between the identity
of nature of the Persons with their origin in each other; the relation
of the latter to the Perichoresis, the $\frac{2}{3}$ to the $\frac{2}{3}$; the problem
of Scriptural exegesis.

To take the first issue, the general presumption must always be
that a thing is as it appears. An important clarification must be made
here. It might be held that the sun is, according to appearance, a rela-
tively small body a few miles from the earth, whereas its diameter is
864,000 miles and its distance 93 million miles. But there is a twofold
answer to this; in the first place, all the valid evidence against the
former "appearance" must itself be appearance, and secondly, even before
the point at which we can speak of a person (as distinct from, say, the
sensory endings of the optic nerve) sensing a thing or detecting an appear-
ance, the central nervous system, with its billions of cells and intercell-
ular linkages, must perform an enormous job of interpretation that is
identical in kind to the interpretations of an electronic brain. Thus,
if we see a car approaching quickly in the distance, we see, in any normal
sense, the car, and not patterns of light occupying certain dihedral
angles of the visual field. The condition for our really seeing the car
as a moving body is not only the lastnamed, but the interpretative, almost
the trigonometrical, activity of the brain, not to mention the stereos-
scopic comparison of two slightly different pictures, one from each eye.
But when this is said, the fact remains that it is really the Sun that we see, and not its "appearance". Of course, a good deal of analogical correction will have to be made when this principle is applied to our knowledge of God, but the principal difference makes the picture more and not less applicable to God. We can conceive a thing that operates in one way, but has its essential existence in another way. But if we try to apply this to God, what evidence can we possibly have that God exists in another way? We can observe other things when they are, as we say, at rest, as distinct from interacting with us in the usual way. But can we observe (in the sense in which Athanasius himself uses the word ἐξωρίζει) God, except insofar as God makes Himself known to us in His work? The very suggestion is blasphemous. And the situation is even more serious than this. The very dualism between appearance, or for that matter behaviour, and reality is unreal, or more accurately, not absolute. It is only relative to a particular aspect of a thing's being, behaviour, or appearance, that happens to claim our interest at the moment. Thus there are only two possible interpretations of the traditional contrast between appearance and reality, both of which produce worse blasphemy than ever when applied to God. It may mean that the thing concerned has certain features when it does not interact with other objects in the way in which we are interested at the moment, but is modified in some way when the interaction takes place. This is the very thing that, so to speak by definition, and what is more important, by God's own revelation of Himself, cannot happen to Him. Or it may mean that "appearance" is the feature of the thing in which we have a primary interest, and "reality" is the feature or features of the thing that are, relatively, remote from this interest. But to Christians, our "interest" in God is the whole of His self-revelation and part of this self-revelation is precisely the fact that He is holding nothing back, save where, as in Mk.13:32, things are concealed for our own
good, according to Athanasius's own exegesis. Therefore, there cannot be any aspect of God which is in any way remote from His own self-revelation to us. Furthermore, God's own revelation is a revelation of grace, and to speculate on any other side of God is in effect a vote of no-confidence in Him. Every word, in both Testaments, about God's faithfulness, even God's Name, the sacred Tetragrammaton, which almost certainly refers to His manifestation and not His abstract being, cries out against this.

There is only one possible argument that can be used against this, that is, that the Conception of Jesus of Nazareth through the Spirit would demand a corresponding doctrine of the Double Generation of the Son, from Father and Spirit. Here, it is my melancholy duty to refer to the quarrel between Barth and G.S. Hendry, even though Hendry's treatment of the issue is so atrocious that silence would be much more agreeable. Unfortunately, Hendry's book on the Spirit is an important contribution to the theology of the Third Person, and he has given the classical modern expression to this dilemma. The trouble is that he did so, and chided Barth for impaling himself on its horns in his "Dogmatics"; in lectures that were prepared and delivered 21 years after this very Kirchliche Dogmatik VolI, Pt.1 had appeared in German, and 17 years after it had appeared in English, in the course of which Barth had noticed the apparent dilemma, and had made a formidable and, according to the author, successful - attempt to resolve it, a section that appears to have escaped Hendry's attention altogether! Barth's solution is simply to say that Jesus Christ is not only God but also Man, and therefore the Spirit's role in the conception of Jesus of Nazareth was simply a special case - in fact, the primary case - of the Spirit's economic work of uniting Man to God.

If we believe, as Barth undoubtedly did, that the principle of the unity of nature of God in His Being and God in His Revelation cannot be interpreted in such a way as to imply Christological Hegelianism or Hegelianism in general - the doctrine of the absolute identity of human and divine natures -, this conclusion follows at once. Barth may not always be quite clear on how the Chalcedonian Christology follows from his doctrine of the absolute primacy of the Incarnate Christ for revelation, but once it is accepted no criticism is possible of Barth's solution to the problem of the "Double Generation of the Son." This removes the one major stumbling-block to the acceptance of the principle that God is in Himself what He is in His Revelation, and therefore, as no one has ever doubted - in theory - that the work of the Spirit proceeds from the work of the Son, Scriptural evidence being overwhelming, the Filioque follows.

Furthermore, if there has ever been a theologian who had to accept this argument, it was, on his own showing, Athanasius himself. The very thing that Athanasius had spent his entire mature life in showing was that a being such as the Logos or Spirit, in Whom God comes to us, must be either wholly God, or not God at all. Even the Arians and the Tropici accepted this disjunction - only they came down on the side of creature. Again, from the very outset of his theology, Athanasius joyfully accepted that God's work for us was a δια θεοτόκος, and he stuck to this throughout his life. How can God impart to us, even by participation, His own life by anything that is not God? Calvin may be criticised for treating of the Third Article under the title of "The Mode of Obtaining the Grace of Christ. The Benefits It Confers, and the Effects Resulting from It." (199) But this is exactly the way in which the Third Person came up to claim the attention of Athanasius, after generations of theological

(199) The title of Book III of the "Institutes".
slumber on this point, as we have already seen. Finally, Athanasius, again as we have just demonstrated, was well aware that epistemically and operationally the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and would have certainly noticed some difficulty in obtaining any other evidence about the Spirit, in spite of his preference for direct propositional scriptural evidence about the Son. In this connection, the only reason for Athanasius's not being able to see this would have been that he was still too ready, whatever his meaning of the Homoousion - to see "the Divine Nature", of which we are to participate, too much in terms of quality. He had not lived with the Trinity long enough to see, as a theological law without any reservation and of universal application, that God would not be God unless He were Father, Son, and Holy Spirit - even though He goes a very long way to laying the foundations for this. Perhaps the later Cappadocians saw this. Augustine, with his more personalist theology, certainly did; perhaps the parenthesis is the clue to the issue. Athanasius could perhaps remain content with the idea that Godhead belongs to each Person; but if we see that not only the Divine Attributes but the intra-Trinitarian relations are what makes God God, we must accept the principle that God is as He reveals Himself, not only as regards attributes, but as regards intra-Trinitarian relations, if what He imparts to us is to be God Himself. Therefore, the Filioque must be accepted, not least on the very presuppositions of Athanasius himself.

The second argument is that concerning the close relation between absolute resemblance between Persons of the Trinity and the origin of one from the other, which is such a feature of the characteristic

(200) See above, pp. 654-6, 1079-1100 and references
(201) See above, pp. 671-3.
Athanasian interpretation of the Homoousion. On the other hand, it might be objected that Athanasius's characteristic argument concerning the Son is in the reverse direction, that is, from the admitted origin of the Son in the Father to the absolute resemblance of the Son to the Father. But the answer could be made to this, that owing to the singularity and uniqueness of God, arguments about God can often be directly converted in the way in which direct conversion of an A proposition is invalid.

Also, we may add a couple of observations concerning Athanasius himself. Firstly, it is possible to interpret what appears to be the change of emphasis in his doctrine to the Homoousion away from the quasi-genetics of the matter to generic likeness, which we have seen in these Letters, as being simply the use of this argument in the direction that we have postulated. Again, it must be remembered that the final result of Athanasius's non-acceptance of the Filioque was not the Greek Εν τω Θεώ, but a disinclination to speak of the Procession at all, almost as if Athanasius subconsciously felt that to speak of the Procession would ultimately commit himself to the Filioque. (203) Still, it might be argued that the absolute resemblance of the Spirit to the Son would be sufficiently safeguarded by the absolute resemblance of Each to the Father, but for the theological truth that the Spirit absolutely resembles the Son, not only as a Person of the Trinity, but specifically as Son. There is any amount of evidence, at least circumstantial, that Athanasius instinctively considered the Spirit in this way; actually, every instance in which he used the series argument. Thus, we can say that if Athanasius had stuck to the procession of the Spirit he ought to have explicitly taught the Filioque, and this argument, though not so strong as the first, is in its favour.

(202) See above, pp. 629-40.
(203) See above, pp. 1228-30.
Still less certain is the third argument in our list, the argument from the $\frac{2}{3}V$ to the $\frac{2}{3}K$, from the Perichoresis to the Filioque. This is because the Perichoresis applies symmetrically to all Persons, while it is obviously impossible to say that the mutual origins of the Persons are symmetrical, as that would affirm that the Father had his origin in the Son and the Spirit. Yet, with the necessary but still arbitrary qualification that the principle cannot be interpreted in such a way as to compromise the Father's status as the Fons et Origo Trinitatis, the weight is still on the side of accepting the argument as being in favour of the Filioque, and it also applies in the case of the Athanasian writings, since he not only emphasised that the Son was in the Father and vice versa, but extended this symmetrically to the Spirit as well.

