THE PHILOSOPHY OF GABRIEL MARCEL
IN ITS RELATIONS WITH CONTEMPORARY FRENCH THOUGHT

by

IAN W. ALEXANDER

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NOTE

A list of Gabriel Marcel’s works is given in the Bibliography. For convenience in quotation, the customary form of abbreviation is employed, after a first mention in full, to indicate the titles of the works most frequently quoted. Thus, JM = Journal Métaphysique; EA = Etre et Avoir; RI = Du Refus à l’Invocation; HV = Homo Viator; PA = Position et Approches concrètes du Mystère ontologique; CD = Les Conditions dialectiques de la philosophie de l’intuition; TP = Tragique et Personnalité; ET = Note sur l’Evaluation tragique, etc.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY

THE BACKGROUND OF CONTEMPORARY FRENCH THOUGHT

The tendencies in modern and contemporary French thought that form the intellectual background of M. Gabriel Marcel's generation, which embarked on its philosophical studies in the early years of this century and grew to philosophical maturity during the Great War, are not only complex but widely sprung. For, they include not only the immediate influences, but others derived from a more distant nineteenth century context. The names of Lequier and Maine de Biran were, indeed, no less operative than those of Brunschvicg and Bergson. For a proper comprehension of a thinker like M. Marcel, whose thought has always been sensitive, some might say over-sensitive at times, to intellectual and spiritual climates, a sketch of these tendencies in their broad sweep is an essential preliminary. And for this purpose we shall take into our survey all those currents and thinkers, predecessors and contemporaries with whom affinities or contrasts will have to be stressed in the course of our exposé, and, as is proper and essential when dealing with one who is a literary rather than an academic philosopher, we shall include literary thinkers as well as the philosophers proper.

The first important current in modern French thought is
the Idealistic. And this current itself, provided it is
stressed that the two overlap at many points, having their
common ancestry in traditional French Cartesianism, may be
divided into two fairly distinct forms each of which has its
roots in the 19th century: the first neo-Criticist and neo-
Kantian, the second developing from the "Spiritualist" school
of Maine de Biran.

This first form goes back to Jules Lequier whose
principal claim to the attention of the historian lies in the
fact of his influence on Renouvier. Strictly speaking, his
philosophy developed from Descartes rather than Kant, although
Fichte was an important factor therein. Lequier's work, of
which fragments only remain, is entitled La Recherche d'une
première vérité. His thought has for its end to discover
"le moyen d'associer le libre arbitre à la raison et au
savoir, avec lesquels on a plutôt l'habitude de le considérer
comme en état de rupture (1)." It takes the form of an
initial dilemma as between liberty and necessity. Lequier
examines four possible hypotheses: necessity affirmed
necessarily; liberty affirmed necessarily; necessity
affirmed freely and liberty affirmed freely. And he finally
chooses the last as being the one which weighs least heavily.
"Je ne puis affirmer ou nier l'une ou l'autre (la liberté,
la nécessité) que par le moyen de l'une ou de l'autre. Je
préfère affirmer la liberté et affirmer que je l'affirme au

(1) Renouvier, Philosophie analytique de l'histoire, Paris,
moyen de la liberté. Ainsi, je renonce à imiter ceux qui cherchent à affirmer quelque chose qui les force d'affirmer. Je renonce à poursuivre l'œuvre d'une connaissance qui ne serait pas la mienne. J'embrasse la certitude dont je suis l'auteur (1)."

Freedom is thus not demonstrated but affirmed, being the result of a Pascalian wager. It is moreover this affirmation that forms the basis of his "first truth" and enables him to posit freely his existence as a thinking being. How indeed can the je pense be affirmed, involving as it does an object "represented" and a subject "which represents", between which there is no purely logical connection possible. "Pourtant ils sont unis, puisque j'existe. J'existe et je ne saurais sans les unir affirmer ma seule existence. Quel est cet intervalle de moi à moi que j'enferme en moi-même?... Et bien, puisque ni l'objet ni l'idée ne me livrent ce lien de l'un à l'autre qu'en vain je cherche et qu'il me faut, je vais le trouver en le formant, et puisqu'il est nécessaire pour m'affirmer, je m'affirme pour le produire (2)." It is thus by an act of freedom that I unite my self and the idea of my self so as to posit the

concrete living self. "Sans doute c'est moi, c'est ce que proprement j'appelle moi-même: moi vivant, moi qui dois agir, qui de mon chef interviens entre moi et l'idée de moi pour consommer mon existence en la voulant, en l'affirmant... Enfin je respire, je l'ai trouvée cette première vérité (1)."

This "first truth", or affirmation of the self as existing and free, is the type of all judgments of existence, synthetic in character, and all having their ground not in the clarity of evidence but in the freedom of willed belief. In this way Lequier establishes the ground of science in freedom and moral choice. As such, he is the founder of the philosophy of liberty which develops in the French neo-Criticists of whom Charles Renouvier is the most important.

Renouvier starts by affirming the contingent nature of judgment, it being impossible to explain error on the basis of a necessary truth. Certainty is an act of freedom and willed choice. "La certitude n'est donc pas et ne peut pas être un absolu. Elle est, ce qu'on a trop souvent oublié, un état et un acte de l'homme... La certitude est donc une croyance, comme je le disais d'abord (2)." An act of will is therefore at the source of all judgments, and philosophy is dependent upon the choice of its initial principle or principles. This enables Renouvier to deal with the antinomies of Kant. Reason and its concomitant law of non-contradiction, he believes, can be rejected only at the cost

(1) Ibid.
of depriving science of its rationality; he therefore posits as the first truth the principle of non-contradiction transformed into the famous "law of number" and applies it to the treatment of the antinomies. He is obliged thereby to accept the theses and reject their contraries as being self-contradictory. That is to posit the finite and relative and reject the infinite and absolute. The latter, moreover, are to be rejected not only as self-contradictory but as incompatible with that freedom which is the sole ground of certainty. Renouvier's philosophy exhibits itself, therefore, as a philosophy of contingency, a pluralism and ultimately a "personalism". He posits God as a postulate of practical reason, but a finite and personal God, as required by the law of number and as being alone compatible with human freedom (1).

Octave Hamelin in his *Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation* (1907) employs the same neo-Critical method. He defines consciousness as "representation", in short as the system of relations (his "synthetic method", derived primarily from Hegel, aims at explaining these relations in terms of a dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis and thus constructing the whole system of mind and its categories (2)). But, in common with Kant and Renouvier, he does not consider consciousness as merely the locus of relations; it is also the agent which imposes the latter upon

the data of experience and reduces them to the unity of
perception. The foundation of consciousness or thought
is thus will, which supposes freedom. In a word, thought
is identified with being and both with liberty and creative
power. "Il faut concevoir la pensée comme une activité
créatrice qui produit à la fois l'objet, le sujet et leur
synthèse: plus exactement...la pensée est ce processus
bilatéral lui-même, le développement d'une réalité qui est
à la fois sujet et objet ou conscience (1)."

This philosophy of liberty, neo-Criticist in inspiration,
develops in contemporary French thought as a philosophy of
radical contingency, which found its first most powerful
expression in Emile Boutroux's De la Contingence des lois de
la nature (1913). Boutroux subjects the laws of nature to a
searching scrutiny and discovers therein an irreducible
element of contingency. Having established the purely formal
nature of the principles of logic, he attacks the laws of
nature themselves and demonstrates the failure of the
principle of causality to apply exactly to the manifold of
experience; "elle n'apparaît plus que comme une vérité
incomplète et relative, lorsque l'on essaye de se représenter
l'entrelacement universel, la pénétration réciproque du
changement et de la permanence, qui constituë la vie et
l'existence réelle (1)." The principle of causality, the
law of conservation of energy, each and everyone of the laws

(1) Ibid., p. 343.
of nature "en posant la détermination et la permanence avant le changement et la vie...trahit l'intervention originale de l'intendance (1)." In short, the contingency involved therein is to be attributed to their ideal character and demonstrates the role of mind and freedom in their creation as against the claims of scientific determinism.

It is still easier for him to prove his thesis when applied to the biological and psychological sciences; but here he can go further and exhibit the spiritual and teleological nature of the life-process and from that infer the existence of a spiritual and providential deity, sole ground of the contingency manifest in nature and personality and defined as "la propriété inhérente à l'acte volontaire de n'être déterminé entièrement, ni par des circonstances extérieures, ni par la nature interne ou les actes antérieurs de l'agent lui-même (2)."

The same contingency of scientific principles is demonstrated by Henri Poincaré in his La Science et l'hypothèse (1902), La Valeur de la science (1905) and Science et Méthode (1903). There he shows the scientific and mathematical principles to be "hypotheses" or conventions arrived at by inductive methods (3). The basis of these conventions is "commodity" in the sense — for he rejects the "nominalism" of

(1) Ibid., p. 27.
(2) Zeller et sa théorie de l'histoire de la philosophie, Revue philosophique, 1877, p. 11.
(3) In this he combats the logisticians. Cf. Science et Méthode, Bk. II, Chps. III, IV and VI, where he criticises the mathematical logic of Cantor, Couturat, Russell and Hilbert.
Lo Roy — that, while derived from experimental laws, and not arbitrary (1), they are the creations of mind and decreed by it. They thus exhibit a contingency which must be attributed to the fact of human freedom.

In the immediately contemporary period the doctrines of Emile Meyerson and Léon Brunschvicg carry the neo-Critical thesis to its conclusion. Meyerson sees in reason a process which aims at reducing the diverse of experience to rational identity. The external world "est pour nous une vérité de fait, une vérité fortuite; nous voudrions l'expliquer, le concevoir comme une vérité de raison, vérité nécessaire (2)." He combats no doubt what he calls the positivism of Poincaré and Mach. Science, he declares, is "rigoureusement réaliste, créatrice d'ontologie", in that respect similar to common-sense; its notions are explicative of the real, being so to speak intermediary between mind and reality (3). None the less, in its attempts to reduce the multiplicity of the real

(1) "Les principes sont des conventions et des définitions déguisées. Ils sont cependant tirés de lois expérimentales... quelques philosophes ont trop généralisé: ils ont cru que les principes étaient toute la science et par conséquent que toute la science était conventionnelle." (La Science et l'hypothèse, Paris, Flammarion, 1902, p. 169.) On the contrary, those experimental laws themselves are not conventions: they are approximations to fact thereafter "erected into principles" "en adoptant des conventions telles que la proposition soit certainement vraie". (Valeur de la Science, p. 239.)


(3) Thus, speaking of the Theory of Relativity, he writes: "Le relativisme, dirons-nous, est un mathématisme, et ce qui est mathématique, appartenant à la fois à notre raison et à la nature, n'est ni tout à fait le même, ni tout à fait l'autre, ou plutôt est les deux à la fois, étant la véritable substance intermédiaire." (La Déduction relativiste, Paris, Payot, 1925, p. 225.)
to identity, mind comes up against an irreducible element of irrationality: "Les conditions d'un phénomène sont d'une multiplicité strictement infinie, et des conditions complètement identiques ne peuvent jamais se retrouver dans la nature (1)." "Cette partie se réfugie d'une part dans le divers sous ses deux formes principales, à savoir le divers dans le temps, tel que le précise le principe de Carnot, et le divers dans l'espace, qui se manifeste par la discontinuité atomique et celle des quanta, et d'autre part dans l'interprétation qui, seule, transforme ce qu'on déduit par les mathématiques en résultat physique (2)." Meyerson's philosophy in many respects continues and completes Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, its ultimate stress being laid upon the limits of reason on the one hand and on the other its essential role in the comprehension and unification of experience. In spite then of its Realistic pretensions, it has acted as a powerful statement of Idealism.

Léon Brunschvicg was undoubtedly the most important representative of contemporary French Idealism, his influence at the Sorbonne on the young philosophers of Marcel's generation being undoubted. The latter's early reflection is coloured by this influence, although his final position will be completely hostile to its standpoint. Brunschvicg, like Meyerson, would reconcile reason and experience. Each

(2) La Réduction relativiste, p. 208.
without the other is but an empty frame (1). The task of reason is to explain and interpret experience. But this it does not by virtue of any *à priori* principles or intuitive truths. It forges its principles progressively, in contact with experience and the problems the latter sets and, in applying them, reduces fact to unity: mind is "une fonction d'unification" and verification (2). These principles are in essence "convenient" hypotheses. Hence a dynamic view of mind: "L'intelligence est une faculté d'invention perpétuelle, par laquelle tout le contenu de nos idées se transforme à chaque instant (3)." And a wholly idealistic conclusion: "Ainsi la réalité de l'univers n'est pas une réalité absolument indépendante de l'esprit: une telle réalité est une chimère: l'esprit ne peut sortir de soi pour attendre et déterminer ce qui lui serait absolument étranger. Il ne donne que ce qu'il possède: c'est en lui-même, et par le seul développement de son activité interne, que l'esprit peut conférer l'existence véritable, comme liée à son existence propre (4)." It is even tinged with religious and at least spiritualistic feeling: "Nous sommes le centre universel, le centre de la pensée qui donne à toute chose la

(2) Je may compare Lalonde's distinction between "la raison constituee", the ensemble of rational principles evolved and in terms of which judgments are made, and "la raison constituant" which is the activity of mind expressing itself in those principles but transcending them. (Cf. Lalonde's *Cours at the Sorbonne, 1909-10*, published in part in the *Revue des Cours et Conférences, 1925.*
(4) Ibid., p. 59.
Il. vérité et la beauté, qui marque à toute activité sa loi et son but: nous sommes l'esprit (1)." He thus comes to view history in the light of a "progress of consciousness", a gradual realisation in science, art and religion, of spirit, wherein mind attains ever greater awareness of its essential spirituality as pure activity and freedom. "Le sujet est celui qui juge, et juge est un acte. Le sujet est activité (2)."

These various philosophies have this in common that they are philosophies of contingency and liberty developed largely from Kantism: in a certain sense they take over Kant's analysis of Pure Reason and interpret or explain the limitations of Pure Reason in the light of the conclusions of Kant's Practical Reason.

The second form which the traditional Idealist current has taken (although not always distinguishable from the preceding one) has its source in the Spiritualism of Maine de Biran. It is characterised by the fact that, while a philosophy of liberty, it is also and above all a philosophy of Being: and no less by the employment of a method of "reflexive analysis" allowing, on the basis of an analysis of consciousness, the passage from psychology to metaphysics.

Maine de Biran's first philosophy develops from, and in reaction to, the Idéologie of the early 19th century. As against Sensationalism he distinguishes, within the content

(1) Ibid., p. 165.
(2) La Modalité du jugement, Paris, Alcan, 1897, p. 236.
of consciousness, the purely affective, passive and organically produced elements and the causal activity of the subject; between, in short, sensation and perception, the latter involving the active process of mind directed towards the ordering and interpretation of sensations and bringing with it the consciousness of self as spiritual causality or will. He thus substitutes for the Cartesian *je pense a je veux*. "Si Descartes a cru poser le premier principe de toute science, la première vérité évidente par elle-même, en disant: *Je pense, donc je suis chose ou substance pensante*, - nous dirons mieux, et d'une manière plus déterminée, avec l'évidence irrécusable de sens intime: *J'agis, je veux, ou je pense en moi l'action, donc je me sais cause, donc je suis ou j'existe réellement à titre de cause ou de force* (1)." Between those two orders of reality and experience - the realm of obscure perceptions, of the affective, organic life and the life of consciousness - there is an unsurmountable duality. To each, moreover, corresponds its own distinct sense, the "sens céstésistique" on the one hand and the "sens musculaire" on the other. In his final philosophy, however, he is led to distinguish yet another plane of reality, a higher order of religious experience involving the religious sense or sense of the Divine activity immanent within us. The Divine existence indeed is the object of an immediate apperception. "Nous ne sommes pas causes ou sujets réels de ce que nous

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Concevons ainsi (la beauté idéale dont les traits échappent à notre intelligence): c'est comme la présence d'une divinité supérieure qui nous remue (1)." This religious experience does not differ from the mystic state in Biran's view: he speaks of "la vue ou la possession de Dieu au dedans de nous-même" and of "ces sentiments ineffables par lesquels notre âme se trouve en contact instantané avec la source de toute vérité, de toute lumière, par lesquels nous sentons Dieu avec l'infini. C'est par ces mouvements intérieurs que Dieu parle à notre âme et se révèle ou se manifeste (2)."

The analysis of consciousness thus yields to religious experience and reveals beyond the causal activity of the self a divine activity. God is the supreme cause or will underlying all causal action. Psychology gives way to metaphysics, although between them no mediating logic can throw a bridge. This divinity, moreover, is, like the self, a person. Indeed the religious sense puts us in communion with a region beyond the psychological consciousness, a realm of spiritual substances or persons sustained by the Divine Personality, all interacting the one upon the other as they do upon the self, within the depths of immanent experience.

The final vision of Biran is a Pluralism and Personalism.

(We shall not fail to be struck by the affinities of this

religious Personalism with Gabriel Marcel's philosophy of communion).

In Maine de Biran we find expressed a current of thought which seeks to transcend the individual mind and reveal an Absolute Thought as the very stuff and substance of reality. In the three philosophers, Ravaisson, Lachelier and Lagneau—all of great importance by reason of their influence during the early years of the century—this tendency takes a still clearer form.

Jules Lachelier rejects Biran's division of experience. The "méthode de réflexion" he proposes aims at following out "the dialectical progress of thought" in its passage from psychology to metaphysics. Its upshot is to reveal Will as the foundation of our being and consciousness. "Nous sommes donc volonté avant d'être sensation; et, si la volonté n'est pas, comme la sensation, une donnée directe et distincte de la conscience, n'est-ce pas parce qu'elle est la condition première de toute donnée et, en quelque façon, la conscience elle-même? (1)" This proof, it will be seen, involves the classic distinction, common to all followers of Maine de Biran, between sensation, the objective and phenomenal content of consciousness, and the active constituent which is the subject of those states. "Le dernier point d'appui de toute vérité et de toute existence, c'est la spontanéité absolue de l'esprit (2)." He then proceeds to relate the spontaneity of

(2) Ibid., p. 158.
consciousness to the realm of final causes and to demonstrate the identity of Being and Thought as the sole and absolute reality in which all things participate in their various grades of being.

Jules Lagneau rejects similarly Biran's division of experience and affirms the possibility of a dialectic employing the method of analyse réflexive whereby a transition can be made from psychology to metaphysics. Philosophy for him is a "physiologie de la pensée". It starts from the analysis of consciousness itself, and notably the psychological conditions of judgment. The latter seems to him to involve a free affirmation of truth, not only, however, of its necessity but even more of its value. It is therefore indicative of a spirituality which is not only will but moral effort. Consciousness is the awareness of a self struggling to attain and affirm the good within it: "Point de conscience sans activité volontaire et finalité, sans effort, sans lutte (1)."

All thought, whether it be the search after knowledge or the obedience to the moral law, is purposive, directed towards the realisation of good and the ideal; it has for that reason to be defined not only as rationality but as love.

Consciousness thus bears witness to the essence of the individual self as will and love. But at this point consciousness yields to reflexion. The former is limited to the particular and the individual; and can only posit the

(1) *Écrits de Jules Lagneau réunis par les soins de ses disciples*, Paris, Union pour la Vérité, 1924, p. 293.
being of self. But the dialectic may be pursued on the plane of reflexive analysis which reveals, as implicated in the self's thinking, a realm of Value and Good which transcends his finite status and can only find its ground in Universal Being and Thought. "Le fond des choses et leur explication n'est pas dans les phénomènes ou objets (nécessaires), ni dans les esprits ou sujets (limités), mais dans l'esprit, ou sujet, absolu et un. La psychologie dans sa source et son fond est la métaphysique même (1)." This Being is God, the Absolute, infinite will and love, the ground, cause and end of all willing, the stuff and reality of the self and all things.

Félix Ravaisson, although chronologically prior to Lachelier and Lagneau, has also exercised a considerable influence on young French thinkers even of the present day. He too finds behind the activity of consciousness a Divine creativity or love which is the foundation of all being and manifests itself throughout the universe as an urge to order and harmony (2).

None of this latter group of philosophers can be claimed as contemporary, yet their influence has been potent. Not only did they pave the way for Bergson, but they profoundly

(1) Ibid., p. 299.
(2) We might also mention in this connection Thomas Jouffroy who belongs to this current. Although he begins in true Cartesian manner by establishing the self as cause, he refuses to identify it with the pure, reflective consciousness. In that he is a precursor of Existentialism, as well as by the importance he attributes, like Vigny, to the problem of personal destiny and by the Pascalian urgency of his speculations.
affected religious thinking. The case of Maurice Blondel is one in point. Marcel's first Idealism owes much to them and his later thought too, although hostile to Idealism as a whole, preserves certain of their themes. It is indeed obvious that in their doctrine lies the germ of a "subjective realism" such as Marcel is to seek to realise (1); his criticisms will bear upon their absolutist and monistic conclusions, their transcendentalism and equation of being with reason.

The importance of this current in French thought derives from the fact that it represents more fully than any other the French philosophical tradition which stems from the Classicism of the 17th century. If all the 19th century thinkers discussed under this head pass naturally from philosophy to religion, it is because, even without realising it, they are following a mode of speculation established in France under the aegis of the Augustinian revival in the 17th century. This tradition is represented not only by Pascal, the Jansenists, Quietists such as Fénélon, even the more orthodox Bossuet who stands mid-way between Neo-Thomist and Augustinian theology, but by Descartes and the Cartesians themselves. The starting-point of Descartes' thought,

(1) Ravaission indeed describes the current as "un réalisme ou positivisme spiritualiste, ayant pour principe générateur la conscience que l'esprit prend en lui-même d'une existence dont il reconnaît que toute autre existence dérive et dépend, et qui n'est autre que son action". (La Philosophie en France au XIXe siècle, Paris, Hachette, 1889, p. 275.)
Augustinian in inspiration, is the intuition of the self's spiritual existence and of the existence of a perfect God who is the source and sustainer both of his knowledge and of his existence. The passage from philosophy to religion that forms the content of his doctrine is an explicitation of this single, although complex, intuition given in the *Cogito*. The 17th century in general admits the same starting-point, and its thought is aimed at revealing beneath human causality, exhibited as secondary, the Divine causality. Represented in an extreme form by Malebranche's Occasionalism, the same viewpoint vivifies the speculations of the Classical age as a whole; in such a way that one might say that for it the metaphysical and the theological are in intimate union.

It is this same traditional standpoint which revives in the 19th century current of thought just discussed. The latter simply marks a return to the French tradition after the 18th century hiatus (a reading of Chateaubriand and Mme. de Staël and other pre-Romantics bears this out). The "philosophy of consciousness", in so far as it develops independently of theology, marks in actual fact an arbitrary disjunction of the epistemological or anthropological elements in the Cartesian tradition on the one hand, and the theological elements on the other. The thought of Blondel and Marcel in the 20th century, however much their terminology may differ, continues the religious anthropology of the essential classic French tradition.
19.

This second current of Idealism is primarily a philosophy of Being and is to be distinguished from the "philosophy of consciousness" already sketched: the one is metaphysical and attempts to relate the being of consciousness to Universal Being, the other primarily critical, content to indicate the nature of the being of consciousness and in many cases hostile to the search after essences. Although sharing a common philosophy of liberty, the one is an Ontology, the other more an Anthropology.

In the contemporary period, this latter philosophy of consciousness is represented outside the field of academic philosophy by several important "maîtres" of the last two generations. The first is Alain (the pseudonym of Edouard Chartier), a philosopher by profession but more widely known as a philosophical essayist.

Alain is to a large extent the disciple of Lagneau. He accepts the Kantian thesis that knowledge is the product of a union between reason and its categories on the one hand and experience on the other: "Du moment où j'avais compris que toute connaissance est d'expérience, et enferme ainsi au contact de l'objet tout l'usage possible des formes, des catégories, et des idées, tout était réglé (1)." It is precisely the function of Understanding (Entendement), as opposed to Reason, which sets the formal conditions of knowledge, to mark the double contribution of reason and (1) *Histoire de mes pensées*, Paris, Gallimard, 1936, p. 131.
experience and their union in knowledge and existence; "Ce qu'on cherche, sous le nom d'existence, ce n'est nullement une présence de qualités, ni un tissu géométrique qui les étale. Tout cela est de nous; et nous cherchons ce qui n'est point de nous. La nécessité extérieure, objet et appui du travail, voilà ce que nous appelons le monde (1)." But while doing so, Understanding reveals the essential relativity of the idea. If the nature of the object is "inertia", that of the idea is its capacity for transformation. "L'opposition est le mouvement même de la pensée et le seul moyen de donner du corps aux idées (2)." Any idea or law which becomes "fixe" would destroy itself and become a "thing", necessity being the very definition of things. The essence of human consciousness is this duality between subject and object, choice and necessity; and not only would the fixation of the idea destroy the idea as such but it would deprive the world of things of its own autonomous type of being. "Nous voudrions expliquer toutes choses d'après une même supposition. Or cela même, si on y arrivait, enlèverait à ce que je crois à l'objet son caractère d'objet (3)."

Knowledge has, in Alain's view, two moments. The first is the moment of doubt, when mind refuses the evidence of the

(2) Histoire de mes pensées, p. 35.
(3) Ibid., p. 85.
senses; when it rejects the external necessity and appeals to its desire for rationality. Such is the very moment of consciousness itself, inseparable from a primitive exercise of freedom. "Car toute conscience est d'ordre moral, puisqu'elle oppose toujours ce qui devrait être à ce qui est... Toute connaissance... commence et se continue par des refus indignés, au nom même de l'honneur de penser (1)."

The second moment is the moment of choice, where the mind chooses its form and applies it to the object in knowledge. This act of will is the sole foundation of truth and the idea and it is the sole guarantee of the latter's adequacy to the real: "L'esprit ne doit pas être le moyen du vrai. Et puisque l'esprit est libre, ou mieux, se veut libre et se décrête libre, la règle de penser comme il faut est de penser comme on veut (2)." Moreover, mind must never be duped by its constructions which are relative and have their justification in their "commodity"; so that doubt must be constantly renewed and constantly followed by a new affirmation and choice: "C'est le doute renouvelé, le doute hyperbolique, qui fait être la droite (3)." Mathematics themselves he describes as an "exercice de volonté", while the sign of truth is "la recherche énergique".

It follows then that the being of consciousness, that is the type of being which appertains to man, is liberty, and a

(1) Ibid., p. 77.
(2) Ibid., p. 167.
(3) Idées, Paris, Hartmann, 1932, p. 121.
liberty which can only be exercised within an irreducible duality involving a conflict of subject with object, of internal freedom with objective necessity, and whose constant renewal and exercise is the condition of that being, so much so that were this exercise of liberty once relaxed man would become a thing. "Car la conscience suppose une séparation de moi d'avec moi, en même temps qu'une reprise de ce que l'on juge insuffisant, qu'il faut pourtant sauver. Toutes les apparences de la perception sont ainsi niées et conservées; et c'est par cette opposition intime que l'on se réveille. D'où j'ai tiré tout courant que, sans la haute idée d'une mission de l'homme et sans le devoir de se redresser d'après un modèle, l'homme n'aurait pas plus de conscience que le chien ou la mouche (1)." In the exercise and consciousness of his freedom consists for Alain man's ideal nature and it has its motive-power in the "Générosité" defined by his master Déscartes.

The thought of Paul Valéry - undoubtedly the most important literary representative of this current - is on similar lines. Valéry's initial aim, as manifest in the Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci and in the Soirée avec Monsieur Teste is to define "pure consciousness". What characterises consciousness in general is a perpetual "exhaustion", a constantly vanishing content, an incessant construction and destruction of relations. "Le caractère de

(1) Histoire de mes pensées, p. 77.
l'homme est la conscience: et celui de la conscience, une perpétuelle exhaustion, un détachement sans repos et sans exception de tout ce qui paraît, quoi qui paraisse (1).

Our ideas, the individual personality itself are such ephemeral constructs or "appearances". What Valéry aims at in the two works mentioned is to "exhaust" the mind of them, so as to attain a pure consciousness of the permanent and irreducible element in mind which is the pure, essential self. This pure consciousness will reveal to us, beyond all particular operations and contingent creations of the mind, the "common origin of all operations of the mind", the pure self reduced, as Valéry says in his preface to Monsieur Teste, to its "real properties". It is, like the Cartesian cogito, an intuition of the thinking self, "pure presence" of mind to thought. In the formula of Monsieur Teste: "Je suis étant, et me voyant; me voyant me voir, et ainsi de suite." This state of pure consciousness reveals the essence of mind as an active "capacity", "la suprême pauvreté de la puissance sans objet," the power of "substitution", of constructing relations, ideas or personality, although it itself is the subjective ground which transcends each particular form. "Il n'y a pas d'acte du génie qui ne soit moindre que l'acte d'être (2)." Monsieur Teste is the hypothetical incarnation of this pure consciousness. He seeks to preserve his mind as a pure "sanctuary of possibilities", making and unmaking ideas while refusing to be

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(2) Ibid., p. 31.
shut up in any, seeking to maintain intact his essential formlessness by a systematic "refus d'être quoi que ce soit".

The analysis of pure consciousness enables Valéry to define the nature and conditions of consciousness and conscious activity in general. He finds these to consist in the creation, by the active effort of mind, of order, form and being out of the virtualities and chaotic possibilities of the unconscious. Self-consciousness itself is a product of such an operation. The mind, before consciousness, is a blind activity plus a mass of virtualities with which it is merged. It applies its power to choose certain of these virtualities and realise them in an ordered personality; and by so doing, the self distinguishes itself from its construction; it sees itself as something constructed in time and, simultaneously, as something which does the constructing, as an active subject. In short it becomes self-conscious. This duality is the very condition of self-consciousness.

The self-conscious activities involve a creation of being from non-being, the imposition of form upon the virtualities of "le hasard" or, as he calls it in L'Idée fixe, "l'Implexe". "Résoudre une nébuleuse," or, as Eupalinos puts it "enchaîner une analyse à une extase". It is in every way the exercise of choice and freedom: it is act. "Me voici, dit le constructeur, je suis l'acte (1)."

The imposition of order is only possible through language (1) Eupalinos ou l'Architecte, Paris, Gallimard, 1924, p. 217.
and symbols. Scientists and poets are both "symbolic minds" creating a stable order of being and fixing it in symbols. Yet those constructions must never become "idées fixes"; the mind must constantly "negate itself", for consciousness is an instrument of "substitutions" or "transferences". Our ideas are thus the product of and guaranteed only by will. They are only possible by virtue of an exercise of will-power which brings with it consciousness of our being and activity in freedom. In short, the more, by the ever free act of mind, acting as an "instrument of precision", being is created from chaos, the more we attain to the ideal pure consciousness of self as active subject or, to employ the term of Gentile, as "Pure Act"; and the more we may say: "J'invente, donc je suis (1)." This adaptation of Descartes' cogito may be considered as the inner principle of Valéry's philosophy.

The final significance of the latter is in its denial of Transcendentalism (2). He rejects the search after first causes and essences which by their nature are not amenable to precise relations and therefore definition. Metaphysics, he says in Analecta, is a mere "infidélité, impuissance du langage". His is wholly a philosophy of consciousness intent

(2) When Valéry speaks of transcendence he speaks, as does Jean-Paul Sartre, of the created order of being evolved by choice from the realm of possibilities. "Ce labeur incessant par quoi l'être est relié une fois de plus - en lui git le secret de la seule et véritable philosophie qui est de créer un ordre transcendant - je veux dire qui comprend tout, et de faire un monde - d'absorber d'avance l'accidental." (Ibid., p. 57.)
on defining the being of consciousness; and this he finds to consist in a duality whereby the mind distinguishes itself as subject from its objective content, and in so doing creates conditions for its freedom to choose and reject its "essence". The life of consciousness, proper to man, implies therefore the rejection of the state of pure being where the self is one with itself, eternal and necessary - that state symbolised by

Midi là-haut, Midi sans mouvement
En soi se pense et convient à soi-même.
(Le Cimetière marin.)

That type of self-sufficient and undivided being is precisely proper to things (as Alain too recognised).

It is impossible here not to recognise in this philosophy of Consciousness a source of Jean-Paul Sartre's Existentialism. The process of self-conscious activity described by Valéry is precisely that which Sartre has termed "néantisation", whereby the "en-soi", whose self-absorption excludes "altérité", is transformed into the "pour-soi", the self becoming an object for the subject mind. It is interesting to note that although Sartre attributes a higher metaphysical status to being "en soi", his philosophy involves a rehabilitation of being "pour soi" inasmuch as it is the condition of human freedom, the latter being possible only by the fact that a "néant" intervenes between the self's ideals and its acts. The central fact in Sartre's metaphysics, as in Valéry's philosophy, is man's consciousness and liberty and their exercise in the creation of a transcendent but contingent order of human
"essences". Alain and Valéry have preceded Sartre in defining the specifically human type of being and existence in terms of consciousness and liberty in opposition to the being of "things".

We must relate to this current also the moral philosophy of Ramon Fernandez whose influence was considerable in the great days of the Nouvelle Revue Francaise when he was a younger member of the Marcel-Rivière-Du Bos group. It has this additional interest that we see a link forming between the Idealistic philosophy of consciousness and freedom and the contemporary Existentialism of the Jean-Paul Sartre group.

Fernandez, as a thinker distinct from the literary critic, was wholly a moralist. His main interest was the study of moral values and the condition of their creation. His attitude was first of all critical, being directed against the semi-Bergsonism associated with Gide, Rivière and Proust and which proclaimed a war on moral law or any attempt at imposing form on the spontaneity and formlessness of the essential self (1). In this type of amoralism Fernandez saw a species of Transcendentalism attributable to Christianity, in that the latter leads to the cult of a "pure" self in some sort transcending time and conscious effort, to be allowed to emerge freely without the intervention of any moral evaluation.

suivent et comme repliée sur elle-même. Nous devons lui obéir et en respecter le mystère, mais au moment de l'intuition nous ne sommes qu'à moitié humains. (1)" The characters of Proust and Pirandello, so Bergsonian in their "dissoluteness", are mere "permissionnaires de la vie"; for what is characteristically human is the creation of values and their maintenance in time, all of which is dependent on a willed unification of the passive forces of feeling. "Ce qui est pour moi essentiellement spirituel c'est l'unification interne de l'expérience concrète de chacun, l'acte, la contraction psychique qui permet à l'individu d'accorder son activité vivante à son activité intellectuelle, de faire la synthèse des deux et, par suite, de progresser, de croître en tant qu'homme vivant (2)." The essence of human activity is willed effort, to refuse what is not considered valid for personality. "La résistance personnelle, le refus d'être ceci ou cela, c'est là le point de contact entre l'imaginaire et le réel, la première pierre dure de la personnalité (3)." Personality is therefore dependent on judgment or at least one with judgment, for "la personnalité n'est pas autre chose, en dernière analyse, que le fait de pouvoir, une certaine perspective mentale étant choisie, établir d'une façon continue la dialectique de ses propres attitudes (4)." And this means that the condition of the moral life as known to

(3) De la Personnalité, p. 35.
(4) Ibid., p. 114.
man is the duality of consciousness, the capacity of mind to withdraw itself from pure immediacy and from its state of self-absorption and, distinguishing itself from its states, to evaluate itself and in terms of its chosen values impose form on its formlessness. "La pensée personnelle implique donc un dualisme psychologique, et la façon dont chacun comprend et respecte ce dualisme le situe dans ce qu'on peut appeler une hiérarchie de la personnalité (1)." Not of course that values should become fixed; they are, as for Alain and Valéry, subject to revision and their ground is in human choice alone.

In this sort of "moral expressionism" we find again the insistence upon the being of consciousness as alone characteristic of what is specifically human and as alone bearing with it, by its duality, the conditions of liberty. In Fernandez's view, the life of the "pure" self exalted by the Bergsonians would be a life quite beyond consciousness if their thesis were carried to its conclusion; as indeed it is in Surrealism.

Without exaggerating the similarity, we might again stress the points of contact between such an Idealism and the later Existentialism of Sartre - a similar definition of the being of consciousness and a similar insistence on pure liberty as the basis and guarantee of human values, sole source of any moral construction. It may indeed be noted (1) Ibid., p. 117.
that both Fernandez and Sartre, rejecting *a priori* values or
göms of value, end up in a sort of Nietzschean cult of action
for action's sake, of gratuitous choice which, strangely
enough, brings them, if we substitute "instinct" for "will",
to a standpoint that, ethically speaking, is not much
different from that of Gide and the Bergsonians (1).

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The second current in modern French thought is the
"philosophy of life" whose chief representative is, of course,
Bergson. The preceding Idealistic current, in so far as it
is voluntarist, does not separate will and rationality.
Vitalism, on the contrary, interprets the force which
constitutes man's being in terms of instinct and feeling as
opposed to the reason and the intellect which arrests life
and encloses it in concepts.

(1) In this voluntaristic ethics an important influence was
Frédéric Rauh, who combated all attempts to subject moral
action to *a priori* or even *a posteriori* principles. "La règle
moralement essentielle, c'est de chercher sa formule de vie."
(*L'Expérience morale*, Paris, Alcan, 1903, p. 189.) The basis
of morality has to be sought in an autonomous "moral experience"
consisting of a prise de conscience of feelings with a view to
discovering rational motives for action. Morality, says
Brunschvicg, "ne consiste ni dans la représentation d'une
res aeterna, ni même dans la définition d'une loi: le véritable
jugé de l'homme est son état d'âme". (*L'Expérience morale
selon Rauh*, Rev. Phil., Jan. – June, 1923, p. 7.) Here again
we may compare the ethical views of such Existentialists as
Sartre and Camus who aim likewise at extracting motives for
action from the consideration of states of mind themselves
without reference to *given* values. (For the clear connection
between Sartre and Rauh cf. *L'Expérience morale*, p. 67.)
The founders of the life-philosophy in France are Guyau, Fouillée, and Ribot. They have their roots in the Positivism of Taine, although by enlarging it and allying it with evolutionary and biological theory they arrive at conclusions often opposed to its scientific determinism.

Guyau (1854-1888), at a time when mechanism and determinism were the watchwords, conceived in his "L'Irréligion de l'avenir" and his "Morale sans obligation", an "ethics of life" which would replace the traditional moral systems based on duty or law. The source of morality is life in all its spontaneity. Life itself is evolution and constant dépassement. Guyau follows it in its creation of new species and new forms up to man and, in man, through the birth of ever higher capacities for feeling. At each stage of life, indeed, are born qualitatively new emotions and, at the human level, emotions bringing consciousness of this life within, with all such consciousness entails in pleasures and exaltations. Therein we have the basis for a new morality; in place of religious precepts or moral laws man may find a motive for his actions in the love of risk, in the perpetual renewal of feeling; before him rises a possibility of infinite transcendence towards unknown regions of experience.

Alfred Fouillée (1838-1912) looks to psychology rather than biology. It is true that he combated Bergsonism and Pragmatism and the irrationalist current in general. Yet his doctrine of "idées-forces" belongs at bottom to the same
vitalist mode of thought. He terms his philosophy an "idéalisme volontariste", but what seems to constitute the "idea" for him is not what belongs to it specifically qua idea, that is the properties of truth or falsehood, of clarity or confusion, but its emotive power; it is by definition a state of consciousness, or feeling in the general sense (1).

His theory reposes on the thesis that all ideas are powers endowed with a dynamic force. Seen in this light, ideas form the groundwork of morality. He shows, for example, in his "Liberté et déterminisme" (1872) how the idea of liberty, independently of whether man is free or not, can be a positive force and become the equivalent of such liberty: by dint of believing he is free man acts freely and is endowed with the power of resistance against external necessity. It is in the force inherent in ideas or feelings by virtue of the "identité foncière entre la conscience et l'être" that lies the efficacy of moral ideals. "Une conscience qui n'exercerait elle-même aucune action serait une inconscience et, au lieu de dire: sum s'abimerait dans la non-existence. C'est ce qui fait que la causalité est immanente au sum et au cogito, qui revient ainsi à un volo (2)."

In particular, the Kantian categorical imperative can be made "le suprême persuasif".

Fouillé reconciles in some sort Idealism and Vitalism. Théodore Ribot is in essence a scientific Positivist and Naturalist. His importance lies in the recognition of an autonomous life of the feelings distinct from and prior to the life of reason. The sensibility — tendencies, emotions and passions — possesses a life of its own and a quality sui generis independent of any intellectual, symbolic elements. In his *Problèmes de psychologie affective* (1910) he studies the forms of the affective life and shows that even pleasure itself, far from being, as the intellectualist psychology would have it, sensation, is in reality "un événement psychologique sui generis, simple, indéfinissable, irréductible à tout autre (1)." He pays particular attention to the problems of memory, normal and pathological, and is led to distinguish an autonomous "mémoire affective" characterised by the reviviscence of the emotion experienced anew, as such, in its integrity, thus opposed to the intellectual memory which is the repetition of the circumstances accompanying the original emotion: "une mémoire affective pure, c'est-à-dire distincte et indépendante des circonstances concomitantes de l'émotion, reproduisant l'émotion elle-même (2)." He goes on to show that there exists a veritable logic of feelings or "logique affective", again independent of and prior to rational logic, one governed by the principle of finality and

expressive of the dynamism of life itself: "Le raisonnement rationnel tend vers une conclusion, le raisonnement émotionnel vers un but (1)."

Needless to say, in the development of the philosophy of life in France, the influence of Pragmatism and of Nietzsche (whose master was Guyau) were all-important. However, these, together with what was most significant in the preceding doctrines, were quickly amalgamated in the now classic philosophy of Bergson. Bergson's philosophy is too well known to require restatement; moreover the points where it interests a study of Gabriel Marcel, in particular the doctrine of Time, will be taken up in their proper place. What is important here is to underline its prevailing tone and significance. Bergson proposes to substitute for the method of objective analytical introspection a synthetic method of intuition capable of grasping the "immediate data of consciousness", that is the inner essential self in its concrete flux and fusion which eludes the grasp of the former method limited to the inspection of its arbitrarily dissociated and atomised states.

Intuition so defined reveals in the depths of consciousness, as constituting the very being itself, a duration. The latter is not decomposable into isolated states, but is a fusion of states, having all the unity and continuity of a melody. It is pure quality, refractory to analysis and (1) Ibid., pp. 49-50.
quantitative measurement; any attempt on the part of intelligence to introduce measurement and relation replaces the inner flux of life by an abstract representation of life and so falsifies it. Duration is synonymous with liberty, novelty, progress. Above all it is time, not the abstract time of conceptual thought, but the real time of experience, le temps vécu. Whereas the former, being essentially a spatialisation of time, is subject to measurement and spatial relation, therefore decomposable into discrete and homogeneous instants, real time or duration is flux, interpenetration of moments, pure succession and therefore absolute novelty and heterogeneity. "Au-dessous de la durée homogène, symbole extensif de la durée vraie, une psychologie attentive démèle donc une durée dont les moments hétérogènes se pénètrent; au-dessous de la multiplicité numérique des états conscients, une multiplicité qualitative; au-dessous du moi aux états bien définis, un moi où succession implique fusion et organisation (1)."

From this identification of time and consciousness derives a conception of memory according to which the whole of the past is seen as accumulated in the present. "La durée est le progrès continu du passé qui ronge l'avenir et qui s'incorpore en avançant... En réalité le passé se conserve de lui-même, automatiquement. Tout entier, sans doute, il nous suit à tout instant; ce que nous avons senti, pensé, voulu (1) Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, Paris, Alcan, 1930, p. 97.
depuis notre première enfance est là, penché sur le présent qui va s'y joindre, pressant contre la porte de la conscience qui voudrait le laisser dehors (1). " In the "pure" perception of our self thus the whole of the past is effectively included, but, since life involves the subjection to what is useful, consciousness must needs select: "Le mécanisme cérébral est précisément fait pour en refouler la presque totalité dans l'inconscient et pour n'introduire dans la conscience que ce ce qui est de nature à éclairer la situation présente, à aider l'action qui se prépare, à donner enfin un travail utile (2)." The pure present nonetheless is the whole of the past with the addition of novelty; it is essentially original, a completely new moment, even to the point of self-sufficiency: "Il est simple, et il ne peut pas avoir été déjà perçu, puisqu'il concentre dans son indivisibilité tout le perçu avec, en plus, ce que le présent y ajoute. C'est un moment original d'une nonmoins originale histoire (3)."

