THE PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES BEARING ON
ALEXANDER CAMPBELL AND THE BEGINNINGS
OF THE DISCIPLES OF CHRIST MOVEMENT

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the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
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PREFACE

During the early stages of research on the philosophical background of Alexander Campbell, the author attended a meeting of the Theological Commission on the Church, a part of the Commission on Faith and Order which was held at Cambridge University. The subject under discussion concerned the background of the divisions among the churches. All those present agreed that the differences were mainly theological, philosophical, social, economic, or political. Emphasis was placed upon the fact that often in the background the philosophical assumptions are unconscious.

All of these factors were important in the life and work of Alexander Campbell and the Movement which he helped to bring into existence. He inherited a theology which he greatly modified, the covenant theology. He adopted a philosophy that he rather consistently followed throughout the course of his life, the philosophy of John Locke and the Scottish Common Sense School of Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, and James Beattie. He came within the scope of social, economic and political factors which had a great deal to do with the contribution which he was able to make to the religious life of his time and to future efforts toward Christian unity.

Alexander Campbell's religious thought parallels to an amazing degree the thought of Albert Ritschl, F. D. Maurice,
P. T. Forsyth and John Oman. He recovered a note which had been lost in Aristotelian thought in its passion for logical precision. It was a rediscovery of the personal relationship of God to men.

When Alexander Campbell went to the Scriptures to look for a basis for the united church he made two discoveries which were of great importance. The first of these was the discovery that the unity of faith in the New Testament church consisted in a common loyalty to the religious leadership of a person rather than to a special set of beliefs about God. The church was not a number of people united in certain metaphysical convictions. It was rather a union of those who sought to follow the inspiring leadership of a Master who had given them a great new insight into the loving nature of God. The second discovery was that the early church expressed this faith, not in the verbal symbols of a creed, but in the symbolic gestures of the two great Christian ordinances, one to declare the adoption of that faith and the other to declare at regular, repeated intervals its maintenance. These discoveries resulted from his realization that the Word of God is an acted word even more than it is a spoken word. In such a way, God's character and purpose are revealed through the Scripture. He had a definite realization that Revelation was 'a given' but it was 'a given' which called for a response, there was something for man to do. This led to the conviction that creeds should not divide those who are loyal to the person and purposes of Christ, that freedom of thought in matters of belief is not incompatible with loyal cooperation in the life and work of the church. He saw the desirability and
need of union in organization and spirit on a basis of voluntary cooperation which would preserve the freedom of the local congregation.

Alexander Campbell was not primarily a philosopher. His primary interest was in the study and proclamation of the scriptures but he was always concerned with the problems of both theology and philosophy. Like every other thoughtful person he accepted and acted upon certain definite philosophical and theological principles. So far as is known this is the first attempt to trace the interaction of the philosophy of John Locke and the Scottish School upon him. In the judgment of the writer, Alexander Campbell and his contribution to the thought of his age is more readily understood with his philosophical background in mind. Many of his important conceptions were strengthened by his philosophical adherence, and he was able to make use of his philosophy in an able defense of revealed religion.

Alexander Campbell was an ecumenical thinker. In this day when the Ecumenical Movement is such a vital part of the religious picture, a study of his thought and of the Movement in which he had such a dominant role is of importance. Perhaps no part of his thought has been so neglected as the philosophical influences bearing on him.
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CHAPTER I
THE MAN AND HIS AGE

I. The Intellectual Background of His Age

No man can be really understood without some appreciation of his intellectual heritage. Of no person is this more true than Alexander Campbell. The child of Scots Presbyterian upbringing, his parents were poor in worldly fortune but rich in wisdom and character. They bequeathed to him a rich legacy. His mind was broadened and deepened in the halls of one of Scotland's great universities, Glasgow, where the philosophy of Locke and Reid and Stewart and the science of Bacon and Newton were the standards of the classrooms and where in the lodgings of the students excited argument often sprang from speculations over the success or failure of the new experiment in government being undertaken by the republic across the ocean in the west.

The story of Alexander Campbell really is identified with the growth and struggles of the American nation. Born in the midst of revolution in Ireland in 1788, he died in the midst of reconstruction in America in 1866. His life is as colorful as the era it spanned. Immigrating to the United States in 1809, he became a citizen of the new republic who was vitally concerned over whatever problem affected the welfare of his adopted country, whether religious, political, social, or economic.

While still in the old World, in his father's North
Ireland study and in the "quiet inner courts" of Glasgow's university, Alexander Campbell had begun to examine the ways of orthodox Calvinism and had laid the foundation for the quest of faith which in the New World was to eventuate in his leadership of a new movement for the unity of Christ's church, and which was to become the largest Protestant body of American origin.

Every movement possessing the vitality and the power to achieve results manifested by the reformation inaugurated by the Campbells has roots that reach far back into history. It is exceedingly profitable and interesting to trace these roots in order to learn what were the influences which shaped and made necessary such a movement.

A factor of significance in differentiating Campbell from the great Protestant reformers of the sixteenth century is that he was a reformer coming out of the background of the Enlightenment. This gave him a tremendous advantage as he did his work on the American frontier. The scholastic philosophy which the early reformers inherited and the creedal formulations of the sixteenth century were not in the thought patterns of the American frontier, whereas Campbell's religious ideas were the counterpart of the formative secular ideas in the pioneer, frontier life of America.

The stream of life and thought in which Alexander Campbell and the Disciples of Christ in the early nineteenth century have their development is the seventeenth century Renaissance and the eighteenth century English Enlightenment.

The Renaissance moved toward an emphasis upon an under-
standing and an appreciation of the natural world and of human life within that scene. There were positive and constructive principles developed under its influence. Among these, were its challenge to institutional authority, its critical spirit, and its insistence upon the intellectual and spiritual freedom of the individual. The men of the Renaissance were in rebellion, consciously striving to put off a tradition they felt to be a burden. This rebellion was against a way of life that was corrupt, overelaborated, stale, unlovely, and untrue. They seek to open a window and let in the fresh air. They desire simplicity. These humanists had an interest in origins and a respect for ancient standards as possessing a validity superior to that of later ones. From this we see a similar impulse on the part of Campbell and the early leaders of the Disciples of Christ to return to the beginnings of Christianity. They had an equal enthusiasm for the Bible as the authoritative classic of the faith, and a desire to restore a primitive, and therefore perfect Christianity. They were classical scholars desirous of understanding the treasures and wisdom of the ancient world not only among the Greeks and Romans but also among the Hebrews and early Christians. They mastered the biblical languages and literature and felt satisfaction in possession of the original words of scripture and of the teaching of Jesus found there.

The English Enlightenment from Bacon and Locke to Reid was a development of this Renaissance mood. As Ernst Cassirer indicates:
Enlightenment philosophy simply fell heir to the heritage of the preceding centuries. It ordered, sifted, developed, and clarified this heritage rather than contributed and gave currency to new and original ideas. Yet in spite of this dependence with respect to content, the Enlightenment produced a completely original form of philosophic thought.¹

This was a century characterized by a restless spirit of inquiry. Traditions which had been long venerated became the objects of searching investigation. The old beliefs which failed to justify themselves at the bar of reason were discarded. There was a real protest against metaphysical speculation. Instead of confining philosophy within the limits of a systematic doctrinal structure, the Enlightenment wants philosophy to move freely, and in so doing discover the form of all natural and spiritual being. Its thirst for knowledge and intellectual curiosity is directed not only toward the external world; the thought of this age is even more impelled by the nature and potentiality of thought itself. Pope gave brief and pregnant expression to this deep-seated feeling of the age in the line: "The proper study of mankind is man."

Symbolic of this change of direction, Aristotle appeared no longer merely as the revered authority in formal logic and in the use of syllogism in sophisticated argument. He was discovered as a scientist, an interested observer of nature, and of the ways of human beings with one another and with the actual world about them.

Francis Bacon was the first to break the supremacy of the Aristotelianism which had so long held sway in England. In his Novum Organum he described the new method of approach to the discovery of truth which was later to have such effect. It was Bacon's purpose to study "facts" and from them form principles rather than to find that which agrees with the principles already laid down. It was this inductive method that he developed which was so highly appreciated by Campbell and which he was able to use so effectively.

It was not until the time of Isaac Newton and John Locke that this method entered all the fields of human interest. These men were the guiding lights, so what they stood for was even more important than their own outstanding achievements. What Cragg says is true, "Locke epitomized the outlook of his own age, and anticipated the thought of the succeeding period." Newton's influence was largely in the realm of science. He gave the world in mathematical form the mechanical view of nature, the first great synthesis on which succeeding science has rested. His work was the outgrowth of the Copernican and Cartesian revolutions. Locke, writing toward the close of the seventeenth century, summed up the great struggles for liberty in the political, religious, and intellectual fields. Campbell found the basis of his religious philosophy where Thomas Jefferson

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1B. Willey indicates that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the "contempt for scholasticism" was traditional. Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1934), p. 34.

found the basis of his political philosophy in the writings of John Locke.

In the light of the findings of Bacon, Locke, and Newton others in the eighteenth century were to pioneer in new areas as yet unexplored. But their emphasis was one-sided, so the end of the century saw a revolt in Romanticism. The two predominant ideas at the beginning of the century were Nature and Reason. As the century drew to a close the idea of Nature remained a dominant concept, but it had shifted from a rational to an emotional principle.¹ In writing of the complexity of the eighteenth century Dr. William Robinson has well pointed out:

The century produced, not only rationalists of the type of John Toland, Samuel Clark, and William Paley, but mystics such as William Whiston and William Law: not only was it under the domination of empiricists like John Locke and David Hume, but it also produced a first class philosophy of the transcendental type—-that of Joseph Butler, in some senses superior to its Continental counterpart—-that of Immanuel Kant. If it had of itself no moral vigour, but practised an easy-going complaisance, it produced two of the greatest moral philosophers—Butler and Kant.²

Why is it that Locke has been described as "the writer whose influence pervades the eighteenth century with an almost scriptural authority"?³ No doubt this was because his thought was the starting point for many different men and movements.

Confidence in the faculty of rational insight had a considerable


history before Locke's time. Since the time of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, the application of reason to religious matters had held promise of providing a final way out of the differences of the warring sects. Natural theology and Christian philosophy had come forward, particularly with the Cambridge Platonists, to urge the reverent use of reason to determine the fundamentals of religious belief. Fully aware of this tradition, Locke wrote his work on *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, claiming as his chief qualification for the task only the piety and fairness of mind that must characterize a reasonable man. This involved the assumption that reason can determine for all practical purposes the realities with which religion is concerned, as well as the nature of that concern. Just how this primary axiom was developed in the Age of Rationalism can be indicated best by noting its presence in Locke's thought. Though modified in significant respects by Samuel Clarke, Bishop Butler and William Paley, Locke's formulation was sufficiently catholic to be used by his successors as the problem of religious thought.

In *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, Locke recognizes two independent sources of religious knowledge—two distinct origins of the idea of God, and with it of the idea of man's responsibility in the sight of God. The first is supernatural revelation, authenticated as revelation through the performance of miracles by the bearers of Divine truth, and through the fulfillment of prophecies by those favored messengers. The second is necessary inference from the facts of inner perception by anyone who seriously fulfills the requirements of valid
inference. As for the practical effectiveness in disseminating religious knowledge, he holds that revelation is by far the more important and authoritative of the two. Rational demonstrations give only fragmentary glimpses of man's whole duty to God and his neighbor. Revelation gives the comprehensive picture. Even so, when Locke considers the truth of religion and seeks appropriate reasons for commending Christianity, he reverses the order and gives preference to the theistic knowledge derived by inference. The norm of all that is to be accepted as true and acted upon as trustworthy is ultimately the knowledge that is obtained by man's native faculty of reason. Locke defines the relation of reason and revelation for the eighteenth century in this way:

Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately; which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away reason to make way for revelation puts out the light of both.¹

What is the character and extent of the religious knowledge to be obtained by reason? The answer to this involves some basic tenets of Locke's philosophy, but chiefly his doctrine of the three-fold knowledge of existence. "I say that we have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition; of the existence of God by demonstration; and of other things by sensation."² He

²Ibid., Vol. IV, Chap. ix, p. 2.
retains the Cartesian doctrine of the duality of substances—mental and material, and the consequent notion of their relation to one another through the medium of "representative perceptions." He accepts the criterion of "clear and distinct ideas" as the mark of true knowledge, adding only that sense experience contributes necessarily to any and all such ideas.

According to Locke, there are two kinds of experience: sensation and reflection, the data presented to the mind by the five senses and the mind's operation upon those data. Out of these materials he builds his empirical philosophy. Let us look now at how he develops his conception of the three-fold knowledge of existence.

Knowledge of the self needs no formal proof, as it is intuitive and immediate. Reason is the most characteristic function of the self. His conception of the self is important as a step in the direction of the knowledge of God.

Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself... yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness; since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us. 1

The evidence for the existence of God he holds is equal to mathematical certainty. His proof is based upon a principle of causation. Summarized, it may be stated thus. 1) That something actually exists every man knows from the certainty of his self-existence. 2) Nonentity cannot produce any real thing; therefore, from eternity there has been something—an eternal Being. 3) This

1Ibid., Vol. IV, Chap. x, p. 1.
eternal Being must be more powerful to be the source and original of all existing powers. 4) The most powerful, eternal Being must also be most knowing to be the source of the knowledge and reason which man finds in himself, as it is impossible that "incogitative" matter should produce a "cogitative being."

5) The final inference is that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being--a necessarily existing eternal Mind, "which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident."¹

 Implicit in this argument, is the a priori validity of the principle that every existing thing given in experience must have a cause, from which it is distinguished as an effect, and to which it nevertheless owes its distinctive character. In the light of this principle, the most important theological consequence of treating nature as a realm of effects is the conception of a God who, is external to His creatures, but at the same time is like them in power and in knowledge.

Knowledge of everything else besides self and God is said to come by sensation. This form of knowledge stands on a lower plane than that derived from intuition and demonstration. Sensation vouches for the existence of particular things, but only at the moment of experience, and only by means of faculties which in part reveal and in part conceal what it is that exists. This element of uncertainty is enlarged when the moment of experience is gone and the idea of the particular thing has passed

into memory, for there is even less guarantee that the idea retained in the mind corresponds to anything existing in actual fact. Thus, Locke is led to the conclusion that sensation gives a very imperfect form of knowledge of material objects. And for this reason, the observational sciences of all kinds can do no more than systematize a body of knowledge, which possesses only a high degree of probability. Strict scientific demonstration in this area of research is beyond reach, and probability is the only available guide. This teaching affects Locke's theistic "demonstration" because it is to sensation that he traces any and all "ideas" arising in the mind—from the simplest to the most complex. And the all-important notion of causation, which embodies the principle on which the demonstration turns, is explained in the fashion of a thorough-going sensationalism. Locke teaches that the idea of cause and effect is an inference from the repeated experience of natural events.

In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect.1

But clearly the resultant idea of causation does not amount to the a priori assertion that every existing thing given in experience must have a cause. It is at best an imperfect induction from the multitude of particular changes the senses record. And Locke left the matter at this, without reconciling his divergent accounts of causation. The two views represent the two strains

in his thinking which his successors were to find radically inconsistent, and they sought to rectify the inconsistency by moving either toward a more consistent rationalism or a more consistent empiricism.

Locke did not see anything revolutionary in his philosophy. He simply looked upon what he had done as a clarification of orthodox ideas in religion and morals. But those who came after him, and carried out his principles with rigid logic, came to results which would have astounded the devout philosopher. He set forces at work which did not stop with him.

One development from Locke's theory of knowledge came in the thought of George Berkeley. Locke had said that all the objects of knowledge are ideas, and he had difficulty in defending the reality of the things which he supposed to be represented by the ideas. Berkeley denied this distinction. The ideas are the things. "It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding." But when this opinion is questioned, the contradiction is evident. The objects are the things we perceive by sense, and we perceive nothing by our own ideas. With regard to material things, just one phrase expresses Berkeley's thought: "their esse is percipi." Active, independent existence can belong to persons or minds only. Material things

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only have a passive, dependent existence. Though Berkeley rejects Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, the idea of cause still holds good for him. He explains the rise of ideas in our minds by referring them to the direct activity of God.

Hume went even further than Berkeley. He continued to their conclusions the lines of thought Locke started in his empiricism and sensationalism. He attacked the necessity of the causal relation as being without real validity; actually there is nothing more than the customary association in our minds. He refused to admit that even reflection was a factor in the making of ideas. By a rigorous analysis of what we actually experience in our perceptions, Hume believed he had succeeded in disclosing that all that we know directly are our perceptions themselves, and that we have no knowledge of the nature or continued existence of objects in the outer world, or of our own personal identity as selves. We have no way whatever to discover the "unknown causes" from which our impressions arrive.\(^1\) This leaves no ground for the acceptance of an external spiritual reality as cause for ideas. Hume called his own view Scepticism. In his *Essay on Miracles* he applied sensationalism to maintain a miracle, as a supernatural event could not be established, even if it could be shown that the events actually happened, for it is impossible to demonstrate.

The sensationalist arguments were more systematically developed in France than in Britain. Holbach in his *System of Nature* and in *Common Sense* denied God, freedom, and immortality. He believed that Newtonian science was a complete explanation of the universe. Matter and motion explain everything. They are eternal. He said quite frankly what a good many intelligent Frenchmen were thinking by 1770.

Another product of the Enlightenment which gained impetus from Locke's thought, much to his irritation, as was evident in his reply to Toland and his repudiation of the doctrines in *Christianity Not Mysterious*, was Deism. This was really a denial of the validity of the concept of revelation and a reduction of Christianity to "natural religion." Deists maintained that natural religion is a sufficient guide to knowledge of God, and that the law of nature gives us all we need to know of virtue. In denying revelation, they were of course saying that there is no religious truth above reason, that Christianity is not a special revelation, that miracles have no evidential value, that the contents of the Bible did not come from God. They held that pure Christianity was identical with the religion of nature.

Many of the Deists considered themselves stalwart defenders of the religion of Jesus Christ. They denied only that the additions to the religion of nature, the many positive precepts of Christianity, were of divine origin. They were attempt-

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2 Class Notes, Principal Baillie.
ing, in what they did, to distinguish the essential from the non-essential in Christianity. By promoting true morality and religion and casting aside what they considered the superstitions of the traditional Christian system they thought they were doing this.¹ Hume helped to bring Deism to its culmination through his skepticism. When he destroyed the argument for God's existence on which they had depended on the Lockian basis, he did away with their moorings.

Interestingly enough, both the Deists and their adversaries, the supernatural rationalists, had much the same conception of God. The whole age, in line with Newton's thought, thought of the universe as a vast machine. God was the intelligent Creator of this harmonious and orderly mechanism. The analogy most often made was to a watch. Watches are made, they do not just happen; they are well planned, they fulfill a purpose. God was the great watchmaker, he started it, and it runs alone.² Addison put Newton's argument into verse in his well-known hymn, "The Spacious Firmament on High." For the Deists, the function of God was simply to start the machine. Newton himself thought that periodic adjustments on the part of the Creator would be necessary.

The development of moral philosophy in the Eighteenth Century was stimulated by the Enlightenment. Locke thought of the moral order as a direct extension of the rational order.


God is thus seen to be the Moving Spirit of moral and rational orderliness. He is worshipped most worthily by extracting His thoughts from his creation and thinking them after Him, without the distortion of enthusiasm. And in a future state, he may be expected to apportion rewards and punishments in the measure that men have helped or hindered his cosmic order.\(^1\) In addition to being subject to the law of God, man is subject to civil law and to public opinion. Moral good is the conformity to some law.\(^2\) He found the motive and sanction of virtue in self-interest.

The successors of Locke applied empirical methods to the study of ethics, and disclosed foundations of morality in human nature, reason, and experience. The third Earl of Shaftesbury, Frances Hutcheson, Joseph Butler, and William Paley worked along these lines.

One of the ethical phases of the Enlightenment, possibly stimulated by Renaissance individualism, was the tremendous interest of the leaders in toleration, and the application of this ideal increased through the period. In earlier times, there had been this desire, but the application was made difficult by the political conditions prevailing. Rupert Meldenius coined the phrase, now classic: "In essentials, unity; in non-essentials, liberty; in all things, charity." Roger Williams in 1644 wrote a great statement in defense of the separation of church and state and he was able to put this idea into practice in Rhode

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Island. John Milton in his *Areopagitica* (1644) gave utterance to words, which while not going so far as Williams, expressed the desire for a real reformation which would issue in a new church and a new England with Christian civil liberty. Stillingfleet, in his *Irenicum* (1659) asked for the church to require no more than Christ himself did of his apostles, as conditions for communion. The rebuke which he received was the Act of Uniformity of 1662 which enabled the Church of England to cast away its most vigorous element—Puritanism. Richard Baxter's irenic spirit pled for unity and he popularized Meldenius' slogan in England. Chillingworth's often-quoted words, "the Bible, and the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants," were written in a context which emphasized this as a unifying principle. The Stuart despotism made it impossible for their ideal to become a reality, but gradually the weakening hold of the territorial church idea was manifest.

John Locke, in 1689, wrote from Holland, where he had fled from the wrath of James II, his *Letters on Toleration*, which helped prepare the way for the Toleration Act of 1689, secured under William and Mary. This practically established freedom of worship.¹ In his work, Locke distinguished between the spheres of church and state. The state is a secular device to secure life, liberty, health, freedom of person, and security of property. It is not concerned with the cure of souls. He maintained that no church has the right to exclusive protection

from the government. No church has the right to impose its ritual or its creed on those unwilling to associate themselves voluntarily with it. Toleration for him had its limits, however. The state cannot tolerate those religious groups requiring allegiance to a foreign prince of authority supreme above that of the state. Neither can atheists be tolerated. The first exception had reference to Catholicism. His experience of the political absolutism of the Stuarts was fresh on his mind, and he saw the dangers of papal control over men's consciences in the affairs of the English people. He reasoned that atheism removed the theological sanction for morality, and thus destroyed the sense of obligation which is the basis of morality.

Similar principles of toleration were proclaimed by nearly all the thinkers of the eighteenth century, though not always in the same degree. Voltaire was ready to help victims of persecution, but he wanted to confine eligibility to public office to members of the state religion. By the time of the French Revolution, there were some who wanted no line drawn whatever. Holbach (Mirabeau) protested even against the use of the word, and Thomas Paine's Rights of Man argued that both toleration and intolerance were despotisms.

The political philosophy of the eighteenth century likewise stemmed from the Enlightenment. In most of Europe enlightened despotism prevailed under such monarchs as Frederick the Great of Prussia, Charles III of Spain, Catherine II of Russia, or Joseph II of Austria. In France under the Bourbons was enlightened despotism. In England and in America there was
constitutional government. Voltaire much admired the achievements of constitutionalism in England, but he thought that those results could better be achieved through enlightened monarchy. He concentrated his efforts, therefore, to influencing monarchs in reform. Voltaire had little faith in the common man. The idea of an enlightened monarch failed for several reasons, however. Hereditary monarchy did not always produce such. Even those kings who desired reform unless they had the active cooperation of their people, could not achieve results. Human nature resists "liberty" handed down from above.

John Locke in his Two Treatises on Civil Government furnished the apologia for the English Revolution of 1689, and his work became the starting point of many of the conceptions later detailed in America and France. His argument is based on the theory of man's transition from a state of nature to a state of political society by means of a binding social contract.

These principles of Locke and the division of powers suggested by Montesquieu were particularly favored by the American colonists. Jefferson when he wrote the Declaration of Independence was writing down the ideas shared by all thinking people.

Rousseau developed a much more radical democratic theory on the basis of Locke's premises. In France this theory was used to justify the French Revolution; in America it was incorporated into Jeffersonian and later Jacksonian democracy.

The French Revolution affected the life and thought of the Western world for many years. The placid waters during the
early years of the century were transformed toward its close into the cataracts of revolution. An ancient order of society was destroyed, and new forces and ideas of social, political, and religious life were emerging. The French Revolution put into practice many of the theories which the eighteenth century Enlightenment had developed, and in other respects it was a decided reaction to many of these ideas. William Godwin, an English writer, who was a revolutionary, caught something of the ardent tone of the closing years of the century in his Political Justice. Edmund Burke, the great English statesman and writer, was the conservative reaction. He rejected the abstract reasoning which has been pushed to such revolutionary consequences in France.

Toward the close of the eighteenth century, as has already been suggested, there was a strong current of reaction against the predominant note of the age, the scientific methods and ideals of the Enlightenment. Romanticism was an emphasis on the less rational side of human nature. It was the appeal to the whole breadth and expanse of man's experience. The early romanticists accepted the eighteenth century ideal of the natural, but they interpreted it differently. The natural man is not the rational man, but the man of passion and feeling. One aspect of this was the emphasis placed upon returning to nature, emphasizing the simplicity of mind and manners of man's natural state in contrast with the artificialities and superficialities of a

1Alfred Cobden, op. cit., p. 12
sophisticated age. This was a secular parallel to the desire of many earnest Christians to return to a "simple, primitive Christianity," departing from ecclesiastical jargon and irrelevancy. Romanticism emphasized individuality and personality above all things. One of its characteristics was open-mindedness, a willingness to receive whatever of truth and whatever of value any experience might reveal. The ideal was the realization of the unique potentialities of every man.

Both Rousseau and Burke gave expression to the Romantic spirit in its early phases in different ways. Sir Walter Scott transposed into fiction the fundamental ideas of Burke. He showed through concrete instances, vividly depicted, the value and interest of a natural body of traditions. Burns sounded the new note in his poetry in Scotland and Wordsworth did in England. Both found their themes in nature and in simple life.

Romanticism was not the only reaction to the thought of the Enlightenment. There were others equally significant as we shall see. Sometimes these reactions were against the whole sweep of Enlightenment thought, sometimes with regard to just one manifestation of its development. William Law and Joseph Butler were both concerned to counteract the claims of Deism.

William Law was a famous mystic. His book *The Case of Reason* was an answer to Tindal's *Christianity As Old As Creation*, the "Deist's Bible." He denied that reason had any power in the realm of religion. "For though no revelation can come from God but what is truly worthy of him and full of internal excellence; yet what is truly worthy of God to be revealed cannot possibly
be known to us, but by revelation from himself.\textsuperscript{1} He maintained that only by revelation can we know what is right and wrong. His argument was a repudiation of the Deists, but was also a repudiation of Locke. The choice he offered was clear: abandon reason or abandon religion.

Joseph Butler's Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed was more effective in answering the Deists,\textsuperscript{2} because he did not go so far as Law in rejecting the use of reason in religion, though he did reduce the use of reason to narrow limits. He pointed out that nature and revelation are both baffling and in some respects unsatisfying. There are just as many difficulties in proving God from the constitution and course of Nature as there are in accepting Revelation,\textsuperscript{3} and they are difficulties of the same kind. In this regard they seem to be products of the same mind. Here he departs somewhat from the eighteenth century tradition which finds nothing imperfect in Nature. In dealing with the Deistical objection that Revelation lacks clarity, Butler affirms that it is probable God intends to test our capacities in understanding revelation, just as he does in exploring the secrets of nature. What chiefly distinguishes revelation from nature, he goes on to add, is the biblical prophecies and miracles. His argument was considered effective in its day, though present day criticism realizes it is a two-

\textsuperscript{1}William Law, \textit{The Case of Reason} (London: W. Innys & J. Richardson, 1755) p. 101.

\textsuperscript{2}Basil Willey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{3}Leslie Stephen, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. 1, p. 281.
edged sword. It may remove difficulties as he hoped it would, or it may lead to the realization that both Christianity and natural religion are irrational, causing skepticism.

A reaction against the skepticism of Hume was led by a group of Scottish philosophers, Thomas Reid, James Beattie, George Campbell and Dugald Stewart. Of this group, Thomas Reid was the most notable figure. This Scottish school stood as the champion of religion and morality against skepticism and materialism, and it occupied a commanding position at the turn of the century in Britain, France, and America. Reid agrees with Locke in appealing to experience and follows Locke's lead in making a study of the human mind by inductive methods. His interest in science led him to an unqualified admiration of the doctrines associated with the names of Bacon and Newton.¹ He believed that philosophy could use the same methods.² It was the publication of Hume's Treatise in 1739 that first stirred his creative thinking. The total skepticism of this document seemed to him subversive of theology and morals. As he saw it, Hume's arguments were virtually unassailable, and therefore if his conclusions were absurd it could only be because his premises were false. Those premises he took to be the theory of ideas which Hume had accepted from Descartes and Locke. This theory


that the immediate objects of the mind's cognition are always ideas, had not been supported by evidence, and was false. We directly perceive the real objects of the outer world as they actually exist, not ideas or copies of them. Reid maintained that what we perceive with our senses is directly connected with the belief or judgment that its object is present in the external world independent of our perception of it. Memory likewise implies knowledge of the actual occurrence of the event recalled. This belief is a simple act of the mind, which cannot be further analyzed or defined. These judgments of "common sense" are immediate; they are prior to reasoning; they are self-evident. Having disposed of the only existences which Hume allowed, Reid is able to reassert the real existence of mind and external objects, which Hume denied. He divides the principles of common sense into contingent truths, which may change from time to time, and necessary truths, which are eternal.

Of all this background of thought, Alexander Campbell was well aware. The most specific influence upon him will be investigated in the next chapter. Since his formative years were spent in the Old World we need now to look at the religious conditions in both England and Scotland before he left for America.

By the time of the eighteenth century, the Church of England was definitely episcopal. Ever since the English Reformation, it had been evident there would be an established church in England with the king as its head. But for a long time it was not clear as to the kind of church it would be, or
what form of Protestant faith and order would be included. Con-
troversy arose between Puritans and ritualists as to order, and
as to the various forms of organization: presbyterian, con-
gregational, and episcopal. Episcopacy won with the restoration
of Charles II to the monarchy. The Act of Uniformity of 1662,
that followed, compelled the dissenters from episcopacy to con-
form or to leave the church. A harsh system of persecution was
inaugurated. This did not end until the Toleration Act of 1689
which came at the beginning of the reign of William and Mary.
This marked the beginning of legalized nonconformity and the
rise of modern denominationalism.

The men who took the lead in the Church after the
Revolution shared the spirit of the new and tolerant age, the
Age of Enlightenment. They were called "Latitudinarian" because
they shared broad and somewhat indefinite views. In their
practical aims they strove to reunite Churchmen and Dissenters.
One of the best representatives of such opinions was Archbishop
Tillotson. He was the most eloquent and persuasive preacher of
his day. He placed special importance on bringing religion to
the test of reason. On such grounds he endeavored to prove the
unreasonableness of atheism and infidelity. Two of the important
controversies of the period were the Bangorian instigated by
Benjamin Hoadly in which some fifty divines joined, and the
Trinitarian, which exposed the liberal views of William Whiston
and Samuel Clark.

Early writers among the Deists professed their allegiance
to the National Church. The deistic writings brought forth a
host of answers. Already mentioned have been Law's and Butler's. Two others were: Bishop Warburton's *DivineLegation of Moses*, Bishop Berkeley's *Alciphron*.

Much has been said with regard to the lack of religious conviction of the clergy of the period. There was this tendency on the part of those who relied completely on reason to be sure, but as Watson stated: "An unemotional England was in the main well served by men who practiced and taught a Christianity that appealed to the very limitations of the age. Their merit was not the less that among their contemporaries were others, themselves laboring under limitations equally grave, who satisfied that emotional need of which mankind was becoming increasingly conscious from the middle of the century."

There came a decided reaction to this rationalism so predominant in the thought of the time and in the church. This came much earlier than the reaction of Romanticism, as it began soon after the first third of the century. Much of the population was not being reached through the channels of the national church. Moral laxity and religious indifference were all too characteristic of the time. There was a tremendous need for a revival of religion when the great religious movement of the century, destined to exercise such a far-reaching influence on the Church of England and to transform the life of the people, was started under John Wesley, Charles Wesley, and Whitefield. John Wesley was greatly influenced by the devotional works of

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William Law, *A Practical Treatise on Christian Perfection*, and *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*, but the deciding influence came through his association with a small group of Moravians in London, in 1738. By them he was converted to the "religion of the heart." The religious conviction and the great activity of the leaders brought about a great religious awakening.

Though the aim of these Evangelicals was practical, they greatly influenced the sphere of religious thought. Wesley insisted on the doctrine of original sin and the fall as opposed to the doctrine prevailing of the dignity and worth of human nature. He emphasized Christ's redemption and atonement. The sinner's hope is to be brought to a sense of his corruption and helplessness, and of his need of divine grace. He taught that the reason is impotent, faith alone is sufficient to discern the things of God.

Wesley throughout his life remained a member of the established church though most of his preaching and teaching was done in connection with the Methodist societies that were started all over the land. Most of his followers felt far more attachment to the society in which their religious commitment was made than to the Church of England. The desire to make the society complete in every way as a church finally caused a break. There were many of the clergy of the Church of England who were in full sympathy with this religious awakening, and they soon became a powerful factor in the life of the established church. The free

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churches, likewise, participated freely in the movement and were greatly affected by it.

By the eighteenth century, the Church of Scotland was definitely established in the Presbyterian tradition. The Presbyterian influence was also predominant in North Ireland since that country had largely been settled by Scots during the preceding two centuries. In 1733 the first secession occurred when Alexander Erskine and three others withdrew to form the Associate Presbytery. They disagreed with the patronage system legalized by the government, and approved by the ruling party of the General Assembly, which made it impossible for a local church to choose its own minister.\(^1\) The term "Associate" indicated an association with those of similar mind in the Church of Scotland in "maintaining and advancing the principles of that Church in its purest days."\(^2\) Fourteen years later, the Associate Presbytery split over the question of what should be done in connection with the burgess oath requiring support of the "religion presently professed within the realm."\(^3\) Burgher was the name given to the liberal group, Antiburgher was the name given to the stricter group. Two generations later, about the turn of the century, each of these had again divided into New Lights and Old Lights through a dispute over a "change of relation to their subordinate


\(^3\)Hume Brown, op. cit., p. 291.
It was to this group of old light anti-burgher seceders that Thomas and Alexander Campbell belonged when in Ireland. In 1761 Thomas Gillespie and two ministers founded what is known as the Relief Church. Gillespie had been deposed some nine years before by moderate party action.

While in England the religious and political turmoil of the seventeenth century ended in an age of enlightened reason and toleration—whose guiding light was John Locke—the settlement in Scotland (1690) brought complete victory to the spiritual successors of the holders of the Covenants, whose faith and national policies were centered in the Westminster Confession. The differences between the two countries in the next half century in temperament, prevailing interest and intellectual endeavor, were as great as the gulf separating Locke's treatment of religious truth in the *Reasonableness of Christianity* from the labored theological precision of the Westminster Confession.

With Hume's skepticism, the Enlightenment reached Scotland some fifty years after it had triumphed in England and on the Continent. His thought moved Scottish religious thinkers deeply, as the Deistic controversy never had, largely because it could claim some kinship with the accepted apologetic of the older orthodoxy.

Moderatism clearly illustrates the fact that the Enlightenment, in some respects at least, had won enthusiastic friends

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1Hugh Watt, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
within the Scottish church and thereby deprived it of the insular status maintained by the Confessionalists. Various historic influences worked toward this end. The union of English and Scottish parliaments in 1707, with the accompanying political and economic results, affected also the religious thought of the two countries. Thus a trend that gathered momentum over a period of fifty years or more came to its fruition about 1755. From then until 1805 Moderatism prevailed in the Church and brought the Scottish mind into intimate contact with Enlightenment influences.¹

Moderatism had many aspects in common with the Latitudinarians of England,² and during its domination Scotland achieved a sudden eminence in many branches of the arts and sciences. The one great sin as a party in the church was in having no more compunction in using patronage to crush popular prejudice and passion than had a Joseph II in using for similar purposes the resources of absolute power.

It might be expected that the advent of Moderatism would mean a revision of the entire religious outlook of Scotland, bringing it into closer conformity with the rational theology of Locke, Clarke and Butler, but this did not occur. The Westminster Confession remained the undisputed doctrinal standard of the Scottish Church during all the years of Moderate supremacy.

²Hume Brown, op. cit., p. 289.
The answer of Reid and the Scottish School of Philosophy to Hume has already been considered. Here it should be said that the conception of the task of philosophy in the Scottish School was such that it did not conflict with the high doctrine of revelation embodied in the Westminster Confession. In all questions concerning the ultimate and divine reality, Reid and his followers recognized the need and place of revelation. In consequence, Scottish philosophy and Confessional theology are found side by side, dividing the labor of thought amicably between them.

The hour of Moderatism gradually dwindled away. It started as the result of a general movement of thought, and a similar movement was to bring it to an end. Another spirit, not moderatism, but zeal was dominant. Manifestations of it we have already noticed in the French Revolution, the rise of the Romantic movement, and in the Evangelical revival in England. With this changed spirit, the popular or Evangelical party of the Scottish church had its opportunity. In justice to the Moderates it needs to be said that, great as were its defects, it made its own contribution to the development of the Church. The new evangelicalism was not as rigid as the old covenanting theology. It was more conscious of the many forces at large in the world with which Christianity must reckon. Its concern was to make religion vital in the lives of all the people.

1Andrew Seth, Scottish Philosophy (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1885) p. 211, 212.
All the forces at work in the eighteenth century in Britain shared a growing humanitarianism. Supernatural rationalists, deists, sceptics, evangelicals agreed on the equal worth and dignity of each human being. All united to stamp out the iniquities of the negro slave trade. A similar concern was felt for the oppression of the Asiatic civilizations. More humane treatment was given to the insane and criminal. Responsibility for the welfare of one's fellows was not overlooked. This was the spirit of the Age.¹

All were likewise effected by the Industrial Revolution. Even in the early stages of this revolution it became obvious that along with the advantages there were many new problems which had to be faced which grew out of the conditions and changes that were taking place in the lives of multitudes.

The Protestant churches of this period gave birth to a large-scaled missionary effort, Bible societies were started so that all might have the opportunity of a first-hand religious experience, Sunday Schools for the purposes of religious instruction became widespread. Likewise the science of biblical criticism had its beginnings.

Let us look now at the American scene to which Alexander Campbell came in the early 1800's, where he was to spend the rest of his life, and where the movement of which he was one of the chief leaders started.

¹A. C. McGiffert, op. cit., p. 169.
II. The American Scene

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, America was still a young country. The population was not great in numbers, and was widely scattered. Most of the people were concentrated around the Atlantic seaboard; less than ten per cent were west of the Alleghenies. A steady stream of settlers was moving westward. For most of the century the frontier was a constant and prominent factor in the development of the United States. In 1800 the population numbered 5,308,483. Only three states, Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee, had been added to the original thirteen. By 1830, with the addition of the Louisiana Territory, purchased from France, the area of the country had more than doubled, and the population had reached 12,860,692.¹ Western Pennsylvania, Western Virginia, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio constituted a genuine frontier, and it was here the Disciples of Christ movement began.

The Christianity of the United States of this period was predominantly Protestant. All the sects of Europe were represented in this new land, so the multiplicity of the divisions of Protestantism was more apparent than anywhere else in the world. Even so, five or six large denominations had the majority of adherents. The formal church membership amounted to only 6.9 per cent of the total population, the lowest of any of the west-

ern countries. By 1800 the largest denominations were the Congregational, Episcopal, Presbyterian, Baptist, and Methodist. Of these, the popular frontier churches were Methodist, Baptist and Presbyterian.

Of the four major churches in America at the beginning of the national period, the two which had occupied the most favored position as state churches in the colonial era were the least prepared to meet the problems of the trans-Allegheny west. These two churches were the Congregational and the Protestant Episcopal.

The Congregationalists had become localized in New England. Even so, at the beginning of the period they ranked first among the churches of the new nation in cultural and educational leadership and prestige. They lacked, however, a strategy for developing with the west and entered into a Plan of Union with the Presbyterian which worked in favor of the latter.

The Episcopal Church was severely crippled because of its close ties with England during the colonial period and the large proportion of its clergy and members who had been Tories rather than patriotic Americans. It was not until large towns and cities began to rise in the middle west that the Episcopalians showed any large growth west of the Alleghenies.

The Presbyterians came through the revolution with a gain in prestige because of the loyalty and patriotic service

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to the cause of liberty of its constituency. The Scotch-Irish from Ulster had settled in large numbers, and in the central and western parts of the state of Pennsylvania they were more numerous than any other church. Among the immigrants were Seceder Presbyterians, representing the Great Secession from the Church of Scotland in 1733. Thomas Campbell, father of Alexander Campbell, reported for duty to their Associate Synod, meeting in Philadelphia, when he arrived in 1807. The regular Presbyterian body by 1820 had eight presbyteries, two hundred sixteen congregations, and ninety five ministers. Kentucky Presbyterianism also developed rapidly due to the large immigration of the Scotch Irish from western Virginia and North Carolina. They founded a number of schools, among them being Transylvania Seminary (University after 1799), the first institution of higher learning west of the Alleghenies. The standard of their doctrine was the Calvinism of the Westminster Confession.

The Baptists were well fitted for the frontier in America. The religious liberty, which they had emphasized from the beginning, was now permitted. The simplicity of their doctrine, the democracy of their organization, and their ability to propagate their faith without overhead machinery helped their growth. Their ministry was largely composed of farmer-preachers. The prejudice against an educated and salaried ministry was stronger with them than with any other church. Their standard of doctrine was the Philadelphia Confession of faith, similar in character to the Westminster Confession. Their leaders had great
zeal and vigorous intellects, though they were usually limited in education.

The Methodists were the newest of the larger churches, but they were already strong. Methodism began, as in England, as a movement within the Anglican Church. With the attainment of American independence, a letter came from Wesley saying the American Methodists were now free "simply to follow the Scriptures and the primitive church." The circuit rider ministry was the key to Methodist frontier effectiveness. Many communities were reached in this way as each circuit rider covered a large territory. Arminian theology stressed that Christ died for all. Their evangelism emphasized that conversion required a direct act of the Holy Spirit. The penitent sinner could only "mourn" for his lost state until redeeming grace was received. This saving act of the spirit was realized by an exalted state of feeling.

These three churches—Presbyterian, Baptist, and Methodist—acknowledged each other as Christians, but they stood entirely separate as to fellowship or communion. At first there was much hostility and antagonism—a sort of pugnacious rivalry between the various denominations. Milburn in his "Pioneer Preacher" says:

There is an active, rough, resolute courage, independence and pluck about the western people, which inclines them to a close, shuffling and grappling, a sort of knock down attitude visible through all the moods of their life; and their clergy are not free from the same peculiarities. Consequently there were great controversies among them, concerning Baptism and Pdeo-Baptism, or Free Grace and Predestination, etc. Representatives of the different denominations would debate each other, the debates often
lasting for several days. These meetings would be conducted from temporary platforms erected in a grove that would accommodate a large number of hearers, and here they would 'treat and maltreat the doctrines and views of each other, to the eminent edification, and oftentimes the entertainment of the assembled multitudes.'

The United States of America began as a free and independent nation with organized religion at a low ebb. 1783 marked the end of the long and desperate conflict. "There was no king in Israel, and every man did what was right in his own eyes." So much had been spoken and written on liberty that multitudes were unwilling to be regulated by any law. The country was rife with French infidelity. The predominating thought in the colleges of the East was sceptical. When Theodore Dwight became president of Yale College in 1795 only five students were members of the church. Lyman Beecher describes Yale College in the seventeen nineties as "the day of the infidelity of the Tom Paine school...most of the classes before me were infidels and called each other Voltaire, Rousseau, D'Alembert..." Religious conditions among the students at Dartmouth, Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Georgia, William and Mary, and Transylvania were similar.

As the revolutionary war closed, French infidelity was at its height. France had been our ally in the war, so America was disposed to give the warmest welcome to anything French. It

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1W. H. Milburn, Pioneer Preachers and People of the Mississippi Valley (New York: Derby & Jackson, 1860) p. 64.

is easy to imagine the effect on the country when it was pro-
claimed over the land that France—enlightened, scientific,
fashionable France—had renounced the gospels and burned the
Bible in the streets of Paris by the hands of the common hang-
man.

In the midst of all this, Thomas Paine's *Age of Reason*
came forth. It is true that the works of Voltaire and Volney,
translated into English, were circulated among the more culti-
vated of the western people, but it was *The Age of Reason* that
appealed to the popular mind. Had not Thomas Paine, himself an
Englishman, so loved America and the right that when they deter-
mined to have "liberty or death" he came to the rescue with his
presence and his pen? "He hastened to publish a pamphlet, ex-
horting them to do what he saw they were already determined to
do. This pleased them, and they hailed him as a patriot."¹ He
published *Common Sense* which was widely read in America. When
the French Revolution broke out, he again rushed to their rescue.
He saw that there, one of the strongest passions was a hatred of
revealed religion, and so he published his *Age of Reason*. It
made no particular impression in France, for they had works of
more eminent men, but it was just the book for the backwoods of
America. It was written in France by the patriot Paine. It was
printed in a cheap pamphlet form and circulated in the Mississippi
Valley in immense numbers. "It could be seen in the cabin of the
farmer, on the bench of the tailor, in the shops of the smith

and the carpenter, on the table of the lawyer, and at the desk of the physician."  

France had said that human liberty and infidelity were inseparable, and multitudes of her fond admirers in America had re-echoed the sentiment, until it had taken root from Maine to the farthest cabin in the western wilderness. There was probably never a time, before or after, when there was as much religious indifference and positive hostility to religion as in the closing decades of the eighteenth century.

Deism was popular and upheld by many as the only true religion. Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin are the best known Deists of the period, though there were many other prominent leaders. Many of the outstanding political leaders were lukewarm to religion or openly defiant of it. Alongside this, contemporary accounts speak of the use of Sunday for other purposes than worship, and tell of heavy drinking, gambling, sexual irregularities, quarreling, fighting, and easy murder. In 1804 Lyman Beecher said in a sermon at Easthampton, Long Island:

... irreligion hath become in all parts of our land, alarmingly prevalent. The name of God is blasphemed; the Bible is denounced; the sabbath profaned; the public worship of God is neglected; intemperance hath destroyed its thousands; and is preparing the destruction of thousands more. ... These are the causes which have destroyed other nations; their malignant nature is still the same, and unless their operation is suspended, they will destroy us.  

1Ibid.

Peter Cartwright, the famous Methodist circuit rider, painted a dark picture of the portion of Kentucky where his boyhood was spent. The lawlessness was such that finally the "Regulators" organized and took the law into their own hands.¹ He also described a scene which he experienced later, when he was preaching in Marietta, Ohio, in 1806, when rowdies tried to break up the meeting. "They were armed with dirks, clubs, knives and horsewhips."² Whiskey was considered one of the necessities, and drinking drams in family and social circles was universally thought of as harmless. This was even true of preachers.³

Many removed from the life of the older parts of the country tended to say farewell to religious practices and morals inculcated by Christianity. It was a great social upheaval in the life of a family to pack up everything and move to the virgin soil of the frontier. It has been suggested that the frontiersman was normally unreligious, rather than irreligious.⁴ He was not really opposed to religion, and when he had the opportunity as churches became established, he was willing to cooperate, at least for his wife and children's sake if not for himself.

A marked recovery from these threats of deism, scepticism,

²Ibid., p. 90.
³Ibid., p. 212.
atheism, immorality and indifference was experienced during the closing years of the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth. Largely responsible for this change brought about in terms of a vital commitment to revealed religion, were four Christian movements. These four movements were the "Second Great Awakening" in the Eastern States, the "Great Revival" on the Western frontier, the Methodist movement under Francis Asbury, and the primitive gospel movement. The primitive gospel movement included several new groups which arose in the nineteenth century whose purpose was to restore New Testament Christianity.\textsuperscript{1} Alexander Campbell, was the chief leader of this movement.

The America in which a new movement for "restoration" and "unity" was about to start had the atmosphere for fresh beginnings. The forms of the Old World were suspect. Humanity was making a new start, unhampered by the dead hand of the evil past. The country was young, free, hopeful, expanding. The frontier spirit led many to dare the impossible, achieving the desired result. All the ecclesiastical backgrounds of Europe were represented, and the absence of any government restraint made it possible for new religious movements to arise, and for old ones to divide. The fissiparousness of the Christian forces was extreme and, the need for correction was urgent. Never before had church and state been separated in any land where Christianity was the dominant faith, and never had all the forms

of Christianity known so near an approach to full toleration.\textsuperscript{1} The problem of Christian union had moved from the political to the religious sphere. If it were to be solved, it would need to be by religious means, by persuasion, by voluntary action. Christians for the first time were in a position to seek a kind of union which would allow them freedom.\textsuperscript{2} The separation of church and state and the recognition of the voluntary character of religion placed the responsibility for the support of the churches and the extension of Christianity upon the members of churches. Ninety-three percent of the population without a church relationship was a tremendous challenge to all the religious forces.

III. The Man and His Work

"Beware" says Emerson "when the great God sets loose a thinker in the planet. Then all things are at risk. It is as when a conflagration has broken out in a great city, and no man knows what is safe or when it will end."\textsuperscript{3} Those words might well have been said of Alexander Campbell (1788-1866). In a world of extremes and of constantly shifting values, only the exceptional man is able to pursue a sane and moderate course, to evaluate and retain the best in his traditional heritage while embracing that which is beneficial in new schemes and systems. Alexander

\textsuperscript{1}K. S. Latourette, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 425.


Campbell proved himself such a man. With his life spanning one of the most significant and complex eras in history, he was faced with the task of assessing and preserving the permanent values of his religious heritage amidst a scene of bewildering social change, and of making his own contribution to the thought and life of his time. But he did not find the task too difficult.

Alexander Campbell came to the American scene in 1809 after he had completed a period of study at Glasgow University. He was young, forceful, vigorous, and hopeful. He had a keen, well-trained mind. He thought with amazing clarity and his command of the English language was impressive. He had the stability of character, the drive of moral courage, and the qualities of personality to make him a leader among men. He was a man about whom no one could ever feel indifferent. Possessed with dynamic vitality, he made his will felt by all with whom he came in contact. He was either greatly loved or greatly hated. Along with a consuming passion for liberty, both religious and political, which motivated his whole life, Alexander Campbell had a spirit of devout obedience to the will of God. "I call no man master upon earth," he wrote; but he bowed unquestionably before any precept he conceived to be a commandment of Christ.

Before leaving the Old World, Alexander Campbell had made his decision to devote his life to the ministry. In both Scotland and Ireland, he had witnessed the evils of sectarian division and had seen the resulting religious bigotry. He knew this was wrong, and he wanted to do something about these conditions. He hoped in America he would have that opportunity.
This young, forceful Scots-Irishman of Highland and Huguenot descent, fired with the liberal ideas he had imbibed both in his father's parsonage in County Armagh and during his student days at the University of Glasgow, had come to America convinced that a democratic church was the necessary counterpart to a democratic state and determined to play his own role in charting new paths of religious freedom in the new republic. Of this early period he was later to say:

My faith in creeds and confessions of human device was considerably shaken while in Scotland, and I commenced my career in this country under the conviction that nothing that was not as old as the New Testament should be made an article of faith, a rule of practice, or a term of communion among Christians.

Alexander Campbell's arrival in America coincided with a crisis in his father's affairs. His father, coming two years earlier, had disregarded party divisions and his liberalism was rebuked by the Seceder Presbyterian synod. Thomas Campbell had withdrawn, and the little group had been attracted by his views formed the Christian Association of Washington, Pennsylvania. They had adopted the slogan: "Where the Scriptures speak, we speak, where the Scriptures are silent, we are silent," and Thomas Campbell had formulated a Declaration and Address which stated the principles of Christian union which the Associ-
ation shared. Thomas Campbell had the freshly printed document along with him when he met his family, and gave it to Alexander to read. They were both delighted to learn on a recounting of experiences that each had broken with his religious past and had arrived at conclusions which led to the same goal. Alexander read the Declaration and Address and was enthusiastic about it. He realized that here was a cause to which he could give his life.

Most of the forces which led Thomas Campbell to the views which he expressed in the Declaration and Address had been operating in Alexander Campbell as well and had led him toward the same conclusions. The Declaration and Address seems to have conformed young Campbell even more strongly in his new convictions and may have helped to crystallize opinions which were yet tentative and unformed.

Though Thomas Campbell was the initiator of the movement, it was Alexander Campbell who was to be the constructive thinker and foremost leader for fifty years. Alexander was more practical and realistic. He had the courage to face the fact that, if ever there is a united church, then that church will have to be defined in terms of its faith, its ministry, its sacraments, its order of worship. Not possessing the full powers of dynamic leadership, as did his more gifted son, Thomas Campbell willingly stayed in the background of the movement which his document and principles brought into being. He simply did not want the premier position of leadership.

The Declaration and Address, the document heralding the
origin of the movement, has often been called "America's Religious Declaration of Independence." Inspired by Locke's writings and those of the Scottish School of Philosophy, sickened by ecclesiastical tyranny and the dominance of the scholastic modes of thought imported from Europe, Thomas Campbell called upon the men of the new republic to break these fetters of the past and to work a reformation which would make operative in religion the same principles of individual freedom and enterprise that Washington and Jefferson were seeking to make operative in government. Because of the importance of this initial document a summary of its essential propositions is in order. They are:

1. The essential unity and catholicity of the church.
2. The independence and autonomy of the local congregation.
4. Human creeds are not to be made tests of fellowship.
5. Scriptural conditions of church membership should be required.
6. The essential brotherhood of all who love Christ and seek to follow him.
7. Division among Christians is a horrid evil.
8. The common reason of intelligent Christians is the only authoritative interpreter of Scripture.
9. Distinction between matters of faith and opinion.
10. Principle of expediency applicable in all matters not expressly enjoined by Scripture.
Harriet Beecher Stowe looked with wonder at human affairs when she wrote, "By what strange law of mind is it that an idea long overlooked, and trodden under foot as a useless stone, suddenly sparkles out in a new light as a discovered diamond?" Just such an idea came from the pen of the obscure Presbyterian minister, Thomas Campbell as he framed the propositions which constitute the basic assumption for action of the Christian Association. Perhaps its most remembered and most quoted statement is: "the Church of Christ upon earth is essentially, intentionally, and constitutionally one."