The fourth possible argument, the exegetical argument, is more difficult, but the point is that the difficulty here is one that is shared by the whole Doctrine of the Trinity, that is, what is the nature of its Scriptural (or other?) basis? In the main, it is something which is not reducible to proof texts, although it would be impossible to discuss the matter now. What can be said is that the text that can be held to be a direct argument in favour of the Greek Procession, John 15:26:

$\Gamma \omega \nu \alpha \omega \mu \eta \gamma \eta \theta \epsilon \delta \sigma \sigma$, $\delta \pi \alpha \omega \lambda \tau \rho \tau \sigma$, $\epsilon \kappa \theta \iota \tau \rho \rho \o\sigma$, $\iota \tau \tau \theta \epsilon \iota \eta \iota \iota \iota \iota$, is probably not so. The preposition is not $\epsilon \tau \zeta$ but $\pi \alpha \rho \circ$, and in this context, with all its references to Jesus "going away" etc., the meaning of $\tau \pi \alpha \omega \lambda \tau \rho \tau \sigma$, is quite patently, "from the place where the Father is, as distinct from the place where the Son has specially localised Himself among men", that is, from Heaven. It is not a real reference to the Eternal Procession.

Thus, our conclusion is that the Filioque is necessary in the
absolute sense, and is especially necessary in the long run for a theology of the character of Athanasius's. But that is quite distinct from saying that the Filioque is implicit in the theology of Athanasius, let alone that it was what he actually intended. After all, this was just what he did not say, even to the extent that the later Nicenes and Alexandrians said it. To this extent it is a real incompatibility in Athanasius's theology, and as such the student of Athanasius is obliged to explain it. We have done so in terms of the type of physical analogy that he uses, and also the continued influence of the implied disjunctions on which the theology of Origen was based, even where the alternatives accepted were opposite to Origen's.

We can now say a few words about the last main division of the theology of the Spirit as revealed in the Letters to Serapion, the operation of the Spirit, even though it is not directly within the scope of the thesis. The great feature of the Athanasian doctrine, as it finally emerges, is that officially all the operations of God are considered together and they all are from the Father, through the Logos (or Son), in the Spirit. This formula is quite invariable in substance, showing only minor verbal variations. In the Ep. I, it is applied to the works of God seriatim as they arise, and finally in chs. 30 and 31 it is said explicitly that the formula applies to all the operations of God, and apparently to all substantial entities as are created. There is no good evidence for it being a stock liturgical formula, otherwise it would have been more influential in the Contra Arianos earlier, even though it occurs in the later chapters. Probably it was a deliberate theological act of

\[(204)\] That is, even the \(\tau\nu\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\\) operibus citatis in the appropriate places.
Athanasius to put things in this way. One cause was undoubtedly the strained circumstances under which he wrote the Letters, which would have resulted, inter alia, in lack of space. The tendency in these circumstances is to cast the material into a tighter, more compendious form, a form which is, as a matter of brute fact, more adaptable to creeds and confessions; easier circumstances, with the greater availability of time, leisure, and, not least, writing materials, lend themselves to a more diffuse style and a more varied presentation of the material, so that differences can be mentioned which would otherwise have to be ignored. But the directly theological considerations are more important. As we have said, Athanasius had to emphasise the absolute unity of operation of all Persons, because if he made any compromises here, there would be always a tendency to think in terms of a hierarchy of operations of the Godhead, some of which could be given to an (illegitimately) subordinate member and others reserved for the superordinate member. As we have already explained, Origen appears to have thought on just these lines. However, there must be a difference in operation somehow, because otherwise there would be no reason to recognise any personal or hypostatic distinctions in the Trinity at all. The solution that was actually chosen was to accept a distinction of the mode of operation, rather than in the work that was operated. All Persons were present and operative in all operations, but in different manners according to the formula as quoted, and the exact repetitions were deliberate, so that it could be more strongly established.

As for the reasons for this formulation, it is unfortunately nowhere explained, and therefore some conjecture is necessary. The last part, ֶךְָּתֶּר, ֶךְָּתֶּר, etc., may be a residual Semitism (or an otherwise non-Hellenic expression), whereby ֶךְָּתֶּר = Heb. ֶךְָּתֶּר prefix =

(205) See above, pp.235, 236, 247, and references cited there.
in this case, "by", agent or instrument. Some of the uses in the Contra Arianos of \( \varepsilon \nu \; \iota \; \delta \gamma \) or \( \varepsilon \nu \; \tau \; \delta \gamma \), suggest this. On this presumption, the formula simply means that the Spirit is that Person who is in immediate contact with the creatures, and therefore is the immediately efficient cause of the Divine operation. The \( \delta \gamma \; \tau \; \delta \gamma \) would simply mean that the Logos was intermediate between this and the origination of all the Divine operations in the Father. The other possibility is that the preposition \( \varepsilon \nu \) had its ordinary Indo-European meaning, "in". In this case, it would correspond to, or be an analogical extension of, the well-known and well-established association between the Spirit and the Church, the Church being the community in which God has done, and still does, His work in the world during this age. Not only was it generally felt that the Spirit and the Church had some connection, but the Spirit continued in the credal and liturgical theology of the institutional and worshipping Church during the period when the Spirit ceased to be of interest to the conscious, intellectual, and academic tradition in theology. Besides there is the traditional analogy, too, between the Spirit in which our spiritual baptism is to take place and the water in which the Christian is to be actually or symbolically immersed, and indeed some theologians and liturgies spoke of a sort of substantial union between the Spirit and the water, including the liturgy attributed to the very Serapion who was the recipient of these letters. In other words, the Spirit is the soil in which Christians grow, the atmosphere - a very cogent analogy - which they breathe and in which they "have their being". The earlier references to \( \varepsilon \nu \; \iota \; \delta \gamma \), etc. that are so common throughout all the previous writings of Athanasius, would thus have a similar meaning, as, to a large extent, the Logos still took over the functions of the Spirit. But the evidence against this is that there is not a word in the Letters
about this sort of issue at all. Is this because he sat lightly on the ecclesiastical doctrine, or because he took it for granted? Serious difficulties are raised by both answers. Probably the truth is that it is impossible for any Westerner, either Protestant or Roman Catholic, or for that matter, any modern Easterner, to enter into fourth-century thought about the Church, since the doctrine of the Church had not been raised in the acute form which is familiar to us. It is highly probable that, as far as the post-Biblical era is concerned, the question could not arise in a critical form until the doctrine of the Holy Spirit had been settled and this applies whether we consider the question in its Western or its Eastern form. We have already shown the cardinal significance of the recognition of the Filioque for the development of Western ecclesiology. If this latter hypothesis is true, the $\mathfrak{F} \overset{\text{Filioque}}{\to} \mathfrak{F}$, would have, in a richer form, the same significance as in the first case. And finally, of course, all parts of this formula would fit in perfectly with the two cardinal Trinitarian analogies of Athanasius, the Father as Light-source or Fountain, the Son as Radiance or River, the Spirit as Light-as-it-reaches-us or Water, respectively, and it would thus be a correspondence between the doctrine of the operation of God and the doctrine of the intra-Trinitarian relations that Athanasius actually accepted.

The danger of this sort of doctrine is the danger that we have already mentioned repeatedly in our study of the Filioque question; incidentally, it is a form of the series doctrine of the relations between the Persons which is consistent with the denial of the Filioque. To be

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(206) See above, pp. 115-55.
specific, it does not do justice to the essential truth that the Spirit not only comes to us through the Son or is the medium in which God works through the Son, but primarily conforms us to the Son. To take the second Trinitarian analogy, what is more amorphous than water? It certainly does not conform us to the river from which it is drawn; in fact, a man would consider himself insulted at the suggestion. On the other hand, this is the very truth that Athanasius aimed to safeguard with his doctrine that the Spirit is the Image (in the sigillographic sense) of the Son, which stamps us with His seal, and the error in question is the endemic heresy of popular modern Christianity, the idea that the Spirit is a power in the same way as petrol in the tank, whereas the Spirit not only gives us our kinetic energy but most imperatively determines our direction of movement and even our form of being too. But in the long run only a strict adherence to the Filioque can safeguard this truth. The form of the Christian life is Christ alone, and if we will to have the power, we must also have the form.

When we turn to the operations of the Spirit - or rather perhaps the operations ad extra of the Trinity in the context of the Spirit - we notice at once that Athanasius has a certain difficulty in sustaining his thesis that all the operations of the Trinity are of the same kind. He has to readmit the theory that there is some difference in the operations that corresponds to a difference in the Persons of the Trinity. The primary list of the operations, in 1:22-27, is Sanctification and Renewal, Vivification, Anointing, Sealing, Mediation of our partaking of God, and also a reference to creation which is considered not primarily as the once-for-all creation of Gen.1, but to the general and continuing activities of of vivification and renewal. When he returns to this topic at the end of

(208) See above, fn.194.
ch. 31, he adds the prophetic ministry of the Spirit, but with a certain emphasis on the present status of the prophet, etc., as an inspired person and the formal question of the relation between the Logos and Spirit in prophecy (concurrence is his solution), and, finally, the only reference that Athanasius ever made to the Conception of the man Jesus by the Spirit. It is true that, for instance, the treatment of the prophetic ministry of the Spirit is more complete than Shapland, for instance, will allow. But one feature of this list of operations is that it is concentrated on the present. What is really missing is any doctrine of the Spirit testifying in our hearts of the reconciliation that Christ has already achieved on our behalf. Similarly, there is a lack of the Spirit's testimony to the Last Judgment, so to speak, temporal testimony in the other direction, and appears to be what Shapland missed when he commented on the restricted scope of the prophetic ministry of the Spirit. The former lack is the more significant as our studies of the De Incarnatione have shown us that justification, even in the quasi-legal or quasi-penal sense, was far more prominent than most theologians have allowed.