Bergson finds in this doctrine a means, in his view, of reconciling modern determinism and free-will. An act may be termed free in so far as it is the projection of the whole personality in the moment of action. It proceeds "de ses antécédents par une évolution sui generis, de telle sorte qu'on retrouve dans cette action les antécédents qui l'expliquent, et qu'elle y ajoute pourtant quelque chose

(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid., p. 7.
d'absolument nouveau, étant en progrès sur eux comme le fruit sur la fleur (1)." We shall see later the significance of this doctrine of freedom. For the moment what is important is to underline the inner inspiration of Bergsonism. It is at bottom a pure Heraclitean philosophy, time being the very stuff of selves and things, and itself pure *devenir*, flux, novelty and transformation. Moreover, it has the character of a Vitalism, matter being defined as "degraded energy". The fundamental reality is Spirit or the *Elan vital*, ceaseless creation and evolution; matter is but the "inverse movement" of this reality, energy which "se défait", becoming immobilised and repetitive. Duration, the stuff of selves, is also the stuff of things, so that cosmology is but a "psychologie retrounée".

It is no doubt in its anti-intellectualism that Bergson's philosophy proved the most potent influence. In the name of intuition, defined as feeling and instinct, it elaborates a critique of intelligence, presenting it as a secondary and derived faculty whose function is to enable mind to handle reality and subject it to the requirements of social utility, and which, to effect this, substitutes for the flux of living experience concepts and relations, thus discontinuity, homogeneity and immobility. In his anti-intellectualism Bergson goes much further than William James, who does not exclude intellectual relations from pure experience, in that for him (1) *Matière et Mémoire*, Paris, Alcan, 1914, p. 205.
a relational element (temporal and spatial in particular) is already present in that experience to be later disengaged and elaborated by reflection proper. Boutroux, in a significant passage, marks the opposition between the two thinkers on this point. "En outre, si la connaissance intellectuelle est, pour Bergson, dérivée et non primitive, c'est qu'elle contient des éléments qui apparaissent comme étrangers aux données immédiates et purement intuitives de la conscience: celles-ci, en effet, se reduisent à la durée en soi, dégagée, non seulement de l'espace, mais du temps lui-même. Pour James, c'est proprement le degré de complexité et de richesse de l'expérience qui en mesure le degré d'autenticité. L'expérience absolument immédiate et intuitive serait l'expérience totale (1)." Here again we shall have to come back to this fundamental factor of difference when discussing Marcel's temporal theories in the light of the paradoxes in the Bergsonian doctrine. Suffice to say at present that Bergson envisages a pure perception wherein subject and object are identified and prior to the relational consciousness. Thereby Bergsonism reveals its most significant characteristics. We can look on it in two ways, either as a Naturalism or better still a "psychologism" and subjectivism. But in both cases it is, in the words of Bergson himself, a "new positivism". It is, in other words, a philosophy of immanence, if only by the fact that it proclaims a pure

experience outwith spatial and even, as Boutroux notes, temporal relations proper, involving an absorption of the object in the subjective stream of consciousness. The proof is that intuition, for Bergson, does not involve any dialectic of interiorisation: it is a pure immediacy or state of pure subjectivity. Bergson's anti-intellectualism and his Immanence are corollary.

It is in religious thought first of all that the Bergsonian influence makes itself most clearly felt, notably in the Modernist and Neo-Catholic movement. Already at the end of the century such thinkers as Ollé-Laprune, Victor Giraud and Brunetière had laid siege to the fortress of scientific determinism and, returning to Pascal, had reaffirmed a mode of thought, operative in belief and faith, distinct from reason and bearing with it an emotional persuasion or "certitude morale". The generation which grew up in this climate found in Bergsonism a more solid justifica-
tion for their Catholicism. Edouard Le Roy is a notable example.

Le Roy defines mind in terms of creativity and spontaneity of feeling, pre-logical and pre-rational. "Il est essentiellement vie, durée, puissance de transformation et de progrès, un mot activité plastique et liberté créatrice. Les principes logiques eux-mêmes, à plus forte raison tous les autres, apparaissent aujourd'hui comme son œuvre, par
certaines côtés contingents (1)." All principles and truths of reason are relative and subject to constant transformation in the light of the devenir of consciousness and the circumstances of its action. Mind in its pure intuitive activity, prior that is to perception, operates by way of "dynamic schemas" expressive of its inner play and urge. "Nulle part il n'y a perception sans préperception, c'est-à-dire sans conscience préalable d'un schéma intuitif, qui exprime en devenir, en profondeur, dynamiquement ce que le discours des images explicites racontera plus tard en termes statiques, comme du tout fait étalé sur un seul plan (2)." It is thought not yet formed, constituting a species of "pré-logique" - "l'acte non encore épuisé, mais au contraire en pleine génération de résultats" - or again a sort of "musicalité du discours".

Applied to religion, this philosophy leads to an extreme of Immanentism which sees in dogma the changing symbols or intellectual expressions of the inner reality of mind. "Ce qui est invariant dans un dogme, c'est l'orientation qu'il donne à notre activité pratique, c'est la direction suivant laquelle il inféchit notre conduite. Mais les théories explicatives, les représentations intellectuelles changent incessamment au cours des âges selon les individus et les époques (3)." It ends up by finding the explanation of

(1) Sur la Notion de Vérité, Versailles, L. Luce, 1906, p. 27.
religion in man and his consciousness, dissipating transcendence and God Himself in the spiritual devenir. This tendency came to a head of course in Alfred's Loisy's La religion (1917) where the religious sense differs little from Jean Jaurès's historicism and humanitarianism. It is not surprising that the modernist movement should have found disfavour in the eyes of the Church and have been the object of papal condemnation in the famous Encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis of 8th September 1907.

Other neo-Catholic thinkers taking their inspiration from Bergson have however avoided extreme conclusions while remaining within the framework of an immanentist system. To this group belongs one who is perhaps the most important figure in modern religious thought in France and one whose influence has, if anything, increased in the last few years, namely Charles Péguy. Of him Bergson has said: "il a connu ma pensée la plus secrète, telle que je ne l'ai pas exprimée, telle que j'aurais voulu l'exprimer (1)."

The earliest influences upon Péguy were those of Jean Jaurès's Hegelian Socialism (notably through the intermediary of Lucien Herr, the great librarian at the Ecole Normale who left his mark on a whole generation of French writers) and also that of Georges Sorel. He was therefore fully prepared for the impact of Bergson upon him, tremendous in its effect. In keeping with the latter's doctrine, Péguy distinguishes

between "intuitions" and "systems", the latter mere "conveniences" even in the literal sense: "Ils veulent avant tout une philosophie, un système de pensée, un système de connaissance où on est assis. Ce qu'ils nomment la bonne ordonnance de la pensée, c'est la tranquillité du penseur (1)."

He develops this distinction in terms of the "se faisant" and the "tout fait". But he elaborates it in the form of a dualism both original and powerful. He sees life as a conflict between the living and the "tout fait", good and evil, "habitude" and "contre-habitude", body and spirit, sin and grace. The reality, he declares, is in neither of those opposites alone but in their inter-penetration. "Ce qu'il y a de redoutable dans la réalité de la vie, ce n'est pas la juxtaposition du bien et du mal, c'est leur interpenetration, c'est leur mutuelle incorporation, leur nourriture mutuelle, et, parfois, leur étrange, leur mystérieuse parenté' (2)."

Here the Hegelian dialectic is the means of developing the Bergsonian philosophy in the sense of an Existentialism; Péguy indeed illustrates the possibility of such a passage. While the Hegel in question and the one which comes to mind is the young Hegel of the Phenomenology, of the "contrite consciousness", whose dialectic moves on the concrete plane of life's conflicts before those have been transferred to the plane of ideal logic.

Viewing life as thus at the intersection of the principles of life and death, of good and evil, Péguy is led to rehabilitate sin and suffering as fundamentals of human experience and, even more, as properly ontological values, for together they constitute the "point d'inhabitude", the point of rupture in life's mechanism allowing for the action of grace and ultimate salvation. The role and function he attributes to "Misère" are more or less those attributed by Kierkegaard and later Existentialists to dread, namely the production of that "void" or break in necessity that opens up the "possibility of freedom".

Nevertheless, Péguy remains within the limits of an Immanentism and one that is even ultra-Bergsonian. This becomes apparent as he develops his series of contraries: between the mystic and the politic, morality and grace (for "la lettre tue" while grace is the vivifying principle, the "contre-habitude" or "la jeune enfant Espérance"); and finally between the "modern", symbolised by the rule of money, itself the symbol of the "tout fait", and the "anti-modern", represented by the Christian Middle Ages where all is simple, naive and spontaneous. Central to all these is the opposition between History (Clio) and Memory. History is the conversion of the living present into the past, the passim, alongside the events which are made to be lived. "L'histoire consiste essentiellement à passer au long de l'événement. La mémoire consiste essentiellement, étant
dedans l'événement, avant tout à n'en pas sortir, à y rester, et à le remonter en dedans... L'histoire est parallèle à l'événement, la mémoire lui est centrale et axiale (1).

At the root of this thesis is a cult of the present pure and simple, independent of all relational elements and grasped in a pure intuition. "Au lieu de considérer le présent lui-même, au lieu de considérer le présent présent, on considérait en réalité un présent passé, un présent figé, et fixé, un présent arrêté, inscrit, un présent rendu déterminé. Un présent historique (2)."

Péguy seems almost to outstrip Bergson in his determination to empty immediacy of the relational (including the properly temporal distinctions like past and future) element. His doctrine carries to an extreme "instantaneism" the premises inherent in Bergson's notions of a "pure" perception. Thereby it fails, in spite of its strength and originality, in spite of its strict preoccupation with concrete existence, to transcend the framework of what is after all a psychologism and vitalism, as witnessed by the reiterated appeal to "nature" and its intimations.

To refer, in conclusion, to one or two thinkers of a like Bergsonian inspiration, we might restrict ourselves to three of the more important in respect of their influence. Henri Bergson, relying upon Ward and Newman and notably their

(2) Note conjointe, loc. cit., p. 239.
distinction between "direct" and "reflexive" acts, contrasts the discursive logic with the logic of intuition and faith, the latter a certain "logique naturelle qu'on essayerait en vain d'astrondre ou de reduire aux règnes d'Aristote". "Le parallele n'est pas entre comprendre et sentir, mais entre comprendre, raisonner, d'une maniere directe, implicite, spontanee, et comprendre, raisonner d'une maniere reflexe et pleinement consciente (1)." In this way he hopes to present intuition and feeling as a superior and primary form of reason. In his application of this doctrine of intuition to religion he comes/naturally enough to make the mystic experience the whole essence of the latter, isolating the pure immediacy from the intellectual element in religious experience. It is thus he distinguishes between ascësis and prayer, the former active and involving method, preoccupation with external symbols, the latter passive in that the soul's energy is absorbed by the Divine energy. "La prière est le mouvement du coeur... Elle est transmutation... de l'agir au pâtir, de l'ascèse à l'union (2)." No doubt the two together are present in religious experience, but it is the latter which is its pure essence, for it alone gives a religious character to the combination of its operations. Bremond moreover has applied his distinction (in which there is more than a hint of Quietism) to the poetic experience in

his *Prière et Poesie* where he attempts in the same way to isolate the moment of "pure poetry", that is of contemplative emotion as distinct from the reflective operation, and to assimilate it to prayer.

On a quite different plane of thought the Bergsonian philosophy of life found its ethical expression in two very different writers, Georges Sorel and André Gide. Sorel's "philosophy of violence" shows marked traces of both Nietzschean and Marxist influence. He views all intellectual knowledge, whether it take the form of scientific principles or political ideologies, as mere instruments of action and more especially as weapons in the service of a dominant class (cf. *Les Illusions du progrès*). It is action which is the source of the moral life, although the moral life itself is for him subordinated to the collective life. History is seen as the product of a more or less unconscious will to power immanent in class-consciousness. His *Réflexions sur la violence* (1907) apply the doctrine of action to Socialism. It is not, he there declares, by means of principles and programmes that the proletariat may achieve power, but only by violent and revolutionary means. Principles and theories can have their place, not however as directives to action but as "myths" (of which the most important is the general strike), giving poetic and emotive form to the urge which alone is the mainspring of action and historical reality.

André Gide, together with Valéry and Bergson himself, is
undoubtedly the greatest influence in modern French thought and literature at large. We shall have occasion to treat his thought in considerable detail in the course of our exposé; it will suffice for the moment to indicate its general tenor and place in the period. His philosophy of life can be classified with justice as "Bergsonian". He is intent on rejecting all attempts at imposing form or law upon the spontaneity of the ever-changing and protean self. We must not "sacrifice truth to continuity, purity of line", but remain sensitive to the urge of the inner devenir accepting thereby all apparent contradictions. Action should remain essentially "gratuitous", the immediate expression of the "naiveté" of the real self; unencumbered by the artificiality of conscious motive or moral law. Gide's outlook carries to a logical conclusion the "realism of time" inherent in the Bergsonian philosophy. The cult of the miraculous instant divorced from its past-future context is, as we shall see in due course, the outcome of Bergson's peculiar and paradoxical theory of duration, for the elimination of relational elements in temporal experience can only deprive time of its very reality and isolate the present from the structure in which it is embedded. The "atomism" so visible in Gide is already implicit in Bergson's philosophy, however much it may differ in its type from the atomism he set out to, and indeed did, destroy.

In general, to sum up, the Bergsonian current exhibits
itself as a doctrine of immanence and, whatever its Realistic pretensions, it hardly succeeds in transcending the limits of what French thinkers have come to term "psychologism".

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None the less, Bergsonism stands as certainly the most potent movement in modern French thought, transforming the domains of ethics and religion as well as of esthetics and literary criticism. There is not a single French writer of value in the contemporary period who does not bear the trace of its influence. The source of its power is to be sought not so much in its conclusions as in the method of subjective enquiry it proposes for metaphysical exploration. And it is here that it has served as the starting-point for the elaboration of a Realism and philosophy of transcendence, whose germs are undoubtedly visible in Bergsonism but are engulfed in the general subjectivist and positivistic context.

The transition may be seen most clearly in the field of religious thought, and particularly in the philosophy of Maurice Blondel (with whom may be associated for our purpose Paul Claudel). It is true that Blondel's preliminary thesis, as propounded in L’Action (1893) is predominantly concerned with a quite Bergsonian critique of scientific and rational knowledge. The latter, we read, is symbolical in character and has value uniquely as the "auxiliaire de l'activite"
pratique". All rational and scientific principles have their foundation in a decree of the will. This will, which is the sole reality, certainly transcends the realm of clear consciousness; it is a certain "mystérieux connu". "Avant et après, au-dessous et au-dessus de la conscience de l'action, il y a quelque chose à savoir et non le moins important de l'action. La conscience n'est pas toute la science, pas plus qu'elle n'est toute la personne (1)."

In this there is nothing which is not Bergsonian, but the development of the argument takes us beyond the Bergsonian positivism. For this inner reality of will is not to be known simply by a single, simple and absolute intuition procuring, within the field of wholly immanent experience, a fusion of subject and object. On the contrary, the essence of this will, the true core of Being, immanent no doubt in consciousness, yet transcends the latter effectively, so that our being, and the whole realm of Being with which it is in contact, is separated from us by an immense interval. "Car le tout n'est pas de vouloir ce que nous sommes, c'est d'être ce que nous voulons, séparés que nous sommes pour ainsi dire de nous-mêmes par un immense abîme (2)."

Two consequences follow from this view. In the first place, transcendence is actively affirmed; the human agir is revealed as participating in a divine and wholly transcendent agir. "L'impuissance de fait et de droit, qui s'est révélée

(2) Ibid., p. 135.
à notre effort volontaire et par les exigences mêmes de notre action, traduit impérieusement la nécessité où nous sommes d'affirmer un transcendant (1). " The transcendent power of Divine grace is the source of, and is immanent in the consciousness of human action, the latter involving what he calls a "recours tacite à la coopération de la cause première (2)." "Dieu nous est plus intérieur que nous-mêmes", repeats Blondel after Ravaisson. Secondly, and more important still, it involves the substitution for the Bergsonian intuitive immediacy of a dialectical immediacy. The Being immanent in consciousness, separated from the seeker by an immense interval, can only be grasped by what Blondel terms a "méthode d'immanence", whereby participation is secured progressively by a series of continuous approximations. This dialectic operates certainly within immediacy, for Being is experienced immediately at every stage or level of the dialectic with varying degrees of compulsion. (And by immediacy he means feeling, so that his dialectic differs from the still intellectual dialectic of the Idealists, such as Lachelier and even Ravaisson.) But it is equally certainly not Bergson's simple intuition. On the contrary, it involves the view that in immediate experience there is a relational element and notably a temporal and even spatial relational content, implying a varying "distance" between Being and the self to be progressively narrowed although perhaps never

(2) Ibid., p. 365.
Blondel thus defines what we might call a "dialectique d'approfondissement" within immediacy working inside concrete existence at the point of intersection between Transcendence and Immanence, Time and Eternity. He thus lays down the condition and the method of an existentialist philosophy of religion. Moreover, he envisages the realm of transcendence as a universe of persons upheld by the activity of the Divine person. "Tout l'ordre des choses n'est que l'ensemble des moyens que nous devons vouloir et employer pour réaliser notre propre personne, en communion avec le dessein du tout et la volonté du Créateur (1)." He thus avoids the Absolutism of the Idealists, whose dialectic ends up more often than not in the vision of an Absolute Unity.

It is however true that, at times, the tone is transcendentalist and Idealistic, as at others it is Bergsonian. Blondel hovers, in fact, between an Idealism pure and simple with a tendency to mysticism, and a vitalist conception of the élance vital with all its temptations of immanentism. He is none the less the contemporary French philosopher with whom Gabriel Marcel has most in common. It will be for him to elaborate, in the light of the teachings of Phenomenology, the dialectic of existence still not fully explicit in

(1) Ibid., p. 366.
Blondel (1).

This above-mentioned tendency of Blondel's thought to merge into a Transcendentalism or into an Immanentism is a very common feature in all those thinkers whose starting-point is Bergsonism, and is indeed bound up with the equivocal nature of that philosophy. For the "pre-perception" or intuition of Bergson is, according to the way you look at it, either consciousness of a temporal devenir and submission to its promptings, or, by the fact that it excludes all relations and therefore temporal relation, a type of extra-temporal communion.

This double tendency is seen most clearly in Marcel's two friends and contemporaries, Jacques Rivière et Charles Du Bos, of whom we shall speak in detail in a later chapter. Both develop their religious thought on the basis of Bergsonism, the former in the sense of an Immanentism reminiscent of Péguy, the latter in the sense of a Transcendentalism.

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(1) We may couple with Blondel, besides Claudel, two religious thinkers of like inspiration, Abbe Laberthonnière (Essais de philosophie religieuse, Paris, Lethielleux, 1903) and Auguste Sabatier who affirms "la coexistence mystérieuse et réelle d'une cause particulière qui est moi, et d'une cause universelle qui est Dieu... C'est le mystère même d'où sort la religion avec une invincible nécessité." (Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion, 2nd ed., Paris, Fischbäcker, 1897, Preface, p. viii.)
A few words must be said of the Neo-Thomist movement in France in so far as it plays its part in the reestablishment of a Realism and philosophy of transcendence. In its reaction against the Kantian Idealism it has affinities with the Phenomenological school and, by the fact that Existentialism itself is an offshoot of the latter, it has some bearing on our subject.

The reinterpretation of Saint Thomas has taken various forms, the element of Realism being common to them all. Thus in Fathers Sertillanges and Garrigou-Lagrange there is a strong element of Bergsonism. While giving priority to the intellection of Being and the universal, they accept the Bergsonian conception of nature as a dynamic principle tending to self-realisation although never succeeding in realising its being, and they use it to justify the Scholastic distinction between essence and existence. Again, Father Maréchal seeks to interpret Kant anew in the light of Saint Thomas. While agreeing with the former that the object as known is phenomenal and grasped in a synthetic unity by virtue of the application of the categories to sense-experience, he sees in the activity of mind so directed to the seizure and comprehension of the real an activity of transcendence or, better, an inherent intentionality.

It is Jacques Maritain who has expressed most fully the Neo-Thomistic position. He claims indeed not to be re-interpreting Saint Thomas at all but applying his philosophy
anew to modern knowledge. He is principally known for his attack on Bergsonism in which he sees the great enemy of the *philosophia perennis*, substituting as it does change and spontaneity for the traditional intellectual categories of substance and being. In the new philosophy he sees "un phénoménisme absolu" and a form of "intellectual nihilism". In other works he devotes his attack to Descartes, victim of the "péché d'anges" and to Kant who, following in his footsteps, has destroyed the fundamental contact or unity of mind and being which it was the aim of the Christian philosophy to preserve and justify. He then goes on to develop anew the Thomistic theory of knowledge seen as a process whereby the mind, starting from the sensitive species given in sense-knowledge, extracts the intelligible species and grasps the object in conceptual knowledge.

In a recent article Maritain has claimed that Thomism is an existential philosophy, if not the existential philosophy. "C'est une pensée personnaliste, selon que la réalisme philosophique de Saint Thomas implique à chaque instant l'acte de la personne humaine toute entière, corps et âme, en face de l'être à pénétrer (1)." It is extremely doubtful if that is so of the objective philosophy of Saint Thomas, although a case can be made out for other Scholastics

such as Duns Scotus and Ockham (1). He also goes on to say:
"Sa philosophie est une philosophie non pas des essences, mais de l'existence; elle vit des intuitions naturelles de l'expérience sensible et de l'intelligence." But this requires reservation. What Neo-Thomism gives is a theory of intentionality, realistic in its inspiration (mind being intentionally directed towards an object of knowledge), but this does not alter the fact that the consummated act of knowledge for Saint Thomas is intellectual or conceptual, therefore mediate, and also by that fact bearing not upon the particular and the individual but upon the universal known in the particular.

It is therefore by its Realism that Neo-Scholasticism has played its part in the movement which culminated in Phenomenology and the later Existentialism. While speaking of the Realistic trend mention must be made of a certain Neoplatonic current. It is represented, for example, by Julien Benda, well-known as the author of La Trahison des clercs in which he castigates Bergsonism and Modernism. His own doctrine aims at preserving the eternal ideal values, but the static conception behind it makes it a strange

(1) This is principally true of Duns Scotus who, by affirming freedom and contingency on the one hand and the priority of the principle of individuation on the other - the individual being the ultima realitas, comprising a haecceitas or positive qualities of individuation added to the universal quiddity or essence (entitas individui est diversa ab omni entitate quidditativa) - transforms a philosophy of essences into a philosophy of existence.
survival from the past, out of touch with modern needs. The other representative, strangely enough, is Marcel Proust, too often presented as a Bergsonian. In actual fact his work describes the devouring and disrupting action of time on being, only to show the possibility of transcending temporal succession by means of an extra-temporal intuition (effected by memory conjoined with present sensation) revealing the eternal essences of things and of the self. It forms a sort of Platonism where the Idea or Essence is to be taken not as a logical universal but as a Generality endowed with power — something like the idée-force of Fouillée. However, we are now properly in the extreme contemporary period, and it is not our aim in this introductory chapter to bring the thought of Marcel into parallel with that of his contemporaries in any detail. We shall leave this to be done as the occasion requires.

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Our survey has revealed various currents of thought often overlapping but reducible to the following. An Idealism or philosophy of consciousness and liberty, hostile in general to metaphysics and transcendence. An Idealism, employing an intellectual dialectic and, in its monistic conclusions, positing an Absolute Spirit or Unity, immanent but transcending finite consciousness, with which union is
achieved once the finite and the temporal are transcended in the semi-mystic experience. A Bergsonian current which rehabilitates the concrete but remains tied to a "psychologism" and doctrine of immanence, where the reality, identified with the devenir of consciousness, is grasped in a simple, absolute intuition impermeable to any dialectic. A Thomistic Realism which rehabilitates the sense of being and transcendence but remains conceptualist at bottom. Lastly, the beginnings of a Subjective Realism, taking concrete experience as its starting-point and its end but revealing within that experience a transcendent; a transcendent which is other than the extra-temporal Universal One of Idealism, rather a plurality of personal entities engaged in time; a transcendent which is not the object of a simple intuition but the term of a dialectic of immediacy which elucidates and comprehends the temporal structure of existence and, transcending the layers of this structure without ever wholly leaving it, reveals the eternal in and through time itself.

It is this method and those conclusions, implicit rather than explicit in thinkers such as Blondel, which Gabriel Marcel will bring to the full light of day; but he will do so with the help of the phenomenological and existential philosophies, which provided him, in their notion of "situation", with the medium for such a dialectic.
As a conclusion to this chapter we shall refer to some of the currents and cross-currents of the Existential philosophy as developed in France, although here again parallels will be reserved for a later context.

The philosophy of Existence developed in France in the years after the Great War. In its original form it can hardly be termed a school. The central figure at this period is undoubtedly Gabriel Marcel, whose thought evolves certainly on existentialist lines yet largely independently of the constituted German school. With him is linked a group of philosophers whose organ becomes the *Recherches philosophiques*; and it is tempting, after the event, to talk of this group as Existentialist. But although what links them is a common phenomenological method intent on elucidating the structure of concrete existence taken in its temporal and historical substance, their actual thought varies considerably (1). We find Louis Lavelle and René Le Senne, the one the product of French Spiritualism, the other of the philosophy of consciousness: Gurvitch, largely influenced by Dilthey; E. Levinas, more obviously Existentialist; while Sartre himself, to judge by an article such as *Transcendance de l'Égo* (2), appears simply as a Phenomenologist, as indeed his thesis on *L'Imaginaire* also indicates.

It would be more accurate at this stage to talk of a

(1) Jean Wahl's *Vers le concret* (Paris, Vrin, 1932) summarises in its title the common tendencies of the group.
Phenomenological rather than of an Existentialist school, its members applying the methods proposed by Husserl to various domains of thought, but applying it in the interests of their own particular philosophical outlook.

It is during the years of the late war that something of a French Existentialist school appeared, centred on the philosophy of Sartre. By this time the principal founders of Existentialism had made their influence felt. Jean Wahl's *Etudes Kierkegaardtiennes* (1) was an epoch-making work in contemporary French thought. As for Jaspers and Heidegger, whose thought had been made known in articles, their ideas were now assimilated and began to take form in the works of the younger writers.

In sketching the cross-currents of the movement we might consider it under two heads, first method and, second, content; for Existentialism is both a methodology and an ethical or ethico-religious doctrine. Let us first take the question of method and begin, as always in this subject, from Kierkegaard.

Kierkegaard's starting-point is a criticism of Hegelian Absolutism and its claim to explain reality in terms of logic and in terms of an Absolute beyond the contingencies of time and individuality. He saw there the type of what he called "objective" thinking, in that it empties the thinker of all the individuality, passion and feeling which makes him an existing, concrete self. In such thinking he has become an (1) Paris, Aubier, 1938.
anonymous generality, and the object of his thought an abstraction without relevance to his existing situation. In the place of this thinker he puts the "subjective", "passionate" or "existential" thinker; and proclaims existence to be prior to essence. In short, it is only in existing, feeling, suffering that the individual may become aware of his true self and being.

It must not be thought, however, that this self is identical with the empirical self of consciousness. Existence has a volume or weight; the self is engaged in time, it is "in the world". But selfhood is not exhausted by its immersion in time; beyond it, at the heart and in the depth of time, lies its hidden source, its eternal and transcendent being. The "inwardness" of existential thinking is directed to the grasping of this obscure core of selfhood. The method constitutes a dialectic, not the logical dialectic of Hegel, but a dialectic which is one with the very process of existing, where, with ever deeper passionate and willed activity, the eternal self and the Divine Being are both made effective and revealed in the individual's living.

The German school of Existentialism proceeds no doubt from Kierkegaard, but in point of method the immediate determining factor was the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. The intuitionary doctrine of Husserl envisages a realm of being or essences, conceived as concrete entities rather than abstract generalities, made known to intuition in a species
of "vision" after a suspension of the empirical consciousness and its replacement by the activities of the pure ego or pure consciousness. With this intuitionism is linked his doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness: "le fait que toute conscience est non seulement conscience, mais aussi conscience de quelque chose, ayant un rapport à l'objet (1)"; that the spiritual life is everywhere characterised by a "sense" or direction. We shall attempt later to show the relationship between certain aspects of Husserl's phenomenology, in particular the "phenomenological reduction" and Marcel's dialectic. For the moment, let us note how phenomenology affects existential method.

Husserl advocates a new way of treating reality, that is by phenomenological description: the intuition and description of the realm of the transcendent and extra-temporal essences which are implicit in every act of consciousness, although made visible only in a type of inward vision which transcends the purely psychological. The method may be applied to all domains of knowledge and reality, for each has its own category of "eidetic" essences capable of being revealed in visionary experience. The point of contact between Phenomenology and Existentialism is in the sort of "subjective realism" it involves; "le sentiment que l'Être est quelque

chose de consistant, qu'il vaut et pèse en quelque manière, que le monde réel est inéluctable, que les 'relations intelligibles' puissent toute leur signification dans les rapports que, hommes concrets, nous entretenons avec la réalité concrète (1)." For the intentionality or "sense" implicated in every act of mind indicates no mere external subject-object relationship but an immediate participation of mind in being (2).

It was Max Scheler who applied this method to the description and elucidation of existence. To do this he replaced Husserl's intellectual intuition (or better, vision) by an emotional one. It was to be achieved by a similar transcending of the psychological enabling the existing self to grasp the spiritual content of his living experience. It reveals the "eternal in man", the eternal values and purposes which are contained therein and are implicit in every intentional act of will, passion or feeling. Love, for example, he described as a type of "intentional sympathy" directed towards persons; faith as bound up with an emotional intuition of the divine.

In short, the phenomenological "description" of existence links up with Kierkegaard's "subjective thinking". Both involve a subjective exploration of existence, undertaken simultaneously with the act of existing and leading to the

(2) Cf. Ibid., p. 46.
revelation of the transcendent being immanent in willed and passionate experience, the "eternal in man", implicated in his feeling and constituting the object or end towards which his existence is directed and of whose realisation his existence is the means.

With Karl Jaspers the phenomenological method as applied to existence takes on a more precise form. It is he who indicates in precise terms the conditions in which the method can operate. These are to be found in what he calls the "fundamental situations" (Grenzsituationen), that is the moments of supreme/existential experience, such as love, faith, suffering, dread and, above all, the proximity of death.

With Martin Heidegger the method becomes fully conscious of its nature and means. Heidegger's avowed aim is the creation of an Ontology, to establish a truth or idea of being. This explicitation of being will be secured by a description and elucidation of the human situation or Dasein - die Metaphysick des Daseins als Fundamentalontologie (1). This means that the construction of the idea of being proceeds pari passu with the realisation of being, that is, for Heidegger, with the process of transcendence whereby the self comes to "ex-sist" and transcend its "in-sistence" in temporal succession. The self indeed is "in-the-world", engaged in a certain spatio-temporal structure and amid conditions which determine its character as an existent.

(1) Kant uнд das Problem der Metaphysick, chp. IV, sec. C.
These are the various "affective-situations", and it is by taking cognisance of them and at the same time dealing with them that the being of the self is both "unveiled" and "realised" – das Dasein ist sein Da. "La situation-affective (Befindlichkeit) que nous fait sentir cette tonalité (Stimmung), non seulement nous dévoile chaque fois à sa manière l'existant en son ensemble, mais ce dévoilement – loin d'être un simple accident – est en même temps l'historial essentiel dans lequel se réalise notre réalité-humaine (1)."

On the one hand, then, existence is revealing (erschliessend) of being, and being revealed (Erschlossenheit): as such it is "ontological" truth, informative of the nature of being. On the other hand, this revelation of being is, for the existing self, realisation of its being, its being made "present" to it: and as such it is "ontic" truth (2). It is therefore pari passu with the striving after self-realisation and self-transcendence that Ontology or the science of being is constructed. "Le dépassement de l'existant s'historialise dans l'essence de la réalité-humaine. Mais ce dépassement, c'est la Métaphysique elle-même (3)."

In actual fact, the "ontological" often predominates over the "ontic" in Heidegger, as compared with Jaspers or Scheler. Much of his analysis, particularly that bearing on the being of "nothing" and its relation to

(2) Cf. H. Corbin, op. cit., Introd., p. 15.
(3) Qu'est-ce que la métaphysique? p. 42.
negation (inspired moreover by Hegel), is pure dialectic.

When we come to the French Existentialists, we find the same method applied: that is, the construction of an Ontology by way of an elucidation of existential experience, which is simultaneously an act of existing and transcending.

Gabriel Marcel is concerned chiefly with the "ontic", and he follows Jaspers in applying his dialectic to fundamental situations which become in his philosophy "concrete approaches" to being, where the self is both the thinker and the actor, and knowledge both self-revelation and self-realisation. His method, original in itself, is not in any case influenced by Jaspers alone; it has undoubtedly for one of its sources the "méthode d'immanence" of Maurice Blondel and generally that "subjective realism" developed from Bergsonian intuition.

The philosophy of Louis Lavelle, in part existentialist, although its predominant motif issues from French Spiritualism, is likewise characterised in its method by the refusal to separate existence from the idea of existence and his latest work, Introduction a l'Ontologie (1) seeks to determine the categories of being in and through the revelation of being given in existence.

Jean-Paul Sartre shows more clearly the influence of Heidegger. He follows the classic method, taking concrete, affective situations which are also modes of self-realisation, (1) Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1947.
elucidating the mind-body nexus, defining the transcendence implicit in free activity, etc. But his principal preoccupation is with the "ontological" rather than the "ontic"; he is even more intent than Heidegger on defining the notion of being and the nature of the being to be attributed to "nothing". M. Jean Wahl speaks even of his two philosophies, his "existentialisme" or Ontology, and his "existentialisme" or ethico-existential doctrine proper (1). There is indeed, we may agree with Wahl, a certain discrepancy between the two.

It would be justifiable, in our view, to attribute this ontological preoccupation with the idea and science of being not only to the influence of Heidegger but equally to the specifically French "philosophy of consciousness". Sartre's whole speculation is built upon an analysis (as much psychological as phenomenological) of the being of consciousness, characterised by the separation of subject and object, the self becoming a "pour-soi", and, on the other hand, the being of things, characterised by complete self-identity (en-soi); and it is from this analysis, reminiscent of Valéry and Alain, that he is enabled to define the former (the human reality) as liberty or the "project", the pursuit of a self-identity never secured.

In this Sartre has a predecessor in René Le Senne, who is or seems almost independent of non-French influences,

although the method is phenomenological in the general sense. He analyses the conditions of value by way of a description "des démarches transcendantales de l'esprit (1)"; and these he finds to reside in the "obstacle", fundamental factor and condition of human consciousness and perception. Although the terminology is phenomenological, this analysis hardly goes beyond the limits of the "transcendental" psychology of the later French Idealists. In many ways, Le Senné, in point of method, is a sort of intermediary between Sartre and the Germans, as Blondel is, for Marcel.

It is therefore apparent that French Existentialism is not, as might seem, a mere offshoot of foreign and especially German influence; on the contrary, it represents, in many respects, an adaptation of contemporary modes and methods to the substance and methodology of traditional French speculation.

Let us turn now to the themes of Existentialism. The fundamental notion, common to all forms, is that of "engagement". Man is "in the world", in time, yet conscious of an eternal self, and with it a realm of eternal Being - others and God it may be - transcending his temporal being. Existence is therefore a problem, not something given, but something to be striven for. He can live on the plane of anonymous, objective and empirical being, but he cannot then be said to exist, to be realising his "authentic" self. He

exists only by the realisation of the true being within him; and this realisation can only be achieved in time itself, by the introduction of eternity into time, of infinity into the finite. Existence is the intersection of Time and Eternity, the making effective of the eternal realm in the full temporal present of purposive action and "passionate" living wherein the whole range of past and anticipated future is immanent. It is therefore "ex-sistence" or "trans-scendence" accomplished within the concrete spatio-temporal structure in which the self is "in-sistent".

Kierkegaard is the first to define this field of existence. In normal living man is a mere anonymous cipher, he acts and thinks as "the crowd"; he is the slave of temporal succession. The realisation of his anonymity and particularly of the dissolution of all his purposes in time's flow can give rise to despair or dread, the sentiment of vanity or "nothingness". Now, deeply experienced, dread becomes the "possibility of freedom". He can break the chain of necessity and assert himself as an existing being: become aware of his eternal purposes and, in particular, of his relation to God through Christ, he can now seek to realise his true destiny or "authentic life" by purposive willed action and faith: he thus substitutes for temporal succession the living present bearing in it all his significant past and future purpose. Ultimately, however, be it noted, existence is for Kierkegaard a "paradox": it
is action and self-assertion but suspended upon a blind act of faith in an arbitrary Deity.

The Existentialism of Kierkegaard contains two different possibilities of development. On the one hand, his pessimism and irrationalism, coupled with the call to self-affirmation, may lead to an irrational cult of will, where action is the positive product of a negative despair; on the other, his affirmation of a transcendent Divinity as the end and purpose of existence and willed assertion, and through communion with whom the self is put into relation with others, lays the basis of a doctrine of communion and transcendence.

In modern Existentialists, this double meaning becomes explicit (we leave out of account theologians proper such as Karl Barth who develops the eschatological content). Thus Max Scheler and Martin Buber elaborate a philosophy of communion that gives primacy in existence to love through which the self participates in the realm of persons and above all communes with God the "Person of Persons". So too Jaspers, after repeating Kierkegaard's strictures on the "one", the anonymous self of empirical living, and bringing out the despair associated with the latter, shows how in the "fundamental situations" of love, suffering and sense of death the self may achieve its true nature by personal decision and by the will to self-realisation through communion.

With Jaspers, however, a significant change occurs; for
the transcendent he envisages and to which he gives the name of God is no longer, as with Kierkegaard, the Man-God but simply the "Other", an obscure indeterminate realm of being. The next step is taken by Heidegger who eliminates God as such, and leaves at the centre man alone and the problem of his self-creation. If he preserves the notion of transcendence it is in the sense of a general background of being constituting the motive-power of man's urge to realisation.

Heidegger accepts the general description of the "One" and relates the latter to man's subjection to time (Geworfenheit). His most important analysis deals with the metaphysical nature of dread. This he sees as bound up with temporal succession. Man sees all his purposes and aims doomed to dissolution, and this is the origin of dread which, at the extreme, becomes the sense of death and "nothingness". It is in that supreme despair, however, that he finds the motive-power or "possibility" which allows him to pass from anonymity to existence. For death is an absolute, it is the one end in life which must come to pass. By living this sense to the full he is freed from fate and at last infuses meaning into his life and action. It is for him to make the "resolute decision" and, accepting his finite condition as irrevocable and essentially his, assert himself as creator and sole creator of his destiny. Thereby he transcends the temporal flow and, emerging from his "in-sistence" in time, "ex-sists" as a self in full
possession of its being, for, having recovered its one eternal purpose, his self has now become its own ground.

Heidegger's philosophy shows the point where the influence of Nietzsche comes to play its part in Existentialism. His is a philosophy of liberty, but of a liberty equated with despair: the very freedom it asserts is grounded in the sense of death and nothingness; indeed he defines it as a "liberty for death". And it is significant that he attributes, as Sartre will do, a reality to "nothingness".

When we come to the French Existentialists, we find the same double trend. On the one hand a doctrine of transcendence, of communion, love and hope, essentially Christian in inspiration; and of this Gabriel Marcel is the supreme representative, although we find it represented, too, by such movements as the "Personalism" of Emmanuel Mounier and the Review Esprit (1). In this current, the influence of Scheler and Jaspers combines with French Christian thought from Pascal to Blondel. On the other hand, we have the Existentialism of Sartre which shows the influence of Heidegger and Nietzsche coupled with that of the French philosophers of contingency such as Valéry or of "experience" such as Frédéric Rauh (2). He, like Heidegger, will attribute a positive reality to

(1) The Idealism of Louis Lavelle is also a philosophy of transcendence and communion, but, although it exhibits several existentialist traits, it is at bottom a philosophy of the Absolute which harks back to Malebranche.
(2) The influence of Nietzsche is most directly apparent in the work of Albert Camus and particularly in L'Expérience intérieure of Georges Bataille (Paris, Gallimard, 1943).
nothingness and despair, and will see in them not only the very being of man but the grounds of his freedom. Moreover, this freedom will be for him an unconditioned self-assertion viewed as a "pro-ject" or constant dépassement and creation of human values - an ethic resembling at times a doctrine of action for action's sake.

It is not that Sartre, any more than Heidegger, eliminates the notion of transcendence, and indeed both stipulate that self-assertion involves communion with others; but such communion, we shall see, is in reality a means to self-affirmation, the "other" only existing as a psychological state in the mind of the subject. In actual fact, transcendence signifies for them the mere "movement" or urge of will towards expansion, what we might call simply its "outwardness". The "sense" or "intention", implicit, as both Phenomenologists and Existentialists declare, in conscious and therefore willed activity, has become divorced from its object and the "movement of transcendence" has become the whole of transcendence. M. Wahl defines with the utmost accuracy this sort of inverted transcendence when he says that in Heidegger's philosophy "l'idée de transcendance perd son caractère religieux, et prend paradoxalement une sorte de caractère immanent; c'est une transcendance dans l'immanence (1)." The result will be a philosophy of freedom, as opposed to a philosophy of being in the positive

sense, coupled with a philosophy of negation.

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This brief sketch of the currents and cross-currents of contemporary French thought will, we hope, serve to illuminate many of the themes in Gabriel Marcel's doctrine which we are about to discuss, and also place this doctrine as a whole in the nexus of intellectual relationships from which no philosopher, least of all an Existentialist, should be sundered. It may also make clear that the Existentialist movement in France is not only much more complex than would appear to the uninitiated, but that its roots are, to a greater extent than is realised, and without discounting the obvious external influences, in traditional French thought.
Known equally as dramatist and as philosopher, M. Gabriel Marcel is one of the most noted members of the group of contemporary French thinkers, which includes M. Louis Lavelle and M. René Le Senne and which is working for the renewal of Ontology. But whereas they, for the most part, continue along the lines of traditional French spiritualism from Descartes and Malebranche to Maine de Biran, Ravaissone and Jules Lachelier, and arrive at a philosophy of Being considered as Pure Act, Gabriel Marcel, less systematic and more intent on the elucidation of concrete Being, has evolved a philosophy akin to that of Kierkegaard and the Existentialists; nearest to Kierkegaard in that his metaphysics has opened up the way to theology and religion and cannot be separated from his ardently Catholic standpoint (his conversion took place in 1929); in short, a system of antinomies expressive of the opposition between the world of objective thought and the world of true Selfhood, concrete Being and Existence, access to which is provided in and through what Jaspers terms "limit-situations" (Grenzsituationen) and Marcel "concrete approaches" (approches concretés) such as love, death, etc., situations properly dramatic in that conditions of time are transcended rather than annulled and self is revealed to self
Mr. Marcel has recently published a text (1) which throws considerable light on the fundamental attitudes in his intellectual and moral make-up determining his philosophical development.

Perhaps the "constant" of his mentality has been what he describes as "une attitude hostile et presque méprisante en face de l'empirisme". This admission thus baldly stated must not be misread. Marcel's whole thought is built upon a Realism. But what traditional philosophy defined as "experience" always seemed to him a mere abstraction: "L'expérience telle que l'ont conçue la plupart des philosophes se présentait à moi comme impure, comme profondément suspecte." (p. 294.) What Marcel rejected from the beginning was the traditional empiricism which limits the mind to knowledge of subjective and phenomenal states. From the first, the "thought of a supra-sensible world dominated in a certain sense his spiritual development", by which he means to imply the capacity of mind to know, even within the limits of sense-experience properly defined and analysed, the realities presented to experience. "Philosophe, ce fut donc sans doute pour moi dès l'origine transcender." (Ibid.)

Impatient with phenomenalism, Marcel was no less so with Transcendental Idealism which loses itself in a world

of abstractions and substitutes an ideal self for the concrete self that alone seemed to Marcel the valid object of philosophical thinking. Not only Spinoza, to whose doctrine he was always "strangely refractory", and Hegel failed to attract him, but Fichte too by the "impossibilité, par lui-même insuffisamment reconnue, où il me semblait être de passer du moi absolu au moi concret, à ce que je ne pouvais me tenir de regarder comme le moi véritable." (p. 295.)

On the contrary, Schelling seemed to point the way to a new empiricism such as might satisfy his "appetite for the concrete":

A tort ou à raison, il me semblait discerner au contraire, au terme de l'immense péripole accompli par Schelling, une lumière qui peut-être un jour éclairerait ma propre route. N'y avait-il pas un chemin ardu qui permettrait d'accéder à un empirisme supérieur, et de faire droit à cette exigence de l'individuel et du concret que je portais en moi? En d'autres termes, l'expérience, loin d'être un tremplin, n'était-elle pas pour moi une terre promise? (Ibid., pp. 295-6.)