The ecumenical mind of Alexander Campbell, like that of his father Thomas, had come to the conclusion that the church ought to be one; that there should be a union of all the followers of Christ. This could be achieved, he reasoned, by a restoration of the essentials of primitive Christianity. Through the centuries, he recognized, the church had added human opinions to the simple requirements of Christ and the apostles and had made them tests of fellowship. This was the cause of much of the division.

These ideas brought forth first a movement within existing churches, then a separate religious body, which in a hundred and twenty five years has grown to a membership of two million and is fifth in size among the Protestant churches of America.

There was no intention of forming a separate body. Campbell\(^1\) believed he had discovered principles which would re-

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\(^1\)When the word Campbell is used by itself, this refers to Alexander.
form and unite the existing denominations, if they were put into practice. The effort for a number of years was to bring about this reform. Both Thomas and Alexander Campbell were evidently quite disappointed in those early days over the reception which the nominally Christian world accorded the Declaration and Address. They believed themselves to be true reformers and were quite certain that the world needed reforming.

The first few years in America were important ones for Alexander Campbell. He was chiefly concerned with the continuation of his studies. For the year 1810, his schedule was as follows: "8 to 9 a.m. one hour to read Greek; 11:00 to 12:00 a.m. one hour to read Latin; between 12 and 1 p.m. one half hour to Hebrew; 2 hours allowed to commit ten verses of the Scripture to memory each day and read the same in the original languages; four hours for the reading and study of ecclesiastical history, and systems of divinity, ancient and modern."¹ In July 1810 he preached his first sermon, the text of which was from the last section of the Sermon on the Mount. During the year he preached on 106 occasions in western Pennsylvania, Virginia and Ohio. His material needs were met by farming. From the first he was determined never to accept pay for preaching.

Through his marriage in 1811, he came into possession of a farm at Bethany, in western Virginia, which was to remain his home for the rest of his life. The farm made him financially

independent, and allowed him eventually to devote the major portion of his time to the work to which he had dedicated his life. Through careful management, this estate grew through the years from three hundred acres to several thousand, and the small home originally there became finally a rambling mansion of twenty-five rooms.

In the year 1811 after unsuccessful efforts of the Christian Association to unite with the main Presbyterian body, the Brush Run Church was formed, entirely independent of other ecclesiastical bodies. Soon after its organization, Alexander Campbell was ordained by the church as its minister. The Lord's Supper was observed each Sunday from the beginning and it was not long before immersion was accepted as the only Scriptural form of baptism. This brought an invitation to the Brush Run Church to join the Redstone Baptist Association. Having been assured they could continue their reforming practices, the church decided to do this for they wanted union and were anxious for some kind of genuine Christian fellowship. From 1813 to 1830 the Campbells and their followers were nominally Baptists.

In these years of association with the Baptists, Alexander Campbell was constantly sounding the note of reform. Even though in the early years he was devoted mainly to reading and study while he carried on the management of his large farm, he frequently had preaching excursions among the Baptist churches of the area. Because of his unusual ability, he was cordially received. Wherever he went, he proclaimed his views and won the allegiance of many to his position.
His most controversial act in those early years of association with the Baptists was his celebrated "Sermon on the Law" which he preached at a meeting of the Redstone Baptist Association in 1816. In this he emphasized that the Christian system is not a continuation of the Jewish regime, but is based on a new covenant. Because this is true, no arguments can be drawn from the Old Testament about the nature and form of Christian institutions. This seemed a dangerous doctrine to many in the Association and he was not so welcome in some of the churches afterwards.

The first manifestation in the New World of his constant interest in education was the establishment in 1818 of Buffalo Seminary, a boarding school for boys. This was located on his farm. He hoped to find and train boys who would be material for the ministry. Though the school flourished, he soon found that it would not serve the purpose for which it was intended, and so it was discontinued after four years.

In 1823 Campbell began a monthly magazine, the Christian Baptist. This was printed at his home in Bethany, and though this magazine continued only until 1830, it was the beginning of forty years of editorship. The religious periodical was one of the most influential factors on the religious scene of the nineteenth century. On the American frontier, where travel was arduous and communications slow, the printing press of Alexander Campbell poured forth books and magazines which in spite of all the difficulties placed in their way by man and nature nevertheless managed to penetrate the continent along with the westward
moving pioneer. It was thus possible for widely separated individuals to be united in a common bond of faith through their common knowledge of a few magazines and books. Campbell's influence was greatly extended through this medium. Campbell was also made a postmaster. In that day postmasters held franking privileges, so the alliance of printer and postmaster made it possible for Campbell's views to be felt as far as the U. S. mail could travel.

He adopted the practice in his first periodical, which he continued throughout all his life, of allowing his opponents as well as his adherents to express their views. His own comment is indicative:

Our editorial career has, if marked for anything prominent and characteristic, been distinguished for a strict and rigid impartiality, so far as the presentation of both sides of all questions, opinions and partisan tenets, or measures, coming within the range of our pages is concerned. For more than a quarter of a century have we occupied the position of an editor. We have uniformly and without a single exception given to our readers both sides of every question upon religion, morality or expediency that has appeared upon our pages.\footnote{Alexander Campbell, Millennial Harbinger (Bethany, Va. Alexander Campbell, 1846) A monthly publication devoted to Primitive Christianity. p. 4.}

On the constructive side, the ultimate goal of this periodical was still Christian unity. He pointed out that the unity of the early Christians was in their love of Christ, their simple faith in him, and their obedience to him. He kept urging that a return to these happy conditions would alone bring about the unity of the church. In a letter "To an Independent Baptist" he gave wise words of counsel and made a strong statement on unity and cooperation. Among many pertinent statements, he says:
Dear Sir, this plan of making our own nest, and fluttering over our own brood; of building our own tent, and confining all goodness and grace to our noble selves and the 'elect few' who are like us, is the quintessence of sublimated Pharisaism. 1

But one of the main features of the Christian Baptist was his exposure of the corruptions and innovations of the church. "The restoration of the ancient order of things" became the rallying call. He singled out for attack the authority and status of the clergy; unscriptural organizations within the church, such as synods and church courts and missionary societies; and the use of creeds as tests of fellowship. He claimed that Protestantism's corruptions came mostly from Roman Catholicism, and that previous reformers had not completed the job of reformation.

This type of attack upon ecclesiasticism was vigorously opposed by the defenders of orthodox Christianity. Campbell was labelled with all sorts of heretical titles: Arian, 2 Socinian, 3 Arminian, 4 Pelagian, Antinomian. 5 His most bitter and hasty critics called him an infidel, 6 a deist, 7 or a Unitarian. 8 In his attack he does show that he is a reformer writing out of the background of a wide acquaintance with the thinkers of the Enlightenment, and that he has been much in-

1 Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptist (1826) Vol. IV, p. 238. Henceforth A. Campbell will not be used in referring to Christian Baptist.
3 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 159.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 91.
6 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 158.
fluenced by the French Revolution. His method of attack is like that of Voltaire and Paine in their use of reckless abandonment, ridicule and scorn. He resembles Godwin in saying the more government, the more tyranny as far as the church is concerned. He relies upon reason and common sense in appealing to the people when pointing to the corruptions of the church. He appeals to the social contract on several occasions. He shows how he detests excessive emotionalism and sentimentality in religion. All of these extremes he shares with the thinkers of the Enlightenment. But he never went into complete rationalism.

In view of Campbell's hesitation and reluctance to respond to the first invitation he had to debate it is quite remarkable that he so distinguished himself in this art. Apparently his reluctance was due to the realization that his father had written in the Declaration and Address that verbal controversy "formed no part of the intended plan." It was not the elder Campbell's purpose to heighten controversy. Instead he hoped to find a way to end the differences of a divided Christendom. However, none was better prepared intellectually and by temperament for debate than Alexander Campbell. He had a background of classical and philosophical training which stood him in good stead when he had to deal with a forensic opponent. He had read widely and possessed an excellent vocabulary. He had all the physical qualifications also. He was tall, distinguished looking, and possessed a resonant voice. He really enjoyed controversial discussion and soon was drawn onto the public
forum to discuss with the best leaders of his time questions of significance. His fluency of speech, keenness of wit, quick perception of logical relations, and wide range of thought were qualities which he could use to good advantage in debate.

His two early debates on baptism helped to make Campbell's views well known and gained supporters for his cause of reformation. One was with John Walker, a Seceder Presbyterian minister at Mt. Pleasant, Ohio, in June, 1820, and the other was with Maccalla, a Presbyterian minister of Kentucky at Washington, Kentucky, in October, 1823. It was the general verdict that Campbell made a magnificent triumph over his opponents. He received many invitations to visit eastern Ohio and Kentucky as a result. In Ohio, Adamson Bentley and Sidney Rigdom were leaders of importance who were attracted by Campbell's views, and in Kentucky he contacted "the Christians" of Barton W. Stone, who had similar views and were of an earlier origin. He also gained influence with a large proportion of Kentucky Baptists. This visit to Kentucky was followed by many others. Most of Campbell's first adherents to the movement came from the Baptists since his preaching and the circulation of his paper were largely with them.

Since Campbell's concept of the successive covenants suggested a new method of Biblical interpretation which was unacceptable to many in the Redstone Association, he and some of his followers organized a new church at Wellsburg and withdrew from the Redstone Association. The new church joined the Mahoning Association in eastern Ohio, and soon practically all the churches
of this Association decided to restore the primitive practice. Alexander Campbell was fortunate in having able associates who shared in the leadership of the reform movement. One of the earliest was Walter Scott. The two men first met in 1821. From the beginning they found a bond of kinship, a community of interests and attitudes, which, through differences and difficulties, would enable them to work together in a common cause for the next forty years. Scott had come to America after graduating at Edinburgh University. His unique contribution was to discover the process by which one becomes a Christian through a careful and thorough study of his New Testament. The outcome was a distinctive method of conversion in sharp contrast to Baptist procedure and doctrine. The steps to salvation were arranged in order. The three steps men needed to take were: faith, repentance, baptism; then there were three steps God would take: remission of sins, the gift of the Holy Spirit, the gift of eternal life. In 1827, when Scott was appointed evangelist for the Mahoning Association he made his appeal on these terms and he had a great response, doubling the membership of the association's churches within a year. The results were electrifying. The whole frontier was awakened. The presentation of this common-sense view of faith and repentance, and of baptism as the completion of the process by which men qualify for the remission of their sins, brought a clarifying insight to thousands of troubled souls both in and outside of the church. Great numbers were outside the churches not because they were bewildered by the creeds or repelled by the irrationality of the
current revivalism. This new method of presenting the gospel enabled many to see the light for the first time. It was the beginning of a great period of growth for the movement.

By the late twenties the reformation movement had reached the stage where difficulties with the more orthodox Baptists began to increase as they realized some of the differences of the reformers from regular Baptist procedures. Orthodox Baptist Associations sought to disfellowship the Mahoning Association by passing anathemas and decrees. Though Campbell was reluctant for the break to come, it was decided by the assembly of the Association meeting in 1830 that it would dissolve. The breach had come. After the separation, an annual meeting was to take place. The movement became known as the "Disciples of Christ." The Christian Baptist ceased as a publication in 1830 and another magazine was begun.

A few years before the beginnings of the Disciples movement apart from the Baptists, a turning point in Campbell's career was reached. Up to that time he had waged a vigorous assault on what he regarded as a corrupt, ecclesiastical Christianity. He had a genius for expressing himself in dramatic extremes, and in his early years he fully utilized his talent in that direction, and he did gain attention. His object accomplished, he spent the rest of his life making clear the sane, middle ground in which he really believed, proclaiming the basis on which all Christians might agree and leading in much constructive activity.

In the year 1828 two publishing events concerned Campbell.
One was the publication from his own printing press of the translation of the New Testament made some fifty years earlier by George Campbell, James Macknight, and Phillip Doddridge. He made various corrections and added a preface and critical notes. In the preface he defended new translations on the grounds that modern scholars had a more thorough knowledge of the ancient languages, and the fact that language is continually changing in meaning. The other was a two hundred page hymn book which he edited and from which he excluded all unscriptural sentiments. This was one of his most profitable publishing ventures.

Two of the most dramatic events of his entire life came in the year 1829, within a few short months of each other, the Owen Debate and the Virginia Constitutional Convention.

Robert Owen, the Scotsman who was widely known as a radical social reformer and an atheist, had challenged the clergy of America to debate with him the proposition that all religions are based upon the ignorance of mankind, and that to religion is due all of the miseries, vice, and disunity of society. After waiting a considerable time for some one to accept the challenge, Campbell agreed to meet Owen in such an encounter.

The debate caused much excitement. Owen was perhaps best known in America for his effort to build a Communist Utopia at New Harmony, Indiana, and his views were well known in his native land. Campbell, though still at the beginning of his career, had attracted considerable attention. When the debate opened in Cincinnati people were gathered from all over the country to listen. The subject was in reality: the validity of the claims
of Christianity versus a materialistic world view. In this
debate Campbell was not the advocate of a particular system,
but was the champion of all Christianity.

Owen insisted that man is utterly the creature of the
social system, the state. The complete regeneration of society,
he argued, could be worked out by following twelve scientific
laws which he had worked out.

The debate lasted for eight days, and was unique in
that Campbell had one twelve hour speech. By the sixth day,
Robert Owen had said all he wanted to say about his twelve
fundamental laws of human nature and society, and so suggested
that Campbell take the rest of the time.

Throughout the debate, Campbell answered Owen with a
combination of logic and eloquence, wit and sarcasm. He tore
apart Owen's system which he said would reduce human society to
the level of "a colony of bees" and degrade man to the status of
"a stall fed ox." In his own statement, Campbell lifted up his
concept of the spiritual nature of man as a child of God and
the democratic thesis of government that the state is something
for man and not man for the state. Even the Edinburgh Scotsman
and the London Times drew attention to the debate. It was later
published and had a rather wide circulation. The debate enhanced
Campbell's reputation and made his critics see, that even though
they disagreed with his particular beliefs, he was definitely an
able defender of revealed religion.

The second event, in the fall, was in an entirely differ-
ent setting. Virginians had decided to rewrite their state con-
stitution. Alexander Campbell was elected as one of the ninety-six delegates. Perhaps no greater tribute has ever been paid to Alexander Campbell's genius than the fact that his people in western Virginia those who agreed with his religious opinions and those who violently disagreed with them were united in insisting that Campbell should go to Richmond as their representative. It was a signal honor to be chosen to sit in this body. Momentous issues were before the state, and Virginia sent her most distinguished sons to chart the course of her revised constitution. And in the year 1829 Virginia's great was America's great. Ex-presidents Madison and Monroe were there; John Tyler, who was a president-to-be; John Marshall, the great chief justice of the Supreme court; and John Randolph of Roanoke, one of the most feared wits of the United States Congress. One historian made this comment: "It is doubtful whether any representative body ever convened, in the world's history, before or since, which included so much talent, eloquence, experience and intellectual power as did that great convention."¹ Even after some allowances are made for state pride, we must admit it was a notable assemblage.

As a debater and orator Campbell made quite an impression. Though his ideas were not particularly unique, he had a vivid and forceful way of speaking, which compelled his opponents to take note. A participant in the debate would inevitably reveal

¹David L. Pulliam, The Constitutional Conventions of Virginia From Foundation of Commonwealth to Present Time (Richmond John T. West, 1901) p. 65.
his opinion on most of the fundamental issues involved in the ferment of Jacksonian democracy. When every great subject of the debate arose, he made a major address. Some of the biggest men in the convention crossed verbal swords with him—Marshall, Randolph, Upshur and others. Moreover, students of debates like Ambler and students of political theory like Merriam have quoted Campbell's phrases. His was the most lusty voice of the Jacksonian "men of the western waters," raised in protest against the vested interest, special privilege and aristocratic pretensions of the great planters on Tidewater. The old constitution had placed all the political power in the hands of the slave-owning aristocracy. The representation in the legislature had put the eastern counties in a highly favored position, and the political leaders were trying to keep this arrangement, along with the property qualification for voters. Campbell led the fight for further democracy in Virginia. He had gone to the convention in the hope of being able to do something to end slavery in Virginia, but he found this was impossible so long as the representation remained on the same basis. The other side had the votes.

Grigsby, a fellow delegate, said later concerning Campbell:

He had a great fund of humor. . . . He was a fine scholar, and, with the younger members of the body who relished his amusing thrust, his pleasant address and social feelings rendered him very acceptable. As a controversialist, he had some great qualities; he was bold, subtle, indefatigable, and as insensitive to
attack as if he were sheathed in the hide of a rhinoceros.\(^1\)

During the three months sitting of the Constitutional Convention, Campbell preached each Sunday in one of the churches of Richmond. Many of the delegates went to hear him. Former President Madison said he had heard him often and regarded him as "the ablest and most original expounder of the Scriptures" he had ever heard.

From 1830 onward Campbell was occupied with numerous interests. He was the most influential figure in an unorganized movement which was rapidly expanding and already involved scores of churches with thousands of members in half a dozen states. He had an extensive correspondence, long tours for preaching, lecturing and visiting the churches, edited a monthly magazine, and operated a large farm. His zeal for restoring the essentials of the primitive church continued, but he was more friendly to the expedients that the church might use under modern conditions to make its work more effective. He became interested in discovering constructive policies that would help to bind the re-forming churches together into a brotherhood.

Indicative of this new outlook, or change of emphasis was the beginning of the *Millennial Harbinger* to replace the *Christian Baptist*. The prospectus stated:

This work shall be devoted to the destruction of sectarianism, infidelity, and anti-Christian doctrine and practice. It shall have for its object the develop-

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ment and introduction of that political and religious order of society known as the Millenium, which will be the consummation if that ultimate amelioration of society proposed in the Christian Scriptures.¹

Campbell edited this monthly magazine until 1866, and it continued until 1870.

In the early years after the separation from the Baptists, the most important event was the union between the "Reformers" led by Campbell and Scott and the "Christians" led by Barton W. Stone. The two movements had so much in common that this union was successful, and the united body expanded rapidly. It was a merging of equal streams.

Mr. Campbell in 1836 published a rather full statement of his views in a book entitled The Christian System. This book was not a creed for the Disciples, as no one was required to accept it. It was merely a rather full statement of his own views. One of his points, in fact, was to state what was essential to salvation.

The belief of one fact... is all that is requisite, as far as faith goes, to salvation. The belief of this one fact and submission to one institution expressive of it, is all that is required of Heaven to admission into the church... The one fact is expressed in a single proposition—that Jesus the Nazarene is the Messiah... The one institution is baptism.²

A statement which he later made in reply to a lady from Lunenberg, Virginia, in 1837 indicates that he did not mean by the above statement that the unimmersed were not Christians.

¹Alexander Campbell, The Millennial Harbinger (Bethany, Va., A. Campbell) Vol. 1, p. 1. Henceforth no mention will be made of the editor.
Who is a Christian? I answer, Everyone that believes in his heart that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah, the Son of God; repents of his sins, and obeys him in all things according to his measure of knowledge of his will... .

I cannot make any one duty the standard of Christian state or character, not even immersion. . . . .

It is the image of Christ the Christian looks for and loves; and this does not consist in being exact in a few items, but in general devotion to the whole truth as far as known.1

Early recognizing the necessity of an educational institution where the youth among the Disciples might be trained as Christian leaders, and having a definite philosophy of education which he desired to put into effect, Campbell secured a charter for Bethany College. He furnished the land for its first campus and was responsible for the erection of the first building. He solicited funds for its endowment and maintenance among the churches. He served as its first president from this time until his death and also as professor of moral philosophy. He was also a pioneer in common school education.

As early as 1825, Alexander Campbell came in contact with a similar movement to the Disciples of Christ, originating in Britain called Churches of Christ. This led to a correspondence between the leaders of the two movements. Occasional articles with regard to the British churches were published in the Millennial Harbinger, and the British periodicals carried some of Campbell's articles. This led to Campbell's visiting Europe in 1847 and speaking in many of the principal cities of England and Scotland. While in Britain he was president of the Conference of the British Churches of Christ. On this European tour

1Millennial Harbinger, 1837, pp. 411, 412.
he carried with him a letter of introduction from Henry Clay when Secretary of State which read:

Dr. Campbell is among the most eminent citizens of the United States, distinguished for his great learning and ability, for his successful devotion to the education of youth, for his piety, and as the head and founder of one of the most important and respectable religious communities in the United States.¹

Campbell participated in two more debates. In 1837 he debated the Roman Catholic Archbishop Purcell in Cincinnati. Here he was the champion of Protestantism against one of the finest minds of the Roman church who defended the claims of that church. Apparently this is the only occasion when an official of such high rank in the Roman hierarchy has met a Protestant in open debate on such a subject.² The debate created wide attention and further increased Campbell's prestige. It came at a time when the whole question of the relation of the Catholic Church to the American state was the focus of the popular interest.

The climax of Campbell's career as a debater came with N. L. Rice in 1843 in Lexington, Kentucky. Henry Clay was Moderator. Here he sought to sum up the basic principles of his movement and to defend them against the current orthodoxy of the day. These debates were published.

As a lecturer, Campbell gained considerable fame. In that capacity he travelled over most of the United States speaking on subjects of a philosophical, educational, political or

religious nature. He addressed the students and faculty of a number of colleges and the literary societies and lyceums of many cities. He was invited to speak to the Congress of the United States in a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Several years later, when he was preaching in Washington, President Buchanan and a part of his cabinet attended, and Campbell was received at the White House. He also spoke before the legislatures of several of the states.

The rapid expansion of the Disciples throughout the nation made it imperative for a certain amount of organizational life to develop. The movement had gained considerable strength and this was essential. Campbell's earlier prejudices, in the face of this need, were laid aside. State organizations for fellowship and cooperation were first formed, and then came a national organization. Campbell was the first president of the national convention of Disciples in 1849, and the first president of the missionary society organized to promote the spread of Christianity at home and throughout the world.

He was a strong believer in cooperation. The minutes of the meeting of the Mahoning Association at Austintown, Ohio, in 1830 record that he was the first one to speak after they voted to dissolve. He said, "Brethren, does this mean that we shall never meet again."

1 As he said in The Christian System:

The necessity of cooperation is felt everywhere and in all associations of men. ... . One hundred churches, well disciplined, acting in concert, with Christian zeal,

1 The Minutes are in the Hiram College (Ohio) Library.
piety, humanity—frequently meeting together in committees of ways and means for building up Zion, for fencing in the deserts, cultivating the enclosed fields, watering the dry and barren spots. . . . would in a given period, do more than twice the number acting in their individual capacity, without concert, without cooperation. 1

His ecumenical interest continued throughout his life. Federation did not satisfy Campbell's concept of unity, but he looked upon it as a step in the right direction. He once said quite emphatically that he did not envision any "mere federation of sects." The Declaration and Address states quite positively that what is intended and desired is "constitutional," "catholic," "organic" unity. Even so, as a sane and practical man, he was well aware that federating must, perhaps, precede any hope of unity. In his day all the interdenominational cooperation suggested had his enthusiastic support. In 1839 he made the proposal:

That a congress of Protestant parties (and if any choose to add the Greek and Roman sects, I will vote for it) be convened in some central place, and that this congress be composed of delegates appointed by all parties in the ratio of their entire population. And that. . . . when convened. . . . the rule of union shall be, that, whatever in faith, in piety, and in morality is catholic, or universally admitted by all parties shall be adopted as the basis of union; and whatever is not by all parties admitted as of divine authority shall be rejected as schismatical and human. 2

He suggested that such a meeting may "perhaps tend a little to the cultivation of that Christian and catholic spirit that must precede the union of Christians."


2Millennial Harbinger, 1839, p. 212.
Some years later, in 1842, he gave enthusiastic support to the American Protestant Association which was forming. In words applicable today to our present ecumenical gatherings when impatience develops because of the slowness of the process of achieving organic unity, he insists:

"Half a loaf is better than no loaf at all. . . . . Let Protestant parties come together, shake hands, look at each other's warts and wens until they become familiar with this mutual deformity, and feel the need of mutual sympathy and condolence. It is good to come together in a friendly mood. To taste the sweets of one general meeting for one common end may be a sort of prelibation of future union on principles more catholic than either Papist or Protestant can yet appreciate."

When more than one thousand Protestants from twelve countries met in London in 1846 to form the World Evangelical Alliance, Campbell characterized it as one of the "great initiatory institutions" toward "union of all Christians," and declared that it would contribute toward a "more rational and scriptural scheme of Christian cooperation and communion." He wanted to attend this gathering which was an assemblage of individuals, rather than of churches, but circumstances prevented his going. At the conclusion of the meeting, he wrote:

"We thank God for the Evangelical Alliance, and we take courage from it; no convention that has met since the Protestant Reformation has had so strong a hold upon my affections and esteem. . . . . I will, to the utmost of my power, cooperate with them just as long as they please to permit me."

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1 Millennial Harbinger, 1843, p. 353.
2 Millennial Harbinger, 1847, p. 31.
3 Ibid.
He pointed to the similarities between this meeting and the formation of the Christian association of Washington which had also been called to "open the eyes of the community to the wickedness of schism and the beauty of union and cooperation."

He participated actively in such cooperative organizations as the American and Foreign Bible Society, and the American Bible Union under whose auspices he translated the Book of Acts.

The slavery controversy was in the forefront in these years and Alexander Campbell declared his views. His position was that the slave-master relation is not unscriptural. Slavery is a matter of opinion, not of faith. He confessed he was strongly against it and said that American slavery was inexpedient. It was economically unsound and out of harmony with democracy. Mr. Campbell held that no Christian communion should make the issue of slavery a term of communion. How successful he was in upholding this is demonstrated by the fact that the Disciples of Christ were the only major religious body, with members in both the south and north, that survived the Civil War without division.

Mr. Campbell took a definite stand with regard to war. He argued that war, though sanctioned and practiced in the Old Testament, is outlawed by both the letter and the spirit of Christ in the New. He held that no Christian can conscientiously

\[1\textit{Ibid.}, 1845, p. 235.\]

\[2\textit{Ibid.}, 1834, p. 358.\]
engage in war. As a positive proposal he advocated an organization like the United Nations of today and a World Court.

His last years were spent quietly at Bethany. His life ended just as the civil war came to a close. He had brought to the American frontier a common sense attitude toward religion. He did his work and advanced his ideas at a time when excessive emotionalism dominated the religious life of the people in the church, and when scepticism reigned supreme outside the church. He was a product of the European Enlightenment transplanted upon nineteenth century American soil. He was primarily a revelation thinker. As both a sceptic and a believer in the Enlightenment he resolved these tensions by placing his total faith in primitive Christianity. He attacked ecclesiasticism and natural religion because he was convinced that both were unreliable. His alternative to both was the union of all Christians upon a universal faith in the revealed truths of the Bible, in terms of the restoration of primitive Christianity. By showing that the beginning of the Christian life was not an ecstatic emotional experience, but rather a simple acceptance of Jesus as Lord and by joining a Christian fellowship he fitted the needs of thousands. Alexander Campbell helped American Christianity to recover an interest in and a commitment to revealed religion.

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1Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures and Addresses (Cincinnati, Central Book Concern, 1979) pp. 342-366.
CHAPTER II

THE INFLUENCES THAT SHAPED HIS THOUGHT

In order to understand Alexander Campbell's thought we need to consider those influences which were most powerful in shaping it. His thinking cannot be explained in terms of any single and simple causation, for he did not have that sort of mind. But it is possible to discover the major influences bearing on him and the movement which he helped inaugurate. Some of these influences are direct and the impression which they made upon him are quite obvious. Others are indirect, though none the less important. He was a student throughout all his life. His own comment reveals this:

It is an error to suppose, that a course of study is confined to the period of youth, and that when a young man has left school or college, he has finished his education, and has nothing to study, but his profession. In truth he has done little more than treasure up some of the important materials and acquired the elementary habits and discipline which are indispensable to the continued improvement of the mind. . . . .

He must make up his mind to be a devoted student for ten years at least; until he shall be able to deepen and strengthen and enlarge and elevate his mind, so as to fit himself for solid, honorable, permanent usefulness.¹

When Lyman Beecher in 1837 asked him how he possessed himself of such stores of methodized knowledge, he replied, "By studying sixteen hours per day."² He was a man who lived in and for

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1834, p. 493.
²Ibid., 1866. D. S. Burnett relates this in an In Memoriam. p. 319.
his time. Consciously or unconsciously, the period in which he lived with its characteristic modes of thought and life, entered into the framework of his thought.

It is not as difficult today to detect these shaping influences on Campbell, as it would have been in the time in which he lived, and he realized this.

No living man can fully estimate the exact momentum of the principles at work in his own time. The objects that obtrude upon his consideration are too near him to be seen in all their just proportions. Time, that great revealer of secrets and infallible exponent of the wisdom of all human schemes, must pass its solemn verdict upon every human enterprise before its proper character can be fully and justly appreciated.¹

Campbell recognized that he was debtor to others for his theological ideas, but he believed he was more indebted to their mistakes than to their achievements, "for these have been to me as beacons to the mariner, who might otherwise have run upon rocks and shoals."² Later when someone indicated that his ideas were not original, he acknowledged his indebtedness:

How many have, in the way of moral causation, excited my mind to this train of reasoning, or to the examination of this fact or incident, I am now, and will be while life lasts, wholly unable to say. But that many individuals of whom I know nothing, and of whom I never knew anything may have directly or indirectly set my mind abroach of things divine and human, and led me by a way which I knew not to very important results, I cannot doubt. I was early taught to take nothing upon trust--to think for myself.³

In closing this recognition of his indebtedness, Campbell expresses his gratitude to God for allowing him to have the best

²Christian Baptist, p. 229
³Millennial Harbinger, 1835, p. 304.
religious education which the nineteenth century could give.

Ireland gave me a good physical constitution and the elements of a general education, Scotland lent me her aids and her facilities so late as the autumn of 1809. And in America I feel peculiarly happy in having its very best and most intelligent and most ardent sons my coadjutors.1

Actually Campbell did not follow any system slavishly. He had an independent mind which drew from many sources, and he was unwilling to accept any teaching unless he was convinced of its truth. Much later he wrote that he had made one of the sayings of John Newton his maxim. "Whenever I see a pretty feather in any bird, jackdaw like, I plucked it out, and plumed myself with it until I became so speckled that not a single species would own me."2

I. Influence Of The Scriptures

Alexander Campbell's own study of the Scriptures was of primary importance in the development of his thought. Under the guidance of his father and mother he first became familiar with the great passages. It was the family custom for each member to learn by heart some portion of the Bible each day, and then repeat what was learned at the family worship in the evening. After this, the facts or truths in the passages were considered.3 Later, when commenting on his introduction to the Christian religion, Campbell said:

1Ibid., p. 305.
2Millennial Harbinger, 1853, p. 228.
I was led by parental authority to memorize much of the Scriptures, and especially the epistles of Paul, and preeminently, that to the Romans and that to the Hebrews. These were my systematic theology, or rather my doctrinal Christology, to which I owed more than to all my memorizing of the creeds and catechisms of the present Scotch orthodoxy.  

From 1816 to 1826 Campbell's inquiries into the Christian religion were almost wholly devoted to the Holy Scriptures. He says of the experience: "I can assure you that the scriptures, when made their own interpreter...have become to me a book entirely new...I have endeavored to read the scriptures as though no one had read them before me."  

He realized man's dependence upon revelation for a knowledge of God and the things of the spirit. "There is not a spiritual idea in the whole human race which is not drawn from the Bible." The kind of reformation needed was a return to primitive Christianity. This could be discovered in the New Testament by the ordinary rules of interpreting all books. He applied the inductive method to the study of Scripture and discovered that as each book was read certain questions needed to be asked: Who wrote it? Why was it written? When was it written? To whom was it written? Where was it written? What

1 Millennial Harbinger, 1856, p. 288; cf. Ibid., 1832, p. 313.
2 Christian Baptist, 1826, p. 229.
3 Ibid., 1825, p. 172.
did it say? Campbell saw that the Bible "proceeds upon the plan of a gradual and progressive development, adapting itself to all the conditions of human existence."2

The Bible was made to be understood, being addressed to all classes of people. While it is true there are some parts of it an unsanctified man could not fully understand because they relate to spiritual experience, there is nothing unusual about this, for the same principle applies to other books.

Who can read Newton's Principia or Mecanique Celeste of La Place, and understand them, unless he comes to the study of them with due preparation? . . . . Who can read and fully understand Milton and Homer, without the spirit and soul of poetry within him which enable him to enter into their views and feelings. . . . . A demand for religious feeling, in order fully to enter into the meaning of the sacred writers, rests on the same principle as the demand for a poetic feeling in order to read Milton with success or a mathematical feeling in order to study intelligibly Newton and La Place. . . . . But still it would be incorrect to say that Newton or Milton is unintelligible.3

According to Campbell, "when God speaks to men" in the Bible, he speaks in human language with a realization of our wants. The sacred writers used all the varieties of style and expression that are seen anywhere else.

Along with his realization of the importance of the Bible as a primary source for the discovery of the essentials of primitive Christianity, he was tremendously influenced by the early

1Millennial Harbinger, 1832, p. 108f.
3Millennial Harbinger, 1832, p. 109.
church fathers of the first four centuries,\(^1\) for he saw in them an additional record of the early church faith and practice. There are numerous references to the early fathers throughout his writings.

II. Influence Of The Reformers

In acknowledging his indebtedness to others, Campbell said "I am greatly indebted to all the Reformers from Martin Luther to John Wesley."\(^2\) He traced the national privileges and civil liberties of America to the Protestant Reformers. In contrasting the present state of U. S. A. with that of Spanish America, and the condition of Britain with that of Spain, Portugal, and Italy he realized how much the intelligence, faith and courage of Luther and his associates had meant. He credited Luther with having restored the Bible to mankind.\(^3\) He did not believe, however, that the Lutheran or Calvinist reformation had restored primitive Christianity. When Luther emerged "from the great city of mystical Babylon, he saw as clearly... as any person could in such a hazy atmosphere."\(^4\) If many of his views had been carried out to their legitimate conclusions the ancient gospel would have resulted. But there was no Joshua to take his place when Luther died. Luther and Calvin "much re-

\(^1\)Dr. William Robinson, "The Background of Alexander Campbell's Theology", \textit{Shane Quarterly} (Butler University) Vol. I, No. 4, 1940, p. 325.

\(^2\)\textit{Millennial Harbinger}, 1835, p. 304.

\(^3\)\textit{Alexander Campbell, Christian System}, p. 3.

\(^4\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 179.
formed the papacy and lowered the prelacy, but they did not enthrone in bold relief the chief apostles, Peter and Paul.\textsuperscript{1} They were "great and good men, and world's benefactors, but they stood on the lower rounds of Jacob's ladder."\textsuperscript{2} Although they did not do all they might have done or all that needed to be accomplished by way of reform, "we should not withhold the need of thanks for what they have done."\textsuperscript{3}

He considered it a tragedy that Protestants had assumed the Reformation was finished when Luther and Calvin died. "The Reformation was a mixture of ten grams in one cup, nine of which were political and one religious. The pope's chair is found in almost every sect."\textsuperscript{4} In seeking to explain the position of the new reform movement Campbell maintained:

The cause we plead is no more anticalvinism than antiarminian. It is a more ancient and more venerable faith for which we contend, not identified with any of the systems of the last thousand years. Calvinism, as a system of religious philosophy taken as a whole, in the moderated tone of the present century, is perhaps as good a system of religious philosophy as Arminianism. At all events, if I could dissect my own speculations, I opine there would be more of John Calvin than James Arminius in my moral philosophy, and I think it is so with the great majority of all our public advocates as far as I am intimately acquainted with their opinions.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Millennial Harbinger,} 1854, p. 248.
\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Christian Baptist,} p. 127.
\textsuperscript{4}\textit{Christian Baptist,} 1827, p. 388.
\textsuperscript{5}\textit{Millennial Harbinger,} 1835, pp. 597-598; cf. \textit{Ibid.}, 1846, p. 173.
III. Influence Of Other Primitive Gospel Movements

l. Glas and Sandeman

Among the primitive gospel movements of the eighteenth century, one of the earliest was that led by John Glas, a Church of Scotland minister at Teeling, near Dundee, who was deposed in 1730. This movement never became popular. It is doubtful if there were ever as many as forty churches or if the membership ever exceeded a thousand. But the writings of Glas, and his son-in-law, Robert Sandeman were widely read and exerted considerable influence with other church groups.1 Among the latter was Alexander Campbell and the Disciples of Christ.

Glas's fundamental idea was that the whole church of Christ had been wrong in relying on Old Testament analogies. We have the pattern in the New Testament, and this pattern implies no establishment,2 no regulated government either hierarchical or conciliar. The local congregation alone has Divine sanction.3 He sought to reproduce the New Testament pattern of the church, as to order, conduct of worship, and the ministry.

The view of Baptism Glas held was not much different from the Presbyterian tradition. He did not find that the New Testament practised only the immersion of believers. He was a


3 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 188.
confirmed Paedo-baptist.\textsuperscript{1} He defines baptism as "the great Christian truth, concerning salvation by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, in whom the Father is well pleased, and the purification of sinners by his blood."\textsuperscript{2}

Glas believed in observing the Lord's Supper weekly as did the Apostolic Church.\textsuperscript{3} He regarded it as "the most solemn outward action of religious worship instituted in the New Testament."\textsuperscript{4} It was necessary to partake of it in the church fellowship, never alone.\textsuperscript{5} Only those could partake who were worthy members of the congregation.\textsuperscript{6}

After studying the Christian ministry of the first three centuries, Glas showed how the simple ministry at the beginning gave way to clericalism in the episcopate, in Presbyterianism, and in independency.\textsuperscript{7} He advocated a plurality of elders in each congregation and "mutual edification" as was the custom in the primitive church.\textsuperscript{8} He rejected the idea of any distinction between the clergy and laity, and did not approve of the use of ecclesiastical titles. Deacon's duties were restricted to the "ministry of tables." Their special function was to minister to the poor. Glas emphasized the importance of the Christian fellowship in fulfilling the duties of Christian discipleship. Among the distinctive practices, they had a love feast, food for the

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., Vol. I, p. 328; cf. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 376.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., Vol. II, p. 356.
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., Vol. II, p. 301.
\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., Vol. V, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., Vol. V, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., Vol. I, p. 188.
\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., Vol. V, p. 325ff.
\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., Vol. II, p. 216.
poorer brethren between the Sunday services, the custom of feet washing, and the salutation with a holy kiss. Discipline was severe. Uniformity was preserved by excommunicating any who departed from any practice of the church.

Robert Sandeman adopted Glas's principles and became a vigorous advocate of them. His own theological writings were highly regarded, particularly his work on the nature of faith. This was an answer to James Hervey's Theron and Aspasio. Hervey was an evangelical clergyman of the Church of England who had come under Wesley's influence at Oxford. He maintained that faith requires a special act of enabling grace and includes an emotional experience which gives "assurance of acceptance with God."¹ In his view faith was a state of feeling, rather than an intellectual act. Faith was at the end of the conversion process rather than at the beginning. Sandeman's reply was that faith is distinctly an act of the intellect by which a man believes the testimony of Christ. The change of heart and feeling is the effect of faith.² As a strict Calvinist he had to limit those who could exercise this rational act to those who were elected to salvation by the sovereign pleasure of God.

This view of faith was developed by Alexander Campbell into a method of successful evangelism, though he also included as a part of faith, in addition to the intellectual element, trust in and loyalty to Jesus Christ as Lord.

Both Sandeman and Campbell reacted against the unrestrained emotionalism which was often divorced from the elements of intellect and will. In Campbell's view of conversion—the intellect, emotions and will all had a part.¹

During their days in Ireland, both Thomas and Alexander Campbell, while Seceders of the strictest branch, had the opportunity of "occasional hearing", which enabled them to attend the Independent Chapel at Rich Hill. Here they first came in contact with the views of Glas, Sandeman, John Walker, and the Haldanes.² Later, while a student at Glasgow University, Alexander Campbell through his friendship with Greville Ewing, who was in charge of the Haldane seminary in Glasgow, and had the books of Glas and Sandeman in his library, was able to learn more about their views.

Campbell was thoroughly familiar with the writings of Sandeman and Hervey on faith. He said that in the controversy Sandeman was "like a giant among dwarfs"³ but that he rejected his system as a whole.

Although Campbell agreed with the Sandemanians in desiring the restoration of primitive Christianity, he saw that some of the early church practices were determined by local custom or temporary expediency. Hence his movement did not follow the Sandemanians in the observance of love-feasts, kiss

² Robert Richardson, Memoirs of A. Campbell, op. cit., pp. 60, 71.
³ Christian Baptist, 1825, p. 228.
of charity, abstinence from eating blood. He differed also in emphasizing the practice of believer's baptism for the remission of sins, the responsibility of evangelization, and the interest in bringing about Christian unity. They agreed also on their conception of the church as a divine society of believers, the independence of the local congregation, the observance of weekly communion, and the conception of faith as intelligent belief based upon evidence.

2. The Scotch Baptists

The early leaders of the Scotch Baptists, Archibald McLean and Robert Carmichael, had for a short time a connection with the Glasites. McLean was a book-seller by trade and a printer. He had been in the Church of Scotland. Carmichael had formerly been a minister of an Anti-burgher Seceder church. Both McLean and Carmichael left the Glasites within a year through dissatisfaction with the action in a case of discipline. By 1765 both had become convinced that there was no scriptural foundation for infant baptism, and that none but believers had a right to be baptized. On matters of faith and order the Scotch Baptists other than on the question of baptism, did not differ much from the Glasites.¹ There were never a large number of churches. Estimates vary from twenty to forty.²

Alexander Campbell's first biographer maintains that he


²British Churches of Christ seem more directly related to the Scotch Baptists, through William Jones, than does Campbell.
became interested in McLean while he was still in Ireland, and always spoke of his work on "The Commission" in highest terms.\(^1\) Campbell also mentions his interest in McLean.\(^2\)

3. The Haldanes

Towards the close of the eighteenth century two wealthy laymen of a distinguished family in Scotland, Robert and James Haldane were associated in the leadership of an evangelical movement to counteract the Moderatism that dominated the Scottish church. They were alarmed at the coldness and formality of the established church and thought that Scotland needed a religious awakening. These two men began their movement as laymen of the Church of Scotland, but later their changing views of Christian fellowship and church order, along with the indifference of the leaders of the established church to what they were seeking to do, resulted in their withdrawal.

In the beginning, the brothers had a series of preaching tours in almost every town and village in Scotland. They built tabernacles for evangelistic meetings, organized Sunday Schools, and established institutes for the training of lay preachers.\(^3\) They brought the English evangelist, Rowland Hill, to Scotland for a series of meetings. They formed an interdenominational Society for Propagating the Gospel at Home.

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\(^1\)Richardson, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 71.

\(^2\)Christian Baptist, 1825, p. 229.

The first church formed independently by the Haldanes was in 1799 in Edinburgh with James Haldane as minister. He was ordained by Greville Ewing, who the year before had withdrawn from the ministry of the Church of Scotland after he had come to accept Independency as a matter of principle. Ewing became the leader of the seminary in Glasgow, and it was he who befriended Campbell during his university days at Glasgow. They desired to return to the primitive pattern as described in the New Testament, so they adopted congregational independency and introduced the weekly observance of the Lord's Supper.

From this time churches on the congregational plan sprang up in different sections of Scotland. Within nine years eighty-five new churches had started. A great many of these were the direct result of the evangelical revival.

James Haldane in 1805 published his work on Social Worship in which he maintains that the New Testament furnishes instructions for church organizations and offices, ordinances and discipline, and the elements of public worship; and all Christians should follow these practices.

Some three years later James and Robert Haldane changed their views with regard to baptism, and were immersed. The Haldanes wanted to leave the question of baptism an open one, but numbers of their followers were unwilling to practice forbearance. Out of this division in the various churches grew many of the Congregational and Baptist churches of today in Scotland. This

1A. C. Watters, History of British Churches of Christ (Birmingham, Berean Press, 1948) p. 15.
controversy was going on while Alexander Campbell was a student at Glasgow University and his friend Greville Ewing did not share the immersionist views of the Haldanes.¹

The Haldanes agreed with many of the views of Glas and Sandeman, but they disapproved of the bitter, intolerant spirit which was so often manifest by them.² They considered the Glasites too dogmatic and narrow. The Haldanes agreed with the Glasites that faith is belief in the testimony concerning Jesus Christ, but they were not satisfied with Sandeman's definition of faith as "bare belief."³ They thought religion included a response of the heart and a belief of the mind, so they included within their definition of faith the idea of trust and confidence in Christ.⁴ This was more nearly like Campbell's conception of faith, than was Glas's conception.

As has been previously mentioned in connection with Glas, Alexander Campbell's first contact with the thought of the Haldanes was during his Rich Hill days at the Independent Chapel there. Later at Glasgow while at the University, Alexander was an intimate friend of Ewing. He attended his church on Sunday evenings, afterwards going to his home with other students where they would have informal discussions. It was "by the facts relating to the Haldanes, so often recounted to him by Mr. Ewing

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¹Richardson, op. cit., pp. 178-182.
³James Haldane, Strictures Upon 'Primitive Christianity' by John Walker (Edinburgh, Wm. Blackwood, 1820) p. 73.
⁴Alexander Haldane, op. cit., p. 477.
and others, that...the change in his religious views was chiefly due."¹ Near the end of the year at Glasgow, Alexander broke with the Seceder Presbyterian Church, of which he and his father had been members.

Other advocates of the primitive gospel with whom Campbell became acquainted were Alexander Carson of Tubbermore, Ireland and John Walker of Dublin. Both of these men he first heard at Rich Hill. At Glasgow he came to know David Dale, the father-in-law of Robert Owen, who was the minister of an Independent Church there.

IV. Influence Of The Covenant Theology

Another important part of the background of Campbell's thought was the Covenant Theology of Johannes Cocceius, Herman Witsius and their associates in the seventeenth century. Cocceius was a theological professor at Leyden. Although he was a Calvinist his thought somewhat modified Calvinism, as he sought to reconcile the sovereignty of God with man's assurance of salvation. The central idea which gave its name to the school was the expression of the relations between God and man in the formula of a covenant or agreement entered into by two contracting parties. By the covenant God bound himself to a certain line of conduct, making known to man in detail what was expected of him.

Cocceius' best known work is entitled Summa Doctrine de Foedere et Testamentis Dei. This was published in Leyden in 1648. After discussing the meaning of 'covenant', he defines

¹ Richardson, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 188.
the covenant of God as "the divine declaration of the method of perceiving the love of God and of obtaining union and communion with him."¹ This differs from human covenants as the mutual feature is absent. God alone formulates the conditions of it, but the covenant is completed only when man by God's grace binds himself to accept the conditions.

According to Cocceius, there are two covenants that God has made with man. The covenant of works was made with Adam as a representative of the whole human race. Life was promised upon the condition of obedience, with death as the penalty of transgression. This covenant was cancelled by Adam through his sin at the fall, so it was not fulfilled. The condemnation did not occur because of Christ's coming. The new covenant was called the covenant of grace. It was an agreement between God and Christ as the second Adam. In this God declares his purpose of salvation through the atoning sacrifice of Christ. This covenant is set forth before and after the coming of Christ. It began immediately after the fall. Everything following the fall belonged to the covenant of grace.² It was made known to Adam and renewed to Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, and to all the people of Israel through Moses.³ But the full revelation of

God's loving purpose was through the coming of Christ himself. He regarded everything in the Old Testament as prophetic of the New. The Old Testament, including the law, was regarded as an actual type of Christian grace, in which the sacrifices given by the Israelites were a bond. By the death of Christ this bond was cancelled.

In Cocceius' thought we see an early realization that the plan of salvation has had a gradual development. He traces this out through his study of the Scriptures into a division of two covenants between God and man. The covenant of grace has various historic stages, each of which has distinctive characteristics in both the Old and New Testaments. In speaking of Cocceius' covenant theology Robertson Smith says "with all its defects this is the most important attempt, in the older Protestant theology, to do justice to the historical development of revelation."¹

Cocceius' method of Scripture interpretation was different from that of his age. Later he became known as "the father of modern exegesis." He broke with the custom of his time of interpreting Scripture by allegory, tradition, and symbolism. He tried to find the meaning of a passage of Scripture by taking the words in the context in which they were written. He sought the plain and obvious meaning. The Bible was studied in its historic setting and the books were considered as connected

¹Robertson Smith, Prophets of Israel (Edinburgh, 1882) p. 375; cf. A. Alexander, Forces of Religious Thought (Glasgow: MacLehose; Jackson, 1920) p. 63 also emphasizes this.
wholes. The distinction between the dispensations was the key that gave unity to the Scriptures and through which he saw the unfolding of the process of salvation. He made the covenant idea the organizing principle of his system.

The Covenant Theology thus served as a remedy for some of the defects of scholastic Calvinism. The covenant gave man something to do in the process of salvation, while Calvinism had not emphasized this. Calvinism had lacked the historic sense. The idea of development in the succeeding dispensations of the Covenant met the need. The mechanical use of Scriptures by Calvinism was replaced by a more satisfactory method of exegesis.

The beginnings of the Covenant theology preceded the school of Cocceius by half a century. Hyperius, Olevianus and Raphael Eglin were the pioneers. Cocceius's teachers at Franeker University had been William Ames, an English Puritan and Matthias Martinius. Ames pointed out the distinction of the different periods within the Old Testament dispensation, and Martinius had the idea of the two-fold covenant. Cocceius developed these ideas and gave them an original treatment. Among the followers of Cocceius, were Wilhelm Momma, Francis Burmann, Johann Braun, Johann van der Weyen and Herman Witsius. Witsius' work was particularly well known. His *Economy of the Covenant Between God and Man* was translated into English and was widely read.

After discussing the covenant in general, Witsius begins by describing the covenant of works:
An agreement between God and Adam...by which God promised eternal life and happiness to him, if he yielded to all his commands; threatening him with death if he failed but in the least point; and Adam accepted the condition.¹

He tells of its violation by man's sin and of God's consequently repudiating it and setting up a new covenant of grace.² Like Cocceius, he distinguishes between the covenant of redemption "between God the Father and Christ the Mediator", and the covenant of grace "that testamentary disposition, by which God bestows by an immutable covenant eternal salvation, and everything relative thereto, upon the elect."³ The gifts to the elect are effectual calling,⁴ regeneration, followed by "true faith in God by Christ"⁵ justification,⁶ spiritual peace,⁷ and adoption.⁸

The Covenant theology gave a liberal interpretation to Calvinism. It endeavored to provide a safe alternative to Arminianism. It was some time before it was discovered that its implications were antagonistic to Calvinism. But when it was realized that it was really a breaking away from the prevailing tradition of the contemporary scholasticism, bitter opposition arose in the Reformed Church of Holland. Division was averted by a timely compromise which made it possible for the Covenant theology to remain as a school of thought within the church.

²Ibid., p. 135. ³Ibid., p. 137. ⁴Ibid., p. 309.
⁵Ibid., p. 337. ⁶Ibid., p. 354. ⁷Ibid., p. 390.
⁸Ibid., p. 403.
It's influence became widespread in many communions both on the continent and in Britain.

The Westminster Confession was the first creedal recognition of the Covenant theology.¹ There is a chapter "Of God's Covenant with Man" in which the divine covenants are stated to be a covenant of Works and a Covenant of grace with the dividing line at the fall.² The concept of the atonement in the Confession bears the mark of the Covenant theology also. The English Puritans of the seventeenth century were committed to the Covenant theology, and they carried it further than the authors of the Westminster Confession.

In Scotland, the influence of the Covenant theology was more far-reaching than in England.³ A number of factors were responsible for this. Many of the Presbyterian clergy had found exile in Holland during the period when episcopacy was forced upon Scotland by the Act of Uniformity in 1662 under Charles II. There they came in contact with Arminianism and the Covenant theology. Even after Presbyterianism was restored as the national religion the custom continued of sending theological students to Holland for training.⁴ As a result of these in-

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³C. G. M'Crie, op. cit., p. 71.

fluences, when prelacy was ousted, there developed a large number of controversies within the Church of Scotland which caused bitterness and division in the eighteenth century. On its theological side, the Secession of 1732 under the leadership of the Erskines was a counter-reformation of Calvinism. A book of the preceding century, *The Marrow of Modern Divinity* by Edward Fisher of Oxford was rediscovered by Thomas Boston and was popular with the Seceders, as were all of Thomas Boston's works, particularly *The Fourfold State* and *A View of the Covenant of Grace*. These books were evidence of the impact of the Covenant theology on the thought of the time.

Both Thomas and Alexander Campbell were originally members of the Seceder church. Thomas, the father, was educated at the Seceder theological seminary at Whitburn where Archibald Bruce was the professor. Herman Mitsius' *Economy of the Covenant Between God and Man* was one of the text books there, and this book was in Alexander Campbell's library. Alexander Campbell's biographer mentions his reading Boston's *Fourfold State* during


5Though many of A. Campbell's books were burned in a fire at Bethany College, this book is still a part of the collection he left the college at his death.
the voyage which ended in shipwreck and his study at Glasgow. 1
Both men in all likelihood were familiar with the Marrow of
Modern Divinity because it was so much a part of the background
of the Seceder Church. In Alexander Campbell's writings he
occasionally refers to the works of Cocceius and Witsius. 2 Mr.
Campbell evidently knew the Covenant theology both as it was
interpreted by the Seceders and as it was taught by Cocceius
and Witsius.