The upshot of this is that Athanasius cannot really sustain his contention that all the works of God have exactly the same relation to all the Persons of the Trinity; that is, there is really some irreducible difference amongst the works of God corresponding to the difference between the Persons, so that one Person or other has special association with certain works. As for the Father, McIntyre points out that there is an almost total lack, in the relevant period of Greek theology, of any theology of the Father in this sense; that is, there is no corroboration of the traditional association between the Father and creation, which has been universal since the days of Marcion and Irenaeus, and which corresponds

(209) See above, pp. 1208-11.
to the traditional association between the Second Person and Justification and the Third Person and Sanctification. This is very true, and raises a very important problem that is all too often neglected. On the other hand, it is necessary to make a number of qualifications and explanations. Firstly, there is the practical fact that Athanasius had spent his lifetime in proving, against the Arians, that the Second Person was on the Godward side of the process of creation, and thus showing the Logos (and also later the Spirit) as Creator. As for the later Cappadocians, they not only owed much to Athanasius but were independently confronted with the same task by the Neo-Arianism of Eunomius, not to mention the Tropicci, Pneumatomachi, and Macedonians who took the same line concerning the Spirit. Secondly, the Greek Fathers are in very extensive company in this regard; no theology has ever very convincingly associated Creation with the Father in this regard. Thirdly, it is likely that the whole principle is wrong anyway, and that at this point the whole correlation between Persons and type of operation breaks down. After all, the fact that creation is creatio per Verbum is just about the main point about it. The traditional correlation of the Father with creation is almost certainly a survival from the heresy of Marcion, later theology rejecting his minor and conclusion, but not the enthymematic major principle on which it is based. Probably the truth is that the Father is just the Father, the fons et origo Trinitatis, and His traditional association with creation is the expression of the analogy between this primacy of the Father and the quasi-historical and quasi-logical primacy of the work of creation. But when we come to the Son there is no doubt whatever that there is a fault or a contradiction in Athanasius's theology. He says that all works are actuated from the Father, through the Son, and in the Spirit, so that

(210) "The Holy Spirit in Greek Patristic Thought", p.359.
presumably all works are of the Spirit in the same way, but the works that he lists have all this present reference, and thus belong primarily to the locus theologicus of sanctification. There is one routine reference to our justification which is almost off-hand, another rapid and overdue reference to the Conception by the Spirit, of Jesus, and that is all. In spite of his own principles, Athanasius has reintroduced the differentiation of the opera ad extra.

The truth is that this differentiation is correct theology, and the experience of Athanasius shows that only if it is accepted is there any possibility of giving anything but a brittle account of the co-operation of all three Persons. Once we recognise that the Spirit is the Person with Which we are immediately associated in virtue not only of our humanity, but also of our existence in the Age between the Ascension and the Parousia, we can give a real account of the work of the Spirit in justification. Justification is supremely the Act that has already taken place for us, so to speak, in the Age of the Son, and it is supremely the Work of the Son, but it is the Spirit Which comforts us by witnessing to our spirit, that we are the children of God, that the reconciliation won for us so long ago is, notwithstanding the interval of time, fully valid and efficacious for us. As with the past, so with the future; the Second Coming is essentially the work of the Son, but, as was the case with John in the concentration camp on Patmos, it is the Spirit that comforts and strengthens us to endure even unto that happy day.

(211) The citation of I. Cor. 6:11 in Ep. I. 31: 601A-B.
(213) Rom. 8: 16.
(214) Rev. 1: 9-10.
One final remark - this concentration on sanctification, on the temporal present, is in many ways very close to the conception of the work of the pre-Arian Logos when it was conceived at its most rationalistic. In both cases, we get an emphasis on the pure present, and a loss of the historical element in the Christian faith - we have just been insisting that this very element must be present in the theology of the Spirit as much as anywhere else. Something has changed; spirituality and mysticism replace rationalism and natural theology, but it remains one of the tragedies of theological history that it lost interest in the Logos, in the classical sense, just at the moment that Athanasius had found the correct form of the doctrine, by relating it not to eternal rationality understood metaphysically, but to predestination in Christ. Between the earlier rationalism and the future mysticism - mainly in the bad sense - Athanasius represents the transition in such a way that both the old and the new errors can be seen in him, but at his best he is the razor's edge, the lucid interval, the best of both worlds, with much that is to be found in him alone of his age and generation.

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(215) In C. Ar. II: 73-82; see above, pp. 904-925.

(216) The fact that Athanasius is the great theologian of the orthodox doctrine of the Son against the Arians, and the first theologian of the Spirit, the hinge between two great epochs of theological history, is the probable reason for the close association of the Spirit with the Son which is the characteristic of these Letters which both Shapland and McIntyre notice so much. But the fact still remains that this close association, as we see it in Athanasius, is a starting point that needs strengthening and development, rather than a conclusive and definitive stage in theology. It is unfortunate that his principal heirs advanced in principle so little beyond him. If it is correct that the Church has always owed much, in the providence of God, to the struggle against heresy, it was unfortunate that the later generation of Arians, like Eunomius, with whom the Cappadocians were directly familiar, had already degenerated into scholasticism, in comparison with the founders of the heresy, and the same can be said even of the Pneumatomachis and Macedonians in comparison with the Tropici in spite of the small interval of time. Perhaps one can even go further and comment on the low vitality of Graeco-Roman society at large in the later fourth century. If, as the author believes, Marxism as we see it to-day, is simply the Arian heresy run to completion, we cannot but deplore (momentarily and transitionally, of course!) the lack of preparation for the exuberance and vitality of modern society and its challenges.
This concludes our discussion of the Trinitarian theology of Athanasius. Thanks to his work, Arianism was theologically a spent force after 362, even if heresy against the Spirit still carried on for a time. Henceforth the centre of interest of theology was in the clarification of the Christological dogma, which Athanasius himself had so brilliantly launched in his reply to Eutychian exegesis. This was, of course, the relation between the Deity and Humanity of Christ, and even the major part of Athanasius's works after 362 are concerned with this problem, with an early form of the Eutychian and Nestorian controversies. We have spent a great deal of space in our summary and study of the theology of the Letters to Sera-pion, because they are really the main source of anything like a mature theology of the Trinity. This could not have taken place until all three Persons had imperatively presented themselves for consideration. The other reason is that, in spite of the common, but false, impression to the contrary, the theology of the Spirit is of comparable maturity to the theology of the Person of Jesus Christ, and, as we have shown, it is this theology of the Spirit, and above all the Filioque, that has been the real determining factor in subsequent Church history, as we have shown. Once this is recognised, much that is still obscure will become clear.
A cursory glance at the theology of the later Fathers indicates the extent to which they all owed to the labours of Athanasius. There was very little change, in fact, in the basic presentation of the problems in the later successors of Athanasius. Some points are tidied up, there are some improvements, but this is more than compensated by a loss of the intensity and vigour of the theology. The outstanding change, which we have noted repeatedly, was in the basic doctrine of the intra-Trinitarian relations, as modified by the Cappadocians. This consisted in, firstly, a more personalist characterisation, including the definite dominance of the Son theology of the Second Person over the Logos theology, as is manifested, for example, in Basil of Caesarea's ostentatious rejection of such words as \( \gamma \gamma \chi \mu \nu \rho \mu \nu \) as worthy descriptions of the Son. Secondly, and closely related to this, there was the differentiation, in what later became the fashion of orthodoxy, between \( \sigma \theta \sigma \psi \lambda \) and \( \zeta \mu \nu \omicron \lambda \tau \nu \gamma \), the former being referred to the One Divine Essence, and the latter—almost never used by Athanasius in any sense other than that of "object" as in geometrical optics, and never in his major theological writings—being referred to the Persons of the Trinity; it carried the sense of something like our word "Person", without the romantic or metaphysical individualism which makes the theology of the Trinity so difficult for many moderns. As for the Doctrine of the Spirit, Athanasius had decisively laid down the main lines along which the doctrine was to develop, and there is very little real difference on major points between him and the later theologians. Basil, for example, actually denies with great vigour that the formula \( \varepsilon \kappa \rho \varsigma \iota \tau \sigma \rho \varsigma \) applied constantly in the Athanasian way, but this was because his own opponents had seized upon it—were they trying to turn Athanasius against
himself? - to show that the Persons were essentially and regularly and constantly different, with the illegitimate inference of difference in rank and category. (Athenasius would have reacted differently by showing that this inference was illegitimate). Similarly, Basil was more disposed to consider the role of the Spirit in the ethical development of the Christian. Perhaps this is a bad sign as much as a good sign - is not the form of the Christian life that of Christ? On the other hand, Basil does emphasise the work of the Spirit in the sort of operation that is lacking in Athenasius, with reference to the Atonement and Last Judgment, considered as primarily the work of the Second Person, and also as works that are past and future respectively. There is not much reference to the Spirit as least of all in Basil (Greg. Naz. Orat. Theol. V. : 10 is an example of this term). The definitive statement of the Coessentiality of the Spirit is the so-called (and so-miscalled) Athenasian Creed. As for the important Filioque question, the Cappadocians followed approximately the Athenasian position. On the other hand, Epiphanius was virtually a Filioquist, and the later Alexandrians, like Cyril, insisted on the in addition to the , while their enemies the Antiochens, like Theodoret, denied that the Son had anything to do with the Procession of the Spirit. It is not clear how this is linked with the outstanding feature of the Antiochene theology, except that it would introduce some congestion to say that Jesus as a perfect man, which was the tendency even of the Antiochens who were not condemned for heresy, partook of a Spirit that proceeded from Father and Son. However, as time went on, the uni-processional doctrine of the Greek-speaking Church hardened,

* See "De Spiritu Sancto". The earlier chapters concern the formulae as described above; the later the work of the Spirit.
until John of Damascus definitively expressed it, and with the Filioque gaining ground in the West, the stage was set for the split in the Church between East and West. In the West, the personalist trend was reflected notably in Augustine, with his emphasis on the love between Father and Son; he was also the definitive formulator of the Filioque position. His theology has been described repeatedly above in contrast with the Athanasian position that nothing else needs to be said.