It is indeed through the later Idealism of Schelling that Marcel will accede to his own type of Realism and, transcending the premises of the Schellingian doctrine, constitute the philosophy of feeling that provides the new and higher empiricism of which he speaks.

This "appetite for the concrete" was undoubtedly predetermined in the young Marcel by the influence of his early education. His father, nourished on the Positivism of Taine, Spencer and Renan, was a typical 19th century agnostic.
His mother having died in his childhood, his aunt replaced her as the head of the household. The latter, a most remarkable and lofty-minded woman, of Jewish origin but later a protestant convert, seemed to have imbibed that harsh moralism and cult of law common both to the Hebrew and the Protestant, and displayed in a rigorism of moral judgment and in a depreciation of nature and instinct:

Nourrie des poètes pessimistes du XIXe siècle, de Vigny à Mme Ackermann, elle avait une conscience aiguë et comme implacable du non-sens vital; impossible à ses yeux de faire confiance à la nature, qui, si même elle n'est pas mauvaise dans son fond, est du moins radicalement indifférente à l'opposition du bien et du mal. (Ibid., p. 300.)

Closed to religious feeling as such, his aunt was no less an agnostic than his father, in Marcel's view, and both combined to stifle the forces of feeling and disrupt the natural communion of his mind with reality:

Certes, on peut dire qu'un irréductible agnosticisme religieux était commun à mon père et à ma tante, mais il n'était pas affecté du même signe. Esthétique chez l'un, éthique chez l'autre, il composait autour de moi une atmosphère instable et aride dans laquelle, sans m'en rendre bien compte, je sais maintenant que j'ai toujours respiré difficilement. (Ibid.)

Hence a constant state of hypertension, made the worse by his being an only child; his every feeling and action supervised, he was at every moment subjected to moral judgment and directed in accordance with abstract imperatives: "mon enfance, dis-je, a souffert d'un état d'hypertension, et comme de harcèlement intérieur qui à certaines époques
atteignit un paroxysme intolérable." (Ibid., p. 301.) Even worse, in Marcel's view, was the lycée system which, with its classifications and abstract methods of teaching, creates around the pupil an "univers désertique".

These influences in combination, says Marcel, produced in him a fear and sense of death and its proximity, manifest in nameless terrors: "l'angoisse continuelle qui était liée pour moi à la vie scolaire s'articulait avec un sentiment informulé de l'irrévocable et de la mort." (Ibid., p. 303.) The sentiment of death, so important in his later philosophy, is already at this early date, as it will be throughout, associated not so much with the idea of an end or accomplishment, but with that of an "absence", experienced whenever the contact with reality and life is replaced by a system of abstractions and objective judgments, whether moral or intellectual:

Je ne pense pas, je le répète, que la protestation exaspirée que dressait ma conscience contre le régime abstrait et inhumain du lycée puisse se séparer de celle, infinité moins distincte, mais aussi plus profonde, qu'éveillait au fond de moi le monde à la fois sillonné d'impératifs éthiques et ravagé par un désespoir invincible dans lequel on entendait malgré tout me faire vivre.

Me voici force de constater une fois de plus que penser, formuler, juger, au fond, c'est toujours trahir. (Ibid., p. 304.)

On the other hand, his mother, although dead, did not cease to exercise an influence: "Indépendamment des rares images précises que j'ai pu conserver d'elle, elle n'est restée présente, mystérieusement elle a toujours été avec
moi." (Ibid., p. 302.) In this influence from beyond the grave is prefigured Marcel's belief in spiritual presences made known in experience both normal and supra-normal, and their power to influence and direct. Apart from that, however, the memory of his mother seems to have acted, from the earliest time, as type and symbol of a reality, real, concrete, immanent in experience by way of feeling; immediately known, in contrast with the system of abstractions proposed to him. Thus from the beginning, a "strange duality at the heart of my life", a "secret polarity between the invisible and the visible", between appearance and reality (terms he employs at the early stage of his thought when Bradley's influence is apparent), between knowledge of reality in its concrete vital essence and knowledge of abstractions, which is simply the former degraded into "objectivity".

This direct experience of reality, however, Marcel knew in his childhood through travel, and principally when in his ninth year his family lived in Stockholm where his father was minister plenipotentiary; or at various periods during vacations spent in the Bavarian Alps and elsewhere in Europe. He indicates, however, the peculiar character of this experience and of his "passion spontanée pour les voyages et pour la géographie". He found satisfaction for his inner need of the concrete only in his visits to places charged with all the novelty of the unknown; he despised the familiar,
the family holiday on the Loire or at Mont St Michel. But
this not through snobbery but by reason of the spiritual
need within him. This need expressed itself in the desire
for communion with the concrete in all its ever-new reality
which alone the distant could satisfy, as opposed to the
familiar, whose reality has been replaced by the stereotyped
abstractions of the guide-book. At bottom, then, was
"l'horreur précoce du défloré, l'idée ingénue et absurde que
ce qui est éloigné dans l'espace, c'est aussi le non-foule,
le non-profane, avec quoi l'âme contracte une alliance intime
et enivrée, au lieu que le proche, le familier est dénaturé
et souillé par la couche d'adjectifs stéréotypés dont le
recouvre chaque visiteur dominical." (Ibid., p. 305.)

This predilection is at the origin of Marcel's later
distinction between Being and Having (approximating to the
Bergsonian one between the vivant and the tout fait). In
short, it represents something more than a mere psychological
need, rather a metaphysical one. But in it is explicit
another tendency of his later thought, the notion of a
reality become "present" to mind by a certain transcending
of space as of time, substituting for the abstract spatio-
temporal categories a here and now or spatio-temporal instant
wherein the concrete reality is grasped immediately:

Mais je ne crois pas me tromper en reconnaissant
malgré tout dans cette disposition le souci
métaphysique de découvrir l'intime au cœur du
plus distant, c'est-à-dire au fond non point
de triompher extérieurement de l'espace par la
vitesse, mais de lui arracher un secret spirituel
qui réduirait à néant sa puissance de ségrégation. (Ibid., p. 305.)

Le monde m'apparaissait alors, et m'apparaît sans doute encore aujourd'hui, comme le lieu indéterminé où il s'agirait d'étendre le plus possible la zone du chez-soi, de réduire au maximum celle de l'abstractionment conçu, ou du confusément imaginaire, du connu par oui-dire, c'est-à-dire en fin de compte du non-vécu.

(Ibid., p. 306.)

These new metaphysical categories of the "presence" and the spatio-temporal here and now, or metaphysical "chez-soi" will later be established in Etre et Avoir and Du Refus à l'Invocation and elsewhere, but before becoming categories they were experiences. (pp. 306-7.) In such communion with natural sites Marcel satisfied his "appetite for the concrete" not in any pantheistic ecstasy, for such pantheism is repugnant to him in that it is incapable "de/laisser subsister la vie personnelle dans sa plénitude concrète". (Ibid., p. 308.) Nature and human life have at all times appeared to him as the realm of "personal" entities, in the light of a Pluralism rather than a Monism.

On the basis of these inner promptings, Marcel's approach to the problems of philosophy and metaphysics could not fail to be existential. As he himself says, the traditional problem of the existence of the external world, or of the self for that matter, was not the form which his enquiry took. To deny the reality of the world seemed to him absurd; it is not there that the supreme question lies:

La vraie question n'était-elle pas bien plutôt de savoir de quel type était cette existence.
The problem is, given a self existing in a world of persons and things existing, to define the mode of their existence. It is existence itself which constitutes the problem. It is possible to grasp those realities immediately in their inner existential essence or, by the process of abstraction, convert them into objects and endow them with a purely ideal existence. At the root of Marcel's philosophy is a Realism which rehabilitates as against Idealism the immediacy of sensation and feeling and their intentional character:

It is with the conditions under which this ontological or transcendent is revealed and the existent brought to light that Marcel's philosophy is concerned on the one hand, and with the nature of this existent on the other. With regard to the latter, the realm of existence will prove to
be a realm of personal relationships, of entities, of "presences" made known within the field of experience to the existing subject and acting as obscure and mysterious influences upon each other and upon the subject-mind, Marcel will define this type of relationship as "participation", such as obtains in the domain of drama where the terms of the relation remain distinct while merging:

Je vois distinctement aujourd'hui que je tendais ainsi à substituer un type de rapport concret et dramatique aux relations encore tout abstraites d'inérence ou d'extériorité entre lesquelles la philosophie traditionnelle prétendait me contraindre à opter. (p. 317v)

He has stated that his early interest in drama and music was of great importance in determining this conception of a "supra-relational" participation. (p. 297v)

For Marcel, the conditions necessary for the revelation of the transcendent and for the latter to act as a "presence" upon the self are to be found in certain existential "situations" such as love, suffering, death. Here we remain within the limits of so-called normal experience, but, as he proceeds, his conception of such experience is enlarged to include the supra-normal.

The influence of his experiences in the 1914-18 war were decisive from this point of view. In August 1914, he replaced Xavier Léon as head of a service of information organised by the French Red Cross. One of his tasks was to trace soldiers presumed lost; and he came up against numerous cases of metaphysical phenomena whose validity
seemed to him unquestionable. The study of those phenomena was to lead him to admit the value of prophetic foresight and telepathy and to elaborate a theory of memory and anticipation which, applicable both to supra-normal and normal experience, would establish their function as "indices ontologiques". His later conversion (in 1929) did nothing to dissuade him from these views: it simply brought him to interpret such experiences anew as the products of a "grace". And he has never ceased to call for a greater attention to be paid to them by metaphysicians:

Finally, it must be observed from the outset that Marcel's philosophy will be the contrary of a Naturalism or an Idealism (apart from an Idealistic first phase), by its insistence on the fissure in human existence. The revelation of Being, of the true self and of other personal realities is no mere natural phenomenon. Man is at every moment subject to the temptations of objectivity and abstraction whereby he transforms both his self and other selves into ciphers and treats Being as a "pure spectacle". Sin, error and treason are fundamental to the human situation and can be overcome only at privileged instants of passionate
existence, by a willed adhesion to Being seconded by Grace. It is precisely the error of Absolute Idealism, the Hegelian in particular, to relegate all such irreducible factors to the realm of Appearance by an arbitrary process of Logic, to cause all that is most concrete and particular in existence to vanish in the totality of an Ideal Essence:

Bien entendu, le problème de l'erreur, celui de la faute, de la souffrance, se posaient à moi de la façon la plus aigüe. La pensée d'un Bradley, quand il parle de transmutation, ne s'exerce-t-elle pas exclusivement sur des contenus qui peuvent en effet se prêter à un rafajustement, comme les morceaux mal assemblés d'un puzzle, qu'il est toujours possible en principe de regrouper correctement? Mais n'y a-t-il pas justement dans une erreur, dans une faute, quelque chose qui sera toujours irreductible à un pur élément de contenu?

(pp. 298-9.)

Marcel has always remained faithful to the conviction that existence is prior to logical essence and that, in keeping with Schelling's doctrine, metaphysical thinking is one with religious thinking: "Ainsi apparaît," he writes, "la convergence absolue du métaphysique et du religieux qui se révèle dès mes premiers écrits." (p. 318.)

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Up to the present we have attempted to relate some of the main themes of Marcel's philosophy to the personal attitudes determined by his early life, thus justifying Marcel's statement that "le développement de ma réflexion a
It takes the form of an exploration of those "soubassements concrets" (1) or that realm of transcendence and Being immanent in the self's consciousness, in which the self participates or is "engaged" in the mode of sensation and feeling and whose presence it seeks to recover by the elucidation of the existential situations or "mysteries" of living and suffering wherein the self is privileged to be at once the actor and the knower. Gabriel Marcel's attitude to philosophy is throughout intensely personal. Endowed with a rich inner life which he defines as "l'intimité avec soi", he proceeds not as the rationalist by analysis and discursive reasoning; his reflection constitutes a "dialectique d'amour", a dialectic whose aim is to maintain the continuity of the inner life, a dialogue of the self with the self, an elucidation of the various situations of Being, whose dynamism and polypal structure must not readily be divided up by processes of objective thought and introspection:

Je tends à croire que je ne peux parler de mon âme que dans la mesure précise et exclusive où ce rapport d'amour dont la dialectique est à la fois l'émergence intellectuelle et à quelque degré la négation s'établit entre moi et moi-même. Seulement les mots trompent. Il n'y a pas ici (1) Du Refus à l'Invocation, Paris, Gallimard, 1940, p. 15.
des termes et un rapport entre eux. Il y a un ensemble réellement indécomposable (qui est l'intimité avec soi, la vie intérieure). (1).

This fidelity towards the inner self, this effort to maintain its continuity which will be shown later to be itself the principal mode of access to Being, characterises Marcel's works, both the Journal Métaphysique and its sequel Etre et Avoir. None of his other works are properly systematic either; each proceeds by antitheses, question and answer, to and fro' movements of reflection. As for the Journal, Charles Du Bos has drawn attention to its dynamic and prospective character which reflects the inner continuity. He contrasts the latter with the discontinuity of Maine de Biran's Journal on the one hand and the retrospective and dreamlike character of Amiel's on the other (2).

Fidelity to the inner self is not, at least primarily, to be taken in its ethical sense as fidelity to a line of conduct or a line of thought. The continuity which Marcel seeks to maintain, although prospective, is not successive nor linear, but rather springs from an ever-widening exploration of the self. Fidelity, which he will later attempt to elucidate in its ethical aspects, is in the first

place a metaphysical method, an attitude towards Being. Metaphysics is essentially an exploration of Being, in and through a given situation or situations, resulting in ever deeper penetrations into the mysterious and obscure centre of selfhood. It is in this sense that M. Joseph Baruzi describes the *Journal Métaphysique* as being less the search after a system of thought than "a transmutation of thought itself" (1). Marcel sees the origin of this subjective type of reflection in Schelling's philosophy of liberty, which elevates on the ruins of Idealism a methodology of the concrete:

**Par la notion tout ensemble concreè, intuitive — et cependant trans-historique qu'a eue Schelling d'une dialectique des puissances de l'être, on peut se demander si, prévoyant l'inévitable échec d'une philosophie des catégories quelle qu'elle soit, il n'a pas conçu un type de spéculation extrêmement neuf et qui encore à l'heure actuelle paraît à peu près vierge, cela malgré les tentatives d'un Secrétan par exemple — une métaphysique qui reconnaîtrait l'être à la façon d'un dramaturge qui explore en tâtonnant une situation donnée et sent frémir sous sa pression les ondes lointaines qui l'ont créée et l'irriguent.** (2).

Marcel indeed has preserved all that is best in the dialectical method. Dialectic as opposed to the discursive method of formal logic consists not in the application of rules, but in a progressive movement of the mind with regard to the reality it contemplates, which enables it, in a series of acts of transcendence, to rid the real of whatever contra-

dictions present an obstacle to its possession, and not only to incorporate it in its own substance but to be itself incorporated (1). But whereas dialectic is applied by the post-Kantians for the most part to abstractions, Marcel's dialectic is at work on concrete reality. It represents an attitude of mind with regard to the concrete reality of experience, a process of successive explorations, thanks to which the subject participates in ever deeper levels of reality. As does that of Pascal, the dialectic of Marcel presupposes a theory of orders, an infinite series of planes of reality which it is the task of intuition to explore by a continuous approfondissement transcending at each and every level the objective, phenomenal and temporal element which resists the absolute participation in the Transcendent:

L'approfondissement métaphysique ne consiste-t-il pas essentiellement dans la suite des démarches par lesquelles l'expérience au lieu de se prolonger en techniques, s'intimise pour ainsi dire, et s'exerce à reconnaître ses implications.(2).

What Marcel means, then, by "intimité avec soi" is primarily a type of relationship of self to self permitting, by a dialectic of approfondissement, or inwardly progressive reflection, a gradual transcending of the intervening

(1) Cf. E. Bréhier: "Elle (la dialectique) est vie spirituelle plus encore que méthode; elle n'est pas l'application de règles d'abord posées; elle est faite de démarches toujours nouvelles, de décisions de l'esprit qui refuse d'arrêter son élan à des contradictions apparentes; et elle ne rend son objet pensable, on le purçeaut de contradictions, que pour arriver à une véritable libération spirituelle." (Histoire de la philosophie allemande, 2nd ed., Paris, Vrin, 1933, p.116.)

(2) Existentialisme chrétien, p. 319.
objective wrapping, so as to expose the hard core of Being upon which the self looks out:

Une recherche du type que je vise en ce moment sera commandée par un certain engagement qui ne se laisse d'ailleurs pas très facilement formuler; il ne suffit pas de dire que c'est un voeu de fidélité à l'expérience; l'étude des philosophes empiriques nous montre à quel point ce mot d'expérience est imprécis et fluctuant. La philosophie, c'est bien une certaine façon pour l'expérience de se reconnaître, de s'appréhender — mais à quel niveau d'elle-même? et comment se définira cette hiérarchie, comment s'ordonnera-t-elle? Je me bornerai à dire qu'il faudra distinguer des degrés non seulement dans l'élucidation, mais dans l'intimité avec soi et avec l'ambiance — avec l'univers lui-même. (R.I. pp. 24-5.)

It is at bottom a type of asceticism, as known and practised by the Augustinian theologians such as Pierre de Bérulle, and one which can only be accomplished by a mind become "intimate with itself" and so exercising its power of self-denuding that its awareness, or illumination by dialectic, is contemporary with its gradual purification:

Je dirai qu'il y a au centre de la réalité ou de la destinée humaine un inépuisable concret dans la connaissance duquel on ne progresse pas par étapes et en faisant la chaîne, comme c'est le cas pour une discipline particulière, quelle qu'elle soit. A cet inépuisable, chacun de nous ne peut accéder qu'avec le plus intact, avec le plus vierge de lui-même. Les difficultés d'ailleurs sont immenses. L'expérience nous montre, en effet, que ces parties vierges qui peuvent seules prendre contact avec l'être sont d'abord recouvertes par une foule d'apports et de scories; ce n'est que par un long et pénible travail de déblayage, ou plus exactement de purification, par une ascèse pénible que nous parvenons à les dégager; et c'est d'ailleurs concurremment à ce travail que se forge l'instrument dialectique qui fait corps avec la
Gabriel Marcel belongs to a generation, including Charles Du Bos and Jacques Rivière, inspired by an ideal of total and absolute sincerity. Apart from Bergson and Pégy, this generation had for its master André Gide, who was the first to combine the virtues in this one virtue of sincerity, "la vérité esthétique de l'Evangile", and to propose the dialogue avec soi as the necessary philosophic and esthetic discipline. François Mauriac, indeed, says in his essay on the Novel that sincerity towards oneself is the virtue of his generation (1). And it is undoubtedly Jacques Rivière who represents most fully this ideal, and his definition of sincerity and of its dialectic finds its very application in Marcel's thought. "La sincérité est un perpétuel effort pour créer son âme telle qu'elle est. Rien de plus menteur que le spontané, rien de plus étranger à moi-même... Il n'y a pas que les autres qui pensent en moi; au plus profond de moi une basse et continuelle méditation, - et dont je ne saurai rien si je ne fais effort pour la connaître: c'est mon âme. Elle est faible et somme idéale; elle existe à peine; je la sens comme un monde possible et lointain (2)."

It is quite in keeping with this ideal that the Journal form should be found the most adequate mode of expression. The *Journal intime*, indeed, is the natural form for that dialogue of self with self which constitutes the medium of a subjective reflection such as Marcel's, or indeed of a pure philosophical thinking in general. "Le philosophe," says Jean Lacroix, "est par excellence l'homme du dialogue", just as "la pensée est un dialogue de l'âme elle-même avec elle-même (1)."

To bring out fully the inner nature of Marcel's introspection and of his dialectic it will be of value to compare them with some other important and classic examples of the *Journal Intime*. And first, before taking some examples from among his contemporaries, a word might be said by way of comparison with the Journals of Maine de Biran and Amiel, for, as Du Bos has suggested, it is those names which inevitably come to mind when we read Marcel.

What characterises Maine de Biran's *Journal Intime*, as Du Bos has pointed out, is the sense of discontinuity. No one has had a greater sensitivity to the duality upon which his philosophy is built and which opposes within the human mind the affective, passive elements on the one hand and the active force of will on the other. His own inner life is characterized by the slavery to those passive states of mind eluding the control of the will; and his *Journal* is the

history of a self subjected to the inrush of "la vie extérieure" and tossed about on the sea of sensational and organic impulses that break the continuity of the self and exclude the possibility of any spiritual realisation. The entry of 6th May 1815 testifies to this state of inner disruption: "Je voudrais suffire à tout, tout saisir, tout faire, tout lire à la fois; je vais précipitamment d'un objet à l'autre, je quitte ma lecture pour en prendre une autre, je glisse sur tout et n'approfondis rien. Il semble que mon bien-être intellectuel et moral, la vérité que je cherche, le repos et la satisfaction intérieure de l'esprit vont se trouver dans chacun des livres que je feuillete et consulte tour à tour, comme si ces biens n'étaient pas en moi et au fond de mon être où je devrais les chercher, en attachant une vue fixe, pénétrante, soutenue, au lieu de glisser si rapidement sur tout ce que d'autres ont pensé, ou sur ce que j'ai pensé moi-même en divers temps (1)."

In this respect Biran anticipates Proust in his analysis of time's devouring power. His Journal introduces what we might call, borrowing the phrase from Du Bos, the "pathétique spirituel". The majority of Journaux Intimes are characterised by this element of the pathetic, which robs them of the higher tragic note symbolic of valid metaphysical experience;

for, at bottom, the pathetic is the external sign of a mind riveted in its reflexion to a "psychologism" (when as in Biran, and later Proust, this psychologism is transcended, it is by virtue of a mode of contemplation which takes us out of the Journal Intime form, for it transcends wholly the realm of spiritual dialectic).

In Amiel's Journal this pathetic takes a very precise and most significant form. The tragedy of Amiel lies, as Paul Bourget has so well analysed, in the over-development of a power of introspective analysis which corrodes and ultimately destroys the will to action and even the sense or capacity to grasp reality. "Mon esprit est le cadre vide d'un millier d'images effacées... Il n'a plus le savoir, il est devenu méthode. Il s'est étherisé, algébrisé" (1).

His self he only sees in spectacular manner as the fluid and ever-changing succession of states of mind. "Plus l'esprit est esprit, plus il est omnimode; le protéisme est son privilège et sa mesure." (9th Aug. 1880). (2). It is in this perpetual passivity with respect to whatever affects him, his "esprit de métamorphose" or "protéisme", that the chief quality of Amiel's mind lies. "Amiel n'était pas un regard fixe: tout à l'inverse il était une température - un des baromètres enregistreurs les plus délicats qui se soient jamais vus dans le domaine des sensations de l'esprit."

Comme le personnage de La Bruyère, 'il se succède à lui-même': il nous dit sans cesse qu'il n'existe pas de forme de vie qu'il ne puisse épouser à volonté (1)." So that his type of self-reflexion or introspection does not enable him to grasp his true self nor to construct his personality, for the activity of his will is constantly subjected to the passivity of his affective life. Hence, his Journal, as Du Bos says, is not the instrument of any spiritual progress: "on ne surprend pas chez lui la moindre trace d'une modification dans la ligne intérieure: plus exactement il n'y a pas de ligne: Amiel continue à marquer le pas jusqu'à la fin (2)."

If now we consider the aim his Journal sets itself, we discover that, starting from an aspiration to self-knowledge, it ends up in a type of arid self-contemplation. "Son Journal," says Bourget, "est l'interminable monologue d'un Narcisse psychologique (3)." We find this clearly marked in the following passage where he defines the aim of his Journal: "Le but à lui assigner, c'est de n'avoir aucun but particulier, mais de servir à tout... Ainsi entendu, le Journal est le modèle des confidents, rêvé par les poètes comiques et tragiques: il ne sait rien, est prêt à tout, écoute admirablement, et pourtant sait consoler, conseiller et gronder." (10th May 1855.) (4). He conceives it simply

(2) Ibid., p. 16.
as a means of liberation, as a confident able to calm and console for the frustrations of life. But this it does precisely because, substituting retrospective dreaming for action, it allows a type of contemplation. "Le journal c'est le confident, le consolateur, le médecin du solitaire... C'est une sorte de sommeil conscient, ou cessant d'agir, de vouloir, de nous tendre, nous rentrons dans l'ordre universel et nous cherchons la paix. Nous échappons ainsi au fini. Le recueillement est comme un bain de l'âme dans la contemplation, et le journal n'est que le recueillement, plume en main." (28th Jan. 1872.) (1).

The already mentioned multiformity precisely, according to Amiel, by substituting the universal for the particular, the absolute for the relative (we here see the Transcendental Idealist) procures this release from the vicissitudes and sufferings of the finite life. "Je reviens de moi-même à l'état fluide, vague, indéterminé, comme si toute forme était une violence et une défiguration... ma personnalité a le minimum possible d'individualité... En étant moins un homme, je suis peut-être plus près de l'homme, peut-être un peu plus homme. En étant moins individu, je suis plus espèce." (14th Aug. 1869.) (2).

Now this contemplation liberates from willed, purposive self-realisation and from the finite particular individuality. And this is only possible by dint of Amiel's retrospective

(1) Ibid., Vol. II, p. 33.
(2) Ibid., Vol. I, p. 279.
attitude to his self throughout the Journal. It involves
the suppression of all sense of futurity, so as to arrest
time, as it were, and allow the present to englobe the past
and the self to view itself as in a sense complete and
absolute. And this past must itself be felt as "tout fait"
and as irrelevant to present and prospective activity. Du
Bos has observed rightly that "Amiel éprouve son âme comme
un poids bien plutôt que comme un élan (1)." And many
passages of the Journal bear witness to this retrospective
dialectic: and did Amiel not define his Journal well when
he wrote: "C'est le livre des souvenirs, et l'heure où je
lui rends visite est l'heure du recueillement." (30 Dec.
1851.) (2).

At this level, we feel, dialectic ceases to be as such;
it vanishes in a species of contemplation or "dream" which
is the exact antithesis of a process of self-exploration,
self-knowledge and above all self-realisation. At such a
point it is meaningless to speak of "sincerity", which is
properly an ethical virtue (3).

(2) Ed. Bouvier, Vol. I, Introd., p. XLIV. This retro-
spective dialectic of Amiel's may be described otherwise, as
a movement of regression towards a point where all temporal
distinctions vanish and where personality itself is trans-
cended.
(3) On Amiel's Journal see also P. Mansell Jones, French
Introspectives, Cambridge University Press, 1937. It will
be noticed that the works of Senancour and Maurice de Guérin
have not been given any special mention. Their Journaux are
less interesting as examples of dialectic than as media for
cosmic experience. Cf. Albert Béguin, L'Ame Romantique et
le Rêve, Paris, Corti, 1946, Chp. XVII.
We might turn now to two contemporary examples of the *Journal Intime*, a study of which provides further useful data for our purpose.

The first is that of Charles Du Bos, with whom, if only by their conversion to Catholicism and common passion for the spiritual life, Marcel has much in common. In spite of Du Bos's declaration that he has "grown out of" Amiel, there is much of the Amiel in him. Du Bos, however, has known the mystic experience, the state of "exaltation" when, overcoming time and space and transcending his contingent self, he enjoys full possession of that "second reality" which lies pure, eternal and uncorrupt beyond the senses and the discontinuity of the sensual life. "L'exaltation de plus en plus pour moi constitue l'unique état ayant caractère terminal et plenier... Cette réalité seconde, comme je l'appelle toujours, - cette vie superposée à la vie qui lui est parallèle, mais libérée semble-t-il de toutes ses lois et qui surtout paraît avoir des dimensions tellement autres où la notion de temps mesurable, d'espace circonscrit, a l'air de choir et d'être aperçue dans sa chute à travers je ne sais quelle brusque déchirure; telle est la région qu'il faut à la faveur des recrudescences fréquentes et toutes spontanées de l'état lui-même, explorer, éclairer (1)."

From these last words it would seem that Du Bos aims at constituting an exploration of this zone of inner self-hood; (1) Op. cit., p. 264.
in actual fact he did not accomplish his aim. He projected a book to be called *Sondages*, whose title indicates his purpose. The sort of introspection he envisaged therein is referred to in his *Journal*: it would aim at clarifying this experience of the Absolute and attaining progressive awareness of self-hood at its deepest levels. It would therefore be necessarily retrospective, for the experience of self-possession outwith time is conditional, as we have said, on the closing of time's circle. Thus in choosing the title of his book, he tells us, he rejected such possibilities as exploration, voyage, etc., because they imply prospective action: "tous les mots synonymes de recherche, découverte, voyage, exploration, etc., sont à rejeter parce qu'ils donnent l'idée du large et par là même de l'avenir alors que ce sont celles au contraire de la descente en profondeur et du passé qu'il importe de communiquer (1)." In short, such a "dialectique d'approfondissement" as envisaged would be essentially retrospective. Strictly speaking, the attempt would have been inevitably doomed to failure, for the absolute *qua* absolute (independently of the temporal and willed effort towards this state) is not the subject of dialectic. For, as Du Bos himself saw, such a state is essentially "trans-moral": "je me représente l'état mystique comme essentiellement trans-moral (2)." As such, it transcends the realm of

(1) Ibid., p. 257. Notice that the title "voyage" rejected by Du Bos is precisely the term preferred by Marcel in his *Homo Viator*.

(2) Ibid., p. 263.
ends, of spiritual progress, of willed effort in time. If we take Du Bos's *Journal* as it stands we find it characterised by a discontinuity of the spiritual life. Du Bos remains "haunted by the mystic state (1)." Between this ideal and his normal spiritual life there is no mean; the latter is subject to a constant discontinuity, reminiscent of that of Amiel and particularly Maine de Biran. "Je lui disais en substance que j'étais à la lettre épouvanté de la discontinuité de mes états intérieurs. Le mot de La Bruyère: 'Il se succède à lui-même' devient always more dangerously true of me... Sentimentalement le moins graduel des êtres: everything given at once, whence an immediate jumping elsewhere. Et comme il en va de même dans le domaine de l'esprit, comme penser essentiellement pour moi est sentir, I cannot abide by anything (2)."

In short, a subjection to the instant divorced from past or anticipated future and excluding all possibility of construction. And it is this latter experience which constitutes the introspective substance of the *Journal* - the "pathetic" of spiritual discontinuity even to the point of abuse. "Le danger sans doute - et je ne prétends nullement en être exempt - c'est un involonataire abus du pathétique spirituel (3)."

Du Bos is a curious example of an introspection which

(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid., p. 403.
(3) Ibid., p. 405.
hovers between a transcendentalism where the dialectique d'approfondissement vanishes as a method of exploration, and a "psychologism" where it does not yet come into play. In both cases, the conception of a dialectic which is at one and the same time a type of reflection and what Joseph Baruzi calls a "metaphysical effort" (1), giving full force to the word effort (that is self-creation as well as self-revelation), is lost.

It would, however, be unjust to consider only, as we have been doing, the Journal (1921-23) and leave out of account the wider Extrait d'un Journal (1903-28) (2), especially as the latter cover the period of his conversion. Yet it can, we think, be shown that the problem has only changed in form. Here too the religious experience of communion is the centre around which his thought revolves, those "moments d'épanchement, d'effusion métaphysique, ... moments où l'allègre va-et-vient de la pensée fait confluer en Dieu le point de départ et le point d'arrivée; - (3)" that state which is still beyond dialectic, where Du Bos can say: "C'est que je ne pense pas, - des pensées me viennent: tout m'est donné, et rien n'est conquis (4)." But between these moments, summed up in the apprehension "deus inest", and the moral life, there still remains a gap, even if the latter is no longer a

(3) Ibid., p. 54.
(4) Ibid., p. 84.
state of intermittence. The duality is now between contemplation and a moral reflexion superimposed upon it.

Become conscious of his liability to be swept away in the gusts of feeling, as he so well described in his previous Journal, he has come to recognise the necessity for him of a continual discipline and "tension". "Toute mon éthique est à l'antipode de ce conseil d'un moraliste français - je crois que c'est Rivalol - : 'Il faut glisser la vie, non l'appuyer'. J'éprouve chaque jour davantage le besoin de l'appuyer, et surtout de la serrer (1)." Without that his personality is subject to dissolution, "La détente s'accompagne toujours chez moi d'un abandon et comme d'une perte totale de ma personnalité réelle (2)."

It is here that dialectic and introspection proper come into play. They are exercised upon the spiritual experience in order to provide therefrom the means for moral accomplishment. But they come after this experience. "Une fois la conversion pleinement accomplie, c'est une forme de sainteté qui se substitue à la pensée: plus précisément, jointe désormais et comme adhérante à notre vie quotidienne, la pensée est toute acquise pour ce travail du modelage intime; et, à son plan, de ce travail, l'introspection, telle que j'ai essayé de la définir, reste, d'un point de vue chrétien, une précieuse artisanne (3)." And they are exercised retro-

(1) Ibid., p. 115.
(2) Ibid., p. 113.
(3) Ibid., pp. 349-50.
spectively too upon the subject's acts; in this, says Du Bos, opposed to Amiel's introspection. "L'introspection du type Amiel, c'est-à-dire, antérieure à tout acte, me paraît vaine; l'introspection qui suit l'acte - bon ou mauvais, - infiniment féconde. Je me connais, non point directement - je tende de plus en plus à croire que l'on ne peut pas se connaître directement, - mais à la faveur de mes exaltations d'une part, de mes chutes ou de mes désastres de l'autre; - et mon progrès, c'est de tenir compte des deux termes (1)."

In short, the role of the spiritual dialectic or reflexion is declared distinct from the religious and metaphysical experience: it is ethical purely and simply. It is not, as it will be for Marcel, one with the metaphysical approfondissement. Du Bos then still exhibits a duality as between the religious and moral life, as between contemplation and reflexion, and one which he expresses most revealingly when he writes "je suis ou en état d'activité intellectuelle plus ou moins près de la surface et accompagnée de conscience, ou alors dans l'automatisme pur; de plus en plus rarement surviennent les moments de bien-être de l'inconscient qui, épaississant pour ainsi dire la personnalité, la stabilisent et par là même la construisent par en dessous (2)."

Thus Du Bos's dialectic tends to operate in a sort of void - a moral void but still a void - and does not become identified with the active, constructive forces of his

(1) Ibid., pp. 325-7.
(2) Ibid., pp. 123-4.
spiritual experience. As a result, his moral life as a whole is subject to a certain artificiality; an artificiality that could only be overcome if, on the one hand, the spiritual experience ceased to be mere contemplation, and, on the other, his reflection ceased to be merely retrospective; if, in short, both were merged and took the form of a gradual bringing into awareness and into efficacy, within the structure of temporal effort and the moral life itself, of the hidden, obscure powers of transcendence. The dialogue of Du Bos is, at bottom, (and its grandeur as well as its weakness lies therein) the dialogue of division. The judgment he passes on Gide and himself, less valid of Gide, is penetrating and final in its application to his own case. "Des êtres comme vous et moi—esprits critiques, autocritiques surtout—(je me refuserai toujours à voir là des défauts)—sont des êtres de dialogue, et non des êtres d'affirmation (1).

There is finally another manipulator of the introspective method, using the Journal form, whose importance is great for our study, namely Gide. Although belonging to the preceding generation as the "master" of "sincerity", himself the author of a Journal, not to mention such works as Les Cahiers d'André Walter, etc., which belong properly to the Journal genre, Gide employs a dialectic as thoroughly ethical as Marcel's, in the sense that it aims at self-creation.

(1) Ibid., p. 97.
through self-knowledge. Yet this dialectic involves, to a
greater extent than any examples taken heretofore, a
"psychologism" whose inner implications are most significant
for the student of the Journal Intime.

Gide's whole effort is, in the words of Edouard in
Les Faux Monnayeurs, to "agir selon la plus grande sincérité",
and for that to "redécouvrir au-dessous de l'être factice, le
naif". By destroying the artificial forms in which the self
moulds itself by subjection to moral and other laws, it can
rediscover its essence, its purity as spontaneity and
gratuitous choice, its inner dynamism. "Tout choix," we
read in the Nourritures Terrestres, "est effrayant, quand on
y songe... La nécessité de l'option me fut toujours
intolérable; choisir m'apparaisait non tant écrire que
repousser ce que je n'élisais pas... Je ne faisais jamais
que ceci ou cela (1)." Become an "esprit non prévenu" and
wholly and absolutely one's self: "Oui, l'homme devient ce
qu'il prétend être; mais prétendre être ce que l'on n'est
pas, c'est une prétention toute moderne; précisons; c'est
proprement la prétention chrétienne. Je ne dis pas que
l'intervention de la volonté ne puisse rien dans la formation
ou la déformation de l'être; mais le païen ne croyait pas
devoir être différent de ce qu'il était (2)." Gide, however,
once he had rid himself of the Nietzschean influence so

(1) Les Nourritures terrestres, 3rd ed., Paris, Mercure de
France, 1897, pp. 16, 77.
apparent in his early work, interprets this state of childish
naivety in terms of New Testament teaching. If the first
moment of liberation from artificial moral codes is the
yielding to each and every desire in all its freshness, at
its deepest level of spiritual experience it becomes the
cult of desire or rather the cult of love independent of its
finite objects. He prefers to possession what he calls the
"élargissement sans fin de l'objet de l'amour (1)." Of the
Nourritures themselves he says: "J'ai l'air d'y prêcher
l'hédonisme, mais les grandes âmes ne s'y peuvent arrêter;
ce qui doit les user, c'est l'Idée non le plaisir. N'importe!
les Nourritures y mènent; elles enseignent déjà une forme
nouvelle de dévouement (2)." The metaphysic of desire
becomes a metaphysic of renunciation or, as M. Joan Hytier
puts it, "l'hédonisme se transforme en ascétisme voluptueux
(3)." Gide's motto - "naître à nouveau" - takes its full
significance in the light of the Christian doctrine of
spiritual rebirth.

Now, Gide's exploration of the self does involve a
dialectic and, as he himself says, no easy one. But its
nature is extremely interesting. It may be characterised
in the first place, to use Marcel's term, as an "instantane-
ism", for it embodies an effort to destroy all that is form

(1) Réflexions sur quelques points de littérature et de
(2) Lettre à A.R., October 31st, 1897, Ibid., p. 482.
(3) André Gide, Algiers, Charlot, 1938, p. 20.
(in that reminiscent of Valery's Monsieur Teste), and that means the systematic elimination of what is retrospective (1), and even properly prospective in the life and experience of the self (for the subtraction of the object from the desire is equivalent to this), in such a way as to leave a self completely absorbed in the present of its desire, and at each and every instant, novel. - "Naitre à nouveau."

It is true that at the moment of his short-lived passion for Russian Communism and his attempt to infuse into his life social purpose, he writes: "depuis deux ans à peu près, en réaction contre moi-même, j'ai souci de situer dans le temps mes pensées (2)." But this effort to "situate himself" in a constructed web of duration was and is contrary to what he calls his "anti-historical nature". Any such attempt appears to him equivalent to the imposition of an artificial form upon the essential formlessness and heterogeneity of the self. The following revealing passage defines in a nutshell his "instantaneism": "Cesser de tenir compte de soi-même, durant des jours, des semaines, des mois. Se perdre de vue... Une conscience trop continue, j'ai craint souvent qu'elle rattachât trop logiquement notre futur au passé, qu'elle empêchât le devenir (3)."

This is a dialectic which remains within the framework

(1) M. Hytier observes perspicaciously that there is one theme Gide has never exploited, namely that of repentance. (Op. cit., p. 23.)
of an Immanentism; its value as a metaphysical exploration is limited, if by that we imply transcendence on the one hand, and continuity of self-creation on the other. But it is even more: for it is less ethical in its nature than esthetic. M. Gouiran refers happily to Gide's "instant esthétique": Gide himself speaks of sincerity as "la vérité esthétique de l'Evangile". And this quality of "estheticism" is what typifies Gide's self-exploration throughout. We may agree fully with M. Hytier when he declares Gide's work is from beginning to end lyrical (1). It is the most important example of an esthetic introspection, wholly removed from the metaphysical and ontological introspection we have now to discuss.

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A comparison of Marcel's Journal (using the term in its widest sense) with the preceding throws the most interesting light on the nature of his "dialectique d'approfondissement".

Generally speaking, as we have seen, his type of self-exploration aims at a progressive revelation of the transcendent and its communicating world of transcendent persons. It is a "method of immanence", to employ Blondel's term, one which seeks to explore the transcendent at the core of immanence. What now are the conditions, according to Marcel,

of such a self-revelation? We must refer here to a most interesting text (1), where Marcel analyses the "sense of depth".

He there affirms that the "sense of depth" involves both a spatial and a temporal reference. In the first place, it includes the notion of a "lointain", but where distance does not imply the separation or disjunction with which it is necessarily associated in abstract, conceptual space. "Ce lointain n'est pas éprouvé par nous comme un ailleurs, comme un "autre part": je dirais bien plutôt que c'est un "tout près"... Ce lointain s'offre à nous comme à l'intérieur d'un certain domaine dont je serais tenté de dire qu'il est nostalgiqument nôtre (2)."

In the second place, it includes a temporal reference to both past and future. Profundity is "comme une plongée intuitive sur ce qui ne peut être atteint que grâce à une recherche qui se développe dans la durée (3)." On the one hand, the present of "deep" reflection is retrospective: "Entre passé et profondeur, il existe une affinité certaine." In some way the whole past of the self is effective in the

(1) Le Sentiment du profond, Journal Métaphysique III (fragments), Fontaine, no. 51, April 1945.
(2) Op. cit., p. 538. This conception, of course, is bound up with the notion of an "espace vécu", as opposed to conceptual space; a distinction anticipated by Bergson, as Marcel underlines, but amplified by E. Minkowski. On the importance of this concept in Marcel's philosophy see below, Chp. VIII, Space, Time and Existence.
(3) Ibid.
present whether by repentance or otherwise (1). On the other hand, the present is prospective, for it bears in itself all the purposiveness of self-realisation. Yet again, this future which the dialectic of introspection anticipates is itself conjoined with the past: "L'avenir qui est ici anticipé n'est en aucun cas évoqué comme pure innovation par rapport aux données actuelles," thus differing from the element of prospectivity or futurity such as it exists in Gide's introspection. Indeed, past and future of the self meet within the present of depth: "le passé et l'avenir, aussi du profond, se rejoignent dans une zone qui est à ce que j'appelle le présent ce que l'Ici absolu est à l'ici contingent." The present of self-exploration, once this has attained depth, transcends then the discontinuity of the self's states by containing within itself all its states, just as it transcends spatial separation; in short, this present is the focal point where the transcendent, eternal, essential self is revealed and realised in time: "et cette zone où le maintenant et le alors tendent à se confondre, comme tout à l'heure le proche et le lointain, c'est à n'en pas douter ce que nous appelons l'éternité."

This dialectic, therefore, is properly metaphysical, surpassing the framework of any "psychologism"; it is a method for the discovery and realisation of "essences". (1) Marcel speaks of the "sens actif ou actuel du passé" as being one of his characteristics. (Journal Métaphysique III (Fragments), Confluences No. 16, Jan., 1943, p. 251.)
"On serait conduit par là à entrevoir que le sentiment du profond est celui où l'essence même est engagée," not in the sense of the "idea" but in the sense of the obscure "veiled presence". The whole movement of dialectic is towards communion with this essence, although absolute identification with it is beyond our reach and, if attained, would render all dialectic unnecessary: it is the light which illuminates, the purpose which motivates: "Je dirai, non sans hésitation, que l'essence est éclairante bien plutôt qu'elle ne peut être éclairée, et a fortiori décrite. Elle est foyer: c'est elle qui est foyer, et c'est pour autant qu'elle est présente à la conscience que celle-ci peut se traiter elle-même comme source lumineuse."

Marcel's self-reflection is an application of the dialectic. His thought represents an ever-moving line; a construction in depth and breadth where at every stage past and future emerge within the present. He speaks in his Regard en arrière of "lançant à mon tour vers mon propre passé un appel insistant, de manière à y reconnaître les exigences longtemps formulées auxquelles mon œuvre a tenté de répondre". (p. 291.) Nothing could be truer of his attitude to his past throughout his work; he refuses to treat it, as does Gide, as a non entity, and even less, in the manner of Amiel, as a dead weight. On the contrary, he seeks to "safeguard the spiritual reality of the past", for the past "loin d'être un dépôt au fond de nous-mêmes, un
Dépôt qui serait un objet, un lingot, demeure en nous comme un appel auquel nous avons à répondre conformément à ce que nous sommes." (p. 293.) While, at the same time, his whole thought is prospective, it is the "expérience angoissante, harassante, d'un forage qui se poursuivait à la rencontre de..." (p. 292.)