That the Covenant theology was an important factor in
Mr. Campbell's thought can be seen by noting the points of
resemblance. Both regarded the Bible as manifesting successive
stages in God's dealing with man in the different dispensations.
Both were reactions against Protestant scholasticism, Cocceius
in the second generation of Reformers, and Campbell in America
in the early nineteenth century. Both opposed the emphasis on
predestination and sovereign grace as discouraging to human
effort. Both stressed what man needed to do to enter into right
relations with God. Both laid primary emphasis on the Bible as
the interpreter of God's way to man. 3

Campbell's development of the Covenant theology was quite
original. It was first manifest in his famous Sermon on the Law
at the meeting of the Redstone Baptist Association in 1816.

Christian Baptism, Its Antecedents and Consequences (Bethany, Va.,
A. Campbell, 1851) p. 146; Christian Baptist, 1825, p. 195;
Christian System, p. 327.
3W. E. Garrison, Alexander Campbell's Theology, op. cit.,
pp. 152, 153.
What he said there was considered heretical by many of his Baptist brethren, and finally caused his separation from that communion. In his plan of development after the fall, he recognized the Patriarchal, Jewish and Christian dispensations calling then the starlight, moonlight and sunlight ages of the world. In his conception of the covenants, he made the cleavage with Christ, rather than at the fall as the Dutch theologians had done. He argued that the Christian system is based on a new covenant which was not just an extension of the law. Christians are not under any part of the law, either judicial, moral or ceremonial, but under the new covenant. The law was abolished with the beginnings of the Christian dispensation. The new covenant is connected historically with the previous dispensations, but it is quite different in principle and content. Morality continued because its basis was prior to the moral law and it must exist in any covenant.

In making the dividing line between the covenants at Adam's fall, Cocceius interpreted the Old Testament in the light of the New. He regarded the law and the prophets as predictions of Christ. He believed the covenant of grace was continuous from the fall to the present. Campbell denied this continuity. The coming of Christ to him, was a completely new covenant, not just an improvement of the old. The Christian church was a new institution, and the Christian ordinances were new. Mr. Campbell drew important conclusions from his interpretation of the new
covenant in this light. Morality was no longer based on the decalogue, but on Christ's moral laws. The Lord's day was no substitute for the Sabbath. The Christian ministry was not a substitute for the Jewish priesthood, and baptism was not a substitute for circumcision. National covenants or the establishment of any form of religion by civil law should not be argued from Jewish law. The Old Testament, for him, was invaluable in showing how God through the ages had provided ways of salvation for men, and in helping men to understand the background of the new covenant, but not to determine the way of salvation for mankind today under the new dispensation.

V. Philosophic Influences

Alexander Campbell had a philosophical background which is worthy of careful study. Though he disclaimed interest in what might be called formal philosophy or theology, he accepted and acted upon certain definite philosophical and theological principles, as does every thoughtful person. This is true even though his primary interest was in the study and proclamation of the Scriptures, the union of all Christians, and the restoration of primitive Christianity. Because of this, he said less about his philosophy than would otherwise be the case.

"He who will not reason is a bigot; he who cannot is a fool, and he who dare not is a slave," Campbell once said and his biographer, Mr. Richardson, regarded that statement as


putting in a nut-shell the attitude of Alexander Campbell. "His mind was capable," Richardson went on to say, "of expansive generalizing power and wide reach of thought." He was able to realize the grand general principles involved in all issues.\(^1\) In him, the understanding and judgment largely predominated.\(^2\)

Once he said with regard to what philosophy teaches "that we should look into the future through the spectacles of the past and present. And this, too, with special reference to the part we should take in the existing scenes of our generation."\(^3\)

Campbell possessed a truly philosophic spirit in his quest for truth:

It is always more or less detrimental to the ascertain­ment of truth to allow our previous conclusions to assume the position of fixed and fundamental truths, to which nothing is to be at any time added either in correction or enlargement. On the contrary we ought rather to act under the conviction that we may be wiser today than yesterday, and that whatever is true can suffer no hazard from a careful and candid consideration. In this manner I am accustomed to examine all questions, literary, moral, or religious.\(^4\)

He was a keen student. Once he said, "I have rummaged antiquity and the systems of philosophy ancient and modern." Any one who reads the volumes from his pen cannot help but be aware of this.

Campbell was certainly no slavish adherent of any school of thought, but he did have a consistent and definite

\(^1\)Richardson, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 523.
\(^2\)Richardson, Memoirs, p. 133.
\(^3\)Millennial Harbinger, 1858, p. 422.
\(^4\)Ibid., p. 160.
philosophy of life which gave point and direction to this thinking and actions. No doubt his philosophical training helped to give direction to the Campbell's thinking and to the movement which he helped to inaugurate. Like Paul, Campbell knew a good deal of philosophy and could use it when the occasion demanded. He once remarked, "We philosophize with philosophers. We preach the gospel to sinners. We teach the uninitiated and untaught. We debate with opponents, and cherish good will toward all mankind."¹ In discussing the importance of thinking, he emphasized that in order "to know the world around us, it is essential to know the world within us. Self knowledge is therefore an essential to safety as it is to happiness."²

Campbell was well read in the field of philosophy. He was familiar with the works of Voltaire, Volney, the Earl of Shaftesbury, Gibbon, Godwin, Paine, Rousseau, Hobbes, Hume, Diderot, Pascal, D'Alembert, Mirabeau, Lord Bacon, Newton, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Cudworth, Henry Lord Brougham, Butler, Paley, Charles Leslie, Soames Jennings, Grotius, and LeClerc. He was a student of the classics and knew the works of Plato, Aristotle and the ancient Greeks.

In comparing British authors with those of ancient Greece or Rome, he says that in his opinion the British are superior:

In all the constituent excellencies of true greatness; in permanent, practical extensive usefulness; in preparing individuals for the walks of private or social life; the

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1858, p. 86.
²Ibid., 1852, p. 367.
citizen, for rational enjoyment of his privileges; the patriot for his public duties; and the Christian for the service of his God and of his fellow men. I would rather have a young man deeply imbued with spirit thoroughly instructed in the principles, and enriched with the knowledge to be gathered from eminent authors of the British school, than that he should be the most accomplished classical scholar. I would rather that he should be a profound student of the philosophy, history and literature produced by the British Isles than that he should copy Thucydides nine times, or transcribe Cicero thrice.

There is no doubt that of all the British School the predominating influences in his philosophy were the writings of John Locke and the Scottish Common Sense School of Philosophy.

Campbell confesses agreement with Locke and Reid in their philosophy quite casually in one of his writings. In order to see how this is true we need to explore the influence of a particular philosophical environment upon the life of a nation, his educational surroundings and training, his writings and addresses, the kind of philosophy taught in the institution he founded, the thought presuppositions of his preaching and teaching.

A clue to the basis of his thinking is found in these words:

In physics, or in metaphysics, in philosophy or in science, there was no progress—no perceptible or valuable progress— for many centuries; during indeed, the entire reign of the Aristotelian philosophy and the tyranny of the mere logical and catechetical learning. Answers printed or written, for stereotyped questions, propounded in seminaries of learning, I care not what the subject or

1Millennial Harbinger, 1834, pp. 490-491.
2Christian Baptist, 1830, p. 662.
the science, never made a thinker, a scholar, a philosopher, or a great man, much less a saint, or an heir of immortality. It is observation, comparison and deduction, that make the man, the philosopher, the Christian. 1

We presume everyone is acquainted with the fact that there has been a great change of terminology, both in the New World and the Old, by the substitution of the Baconian style of reasoning in the place of the Aristotelian method, which was eminently a priori. When the Baconian system came into use the former style was laid on the shelf. Consequently we have now to reason from facts, so that the logic of the present age is far superior to that of the Greeks and Romans. 2

The Baconian method of induction was basic in the philosophy of both Locke and the Common Sense School of Scottish Philosophy and in that of Alexander Campbell as well. 3

VI. The Influence of A Particular Philosophical Environment

Down through the centuries, from the time of Plato and Aristotle to our present day, the evidence is clear of the moulding influence of the leading philosophical schools upon the intellectual or religious leadership of the period. This was certainly true as far as Alexander Campbell was concerned.

The thought of Locke dominated British and American life in the eighteenth century and in much of the nineteenth. In practically every area of human experience he caused men to re-

1A. Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, p. 308.

2A. Campbell, Familiar Lectures on the Pentateuch, p. 374.

3"The Disciples of Christ apply the scientific method to the interpretation of the Bible and oppose the mystic and dogmatic methods. What Bacon was to the scientific world, Alexander Campbell was to the religious. Lord Bacon was the first to apply the inductive method to science; Alexander Campbell was the first to apply it to religion." J. W. Lowber, Struggles and Triumphs of the Truth (Cincinnati: Standard Publishing Co., 1910) p. 170.
think their basic presuppositions. One of the historians in this field says: "The name of John Locke stands for all that is most characteristic in English philosophical thought, down almost to the present day."¹ He goes on to say that in all of Locke's works "the aim is to show the futility of empty verbiage and idle acquiescence in traditional opinions and assumptions, which take the place of honest intellectual effort and inquiry. In opposition to this, it strives to make men use their own minds, not upon words but upon real facts, to the intent that they may be freed from the weight of the past, and attain to a rationally grounded liberty."² Locke's views of government helped to fashion the early republic. He actually wrote the constitution for Carolina, and his ideas were influential in shaping the constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Independence. He greatly influenced the views of the founders of American political life and helped to fashion the thought of Thomas Jefferson.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Scottish School of philosophy led by Thomas Reid occupied a commanding position in religious and intellectual circles in Britain, in France, and in America.³ It stood as the acknowledged champion

²Ibid., pp. 323, 324.
of religion and morality against scepticism and materialism. It was taught at the four Scottish universities: Aberdeen, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and St. Andrews. Goethe tells us the value of the Scottish philosophy for him and the world:

The reason why foreigners—Britons, Americans, Frenchman and Italians—can gain no profit from our new (German) philosophy is simply that it does not directly lay hold on life. They see no practical advantages to be derived from it, and so it is that men turn more or less to the teaching of the Scottish School as it is expounded by Reid and Stewart. This teaching is intelligible to the ordinary understanding, and this it is that wins it favour. It seeks to reconcile sensationalism and spiritualism, to effect the union of the real and the ideal, and thus to create a more satisfactory foundation for human thought and action. The fact that it undertakes this work and promises to accomplish it, obtains for it disciples and votaries.¹

Among the early leaders of American life strongly influenced by the Common Sense School was Thomas Jefferson. He found Stewart enlightening,² and so it was to him he sent his representative when he decided to recruit from Great Britain the faculty for the new University of Virginia.³ Jefferson once explained that when he referred to "self-evident truths" in the Declaration of Independence he meant nothing more than "the common sense of the subject," and this meant the common reason. He agreed with the Scottish realists, loosely identifying the intuitions of what they called the moral sense with reason and common sense.⁴ He

²Herbert W. Schneider, op. cit., p. 247. Jefferson probably first learned of the Scottish philosophy through his professor of moral philosophy at the College of William and Mary, a Scot, Dr. William Small, who was his favorite professor.
agreed with the Scottish intuitionists as well as with Locke.

Alexander Campbell's first contact with philosophy was under the guidance of his father, Thomas Campbell. His father graduated from Glasgow University and had been trained in the theological seminary of the Seceders. An associate said of him: "he was one of the most accurate English and classical scholars, and exact and thorough disciplinarians and teachers, we have known."¹ Throughout most of his life he was highly regarded as a teacher as well as a preacher. He drilled his son in the Latin and Greek classics, French, English literature and philosophy. Here Alexander formed the habit of laborious and thorough investigation for which he was in after years so eminently distinguished.

As he advanced in age, he learned greatly to admire the character and the works of Locke, whose "Letters on Toleration" seem to have made a lasting impression upon him, and to have fixed his ideas of religious and civil liberty. The "Essay on Human Understanding" he appears to have thoroughly studied under the direction of his father, who was earnestly desirous that his son should make all possible advancement and preparation, trusting that he would be able, after some time, to send him to the University.²

No doubt Thomas Campbell also taught his son something of the philosophy of the Scottish School led by Thomas Reid, as this was the dominant philosophy during his father's student days.

At the University of Glasgow he enjoyed the finest opportunities to perfect his previous studies and to enlarge his knowledge of literature, science, and philosophy. During

¹W. K. Pendleton, Millennial Harbinger, 1866, p. 122.
²R. Richardson, op. cit., p. 33.
Campbell's student days at Glasgow he had both public and private classes in Greek with Professor Young; public and private classes in Logic and Belles Lettres under Professor Jardine; and a class in Experimental Philosophy with Dr. Ure. His biographer indicates his intense interest:

The necessary preparation for these classes, and the various exercises required, kept him extremely busy, and he devoted himself with uncommon zeal and indefatigable industry to his studies during the session. In addition to the above regular classes, he resumed the study of French, and gave considerable time to English reading and composition. Retiring to bed at ten o'clock p.m. he arose regularly at four in the morning. At six, he attended his class in French; from seven to eight, a class in Greek Testament; and from eight to ten, his Latin classes, returning to bathe and breakfast at ten. In the afternoon he recited in a more advanced Greek class and in Logic, attending also several lectures per week delivered by Dr. Ure, and accompanied with experiments in natural science, in which he was very much interested.¹

Two of his teachers, professors Young and Jardine, had been the teachers of his father nearly a quarter of a century before.

Dr. George Jardine was an exponent of the Common Sense School of Scottish Philosophy, and particularly of the thought of Thomas Reid. He paid his tribute to him in these words:

To uncommon candour and genuine simplicity, this celebrated philosopher added an absolute command of his attention, great powers of discernment, and an indefatigable industry, uniformly directed by the love of truth. No other writer has so well delineated the method of studying mind; and no one has treated metaphysical subjects with so much perspicuity.²

Jardine then relates how he had not only studied under Reid, but

¹Ibid., p. 131.

had been a personal friend, for the last twenty years of his life living with him. Jardine was highly regarded as a teacher at the University of Glasgow. His classes which at first averaged fifty, grew to an average of two hundred. He revised the course in logic in order to make it fit the needs of his students. In addition to formal logic, he included a study of the mind and the various faculties, language, taste, beauty, and criticism.

Campbell devoted much of his time to reading while at Glasgow. He studied more of Locke's writings. Since he later shows the influence upon him of The Reasonableness of Christianity and the Two Treatises of Government, it is quite likely that his first acquaintance came at the University. He evidently also read the works of Thomas Reid and James Beattie, and possibly Dugald Stewart.¹ In a memorandum he states part of his reading:

Dr. Beattie's "Minstrel," "Life and Poems of James Hay Beattie." A work of Stuart's, Mackenzie's "Man of Feeling," Buffon's "Natural History," Johnson's "Lives of the Poets," four volumes, Dr. Beattie's "Ethics," and one volume of Goldsmith's "Animated Nature." Many extracts appear... from Dr. Beattie's "Ethics." Among these, we have much upon the principles of Law and Civil Government, Right, Obligation, Justice, etc; also upon Reasoning and Evidence, and style of composition, historical, rhetorical, etc.²

The numerous references to John Locke and the Scottish School of Philosophy in his own writings indicate something of

¹C. R. Athearn, op. cit., p. 164. Dugald Stewart's name was frequently misspelled Stuart in numerous references I have seen which included his first name.

their influence upon him. He often refers to Locke as "the Christian philosopher,"¹ and the "great mental and moral philosopher."² He includes the name of Locke on countless occasions in terms of high admiration. On one occasion he refers to him along with others as "champions of the faith."³ He frequently mentions together the names of Newton, Bacon, and Locke. He does this sometimes to show that there does not need to be controversy between science and the Bible. Nothing in Christianity conflicts with true science.

All the great masters of science were believers in the Bible and cherished the hopes which it inspires. Bacon, the founder of the inductive philosophy; Locke, the great mental and moral philosopher, and Newton, the interpreter and revealer of Nature's secrets, are well-known to the religious as well as to the scientific world, as believers in the Bible and expounders of its doctrines, its precepts, types and promises. They are as eminent for their homage to the Bible as for their devotion to the studies of nature. Philosophy, with them, and Christianity were not at variance.⁴

On another occasion when speaking of men of genius and talent he remarks, "in a Locke, a Bacon, or a Newton, we discover the still superior force of genius and talent combined."⁵ In speaking of industrious habits, he says of the three men "they were

¹The Christian Baptist, 1824, p. 82; Millennial Harbinger, 1844, p. 12; Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 795; Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 252; Popular Lectures and Addresses, p. 130.

²Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 49; Millennial Harbinger, 1860, p. 60; Millennial Harbinger, 1832, p. 274; Popular Lectures and Addresses, p. 136.

³Millennial Harbinger, 1856, p. 407.

⁴Millennial Harbinger, 1838, p. 512; Popular Lectures and Addresses, p. 136; Millennial Harbinger, 1857, p. 252.

⁵Popular Lectures and Addresses, p. 78.
as much distinguished for labor as for genius."¹ In stressing how so many improvements and reforms in the world had been unappreciated by contemporaries he remarked:

Bacon had to will and bequeath his fame to other nations than that which gave him birth. Locke's Essays were proscribed by the heads of the English Universities and forbid to be read. And even Newton was regarded as an innovator, unsettling the schools and rendering doubtful the attainments of former times.²

Campbell frequently refers to the basic view in Locke's Essay that our original ideas are the result of sensation and reflection.³

In his Athens College Address in 1838 on "Literature, Science and Art"⁴ Campbell quotes Locke's division of ideas into things, actions, signs, as recorded in his Essay.⁵ He then goes on to indicate his approval of Locke's division of the sciences into physics, mechanics, ethics, symbolics.

As already indicated, Locke's Letters on Toleration seem to have had a lasting effect on Campbell. He pays tribute in his Evidences of Christianity:

We ascribe much to the intelligence, virtue, and patriotism of our revolutionary heroes and statesmen. But there was one Christian philosopher, to whom we are more indebted than to any of them. . . . The

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1843, p. 370.
²Millennial Harbinger, 1832, p. 40.
³Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 618; Millennial Harbinger, 1835, p. 152; Christian Baptist, 1828, p. 497; Christian Baptist, 1826, p. 271.
⁴Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures and Addresses, pp. 130-131.
⁵J. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. xxi, Par. 1-5.
cause of civil and religious liberty owes more to the labors of Mr. John Locke. . . . His Essay on Toleration first burst the chains that held England and Europe fast bound under a religious and civil despotism. . . . (and) laid the foundation for a new order of society. . . . This essay gave the first impulse to the spirit of inquiry, and laid the foundation of present liberties . . . . It should be known, and everywhere divulged, in all and amongst all people, that Europe and America are more indebted to the elaborate discussions of our Christian philosopher, for the quantum of civil and religious liberty now enjoyed, than to all the sceptics who have written, from the days of Pyrrhus to my friend Robert Owen.1

Before quoting extensively from Locke's first letter on Toleration2 Campbell points out that the incidental views3 he expresses of the church and its institutions are just as valuable as the main argument in favor of toleration.4 In the Campbell-Rice Debate the first letter is also quoted.5

Locke's views concerning the Scriptures were not discovered by Campbell until 1825 when he was editing a new translation of the New Testament. He shows his approval when he says:

In presenting our readers with the following extract, we are afraid of being charged with the crime of plagiarism; because it will be remembered that, if we have not

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1Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 252.
3Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason (Cambridge: University Press, 1950) p. 115. Cragg agrees with Campbell when he says: "His incidental comments on religion were often more important than his explicitly theological work, and the spirit in which he approached Christianity was more significant than what he actually said about it."
4Millennial Harbinger, 1844, p. 11.
used the very words and phrases in some of our public addresses, we have certainly on various occasions, viva voce, and, perhaps, with the pen, too, expressed every idea in the extract, and yet never acknowledged Mr. Locke as our tutor in any instance. Yet strange as it may appear, we are perfectly innocent of the crime. For, until a few days ago, we had never seen or read one sentence in this work. . . . This great layman, commentator, and philosopher, to whom all the British empire and all America are indebted for his essays on Toleration, on the Human Understanding, and on other accounts, did in our judgment, and in that of the great Dr. Pierce, and many others, make the best effort towards understanding the apostolic epistles ever made since the great apostacy took place. But he was a layman, else he should have been better known and more universally read as a Commentator. His praise as a philosopher is commensurate with the English tongue—and, indeed, with modern Europe; but his character as a biblical critic is not so well known, because he had never been consecrated.

He printed an extract from the Preface to Locke's Paraphrase and Notes on Four of Paul's Epistles in order to show that views so much like his own were held a hundred years before and agreed in the necessity for a new translation of the New Testament. He quotes two references to Locke's notes on the meaning of baptism, and his paraphrase of the Biblical view of marriage and divorce. Locke's views on the Resurrection in his letter to Stillingfleet are also quoted. Further appreciation of

1Christian Baptist, 1825, pp. 193-194; Millennial Harbinger, 1832, pp. 274-275. Here Campbell again deals with Locke's opinions of form in which Scriptures are printed.


3Millennial Harbinger, 1853, pp. 533 quotes Locke, Ibid., p. 115.

Locke's views on the Scriptures is expressed by Campbell in 1845. He recalls that Locke made a close study of the Scriptures for fifteen years and that he constantly made fresh discoveries of truth in it. Locke's recommendation to a young man as to the best way to attain a true knowledge of the Christian religion was "Let him study the Holy Scriptures, especially the New Testament. Therein are contained the words of eternal life. It hath God for its author—salvation for its end; and truth, without any mixture of error, for its matter."

Campbell's views of the social compact and the principles of government were essentially those of Locke and the natural rights school of social and political philosophy. Though the evidence is not conclusive that Campbell actually studied Locke's "Two Treatises of Government," he at least got many of the principles second hand through Beattie, who followed Locke closely in regard to his social philosophy. Campbell studied Beattie's "Elements of Moral Science" quite carefully making copious extracts in his "Common Book" on these matters. Upon occasion he also quoted and commended the political writings of another classical writer in the Lockean natural rights tradition, Montesquieu.

The references to the Scottish School of Philosophy in Campbell's writings are not quite so extensive, but they are none the less important.

Campbell, in arguing with Robert Owen, shows and acquaint-

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1Millennial Harbinger, 1845, p. 143.
ance with Reid when he points out some of the curious and absurd doctrines men have held. He refers to Hobbes' conviction that there was no such thing as right and wrong, to Berkeley's belief that matter does not exist, and to Hume's saying that there was nothing else in the world but ideas and impressions, then he says,

Reid, in his Essay on the Human Mind states that some of the old philosophers went so far as to doubt their own existence. Descartes was one of these. He would not believe in his own existence until he had proved it to his own satisfaction. And how think you he did prove it? Why said he, cogito ergo sum. Now this was proof, just as illogical as if he had said, 'I have an eye or an ear, and therefore I am.' Yet this proof satisfied his mind.1

In an address on "The Philosophy of Memory" before the Union Literary Society of Washington College in 1841 Campbell asks, "What can we say of memory that has not been already said, and better than we can say it, by some of the great masters of mental philosophy, such as Bacon, Locke, Reid, Watts, Stewart, Brown, or Combe?"2 When exchanging views with regard to conversion with J. A. Waterman both refer to Paley, Reid and Stewart and their researches into the mind.3

The opening issue of The Christian Baptist, Campbell's first publication, gives Dr. Beattie's opinion of the Christian religion in which he emphasizes the simplicity of the Christian religion. "It is fitted, both in its doctrines and its evidences, to all conditions and capacities of reasonable creatures--a

1 Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 47.
2 Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures and Addresses, p. 273.
3 Millennial Harbinger, 1833, p. 408.
character which does not belong to any other religious or philosophical system that ever appeared in the world." He closes with this conviction: "an intimate acquaintance with the Scripture, particularly the Gospels, is all that is necessary to our accomplishment in true Christian knowledge."

When Alexander Campbell published a new translation of the New Testament incorporating Dr. George Campbell's translation of the four gospels, he quoted Dr. Beattie's comments on this translation in letters written to Mrs. Montagu and Sir William Forbes. Campbell's comment is: "The judgment of such a man as Dr. Beattie is of more moral weight than the decision of a generation of partisans fired by a misguided zeal, or shackled by the restraints of religious prejudice."²

The regard in which Campbell held Dugald Stewart is evident in these words: "We shall next hear the oracle of modern philosophers who filled the chair of Dugald Stewart, the greatest of metaphysicians."³ Following this there came a quotation from Thomas Brown of Edinburgh concerning philosophy as forming and fashioning the soul in addition to comprehending the nature of our spiritual being. On his European tour in 1848 Campbell visited Edinburgh and wrote back, "In ascending Carlton Hill... the superb monument of the great metaphysician Dugald Stewart, rises, in all the graceful elegance of the most

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¹Christian Baptist, 1823, p. 10.
²Millennial Harbinger, 1833, p. 22.
³Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures and Addresses, p. 101.
delicate taste." If Campbell could speak of the Common Sense philosophers in these terms, he must have had a high opinion of the system of thought which they advocated.

2. What Kind of Philosophy Did Campbell Teach?

From the day in 1840 that Campbell founded Bethany College to the time of his death, he was president and taught Mental and Moral Philosophy, Evidences of Christianity, and Political Economy. In the 1855 Millennial Harbinger appear extracts from the catalogue of Bethany College indicating the course of instruction and text books. In the school of Sacred History and Moral Philosophy:

The course of instruction in this department occupies four years. It comprises the Evidences of Christianity, Sacred History, Biblical Literature, Ecclesiastical History, and Moral Philosophy. The text books used are the Bible, Paley's Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, Butler's Analogy, and Mosheim's or Giesler's Ecclesiastical History. The following works of references are also recommended—Josephus, Prideaux' Connection, Rollins' Ancient History, Neander's Church History, Burnet's and D'Aubigne's History of the Reformation and Warburton's Divine Legation of Moses.

In one of his lectures upon Sacred Literature, Campbell elaborates that the books of basic importance are the Bible, Butler's Analogy, and Paley's Evidences of Christianity. He believes the Analogy was founded upon correct principles of reasoning. He sums up the argument: "It goes to show that every objection urged against revealed religion of the Bible, may be

1 Millennial Harbinger, 1848, p. 48.
2 Millennial Harbinger, 1840, p. 158.
3 Millennial Harbinger, 1855, p. 255.
used with equal force against the laws of nature.\textsuperscript{1} He made use of Butler to demonstrate "there is nothing wrong in religion" and of Paley "to learn the power and wisdom of God." Even so, they give no sound arguments for revealed religion, and unsound reasoning upon them produces infidels. Neither Butler or Paley give clear, positive proof of revelation, but they do help to "stop the mouths of those who are continually saying, we look up through nature to nature's God."\textsuperscript{2}

It is of importance here to mention that Dugald Stewart, in his \textit{Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid} recalls that many of Reid's views coincided with those of Butler. He had made a careful study of the "Analogy," and also his "Discourses on Human Nature." He considered the latter as "the most satisfactory account that has yet appeared of the fundamental principles of morals."\textsuperscript{3} Stewart also commented that Paley's work approached nearer to the spirit of Scottish philosophy than any of Locke's English disciples since the time of Butler.\textsuperscript{4} Ernest Campbell Mossner in his work on Bishop Butler\textsuperscript{5} indicates that Butler's principles were indoctrinated

\textsuperscript{1}Alexander Campbell, \textit{Familiar Lectures on the Pentateuch}, op. cit., p. 376.

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 379.


\textsuperscript{5}Ernest Campbell Mossner, \textit{Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason, A Study in the History of Thought} (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1936, p. 192.)
in Scotland by Thomas Reid after the middle of the eighteenth century. Campbell quite likely became acquainted with Butler's and Paley's work through Reid's followers at Glasgow.

The text books in intellectual and political philosophy were Intellectual Philosophy, (Upham); Logic (Whateley); Political Economy (Wayland); Constitutional Law (Story); International Law (Wheaton and Kent).

In the department of Intellectual and Political Philosophy in addition to the regular recitations of the text-books, lectures will be given, so as to place these topics, both in their history and present phases, fully and fairly before the minds of the students. The characteristic features of the different schools of metaphysics, will be distinctly drawn and criticized, and a constant effort made to awaken in the consciousness of the student those mental states, the actions and laws of which he may be studying. Thus, it is believed, he may be most successfully taught, not only the bearing of the books, but the knowledge of himself. In this course of studies and instruction, reference will frequently be had to Kant, Cousin, Locke, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Coleridge, Sir William Hamilton, etc.1

Thomas C. Upham, professor of mental philosophy at Bowdoin College, was an advocate of the Scottish School of Philosophy, his basic ideas coming from Reid and Stewart.2 He was the first great American textbook writer in mental philosophy. His Elements of Intellectual Philosophy appeared in 1821. Francis Wayland was president of Brown University.3 He was best known in the field of moral philosophy. In his Political Economy (1837) he argued for free trade. On the slavery issue he tried

1Millennial Harbinger, 1855, p. 228.
3Ibid., pp. 242, 243.
to conciliate the North by being a "conscientious" objector to slavery and to conciliate the South by saying that slavery was not a "political" issue. This stand pleased neither side.

Richard Whateley's *Elements of Logic* (1828) his most influential work, Campbell used as a text. He was also highly appreciative of the noted Anglican's other writings. In his debate with Rice he quotes extensively from Archbishop Whateley's *Kingdom of Christ* whose thesis, with which Campbell agreed, was "that a regularly constituted christian society, framed in accordance with the fundamental principles taught us by the apostles, and their great Master, has the only true, real apostolic succession of divine authenticity." Whateley was a reforming spirit in the Anglican church and Campbell, the reformer, shared many of his views. In addition to denying the apostolic succession, Whateley was a strong believer in the priesthood of all believers; he opposed Calvinistic election, and the Fourth Commandment as being obligatory as a rule for the Christian Sunday. He thought numbers of people made the New Testament writers responsible for doctrines which were not actually there when correctly interpreted.

A fellow teacher with Campbell at Bethany, his associate and biographer, in an article on "Interpreting the Scriptures" indicated that the books that might be profitably studied to help were: Whateley's *Logic*; Paley's *Evidences*; and Beattie's

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Essay on Truth.¹

It is doubtful if Campbell had a thorough acquaintance with Kant's writings. He does refer to him once. "Modern philosophy with the celebrated professor Kant, has quite set aside the unmeaning distinction between matter and spirit; for who can tell where matter ceases and spirit begins?"² The writings of Kant were not translated into English until 1854³ and Campbell's views were well formulated long before that. Kant was not taught in the Scottish universities at the time Campbell attended. It was not until Sir William Hamilton's teaching that Scotland felt something of the influence of the Kantian school. More than likely his chief acquaintances with him was in the reference others made to him in their writings. Not many people in Britain or America knew much about Kant during Campbell's formative years.

There is reference to Coleridge several times in Campbell's writings. He added the complete works of Coleridge to his library in 1853.

That Samuel Taylor Coleridge was a man, a whole man, a full developed man—that he was a thinker, a great thinker, an original thinker—that he was a poet, a philosopher, a sage—that he was a benevolent man, a philanthropist, a Christian, are matters cordially,

¹R. Richardson, Millennial Harbinger, 1849, p. 644.
²Christian Baptist, 1827, p. 375.
gratefully, and I presume to say, very generally con-
ceded by all men of sense. 1

When writing this he had read the first volume, *Aids to Re-
flection*, but by 1854, he had had a chance to look through the
whole series. As a pre-eminent Christian philosopher, meta-
physician, critic, lecturer and poet "few men have equaled him
in any one of the professions; none has excelled him; more
probably, none has equaled him in them all." He goes on to
add what a support Coleridge was to the sound doctrine of the
Anglican church, and how he had uprooted its errors and
hierarchical pretensions. "He has pierced Unitarianism under
the fifth rib." Then he speaks of Coleridge's agreement with
the movement which Campbell was leading: "In every prominent
position assumed by us as a people, on account of which we have
been calumniated by the sectarian press, he not only sustains,
but fortifies all our capital positions." 2 He then proceeds to
discuss some of the points of agreement and mentions how in
some instance he does not think Coleridge goes far enough. "In

In tracing the mind of his great oracle of science
and learning, as developed in his masterly touches on
all the great ecclesiastical questions of the day, and
especially in his allusions to the constitution and
characteristics of the English hierarchy, I find much
to admire and little to regret. Still, his conceptions
of the true genius and spirituality of Christ's Kingdom,
are not exactly equal to himself in matters of general
science and philosophy. 3

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1 *Millennial Harbinger*, 1853, p. 309. The edition of
Coleridge's *Works* referred to was in seven volumes, edited by
Professor Shedd, and published by Harpers in 1853.


3 *Millennial Harbinger*, 1854, pp. 250, 251.
Later he indicates the inadequacy of Coleridge and the metaphysics of the past.

The metaphysics of the past or of the present day whether in the masterly hands of a Coleridge, a Plato, an Aristotle, or a Leibnitz, are, one and all, impotent to originate one spiritual conception of an essence absolute, or the sub-basis of a man, an angel, or a demon.¹

It is interesting to conjecture, what difference if any, would have taken place in Campbell's life and thought had he encountered the philosophy of Kant and Coleridge in his formative period. As it was, Coleridge was not read until Campbell was sixty-five.

The other philosophers studied at Bethany as set forth in the catalogue were Locke and the Scottish School's Reid, Stewart, and Sir William Hamilton; Thomas Brown, (though not in complete agreement, he had been greatly influenced by the Scottish School); and Victor Cousin, the exponent of the Scottish philosophy in France. Campbell regarded Cousin as "the most distinguished French philosopher of the age,"² when quoting him as to the importance of religious education being an indispensable part of general education. Another writer to whom Campbell frequently referred and with whom he found much in common was Thomas Chalmers, who had been greatly influenced by the Scottish philosophy. They shared the same high regard for the Baconian inductive method of scientific study and made use of it in their study of the Bible. Sir William Hamilton is mentioned with

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1859, p. 435.
²Millennial Harbinger, 1839, p. 351.
approval by W. K. Pendleton, professor at Bethany and Campbell's associate in editing the *Millennial Harbinger*, when he says "than whom no greater name throws its shadow over the mysteries of metaphysics." Hamilton was the first professor in Scotland to become familiar with the Kantian philosophy and he endeavored to incorporate certain elements of it and the Scottish philosophy together into a system. H. L. Mansel's book, *The Limits of Religious Thought* is reviewed favorably in 1860² and again in 1866³ by Campbell's students. Mansel was Sir William Hamilton's disciple. Robert Milligan, Campbell's student and later a professor in Kentucky University, refers to Locke, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Hamilton, Kant, and Cousin in comparing how they describe human nature and the way the Bible describes it.⁴

Dr. F. D. Kershner, one of the prominent historians of the Disciples of Christ, recalls⁵ that his teachers at Kentucky University (now Transylvania), in Lexington, Kentucky in the late 1890's had been students of Alexander Campbell, and were exponents of the Scottish philosophy. Robert Graham, the professor of philosophy used as text-books Joseph Haven's writings on mental and moral philosophy. Next to McCosh, Joseph Haven was

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¹*Millennial Harbinger*, 1860, p. 145.
³*Millennial Harbinger*, 1866, p. 482.
⁵F. D. Kershner in a letter of May 16, 1950, to the writer. Dr. Kershner is a professor at Butler University, Indianapolis, Indiana.
the most persistent exponent of the Scottish philosophy.\(^1\) There was a tradition that Professor Graham had brought Haven's textbooks with him from Bethany some thirty years before. Graham regarded Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton as the foremost of modern philosophers. Dr. Kershner is "quite sure that he reflected the position of Alexander Campbell under whom he studied at Bethany."\(^2\)

Walter Scott, one of Campbell's chief associates in the early days, received his training at Edinburgh University during the days of Thomas Brown and in all likelihood was familiar with the Scottish philosophy,\(^3\) and there is evidence of Locke being one of his favorite authors.\(^4\) Scott was the first president of Bacon College (later Kentucky University). His inaugural address was on Francis Bacon. Since Bethany and Kentucky University were the first training centers of the Disciples of Christ ministers, the influence of both Locke and the Scottish philosophy must have been widespread in the formative period.

In an address before the 1845 graduating class of Bethany College Campbell responded to a request to give a list of books essential to a student's library in literature, philosophy and the sciences, in addition to those already familiar to them in

\(^1\)H. W. Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

\(^2\)Dr. Kershner's letter, already referred to.

\(^3\)F. D. Kershner, Typewritten seminar notes on *The Philosophical Background of Alexander Campbell* (Butler University, 1946) p. 217.

their course of studies. The philosophical works included were: Pascal's Provincial Letters, the Bridgewater Treatises, Montesquieu, Bacon's, Locke's and Newton's Works, Lord Kaine's Elements of Criticism, Beattie on Language. Earlier he had published a list of books for a good library in which these philosophical works were mentioned. Paley's Evidences, Chalmer's Evidences, Butler's Analogy, Paley's Nat. Theology, Paley's HORSE Paulinae and Moral Philosophy, Berkeley's Minute Philosopher, a Law's Considerations of Nat. & Revealed Religion, Beattie on Truth, Smith's Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, Locke's Essay, Dugald Stewart, Edwards on Will, Watts' Improvement of Mind, Enfield's History of Philosophy, Reid, Brown, Bacon's Advancement of Learning, Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, Kame's Elements, admirable article on politics, philosophy and criticism, in the Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews.¹

Among the philosophical works in Alexander Campbell's library, spared from a fire which destroyed many volumes, and now in the library of Bethany College are: William Paley's Works, in five volumes; George Campbell's Dissertation on Miracles; James Beattie's The Theory of Language; Thomas Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind; John Locke, Works; Baron D8holbach, The System of Nature; Joseph Priestly, Works; Lord Henry Brougham, Discourse on Natural Theology.

This chapter, after tracing the other influences, has attempted to give some evidence of the philosophical references in Alexander Campbell's life and thought and teaching, and to

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1834, p. 492.
show that though he was widely read in philosophy, the predominant philosophical influences were those of John Locke and the Scottish School of Philosophy.

Succeeding chapters will endeavor to closely examine Campbell's thought for the resemblances to these two philosophic influences.
CHAPTER III.

CAMPELL'S DEBT TO LOCKE

I. Theory of Knowledge

John Locke sought to develop the underlying principles of the empirical method, which Francis Bacon had previously described. During his university days at Oxford Medieval, scholastic philosophy became distasteful to him. Though he was first awakened philosophically by Descartes, he invariably follows the Baconian method as contrasted with the Cartesian. His general approach to problems has been described by Fraser. He is the typically English philosopher in his love for concrete exemplifications of the abstractions in which more speculative minds delight; in his reverence for facts—facts of nature, or facts of conscious life; in indifference to speculation on its own account; in aversion to mystical enthusiasm; in calm reasonableness, and ready submission to truth, even when truth could not be reduced to system by a human understanding; and in the honest originality which stamped the features of his intellect and character upon all that he wrote.  

Locke’s purpose in formulating his theory of knowledge arose from the difficulties encountered in discussing the principles of revealed religion and morality with a group of friends.  

Before proceeding to an explanation of how ideas arise in the mind of man, Locke endeavored to refute the position of  

\[1\] A. C. Fraser, *Locke* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1890) p. 274.  

those who held that innate ideas were the basis of knowledge. He then went on to indicate how all our ideas originate in experience.

Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking.¹

All knowledge then comes from sensation and reflection. This perception of external objects by our senses which Locke calls sensation is the source of most of our knowledge. It vouches for the existence of particular things, but only at the moment of experience, and only by means of faculties which in part reveal and in part conceal what it is that exists. Locke observes how little children gradually acquire impressions of external objects, and as they continue to develop become able to reflect upon these ideas comparing, contrasting, and enlarging upon them.²

Campbell's theory of knowledge was also fundamental to his thought. He had a high regard for the Baconian inductive method and sought to follow it. He accepted the view that all our original ideas of the material universe are the result of sense perception and reflection. Evidence of this is found throughout all his writings,³ but nowhere is he more explicit

¹Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. I, Par. 2.
²Locke, Essay, Bk. II, Ch. 1, Par. 22.
³Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 618; Millennial Harbinger, 1835, p. 152; Christian Baptist, 1828, p. 495; Christian Baptist, 1826, p. 271; Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, pp. 49, 116-117.
than in his debate with Owen on the *Evidences of Christianity*. Here he both paraphrases and quotes Locke.

The simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by sensation and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thoughts, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned; nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there. . . . . It is impossible for anyone to imagine any other qualities in bodies, however constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities. Had mankind been made with four senses, the qualities then, which are the objects of the fifth sense, had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a sixth, a seventh, or an eighth sense can possibly be; which, whether yet some other creatures in some parts of this 'vast and stupendous universe,' may not have, will be a great presumption to deny.¹

For the benefit of Owen, who was an atheist, he indicated that Hume and Mirabeau would agree with Locke here.²

After describing the five senses as "the only avenues through which intelligence concerning material things can reach us," he goes on to consider what happens when a man is deprived of any one sense. Then man is not able to accomplish what that sense is accustomed to do. A man born deaf would have no idea of the nature of sound, and a man born without the sense of smell would have no idea of odours. A man born lacking all his

¹ Alexander Campbell, *Campbell-Owen Debate*, pp. 116-117, a quotation from Locke's *Essay*, Bk. II, Ch. ii, Par. 2-3.

² It is sometimes pointed out that Locke was not saying anything original with regard to the power of the senses. This is no doubt true, but as Maurice points out, there was an unique factor: "The existence of the sense had never been recognized
senses would be an idiot, "a lump of insensible matter." It is impossible to have an idea of material objects that does not come from the exercise of our senses on the material objects around us. Our intellectual powers are "circumscribed" by the simple ideas which we acquire. Just as the manufacturer must possess raw material before he can produce an item, so the mind must have simple ideas to work on.

A child, as soon as he begins to distinguish the different objects of sense, acquires a fund of simple ideas on which his intellect begins to work. The superficial observer will not notice this, but the infant is constantly seeking to use his eyes and hands, and move the different parts of his body.

Locke says that the mind is originally a tabula rasa, "white paper." He uses this metaphor to describe the passivity of the mind in its original state. In similar fashion, Campbell states "that the human mind, on its first awakening into life, is, as respects knowledge, or the ideas of which it is composed, a perfect cart blanche, is now a well established article in the catholic faith of all mental philosophers." He continues by stressing the later activity of the mind. In the formation of as directly connected with culture," before. F. D. Maurice, Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy (London: Macmillan and Co., 1890) p. 443.

1 Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, pp. 138-139.
2 Ibid., p. 139.
3 Locke, Essay, Bk. II, Ch. i, Par. 2.
4 Millennial Harbinger, 1838, p. 529.
complex ideas Locke maintains the activity of the mind "wherein it exerts its own power over its simple ideas,"¹ but he does not place as much stress on this activity as later philosophers.

Perception, retention, discerning, comparison, compounding, and abstraction are the main operations of the mind according to Locke. Campbell in discussing the powers of the mind mentions perception, memory, consciousness as powers capable of acting independently of volition, and of the powers of recollecting, reflecting, imagining, reasoning and judging which are dependent upon volition. He does not define these in quite the same way as does Locke, as will be seen in the next chapter.²

Arguing on the basis of Lockian theory, Campbell says there is no creative power in the human intellect. We have to reason from the known to the unknown. In the material world no new particles of matter can be created, though they can be changed and modified. This is also true in the operation of the intellect upon sensible objects. "Imagination is to the intellectual world what mechanical ingenuity is to the natural world."³ Each needs something to begin upon. Imagination is a great power, as Locke admits, but it is confined to abstracting, compounding, and combining qualities of objects already known. But to form ideas of spiritual things, imagination would have to "travel outside her province."⁴

¹Locke, Essay, Bk. II, Ch. xii, Par. 1.
²Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, pp. 74, 142, 149.
³Ibid., p. 149.
⁴Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 50.
These philosophical principles of Locke are prominent throughout Campbell's writings. This fact does not warrant the conclusion that he drew his conceptions in detail from Locke, but it does make reasonable the supposition that he accepted Locke's general point of view, and in its application naturally arrived at very similar results.

1. The Limitations of Knowledge

Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, as D. G. James¹ has well said, is also an Essay concerning Human Ignorance. He constantly emphasizes the limitation of man's knowledge,² and counsels humility and resignation in thinking about the world and its mysteries. Some of these limitations are temporary in nature, others are permanent. At the best, human knowledge is limited and is subject to much ignorance and error. He concludes that no genuine science of nature is possible for us.

... we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe, and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philosophical knowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a part of us. ... As to a perfect science of natural bodies, (not to mention spiritual beings), we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it.³


²Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason (Cambridge: University Press, 1950) p. 217. He indicates: "Locke had a modest estimate of human resources for forming judgments in religion. A constant sense of the limits of human understanding underlay all his arguments for toleration. He believed that in matters of religion there is no certain or demonstrative knowledge. We must be satisfied with a persuasion of our minds short of knowledge."

³Locke, Essay, Vol. IV, Ch. iii, p. 29.
The portion of the intellectual and sensible world which we see
is nothing like what we are unable to see, and whatever "we
can reach with our eyes, or our thoughts, of either of them, is
but a point, almost nothing in comparison with the rest." However, our faculties are sufficient for our needs. 

Campbell was fully aware that large as is the area of
our knowledge, the area of our ignorance is yet much larger;
that the "unknown incomparably transcends the known" in all the
fields of true science.

Matter and spirit are familiar words. But who can
compass either of them in his mind? All that we call
visible, sensible, or material nature, is but a partial
development of matter in its untold and incomprehensible
modes and forms of existence. . . . Could we examine
every form and mode of its existence wherever found. . . .
still we comprehend not one of its atoms in all its
essence, laws, and modes of existence. . . .

It is quite likely, too, that there is a connection here with
Locke's thought in Campbell's attitude towards creedal state-
ments of the nature of God which seem to suggest that God is
fully and exhaustively known. Further indication of Campbell's
realization of the limitations of knowledge will be seen in the
next chapter.

2. Speech and Language

Locke's views on language formed a definite part of his
type of knowledge, and Campbell was influenced by him here too.

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1Locke, Essay, Vol. IV, Ch. 111, Par. 23.
2Ibid., Vol. II, Ch. xi, Par. 12.
3Millennial Harbinger, 1851, p. 442.
4Ibid., p. 64.
Locke says little with regard to the origin of language, but he does attribute it to God.

God having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society.¹

Campbell held that language was originally "a special gift of God to man."² He saw no logical objection to Newton's observation that God has given man reason and religion by giving him speech.³

Locke indicated the necessity of man finding external visible signs that he might make known his ideas to others. "Words in their primary signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them."⁴ Names, Campbell said, are applied to things and ideas, as a result of the ideas having pre-existence in the mind. The idea always precedes the name.⁵ "The relation between a word and the idea which it represents is the nearest of all relations in the universe; for the ideas is in the word, and the word is in the idea."⁶ Men think in words in addition to communicating them. The natural process is "that the thing is pre-existent, the idea of it next,

¹Locke, Essay, Bk. III, Ch. 1, Par. 1.
²Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures and Addresses, p. 20.
³Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 62; Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 151; Christian Baptism, p. 38.
⁴Locke, Essay, Bk. III, Ch. 11, Par. 2.
⁵Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 159.
and the word last."¹

In explaining the meaning of definition, Locke says that it is nothing "but making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands for." Because of this, "a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined."² When Campbell discusses the meaning of words, he insists that it is agreement, usage and custom that established a connection between words and ideas. This testimony is collected in dictionaries which "by the consent of those who spoke that language faithfully, represent the meaning attached to those terms, or the ideas of which those words were the signs."³

In referring to the abuse of words, Locke points out that so often we have words without any clear and distinct ideas behind them. They become empty sounds for no one knows what are the precise ideas for which they stand.⁴ Others use words which convey very important ideas in such a loose way that they lose their true meaning. We should be careful that we do not use words without having an idea for which they stand.⁵ Words need to be carefully chosen.⁶

¹Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 624.
²Locke, Essay, Bk. III, Ch. iii, Par. 10.
³Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 56.
⁴Locke, Essay, Bk. III, Ch. x, Par. 2.
⁵Ibid., Par. 3.
⁶Ibid., Ch. xi, Par. 8.
Locke contended that we should use the words and terms precisely as they occur in the Bible. In his discussion with the Bishop of Worcester concerning the resurrection, he says:

In matter of revelation I think it not only safest, but our duty, as far as any one delivers it for revelation, to keep close to the words of the Scripture, unless he will assume to himself the authority on one inspired, or make himself wiser than the Holy Spirit himself.¹

One of Campbell's concerns was the abuse of words in religion. He contended that one of the surest signs of the corruption of the ecclesiastical structure was its corrupt speech. These misleading and arrogant distinctions distort the simplicity of Christianity.² The corrupt and technical language that disgusted him he illustrated by listing such terms as:

The Holy Trinity, Three persons of one substance, power and eternity. . . . conditional election and reprobation, effectual calling, inherent righteousness, progressive sanctification, justifying and saving faith, . . . . evangelical repentance, . . . . consubstantiation.³

Such words are not founded in the realm of certainty and pure speech. He thought all non-Biblical phrases and words in the ecclesiastical system were rooted in unreliable and unimportant human speculations and traditions. "We choose to speak of Bible things by Bible words, because we are always suspicious


²Christian Baptist, 1823, p. 7.

that if the word is not in the Bible, the idea which it represents is not there."¹ The disputes in religion deal with what the Bible does not say, rather than about what it does say. "It is a virtue then to forget this scholastic jargon."²

3. Faith

Locke's conception of faith arises in a discussion of judgment and probability. Since most of the propositions that engage our minds are such that we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth, he reminds us that we do not have to depend on the certainty of intuition and demonstration to live satisfactorily. The understanding faculties have been given to man, "not barely for speculation, but also for the conduct of his life."

Man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his life, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he has a demonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do but to sit still and perish.³

Man, because of the limits of his understanding, accepts reasonable probability and lives by its standards. The grounds of this reasonable probability which helps to supply the defect of his knowledge and give guidance to him, are:

²Ibid., p. 126.
³Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Ch. xiv, Par. 1.
First, the conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experience.

Secondly, the testimony of others, vouching their observation and experience. In the testimony of others, is to be considered: 1. The number. 2. The integrity. 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The design of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited. 5. The consistency of the parts, and circumstances of relation. 6. Contrary testimonies. 1

The highest degree of probability is attained when a belief accords with the testimony of "all men in all ages," and with the rest of one's experience. This is really belief in matters of fact. 2 One of Locke's meanings for faith is probability.

Locke usually means by faith "assent to any proposition . . . as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication." 3 He considers the bare testimony of revelation the highest certainty. Because the testimony is of God "this carries with it an assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception." Our assent to this revelation is faith. 4

Campbell agreed with Locke as to the importance of faith in all of man's relationships. Man walks by faith "physically, intellectually and morally." 5 By his five external senses he acquires "all information of the objects of sense" around him, but all the rest of his information comes by testimony, either

1 Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. xv, Par. 4.
2 Ibid., Chap. xvi, Par. 5-6.
3 Ibid., Chap. xviii, Par. 2.
4 Ibid., Chap. xvi, Par. 14.
5 Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 66.
human or divine."¹ Man walks more by faith "than by his five
senses, his own observations, or his own experience—probably
more than by these all combined."² Faith then becomes equivalent
to an "extension of sense perception."³ He defines faith as
"belief of testimony."⁴ Where there is no testimony, there is
no faith. This conception of the proper object of faith also
explains in part, at least, Campbell's opposition to creeds.

Campbell shared Locke's high regard for the testimony of
God. He has this to say:

The faith which we have in the testimony of God differs
from that we have in the testimony of men in this one re-
spect only—that as men may be deceived and deceive others,
so the confidence we repose in their testimony, in some
instances may be limited; but as God cannot be deceived
himself, neither can deceive others, so the confidence we
have in his testimony is superior to that we repose in
the testimony of men.⁵

With Campbell, five words speak of the order of things
in regard to faith: "1st. the fact, or the thing said or done—
2nd. the testimony concerning it—3rd. the belief of that test-
imony—⁴th. the feeling, consentaneous with that faith—and 5th.
the action, corresponding with that feeling."⁶ All revealed
religion is based upon facts. "As existences or beings must

¹Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 112.
²Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 66.
³W. E. Garrison, Alexander Campbell's Theology, p. 218.
⁵Christian Baptist, pp. 58, 59.
⁶Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Purcell Debate (Cincinnati: H. S. Bosworth, 1860) p. 162.
precede knowledge, so facts must precede either knowledge or belief."\(^1\) The gospel facts include "all that is recorded of the sayings and doings of Jesus Christ from his birth to his coronation in the heavens."\(^2\)

Locke refers to history as part of the traditional testimony of man. He gives this word of caution, however. "Any testimony, the further off it is from the original truth, the less force and proof it has." He does not mean to lessen the credit and use of history by saying this, for he adds, "It is all the light we have in many cases, and we receive from it a great part of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence." He wished there were more uncorrupted records of antiquity as they were invaluable. But he reiterates: "No probability can rise higher than its first original."\(^3\)

The emphasis of Campbell was much the same as Locke here. He indicated that "faith is strong or weak, in the ratio of the clearness and force of the testimony adduced." An essential to strong and vigorous belief in anything was "that the testimony be clear and forcible in itself, and that it be clearly perceived and fully comprehended by the believer."\(^4\)

"History," Campbell said, "is only another name for test-

\(^1\)Millennial Harbinger, 1830, p. 9.
\(^3\)Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. xvi, Par. 10-11.
\(^4\)Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 69
mony."¹ He went so far as to say that if the gospel is not true, there is not a credible history in the world. He supports this assertion by saying that the original witnesses were "plain, ordinary, common sense, matter of fact men." Since they were fishermen chiefly "their occupations...were favourable to having good eyes and ears...The facts which they relate, and which constituted the gospel were sensible facts—subjected not to one sense but to several senses." The indispensable qualifications of good witnesses were good eyes, good ears, and a good memory.² Locke's influence is plainly seen in this. He had said: "The greatest assurance I can possible have and to which my faculties can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges of this thing."³

The power of faith depends on the truth that is believed, according to Campbell. It is not faith itself, but the object of faith that has the power to save.⁴ Basically all the development of the human mind comes from human testimony. Intellectual, moral and religious education are all based on testimony directed to our reason, our understanding, our affections. The only difference is "that the claims of the gospel, its evidence, and its arguments are transcendentally superior to those of the flesh and the world that now is; and its evidences are, when rationally

¹Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 113.
²Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 32; Campbell–Owen Debate, pp. 276=277.
³Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. xvi, Par. 10.
adjusted, and weighted in the balances of palpable fact, truth, evidence of reason paramount to any other evidence or any other subject in the whole range of human education and human acquirements.1

An individual who wants faith must put aside his prejudices and indispositions and listen to the divine testimony, for faith comes by hearing.