Some further comments are necessary on the basic Trinitarian question. To understand fully the Cappadocian contrast between \( \omega \sigma \alpha \chi \) and \( \tau \tau \phi \sigma \tau \alpha \sigma \) we must take into account as well the much less celebrated but equally important distinction between \( \omega \sigma \alpha \chi \) and \( \tau \tau \phi \sigma \tau \alpha \sigma \) that was implied in the later Chalcedonian formula. These latter two words were used synonymously by Athanasius, since \( \tau \tau \phi \sigma \tau \) by reason of its root referred to what the Son was aboriginally as distinct from His Humanity. However, the later Chalcedonian theology put \( \tau \tau \phi \sigma \tau \) as a concept on a lower plane even than \( \tau \tau \phi \sigma \tau \alpha \sigma \) in its Trinitarian sense, as being something that both God and man can be said to possess. On the other hand, \( \omega \sigma \alpha \chi \) stood for the full mysterious unity of God, which is the thing that has no analogy among men, by which God is really God. This is the best Trinitarian doctrine, and the best way to interpret Cappadocian theology. Our study of the Athanasian theology supplies a very interesting confirmation of this interpretation, as the way in which the Cappadocians probably understood their own theology. For another way of putting this is that the \( \omega \sigma \alpha \chi \) referred to the basic categorial distinction between God and the creatures, in exactly the sense in which we have used this word in our study of the Athanasian theology. Now, in our study of the final state of Athanasius's Trinitarian theology as we find it in the "letters to Serapion", we have shown that what is usually taken
to be a modification of the Homoousion towards generic resemblance is really an emphasis on the Homoousion in precisely this categorial sense, and the categorial type of argument is its specific context. May not the same have been true of the Cappadocians? On this basis, the word for essence in the sense of specific or generic identity would have been \( \psi \) as in the Chalcedonian formulary. This would be another case of Athanasius, contrary to general opinion, having anticipated what is usually regarded as a later development.

Then began that appalling period during which the theology of Athanasius was all but lost. It is true that he was always venerated in the East, but theology in Eastern Orthodoxy lost its dynamic after John of Damascus, and what development there was was in the fields of mysticism and heterodoxy. On the other hand, there was a millennium in the West during which he was regarded as the defender of right theology par excellence, but his works were almost unknown except for the "Life of Antony" and the spurious "Athanasian Creed." Even as late as Calvin's "Institutes", Athanasius is still an almost completely unknown theologian.

The modern revival in Athanasian study and influence is, in one sense, the field that has been covered at great length in our footnotes on previous work, but a brief summary is necessary here. The revival, of course, followed pari passu the revival in Greek studies of all kinds. There were four stages in this, or five if we count the modern ecumenical encounter that is only beginning. First, there is the impulse of the early Renaissance, which produced Erasmus's studies, then the revival of Greek scholarship in the Counter-Reformation, whose final fruits were the great

* See, and for what follows, Cross, "The Study of St. Athanasius", pp.3-11.
Benedictine edition of Montfaucon, and other editions. Thirdly, there was the revival of Hellenism in the Anglican Church of the Stuart period, closely connected with its movement away from its earlier Calvinist position. Finally, the most important of all, there was the great revival of Hellenic studies of all kinds associated with the great German idealist movement in the nineteenth century. All these movements have left their mark on Athanasian study. In the main the effects of these trends are that the whole of Athanasian study has been given an anti-Reformation bias in one way or another which Athanasian theology proper does not possess, as we have had to remark repeatedly, and that the chief interest has been directed to the De Incarnatione as against the Contra Arianos (and the Letters to Serapion) as the primary works of Athanasius. The recent interest in the Letters to Serapion has been stimulated by a revival of interest in the Spirit and, most important of all, by the problem of the Filioque in ecumenical relations with the Eastern Orthodox. As far as the Contra Arianos is concerned, the great exception to the general lack of interest still remains Newman, but he is the exception that manifestly proves the rule, since the main interest of the Contra Arianos for him is that it is the first and greatest member of the series of works which embody the orthodox Trinitarian and Christological theology. At this stage interest in this side of Athanasius remains. Thus, there is little stimulus for Reformed theologians to break through the anti-Reformation curtain that envelops Athanasian study, particularly on the anti-Arian theology. It has been a matter of continuous astonishment to the author that in the immense writings of the Kirchliche Dogmatik of Karl Barth, whom we have repeatedly recognised as occupying a position corresponding to Athanasius, not only as regards the fundamental Christocentricity of both, but also in many important details, Athanasius is one of the many authors that rate only rare and incidental mention.
The villain of the piece in all this has been what is supremely the Roman Catholic attitude, that in his struggle with the Arians Athanasius fought for pure orthodoxy. That Church's friends are not encouraged to undertake close and original research, and its enemies acquire a prejudice against this side of Athanasius altogether. The great danger of this sort of veneration is that we shall illegitimately convert the proposition and assume that what there is in Athanasius is the orthodox tradition and nothing else. This is the perfect recipe for missing the whole point of a great theologian like Athanasius. This is our great loss in these days when, once again even though in a rather different way, we are called upon to relearn that the ultimate power with which we are confronted in our lives is God Himself in His very Being. As against the Arians, Athanasius maintained that the Divine Logos (in the Greek and Hebraic senses alike) with Whom we are confronted as Christians and which the Arians recognised, is God Himself in His very Being. The Reformers maintained that every good gift and every perfect gift which everybody recognised as coming "from above" in some way, can only "come from above" in the sense of coming strictly from God Himself in His grace. What has happened now - as Athanasius ruefully predicted - that the very principles on which there was agreement on the previous occasions are being attacked by the modern atheists. What we have now is both controversies together in a far more acute and dangerous form. Our whole study has been an effort to show that what is in Athanasius is not restricted to the traditional orthodoxy, but far transcends it. And the points where it transcends traditional orthodoxy, precisely the points that traditional study has missed, are precisely the points at which the Athanasian theology is so supremely relevant to our sombre crisis. In particular, we have been able to show that the struggle of Athanasius against Arianism and the struggle that the Church has even
now hardly begun yet against Communism are one and the same in all important respects. In this struggle, we are obliged to know the enemy, and we must fulfill all the requirements of love and devotion without which no theology can be Christian, but the whole work of the author has convinced him that not far below these is the diligent study of the Contra Arianos.

Perhaps the first and most obvious lesson that we must learn from Athanasius is the importance of Trinitarian theology as such. The traditional deprecation of such works as the Contra Arianos is ultimately only a sign of a fundamental misology in much of the modern outlook. We consider Trinitarian theology as "theoretical" as opposed to "practical", and we have forgotten that achievement, is something that supremely belongs to God Himself and not to man or any other creaturely field; it belongs both to God in Himself, and supremely for us to God in Christ. The "objectivism" of Athanasius is simply the sign that he has accepted the truth that here and here alone is the source of even practical theology. The Incarnation and all that followed from it is God's great work, and, as we have said repeatedly, Athanasius, even if we disagree with his details, shows as clearly as any other theologian and far more than any theologian from Patristic times to Karl Barth, the necessary connection between the Trinitarian nature of God and His attributes, which in the case of God must mean His activities. This is the complete opposite of the attitude classically expressed by Harnack, who is fittingly the source both of the one-sidedly "practical" interpretation of theology and the modern deprecation of such works as the Contra Arianos. In fact, it would be fair to describe the dogmatic works of Athanasius as a study in the unity of theory and practice in the field of dogma. Without the fundamental basis that we have been describing, modern theology will be helpless in face of the many modern foes of Christ, whether they be Communism, Islam, or anything else.
Now that we have established the basic principle, let us turn to the detailed study of the implications of the Athanasian theology for us to-day. They apply primarily to the theological conflict with Communism, since, as we have shown, it is Marx, and not such plagiarizers as the "Jehovah's Witnesses", who are the Arians of this modern age. It is fashionable to decry the ideological threat of Communism in the present, on the grounds that it is a purely materialist creed that outrages the dignity of any man who is not frankly starving or gravely oppressed, that the proletarianism of Marx has the same effect as well as being a source of serious internal self-contradiction in a Socialist or Communist society that has become rich and powerful, and that the imminent split in the Communist world between a Russian and a Chinese half will further weaken the impact of Communism as an ideology, that the "West" needs only to maintain sufficient military strength to make a genuine military victory over it impossible, and that even if in some way the whole world became Communist and even more if it did not, the virulence of the ideological atheism would subside so that any special effort on the part of Christians would be unnecessary, since its opposition would be in a state of senility. Much Christian thinking on the subject, insofar as it rightly recognises Marxism as a great enemy, comforts itself with these reflections. Unfortunately, this picture is absolutely wrong in everything that matters. The writer of this thesis does not believe in preventive war and regards the windy effusions of certain Christian bodies in the U. S. A. and the Un-American Activities Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives as worse than useless, but this only shows the need for much harder, if humbler, thinking and action. To return to the matter in hand, Marxist Communism is, in the first place, not a materialist philosophy in the sense in which this is usually understood. The most serious criticism that must be made of Karl Barth is that he has misunderstood Marx at this point; he considers him
as just another and worse materialist of the type of Haeckel. In fact the author would maintain that all the questionable features of Barth are associated with his failure at this point. It casts a big question mark over his whole treatment of the historical and even temporal aspects of the Christian faith, for all his resolution in so doing, for is not history supremely "materialistic", as Marx showed? It also impedes his appreciation of the link between historicity and universality, which is one of the principles in Hegel and Marx alike that Christian theology jettisons at its peril; for is not this, as Marx shows supremely "materialistic", "inhuman", and therefore, in Barth's sense, "abstract"? Finally, it dulls his sense of the real menace of Communism, which he sees as at best merely a materialist over-corrective to the abstraction of so much theology, and at worst as something which cannot seriously challenge Christianity, as it is in no sense co-planar with it. Similarly, he cannot appreciate the dangerous fascination which Marxism and Marxist modes of thought exercise over otherwise faithful Christians, which we can rightly compare with the fascination exercised by Arius over so much of his generation; it was this sort of fascination which he rightly stated to be the supreme menace of Nazism, and the true reason for the Church to speak out against it so loudly, yet he does not see, and in fact denies, that the same thing happens many times over with Communism. This is the great triumph of the enterprise of obfuscation which Marx subconsciously but with the wisdom of the children of darkness set himself. The point is that for all his obscurity at this point, was talking all the time of one supreme transcendent reality. In spite of the efforts of Sidney Hook, a pluralistic interpretation of Marx is nonsensical. Reality for Marx was one, or inexorably to become one.