The term "voyage" is one very dear to Marcel, for it expresses most clearly the nature of spirituality itself: "c'est l'âme, précisément, qui est une voyageuse, c'est de l'âme, et d'elle seule, qu'il est suprêmement vrai de dire qu'être, c'est être en route (1)." And no term could indicate better the prospective and, above all, active nature of his introspection. Far from being a type of egotism, as so often for Amiel, or an estheticism, as for Gide, it is a metaphysical effort. For self-knowledge is one with self-realisation: the term prospective is synonymous with purposive. Self-knowledge is inseparable, in the mode of introspection, from the willed effort of the self to secure and bring to realisation the essence pursued and glimpsed; the dialectic is not only knowledge, but at the same time action. "L'expérience nous montre en effet que ces parties vierges qui peuvent seules prendre contact avec l'être sont d'abord recouvertes par une foule d'apports et de scories; ce n'est que par un long et pénible travail de déblayage, ou plus exactement de purification, par une ascèse pénible que...

nous parvenons à les dégager; et c'est d'ailleurs concurremment à ce travail que se forge l'instrument dialectique qui fait corps avec la pensée philosophique elle-même et dont pourtant celle-ci doit toujours garder le contrôle (1). We may say, to employ M. Lacroix's good expression, that Marcel is at all times "contemporary with his own thought (2)."

At the same time, by that very fact, Marcel's retrospective reflection exhibits a continuity lacking in most other forms. Not of course a logical continuity, but still one which, allowing for the failures and "black-outs" incidental to any spiritual ascetic, establishes over and above such gaps a continuity of lived experience.

Finally, there is one last characteristic of his reflexion which must be mentioned: it is its power to influence. As compared with that of Maine de Biran, Amiel and Du Bos (although excepting Gide), it is not "closed"; rather it operates, as does Pascal's, to move, influence and persuade the reader. It is not only a dialogue of self with self but a dialogue of the self with the other. It does indeed constitute an "appel". "Effort ainsi de conversion," says Baruzi of the Journal Méthaphysique, "comme si étaient

(1) Du Refus à l'Invocation, pp. 91-2.
(2) Op. cit., p. 11. Marcel would reject entirely M. Prévost's theory that introspection is a "game". This theory is bound up with the view that the memory is imperfect. (v. Jean Prévost, Essai sur l'Introspection, Paris, Au Sans Pareil, 1927, p. 54.) But although this may be valid of conceptual memory, it is not so of the memory operating in active life, for its function then is not to recall things as they were but to give significance to and take significance from the present.
Of other masters of the Journal Intime the one who has most in common with Marcel as a representative of the prospective dialectic defined above is of course Kierkegaard, whose "repetition" is not only an ethico-religious category, but also a mode of introspective enquiry applied throughout his Journals. The Journals of Berkeley and Novalis, whatever the differences in outlook and doctrine, have also in common with those of Marcel a prospective intention. In France itself it is perhaps in modern times Joubert in his Carnets who comes nearest to the latter. Before that, we have to go back to Pascal, whose Pensees it would not be incorrect to claim as in some sort a Journal Intime, if we admit Brunschvicg's description of the Apology as an "itinéraire de l'âme vers Dieu".

The Journals of Baudelaire (Fusées, Mon Coeur mis à nu, etc.), however, deserve special mention, for they exhibit an interesting opposition between the two dialectics, the retrospective and the prospective.

The first is bound up with Baudelaire's enslavement to sinful and sensual pleasure which brings with it discontinuity and rupture. "Celui qui s'attache au plaisir, c'est-à-dire au présent, me fait l'effet d'un homme roulant sur une pente, et qui, voulant se raccrocher aux arbustes, les arracherait et les emporterait dans sa chute." (Mon Coeur, Œuvres, Ed. de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1935, Vol. II., p. 654.) The primary experience of Baudelaire is the sense of time's flight and of its discontinuity. But it involves him at the same time in a subjection to the past; each instant no sooner is than it is past, engulfed in the ever-growing weight of sin which hangs like a chain round his neck and, under the corroding influence of the sentiment of the "irreparable"; petrifies his moral life and no less his spiritual meditation.

Yet Baudelaire comes to know the prospective sense and to envisage a "dynamique morale": the possibility of a spiritual destiny through the discovery of a prospective
Marcel's conversion in 1929 was the natural outcome of all his previous efforts at spiritual self-knowledge. The very dialectic brought him into a region of transcendence felt and experienced as a "presence", whose power to illuminate had all the force and value of a Divine Grace. God was the ultimate term of the process of introspection, undertaken in the spirit of truth and sincerity. In this his experience was that of the users of spiritual dialectic such as Maurice Blondel and Paul Claudel and, to a large present which, infused with purpose, can, by repentance, transform this past from a dead weight into a positive force working within the present for the self's salvation, so permitting spiritual growth and destiny by making the present the focal point of a continuity of past and future. "Que de pressentiments et de signes envoyés déjà par Dieu qu'il est grandement temps d'agir, de considérer la minute présente comme la plus importante des minutes, et de faire ma perpétuelle volupté de mon tourment ordinaire, c'est à dire du Travail!... Tout est réparable. Il est encore temps... Je n'ai pas encore connu le plaisir d'un plan réalisé." (Ibid., pp. 668, 670, 671.) Before him opens up the hitherto closed vista of the future and of hope. "Puissance de l'idée fixe, puissance de l'espérance." (Ibid., p. 671.)

It is, however, Baudelaire's tragedy that his intention never comes to actual realisation. Both his meditation and his activity remain suspended between a corroding retrospection, which is a fact, and a longed-for prospectivity which remains an ideal. The two dialectics never meet. If Amiel's Journal belongs to the category of the pathetic, if Marcel's belongs to that of the tragic, in that prospective and retrospective meet in a conflict whose issue is never secure and which is resolved at each and every minute by the infusion of renewed intention, then Baudelaire's belongs to a category set apart as an ultimate in its own right: it is the drama of eternal scission and disruption, a category which transcends both the pathetic and the tragic and manifests a sincerity all its own.
extent, Jacques Rivière and Charles Du Bos. These last two are of especial interest as being in the first place the close friends and intimates of Gabriel Marcel, their faith elaborated under the pressure of the same circumstances and influence, and because their religious thought offers striking differences with his.

Both are the direct products of Bergson's philosophy, although they arrive at different conclusions. Both apply the Bergsonian method of subjective introspection in the service of an ideal of total sincerity and both find God at the end of their search. God, says Rivière, is "quelque chose qu'on rencontre (1)." Yet he remains fundamentally an immanentist and hardly transcends the region of subjective experience. "Je suis un objet d'expérience: l'expérience, le tâtonnement de la main qui palpe (2)." It is true that he defines the "sincere" man as he who "s'arrête à chaque étage de lui-même (3)." But strictly speaking, he recognizes, in Bergsonian fashion, only two levels: one the field of rational relations, the other the field of intuition, or pure immediacy beyond all relations, sort of fusion with the immanent Divine force— in other words, a state or experience impermeable to any dialectic whatsoever.

There is, moreover, in Rivière's faith a strong element

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(2) De la Foi, Paris, Chronique des Lettres françaises, 1927, p. 96.
of fideism (the influence of Pragmatism on him is important) and it is known that he lost his faith not long after his conversion only to regain it before his death.

It is not surprising when we recall that the major pre-occupation of his thought was to establish his faith firmly on an act of will and to sap the pretensions of rationalism. Reason, he writes, "n'est-elle pas la faculté de se représenter autre chose que ce qui est donné (1)"? He seeks to show the primordial role of will and of intuition not only in faith but indeed in establishing the very premises of rational inferences. "Il n'y a que lorsqu'elle est encadrée d'intuitions, 'attelée'; que ses démonstrations prennent de la constance, de la perpétuité (2)." A sort of fideism and radical intuitionism on the one hand, and on the other a cult of devenir, novelty and heterogeneity, similar to Gide's (3), such is Rivière's philosophy.

With Charlès Du Bos it is somewhat different. His conversion took place almost parallel to Marcel's and we find a similar apprehension of the Divine Transcendent immanent in the core of self-hood. "When, he asks, do I have consciousness of myself? "Alors - et alors seulement - que deus inest (4)." A similar sense of communion, at a certain level of experience, of "participation...à un monde spirituel illimité, invisible, dont jamais ne s'interrompt la

(1) A la Trace de Dieu, p. 163.
(2) Ibid., p. 174.
(3) See Moralisme et Litterature.
(4) Extraits d'un Journal, p. 296.
majestueuse révolution, dans lequel... tous tant que nous sommes, nous sommes pris, emportés... (1).” But, as we have seen, this central apprehension of the Divine takes place in a type of intuition which, although outwith time, a state of transcendence rather than immanence, is yet, like Rivière's state of fusion, extra-relational – a pure, simple immediacy – and, for that reason, like it, impermeable to dialectic.

As we have suggested in the previous chapter, both of these conclusions are inherent in a Bergsonian viewpoint – for the pure experience, being extra-relational, can be viewed either as a fusion with a temporal flux or, by accentuating the non-differentiated and extra-relational, a fusion with an extra-temporal – both impervious to dialectic within a temporal differentiation and approfondissement. Du Bos's conclusion results from a rigorous interpretation of Bergsonism. Accepting Bergson's dualism of intelligence and intuition, he refuses all relational element to immediacy. He could not have marked more clearly the difference between himself and Marcel as when he declares that, in contrast with himself "qui sent sa vie", Marcel "sent sa vie et ses rapports (2)." Indeed, the greatest originality of Marcel lies in his recognition of a relational element in the experience of immediacy (temporal or spatial, although not of course the merely rational and conceptual), allowing for

(1) Ibid., p. 382.
(2) Ibid., p. 340.
progressive levels of spatio-temporal experience and therefore of self-revelation and self-realisation, and requiring not a simple intuition, but a "reflexion" within, and one with, immediacy, a "dialectic of immediacy", of "approfondissement".

In this Marcel comes nearest to Blondel and, in certain respects, Claudel. He resembles them too in the firmness of his religious faith - with this difference that his inner spiritual serenity does not exclude the tragic sense of the knowledge that God's face may be hidden and grace withdrawn. Marcel's subjection to the intermittences of grace and therefore of existence is a strong and important theme in his philosophy. Yet, underlying the tragic sense and realism, lies a sense of God as the inner presence, veiled, sometimes obscured, but voicing a never-ending call. Du Bos too, as distinct from Rivière, has had this same strength and serenity, and it is in it that the two writers have a very strong common element - the consciousness of the living presence of God beyond the intermittences of faith. "Or, en mon cas, le moi du deus n'est pas par essence discontinu; ses intermittences sont de mon ressort et non du sien; de plus...il ouvre toujours une porte par-delà. Je veux dire (et cela à quel degré ne l'ai-je pas senti dans toutes les œuvres que j'admire) que l'expression émanant du moi du deus, par delà le contenu précis qu'à tel moment elle vise, paraît toujours tracer une série de cercles concentriques qui
indiquent que la voie est libre, que l'on peut passer et que l'on avancera (1)."

Gabriel Marcel's thinking gravitates between two poles, each of which represents an extreme of his experience. Those two poles are music on the one hand and what, in conversation with the writer, he preferred to call "la grimace" on the other.

Marcel is himself an accomplished composer and executant on the piano; he has even been known to affirm that music is his true vocation: "là seulement je suis créateur" (2). From early youth he learned to improvise on the piano, and from 1945 he began to set to music poems of his preference. (The writer has been privileged to hear some of these pieces, including melodies for poems of Valéry, Supervielle and Emily Brontë. Although not aspiring to any competence in this field, he can testify to their melodic beauty and harmonic structure. They mark, in their progress, a gradual deepening of harmonic complexity, and some of the last pieces, notably the settings for Emily Brontë, are quite remarkable for the exquisite purity with which each modulation and shade of feeling in the original is incorporated in the intricate, yet

(1) Ibid., p. 297.
(2) Quoted by M. Roger Troisfontaines in Existentialisme Chrétien, pp. 210-11.
melodious, harmonic texture. They constitute, on the musical plane, a pure music whose means and effects can only, in the writer's estimate, be compared to those, in poetry, of Mallarmé or Valéry. Having already won the admiration of eminent interpreters, they await only the opportunity, which needs must be forthcoming, for them to be made known to a wider musical public.)

The rôle which Marcel's musical creation plays in his thought is of great interest. Music is for him the realm of pure lyricism, of pure subjectivity, the moment of contemplation, of immediate communion with the essential self and the world of essences. Thus, musical expression is a type of expression where all reflexion has ceased. "La musique ne signifie strictement rien, mais peut-être parce qu'elle est signification... L'expression serait alors la perméabilité de l'essence à elle-même (1)." It is significant that he records the influence upon his mind of the Schopenhauerian theory of music (2).

In short, music and musical experience represent that point of contemplation which is beyond and transcends the spiritual dialectic; it is the extremity of Marcel's subjective experience where time and temporal effort have given way to eternity in the moment of ecstatic participation.

At the other extreme is the "grimace". This is the state of pure objectivity, of separation from the essence.

(2) Existentialisme Chrétien, p. 295.
where the mind distorts the real and infects the universe with its grimace. This mode of apprehension is represented in Marcel's work by his recently published *Théâtre Comique* (1). Therein Marcel satirises himself and his spiritual experience: in the short plays which compose the volume, the characters are grotesques emptied of all spiritual significance and value, and their relationships have the fixity and mechanical rigidity imposed upon personalities which have become types and ciphers.

As for the dramatic value of those satirical or farcical plays, reserves would have to be made. No doubt, farce is a dramatic genre in its own right, but to be dramatically successful it requires first to be lived by its author. The world of farce, with all it entails of the grotesque and the inverted pathetic, is in every way a world of its own, endowed with its own life, even if this life is an anti-life. And to represent this world and all its maleficence, the author must have lived with it and experienced it in all its diabolism. It is this experience of such evil which seems to be lacking in Marcel's nature, with the result that his farces are curiously abstract and artificial. It would seem indeed that for the objective to be represented adequately in dramatic form, it must first be subjectively experienced such as it was for Molière (whose great comedies are shot through with the sense of maleficent power), not to mention a (1) Paris, Albin Michel, 1947.
Voltaire or a Swift. (The great Romantics such as Schlegel and Baudelaire recognised this central factor in irony and satire.)

Yet undoubtedly this Théâtre Comique represents something real in Marcel's experience; — it is symbolic, as he admits, of a certain "temptation" which, although always overcome, has not ceased to attract and haunt him (perhaps a remnant of that agnosticism which entered into the influences of his early home life). This is the temptation of irony: the temptation of the "spectacular" attitude, the sin of distorting objectification whereby the immediate communion obtaining between self and reality within the depths of immanent experience is disrupted, and the real is made "absent". Irony is the refusal of transcendence.

Now the ironic, spectacular attitude too, at the other extreme from pure, musical subjectivity, is outwith the sphere of dialectic. But not, this time, beyond, rather on this side of the dialectical movement. It may, indeed, be considered as the essential starting-point of the dialectic of sincerity, as Kierkegaard has affirmed, but it is only, in his words, an "absolute beginning", anticipating dialectic but itself pre-dialectical. As M. Lacroix has well put it: "Si l'ironie est le 'commencement absolu de la vie personnelle', elle risque aussi de nous murer dans notre individualité. Aussi comprend-on que Kierkegaard ait craint en elle la négativité infinie: l'essence de l'ironie, dit-il,
c'est de nier l'essence. Le point de vue de l'ironie en tant que telle est le *nil admirari* - et qui n'admire rien ne peut se donner à rien. La vie personnelle qui méprise tout et se méprise elle-même ne peut que conduire au néant. Il est nécessaire de passer par l'ironie, mais il est nécessaire aussi de la dépasser. L'ironie doit être un moment, mais un moment dominé (1)." And therefore it is not properly *dramatic*. (It is for this reason that farce is not in essence dramatic in the true sense, but only virtually dramatic.)

Between those two poles, each excluding, in its own way, the movement of spiritual *approfondissement*, lies the real domain of Marcel's reflexion. And within this domain, his metaphysical reflexion is pursued on two parallel lines: first, in his *Journal Intime* and other phenomenological works; secondly in his plays. In a later chapter, Marcel's tragedy will be studied in detail. Suffice for the moment to say that his plays represent an embodiment in dramatic form of his metaphysical dialectic. His tragedy is simply this dialectic made incarnate.

Hence the form it takes. It portrays in its characters and their relationships the struggle of selves to attain, in the depths of concrete, temporal experience, the vision and possession of essential self-hood, a struggle which is set between two poles, the one the pole of absence and objectivity, (1) Op. cit., pp. 23-4.
where darkness and separation reign, the other the pole of pure subjectivity, acting as the light which inspires and gives purpose to the struggle.

Within this field, bordered by irony on one side and lyricism on the other, separation and communion, judgment and contemplation, the dialectique d'approfondissement has its legitimate application and function. And within this field, metaphysics and drama meet, not only in that they operate as parallel activities of reflexion, but in the literal sense that each lends the other its aid and its means. In every sense of the term — and no statement could better define the "register" of Marcel's thought — his metaphysical inquiry is dramatic, and his drama is metaphysical.

It is to the exposition and elucidation of this drama of ontological exploration that we must now turn.
CHAPTER III
IDEALISM

The evolution of Marcel's thought is full of interest. Starting from an Idealist standpoint, for the most part Hegelian or neo-Hegelian, he evolves through a phase of "positive" Idealism under the influence simultaneously of Schelling and the French Idealists, to end up in an uncompromising philosophic Realism.

Referring to his youthful "Hegelian ardour", soon to be quenched, he relates how, when a student at the Sorbonne, he scandalised Jacques Rivière by asserting that the Absolute might not be the immediate, but the fruit of dialectic (1). His Hegelianism, however, does not seem to have survived long, as may be seen from his thesis for the Diplôme d'études supérieures in 1909. (We are indebted to Charles Du Bos for an account of this unpublished memoir entitled: Les Idées métaphysiques de Coleridge dans leurs rapports avec la philosophie de Schelling (2).)

Speaking in the name of a "dynamic philosophy", of a "philosophy which posits life as primary, the whole as prior to its parts, finality as infinitely more true than mechanism, which is only a superficial view of things", he criticises the attempt of the Absolute Idealists to explain the real in terms of an immanent dialectic. He rejects

(1) Constantes, article in the special number of the Nouv. Rev. franç., Hommage à Rivière, April, 1925.
(2) Gabriel Marcel, loc. cit. p. 9.
such an attempt to make logic account for reality on the
score of its failure to explain two factors: concrete,
individual existence on the one hand, and freedom on the
other. Schelling's philosophy of identity, like Absolute
Idealism in general, sought to deny or eliminate the
sensible, the concrete actuality. The latter, replies
Marcel, "ought not perhaps to exist, but it is", and must
be accounted for. As for the second factor, "for whoever
has been made aware of freedom as a fact, as an act, as the
only possible reality, we believe that a philosophy of
immanence becomes untenable". Both Schelling and Coleridge
were ultimately obliged to recognise the fact of liberty as
essential to religious thought. And so too must a coherent
"philosophy of life". "Refusing both to view the world as
an ensemble of abstract relations and to consider it as
subject to a blind becoming", it needs must affirm that "what
is best and highest in us cannot be absolutely unrelated to
what is at the root of things and that there must be some
profound analogy between the inner principle which animates
them and the mainspring of our activity."

The source of Marcel's first meditations is, as the
subject of the memoir indicates, the philosophy of Schelling.
Schelling's evolution from a system of rationalistic identity
and Pantheism to what Dr Bolman has called a "dynamic meta-
physics of irrational creativity (1)" reflects Marcel's own evolution from Hegelianism to a "dynamic philosophy" or philosophy of liberty. It is to Schelling (and not, as Du Bos suggests, to Bergson, for reasons that will become apparent later) that he is indebted for the means of overcoming the temptations of Hegelian rationalism.

Schelling's philosophy of identity is a philosophy of immanence aiming, like that of Hegel, at making logic account for existence. It shows how, through intellectual intuition, the ideal and the real may be reduced to rational identity. It sees in the contingent reality mere appearance, which may be wholly accounted for by pure thought intuitions the pure ideas and relations it embodies. "Philosophy", Schelling declares, "is the science of ideas or the eternal prototypes of things (2)." In the "positive" philosophy Schelling comes to see that the individual, or concrete actual existent, is distinct from the universal, the idea and the concept, and that existence cannot be rationally inferred. Reason cannot account for existence, for it deals only with the "possible", with the "essence". "Reason", he says, "gives everything, with respect to content, which appears in

experience; it comprehends what is actual but, on that account, not actuality (1)." The positive philosophy re-establishes the primacy of the existent as wholly contingent and free with regard to the mere "possible" or "essence", and thus makes the concept depend upon actuality. It comes therefore to find the ground of existence in a free creation or act of absolute freedom on the part of a Divinity transcendent with respect to his creation.

On this basis Schelling elaborates a history of the divine drama which takes us back to Jakob Boehme. He conceives a "super-godhead" (Ubergottheit) resembling the Urgrund or Urgrund of Boehme - pure will, absolute freedom, indeterminate and unconditioned. It is this irrational principle in the Godhead, recognised as prionus with regard to his "essence", that is the principle of existence. It is the principle of the Divine existence itself; for the Godhead exists in possessing it (2). Above all it is the principle of actual created existence, for pure will involves a possibility of willing what is contrary to its essentiality. And it is precisely in deploying this pure will in an act of

(2) Cf. Charles Secrétan: "Ainsi l'existence immuable, éternelle de Dieu repose sur la base de sa volonté. Aussi longtemps que cette volonté reste en puissance, Dieu la possède comme sa puissance, et l'existence de Dieu distincte de cette puissance consiste à la posséder; c'est en elle qu'il se sent vivre, c'est en elle qu'il trouve la félicité, ce qui est proprement l'acte éternel de son être." (La Philosophie de la liberté, 2nd ed., Paris, Durand et Cherbuliez, 1866, Lecon XIV., p. 234.)
utter irrationality, so as to bring into being, in despite of the absolute, self-contained perfection of His essence, a world of contingent and free individuals that the Godhead reveals itself as God. Creation and existence are thus wholly irrational, having their origin in an unmotivated act of pure liberty.

The drama of the universe then becomes the revelation of God in nature and history; a revelation which brings into existence a contingent world and contingent beings endowed with freedom. The creation itself is a "fall" or a "leap". The finite existing beings are invested with the freedom which characterises the Absolute from which they take their origin: "What is exclusively peculiar to absoluteness is that it invests its counterpart not only with its own nature but even independence. This being-in-self (in-sich-selbst-Sein), this genuine and true reality of what is first envisaged, is freedom, and from that first independence of the counterpart flows what comes forth in the phenomenal world as freedom, which is the last trace and, as it were, the seal of divinity envisaged in the fallen world (1)."

In the universal or Absolute Will all things participate by their freedom. It is by the wrongful use of this freedom that they separate themselves from God; which is the significance of the Fall. At the same time, they are impelled to return to the Absolute. The history of the universe is one of process and one of gradual return to Unity.

each form of being striving to pass, by what Brehier has termed a sort of "epigenesis", from the lower to the higher. And throughout this drama, the original "fall", the "process", and the "passage" from lower to higher, freedom and irrationality are manifest.

This brief exposure of Schelling's final philosophy will be of use presently, for it would appear that it forms the background to all Marcel's thought before 1914. For the moment it may be observed that besides Schelling himself, a source of Marcel's first Idealism may well be Charles Secretan, whose "philosophy of liberty" is directly derived from Schelling. It posits, in a similar fashion, a God endowed with absolute liberty, and explains finite existence in terms of a principle of freedom (which Secretan, in common with Schelling and Ravaisson describes as "love") working in man and constituting what is real and divine in him; a freedom, moreover, which, if exercised in conformity with the Absolute Will, enables union with God (1).

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This Idealism continues to characterise Marcel's thought for some time to come. It informs his first philosophy formed between 1909 and 1914. This first philosophy is expounded in the first part of the Journal Metaphysique (1) On the influence of Coleridge, coupled with that of Schelling, see Appendix to Chp. III below.
This first philosophy elaborates with greater thoroughness the criticism of Absolute Idealism. Its primary significance, indeed, is in its rejection of the Hegelian ideal of absolute knowledge and of the pretensions of logic to account for reality. The argument centres on two points: first, any attempt to reconcile the Absolute and its temporal appearances leads to the destruction of the appearances it seeks to transcend (J M pp. 10-11); secondly reality is refractory to total determination by conceptual thought.

This latter argument is developed fully in the above-mentioned article which gives, moreover, the quintessence of Marcel's first philosophy.

The object of the article is to determine the conditions under which a religious thought is possible, in other words a philosophy of intuition defined as any doctrine which maintains that Being may be grasped by intuition and can only be grasped by intuition (C D p. 638). The essential condition of any such philosophy of intuition is the preparation of the intuition of Being by a dialectic aiming at the destruction of the idea of absolute knowledge revealed as self-contradictory.

(1) Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1912.
(2) Paris, Grasset, 1914.
Nous serons ainsi amenés à établir que la philosophie de l'intuition ne peut se constituer que sur une critique rationnelle de l'idée de savoir absolu, et que celle-ci est solidaire de celle-là: si l'on ne peut prouver que l'idée de savoir absolu est contradictoire, il faut renoncer à édifier une philosophie de l'intuition. (Ibid., p. 639.)

An absolute knowledge is impossible, since it is impossible without contradiction to affirm the complete autonomy of knowledge, implying as it does the identity of Being with the idea of Being. Thought transcends knowledge as Being transcends the idea of Being; between the two exists a constant margin. Though the idea of absolute knowledge may be a powerful impelling force in scientific and philosophical investigation, it is merely an idea, that is an exigency of mind, and insufficient as an explanation of reality.

What then is this residue of thought, irreducible to knowledge or objective thought? It is not Spencer’s "unknowable", which belongs to the world of objects, for no object is impermeable to knowledge. Rather it is thought itself in so far as it is not knowledge, not idea, not objectivated by the process of reflexion - in short, thought as positing, not as posited. Thought so conceived corresponds seemingly to Being, in Marcel's view, although we are not justified in declaring it identical with Being, for to do so would be to convert it into an object; nor can Being itself be thus objectivated. What Marcel calls a **negative** dialectic is the natural outcome of the preceding
positive dialectic, namely a dialectic by which the core of Being is approached not by way of objective thought, but by successive acts of participation. It is this act of participation which Marcel defines as intuition: "An act of transcendence by which thought, becoming aware of the deforming nature of all objectivation, affirms itself irreducible to any such conversion, and in this sense if not identical with Being (such an affirmation would plunge it once more into the world of ideas) at least as participating in Being." (Ibid., p. 652.)

Intuition, in short, is the act whereby thought affirms itself as transcending what is in itself but pure objectivity. It is an act not of knowledge, but of faith, by which the mind, beyond all judgments of essence and existence, grasps the spiritual reality within itself in an immediate participation:

Elle est donc en somme un acte de foi, et son contenu ne pouvant s'expliciter que dans une dialectique pratique de la participation, par laquelle la pensée, dépassant le monde du savoir, se rapprocherait par des démarches successives de création du centre où elle doit librement se renoncer, pour faire place à Celui qui est. (Ibid.)

The domain of intuition and faith is beyond the categories of truth and error, existence and non-existence. God, the ultimate "object" of the act of faith, is not to be known objectively, hence a negative theology. Hence too a negative psychology, for like God, the self too "transcends all experience, all possible existence, all truth" (J M p. 38).
Such problems as the nature of the divinity or of the self vanish in the living experience of faith, as does that of the relation between mind and body, for "there is no possible truth of myself" (J.M.p. 118). So that the outcome of this first philosophy is an act of faith beyond the sphere of knowledge, by which thought secures, in an immediate participation, the transcendent spiritual reality immanent within it:

La foi est une affirmation qui ne doit pas et ne peut pas être dissociée de ce sur quoi elle porte. Dans la mesure où la foi est née au profit de ce qu'elle affirme (qui est alors traité comme un objet) elle se convertit en pensée théorique et se supprime. (J.M. p. 39.)

The significance of this first statement, taken together with the memoir previously mentioned, lies first of all in its criticism of Absolute Idealism and of its assertion that the real may be wholly determined by reason in the idea or concept, so that the Absolute may ultimately be accounted for, without residue, by logic. Reality, it is shown, cannot be thus wholly determined by reason by virtue of the fact that Being transcends the idea of Being. Beyond the universal and the concept, which are the objects of rational construction, lies Being itself, the active subject which does the constructing and which it is for intuition alone to reveal immediately to thought, once all that is mere object
and construct in the mind has been transcended.

None the less, however much this first philosophy succeeds in refuting Absolute Idealism, in restoring the Transcendent, and in vindicating the claims of intuition as against discursive and conceptual reasoning, it is far from being a Realism. Speaking of this first period of his thought, Marcel, while stressing that his whole philosophy springs from a reaction against Transcendental Idealism, admits that it was within the framework of the categories of Idealism that his reaction developed.

Cette réaction contre l'idéalisme s'est cependant développée à l'origine à l'intérieur même d'un idéalisme, ou du moins d'une pensée qui restait à quelque degré tributaire de catégories idéalistes. De là tout ce qu'il y a de difficile, d'irritant, voire de rebutant dans la démarche de la première partie du Journal métaphysique. A distance, je me fais un peu l'effet d'un homme qui s'embarrasse continuellement dans les vêtements trop ajustés dont il tente en vain de se dépouiller. (1).

It remains, in fact, within the framework of the positive Idealism of Schelling and the French Idealists, as a closer analysis will serve to show. In the first place, both the article and the first part of the Journal are the work of a dialectician, steeped in the post-Kantian philosophers' (2). Marcel has accepted Hegel's criticism of immediacy as contained in the Phenomenology. His intuition is the

(1) Exist. chrét., p. 309.
(2) L. Baruzi remarks justly of the first part of the Journal Métaphysique that there is "something as if it were curiously spectral in this survival of a form after the destruction of its content". (Review of the Journal Métaphysique, loc. cit.)
outcome of a long dialectic and, on his own admission, depends for its validity on this preliminary reflexion. Marcel says that his first spontaneous reaction was hostility to empiricism, so much so that he could not take experience as his point of departure; rather, under the influence of Schelling, he envisaged a process of dialectic which might lead to an "empirisme supérieur", as its term (1). But such a dialectic, he goes on to say, as he envisages it at the moment, could only be itself "ideal", being not the dialectic of Hegel, whose movement is or claims to be throughout an explicitation of real existence, but a progress of thought whereby it transcends gradually its positions.

He assimilated it to Bradley's rather than to Hegel's dialectic, as the former is defined in Appearance and Reality, whereby appearances are "en quelque façon recueillies et transmuées au soin d'une réalité qui les comporte à un niveau

inférieur d'elle-même, mais qui en même temps les absorbe, les récuse et les dépasse (1), a progressive movement of interiorisation by virtue of which thought, transcending at each stage the objective conditions of intelligibility it itself posits in its unfolding, is led to awareness of its subjective reality, thus allowing the passage from objective content to the intuition of faith, from "Appearance" to "Reality". It follows that the intuition he envisage at this stage is the contrary of intuition in the Bergsonian sense or as Marcel will understand it later, that is an immediate prise de contact of reality serving as an immediate starting-point for all future reflexion (2).

It is in somewhat similar fashion that Schelling's positive philosophy is preceded by a "negative" philosophy called the science of reason, which demonstrates that existence cannot be rationally inferred but must be suspended upon an act of faith or immediate concept of actuality - although this act of faith becomes, in a way unknown to Marcel, the starting-point of a deductive science of existence, namely the "positive" philosophy (3). In this

(1) Ibid., p. 298.
(2) We must however point out here that in his later Realism and philosophy of immediacy, Marcel will not accept the Bergsonian definition of intuition as a simple non-relational and absolute datum. On the contrary, he will believe that immediacy is not exclusive of qualitative relations and that within the prise de contact there is a dialectic, not rational but by way of participation, not posterior but one with the immediacy of experience.
connection too, the influence of Bradley is apparent; Marcel, it is to be remembered, owes much to the study of the British and American neo-Hegelians (1). A parallel may be drawn with Bradley's dialectic, by which the Absolute is demonstrated unknowable (although Marcel at this moment does not yet accept Bradley's apparent return to the immediacy of sensation as the starting-point of reflection).

In the actual development and movement of this preliminary dialectic there is apparent a double influence. That of Fichte: the manner in which thought in its pure activity is dissociated from what is in itself mere objectivity resembles closely Fichte's dialectical differentiation of Self and non-Self. In addition, French Idealism undoubtedly weighs on the young Marcel, fresh from the Sorbonne. Jules Lachelier, in his philosophy of liberty, transcends by a similar dialectic the immediate data of consciousness, as are sensations, and discovers a final element, irreducible to the status of object, consciousness itself, the perception of the active, willing subject which conditions and accompanies all objective representations (2).

The similarity of this reasoning and that of Marcel is apparent: the same effort of dialectic to transcend objective

(1) Cf. his article La Métaphysique de Josiah Royce, Rev. de Mét., 1918-19, published later in a volume (Paris, Aubier, 1945).
(2) Cf. the method employed by Paul Valéry to attain a "pure consciousness" in La Soirée avec M. Tosté.
thought and the same general result, the recognition of an element in thought refractory to objectivation, none other than thought itself in its pure activity (1).

But above all this doctrine of intuition is built up in opposition to, or rather as an extension of the neo-Kantian Idealism of Léon Brunschvicg, under whose influence Marcel

(1) Generally speaking, Marcel's method at this moment is an application of the French Idealistic analyse réflexive as practised by Maine de Biran and his followers. For this reason, his use of the term "intuition" is a somewhat special one. It evidently corresponds to Maine de Biran's "belief". It will be recalled that, in the latter's view, self-awareness in the experience of effort constitutes intuitive knowledge, that is the subject not only knows his existence but what he is. But this only because the self is given to the subject as an object by virtue of a duality. In short, it has intuitive knowledge of itself only as a series of phenomenal and relative states. On the other hand and at the same time, awareness of itself as it is in-itself, as absolute self and pure subjectivity accompanies, and is one with, the immediate presence of the subject to itself in its act. This latter awareness, however, is brought to light by a process of reflexion whereby the pure subject is revealed beneath its objective appearances in and through a progressive purification. It is not therefore an intuition. It is so even less by reason of the fact that it is not knowledge but faith or belief. The term intuition is applicable only to the sphere of knowledge, where there is duality of subject and object and where, in the case of self-knowledge, the subject becomes an object open to the vision of the self.

then was, Marcel has informed the writer in conversation that in the spring of 1914 he was contemplating a thesis on the nature of intelligibility. The object of this work was to be a study of the relation between the intelligence "opérante" and its ideological product. The whole would revolve around Brunschwicg's theory of verification, according to which the mind creates or forces its own conditions of verification, i.e. the principles whereby it "verifies" experience and accepts and rejects it as truth and knowledge. On the basis of this theory, Marcel would have attempted to demonstrate that beyond the ideological content of the mind, verified in terms of the mind's self-made conditions, there exists a domain which is "unverifiable", inasmuch as it is prior to the realm of objectivity, as it is not content but mind itself in its subjective activity; and that this "unverifiable" is the "object" of intuition. But this subjective realm of being and spirit is not definable except in negative terms as what is not "verifiable", not "objective" and not "knowledge".

That Marcel is expanding Brunschwicg's theory of mind, but along lines suggested by Kant's Practical Reason, is obvious from a study of the first part of the Journal Métaphysique, where his analysis of faith, although somewhat more incoherent than in the article, is also more explicit. A short statement of its contents, supplementing our exposé of the article, is here desirable.

Marcel asserts with Brunschwicg that the object is a
construction of thought in terms of forms (space, time, etc.) which it creates as the conditions of intelligibility.

"...l'objet est construit comme objet, c'est-à-dire - et par définition même - comme indépendant du sujet percevant; cette construction n'est ni postérieure à l'expérience comme le voudrait un empirisme contradictoire, ni antérieure à elle, mais elle lui est identique, elle lui est coextensive (J.M. p. 15) (1).

But in this very act of constructing the object, the mind is made aware of itself as thought, not "constituée" but "constituante" or rather "se constituant", in short as an act transcending the forms it creates and which are the conditions of its objectivation and therefore of its "verification", but to which it itself is not subjected. Thought in its pure subjective reality is "unverifiable" and beyond all determination.

Le "je pense" n'est pas un donné, il n'est pas une forme, il est un acte. Je crois que Descartes a ici été plus loin que Kant. L'inverifiable est donc fonction de l'acte libre, il est la trace de celui-ci, il est l'expression toute négative de ce fait que l'acte libre devient pour lui-même un mystère aussitôt qu'il se transforme en pensée objective (la pensée objective ayant pour caractère de se nier au profit de son objet). Je ne crois pas qu'on puisse aller plus loin dans la détermination de l'idée d'inverifiable. (Ibid., p. 37.)

(1) Cf. "Ainsi ce n'est pas l'intelligibilité qui est fonction des formes, ce sont les formes qui sont fonction de l'intelligibilité; et, je le répète, il est nécessaire qu'il en soit ainsi; car rendre raison de l'intelligibilité, c'est, ou bien ne rien penser, ou bien préformer l'intelligible même dans le principe formel qui est destiné à en rendre compte." (Ibid., p. 111.)
Pure thought, the inner reality of mind, reveals itself thus as pure spontaneity, as liberty.

L'acte par lequel je pense la liberté est l'acte même par lequel la liberté se constitue. Le moi serait en quelque sorte le médium intelligible par lequel la liberté passe de l'idée à l'être. Mais il est clair que cet acte de création n'est autre que le cogito. La pensée se crée en se pensant; elle ne se trouve pas, elle se constitue.

(Ibid., p. 32.)

And this means that it cannot be posited as existing.

Il n'y a de vérité que de ce qui est dans l'espace et dans le temps, mais il n'y a de vérité que pour une pensée qui se définit hors de l'espace et du temps. Une telle pensée ne peut sans contradiction se poser comme existante: et ceci revient à dire qu'elle est libre.

La liberté, condition de toute vérification, ne peut être pensée elle-même que comme radicalement inévertifiable, comme affranchie des conditions d'existence auxquelles doit satisfaire un objet pour pouvoir être vérifié (déterminé comme vérité).

(Ibid., pp. 30-1.)

The Cogito posits the thinking subject as liberty, a pure essence of thought, thus establishing the grounds of a universal science.

Le moi, ai-je dit, est le médium de la liberté, c'est-à-dire que dans le cogito le moi exprime l'acte par lequel la liberté se pose elle-même. Seulement ce moi est universel, ou tout au moins il se supprime dans l'universalité du sujet pensant. En tant que je pense, je suis universel, et, si la science se suspend au cogito, c'est précisément en vertu de cette universalité inhérente au moi pensant.

(Ibid., pp. 40-1.)

But the je pense itself, by the inward progress of thought, must give way to a deeper intuition of the subjective reality:

(1) Cf. Ibid., p. 32.
this is the je crois, the intuition of faith, wherein the self is made aware of its spontaneity in its particular individuality. Both in the je pense and the je crois we are beyond the plane of verification, but in the first case the self posits itself as transcending all objective categories in order simply to provide the universal ground and condition of objective knowledge; in the second case the self is not concerned with establishing its freedom as a universal ground for the development of rational knowledge, but as the concrete essence constituting its individuality. (Marcel is here trying to surmount the difficulty of the Cartesian res cogitans).

La question se ramène à celle-ci: comment le cogito peut-il se dépasser lui-même? Il est clair en effet que l'individualité qui se réalise dans la foi doit être par delà l'universalité tout abstraite du je pense, elle doit la comprendre et la dépasser. (Ibid., p. 42.)

La foi est l'acte par lequel l'esprit comble le vide entre le moi pensant et le moi empirique en affirmant leur liaison transcendantale; ou plutôt
In so grasping its inner concrete individuality, the self grasps at one and the same time the spiritual and divine principle of activity with which it participates. Faith is essentially participation, for this individuality

n'est qu'en se suspendant à un acte de création, à une liberté qui est distincte d'elle; la négation absolue du solipsisme est la condition préalable de toute vie spirituelle. (Ibid., p. 62.)

The act of faith is affirmation of liberty, but of a liberty which finds itself in participation and ultimately in union with Absolute Spirit or Absolute Thought.

N'avons-nous pas été dupe des mots en dissociant le cogito et l'affirmation portant sur Dieu? bien plus, n'apparaît-il pas absurde de distinguer maintenant deux libertés? Ne sommes-nous pas obligés d'identifier au sein de la pensée se pensant elle-même (et qui n'est ni ma pensée ni la pensée d'un Dieu, mais seulement la Pensée) les deux moments que seule une réflexion superficielle nous avait permis de dissocier?

(Ibid., p. 38.)

C'est-à-dire que l'esprit pose Dieu comme le posant.

(Ibid., p. 46.)

In the self-affirmation of faith suspended upon the affirmation of God, freedom attains its true actuality: in short,
the individual subject attains true actuality only in union with Absolute Spirit.

Being beyond verification, Spirit and God, which are the "object" of faith, are beyond the judgment of existence, no less than the pure thinking self.

It will be seen clearly from this more detailed exposé of the content of the First Part of the Journal that Marcel is utilising Brunschvicg's theory of verification as a starting-point from which to develop a doctrine of faith along Kantian lines in terms of an "unverifiable", but supplemented by a theory of participation on the lines of the French Idealists.

If we now turn to consider the nature of the Being which is the object of Marcel's intuition, it is no less obvious that his thought has its source in modern Idealism. The first philosophy, indeed, simply elaborates the conclusions
of his thesis. Its aim is at bottom the same as that of Schelling: to show the inadequacy of a logical pantheism which reduces reality to a system of necessary and abstract relations, and to reassert the primacy of liberty. It is an intuition which breaks the bonds of logical determinism and provides awareness of the cardinal fact of liberty and irrational activity as the very substance of reality. The first philosophy of Marcel is from start to finish a philosophy of liberty: it equates Being and Freedom; it affirms an intuition of a transcendent Active Thought immanent in self. Its sources are first of all Schelling. Secondly, French Spiritualism and Idealism from Maine de Biran and Ravaisson onwards; Jules Lachelier and Jules Lagneau in particular, all of whom define Being as absolute spontaneity, pure will and active mind.

The identification of Being with liberty is sufficient in itself to mark the abyss between Marcel's first philosophy and his later development. One outstanding feature which is to characterise his final philosophy is the uncompromising rejection of what he is to term the "primat de la liberté" common to practically all modern Idealisms.

The full implication of this Idealism will become evident if we consider the intrinsic nature of Being as defined above by Marcel. Certainly, Being, considered as Freedom and Spontaneity, is not the abstract notion of Being formed by the Scholastics. Comparing his conception of Being with that
of Bergson, Marcel states in a note: "It goes without saying that, for me, Being (as grasped in intuition) is the concrete." (C.D. p. 638, Note.) None the less, the comparison is at this stage inaccurate. For it is obvious that he is not defining Being as existent. "La réalité spirituelle," he writes, "n'est donc qu'à condition de se nier comme existence." (J.M. p. 122.) The Being revealed in intuition is rather, as M. Wahl has pointed out, 'the Transcendent Unity of Plotinus, situated on a plane beyond all categories of existence or non-existence, essence or non-essence, truth or falsehood. Indeed the author declares as much:

La négation de Dieu comme existant entraîne l'affirmation de Dieu comme transcendant, avons-nous dit. Ceci veut dire que nous devons penser Dieu comme transcendant à toute détermination quelconque; aboutirons-nous donc à l'Un alexandrin? Je crois qu'il faut reconnaître ce qui est absolument vrai chez Plotin; l'idée que Dieu n'est véritablement pour nous qu'en tant que nous participons à lui. Seulement il importe de transposer dans l'ordre de l'esprit, dans l'ordre subjectif tout ce qui subsiste chez Plotin: l'Émanatisme objectif. (J.M. pp. 35-6.)

Or again it is conceived in the Fichtean and Spiritualistic sense as the pure Transcendent Subject or Active Mind, grasped outwith the spatio-temporal conditions of actual and sensational experience. The Je pense, declares Marcel, "transcends all experience, all possible existence and all truth". (J.M. p. 38.)