Such is the constitution of the human mind, that a man is as passive in believing as he was in receiving his name, or as the eye is in receiving the rays of light that fall upon it from the sun; and consequently no man can help believing any testimony when the evidence of its truth arrests his attention.2

Here Campbell emphasizes Locke's passivity of the human mind in order to combat the prevalent conception on the frontier that faith comes through a deep emotional disturbance which must be awaited. He sought to show that the human will has power over the act of belief.

Although it is commonly thought by many that Locke's conception of faith is wholly intellectual, this is not true to the facts. He speaks of assurance in connection with the testimony coming from the common consent of "all men in all ages," and of confidence in connection with unquestioned testimony.3 His usage of the term belief includes more than intellectual assent. He makes it clear that to accept the

1Millennial Harbinger, 1856, p. 406.
2Christian Baptist, 1824, pp. 142-143.
3Locke, Essay, Ek. IV, Chap. xvi, Par. 6-7.
proposition "Jesus is the Messiah" means the commitment of one's whole life to the purposes of God. This involves as perfect obedience to his claims as is possible within the limits of nature. Belief includes becoming Christ's disciple and following him.

The believing Jesus to be the Messiah, includes in it receiving him for our Lord and King, promised and sent from God: and so lays upon all his subjects an absolute and indispensable necessity of assenting to all that they can attain of the knowledge that he taught; and of a sincere obedience to all that he commanded. ¹

Campbell's conception of faith is not wholly intellectual either, even though his opponents criticized him for this.

Let no one hence infer that we are opposed to feeling. God forbid! A religion without feeling is a body without a spirit. A religion that does not reach the heart and rouse all our feelings into admiration, gratitude, love and praise, is a mere phantom. But we make feelings the effect, not the cause of faith and of true religion. We begin not with the feelings, but with the understanding: we call upon men first to believe, then to feel, then to act. The gospel takes the whole man—the head, the heart, the hand, and he only is a genuine Christian who believes, feels, and obeys from the heart the whole mould of doctrine delivered to us by the holy Apostles. ²

Faith, in addition to meaning belief in testimony, also implies "trust in God. It is not merely a cold assent to truth, to testimony; but a cordial, joyful consent to it, and reception of it." ³ Elsewhere, he differentiates between the definition of the term as "belief in testimony" and the thing which is

²Millennial Harbinger, 1839, p. 12; Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 613.
³Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 293.
"confidence in testimony--confidence in the person or thing testified. As a Christian principle of action, it is confidence in the Messiah, as revealed in the testimony of Apostles and Prophets."¹ What a man believes soon becomes evident "by the influence of the fact upon him."²

a. Faith in Christ - The Fundamental Article of Christian Faith

We have seen that faith involves more than intellectual assent to testimony, it also means trust in a person or thing, in the thought of both Locke and Campbell. Locke considered the fundamental proposition of the Christian system to be, "Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God."³ This was the proposition on which he thought all Christians could unite.⁴ Campbell stated the proposition in almost the identical words: "Jesus the Nazarene is the Messiah, the son of the Living God." Faith thus becomes personal in its object. Campbell describes his position by saying: "Faith in Christ is the effect of belief. Belief is the cause; and trust, confidence, or faith in Christ is the effect."⁵ For both Campbell and Locke faith involved an active element which led to complete obedience to the will of God.

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1832, p. 42.
⁴Robert Sandeman, in his Letters on Theron and Aspasio, which Campbell had read, quotes from Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity: "The faith required was to believe Jesus to be the Messiah, the anointed one, who had been promised by God to the world." So Campbell had this additional contact with Locke's view, in addition to reading him directly. ⁴th Edition, 1803, p. 252.
⁵Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 52.
in Christ Jesus. It was trust in and loyalty to Jesus Christ as Lord.

b. Faith and Opinion

In his Essay, Locke warned against relying on the opinions of others. He thought that was a real danger. He is more explicit on the subject as far as practical considerations are concerned in his Letters on Toleration. His reliance on faith rather than opinion as the foundation of the church is evident in these words: "Now nothing in worship or discipline can be necessary to Christian communion, but what Christ our legislator, or the apostles by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, have commanded in express words." He realized that the church must be broad enough to allow differences of opinions on non-essentials.

Locke looked at the apostles and discovered that they "did not all of them agree in everything, but even the chief of them had differences amongst them in matters of religion." He saw the necessity for "agreement in truths necessary to salvation" but also the need for "maintaining charity and brotherly kindness with the diversity of opinion in other things, is that which will very well consist with Christian unity, and is all possibly to be had in this world, in such an incurable weakness

1Locke, Essay, Bk. I, Chap. ii, Par. 23-27; Bk. IV, Chap. xv, Par. 6; Bk. IV, Chap xx, Par. 17.

and difference of men's understandings." The lack of toleration of those who held different opinions had resulted in the "bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world."  

We have already noted Campbell's high regard for Locke's *Letters Concerning Toleration*, in the preceding chapter. It is quite likely that Locke's views on the subject of faith and opinion would have been of much influence on him, as the distinction is important in his own thinking. He held that

Opinion is no more than probable evidence, the view or conclusion which the mind forms by its reasonings and reflections on those things of which there is no certain evidence within one's reach; or it is the uncertain, dubious and indistinct view and conclusion which one entertains upon any subject of which he has neither the advantages of testimony, the evidence of sense, nor the experience of consciousness.

He illustrates what he means by saying he believes that Jesus Christ died for our sins, he knows the sun gives light, and he is of the opinion that all infants who die will be saved. "A person's faith is always bounded by testimony, his knowledge by observation and experience, and his opinions commence where both these terminate, and may be as boundless as God's creation or human invention."

He made a distinction between declarations of the

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3*Millennial Harbinger*, 1836, p. 166.

Scripture and the deductions drawn from them. He believed that the various evangelical denominations were agreed on the great revealed truths of Christianity, but were separated because of certain favorite opinions of their founders. "So long as union of opinion was regarded as a proper basis of religious union, so long have mankind been distracted by the multiplicity and variety of opinions." Sects are founded on opinions and not on faith. He pointed out that Luther and Calvin began a great reformation, but that ever since people have quarreled about what they meant. Much ill feeling has arisen over differences of opinion. One of his important convictions in connection with Christian unity was that men should be allowed to differ on matters of opinion, while agreeing on the great doctrines of faith. The phrase which Rupert Meldenius coined in 1628, "In essentials unity, in non-essentials liberty, in all things charity," has served as a watchword for the movement of the Disciples of Christ through the years.

c. Faith and Repentance

There was a close connection between faith and repentance in Locke's thought. He maintained that "repentance is as absolute a condition of the covenant of grace as faith; and as

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1 Alexander Campbell, *Christian System*, p. 121.
necessary to be performed as that."\(^1\) He realized that repentance is "not only a sorrow for sin past, but (what is a natural consequence of such sorrow, if it be real) a turning from them into a new and contrary life."\(^2\) This "turning about" involves "a sincere resolution and endeavour, to the utmost of our power, to conform all our actions to the law of God."\(^3\) It did not consist in one single act but in "doing works meet for repentance, in a sincere obedience to the law of Christ, the remainder of our lives." Believing Jesus to be the Messiah, and a good life are indispensable conditions of the new covenant.\(^4\)

In Campbell's view, faith and repentance were so closely tied together, that it was difficult to understand one without the other. He held that faith always preceded repentance, so that "repentance is an effect of faith."\(^5\) He thought the reasoning of those who insisted that repentance precedes faith was all wrong. "Repentance is sorrow for sins committed; but it is more. It is a resolution to forsake them; but it is more. It is actual 'ceasing to do evil, and learning to do well.' . . . . True repentance. . . . is always consummated in actual reformation of life."\(^6\) He sought to guard against the view that repentance was only feeling by emphasizing the practical outcome, the "reformation" which it brings about. The genuine-

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\(^1\) Locke, "The Reasonableness of Christianity", \textit{Works}, Bk. VII, p. 103.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 105

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Ibid.


\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 53-54.
ness of faith is determined by its fruitfulness in reformation. For Locke and for Campbell, repentance involved an active element. They expected a change of view to result in a change of life.

4. Faith and Reason

In Locke's thought, reason tests whether or not revelation is genuine. This test inquires how the revelation came about, and examines the content of it. Though revelation may go beyond reason, he assumes that it never contradicts reason. When God "makes the prophet" he does not "unmake the man." He defines reason as "the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deductions made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties." Faith, on the other hand, "is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication." Reason gives guidance to faith. The relationship between the two is therefore quite close. Reason does not give us revelation, for revelation is independent of reason, but faith does rely on reason for help in deciding what revelation means. He admits that while

1Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. xiv, Par. 14.
2Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. xviii, Par. 2.
most of the time he is contrasting the opposite qualities of faith and reason, actually faith is "assent founded on the highest reason."

Whatever God has revealed is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith; but whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge. • • • •

Locke, in employing reason as the criterion of the truth of revelation, used the phrases "according to," "above" and, "contrary to" reason.

1. According to reason are such propositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflection; and by natural deduction find to be true or probable. 2. Above reason are such propositions whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles. 3. Contrary to reason are such propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas. Thus the existence of one God is according to reason; the existence of more than one God, contrary to reason; the resurrection of the dead, above reason. 2

Locke cites two instances when reason cannot positively judge the truth of a given revelation: when the content is wholly above reason, and when a given revelation deserves to be believed even when the weight of probability is against it. 3

When Locke mentions the early philosophers who depended on reason and her oracles alone, he points out that it is possible to claim for reason more than reason is able to do.

Yet some parts of... truth lie too deep for our natural powers easily to reach, and make plain and

1Ibid., Bk. IV, Chap. xviii, Par. 9.
2Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. xvii, Par. 23.
3Ibid., Chap. xviii, Par. 7, 8.
variable to mankind; without some light from above to direct them. When truths are once known to us, though by tradition, we are apt to be favourable to our parts; and ascribe to our own understandings the discovery of what, in reality we borrowed from others. 1

Nothing appears difficult to our understanding once it is known, so we sometimes forget the help we have had from others who enabled us to see, and credit ourselves with being the originators. Many are indebted to revelation who do not recognize that they are.

It is no diminishing to revelation that reason gives its suffrage to the truths revelation has discovered. But it is our mistake to think, that because reason confirms them to us, we had the first clear knowledge of them from thence; and in that clear evidence we now possess them. 2

The relationship between faith and reason is an important aspect of Campbell's thought. It bears a striking similarity to that of Locke. In the 1831-1832 Millennial Harbinger he had three essays on "Reason Examined by Interrogatories" which show the trend of his thinking. Reason is a power which the mind possess to examine, compare and arrange the ideas received through the medium of sensation and consciousness. It can do nothing without ideas. Reason is younger than perception, memory, and sensation, for it does not come into existence until the mind has something to work upon. Though reason can prove nothing, it

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1Locke, "Reasonableness of Christianity", Works, Ek. VII, p. 144; R. I. Aaron, John Locke (London: Oxford University Press, 1937) p. 310. "He would not accept the view that revelation was worthless, and that the only true religion was natural religion. Reason in man was too narrow a foundation for the religious life. It must be helped out by revelation."

can make a decision about the claims of everything to be true or real. Even so, "the faculties of the human understanding" and "the five senses" have to assist reason. He makes reason speak:

I am a friend to Faith, and always lend her my hand in comparing, examining, and deciding upon testimony. But when faith becomes intoxicated with the gas of enthusiasm, I permit her to take her own course, and make it a rule to aid her in nothing unless she ask my aid. I am also a friend to Revelation, and always vote for her at the polls. I only, however, decide upon her pretensions and upon the meaning of her words. She permits my interference, she solicits my aid no farther; and, indeed, this is all I am able to do for her.¹

Christians are commanded to be ready at all times to give a reason "for the faith once delivered to the saints."² Since "God is reason" and all his communications are "rational" man, who is also a "reasonable being" must give good reasons for believing the Christian religion.³ In the course of the Owen Debate he claimed that his arguments had shown that "no man philosophically or rationally can object to the Christian religion; and that upon the principles of reason he is compelled to assent to the divine truth" of Christianity.⁴ He had looked forward to the debate because Mr. Owen "was all for reason and philosophy, which no intelligent Christian ever feared."⁵

He had no objection to using reason in religion so long

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1831, p. 487.
²Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 13.
³Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Purcell Debate, p. 256.
⁴Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 416.
⁵Ibid., p. 407.
as "its use is not perverted."

Reason maintains that all "God has spoken is true, for 'God is truth.'" In a dialogue the question is asked, "Is it not alleged by thee that God has always spoken in accordance with thee—-that revelation and reason perfectly harmonize?" "Reason" replies:

When men speak of revelation and reason according and harmonizing, they cannot mean a faculty of the human soul; for what sense is there in affirming that natural light and the eye harmonize and accord?. . . . Reason is the eye of the soul to which the light of revelation is addressed. But the babbling world, perhaps, mean that revelation and experience agree; which is true just as far as we have experience; but as revelation immeasurably transcends our experience, it can only be affirmed that so far as human experience reaches, it accords with revelation; and hence it is fairly to be presumed that experience will continue to agree or correspond with revelation until the terms "revelation" and "experience" will be terms of equal value and cover the same area of thought.

An article in the 1863 Millennial Harbinger which Campbell could have written considers the terms "above reason," "contrary to reason," "accordant to reason," and paraphrases Locke acknowledging so by saying, "These distinctions were first presented to the world by the gifted Locke, in his work upon the Under-standing." In another article he says the terms mean nothing more than "above or beyond my experience, contrary to my experience, or accordant to my experience."

Toward the close of 1833 on one of his many tours,

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1 Millennial Harbinger, 1844, p. 146.
2 Millennial Harbinger, 1832, p. 99.
3 Millennial Harbinger, 1863, p. 352.
4 Millennial Harbinger, 1832, p. 99.
Campbell addressed large gatherings of the Sceptics of New York City in two great gatherings at Tammany Hall and Concert Hall. In the second lecture he spoke on reason and faith. He endeavored to show that reason without faith "is wholly inadequate to guide man," and he sought to justify the wisdom of God in directing revelation to faith, which is the way most of our useful knowledge comes.

He argued that the fact that reason was impotent and inadequate to originate or decide anything regarding religion was demonstrated by the Sceptics themselves who after much reflection were unable to decide whether or not there was a God. Their own consciousness was incompetent to guide them to a knowledge of their origin and destiny.

Faith, on the contrary, was that capacity or power in man, to which this knowledge was addressed, and by which alone it could be acquired. Indeed, all our knowledge of the past, and of the present, except only the narrow horizon which comes under the cognizance of our senses, is derived through this channel.

He regarded faith as "the most natural, universal, and powerful principle of action implanted in the human breast," necessary in every phase of life. He claimed that "faith is not in any case, incompatible with the highest reason. But it often transcends its power and outmeasures its periphery."

What reason does is to judge testimony determining what is true or false or indecisive. "Reason deciding that the test-

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1Millennial Harbinger, 1834, p. 77.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 1856, p. 270.
mony is true, is believing; reason deciding that the testimony is false, is disbelieving; reason unable to decide, is scepticism." All that testimony is actually, is the experience of others. "This experience, reported and believed, is our faith." In the absence of testimony and experience reason is our sole guide.

Earlier, in 1827, Campbell had quite a discussion with regard to the community at New Harmony, Indiana, which the infidel, Robert Owen, had set up in order to put into practice his theories. He emphasized that, even though there had been many improvements in philosophy in eighteen centuries, "the world is no wiser in respect to God than it was when Paul lived." Neither Greece, nor Rome, nor Egypt, with all their philosophy, knew God. And God was still unknown in New Harmony, and to all who depended on philosophy alone. As striking proof of this he cited the people of the city of "Mental Independence" who, though having the best library on the continent, have "voluntarily extinguished the lights of supernatural revelation," and assert quite openly that there is no God, immortality, heaven or hell, claiming that these are unknown and unknowable to them. This bore out Campbell's conviction that "there is no stopping place between Deism and Atheism."

In 1840, in an address before the Charlottesville,

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1Millennial Harbinger, 1834, p. 77.
2Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 457.
3Christian Baptist, 1827, pp. 372, 373.
Virginia, Lyceum, on "Is Moral Philosophy An Inductive Science?"
Campbell pointed out that "philosophy, or human reason is. . . . very inadequate to the discovery of ideas on any of the great points involved in the origin, obligations and destiny of man.
Because of this men have depended on tradition or revelation, and not on "natural religion" or "moral philosophy" for all knowledge on these subjects. 1 After comparing the different faculties that man possesses, he indicates that reason has no creative power. He compares reason as being to the soul what the eye is to the body, while not the light, it is the power of perceiving and using the light. Just as the eye would be useless without light, so reason without tradition or revelation would be useless to man "in all the great points which the inductive and true philosophy of nature and of fact humbly acknowledges she cannot teach." 2

Faith enables man to have the experience of all other men through believing their testimony. Human knowledge "consists of but two chapters. Our own individual experience furnishes the one, and faith the other." 3 Nature and the gospel agree that "he that believeth not shall perish." Man must walk by faith long before reason begins to examine. When we affirm that reason is a better guide than faith, we "charge our Creator with

1 Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures and Addresses, pp. 106, 107.
2 Ibid., p. 117.
3 Ibid., p. 118.
folly in subjecting man to an inferior guide" during his developing days. In behalf of reason, Campbell says she seeks to minister to faith, as she does to religion and morality by examining testimony and deciding upon its pretensions. "In this sense, intellect and reason are as necessary to faith as they are to moral excellence; for a creature destitute of reason is alike incapable of faith, morality and religion."¹

He summarizes the province of reason in reference to divine revelation in five points: 1) "to show the desirableness and the necessity of a divine revelation." This is chiefly done by exhibiting "the imperfect teaching of natural religion." 2) "to determine whether the claim of the Bible to be a divine revelation is sustained." This is done by testing the external and internal evidences. 3) "to determine, according to the laws of language, what this revelation teaches." 4) "to meet on her own ground, or on that of revelation, the objections which are made to revealed religion." 5) "to show the harmony that subsists between the works of God and his word."² On another occasion he said that "man was created and made to walk by faith and reason, not separately but conjointly."³

The thought of Locke and Campbell closely parallel as to the relationship between faith and reason. For both Campbell and Locke reason has a humble, though a necessary part in the

¹Ibid., p. 120.
²Millennial Harbinger, 1863, p. 353.
³Ibid., 1830, p. 70.
quest for religious knowledge. It is the servant of faith and of revelation.

There are two vulnerable points in Locke's discussion which Campbell guards against, as we will see in the next chapter. Locke is open to the charge of subjectivism when he allows the credit of revelation to rest on testimony, i.e., on "the credit of the proposer." Closely allied to this, there is a strong individualistic tendency manifest, when he states that every man must judge for himself the truth of any given revelation.

5. Revelation

In connection with the discussion of faith and reason, the subject of revelation has been dealt with in part, but more needs to be said. Of the beliefs accepted on testimony, those based on revelation, according to Locke, "challenge the highest degree of our assent... whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common experience, and the ordinary course of things or no."¹ Our assent to this testimony concerning revealed things is faith. He cautions that we must be sure the testimony is a divine revelation, and that it is understood, or we will "expose ourselves to the extravagancy of enthusiasm, and all the error of wrong principles."² He defines revelation as "natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth

¹Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. xvi, Par. 14.
²Ibid.
of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God.\(^1\)

Locke quite often qualified his statements about ordinary human knowledge by some phrase which indicates his belief in revelation; for instance:

For bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial ideas of spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all spirits, the eternal independent author of them and us and all things, we have no certain information so much of the existence of other spirits but by revelation.\(^2\)

Locke here shows that revelation is a way of knowledge different from the empirical method. There is no doubt throughout his writings that he regards Scripture as the source of such revelation. He regarded the Bible as the record of a series of events which uniquely manifest God's character and gracious purpose towards men.\(^3\)

Campbell had this same high conception of revelation that Locke held. Both men regarded it as supernatural, but they saw the necessity that it be understood. In true Lockian fashion Campbell said that although reason and the use of our five senses cannot take the place of revelation, "the things revealed are reasonable when all the premises are understood."\(^4\) He contended that before revelation is accepted it should be examined by our

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\(^{1}\) Ibid., Chap. xix, Par. 4.

\(^{2}\) Ibid., Chap. iii, Par. 27.

\(^{3}\) Principal James Gray states this quite clearly in an article "Whither Disciples?" in The Scroll, June, 1940, Vol. 37, No. 10, pp. 389-395.

\(^{4}\) Christian Baptist, 1827, p. 344.
reason alone. After it is proved to be true revelation, its content must be interpreted as reason or usage suggests the meaning of the terms.

There was an element of mystery in revelation for both Locke and Campbell. This is particularly evident in Locke when he speaks of that which is "above reason," beyond the discovery of our natural faculties. He put resurrection from the dead in this category.¹ He also speaks of reason often failing us, when it comes "far short of the real extent of even corporeal being."²

Campbell thought it was part of the glory of religion that there were "facts incomprehensible by human reason--not contrary to, but altogether above it." This did not mean that God was inconsistent.

So far as our feeble powers enable us to see, his manifold works are the perfection of his reason, for in wisdom he made them all;--and when we are lost in the infinite maze of creation, and the chain which connects in heavenly harmony the wonderful elements of that which is known, seems broken over the chasm that separates us from that which is unknown, it is only the dim vision of the mortal who "now sees through a glass darkly," that fails; -- "but when that which is perfect is come," when we shall know even as we are known, the undiscovered links will appear and God will stand justified in all his ways.³

Campbell's understanding of revelation went much further than Locke's. He did not agree with the conception of revelation which said that the whole Bible was a revelation from God. He meant by this that there are numerous historic facts related in the Bible which obviously do not come from God directly. Many

¹Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. xviii, Par. 7.
²Ibid., Chap. xvii, Par. 9.
³Millennial Harbinger, 1844, p. 147.
things quite natural and common are included in the Bible for which inspiration is neither claimed nor intended. He agreed with Thomas Paine's definition of revelation in his *Age of Reason*: "A communication of something which the person to whom that thing is revealed did not know before," and he added, "could not otherwise know." In his own way of expressing it, he says revelation "means nothing more nor less than a divine communication concerning spiritual and eternal things, a knowledge of which, man could never have attained by the exercise of his reason upon material and sensible objects." As further support he quotes Paul, "Things which the eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the heart of man to conceive, has God revealed to us apostles, and we declare them to you."  

In the Old Testament, revelation is distinguished from all else by such statements as "The Word of the Lord," or "A message from the Lord came," or "The Lord said." In the New Testament, the phrase "The Word," or "The Word of the Lord," or "The Truth," is almost exclusively appropriated to "the testimony which God gave concerning the person and mission of Jesus Christ." Revelation helps us to see the nature of man, and it reveals to us the character and purpose of God. "Revelation has nothing to do with opinions or abstract reasonings; for it is founded

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1 *Millennial Harbinger*, 1846, p. 16.
2 *Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate*, p. 141.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
This emphasis upon "character" of God, rather than on his metaphysical nature in revelation was an important aspect of Campbell's thought. The word of God was an acted word. Such phrases as "The Word was made flesh" and "Emanuel, God with us" had a particular relevance for Campbell for they indicated the supreme manifestation of this acted word. Revelation for Campbell was "a given" which was definitely related to the needs of man.

6. Knowledge of God

Locke uses a form of the cosmological argument in arriving at a knowledge of God. This involved "demonstration." Man can, "by the right use of his natural abilities" come to an absolutely certain proof of the existence of God which is open neither to doubt nor error. He realized, of course, that God cannot be presented to us in sense experience. He thought real existence can be known only of one's own conscious self. It is from this fact he deduced his demonstration. It is also evident that Something has existed from all eternity. It is a fallacy to think that real existence could produce itself from nothing.


2Dr. William Robinson in several of his writings makes this point clear.

3Locke, Essay, Bk. I, Chap. iii, Par. 12.

4Cragg, op. cit., p. 116, "Locke was uncompromising in asserting the inescapable character of belief in God."
Since each individual is aware of his own finiteness, that he had a beginning, and knows that everything which had a beginning must have been produced by something else, all that belongs to him as a human being must have come from another Being, an Eternal Something, which he called God.  

Locke utilized his demonstration to prove God's existence, omnipotence and omniscience, and in addition God has all those qualities which we as individuals consider worth having, in their perfection.

There are traces also of Locke's use of the teleological argument. In several instances he appears to infer the existence of God from order and purpose observed in creation. "For the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of creation, that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect upon them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity." This may be interpreted teleologically. He sometimes speaks of "the all-wise Contriver" when referring to God, and of the "great design and infinite goodness of the Architect."

Although he acknowledges that all ideas of the sensible universe are the result of sensation and reflection, Campbell

1Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. x, Par. 1, 2, 4.
2Ibid., Bk. II, Chap. xxiii, Par. 33; Bk. IV, Chap. x, Par. 6.
3Ibid., Bk. I, Chap. iii, Par. 9.
5Locke, Essay, Bk. III, Chap. vi, Par. 12.
maintains that all our knowledge of God comes by faith.\(^1\) He is
critical of the hypothesis of natural religion that man by the
use of his natural religion can originate the idea of God.\(^2\)
Nature cries out in all her works that God exists, but we do not
recognize this until we have heard of a Creator.\(^3\) As soon as
the idea of God is suggested to the mind everything "within us
and without us" bears testimony to his existence and attributes.\(^4\)
The Deists borrow the truths about spiritual things from the
Bible, even though they boast that by the use of their reason
alone they have a belief in God, immortality of the soul, and
a future state. "Reasoning on what? the things that are made--
but who made them? Thus it goes in a circle; they prove that
there is a creator from the things created; and they prove that
things are created, because there is a creator."\(^5\) Supernatural
revelation is necessary before God is known.\(^6\)

He defines theology as "the knowledge of God--the science
of his beings and perfections." All human knowledge is related,
so the knowledge of God "cannot be acquired without the knowledge
of man, nor the knowledge of man without the knowledge of God."
Knowledge of God is acquired from his works and from his Word.\(^7\)

In 1827 a "lover of just reasoning" objected to Campbell's

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\(^1\) Alexander Campbell, *Campbell-Rice Debate*, p. 618.
\(^2\) Alexander Campbell, *Campbell-Owen Debate*, p. 133.
\(^3\) Christian Baptist, 1827, p. 375.
\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ibid., p. 271.
\(^6\) Ibid., p. 172.
\(^7\) Ibid., p. 375.
denial of the possibility of God's existence being made known without the aid of the Bible. This critic used Locke's reasoning in Book IV, chapter x of his Essay to support his conclusions.\(^1\)

Campbell admits that intuitive evidence produces infallible certainty, but says that this is no more important in actual life than "the certainty, fallible or infallible, which results from the evidence of our senses or of testimony." He points out that the error in reasoning from intuitive principles in order to originate the idea of a Creator or first cause lies in imagining you have acquired it by reasoning, when you begin to work with the idea. He speaks of Locke as saying that it is impossible to have a single idea which is not first perceived by one of the senses.

Locke and other philosophers who have rejected the doctrine of innate ideas and who have traced all our simple ideas to sensation and reflection, have departed from their own reasonings when they attempted to show that, independent of supernatural revelation, a man could know that there is an eternal first cause uncaused.\(^2\)

Here Campbell claims to be more Lockian than Locke himself.

Campbell uses the cosmological argument in the demonstration that God exists, but he does so, realizing the priority of revelation. In this he is different to Locke.

We are decidedly on the side that tradition, oral and written, propounds 'that God is' or exists, and that the material universe only proves or demonstrates the truth of the oracle 'that God is.' The best and most laconic demonstration that God is, will, as I conceive, be found in the two words, 'We are.' We did not make ourselves. And as to his nature, we argue, that whatever is in the effect, was in the cause. But

\(^1\)Christian Baptist, 1827, pp. 373, 374.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 375.
it follows not that all that is in the cause is in the effect. For many effects may be in one cause, and yet the cause may not be exhausted. 1

He and his followers also reasoned from God's creativity to other attributes, in much the same way as Locke had done previously. The power, wisdom and goodness of God is revealed in the creation. His justice, truth and holiness show God's providence. "The gospel unfolds his mercy, condescension, and love; and all these proclaim that God is infinite, eternal, immutable." 2 Walter Scott, Campbell's associate, wrote on God's sovereignty 3 and another follower of the Movement who used the pseudonym Ecclesiastes acknowledges God as "the Almighty, the Omniscient." 4 Campbell also used the teleological argument.

It is true that Locke does distinguish between the revelation that comes to us by reason (the cosmological argument) and that which comes to us through the "voice of his spirit." 5 This he says little about, but it may well have been his real ground of believing. If this is so, his view and Campbell's would be closer at this point than would otherwise seem to be the case.

Locke's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity is not altogether clear. In his writings there is no formal statement concerning it, and nowhere does he expressly affirm or deny its

2Christian Baptist, 1829, p. 59  
3Ibid., 1830, p. 615.  
4Ibid., p. 644.  
5Locke, Essay, Bk. II, Chap. xxiii, Par. 33; Bk. IV,
validity. He did deny to reason the power to understand the
essence of God's nature, and he also conceived it impossible
for any simple ideas derived from revelation to be communicated
unless such ideas were derived from sensation and reflection.
Thus he set up a barrier to any natural or revealed knowledge
of the Godhead's substance. He thought "it might be enough to
own it as it is delivered in the Scriptures."\(^1\)

Campbell was also hesitant and reluctant to make comment
on the doctrine of the Trinity. Like Locke, he accepted it as
delivered in the Scriptures. He occasionally did indulge in
speculation on the subject, but he was careful always to point
out that it was only his opinion "nor would I dispute or con-
tent for it as a theory of speculation with anybody."\(^2\) In the
Rice Debate, Campbell endeavored to clarify his position by
saying that he taught "the mysterious sublime, and incomprehensible
plurality and unity in the Godhead. It is a relation that may
be apprehended by all, though comprehended by none."\(^3\)

II. The Bible

Locke's high regard for the Scripture is manifest in
these words:

The holy Scripture is to me, and always will be, the
constant guide of my assent; and I shall hearken to it,
as containing infallible truth, relating to things of
highest concernment. And I wish I could say there are
no mysteries in it; I acknowledge there are to me, and


\(^2\)Christian Baptist, 1827, p. 380.

\(^3\)Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 615.
I fear always will be. But where I want the evidence of things, there yet is ground enough for me to believe, because God has said it; and I shall presently condemn and quit any opinion of mind, as soon as I am shown that it is contrary to any revelation in the holy Scripture. But I must confess to your Lordship, that I do not perceive any such contrariety in anything in my Essay of Human Understanding.  

Locke's reverence for the Bible was as deep as his knowledge of it was great. For a layman who had such a wide variety of interests, he possessed a remarkable grasp of the contents of the Scripture. The Essay and all his other writings contain abundant quotations from the Bible. While he concerned himself primarily with the New Testament, his works show that he was not unacquainted with the contents of the Old Testament.

While Locke's approach to the Scripture was always reverent, he was so sure of its truth that he did not fear to subject it to all the tests imposed by reason, for, as we have seen, he did not believe that anything revealed was contrary to reason. The title of his principal theological work, The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures, indicates the trend of his thought in the matter. Locke was sure that God had revealed himself, and that his revelation had been given in the Bible.

It was Locke's conviction that the Bible is the sole basis of the Christian religion. He believed that it contains


2D. G. James, The Life of Reason (London: Longmans, Green, 1949) pp. 66-67. "If he was no apostle of rationalism, he was that incalculably better thing, an apostle of reasonableness, and his reasonableness sprang not from a doctrine, but from an indefinable temper which, because it was inspired by faith in God, declined to despise and tried temperately to employ, the powers of reason."
all that is necessary to the salvation of men.\textsuperscript{1} He thus agrees with the Reformation doctrine of the all-sufficient authority of the Scriptures. His statement is clear and has a simplicity that is refreshing. "Let us not," he says, "be more wise than our Maker in that stupendous and supernatural work of our salvation. The Scripture, that reveals it to us, contains all that we can know, or do, in order to it: and where that is silent, it is in us presumption to direct."\textsuperscript{2} This sounds strangely like the popular slogan used by the Disciples movement from the beginning: "Where the Scripture speaks, we speak; where the Scripture is silent, we are silent."

His conception of inspiration is also evident throughout his writings. He says of St. Paul, he "had the immediate direction and guidance of the unerring Spirit of God and so was infallible."\textsuperscript{3} His most extreme statement is found in a comment on I Corinthians 2:6, "Howbeit we speak wisdom to them that are perfect."

(Perfect) here is the same with spiritual. . . . one that is so perfectly well apprized of the divine nature and original of the Christian religion, that he sees and acknowledges it to be all a pure revelation from God, and not, in the least, the product of human discovery, parts, or learning; and so, deriving it wholly from what God hath taught, by his Spirit, in the sacred Scriptures, allows not the least part of it to be ascribed to the skill or abilities of men, as authors of it, but received as a doctrine coming from God alone.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1}Locke, "Letters on Toleration," \textit{Works}, Bk. VI, pp. 353ff, 519ff.

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 184.
Other statements are more moderate in content. In the Essay, he comments: God leaves all man's faculties in "their natural state to enable him to judge his inspirations whether they be of divine original or no. When he illumines the mind with supernatural light, he does not extinguish that which is natural."\(^1\) In another pertinent statement he says, "No man inspired by God can by revelation communicate to others any new simple ideas which they had not before from sensation or reflection."\(^2\) A further passage continues to clarify his meaning of the manner in which God communicates with men.

God, I believe, speaks differently from men because he speaks with more truth, more certainty: but when he vouchsafes to speak to men I do not think he speaks differently from them, in crossing the rules of language in use amongst them: this would be not to condescend to their capacities, when he humbles himself to speak to them, but would lose his design in speaking what when spoken they could not understand.\(^3\)

The Bible was regarded by Campbell not only as the source of all religious information, but also as the reservoir from which all spiritual ideas have come. "There is not a spiritual idea in the whole human race which is not drawn from the Bible."\(^4\) In this sense the Bible is unique.\(^5\) In the Bible we find the voice of God "which is the voice of reason." God now speaks to

\(^1\)Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. xix, Par. 14.
\(^2\)Ibid., Chap. xviii, Par. 3.
\(^4\)Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 15.
us "only by his word." There Jesus Christ fully reveals God to us.\(^1\) From the contents of the book, we can see "the handwriting of the Almighty indelibly inscribed."\(^2\)

With regard to the authority and inspiration of the Scriptures, Campbell was not always consistent. This we have just seen, was also true of Locke. He speaks of the Bible as having been "dictated from heaven."\(^3\) What the Apostles say "are as much the words of the Holy Spirit when in written characters as they were when existing in the form of sound." The writers were "guided in the selection of documents" and kept from making errors. God's Book is "put into the hands of men as it was first spoken to men."\(^4\) These passages all tend in the direction of verbal inspiration. Both Locke and Campbell think of word and idea as the closest of relationships. "The idea is in the word and the word is in the idea." Words are necessary to convey the ideas to our senses.\(^5\)

Just as with Locke, there are elements in Campbell's thought which rise above the spirit of Biblical literalism. He did not hold that all Biblical passages were of equal importance. Only that part of the Bible was a matter of revelation which was beyond the natural reason of man. The New Testament tells all that is needed to be known for man's salvation. These are all indications of this.

\(^1\)Christian Baptist, p. 50.
\(^2\)Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, pp. 182-183.
\(^3\)Christian Baptist, p. 82.
\(^4\)Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 50.
\(^5\)Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 22.
Locke indicated the method which he used in the study of the Scriptures, in his preface to his *Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul’s Epistles*. He used the empirical method of Bacon. Campbell also did this. He believed that if all students of the Bible used the same rules of interpretation many of the differences of opinion would vanish. There would be more uniformity than had ever resulted from the adoption of a written creed.\(^1\) Both Locke and Campbell by so urging anticipated the spirit of modern historical criticism. Campbell’s rules are as follows:

1. Consider first the historical circumstances of the book. These are the order, the title, the author, the date, the place, and the occasion of it.

2. In examining the contents of any book, observe who it is that speaks and under what dispensation.

3. To understand the meaning, the same laws of interpretation which are applied to the language of other books are to be applied to the language of the Bible.

4. Common usage must always decide the meaning of any word which has but one signification; but when words have more meanings than one, the scope, the content, or parallel passages decide the meaning.

5. In all tropical language ascertain the point of resemblance, and judge the nature of the trope, and its kind, from the point of resemblance.

6. In the interpretation of symbols, types, allegories and parable, ascertain the point to be illustrated; for comparison is never to be extended beyond that point.

7. We must come within the understanding distance.\(^2\)

Campbell published an extract\(^3\) from Locke which contained his objections to the usual division of the Scriptures into chapters and verses, which he contends often obscures the meaning and allows for piecemeal quotations, "whereby, he that has a

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\(^1\) Alexander Campbell, *Christian Baptism*, p. 50.

\(^2\) Alexander Campbell, *Christian System*, p. 16.

\(^3\) *Christian Baptist*, 1825, p. 195.
mind to, may, at a cheap rate, be a notable champion for the truth; that is, for the doctrines of the sect that chance or interest has cast him into."¹

Recognizing the sole authority of the Scriptures in matters of religion, and particularly the New Testament, Locke emphasized the importance of every man's having a first hand acquaintance with the Bible. He believed in going straight to the Word itself and in studying it for himself, freed from the opinions of commentators, systems of divinity and particular creeds. This is how he states the case:

The little satisfaction and consistency that is to be found in most of the systems of divinity I have met with, have made me betake myself to the sole reading of the Scriptures (to which they all appeal) for understanding the Christian religion.²

He also says,

If I must believe for myself, it is unavoidable that I must understand for myself. For if I blindly, and with implicit faith, take the Pope's interpretation of the Sacred Scripture, without examining whether it be Christ's meaning, it is the Pope I believe in, and not in Christ; it is his authority I rest upon; it is what he says, I embrace; for what it is Christ says, I neither know nor concern myself. It is the same thing, when I set up any other man in Christ's place, and make him the authentic interpreter of Sacred Scripture to myself.³

If more men would do this "Christendom would have more Christians," and they would know more and be more in the right than they are.⁴ Campbell also stressed this. He wanted the Bible to be

³Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 22.
read without prejudice that its true meaning might be discovered. ¹ We blamed some interpretations being put upon Scripture because there were men more interested in presenting specific "doctrines" than "facts."²

Campbell insisted just as much as did Locke that the Bible was meant to be understood. "It was written by men and for men" and addressed to all classes of people. "So far as the Scriptures are designed to make known a revelation to us, respecting things that are above the reach of our natural understanding, just so far are they designed to communicate that which is intelligible."³

Campbell went further than Locke in his thinking when he emphasized the idea of development in the Bible. The same developments found in the "pillared firmament" are also discovered in the sacred book.⁴ The plan of the Bible is a "gradual and progressive development." Since the human family have an infancy, a childhood, a manhood, an old age, the Bible addresses itself to all of these stages.⁵ In this way the Bible becomes a glorious system of grace which leads man to a great and significant end.

¹Locke, "Popular Lectures and Addresses," Works, p. 68.
²Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 342.
³Millennial Harbinger, 1832, p. 108.
⁴Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, pp. 182-183.
⁵Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 90.
It was in textual interpretation and translation that Campbell's scholarship was most notable. Richardson indicates that in 1843 in the Rice Debate, he argued from the probabilities of the correct translation of a certain passage and was accused by Rice of distorting evidence. Campbell's supposition was authenticated sixteen years later in the Codex Sinaiticus discovered by Fischendorf in 1859. His choice by the American Bible Union to make a translation from the Greek of the Book of Acts for general distribution was a recognition of his scholarship.

III. The Work of the Holy Spirit

In Locke's Essay he makes a bold attack on the unwholesome 'mysticism' of his age. This "enthusiasm" he regarded as the enemy of revelation and reason. He describes it as "founded neither on reason nor divine revelation, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men then either of those two, or both together."

The source of interest in immediate revelation as a manner in which religious truth could be appropriated, Locke thought was not hard to find. It was born of intellectual laziness which he believed was characteristic of the majority of mankind.

2Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. xix.
3Ibid., Par. 7.
Immediate revelation being a much easier way for men to establish their opinions and regulate their conduct, than the tedious and not always successful labour of strict reasoning, it is no wonder that some have been very apt to pretend to revelation, and to persuade themselves that they are under the peculiar guidance of heaven in their actions and opinions, and especially in those of them which they cannot account for by the ordinary method of knowledge and the principles of reason.  

Locke did not deny the possibility of immediate revelation. "God, I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the understanding by a ray darted into the mind immediately from the fountain of light." But he did think that men too easily made that possibility an untrue conviction, with the result that the "conceits of a warmed and overweening brain" led them to identify their own wish of what might be true with what actually is true. Once this process begins, it continues in a vicious circle, and Locke says that adherents unconsciously become bound in this way. "It is a revelation because they firmly believe it: and they believe it because it is a revelation."

After stating that firmness of persuasion is hardly proof that any proposition has come from God, he makes it very clear that the high quality of one's moral life does not free the honest searcher after truth from the hard intellectual labour of its pursuit. Here he shows his penetrating insight.

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1Ibid., Par. 5.
2Ibid.
3Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. xix, Par. 10.
4Ibid., Par. 12.
Locke dreaded "enthusiasm." In its meaning was bound together those things which he hated most—subservience to tradition and authority, emotional warmth buttressing religious prejudice, and above all its tendency to obscurity of thought. Locke had lived through a period of history when an unenlightened religious enthusiasm had caused great difficulty. He raised a strong voice against it, and the influence of his attack carried weight for over a century.

Campbell dreaded "enthusiasm" or fanaticism as much as did Locke. This is how he described the characteristics:

A blind credulity in consequence of which its subject is led to imagine himself always to be the favorite of heaven, and actuated by divine inspiration; disorder and contradiction in the religious system proposed by the enthusiast; and obscurity and absurdity in his exposition of it, accompanied by dictatorial positiveness, requiring an implicit credence of his pretensions; a morose, unsocial and severe system of morality; a contempt of all written revelation.

None of these characteristics, did he find, in the writings of the apostles, for "they appealed to arguments, fact, and miracles." He went on to say, "the style of fanatics if always obscure, arrogant, and violent. The style of the New Testament is the very reverse of this."¹

The development of Alexander Campbell's conception of the Work of the Holy Spirit was greatly influenced by the religious conditions on the American frontier. In a letter to England in 1837, endeavoring to explain his position, he stated: "Had I lived in England or Scotland, it is a thousand to one if

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1832, pp. 489, 490.
I had written one sentence on the work of the Holy Spirit in the conversion of sinners for one hundred that I have written here."¹ He goes on to tell of how conversion in the New World is in countless instances effected in a way then unknown in Britain. He describes how this popular 'mystical' revivalism was carried on in large camp meetings, and how the converts had no clear views of the system of grace. This was what he opposed, and "not at all the influence of the Holy Spirit, as the Spirit of Truth, and the Spirit of Grace on saint and sinner."² The conditions he was opposing on the American frontier had something of the same effect as the conditions which Locke was opposing one hundred twenty five years earlier.

This 'experimental religion' or 'Christian experience' type of religion which was so prevalent on the frontier centered upon a person relating the experience by which he became a Christian. Conversion was attributed to "the direct and irresistible power of the Holy Spirit."³ Man was considered to be so depraved that he was incapable of partaking of the Spirit on his own initiative. He could not believe the gospel until the Holy Spirit acted so directly upon him and so changed his nature that he recovered his power to believe. This change came about without the aid of God's word. As there was no particular way a man could bring this about, he had to depend entirely upon his

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1837, p. 422.
²Ibid.
feelings to determine whether he was regenerated. "The result was an agonizing period of 'seeking,' and sometimes a dire despair of salvation, on the part of persons who had heard and believed the Gospel and repented of their sins."\(^1\)

Of this system, Campbell said, "The popular belief of a regeneration previous to faith, or a knowledge of the gospel, is replete with mischief." It meant that a man had to become an infidel before he became a believer.\(^2\) He was concerned with the way enthusiasm flourished in this system, and admonished his friends instead "to open your Bible and to hearken to the voice of God, which is the voice of reason. God now speaks to us only by his word. By his Son, in the New Testament, he has fully revealed himself and his will."\(^3\) This admonition is similar to the one Locke had previously given in the circumstances he faced. It is not surprising that Campbell who shared many of the same attitudes as Locke did, should manifest a similar antipathy to "enthusiasm."

On several occasions Campbell pointed to two extremes of doctrine in connection with spiritual influence. One was the Word alone system and the other was the Spirit alone. He did not believe in either. "The former is the parent of a cold, lifeless rationalism and formality. The latter is, in some temperaments, the cause of a wild, irrespressible enthusiasm,\(^4\)

\(^1\)W. E. Garrison, *Alexander Campbell's Theology*, p. 256.
\(^2\)Christian Baptist, 1824, p. 49.
\(^3\)Ibid., 1823, p. 50.
and in other cases, of a dark, melancholy despondency.\(^1\) His position was that the word and the Spirit cooperated in every case of conversion. He conceived of the "Spirit of God as clothed with the gospel motives and arguments—enlightening, convincing, persuading sinners, and thus enabling them to flee from the wrath to come."\(^2\)

In seeking to make clear his position, Campbell first stated positions which he opposed. He denied: 1) that "an invisible, indescribable energy is exerted upon the minds of men to make them Christians; and that, too, independent of, or prior to, the word believed;" 2) that all men are "spiritually dead" and can do nothing to contribute to their own salvation; 3) that all sinners must be in a miserable condition before they can believe the Gospel; 4) that physical signs of pardon should be expected and that an emotional response is the test by which we know of God's acceptance.\(^3\)

These statements of denial, were followed by Campbell's affirmative position in a series of essays on "The Work of the Holy Spirit in the Salvation of Men." As a good Lockian, he sought to keep free from metaphysical speculations, or abstract theories of his own.\(^4\) Instead, he made an inductive study of

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\(^1\) Millennial Harbinger, 1848, p. 361; Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 286; Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 614.

\(^2\) Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 614.

\(^3\) Christian Baptist, pp. 49, 50. This is also summarized in W. E. Garrison's, Alexander Campbell's Theology, pp. 259-261.

\(^4\) Christian Baptist, p. 139.
the subject as it was found in the Scriptures. He discovered that the work of the Holy Spirit in the salvation of men was threefold: the Spirit of Wisdom, the Spirit of Power, the Spirit of Grace or Goodness. This activity of the Spirit cannot be separated from the Word of God.\(^1\)

As the Spirit of Wisdom, he bestowed those gifts of wisdom, of the word of knowledge, of prophecy, and of tongues, to the ambassadors of Messiah, to qualify them to reveal, in words adapted to every ear, the character and achievements of God's only Son, and the benevolent purposes of the Father, through him, towards the human race. As the Spirit of Power, he clothed them with all those magnificent gifts of power over the bodies of men, by which they were able to prove their mission and demonstrate their authority as the plenipotentiaries of the Son of God.\(^2\)

The Holy Spirit, as the Spirit of Wisdom and of Power, was confined to a few saints in biblical times. It was "the author of all the miracles, spiritual gifts, and prophecy."

But as the Spirit of Goodness and of Grace it is "the author of that principle" in Christians of all periods "which inclines and enables them to cry Abba, Father."\(^3\) He describes the Spirit of Grace as dwelling in the hearts of men, and teaching them "to deny ungodliness and worldly lusts; to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present evil world."\(^4\)

In opposition to the popular revival teaching, Campbell insisted that the Spirit created "no new faculties in the human mind, nor are any of the old ones annihilated—no new passions, no new passions, no new passions."

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1 Alexander Campbell, *Christian System*, p. 68; *Christian Baptist*, p. 139.
2 *Christian Baptist*, p. 124.
nor affections are communicated." What actually happens is that new objects are presented to the faculties, volitions and affections of men. When these are apprehended, they make use of the powers of the human understanding, "captivate the affections and passions of the human soul" and thus draw the whole man into "new aims, pursuits and endeavors." He found nothing mysterious about the operations of the Spirit.

In the Rice Debate, held in 1843, Campbell took as the affirmative for his fifth proposition: "In conversion and sanctification, the Spirit of God operates on persons only through the Word." He used the terms conversion and sanctification as synonyms for he says, "renewation, conversion, justification, etc., are frequently represented as component parts of one process: whereas any one of these, independent of the others, gives a full representation of the subject." He sustains this proposition by arguing from Locke's philosophy. He first argues from the constitution of the human mind. Here he reaffirms that the Holy Spirit in conversion respects the mind as it is constituted. All ideas of the sensible universe come through sensation and reflection. Knowledge of God comes by faith, and "faith comes by hearing," and "hearing is the effect of speaking." The arrangement is the word spoken, hearing, believing, feeling, doing. The Spirit here depends on the Word.

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1Christian Baptist, 1825, p. 131.
2Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 611.
3Ibid., p. 612
4Ibid., p. 618.
In this argument Campbell shows his indebtedness to Locke in his use of knowledge coming through sensation and reflection. His stress is on the intellectual side of faith, as was Locke's. He repudiates the "whole theory of mystic influence and metaphysical regeneration" in much the same way that Locke previously had rejected metaphysics and limited his consideration to the powers of the human mind. Salvation comes about through the knowledge which the Holy Spirit brings to man through the Word of Truth.

The next argument claims that "no living man has ever been heard of, and none can be found, possessed of a single conception of Christianity. . . . where the Bible, or some tradition from it, has not been before him." He makes use of the Lockian argument that man gets his ideas solely through the senses. Since no sensations coming from the natural world could produce spiritual ideas, they must come by the senses through revelation, through the Word.

Other arguments Campbell uses are: No one converted by the Spirit can express a single right conception of Christianity that is not found in the Word. Whatever is essential to conversion in one case, is essential in all cases. The method of the Holy Spirit in addressing unconverted men is by "signs addressed to the sense, and words to the understanding and affections." The name given by Jesus to the Holy Spirit,

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1 Alexander Campbell, *Campbell-Rice Debate*, p. 619.
Paracletos, or Comforter and Advocate indicates the method to be used in doing the work he was sent to do. The gift of tongues, through which the Advocate began his work in the new age, indicates the necessity of men hearing in the language which they know. Then he cites different passages of Scripture which support his thesis. Campbell was consistently Lockian throughout the Rice Debate on this proposition concerning the work of the Holy Spirit.

Both Locke and Campbell seem to recognize an influence of the Spirit which is different in character from what they assert is necessary in connection with the constitution of the human mind. This difference is noted when they speak of regeneration. Locke speaks of the promise of assistance which Jesus assures.

If we do what we can, he will give us his Spirit to help us to do what, and how we should. It will be idle for us, who know not how our own spirits move and act us, to ask in what manner the spirit of God shall work upon us. The wisdom that accompanies that spirit knows better than we how we are made, and how to work upon us. If a wise man knows how to prevail on his child, to bring him to what he desires; can we suspect that the spirit and wisdom of God should fail in it; though we perceive or comprehend not the ways of his operation.2

Campbell asserts that "all that is done in us before regeneration God our Father effects by the word, or the gospel as dictated and confirmed by the Holy Spirit." Then he goes on to say, after our new birth "the Holy Spirit is shed on us richly through

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1Ibid., p. 623.
Jesus Christ our Saviour." In this new kingdom "the Holy Spirit is as the atmosphere in the kingdom of nature; we mean that the influences of the Holy Spirit are as necessary to the new life, as the atmosphere is to our animal life in the kingdom of nature."¹ How this operates upon man, he never fully explains.

IV. The Ordinances

Locke accepted the two ordinances of baptism and the Lord's Supper. He did not think a person was born into the church, but that baptism was the "initiating ceremony into the Christian Church."² Commenting on Romans 6:1, he says that Paul explained to his converts that by "the very initiatory ceremony of baptism, wherein they were typically buried with Christ, to teach them that they, as he did, ought to die to sin; and as he rose to live to God, they should rise to a new life of obedience to God."³ After quoting Acts 2:38 which links repentance and baptism together as requirements for the remission of sins and entrance into the Kingdom of God, Locke explains that Baptism was made use of by our Saviour, to be that solemn visible act, whereby those who believed him to be the Messiah, received him as their King and professed obedience, to him were admitted as subjects into his Kingdom.⁴ It is evident that Locke considered baptism to be a declaration of allegiance to

³Ibid., p. 302.
Christ, one of the steps in redemption, which brought a person into communion with Christ and his Church.

He describes the origin of the Lord's Supper in his Commentary. "Two of these ceremonies (of the Jew's Passover) were eating of bread solemnly broken, and drinking a cup of wine, called the cup of blessing. These two our Saviour transferred into the Christian church, to be used in their assemblies, for a commemoration of his death and sufferings."1 Locke regarded the bread and wine as a symbolic of Christ's suffering and death. When commenting on I Corinthians 10:4 Locke mentions "the bread and wine, which we eat and drink in the Lord's Supper, are typical representations of him."2 In his comment on I Corinthians 11:23-29 he again speaks of the commemorative function.