* Cf. Ch. Dogm. Vol. II Pt. II pp. 387ff. See also the relevant section of West, "Communism and the Theologians." It is, again, most unfortunate that West's criticisms are too "practical", and do not go deeply enough into the theological bases of Barth's deficiencies.
The reason why Marx did not give any name to it, or any indication other than a parabolic one that he was talking about the unity of reality, is that he knew very well that he would immediately expose himself to the sort of argument that was expressed by Athanasius! (C.Ar.II.18-31 &c.). The point about this reality was not that it was even "materialistic", but that it was creaturely, in the exact sense in which that description was used by Arius himself. The intimate connection even in Athanasius, and above all in Athanasius, between being "material" and being creaturely is most significant here. The very economism of Marx is not even primary, but is actually secondary to the denial of the transcendence even of man over the rest of creation, and is in fact the essential expression of that lack of transcendence; behind this lies the denial of the existence of the God Whose making of man in His own image is the basis of this transcendence, and thus the economism of Marx is secondary to his atheism, not vice versa, in spite of the common impression to the contrary of many Christians who are fascinated by Marx. No, the primary doctrine of Marx and all Marxists is that life is one, that this one entity is a creature in exactly the Arian sense, and that the nature of this one reality is to be expressed in economic terms because that is the field where man and things come together and are one. The sharp distinction between this and materialism of the gross kind is obvious, and accounts for the fascination that is exercised by Marxism over people who would find ordinary materialism just repulsive.

This has brought us to the second criticism that we have to make of the popular notion that Marxism is on the wane. It is true that the economism and proletarianism of Marx is no longer attractive to many people. As far as the proletarianism is concerned, this should not give Christians any pleasure, since it is the main residuum of
Christianity in Marx, involving a lively realisation of the fact that, although God may (or may not) be in His heaven, all is not yet right with the world. It is also an effect of Marxism being in a relatively early and entirely pre-revolutionary stage, and also of his economism, especially in view of the form of industrial production most familiar to Marx (which still largely applies to-day!) whereby the persons actually in the most intimate contact with things produced are the alienated, expropriated, and exploited labourers. The trouble is that if, as we have said above, the whole economism of Marx is really secondary to his metaphysics, it is not the only possible corollary. It could be just as easily deduced that the sphere where man and things are united par excellence is not production in the classical Marxist sense, but science and technology. Indeed this was always an element even in classical Marxism; otherwise, he would have had as his hero the peasant farmer - which appears to be the concept of Roman Catholic natural law and the political philosophy deduced therefrom. It would be quite conceivable to have a thoroughly Marxist movement that centres on scientists and technologists, especially now that science and technology have acquired an enormous and obvious importance and majesty that was not fully evident even to Marx. It would be a blind man who ignored the growing influence of this element in Communism in the last century. The whole "revisionist" controversy in Socialist and Communist movements can be explained in this way, and the contemporary Russian emphasis on science and technology, as well as its increasing divergence from the more primitive Communism of China, are among the most important facts of the present day. It is quite conceivable that in the near future we shall see a new theory of Communism in Russia based on the science and technology, and on the struggle of these against their reactionary enemies, among which all religions hold the pride of place. It will be tempting to regard this development with complacency on the ground that it will be a less revolutionary and a more stable and conservative force and will also split the
Marxist movement and divorce the underdeveloped and proletarianised peoples from the might of the U.S.S.R., but this would be most gravely short-sighted. Such a Marxism would be stable, but also far more inhuman and far more comprehensively anti-Christian, since it would have cut itself off from the elements of the Christian faith that still remain in Marx, his compassion, his interest in remedying injustice, even his protest against militarism. On the other hand, a neo-Marxism of this kind would be enormously more attractive to "Westerners", and especially to the most dangerous class of all, the frustrated scientists and technologists of the type who do not believe in any "sentimental nonsense" but are profoundly convinced that in a scientific and technological age wealth and power rightfully belongs to scientists and technologists, and all others, like artists, "religious obscurantists" and parasitic businessmen and hucksters should be kept firmly in their place. It is by no means certain that we in the Church shall avoid the sharpest and most painful confrontation with some form of Marxism, and certainly as a para-theology it may be on its last legs, but its last legs will carry it a long way yet. We have not even considered the possibility of a direct military, political, or economic conquest of "The West" by the forces of Communism as we know them to-day. And there is the further possibility that if Communism becomes more tolerant and more inclined for syncretism with Christianity one result will be an attempted reversion on a huge scale to Arianism pure and simple in its ancient form. Thus, from all these angles, it is possible that the struggle of the Christian faith against Communism may not be over; it may have hardly begun.

We do not need to consider this question in its entirety; our task is the more restricted one of studying its theological aspects. From this point of view, the first thing to remember is that there is one very important difference between the way in which Marxism and Arianism present
themselves to the world at large, and that it is this difference that has obscured their basic similarity. The Arians, who lived in a period of declining secular culture, did not get to the stage of abandoning even the Father, but were able to preserve a supreme figurehead of a god even though it was otiose. This solution was unavailable to Marx. Fifteen centuries during which the Nicene Creed had been repeated every Sunday morning had rendered it forever impossible, as Hegel himself had recognised with alacrity, in however perverse a way. Therefore, once the Logos had been stated to be a creature, the Father had to go too, and the result was a complete break with Christianity. Now, there is a difference in the disguise adopted by these two doctrines corresponding to this basic difference in their nature and origin. The Arians were always trying to shelter under the wing of Christianity, as they had nowhere else to go, by concealing the fundamental atheism of their views; their very acceptance of an otiose god the Father certainly had this as its motive. It was the greatness of Athanasius that he saw through this pretence, whereby they sought subconsciously to delude others, and even their own conscious minds, and that he was therefore able to affirm, in season and out of season, that the proper corollary of their theology (?) was not unitarianism but atheism. The analogy that can now be seen between Arius and Marx shows that Athanasius was right and that it was a pretence. On the other hand, what Arius tried, with some success, to conceal, Marx had to admit from the outset. Therefore, the corresponding disguise of Marx had to be to exaggerate what Arius concealed, and to conceal what Arius ostentatiously allowed, that is, that his creed still had Christian roots and therefore came under Christian judgment. As we have said, Marx and his followers tried to disguise the fact that they were talking about one supremely real entity as a unit, while their whole philosophy is pointless unless this is its real subject-matter. A Marxism reduced, in the manner of Hook, to a strictly pluralistic doctrine
that one creature was very much like another, with nothing, enjoying absolute supremacy, would simply not be Marx or Communism. For one thing, it would be a grey, pedestrian doctrine without any fascination or attractive force whatever. The first theological task of the Church is to point out that the Marxists, even in spite of themselves do believe in one supreme power. And here we come to one of the great arguments of Athanasius, the categorial argument. He spends a great deal of his time and work throughout the later theological writings - the later they are the more important this becomes - in showing, absolutely correctly, that pluralism is the truth about creatures, all creaturely existence, and all relations of creatures to each other, and therefore that no creature can have the absolute and unconditional cosmological supremacy that the Arians still claimed, and necessarily so, for their second person. Seeing that the Marxists really believe in such an entity which has such an unconditional supremacy over lesser creatures, so that even their talk about "materialism" simply obfuscates the issue, the Church must use the same argument against them in a form contrapositive to that of Athanasius corresponding to the different disguise, that is, that anything or any entity with the unity, uniqueness, and absolute supremacy which the Communists in spite of themselves attribute to it, cannot be a creature but must be god. Therefore, the Marxists are not even respectable atheists, but are literally idolaters in the same sense in which that term is applicable to the Arians, and was applied by Athanasius. They are not only idolaters in the individualistic sense in which the supreme and all-consuming false interest of the individual is his idol de facto; they are also idolaters in theory as well as in practice, since they say with the greatest possible emphasis that their idol is not just their personal god but the universal lord. So the first task is to strip off this disguise, with humility but with confidence and vigour.

Before we leave this side of the argument, there is one
qualifications, and one very important digression. There is a very numerous
class of convinced pluralists who would accept the whole of this criticism,
but for that very reason deny the existence of God. Politically, they are
those on the Centre and even on the Left who actually resent Communism for
what it has in common with Christianity, by which is to be understood not
only the evil persecuting and totalitarian tendencies that have infected
historic Christianity, but also and most decisively the very faith itself
in one God or god. These absolutely consistent pluralists are the most
difficult problem of all for Christianity; in a sense they are the absolute
atheists. For them, no theological dialectic can play any part at all;
here we are really stripped to the pure proclamation of the Gospel; if
this will not work, nothing will at all. But with regard to pure classical
Marxism, we should be thankful that here, as much as anywhere else, is a
"point of contact". We should be both more aggressive against them and
more friendly to them than we have been in the unfortunate past.

This categorial argument, this association between categorial
uniqueness and God Himself, unfortunately but inescapably involves us in
one of those iceberg issues of theology and ecumenical relations, which we
must face at once, since it is in the dynamic of Athanasian theology that
we see its significance more than anywhere else. The categorial argument
is very good up to a point, but extremely dangerous after that point, and
the limit to its use must be specified clearly. Closely related to this
argument, as we have seen in our study of the Letters to Serapion, is the
pragmatic argument, as we have called it, and here the relation is even
closer, so that both will be treated together. We have seen that, once
the correct doctrine of the Deity of the Second Person was established, the
Third Person came up for attention, for the first time, as the mode whereby
the grace of the Son applies to us. When the Deity of the Spirit became
the burning question, Athanasius said that the Spirit was the absolutely necessary condition for our participation in Divine grace, that the Spirit was one even as God is one and creatures are many; therefore the Spirit must be God. Unfortunately, there are other things about which this, or something dangerously and deceptively similar, must be said as well. The humanity of Christ is an absolute condition for our sharing in the grace of God, and the humanity of Christ is one and not many. Likewise, nobody shares in the grace of God without the Church, and the Church, the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of the Nicaeano-Constantinopolitan Creed, is one, for the purposes of this argument, however this unity is interpreted. And once the presupposition of Mariology are admitted, the same also applies to the Virgin Mary. On the basis of these arguments, are the Humanity of Christ, the Church, and Mary to be also accepted as God? If not, why not?