The sources of this conception of Being are once again the French Idealists and Schelling. The principal feature in the development of French Spiritualism in the nineteenth
century is the gradual transition from the contingent, existential subject, which is the object of Maine de Biran's psychological analysis, to the transcendent Absolute Subject. It has its starting-point in the analysis of the empirical consciousness initiated by Maine de Biran, in the consciousness of the self as voluntary activity or cause distinct from what is mere passive sensibility and affectivity. "J'agis, je veux, ou je pense en moi l'action, donc je me sais cause, donc je suis ou j'existe réellement à titre de cause ou de force (1)." With Félix Ravaissón, this Spiritualism is enlarged to afford a passage from psychology to metaphysics. The active will of the self becomes linked with the transcendent principle of love working in man and nature, a universal aspiration towards harmony and beauty — Absolute Being or God. So that Being becomes identified with a single universal principle transcending the individual empirical consciousness and towards union with which it strives.

It is Lachelier who transforms Spiritualism into a pure Idealism. The transcending of the objective content of thought, already described, leaves an element which analysis cannot reduce, namely consciousness itself — the consciousness of mind or thought as pure activity and spontaneity. But this consciousness is not the "conscience sensible", but a pure consciousness — "conscience de la conscience". The Being or Thought grasped therein is a "spontanéité absolue".

transcending the purely relative perception of self-activity which is the datum of the real, empirical consciousness. "Puisque la philosophie se propose d'expliquer toute la réalité, il faut bien qu'elle en cherche la dernière raison dans quelque chose qui ne soit plus réel, et qui soit par conséquent une pure idée (1)." "Ne craignons pas de suspendre en quelque sorte la pensée dans le vide, car elle ne peut reposer que sur elle-même, et tout le reste ne peut reposer que sur elle: le dernier point d'appui de toute vérité et de toute existence, c'est la spontanéité absolue de l'esprit (2)."

Lachelier thus turns his back upon all psychological realism, which he dismisses as a mere "naturalism". He places the ultimate reality not in the individual will, the active force which is the object of the intuition of the real, existing self and which forms his "substance" or "essence" as an individual personality, but in an Absolute Spontaneity transcending selfhood and existence as such. The Absolute is not the individual existing self, but a Pure Thought which is the measure and ground of both thought and existence. "La pensée et l'existence ne sont que deux noms de l'universelle

(1) Psychologie et métaphysique, pp. 103-4.
(2) Ibid., pp. 157-8. The notion of a "pure consciousness", "conscience de la conscience" is the same as Valéry's. "Tout le cède à cette universalité pure, à cette généralité insurmontable que la conscience se sent être." (Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci, p. 25.) "Je suis étant, et me voyant; me voyant me voir; et ainsi de suite." (Monsieur Tante, Paris, Gallimard, 1927, p. 50.)
et éternelle nécessité (1)."

The same turning back upon finite existence is to be found in the philosophy of Jules Lagneau. He denies the possibility of grasping the self. (Sensation is an ideal limit never given nor experienced as such.) What alone can be grasped, and that by pure consciousness, is Absolute Spirit:

"Cet effort vers l'esprit-moi est vain: le moi échappe, l'esprit seul, universel, est atteint par le sentiment du nécessaire absolu à la fois subi et subissant, c'est-à-dire de l'unité totale et absolue (2)."

These tendencies of French Idealism have their counterpart in Schelling. Reflecting the inspiration of Boehme, Schelling's Being or Absolute Liberty, in which the contingent selves participate in respect of their degree of being, is described in strictly neo-Platonic terms as beyond essence and existence, entirely indeterminate and unconditioned. Itself the ground and principle of being and existence, it yet cannot be said to be or exist, as it is beyond predication. Being, or the "super-Godhead", is uncharacterisable; in one sense it is and exists, in another it is not and does not exist. In short, it enjoys what the neo-Platonic theologians term "super-existence" and "super-essence". "It is eternal freedom, pure will, but not the will for something - for example the will to reveal one's self - but pure, passionless

(2) Esdras, p. 299.
and desireless will, will in so far as it does not really will (1)." "Thus, in a strict sense, the Godhead cannot be called conscious, for this would presuppose a distinction of itself from something of which it is conscious, since it certainly is altogether pure consciousness and throughout nothing but just itself, and everything is absorbed in the nature of the Godhead. According to this same doctrine, the Godhead in itself cannot be called willing, because it is will, pure freedom itself, although just on this account it also cannot be called non-willing. Finally that ancient proposition, which sounds strange only to the ignorant, also follows from this doctrine, that the godhead in itself neither is nor is not, or, in another, though inferior phrasing, that it is as well as is not (2)." In short, the ultimate Being or Reality is beyond all categories; although in one sense infinite Being, infinite existence and infinite personality, it cannot be said to possess being, existence or personality in a "positive" sense. Hence the Absolute is to be known only "negatively" (3).

Finally, Dr Bolman has described Schelling's evolution as a "transition from a relatively static to a truly dynamic poetic monism (4)." And a Monism his philosophy remains

(1) The Ages of the world, p. 123.
(2) Ibid., p. 125.
(3) Cf. John Scott Eriqena: "Nam qui dicit superessentialis est, non, quid est, dicit, sed, quid non est; dicit enim essentiam non esse, sed plusqam essentiam." (De Divisione Naturae, 462 D, quoted by H. Bett, Johannes Scotus Eriqina, Cambridge University Press, 1925, p. 24.)
(no less than the Monism of French Idealism). He visualises an Absolute Spirit, beyond contingent existence, in which all finite beings participate by their freedom and to union with which all aspire (1).

The first phase of Marcel's thought, as our analysis may have helped to show, exhibits all these traits of post-Kantian Idealism. He seems to conceive intuition as bearing upon a universal "Geist" transcending individual consciousnesses, ultimately uncharacterisable, beyond concrete existence, into which the individual, finite, existing self is to be absorbed in the final phase of intuition. Marcel in the first part of the Journal Métaphysique criticises "spiritualistic Monism" no doubt:

But, in reality, he is only criticising Monism in so far as it denies the value of external relations; which it does because it confuses such relations with pure relations of "juxtaposition". No doubt, he argues, external relations have no intrinsic reality and are not ultimate, but they have their place at a certain moment of dialectic:

(1) "Ce qui est de la plus grande importance non pas seulement historique mais intrinsèque c'est l'effort qu'a fait ici. Schelling pour fonder la liberté humaine ontologiquement, ou plus exactement encore pour la greffer sur la vie divine elle-même." (G. Marcel, review of Schelling, La Liberté humaine, transl. G. Politzer, Nouv. Rev. franç., Oct., 1946.)
Le monisme a, je crois, pleinement raison tant qu'il se borne à affirmer que plus nous nous élevons dans l'être, plus le pur juxtaposé tend à être éliminé. Le progrès dans l'être à cet égard est un progrès dans l'intériorité... Pour nier la valeur ontologique de l'aussi (pour lui refuser toute réalité intrinsèque), est-il nécessaire de chercher à l'éliminer? La question qui se pose avant tout est de savoir si cette élimination est réelle, si elle n'est pas illusoire. Il y a un plan de la pensée qui est celui de l'aussi, quoi qu'on fasse pour le nier; la question est de savoir si en niant que ce plan soit ultime, on affirme par là même la thèse moniste de la réductibilité de toutes les connexions externes à des rapports d'intériorité.

(Ibid., p. 95.)

It is certain that there is here some incoherence and that the author's dialectic has overrun itself: to deny the "intrinsic reality" and "ultimacy" of external relations is tantamount to affirming Monism and no Monist ever meant anything else. And, in actual fact, Marcel's philosophy at this time denies any reality except to the Transcendent Unity - what he calls "l'Esprit" as opposed to "thought thought".

The intuition he describes is therefore completely unlike that of Bergson and the intuition he later defends, namely the immediacy of feeling and sensation as experienced by the existing self and given in the concrete spatio-temporal conditions of such experience. At the moment, the intuition he envisages is the very contrary of sensation (which with the Idealists he would no doubt relegate to the domain of objectivity (1)). It is a form of "pure intuition" prepared

(1) M. Wahl, in his article on the Journal, observes rightly that Marcel at this time identifies existence with space and that it is for this reason that he refuses existence to Being.
by a transcending of all that is contingent (and therefore, strictly speaking, spatio-temporal) in experience.

Moreover, it puts us in touch with a Being which is not itself existent; an absolute spontaneity, or God, not even characterisable as a "person", as a "substance" or as an "essence". Nothing could be further removed from the Being of his later philosophy, revealed in feeling and sensation; a Being which is a plurality of individual selves and "essences" existing in Time, Space and History.

In conclusion, two features of this preliminary Idealism stand out in opposition to his later Realism. First, what seems to be its Monistic implications. His thought appears at this moment to be dominated by the mystical notion of a return to unity, culminating in what is at bottom the depreciation of individual finite existence. He is quite obviously under the influence of Schelling and Fichte, whose Idealism reflects the neo-Platonism of Eckhart and Boehme, and of Hegel himself, in so far as the latter's dialectic derives from a similar source and originates in a like concept of unity (1). Secondly, there is the negative character of his first philosophy and of the theology it involves; so unlike the positive Realism of his later and more original phase. The being he describes is characterisable only in negative terms; an Indeterminate Absolute One, not even a

person, to be approached by successive acts of participation, transcendence or faith, in short by a dialectic which implies something not unlike the via negativa of the Christian Neo-Platonists, of a Dionysius or an Erigena.

M. Jean Wahl has pointed out that Marcel, in his later philosophy, is on the prolongation of a line from Hegel to Bradley (1). Bradley's position is extremely equivocal; his criticism of absolute knowledge and his defence of sensation as a concrete participation in reality, the latter made known to the subject not in an objective relation but in an immediate presentation, seems to incline him towards a true Realism. Nevertheless, he seems unwilling to maintain wholeheartedly that the unknowable Absolute is thus grasped in what is for him an individual fragmentary experience (2).

(2) Bradley's Metaphysics, triadic in character, marks an effort to transcend the naive immediacy of sensation and feeling and to arrive at a new immediacy on a higher level which will restore the vision of the Absolute Whole which the relational activity of the intelligence has fragmented. Comparing Bradley's immediacy and Spinoza's intuition, Alexander writes: "Our simplest life is that of bare feeling; then follows reflection in which we think of the relation of things; then comes the feeling in which we cease to break up the unity of realities into their separate aspects or features, which our analytical reflection discloses and in which it works as in its appropriate medium, and we return to the immediacy of our original feeling, but an immediacy which is no longer naive and irreflective, but chastened by reflection and superior to it." (S. Alexander, Spinoza and Time, London, Allen and Unwin, 1921, pp. 61-2.)
And his theory of judgment, which stresses the impossibility of any valid judgment other than the all-containing judgment which relates the totality of the real to the totality of determining predicates, postulates an ultimate universal reality or Hegelian Geist as the term of a long dialectic. Thus Bradley hovers between Idealism and Realism. Gabriel Marcel, with the aid of Bergson and his defence of immediacy, takes the step Bradley refuses to take, and thereby turns his back upon Idealism. He identifies the immediate and the Absolute and proclaims the individual experience of sensation and feeling to be a revelation of the Absolute itself. The Absolute, impermeable to thought, which transforms the real into an object and thereby deforms it, is grasped in its pure essence in feeling. And thus Marcel's Idealism with its negative philosophy of Being yields to an uncompromising Realism and a positive theory of Being as essence and existence.

Already in this first phase there were several indications of his later development. In his Regard en arrière Marcel himself has noted that from the beginning he was hostile to pantheism, which for him implied a logical pantheism:

Sans que je puisse expliquer exactement pourquoi, je constate que le panthéisme ne m'a jamais attiré - sans doute avant tout parce qu'il me semblait incapable de laisser subsister la vie personnelle dans sa plénitude concrète. (pp. 307-8.)

Anything in the nature of "thought in general" was abhorrent
to him and he relates that already in 1912 he had adopted, while still unacquainted with his works, the position of Kierkegaard as to the subjective individuality of faith:

Again, his first phase shows evident uneasiness over the question of Monism, so incompatible with his urge to concreteness. We have already quoted the passage in the Journal Métaphysique where, unsuccessfully, he attempts to justify within the general framework of his Monism external relations. But the incoherence itself of the passage bears witness to the fact that he is seeking to define a new type of relation — the relation of participation which involves both the plurality of personal concrete entities and their unity in participation. From an early time the study of Bradley, he tells us, had caused him to react vigorously against the idea of an "absolute knowledge" and to place reality in the "act".
réflexion sur l'acte considéré comme irréductible, à un contenu de pensée que j'ai été d'abord amené à m'inscrire en faux contre l'idée d'une totalité intelligible qui serait à la fois le principe moteur et la fin de la dialectique. (pp. 316-17.)

So much so that he was for a time tempted by the monadist solution until he realised fully its total incompatibility with the requirements of his own views of participation and communion:

l'acte m'a toujours retenu avant tout par son irréductible originalité, ou même par la singularité de perspective qui le commande inévitablement. Là est la raison pour laquelle le monadisme a pu me séduire quelques temps; et sans doute m'y serais-je rallié durablement si la thèse de l'incommunicabilité des monades ne m'était apparue comme un défi à l'expérience et au sens commun. (p. 317)

It was these two exigences, the necessity of a theory of concrete plural persons and the necessity of a theory explicative of their participation and union which drove him to seek for a solution beyond both Monism and Pluralism proper:

De ce point de vue je crois pouvoir dire aujourd'hui que j'ai toujours tendu à accorder au pluralisme une valeur au moins négative – celle d'un refus, d'une protestation nécessaire – sans d'ailleurs aller jusqu'à y voir une doctrine métaphysique tenable; ma tendance personnelle étant bien plutôt de denier à l'opposition de l'un et du plusieurs la portée ontologique que lui ont assignée les métaphysiciens depuis l'école d'Elée jusqu'aux néo-hégéliens. (p. 316.)

And the solution, half-glimpsed in the first part of the Journal Métaphysique, he will find in a new type of concrete personal relation over and beyond the abstract concepts either of internality or externality.
Je vois distinctement aujourd’hui que je tendais ainsi à substituer un type de rapport concret et dramatique aux relations encore tout abstraites d’inhérence ou d’extériorité entre lesquelles la philosophie traditionnelle prétendait me contraindre à opter. (p. 317v)

Again, we have seen how Brunschwieg’s notion of the "unverifiable" plays a large part in the first phase. At this time he could define this non-objectified and non-objective realm of being only in negative terms. Although unwilling to lapse into a Spencerian agnosticism, he cannot wholly escape from it. As he sees it, reality is beyond thought and the conditions of knowledge. His theory of knowledge is at bottom a negative one. The insufficiency of this viewpoint will soon become apparent. As he states, it will soon contradict his later philosophy of existence which rests upon positive experience. By attempting to "discern the transcendental conditions of a faith grasped in its purity“ he was led to transcend wholly the domain of positive knowledge and of fact. His viewpoint "visait à poser un invérifiable qui transcende le progrès de la connaissance tel qu’il se poursuit au sein des sciences particulières". (p. 309.) In this he deprived religious experience of its basic experiential ground:

Ici cependant, c’est bien en dernière analyse l’expérience qui décide; il reste à établir que la télépathie est un fait, qu’il y a des prémonitions réelles, etc. Il m’aurait au contraire de prime abord paru scandaleux de soumettre la foi religieuse pensée dans sa pureté à ce contrôle empirique. Elle se présentait à moi comme allant par essence au-delà de tout démenti et de toute confirmation expérimentale possible. (p. 310.)
It is precisely on the basis of sensation and all its attendant forces that he will establish his own Existential Realism.

Yet, although that is so, this distinction between the "verifiable" and the "unverifiable" will be the origin of his later distinction between "problem" and "mystery":

Only this latter will be interpreted in a positive empirical sense, as valid positive knowledge.

The supreme factor in the transformation we shall now witness was the experiences during the 1914-18 war, of which we have spoken and which forced upon him the problem of personal relationships, normal and supra-normal. It was these experiences which provided the reservoir of empirical information and positive discovery of which he was later to attempt a philosophical explanation (1).

With this transformation of his thought runs parallel a transformation in his dialectical method. Hitherto, in the first phase, this dialectic was conducted on the ideal

plane. It was the movement of thought "transcending its own positions"; a dialectic largely inspired by Bradley and reminiscent of the synthetic method of Octave Hamelin. It is this juxtaposition of a rational dialectic with a philosophy wholly directed to establishing the primacy of freedom which is so curious in the first phase. For the dialectic has little resemblance with an existential dialectic. It progresses in a continuous movement with all the facility of a thought "transmuting" Appearance into Reality (1). But such a dialectic, Marcel was soon to see, leaves out of account error, suffering, sin, which are facts not to be so simply reduced, indeed not subject to reduction at all:

La pensée d'un Bradley, quand il parle de transmutation, ne s'exerce-t-elle pas exclusivement sur des contenus qui peuvent en effet se prêter à un raffinement, comme les morceaux mal assemblés d'un puzzle, qu'il est toujours possible en principe de regrouper correctement? Mais n'y a-t-il pas justement dans une erreur, dans une faute quelque chose qui sera toujours irreductible à un pur élément de contenu? (pp. 298-9.)

What will be required is a dialectic of a quite different sort; one which operates on an existential plane, being the reflexion of the subject on his concrete situation as he lives it at the moment; a dialectic which is subject to discontinuity and interruption whenever sin and error intrude upon its movement and block its access to Being, and one above all whose progress consists, not in the transmuting of sin and death by a sort of passe-passe, but in the espousing (1) Ibid., p. 298.
and realising of their inner core and so snatching from their jaws Being itself.

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The preliminary phase of Idealism definitely transcended in the second part of the *Journal Métaphysique*, Marcel's philosophy presents itself from now on first and foremost as a Realism. In common with Whitehead and Minkowski, Marcel condemns the separation effected by modern Idealism between the mind and the universe to which it adheres:

Nous avons cru, on nous a fait croire, qu'il n'était d'intérieurité possible et pour tout dire de reconnaissance de l'esprit par lui-même qu'au sein de l'idéalisme. C'était là une effroyable erreur et dont je m'accorde avec Jacques Maritain pour penser que les conséquences ont été tragiques et illimitées... Le fait le plus grave peut-être qui se soit accompli au cours des derniers siècles, c'est la rupture d'une amitié séculaire entre l'homme et l'univers, d'une amitié que l'œuvre maléfique des philosophes a précisément consisté à nous rendre aujourd'hui impensable. Et il y a là un point sur lequel l'accord me semble en train de s'accomplir entre les croyants authentiques et les poètes mêmes étrangers à toute foi véritable, un D.H. Lawrence, par exemple, dont les derniers écrits marquent la protestation la plus vénément que je sache contre la mutilation systématique dont l'homme moderne s'est lui-même rendu victime (1).

In opposition to Idealism, defined as a philosophy which "attempts to maintain in the margin of Being a consciousness which posits or denies it (2)," Marcel seeks to restore that

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"vinculum substantiale, that mysterious bond which unites us to the world we live in, a world which is more than a place, more than a theatre, a vital envelope, and, so to speak, a spiritual placenta (1)."

For Marcel, philosophy is Metaphysics, Ontology, philosophy of Being. The philosopher is one who experiences a certain need, who cannot be satisfied with abstract, logical truth, but desires, the intimate possession of reality and must be assured of its presence by a sentiment of plenitude and total satisfaction. This need, felt by the true philosophers, Marcel calls, in terms reminiscent of Alexander and Hocking, "l'appétit de l'être" (2). Such metaphysical need is, as Pascal has shown, inseparable from "anxiety" or "inquiétude" (3). The true philosopher is a prey to an "inner want", an oppression of spirit or inner "tension" which finds satisfaction only in and through Metaphysics. Far from belonging to the realm of pure speculation, a form of "transcendent curiosity", philosophy appertains to the realm of life, it begins and ends with the satisfaction of the inner appetite for Being and the consequent resolving of the inner tension (4). Marcel's philosophy is thus grounded in a Realism: it aims at restoring the sentiment of immediacy, at recuperating, to use Husserl's term, the "vision of

(1) Pref. to Luc-Benoist, op. cit., p. iii.
(2) J.M., p. 279.
(3) Ibid., p. 280.
(4) "Le métaphysicien est comparable à un malade qui cherche une position." (Ibid., p. 281.)
essences", to establish and elucidate those immediate, spontaneous experiences wherein the real is made present to mind (1).

(1) "Le bonheur ne serait-il pas une certaine façon d'être présent à soi-même?" (Ibid., p. 280.)
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III

Subsumed under the influence of Schelling's final philosophy is that of Coleridge's "spiritual Idealism", allied, however, with the general influence of French Spiritualism. Coleridge's philosophy is grounded in the opposition between Nature and Will. Nature is a power subject to the Law of Continuity, which finds its necessary expression in the law of cause and effect, a law or, in the Kantian terminology Coleridge employs, a "form" of the Understanding (the "faculty judging according to sense", as opposed to Reason, "the Power of Universal and necessary Convictions, the Source and Substance of Truths above Sense, and having their evidence in themselves (1))." Nature appears thus, by virtue of the inherent structure of the Understanding, as a continuity and Causal Mechanism, without beginning or end, and the negation of freedom.

But over and above Nature stands the Will, whose activity furnishes the inner conviction of self-origination and the possibility of discontinuity, of creation: "Nature is a line in constant and continuous evolution. Its beginning is lost in the super-natural: and for our understanding, therefore, it must appear as a continuous line without beginning or end. But where there is no discontinuity there can be no origina-

(1) Aphorisms on Spiritual Religion in Aids to Reflection, Bohn's Library, London, Bell, 1913, p. 143.
tion, and every appearance of origination in nature is but a
shadow of our own casting. It is a reflection from our own
Will or Spirit. Herein, indeed, the Will consists. This
is the essential character by which Will is opposed to Nature,
as Spirit, and raised above Nature, as self-determining Spirit
— this namely, that it is a power of originating an act or
state (1)."

Coleridge's philosophy is therefore strictly a
Spiritualism of the French variety. For its starting-point
is in the intuition of the individual consciousness, the
self-conscious activity of the person which brings awareness
of the self as causa sui.

Coleridge's analysis of the fact of self-consciousness
is on a parallel with that of Maine de Biran, but of a Maine
de Biran nourished on the dialectic of Fichte. Self-
consciousness is the condition of consciousness in general;
"the precondition of all experience", it signifies "to know
a thing in relation to myself, and in the act of knowing
myself as acted upon by that something (2)." It is given
only in the act whereby I dissociate myself from my self (or
non-self) in order to construct it, and thereby simultaneously
apprehend myself as something constructed and a something
which constructs, that is as Act or Will: "namely, that there
can be no I without a Thou, and that a Thou is only possible
by an equation in which I is taken as equal to Thou, and yet

(1) Ibid., p. 176, n. 1.
(2) An Essay on Faith in Ibid., p. 343.
not the same. And this, again, is only possible by putting them in opposition as correspondent opposites, or correlatives. In order to this, a something must be affirmed in the one, which is rejected in the other, and this something is the will. I do not will to consider myself as equal to myself, for in the very act of constructing myself, I take it as the same, and therefore as incapable of comparison, that is, of any application of the will (1)." Therefore "the becoming conscious of a conscience (i.e. self-consciousness) partakes of the nature of an act". Moreover, it involves an act of Faith towards myself. "It is an act in and by which we take upon ourselves an allegiance, and consequently the obligation of fealty; and this fealty or fidelity implying the power of being unfaithful, it is the first and fundamental sense of Faith (2)."

It is in the will or the act, as exhibited in self-conscious activity, that Coleridge places the ultimate reality: "It is at once the distinctive and constitutive basis of my philosophy that I place the ground and genesis of my system, not, as others, in a fact impressed, much less in a generalisation from facts collectively, least of all in an abstraction embodied in an hypothesis... In contradiction to this, I place my principle in an act - in the language of grammarians I begin with the verb - but the act involves its (1) Ibid. (2) Ibid.
reality (1)."

It is the self-activity of the moral being which alone, in his view, bridges the gap between the finite and the Absolute. "From whichever of the two points the reason may start: from the things that are seen to the One Invisible, or from the Idea of the absolute One to the things that are seen, it will find a chasm, which the moral being only, which the spirit and religion of man alone, can fill up or overbridge (2)."

Like Maine de Biran and Ravaisson, Coleridge proceeds from psychology to metaphysics. Positing the priority of the will in the human consciousness, he posits a like priority in the Absolute consciousness. He relates the stuff of the self to the ultimate stuff of reality. Like Schelling and Ravaisson, he conceives the human will as participating in the Absolute Will. "A finite will constitutes a true Beginning; but with regard to the series of motions and changes by which the free act is manifested and made effectual, the finite Will gives a beginning only by co-incidence with that Absolute Will, which is at the same time Infinite Power (3)."

Like them, too, he defines the will as, in its essence, love. Underlining his disagreement with Kant's statement that "love is a matter of feeling, not of will", he writes:

(2) Ibid., p. 108.
(3) Aids to Reflection, p. 178, note.
"But the contrary I do believe. What Kant affirms of man in the state of Adam, an ineffable act of Will choosing evil, and which is underneath or within consciousness, though incarnate in the conscience, inasmuch as it must be conceived as taking place in the Homo Noumenon not the Homo Phaenomenon—something like this I conceive of Love, in that highest sense of the word which Petrarch understood (1)." Thus, like Schelling and Ravaission, he sees the moral life in a striving towards union with the Absolute Will through Love. "Is it in this or that limb, or not, rather, in the whole body, the entire Organismus, that the Law of Life reflects itself? Much less then, can the Law of the Spirit work in fragments (2)." The final actuality of contingent beings is in their union with God or the Absolute. The origin of their being, as the origin of sin, is in the voluntary lapse from the pristine Unity, "a ceasing to be eternal and a transition into the temporal", or, in Muirhead's words, a "willing their actuality in themselves and not in God (3)." Their salvation and redemption lie in the merging of the finite will in the Absolute Will. Although we must note that, in contrast with Schelling at least, Coleridge's strictly ethical starting-point will not admit a loss of the individual in the whole (4).

(1) Quoted Muirhead, op. cit., p. 158.
(2) Ibid., p. 160.
(3) Ibid., p. 241.
(4) Cf. Ibid., p. 159.
CHAPTER IV
REALISM

The Realism of Gabriel Marcel starts from a closely worked out and preeminently Bergsonian distinction between Existence and Objectivity. Philosophical Idealism, intent on defining the intelligible characteristics of the object, whereby the thinking self is enabled to grasp it in the conceptual process, leaves necessarily in the background its existential aspects.

The arbitrary separation of thinking subject and real object, the disruption of the vinculum substantiale which links the self and the real results in the object's being endowed with a sort of "insularity", and in the construction of a system of stable relations between the object and the mind. Such objectifying processes of thought, Marcel agrees with Bergson, are necessitated by practical considerations, for only through them can science function. But what is left out is the object in its inner existential nature and reality, made present to the mind in a mode of knowledge which exists in its own right on an infra or supra-intellectual plane:

Ce qui, par contre, sera délibérément laissé de côté, ce sera le mode suivant lequel l'objet est présent à celui qui le considère, ou, ce qui revient au même, la mystérieuse puissance d'affirmation de soi grâce à laquelle il se
The consequences of the Idealist theory of knowledge are far-reaching. In the mind-object relation, such as it obtains in the mode of reflexion, we are in the presence, Marcel points out, in keeping with Royce's view, not of a dual, but of a triadic relation: "l'objet a pour caractéristique d'être cela de quoi je m'entretiens avec un interlocuteur réel ou idéal." (Ibid., p. 316.) The object, on which I reflect, is in some way interposed between me and myself. This peculiar situation of the object–idea leads to two consequences. First, the tendency of the object to assume an unwarranted "insularity", to appear as a mere "thing", indifferent to the mind which discourses on it. In the second place, it gives rise to the closed mental system within which the Idealist lives. For the thinking subject and the object are in a state of mutual interrogation: "...l'objet n'est pas, si l'on peut dire, inerte par rapport à ce discours, à cet entretien; nous serons en droit de dire que je le questionne et qu'il me répond." (Ibid., p. 316.) What occurs is that the Idealist, recognising only the

(1) The essay entitled Existence et Objectivité, from which the following quotations are taken, forms an appendix to the *Journal Métaphysique*. It first appeared in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1925.
solicitations of the enquiring mind, is blind to the contribution of the object, which has become for him an indifferent and inert element: "ces doctrines, mettant un accent toujours plus décisif sur ce caractère insulaire de l'objet, seront appelées à minimiser l'apport original que cet objet est susceptible de nous fournir." (Ibid.) So that, finally, the subject forms with itself a "closed" system, an identity from which the object is excluded as such, losing its existential, extramental status and becoming a mere term in the process of discursive thought. Furthermore, it is in the nature of things that this decanting in the real object of its existential reality should result in the subject's falling victim to a similar fate. Within the closed system of Idealism, the real assumes the aspect of a system of logical relations and identities, linking a sequence of terms, within which sequence the mind or subject itself is integrated as a component term. Object and subject are alike "dis-individualised" and deprived of their singularity. Indeed, the effort of Idealism, as exhibited in the theses of Brunschvicg, Lalande and particularly Meyerson, is directed towards a progressive elimination of the particular and the contingent, and the gradual reduction of multiple real fact to the smallest number of identities. There is always behind Idealism, whether of the Cartesian, the Condillacian or the Hegelian type, the vision of a real world totally expressible in terms of logical relations.
In short, the arbitrary rupture of the Self and the real, of subject and object, which characterises Rationalism and Idealism, and their consequent insistence on the intelligible features of the object by which it is made known in the idea and the concept, leave out of account the latter's existential nature, its reality and felt presence. Marcel's Realism marks an effort to rehabilitate the Existent and non-conceptual mode of knowledge in which it reveals itself - the subjective mode of thinking, as opposed to the mode of "objectivity" obtaining in conceptual thought.

In his analysis of Existence, as opposed to Objectivity, Marcel first enquires as to the possibility of doubting existence. Doubt is always the rupture of a certain adherence and is only practicable within a duality. But Existence is never a predicate. Only the structure of our language allows us to ask whether there is some thing which possesses existence. In reality, existence and the existing thing compose a unity, whose expression in terms of a subject-predicate proposition is arbitrary, and upon which doubt can have no hold. Those who, like the Idealists, reject Existence, do so by an arbitrary decree. And, says Marcel, "if the denial of existence is a decree, we opt then for the opposite decree, and do not hesitate to declare that existence
is, in our view, indubitable." (J.M. p. 312.)

What now is the nature of this assurance? It is not an assurance of existence in general, considered as an abstraction. Nor is it an assurance of the existence of any particular thing, for that again would involve treating existence as a predicate. It is illegitimate even to affirm "I exist, unless the 'I' is first of all understood as the express negation of any particular content." (Ibid., p. 313.)

What is given is simply "the confused and global experience of the world as existing". (Ibid.)

It is this assurance of an existing universe with which we are furnished in the "judgment of existence". But the term "judgment" is here dangerous. It is not a proposition; it is pure feeling (1), pure experience; "an assurance which

(1) The term "feeling" is used in the sense which has now become current in contemporary philosophy, notably in Bradley and Whitehead. "Bradley uses the term Feeling to express the primary activity at the basis of experience. It is experience itself in its origin and with the minimum of analysis." (Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1933, p. 295.) Whitehead, in the passage quoted, brings out the resemblance between his own use of the term and Bradley's. He quotes Bradley: "In my general feeling at the moment there is more than the objects before me, and no perception of objects will exhaust the sense of a living emotion." (Essays on Truth and Reality, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1914, p. 159.) And he adds: "In accordance with this doctrine of Bradley's I analyse a feeling (or prehension) into the 'datum' which is Bradley's 'object before me' into the 'subjective form' which is Bradley's 'living emotion', and into the 'subject' which is Bradley's 'me'". (Op. cit., p. 297.) Whitehead believes that the word 'feeling' has the merit of preserving this double significance of subjective form and of the apprehension of an object. It avoids the disjecta membra provided by abstraction." (Ibid., p. 299.) In Whitehead's doctrine of prehension as explicative of process feeling belongs to the positive class of prehensions. It is the "basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the
coincides strictly, which is one with the reality on which it bears, a reality massive, global like itself." (Ibid., p. 314.) To replace this immediacy by a logical proposition is to destroy the unity of existence, convert it into a predicate and reality into an "object". For that reason, the distinction between existence and the "idea of existence" must be rejected; it is a "fiction qui prend naissance dans l'acte arbitraire par lequel la pensée prétend transformer en affirmation d'objet ce qui est une connaissance immédiate et une participation." (Ibid., p. 315.)

Marcel now turns to examine the three main forms of immediacy in which Existence is revealed. These are willing, memory and sensation. As regards the first, he relies for the most part on Rénouvier and Bergson (the views too of Ravaisson and Lachelier are brought to mind). He reacts strongly against the conception, on which determinism is ultimately based, of the will as a sort of instrument intermediate between motives which determine it, and the act which carries them out. Such is Locke's well-known definition of liberty as "a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs (1)." But this mechanistic interpretation


subjectivity of the actual entity in question," the actual entity itself being "a process of 'feeling' the many data, so as to absorb them into the unity of one individual 'satisfaction'." (Process and Reality, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1929, p. 55.) Feeling, it may be added, is also analogous in certain respects to Alexander's "enjoyment". (Cf. Space, Time and Deity, London, Macmillan, 1920, Vol. I., Introd., pp. 12-13.)
of the process of willing in terms of a mind working upon a will which, in its turn, sets the act in motion is the product of a distorting analysis which transforms into distinct "objects" what is a single and immediate experience. In this experience, motives, willing and action are one in a single act, which is the projection of the whole personality.

I am, in every sense of the term, my act of will (J.M. p. 190.) So that, in willing, it is no outward relation I have with myself; I participate immediately in the reality of my self.

In similar fashion, it is an error to define memory as a relation between the actual self and its past. I am my past (J.M. pp. 187, 9.) My past is the condition of consciousness, and for that reason I am not conscious of it, I feel it, I am it, I participate in it (1).

It is, however, the theory of sensation (and perception) which provides the most interesting and the most original analysis. Sensation is usually conceived as "something emitted" by an object and picked up by the perceiving subject. It is an irresistible tendency of commonsense to consider sensation as "a means of communication between two posts"; (E.O. p. 317.) In short, as a "message" transmitted by an object to the perceiving mind and which the latter "translates". Now this presupposes that in sensation the mind is furnished

(1) Cf. S. Alexander's theory of memory, where he argues that "our consciousness of past and future is direct, and is not the alleged artificial process of first having an experience of the present and then referring it by some method to the past or future." (Space, Time and Deity, Vol. I, p. 133.)
with a "datum"; which is not the case; we are led to believe so only by reason of that spatial image of the two posts which we cannot banish from our minds. Sensation, on the contrary, is an immediate participation in the reality perceived: "une participation immédiate de ce que nous nommons habituellement le sujet à une ambiance de laquelle nulle frontière ne le sépare." (Ibid., p. 322.) "A sensation," he says elsewhere, "is an affection, not a piece of information." (J.M. p. 185.)

From this theory of sensation derives a highly original conception which Marcel calls "the theory of my body". It is a natural result of the conception of sensation as a communication between subject and object to consider the body as the means of this communication, as the "instrument" by which the transmission between the two posts is accomplished. This instrumentalist theory Marcel considers wholly inadequate. The expression "I employ my body" fails to render the facts of internal experience. "I do not employ my body, I am my body". (J.M. p. 323.) "Quelque chose nie en moi l'extériorité de mon corps par rapport à moi-même (Ibid.). Both Materialism and Sensationalism are efforts to account for the immediate experience of my body. The instrumentalist theory is due to a veritable desincarnation by which I divorce myself from my body and treat it as an object. Immediate experience, on the other hand, is that of a self "incarnate" in a body in which it participates:

Ainsi, dans la mesure où je parlerai de mon corps comme d'un instrument, je le traiterai comme un objet, c'est-
à-dire comme non-mien; j'adopterai par rapport à lui la position d'une tierce personne, et la définition que j'en pourrai donner sera liée à la déincarnation idéale à laquelle j'aurai dû procéder au préalable, et à l'acte par lequel j'aurai délégué à une sorte de double fictif le "pouvoir" d'utiliser cet instrument. Pour autant que j'agis, je m'identifie à ce double qui recouvre ainsi la réalité dont, en me détachant de lui, je l'avais dépouillé: et par là se recrée l'unité que l'analyse avait brisée et à laquelle elle avait substitué la dualité de l'instrumentiste et de l'instrument. (Ibid., p. 324.)

At the very centre of Marcel's Realism is this fact of "incarnation" which he describes as "the fundamental datum of Metaphysics" – an initial unity given in the immediate experience of sensation, revealing the body as a felt presence. The whole possibility of judgments of existence, that is of participation in the real universe, centres on the cardinal fact of incarnation. For it is only in and through the body as existent or, as Marcel puts it, in its quality of "médiateur absolu" that the self is put into possession of the real: "Dans la mesure où nous pouvons imaginer un entendement pur, il n'y a pas pour un tel entendement possibilité de considérer les choses comme existantes ou non-existantes." (E.A. p. 10.) The fact of incarnation renders meaningless the so-called "problem" of the external world. The self participates in the body and, through it, acting as "médiateur absolu", participates in the universe and other selves:

Il est permis de se demander si l'union de l'âme et du corps est d'une essence réellement différente de l'union entre l'âme et les autres choses existantes; en d'autres termes, est-ce qu'à toute
The "problem" only arises when I form an idea of my self and proceed to treat it as incommunicable with my body, for then, divorced from the body, I am divorced from the real, both being converted into objects:

This union of mind and body must never be resolved into an objective relation: "Dès le moment où le corps est traité comme objet de science, du même coup je m'exile à l'infini." (E.A. p. 12.)

It is moreover by virtue of a misrepresentation of the cardinal body-self unity that the doctrine of sensation as communication or translation of a message emerges:

For once a distinction is made between the physical affective datum on the one hand and the activity of a consciousness which is placed over against the bodily organism and receives or accepts the datum on the other, it becomes possible to view the process of sensation as a process of translation,
a process of mediation instead of what it is: immediacy itself:

Si nous réfléchissons profondément aux implications d'un donné quelconque - du fait d'être donné, "des, Gegebenseyns", - nous voyons bien que l'extériorité qui caractérise ce rapport, en admettant que c'en soit un, suppose une intérieurité essentielle, c'est-à-dire la conscience elle-même. L'événement physique en tant que tel, lorsqu'on le considère en tant que soubassement de la sensation, a pour essence de n'être pas et de ne pouvoir être donné à cette conscience qui est censée le traduire en sensation.

Il n'y a en réalité aucun sens à traiter la sensation comme une traduction; elle est immédiate, elle est à la base de toute interprétation, et de toute communication, et ne peut donc être elle-même une interprétation ou une communication. (Ibid., p. 38.)

Marcel's doctrine of "incarnation" is a version of what has become known in contemporary philosophy as the theory of the "embodied self". Whitehead, for instance, affirms an immediate experience of the body, an "intimate sense of derivation from the body, which is the reason of our instinctive identification of our bodies with ourselves (1)." "There is thus every reason to believe," he states, "that our sense of unity with the body has the same original as our sense of unity with our immediate past of personal experience. It is another case of non-sensuous perception, only now devoid of the strict personal order (2)." The Cartesian dualism of "thinking substances" and "extended substances" derives from the error of "mistaking an abstraction for a:

(1) Adventures of Ideas, p. 290.
(2) Ibid., pp. 243-4.
final concrete fact (1)."  "The truth is that the brain is continuous with the body; and the body is continuous with the rest of the natural world. " Human experience is an act of self-origination including the whole of nature, limited to the perspective of a focal region, located within the body, but not necessarily persisting in any fixed co-ordination with a definite part of the brain (2)." Whitehead sees the ultimate root of an unwarranted dualism in the "exclusive primacy of introspection", considered as the sole method of examining experience, and involving the limitation of experience to sense-perception. "It lifts the clear-cut data of sensation into primacy, and cloaks the vague compulsions and derivations which form the main stuff of experience. In particular it rules out that intimate sense of derivation from the body, which is the reason for our instinctive identification of our bodies with ourselves (3)."

In similar fashion, S. Alexander develops a form of "the identity doctrine of mind and body, maintaining that there are not two processes, one neural, the other mental, but one." (4)." "The bodily person is thus the type and beginning of all forms of the self." "Mind and body are experientially, one thing, not two altogether separate things,

(1) Ibid., p. 245. That is the "Fallacy of misplaced Concreteness" described in Science and the Modern World, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1927, p. 64.
(3) Adventures of Ideas, p. 290.
because they occupy the same extension and places as a part of the body (1)." It is this immediate experience of mind with body which conditions his Space-Time theory, according to which "Time as a whole and in its parts bears to Space as a whole and its corresponding parts a relation analogous to the relation of mind to its equivalent bodily or nervous basis; or to put the matter shortly... Time is the mind of Space and Space the body of Time (2)." "The identity between the relation of Time and Space and that of mind and body, on which the hypothesis is based, is that mind and its corresponding body are indissoluble and identical (3)."

In conclusion, in certain experiences of immediacy the reality is directly present to mind. Such experiences are prior to reflection and verification:

L'immédiat de la sensation est foncièrement un paradis perdu. La dialectique, le drame de la sensation, c'est qu'elle doit être réfléchie, interprétée; par là l'erreur devient possible... Mais d'autre part la sensation non-réfléchie est en deçà du plan du faillible. (J.M. p. 131.)

They provide the initial data, prior to the objectifying processes of rational thought, and upon which the reflection of the philosopher or metaphysician erects his demonstrations, although they themselves are not capable of demonstration. They are the irreducible "facts" which form the material for "problems" but are themselves non-problematical:

(2) Ibid., Vol. II, p. 38.
(3) Ibid., p. 39. See also Appendix to Chp. IV below.
Cet ensemble de discussions nous amène à faire une distinction générale et très importante entre les données susceptibles de fournir la matière d'un problème, données qui sont par là même objectives - et celles sur lesquelles il faut que l'esprit s'appuie pour poser un problème quelconque; il est impossible de traiter celles-ci comme problématiques sans tomber dans les pires contradictions. La sensation (le fait de sentir, de participer à un univers qui en m'affectant me crée) et ainsi le lien intellectuellement indéfectible qui m'unit à ce que j'appelle mon corps constituent des données de ce deuxième type: et il n'est pas difficile d'apercevoir que, selon toute vraisemblance, elles se confondent au sein de l'existence telle que nous l'avons, au début de cette étude, non point définie, mais reconnue.

Ce qu'on appelle communément - mais improprement l'union de l'âme et du corps semble donc devoir être considéré comme une forme métaphysique de l'occèit; elle est, comme celle-ci, un individible sur quoi la réflexion ne peut mordre. (J.M. p. 328.)

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To complete this Realism, Marcel combines with the theory of Existence a theory of Being. The former has demonstrated, in the various forms of immediacy, an immediate participation in the real world of things. We are rid of the Idealism of the first part of the Journal, where this participation was described as a participation in the Transcendent Unity of Spirit. None the less, in the theory of Existence, it is said to reveal a confused and global reality, permitting no assurance as to the existence of a particular existent, not even our own self. The theory of Being, which now runs parallel with the theory of Existence, fills in this gap and
explains the process of participation in individual "substances" or "essences".

The question had already been raised in the first part of the *Journal*. Love and faith had been described as a direct communion with the reality of the person loved or of God; both types of participation being non-reflective and transcending any possible judgment: "Il n'y a pas de jugement valable portant sur l'être." (J.M. p. 92.) "Dieu ne peut et ne doit pas être jugé; il n'y a pas de jugement possible sur l'essence." (Ibid., p. 65.) In common with Plato, Pascal and Proust, Marcel affirms that in love and faith we are put in direct communication with the inner reality or transcendent essence of the object, an essence which analysis fragments into abstract elements:

...pour l'amour, et pour l'amour seul, l'individu-
alité de l'aimé ne se disperse pas, ne s'effrite
pas en je-ne-sais quelle poussière d'éléments
abstraits. Mais d'autre part cette réalité de
l'aimé ne peut être maintenue que parce qu'elle
est posée par l'amour comme transcendantale à toute
explication, à toute réduction. (Ibid., p. 65.)

In the latter part of the *Journal* the theory of Being
is developed more thoroughly. It starts from a distinction
between Being and Objectivity. Objectivity is the realm of
questions and answers; answers which are mere "renseignements"
or pieces of information given to a questioner as indifferent
to the person questioned as the latter is to himself; each
being, in Marcel's terminology, a "he" for the other.
Science, for instance, is a system of such questions and
answers, in the third person. Science forms a system of
propositions, whose subjects are the questions it sets — "des questionnaires qui, peu à peu, se remplissent" (J.M. p. 157) — and whose predicates are precisely the answers obtained.