Throughout his life, Campbell maintained that the ordinances held a central place in the church. He constantly stressed their importance. Numerous references to them appear in all his works. He of course recognized their value in obedience to Christ's teaching. He also recognized that there was value in the way in which they presented the facts of the gospel vividly to the senses.3 This related to the Lockian aspects of his theory of knowledge. In stressing the significance of the ordinances, he said: "So long as the five senses

1Ibid., p. 142.  
2Ibid., p. 130.  
3The Christian Baptist, 1825, p. 174. Campbell speaks of practically all the religious world agreeing that the breaking of bread and the cup should be a part of the act of worship commemorating the sacrifice of Christ. The only exception is the society of Friends. "Their religion is all spiritual, and may
are the five avenues to the human understanding, and the medium
of all divine communication to the spirit of man, so long will
it be necessary to use them in the cultivation and exhibition
of piety and humanity. 1

When Campbell approached the question of covenants and
ordinances in his debates, he used Locke's method. Knowledge,
said Locke, is gained by observing particulars. We observe the
qualities of things, and do not speculate about their substance.
If all the observable qualities of two objects are different,
they are not the same. It is not right to say some mysterious
"substance" makes them identical. 2 Locke would have agreed with
Campbell that it is not correct to say that all God's dealings
with man constitute one covenant when the terms of the agreement
and the people concerned, with the exception of God, have
changed. The continuity of "substance" is pure speculation,
and the correspondence of parts, baptism and circumcision, mere
fancy, they would say. Instead, Campbell said, if you want to
find out the scriptural truth about baptism, go to those parts
of the Bible which deal with it, instead of arguing about the
correspondence to some earlier ordinance which has a different
purpose and origin.

be suitable to beings of some higher order than the natural
descendants of Adam and Eve; but it is too contemplative, too
metaphysical, too sublime for flesh and blood. We have tongues
and lips wherewith men have been impiously cursed, but with
which God should be blessed. We have bodies too which have be-
come the instruments of unrighteousness, but which should be
employed as instruments of righteousness."

1Ibid.

2Locke, Works, Bk. II, Chap. xxiii, Par. 4; Bk. II,
Chap. xxxii, Par. 23.
In the first article of the 1843 *Millennial Harbinger*, Campbell writes on "The Ordinances." He emphasized that the distinguishing mark of the "Disciples of Christ" movement was "the conspicuous it gives the Bible and its ordinances as the indispensable moral means of spiritual life and health." The characteristic feature is "a restoration of the ordinances of the new institution to their place and power. Not a restoration of the word and ordinances, as though distinct from each other; but simply a restoration of the ordinances; inasmuch as the Bible is one of the ordinances itself.¹

Describing how the Kingdom of God is administered, he says, "Faith is the principle, and ordinance the means, of all spiritual enjoyment. By comparison, "in the kingdom of nature sense is the principle and ordinances the means of enjoyment." Without the use of our sense we cannot enjoy anything in nature.

All the creative, recuperative, and renovating power, wisdom and goodness of God, exhibited in nature, are contained in ordinances. The sun, moon, and stars, the clouds, the air, the water, the seasons, day and night, are therefore denominated the ordinances of heaven, because God's power, wisdom, and goodness are in them, and felt by us only through them. Now, sense without the ordinances of nature, like faith without the ordinances of religion, would be no principle of enjoyment; and the ordinances of nature, without sense would be no means of enjoyment. These are the unalterable laws of God.²

A law or ordinance of nature is defined as "the mode in which the powers of nature act, while an ordinance of religion is defined as "the mode in which the grace of God acts upon human nature."

¹*Millennial Harbinger*, 1843, pp. 9-10.
The ordinances of Christianity are, therefore, the powers of the gospel of the grace of God. Every law of nature is a specific demonstration of divine power in reference to some effect no other way attainable. So every ordinance of the gospel is a specific demonstration of divine grace or spiritual power in reference to some effect in no other way attainable. . . . No one ordinance of God in nature can ever be substituted by another. This when established in nature, shall be shown to be equally true in religion. . . .

He included among the ordinances containing God's grace preaching the gospel, immersion, the reading and teaching of the Bible, the Lord's Day, the Lord's Supper, fasting, prayer, confession of sins, and praise. Each of these involves communion with Christ. Each is essential for some purpose that is all important to Christian life, health and usefulness.

In both the Purcell and Rice debates, Campbell insisted that the ordinances do not depend upon priestly ordination for their validity. He argued that the ordinances are efficacious in themselves, and do not depend on the personal character or the office of the minister. Instead, their efficacy depends upon the nature of the ordinances and the faith of the receiver.

In his debate with Purcell, Campbell attacks the arguments for transubstantiation and for consubstantiation, on the basis of sense perception and reason, or the Lockian theory of knowledge.

During the course of the Rice Debate, Campbell quoted Locke's paraphrase of Romans 6:4, "Buried with him in baptism."

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1Millennial Harbinger, 1843, pp. 9-10.
2Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 493.
3Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Purcell Debate, pp. 303, 310.
We did own some kind of death by being buried under the water, which, being buried with him, i.e., in conformity to his burial, as a confession of our being dead, was to signify, that as Christ was raised up from the dead into a glorious life with his Father, even so we, being raised from our typical death and burial in baptism, should lead a new sort of life, wholly different from our former, in some approaches towards that heavenly life that Christ is risen to. 1

When defending his new version of the New Testament, Campbell quotes Locke's note on I Corinthians 1:13, "To be baptized into anyone's name is solemnly by that ceremony to enter himself a disciple of him into whose name he is baptized, with profession to receive his doctrine and rules, and submit to his authority." 2 Campbell evidently considered baptism in much the same light that Locke did, and so used Locke's views in support of his own position. Locke's idea of baptism being an initiation, was paralleled by Campbell in comparing baptism to becoming naturalized. 3

We have already noted Locke's view of the Lord's Supper as a memorial. Campbell also regarded the breaking of the loaf and the drinking of the cup as commemorative of the Lord's death. They speak to the heart of Christians saying, "When this you see, remember me." When the symbols are received by each disciple, he remembers, "This is my body broken for you. This is my blood shed for you." The loaf is a "representation of his body--first whole, then wounded for our sins." The cup is thus instituted

1 Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 235 quoting Locke, Works, VIII, p. 303. This passage was also quoted in Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 162.

2 Millennial Harbinger, 1834, p. 152 quoting Locke, Works Bk. VIII, p. 80.

3 Millennial Harbinger, 1843, p. 223.
a "representation of his blood--once his life, but now poured out to cleanse us from our sins."\(^1\)

In still further attempting to describe what happens in the experience of the Christian participant of the Lord's Supper he says:

Ties that spring from eternal love revealed in blood and addressed to his senses in symbols adapted to the whole man draw forth all that is within him of complacent affection and feeling to those joint heirs with him of the grace of eternal life. While it represents to him 'the Bread of Life'--all the salvation of the Lord--it is the strength of his faith, the joy of his hope and the life of his love.\(^2\)

He speaks of the Lord's Supper and Christian Baptism as "two commemorative actions."\(^3\) Baptism is one of the most important "monumental actions" in the Christian religion. This institution "commemorates his death burial and resurrection."\(^4\) This is the "first action necessary to making a disciple." "The active principle" is important.\(^5\) The Lord's Supper commemorates "the wounding or breaking of his body even unto death, and the shedding of his blood as the seal of the love of God to man; of the reconciliation of a sinful world to the character and government of God."\(^6\) The Christian institution thus consists of these positive acts which no a priori principles, nor modes of reasoning could have suggested, keeps itself forever standing before the eyes of men. Christ crucified,

\(^1\) Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 310; Christian Baptist, 1825, p. 175.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Alexander Campbell, Evidences of Christianity (St. Louis: Christian Publishing Co., 1906) p. 322.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 323. \(^5\) Ibid., p. 324. \(^6\) Ibid., pp. 322-323.
pierced, wounded, dead, buried, quickened again, ascending, exhibited in all its sacred acts of worship. In our prayers, we speak to Him, in our positive acts of worship, commemorate Him, and in our moral actions, imitate Him.¹

What Campbell is actually saying as to Baptism and the Lord's Supper is that we have something "given" which demands a personal response from us. These two ordinances are channels of God's grace. They witness to God's personal relationship to mankind. In them we see, in the words of a modern Disciple, "the Holy action of God represented in symbolic forms." In Baptism we see "set forth the death, burial and resurrection of Jesus, and the personal action of God" is made known in "the remission of sins." In the Lord's Supper we see again "Jesus visibly depicted crucified, and His Holy Action" is made "meaningful and powerful in the Fellowship" which shares "His Life" and is willing "to be identified with Him in 'making up the afflictions which were lacking' --treading the path of love, and not of power."²

V. Conception of the Church

In a previous chapter mention was made of the lasting effect which Locke's "Letters on Toleration" had on Campbell. Since much of that work was concerned with Locke's view of the church, we will see now what that effect was.

Locke defined the commonwealth as "a society of men constituted only for the procuring, the preserving, and advancing

¹Ibid., p. 324.

their own civil interests" and asserted that the power of civil
government is confined to things of this world and has nothing
to do with religious matters.\(^1\) Though he never attempted to
define terms, it is clear that Campbell's views of the nature
and function of government were essentially those of Locke.
This is what Campbell seems to have meant when he spoke of
American government as "purely political" and designed to
"secure only men's political rights and promote his political
happiness." "This government," he declared, "regards this world
only as the appropriate object of its supervision and protection
... Here the affairs of another world are left to them-
selves. It permits every man to be of no religion, or of any
religion he pleases."\(^2\) This was all Christianity could ask for,
Campbell thought. He believed in the complete separation of
church and state.

Both Locke and Campbell disagreed with the Romanists on
their interpretation of Matthew 16:13-18, that it was upon
Peter specifically that the Christian Church had been founded.
Locke says, "Our Saviour has promised that he will build his
church on this fundamental truth, that he is 'Christ the son
of God; so that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.'"\(^3\)
He elaborates on this by continuing: "I do not remember that

\(^{1}\)Locke, *Works*, Bk. VI, p. 5.

\(^{2}\)Millennial Harbinger, 1830, p. 305f; Alexander Campbell, *Popular Lectures and Addresses*, p. 373.

\(^{3}\)Locke, *Works*, Bk. VI, p. 484.
our Saviour anywhere promises any other assistance but that of his Spirit; or gives his little flock any encouragement to expect much countenance or help from the great men of the world."¹ In his debate with Purcell Campbell argues the same point from the meaning of the words of the text, and agrees with Locke, that it is the confession of Peter, and not on Peter himself, that the church is founded.²

Both men insisted on the voluntary character of church membership. "Nobody is born a member of any church," Locke says, in the sense that he is born a member of civil society. "A church is a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord, in order to the public worshipping of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls."³ Members of a church of Christ are, according to Campbell, "those only who voluntarily and joyfully submit to him as lawgiver, prophet, priest, and king; who assume him as their Saviour, die to sin, are buried with him, and rise to walk in a new life."⁴ Campbell's statement is more specific in content, but the voluntary aspect is certainly there. Campbell defined a church of Christ as "an assembly of persons meeting statedly in one place, built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, Jesus himself

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¹Ibid., p. 485.
²Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Purcell Debate, pp. 83, 84.
³Locke, Works, Bk. VI, p. 13.
⁴Millennial Harbinger, 1832, p. 351.
the chief cornerstone. "1 There is no question with either Locke
or Campbell as to the divine nature of the church. It is implicit
in their writings.

Both Locke and Campbell realized the necessity of church
order. There had to be some form of coming together as a church.
Locke put it this way: "No church or company . . . can in the
least subsist and hold together, but will presently dissolve
and break to pieces, unless it be regulated by some laws, and
the members all consent to observe some order."2 Campbell in­
dicates that some agreement is needed that members "will walk
together as becomes saints in the relation of a christian con­
gregation." He continues: "when a society of disciples agree
thus to walk as Christians under the New Testament, solemnly
adopted as the rule of their piety and morality, they are not
organized as a body having all the officers necessary to their
furtherance in the faith, and growth in the knowledge of God and
of Jesus our Redeemer. They need bishops and deacons."3 They
need to decide as to the time of worship and the procedure of
worship.

Neither Locke nor Campbell believed in apostolic success­
ion. Locke thinks it folly to say that "no society can be a true
church, unless it have in it a bishop or presbyter, with ruling
authority derived from the very apostles and continued down unto

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1 Ibid.
2 Locke, Works, Bk. VI, p. 13.
3 Millennial Harbinger, 1835, pp. 494-495.
the present time by an uninterrupted succession,"¹ for Christ
did not so teach. Christ's own promise, Locke maintained, was
that "wheresoever two or three are gathered together in his name,
he will be in the midst of them,"² and this implied a denial of
such a view. Campbell rejects the idea of "an elect order in
succession in the christian church, possessing vested rights,
derived not from the community as such, but from Jesus Christ,
through a distinct class in the community"³ as papistical in
tendency, and contrary to the spirit of the New Testament. He
held that the congregation "elects and ordains all her officers."⁴

When Locke says that the basis of true communion with
the church consists "in such things and such things only, as the
Holy Spirit has in Holy Scriptures declared in express words to
be necessary to salvation,"⁵ Campbell is in complete agreement.
Campbell quotes at some length from Locke's passage containing
these words when he debates with Rice. They were arguing about
creeds and Rice had told of the good deeds of Presbyterians in
the cause of human liberty, as another evidence in proof of the
divine authority of creeds. Campbell's reply was:

Those who concur with us in our views of Bible in-
terpretation, creeds, and church organization, were the
patrons and promulgers of the principles that originated
our political institutions; and infused into the mother

¹Locke, Works, Bk. VI, p. 13.
²Matthew 18:20.
³Millennial Harbinger, 1835, p. 496. ⁴Ibid.
⁵Locke, Works, Bk. VI, p. 15.
country, and into this, the true doctrines of civil
liberty. . . . The author of the essay on toleration;
the greatest patron and advocate of civil and religious
liberty in the world; the immortal philosopher and
Christian, John Locke.

After reading Locke's words, Campbell makes this significant
remark: ". . . . I ask every person of reflection in this
community, whether this great philosopher and politician has
not expressed our identical views in the extract read."¹ This
was a part of his main thesis. Both men believed that the church
has no right to initiate doctrine, for it comes alone through
the Holy Spirit in the Scriptures. This did not mean for
Campbell that the Scriptures were the only guide for the church,
for he also said, "It is not the will of Jesus Christ, because
it is not adapted to human nature, nor to the present state
of his kingdom as administered in his absence, that the church
should be governed by a written document alone."²

Locke distinguished in religious worship "between what
is part of the worship itself, and what is but circumstance."³
Heresy," he says, "is a separation made in ecclesiastical
communion between men of the same religion, for some opinions no
way contained in the rule itself. . . . . Amongst those who ac-
knowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to be their rule of
faith, heresy is a separation made in their Christian communion

¹Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 795.
³Locke, Works, Bk. VI, p. 32.
for opinions not contained in the express words of Scripture. ¹

Campbell would not allow any interference with the Christian institution. He did see, however, the necessity of distinguishing between the Christian institution and its circumstances. "The faith, the worship, and the righteousness" of the Christian institution are not "legitimate subjects of human legislation."² The law of expediency does not apply to them, but to "the circumstantialis of the gospel and of the church of Christ." Many things of vital importance are left to this law. "Expedients are to be chosen with regard to times, seasons, and other circumstances."³ They concern the best present means of attaining given ends. Such matters have to be decided by individuals and communities concerned and are not matters of revelation. The decision of the majority determines the course of action. He held that all parties in Christendom that did not stand exactly upon the Christian Scriptures alone were heretical. Both Locke and Campbell were willing to accept as necessary doctrine only that which is expressly contained in the Scripture.

Locke and Campbell were alike in their desire to see Jesus' prayer "that all may be one" answered.⁴ They realized the impossibility for agreement among Christians on all matters

¹Ibid., pp. 55-56.
³Ibid., p. 93.
of faith and opinion. They looked for what was absolutely essential for belief. They found their answer by a careful study of the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. Locke found that one fundamental doctrine was the essential: "Jesus is the Messiah." This he discovered, "was the proposition that was then controverted, concerning Jesus of Nazareth, 'Whether he was the Messiah or No?' And the assent to that was what distinguished believers from unbelievers."\(^1\) Campbell's conclusion was the same: "belief of one fact, and that upon the best evidence in the world, is all that is requisite, as far as faith goes, to salvation." Expressed in a single proposition, this fact is "that Jesus the Nazarene is the Messiah."\(^2\) Neither Locke nor Campbell thought an elaborate system of doctrine was necessary. They both wanted a Christianity that was so simple that it could be comprehensible to all. They sought to extract the essence of the Christian faith from what they considered to be the extraneous and harmful accessories with which the simple doctrine had become encumbered.\(^3\)

The priestly accretions engrafted on the pure and simple gospel were ridiculed by Locke. He held that Christ's advent

\(^1\)Locke, "Reasonableness of Christianity," \textit{Works}, Bk. VII, p. 17.


\(^3\)H. McLachlan, \textit{Religious Opinions of Milton, Locke, and Newton} (Manchester: University Press, 1941) p. 84 quotes James Gibson as saying something similar to this with regard to Locke and adding, "In this way he sought to facilitate its appeal to the reason and conscience of all men, and to render possible a wider religious communion in which the distinctions of sects should be submerged."
inaugurated a simple and inward worship of God. Before the
Incarnation, "stately buildings, costly ornaments, peculiar
and uncouth habits, and a numerous huddle of pompous, fantastical,
cumbersome ceremonies, every where attended divine worship."¹
Christ showed the useless character of this sort of worship.
His remedy was "a plain, spiritual and suitable worship."²
Since the time of Christ, priests had obscured true Christian
worship, and made it necessary to return to the spiritual worship
of God which Christ required.

There was strong opposition on Campbell's part to the
ecclesiasticism of his day, for he saw the speculation, institu­
tionalism and traditionalism of the established churches as depriving the nineteenth century layman of his rights and liberties. He endeavored to point out these tendencies in the
clergy, in religious sectarianism, in the union of church and
congregations, and in the elements of Roman Catholicism still inherent
in ecclesiastical organizations. He argued that "the priesthood"
as a system was corrupt and its motives could be reduced to will
to power and personal wealth. He emphasized the glaring in­
consistencies of organized Christianity of his day as compared
with the churches of the New Testament.³

¹Locke, "Reasonableness of Christianity", Works, Bk.
VII, p. 147.
²Ibid., p. 148.
³This attack occurred in the Christian Baptist, the first
paper he edited, in a series of articles on the clergy. It was
characteristic of his attitude in his early days. As the years
passed by, and his own energies became absorbed in the problems
of constructive churchmanship, he became less concerned with his
attack on the clergy.
In his Treatise of Civil Government, Locke upheld the view that, inasmuch as the king derives his power from the people, when he is untrue to his trust, authority was again in the hands of the people and the government could be overthrown.¹ This principle of the right to revolt Campbell applied to religion. He and his followers revolted against the practices and procedures in the churches with which they were identified, because they believed that these churches had departed from the true standards. They called on others to join them in this revolt.

Locke also maintained in his work on civil government that when governments go wrong, it is necessary to go back to the beginning and restore the original conditions.² Both he and Campbell sought to apply this condition to religion. Locke asked, "Of what use and necessity is it among Christians that own the Scripture to be the word of God and rule of faith, to make and impose a creed?³ His own answer was that there was no necessity of so doing. The danger is that they require either more or less than God requires to be believed as necessary to salvation.

Campbell followed the same line of thought. He admits that the oldest creeds have the virtue of stating facts, and compares them to the modern creeds which are "human expositions

²Ibid., p. 469.
³Ibid., Bk. VI, p. 153.
of doctrines," but they are hindrances.¹ In his debate with Rice, Campbell defended the proposition that "human creeds, as bonds of union and communion, are necessarily heretical and schismatical."² His main contention was that creeds by their very nature are divisive. They have had made "more heretics than christians; more parties than reformations; more martyrs than saints; more wars than peace; more hatred than love; more death than life; they have killed or driven out all the apostles, prophets, and reformers of the church and the world."³ He objected to efforts to make men think alike on countless matters of human opinion.⁴ He called attention to the fact that during the period from the death of the apostles to the year 200 A. D. the church was united, happy, and harmonious, and during this period there was no creed whatever but the apostolic writings.⁵

Creeds were made, he said, for a particular age, to meet certain situations that the church was confronting. "They are not adapted nor framed for the human race."⁶ Instead of creeds, the word and the testimony of the Apostles is what is needed. This is "all sufficient and alone sufficient to the union of all Christians."⁷ The only way to remedy the ills of the church is

¹Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Purcell Debate, p. 77. He says that the Apostles Creed was not written by the apostles, though it is apostolic. He indicates he believes every article of the Apostles Creed.

²Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 759.

³Ibid., p. 765. ⁴Ibid., p. 797.

⁵Ibid., p. 901. ⁶Ibid., p. 878.

by going back of the creeds and the councils, and restoring things as they were in the beginning. Campbell, like Locke, could not see the necessity of creeds. If they had been necessary, he believed they would have been a part of the Scripture.  

Locke and Campbell both sought tolerance for the sake of Christian union. Locke wanted a church in which many different factions could be brought together in harmonious relations. He thought that this could be achieved by the reduction of doctrinal requirements. He looked upon those who wanted to impose "articles of men's making" and make "things not necessary to salvation" the terms of communion as narrowing Christianity "within the bounds of their own making." He poses this question: "Who sees not, but the bond of unity might be preserved, in the different persuasions of men, concerning things not necessary to salvation, if they were not made necessary to communion?" He considers "the toleration of those that differ from others in matter of religion" to be so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, "and to the genuine reason of mankind," that men should see the necessity and advantage of it. To a very considerable degree the Movement to which Campbell gave leadership achieved this goal of Locke. In the Rice Debate Campbell stated his views growing out of conviction and experience.


3Ibid., p. 9.
We have long since learned the lesson, that to draw a well-defined boundary between faith and opinion, and while we earnestly contend for the faith, to allow perfect freedom of opinion, and the expression of opinion, is the true philosophy of church union, and the sovereign antidote against heresy. Hence in our communion at this moment, we have as strong Calvinists and as strong Arminians, as any, I presume, in this house—certainly many that have been such. Yet we go hand in hand, in one faith, one hope, and in all Christian union and cooperation in the great cause of personal sanctification and human redemption.  

VI. Views on Education

Locke held definite views on education of importance and his theory of knowledge had important implications as far as education was concerned. His views were quite influential in shaping the course of educational theory and practice. Campbell was vitally interested in the field of education also and was constantly making references to its importance and stating his views with regard to it. Next to the Christian religion itself, education, for him, was the most important of human concerns and interest. 2 His views were greatly influenced by Locke in this field as well as in the others we have mentioned. Not only did he have a theoretical interest, but he also was able to put into practice many of his views. As early as 1818, he opened a seminary for the training of young boys, which he conducted for five years. Then in 1840 he founded and served as a president and professor in Bethany College. In addition, he

1 Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Rice Debate, p. 797.
2 Millennial Harbinger, 1838, p. 204; Ibid., 1853, p. 439.
influenced the course of common school education in Virginia through a plan which he presented to the State Convention. He was an outspoken advocate of free public education.

In his discussion of how men learn, Campbell begins by saying that life starts for all without a single idea. At birth man is furnished with faculties and capacities by his Creator, but the developments and discipline of these are in the hands of those to whose management he is entrusted. The five senses are the machinery "through which, and by which the mind acts, and is acted upon." Education must be based, then, on a knowledge of the philosophy of the human mind.

But how does he learn? First, undoubtedly, by sensation, and then by reflection. But what is sensation, but perception by the sense? and what reflection, but the act of looking back, reading and comparing the records of memory? That something which perceives and reflects is different from the perception and the reflection, and still more different from that which is perceived and reflected upon. This percipient reflecting principle is what we call the mind; that intellectual something which is called the soul of man, on which impressions terminate as the rays of light upon the retina of the eye. All that makes the outward man are but the organs of his spirit, as the tongue is the organ of speech. The five senses, with all their appendages, all the members and parts of the animal frame, are but instruments by which the human spirit acquires the means of enjoyment, and of making for itself a character.1

This discussion is Lockian in content.

One of Campbell's best statements on the fundamental purpose of education was in a lecture at Steubenville, Ohio:

Education with me, is the proper development and direction of the human powers. It is not merely the simple communication of the knowledge of letters - of

1 Millennial Harbinger, 1835, p. 152.
the names of things - of the rules of art, or of the outlines of the whole circle of science. It is the proper training, the full development and cultivation of the physical, intellectual and moral faculties. It is teaching a person to think, to reason, to act for himself, and from himself, in harmony with the constitution of the universe; or in unison with himself and with all the relations in which he stands to God and man - to things past, present, and future. Such is a rational and moral education.¹

Locke in his *Thoughts on Education* mentions that the great skill of a teacher "is to get and keep the attention of his scholar."² Campbell suggests we have something to learn as to education from Nature, and how she teaches. In seeking to arrest the attention of the pupil, his powers are aroused into action by interesting him in things which appeal to his senses. He suggests this is the method which teachers should use.³ Since mothers are the first teachers, he pleads that women should have as good education as men.

Both Locke and Campbell stressed the importance of physical education for "a sound and mature mind requires a sound and mature body."⁴

Locke was critical of the prevailing mode of teaching in his time, and Campbell was doubtful of the procedure for the training of the human mind in vogue in his generation. He said it was putting the "wrong end foremost."

¹*Millennial Harbinger*, 1837, p. 256.
²Locke, *Works*, Bk. IX, p. 158.
He begin in metaphysics and end in physics. The natural sciences, in the present course, are for young men, the last years of their academic, and the unnatural sciences (pardon the antithesis) are for infants and children! The infant schools now in experiment, are approximating very much towards reason, or towards the philosophy of human nature. We want another class of infant schools for young men.¹

He then goes on to relate his experiment when he supervised a classical school in which mathematics and the natural sciences were taught. He said he was convinced that more than half the time was lost in the older way of teaching and less than half was learned than might be under the newer method.²

Locke emphasized the need of youth learning about God in the right manner. He should be taught that God is "the Supreme Being, Author and Maker of all things, from whom we receive all our good, who loves us, and gives us all things," and whom we should love. He suggested teaching children short, simple prayers suited to their age and capacity would be of great use to them in "religion, knowledge, and virtue."³

Campbell claimed that the traditional religious training had given views of the divine character to children which had usually alienated them from the life of God. Total depravity had stressed "that infants naturally, perfectly, and cordially hate God." Following Locke, he said that this hatred is not innate for "the enmity or love to God conceived in the mind of

¹ *Millennial Harbinger*, 1830, p. 252.
² Ibid.
a child, depends upon the character of God" which the Christian
parents present. "That the minds of children are capable of
being shaped after almost any model and cast into any mould,
universal testimony and observation prove."1

In an important address during 1836 before the Western
Literary Institute and College of Professional Teachers, Campbell
spoke on "The Importance of Uniting the Moral with the In-
tellectual Culture of the Mind." He quoted Locke in support
of his thesis, citing three different passages from his Thoughts
on Education which show his emphasis on virtue as the primary
aim of education; that learning, though necessary is subservient;
that teachers need to realize this priority.2

It is virtue—direct virtue—which is the hard and
valuable part to be aimed at in education. . . . All
other considerations and accomplishments should give
way and be postponed to this. . . . 3

Learning must be had, but in the second place, as
subservient only to greater qualities. . . . Place
(your sons) in hands where you may as much as possible
secure his innocence, cherish and nurse up the good,
and gently correct and weed out any bad inclinations
and settle him in good habits. . . . 4

But under whose care soever a child is put to be
taught. . . . it should be one who thinks Latin and
language the least part of education; one who knowing
how much virtue and a well-tempered soul is to be
preferred to any sort of learning or language makes
it his chief business to form the mind of his scholars
and give them a right direction. 5

1Millennial Harbinger, 1830, pp. 253-255.
2Ibid., 1836, pp. 589-590.
3Ibid., p. 590; Locke, Works, Bk. IX, p. 143.
5Ibid.; Locke, Works, Bk. IX, p. 171.
Campbell indicates that moral training should precede formal education, accompany it, and follow it. He compared the influence of such men as Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, and Rousseau with men like Bacon, Locke, Newton, Boyle, Addison, Milton, Grotius, and Butler to show that learning without moral training can be a curse to society, while moral training along with learning and talent is a blessing to society.

Locke recommended that the Bible be studied through the various stages of a youth's training, but only those portions which he could understand. He saw the need of a good history of the Bible for all age levels. He argues for the teaching of the Bible throughout the school curriculum because it is so easy for young minds to become so absorbed with matter that the spiritual in life is forgotten and neglected.\(^1\)

The use of the Bible in teaching throughout all the stages of study was also urged by Campbell. The College which he founded was the first in the United States of America to have a department of Sacred History and Biblical Literature.\(^2\) He believed that the Bible could be taught as a text-book of religion and moral science, for there is a "common Christianity amongst all Protestant parties, against which no intelligent Protestant would object."\(^3\) He did not think that an educational institution should be sectarian or deistical, but he saw the

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\(^2\)Millennial Harbinger, 1845, p. 26.

\(^3\)Millennial Harbinger, 1837, p. 258.
necessity of teaching the evidences of the Christian religion, and that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah on religious, moral and political grounds. He raised the question as to why pagan mythology is taught and the Bible excluded?

Campbell realized the interdependence of Protestantism, the public schools, and democracy. He saw that the right of suffrage is used safely only by "intelligent, moral, and virtuous people." He argued that the educated mind is the true commonwealth of a community, that education is a nation's best defense, and a great force for the preservation of internal peace. Ignorance is the parent of idleness and this becomes the fruitful source of immorality and crime. "To prevent crime," he said, "is much wiser than to punish it."

VII. Political Ethics

Locke's political theory begins with a discussion of man's shift from a state of nature to a state of civil government by means of a binding social contract. In the state of nature, men were free from external control. "Man. . . . hath by Nature a power to preserve his property---that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries of other men." The

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1 Ibid., 1860, p. 372.  
2 Ibid., 1850, p. 168.  
3 Ibid., 1853, pp. 425-426.  
5 Cobban, op. cit., p. 78. "Locke had substituted empiricism for rationalism in philosophy, but he still treated ethics and politics as deductive sciences of the same nature as mathematics."  
state of nature would be a state of peace and happiness if men acted in conformity to the law of nature. Actually men are often dominated by greed, envy, laziness and lust. In order to escape from the dangers of the state of nature, men "join in society with others who are already united or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates."¹ The basis of the political society is the social contract. In this contract men relinquish some of their natural rights in order to secure their remaining rights. They agree to turn over to a central authority the maintenance of law and order.

The social contract was so formulated as to sanction only a constitutional government. Tyranny is a clear indication that a government has gone beyond the terms of the social contract upon which it was founded. Tyranny therefore dissolves the government, and makes of the tyrants one party to a state of war in which the people are free to defend themselves. "Using force upon the people without authority and contrary to the trust put in him that does so is a state of war with the people. . . . .In all states and conditions the true remedy of force without authority is to oppose force to it."² Locke's aim was to discourage tyranny, rather than to encourage revolt. He pointed out to rulers that the only basis of their continued rule was a strict observance of the terms of the social contract. Justice was the only ground on which their right to obedience

¹Ibid., Chap. viii, Par. 131, pp. 181-182.
²Ibid., Chap. xix, Par. 222, p. 229.
could be maintained. Because he was so concerned with the concrete problems resulting from James II's despotism and with the justification of the Glorious Revolution, many possible developments of the English constitution remained hidden from Locke, while many implications of his own theories he left to be worked out by others.

Government is limited to the particular ends for which established. It must be guided by the principles of natural law and must itself respect the natural rights of its members. Upon these grounds, he insisted on the right of the majority. No taxation without consent of the people, and the right of revolution in cases where rulers violated the conditions of the compact.

The actual form or machinery of government, may range from a perfect democracy to a monarchy, depending upon the manner in which the majority decides to employ the powers of making and enforcing the law.

Other points of significance include: 1) retention of the supreme political power in the hands of the people; 2) supremacy within government of the legislature, rule of law and separation of powers.

Campbell's clearest and most distinct views on politics were expressed during the Virginia Constitutional Convention which met in Richmond, Virginia, from October 5, 1829 to January 15, 1830. Here he gave fullest expression to his views of the social compact and the fundamental principles of government.

He was concerned about "the strong dislike to the doctrine
of the majority, appearing in many of the gentlemen's speeches on the floor." He maintained that if men had "equal natural rights they ought to have equal conventional rights."\(^1\) Disagreeing with the idea that there are "two sorts of majorities: of numbers and interests; in plain English, of men and money, Campbell pointed out there also were "majorities of talent, physical strength, scientific skill, and general literature," which are all "more valuable than money, and useful to the state."\(^2\) These majorities, he urged, ought to have as much weight as mere wealth.

On the basis of the third article of the Bill of Rights which declares that the majority of the citizens of the state have the right to alter or amend the form of government when disagreeable, Campbell traced the origin of the majority to the state of nature. He realized, of course, that "men roaming at large, over forests, could have no idea of majorities."

But so soon as men form a compact, it is one of the first things, which from nature itself, would present itself to them. The true origin of this idea is found in the nature and circumstances of men. Man is a social animal, and in obedience to this law of his nature, he seeks society, and desires the countenance of man.\(^3\)

Campbell gave an imaginary example of men forming a social compact. He pictured the invasion of a foreign enemy on American shores. Devastation, ruin, and death spread through the land.


\(^2\) Ibid., p. 119.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 120.
Only a few citizens escaped and fled beyond the Rockies. Five meet to form a social compact.

'A' says the government is chiefly for protection of property. He has money. 'B' claims his wife is as important as the money of 'A'. 'C' claims his rifle is as much use as possessions. 'D' has many children and makes his claim. 'E' can speak the Indian language. 'A' suggests they must abandon the idea of a social compact on these principles. Each will claim only a single vote. All agree to surrender selves, property, talents, and skill pro bono publico. This, Campbell claims, is the true philosophy of the social compact.

When differences of opinion arise on matters of common interest, he agrees with Locke, that "the minority must yield to the majority." 3

The right of suffrage, Campbell indicated, "is not a right derived from, or conferred by, society, for it is a right which belongs to him as a man. Society may divest him of it, but cannot confer it." This power was given to man by God as a natural right, which he brings with him into society." "A vote is neither more nor less than an expression of a person's will." 4 That policy which augments the power of wealth, which tends to make the rich man richer, and the poor man poorer, is the worst policy for the community, Campbell argued.

1 Ibid., p. 121.
2 Locke, Two Treatises on Government, p. 165.
4 Ibid., p. 122.
We have seen in this chapter the similarity of Campbell's thought to that of Locke at many points. Many aspects of his theory of knowledge, his attitude and approach to the Bible, his views on faith and reason, revelation, the work of the Holy Spirit, the ordinances, the conception of the church education, and political ethics bear a striking resemblance to Locke. In a number of instances Campbell developed his conceptions with more detail than did Locke. The situation in which he worked and his own natural interests demanded this. It is quite likely that in some instances Campbell would not realize the resemblance of this thought to Locke. Having accepted much of Locke's general point of view, he naturally arrived at results which were similar when that point of view was applied practically.

In the next chapter we shall see that there is another philosopher and school of thought which likewise had considerable impact upon Campbell's thought, Thomas Reid and the Scottish "Common Sense" School of Philosophy.
CHAPTER IV

CAMPBELL'S DEBT TO THE SCOTTISH COMMON SENSE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

I. The Golden Mean

Thomas Reid, and the other members of the Scottish School, James Beattie, George Campbell, Dugald Stewart, and later Sir William Hamilton, sought to develop a mediating position which would do justice to Locke's "confident" philosophy and at the same time reject many of the conclusions which those who followed Locke developed from his premises. Reid thought it was possible, "by caution and humility, to avoid error and delusion."¹ Perhaps nowhere does Reid summarize so well what he endeavored to do as in these words:

Extremes of all kind ought to be avoided; yet men are prone to run into them; and, to shun one extreme, we often run into the contrary.

Of all the extremes of opinion, none are more dangerous than those that exalt the powers of man too high, on the hand, or sink them too low, on the other.

By raising them too high, we feed pride and vainglory, we lose the sense of our dependence upon God, and engage in attempts beyond our abilities. By depressing them too low, we cut the sinews of action and of obligation, and are tempted to think that, as we can do nothing, we have nothing to do, but to be carried passively along by the stream of necessity.

Some good men, apprehending that to kill pride and vain-glory, our active powers cannot be too much depressed, have been led, by zeal for religion, to deprive us of all active power.

Other good men, by a like zeal, have been led to depreciate the human understanding, and to put out the light of nature and reason, in order to exalt that of revelation.

Those weapons which were taken up in support of religion are now employed to overturn it; and what was, by some, accounted the bulwark of orthodoxy, is become the stronghold of atheism and infidelity.

Atheists join hands with Theologians in depriving man of all active power, that they may destroy all moral obligation, and all sense of right and wrong. They join hands with Theologians in depreciating the human understanding, that they may lead us into absolute scepticism. 1

James Beattie also mentions this middle way. "Virtue," he says, "consists in a middle between two extremes; one of which is criminal from excess, and the other from deficiency." He indicates that this doctrine is useful in the conduct of life, and will be found true in many respects. 2

Again and again through Campbell's writing he points to the "Golden Mean." When discussing Robert Owen and his Social System, two years prior to his debate with him, Campbell anticipates an important aspect of their later argument when he says, "To make every thing in human character depend upon the power of circumstances, is to me as great an error as to make nothing depend on it. These are two extremes. 'Media tutissima est.' The true and safe way lies between." 3

1 Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 635-636.

2 James Beattie, Elements of Moral Science (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable, 1817) p. 359. The Scottish School here is reviving a conception that is as old as Aristotle and the Peripatetics.

3 Christian Baptist, 1827, p. 327.
Later, in interpreting his position as a religion reformer, Campbell recognizes that most reformers in zealously opposing error have been unable to defend themselves from the "imputation of originating or reviving another." The result has often been "a new suit of errors in exchange for the schismatic livery of an antiquated system." Fortunately time and experience tend to mediate the differences of extreme heresies and often bring "the rival spirits antagonistic errors, not only within the bounds of moderation, but often into the intimacies of close communion."

 Permit me to say, that however successful we may have been in the enterprise, we have always been cautious of extremes; and allow me to add, that if at any time, or on any point, we have seemed to lean a little over, it was only for the moment—as one recovering his balance after the pressure of some extraneous force is wont to throw himself back or forward for the sake of preserving the center of gravity. Allow me, then, to place before you a few of the extremes between which we have endeavored to stand. 1

He goes on to mention thirteen extremes. Then he closes with these words: "I incline to the rational mean, or to some point equidistant from these remote ends of conflicting theories." 2

The preface to the second edition of The Christian System, written in 1839, gives this interesting appraisal of Campbell:

Things ecclesiastic are moving forward to a new issue. The Christian System is undergoing an examination in the present day, both as to its evidence

1 Millennial Harbinger, 1836, p. 242.

2 Ibid., p. 244.
and signification, wholly unprecedented since the days of the grand defection. Such an age is always an age of extremes; but things will regulate themselves and settle down on the true foundation.¹

In his 1845 Baccalaureate Address to the graduates of Bethany College, Alexander Campbell describes his own point of view in giving a parting admonition. This is strikingly similar to Reid's statement. He describes how some youth rely completely on their own resources, will not listen to others, question everything and become sceptics. Others are the slaves of tradition and fail to think for themselves. Between these two extremes lies the golden mean of "sound philosophy and common sense." This involves keeping what we have learned until it is proved wrong, and not accepting a proposition until it is evident that it is correct. He illustrates this by telling the story of Phoebus's remark to Phaeton on how to guide the chariot of the sun for a day; "You will travel safest in the middle way."

Take this at least, this last advice, my son, Keep a stiff rein, and move but gently on; The coursers of themselves will run too fast; Your art must be to moderate their haste. Drive them not on directly through the skies, But where the zodiac's winding circle lies, Along the midmost zone; but sally forth, Nor to the distant South, nor stormy North. The horses' hoofs a beaten track will show; But neither mount too high, nor sink too low, That no new fires or heaven or earth infest, Keep the mid way -- the middle is the best: Shun both extremes, the rest let fortune guide, And better for thee than thyself provide!²

From his own experience, he knew the difficulty of this course

²Millennial Harbinger, 1845, pp. 324-325.
of action, and in the same way, he knew the values of the middle way.

Neither the false pride of consistency, nor homage for great and venerable names, should induce us to revere any position more or less than the evidence on which it rests. Assent above evidence, is credulity or enthusiasm; assent below evidence, is prejudice and obstinacy; assent according to evidence is reason, and candor and consistency.¹

Twenty years later, Charles Louis Loos, one of Campbell's students who became associated with him in the editorship of the Millennial Harbinger, wrote of the new movement, the Disciples of Christ, in similar terms to those Campbell had used with regard to the individual. He spoke of the two opposing tendencies prevalent in the religious world. One was the tendency to creeds, the effort to bind human thought and conscience by assent to authoritative forms of faith, outside the Bible. The other was the latitudinarianism which under the "inspiring cry of freedom" sought to remove all bonds and taught as gospel anything and everything. He then stated the mediating way of the Disciples:

Our position rejects with equal steadfastness both these extremes as alike false and fatal to Christianity. Ours is to sail between this Scylla and this Charybdis, inclining to neither. On the one hand, we must maintain as a positive decided principle, the rejection of every effort towards extra-scriptural confessionalism—creeds or formularies of doctrine and faith. . . . We equally relished principles to stand on for conviction and peace.¹ Let us inflexibly demand the most cordial, faithful, and well-understood acceptation of all the great ancient truths of the Gospel, as once taught by Christ and his apostles.²

¹Ibid., p. 326.
²Ibid., 1865, pp. 119-122.
In a series of articles entitled, "Scylla and Charybdis" Loos developed this view. He believed that between the extremes lies the "true course of the church of God" and "the true mission of Protestantism." He rejoiced that the leading minds of the Protestant world "are becoming conscious that they cannot hold the people where they are" and see the need of providing a remedy against the drift to the two extremes. "Protestants must themselves awake from the dreams of the Past, and look the living Present in the face. They must let the dead Past bury its dead, and arise and follow Christ."  

He quotes from an address which Dr. James McCosh delivered before the Evangelical Alliance in Edinburgh in July, 1864 to substantiate his position.  

II. General Epistemological Principles

The Common Sense School of philosophers had a great admiration for Bacon. Reid declares in a letter to Dr. Gregory, "I am very apt to measure a man's understanding by the opinion he entertains of that author." Stewart makes this comment with regard to Reid: "The distinguishing feature of Dr. Reid's philosophy is the systematical steadiness with which he has adhered in his inquiries, to that plan of investigation which is delineated in the 'Novum Organon,' and which has been so

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1Millennial Harbinger, 1865, pp. 196-197.

2It will be remembered that Dr. McCosh was one of the leading exponents of the Scottish School of Common Sense Philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century.

3Reid, Works, Vol. I, p. 11
happily exemplified in physics by Sir Isaac Newton. "1 The rules of inductive reasoning," writes Reid, "or of a just interpretation of nature, as well as the fallacies by which we are apt to misinterpret her language, have been with wonderful sagacity, delineated by the great genius of Lord Bacon so that his 'Novum Organon' may justly be called 'A Grammar of the Language of Nature.'"2 Reid employed the inductive method consistently throughout the Inquiry in his examination of each of the five senses in turn.

Campbell had this same high regard for the inductive method which Bacon and Newton so successfully used. He stressed the need for the study of the Bible according to the Baconian method of scientific study. In the Owen debate, he said, "I will make the principles of the inductive philosophy my rule and guide in this investigation."3 Writing in the paper which he edited, he stated "the inductive is the only true method of investigation."4 He appealed to Lord Bacon as laying "the foundation for correct reasonings" upon the subject of human experience and knowledge.5

In his exchanges with the Universalist, Mr. Skinner, Campbell accused him of using a priori reasonings in his approach

1Ibid., p. 8.  
2Ibid., p. 8.  
3Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 247.  
4Millennial Harbinger, 1842, p. 508.  
5Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 247.
to Scripture, and thus begging the whole question. This was putting the Bible at the mercy of the school of Plato, or Aristotle, or what was far more humiliating, "to the school of every sectarian scrap-doctor." Campbell continues by showing where he stands:

Wise men, like Bacon, Newton, Locke, and all the authors of true science, reason \textit{a posteriori}, not \textit{a priori}, in eliciting truth, fact, and law. I am a pupil in their school, and therefore look from and through nature up to its Author—you, a pupil in the school of Aristotle look from the Author down to nature. You start from hypothesis, I start from fact. You begin with what ought to be—I with what is. I reason from the things that are, to those that shall be— you, from the things that ought to be (as you think) to the things that must hereafter be. How different then, must be our conclusions. You have put this label upon your own philosophy by your own fingers.\footnote{Millennial Harbinger, 1838, p. 221.}

Perception according to Reid concerns itself with things of whose existence we have a full conviction. It is applied to external things primarily, and deals with something immediately present. An analysis of perception, he says, reveals three things: (1) some notion or conception of an object perceived; (2) an irresistible conviction and belief that the object exists in the present; (3) a conviction and belief that are not the effect of reasoning but are immediate.\footnote{Reid, \textit{Works}, Vol. I, p. 248.}

Campbell never questioned the reality of external objects.

I think it more difficult to prove an internal world, than an external one. Yet some great men, and well educated in the common views of mankind,
in their day have doubted both worlds. Shall we then, conclude, that because one philosophy affirms that there is no external world, and another that there is no internal world, --ergo, there is no world at all.1

He accepted them. In so doing, he rejected the position of Berkeley and Hume, and adopted that of Reid.

The way the notion of external objects and the immediate belief of their existence comes about by means of our senses, Reid cannot explain except by the "will of Him that made them."

The Supreme Being intended that we should have such knowledge of the material objects that surround us, as is necessary in order to our supplying the wants of nature, and avoiding the dangers to which we are constantly exposed; and he has admirably fitted our powers of perception to this purpose.2

God thus makes it possible for man to receive knowledge by giving him the powers to perceive it.

Campbell also recognizes the divine origin of the powers of man to acquire knowledge:

The desire of knowledge, and the power to acquire it, are, by a benevolent provision of the great Author of Nature, jointly vouchsafed to man. The centripetal principle of self preservation which pervades every atom of the universe, the great globe itself, with everything that lives and moves upon it, is not more universal than is the desire to know, in every being that has the power to know. This is the soul of the soul of man,—the energizing principle, which stimulates into action his whole sensitive, perceptive and reflective powers. . . . .3

In dealing with the question of what powers of acquiring knowledge man has, Campbell's answer is: "With the most liberal philosophers they are four--Instinct, Sense, Reason, Faith."4

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1 *Millennial Harbinger*, 1853, p. 509.
Reid does not make any such classification but he does emphasize each of these powers.

1. Instinct

Instinct is listed among Reid's mechanical principles of action. He means by instinct, "a natural blind impulse to certain actions, without having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do." Most remarkable are the instincts which appear in infancy, and which help to supply the defects of our intellectual powers in that early period. But there are many which continue through life and supply the defects of our intellectual powers in every period.

Campbell indicates that instinct has never been satisfactorily explained by any one. "It is a law or rule of life conferred by the Creator on every animated existence... by which such acts are performed as are essential to its existence and well-being." It differs from sensation and reason, existing where there is neither and where there are both. Instincts cannot be improved by education. Man has fewer instincts than all the other creatures.

2. Senses

Reid maintains that the external senses give us that information of external objects which God wants us to have.

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2Ibid., p. 547.
They give to all mankind the information necessary for life, without reasoning, without any art or investigation on our part." The wise and uninstructed have just as distinct conceptions of the immediate objects of sense. By sense, Campbell says, we mean "those external organs, usually denominated the five senses, through which we become acquainted with the sensible properties of all the objects around us." Man is not alone in this, as other terrestrial beings also have the use of sense.

3. Reason

Reid ascribes to reason two functions: to judge things self-evident, and to draw conclusions that are not evident from those that are. Unless a man can perform the first function, he cannot perform the second. Reason, then, is "the process by which we pass from one judgment to another." It may consist of a number of steps. Because of it, many important truths can be discovered which would otherwise be beyond our reach. Though persons have the gift in varying degrees, the power develops through use. Even so, "it seems to be only a kind of crutch to a limited understanding." He held that his predecessors had depended too much on reason to the consequent neglect of other human factors--consciousness, sensation, faith and the like.

2Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures and Addresses, p. 117.
4Ibid., pp. 475-476.
While Campbell glories in man's reason, he also sees its limitations. "It is the power bestowed on man, of comparing things, and propositions concerning things, and of deducing propositions from them. It is the faculty of discriminating one name, or thing, or attribute from another, and of forming just conceptions of it."\(^1\) It has no creative power. In the Owen debate Campbell introduces the interesting conception of the interrelationship of nature, reason, and religion. He called it "the trinity of nature, reason, and religion." These are all in harmony since they are expressions of the one creative will.\(^2\)

4. Faith

Reid does not think belief can be defined. He often associates the term with conception. He makes belief an ingredient in several mental operations. "A man cannot be conscious of his own thoughts, without believing that he thinks. He cannot perceive an object of sense, without believing that it exists. He cannot distinctly remember a past event, without believing that it did exist. Belief therefore is an ingredient in consciousness, in perception, and in remembrance."\(^3\) Belief is also found in the active powers of the mind, in joy and sorrow, hope, fear, gratitude, esteem, sentiment. Reid is sure that

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1 Alexander Campbell, *Popular Lectures & Addresses*, p. 117.


belief does not come by comparing ideas, or by arguing, education or experience. It springs from an original principle\(^1\) that clings to us always. There is always an object of belief. "For he that believes must believe something. Of this object of belief he must have some conception, clear or obscure."\(^2\) Belief has such a large share in our intellectual operations, active principles, and actions that Reid compares "faith in things divine. . . . the mainspring in the life of a Christian "to belief in general" as "the mainspring in the life of a man."\(^3\) The ground of belief is always evidence.\(^4\) This evidence is of different kinds; the evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, the evidence of consciousness, the evidence of testimony, the evidence of axioms, and the evidence of reasoning.\(^5\)

The power of belief is usually called faith.\(^6\) This is the "ennobling faculty" of man, according to Campbell. The other powers of acquiring knowledge are confined to a single individual, but faith, by believing in testimony, gives the whole experience of mankind.\(^7\) From his earliest days man must walk by faith physically, intellectually, and morally. "Hence man is obliged to walk through his whole life more by faith than by his five senses, his own observations, or his own experience--probably

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 196-198. This is the principle of credulity which will have further mention as it was shared by Reid and Campbell.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 327.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 328.

\(^4\)Ibid., Vol. II, p. 548.


\(^6\)Alexander Campbell, Lectures on Pentateuch, p. 61.

\(^7\)Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, p. 118.
more than by these all combined. What instinct is to "the mere animal creation" faith is to man. Man has the faculties of speaking, hearing, reasoning, and believing as naturally as he has the faculty of seeing, tasting, feeling. "Speaking and hearing are both useless endowments. . . . if we have not the faculty of believing what is spoken, or of ascertaining the truth of what is heard." Since faith is as essential to men as reason, he could not see why any one should give a higher place to reason than to faith in considering the powers of the human understanding.

Campbell would not have agreed with Reid's use of the terms belief and knowledge interchangeably as he sometimes does. Campbell clearly distinguished the two. Reid when he fails to make the distinction is criticizing Locke's conception of knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Locke also distinguishes between faith and knowledge, so that Reid is actually only criticizing at that point Locke's conception of knowledge and not his conception of belief.

5. Activity of the Mind

Reid thinks that the common philosophic opinion is that the mind is wholly passive in sensation. He agrees with this,

1 Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 66.
2 Ibid., p. 63.
3 Alexander Campbell, Lectures on Pentateuch, p. 61.
in so far as the mind itself "cannot raise any sensation," cannot originate it de novo, by a sheer act of the will. He further agrees with the passivist position that it is impossible for the mind to avoid experiencing a sensation when an object is presented to it. On the other hand, the mind exercises some control over sensation. When thought is turned toward the sensation, the sensation is increased. When the reverse happens, the mind is diverted. The consciousness of bodily ills may be diverted by an unexpected interruption, and what one is doing may deafen the senses to what is going on in the same room. Intense pain may be lessened by surprise, and when absorbed in conversation, the sound of a striking clock may not be heard. If the impulse is strong and unusual, it almost impossible to withhold our attention from it. It is not easy to determine how far the mind might be steadied by resolution and practice.¹ So Reid is not willing to attribute pure passivity to the mind in sensation, yet he does not say how important a role the mind's activity plays.

In describing perception, Reid tells of perceiving a tree growing by his window. An object is perceived and an act of the mind by which it is perceived is evident. He says, "the object is made up of a trunk, branches and leaves; but the act of the mind by which it is perceived hath neither trunk, branches, nor leaves."² He is conscious of this act of mind and can reflect upon it.

¹Ibid., pp. 114-115. ²Ibid., p. 183.
In an address on "The Rank and Dignity of Man" delivered to the students of Florence Academy, Washington County, Pennsylvania, Campbell expresses this passivity:

That the human mind, on its first awakening into life, is, as respects knowledge, or the ideas of which it is composed, a perfect cart blanche, is now a well established article in the catholic faith of all mental and moral philosophers. That it is also one of the most suscipient, ductile, and pliant subjects in universal being, is almost, if not altogether, universally admitted; and that in early youth it may, by the plastic hand of rational education, be shaped and modelled after any dialect of thought, speech, or action, is fast rising into equal credit amongst the most profound thinkers in both the Old World and the New.1

In another connection he speaks of the mind as passive, before it can be active. "That something we call mind, acts not till acted upon through the medium of the machinery of sense."2 But this is not the whole story. In an Address on "Responsibilities of Men of Genius" he indicates the activity of the mind:

The mind, indeed, may seize anything as gross as ether, or the subtle fluids that roll their invisible currents through the channels of a vein infinitely minute; but the sanctum sanctorum of its awful residence is not to be approached, much less entered, by the ablest, the most profound and erudite of human kind . . . . It grasps a universe, and yet may be filled with a single idea.3

In taking the position that the mind is partly passive, partly active in sensation, Campbell agrees with Reid.