The argument can also be put in the formal way, in terms of the dynamic of theology. We have noticed that, even though Athanasius accepted Trinitarianism credally, the substance of his theology was binitarian in the sense that the centre of interest was the Father and Son alone. In this theology, he was proving the Deity of the Son. Later on, the problem of the Spirit arose, and it would be correct to say that his theology expanded to include the Deity of the Spirit. Now that the range covered by the Trinitarian doctrine has expanded in this way, is it not, on the above arguments, committed to continue its expansion to cover as well the Humanity of Christ, etc.? Once again, if not, why not? It is interesting to notice that Athanasius was immediately, and in his own lifetime, confronted with this corollary of his own theology - which he rightly rejected with horror. This is almost certainly the correct etiology of the doctrine that grew up as early as the 360's, that the flesh was co-essential with the Godhead.

This almost certainly matured into the Eutychian heresy, and it is most instructive that, in spite of Athanasius's own warnings, Eutychianism and Eutychian tendencies became and remain definitively associated with the very Alexandria in which Athanasius did his great work; the Coptic Churches are Monophysite to this day.

But the matter did not end here. It is true that the first manifestation of this corrupt tendency was soundly and completely suppressed at Chalcedon, and since then there has been no wish to expand the Trinity in so many words. But this does not mean that the trend did not continue for in fact it was the very thing that the Reformers found in the Roman Catholic Church, rightly or wrongly, the tendency, while recognising ostentatiously that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and that everything else is creaturely, to pay increasing honour to the Humanity of Christ, the Church - whether it is Episcopal or conciliar authority, Papal infallibility, or the priest "performing the miracle" (!) of transubstantiation -, and finally and most flagrantly the Virgin Mary. These honours, to say the least, sail dangerously close to the wind of being honours inconsistent with anything less than deification in the absolute sense. Even while theology at its highest level shrinks from the final consequences of all this, popular piety - with few exceptions unrebuked or inadequately rebuked - shows little restraint. This includes the cult of saints, which comes under the same heading. Even though it is fair to say that warnings are being issued in certain authoritative quarters (especially the French Hierarchy) the Dogma de Assumptione corporea B.V.M., proclaimed in 1950 by the Pope ex cathedra under the 1870 dogma of Papal Infallibility, is a sure sign that the dynamic is still operating with unprecedented potency at the highest theological and ecclesiastical levels.

The information is properly cited as a quote (in the original...
etymological sense of this word! against all this and for the sole and unconditional glory and honour of God, and an extirpation of all these contrary tendencies. But there is a hidden pitfall here. Is there a hidden impulse in Protestantism not only to put this tendency into reverse but to leave it running in reverse, so that it ends up, not even at unitarianism but at Feuerbach, Marx and atheism? Unfortunately, there is considerable evidence of this sort of thing at work, of which the degeneration into Unitarianism of so much post-Caroline English Presbyterianism is the most celebrated example. May this be the source of the power of fascination exercised by Marxist ways of thought over so much of otherwise committed Protestant Christianity? It is unfortunately true that while the mass following of Communist Parties is for various reasons generally much greater in Roman Catholic than in Protestant communities, the reverse is true of the power of the Marxist philosophy over the Protestant and Roman Catholic mind. This whole tendency is what Newman undoubtedly felt in Protestantism, which in fact led him to his great Work on the anti-Arian writings of Athanasius, even though he never said so in so many words. He admitted that he felt that his exposition of Athanasius's struggle against Arianism and his own struggle against Protestantism went together. Although he expressed this link in terms of a hypothetical (and untrue, as we have shown) Arianism that was Scriptural in the Reformation sense and an Athanasius who accepted the Catholic supremacy of sine Scriptura traditio, the author is certain that behind this there was some such half-instinctive feeling as he has suggested. On the other hand, when one thinks of the extreme fundamentalists and the extreme romantic exponents of "the human spirit", there are certain tendencies in Protestantism that run on parallel lines to what prevails in Roman Catholicism.

The significance of all this is that however useful the categori
argument is against heretics and atheists, it cannot be the basis of a positive theology. This appears to have been understood by Athanasius himself, as, in his discussion of analogy, he treated unity, that very feature that is at the heart of the categorial argument, as something that primarily and essentially belongs to God, but which also belongs to man secondarily, by participation, and by Divine grace in the Son and Spirit. Indeed, unity was the supreme example of this principle applying in this way. Thus, the unity and uniqueness of the Humanity of Christ, of the Church, even of Mary, of Scripture, of the human spirit, or of the individual in his unique calling, are soundly and completely subordinate to the unity and uniqueness of God, God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The primary way in which this category is present in the Trinity shows that each Person is God; the way in which it is present in all these other entities not only does not show that they are God, but shows quite positively that they are not God. This is one of the main lessons to be learnt from Athanasius. On the other hand, it is still better not to rely on the categorial argument for the basis of the doctrine of God. It would be far better and safer to have a doctrine of God that is Trinitarian from the outset, than to take the risks involved in building up a doctrine of the Trinity by accretion. It is the main defect of Athanasius that it was virtually by this method that his mature Trinitarianism was built up, and in that sense the system of, say, Augustine, would prima facie be better. An even more important advantage of this principle would be that it would be proof against the expansionist tendencies that we have noted, against which Athanasius's protest, correct and vehement as it was, was not completely successful. It must not only be clear that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but also God cannot be more than Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Now, how is this God to be understood as acting in the world?
We learn from Athanasius that it is essentially by the Incarnation, if we have not learnt it already from the source from which Athanasius learned it. This means that if we are to give an account of the activity of the truly transcendent God in the world, it must be both Incarnational and therefore soteriological too. We have not emphasised the latter greatly, since it is outside the immediate scope of the thesis, but it cannot be stressed too much that a Christian theology will fall at once before Communism if it is not soteriological. For if there is one thing that Communism claims to be, it is a system of soteriology, in however perverted a sense. If it is true that the only possible single and compendious word that can be applied to the one supreme reality of which Marx treats is the word Logos in a basically Greek sense, it is even more true that Marx and all his successors actually envisage it as the saving Logos. After all, what is the Whole doctrine of the Proletarian Revolution and the future Classless Society but a fantastic reflection of the basic Christian soteriology. Just as little, of course, can any Christian theology that neglects its soteriology make any impression on the mass of mankind that is not Marxist, especially since for all their superficial euphoria modern men are with good reason deeply pessimistic, unlike their fathers' generation.

However, there are two major qualifications which are specially needed here. The incarnational theology that is required must be really Incarnational in the sense of Chalcedon, that is, it must respect the absolute distinction between God and creaturely reality. The author has the strong feeling that a lot that goes under the title of Incarnational theology these days (this does not include Karl Barth) is not so interested in preserving this distinction as in blurring it. It needs to say that, by the miracle of the Incarnation and the Atonement, God has removed the wrath and enmity between Himself and all flesh, and instead makes the
and untrue statement that He removed the distinction. This is a plain straight case of trying to beat Marx and all his successors by going back to Hegel, and it simply does not work, in the same way that in the fourth century it was impossible to deal with Arius by going back to Origen, Clement of Alexandria, or the Apologists. The Arian insistence on the absolute distinction between God and creatures is the one thing about their teaching that was correct, utterly correct, and as such was a judgment on all previous theology. It was the great wisdom of Athanasius that he saw that this was genuinely Scriptural and therefore had to be accepted. It is the same now. The very foundation in fact of Communism and all its later atheistic successors is this very absolute distinction between God and creatures that was at the root of Arianism, even though the modern equivalents treat God as being necessarily a null class on the grounds of this very distinction. Any attempt to return to the Hegelian doctrine of the identity of human and divine natures will simply mean a return to another Feuerbach and Marx, trebly powerful now that there would appear to be no genuine alternative. For this reason, the Incarnational theology that is to be accepted must be that of the Contra Arianos; even the currently fashionable De Incarnatione is not enough. The only thing in the earlier work that is not emphasised very much more clearly in the later anti-Arian theology is the element of penal substitution, although in all conscience the contemporary school of "incarnational" theologians seems to ignore it. For that matter, it is ignored by theologians and Christians generally at their peril. But everything else of importance is much clearer in the later theology, and nowhere is this more so than with respect to the exaltation of our humanity in Christ which is the favourite doctrine of the Incarnationist school. There is an instructive lesson here— in spite of the traditional use of the vocabulary of "deification" by Athanasius; that is, that the way to a grateful recognition of the true exaltation of our
humanity is to accept it as real creaturely humanity and to forget all about the Hegelian identification of human and divine natures. Again, the very insistence and persistence of his Arian opponents forced Athanasius, in the Contra Arianos, to examine rigorously the difficulties of the Incarnation and what later became the Chalcedonian Christology. The strict conception of the impassibility of God, and therefore of the Divine Nature of Christ, made things difficult for him, and a rigidly Stoic or rationalistic doctrine of the impassibility of God would make an incarnational theology impossible. God must be "touched by our infirmities," and it is the whole Person of Christ, which in the Chalcedonian sense is God, which endures suffering for us, not simply one of the natures. The distinction which must be drawn by a fully-developed theology is between suffering in the sense in which God in Christ victoriously endured for the sake of those whom He called His friends, and suffering in the sense of being ultimately and decisively subdued or even annihilated. The rationalistic forms of Greek philosophy could not draw this distinction. But this failure in Athanasius is at its worst, in fact, in the De Incarnatione, where it leads to instrumentalist language about the death of Christ and His humanity as a whole which is best not imitated and which represents a level of theology which one is well advised to transcend. If the case appears to be worse in the Contra Arianos, this is only because Athanasius to a far greater extent than before is confronted with the full difficulties of the position. In fact, as we have shown in our detailed analysis, Athanasius goes a long way in the Contra Arianos towards modifying the earlier ideas of impassibility in the right direction. As to his solution to the detailed problems of what later became the Chalcedonian Christology, Athanasius may not have been entirely successful, but if he was unsuccessful, virtually everyone else in the history of theology was evasive, if he was properly confronted with the problem at all, and once again the solution on examination appears
to be much closer to success than to failure. The Arians, contrary to some impressions, may have been theological knaves, but they were no fools, and even to tackle them in a serious way would have been a severe trial of the human intellect as well as all the other qualities that are essential to a theologian - which is another lesson that the Church would do well to learn in relation to Communism.