All objective judgments, scientific or not, are so composed of question and answer in the third person. They are "judgments in he". They are concerned with the obtaining of a piece of information whose truth or falsity is independent of the being and personality of the interlocutors. Thus, the judgment "I have blue eyes" is an objective judgment; it can be expressed in the form of question and answer, and formulated in the third person, for the "I" of the question "have I blue eyes?" is quite indifferent, is a mere "he"; and the ideal responder is no less a "he". The proposition itself is a piece of factual information and, as such, verifiable.

In contrast are judgments of being, which cannot take the subject-predicate form, nor be formulated in the third person. Such is the judgment "I am". To express it in terms of question and answer, to answer the question "what am I" is to destroy the reality of the "I", which is precisely what the judgment assures us of: "Plus il s'agit de ce que je suis comme totalité (et non de ce que j'ai) plus la réponse et la question même perdent toute signification. (J.M. p.152.) In other words, it is not expressible in terms of subject and predicate, for here subject and predicate form an indissoluble
unity. It is what Marcel calls a "judgment in I", for the subject "I" is the real individual self, incapable of being converted into a "he", or third person. In short, the "judgment in I" is an immediate "presence" of the self to self: "Dans le jugement en je, c'est l'immédiateté de l'état qui fait fonction de sujet. Il y a un feeling pur et simple, c'est-à-dire un absolu, ou quelque chose qui imite un absolu, qui n'est pas rapporté, médialisé." (Ibid., p. 145.)

Of similar nature is the "judgment in thou", likewise opposed to the "judgment in he". It is the "presence" of another self to the self: direct participation in the "substance" or "essence" of the friend or lover. In reality, says Marcel, the two go hand in hand; the presence of self to self and the presence of other selves to self are interdependent: "plus je me suis présent à moi-même, plus les autres existent eux aussi pour moi." (Ibid., p. 280.)

L'être que j'aime est aussi pour que possible un tiers pour moi; et en même temps il me découvre à moi-même, puisque l'efficacité de sa présence est telle que je suis de moins en moins lui pour moi; mes défenses intérieures tombent et en même temps les cloisons qui me séparent d'autrui. (Ibid., p. 146.)

Marcel analyses closely this sentiment of the "presence".


In particular he notes the inner despair or ennui which characterises ordinary living and its objective relationships, where not only the self but other selves become indifferent objects; he contrasts it with the joy and sentiment of spiritual enrichment which mark those moments when their presence is assured:

Longuement réfléchi sur le sentiment d'indigence intérieure qu'il m'arrive d'éprouver si cruellement. Je crois toujours que ces moments sont ceux où l'être s'amincit, où il cesse de résister à lui-même. Et cet amincissement de soi paraît lié au fait que tous les autres sont traités comme autres; le toi disparaît; le moi devient lui-même lui pour soi... Le bonheur ne serait-il pas une certaine façon d'être présent à soi-même? Et plus je me suis présent à moi-même, plus les autres existent eux aussi pour moi. (J.M. pp. 279-80.)

The supreme "judgment in thou" is the immediate presence of God, who is the "Absolute Thou". Faith is of the same order of immediacy as love. To treat God as a "he", as an "object" or idea, is to deprive him of his reality and his spiritual efficacy. The essence of faith is participation in the being of God. Hence Marcel, in common with Pascal and Kierkegaard, rejects rational theology; God cannot ultimately be proved or "verified". Moreover, as the presence of self to self and that of other selves to self are interdependent, so too is God's presence intertwined with other presences.

On these lines Marcel develops what M. Wahl calls a "mystical personalism". Beyond and above the order of objective, impersonal relationships, there exists a spiritual order of communion and invocation; mysterious contacts
between selves, sudden revelations of "presences". Marcel's dramas are full of such spiritual communions. The theory of Being is indeed based on an acceptance of metapsychical phenomena. The theory of "my body" is of this nature. Marcel goes so far as to maintain that the bodily element with which the self is in direct contact through feeling remains after death (1). The theory of presences in particular involves a metapsychical doctrine. The self is a centre of spiritual energy, a core of feeling. Contact between selves takes place by means of a sort of "fulguration". And these contacts can transcend time and space; in the immediate experiences of memory and foresight, a self may participate in the past or future of another; by telepathy it may enter into contact with a distant mind. Hence selves are linked in mysterious bonds, reaching out even beyond the grave, acting by an occult process upon each other, to produce conversions and provide sudden insights. (We shall study this mystic personalism in detail after exposing the

(1) Marcel describes the problem of immortality elsewhere as the "pivot of metaphysics". (E.A. p. 11.) The theory described above revives the speculation of the 17th century Mortalists. It has also a counterpart in the system of Palingenesis of Charles Bonnet, who considers the "ethereal" bodily element, which is the "immediate organ" of the soul, to continue attached to the latter after death. He deems this necessary for the survival of personal identity; memory being the condition of the latter, and memory, in accordance with his psycho-physiological viewpoint, working by means of the impressions left on the "nervous fibres" of the body by sense-experience. See Appendix to Chp. IV.
novel theory of Time and Space which it involves. (1). 

The return to Realism is now complete. By the theory of Existence we are assured of participation in an existent universe. By the theory of Being we are assured participation in real "substances" or "essences", self, other selves and God. The two theories complete each other. Willing, memory, sensation, love and faith are the several varieties of immediacy, the several forms of a common participation in Reality:

... ceci revient à dire qu'on ne peut dissocier réellement: Existence; Conscience de soi comme existant; Conscience de soi comme lié à un corps, comme incarné. (E.A. p. 9.).

(1) In the above respect, the theory of "my body" and of "presences" has similarities with the no less metapsychical theses of M. Jean Daudet. He distinguishes an "elementary", called "l'ambiance", a sort of energy in which the self bathes, neither quantitative nor qualitative, yet both. "L'ambiance ne se confond pas avec la pensée, et cependant elle sort de véhicule à la pensée. Elle ne se confond pas avec la sensation et cependant elle propage... ordonne toute sensation." (Melancholia, Paris, Grasset, 1928, pp. 16-17.) Its seat is the epithelium or cutaneous surface; by it we are put in immediate contact with the real, assuring an equilibrium between "nos rythmes intérieurs et les rythmes de la nature". After death, the "ambiance" may manifest itself as an aura. Moreover, all contacts between selves and between self and things are the product of a "fusion" of two "ambiances", as for example in love. What Daudet calls the "ambiance" is not unlike what Marcel calls "my body", which serves as the immediate organ of contact with other realities — a kind of otherreal corporal organ by which the spiritual force or energy which constitutes the essence of a reality flows out and by a species of fulguration fuses with that of another.
The Realism of Marcel affirms, in terms as uncompromising as those of Bergson, the absolute primacy of feeling. For both, intelligence is thought directed to the practical ends of scientific knowledge; its activity consists in the reduction of the manifold, concrete variety of the real to a homogeneous system of identities for the obtaining of power over the real. It thus abstracts from real things their general qualities and lets slip their concrete, individual "essence". Yet Marcel is as far removed as Pascal from affirming an opposition between feeling and thought itself. In an article on Hocking entitled W.E. Hocking et la dialectique de l'instinct, (1), we find a most interesting discussion of feeling in relation to thought. Feeling, he says, is simply thought in its pure virtuality; it is "a mass of ideas at work in us". "The idea is an integral part of feeling, and the latter is destined ultimately to be completed and consummated in knowledge of an object." (p. 24.) Far then from being opposed to the idea, feeling is none other than the idea itself, but the idea in action, "working in us to free itself, as a forgotten name is at work in the depths of the mind striving to recall it." (Ibid.) The error we make is to conceive an idea as a "finite content" devoid of any plasticity - as a sort of block. On the contrary, anything in experience can become idea; the latter is experience itself, selected, to enable it to be remembered.

(1) Rev. Phil., 1919.
and communicated. The ultimate identity of feeling and thought is shown by the fact that insensibility is more often than not accompanied by lack of intelligence. What then is feeling? It is an activity of ideas, it is thought à l'état pur, thought not yet poured into the mould of ideas, but mobilised for action. In short, it is "thought assuming the control of the real." (Ibid., p. 25):

Ainsi dirons-nous que les instincts humains, si du point de vue physique ils sont formés de la même substance que les systèmes solaires, métaphysiquement parlant sont faits de l'étoffe dont les rêves, les idées et les raisonnements sont faits. (Ibid.)

Thus Marcel is an "anti-intellectualist" only in the sense that he will not limit the activity of thought to the purely conceptual processes whereby reality is expressed as a system of abstract ideas, permitting us to treat things as "objects" or "limited contents" for the better handling of them in our scientific deductions. But, like Pascal, he seeks to preserve and to rehabilitate, as the necessary complement and indeed condition of the former, those immediate processes of thought which provide knowledge of the concrete, individual reality of things.

Any attempt to discredit the testimony of feeling on the grounds that it deceives us rebounds upon itself; for it is not maintained that feeling is verifiable, can be described as true or false, but only that it provides an immediate experience of reality which, as such, founds all judgments of Being and Existence, that is all judgments of
Value. A feeling can be affirmed as true or false only if it is actualised as an idea, in short ceases to be a feeling. But then, the adherence to reality being broken, no judgment as to the value of the original experience is possible. So that there is no judgment of feeling, no judgment of judgments of value; from the tribunal of feeling and immediacy there is no appeal possible to reason. Such experience, sensation, memory and the like, is the starting-point and the condition of demonstration and mediation, the premises it so provides are themselves undemonstrable.

Marcel's Realism has its place in the neo-Realist movement in contemporary philosophy; with its two main streams, the Anglo-American, inspired largely by G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, and the Phenomenological, derived from the new psychology of Frantz Brentano, the theory of the "intentionality" of consciousness and the "prepositional" theory of perception. We can, at the same time, more clearly than in the Anglo-American Realists, discern in his thought the influence of later 18th century Empiricism and its rehabilitation, against conceptualism, of sensation, memory and belief as providing immediate knowledge of reality. Marcel takes us back beyond the transcendental dialectic of the post-Kantian Idealists to Hume and Reid and to such
German Intuitionists as Hamann and Jacobi (1).

In conclusion, this psychological Realism of M. Marcel is to be transcended in the new phase by a philosophy of Existence in the accepted sense of the term. Yet none the less, it must always be remembered that it provides the starting-point and basis of his Metaphysics. It is it, as we shall see, that will prevent him from lapsing into any mere "negative Ontology" and thus safeguard him against one of the pitfalls which beset the Existentialist by reason of the subjective method, or "method of immanence" he employs.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV

In classical philosophy the theory of the embodied self is anticipated most fully in the Monism of Spinoza.

"Objectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus, sive certus extensionis modus actu existens, et nihil aliud (1)."

"Hinc sequitur hominem mente et corpore constare, et corpus humanum, prout ipsum sentimus, existere (2)." "Mens se ipsum non cognoscit, nisi quatenus corporis affectionum ideas percipit (3)." "...quoniam primum, quod mentis essentiam constituit, est idea corporis actu existentis, primum et praecipuum nostrae mentis conatus est, corporis nostri existentiam affirmare (4)."

Mind and body being modes of thought and extension, attributes of a single substance, the mind is the body and vice versa; so that "the soul, being an Idea of this body, is united with it in such a way that it and this body, thus constituted, together form a whole (5)."

By the term "Idea" Spinoza means an emotion or immediate feeling of the state of our body, "an immediate feeling of

(1) Ethica, Part II., Prop. XIII.
(2) Ibid., Coroll.
(3) Ibid., II, Prop. XXIII.
(4) Ibid., III, Prop. X, Demonstr.
its tone' and an "awareness of the increase or decrease of our general vital energy (1)." "And this change in us," says Spinoza, "resorting from other bodies acting upon us, cannot take place without the soul, which always changes correspondingly, becoming aware of the change. And (the consciousness of) this change is really what we call feeling (2)." From which it follows that "as the first thing which the soul gets to know is the body, the result is that the soul loves it so, and becomes united with it (3).

This primitive and immediate unity is the condition of other immediate knowledge. "The most important of these (the influence of the body on the soul), we maintain, is that it causes the soul to become aware of it, and through it also of other bodies (4)." And, in particular, knowledge of God. For if the essence of the soul is that "natural love which prompts everything to preserve its body" or the "Idea is the 'objective' essence of such body which is in the thinking attribute," and if, consequently, "according as the object changes or perishes, so its Idea must change or perish (5)," then the soul perfects its essence only in so far as it contemplates God as eternal object or eternal body. "If once we get to know God, at least with a knowledge as clear as that with which we also know our body, then we must become

(2) Sh. Ar. sec. XIII, p. 65.
(3) Ibid., pp. 122-3.
(5) Ibid., p. 158.
united with him even more closely than we are with our body, and be, as it were, released from the body (1)." "As it were," for the union with the body is the condition which permits the final transcending of the created body and vision of the eternal body.

Brunschvicg has summarised Spinoza's theory of the body, in opposition to Cartesian Dualism, in a brilliant passage where he writes: "Loin d'être une substance irréductible à la substance pensante, un poids mort que l'âme s'épuise à rejeter... le corps devient le pivot de la dialectique, assurant à l'homme l'expérience effective et profonde de la beatitude. L'éternité n'est pas le privilège de l'âme; l'âme n'est éternelle que dans la mesure où elle est l'idée d'un corps éternel (2)."

We can perhaps trace Spinoza's influence in the Cartesianism of such 18th century thinkers as the Abbé de Lignac, in whose philosophy we find a thesis somewhat similar to the one presented. He posits as the initial datum of thought an immediate apperception of the self as an active, thinking substance. But in contrast with Descartes, he links therewith what he calls the "sens de la coexistence"; or immediate perception of our body, the volume of matter to which the soul is bound and which belongs to it. "J'ai la perception habituelle de l'existence même numérique d'un.

(1) Ibid., p. 123.
(2) Spinoza et ses contemporains, Rev. de Mét., 1906, p. 40.
volume de matière qui m'est propre. Cette perception me rend mon corps toujours présent; elle me le fait distinguer de tout autre corps; elle le rend partie de mon être; elle complète ma personne; elle fait que mon corps entre dans ce que j'appelle moi (1)." From this double perception, in conjunction with the immediate perception of God as the Cause of our being, he derives all our ideas (2).

It is noticeable that the Leibnizian Idealism, on the other hand, remains within the framework of Cartesian dualism, in that the body, although united with mind, is strictly phenomenal (3).

Finally, we may notice the theory of Palingenesis of the

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18th century Charles Bonnet. He distinguishes between the "corps calleux", mere envelope, and the true seat of the soul which is "un compose de matiere analogue a celle du feu ou de l'ether." It is the "organe immediat de ses operations" and accounts for the "instantaneite" of sensations (1). As distinct from the former, it survives with the soul after death.

CHAPTER V

ONTOLOGY

The discussion up to the present has been conducted mainly on the plane of psychology, in terms of an analysis of the processes of sensation and feeling. At this point Marcel's meditations take a new turn. As Phenomenology has suggested, psychology, analytical or descriptive, does not provide an adequate basis for metaphysics. The way to metaphysics is opened up by a properly ontological approach. For psychology is not chiefly concerned with the problem of value, but rather with the explanation of functions. The problem of value, which enters as a chief element into metaphysics, requires the isolating, within the multiple facts of experience, of some central fact of import which conditions and legitimates the individual's judgments of value. It is towards this end that Marcel's reflection is now directed.

Before entering upon this discussion Marcel devotes considerable space to what for him is a preliminary problem: that of the relation between Being and reflective thought. Just as Descartes had to struggle to liberate himself from Scholastic forms of thought, so that his whole philosophy is coloured by this struggle, so Gabriel Marcel has found constant difficulty in freeing himself from the Idealistic type of thinking. It seemed in the preceding phase that he
was rid once and for all of Idealism. The theory of presences has revealed an infra-intellectual mode of knowledge characterised by immediate participation in the real, as opposed to the objectifying mode of thought which interposes between the thinking subject and the real object a screen of ideas. Idealism, by claiming this latter to be the sole mode of knowledge, is led altogether to discount and to eliminate the real existent object and to substitute for the variety of the real, present in feeling and sensation, a world of pure ideas and logical identities.

But at this point\(^{(}\) (the passages here to be dealt with refer to the year 1929), under the influence of the Neo-Scholastic group (he refers to his reading of Father Garigou-Lagrange; and we must no doubt include the personal influence of Maritain), Marcel feels the necessity, before embarking upon the problem of the access to Ontology, of undertaking a further critique of Idealism on the plane of epistemology proper, by an analysis of the process of objective or reflective (i.e. mediate) thought itself in relation to Being. For, as suggested above, although thought and feeling, the idea and the presence, are opposed, as are the mediate and the immediate, they are not exclusive as regards Being and Existence. They offer two modes of knowledge, equally legitimate no doubt, each in its own sphere. Marcel therefore proceeds quite naturally to discuss the relation between conceptual thought and Being. He seeks first to establish that the act of thinking by means of the concept
itself implies reference to a real object and that thought is intentional in character; secondly, in the light of this conceptual Realism, to criticise the epistemology of Idealism. In his discussion he relies for his arguments on Thomistic epistemology, and in his criticism of Idealism adopts an attitude towards Cartesian and Kantian "subjectivism" current in Neo-Scholastic writings, notably those of Maritain.

Marcel's first question is: is the idea (essence) prior to the saisie of the object in its inner existential nature (existence)? No, he answers: this is a pure illusion on our part "due to our opposing what is only conceived (and what we think ourselves justified in treating as non-existent) to what is realised." (E.A. p. 34.) In reality, thought (conceptual) and existence are two modes of existence: or rather thought is included in existence; there is no passage thinkable from the idea of the thing to the thing itself:

Le passage à l'existence est quelque chose de radicalement impensable, quelque chose qui n'a même aucun sens. Ce que nous appelons ainsi est une certaine transformation intra-existentielle. (Ibid.)

Thought by which the mind conceives the object is, with reference to Being, one with the existential participation in the object, and it is only by an abstraction that the two can be divorced. In other words, they are to be distinguished, within the limits of Being and Existence, as two modes of knowing a transcendent object, the one immediate and of the nature of feeling, the other mediate or conceptual and of the
nature of reason. In both cases the mind is directed
towards a real object other than itself and to the espousal
thereof:

Il faut donc dire que la pensée est intérieure
à l'existence, qu'elle est une certaine modalité
de l'existence qui jouit du privilège de pouvoir
faire abstraction d'elle-même en tant qu'existence,
cela pour des fins strictement déterminées. Il
ne serait pas faux de dire que la pensée implique
en ce sens un certain mensonge, ou plus exactement
un certain aveuglement fondamental: aveuglement
qui disparaît dans la mesure où il y a connaissance,
c'est-à-dire retour à l'être. Mais ce retour ne
peut être rendu intelligible qu'à condition que
l'aveuglement initial soit expressément reconnu.

(E.A. p. 35.)

Hence he condemns Cartesian and Fichtean Idealism which
makes the idea or concept the object of thought presented
immanently to consciousness and so leads to the eventual
elimination of the world of transcendent things:

A cet égard, un certain cartésianisme, et surtout
un certain fichtéisme, m'apparaissent comme les
plus graves erreurs dont aucune métaphysique se
soit rendue coupable. On ne dira jamais assez
combien la formule es denkt in mir est préférable
au cogito qui nous expose au pur subjectivisme.
Le "je pense" n'est pas une source, c'est un
obturateur. (Ibid.)

We may go with Idealism as far as to affirm that knowledge
bears on ideas (essences) rather than things, if we understand
that the idea is directed towards the thing and can only be
detached therefrom by an arbitrary abstraction which trans-
forms the idea into an object devoid of all intentionality
and acquiring itself an unwarranted status:

Une connaissance aveuglée de l'être en général
est impliquée dans toute connaissance particulière...
Je m'exprimerais mieux en disant que toute
Il faut qu'il y ait à la racine de l'intelligence une prise sur le réel. (Ibid., p. 65.)

From this general affirmation, Marcel passes to a more precise discussion of the problem. This discussion takes the traditional Scholastic form of an analysis in its epistemological implications of the principle of identity which, together with the principle of non-contradiction, provides the firmissimum principium of the Thomistic philosophy, and which is both grounded and illustrated in the assertion: Being is. It is impossible to deny this principle except in verbis, and this impossibility renders untenable the position which denies Being and at the same time abstains from pronouncing as to whether Being is or not. (Ibid., pp. 36-7.) Being must be affirmed or denied; the equivocal abstention of certain philosophies is untenable.

Now if Being is denied and refuge is sought in Nominalism, we are affirming not only that there is no reality corresponding to the word Being, but that there is not even an idea. (Ibid., p. 37.) For the principle of identity, by virtue of which we affirm that Being is, becomes a pure règle du jeu, or commodity of thought: thought is deprived of what is the essential condition of ideation, namely the possibility of positing a notion as true or false with reference to some
objective standard of verification. The absence of such a condition, by the reduction of the principle of identity to a pure commodity of thought in the Positivist sense, or in the Kantian sense to a purely formal condition of thought, renders it impossible to rise from the plane of purely subjective states of mind to ideation proper.

Marcel proceeds now to examine more closely the principle of identity, and its epistemological implications in the assertion: A is A. The principle of identity as expressed therein is the condition of any thinking at all. To deny it, to deny that A is A, implies that at the moment I think A, it is suddenly withdrawn as the object of my thought and is dissipated, so that I cease to think:

On ne pourrait, en réalité, nier le principe d'identité qu'en niant la possibilité pour la pensée de porter sur quelque chose, en prétendant que, dans la mesure où je pense quelque chose, je cesse de penser, ma pensée devenant esclave d'un certain contenu qui l'inhibe ou même l'annule.

(E.A. p. 39.)

On the contrary, the affirmation A is A implies that, in the act of thinking A, the mind is directed towards an object which remains identical with itself throughout successive acts of thinking and on each of which it is presented as an identical object to the mind; an object, in short, which is extra-mental and not simply a state of the mind. For it is the characteristic of states of mind, by reason of the fluidity of subjective contents, to be refractory to identity. It is possible, says Marcel, to
conceive a Heracliteanism or super-Bergsonism which would see in thought a purely subjective process lacking any transcendent object or confronted with a constantly vanishing object. And he asks further whether such a thought "qui ne serait pas la pensée de quelque chose, serait encore une pensée, si elle ne se dissiperait pas en une sorte de songe d'elle-même." (Ibid., p. 40.) He, for his part, is convinced of it. And for this reason he maintains that it is impossible to think one's thought, for the latter inevitably, by virtue of its devenir, provides no real object for the knowing mind, is a constant passage of ideas into their contraries, a néant which eludes the thinking subject. I cannot think my thought "sans convertir ce moi pensé en quelque chose qui n'est rien et qui est donc contradiction pure". (Ibid.)

Marcel thus rejects Cartesian Idealism which appears to him essentially a "subjectivism", in that all thought is affirmed to be thought of the thinking self and of its contents, and adheres to the Thomistic theory of intentionality: all thought is thought of a transcendent object, which the mind espouses:

C'est ici que je rejoins le thomisme, tel du moins que je le comprends. La pensée n'est nullement relation avec soi-même, elle est au contraire par essence self-transcendance. En sorte que la possibilité de la définition réaliste de la vérité est impliquée dans la nature même de la pensée. La pensée est tournée vers l'Autre, elle est appétence de l'Autre. (Ibid.)
In another passage Marcel replies to the subjectivist theory in an argument which, strangely enough, has a distinctly Cartesian flavour. The assertion that knowledge is of states of mind seems to envelop the ideal supposition of a knowledge of Being, a supposition deriving from an innate positive conviction or aspiration. The latter can hardly proceed from a world of purely subjective states; must we not then conclude that it is the "mark" of a superior order, the order of transcendent Being, as Descartes concludes that the idea of the perfect is the "mark" of a transcendent Perfect Being:

Mais il ne m'est guère possible de comprendre comment l'idée d'une connaissance réelle, c'est-à-dire d'une référence à l'être, pourrait prendre naissance à l'intérieur d'un monde de purs états de conscience... Ne serai-je pas conduit à reconnaître dès lors que cette idée même est comme la marque ineffacable en moi d'un autre ordre? (Ibid., p. 78.)

In conclusion, analysis of the principle of identity and its epistemological implications shows, in Marcel's view, that this principle is the condition of all knowledge, not in any mere formal sense, but in the ontological sense that the mind, in applying it, as it must in all true acts of knowing, is directed towards an object other than itself or its states, and is affirming as identical to itself the transcendent object. Likewise, the negation of the principle of identity is seen to imply that the mind, in the act of knowing, may think simultaneously an object and its contrary, from which the conclusion would follow that the object of the mind is
not extra-mental but its own subjective states; which assumption is further shown to be epistemologically absurd, as it would imply that, in the act of knowing, the object of thought might be withdrawn or dissipated at the very moment of thinking, the mind bereft of its content and the act of knowledge left unconsummated. Therefore, Marcel concludes, in every act of knowledge, by virtue of the principle of identity itself, is implied contact with Being. Finally, the original affirmation of Ontology: Being is (Being) is not in any sense a redundancy. It is the affirmation of a transcendent reality, just as the particular affirmation A is A is seen to be equivalent to the assertion that A is a transcendent object (1).

To understand fully Marcel's views on reflective thought it is necessary to indicate their Thomistic origin. Although he simply refers to a certain identity of his views with those of the Neo-Thomists, it is throughout obvious that his main arguments against the epistemology of Idealism are at one with those of Maritain. The argument for the existence of Being, based on the principle of identity, is of course Scholastic in tenor. It is the fundamental contention of Saint Thomas that the principle of identity is grounded in

(1) In an article on L'Evaluation tragique (Journal de Psychologie, Jan. – March, 1926) Marcel finds in the idea negating itself a superior form of the tragic. It is interesting to note that Hegel himself in his Phenomenology presents his dialectic as essentially a drama of the tragic consciousness likewise. Cf. J. Wahl, L'Idée du malheur chez Hegel, Rev. Phil., 1926-7, and La Conscience malheureuse dans la philosophie de Hegel, Paris, Rieder, 1930.
the notions of Being and not-Being and serves simply to articulate the various modes of Being (1). "It is sufficient," says Maritain, "for each to consult himself and experience within himself the absolute impossibility of thinking the principle of identity without positing extra-mental Being (at least possible) of which this first of all axioms expresses the behaviour (2)."

The analysis of any judgment is sufficient, in the Thomistic view, to establish this. The act of judgment is an act whereby a subject and predicate, differing as notions or mental objects, are declared to be identical in the transcendent object or thing, i.e. extra-mentally. And the function of judgment is none other than to transport the mind from the plane of the ideal object or essence to that of the existent thing.

Secondly, the epistemological assertions here taken over by Marcel are Thomistic in origin and are opposed alike to the Cartesian and Phenomenological doctrines and to the Kantian. It is assumed that all knowledge is conformity with a transcendent object, the fruit of an act whereby the mind is made intentionaliter one with the object: fieri aliud in quantum aliud (3). The process of knowledge as described by Saint Thomas is a process of reflection whereby.

the transcendent object, as given in sense perception, is rendered intelligible and thereby present to the mind. Knowledge starts from sense perception wherein the thing is immediately grasped in its sensitive species; by a process of abstraction, as defined by Aristotle, the mind extracts therefrom the forma rei or intelligible species, thanks to which the thing is rendered intentionally present to thought; finally, by means of the concept or idea which the mind furnishes spontaneously, the intellectual faculty is put in possession of the thing, concept and intentional, intelligible species becoming one in the final consummated act of knowledge (1). "The whole Thomistic epistemology," writes Gilson, "rests on the fact that the intellect attains to being and takes possession of it, because it attains to the sensible species and takes possession of that, after transforming it. The objectivity of knowledge is consequently based upon the sensible species as the meeting-point between the intellect and the object, hence the impressive formula in the Compend. theol., c. 83: 'Cum vero praedictas species (scil. intelligibles) in actu completo habuerit, vocatur intellectus in actu. Sic enim actu intelligit res, cum species rei facta

fuerit forma intellectus possibilis." It is impossible to express more forcibly the continuity between object and subject (1)."

Now in this theory of knowledge two points are noteworthy. First, the concept or idea is not itself the object of thought, which is rather the intentional species or universal, i.e. the thing itself in its intelligible aspects. The idea is simply a means or instrument whereby the transcendent thing is grasped as an object of thought (2). Secondly, all knowledge is mediate. Starting from sense perception it consists in a process of mediation whereby the mind, in and through the concept, is put in contact with the thing in its intelligible aspects. It is therefore a process of mediation aiming at the extraction of the universal from the particular (3).

The reader, it is hoped, will forgive this lengthy digression when it is seen that it throws light on Marcel's own views on conceptual thought. He has nowhere explained precisely his attitude, but it can be safely inferred from his adoption of the general Thomistic thesis that all ideas are ideas of Being that it is in a similar manner he would account for the intentional nature of the concept. Only on

(3) Cf. M. de Wulf, Philosophy and Civilisation in the Middle Ages, Oxford Univ. Press, 1922, p. 194.
this basis can the reader account for his criticism of Cartesian Idealism which approximates to those of the Neo-Scholastics; and only so can the ideas expressed in the above passages be rendered compatible with his more fundamental doctrine of immediacy.

To consider first his criticism of Cartesian Idealism. Cartesianism is described by him, as by Maritain, as a "subjectivism"; firstly in that it considers the idea or mental concept or essence as the sole object of thought, grasped in an immediate intuition by the thinking self of its own states. Descartes and Husserl alike posit a pure object or universal essence dependent on the Cogito, that is grasped in an immediate intuition of pure consciousness without reference to a thing present in sense perception. Marcel, like Maritain, rejects this epistemology on the ground that the concept is not itself the object of thought, but the means towards the saisie of the object, which latter exists independently of the thinking self; and on the ground that knowledge, starting from sense perception and the particular, rises only by a process of mediation to clear and intuitive vision of the universal as a final consummation (1). From

(1) Cf. Maritain, Les Degres du Savoir, p. 177. It may be noted that Saint Thomas expressly declares that the idea is the medium and not the object of thought, and criticises those who "have maintained that our cognitive powers have knowledge of nothing but their own mutations." (Summa theol. I, lxxv, 2.) For the clear opposition between Husserl and Scholasticism see E. Parl Welch, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1941, p. 224 sqq.
which it follows that evidence accompanying the concept is for the Cartesian a "subjective evidence, quality of certain ideas", whereas it is for the Thomist a "property of being" (1). It is in this sense that Maritain reproaches Husserl with the substitution of the "verified" for the "true" (2).

But not only does Marcel have to reject Cartesian immediacy, he has to go to the root of the matter and criticise the initial cogito of Idealism. The cogito for Descartes and Husserl is the essential condition of a theory of intuition of essences: that is the immediate intuition of a self as a thinking substance, the revelation of a pure self directly intuited other than the empirical self, an intuition in which are grounded and which accompanies all intuitions of essences. It is this cogito which Marcel rejects in terms similar to those employed by the Neo-Thomists in the passage quoted above. It is impossible, he maintains, to think my thought, in the sense of my having a direct intuition of myself as a thinking substance. It is in fact a common-place of Thomistic doctrine that the first principle of philosophy is not the cogito but the cogito ens (3). What is first given is the extra-mental object; the knowledge of self is not immediate, but given in actu secundo in the

(2) Degrés du Savoir, p. 171, n. 2.
reflex act of thought (1). As Marcel suggests in the passage quoted, thought is essentially "self transcendence" rather than an internal relation of thought to thought. Any attempt to intuit the thinking self, independently of its relation with Being, presents thought with a vanishing and self-contradictory object which it is powerless to grasp. Knowledge of the thinking self, as far as conceptual thought seeks to attain it, is a by-product of knowledge of Being. And this is due to the fact that thought is essentially mediate; ideas are not themselves objects of thought, but signs of things; therefore thought in the presence of its contents is not in immediate possession of its own essence, but in the possession of knowledge of extra-mental Being.

It is only inasmuch as it knows Being that the thinking self by implication knows that it exists, and this reflex intuition

(1) Cf. Saint Thomas, Summa Theol., LXXXVII, 1. On the vanity of certain Neo-Thomistic attempts to integrate the Cartesian cogito in the Thomistic scheme, cf. E. Gilson, Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance, Paris, Vrin, 1939, p. 68 sqq. We may refer also to the more recent work by Father Joseph de Finance: Cogito cartésien et réflexion thomiste, Paris, Beauchesne, 1945. The author criticises the Idealistic implications of the Cartesian cogito which establishes a divorce between thought and existence, and concludes that it cannot be assimilated by Thomism, whose starting-point is similar to that of Existentialism. Cf. also, by the same author, Etre et Agir dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas, Paris, Beauchesne, 1945; Father Geiger, La Participation dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, Paris, Vrin, 1942; E. Gilson’s chapter Existence et Réalité in the 4th edition of his Thomisme (Paris, Vrin, 1942).

All these works attempt to interpret Saint Thomas in terms of the Existentialist philosophy, rather arbitrarily in the present writer’s view.
does not permit the self to conclude that its essence is to think, but rather that its essence is to think Being; it is not the presence of thought to thought but of Being to thought that is the starting-point of knowledge.

To summarise, Marcel's views on thought (as reflective or conceptual) are inspired by Neo-Thomism. Thought for him is directed towards Being. Ideas are not themselves the object of thought, but represent knowledge of things. Thought is mediate, dependent upon concepts expressive of the nature of things. There is therefore no intuition, as far as reflective thought is concerned, of self; the content of thought being incapable of becoming an object of knowledge in itself. Idealistic epistemology, in short, is at fault in assuming that ideas are sole objects of thought independently of things, and in conceiving the relation of thought to thought as the initial condition of reasoning.

At the root of Marcel's return to rational Realism is obviously his fundamental rejection of dualism and the separation of mind and body. In keeping with the Thomists he sees in the mind-body relationship a cardinal fact of unity whose nature he expresses forcibly in his theory of incarnation. This theory marks the starting-point of his own doctrine of immediate knowledge through feeling and sensation. But already on the plane of rational and discursive knowledge it precludes him from accepting an Idealism grounded on a negation of this cardinal fact.
Now this alliance with Neo-Thomism is merely provisional. The passages studied are undoubtedly of great importance, certainly of greater importance than M. de Corte is willing to concede (1), but it is imperative to place them in their true perspective. The discussion has been on the plane of epistemology rather than of Ontology proper, (in this respect we can understand the comment of M. de Corte, who is a Thomist, when he declares that the passages reveal not only Marcel's incapacity "to realise the metaphysics of Being as Being, but even to think metaphysically (2)". The passages treated are motivated by a final reaction on the author's part against Idealism: he has desired to give a final coup de grâce by refuting it on the plane of epistemology and reflective reason. This he has done by recourse to the Thomistic doctrine of intentionality. He has sought to show, as against certain forms of Idealism, that ideas are ideas of things and that on the plane of ideation itself there is contact with Being.

But none the less, intelligence and the processes of ideation and discursive thought are conceptual in their mode of operation. The intelligence grasps the real only in and through concepts which intervene as the mediating instruments between the latter and consciousness. It therefore functions on the plane of Objectivity and not of Existence; it offers

(2) Ibid., p. 13.
not immediate participation in the real, but "knowledge of" the real. Even if conceptual knowledge does bear upon reality and the essences of things, these essences are intelligible, not existential essences, the purely formal elements of the real, or Being in its intelligible features and not in its existential nature (they would correspond to Whitehead's "factors in fact", i.e. the universal forms or entities provided inextricably with the concrete of sense-experience and which, by becoming objects of thought, allow the latter to make true-false propositions about them (1)).

Thomism has thus proved of great service in the limited sphere of epistemology, it has served to define the status of reflective thought and the status of the cogito which all reflective thought involves. It has guaranteed as against Idealism the adequacy of reason to its object and thus legitimated the methods of scientific enquiry. The previous discussion has played the preliminary role of clearing the ground of certain Idealistic misconceptions, but it has not yet brought us to Ontology proper. It has been aimed merely at defining the status of discursive thought, i.e. the conditions under which it has knowledge of the object and the knowing self, those conditions being shown to belong to the order of mediacy. But beyond objective thought and beyond the order of mediacy Marcel posits a higher order of immediacy and participation. On this plane alone does the mind have

access to Ontology. Ontology is synonymous with Existence. Over and beyond the problem of knowledge about being is the problem of Being itself, or rather, for here we are in the domain of the meta-problematical, the "immediate datum" of the presence of self to self (involving the presence of other selves to self), which is the initial fact conditioning ontological meditation. On this plane reality is not presented to the mind through the mediacy of the concept, but is one with the experiencing subject; duality is abolished in favour of an experience which involves an intimacy of subject and object inexpressible in conceptual terms, and wherein the Being grasped is not an essence but an existent. What then is the precise nature of this cardinal and initial experience which provides access to Ontology, that is to the real existential?

Here Marcel's philosophy turns its back on Thomism no less than on Cartesianism. As against the former, it transcends objective conceptual thought, it establishes as its starting-point an immediate revelation of self to self or _Ego Sum_. As regards Cartesianism, it defines this initial _Ego Sum_ in terms not of pure thought but of feeling. It is all-important to develop these explanations.

Thomism is content to start from the judgment _Being is_ and to elaborate a process of thought by which Being is made known to the subject through the concept. Further, it relegates the _cogito_ to a secondary position. Marcel has
taken over those theses in so far as they seem to explain the process of discursive thought and the founding of the epistemological subject. But over and beyond discursive thought and over and beyond the epistemological subject is thought in its pure immediacy and the ontological subject. On the plane of existence the experiencing subject is placed in a totally different situation, one not of objectivity but of subjectivity. It is this cardinal situation and the judgment of existence which it involves that alone provide an adequate starting-point for a philosophy of existence, that is for a true Ontology, which refuses to separate knowledge of Being and existential experience, as does Thomism, and which seeks to approach the real by a purely subjective way.

In the sphere of Ontology, Marcel thus reverts to a subjective approach which, in its first aspects, has much in common with Cartesianism and its modern counterpart, Phenomenology, in that he posits as a condition of access to the real a primitive ontological judgment, or judgment of existence - *Ego Sum*. In a similar manner Husserl posits his pure Ego, the "I to which I am present" and which participates in the realm of pure essences (1). The *Ego Sum* of Marcel fulfils a similar function; it is the pure "essential" self revealed to self, in and through which the latter participates in other selves. Such is the immediate *prise de contact* which (1) Cf. *Ideas*, p. 172.
serves as starting-point for Ontology. But here all resemblance ends, for Marcel refuses to identify the *Ego Sum* with the *cogito*.

In the *Esquisse d'une Phénoménologie de l'Avoir*, Marcel underlines the uselessness of the *cogito* as a starting-point for knowledge of the existential self:

> Contrairement à l'idée qui se présente d'abord à l'esprit, je ne crois pas que le *cogito* puisse nous être ici d'aucun secours. Le *cogito*...garde le seuil du valable et c'est tout; le sujet du *cogito*, c'est le sujet épistémologique. (E.A. p. 249.)

The subject of the *cogito* is the epistemological subject, the subject present in all judgments. Nor is this subject the real ontological self, as Descartes supposes, revealed by an intuition of pure thought. The *cogito* has its place on the plane of rational thought, as establishing the epistemological subject underlying all objective judgments; although, as already shown, it is not, as Descartes supposes, primary even on this plane, being given in *actu secundo*, conditional on the positing of transcendent Being. As far as discursive thought is concerned, it begins by positing transcendent Being, and, as it were by implication, posits a thinking self as a subject of its future discourse and reasoning, what Marcel calls "le sujet épistémologique comme organe d'une connaissance objective (1)." But this pure thought subject is not the existential subject, the self which acts and feels.

the self of "passion", to employ the term of Kierkegaard, the concrete self of temporal and historical experience (we may recall Heidegger's reproach against Descartes and Kant for neglecting the "Sum" of the "res cogitans" (1)). Something more than a merely formal condition of objective judgments is required. Although, for the purposes of reasoning it is not necessary to proceed beyond the affirmation of real things and of a thinking subject which conceives them, i.e. the epistemological subject, there is necessary, to found the self ontologically, i.e. as existing and not merely as the formal condition of thought, a judgment of existence.

Now Descartes claims in his version of the cogito, which Marcel rejects, to have found such a judgment of existence. The cogito ergo sum in Descartes' system opens up the way to Ontology, as it affirms me to be inasmuch as I think. But Marcel rejects entirely this standpoint which introduces a disastrous divorce between the "intellectual and the vital" and which limits the existent self to a purely thinking

activity. For him the primitive judgment of existence or ego sum must found the truly existential and pathetic subject:

Et certes il n'y a pas lieu de nier qu'il soit légitime d'opérer des distinctions d'ordre au sein de l'unité d'un vivant qui pense et s'efforce de se penser; mais le problème ontologique ne se pose que par delà ces distinctions et pour cet être saisi dans son unité, dans son élan.

(E.A. p. 249.) (1)

We may summarise Marcel's views on the cogito as follows.

He rejects the cogito ergo sum as having no ontological

(1) From this point of view, the Ego sum of Marcel approaches more nearly the Cogito of Saint Augustine than that of Descartes, in so far as the former is an intuition of our own existence or life rather than that of our thought. "Scisne saltem te vivere?" "Scio," inquit. "Scis ergo habere te vitam...?" "Et hoc," inquit, "scio." (De Beata Vita, II, 7.) New light has recently been thrown on the vexed problem of the relation and opposition between the Augustinian and the Cartesian cogito by Dr Nigel Abercrombie. Reacting against their assimilation by Gilson (Cf. Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien, Paris, Vrin, 1930, Appendix I, Descartes, Saint Augustin et Campanella; Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin, 2nd ed., Paris, Vrin, 1943, pp. 53-5), he makes a searching analysis of the various Augustinian texts upon which this assimilation is founded, and arrives at the conclusion that "Descartes' cogito ergo sum is in fact independent of its supposed Augustinian archetype". (Saint Augustin and French Classical Thought, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1938, pp. 57-64.)

Historically speaking, it is probable, given the fact that the intuition of existence comprises the intuition of thought, that Saint Augustine is the source both of the rational and the existential cogito. "L'on peut discernner, tout le long de la spéculaton augustinienne, la présence constante et le développement parallèle de deux augustinismes philosophiques, celui de l'ontologisme des vérités rationnelles, qui vient précisément s'épanouir chez Descartes, et celui de l'expérimentation des vérités religieuses, qui a son apogée chez Pascal. Augustinismes différents, qui engendrent deux intuitionnismes différents, celui de la raison pur et celui du coeur. Tout cela, qui se fondait en une admirable unité dans Saint Augustin lui-même, s'est dissocié peu a peu." (E. Baudin, Recherches de sciences religieuses, 1924, p. 345.)
validity. If claimed, as it is by Descartes, to be a metaphysical principle, it does not fulfill the function, as it posits simply the thinking self, not the existential self: for it makes the ego sum depend quite arbitrarily on the cogito.

In actual fact, the cogito has its place only in the sphere of reflective thought to establish the thinking subject as the formal condition of discourse. It says nothing more than that I am the thinker. As Kierkegaard has pointed out, the ego sum is illegitimately introduced and indeed is tautological in this sphere: "If the 'I'," writes Kierkegaard, "which is the subject of the cogito means an individual human being, the proposition proves nothing: 'I am thinking, ergo I am; but if I am thinking, what wonder that I am': the assertion has already been made, and the first proposition says even more than the second (1)." On this plane the cogito has its use, though limited: it establishes that a thinker is required as the subject of his thought, or as a "unity of apperception", to employ the Kantian term, but is illegitimately used to posit the ego sum, that is the existential subject. To found the latter there is required another judgment on a plane other than that of

reason (1).

Marcel, then, posits as the starting-point of Ontology an *Ego sum*, an immediate revelation of the transcendent self to consciousness, given not on the plane of pure thought, but in the intense personal experience of action, suffering and existing. In all such moments of true existence the self transcends the limits of its finite nature and participates in its eternal and infinite "essence". It is thus made aware of transcendent Being immanent within it, regaining contact with the source of its spiritual activity. The *Ego sum* is what Heidegger has termed the "ontic truth".