6. Attention

Attention is one of Reid's first principles.4 It is a voluntary act requiring "an active exertion to begin and to

1Millennial Harbinger, 1838, p. 529  
2Ibid., 1835, p. 152.  
3Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, p. 75.  
4Ibid., p. 239.
continue it, and it may be continued as long as we will." In contrast to attention, consciousness is involuntary and does not continue, but changes with every thought. Attention is given "to any object, either of sense or of intellect, in order to form a distinct notion of it, or to discover its nature, its attributes, or its relations."¹ Without attention, it is not possible to obtain a distinct notion of any object of thought. Genius in matters of judgment and reasoning consists chiefly in giving "that attention to the subject which keeps it steady in the mind, till we can survey it accurately on all sides."²

Campbell also realized the importance of this power of attention. He speaks of it as an essential ingredient of learning. All those instructing youth should teach their pupils "to command their own attention."³ This power widens, deepens, and enlarges the capacity of the human mind more than anything else. Even so, it is not often appreciated, nor easily cultivated.⁴ It is the basis of all that is called talent, or genius, or greatness among men.⁵

7. Testimony

Testimony is one of the important channels by which we acquire human knowledge, according to Reid. He ranks it along

¹Ibid., Vol. II, p. 537.
³Millennial Harbinger, 1835, p. 153.
⁴Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, pp. 125-126.
⁵Millennial Harbinger, 1835, p. 154.
side the perception of external things by the senses. Reason in infancy leans almost entirely upon testimony. When brought to maturity reason relies more on her own strength, and learns to suspect and disbelieve testimony in some cases. Until the end of life, there is need of borrowing light from testimony. In many of our most important concerns we rely upon it with perfect security. "The character, the number, and the disinterestedness of witnesses, the impossibility of collusion, and the incredibility of their concurring in their testimony without collusion, may give an irresistible strength to testimony."¹ The human testimony with regard to matters of fact is a first principle with Reid.² The two principles which God has implanted in our natures, the propensity to speak truth and the principle of credulity enable us to rely on testimony.³

Campbell's conception of testimony is similar to Reid's. Testimony does not report the conclusions and deductions of reason, but "the recital of experience, a narration of things heard, seen, or felt." The basis of its assurance is always "the evidence of sense, or of consciousness, or of feeling." The original witness says: "I saw, I heard, I think, I feel—not I reason, I conclude, I suppose, I conjecture." Testimony is concerned with "the evidences of sense and consciousness," and these give the greatest of all certainty. Next to the evidence of sense, the evidence of testimony "produces the

²Ibid., p. 450.
³Ibid., p. 196.
greatest certainty."¹ "As by our five external senses we acquire all information of the objects of sense around us; so by testimony we acquire all information upon all facts which are not the objects of immediate exercise of our five senses upon the things around us."²

In describing the testimony of the twelve disciples Campbell shows definite evidence of the influence of the Scottish School of philosophers:

This testimony is such as no length of time can diminish. It is founded upon the universal principals of human nature; upon maxims which are the same in all ages, and operate with equal strength in all mankind, under all the varieties of temper and habit of constitution. So long as it shall be contrary to the first principles of the human mind to delight in falsehood for its own sake; so long as it shall be absurd to suppose that twelve men could all be deceived in the person of a friend with whom they had lived three years; so long it will be certain that the apostles were competent to judge of the truth and reality of the fact which they asserted. So long as it shall be in the nature of man for his own interest and ease to be dearer to himself, than that of another; so long it will be an absurdity to suppose that twelve men should persevere for years in the joint attestation of a lie, to the great detriment of every individual of the conspiracy, and without any joint or separate advantage, when any one of them had it in his power, by a discovery of the fraud, to advance his own fame and fortune, by the sacrifice of nothing more dear to himself than the reputation of the rest; and so long will it be incredible, that the story of our Lord's resurrection was a fiction, which the twelve men, (to mention no greater number) with unparalleled fortitude, and with equal folly conspired to support; so long, therefore, as the evangelical history shall be preserved, so long as the books are extant, so long the credibility of the apostle's testimony will remain whole and unbroken.³

¹Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 457.
²Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 112.
Campbell's belief in miracles rested upon the validity of accepting accurate testimony. "On perfect human testimony it must be believed, on the principle that every effect must have a cause." He thought if a number of persons of sound understanding radically change their manner of life and break well established habits "because of an alleged display of supernatural light and power, submitted to their understanding and their senses; we would have to believe them, or admit the existence of an effect without a cause." The twelve apostles were individuals who could give perfect testimony, for they had ample opportunities of observation, and had "two, three and sometimes all the senses addressed in the same miracle."2

8. Fact and Truth

A fundamental principle which Reid lays down in his inquiries into the structure of the mind and its operations was this: "No regard is due to the conjectures or hypotheses of philosophers, however ancient, however generally received." He saw the need to "try every opinion by the touchstone of fact and experience," for he added, "what can fairly be deduced from facts duly observed or sufficiently attested is genuine and pure; it is the voice of God and no fiction of human imagination."3

1 Alexander Campbell, Christian Preachers Companion, (Centerville: R. B. Neal, 1891) p. 3.

2 Ibid., p. 4.

So highly did Reid regard "facts" that he included among eight principles "taken for granted" the statement "such facts as are attested to the conviction of all sober and reasonable men, either by our senses, by memory, or by human testimony."¹

Dugald Stewart gives further evidence of Reid's emphasis on facts: "To Reid must be given the credit of having cleared the ground of philosophy, and of having laid the foundation for the superstructure." "Singular as it may appear," he continues, "Reid is the first who has had the courage to lay aside all common hypothetical language concerning the doctrine of perception, and to exhibit a plain statement of facts."² In explaining how the term Common Sense is used in ancient times and by the philosophers who had preceded him, Sir William Hamilton says that it denotes "an original source of knowledge common to all mankind—a fountain of truths intelligible indeed, but like those of the senses revealed immediately as facts to be believed, but not as possibilities to be explained and understood."³

Campbell's lifelong defense of revealed religion in terms of the history and evidences of Christianity hinged partly upon his conception of the term "fact." He thought of Christianity as "a positive institution. ... built upon facts."

¹Ibid., p. 233.


The Christian facts are all matters of record. The record, or testimony is the object of faith. Hence faith requires testimony, testimony concerns facts, and facts require a witness. The historian records facts. The philosopher speculates upon opinions and abstract truths. 1

He claimed that Owen, with whom he debated on "The Evidences of Christianity," confused the terms speculations, laws of nature, and facts; because Owen liked the latter term, he called all his views facts.

The truth of religion, he said, is altogether dependent upon facts—"facts which can be apprehended as easily by the unlearned as by the wise." 2 He describes the Christian faith as being known and recognized as

A belief of the gospel facts, and not the assent of human understanding to certain matters of opinion; a belief of facts, and not of doctrines; of facts resting upon divine testimony; and not of opinion dependent upon the acuteness of the human intellect or the logical powers of inferential reasoners. A regard to men's moral actions, more than to the strength of their intellects will soon subvert the metaphysical systems of past ages; and place Christianity upon a new footing in the eyes of the world. 3

The source book of the Christian religion, the Bible, "is a book of facts, not of opinions, theories, abstract generalities, nor of verbal definitions." God and man are revealed in these facts, and Biblical doctrine arises from the meaning of the Bible facts. 4 Campbell maintained that the Biblical facts could be taught, believed, and obeyed "without one speculative oracle on the part of teacher or pupil." 5

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1 Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 220.
2 Ibid., p. 75.
3 Ibid., p. 412.
5 Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, p. 235.
The fundamental importance which Campbell gave to facts is revealed in this comment:

Facts versus theories have revolutionized the scientific world. Facts versus human traditions have protestantized much of the Papal world. Facts versus natural religion (by natural religion we do not mean natural theology. These are frequently, and rather unceremoniously used as verbal equivalents) have Christianized many theists, deists and atheists; while between nature and theology, properly so called, there is not one discordant note, in heaven, earth or hades. ¹

The difference between fact and truth is evident in Reid's distinction between contingent and necessary truths. The contingent truths are the primary truths of fact, while the necessary truths are the primary truths of reason. ² He held that demonstrative reasoning can be applied only to truths that are necessary, and not to those that are contingent.

Of all created things, the existence, the attributes, and consequently the relations resulting from these attributes are contingent. They depend upon the will and power of Him who made them. They are matters of fact, and admit not of demonstration. ³

One of his twelve "first principles of contingent truths" is: "That there is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact," Reid maintains that truth "can never suffer by a fair inquiry." ⁴ Another of his first principles "of contingent truths" is: "That the natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious." ⁵ We need to

¹Ibid., p. 536.
³Ibid., p. 477.
⁴Ibid., p. 450.
⁵Ibid., p. 455.
⁶Ibid., p. 447.
trust our reasoning and judging powers. Each of us has a natural propensity to speak the truth.\(^1\)

Campbell reflects the influence of the Common Sense School and of Reid in particular here. He distinguishes between truth and fact by saying, "All facts are truths, but all truths are not facts." Fact means "something done."\(^2\) In Campbell's debate with Owen he objected to Owen's loose use of "fact." Owen defined fact "as that which exists." Campbell claimed that no philologist would assent to such a definition. "Stones, trees and opinions exist" but could these be considered "as matters of fact?"\(^3\) Owen, he said, had conceived twelve imaginations instead of twelve facts with regard to human nature.

Truth and fact are neither synonyms nor contrasts, according to Campbell. He defined truth as "the expressed agreement of words with things." He continues

Fact is an event, or something done; verbal truth, is the exact statement of it. Facts are proved by witnesses, truths by demonstration of the agreement of words with things. All truths are not facts, even when enunciated, but all facts are substantive truths, when fully expressed. That God exists, is a truth, but not a fact. That he created the universe, is a fact. The expression of this, in adequate terms, is a truth. Truth, then, is--what is; and fact--what is done.\(^4\)

Campbell particularly stressed that facts "have a power which logical truth has not." He called facts "stubborn things," the

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 196.  
\(^3\)Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 192.  
\(^4\)Millennial Harbinger, 1849, p. 229.
power of which was in "the meaning." 1 Something has to be done before it can be known, told, and believed. If we reason from cause to effect, first comes the fact, then the testimony, and then the belief. Following belief comes feeling and then action. 2 He claimed that facts could be discovered in only three ways: by the evidence of sense, by testimony, and by reason. 3

Reid's emphasis on judging all opinions "by the touchstone of fact" 4 was indicative of his dislike of speculation. In a letter to Lord Kames he elaborates on this point. He does not mean to dampen the spirit of inquiry by distrusting hypotheses and conjectures. He explains "I would discourage no man from conjecturing, only I wish him not to take his conjectures for knowledge, or to expect that others should do so." 5 Reid wanted a clear treatment of philosophical issues with a basis on observations from facts, rather than idle speculation.

Campbell's concentration on facts and his dislike of human speculation in religion no doubt was partly due to the emphasis of the Scottish philosophy. He always sought to use language which could be understood by the common man.

9. Credulity

An original principle which Reid associates with be-

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1 Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 111.
2 Ibid., p. 118.
3 Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 457.
believing is "the principle of credulity." He means that human nature has an inclination to believe, without which, man would have long since perished. In children, credulity is associated with faith and is simply unbounded. They believe implicitly what they are told, and receive with assurance the testimony of every one, without ever thinking why they should do so. This continues "until they meet with instances of deceit and falsehood; and it retains a very considerable degree of strength throughout life." Without fidelity and trust there can be no human society. Elsewhere he says:

I am persuaded, that the unjust live by faith as well as the just; that, if all belief could be laid aside, piety, patriotism, friendship, parental affection, and private virtue, would appear as ridiculous as knighthood; and that the pursuits of pleasure, of ambition, and of avarice, must be grounded upon belief, as well as those that are honourable or virtuous.

Campbell, too, described credulity as a power inherent in the human mind. It is the power to believe upon testimony. Upon this innate principle the educational system is built. This principle distinguishes man from the lower animals. He is able to improve because of this power. It is the greatest power for morals that he possesses. He contended that man is born a creature of faith, and is dependent upon others for his language and basic conceptions. Modern knowledge is dependent upon the experience of the human race which is received by testimony. "Experience is neither more nor less than another name for memory."

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1Ibid., Vol. II, p. 549.  
2Ibid., Vol. I, p. 196  
3Ibid., p. 95.  
4Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, pp. 161-162.
10. Language

The conception of language held a prominent place in the thought of the Scottish Common Sense School of Philosophy. Two of the philosophers wrote books on the subject: James Beattie's *A Theory of Language*, and George Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric* were both well known and highly regarded at the time of their writing. Reid and Stewart also treated the subject fully, and Lord Kames, with whom Reid had extensive correspondence, though not a member of the school was closely related to it, and wrote his *Elements of Criticism*.

Beattie is more explicit than the others as to the origin of language. He says, "we may warrantably suppose, that our first parents must have received it by immediate inspiration."¹ He agrees that until the building of the tower of Babel, eighteen hundred years after the fall, the whole earth had the same speech. He relates Lucretius' account in his poetry of the origin of speech and of how Horace adopted it, but he rejects the account.

Campbell made the same approach. He said, "The first man could not have taught himself to speak." Language, like faith, "comes by hearing." He added that mankind were not a dumb and brutal race as Lucretius and Horace had sung. He regarded language as a "special gift of God to man."² For almost eighteen hundred years, the human family were all "of one

³Ibid., p. 22.
language and one speech.\(^1\)

Since none of the inferior animals possess it, the faculty of speech, according to Beattie, is "one of the distinguishing characters of our nature." Speech implies "thought and consciousness, and the power of separating and arranging our ideas, which are faculties peculiar to rational minds."\(^2\) Reid calls language "the express image and picture of human thoughts."\(^3\) "Words being the signs of our thought, "the sign is so associated with the thing signified, that the last can hardly present itself to the imagination, without drawing the other along with it."\(^4\)

As already indicated, Campbell regarded language as embodied thought, and feeling. "It is an embodiment of ideas, volitions, feelings, in audible sounds, or in visible forms, addressed to others."\(^5\) It enables one individual to express his thoughts, emotions, and volitions to another, or to many.

Beattie indicates, "we learn to speak, by imitating others; and therefore he cannot speak, who does not hear."\(^6\) A person who cannot hear would be dumb, or could only use the natural language of groans, laughter, cries.

In the Owen Debate, Campbell emphasized that speech was not natural to man, but that it was imitative and socially ac-

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1Ibid., p. 22.
2Beattie, op. cit., p. 2.
5Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, p. 18.
6Beattie, op. cit., p. 7.
quired. Infants do not speak as naturally as they see or smell. They can sigh, groan, laugh, and cry quite naturally as do many animals, but "speech is the result of education, of training, and of the imitative faculty of man."¹ He describes how a child at birth, if deprived of hearing the sound of the human voice, would not be able to speak any more than could the brutes. Likewise, a man born deaf could not speak until his deafness was removed. Here Campbell seems to be following Beattie.

Reid thinks it possible to discover in language the constitutive elements of the human mind. "That which is common in the structure of languages indicates a uniformity of opinion in those things upon which that structure is grounded."² For example he states that all languages have the same parts of speech, and use the same rules of syntax.³

While Campbell never indicated this specifically, he shows his understanding of language, and of its basic uniformity, when he expresses the hope that there would be at last one language amongst the sons of Adam.⁴ That language is best which "can most directly, clearly, fully and impressively utter all the soul, and render transparent to an attentive mind every emotion, thought or desire."⁵

Reid agrees with Locke that the imperfections of language and the abuse of it are the occasion of many errors. They both

¹ Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 150.
⁴ Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses pp. 43, 286.
⁵ Ibid., p. 30.
realized the importance of definition of terms. In this respect Campbell followed them both. Some of Campbell's definitions which he used in discussing the powers and operations of the mind parallel those of Reid.

Reid: Sensation, taken by itself, implies neither the conception nor belief of any external object. It supposes a sentient being, and a certain manner in which that being is affected; but it supposes no more.1

Campbell: Sensation is the name which philosophers have given to the exercise of the senses, or rather, to the operation by them which makes us acquainted with the material world.2

Reid: Perception implies an immediate conviction and belief of something external.3 The immediate object of perception must be something present, and not what is past.4

Campbell: Perception is the name given to these acts of the mind which discriminate the different sensations or impressions made upon the senses. . . . By this faculty we become acquainted with all things external.5

Reid: Consciousness is a word used by philosophers, to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our immediate thoughts and purposes, and in general, of all the operations of our minds. It is only of things present.6

Campbell: Consciousness is like an internal eye, enabling me to take cognizance of . . . all the operations of my intellect such as reflecting, comparing, discriminating, and judging.7 Consciousness has respect only to things present.8

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1Reid, Works, p. 312.
2Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, pp. 148-149.
3Reid, Works, p. 312. 4Ibid., p. 222.
5Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 149.
6Reid, Works, p. 222.
7Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 149.
8Ibid., p. 142.
Campbell's close study of language origins was practically applied in his debates. His debates on baptism centered on the meaning of baptizo. When debating Archbishop Purcell he endeavored to show that the Roman church's indebtedness to the Greek from the fact that all the leading ecclesiastical terms in the Roman church were Greek. "For example: 'pope,' 'patriarch,' 'heresiarch,' 'catechumen,' 'hierarchy,' 'church,' 'church,' 'presbytery,' 'trinity,' 'mystery,' 'mystic,' 'catholic,' 'canon' etc. This as fully proves the seniority of the Greek church as it does that of the Greek language over the Latin." Another instance was his challenge to Purcell's reference to Peter as the rock mentioned in Matthew 16:18.

\textit{Mn su Petros, kai eno tsute te petra}—You are Peter and upon this petra, strikes the ear of a Grecian as 'Thou art stone and upon this rock,' strikes the ear of an Englishman; and as we have seen is a part of the Saviour's peculiarity.

The construction of the language requires that the word "this" should refer to something antecedent different from \textit{thou} or \textit{you}. They are different in person and case.

11. Memory

Memory had an important function in the thought of Reid, and also in the thought of Campbell. Quite early in Reid's writing he mentions it. "The evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the necessary relations of things, are all distinct and original kinds of evidence, equally grounded

\footnote{1Alexander Campbell, \textit{Campbell-Purcell Debate}, pp. 46-47.}

\footnote{2Ibid., p. 84.}
on our constitution.¹ These are first principles.

Campbell's stress was the same. He linked perception, memory, and consciousness together as the "primary powers of the mind," "the intellectual powers of man." The will has no power over these three, for they are independent of volition.²

In explaining what memory is, Reid contrasts it with perception and consciousness. "The object of memory, or thing remembered, must be something that is past; as the object of perception and consciousness must be something which is present."³ Campbell's contrast was strikingly like Reid's. "Perception has present, sensible objects for its province." By it, "we become acquainted with all things external." Memory "is the record which we have of the past."⁴

For Reid, memory is an original faculty given to us by our Maker. Campbell, too, would say that memory is a gift of God.

The notion of duration comes by the faculty of memory. Reid explains that "the notion of the past is immediately suggested by memory. . . . And when we have got the notions of present and past, and of prior and posterior, we can from these frame a notion of the future; for the future is that which is posterior to the present."⁵ This notion of continued exist-

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²Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 142.


⁴Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 74, 142.

ence is also in the thought of Campbell.

By it we not only commune with the present and the past, but by its instrumentality we acquire both impulse and motive for future action. It holds up to our feet the torches of past observation and experience, and throws upon our path the concentrated light of bygone years; thereby furnishing us from its rich and varied treasures those arguments and motives which constitute the very elements of wisdom and prudence. . . . . It is a gift which rescues from oblivion the experiences of the past, and which converts into the currency of every moment the wealth acquired through years of labor and sorrow. 1

Reid is critical of Locke's views concerning memory, duration and identity. Locke held that personal identity consisted in consciousness alone. Reid saw some strange consequences of this. 2 Primarily because the identity of a person could hardly be constant in the midst of something which is always changing like consciousness. Personal identity for him consisted in consciousness and memory. The difficulty here between Locke and Reid is over the meaning of consciousness. Locke does not, like Reid, view consciousness as a co-ordinate faculty with memory. Under consciousness Locke comprehends the various faculties as so many special modifications. Campbell held to the co-ordinate view of Reid. 3 He said that "perception, memory, and consciousness are just as distinct from each other as the ear, eye, or hand. . . . . These faculties are as distinct in their operations, as are the different members and organs in the animal part of man." 4

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1 Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, p. 280.
3 Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 142.
4 Ibid., p. 74.
Reid disagreed with Locke's conception of memory. 1

Locke observed that

... Our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be anything when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more but this, that the mind has a power, in many cases, to revive perceptions which it once had, but with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before; and in this sense it is, that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually nowhere; but only there is an ability in the mind to revive them again, and as it were to paint them anew. 2

Reid finds difficulty in this statement. He does not see how it is possible to revive things that have ceased to be anything. "Then a thing is once annihilated, the same thing cannot be again produced, though another thing similar to it may." An ability to revive our perceptions, after they have ceased to be would indicate an ability to create new perceptions similar to what we have had before. Elsewhere Locke has said that the same thing cannot have two beginnings of existence. This is not in agreement with what he is here saying, "they are revived, with this additional perception, that we have had them before." 3

Campbell's view more closely resembles Reid's than Locke's. He believed ideas were really in the memory and could be recollected from there.

With us, memory is contemplated merely as a monumental tablet, not as an organ or an active power. Recollection, indeed, is a faculty, an active power of reading what has been written and inscribed on the tablet of memory. Memory is as passive as the marble tables on which the finger of

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1 The points of disagreement occur largely in Locke's, Essay, Bk. II, Chap. x, Par. 1, 2.
God inscribed the ten everlasting precepts, while recollection is as active as the pulse of life in reading the inscriptions on those mysterious and incomprehensible tables. ¹

Reid also acknowledges this distinction between memory and recollection which he says originated with Aristotle. "He says this distinction has a real foundation in nature, though in our language, I think, we do not distinguish them by different names."² Apparently Campbell did not always so distinguish them either, for he calls memory "this noblest of our intellectual powers."³

12. Natural Theology

Reid indicates that the existence of the Supreme Being is the only necessary truth he knows regarding existence. Although the existence of Deity is a necessary truth, it can only be realized from contingent truths. The only arguments for the existence of God which he is able to comprehend are grounded upon the knowledge of his own existence, and the existence of other finite beings. But these are contingent truths.⁴

From certain signs or indication in the effect, we are able to infer that there must have been intelligence, wisdom, or other intellectual or moral qualities in the cause. This is a first principle which is of great importance in natural theology. He regards this as the strongest argument for "the being and

¹Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, p. 273.  
When we attend to the marks of good contrivance which appear in the works of God, every discovery we make in the constitution of the material or intellectual system becomes a hymn of praise to the great Creator and Governor of the world. And a man who is possessed of the genuine spirit of philosophy will think it impiety to contaminate the divine workmanship, by mixing it with those fictions of human fancy, called theories and hypotheses, which will always bear the signatures of human folly, no less than the does of divine wisdom.¹

Reid's metaphysical first principles are three in number:

1. That the qualities which we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which we call a body, and that the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject which we call mind.
2. Whatever begins to exist, must have a cause which produced it.
3. Design, and intelligence in the cause, may be inferred, with certainty, from marks or signs of it in the effect.

Beattie's chief argument rests on teleology as does Reid's. In natural theology, which Campbell distinguishes from natural religion, the universe is the text-book, while in revealed theology, the Bible, which is the written word of God, is the text. "It is the Bible that puts a tongue into nature, and enables her to speak intelligibly."²

Natural theology assumes to itself the province of nature, or creation, and its laws. Certain attributes of God, as well as his being or existence, are developed in and by his works of creation and providence. It is the Bible... which after its history of creation, treats of his moral... nature, his moral perfections, and his moral government. These two libraries are God's two grand witnesses and preachers to the human race. In the order of the universe, in the course of things, nature precedes providence, creation precedes providence, legislation and redemption.

¹Ibid., p. 460.
²Millennial Harbinger, 1853, p. 285.
Revelation presupposes created mind—intellectual and moral percipients. It first assumes, and then declares that God is light, and that all percipient and rational beings require light. Creator and creature are not more correlative than light and eye, than music and an ear. The one implies the other. Indeed all words save one are relative. Creation implies creature. God, or the Good One implies an evil one. Lord implies property or lordship. No creator, no property, no lordship; no Good One, no evil one. In universal speech we have but one irrelative term, in the fullest sense of that word: that term is Jehovah.

The first truth in theology, Campbell says, "is a necessary truth. God was because we are; and we are because God was." The whole universe is one immense system of means and ends which suggests to the philosopher "one great First Cause and one grand Last End, between which all things exist." We must judge of the divine attributes from what exists in nature before our eyes, as well as what is said in Scripture. Nature attests and displays "the knowledge, wisdom, power, and goodness of God."

God did not create the universe because he had infinite wisdom, nor because he had the power to create it. It was because of his goodness. Wisdom and power are passive instruments. God is "naturally, necessarily, and therefore immutable active, communicative, or radiating." Goodness is the active principle.

1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 287. 3Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, p. 139. 4Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 130. 5Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 20. 6Millennial Harbinger, 1853, p. 287.
Campbell's natural theology more closely approximates Reid's than Locke's. He combines cosmological reasons with teleological reasons for his proof of God. He differs from them both though in that he does not believe man can reason from nature to nature's God without first receiving revelation. In answering Owen, who claimed that the idea of an Eternal First Cause uncaused came into the world by imagination, Campbell stated that neither our sensations, impressions or their combinations have been able to give us an archetype of God as Creator "producing something out of nothing." Yet we have this idea of God as Creator. The light of revelation is needed to give us this idea and spiritual system. "True philosophy and the Bible make revelation essential to religion."\(^1\)

13. Where Reason Breaks Down

At an early stage of his investigation, "An Inquiry Into the Human Mind," Reid discovered certain principles "which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them--these are what we call the principles of common sense."\(^2\) Later, in his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man," he writes that the real essence of things is not comprehensible. Our knowledge must always be relative and imperfect.

\(^1\)Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 50; Christian Baptist, 1825, p. 172.

\(^2\)Reid, Works, Vol. I, p. 108. The underlining is mine, and not Reid's.
Individual things which really exist, being the creatures of God (though some of them may receive their outward form from man) he only who made them knows their whole nature; we know them but in part, and therefore our conceptions of them must in all cases be imperfect and inadequate; yet they may be true and just as far as they reach.¹

It is from the real essence, or constitution of nature "that all their qualities flow; but this essence our faculties do not comprehend."²

Since the real essence is unknown to us, experience cannot teach us any necessary truths. Experience can only teach us what is or what has been, not what must be. Because of this, neither mathematical truths nor the principle of causality can be proved by induction. "Though we had the most ample experimental proof that things which have begun to exist had a cause, this would not prove that they must have a cause. Experience may shew us what is the established course of nature, but can never shew us what connections of things are in their nature necessary."³

One of the four essential characteristics of the principles of Common Sense, according to Sir William Hamilton, is incomprehensibility. "A conviction is incomprehensible when there is given us in consciousness—That its object is; and when we are unable to comprehend through a higher notion or belief, Why or How it is."⁴

In addition to this realization of an incomprehensible element, the Scottish philosophers were aware that men do not

¹Ibid., p. 364. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 455. ⁴Ibid., Vol. II, p. 754.
have the faculty of reason in equal measure. Beattie, in his Elements of Moral Science points out that by some reason is "perverted by inattention and prejudice." By others it is "much improved by regular and accurate study, and by habits of deliberate and candid investigation." He emphasizes that "philosophical truth is discovered, not by dispute, but by meditation; and by observing the energies of nature, as they appear in the suggestions of the human mind and in the phenomena of the visible universe."¹

Campbell also admitted that there was a sphere in which reason broke down. He thought "a religion without mysteries--a revelation without incomprehensible ideas" looked too much as if it were the invention of man. He thought it was to the glory of religion that it had its mysteries, "facts incomprehensible by human reason--not contrary to, but altogether above it."² He speaks of reason in all cases being "circumscribed by knowledge. This is the record beyond which it cannot travel."³

He saw that there was in personality an abiding mystery and that in the field of personal relationships there is an area of understanding which is not within the bounds of reason. He speaks of the necessity of coming "within the understanding distance."⁴ He illustrates what he means by this by recalling

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²Millennial Harbinger, 1844, p. 147.
³Ibid., 1863, p. 352.
that the distance beyond which a person cannot be heard, is
called the speaking distance. If we want to hear another, we
must come within the radius of the voice. In a similar fashion
there is an "understanding distance" with regard to God. "All
beyond that distance cannot understand God; all within it can
easily understand him in all matters of piety and morality." 1
This involves great effort and sacrifice on our part. By fors-
saking "pride, covetousness, false ambition" we can come
"within that circle" the circumference of which is unfeigned
humility, and the center of which is God himself," and then
the voice of God is "distinctly heard and clearly understood." 2
To really understand the Bible we must approach the volume with
"the humility and docility of a child, and meditate upon it
day and night." 3

14. Revelation

The conception of the task of philosophy which Reid and
the other members of his school held was such that there was no
conflict with a high doctrine of revelation. In all questions
concerning the ultimate and divine reality, Reid and his followers
recognized the need and the place of revelation. There is an
implied theistic faith underlying their philosophy. Reid's
principles "which the constitution of our nature leads us to
believe" and which we "take for granted in the common concerns
of life" 4 are the "inspiration of the Almighty." 5 No reasons

1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 18. 3Ibid.
5Ibid., p. 209.
can be given for them but the "will of our Maker."\(^1\) The laws of Nature are "the rules by which the Supreme Being governs the world."\(^2\) He speaks of the faculties as being given man by God.\(^3\) One can hardly turn a page of either the *Inquiry*\(^4\) or the *Intellectual Powers* or the *Active Powers* without coming on the doctrine of divine inspiration.

Reid sees in intuition and the irresistible beliefs of the human mind, the handiwork of the Almighty, which may be accounted for, in part, by this, that he was a devout Christian all his life, and a minister as well as a philosopher. For him, faith is requisite not only for the Christian, but for philosophers and men in every walk of life. The inspiration of faith is mediated by the human constitution. He indicates that "revelation was not intended to supersede, but to aid the use of our natural faculties."\(^5\)

We have already noted Campbell's conception of revelation in some detail in the preceding chapter. He believed in its supernatural character, and he emphasized that it had to do with facts, rather than with opinions or abstract happenings.\(^6\) He had a high doctrine of revelation. He would agree with Reid that revelation was intended to aid the use of our natural faculties. He puts a query to reason, what dost thou make of revelation? and the answer of reason is this:

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 247.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 484.  \(^3\)Ibid., p. 485.

\(^4\)Underneath the title of the *Inquiry* stands a quotation from Job 32:28 "The inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." This is not unlike the *lumen naturale* of the Scholastics.


All its communications are to me as the axioms of Euclid to the mathematician. I use them all as first and fixed principles never to be called in question, as rules and measures by which all moral principles are tried. A 'thus says the Lord' ends all debate.¹

Both Campbell and Reid held that philosophy was a limited human activity, which nevertheless points toward the Divine reality. Revelation is freely acknowledged to be the activity of God by which he spells out his redemptive will for men. Christian teaching about God completes the philosophical portrait of reality. For this reason there is justice in the remarks of A. S. Pringle-Pattison that "for their personal ontology" the Scottish philosophers "simply fell back upon the language of religion, which relates God to the world as its Creator, and to man also as his Creator, and in a special sense, his Father and God."²

III. The Concept of Authority

In the faculty of judging,³ Reid includes sense. Sense, he observes, has usually been taken in the wrong sense, as the channel by which we receive impressions and ideas from external objects, and as such having nothing to do with common sense and Judgment. This is all wrong, he explains, for in the common meaning of the term, sense usually refers to experience and to a judgment. "In common language sense always implies judgment. A

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1832, p. 100.
³Judgment is being used as "every determination of the mind concerning what is true or what is false."
man of sense is a man of judgment. Good sense is good judgment. Nonsense is what is evidently contrary to right judgment. Common sense is that degree of judgment which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business."¹ Because they judge by them, common people call seeing, smelling, and hearing senses. Because we obtain ideas by them, philosophers call the same organs senses. In thinking of the popular usage of the term common sense, we notice that a certain amount is needed for managing our daily affairs, living as citizens of a government, and being accountable for our conduct toward others. As it is essential and common to all men, it is termed common sense. "This inward light or sense is given by heaven to different persons in different degrees."² Most people, he thinks, agree in the meaning of the term without ever having thought of defining the boundary lines. "It seems to me that common sense is as unambiguous a word and as well understood, as the county of York."³

In the Inquiry, Reid's tendency was to set reason and common sense over against each other as competitors, though this was not always the case. But in his later work, the Intellectual Powers he speaks in a different way: "It is absurd to conceive that there can be any opposition between reason and common sense. It is indeed the first-born of reason, and as they are commonly joined together in speech and in writing, they are inseparable.

²Ibid., p. 422.
³Ibid., p. 423.
in their nature. 1

All knowledge, Reid says, "must be built upon principles that are self-evident; and of such principles every man who has common sense is a competent judge." 2 He suggested that if in other branches of learning "the first principles were laid down, as had been done in mathematics and natural philosophy, and the subsequent conclusions grounded upon them, this would make it much more easy to distinguish what is solid and well supported from the vain fictions of human fancy." 3 He thought that men of "candour and capacity, who love truth, and have patience to examine things coolly," 4 might come to unanimity with regard to first principles and deductions from them.

The qualifications for judging first principles are simply ripeness of understanding and freedom from prejudice. All individuals are capable of passing judgment "when they are not misled by some bias, or taught to renounce their understanding from some mistaken religious principle." 5 In anything beyond the reach of common understanding, "the many are led by the few and willingly yield to their authority." But where common sense is concerned "the few must yield to the many" provided local and temporary prejudices are removed.

Opinions opposed to first principles are not only false but absurd. They cannot be held when the mask is removed which lets in the light and exposes the error. Thus Reid conceives.

1Ibid., p. 425. 2Ibid., p. 422. 3Ibid., p. 437. 4Ibid. 5Ibid., p. 438.
that first principles which have the assent of common sense contradict absurdities in opinion and will always "from the constitution of human nature support themselves, and gain rather than lose ground among mankind." ¹

Reid mentions three ways of reasoning about first principles which enable those that are true to be detected from those that are false. 1) An ad hominem argument is to show that "a first principle which a man rejects, stands upon the same footing with others which he admits." If this is true, he must be guilty of inconsistency. 2) An ad absurdum proof supposes that a contradictory proposition is true, traces the consequences, and if any of these are absurd, the supposition from which it comes is false, and therefore the contradictory is true. 3) A general agreement among men of different ages and nations, educated and uneducated, "ought to have great authority with regard to first principles, where every man is a competent judge." ²

At this point, Reid raises the question of authority. He realizes the tyranny which authority in past ages has caused. He honors those who have helped "to break the yoke" of the authority by which men lose "the unalienable right of judging for themselves," but he sees the folly of going from one extreme which is wrong to another which is also wrong. Even though authority can be "a very tyrannical mistress" to private judgment, it may sometimes be "a useful handmaid." ³

¹Ibid., p. 439. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 440.
He illustrates this by citing the case of a mathematician who makes a new discovery which he thinks is important. After putting his demonstration in order, and carefully examining it himself for any flaw, he asks a friend who is a competent judge to examine it. If this judgment is favorable, his confidence is increased. When this is confirmed by two or three other able judges, he is satisfied that his discovery is sound. If any judgment is unfavorable, the suspected part is again rigorously examined.

Here, a man is not satisfied with his own judgment and seeks the aid of authority to support it. He is greatly strengthened by the favorable judgment the authority gives. So Reid concludes:

Society, in judgment, of those who are esteemed fair and competent judges, has effects very similar to those of civil society: it gives strength and courage to every individual; it removes that timidity which is as naturally the companion of solitary judgment, as of a solitary man in the state of nature. Let us judge for ourselves, therefore; but let us not disdain to take that aid from the authority of other competent judges, which a mathematician thinks it necessary to take in that science, which of all sciences, has least to do with authority.

In a matter of common sense...the judgment of mankind...is the natural issue of those faculties which God hath given them.\(^1\)

He thinks it highly unreasonable to expect a "general deviation from truth among mankind in things self-evident, of which no cause can be assigned."\(^2\) For him it is evident that a theory that leads away from and clashes with facts the majority of

\(^1\)Reid, Works, Vol. I, p. 440. This last statement agrees with the Cambridge Platonists that "the spirit of man is the Candle of the Lord."

\(^2\)Ibid.
humanity agree about, and nobody in daily life can doubt; that such a theory must be wrong and common sense right.¹ Common Sense, then, means for Reid something about which everyone agrees and that must from the empirical point of view imply an appeal to the majority. When we use an empirical method a theory must be better founded the more examples we have. Alongside this conception of common sense, forming another strain in Reid's thought, is this statement: "If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under the necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them—these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd."²

It is possible to discover these first principles by experience, but they are not valid because they are acknowledged by everyone, but because they are necessary; there can be no other reason for their validity than their own evidence. The principles of common sense, then, are the laws common for humanity and constitutive for the human mind. Philosophical thinking has its root in common sense, and it is necessary to keep it in harmony with common sense; also, the common sense principle is necessarily endorsed by everybody. Hence for Reid, there is no real difference between these two lines. If these

fundamental laws are constitutive for the human mind, then they must also be endorsed by everybody, and an appeal to the majority is not undue.

In the Declaration and Address of Thomas Campbell, the first document of the Disciples of Christ movement, are clear traces of Reid’s conception of authority and his views of "common sense." In the first sentence he asserts the right of private judgment. "It is high time, to think and act for ourselves."\(^1\) He then emphasizes the supreme authority of the Scriptures. At first sight, these two positions might appear to be contradictory, but they were not so in Thomas Campbell’s thinking, for he believed in the substantial accuracy of "the common mind."\(^2\) He obeyed Reid’s admonition, "Let us judge for ourselves...but let us not disdain to take...aid from the authority of other competent judges."\(^3\) Thus the private interpretations of the Scriptures by any one individual did not mean each person would have a different conception of what was read. For the conception which an individual held would need to be verified by appealing to the qualified scholarship of the great doctors of the whole church. The Campbells did what Reid

\(^1\)F. D. Kershner, The Christian Union Overture, An Interpretation of the Declaration and Address (St. Louis: Bethany Press, 1923) p. 32. This contains the whole Declaration and Address of Thomas Campbell as well as comment upon it. The Declaration was first published in 1809.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 44.

indicated needed to be done in his illustration of the mathematician with his new discovery. The common judgment would be the correct one. This common judgment or common mind or universal reason made unity of thought possible. Men were helped in arriving at this "common mind" by "fixed and certain principles of interpretation" which were used by all,\(^1\) in the interpretation of any ancient book. If the same rules of interpretation were used by all who read the Bible, they were certain the facts could be discovered.

The Campbells always referred to this common mind in connection with their theological conceptions. After making a thorough study of baptism, by examining the early Fathers\(^2\) and then the later teachers they concluded that the great body of scholarship was agreed as to the practice in the New Testament period. Since the universal reason had spoken in support of this view they felt bound to commit themselves to this position. The same approach was true with regard to the other doctrines they held. This was the deciding factor in their attitude toward creeds. The common mind, as represented by the best scholarship of the day, had concluded that the confession of faith in Jesus Christ as the Messiah was the only creed used in the New Testament period, so they rejected all human creeds.\(^3\)

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1 Alexander Campbell, *Christian Baptism*, p. 49. Here Campbell was referring to the inductive method as applied to the study of Scripture.

2 Alexander Campbell, *Campbell-Walker Debate* (Steubenville, Ohio: James Wilson, 1820) pp. 101-123.

3 F. D. Kershner, *Christian Union Overture*, op. cit., p. 47.
If the Scriptures are interpreted by this principle of private judgment checked by the common judgment of best scholarship there is real justification in regarding them as the ultimate authority in religion.

This conception of authority, the authority of the common judgment, had important implications for the Christian union in which the Campbells were so interested, and helped them to formulate a practical plan for Christian union. They saw that if unity were to be achieved its basis would be the possession of the common mind in all the divisions of Christendom. They recognized the essential Christianity of all the followers of Jesus, and "the equality of all Christians before God." Alexander Campbell once declared: "The voice of the whole church is the voice of God - because it is the voice of reason and of truth."

The Campbells were great believers in democracy. In the course of all his writings, Alexander Campbell emphasized the rights of man and the implications of religious liberty. In 1830, in an "Oration in Honor of the Fourth of July" he said "The American Revolution is but the precursor of a revolution of infinitely more importance to mankind. ... A more glorious work is reserved for this generation. ... --the emancipation of the human mind from the shackles of superstition. ... To

1 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
2 A phrase used by Peter Ainslie, one of the greatest ecumenical minds of the Disciples of Christ of a recent day.
3 Millennial Harbinger, 1846, p. 435.
liberate men from sectarian tyrannies. . . . "1 This he conceived to be his task. He thought that the rationality of the average mind would respond to truth when facts were adequately presented. He saw his movement as an expression of the "common mind" of Christendom.2 With Thomas Campbell, "the only test of truth is its universal acceptance by right thinking people everywhere."3 This does not mean a mere majority vote can decide as to the course of things. Thomas Campbell says quite clearly, "it is not the voice of the multitude, but the voice of truth, that has power with conscience; that can produce rational conviction and acceptable obedience."4 Here the other strain of "Common Sense" philosophy is evident: "principles . . . which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe."5 Even though the common mind is not always found among the prejudiced, a fact which Reid also recognized, it is always present among the earnest seekers after truth. Such people he describes as the "real Christians of every denomination."6

Both father and son emphasized that the common mind or common judgment could agree on essentials. Those things on

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2 There is some similarity between the view of the Campbell's with regard to the authority of the common mind and the view of the Catholic modernists, Loisy and Tyrell who believed that the Pope should express the collective mind of the church rather than his own.
6 F. D. Kershner, *Christian Union Overture*, p. 97.
which there could be no agreement, were non-essentials. There should be union on the essentials, and freedom should be allowed as to the non-essentials. Thomas Campbell describes this basis of union, as "union in truth." The Christian world is not divided on the things necessary to salvation, but on matters of opinion and speculation—those things "in which the kingdom of God does not consist." Alexander Campbell speaks of great cardinal points in which all Christians agree:

There is something which may be called a common Christianity amongst all Protestant parties, against which no intelligent Protestant could object—such as, the evidences of the Christian religion—the arguments that prove the divine person and mission of the common Saviour—the reasons why he is to be accredited and received as the only Saviour of the world—the necessity of faith in him—of repentance towards God—of new heart and life—of supreme devotion to his will—the value of his death as a sin offering—the necessity of his resurrection, and the certainty of his coming to judge and retribute the living and the dead according to their works.

Again and again is expressed the idea that what is really important is the "common Christianity" which through the years has been regarded as essential by the common, thoughtful mind of the church.

In the Declaration and Address, Thomas Campbell called attention to certain "fundamental truths" and directed them to "first principles." He sought to clear the way by "removing

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1 Kershner, Christian Union Overture, p. 97.
2 Ibid., p. 60.
3 Millennium Harbinger, 1837, p. 258.
4 This point of view was later expressed in Scotland by Robert Flint and James Kennedy.
the stumbling blocks" for a "Scriptural unity among Christians." He made his appeal to "the right reason" of Christians everywhere. He expresses his willingness to adopt some other program if his own "preliminary" suggestions do not stand the test. He shows his devotion to the inductive method in the search for truth, the same method Reid used, when he asks that these principles be "examined with rigor, with all the rigor that justice, candor, and charity will admit." He asks that his principles, if found inadequate, be "corrected and amended" until "they become sufficiently evident, adequate, and unexceptionable." He sets forth thirteen propositions, or "first principles" as a platform for Christian union. The Campbells sought to do in the field of religion as they sought Christian unity, what Reid had attempted in the field of philosophy and they had the same confidence that this would make it "much more easy to distinguish what is solid and well supported from the vain fictions of human fancy."  

Alexander Campbell concurred heartily in all the expressions of the Declaration and Address. In writing of the relation between reason and revelation, he stressed that "the truths of the Bible are to be received as first principles, not to be tried by our reason, one by one, but to be received as new principles, from which we are to reason as from intuitive principles in any human science."  

1Kershner, Christian Union Overture, pp. 96-97.  
3Christian Baptist, 1827, p. 380.
to "a lover of just reasoning" who was following a strict Lockian pattern of argument on the same subject, and emphasizing the superiority of intuitive evidence in arriving at a knowledge of God and also maintaining the fallibility of Scriptural evidence, Campbell maintained that more had been said of the superiority of intuitive evidence in arriving at a knowledge of God than the subject deserves. He admits, for the sake of argument, the infallible certainty of this, but denies this is more important than the evidence of sense and testimony. He points out that the revelation of God did not come first by testimony, but that now it is a matter of history and testimony.

The Revelation is addressed to the whole man, and it has within it its intuitive principles, which it presents to the honest student as Euclid does to his students. . . . It is impossible that the Bible could have been forged through priestcraft or kingcraft. To those acquainted with its contents, it is an axiom as evident in morals, as any respecting quantities in mathematics, that good men could not surreptitiously introduce this volume. ¹

In an article on "The Office of Reason in Reference to Divine Revelation" in the 1863 Millennial Harbinger, probably written by Campbell, these statements are made:

There are some propositions so clear, so obviously true, that as soon as they are exhibited in words which we understand, the mind assents to them. Such are the following: 'Every effect supposes a cause.' 'The whole is greater than any of its parts.' Not to assent to these would be doing violence to reason. No other proof is required than that of immediate perception. These are called axioms or self-evident principles. There are other propositions, which do not claim our assent as soon as they are announced, because they are more remote de-

¹Christian Baptist, 1827, p. 374.
ductions from clear and distinct premises. But whenever these deductions have a just connection with true and established principles, they are as certain as self-evident propositions.  

Among the opening statements of the Owen Debate, Campbell speaks in the language of the Scottish School of philosophers.

I hope to be able to show that religion is admirably adapted to the constitution of human nature, as the eye is to light, or the ear to sound. And I will further attempt to prove that the author of the universe, must also be the author of religion, because both are predicated on the same fundamental principles; or, in other words, that the Almighty has predicated religion and the universe on the same principles.  

Later on, in the same debate, he talks of what happens when darkness is expelled from the human heart:

Now, in expelling from the human heart that darkness, in which, without the light of revelation, it must ever have remained, in elevating the human mind to the contemplation of spiritual things, the Almighty acts by a few general laws. He raises man to heaven by the simple operation of two or three fundamental principles.  

On another occasion in the Owen Debate, Campbell attempted to establish the will of God not only on the basis of his revealed word, but also on the basis of the constitution he has given the human race as reason may discern it. For example, in opposing Owen's repudiation of marriage, Campbell declared:

God said it is not good for man to be alone! He then created a helpmate for him. . . . Polygamy was denounced in the creation of but one woman for man, and the equal distribution of the sexes since has shown,

1 Milennial Harbinger, 1863, p. 352.

2 Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 96.

3 Ibid., p. 183.
that every man ought to have his own wife, and every woman her own husband. ¹

Here Campbell shows his indebtedness to Reid's philosophy. Not only did he use Reid's own illustration, but he was obviously following the principle of Reid's second fundamental axiom in his principles of morals: "As far as the intention of nature appears in the constitution of man, we ought to comply with that intention."²

In an "Essay on the Holy Spirit," Campbell makes this comment: "That faith is necessary to salvation is a proposition the truth of which we need not now attempt to prove, as all professors of Christianity admit it; and that testimony is necessary to faith is a proposition equally true, evident, and universally admitted."³ Here he is speaking of self-evident propositions, universally admitted, the same phraseology of the Scottish philosophers.

During the course of a series of articles on "The Nature of the Christian Organization," there is the recognition that there is something in addition to the inductive method as well as the distinction between self-evident and inferential truths.

Though the inductive is the only true method of investigation, and though it is of general application, it would be erroneous to infer that there are no truths save those which are susceptible of inductive proof. The fact is there are self-evident truths, or axioms—inductive truths and inferential truths. Of the self-

¹ Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 397.
³ Christian Baptist, 1824, p. 83.
evident truths some go before induction, and some follow after; whilst all inferential truths become evident, of course, subsequent to the induction.

If Christ has established a church, that is has some organization becomes self-evident. The germs alone of this organization are discernible in the New Testament.¹

Later, in the discussion of Campbell's political philosophy we shall note his great stress on "first principles" in government.

IV. Use of the Term "Common Sense"

The appeal to common sense does not necessarily demonstrate any connection between Campbell's thought and Reid's philosophy as such an appeal may be said to have been rather in vogue at the time. The industrious and learned Hamilton has enumerated more than a hundred philosophers who have thought that their systems were in harmony with Common Sense. But in view of the other similarities in the thought of Campbell to Reid and the Common Sense Philosophy, it is well to note his use of the term in his writings.

In the 1831 Millennial Harbinger Campbell speaks of an article written by three men on "Faith According to Common Sense." He says that they have "written in the style of common sense," and then he quotes some of the most cogent points of the article.²

In the Christian Baptist, an article on "The Social System and Deism" has this comment:

I never censure a Deist for his eulogies on reason, but for his want of it. I have, indeed, regretted to see and hear men extol common sense, and immediately

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1842, p. 508.
²Ibid., 1831, pp. 476-477.
turn round and shew that they had not a particle of it. If there be in this country a reasonable Deist, I have not had the good fortune to become acquainted with him. Some of them, I know, talk a great deal about reason; but, really if I know the meaning of the word, they are the most unreasonable beings I have met with. But I would not get angry with them on that account.

One of Campbell's statements when debating with Rice the proposition that "baptism is to be administered only by a bishop or presbyter, scripturally ordained," uses the term. He takes the negative of the proposition. Rice asked who is to determine the circumstances which allow laymen to baptize? Campbell maintained that no general council was necessary or expedient. "The common sense of a community, and the good sense of aged and experienced brethren, will be a much safer palladium than ecclesiastical or synodical action. My general observation on this subject is, that any disciple or brother may baptize, only when circumstances require and authorize it. . . . We cannot, then, in justice, be represented as teaching that every person. . . . amongst us has a general right to administer baptism." Here Campbell definitely uses the term in the way in which Reid does when he refers to common sense as common judgment and "society in judgment." Another instance in the Rice Debate of the use of the term is in the opening speech when Campbell says, "So far as my peculiar tenets are involved, the common Testament and common sense are all sufficient."

During the course of the Owen Debate, Campbell speaks of what is involved in the idea of responsibility.

1 *Christian Baptist*, 1826, p. 344.
3 Ibid., p. 62.
Common Sense, then, teaches us that rationality and responsibility are terms nearly allied, and that the development of one is inseparably connected with the development of the other. All but philosophers agree that reason can control that which is irrational; that reason is stronger than the laws of attraction and cohesion, and therefore all men who have not philosophized themselves beyond the regions of common sense, are agreed that every being whose reason is developed is responsible for his actions, and that where reason does not exist or is not developed, praise, blame, or responsibility cannot be attributed. Now Mr. Owen makes all men everlasting infants, or predicates his whole philosophy upon the assumption that the infant, the idiot, and the philosopher are equally irresponsible and equally controlled by circumstance—Thus far, right reason and common sense go with us. But when we transcend these limits both reason and common sense bid us adieu.

When discussing creeds in the Christian System, Campbell remarks that a religion which calls for a lot of "refined distinctions" is not suited to present circumstances. He thinks that such a course has "paganized Christianity."

To present such a creed as the Westminster, as adopted either by Baptists or Fedobaptists, such a creed as the Episcopal, or, in fact, any sectarian creed, composed, as they all are, of propositions deduced by logical inferences and couched in philosophical language, to all those who are fit subjects of the salvation of heaven,—I say, to present such a creed to such for their examination or adoption shocks all common sense.

Here he evidences the same dislike for speculation so characteristic of Reid.

In his Popular Lectures and Addresses, when dealing with "Responsibilities of Men of Genius," Campbell points out that "men reason against both common sense and philosophy, when they argue. . . . that a good civil government can anywhere exist without sound religion and sound morality. . . . All empires that

1Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 123.
have fallen, all states and nations that have passed away, have perished through irreligion, immorality and vice.¹ In the same volume in another address he speaks of the four powers for acquiring knowledge: instinct, reason, sense, and faith, and then indicates that it is by faith that man must walk. In summary he says: "Reason, then, in one word, examines the tradition and the testimony, whether it be that of our five senses, our memory, our consciousness, or that of the other persons; faith receives that testimony, and common sense walks by it."² This appears in the sense of common judgment here and is in accord with Reid's usage.

V. Freedom of the Will

Thomas Reid was an ardent champion of freedom of the will, and one of the most forceful writers on the subject. Man, Reid says, is a being whose powers are worthy of the Author of them. All materialistic, egoistic interpretations which depreciate man are, then, to be deplored. We may properly think of the natural world as a grand machine, held in a system of necessity; but man has been given a dominion of his own, a realm of moral freedom.³ Escaping from the determinism of Calvinism, Reid did not want to fall into a mechanistic determinism with the same degree of lack of freedom. Reid states what his position is, in this way:

¹Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, p. 87.
²Ibid., pp. 120-121.
If, in any action, he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in that action he is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in his external circumstances, he is not free; he has not what I call the Liberty of a Moral Agent, but is subject to Necessity.  

Man as a moral agent is not just a "tool" in the creation of God, he is of "superior rank." He is a servant to whom much has been entrusted. He has "reason and active power" and these two together make moral liberty. Man is responsible to God for the talents entrusted to him. By education, example, and persuasion, a man may have much influence upon the voluntary acts of other men. This being true, it is surely reasonable to allow "a much greater influence of the same kind to Him who made man."  

According to Reid there are three basic arguments for his position as to free will.

(1) Because he has a natural conviction or belief, that, in many cases he acts freely;  
(2) Because he is accountable;  
(3) Because he is able to prosecute an end by a long series of means adapted to it.  

In speaking of man as an accountable being, Reid indicates certain principles basic to "the systems of morality and natural religion, as well as the system of revelation, and which have been generally acknowledged by those who hold contrary opinions on the subject of human liberty."  