What we have been discussing is relatively familiar and easy. But it is, for better or worse, not the field where the Church is to face its severest challenge now, and at this point we should be very clear on the great difference between the present and the fourth century. Between then and now there have intervened two of the most significant events in Church history, that are usually not appreciated but are at least comparable to the Reformation - the adoption of the Filioque and the initiation of what may be called the Opposition theology of Joachim of Flora and his successors - including Hegel and beyond. The former, as we have seen, changed Western theology and Church life from an internally static to an internally dynamic phase, and the latter was a portentous revival of the theology of the Spirit, in however perverse a form, and - this is the important point - a revival of the doctrine of the Spirit in the context of the dynamic of Christian Heilsgeschichte and eschatology. It is possible to trace a direct line from him through the Franciscan Fraticelli and other movements of this character in the Middle Ages and the enthusiasts of the Reformation period to Hegel and his successors. However questionable all this is in many of its aspects, it represents a real revival of a vital New Testament concern which the Church had all but forgotten. Unfortunately, the doctrine of Joachim of an ascending triad of Kingdoms, the Kingdom of the Father (the Old Testament, 42 generations, vide Matt. 1), the Kingdom of the Son (from the Birth of Christ, expected
to last 42 generations of 30 years each), and the final eschatological
Kingdom of the Spirit, which Joachim expected to come in A.D. 1260 and
last for ever and ever, was so heretical that the ultimate separation of
this tradition from its Christian basis and its culmination in the atro-
cities of Hitler and Stalin was what could be expected. But the point is
that this tradition is the key to understanding the great crisis of our
age - insofar as it is not a crisis of sheer despair. For Joachim is
patently the ancestor of the triadic method of Hegel and his Marxist suc-
cessors, and if anything is needed to show this it is the fact that in
Hegel's demythologisation of the Trinitarian dogma pride of place is given
to the Spirit. And even after the complete break with Christianity in
Feuerbach and Marx, there was still the triadic rhythm in history and the
intense eschatology that link Joachim to the present day.

Therefore, it is not enough to be Incarnational merely with
reference to the Second Person and the incarnate life of Christ. It is
vital to extend this incarnational principle to the present age, and do it
in such a way as to preserve intact the supremacy of the incarnate Life of
Jesus of Nazareth. This is one of the most significant corollaries of the
Filioque. Revelationally, the Kingdom of the Spirit is not the eschatol-
ogical Kingdom of Heaven, but this age now, from Pentecost to the Second
Coming, and if the Spirit proceeds from Father and Son, so must the Age of
the Spirit likewise, which means that this age must take its norm and
character from the Incarnate Life of Jesus. But it must be remembered that
the theological understanding of this must be another distinct activity;
this subject must be another locus theologicus. Otherwise, we shall fall
into one of two traps. We shall perhaps take a position of complete
quietism and adiaphorism about the historical problems of this age, on the
false ground that there can be nothing of theological significance out of


the Ascension and the Second Coming - a form of blasphemy against the Spirit? Or we shall follow Hegel, and also apparently the Apologists and ante-Nicene Christian intellectualists, in regarding the Incarnation as simply the archetype of a general principle of incarnation. This is quite true, in the right sense, but the right sense is itself the whole question of the right theology of the Spirit, and if this is ignored, the temptation would be irresistible, especially for modern man, to regard archetype in the rudimentary or embryonic sense, which in fact is the doctrine of Hegel, and Joachim. The task of the Church is to get the theology of the Incarnation proper right, and then, with the unconditional superiority of the Incarnation of the Second Person always in mind, to deal with the historical and other problems of our age on the basis of the analogy of Christ; this analogy of course will always be irreversible, as Christ is Alpha and Omega.

Thus, the effect of the intervening centuries of Church and general history on the Arian crisis, when it recurred as the Marxist crisis, was not only to make it a much more serious and fundamental attack on the Christian Faith but to change the point of attack as well, from the doctrine of the Incarnate Son to the Christologically analogous doctrine (so often rudimentary or non-existent) of the work of the Spirit. The first lesson that the Church must learn from Athanasius now is not to avoid the issue. The ground on which the struggle is being fought is a vital concern of faith, and if the Church, whether through cowardice or arrogance, evades this area of operation in its theological struggle, it will not be fulfilling its calling. In particular, if theologians simply repeat unchanged and without any addition or development the theology even of Athanasius himself, even the theology of the Contra Arianos, they will not be one with the great father of the Church, but with Eusebius of Caesarea, Basil of Ancyra, Eustathius of Sebaste, and others who knew not the hour of the Church's
theological visitation. Athanasius, for all his opposition to the Arian heresy, knew that it had exposed a besetting weakness in his predecessors, that they were not properly aware of the absolute difference between God and created reality, and that in spite of themselves they were the judgment on the Church to warn it to reinstate some essential part of the Biblical faith that had been forgotten. Therefore, Athanasius knew that one could not possibly answer Arius by going back to the ambiguities and lack of distinction of earlier theologians, but that the whole theology of the Incarnation had to be expressed on the basis of the very thing that was lacking in the traditional theology but that the Arians had resurrected. Similarly, it is impossible to answer Marx by denying the relevance of history, Heilsgeschichte, and historical eschatology to theology and faith. The sort of thing that Marx talked about is a real and indispensable part of the Christian faith, and this field must not be left to Marxists, "historians", or those peripheral Christians who have excessively fallen under the influence of alien ideologies. It must be tackled by absolutely committed Christians and Christian theologians, from the very centre of the faith. As we have said, the one great fault that we find in Karl Barth is that he is not clear on these matters. He says more than anyone else, owing to his superlative comprehension of interests, but there is still a question mark over his whole treatment of the matter; it is most dangerous to make this sort of charge against Barth, but the author has the feeling that when he uses such words as "history", Geschichte, and similar words, that he means them in their existentialist sense, which refers only to the encounter between God and individual men. The great danger in Barth is that in rightly throwing out the bath-water of rationalistic and metaphysical universality, he throws out the baby of the majesty and universality of the rightful lordship of God. This is only perhaps a danger; it
may be no more than an apparent danger or even a canard. But it is the very type of theology that is gloried in in the German-speaking world by his existentialist successors (in the chronological sense only!)

Perhaps one should not criticise any one theologian too much, since this is the side of theology that is endemically neglected in all periods. Athanasius's theology of the work of the Spirit gives us no solution, with its emphasis on sanctification in the present sense. It could be strongly argued that Athanasius has no theology of the work of the Spirit in the sense that he has a theology of the work of the Son, and that his list of the works of the Spirit simply serves the purpose of establishing that the Spirit is on the active side of the Divine operation, that is, the categorial argument for the Deity of the Spirit. But there is one place, usually considered to be on the periphery of the Contra Arianos, where Athanasius comes nearer to solving these problems than any other theologian, that is Contra Arianos II:73-82. Of orthodox theologians only Irenaeus and Augustine can be said to surpass Athanasius in this matter, and then only in terms of the prominence which they give to the issue and the circumstantial detail in which they describe the problem. In many important respects Athanasius stands supreme. Unfortunately, he never deals with the future, eschatological aspect of the process, and at first sight much of what he says may be irrelevant, but there is much material indispensable to the solution of the problem that can be found nowhere else. Firstly, there is the Doctrine of Predestination, which is presented in chs. 73-77 as the exegesis of Prov. 8:23. (Of course, in this respect Barth does not err; he develops this line still further.) In this passage, Athanasius, unlike almost every other theologian, presents the object of predestination as not primarily individuals or groups, but Christ Himself, or the whole Economy of Salvation through the Incarnation, so that it is essentially in Christ
that men are predestinated. What is established before the foundation of the world, is the Incarnate Christ, as the Plan made by a good architect in case the building shows weakness. This is the final development of the Greek form of the Logos doctrine, and it is one of the tragedies of the history of theology that it attracted so little attention. In general the work of Athanasius was to correlate the Logos more and more with God alone. But we must never forget that Christ is still the rightful Logos of the world, and this passage reminds us of this truth. He is the Logos of the world, not in the rationalistic sense, but in virtue of the Predestination of God, and it is as such that He is the Predestined One. "In Him all things consist." We see not yet all things put under His feet— and we have to give the Marxists the credit for saying something very similar — but we see Jesus... crowned with glory and honour. This is why we must dethrone dialectical materialism, historical necessity, and the force thereof, and all other similar monistic entities, not because there is a pluralistic or "absurd" structure of the world which prohibits such entities, but their place belongs to One and One only, Jesus Christ, the Way, the Truth, and the Life. It was His Incarnation that was planned before the foundation of the world, and He is the Plan, the Ultimate Principle, that rules the world in this age through the Spirit according to His incarnate work. There is really a unique body that is the bearer of this Principle and Plan, and we reject the ascription of such a task to the proletariat, or the Communist Party or anyone else, not because there is no such function, but because it rightfully belongs to the Church of Jesus Christ, and to nothing else.