"La vérité du jugement a ses racines dans une vérité plus primitive, dans la révélation antéprédicative de l'existant,

(1) Notwithstanding this complete disagreement on the function and status of the cogito, the reversion to the subjective mode must always have something in common with Cartesianism, as the close relations between the latter and Phenomenology bear witness; and M. de Corte is right in bringing together the cogito of Descartes and the Ego sum of Marcel (op. cit., p. 60). Common to both is the identification of the immediate apperception of the self with the very existence of that self. Knowledge and existence, the act of knowing and the act of existing are one. It is in this assertion that Hamelin sees the profound originality of Descartes' definition of thought. "Ce qu'il y a de plus nouveau dans la définition de Descartes, c'est la part qu'il accorde au sujet dans l'acte de penser. Il a eu le sentiment très vif, inconnu avant lui, que penser ou se poser pour soi est tellement bien un acte du sujet, que être pour soi c'est en quelque façon être par soi, ce qu'exprime sum dans le cogito, ergo sum. (Le Système de Descartes, 2nd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1921, p. 182. Cf. also R. Lerèvre, Le cogito, activité irréductible du sujet, Revue d'histoire de la philosophie, 1931, p. 282.) It is this same assertion, transformed by the passage from the plane of pure thought to that of passion and feeling, which informs the Existential philosophy.
et que nous appelons véri
té ontique (1).

The **Ego sum** is the supreme example of what Marcel in his Position: et Approches calls the "mystery" as opposed to the "problem". The "problem" exists for a mind confronting an object which it aims at "verifying"; it has reference solely to "l'activité vérificatrice" of mind. As long as the mind remains on the purely objective plane and within the limits of a purely psychological or epistemological enquiry, it is debarred from "l'expérience ontologique". The latter supposes the destruction of the merely external mind-object relationship, and the passage from the plane of "objective knowledge" to that of "being": a plane on which the self perceives itself as "implicated", as an active, suffering, and not only thinking being, in a reality which encloses him all about on all sides, and of which he is the "seat" rather than the "subject".

The ontological situation is one which cannot be said to be "mine", but rather to consist wholly "à être moi":

> La connaissance intérieure à l'être, enveloppée par lui: mystère ontologique de la connaissance. (E.A. p. 166.)

At this level of experience, the psychological and epistemological yield to the ontological. We are beyond the realm of the "problematic", in the sphere of the "meta-problematical" or the "mystery", where being and knowledge are one: "nous sommes ici dans une zone où il n'est plus possible de dissocier l'idée elle-même et la certitude ou l'indice de certitude qui (1) Quoted by M. de Corté, op. cit., p. 58.
Subject and object apprehended can no longer be separated, but are one in the "mystère du connaître" (1). The transcendent self is revealed as a felt presence to the experiencing subject: what Claudel calls the presence of "quelque chose en moi qui soit plus moi-même qu'eux moi".

The **ego sum** is an irreducible fact, an experience inexplicable in intelligible terms. As a revelation of self to self in immediate participation it does not allow itself to be degraded into a "problem".

Il convient d'autre part de remarquer que moi qui interroge sur l'être, je ne sais de prime abord ni si je suis ni a fortiori ce que je suis – ni même tout à fait clairement ce que signifie cette question: que suis-je? qui pourtant m'obsède. Nous voyons donc ici le problème de l'être empiéter sur ses propres données, et s'approfondir à l'intérieur même du sujet qui le pose. Du même coup il se nie (ou se transcende) en tant que problème et se transforme en mystère. (E.A. p. 169.)

The **Ego sum** constitutes knowledge but not "objective" knowledge: it does not provide "knowledge about" but "knowledge of" my self. Put in another way, in the initial mystery of self-revelation, knowledge and existence are one, identical and inseparable. I know myself inasmuch as I exist, in acting, suffering, etc., and vice versa. My "existence" is not abstracted from the experience of existing and treated as an abstract idea, but is known in and through the experience itself.

The **Ego sum** is thus the perfect illustration of what (1) Cf. the *Jemeinigkeit* of Heidegger.
Kierkegaard has called "subjective thinking" or "inwardness": a process of self-revelation induced by an inner type of reflection which grasps within the depths of consciousness the transcendent "essence" of the self, immanent therein and with which the finite self is in communion. It contrasts therefore with "objective thinking" to which such access is debarred by its method of approach, treating the self as something to be understood, something indifferent to our existence and external to it (1). "Subjective thinking" is the thinking of a self implicated in existence: it approaches reality through immediate personal experience, it is "existential" thinking (2). For all real knowledge is gained in the personal experience of action and suffering (3).

It is important to enquire under what conditions the *Ego sum* is given. It has been stated that the "existential

(1) "For an objective reflection the truth becomes an object, something objective, and thought must be pointed away from the subject. For a subjective reflection, the truth becomes a matter of appropriation, of inwardness, of subjectivity, and thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and his subjectivity... The way of objective reflection makes the subject accidental, and thereby transforms existence into something indifferent, something vanishing. Away from the subject the objective way of reflection leads to the objective truth, and while the subject and his subjectivity become indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent, and this indifference is precisely its objective validity; for all interest, like all decisiveness, is rooted in subjectivity." (Kierkegaard: Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 171, 173.)

(2) For a description of various aspects of existential thinking, e.g. Hegel, Marx, Feuerbach, etc., cf. P. Tillich, Existential Philosophy, Journal of the History of Ideas, Jan., 1944, pp. 53-5.

(3) Cf. P. Valéry: "Il n'est de véritable savoir que celui qui peut se changer en être et en substance d'être, c'est-à-dire en acte." (Cahier B, p. 39.)
judgment" is not given on the plane of the cogito. The cogito of Descartes is the clear and distinct idea of my own thought, of my existence as a purely thinking being, and therefore independent of body. Existence is for this reason a datum wholly permeable to thought and expressible in terms of a clear and distinct idea. For Marcel, on the contrary, in the fact of consciousness we are in the presence of a datum not transparent to thought, precisely because it is given to a self which is "incarnate" in a body: the primary situation is that of "incarnation", the "situation of a being who appears to himself as united to a body". (E.A. p. 11.)

The starting-point of Ontology is not, therefore, a self abstracted by means of an initial doubt from space, but the concrete self implicated therein. The point of departure of a "philosophie concrète" cannot be the cogito of Idealism which denies this implication of self in reality:

Ce que je n'ai pas cessé de vouloir marquer le plus fortement possible, c'est qu'une philosophie qui part du cogito, c'est-à-dire du non-inséré, ou même de la non-insertion en tant qu'acte, risque de ne pouvoir jamais rejoindre l'être. "L'incarnation est la donnée à partir de laquelle un fait est possible;" ce n'est pas une forme, on ne peut même pas dire purement et simplement que ce soit une relation. C'est une donnée non transparente à elle-même. (R.I., pp. 90-1.)

Rather is this point of departure in the primitive datum of a self "situated" and "engaged" in the world (l'être-au-monde, or l'être-en-situation; as he terms it in the essay so entitled in Du Refus à l'Invocation).
The starting-point of Ontology is a most rigorous
Realistic affirmation:

Je dirai de ce point de vue qu'il ne saurait y
avoir selon moi de philosophie concrète sans
une tension continuellement renouvelée et
proprement créatrice entre le Je et les
profondeurs de l'être en quoi et par quoi
nous sommes, ou encore sans une réflexion
aussi stricte, aussi rigoureuse que possible,
s'exerçant sur l'expérience la plus intensément
vécue.' (Ibid., p. 89.)

For that very reason, the existence revealed in the Ego sum,
far from being a datum permeable to thought, is precisely
the hard core which is impermeable to thought, "ce qui
résiste", a "donnée/opaque". For Marcel, the fact of
consciousness revolves around an impenetrable obscurity;
it is not a domain of clearness or distinctness (1):

Rompre, par conséquent, une fois pour toutes avec
les métaphores qui représentent la conscience
comme un cercle lumineux autour duquel il n'y
aurait pour elles que ténèbres. C'est, au
contraire, l'ombre qui est au centre. (E.A. p. 15.)

Ici s'amorcerait une réflexion sur l'opacité et
les conditions qui la déterminent. J'ai été
amené progressivement à adopter la thèse sans
doute paradoxale d'après laquelle c'est toujours
le moi qui se fait ombre à lui-même, l'opacité
venant de ce que le moi s'interpose entre le Je
et l'autre. "L'obscurité du monde extérieur
est fonction de mon obscurité pour moi-même;
aucune obscurité intrinsèque du monde." (R.I. p. 91.)

It is just because Being is buried in the impenetrable
cavern of consciousness that a passage will be secured from
the self to Existence as a whole, to the universe and other
selves. Marcel's philosophy is protected from any danger
(1) Cf. Malebranche as opposed to Descartes.
of solipsism. For the body is a "médiateur absolu" between myself and the transcendent Reality; the "donnée opaque" of self-existence opens out on to the world of other existences. It is in and through "incarnation" that the self is put by sensation and feeling into possession of reality as a whole. On the contrary, "dans la mesure où nous pouvons imaginer un entendement pur, il n'y a pas pour un tel entendement possibilité de considérer les choses comme existantes ou non-existantes". (E.A. p. 10.)

The Ego sum given in the fundamental situation of "incarnation" is the initial condition of all further judgments of existence, of the revelation of all other "presences". The passage is secured only by virtue of the "subjective way", but immediately and not, as for Descartes, by a process of inference. The Ego sum marks the point of contact between the psychological and the ontological; it alone provides access to Ontology proper. By virtue of it the self is in contact with the Transcendent in an indissoluble bond; and by the experience which it makes explicit, the universe, to employ Claudel's term, "co-nait à nous".

"Subjective" or "Existential" experience, indeed, provides access not only to the "essential" self, but to the
all-inclusive transcendent realm of Being: "omniprésence de l'être". The self is thus made "open to" other selves and other realities, to the whole plurality of "essences" which inhabit the Transcendent. The initial Ego sum, the revelation of self to self in existence is what renders possible the self's participation in a real universe:

Le bonheur ne serait-il pas une certaine façon d'être présent à moi-même? Et plus je me suis présent à moi-même, plus les autres existent eux aussi pour moi. (J.M. p. 280.)

Transcendence and Immanence are thus closely intertwined in Marcel's philosophy: the Transcendent is immanent in the mind of the existing subject, and it is only by the "inward" thought of such a subject, by a "method of immanence" that it is made manifest:

omniprésence de l'être et ce que j'appellerai peut-être improprement l'immanence de la pensée à l'être, c'est-à-dire, et du même coup, la transcendence de l'être à la pensée. (E.A. p. 49.)

That access to this Transcendent is only by way of immanence cannot be too strongly stressed. The starting-point of ontological reflexion is the concrete experience of an existing subject, who becomes conscious of the source of being immanent within him (1), and the ontological reflexion is itself, or itself is one with the dialectique d'approfondissement which unveils at ever deeper levels this being:

(1) Cf. Heidegger: "L'être se comprend toujours en partant de son existence, d'une possibilité de lui-même d'être ou de n'être pas lui-même." (Quoted by M. Boucher, K.W.F. Solger, Esthétique et Philosophie de la Présence, Paris, Stock, 1934, p. 245.) Cf. the notion of Erlebnis in Dilthey.
Je dirai qu'il y a au centre de la réalité ou
de la destinée humaine un inépuisable concret
dans la connaissance duquel on ne progresse
pas par étapes et en faisant la chaîne, comme
c'est le cas pour une discipline particulière,
quelle qu'elle soit. A cet inépuisable, chacun
de nous ne peut accéder qu'avec le plus intact,
avec le plus vierge de lui-même. Les difficul-
cultés d'ailleurs sont immenses. L'expérience
nous montre en effet que ces parties vierges
qui peuvent seules prendre contact avec l'être
sont d'abord recouvertes par une foule d'apports
et de scories; ce n'est que par un long et
pénible travail de déblayage, ou plus exactement
de purification, par une ascèse pénible que nous
parvenons à les dégager; et c'est d'ailleurs
concurrentement à ce travail que se forge
l'instrument dialectique qui fait corps avec
la pensée philosophique elle-même et dont
pourtant celle-ci doit toujours garder le contrôle.

(R.I. pp. 91-2.)

The discovery of the nature and scope of the experience
which finds expression in the Ego sum solves an important
difficulty which has beset Marcel throughout the whole course
of his previous reflections. Marcel himself has underlined
it, speaking of the "difficulty he has always experienced in
discerning the relation between Being and Existing." (E.A.
p. 50.) Hitherto he seemed to be thinking along two
parallel lines, in terms of a theory of Being and a theory
of Existence, of Transcendence and Immanence. Further, his
existentialist viewpoint led him more often than not to
depreciate the order of Being and Transcendence. He himself
speaks of his repugnance to employ the categories of Being:
"J'ai toujours eu, je m'en rends compte, une répugnance
intime à penser selon la catégorie de l'être." (E.A. p. 38.)
But this repugnance can, he declares, be no longer justified.
at the moment he is about to set out on his ontological meditation:

La pensée se trahit elle-même, elle méconnaît ses propres exigences, en prétendant substituer l'ordre de la valeur à l'ordre de l'être; et elle se condamne du même coup à demeurer dans l'ambiguïté la plus suspecte en face du donné, et là où il s'agit de saisir, de définir ce donné même. (E.A. pp. 38-9.)

The difficulty is solved by the discovery of the nature and scope of the *Ego sum* or existential experience, which marks the point of intersection between Being and Existence, Transcendence and Immanence, their union and synthesis in the concrete actuality of immediate experience. "It appears to me evident," says Marcel, "that existence is a certain form of being." (E.A. p. 39.)

Perhaps, he suggests, it is not the only form, perhaps something can "be" and yet not "exist" (and this margin between Being and Existence is what constitutes the negation of any Absolute Idealism and preserves the irreducible character of the Transcendent). But, at any rate, the inverse proposition, that what "exists" may not "be" is inconceivable. The former domain of pure possibility, of "non-existent" Being, can however be rightly neglected as of no consequence to a metaphysics which posits as its sole task the elucidation of the actual and the concrete, and aims at grasping the Transcendent as it is actualised in the drama of human existence and revealed in the contingent and the temporal.
From now on Marcel treats the terms Existence and Being as practically synonymous. The employment of one in preference to the other has little but philological significance; the category of Being is used when attention is focussed on the ontological import of experience, that of Existence when analysis is being made of the concrete situation wherein Being is revealed.

This affirmation of concrete experience, in which the Transcendent is revealed as immanent in thought, as the sole starting-point of Ontology, is at the very core of the Existential philosophy. It is of the utmost significance for the further development of ontological reflexion. For if Being is revealed only in and through Existence, if, as Heidegger says, "l'acte même de la révélation ontique s'accomplit dans l'état cénésithésique de l'homme placé au coeur de l'existant et dans les comportements impulsifs et volitifs, fondées en cet état, à l'égard de l'existant (1)," then it is obvious that Being is grasped only in Time and Drama. Time will be the only road to Being; and the problem of Time becomes central in metaphysics.

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The closing of whatever gap remained between Being and Existence is marked by a certain change of vocabulary. On (1) *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, p. 76, quoted by M. de Corte, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
first adopting the standpoint of Realism, Marcel was wont to use the term "intuition", perhaps to stress his new Realistic outlook, to denote the type of contact with Being procured in immediate experience. But strictly speaking, as Heidegger has remarked, the "ontic truth" or \textit{Ego sum} is hardly an intuition. The term intuition is still impregnated with objectivity. With the bringing together of Transcendence and Immanence, Being and Existence, and with the recognition of a "subjective way" to Ontology, the term "participation" comes to be used constantly by Marcel. It serves to mark the subjectivity of metaphysical experience, as also the dialectical character of this experience, inasmuch as Being is made manifest only in and through the exploration and deepening of existential experience.

One may well ask however if there is not a contradiction between the ontological approach by way of a subjective dialect and the Realism of sensation and feeling. Is the substitution of "participation" for "intuition" not equivalent to an overturning of the whole Realistic premiss? Does it not even mark a return to the Idealistic viewpoint?

The answer to these troublesome questions is in the negative. The Realistic position remains at bottom intact. Marcel affirms that self, selves and things, as they exist in themselves, are given to the mind in all experience; sense-experience does not differ in kind from faith or even from self-awareness. All consciousness is an immediate relation
of mind to something presented to and transcendent to the mind. In this Marcel is a Realist like Bergson. But why, then, does he not accept the Bergsonian "intuition"? It is because it is in his view inadequate to describe the true nature of immediacy. Bergson's intuition is, as we have already said, a type of vision involving a fusion of subject and object. Bergson himself describes it as a "connaissance qui est contact et même coincidence (1)." A simple or single act, it admits of no degrees; it is an immediate coincidence.

Here lie, as Marcel sees it, and if we interpret his thought correctly, the limitations and dangers of modern Realism. We risk seeing the mind vanish in the stream of nature and intuition or perception become a fact rather than what it is – an event or process. Are we then to renounce Realism and adopt the viewpoint of subjective Idealism? Are we to say that there is no immediate experience other than the merely subjective, no presence of the real as it is in itself other than that of the self to itself?

According to Maine de Biran, it will be recalled, perception and intuition (he uses the latter term in the pre-Bergsonian and classic sense, in conformity with its derivation) are a relation between the mind and its object or its objective content; as such, they do not reach beyond what is represented and phenomenal. The mind's intuitive knowledge of itself is equally objective in so far as it is equally objectiv in so far as it

(1) La Pensée et le Mouvant, Paris, Alcan, 1934, p. 36.
involves its becoming an object for its own inspection. In all such cases there is stipulated a dualism or separation of subject and object. At the same time, in every experience of self-awareness in effort, says Biran, the subject in its inner reality is also immediately present to itself. This immediate grasping of real substance in inward experience (and there is no other) is what he calls reflexion. It is the pure presence of the subject to itself independently of its objective content. It is not knowledge, intuition or perception: rather is it "belief" (1). Both the Bergsonian Realism and the subjective Idealism aspire to a pure experience of fusion with substances in their inner reality. The only difference is that the latter can conceive such a fusion as possible only within the merest subjective experience.

Now, if it is this type of identification that is taken as the criterion, no doubt the Idealist position is the sounder. So it seemed to Marcel himself in his earlier, his Idealistic phase. Now, however, he envisages another type of immediate relation, a new doctrine of immediacy which gives a more satisfactory account of existential experience and not only is compatible with, but requires the Realistic postulate.

What we have called his Subjective Realism posits a form of relation which, although maintaining all the qualities of a relation, yet involves an immediate contact. It supposes that, within the immediacy of sensation and feeling, of "presentification", degrees are possible. It thus allows for a dialectic. It supposes too that the duality of subject and object can be transcended in a new relation of diversity within unity, so safeguarding the claims both of mind and of the existent reality. In short, it introduces into the Realistic postulate what we might term spatiality. There is in experience, which is always experience of something, a volume; and that volume is neither of the subject's nor of the object's making, but is as it were the medium in which both bathe and by virtue of which each, and the relation of each to the other, come to light, and both are constituted mutually as significant existents. The dialectic of the "approches concrètes" is simply the progress of this mutual awareness and coming into being.

Moreover, this new definition allows Marcel to define immediate experience as knowledge, as being itself reflexion. Certainly not conceptual knowledge. But neither is it contemplative and intuitive in the Bergsonian sense, nor relationary and intuitive in Biran's sense; it is rather " supra-relational", by that meaning not extra-relational but relational in a fully subjective and qualitative sense.

With his usual perspicacity, M. Wahl has lighted on this
original feature of Marcel's doctrine, without however developing it further. "Le romantisme d'un Novalis," he writes, "le romantisme en général conçoit le sentiment comme fusion, identification. Il est apparu avec Scheler, avec Lawrence, en France avec Gabriel Marcel, une conception différente où les êtres restent séparés dans l'amour, où ils sont présents, mais présents en face l'un de l'autre, plutôt que présents l'un dans l'autre. Ces écrivains ont marqué dans l'amour l'élément d'alterité et de transcendance (1)."

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In conclusion, the approach to Ontology is in and through certain immediate and intense personal experiences. At such moments of "existence", decision, despair, suffering, etc., the self is made aware of its essential being which transcends its finite nature and with which it is in a relation of immanence or immediate participation. The mind encounters a "donnée opaque", "ce qui résiste", a more-than-self, or, to repeat the phrase of Claudel, "quelque chose en moi qui soit plus moi-même que moi (2)." In such moments of existing the essential self is made manifest, and with it the whole realm

(1) Sur l'Absolu, Idealismus, Bd. I., 1934.
of the Transcendent and of Being, the realm of other selves and things on to which the self opens out. These revelations of Being ground the **Ego sum**, and with it, all other existential judgments.

This participation in the Transcendent is only possible to a type of "subjective" or "existential" thinking. By virtue of it the mind penetrates below the subject-object distinction to the stratum of Being which Jaspers calls the **Ursprung**, transcending mind but immanent in the depths of mind, and which is revealed only to the "pathetic" thinker. A method of "inwardness", or to employ the old Germanic term, **Innerlichkeit**.

The **Ego sum** is not then to be construed as a relic of subjectivism. It is the product of an experience which penetrates below the distinction between subject and object to a Being neither "objectivity" nor mere "subjectivity", but transcendent to consciousness, with which it must not be identified.

Now, if the **Ego sum** alone provides a starting-point for Ontology, if Existence is the portal to Being, Ontology as a "science" is no longer concerned primarily or wholly with the explanation of Being, its nature and status, but with the nature of the existential situations wherein Being is made manifest. The way is clear for the elucidation of the human drama in its actual spatio-temporal features in so far as it may be taken as revealing the Transcendent, that is for a philosophy of Existence proper.
CHAPTER VI
EXISTENCE.

I. Problem and Mystery.

After the psychological approach to the problem of Being (theory of sensation and feeling), after the ontological approach, Marcel rises to the final and truly existential approach — to the elucidation of the fundamental situations or, as he names them, the "concrete approaches" wherein the transcendent self and selves are revealed to self. In this section his thought lies very close to that of Kierkegaard and Jaspers, as we find in studying his analysis of such fundamental situations as despair, death, etc.

He comes to his problem, in characteristic fashion, by way of a radical distinction between the "problem" and the "mystery" (1):

...un problème est quelque chose que je rencontre, que je trouve tout entier devant moi, mais que je puis par la-même cerner et réduire - au lieu qu'un mystère est quelque chose en quoi je suis moi-même engagé, et qui n'est par conséquent pensable que comme une sphère où la distinction de l'en moi et du devant moi perd sa signification et sa valeur initiale. (E.A. p. 169.)

"...le mystère est quelque chose où je me trouve engagé, dont l'essence est par conséquent de n'être pas tout entier devant moi," (Ibid., p. 145), wherein the subject remains "intérieur

à une certaine affirmation que je suis plutôt que je ne la profère — une affirmation dont je suis le siège plutôt que le sujet." (Ibid., p. 250.)

Un mystère, c'est un problème qui empêche sur ses propres données, qui les empêche et se dépasse par la même comme problème. (Ibid.)

A problem admits of solution by virtue of some technique or method: "Tout problème authentique est justiciable d'une technique, et toute technique consiste à résoudre des problèmes d'un type déterminé." (Ibid., p. 149.) The mystery, on the other hand, is incapable of such solution and cannot, under penalty of its being degraded into a problem, be the object of a resolving technique; it appertains to the zone of the "meta-problematical" and "meta-technical". Science treats problems, metaphysics deals with mysteries, in short, certain concrete situations wherein the subject, far from being an inquirer, is inextricably involved and cannot accomplish the necessary recul whereby he might envisage the given as an object and treat it as a problem to be solved. All so-called "problems" of Being are in reality mysteries of this sort, such as the mysteries of love, evil, suffering and death.

In this definition of the "problem" as what is subject to verification, and its opposition to the "mystery" as what is beyond verification, Marcel is directing his attack against the doctrine of verification of Léon Brunschvicg. He has elaborated his criticism in a communication to the
Union pour la Vérité made shortly after the publication of the Journal Métaphysique and reproduced in substance in Du Refus à l'Invocation. Brunschvicg's doctrine of verification is an offshoot of Kantism. He conceives reason as a power applied to sense-experience to order and comprehend it. Reason does not, however, operate by way of a priori principles; those principles it employs are, to use Poincaré's term which Brunschvicg affects, "commodities"; it forges and develops its principles in the process of its verification of experience. The march of reason and science is essentially a "progress of consciousness". On the other hand, reason is not an activity of the individual consciousness but of a universal consciousness — or "conscience intellectuelle". "L'univers de l'idéalisme ce n'est pas celui qui se dissout dans la subjectivité de la conscience individuelle, c'est celui dont la réalité s'impose à la conscience intellectuelle, foyer du jugement de vérité (1)."

In a word, the advance of knowledge is a process of verification wherein the intellectual consciousness verifies the content of its experience in terms of universal principles immanent within that experience, incorporating within the body of expanding truth what is so verifiable and rejecting the unverifiable.

What Marcel wishes to point out is that this doctrine of verification is bound up with an Idealism, namely the

view that thought, universal and general, is as it were placed against the real and that therefore this real becomes the object of knowledge only in so far as it is reducible to thought by virtue of verifying principles immanent in the structure of the latter, even if they are called out by experience.

We may accept the fact that one type of knowledge—namely objective knowledge—is so obtainable, but at the cost of losing the concrete essence of the reality known and of the knowing subject. But what Idealism affirms is that there is no knowledge possible other than what may be verified, what lends itself to treatment and solution as a "problem". It is here that Marcel proclaims another positive form of knowledge which exists beyond verification and which is essentially "real" (using the term in the way Macmurray uses it of "being real in our feelings"). It is the type of knowledge procured in the immediate experience of a subject no longer set over against the real but itself immersed in a process including and therefore transcending subject and object. The artistic, religious and moral consciousness bears witness to a type of experience highly individual and eminently concrete. In such experiences the plane of verification is transcended, for the knowing subject cannot detach himself from the global reality with which he is "given" in order to verify his experience in terms of general and universal principles of judgment:
Certaines des plus hautes expériences humaines impliquent soit l'appréhension, soit tout au moins la position de quelque chose qui va au delà de toute vérification possible: pour fixer les idées, j'évoquerais simplement l'amour ou l'adoration, dont l'objet est par définition impossible à détailler, et ne se laisse pas atteindre par ces démarches de proche en proche en lesquelles se distribue au contraire tout processus de vérification. (R.I. p. 11.)

Mais voilà qui suffit à montrer qu'il est des domaines où un ordre, c'est-à-dire une intelligibilité, se laisse reconnaître à la faveur de conditions en quelque sorte inspecifiables parce qu'elles sont inhérentes au sujet lui-même en tant qu'il est une expérience vivante, qui par essence ne peut se réfléchir elle-même intégralement. (Ibid., p. 12.)

It is such experience and the type of knowledge it procures that Marcel seeks to designate by the term "mystery": and
the doctrine of the "mystery" in Marcel is inseparable from
a wholehearted Realism.

It is worth while underlining that the opposition between "problem" and "mystery" (as Marcel himself has assured the writer) is built up against Brunschvicg and his
doctrine of verification. Already this reaction was present
in the Idealistic phase, but at that time Marcel was
envisaging a realm beyond thought and existence, beyond
knowledge itself. Only thus could he transcend, in his
view, the realm of verification. What he offered was still
rather a negative theory of knowledge, a corollary of his
negative theology. Now he indicates a positive mode of
knowledge, which transcends verification but is no less
knowledge. It was not, as Marcel declared in conversation
with the writer, until about 1930 that he felt able to define the content of the "mystery" in other than negative terms, as a "transcendance actuelle". He would, he further declared, relate this mode of knowledge to the phenomenon of memory and forgetfulness, where the forgotten name is something more than non-existent, something more than a mere possibility, being present and "known" and indeed already operative in the actuality of the present reflection; and yet not known in the ordinary sense of the term. "On ne sait pas ce qu'on cherche. Si on le savait on ne le chercherait pas." In a sense, one knows the name without knowing it. "Vous l'avez sans l'avoir." It is in similar manner that the future is known in the anticipation of present experience. The content of the "mystery" Marcel would define as "la présence voilée", thus stressing its positive, although meta-problematical character.

Such mysteries cannot be solved but only "elucidated", and this elucidation is the true domain of metaphysical reflexion, which Marcel defines as a "reflexion levelled at a mystery". (E.A. p. 146.) It is not meant by that that the philosopher's task is to draw a line between the knowable and the unknowable; a mystery is not synonymous with any Spencerian residuum or unknown. Face to face with a mystery the philosopher is in presence of a positive realm of knowledge. The metaphysician starts from immediate existential experience, that is from certain existential situations which present
themselves to his reflexion in the form of mysteries; and it is these mysteries, which are already themselves both knowledge and experience, reflexion and existence, that provide the "concrete approaches" to Ontology. Metaphysics is thus what Marcel calls a "reflexion on a reflexion", a "reflexion to the second degree". (E.A. p. 171.) The reflexion of the metaphysician is directed towards the elucidation of these "concrete approaches"; it constitutes what Marcel, speaking of Jaspers, calls an "orographie de la vie intérieure". By it and by the exploration of such "concrete approaches" it aims at recapturing the primitive participation in Being given in immediate experience or, better, at rendering explicit the dialectical content of such experience (1). The method is one of description aimed

(1) A certain similarity between this conception of metaphysics and that of the final Bradley is striking, as Marcel himself recognises. "Je tiens à observer en passant que cette réflexion du second degré ou à la deuxième puissance, cette réflexion s'exerçant sur une réflexion initiale, est à mes yeux la philosophie elle-même dans son effort spécifique pour restaurer le concret par-delà les déterminations disjointes ou désarticulées de la pensée abstraite; et sur ce point, malgré les différences que je ne songe pas à nier, j'ai conscience de demeurer très proche, non point de l'hégélianisme lui-même, mais de certaines doctrines qui l'ont prolongé en l'assouplissant - en particulier de celle de Bradley." (R.I. p. 34.) In conversation with the writer he has more than once stressed the influence of Bradley on his thought. He mentioned that about 1912, or so he proposed to write a memoir on Bradley's Appearance and Reality (noting the influence of Lotze). He has in his possession a short unpublished text dated 1912, all that survives of this project, devoted to a reflexion on the notions of appearance and reality. Reference to this text will be made later in connection with another matter.

As regards the present question, it must again be stressed that what Marcel shares with Bradley is a certain
at vision of Being; at exposing the Absolute behind the accidental and contingent of experience, at discovering what Heidegger calls the Being of Being or what Solger terms the "vision of what is revealed (1)".

This recuperation of the primitive participation in Being is possible to the metaphysician in and through a preliminary operation which Marcel calls "recueillement".

Le recueillement, dont la possibilité effective peut être regardée comme l'indice ontologique le plus révélateur dont nous disposons, constitue le milieu réel au sein duquel cette récupération est susceptible de s'accomplir.

(E.A. p. 171.)

By virtue of this mental preparation or ascesis, whose purpose is to free the mind temporarily from all external impressions and restore its capacity for grasping and reading the essential, the reflection of the metaphysician is confronted with certain spiritual situations wherein the transcendent self and the realm of Being it opens on to are revealed; the real self is revealed transcending the "empirical self": beyond "my life" I discover what "I am":

Au sein du recueillement je prends position... en face de ma vie, je m'en retire en quelque manière, mais non point comme le sujet pur de la connaissance; dans cette retraite j'emporte avec moi ce que je suis et ce que peut-être ma vie n'est pas. Ici apparaît l'intervalle entre mon être et ma vie. Je ne suis pas ma vie... Le recueillement est sans doute ce qu'il y a de

(Note (1) contd. from previous page.)

conception of metaphysical thinking as aimed at the recovery and explicitation of immediacy. Where they differ finally is in their view of the Absolute, for the one the whole, for the other the individual concrete.

(1) M. Boucher, K.W.F. Solger, p. 245.
The ontological method is by way of elucidation of such
situations, which reveal a Being transcending consciousness
and capable of being accepted or denied:

S'il en est ainsi, les approches concrètes du
mystère ontologique devront être cherchées non
point dans le registre de la pensée logique
dont l'objectivation soulève une question
préalable, mais plutôt dans l'élucidation de
certaines données proprement spirituelles,
telles que la fidélité, l'espérance, l'amour,
où l'homme nous apparaît aux prises avec la
tentation du reniement. (E.A. p. 173.)

The method employed by Marcel is strictly phenomeno-
logical. What he calls "recueillement" corresponds to the
Cartesian doubt, but more clearly to the Epoche of Husserl,
the "suspension of the thesis", that "bracketing" or "dis-
connecting" of the world and of the psychological "I" with
a view to obtaining a vision of the pure sphere of trans-
cendental subjectivity, with its essences which are the
content of pure consciousness. But whereas, like Descartes's,
Husserl's philosophy moves in the sphere of the clear and
transparent, Marcel's moves in the realm of the "opaque" and
the "mystery". In both, however, the fundamental experience
is recaptured by a similar preliminary asceticism aiming at the
transcending of the practical self so as to lay bare a realm
of transcendence immanent in deep experience (1).

(1) On Husserl's phenomenological "epoché" or "bracketing" of

It will be noticed that we have spoken of "correspondence".
The parallel at this point serves to underline the general
phenomenological approach of Marcel; namely the view that
the starting-point of metaphysics requires a certain
"bracketing" of the Objective world: by which is meant not
a denial of its reality or its transcendence, but a refusal
of its merely objective appearance so as to allow its
essentiality to become immediately known in immanent
experience. Husserl's phenomenological reduction affirms
too that "it is not that the real sensory world is 'recast'
or denied, but that an absurd interpretation of the same...
is set aside". (Ibid., p. 169.) And it aims also at
revealing the essential nature of reality to the pure Ego of
subjective experience.

Nevertheless, Husserl's theory, in spite of its claims,
develops on Idealistic and epistemological and not, as does
Marcel's, on Realistic and existential lines. For Husserl,
bracketing the real world, withdraws himself from existence.
"I use the 'phenomenological' epoche, which completely bars me
from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence
(Dasein)." (Ibid., pp. 110-11.) Whereas Marcel withdraws from
the objective spatio-temporal world in order to reveal its
subjective and existential, spatio-temporal essence. (Cf.
Chps. VII and VIII.) And if Husserl does so, it is because
he seeks to show that the world, or Being, is in itself
"nothing at all" and exists only "for" consciousness, that all
its meanings (i.e. what it is essentially) come from the field
of pure consciousness with its "essences", spaceless, time-
less and, like the pure Ego itself, transcendent to existent
reality. His reduction has for purpose to demonstrate that
"the whole being of the world consists in a certain 'meaning'
which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field from
which the meaning is derived; and...that this field, this
existential realm of absolute origins, is open to research
on an intuitionistic basis, and contains an infinite wealth of
insight-rooted knowledge of the highest scientific worth." (Ibid., p. 169.) In short, he will show that the world is
and comes to exist as it is "for a consciousness" or is
constituted by consciousness in its intentional acts. "The
whole spatio-temporal world, to which man and the human Ego
claim to belong as subordinate singular realities, is according
to its own meaning mere intentional Being, a Being, therefore,
which has the merely secondary, relative sense of a Being for
a consciousness." (Ibid., p. 153.)

Marcel's doctrine, on the other hand, aims at probing
beneath the objective appearance of the world of self, selves
and things, so as to participate in them, in their essential
and existential nature, a nature which is wholly existential
or spatio-temporal (although not in the objective mode of
space-time). Moreover, a world of transcendent selfhood and
It is important to note that what Marcel means by "recueillement" is, if we interpret his thought correctly, an ascesis; it is not a dialectic. It differs thus from that transcending of the objective content of consciousness so as to permit intuition of the pure subject which he described in his earlier Idealistic phase. The latter was itself the dialectic and had for aim to transcend all dialectic. But here, and from now on, the immediate experience is the only beginning and end; it is, and nothing else is, the dialectic, and there is nothing beyond it. The "recueillement" simply prepares the way for this dialectic to become explicit, for it to be "read".

For the same reason, the "second reflexion" he speaks about is not to be construed as another dialectic superimposed; it is simply the rendering explicit of the dialectic involved in immediate experience together with its content. Immediacy is the sole metaphysical "fact", the starting-point and the end.

(Note (1) contd. from page 249.)

Being which, when found, is found to be itself instinct with meaning and does not derive this meaning solely from the self immanent in consciousness – an intersubjectivity composed not, as is Husserl's, of an "absolute consciousness" set against "real" Being, which it constitutes as an existent by the infusion of its own meanings, but composed of a mutual participation and mutually informative activity of self and selves or of self and things endowed with all the qualities of real, that is subjective, existence.

For a further development in relation to Jean-Paul Sartre, who follows out the consequences of Husserl's theory and so develops on lines wholly opposed to Marcel's, cf. Chp. XII.
Marcel, moreover, is able to limit himself to this "fact" because he considers immediacy to constitute itself a reflexion, to be not a mere or simple datum but a movement, a participation with spatial and temporal volume, and one where the process of unveiling moves within the content of what is revealed - in every sense a "mystery". Metaphysics is this expliciting or descriptive "reflexion upon a reflexion" and its transcendent content, prepared by a preliminary ascesis.
II. Being and Having.

A preliminary question here rises naturally to the mind. Why should it in fact be necessary to study the problem of Being thus through certain concrete approaches, by the elucidation of specific situations? Because Existence and Being are not a necessary accompaniment of consciousness and ordinary human activity. Ordinary living takes place on a plane other than that of Being; the vision of true Being, the realisation of Selfhood are the result of a certain state of grace, occurring only at certain privileged moments when the plane of ordinary living is transcended. That there is such a thing as a "problem" of Being is due to a radical difference in nature between "living" and "existing":

Le "problème de l'être" ne sera donc qu'une traduction en un langage inadéquat d'un mystère qui ne peut être donné qu'à un être capable de recueillement, à un être dont la caractéristique centrale consiste peut-être à ne pas coincider purement et simplement avec sa vie. (E.A. p. 171.)

In Marcel's terminology this fundamental distinction becomes one between two orders: that of "having" and that of "being". He deals with it in a short lecture entitled Esquisse d'une phénoménologie de l'avoir included in Etre et Avoir. This study, which he claims has nothing in common with Gunther Stern's Ueber das Haben, is not psychological in character, but phenomenological, in that "elle porte vraiment sur des contenus de pensée qu'il s'agit proprement de faire émerger, de faire affleurer à la lumière de la réflexion." (Ibid., p. 229.)
How far is it possible, he asks, to identify a sentiment first experienced? Only in so far as I treat it as something I "have" and thereby intellectualise it, define its content. I am then treating it as an object independent of my own being. On the other hand, the feeling, when preserved in its pure affectivity, is so immediate to the self that I cannot say I "have" it, but rather that I "am" it:

Mais n'existe-il pas; par opposition à ces sentiments que j'ai, une sorte de trame affective qui est à tel point consubstantielle à ce que je suis que je ne peux pas me l'opposer réellement (et par conséquent la penser)?" (Ibid., p. 224.)

It is therefore possible to distinguish between two radically different orders, "having" and "being". All "Having" involves separation of the subject and the object: "un certain quid rapporté à un certain qui traté comme centre d'inhérence ou d'appréhension." (Ibid., p. 230.) From the point of view of the "having" subject, his separation of himself from his affect reacts upon his self; not only does he transform the former into an object, but he transforms his own self into a similar object, depriving it of its individual reality; it becomes a mere "another" or "he":

...nous ne pouvons nous exprimer en termes d'avoir que dans un ordre comportant des références à autrui en tant qu'autrui... Car le j'ai ne peut se poser lui-même que dans sa tension avec un autre senti comme autre. (Ibid., p. 234.)

To proceed, all having implies possession; what I have is what I deem to possess and consequently to have power over, to dispose of. It is this latter characteristic of "having"
that is of real importance from the existential standpoint. "Having" is centred in the desires and fears of the individual; the peculiar relationship of possession obtaining between the self and its object results in a perpetual tension or "angoisse", provoked by the desire to continue in its possession and by the fear of losing it:

D'autre part en tant que ce quid est une chose, soumise par conséquent aux vicissitudes propres aux choses, il peut être perdu, il peut être détruit. Il devient donc, ou risque de devenir, le centre d'une sorte de tourbillon de craintes, d'anxiété, et par là se traduit précisément la tension qui est essentielle à l'ordre de l'avoir. (Ibid., p. 235.)

The order of "having" is the domain of human suffering and despair.

It follows too that abstract knowledge appertains to the order of "having": "la connaissance comme mode de l'avoir" (Ibid., p. 210), inasmuch as such knowledge converts realities into concepts. Its extreme form is fanaticism and ideology, which is "une sorte d'injustifiable aliénation du sujet... en face de la chose quelle qu'elle soit". (Ibid., p. 242.) But all thought in its generalising activity has the same effect of transforming the intimate relationship of a self participating in reality in immediate experience into a purely external relation between an anonymous subject and a no less anonymous object:

En réalité, la pensée en général, c'est le on; et le on c'est l'homme de la technique, de même que c'est le sujet de l'épistémologie, lorsque celle-ci considère la connaissance comme une technique, et c'est, je crois, le cas chez Kant. Au contraire
le sujet de la réflexion métaphysique s'oppose essentiellement au on; essentiellement ce n'est pas n'importe qui (le man in the street). Toute épistémologie qui prétend se fonder sur la pensée en général va vers la glorification de la technique et de l'homme de la rue (démocratisation de la connaissance qui au fond la ruine). (Ibid., p. 182.)

The order of "having" is the order of space; for the identification of sentiments appertaining to self or other selves involves their delimitation as distinct objects, and consequently their situation in successive points of space:

Avoir et spatialité. L'avoir se réfère au prendre, mais il semble qu'il n'y ait de prise que de ce qui est dans l'espace, ou de ce qui est assimilé à du spatial. (Ibid., p. 209.)

Moreover, "having" implies also temporality, the situating of selves and feelings in points of time. We shall be dealing more fully with this problem later, as it requires special treatment; suffice to recognise for the moment that Space and Time are what Marcel calls "modes de l'absence"; inasmuch as the individual treats his self or other selves as things he "has" and destroys them as "presences" wherein he participates immediately and which are, so to speak, one with his own being and existence, he delivers them over to the despairing succession of time and space, alienating them to a greater or less degree from himself.
III. The Concrete Approaches.

Now the order of "having" can, on certain privileged occasions, be transcended and access gained to the domain of Being. There are in every human life certain situations which procure to the individual, if only for a brief moment, participation in the transcendent reality of his own self or other selves, and which release him from those exigencies of normal living which oblige him to treat reality as something he "has" and thus alienate it. It is the task of metaphysics to elucidate such situations by a method other than the objective method suitable for the treatment of a "problem", by the "subjective" method already described, a method of exploration or "approfondissement":

Au fond, la méthode est toujours la même: c'est l'approfondissement d'une certaine situation métaphysique fondamentale dont il ne suffit pas de dire qu'elle est mienne, car elle consiste essentiellement à être moi. (B.A. p. 24.)

Of these situations, which represent for the philosopher the concrete approaches to Being, the basic one is that of "incarnation", the primitive relationship of the individual with his own body. The body is, in a sense, "l'avoir-type"; it is that which I seem to "have"; for all practical purposes of life I am obliged to treat it as a "thing" or as an instrument, something over which I have complete control, and of which I can dispose at will. In fact, it is "l'avoir absolu", as it is in and through it I have control over all other things. The result of so treating my body as a thing is not only the liquidation of its existential reality, but
the complete absorption of the self by the body and its desires:

Il semble bien être de l'essence de mon corps ou de mes instruments en tant que je les traite comme possédés, de tendre à me supprimer, moi qui les possède. (Ibid., p. 240.)

The self (moi) loses both its individuality and its spontaneity and becomes a soi, which is none other than a "sclérose", a sort of "hardening" resulting from enslavement to desire:

Celui qui reste au plan de l'avoir (ou du désir) se centre soit sur lui-même soit sur l'autre en tant qu'autre... il faudrait prendre en quelque sorte à bras le corps la notion du soi, du soi-même, et reconnaître que toujours, contrairement à ce qu'ont cru beaucoup d'idéalistes et en particulier les philosophes de la conscience, le soi est un épaississement, est une sclérose, et peut-être, qui sait? une sorte d'expression apparente spiritualisée, d'expression à la seconde puissance, non du corps au sens objectif, mais de mon corps en tant que mien, en tant que mon corps est quelque chose que j'ai. (Ibid., p. 243.)

This dual relationship with my body may however, in certain circumstances, give place to a relationship of immediacy in which the fact of "incarnation" is realised - I am my body. No doubt such an experience can be only momentary, by reason of the fact that practical considerations require my treating the body as an instrument, if only to control other things; but inasmuch as I am my body, I free myself from the slavery of desire: "peut-être un être est-il en réalité d'autant moins esclave de son corps qu'il a moins la prétention de disposer de lui." (Ibid., p. 121, n. 1.)