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1Ibid., p. 599.  
2Ibid., pp. 615-616.  
3Ibid., p. 616.  
4Ibid., p. 620.
These principles "proclaimed by every man's conscience" are:

That there is a real and essential distinction between right and wrong conduct, between just and unjust—That the more perfect moral rectitude is to be ascribed to the Deity—That man is a moral and accountable being, capable of acting right and wrong and answerable for his conduct to Him who made him, and assigned him a part to act upon the stage of life. 1

Reid seeks to counteract the arguments in favor of necessity. He shows that liberty is not inconsistent with the influences of motives, as the necessitarians claim. The argument that there must be a sufficient reason for every action does not affect the question of liberty. Natural laws are necessary for man's well being, but some particular events are not fixed by general laws, but are "directed by particular acts of the divine government," so that "his reasonable creatures may have sufficient inducement to supplicate his aid, his protection and direction, and to depend upon him for the success of their honest designs." 2 A similar situation exists in human government, as it is not possible to direct every act of administration by established laws.

Another argument Reid rejects is that liberty of action implies an effect without a cause. His answer is "that free action is an effect produced by a being who had power and will to procure it; therefore it is not an effect without a cause." 3

He denies that every voluntary action is determined by the laws of nature. "A law of nature is not the cause of any event. It is only the rule according to which the efficient cause acts." 4 He distinguishes between the physical laws of

1 Ibid., p. 620.  
2 Ibid., p. 626.  
3 Ibid., p. 620.  
4 Ibid., p. 628.
nature and the moral laws of nature. The physical laws are those which God ordinarily uses in his natural government of the world. The moral laws are those which God gives to his rational creatures for their conduct. These moral laws are often violated.

To those who seek to prove that liberty of action is harmful to men, Reid admits that men are hurt by their own voluntary action, but maintains that this is not inconsistent with the doctrine of liberty. To argue against liberty from its hurtfulness a necessitarian must prove "that if a man were a free agent, he would do more hurt to himself, or to others, than he actually does."\(^1\)

Discussing the permission of evil, Reid says that the advocates of necessity believe it is impossible to think of God as foreseeing and permitting evil. He admits that to suppose that God prevents what he foresees by his prescience, is a contradiction. "Nothing can happen under the administration of the Deity which he does not see fit to permit."\(^2\) Natural and moral evil is permitted. This cannot be used as an argument against liberty, however, as the difficulty is just as great in accounting for it under necessity.

Those who defend necessity, who are also defenders of theism, give up all the moral attributes of God except goodness or a desire to produce happiness. "He does evil that good may come." He is the cause of moral evil as well as good. This

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 629. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 633.
view of God is more shocking to Reid than the permission of evil by man's freedom of the will.

If we form our notions of the moral attributes of the Deity from what we see of his government of the world, from the dictates of reason and conscience, or from the doctrine of revelation—justice, veracity, faithfulness, the love of virtue and the dislike of vice appear to be no less essential attributes of his nature than goodness. 1

Although God permits evil, he certainly does not find it pleasing. Why does he permit it? Reid does not know, and says it is our part to obey his commands, rather than to question. He observes that permit has two meanings: "not to forbid" and "not to hinder by superior power." God never permits sin in the sense of not forbidding it. "But he does not always, by his superior power, hinder it from being committed." This is so, in order that man may be a free agent. 2

Campbell was another strong believer in the freedom of the will. Along with Reid he broke with Calvinism at this point. In view of his familiarity with the Common Sense Philosophy it is almost certain that his views were strongly influenced here by Reid. They agreed that the foundation for the notion of free will is in the human constitution.

In his debate with Owen the underlying issue throughout was the question: Is man entirely determined by the natural, social and physical circumstances into which he is born, or is it possible for him to transcend them? Owen's whole argument was based on the position that man is not a free agent. He main-

1Ibid., p. 633.  
2Ibid., p. 634.
tained that man is a being so created that he can never be made to become "responsible for his nature." His character and conduct "proceed essentially" from his "organization or natural capacities." All human beings are merely "effects of causes irresistible in their influence."^2

Owen was willing to rest the controversy upon the single proposition, which was his sixth law, "that no human being ever had the power of belief or disbelief at his will, and therefore there cannot be merit or demerit in any belief."^3

Campbell pointed out that Owen's complete determinism as a basis for renouncing all the religions of the world on account of their alleged ignorance was not sound because 1) many religionists believe as firmly in man's being a creature of circumstance as Owen. He calls them "necessarians" who believe in "supernatural revelation."^4 2) Such drastic determinism is questionable in the light of actual human experience.

He acknowledged that the difficulties on the subject of human responsibility are of "no ordinary magnitude," as the most profound ancient and modern philosophers have differed upon this knotty problem. Recognizing how easy it was to be carried away by some favorite idea "beyond the limits of common sense and sober reason" he suggested learning from our own experience of "our liability to err" if we are to be governed by "common

^1Ibid.  
^2Ibid.  
^3Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 198.  
sense." If this is true, even when we have the evidence of sense, how much more is it true when dealing with metaphysical questions.¹

Even though "many honest minds have been deceived by its plausibility" he was ready to make "ample concessions to the doctrine of circumstances." For instance, we cannot choose "the period or place of our birth, nor control the circumstances of our nurture and education" in our early years.

Even so, there are facts available to indicate "that to a very considerable extent, we are not the pure creatures of circumstances." Robert Owen is a "living refutation of his own doctrine, since he ascribes "everything to circumstances" but "talks of happiness." His own ideas are not the creatures of circumstances, but "of an overheated imagination."² While Owen asserts that faith is in voluntary, "he has the most voluntary faith I ever knew." Then Campbell mentioned his belief and disbelief of certain portions of history, as Owen had already related in the debate.³ He mentioned how Owen was born in Great Britain, and so "was bred in a state of society very different from that which he is so anxious to induce." He asked, "Did his early circumstances make him such a man as he is, or originate those ideas which he is now divulging?"⁴

¹Ibid., p. 46.
²Ibid., pp. 46, 47.
³Ibid., p. 234.
⁴Ibid., p. 46.
Campbell maintained that Owen's sixth law was not "anything more than an assertion that our belief is independent of our volitions." Actually, "our volitions have as much control over our mental as our corporeal eye." He admitted that frequently our physical and mental eyesights are involuntarily exercised, but he did not think it fair to argue from "these particular premises" to the general conclusion that "in no case whatever is my belief, or my vision, under the control of my volition."  

In seeking to prove that volitions do "in many instances, determine our belief," Campbell gave the example of his being informed that an event had taken place which was very important to him. His informant was a man of "suspected veracity," but because of his intense interest, he collected enough evidence to convince him of the truth of his first informant's report. Until the full report was available, belief was withheld. He raised the question, "Was not my belief of this fact, some way dependent on my volition?"  

Owen answered that it was "his interest that generated his will, and therefore compelled him to investigate." This answer was in line with Campbell's thinking, for he held that though volition did not create the evidence on which belief is founded, it can give sufficient stimulus to carry on the investigation. Suppose Owen is correct in indicating that it is interest that excited the investigation? "Am I not at liberty

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1Ibid., pp. 201-202.  
2Ibid., p. 67.  
3Ibid.
to act according to my true interest? And if I so act, do I not act rationally and voluntarily?" He asserted that the will has an immense control over our belief. His adage was, "What men will to believe, they most generally, if not universally, believe. . . . The understanding is not independent of the will, or the will of the understanding."²

Campbell claimed that "common sense teaches us that rationality and responsibility are terms nearly allied, and that the development of the one is inseparably connected with the development of the other."³ He held that the basis of all responsibility was dependence. Since man depends on his Creator for everything, "it is necessary that he should, in all points submit to his will."⁴ Man is not a creature totally "riveted to his physical and social circumstances."⁵

Basic to morality are human freedom and responsibility. If man has no freedom to choose and map out his course of action, there can be no moral life. It is only as man has some freedom to choose the alternatives before him that he can act in a moral manner. Responsibility, for Campbell, is:

The doctrine of moral relations between an inferior and superior—between a dependent and an independent being; as well as between such co-ordinates as enter into any social compact implying or involving obligations to each other.⁶

He claimed that responsibility was of primary importance in the social system and to every member in it. This is true because

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¹Ibid., p. 72. ²Christian Baptist, 1827, p. 365.
³Ibid., p. 59. ⁴Ibid., p. 66.
⁶Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, p. 78.
it involves the doctrine of human destiny, of human happiness, and of human misery.

God's hand was in the creation of man, in Campbell's view. His position was that of "lord tenant." Man was "a free responsible agent, capable of managing his estate and paying his rent; and consequently was susceptible of virtue and of vice, of happiness and misery."\(^1\) From the beginning man had free will. This does not mean it was in his nature to sin, for the motive to obedience was "simple, positive, clear."

In his debate with the Catholic Archbishop, Purcell, Campbell stressed this point:

It is not possible in mechanics, nor in morals, nor in religion, to have a rule which will prevent error so long as those who use it are free and fallible agents. If there could have been a law given to free agents, which would have precluded error, verily God would have given it. But as he has not given any such law, therefore, there has been error. . . . \(^2\)

The archbishop questioned him on this and he explained that he had said, "God could not create a hill without a valley—could not make a free agent and bind him." In answer to a further question, he said, "There can be no virtue nor vice, without liberty of choice."\(^3\) His position was that man was born capable of sinning, but it was not innate, nor was he born with the intent to sin.

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 26.

\(^2\)Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Purcell Debate, p. 166.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 171. Also in the Christian Baptist, p. 282, he states a similar view. "It is essential to moral good that the agent act freely according to. . . . the best dictate of his understanding. . . . If a rational being was created incapable of disobeying, he must, on that very account be incapable of obeying."
When man fell, sin was born. When this happened, man placed himself in a position of dependence. As sinful and responsible as he is, man has elements within his nature enabling him to transcend the time, space, and natural environment in which he finds himself. Yet in spite of his capacities for self-transcendence, man is in a situation in which he cannot entirely free himself without dependence upon a being higher than himself.

Man does not necessarily sin because of Adam's fall. But the nature of all mankind was corrupted by that event, so that man stands in need of help. "Until man...believes the gospel report...and submits to Jesus Christ as the only Mediator and Saviour of sinners, it is impossible for him to do anything absolutely pleasing or acceptable to God."¹

Campbell did not use the term "total depravity." He believed man is fallen in body, soul, and spirit, and that his perception, reflection and moral powers are impaired by the fall. But that he is totally depraved as respects the "nature of the depravity" he thought absurd and unscriptural. If that were true the new born babe would be as depraved as the most evil man. Depravity does not apply to the body or to the understanding of man. It "belongs to the heart, not to the will and the affections." The human heart is born with a susceptibility "of being deceitful above all things and desperately wicked." In some instances it becomes so. Some men are of a much more

¹Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 29.
noble and honorable nature than others. 1

Campbell stressed that "the current of the universe all runs on the side of benevolence." While admitting the evil, he says, "under the benevolent administration of the Father of mercies, there will be as much good, with as little evil, as almighty power, guided by infinite wisdom can achieve." 2 No matter how much we may conjecture about the origin of moral evil, we can really know little about it. He indicates that the Bible gives a full account of the history of evil on the earth, and that is all we need to know to engage in "successful warfare against its power, and blissful escape from its penal consequences." 3

Since sin is in the world, and man is often its victim, God's purpose is "to limit the contagion of sin, to prevent its recurrence in any portion of the universe, and to save sinners from its ruinous consequences." 4

No religion is so favorable to human liberty as the Christian. He called the Christian Church "the only perfect cradle of human liberty." It requires each person "to think, speak and act for himself." Each person's destiny depends on his own choice, and the great doctrine of personal accountability is made the foundation of personal liberty. 5

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1 Millennial Harbinger, 1837, p. 497.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 112; Millennial Harbinger, 1846, p. 308.
The similarity of the thought of Reid and that of Campbell is evident in this conception of freedom of the will. Both men make a strong case for the freedom of the will. Both men have a high conception of man as a thinking, rational being, capable of making his own decisions in the light of his own common sense. They both recognize man's ultimate dependence on God and his personal accountability to God. Both men recognize that God permits evil, even though he wants the good for man.

VI. Grace

Reid recognized that all man's power came from God, who could take it away if he so willed, just as he had given it.¹ Man, he said, must exercise properly this power given him by his Maker. Every man is accountable to God for the power committed to him in trust. He quotes "that to whom much is given of him much will be required" as a maxim of common sense confirmed by divine authority.² He may greatly improve his mind by "acquiring the treasures of useful knowledge, the habits of skill in arts, the habits of wisdom, prudence, self-command, and every other virtue."³ One mind can effect others through "good education . . . proper instruction, . . . persuasion, . . . and good example." Human power, though, is entirely "dependent upon God, and upon the laws of nature which he has established."⁴ Man can either properly exercise his gift and cause great improvement in

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the world, or he can abuse it and cause much evil.

Among the principles of action which govern man are those which have "persons for their immediate object." These can affect some person for good or ill. "Every man has power to do much good to his fellow-men, and to do more hurt." "Mutual kind affections are the balm of life."\(^1\)

Human beings acquire virtue "by struggle and effort," by temptation and trial. Patience comes through suffering, and fortitude "by being exposed to danger."\(^2\) Passion often tempts us to do wrong, but our reason and conscience oppose this. Upon the outcome of the conflict of the flesh against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, "the character of the man and his fate depend."\(^3\)

Reid believes the happy man is the one who not just looking out for himself, but who is leaving "the care of his happiness to him who made him," while he goes about his duties faithfully. He talks of a principle in man, an original power, which "when he acts according to it, gives him a consciousness of worth, and when he acts contrary to it, a sense of demerit."\(^4\) This is called the conscience, or the moral sense.

Christian writers, Reid indicates, classify morals under three heads: those we owe to God, to ourselves, and to our neighbors.\(^5\) Beattie also follows this classification.\(^6\)

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 560.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 573.  
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 573.  \(^4\)Ibid., p. 587.  
\(^5\)Ibid., p. 642.  
Reid concludes the *Active Powers* by saying,

> The Judge of all the earth, we are sure, will do right. . . . . What we know in part, and see in part, of right and wrong, he sees perfectly; that the moral excellence, which we see and admire in some of our fellow creatures is a faint but true copy of that moral excellence which is essential to his nature; and that to tread the path of virtue, is the true dignity of our nature, an imitation of God, and the way to obtain his favour.¹

Here we have the foundation for a conception of Grace, such as Campbell developed. He did not believe it was possible to separate true morality from true religion. He makes the same classification of morals and religion: "God, his neighbor, and himself." He goes on to add:

> The three things in relation to God are his being, perfections, and revealed will; and these comprehend the whole of religion. The three things concerning his neighbor, are--his person, his character and his property, which includes the whole subject of morality; and the three things in himself in reference to each of the three objects, are--his heart, his hands, and his lips.²

The two presuppositions of the moral life, for Campbell, were freedom and responsibility. With this in mind, he defines the moral sense or conscience as:

> That power which, when properly educated, dictates and appreciates the character of actions, as they affect and bear upon the persons, the property and the character of our neighbors and fellow-citizens. Religion sanctions these, but religion properly indicates our duties to God.³

The heart of Campbell's conception of Grace is contained in a chapter in his *Christian System* which he entitles, "Religion

³*Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses*, p. 303.
for Man, And Not Man For Religion." He emphasizes that religion involves reconciliation, bringing man back to God. This involves things "that God has done for us" and those "that we must do for ourselves." Our salvation is by grace, In this kingdom of grace, "heaven provides the bread, the water, the fruit, the flowers; but we must gather and enjoy them." Here we see the recognition of man's responsibility and his dependence upon God, both aspects of which Reid emphasizes, in connection with man's freedom.

There are three kinds of relationship possible among men: mechanical, legal and personal. Mechanical relations exist between "things and things, persons and things, and persons and persons." Legal relationships occur between "persons and things, and persons and persons. Personal relationships exists "only between persons and persons." Reid recognized the personal relationship among men, and implicit in his thought was the recognition of a personal relationship to God. Campbell's first public recognition of this was in his famous Sermon on the Law preached before the Baptist Association of which he was then a member in the year 1816. His text was Romans 8:3 "For what the

1Alexander Campbell, Christian System, p. 34. 2Ibid.
4This is most evident in Reid's discussion of moral government, Works, pp. 615-616 and of prayer, Works, p. 626.
5Alexander Campbell, Christian Evangelist, September 8, 1938, Vol. 76, No. 36, p. 993. This resulted in his having to leave the Association. He was branded a heretic. In a later introduction to the sermon he states: "It is, therefore, highly probable to my mind, that but for the persecution begun on the alleged heresy of this sermon, whether the present reformation had ever been advocated by me."
law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending his own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh." Campbell was combating here the conception, so prevalent in his day, that the Christian teaching could be found in the old Testament in a fully developed form. He endeavored to show that the Bible was a progressive revelation of God's truth, and that the legalism of the Old Testament was greatly inferior to God's grace in Christ. He maintained that we are not now under the law, but under Christ. Christ's standard was love of God and love of each other. The defects of the law were remedied by "the Eternal Father sending his own Son." In him we can find righteousness and eternal life," not by legal works or observances, in whole or in part, but through the abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness which is by him.¹ He refers to Paul in Romans 6:15 affirming that Christians are not under the law.² He saw an essential difference between law and grace, and drew attention to the fact that "example is a more powerful teacher than precept." Jesus Christ has given us "an example of human perfection never witnessed before. He gave a living form to every moral and religious precept which they never before possessed."³

Here the doctrine of grace involves a personal relationship of God to men. It is a love relationship. The spirit of God

²Ibid., p. 297.
³Ibid., p. 281.
is "the spirit of love."\(^1\) "In the person and mission of the incarnate word" God gives us himself, and so we see he is love.\(^2\) Love, Campbell says, is "the fruit of the whole gospel. It is the cardinal principle of Christian behavior, . . . . the breath of the new life."\(^3\)

In a letter to J. Wallis in England, Campbell writes:

To convert men to a party, to a tenet, we offer the claims of the party, or the tenet as the case may be. But in converting men to a person we keep before their minds simply the claims which that person has upon them. . . . . The Christian religion is indeed a personal concern. It is confidence in a person, love to a person, delight in a person. It is not confidence in a doctrine nor love to a party. Jesus Christ is the object on which a Christian's faith, hope, and love terminate; and to be with Christ is the Christian's heaven.\(^4\)

It is interesting to note that many of Campbell's important conceptions are more succinctly stated in his letters to England to those of a similar faith than anywhere else.

VII. Political Ethics

Although it is quite possible that Campbell studied Locke's political philosophy by reading his *Two Treatises on Government*, there is no conclusive evidence that he did so. It is therefore worthwhile to examine the position of James Beattie, whose political philosophy we know Campbell studied with some care and whose specific statements on a number of subjects he

\(^1\) Alexander Campbell, *Christian System*, p. 268.
\(^4\) *Millennial Harbinger*, 1837, pp. 317-318.
felt important enough to copy out in his notebook.

While Beattie was a member of the Scottish "common-sense" school of philosophy, in his political theory he was a rather close follower of John Locke.

Beattie introduced his discussion of politics by defining law as "the declared will of a person, or persons in authority (that is, having a right to govern), commanding some things, and forbidding others, with a promise, expressed or implied, of reward or convenience to those who obey, and a denunciation of punishment or inconvenience to those who disobey."¹ There are two kinds of laws: laws of God and laws of man. Laws of God, in turn are subdivided into the natural or moral law, and the positive or revealed. The former is known by the right use of reason; the latter by revelation. "The moral law of nature is what our reason and conscience declare to be right."² There would be society even in a state of nature, Beattie affirmed because "man is a social being."³

Two forces tend to bring men into political society:
1) The natural admiration which the weak and inferior have for men of superior abilities—the weak looked to the strong for advice and assistance and 2) the inconvenience of the state of nature.⁴

Beattie, like Locke, had a purely utilitarian theory of the function of government and presupposed a social compact.

¹Beattie, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 76.
²Ibid., p. 83. ³Ibid., p. 87. ⁴Ibid., p. 150.
Though government is an art, it is not unnatural, he declared.\footnote{Ibid., p. 152.} A significant passage on civil government analyzes the process of the social compact.

The independence and equality of men in the natural state, being alienable rights, may be parted with, for valuable considerations. Men quitting that state, in order to establish policy, would accordingly part with them; and either expressly or tacitly enter into a mutual agreement to the following purpose. First; every individual would engage to unite himself with the rest, so as to form one community; whose conduct in matters of public concern is to be determined by the will of those who shall be entrusted with the sovereignty. Secondly; it must be further agreed, that the government shall be of some one particular form; that is, that the sovereignty shall be lodged in the body of the people, which is democracy; or in the more distinguished citizens, which is aristocracy; or in one man, which is monarchy; or that government shall be made up, as ours is, of two or more of these forms mixed together. For different forms of government are supported by different systems of law; and therefore, till the form be ascertained, it cannot be distinctly known what laws would be expedient. Thirdly, the form being agreed upon, they who are entrusted with the sovereignty would become bound to allegiance and obedience. And from this contract would arise the sovereign's right to command, and an obligation on the rest of the community to obey.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 153, 154.}

After considering the origins of government in theory, he turned to actual origins in history. Like Locke, Beattie was of the opinion that "in the first ages of world, government may have arisen from parental authority."\footnote{Ibid., p. 158; Locke, \textit{Two Treatises of Civil Government} (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1924) pp. 152-154; Alexander Campbell, \textit{Christian System}, p. 129 agrees.} However, Beattie, too, was eager to prevent mistakes on the subject and so went on to remark that the authority of a parent is different, in kind and
in degree, from that of a sovereign. He recognized that many governments are founded on conquest. His classification of the forms of government was according to the scheme of Montesquieu: republics, monarchies, despotisms. He indicated that the people in a democracy are the sovereigns, and also the subjects. He actually wrote at last in favor of monarchy, and came out at last with a eulogy of his own country's political system as finest expression of a government according to divine law of nature.

Campbell was obviously and directly indebted to Beattie's version of natural rights philosophy at many points. In addition to Locke and Beattie, he also owed much to Montesquieu. Beattie had incorporated much of Montesquieu in his own work, and Campbell also had read Montesquieu at first hand. His emphasis on the separation of powers in a system of checks and balances in government structure and his understanding of the interrelationship between climate, geography, social customs, religion, and the forms of political institutions depended much on Montesquieu. He was also familiar with the French philosophers Voltaire and Rousseau. Usually he referred to them in connection with their religious views. He could not have accepted Rousseau's view of the community as involving a collective good apart from the private interests of its members. He was too much a follower of Locke and Beattie to agree to this.

2Ibid., p. 200.
3Ibid., p. 160.
4Ibid., p. 176.
Of the English writers in the field of politics and ethics, Campbell quoted from the works of Godwin, Bentham, Hume, and Burke. Though he did not accept many of Godwin's extreme views, he was impressed by his emphasis upon the individual, his opposition to coercive and oppressive institutions, and his ardent advocacy of peace. Many of the views of Hume and Burke, Campbell opposed. He disagreed with their insistence that the rights of men are purely conventional rather than natural.

As for American political writers, Campbell showed a high regard for James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. He shared their emphasis upon a government by law rather than by men. Of Thomas Paine, he said he was "sane in politics and insane in religion."

For the most part Campbell followed rather uncritically the Locke-Beattie version of natural rights philosophy and based his views of the state and government upon its presuppositions. He disagreed with those who looked upon government as having any "good" beyond the welfare of individual citizens.

During the Virginia State Convention of 1829-30 to which Campbell had been elected as a delegate he made some quite forceful statements with regard to getting back "first principles" just as in church practice he sought to return to the principle of the New Testament church. He claimed that "it was principles, Mr. Chairman, which brought me here. Principles, Sir, which

reason, observation, and experience convinced me, are inseparably connected with the temporal prosperity of men; and of our State of Virginia; and principles, Sir, which are not to be sacrificed.\(^1\) He rebuked his fellow delegates for their unwillingness to settle on certain fundamental principles. He thought this essential before attempting to form the Constitution.

He confessed that he believed that "in the science of politics, there are as in all other sciences, certain fundamental principles, as true and unchangeable as any of the fundamental principles of physics or morals." For his part, Campbell said, he could never reason "without some principles to reason from."\(^2\)

Campbell sought to direct the attention of the delegates to the Virginia Bill of Rights adopted on June 12, 1776 as the basis for their thinking, the fundamental principles which should guide them. "It is just as true," he said, "that government ought to be instituted for the benefit of the governed, as that a whole is greater than a part; or that a straight line is the shortest possible distance between any two given points."\(^3\) In referring here to the third article of the Bill of Rights, he indicated the source to which he looked for his fundamental principles of politics. He wanted to see "the principles already defined, understood, and canonized, carried out to their proper extent."\(^4\) The framers of the Bill of Rights, he main-

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tained, "declared the principles, the just and righteous principles of the social compact, and progressed so far in the application as they supposed the then existing state of society required and permitted." Foreseeing, however, that changes would take place as the state progressed they "most prudently advised a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles: not to change those principles, but to purge and reform our institutions by bringing them up near to the unchangeable principles; by a continual approximation to the cardinal principles which they propounded."¹ In support of his assertion, Campbell then quoted the fifteenth article of the Bill of Rights with its stress upon the necessity of "firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue" and "a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles."² His subsequent addresses were given over largely to defending the basic principles of the Bill of Rights and deducing correct procedures from those principles.

When the question of immigrants and suffrage was raised, Campbell expressed preference for "residence and moral qualifications" rather than "a pecuniary or property qualification."³ Asking the pardon of those who believed that "man has no rights but what different governments in the world please to bestow upon him," asserted:

Believe this who may, I cannot. He has, in my judgment, certain inherent and inalienable rights of which he

¹Ibid., p. 385. ²Ibid., p. 385. ³Ibid., p. 386.
cannot be divested with impunity. Among them is the right of a voice in government, to which he is to submit. 1

His essential faith in democracy is expressed in these vivid words:

I love King Numbers; I wish to live, and I hope to die, under the government of this majestic personage. He is, Sir, a wise, benevolent, patriotic and powerful prince—the most dignified personage under the canopy of heaven. 2

He reasserted his faith in the rights of man by saying, "No man with due respect to himself and his rights would stoop to purchase what he has a right to demand." 3 As to his voting, on the crucial issue of the extension of suffrage to all free white males on the basis of residence, Campbell was consistently on the side of the losing minority.

When stressing the importance of local government, Campbell declared that "more of the happiness of this Commonwealth depends upon the county government under which we live than upon the state or the U. S. government." 4 He objected to the existing system of county courts because they were not responsible to the people, and showed how this violated the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of the Bill of Rights. He voted in favor of the popular election of the governor on three different occasions.

Campbell's closing words at the Virginia Convention were characteristic of his stand during the whole proceedings:

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1Ibid., p. 387.  
2Ibid., p. 389.  
3Ibid., p. 440.  
4Ibid., p. 526.
Public opinion is the supreme tribunal in all this extensive country. . . . All our acts must be judged by it, and I rejoice to live in a country in which this is the supreme law. I am for reposing the greatest confidence in the people. The power is safely lodged in their hands; more safely, I am sure, than in a few privileged ones, whom they never appointed their trustees. 1

The Reform Convention of 1850-1851 adopted most of the progressive measures for which Campbell stood in 1829-1830.

When Campbell at the Virginia Constitutional Convention helped to formulate a government compact, he turned from the Bible to the natural law and found his norms where other Americans of his time found them—in the Bill of Rights and the Natural rights philosophy of Locke, Beattie, Montesquieu, Jefferson and others.

This was not only true at this Convention, however. There are a number of instances when he refers to the importance of the social compact, and of the forces which impel man toward society. Beattie had mentioned the tendency of the weak to look up to the strong. Campbell suggested that diversity of interest and ability is helpful in society and government. 2

He indicates it is the duty of each man not to invade the rights of others. Because these rights are often invaded, a world without civil government is full of violence. 3

The essential elements in forming a state, according to

1 Ibid., p. 530.
2 Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, p. 80.
3 Christian Baptist, 1829, p. 569.
Campbell, are people and country. The people then make a constitution. "This makes a President or King, citizens or subjects, and everything else belonging to a state." He looked upon this constitution as "an agreement on certain principles between the government and the citizens." To all intents and purposes it is a covenant.¹ He recognized that man gives up certain rights, and surrenders part of his natural liberty when he becomes a part of a civil government.² He indicated that the natural rights of men are equal rights.

Like Beattie, Campbell said that monarchy was the ideal form of government.

The most approved theory of human nature and of human government now current wherever the English language is spoken either in the Old World or the New, is that monarchy would be always the best government, because the cheapest, the most efficient, and the most dignified; provided only, that the crown was placed on the wisest head, and the sceptre wielded by the purest hands.³ Practically, however, he believed a republic to be better. Elected officers had shorter terms of office, and so there was a rotation in office with less chance of corruption.⁴ He emphasized constantly that the educated man must rule. He realized the necessity of constitutional limitations, and liked the division of authority between the executive, legislative and

¹Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 93.
²Millennial Harbinger, 1835, p. 473.
⁴Ibid., p. 156.
judicial branches of government.¹

Campbell clearly states what he believes to be the function of a Christian in politics:

In our country and government, every man is responsible for his vote. When, therefore, in his horizon, there is a question or a crisis involving, as he judges, any good, or the prevention of any evil, it is his duty to God, who gives him a vote, and it is his duty to man, to use or to give that vote, to that person, or to that measure, which will, in his judgment, inure to the most good, or of two evils to prevent the greater, by voting for the less.

Every Christian man is constrained by the spirit and letter of Christianity, to do good to all mankind as far as God gives him opportunity. And, therefore, so far as vote for this measure or for that, for this reason or for that; for this person or for that, will, in his best judgment, result in the greater good, or in the lesser evil to the community, as a Christian man, he ought, as we think, to vote for that person or for that measure.²

We have seen in this chapter that there are striking similarities between the thought of Reid and the Scottish "Common Sense" School of Philosophy and Campbell. They believed the "Golden Mean" to be the goal toward which to strive. They shared in their high regard for Bacon's inductive method as the best means of investigation. They believed in the reality of external objects, and that through perception this belief was immediate. Their views on faith and reason, the activity of the mind, credibility, on "attention" as an essential ingredient of learning, on the importance of testimony as a channel by which we acquire knowledge are alike. The stress which each places on facts


and the distinction between truth and facts is the same. They sensed the need for precision in the use of language and carefulness of definition. There is a resemblance in the definition of such terms as sensation, perception, and consciousness. Campbell held to the coordinate view of memory as did Reid. In their natural theology they both used cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God, with the stress on the teleological. Their conception of revelation was essentially the same, though Campbell in his writing was far more explicit about his views. They realized that the real essence of things could not be realized, and so there is a sphere in which reason breaks down. They emphasized the importance of first principles and Campbell reasoned on the basis of such principles in the field of religion, morality, education, and politics. They believed in the authority of common judgment or common reason and it was partly because of this that first principles could be utilized. Each used the term "common sense" in much the same way. The discussion on freedom of the will, and political philosophy show a corresponding likeness.

Campbell would differentiate between belief and knowledge while Reid uses the terms interchangeably. Campbell did not believe that natural theology was possibly without first having revelation. Reid did not see the need for such a priority. Campbell's conception of grace and many of his other views went far beyond any treatment which the Scottish School gave to them. There were points which he emphasized and developed in the practical situation with which he was confronted that needed
further treatment, and his own natural interests were more in the field of religion than in the field of philosophy.

In the next chapter we shall look at both Locke's and the Scottish School's influence upon Campbell, and see what are the similarities and differences and deal with the measure of his dependence.
CHAPTER V

THE MEASURE OF CAMPBELL'S DEPENDENCE
AND THE STRUCTURE OF HIS THOUGHT

After a careful study of the influence of Locke and the Scottish Realists on Campbell, it is evident that much of the impact of their thought upon him involved aspects which they held in common with each other, although there were also significant differences and developments. It is now our purpose to see what those common influences were, and then to determine, when there were differences, to what view Campbell was inclined, and to see some of the developments which he made from conceptions in the thought of both; following this, to consider the type of philosophy which Campbell opposed, and some of the early reactions to Campbell's thought among his followers.

I. The Common Influences

In view of the fact that the Scottish Realists were offering a corrective to the disintegrative tendencies of Locke's thought as seen in that of Berkeley and Hume, it is surprising the large area of agreement between Locke and the Scottish School. One commentator has suggested that Reid may be regarded as "Locke purged and Locke re-created." He says that it is only a mild exaggeration to say that Reid's system is a critical
reconstruction of Locke.\textsuperscript{1}

Reid paid high tribute to Locke throughout his writings. He acknowledges his indebtedness when he speaks of his respect for him and says: "to whom I owe my first lights in those studies (of the human mind) as well as my attachment to them."\textsuperscript{2} He emphasized, "Locke was no enemy to common sense."\textsuperscript{3} He thought Locke had pointed out the extent and limits of human knowledge "with more accuracy and judgment than any other philosopher had done before."\textsuperscript{4} He considered the road which Locke sought to travel, that of experience and reflection, was the right road, and that he had made many openings that would lead to the discovery of truths which he had not been able to reach himself, and to the detection of errors in which he had been involuntarily entangled. The attempt which Locke made was laudable. He added, "no man was better qualified for this investigation; and I believe no man ever engaged in it with a more sincere love of truth."\textsuperscript{5}

The reputation which Locke's "Essay on Human Understanding" had at home from the beginning, and which it has gradually acquired abroad, is a sufficient testimony of its merit. There is, perhaps, no book of the metaphysical kind that has been so generally read by those who understand the language, or that is more adapted to teach men to think with precision, and to inspire them with that candour and love of truth which is the genuine spirit of philosophy. He gave, I believe, the first example in the English language of writing on such abstract subjects, with a remarkable degree of simplicity and perspicuity; and in this he has been happily imitated by others that came after him.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1}G. A. Johnston, Selections From the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (London: Open Court Publishing Co., 1915) p. 8.
\textsuperscript{2}Reid, Works, Vol. I, p. 275. \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 140.
\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., p. 432. \textsuperscript{5}Ibid., p. 346. \textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p. 275.
Locke and the Scottish Realists wanted to break away from the Cartesian rationalism, with its emphasis on abstract intellectualism and innate ideas. The essence of the mind was to them, more than thought, and, set in the direction of empiricism as they were, the a priori character of innate ideas was not acceptable. In this aspect of their philosophy the Scottish Realists could be said to be good followers of Locke. This accounts for the attention given by them to sensation and perception, the sources of our knowledge of the external world, and for their being called empirical.

Locke and the Scottish Realists believed that human nature could be known as truly as any other set of phenomena could be known. This meant that knowledge of it could be arrived at by following empirical methods in the spirit of Bacon and Newton. One of the great surprises in Locke's writings is the fact that he never mentions Bacon, for in the general approach to his work Locke invariably follows the Baconian method as contrasted with the Cartesian. Even though he owed much to Descartes for his first awakening in philosophy, Locke could never be classed as a system builder, and his dislike for metaphysical considerations is too well known to need elaboration. The empirical tradition was so much a part of Locke's intellectual environment that after his early repudiation of the scholastic method the one which took its place seemed to him to need no comment. Reid and the other Scottish Realists were more explicit in their recognition of indebtedness to Bacon.
The art of syllogism produced numberless disputes, and numberless sects who fought against each other with much animosity, without gaining or losing ground, but did nothing considerable for the benefit of human life. The art of induction, first delineated by Lord Bacon, produced numberless laboratories and observatories, in which nature has been put to the question by thousands of experiments, and forced to confess many of her secrets that before were hid from mortals; and, by these, arts have been improved, and human knowledge wonderfully increased.

Reid goes on to describe the process of induction as "an ascent from particular premises to a general conclusion." He believes that the greatest part of our knowledge rests upon this kind of evidence. He includes Sir Isaac Newton as following in this tradition.

Bacon and Newton were named again and again by the Scottish Realists as the masters whom they would follow. But Locke was the philosopher of mind and morals who, to their way of thinking, embodied this procedure most perfectly. They never tired of lauding him for abandoning metaphysical and fruitless "hypotheses" and for pointing the way to an empirical study of the mind, on the general principles of Bacon and Newton. To them, as to Locke, introspection of their own minds seems to be an empirical beginning. As they looked into their own minds and found there ideas of benevolence, fear, vanity, justice, love, as well as ideas conveying information about the physical world; when they saw other people behaving as if they, too, experienced these same ideas and inclinations, it seemed to them

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that they had discovered an observable basis for the science of man, but one so universal that it embraced all the laws of nature at work in and for man. Hence the organizing principles for making a science of man became for them human nature itself.

Almost every page of the work of Thomas Reid bears witness to his belief that empiricism must be the beginning of science. Nor is he sure, like Locke, that we can or need ever arrive at that all embracing synthesis called metaphysics. Cousin reminds us that Reid had really the Baconian contempt for metaphysics. ¹ As for the realm of moral philosophy, it offers a fruitful field for the application of the same empirical principles based as it is for him on the compassable facts of the human mind. The powers and principles of the mind can be discovered in just the same way that we have discovered all that we know of the body, that is by anatomical dissection and observation. Reid thinks of himself as an anatomist of the mind in the Baconian tradition.² Newton had also given him courage to believe that moral philosophy could profit from the use of those methods. Newton had written, "if natural philosophy, in all its parts by pursuing the inductive method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds of moral philosophy will also be enlarged."³

³This sentence occurs at the end of Newton's Optics, and is quoted by Stewart in his "Account of the Life and Writing of Thomas Reid," in Reid's Works, Vol. I, p. 13.
The combined influence of Locke and the Scottish Realists contributed to Campbell's high regard for the inductive method of Bacon and Newton, to which he constantly refers in his writings and which he used with great effectiveness in his own work.

Campbell had the same dislike for metaphysics. He said: "The metaphysics of the past or of the present day...is impotent to originate one spiritual conception of an essence absolute, or the sub-basis of a man, an angel, or a demon."

Locke and Reid agreed on the importance of language. On numerous occasions throughout his works. Reid expresses his admiration for the way Locke had pointed out the ambiguity of words, and thus helped to receive "many knotty questions which had tortured the wits of the schoolmen." His only criticism is that Locke did not apply his own observations to the word "idea", the ambiguity and abuse of which, he thought, had hurt his excellent Essay. Campbell recognized the importance of language and was indebted to both Locke and the Scottish Realists for his conception.

Reid expresses his agreement with Locke that man's power is confined to compounding, combining or dividing "the materials that are made to his hand," but cannot create a single particle of matter. He has the same inability to "fashion in his understanding" any simple idea not received by the powers which God

1 Millennial Harbinger, 1857, p. 435.
3 Ibid.
4 But Reid doesn't think all our ideas are derived from the particulars of sense.
has given him.\textsuperscript{1} Campbell used this argument in the Owen Debate to prove that man cannot create the idea of God.\textsuperscript{2} He said, "the human intellect has no creative power. It can only reason from the known to the unknown."\textsuperscript{3}

Locke and Reid held that the works of God are all imperfectly known by us. Reid says that all we see is the outside, or perhaps by observation and experiment we discover some of the qualities and relations, if we are assisted by reasoning. But he maintains that we can give no definition which comprehends "the real essence." He refers to Locke's observation, that only nominal essences, "which are the creatures of our own minds, are perfectly comprehended by us" and can be defined. Many of these are too simple for defining, and all we can do is to give "attentive reflection" to them. The attributes or facts which we discover are all that we can know. The real essence is above our comprehension.\textsuperscript{4} This was at the basis of Campbell's pointing to the element of mystery in religion, to things incomprehensible, and the necessity to come within "the understanding distance" so that we may learn all that is possible.\textsuperscript{5} Campbell also indicated:

The whole doctrine of essences, whether of mind or of matter, is contraband in every province of legitimate

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., pp. 367, 128.
\textsuperscript{2}Alexander Campbell, \textit{Campbell-Owen Debate}, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 149.
\textsuperscript{5}\textit{Millennial Harbinger}, 1844, p. 147; Alexander Campbell, \textit{Christian System}, p. 17.
philosophy. No sane person, trained in the schools of useful learning, in this our age of reason, presumes to scan any essence or quintessence whatever. But this matter of fact inductive age disdains such idle dreams.\footnote{Alexander Campbell, \textit{Popular Lectures & Addresses}, p. 75.}

While it could not be said that the conception of faith held by Locke and Reid was identical, certainly many aspects of faith were held in common. Reid is never as explicit as Locke in his references to Christianity, but he does say faith is requisite not only for the Christian, but for philosophers and men in every walk of life. Locke shared this view. Both would agree that belief must have an object, that it involves assent, that it is expressed in language by a proposition, that evidence is a necessary ground for belief. They both considered it essential to supply our lack of knowledge. Campbell shared this common attitude toward belief which Locke and Reid expressed.

Although their conception of reason bears the mark of the age in which each lived, here again they had much in common. Locke, it will be remembered helped to bring into being "the Age of Reason" and Reid lived in a period when there were reactions against reason unaided by the other powers of man. Reid held that his predecessors had depended as much on reason that they had ignored such important factors as consciousness, sensation and faith. When all their writings are considered, both Locke and Reid held that reason is essential in man's quest for knowledge, though its role is a humble one. Reason makes it possible for man to extend his intellectual view beyond the immediate
data of external and internal perception. We judge things self-evident, and drew conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. Campbell's view was similar to that of his philosophical heritage.

Locke and Reid had a firm belief in a high doctrine of revelation. They recognized the need, the importance and the place of revelation. Campbell was known on the frontier of America as an able defender of divine revelation. The fact that the philosophers whom he had carefully studied, and whose views on other subjects he shared, must have had its effect on his conception of revelation.

The evidence of sense was held in high esteem by Locke and Reid. Locke does not regard sensible knowledge as on the same level of certainty with intuition and demonstration, however. But for all practical purposes sensible knowledge can be relied on.1 Reid had just as high, if not a higher, regard for the evidence of sense. He thought it the kind of evidence "which we may securely rest upon in the most momentous concerns of mankind."2 One of his first principles was "that those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our sense, and are what we perceive them to be."3 Campbell shared this high regard for the evidence of sense. When tracing Locke's influence upon Campbell we saw how the concept of sensory perception had influenced Campbell's view of the ordinances. This would be rein-

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3Ibid., p. 445.
forced by the Scottish School also.

Both Locke and Reid stress the importance of testimony. For Reid, this was even more important than for Locke. Campbell's emphasis closely parallels Reid's. For both it was placed alongside the evidence of sense as of equal importance.

Locke and Reid were concerned mostly with facts in their empirical investigation. Reid mentions their importance and significance far more than does Locke. Campbell stressed the importance of facts as over against speculation in religion and indicated that the Bible presented facts in its revelation of truth. Campbell was chiefly indebted to Reid here.

This emphasis upon facts in Locke's and Reid's thought, led to their strenuous opposition to speculation in philosophy and religion. This opposition was equally strong in them both. Campbell followed them both in his own opposition.

Reid expresses his approval of the way Locke arrives at a knowledge of God. He indicates that Locke was aware of Descartes attempting to prove the existence of God from the agreements and disagreements of ideas, but he rejected this because he thought it a poor way of establishing the truth, and silencing Atheists. According to Reid, Locke proves this point "with great strength and solidity, from our own existence, and the existence of the sensible parts of the universe."¹ For Reid also, the only arguments for the existence of a Deity which he was able to comprehend, were those grounded on the knowledge

of his own existence, and the existence of other finite beings. Although Campbell held that our first knowledge of God comes by way of revelation, he too made use of this argument in his natural theology.

Both Locke and Reid use the term "common sense" in their writings. Hamilton admits this when he says:

For even those philosophers who profess to derive all our knowledge from experience, and who admit no universal truths of intelligence but such as are generalized from individual truths of fact—even these philosophers are forced virtually to acknowledge, at the root of the several acts of observation from which their generalization starts, some law or principle to which they can appeal as guaranteeing the procedure, should the validity of these primordial acts themselves be called in question. This acknowledgement is, among others made even by Locke; and on such fundamental guarantee of induction he even bestows the name of Common Sense. Locke uses the term in referring to self-evident propositions. Thus it refers to intuitive knowledge. Reid also uses it in connection with the judging of self-evident propositions, and also when referring to certain principles, "which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life." Campbell, it has been seen, made use of the term in much the same way as did Locke and Reid.

Locke's views of the social compact and the principles of government he espoused were later advocated by James Beattie.

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1 Ibid., p. 432.  
3 Ibid., p. 759.  
Campbell's views of the social compact and his political theory were essentially the same as those of Locke and Beattie. This is true even though Campbell was a New Testament primitivist who taught that the Christian must seek his norms for religious and moral action in the New Testament. On occasion he spoke of "moral precepts...more or less discernible...merely by the light of nature."\(^1\) For the most part Campbell felt that Bible ethics and those of natural law or common sense run along parallel lines. Only at the Virginia Convention did Campbell speak or write as a "politician" or from the viewpoint of political theory. Elsewhere he generally dealt with issues from the point of view either of the individual Christian or of the Church. The Virginia Bill of Rights he accepted almost as divine revelation and applied to it the same methods of exegesis and interpretation that he applied to Scripture. As the Bible sets forth the will of God for the conduct of the individual Christian, so the Bill of Rights was assumed to set forth eternally valid principles for the organization and conduct of the state.

II. Differences

Reid considered that Locke's theory of ideas was one of the main pillars of modern scepticism, though he admits that Locke had no intention of making that use of it.\(^2\) He thought that great as Locke's success had been, it would have been greater,

\(^1\)Alexander Campbell, *Campbell-Walker Debate*, p. 46.

had he not "too early formed a hypothesis upon the subject, without all the caution and patient induction, which is necessary in drawing conclusions from facts." \(^1\) It was the ambiguity of his use of the word idea that had caused the trouble. He believed that if Locke had seen the consequences of his doctrine of ideas, consequences which Hume had seen, he would have reconsidered his theory. \(^2\) He trusted that anyone acquainted with the philosophy of Hume would seek the support of some other principles than those of Locke. \(^3\)

Locke had followed Descartes in believing that "the objects we immediately perceive are ideas only." When he speaks of the reality of our knowledge Locke says, "It is evident that the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real, only so far as there is conformity between our ideas and the reality of things." \(^4\) Locke was aware that this doctrine made it necessary to prove the existence of the material world, and he attempted to do this. Berkeley, on the foundation of Locke, sought to demonstrate that there is no material world, and Hume carries the theory of ideas even further, by saying that there is neither mind nor matter in the universe, only impressions and ideas.

Reid sought to prove that in knowledge we have more than ideas, and that we are unquestionably in contact with reality. He canvassed anew the whole question of epistemology on the basis of a fresh analysis of experience. He discovered that

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 346. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 433. \(^3\)Ibid., p. 468. \(^4\)Ibid., p. 275.
we have an immediate knowledge of external objects which our senses convey to us. He begins his Baconian investigation by examining consciousness and this leads him to an analysis of the five senses. He discovers that perception always has an object distinct from the act by which it is perceived. The world for him is always immediately present.

Campbell certainly believed in the existence of the material world. He was quite familiar with the philosophic thought of the modern period, the development of philosophy from Locke to Hume, so it is reasonable to believe that he would have followed Reid here rather than to accept the fallacies of Locke’s position.

Reid did not think Locke had confined knowledge to the agreement and disagreement of ideas, as he thought he had. Particularly this was true of the fourth book of the Essay said Reid.

Mr. Locke did not believe that he himself was an idea; that his friends and acquaintances were ideas; that the Supreme Being, to speak with reverence, is an idea; or that the sun and moon, the earth and sea, and other external objects of sense, are ideas. He believed that he had some certain knowledge of all those objects. His knowledge, therefore, did not consist solely in perceiving the agreements and disagreements of his ideas; for surely to perceive the existence, the attributes, and relations of things which are not ideas, is not to perceive the agreements and disagreements of ideas. And if things which are not ideas be objects of knowledge, they must be objects of thought. On the contrary, if ideas the only objects of thought, there can be no knowledge, either of our own existence, or of the existence of external objects, or of the existence of Deity.\footnote{Reid, Works, Vol. I, p. 432.}
Reid was sure that Locke did not see all the consequences of his theory. "He adopted it without doubt or examination, carried along by the stream of philosophers that went before him." He thought Locke's judgment and good sense had resulted in his saying many things which could not be reconciled to it. He believed Locke in his definition of knowledge must have had in mind chiefly abstract truths. Reid goes on to say that there is another great class of truths that are not abstract and necessary, and therefore cannot be perceived in agreement and disagreement of ideas. These are all the truths we know concerning the real existence of things—animate, animal, and rational. These he calls contingent truths.

Campbell nowhere speaks of knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. He never defines knowledge, but he does say that it depends upon the evidence of sense. It is quite possible that he so describes it realizing the difficulties of Locke's position. On the other hand, he does not agree here wholly with Reid.

In continuing to describe Locke's thought, Reid says Locke observes that we know intuitively, and we have a knowledge of external objects "only by sensation." Sensation he later describes as "the testimony of our senses, which are the proper and sole judges of this thing; whose testimony is the greatest assurance we can possibly have, and to which our faculties can attain." "This," Reid says, "is perfectly agreeable to the

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1 Alexander Campbell, *Campbell-Owen Debate*, pp. 68, 69.
common sense of mankind, and is perfectly understood by those who never heard of the theory of ideas. Our senses testify immediately the existence, and many of the attributes and relations of external material things; and by our constitution, we rely with assurance upon their testimony. 1

Reid also indicates how Locke admits two different sources of ideas, "sensation, by which we get all our ideas of body, and its attributes; and reflection upon the operations of our minds, by which we get the ideas of everything belonging to the mind." He thinks Locke uses the word reflection in too confined a sense. He would include besides consciousness, which is the sense Locke uses it, "when we remember.... and survey it with attention.... when we define, when we distinguish, when we judge, when we reason, whether about things material or intellectual." 2

Later in a discussion of metaphysical first principles, Reid expresses the wish that Locke had turned his attention more to the origin of the opinions which he believed, "that sensible qualities must have a subject which we call a body, and that thought must have a subject which we call mind." Reid thought if Locke had done this, he would have perceived "that sensation and consciousness are not the only sources of human knowledge; and that there are principles of belief in human nature, of which we can give no account but that they necessarily result from the constitution of our faculties." 3

2Ibid., p. 294.
3Ibid., pp. 454-455.
Here we see, Reid has a large measure of agreement with Locke. They both rely on the testimony of the senses for the achieving of knowledge, though they differ as to what is included in reflection. Reid believed that there were also principles of belief which we take for granted. Campbell would agree with Reid here, though this is more implicit than explicit in his thought.

There are times when Campbell seems to rely more on Locke than on Reid. This is particularly evident in his debate with Owen. One Disciple historian, Dean Walker,\(^1\) claims that the Lockianism in the Owen Debate was assumed as an argumentum ad hominem. There is some justification for this, as that undoubtedly was the best line of approach in debating with Owen, the infidel philanthropist and social reformer. But there is also strong evidence of the influence of Reid in that debate as well. In fact, it could well be said that Robert Owen was Campbell’s Hume, as he more fully develops his philosophical views in that debate than anywhere else, just as Reid reacted to Hume’s views with a full development of his own thought. These


Professor Walker’s statement in full is: "It is a commonplace that Campbell was debtor to the Protestant reformers and to the philosophers of the enlightenment. It is less well known that his thought was more largely conditioned by Reid’s common sense school, the Scottish philosophy, than by Locke’s empiricism. The misconception arises largely from failure to see that his Lockianism in the Owen debate was assumed for an argumentum ad hominem. It was Reid, Dugald Stewart and James Beattie whom he studied in Glasgow and who served as a corrective of Locke, whom he studied at Rich Hill."
passages in Campbell's other writings, however, must also be reckoned with in any evaluation of the influence of Locke:

All the ideas you have by the five senses are the mere images of sensible objects, or objects of sense; but on subjects that are not objects of sense they give you no information. . . . Are not all our simple ideas the result of sensation and reflection? 1

As sensation first, and reflection afterwards, give man all his simple ideas or first views of things; so the symbols or types of all his ideas are the material objects around him. By comparing the objects with one another, by abstracting, classifying and compounding their qualities or properties he forms all the complex ideas of which he is possessed. So that all his simple ideas are the images of things which do exist, and he has not a single idea the archetype of pattern of which is not to be met with in the materials around him. His imagination may create a great many new forms, but the materials out of which it creates these new forms were originally presented him in the great magazine of nature . . . . 2

The inlets of all human knowledge are the five senses. Reflection upon the ideas thus acquired gives birth to new ones, akin, however to those received by sensation. Imagination may now combine these ideas without any restraint but its own power. . . . but it cannot create an idea perfectly new. 3

All our ideas of the sensible universe are the result of sensation and reflection. All the knowledge we have of material nature has been acquired by the exercise of our senses and of our reason upon these discoveries. 4

These selections clearly indicate the influence of Locke's thought as do Campbell's writings on how man learns, 5 though they are not altogether inconsistent with Reid's position.

1 Christian Baptist, 1826, p. 271.
2 Ibid., 1828, p. 495. 3 Ibid., p. 495.
5 Millennial Harbinger, 1835, p. 152.
In his discussion of first principles, Reid mentions how Locke indicates that part of our knowledge is intuitive. This kind of knowledge is "clearest and most certain" according to Locke, and is necessary to demonstration. He agrees with Locke in his effort to show that axioms or intuitive truths are not innate. Reid maintains that it is only "when the understanding is ripe" that we "distinctly apprehend such truths and immediately assent to them." He also grants that a number of self-evident propositions, which have no utility and are trifling, do not deserve the name of axioms. Reid differs from Locke when he says "concerning the real existence of all other beings, besides ourselves and a first cause, there are no maxims," for Reid asserts that there are such first principles. He believes Locke, from what he has said, actually does rest his case for the evidence of our own existence, and that of a first cause on first principles, even though he does not admit that they are. He points to geometry in answer to Locke's statement that no science is built on first principles, and refers to Newton's "Principia" in which he lays down principles which he assumes in his reasoning.