The second important principle that we learn from Athanasius is that of created wisdom, which is discussed in chs. 78-82. This has the

same relation to Wisdom as the title of the Second Person, as the Body of
Christ has to the Pre-existent Second Person proper. It is this created
Wisdom which directly works in men. This principle, as such, is almost
unique in theology, but is the solution to many problems. It was applied
to Wisdom as the Second Person because at the time the theology of the
Second Person was far more developed than the theology of the Third Person,
but imperatively demands to be applied to the Spirit. In fact, there was
a tradition in the earlier Fathers that associated the title Wisdom with
the Spirit rather than with the Son. It is another major misfortune of
theology that Athanasius never returned to the detailed theology of crea-
ted wisdom or created spirit in his account of the Holy Spirit later, ex-
cept for one offhand reference to the bare existence of created spirit.
But this does not affect its importance. It is immediately evident that
it solves, for example the problem of perfectionism in the individual.
The individual has the Holy Spirit in him, but the immediate motivation of
his Christian actions is the created spirit in him which is not simply
the human spirit but has the same relation to the Holy Spirit as the Body
of Christ has to the Pre-existent Second Person. This is the true third
possibility which avoids the apparent dilemma of either having the
Christian individual either perfect in the sense of being directly divised
by the Spirit, or not essentially changed by the indwelling of the Spirit.
The same applies of course to the question of the perfection of the
Church, which is an even more contentious subject. If we agree that the
supreme sphere of operation of the Spirit is in the Church, we can
accept that all the principles of Church order, and all the rules, regu-
lations, organisation, politics, etc., connected with the Church really
come under created spirit. Thus they are not divinised, but they have
a status superior to that of creaturely forces entirely outside the field
of the special work of Christ, and therefore not adiaphora. But the
chief point of interest here is the application of this principle to history. What inhibits a true theology of history is the fear of illegitimately mixing the things of God and the things of creaturely reality. On the principle that we have been describing, there need be no such fear. The way in which the Gospel is proclaimed, the reactions of the world to it which enable it to spread, the providential ordering of the world in connection with the proclamation of the Gospel, the way in which it shows signs that the grace of God has been operative in it, and the progressive development of these even though the exasperated power of residual evil means that we shall have to endure the apocalyptic woes to the end before the Second Coming takes place; all this, insofar as it is human work, belongs to the sphere of created spirit which is to the Holy Spirit as the Body of Christ is to the Eternal Son. Or rather it is the act of Christ through the Holy Spirit with created spirit occupying the position with regard to the Holy Spirit analogous to the Body of Christ. The task of any theology that wishes to do for this age what Athanasius did for his age, is to take up these aspects of his theology where he left off, and develop them just as fully, and with just as much fidelity to the essentials of all genuinely Christian theology, as he developed the theology of the Trinity and the Incarnation proper. When we denounce such Marxist notions as the increasing solidarity of the proletarian movement, the increasing desperation of the capitalists, the final collision in the proletarian Revolution followed by the classless society which is paradoxically both the achievement of man and the inexorable destiny dictated by the laws of historical necessity, we must never denounce this picture in itself. We must do so because we believe in the proclamation of the Word which is our calling from Christ in the Spirit, the progressive unmasking and desperation of evil which is the result of this, and then, after the Gospel has been first preached to all nations, the final woes and trials followed by the Kingdom of Heaven which
shall be the sole work of God but of the God Who took flesh in Jesus Christ for our salvation, and in the Spirit bestows upon us the glorious privilege working His own works with Him. Marx has been the scourge of the Church to point out to it what its fathers had neglected or left to cranks; let us follow the example of Athanasius and, heeding the warning, give it again its rightful place.

There is one theological point that we shall have to clarify before leaving this subject. It might be objected that these Christological analogies that we have been discussing cannot be drawn because they cannot correspond to the correct Chalcedonian Christology, that is, to the Anhypostasia and the Enhypostasis of the Humanity of Christ. That is, even though Christ took our fallen humanity, He was without sin, because He was hypostatically God. If we, for instance, used this analogy about the Church, we would have an absolutely perfect Church in the way in which Christ was sinless, which we found objectionable in the first place. The answer is that the principles of Anhypostasia and Enhypostasis cannot apply in the same way with regard to these analogous situations, and the reason will be clear if we remember that the Divine Person in these is not the Son but the Spirit. There are two senses in which all Three Persons of the Trinity are personal in the same way, the sense in which personality belongs to the One Essence of the Godhead, and the sense in which there are Three Persons in the Godhead. But there is another sense in which the Father and Son are Persons, but the Spirit is not, in the sense that the Father is Father and the Son Son, but the Spirit is Spirit. In spite of the ambiguities and difficulties as between all these senses, the author cannot help feeling that the last sense is relevant to the problem. For corresponding to this sense of the impersonality of the Spirit the Spirit does not make itself hypostatically obvious. It hides itself in the person or hypostasis of men
and even churches even when exercising the right of absolute dominion over the form, direction, and power of human life, and testifies not to Its own Person, but to the things of Christ. Thus we are still dealing with real persons and churches which, under the providence of God, are not yet deprived of the power to sin before Christ comes again. This difference cannot invalidate the basic Christological analogy, but it corresponds exactly to the ontological and eternal difference between the Son and the Spirit in the Trinity.

One could dilate endlessly on other aspects of the Athanasian theology that are of crucial significance for this age, and indeed for every age. There is, for instance, the fact that Athanasius is the principal theologian for the doctrine of analogy, even though he did not use any of the technical terms. The very nature of the Arian controversy compelled him to make it clear that analogy played an indispensable part in all theological statement. There is also the acme of the doctrine of analogy, that it is, for instance, the Fatherhood of God the Father and the Sonship of God the Son that are the true fatherhood and sonship, and that it is precisely human fatherhood and sonship that are always breaking down into what they are not, and which need their dialectical antithesis for their complete understanding — in which Athanasius anticipated Freud by a millennium and a half. There is, in relation to this, his unrivalled exposition of what we now see as the problem of analogia entis and analogia fidei. There is his unrivalled exposition of what created reality means and how creation differs from the eternal generation of the Son. Even in his failure to transcend the physical analogies favoured by his contemporaries, he at least made a beginning, and even if he failed to establish the Filioque, he at least intimately related the doctrine of the Spirit to that of the Son. All this was done with the minimum of technical jargon. But let us conclude
with one important principle, that of our participation, and related words, in God's nature and purpose and grace, the word that was originally and classically by the Platonic Socrates for the way in which particulars shared in ideas, on an absolutely lower plane. Now, it is fashionable to criticise Plato, but before we do so, we should be very careful of what we are really criticising. We dare not criticise him for "idealism" purely and simply; the prevalence of this sort of criticism is one indication of the fascination exercised by Marxist ways of thought. If we believe in God the Omnipotent, Who transcends all that is material, we cannot deny, but must accept, however cautiously, that our theology look like idealism. When we criticise the hierarchical aspect of the doctrine of participation, we must remember that the transcendence of Forms over particulars is as nothing to the transcendence of God. We must criticise his basic theoretical bias, but the Platonic Socrates is in very extensive company here. Above all, we must denounce, along with Feuerbach and Marx, all idealism that is escapist and therefore fundamentally mendacious, but even here it was Parmenides, not the Platonic Socrates, who considered "appearances" not worth "saving". We dare not say that God is simply the "ultimate meaning" or "significance" of life, as if this were true indiscriminately, as if there were not some things that God wills to annihilate, but again it was the Platonic Parmenides and not Socrates who said that the theory of Forms would have to apply to dirt in the same way as to anything else. When we remember all this, we can see that this concept of Participation is the best possible way of describing the relation between God and man. It safeguards the absolute transcendence of God in His Being and Grace, while also safeguarding the real status of man which God graciously confers. Concretely, we must remember that we participate, not as instruments but as fellow-workers and friends by adoption and grace, in God's plan. The great danger in the revival of the Reformation emphasis on God's
absolute transcendence in grace, is that it will apparently demand a sort of depressive quietism in matters ecclesiastical and secular, including theology, which is apparently so appropriate to the age in which life has seemingly got out of control. No; it is precisely because God has been gracious to us that we can and may work. We are liberated from precisely this futile and pernicious quietism and depression, so that we may not bear the bounden duty, but share the glorious privilege, of being God's co-workers, under His grace, in His purpose in history, whether proclaiming the Redemption that has been already accomplished in Christ, or pointing forward to the glory that is to come.

Perhaps the last lesson to learn from Athanasius is this, his sheer vitality and exuberance in every way. It is generally recognised that he had in unusual measure the love of a Christian for God and his neighbour, and also the practical qualities which enabled him to organise his diocese, resist the onslaught of heresy, and endure any hardship that came his way. As this is a theological study, we must add that he understood that an intellectual must love God with all his mind, that the crisis demanded a heavy tribute of intellect, and that God will surely reward in full those who give their mind to Him. In these days of the hypertrophy of the secular intellect, it is all too easy to accept the canard that the Christian faith is not a fit subject for the intellect. Nothing less than Athanasius's intellectual devotion is required in this great crisis, and it is a tragedy that there was not another Athanasius at hand a century ago, in the days of Fuerbach and Marx. Pray God that He will send another Athanasius into the harvest.
Note: Where reference is made to chapters within the main chapter subdivisions of the thesis, the reference is to the chapters of the work of Athanasius under discussion, together with routine comment on the same, since the form of the thesis is a simple exegesis of the writings of Athanasius, to show the development of his theology.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography includes all the main works on Athanasius and the main topics of the thesis, although certain works, of decidedly peripheral interest, mentioned in the notes (normally with full title etc.) have been omitted, since they would produce an unbalanced bibliography.

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1. SCRIPTURE has been cited in the main in the Authorized Version unless it seriously misrepresents the Greek as it appears in Athanasius. The Greek, where necessary, is as cited by Athanasius, and on occasions the Hebrew Massoretic Text is cited. The English version of passages from the Apocryphal books, etc. is as it appears in the translation used.


Vols. XXV and XXVI. Historica et dogmatica
Vol. XXVII Exegetica.
Vol. XXVIII Dubia et spuria.
Note: Many of the works included in Vol. XXVI are now considered to be either dubious or spurious. Volume XXV includes Montfaucon's Introduction, and other notes.

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96 - 197 De Incarnatione Verbi Dei
197 - 203 Expositio Fidei (? - duh)
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together with other works now regarded as highly dubious or spurious, and a Latin translation of the Festal Letters.


Note: Publication and distribution of these works was severely hindered by the Second World War. The
author has had access only to the first nine loose-leaf publications, comprising (in the original plan), Band III, Teil I. Urkunde zur Aufang des arianischen Streites, 318-328 (Lieferungen 1-2; this was intended to extend to the Council of Constantinople, 381).


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XLII - XLIII Epiphanius (Haer. LXIX - Ariomaniacs.

LXXIII - Semiarians

LXXIV - Pneumatromachi

LXXVI - Anomoeans.

LXXII Socrates. Sozomen

LXXX-LXXXIV Theodoret.

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Library.
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Note: Apart from the articles of Loofs above, none of the other articles in encyclopaedias, etc. was found to be of sufficient importance for citation, although they are always useful for gauging the generally accepted opinion among Protestant or Roman Catholic scholarship, as the case may be, at the time.