Locke and Reid were not as far apart in their conception of first principles as might at first be thought. Though Reid lays much more stress upon them than Locke does, he believes they are also implicit in Locke's thought. Reid puts trust in those underlying assumptions "so necessary in the conduct of

life that a man cannot live and act according to the rules of common prudence without them." Campbell refers to first principles again and again throughout his writings and seeks to show that there are first principles in religion, politics, and morality just as there are in the other areas of life. He is apparently in full accord with Reid's position here.

Locke and Reid both believed that the mind was passive at birth. Locke later admits that the mind becomes active in forming complex ideas, but Reid goes further in asserting the activity of the mind. He believed that the mind exercises some control over sensation. His chief ground for rejecting the doctrines of association, which Hume vigorously defended, was his belief in the fundamental inductive principle of the mind, which is active, which of itself brings together, sorts out and tests ideas, but which is independent of and superior to the ideas which it integrates. Campbell apparently follows Reid in this regard, but the meager evidence is not conclusive.

Locke and Reid differed as to the meaning of judgment. Locke considered judgment to be a faculty which man has in order to supply the want of knowledge, when that cannot be had. Reid thinks that judgment is involved in both knowledge and opinion. In knowledge, "we judge without doubting"; in opinion, "with some mixture of doubt." Judgment is thus used in a more extended sense by Reid. He understands by it "that operation of mind by which we determine, concerning anything that may be expressed by a proposition, whether it be true or false; so is every judgment."¹

Judgment extends to all kinds of evidence, probable or certain.

Campbell's use of the term judgment seems to differ from that of both Locke and Reid. In a discussion of reason, he shows that we reason for the sake of a conclusion.

If the conclusion is of one kind, we call it a determination; if of another kind, we call it a judgment. If it be a conclusion calling us to action, we call it a determination; but if it do not call us to action, we call it a judgment. . . . All conclusions of the understanding upon abstract or remote subjects, not bearing upon our conduct, we call judgments. But all conclusions calling for our energies, we call determinations. . . . Hence we say, it is my judgment that he ought to go, but it is my determination to go.1

Campbell distinguishes between sensation, perception, and consciousness in much the same way as Reid does, and here he differs from Locke. Reid's view was that consciousness was a coordinate faculty with memory. Campbell agreed with Reid in this.

Locke and Reid disagreed about the nature of memory. In his explanation of memory Reid contrasts it with perception and consciousness. This is what Campbell also did. His definition of memory more closely resembles Reid's than Locke's. This was true also with regard to the notion of personal identity. The difference here largely centered in the meaning of consciousness. Personal identity for Locke consisted only in consciousness, but for Reid it consisted in consciousness and memory. Since Campbell held to the co-ordinate view of Reid, he too would have been critical of Locke's conception of identity.

1Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 493.
In their Biblical study, both Locke and Campbell used the same method of study, the Baconian. Reid would undoubtedly have done this too, but he left no work of Biblical study as evidence nor did he make any comments on this particular subject, though his following of the Baconian method elsewhere would be sufficient indication. The fact that Campbell did not see the introductory essay to Locke's commentary of Paul's Epistles until after he had written an introduction to his own edition of the New Testament, and of his mentioning his surprise in seeing the close similarity of what he had said with what Locke had said, indicates how close he must have been in spirit to Locke in his study of the Scriptures.

Locke and Reid were not in agreement as to the freedom of the will. There are certain elements of determinism in Locke's dealing with the subject, though he does leave a loophole for moral responsibility. Reid believed wholeheartedly in the freedom of the will and his argument was most persuasive. Campbell's thought was undoubtedly influenced by Reid with regard to this doctrine. He ably defended the freedom of the will in his debate with Owen and made a fine statement of his position in his Christian System also.

There are certain emphases of Locke which had an effect on Campbell that are hardly mentioned by Reid. Reid's thought was not as comprehensive in its scope as was Locke's, he was more limited in what he sought to do. His principal concern was providing an effective answer to the scepticism of Hume. Locke was living in a time when there was a terrific struggle going on
for political and religious liberty, and he sought to express the highest aspirations of his century. This resulted in his writing casting a wide sweep upon many problems.

Locke's opposition to the unwholesome 'mysticism' of his age caused him to state his vigorous rejection of this 'enthusiasm,' and Campbell, facing a similar situation on the American frontier, reacted in much the same way when developing his conception of the Holy Spirit which depended on Locke's philosophy. Reid does not treat this subject in any extensive manner but he does indicate that it is one of the extremes which we must avoid.²

Locke's conception of the church was the outgrowth of his study of the New Testament, his own understanding of the issues involved in religious toleration, and his basic philosophy. Though written with a particular situation in mind, the principles which he expounded were timeless in character. Campbell was much influenced by Locke's conception and found that it agreed in essentials with his own study of the New Testament. This does not mean that Campbell's view of the church was confined to the limits of Locke's thought. His leadership

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¹ J. McLachlan, "Religious Opinions of Milton, Locke, Newton," p. 113. With his distrust of mysticism and reliance upon reason and scriptural revelation, Locke would have subscribed to Johnson's definition of "enthusiasm" as that word was understood in the eighteenth century, namely, "a vain belief of private revelation, a vain confidence of divine favour or communication."

of a growing religious community which had as one of its primary objects "the union of all Christians" made it necessary for an expansion of his views as he faced a practical situation in his attempt to recover the lost elements of primitive Christianity.

Locke sought in his religious writings to bring Christianity back to the norm of the Scriptures, instead of following the Fathers, the Councils, and the creedal statements of more modern times. He found that these confused rather than simplified the issue. Campbell was vigorously opposed to the ecclesiasticism of his time for the same reason. Both Locke and Campbell thought the one fundamental truth for faith was belief in Jesus Christ as the Messiah. An elaborate system of doctrine was not necessary.

Locke's views on education effected the course of education far more than anything which the Scottish School wrote on the subject, and Campbell was much influenced by them. However at one point he was influenced by the Scottish School. Dugald Stewart indicated that the study of logic should not come first in a course of study in the university. The order needs to be reversed.

If the study of Logic were delayed till after the mind of the student was well stored with particular facts in Physics, in Chemistry, in Natural and Civil History, his attention might be led with the most important advantage, and without any danger to his power of observation, to an examination of his own faculties, which, besides opening to him a new and pleasing field of speculation, would enable him to form an estimate of his own powers, of the acquisitions he has made, of the habits he has formed, and of the
farther improvements of which his mind is susceptible.\textsuperscript{1} Campbell made some experimentation along this line which was further developing an emphasis also of Locke.

III. Developments

1. Grace

The germ of Campbell's conception of grace was certainly in the thought of Reid, though nothing like the full development. This no doubt came through his intense Biblical study. The germ was in man's recognition of his accountability to God and his dependence upon God. He has a clear realization of what God has done for man and what man needs to do for God. He was conscious of the personal relationship among men and implicit in his thought was an awareness of a personal relationship to God. With this as a basis and with the covenant conception of Cocceius in the background of his thinking, Campbell was able to make a clear distinction between law and grace, between the old and the new covenant. God's grace was fully manifest in Jesus Christ. Here we see the free self-giving love of God. This love relationship transcends the law, and man comes to realize that his true freedom is found in obedience to God's will.

2. Private Judgment and the Common Mind

Campbell combined elements in the thought of Locke and Reid as a safeguard against the Protestant individualism which

\textsuperscript{1}Reid, \textit{Works}, Vol. I, p. 420.
he constantly encountered. He saw the need of the gospel and the church, and realized the danger of the one without the other. He claimed as did Locke, that we must go to the New Testament if we want to know what Christianity really is, and he realized the importance of all those who read it using the Baconian method. He agreed with Locke's emphasis on the right of private judgment modified, however, by Reid's emphasis of weighing our own judgment by comparing it with the authority of other competent judges, in this case the guidance of the accepted scholarship of the universal church throughout all the centuries. No interpretation was authoritative unless this was done. This was a safeguard against every individual thinking his private interpretation was the right one and made it possible for the Scriptures to be set within the living church. It was not a question then of either-or but of both-and. This emphasis on the church and the New Testament was a catholic teaching of Campbell. This conception, together with Locke's emphasis on the possibility of discovering a "common Christianity" upon which all men could agree by finding the essentials of the faith, gave great impetus to the Disciples movement of which Campbell was a key leader and had much to do with the rapid growth of the communion of American soil.¹

¹It is worth noting also that the teaching of Reid on reliance on competent scholarship as a test as to the correctness of one's own views, is one way of arriving at the "common Christianity" which Locke was seeking, so that Christians might come together as a "united church."
3. Attaining Knowledge of God

Campbell disagreed with Locke that by means of reason, man could attain a knowledge of God without the aid of revelation. Locke held that the knowledge of God was demonstrable. This explains Campbell's differentiation of the terms "natural religion" and "natural theology." He believed that once the idea of God is given to man through divine revelation, all nature testifies to the character of God which the Gospel reveals. It was in this sense that natural theology was important. But nature itself is merely "the course of things." He considered the term "natural religion" a misnomer, as religion in its proper and logical setting is supernatural. Man invented "natural religion" after God gave us revealed religion.

It is some credit to Campbell's philosophical acumen that he saw that Locke's arguments for the existence of God were inconsistent with his own basic, empirical theory of knowledge. Locke argued that all our ideas are derived from the particulars of sense experience and our mental operations, that all thinking is a revival and rearrangement of these ideas, and that knowledge is simply the perception of the agreement and disagreement between such ideas. Campbell saw that from such a basis one could never pass to a knowledge "that there is an eternal first Cause uncaused." He concluded, therefore, that this idea, and all our ideas of "spiritual things" must have first been given to man.

1Locke was not a Deist for he held that while religion never contradicted reason, reason itself cannot take us the whole way.
by divine revelation and preserved and disseminated by testimony.

Reid rejected the Lockian view that the originals of all our knowledge are ideas of sensation or reflection affirming that these are mere products of analysis which we find within a "judgment" in which the knowing mind is genuinely related to the external object. "Common sense" is not merely "popular opinion" but the "foundation of all reasoning and all science" implanted in the human mind by its Maker. It is through his possession of these divinely implanted principles of mental operation that man knows directly the material world and his own self; and using these principles of reason he arrives logically at the idea of God.

Campbell believed that man's original ideas of the material world are derived through sense perception and natural reason. This could be consistently maintained either by a disciple of Reid or by one who accepted Locke. But Campbell also argued that man's original ideas of the spiritual world are derived through direct revelation and are otherwise unobtainable; and that man in possession of but five senses and with no other guide but the light of nature could never have originated the idea of Deity. This could never have been said by a consistent follower of Thomas Reid. The argument depends on an acceptance of the Lockian theory of ideas and critical recognition of the limitations it places on human knowledge—limitations which Reid's "common sense" philosophy sought to overcome.

Campbell's rejection of natural religion therefore rests upon a critically exact application of the Locke's theory of
ideas, which he does not consistently maintain, but abandons for Reid's epistemology when he turns to consider our knowledge of the self and the physical world and other minds. His argument is that man's natural sources of knowledge in sense, memory, imagination and reason, not only cannot prove the existence of God but could not even produce in his mind the idea of God. Yet man has this idea. Since it could not come from a natural source its source must be supernatural. It must have been revealed to man by God himself. Once given the idea of a superhuman spiritual reality common sense can find good reasons to support it. And here Campbell is willing to find a place for the sort of argument found in Paley's Evidences and Butler's Analogy. But the idea itself could never have been developed by human reason alone from the data supplied in natural experience.

Thus the epistemology which rejected natural religion (a religion based on natural empirical facts and reason alone) becomes the basis of a new rational apologetic—an apologetic which claims to prove that God must exist because only by God's self-revelation to man could man have the idea of God. Natural theology and revealed religion thus join hands and repudiate natural religion.

4. Revelation

Campbell had a deeper understanding of revelation than did Locke. He emphasized what is given to us in revelation. God's character and purpose are revealed through an acted word
even more than through a spoken word. The Bible does not reveal the metaphysical nature of God nor deal with speculation or ideas. Its concern is with facts, with historical happenings. It shows that the relationship of God to man is personal. The conception of God entering a relationship with man in the form of a covenant is present.

5. Baptism

There was a large measure of originality in Campbell's discussion of baptism. His mature views on the question represent a gradual growth of his conceptions, as can be seen by a study of the Walker Debate of 1820, the McCalla Debate of 1823, and the Rice Debate of 1843.¹ His comprehensive view, as set forth most fully in Christian Baptism, had the following divisions: Antecedents of Baptism, Action of Baptism, Subjects of Baptism, Design of Baptism.

The antecedents of baptism are both objective and subjective. The Bible is in the first category with the injunction of Christ as a positive ordinance. In the second category are faith and repentance which represent the attitude of the individual toward the truth, and his resolution to follow Christ alone.

The action is immersion in water in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The philological arguments for this

¹His final position is found in Christian System (1835), Rice Debate (1843), and Christian Baptism (1852).
seem to him conclusive, and he finds evidence beginning with the New Testament and early Church fathers through the centuries until his own time for his position.

The subjects of the ordinance are penitent believers who have fulfilled the requirements of faith and repentance.

The design of baptism, or its meaning, he associates with remission of sins. He did not mean by this that baptism alone produces the entire change in man whereby he is forgiven and starts anew. He did not believe in baptismal regeneration of which he was sometimes accused. He was saved from this by "making a distinction between the state of a man and the character of a man, and between real and formal remission of sins."¹ He did not belittle baptism by so doing, for the entrance into the new state was regarded as a matter of importance. He used the analogy of a foreigner entering another country. He may believe in it and give allegiance to it, but he cannot enjoy the full privileges until he becomes a citizen by being naturalized. Baptism, like naturalization, is the formal oath of allegiance by which an alien becomes a citizen.

"Baptism," Campbell says, "is no work of law, no moral duty, no moral righteousness, but a simple putting on of Christ and placing ourselves wholly in his hand, and under his guidance." He calls it "an open, sensible, voluntary expression of our faith in Christ, a visible embodiment of faith."²

¹ W. E. Garrison, Alexander Campbell's Theology, p. 246.
² Alexander Campbell, Christian Baptism, p. 284.
The outward act for Campbell is "but the symbol of the transition, inward and spiritual, by which our souls are bathed in that ocean of love, which purified our persons and makes them one with the Lord." Unless this happens inwardly it means nothing. Without previous knowledge, faith and repentance immersion would be fruitless. This explained his opposition to infant baptism, and his opposition to adult baptism without a previous knowledge of the gospel.¹

6. The Church

Although much of Campbell's conception of the church has been dealt with in comparing the thought of Locke and Campbell, Campbell worked out in more detail what his views were. This was necessary because he was the chief leader of a new religious movement which was not able to stay within the confines of the organized churches of the day. Locke lived at a time when the national church required rigid conformity to its ritual, polity, and articles of doctrine. Locke visualized a church where these rigidities would be cast aside and a simple Christianity proclaimed that could be comprehended by all. He never had the opportunity to put his ideas into practice, while Campbell, in a situation on the frontier, where all religion had a freedom heretofore unknown, was able to give expression to his views in a practical way.

Already mentioned also under the influence of the

¹Alexander Campbell, Campbell–Rice Debate, p. 493.
Scottish School is the fact that Campbell referred not only to truths secured by induction, but also to self-evident truths and inferential truths in regard to the church. "If Christ has established a church, that it has some organization becomes self-evident. The germs alone of this organization are discernible in the New Testament."^1

Campbell indicates the need of a constitution in the church, and this he finds in the New Testament. This teaches by precept and example "the necessity of united and concentrated action in the advancement of the kingdom. It lays down some great principles and applies them to the emergencies that arise."^2 Among these are the necessity of cooperation, of two distinct classes of officers in every community, of a third class of public functionaries with different ministries; the necessity of choice, selection, and ordination to office; a general superintendency of districts and cities by those who preside over the churches in those districts.

He believed that everything in the church should be done decently and in order. Persons qualified should be selected and appointed by the "common consent of the whole community." He goes on to add that "the voice of the whole people is not necessarily the voice of God. The Bible is, indeed, the voice of God, whatever the people may say to the contrary notwith-

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^1Millennial Harbinger, 1842, p. 508.

^2Ibid., p. 62.
standing."¹

The setting apart of a man to the ministry was, according to Campbell, in all cases to be done by a local congregation, or by local congregations acting in unison, never by supra-local ecclesiastics.² The proper procedure was by the laying on of hands by the bishops, who were in all cases officers of one congregation, never having jurisdiction over more than one. Whatever the procedures, whether by one congregation or several, the authority resided in the whole church. Here Campbell expressed his faith in the common mind of the church. "The voice of the whole people is the voice of God because it is the voice of reason and of truth."³ An interesting thing about this view Campbell expressed is that he not only affirmed the "right" of the common mind to be expressed, both in the affairs of a local congregation and in supra-local affairs, but he affirmed the "rightness" of the decisions the common mind would make.⁴ Here is the ultimate of faith in the democratic process. Here he is reflecting again the influence of the Scottish School.

He drew a line between what is "revealed" and what is "expedient." The Bible is the final authority for all that is revealed. In questions of expediency the church is the authority.

He regarded a single congregation of Christians as "the highest court of Christ on earth, in all cases of its own jurisdiction." In all that concerns the spread of Christianity, in

¹Ibid., 1858, p. 448. ²Ibid., 1849, pp. 459-463. ³Ibid., 1846, p. 435. ⁴Ibid., 1843, pp. 133-137.
the same manner as did the primitive church, he believed in a cooperation of churches "in any form of conventional or associational agreement, periodical or contingent as circumstances or emergencies require, or the general conversion and salvation of the world may demand at our hands."¹ In what concerns every private community, each local congregation is independent of and irresponsible to another, but in all that pertains to "the interests, honor, and prosperity of all" it is "both dependent upon and responsible to every community."²

A Missionary society, according to Campbell, was the church of any given area, assembled to discover ways and means for accomplishing the spread of the gospel with more concentrated power and efficiency.³ Cooperation among Christian Churches in all the affairs of common salvation "is not only inscribed on every page of apostolic history, but is itself of the very essence of the Christian institution."⁴ He thought there was too much squeamishness about the manner of cooperation. The only model that could be given is "that the first churches in Judea, Samaria, Glatia, etc. did all they could in the way of sending out and supporting those who labored in the gospel among the heathen, and that they did it in the best manner they could."⁵

His realization of the need for some order and procedure

¹Ibid., 1850, p. 230. ²Ibid., p. 286. ³Ibid., 1830, p. 208. ⁴Ibid., 1835, p. 120. ⁵Ibid., p. 120.
for the rapidly expanding Movement of which he was the foremost leader is indicated in these words; as he begins a series of articles on church organization:

As we proceed through the sacred history of the New Testament we shall have more reason to urge the adoption of such measures as will prevent the injuries now being inflicted by some novices, and call forth and sustain energies more in keeping with the high character of Christ's church, and more promotive of her prosperity than the present haphazard system of operations which accident and not choice has inflicted on us.¹

His dilemma was that he says too much independence and democracy in one scheme and too much monarchy and despotism in another scheme of ecclesiastical organization. He believed that Christ's kingdom is a "well organized body" which has "a self-preserving and conservative principle."²

In addition to the Congregational element found in the constitution and details of the Christian Church "there is also a Presbyterian element, and also an Episcopal element." The Congregational element was the polity of the local church, the voice of authority in the election of officers. He illustrates by citing a state, Virginia, where the churches are divided into districts each of which should be a perfect system of cooperation. This requires

1) statistical knowledge
2) joint consultation or counsel
3) cooperation or work together by executive body
4) ordinary or stated meetings in one place
5) occasional meetings, extraordinary on special emergencies.³

¹Ibid., 1842, p. 137. ²Ibid., p. 327.
He did not mean by this ecclesiastical courts or judicial tribunals, but deliberative, cooperative and executive meetings. All forms of government have "legislative, judicial, and executive functions." It is clear that Campbell would have preferred a form which had a combination of congregational and presbyterian features, but the Movement spread so rapidly, it eventually took a Congregational form.

To him the word "church" indicated the whole Christian community on earth. "Every individual church on earth stands to the whole church as one individual does to one particular church." Other great doctrines of Christianity such as the person of Jesus Christ and the atonement have not been mentioned for Alexander Campbell or the Disciples of Christ did not make any great contribution. The chief contribution here has been the declaration that the Christian religion is centered in facts rather than in metaphysical speculations and theories. This emphasis resulted in a vigorous protest against the speculative language of creeds and confessions and an appeal to use Biblical language in explaining Biblical terms.

IV. Philosophies With Which Campbell Disagreed

We have been dealing in the main with the philosophical background with which Campbell felt some measure of agreement. Perhaps this can be made more vivid by getting Campbell’s re-

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1Ibid., p. 389. 2Ibid., p. 386.
action to the philosophies with which he disagreed.

He ranks La Place and David Hume as the two greatest names on the list of sceptics. La Place's argument on the uninterrupted continuance of the laws of nature as superior to all other evidence was rejected by Campbell. He asked for evidence that this was true. He cited the evidence of geology and astronomy to prove otherwise. Hume could not believe "any testimony that is contrary to universal experience" because it is infinitely more probable that the witnesses are mistaken, than that the laws of nature have been violated. Campbell objected to this appeal to "universal experience." Reading into this term, that it was the "experience of all persons at all places and at all times," he thought it absurd that through the five senses one man could observe all this. All we can know is the experience of one man in one place at one time, and this is the experience of each individual self. All the rest is memory or faith. You can believe the experience of all men, but you know only your own. He pointed out the fallacy of Hume's writing his History of England.

The eloquent author of the History of England seems not to have perceived the delusion he was imposing on himself, in making his own individual experience, or that of a few others, equal to that of all mankind in all ages of the world, a ten-thousand-millionth part of which he, nor no other person ever heard or knew! No man ever had universal experience, consequently no man could believe it.

1 Alexander Campbell, Popular Lectures & Addresses, pp. 144, 154-156.

2 Ibid., p. 118.
Campbell's view was that experience is either personal or derived. Personal experience involves consciousness and memory, and derived experience is founded on testimony. Both deal with general maxims formed from a comparison of particular facts. If we consider only personal experience, man's measure of information is below even that of the savage. He could not agree with Hume that "no testimony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof."\(^1\) Campbell contended that Dr. George Campbell of Aberdeen, in his Dissertation on Miracles\(^2\) had a "complete and masterly refutation" of Hume's Essay Upon Miracles. "Hume felt himself defeated—completely defeated. He never replied to it. And I have it from living testimony, that when Hume's friends jested him upon the complete defeat of his system, he acknowledged that 'the Scottish theologue had beaten him.'"\(^3\)

Campbell then went on to maintain that the great question is what Chalmers poses: "Shall we admit the testimony of the apostles, upon the application of principles founded upon observation, and as certain as is our experience of human affairs; or shall we reject that testimony upon the application of principles that are altogether beyond the range of obser-

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\(^1\)Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, pp. 244-245.

\(^2\)Of this work, W. L. Davidson in his article on "Scottish Philosophy" in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. XI, p. 266 says: "This work is as much philosophical as theological. The foundation argument is an appeal to common sense, or the 'primary principles of understanding.' Here again is evidence of Alexander Campbell's reliance on the Scottish realists.

\(^3\)Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 247.
vation, and as doubtful and imperfect in their nature as is our experience of the counsels of heaven." He then adds that Christianity is based upon experience, and infidelity upon assumption.

In an address on "Responsibilities of Men of Genius" Campbell makes further mention of Hume:

It will remain a secret to the development of the Great Day, how much poison has been infused into society through the intoxicating cup of a false though fascinating philosophy, sparkling with the brilliant display of elevated genius, administered by such men as the speculative Hume, the eloquent Gibbon or the accomplished Rousseau.

He recognizes Hume as "a man of distinguished talents, and as an elegant historian," but he says, "the spirit and tendency of his writings are most clearly, though most insidiously, irreligious and immoral." He the able defender of revealed religion is speaking about the ablest critic Christianity had to encounter for many years.

Campbell stated his opposition to mechanism in no uncertain terms. He had a high regard for Newton and the contribution which he made to the world's thought, but he had not use for those who derived a complete mechanistic philosophy from what he did.

I belong not to that school which regards the whole solar system as a piece of machinery somewhat like an eight day clock, which after it was put together and wound up by its Maker, would just run on for one week of seven days, a thousand years each, without a single touch from the hand of its Maker. I say, I cannot regard that great system of physical laws, called the material or solar system, especially when made to be

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1 Alexander Campbell, *Popular Lectures & Addresses*, pp. 84, 85.
inhabited by rational, or voluntary agents, as detached from the superintendence of its Creator, as if he had no concern with it.¹

He goes on to indicate that this does not hold true for the moral system either. Even though the moral laws operate in a regular series of cause and effect they are not so perfect "as not to require the special notice, care and superintendence of the Father of Spirits." It was inconceivable to him how mind and matter, two systems "so united and yet so essentially distinct" could continue to move on for a single day "without the providence of the great Author of the universe." To prove his point he illustrates by suggesting a universe of a million voluntary agents moving in all directions from a common center impelled by a million impulses from within and without, and at the same time a million involuntary agents directed by law, in regular motion and in fixed channels moving about in the same arena. In such a situation would there not be perpetual jars and discords, until one class of agents annihilated another? His conclusion is then:

The preservation of the universe appears to me to require the exercise of the same wisdom, power, and goodness, which appear in creation. As rationally might we attribute its creation, as its preservation, to secondary causes. If it be godlike to originate such a universe, it is godlike to sustain it.²

One of Campbell's chief objections to Deists was their lack of reason. He said, "I never censured a Deist for his

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1833, p. 186.
²Ibid., p. 187.
eulogies on reason, but for his want of it.\(^1\) He claimed that Deists were begging the question, that there was no stopping place between Atheism and Christianity. He thought it just as reasonable to look for "penknives growing upon apple trees as Lord Herbert's doctrine in the mind of a savage."\(^2\)

The Deists assume, according to Campbell, that independent of revelation "from the works of creation alone" a natural man can know that God exists. This religion is called natural religion in order to distinguish it from revealed. There is some difference among individual Deists as to the number of items that may be learned from the volume of nature, though there is fairly general agreement that among the things that may be learned are: the being and some of the perfections of God, the immortality of the soul, a future state of existence and rewards, and the nature and extent of moral obligation. With them revealed religion is unnecessary and false because it is capable of perversion and corruption. If there is any logic in this, Campbell argues, is there not as much in saying "Natural religion is a figment of human invention, because it has been corrupted."\(^3\) After much reflection and examination Campbell affirms that "natural religion and deism are of the same kidney—they are both plagiarisms from the Bible; that no man can

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\(^1\) *Christian Baptist*, p. 344.

\(^2\) *Alexander Campbell*, *Campbell-Owen Debate*, p. 122.

\(^3\) *Millennial Harbinger*, 1832, p. 310.
rationally be a deist or a natural religionist." According to him, "man invented natural religion after God gave us supernatural religion."2

Campbell relates that when Dr. Clarke classified four great classes of Deists, they agreed in acknowledging one God, but disagreed on everything else. He mentions the five points of Lord Herbert's, De Veritate, as an effort to give some sort of system to a religion based on reason and the light of nature.3

He found it amusing to contrast Paine and Mirabeau to see how the deists and atheists handle each other. Mirabeau asks if there is any miracle in any religion "more impossible to be believed, than that of the creation? Is there a mystery more difficult to be comprehended than a God impossible to be conceived; and whom, however it is necessary to admit!" Paine then says:

The only idea that man can affix to the name of God is that of a first cause, the cause of all things. And incomprehensibly difficult as it is for man to conceive what a first cause is, he arrives at a belief of it, from the tenfold greater difficulty of disbelieving it."

Then Mirabeau says, "All theology is false," and Paine affirms, "there is one true theology--and one unadulterated revelation of God, viz.: the universe. The belief of a God, so far from having anything of mystery in it, is of all beliefs the most easy; because it arises to us out of necessity." This to Campbell seemed to be the height of contradictions. It was

1Ibid., 1835, p. 36.  
2Ibid., 1857, p. 350.  
3Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 64.
Paine's answer to Mirabeau's question: "Can there be a mystery more difficult to comprehend than a God." 1

In his early years, Campbell charged that Calvinism is another form of deism or natural religion. As evidence he quoted from Calvin's Institutes that the human mind is "naturally endowed with the knowledge of God." Campbell countered this with the Scripture, "the world by wisdom knew not God," and so he says, "say the history of the world and the conscious experience of every individual," for Locke exploded this doctrine of innate ideas. 2

Campbell classified atheists among the ancients according to Cudworth's Systema Intellectualae which listed four distinct varieties. 1) Disciples of Anaximander, "who attributed the formation of everything to matter destitute of feeling." 2) Atomists, or disciples of Democritus, "who attributed everything to the concurrence of atoms." 3) Stoical Atheists, "who admitted a blind nature, but acting after certain laws." 4) Disciples of Strato, "who attributed life to matter."

Among the modern philosophers who are atheists, Campbell lists Spinoza, Hobbes, Vannini, and Mirabeau. He mentioned that Spinoza taught that there is but one substance in nature and that all souls are modification of this one substance and "there is but one being and one nature" which produces by an immanent act

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1Ibid., p. 65.  
2Christian Baptist, p. 172.
all creatures. According to this, "his Deity is both agent and patient, creator and creature."¹

He noted that Aristotle held that God and matter were co-eternal with some sort of union existing between them as exists between the soul and the body.

There is no fixed principle in atheism, so no two atheists agree exactly in their speculations. Campbell found atheism full of natural mysteries, such as: the origin of matter; the principle of motion in matter; the specific origin of the earth; the origin of man; the elements of bodies; the nature of magnetism; the nature of attraction; the nature of repulsion; the nature of cohesion; the nature of electricity; the nature of elasticity; the destiny of the whole or any part of the universe; and the relation of will, belief, knowledge, faith and opinion to one another. Other difficulties for which atheism has no answer are: why man is interested in his origin; why man considers himself a privileged being; how to account for the origin of man; whether matter or motion originally had the same powers which they now possess; and accounting for the origin of the idea of God which is so universal among men. Campbell thought the greatest mystery of atheism is the problem of the regularity in motion which is assumed as only a property of matter. Why should motion have acted so irregularly as to form man at one time and so regularly ever since?²

¹Alexander Campbell, Campbell-Owen Debate, p. 66.
²Ibid., p. 80.
The atheist, Campbell believed, is actually in a worse position than the Christian, for he has to "confess as much ignorance and to believe more mysteries". He has to "teach, admit and contend for a number of absurd mysteries" which are "much greater than any taught in the most corrupt schools of pagan priests."¹

Of all atheists, Campbell refers more to Mirabeau than to any other. He attacked Mirabeau's view that "savages invented the idea and name of God and spiritual existences," and so men labor for unknown objects to which they attach great importance and never dare to really examine.²

In answer to this, Campbell indicated that there are only two ways in which ideas can be communicated: either through the presentation of the archetype which those ideas represent, or through speech "describing the thing to be revealed or communicated by something already known." If all the premises were clearly understood, they would be as decisive proof as the discovery of gold and silver coins among savages would suggest that they are the finders rather than the makers of the coin. Mirabeau might as well say that savages made the first gold coin without fire, mold, and metal.

In a conversation between a Christian philosopher and an atheist, Campbell brings his argument against such reasoning to a climax.

The Christian philosopher listening to the triumphant Atheists... interposes—"You affirm, Mr. Atheist," says the Christian, "that the idea or the name of a supreme intelligence, called God, did not enter the human mind by supernatural revelation, and that it could not enter the human mind by reason; but the idea and the name are now in the human mind, entertained by millions of the wisest and best men in the world. Will you, then, please explain to us how this name God and the idea which it represents, first took possession of the understanding. 'By imagination,' promptly responds the Atheist. 'Who' replies the Christian philosopher, 'is this God imagination? In what heaven does he dwell? He can create out of nothing the idea of one supreme spirit! In what city have you dedicated a temple to this divinity? And is this the perfection of Atheism? . . . . . . Imagination, the God of Atheists, creates the God of Christians! I believe not in this divinity, and will not believe in him, unless he can work one miracle at least. Let him create one new idea, or the model of one new idea and I will believe him. But it must be a new idea. . . . . Imagination is only imitative. If it could only create a God, it certainly could furnish man with at least one new sense. But it has been asked in vain to suggest one original idea, and to try its strength in giving name to a sixth sense.'

He points out that the Christian has two sources of original ideas while the unbeliever has but one. The Book of Nature and the Book of Revelation furnish the Christian with all his original simple conceptions. He needs five senses for the Book of Nature, and his reflections on the objects of sense, and the impression these objects make on him, furnish him with ideas compound and multiform. "But every idea properly original is a discovery. Its model is found in the volume of nature, or in the volume of revelation. Sense fits him for the one, and faith for the other." All supernatural ideas are directly or indirectly found in the Bible.

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1 Millennial Harbinger, 1835, p. 199.
2 Ibid., p. 200.
This conclusion is drawn, according to Campbell, by using "the premises," and working "by the rules of all the mental philosophers of acknowledged orthodoxy in the science of mind and of language." He goes on to add: "The unbelieving Hume and the believing Locke, alike assent that all our simple and original ideas are derived from sensation and reflection; and that the imagination is absolutely dependent upon the discoveries of the five senses for all its inventions and creations."

V. Reactions

There were some of Campbell's early followers who misunderstood him and went too far in their desire to make Christian experience a purely intellectual process divorced altogether from emotion. They were chiefly those who had once been sceptical and who were disposed to rely solely on reason. Richardson, Campbell's biographer, describes them:

Taking Locke's philosophy as the basis of their system, and carrying his "Essay on the Human Understanding" along with the Bible in their saddle bags, they denied even to its Creator any access to the human soul except "by words and arguments," while they conceded to the Author of evil a direct approach, and had more to say in their discourses about "the laws of nature" than about the gospel of Jesus Christ. These were extremists who were not truly representative of the movement. Campbell and the majority of Disciples, though indebted to Locke, did not carry his philosophy to this extreme, which they called "sensualistic dogmatism."

1Ibid., p. 200.
Richardson wrote a series of articles in the Millennial Harbinger attacking the extremist position. In this series he endeavors to interpret the position of Campbell and the majority of Disciples:

The true Christian faith reaches beyond the recorded facts to the person concerning whom the facts are related. It is Christ himself, and not any, nor all of the facts in his history, that is the true object of this faith. He believed the extremists made the facts themselves the end of faith and thus prevented the mind from attaining a personal trust in Christ. Their view arrested spiritual progress, growth in knowledge and grace. The facts, he said, were not an end but a means of faith.

When we understand the Christian faith to be a trusting in Christ we may comprehend how it admits of increase. We are induced to trust in Christ from our conviction of the truth of the gospel in the first instance, and under the influence of this reliance upon Christ we give ourselves up to his guidance and enter into fellowship with him, in the nearest and most intimate spiritual relations. The more we know of him, the more we experience of his infinite love, mercy, wisdom, and power; the more we confide in him—the more reason we have to trust in him. As our trust in those who are worthy increases the better we become acquainted with them, so does our faith in Christ increase the more we have fellowship with him. The more we learn of him, the more we experience of his perfections. An increase of faith thus depends, not upon external and remote testimony, upon mere declarations of ancient witnesses, but upon an actual and present Christian life. In order to healthful growth the intellect must be constantly gaining new insight into sacred mysteries presented in the gospel, and a more accurate and clear comprehension of Scriptures.

1 Millennial Harbinger, 1857, p. 399.
2 Ibid., pp. 402-403.
In another statement on the subject of interpreting the Scriptures Richardson says that: Beattie's *Essay on Truth* and Abercrombie on *Intellectual Powers* may be profitably studied as preparation for interpreting the Scriptures. He shows his own influence by the Scottish School here.¹

D. S. Burnett in his "In Memoriam" on Campbell's death in 1866 has this rather interesting statement to make with regard to his philosophy:

His social discoursings were not on metaphysics. Having in early life read the sensuous philosophy of Locke, and having possibly been injured by it, he seemed disinclined to pursue the subject, which I presume did not come within his short curriculum in Glasgow. He never became a metaphysician, simply because his tastes took a different direction. Early in his life, the short logic of Locke certainly did pervade his mind. Had Browne or Cousin or Sir William Hamilton then been his teachers, a different turn might have been given to his life by the alluring influence of their fertile pens. A taste for such inquiries, with such leaders, might have diverted his attention from that life-long devotion to biblical study, which has placed him in such a commanding position before the world. Instead of studying critically the mental structure, he consecrated the powers of that structure to the study of God in his word, founding there his moral system.²

This comment is interesting as it comes from the pen of a younger contemporary of Campbell's. It reflects the difficulty of making an objective appraisal so soon as a life has finished the course.

He is certainly right in his emphasis that it was Campbell's life-long devotion to Biblical study, that had been of primary importance in making his position known on the frontier in America, but he fails to recognize that Campbell's philo-

sophical background undergirded his life-long devotion to Biblical study, and helped him as he sought to make known this views to deists, free thinkers and the orthodox religious world of nineteenth century America.

It is true that neither Locke nor the Scottish School with whom Campbell was most familiar engaged in metaphysics to any great extent, but what they did say was important to Campbell's thinking, perhaps more important even, than he realized himself.

F. D. Maurice makes an interesting comment on the Scottish School in general, though he is referring to Dugald Stewart in particular. He says that they were unsatisfactory in answering the man who wished to know "what he was, whence he had come, whither he was going." This is a correct judgment, for they left those answers to revelation. Campbell, however, was quite willing and ready to have revelation answer these questions and he sought to explain what revelation had to say with regard to them. In this he was helped by the insight of Locke and the Scottish School.

One of Campbell's most philosophical discussions was carried on with J. A. Waterman, a Methodist, minister in 1833-1834. Their discussions on prayer, special providence, and conversion were of particular interest because they both had the same philosophical background, Locke and the Scottish Realists. Waterman quotes Locke in support of his conception at one point and refers to him as "our philosopher," not in terms of the editorial "we" but realizing the high regard which both held for
Locke. Reid and Stewart were also referred to in support of arguments by both of them. In one of his replies to Waterman, Campbell is more explicit than is usual:

Our Saviour needed no other philosophy than the parable of the sower to explain its (the gospel's) success to his disciples. And there is not in all the Bible a promise of the Holy Spirit to any unbeliever. Mark 4:26 is worthy of the consideration of all our moral philosophers, not forgetting those you have quoted. I shall transcribe it: "The kingdom of God is like seed which a man sowed in his field. While he slept by night and waked by day the seed shot up and grew without his minding it. For the earth produces of itself first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear. But as soon as the grain was ripe he applied the sickle because it was time to reap it." If, then, we would be philosophers of the common sense school, we will scatter the seed—PREACH THE WORD, and without any theory of the soil or of the process of vegetation, allow it to grow according to the genius of this parable.

In 1842 Campbell published an address by W. W. Stephenson before the Little Rock, Arkansas Lyceum on "The Mind And Its Improvement." It is based on the thought of Bacon and Locke. Campbell indicates that it is worthy of the attention of a larger audience than the Lyceum, and makes this comment: "He has spoken many excellent and practical truths in plain and forcible style. . . . Our brother is better read in the old school of mental philosophy than in the new; therefore his adhesiveness to its dogmata. But this excepted, there is so much good sense in it, sound maxims, correct views, sage reflections, and general knowledge of advantage to young men and some of more advanced years, that I have laid it before my readers as eminently worthy of their perusal." Here is further evidence

1Ibid., 1833, p. 458.  2Ibid., 1842, pp. 490-491.
that Campbell is not completely satisfied with the Lockian influence alone, but has also drawn from the Scottish Realists in forming his own philosophy.

W. K. Pendleton, Campbell's son-in-law and successor as president of Bethany College and co-editor of the Millennial Harbinger seems also to have been an exponent of the Scottish Realists. There are traces of this influence in an article of his, "What Is A Good Conscience?" He says that it is sphere of a man's own consciousness where he finds the only light on the question of conscience. He speaks of man's distinguishing faculty, that which he has in common with God and which nothing else animate or inanimate possesses, is reason. "It is the faculty of the universal and the necessary; through it alone can we comprehend spiritual truths." He describes the knowledge that we derive through the senses as intuitive, which means that we get it "without the influence of intervention of argument or testimony." He tells of immediately perceiving reality.

We touch, taste, see, smell, or handle the object, and we are assured of its being, and affirm, without hesitation, its reality. No matter how much some cunning sophist may bewilder and entangle our understandings, so as even for a moment to make us deny or doubt the reality of any thing deemed external to ourselves, yet the affirmation of its reality is perpetually renewed in the consciousness, and admitted in the experience of even the subtlest sceptic, so that practically, he does not butt his brains out against the post, the reality of which he is, in theory, brainless enough to deny.1

Pendleton indicates his belief in first principles. "To satisfy me of the truth of an abstract principle or axiom, it is

1 Ibid., 1853, pp. 662-663.
only necessary to announce it to me in terms that I comprehend, and I at once admit it, as both universal and necessary." He sees intuitively "not only that it is so, in all cases, but that it is so, in all cases, but that it must be so." He includes free will, the soul's immortality, and God as such axioms. He does not question how such ideas come into the mind, whether they may be "originally self-affirmed, or presented by the revealing word," but simply wants to draw attention to the fact that all men have them. He sees the absolute necessity of conscience in the idea of God "as the immutable and eternal source of all obligation"; in the idea of free-will "we feel and acknowledge the ability of man to maintain the obedience, which God through the conscience requires for him"; and in the idea of the immortality of the soul, "we perceive and anticipate a state in which we shall receive--...in just proportion to our moral worth--good or evil forever."

In another article on "Nature and Spirit" Pendleton tells of man's possession of a power which distinguishes him from all else in natural creation. This he calls his Spirit--his will "the free, self-determining, responsible I, that makes him at once accountable and immortal. I say accountable, because responsibility, in a moral sense, cannot be conceived of as right, as just, without the ground of freedom."¹

Robert Graham, a student of Campbell at Bethany, later became professor of philosophy at Kentucky University. Writing

¹Ibid., p. 362., 1870
in 1870, he identified himself with the Scottish School:

If you mark well the phraseology of those whose opinions about metaphysics are worth anything, you will discover that they are no strangers to the pages of Brown, Stewart, and Reid, or it may be, of Hamilton, Cousin and Kant. . . . . If men think at all they will have a philosophy true or false, complete or incomplete; how important they have a sound one. There is a philosophy of receiving the things of God through faith that should be considered, and considered profoundly. 1

VI. Appraisal

We have seen that Locke and the Scottish School are in the same general movement of philosophy. Because of this there was a common influence which they had on Campbell, that was of more importance than the differences. He shared in common with them: a high regard for the inductive method; a rejection of innate ideas; a recognition of the danger of ambiguous language; a lack of concern for metaphysics; the dualism of mind and matter; acceptance of the causal relationship; a realization that the real essence of things is above our comprehension; the conception of faith, reason, and revelation and their interrelationships; recognition of the importance of testimony; a high regard for the evidence of sense; a stress on the importance of facts as over against speculation; the use of the term "common sense"; views of the social compact and the principles of politics.

Campbell agrees with Locke that man's original ideas of

the material world are derived through sense perception and natural reason; in the use of the Baconian system of induction in Biblical study; in his reverence for the Bible; in his opposition to the unwholesome 'enthusiasm' which each confronted in his own age; in his conception of the church; in the one fundamental truth for faith, the belief in Jesus Christ as Messiah; in opposition to creedral statements as tests of faith; in his views on education; in his view of the Holy Spirit.

Campbell agrees with Reid and the Scottish School in the existence of the material world, and in the immediate knowledge which we have of this external world; in the stress on the activity of the mind; in the belief in first principles; in the realization that while there are no innate ideas there is a capacity of the mind "when the understanding is ripe" that we can apprehend certain truths and immediately assent to them; in the definition of sensation, perception, consciousness, and memory; in the conception of personal identity; in his conception of freedom of the will.

In his conception of grace Campbell combines elements in the thought of Reid and the covenant theology with his own intense Biblical study to produce an interesting, significant, and important development. He combined elements in the thought of Locke and Reid to safeguard the Protestant individualism which was such an obstacle in his age and to give a new authority, "that of the common mind." He disagreed with both Locke and the Scottish School that a natural theology was possible without the aid of revelation. But once given this revelation, Campbell's
natural theology closely resembles that of Reid and Beattie. In his conception of revelation there are important new developments of a similar character to the developments in his conception of the ordinances of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. His conception of the church, while paralleling Locke and Reid, in some of its implications, goes beyond both.

This does not mean that the other influences mentioned earlier: his own study of the Scriptures, the Reformers of the sixteenth and eighteenth century, the Covenant theology, and the primitive gospel movements of Glas and Sandeman, the Scotch Baptists, and the Haldanes were not of vital importance. Each had its place in the totality of his thought.

Campbell was no slavish follower of any man or system. He was an independent thinker who had the capacity to make use of his intellectual heritage to achieve the high goals which he had set for himself. The union of all Christians upon a universal faith in the revealed truths of the Bible, in terms of the restoration of primitive Christianity was his high purpose.

There were times when Campbell himself seemed reluctant to admit any philosophical adherence. On such occasions when he denounced philosophy he had in mind the traditional philosophy of the Greek thinkers and the Scholastics, to whom the world of thought had so largely been in bondage for centuries. He was an inheritor of the whole Renaissance-Enlightenment tradition. He was well enough aware that in that tradition was liberty and also danger, and so he was both a sceptic and a believer in the Enlightenment. His closest points of contact with that tradition
were the philosophies of John Locke and Thomas Reid and the Scottish School.

His life interests were in the problems and subjects of both theology and philosophy. His proficiency in these fields enabled him to employ them as effective instruments in his defense of revealed religion and the "common Christianity" to which he called all men to adhere. Using such tools, his advocacy of the causes which he held dear was strengthened.

He was somewhat selective in his use of materials and methods being able to borrow and reject with discrimination. Rather significant as to his real objective was his shift from Pope's watchword of the Enlightenment, "The proper study of mankind is man." His comment on that popular oracle was "but we must study man in God, and God in man before we can properly attain the true knowledge of either."¹

Perhaps what Campbell really does as he is influenced by Locke and Reid is revealed in a statement made in one of his popular addresses: "Following both Locke² and the moderns, so far as they both can be followed by one person, or rather putting them together and forming a tertium quid, a new compound..."³ Here he indicates how much Locke and Reid had in common, and yet

¹Millennial Harbinger, 1863, p. 546.
²R. I. Aaron, John Locke, op. cit., p. 121. "Though nominally Locke remains representationalist in his explanation of the knowledge we have of our minds, actually he proceeds as if we know ourselves and our operations directly in reflection and as if this knowledge was in all cases exact."
³Millennial Harbinger, 1838, p. 507.
recognizes that there were differences resulting from the particular age in which each lived and what had transpired in the intervening period. Campbell used Locke's empirical methods to counteract the rationalistic, speculative, dogmatic conventional thought on the American frontier and he used Thomas Reid's philosophy to escape the destructive implications that Hume found in Locke's thought.

Campbell himself had no doubt that Locke was the great Christian philosopher. He speaks of him as the one "to whom we are more indebted than any other" and as "our Christian philosopher." Campbell realized that Locke was not aware of any destructive implications in his own thought, and he was conscious of his great contribution to intellectual, civil and religious liberty. As a great fighter in the endless conflict between light and darkness he held him in high regard. Locke took an active part in the affairs of his day and his thought was forged out of that experience. He travelled extensively, and held various governmental positions at home and abroad, he faced the practical problems of the church and state in seventeenth century England. His thinking was done in the midst of a political situation that was fluctuating.

Locke's personality shines through all his works. He is everywhere simple, direct, practical; yet he is also strong, foresighted and convincing. In religion he was always reverent and genuine. Such qualities as these no doubt appealed to Campbell, and he found in Locke a kindred spirit. Thomas Reid, James Beattie, Dugald Stewart and George Campbell reinforced
what he found in Locke. As the great champions of the faith against the scepticism of their age Campbell saw them as stalwart defenders of the truth and so praised Dugald Stewart as the "greatest of metaphysicians." He quoted comments from James Beattie and George Campbell in support of his views and showed his high appreciation of them. Perhaps his simplest and most direct statement is found in the closing pages of the last volume of the Christian Baptist: "I agree...with Mr. Locke or Mr. Reid in their philosophy." ¹

Locke in summing up the conclusions of his own age became the starting point for the thought of the age that was to follow. By so doing he exemplified the "Golden Mean." Thomas Reid and the Scottish School also sought to exemplify this and were explicit about it.

There have been those of his followers who seek to make Campbell a latitudinarian liberal on the one hand or an arch conservative on the other. Actually he was neither. His ideal was Thomas Reid's "Golden Mean." There were times in his early years when he expressed himself in dramatic extremes as he attacked the clergy and their kingdom and the tyranny of theology and tradition, but most of his life he spent explaining the sane middle ground in which he believed so firmly. He often used the expression: "Via media tutissima est," and his closest associates were fully conscious of this.

¹Christian Baptist, 1830, p. 658.
There are points of course in which Locke and the Scottish School were the children of the age in which each lived. They held to some beliefs which have changed or been given up by those who still consider themselves indebted to these thinkers for their general philosophic spirit and method. For example, today psychologists do not regard the mind of an infant as a passive tablet on which sense impressions are made. The infant is a behaving being, and this active behavior is marked by feeling and rapidly forming habits from the first. Locke's conception of original states of consciousness, or simple ideas, which build themselves up into complex ideas, is no longer accepted. Locke did not recognize the importance of the emotional life of the child and the enormous part it plays in the process of selection, and in the fashioning of interest and effort. He had no appreciation of the unconscious factors which are now known to be involved in all aspects of the psychical life.

The Scottish School's chief difficulty was their lack of clarity with regard to the extent of first principles. There were other ways in which they were a corrective to Locke than their emphasis on the immediacy of material knowledge through our sense impressions. They were certainly forerunners into the new fields of investigation which were later called sociology and social psychology. Reid's chief ground for rejecting the doctrine of association was his belief in the fundamental inductive principle of the mind, which is active, which of itself brings together, sorts out and tests ideas, but which is independent of and superior to the ideas which it integrates.
They tried to show that man is a sensitive being as well as a thinking being. Hence they gave attention to feeling, impulse and passion. In all their writings great attention is given to sympathy, communication, imitation, habit and conviction. Their very certainty as to some integrating principle was what made them popular in their day and in the next generation in France and the United States. They appeared to save the individual and society from intellectual and moral chaos. Because of the insistence upon the unity and coherence of the mental life, and because the individual is pictured as an acting entity, rather than as a mere field in which capering ideas are assembled and reassembled, the greatest contributions of the Scottish School were necessarily general rather than specific.

Locke and the Scottish School did not realize the significance of the immanence of God or the religion of the inner light and thus neglected these aspects of the thought concerning God. Their conceptions of revelation would not be considered adequate today, but they were right in regarding the Bible as the record of a series of events which uniquely manifest God's character and gracious purpose towards men.

The Disciples of Christ Movement of today is certainly not bound by the philosophical method which Campbell used, but understanding the use which Campbell made of his philosophical background in the interpretation of his religious views helps the modern student of the Movement to realize more fully the importance of what Campbell was seeking to do.

Campbell's versatility is somewhat like that of Locke.
As a theologian and philosopher, he founded a major and indigenous American Protestant communion. As an editor and publisher, he established a press and issued a monthly magazine which furnished the citizens of the West for a generation with some of their most provocative reading. As a scholar and educator, he founded a college, wrote and lectured on education and was a pioneer for a free public school system. As a farmer and sheep-breeder and man of affairs, he accumulated a manorial estate and pioneered in methods of improved agriculture. As something of a politician, he represented his district in that august assemblage, the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829, where he pitted his talents against the best the nation had to offer.

As an able defender and protagonist of revealed religion, Campbell offered to the American on the frontier a faith whose intellectual concepts and ethical precepts were rooted in the same ground with their politics and economics, a faith which spoke in the clear accents of John Locke and the Scottish School, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Inspired by the writings of Locke and those of the tradition of Thomas Reid, and by the accomplishments of the American Revolution, and sickened by the ecclesiastical tyranny and the dominance of the scholastic modes of thought imported from Europe, Campbell called upon the citizens of the New World to break these fetters of the past and to work a reformation which would make operative in religion the same principles of individual freedom and enterprise that Washington, Jefferson and Madison had sought to make operative
in government; invoking the names of Locke and Bacon and Newton, he was summoning them to eschew emotionalism and arid abstractions and perceive that the truths of religion, like the truths of science, could be discovered by the inductive method; he was urging them to denounce dogmatism and discover for themselves that the unity of the faith in the New Testament church consisted in a common loyalty to the religious leadership of a person, Jesus Christ, rather than a special set of beliefs about him; he was insisting on a practical religion and morality; he was calling forth a full exercise of that spirit of reliance which was a first requisite of life on the American frontier, challenging them to make use of their own mind and energies to find God's will and way even as by their own hands they were wresting a new civilization from the wilderness.

The call found a ready response, the movement spreading, as one disgruntled observer remarked, "like a mighty contagion throughout the West" until today throughout the world there are more than two million adherents, and churches in forty-one countries.

The impact of Campbell's religious ideas was felt not only by those who became his followers. His concepts have modified the course of Protestant thought in America, especially among Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist and Congregational churches. Furthermore, Campbell in a period of rabid sectarianism, urged the cooperation with a view to eventual organic union of all Christian sects. As far as Christian unity is concerned many have thought that the movement came a century
before its time. Many of Campbell's pleas for unity are just now beginning to be acknowledged by churchmen of every faith in the modern ecumenical movement.

In his own day the result of Campbell's work was, seemingly, to set up one more church amongst the many, but that church has never forgotten the concern for Christian unity and regards itself as a Movement to foster the spirit of unity until Christians are one united family.
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