(In the same note Marcel suggests that in such an attitude
might be found the explanation of miraculous cures and other supranormal influences of mind over body.

The consideration of the situation of "my body" leads automatically to the elucidation of further situations. The body is in a special position, as in and through it we have access to other things and selves. And according as the individual uses this "médiateur absolu" to acquire control over them or to participate in them, he rests within or transcends the realm of "having", he either obtains or denies himself access to Transcendent Being: "...la corpérité comme zone frontière entre l'être et l'avoir."

(Ibid., p. 119.) Thus while the pursuit of practical knowledge requires the demission of sensation, which provides immediate participation in realities, in favour of a subject-object relationship whereby the "subject" acquires control over an "object" decanted of its reality, there are privileged occasions where the full immediacy of sensation and feeling is preserved: all moments of pure affectivity where the individual enters into and is one with the perceived object. (Cases of involuntary memory come under this head, as do the intense aesthetic experiences described by Theodor Lipps in terms of "einfühlung" and Vernon Lee in terms of "empathy".) Such moments of participation are achieved on a pre-rational plane: they are a feature of the primitive or pre-logical mentality which Lévy-Brühl has analysed (1).

But there are higher levels of spiritual activity wherein the plane of "having" is transcended and immediacy restored. Thus in any type of creative activity, the material worked upon, the instrument employed, cease at a certain moment to be objects and mere instruments and become one with the creator in the common task of creation:

Partout où il y a création pure, l'avoir en tant que tel est transcendé ou encore volatilisé au sein de cette création même; la dualité du possédant et du possédé s'abolit dans une réalité vivante. (Ibid., p. 241.)

This is so, in particular, of the artist and his instrument, or of the scientist in his laboratory; in all such cases, the current of creative activity transforms the objects and instruments into felt presences, the material ceases to be instrumental and becomes one with the artist in the creative act. This point, in Marcel's opinion, will even serve to distinguish the true thinker from the "idéologue". The latter treats his ideas as objects, as mere things; they end by becoming fixed ideas which absorb his mind. The true thinker, on the other hand, is one with his ideas, which he ceaselessly moulds, transforms and revises; his thought is an active, creative process imbued with finality:

Le penseur au contraire est perpétuellement en garde contre cette aliénation, cette pétification possible de sa pensée; demeure dans un état perpétuel de créativité, toute sa pensée est toujours et à tout moment remise en question. (Ibid., p. 242.)

This distinction, formulated in terms which remind us of "Valéry's Léonard de Vinci and Monsieur Teste, involves a
further distinction between activity and passivity; for it is inasmuch as the individual is passive towards his material that he treats it as mere object or instrument; while, on the contrary, any active attitude he adopts thereto promotes him from the plane of "having" to that of "being". "Having," writes Marcel, is "perhaps a certain manner of being what one is not." (Ibid., p. 214.) The true thinker is he who ceases to "have" ideas and "is" his ideas. Not that Marcel would relapse here into any mere Idealism or Subjectivism; he is simply stressing a certain attitude on the thinker's part which is conducive to a sense of existence, and a certain state of mind which cannot be continuous, as so much of our thinking must of necessity bear on "limited contents" and move in the sphere of "having", but which, when granted in the comparatively rare moments of creative thought, constitutes a precious revelation and realisation of the true self.

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Turning now to the consideration of situations revelatory of the transcendent self and selves, the truly existential situations, in that they bear witness to what he calls the "poids ontologique de l'existence humaine"(E.A. p. 149), Marcel follows out the implications of evil, disease, death, hope and despair in terms which recall Jaspers and Heidegger. Here again the individual is, in normal life, a prey to
the claims of "having". As regards evil, the temptation is to regard it as a problem to be solved; to consider it not as part and parcel of my self but as outside my self and subject to treatment or remedy: "Seulement le mal purement constaté ou même contemplé cesse d'être le mal souffert, tout simplement je crois qu'il cesse d'être le mal." (Ibid., p.251.) Similarly with disease and suffering. But if the individual grasps them in their inner mystery and accepts them as his, just as his body is his, he is put in immediate communication with his essential self: he realises his true being in Existence, beyond the plane of living:

En réalité je ne le sais is comme mal que dans la mesure où il m'atteint, c'est-à-dire où j'y suis impliqué au sens où on est impliqué dans une affaire; c'est cette implication qui est ici fondamentale; je n'en puis faire abstraction que par une opération légitime à certains égards, mais fictive - et dont je ne dois pas être dupe. (Ibid., p. 251.)

And, at the same time as the individual recaptures the essence of his self, evil, disease, and suffering cease to be for their part abstractions and regain their positive character as existential realities. Marcel praises Schelling for having thus recognised the positive nature of evil: "Le mal est ici traité non point du tout à la façon leibnizienne comme un moins-être, mais comme une réalité positive (1)."

In all such experiences we have access to the Transcendent. Even more so in the mystery of death. In the

individual's capacity to grasp (étreindre) his own death, to feel it as his with all the weight of hope and despair attached to it, lies the secret of his selfhood. It is the merit of Kierkegaard and Jaspers, affirms Marcel, to have stressed the ontological implications of death, as it is the defect of Neo-Thomism to overlook them. (E.A. p. 149.) By so espousing his own death the individual realises his essential self and as it were closes the gap between it and his life. In martyrdom especially we have exemplified such espousal of death and realisation of selfhood; by his free choice of death the martyr affirms his being transcendent to his "life", his eternal essence transcendent to his contingent, empirical self; thus testifying to the "identité cachée de la voie qui mène à la sainteté et du chemin qui conduit le métaphysicien à l'affirmation de l'ètre". (Ibid., p. 123.) Suicide, on the contrary, is a manifestation not of being and existence but of "having". The individual who takes his own life is claiming to treat not only his body but his being as an object; he is decanting both his body and his self of their reality; he is acting not in the first but in the third person as a "he" or an "anyone", as an individual indifferent and unspecified.

The fact of death is the condition of both despair and hope;

La mort comme tremplin d'une espérance absolue.
Un monde où la mort ferait défaut serait un monde où l'espérance n'existerait qu'à l'état larvé.

(Ibid., p. 135.)
The analysis of despair is most fruitful ontologically.
Despair is rooted in the individual's preoccupation with self, his slavery to desire and the spirit of possessiveness, all of which are manifestations of having. Inasmuch as the individual treats his self and others as possessions he is obliged, for the better handling of them, to situate them in successive points of time. Hence the root of human pessimism is metaphysical, and, as Kierkegaard and Heidegger have indicated, is to be found in man's servitude to time and successivity. Despair is "l'angoisse même de la temporalité, l'angoisse de se sentir livré au temps". (E.A. p. 106.) It characterises all human life, is the mark set upon man at his creation; it is the universal characteristic by reason of the fact that temporality is the condition of living in its practical aspect: "l'inquiétude comme disgrâce fondamentale, comme donnée...universelle." (Ibid., p. 107.) This despair in its universal aspect is not directed towards any definite object, but is merely the vague and unreasoning anxiety of the temporal being; rather than despair Marcel prefers with Thomas Hardy the term "unhope" (which he translates by "inespoir"); only when it is directed towards any given object or thing does it become despair in the normal sense.

Should this despair be treated as an object capable of "treatment", the individual consents to a perpetual anonymity, and the positive fruitfulness of his despair is frittered away
in the frantic pursuit of the pleasure and distraction which Pascal has so keenly analysed in his *Pensées* under the name of "divertissement". But for the self which accepts its despair and lives it, so as to extract therefrom the maximum weight of pathos, there is assured a participation in the source of its spiritual being beyond the activities of the purely finite ego. For despair which is made the object of deep personal experience and suffering affords the revelation of the eternal and transcendent within us (1). In fact the inquiétude which beats us in existence, and which is the mark of sin and guilt upon us (the Verfallenheit of Jaspers), when properly understood, is seen to be the sign of the transcendent in man, the finitude it implies pointing to an eternal essence within us (2).

Yet in Marcel's thought despair has not in itself the actual positive character it has in Jasper's or Heidegger's. It remains a symptom of our "indigence ontologique". Rather is it, when deeply experienced, the gateway to a deeper revelation of the Transcendent given in hope. To the individual who espouses his despair there is opened up a new vista of hope; despair is the condition of hope, for hope


(2) M. Maurice Boucher defines despair in this sense as "l'intentionnalité de l'âme tout entière". (Jaspers et l'Existenz-philosophie, p. 366.)
consists in "giving credit to reality, affirming that there is in it sufficient to triumph over this peril." (E.A. p. 108.) Just as despair belongs to the realm of "having" and is centred in the objectifying activities of self, and is thus the outcome and the accompaniment of a negation of reality, so hope appertains to the order of "being" and of the "meta-problematical" and is essentially the affirmation of reality: "Elle porte toujours sur la restauration d'un certain ordre vivant dans son intégrité" (Ibid.), as for example the hope of a bodily cure. For this reason, as contrasted with pessimism which is, as we have seen, rooted in the temporality characteristic of ordinary living, hope is the supreme ontological affirmation of a transcendent order of Eternity.

In this sense, "all hope is hope of salvation". (Ibid., p.109.)

Hope is not of the nature of reason, for reason, limited to its conceptual processes, is denied access to the real as such, a fortiori to the invisible order of the spirit. Reason, through its categories, constructs mental objects which provide the data of "problems" and are subject to "verification". Reason, on which the modern world sets a premium, is an instrument or "arm" aimed at power over things, and rational activities constitute a "technique". Hope, on the contrary, is situated on the plane of the "mystery" and the "unverifiable", for only on that plane can it find fulfilment:

Il est par conséquent de son essence même, là où dans le domaine du visible elle a été trompée,
Nor is it an arm or instrument of power, but rather synonymous with faith and love, a mode of participation. It is one with faith, love and feeling as an immediate mode of knowledge, transcending reason and the rational categories of space and time. Marcel calls it a "prophetic power": "elle ne porte pas sur ce qui devrait être (the Sollen of Rickert), ou même sur ce qui devra être; simplement elle dit: cela sera." (Ibid., p. 115.) It is a pure élan d'amour, a refusal to "supputer les possibilités". (Ibid.) As such, it is ultimately to be related to the will, and might, in Marcel's opinion, be defined as "une volonté dont le point d'application serait placé à l'infini". (Ibid., p. 116.) In such passages we hear the accents of Pascal, Kierkegaard and Ravaisson, as well as those of Marcel's contemporaries, Péguy and Claudel.

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We come now to those experiences where revelation both of self and of other selves is involved. First, love or charity; love implies immediate participation in the reality of the loved one, who thus becomes a "presence" or "thou". A "presence" is "ce dont je ne dispose à aucun degré, ce que je n'ai pas". (E.A. p. 211.) In so far as I treat a person as a "he", as an object of possession, I establish a dual relation which renders impossible any communication of self with other
Opposed to love is desire; whereas love supposes the absolute gift of self or, as Marcel terms it, a state of "disponibilité", desire is the outcome of the spirit of possession, which seeks at one and the same time to possess a person and to withhold the self. Desire is a state of "indisponibilité", and the spiritual life itself may be defined as "l'ensemble des activités par lesquelles nous tendons à réduire en nous la part de l'indisponibilité". (Ibid., p. 101.) Desire is therefore the product of "self-consciousness", whereby the individual is rooted in the preoccupation with self, that anonymous self, that "he" or "soi" which all men carry with them. Under its influence, we substitute for the person, present in love in all his concrete "otherness", an idea of the other, an abstraction as indifferent as the anonymous self:

L'autre en tant qu'autre n'existe pour moi qu'en tant que je suis ouvert à lui (qu'il est un 'toi), mais je ne suis ouvert à lui que pour autant que je cesse de former avec moi-même une sorte de cercle à l'intérieur duquel je logerais en quelque sorte l'autre, ou plutôt son idée; car par rapport à ce cercle l'autre devient l'idée de l'autre - et l'idée de l'autre ce n'est plus l'autre en tant qu'autre, c'est l'autre en tant que rapporté à moi, que démonté, que désarticulé ou en cours de désarticulation. (Ibid., p. 155.)

It may also be noted that the revelation of others, furnished by love and charity, is, in Marcel's view as in Jasper's,
inseparable from, and indeed a condition of, knowledge of the individual self; a further proof that "nous ne sommes pas à nous-mêmes". (Ibid., p. 165.)

Like other realities immediately experienced, self and selves are "uncharacterisable". Such characterisation is a product of the mind's conceptual activity, whereby it gains control over objects, for "la caractérisation implique une certaine position de moi-même en face de l'autre, et, dirai-je, d'une sorte d'absence radicale ou de coupure entre les deux". (Ibid., p. 245.) To seek to define selves is to convert them into abstractions.

With these considerations, we are brought back to the now familiar circle of ideas on love as developed in the *Journal Métaphysique*; but with this difference that love is now presented both as a mode of knowledge and as a concrete situation or experience among other similar experiences, by reference to which the human drama is clarified and elucidated.

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We come now to the two modes of existence which occupy the central place in Marcel's meditations: faith and fidelity. Faith as a mystery may be defined as the "evidence of things unseen". (E.A. p. 27.) It is in its highest and purest form participation in the Being of God, who is the
"Absolute Presence" or "Absolute Thou". As a presence God admits of no predication, and Marcel is convinced that any attempt to define Him in terms of His attributes would convert the reality of faith into an abstraction or "cela métaphysique!"

It is important to note here that the negative theology of Marcel's first period has yielded to, or rather is now subordinated to a positive conception of belief. The two now go hand in hand. He remains refractory to any "doctrine of attributes"; the divine attributes can be established only by a negative dialectic:

Similarly, the proof of the existence of God serves only to confirm an initial intuition. (Ibid., pp. 175-6.) Theology is strictly subordinated to faith; and as faith appertains
to the order of the meta-problematical, it is refractory to any specification, for only the object and never the presence can be specified, clarified and defined. So that the paradox of Chestov "I do not know myself what I believe" remains a true statement of the nature of faith. Admitting of no analysis of its content, it must remain itself unspecified, its content not a definition but a transcendent reality which invests the self to the exclusion of all else.

But if theology is negative in this limited and modern sense, and if faith itself does not admit of objective determination, it must be underlined that Marcel is now far from transforming God into an Indeterminate Unity. He is no longer attracted by the Neoplatonic negative theology of a Dionysius the Areopagite or an Erigena. His is now a positive doctrine of faith; the negative theology is subordinated to a positive one. The Neoplatonic theology is wholly negative in character: it involves a dialectic of successive dropping of predicates and a gradual approach to a final identification with the Indeterminate Unity.

Marcel posits, on the contrary, in faith and intuition a positive and immediate "prise de contact" with the Divine, and with a Divine Being moreover who, as the "Absolute Thou",

Il faut bien maintenir cette foi globale, massive, comme antérieure à toute éclucidation possible: elle implique une adhésion à une réalité dont le propre est de ne point se détailler ou se débiter. Cette adhésion serait impossible, si cette réalité n'était pas présente, peut-être faut-il dire: si elle ne m'investissait pas tout entier. (Ibid., pp.178-9.)
is more than an Indeterminate Unity, a Supreme Self or Person rather than a mere totality of Being; a contact finally which involves participation and not identification or loss of all self-identity, for Marcel's immediacy postulates a mode of communication which, unlike the Neoplatonic ecstasy, preserves a distinction between self and "presence" and thus guards intact the pluralism which distinguishes his philosophy from any Absolute Idealism.

Now faith, like hope and love, is totally bound up with the will, and consequently its full implications only become clear when related to fidelity:

Je prends aussi une conscience de plus en plus claire du rôle de la volonté dans la foi. Il s'agit de se maintenir dans un certain état qui, sur le plan humain, correspond à la grâce. En ce sens, c'est essentiellement une fidélité, la plus haute qui soit. Ceci je l'ai reconnu immédiatement, dès le 25 Février, avec une netteté foudroyante. (Ibid., p. 27.)

It may be said that the individual's capacity for fidelity testifies beyond all else to the margin existing between his empirical self and his true being; the possibility of fidelity or of its contrary, betrayal, implies the reality of a transcendent self which is in some sort an "enjeu", which can be accepted or denied: "Il est peut-être de mon essence de pouvoir n'être pas ce que je suis." (Ibid. p. 154.) (1) The capacity for fidelity postulates no less,

(1) In this context, we may recall Coleridge's definition of self-consciousness itself as "fealty" or "fidelity" and therefore involving an act of faith. "It is an act in and by which we take upon ourselves an allegiance, and consequently the obligation of fealty; and this fealty or fidelity..."
as the condition of self-revelation and self-realisation, adherence to some transcendent reality or principle. The individual at those moments he exists exists only in so far as he swears fidelity to some transcendent reality, be it his own self, other selves, a group, a nation, a church or God. Being in this sense may be defined as the "Héau de la fidélité" and betrayal as the "mal en soi". (Ibid., pp. 55, 56.)

Fidelity Marcel describes as the recognition of an "ontological permanence", of some reality which is no mere formal and eternal essence, but implicated in time and history. Like faith, fidelity is then "pure transcendence"; it describes a state wherein the individual is an active participant in the reality which invests him, and to the existence of which he "bears witness". It is thus that the Church may be defined as a "témoignage perpétué, comme fidélité," (E.A. p. 138); and that, in general, what characterises man as compared with the animals is his capacity for "bearing witness". (Ibid., p. 140.)

Marcel extends his conception of fidelity to cover every relation of the true self to Being; it serves to define orthodoxy which also is a "témoignage perpétué", as opposed to mere conformism which is nothing but a "prétention" (1). Similarly, it serves to describe spirituality itself; for implying the power of being unfaithful, it is the first and fundamental sense of faith." (Essay on Faith in Aids to Reflection, p. 343.)

(Note (1) contd. from previous page.)
spirituality is the love of truth, which is the continued attestation of a truth that is no mere construction of mind but bears on reality. For, as Marcel stressed in his ontological reflections and as he again repeats: "Il faut qu'il y ait à la racine de l'intelligence une prise sur le réel." (ibid., p. 65.) It is indeed the loss of this fidelity to a transcendent truth, the failure to bear witness to a truth of Being that characterises modern thought and dooms it to inanition (1).

It is, however, the consideration of the more vital forms of fidelity that provides Marcel with the most fruitful reflections. Fidelity to the Group, the Church, the common civilisation - to the ensemble of spiritual realities and principles which transcend the finite life of the individual. Given the fact that all such realities are historical and made manifest in time, the condition of any fidelity to them is memory; memory as a faculty of immediacy and participation constitutes an "indice ontologique". (Ibid., p. 140.) The importance of memory in this context is brought out by Marcel in his preface to the Correspondence of V. Ivanov and M.O. Gerschenson (2). In this correspondence we see two contrasting viewpoints: the one of the revolutionary and the other of the traditionalist. Gerschenson is a Rousseauist and nihilist condemning history and the tradition it creates.

(2) Correspondance d'un coin à l'autre, Paris, Corrêa, 1931.
as corruption, the whole of civilisation as "a plain covered with ruins", and advocating a return to the primitive state. Ivanov, on the contrary, is alive to the persisting vitality of the "spiritual patrimony" and its transcendent value. He believes that any purification must come not through the overturning of tradition and religion but through a purifying of our vision and of the spiritual order. "Redevenir primitif est une trahison, un oubli, une fuite, une réaction lâche et qui marque la lassitude." Ivanov's point of view is that of the "realist" as opposed to the "nominalist", the former endowed with a sense of the reality of the spiritual in all its manifold and historical variety, the latter seeing in it nothing but a degradation of some pure state, by reference to which is is mere appearance. The dispute, as Charles Du Bos puts it, is between two views which he calls "le salut du thesaurus" and "la hantise de la tabula rasa". As Marcel well understands, at the core of the debate is the problem of memory. In Ivanov's view the rejection of tradition "of which the Church is the prime receptacle" is a manifestation of forgetfulness and based on a misapprehension of the essence of memory. For memory is, in its purity, a dynamic principle, the source of contact and communion with the spiritual drama as enacted on the stage of time; by it the individual is enabled to transcend the "instruments of disunion", space and time, and restore the continuity of the Absolute.
We have reproduced the points stressed by Marcel in his preface, as they illustrate his own conception both of fidelity as "pure transcendence" and of memory as an "indice ontologique". It is by arguments identical with those of Ivanov that he would justify metaphysically the reality of our spiritual patrimony and the ontological value of tradition and particularly of the Church (1).

Like love and hope, fidelity is linked with the will, but nothing would be more wrong than to relapse into a form of Stoicism. Fidelity is transcendence, participation in a

(1) Fidelity, in Marcel's philosophy, plays the same rôle as does "historical appropriation" or the "energy of veneration" in Jasper's. This "historical appropriation", the latter declares, with Marcel, is the essential condition of culture. He contrasts it with "historism", the former, to employ Ribot's terminology, operating through affective memory, the latter through mere intellectual memory. "For remembrance as a mere knowledge of the past is nothing more than a collection of an infinite number of antiquarian details; remembrance as mere contemplation instinct with understanding realises the pictures and the figures of the past only as a non-committal confrontation. It is not until remembrance takes the form of appropriation or assimilation that there comes into being the reality of the self-hood of a contemporary human being in the form of veneration; subsequently as a standard for his own feeling and activity; and finally as participation in his own eternal being. The problem of the mode of remembrance is the problem of such culture as still remains possible." (Man in the Modern Age, transl. by Eden and Cedar Paul, London, Routledge, 1933, p. 137.) For Jaspers, as for Marcel, fidelity, or "veneration", working through memory, is a chief instrument of self-realisation. Together with what he calls the "concentration in occupational work" and "exclusive love", all instances of "historical immersion", it is the "foundation of self-hood". It is the agent of continuity whereby the vision of the transcendent is maintained and, as tradition, rendered operative in the present. "It is loyal to whatever has been effective in its self-becoming as tradition... Remembrance preserves for it as an absolute claim that which no longer has any real existence." (Ibid., p. 217.)
reality other than the self; and any attempt to see in it a purely subjective exercise of will-power lands us at once in a Voluntarism of the Nietzschean type. Fidelity in its essence implies an engagement of self with respect to others or to some reality or principle; it postulates some promise given, some responsibility assumed. Can fidelity then be reduced to a mere "tension du vouloir"? Were that so, the reality, the other self, or even God, in favour of whom the individual makes this contract, would be nothing but a "pretext"; fidelity would become mere pride and obstinacy. Even more grave, it would be pure deceit, for the contracting party would recognise no other law than himself, than his fluctuating moods and states of mind of which his will forms a part. (E.A. p. 75.) We must therefore conclude that fidelity involves a contract made with something which transcends the self; it is an "Absolute Datum", a unique experience of something having been confided and for which one has assumed responsibility:

"Cette fidélité, sous peine de demeurer stérile, bien plus, de se réduire à une pure obstination, doit avoir son point de départ dans ce que j'appellerai une donnée absolue (je sens cela au suprême degré par rapport aux êtres que j'aime). A l'origine il faut qu'il y ait l'expérience d'une renonciation, quelque chose nous a été confié, en sorte que nous ne sommes pas seulement responsables vis-à-vis de nous-mêmes, mais vis-à-vis d'un principe actif et supérieur.

(E.A. p. 16.)

Fidelity thus implying participation in a transcendent must ultimately be grounded in faith, of which all other modes of fidelity are, in a sense, the image:
Ce que j'entrevois, c'est qu'à la limite il existerait un engagement absolu qui serait contracté par la totalité de moi-même, ou tout au moins par une réalité de moi-même qui ne pourrait être reniée sans un reniement total - et qui s'adresserait d'autre part à la, totalité de l'être et serait pris en présence de cette totalité même. C'est la foi. (E.A. p. 63.)

Examining the nature of faith anew in this light we can grasp its specifically transcendent character. Faith in God is more than a subjective sentiment; it defines less the relation of the soul to God than that of God to the soul; in the act of faith it is God who grasps and holds the soul even more than the soul participates in God. Therefore it follows that faith is conjoined with grace, just as the liberty of the individual is merged in the Divine Will and can be defined only in terms of it. Faith is an "acte de transcendance avec contre-partie ontologique qui est la prise de Dieu sur moi. Et c'est par rapport à cette prise que ma liberté même s'ordonne et se définit." (E.A. p. 76.)

But in turn fidelity must be conceived in terms of faith; it too is pure transcendence, relation or rather communion with a transcendent reality which lays hold of and binds the self. Fidelity is therefore inconceivable apart from the gift of grace. To conceive it otherwise, to deny the investing force of the real would be to place at its heart the deceit which an outmoded subjectivism involves:

La mystérieuse relation entre la grâce et la foi existe partout où il y a fidélité; et là où toute relation de ce genre fait défaut, il n'y a place que pour une ombre de la fidélité.
une contrainte peut-être coupable et mensongère à laquelle l'âme se soumet. (Ibid., p. 76.)

... il n'y a pas d'engagement purement gratuit, c'est-à-dire qui n'implique une certaine prise de l'être sur nous. Tout engagement est une réponse. Un engagement gratuit serait non seulement téméraire, mais à porter au compte de l'orgueil. (Ibid., pp. 63-4.)

In conclusion, like other such experiences, fidelity is a mystery. If the self's assumption of responsibility towards the real involves at a certain moment a judgment, the latter serves only to sanction the prior apprehension which is its source. (Ibid., p. 66.)

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Such are the various "concrete approaches" to Being. The elucidation of their ontological implications forms what Marcell, speaking of Jaspers, has called an "orographie intérieure". Their further clarification now demands an analysis of the spatio-temporal structure of existence in which they are each and everyone implicated.
CHAPTER VII

TIME

In his excellent article on Karl Jaspers (1) Gabriel Marcel underlines one of the fundamental theses of the Existential philosophy. The Transcendent immanent in man cannot, he declares, be grasped outside of Time; the disclosure of Eternal Being is accomplished only by virtue of a certain "transcending" of Time, and not by any gratuitous vision of the Platonic and pseudo-mystic type involving a release from all temporal conditions. The eternal transcendent Essence of the self is made manifest, as Jaspers puts it, "de telle façon que dans le temps, je sois au-dessus du temps sans être en dehors de lui (2)."

Analysis of the human situation indicates in fact, beyond all doubt, the "temporal structure of human existence". He quotes Jaspers's formula: "Aus möglicher Existenz ergreife Ich das Geschichtliche meines Daseins", which he interprets as follows: "En tant que je me mues sur le plan de l'existence possible, je reconnais le caractère profondément historique de ma situation." (R.I. p. 293.) Marcel criticises Spinoza, whose philosophy he seems to interpret

(1) Situation fondamentale et Situations limites chez Karl Jaspers, Recherches Philosophiques II, 1932-3; later included in Du Refus à l'Invocation.
(2) Quoted by Marcel, op. cit., p. 295.
in the manner of Alexander and Gunn (1), for what he calls his "radical misunderstanding" of this fact, adding that in this matter the Bergsonian position appears unassailable.

If, however, as we are already assured, temporality is what most characterises the empirical self and the plane of ordinary living, we must assume, as the necessary condition of both the revelation and realisation of Being, the possibility of transcending Time while remaining within the framework of actual spatio-temporal experience. Marcel seeks indeed to demonstrate that such transcending of Time as is accomplished in moments of Existence and participation can be accomplished only in and through what is most real in Time. Like Baron Von Hügel, with whose position he appears to be in general agreement, Marcel would consider mysticism and the mystical experience as normal to religious life; he seems impervious to the experience of ecstasy which so often ends up in a form of Pantheism (2). Ecstasy, in fact, presupposes a complete liberation from the spatio-temporal conditions of normal experience, not so much the transcending

(2) Cf. Von Hügel: "Even the most exclusively mystical-seeming soul ever depends, for the fullness and healthiness of even the most purely mystical of its acts and states, as really upon its past and present contacts with the Contingent, Temporal and Spacial, and with social facts and elements, as upon its movement of concentration, and the sense and experience, evoked on occasion of those contacts or of their memories, of the Infinite within and around those finitudes and itself." (The Mystical Element of Religion, London, Dent, 1909, Vol. II, p. 254.)
of Time but the destruction of Time. Rousseau in the modern era is a case in point: his experience, as described in the Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, are of such a nature and end up in such a type of Pantheism; the personal, transcendent God of the Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard becomes identified, as Nourrisson has said, with the Immanent God of Nature; or, as Maritain has put it, the self of Jean-Jacques ends by expanding into the Deity itself (1). The deprecation of spatio-temporal conditions is a main characteristic of all Neoplatonic thought (of which Rousseau to a certain extent is, through Fénelon, a representative).

However that may be, Marcel will admit no "privileged state" whereby reality may be grasped under peculiar non-temporal conditions. Referring to the supra-normal experience of Proust, wherein memory is as it were super-imposed upon sensation and the mind thereby thrown out of the rut of temporal experience, he declares: "Il n'y a pas d'état privilégié qui nous permette de transcender le temps: l'erreur de Proust est de ne l'avoir pas compris. Un état comme celui qu'il décrit n'a que la valeur d'un amorçage." (E.A. p. 16.)

(1) This tendency to Pantheism, Von Hügel points out, is largely due to the Intellectualist theory of Universals, according to which the Universal is alone real. Cf. op. cit., p. 318.
I. Objective and Real Time.

In *Etre et Avoir* Marcel broaches the problem of Time in the following manner. Taking as an example of any given event in time the act of reading some passage, he distinguishes between two modes of apprehension open to the conscious subject. The latter may be taken as apprehending successively a content which is given as a simultaneous whole (what Marcel calls a *totum simul*), and with regard to which it remains passive. Such a mode of apprehension is nothing more than a déchiffrage of a multiplicity of discrete elements. As such it does not describe the actual process of reading; it describes a certain attitude towards the "object", but certainly not the attitude of a self actively engaged in the event. In any true act of reading the subject is far from passive, but is on the contrary the active collaborator from moment to moment in the creation of the whole: "en d'autres termes, le sujet est engagé en tant qu'agent (et il n'est réceptivité qu'à condition d'être du même coup agent) dans le contenu qu'il était censé déchiffrer purement et simplement. (E.A. p. 18.)" In the first case, the reality apprehended is given as a whole and at once to be deciphered in succession, in a series of acts which are completely indifferent both to the conscious subject and the reality apprehended. In the second case, the latter is one with the subject in a series of acts of mutual creation from instant to instant, permitting a revelation of the reality apprehended and of the experiencing
self in their ultimate essence. The process may be described as one of "improvisation", or better still of "participation":

Plus cette participation sera effective, plus je serai engagé activement dans l'improvisation (moins je me comporterai par rapport à elle comme pure réceptivité), et plus, en un certain sens, il me sera difficile de la traiter comme totum simul. Mais cette difficulté, cette quasi impossibilité sera liée beaucoup moins à la structure même de cet ensemble qu'à la façon dont j'y suis activement et personnellement engagé. (Ibid., pp. 19-20.)

It is obvious that we have here the familiar distinction, common to Bergson and contemporary psychology as a whole, between succession and duration. But before discussing the conception of time involved, several preliminary points may be stressed. The two temporal orders described are functions of the two modes of apprehension appertaining to the realm of "Having" and "Being", of "Objectivity" and "Existence". It is inasmuch as I treat the real as an object which I "have" and possess, decanted of its reality and reduced to the status of an abstraction, that it is simply "given" to me as a totum simul, to be apprehended passively by me in succession. And this objective attitude to the real is involved in the conceptual activities of thought; it being a condition of such knowledge that reality be constructed as an object in terms of concepts and relations, and it being a further condition of ideation that there be analysis and synthesis of the intelligible constituents of the object. For this latter process, which,
is a condition of discursive thought, can only be accomplished in temporal succession: clear and distinct knowledge requires the analysis of the whole into its elements and, by comparison of these elements, their regrouping in a deductive synthesis permitting the mind to form "par des gradations successives", as Descartes says, a clear and distinct idea of the whole. Temporal succession is therefore the condition of conceptual thought, and as the latter is itself a prerequisite of practical living, temporal succession is the condition of practical life. The latter aims at power, power over things, power over selves; and for its means it requires the defining of things, their detailing in terms of their intelligible features. For the real it substitutes "objects", abstract notions, summaries or "inventories" of definable characteristics, which are none other than the deductive syntheses which a mathematician constructs in temporal succession. And thus the world, as viewed by the intellect and by the empirical self, forms a "given whole", indifferent to the self, who exists as a mere spectator deciphering it in succession, and grouping a multiplicity of "objects" and formal features situated in successive points of time, and thus made clear to the thinking mind. A universe of selves and things delivered over to temporal succession, a universe meaningless and absurd: "plus nous traitons le monde comme un spectacle, plus il doit nécessairement nous devenir métaphysiquement inintelligible; cela parce que la relation même
qui s'établit alors entre nous et lui est intrinsèquement absurde." (Ibid., p. 22.) An indifferent universe, dispersed in succession, given as a spectacle to a self delivered over to succession; a spectacle productive of ennui, monotony, of "unhope" and ultimately of despair: "...l'angoisse même de la temporalité, l'angoisse de se sentir livré au temps." (Ibid., p. 106.) In this alienation of realities and selves, in their dispersal in time Marcel sees "le fondement d'une théorie du mal, qui en maintienne à la fois la réalité et la contingence". (Ibid., p. 22.)

For is evil not simply "absence", alienation of self, of selves and of God, indifference to them? - real as originating in the unalterable structure of human life, contingent as capable of being transcended by virtue of a transcending of temporal succession itself.

This transcending of time takes place in those moments of Existence already studied, in all those participations of sensation and feeling. There the self is in immediate contact with the transcendent essential self and beyond it with the essences of other selves and things; realities which, far from being given to be deciphered in succession, are grasped in ever deepening penetrations in their ultimate essence, and in a sequence of interpenetrating instants, each one of which has an atomic value and yet is in a relation of interpenetration with those preceding and following. The subject, no longer confronted with a purely "cinematographic"
representation and déroulement of the real, apprehends the latter as a felt presence in a sequence of concrete instants by virtue of which both the real and the self are made manifest in their true being and as it were "created":

Marcel suggests that to one who thus participates in the universe through sensation and feeling the problem of its origin disappears. Such a problem only arises for reflective thought, when the universe is "conceived" and therefore detailed in succession:

(Ibid., pp. 23-4.)
Incidentally, in a passage such as this we see how Marcel's anti-intellectualism, like that of Pascal, amounts to a purely Kantian recognition of the antinomies of pure reason which are the inevitable result of a speculative approach to the problems of Ontology. And again like Pascal, Marcel falls back on feeling.

One last point remains to be stressed. Marcel insists upon the active attitude of the self in all such participations of existential experience. Far from being confronted with a mere "given", the self is presented with a real whose reality it in part creates: "Il n'est pas inconcevable que cette participation contribue en quelque sorte à l'improvisation elle-même." (E.A. p. 19.) The act of participation is itself an "event" (a term which Marcel himself uses) or, to employ Whitehead's terminology, a "prehension". It seems therefore a distortion of Marcel's theory of participation to conceive the latter as a mere perception of a reality indifferent to the participating self and its "prehensions". Certainly Marcel's philosophy is grounded in a Realism and would reject any such Humean phenomenalism such as still lingers to however small an extent in the Epistemology of Whitehead himself. But his Realism is less naive than that of Von Hügel, for example, for whom reality is "simply there". He accords considerable activity to the mind in so far as the mind is actively "directed towards" the unveiling of Essential Being. In this he goes no further than the Phenomenologists,
and is certainly not a partisan of what Whitehead has called the "theory of bifurcation of nature", or even of the theory of psychic additions (1).

II. Real Time and the "Instant".

In discussing Marcel's theory of time, we propose to relate it to contemporary theory in general and notably the doctrine of Whitehead: it is by so situating it that its full implications are brought out.

Marcel's doctrine involves first of all the now generally accepted distinction between time as conceived and time as perceived, the objective "clock-time" of the mathematician and the real "lived" time or durée. The former is a uniform, homogeneous continuum (1), infinitely divisible, what Bergson has defined as a "discrete multiplicity (2)." It is essentially abstract, in that it arises from the abstracting of events from their happening, from a detemporalisation by

(1) A uniformity that does not preclude the possibility of several time-systems, as the Theory of Relativity assures us. (2) Bergson's view of duration is linked with a highly debateable assimilation of conceptual time with space. "La succession distincte, telle qu'elle apparaît à la conscience réfléchie, n'est que la dissociation et la juxtaposition, dans l'espace homogène, d'images étendues que nous substituons à la pénétration mutuelle de nos états de conscience." (Note sur 'La Genèse de l'idée de temps' par Guveau, Rev. Phil., 1891. Cf. Essai sur les données immédiates, p. 96.) This relegation of simultaneity to space, considered as pure construction and measurement, involves him, we shall see, in the manifest impossibility of accounting for personal activity and final causation and in a no less hopeless metaphysical contradiction as to the status of time itself.

It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard among the predecessors of Bergson, had underlined the spatialisation of time inherent in the visualising activity of thought (cf. The Concept of Dread, Oxford Univ. Press, 1944, p. 77). But, unlike Bergson, he does not, for that reason, reduce time to pure heterogeneity and pure succession, discovering in the "instant" of lived time an element of permanence and eternity.
which the physicist substitutes for the temporal relationship of past and future the purely logical relationship of "before" and "after" (1). Objective time is thus mere successivity; it appears as a line on which events may be situated as appertaining to an irrevocable past, present and future (2). And it is on this plane that the empirical self, as defined by Marcel, functions in its process of objectifying reality. By treating the real as an object, the self is detailing it and deciphering it in succession; and, as Bergson has said, he is consequently dissociating it from his experience and transforming what is a present (a "presence" in Marcel's vocabulary) into a past, each element of the real event becoming irrevocably attached to a point in the series. The living present is degraded into a "tout donné" or what Péguy calls a "tout fait". It is again, as Bergson shows, this reduction of reality to appearance, by the substitution of a logical for a properly temporal relation which gives the process that mark of inevitability which characterises the world of objectivity. (It is perhaps this very substitution of the logical for the temporal in Descartes' philosophy, however far from his intention and from his starting-point in intuition and in a doctrine of discontinuity with its

(2) "The definite apprehension of a time-series, having a distinguishable beginning and end, connected by a train of intermediate events, each having its own position in the series determined by its relation to other events which come before and after it." (Stout, Manual of Psychology, 2nd ed., London, Clive, 1901, p. 400.)
insistence upon instantaneous experience (1), which gives rise to Spinoza's initial identification of physical causality with logical connection (2) and his consequent geometrical determinism with its implicit "misunderstanding" of time stressed alike by Marcel and Alexander.

In contrast with objective "clock-time", contemporary philosophy distinguishes the time of immediate experience or duration, the temps vécu of Bergson. This exhibits itself, to employ the expression familiar in psychology since William James, as a "specious present". The "specious present" is the unit of immediate temporal experience, and the sequence of such units constitutes the flow of time as a whole. The flow of real time is no mere succession or juxtaposition of discrete instants, but an interpenetration of moments; not a homogeneous series, but a heterogeneous continuity, each instant emerging from the preceding and exhibiting characteristics both of permanence and of novelty. Moreover, as distinct from conceptual time, real time is not uniform but relative to the consciousness of the percipient as well as to the purposive activities of the individual. "There is time," says Whitehead, "because there are happenings, and apart from happenings there is nothing (3);" a point of view which informs Marcel's doctrine of time no less than that of

(3) Concept of Nature, p. 66.
the writer. Again, it is not linear in the mathematical sense, where time is seen as a line of points having a before-and-after relationship, but dynamic, the present being no longer a point situated in a uniform series, but itself a moving line or, to quote Gunn, "a line whose content is always changing (1)."

Bergson's view of duration tends to stress the "flow" character of time: his is a philosophy of evolution and it is natural it should lead him to an unjustified hypostatization of time. Marcel stresses above all the "atomic" structure of real time. In this he is in full accord with Whitehead's "epochal" theory which defines the "specious present" as an "epoche" or "arrest" (2). Marcel's duration is less the Bergsonian flow than the event-sequence of Whitehead. For both, in accordance with the new world-view of contemporary physics as expressed in the quantum theory, the initial datum of temporal experience is a discontinuity. For that reason, the temporal problem, in Marcel as in Whitehead, stated by the one in terms of natural and speculative philosophy, and by the other in terms of existential philosophy, turns on the passage from discontinuity to continuity (3), or, more exactly, on the immanence of

(1) The Problem of Time, p. 383.
(2) Science and the Modern World, pp. 157, 158, 159. The epochal theory is the corollary of his definition of the actual entity as a "throb of emotion".
continuity and permanence within discontinuity and the means whereby they pass from possibility to actuality by repeated transcendent acts of freedom and "decision".

Marcel's actual conception of the nature and function of the specious present or "instant" of real time follows closely that of James and other modern philosophers, more especially Whitehead, and which may be summarised as follows.

Endowed with the "saddleback" character which James has attributed to it, the present shows itself as a duration having a certain breadth and involving a reference to a past and future, to a "before" and "after" (temporal, not logical) sensed at the same time as present (1). Miss Cleugh states that "the specious present contains both immediate perception and immediate memory" wedded together (2). "Distinction between past, present and future," says Stout, "can only be apprehended in a rudimentary way at the perceptual level. But there is, even at this level, what we may call a 'not yet' consciousness and a 'no more' consciousness (3)."

The present, indeed, is not in any sense an instant without extension. "There is no sharp distinction," to quote Whitehead, "either between memory and the present immediacy or between the present immediacy and anticipation... The past and the future meet and mingle in the ill-defined present. The

passage of nature which is only another name for the creative force of existence has no narrow ledge of definite instantaneous present within which to operate. Its operative presence ... must be sought for throughout the whole, in the remotest past as well as in the narrowest breadth of any present duration. Perhaps also in the unrealised future. Perhaps also in the future which might be as well as the actual future which will be (1)." The present instant of real time, the time of existence, is thus the focal point wherein meet, through the elements of immediate memory and anticipation which the present contains, past, present and future; for "past and future are together in organised union in the present (2)."

The implications of this conception of the instant are all-important for metaphysics. The present must no longer be conceived, as it is by Bergson, as pure succession, change and heterogeneity, but as involving an element of permanence and simultaneity. "Une hétérogénéité trop absolue, si elle était possible," Guyau points out, "exclurait aussi l'idée de temps, qui a parmi ses principaux caractères la continuité, c'est-à-dire l'unité dans la variété (3)." In the present there is not only novelty: something endures projected from a past into a future by means of a present. And if that is

so, it will be seen to involve a double assertion as to the status and nature of time; first, that time bears within itself a reference to a "timeless" essence; secondly, that time is itself the "means" by which such "timeless" essences are realised.

It is in the light of this conception of time and its function that Marcel's doctrine is seen in its proper perspective.

The first part of the assertion follows from the consideration of temporal experience in its relation to personal activity. Such activity can only be understood in terms of ends and purposes for which time is the means of realisation, but which themselves transcend time. "We may maintain the Reality of Time," writes Gunn, "but doubt its ultimacy. It is not the last word about reality. However much we stress the Devenir, the Becoming, it must be remembered that our life has value and significance only because, and so far as, it realises in fact values which transcend Time and Becoming, and are true at any time and for all time (1)." No philosophy which fails to posit a self transcending time and related to time as both formal and final cause can account for the unity and continuity of the personality. And this has been explicitly recognised

(1) Op. cit., p. 363. Cf. J.L. Stocks: "The perception of temporal succession itself proves that the perceiver is in some respect other than temporally successive, which is to say that the perceiver has in some respect non-temporal or timeless being." (Time, Cause and Eternity, London, Macmillan, 1938, p. 143.)
by Marcel, particularly in his rejection of the Bergsonian hypostatisation of time.

In an important article on the Aesthetic of Adriano Tilgher (1), he refutes the "réalisme du temps" which is at the source of the dramatic theories of Tilgher and of Pirandello. Both distinguish between "form" and "life", as between artificial and real and, like Bergson, see in Becoming the fundamental reality. In Marcel's view, such a temporal realism means the destruction of the unity of the self and consequently the end of dramatic characterisation. Again, in an interesting passage from his communication to the Congress of Philosophy in 1937 (2) he states his viewpoint more clearly. It is possible, he says, to regard my life as an "object", from the standpoint of a detached spectator; in such an attitude, my life will appear to me as a "lottery".

Il m'est loisible à chaque moment de me détacher assez de ma vie pour la regarder comme une succession de tirages au sort... Je constate que tels et tels numéros me sont déjà échus, ce qui me permet de dire que j'ai eu telles chances, telles malchances. (R.I., p. 183.)

In short, living in objective succession, my past and my future are divorced from my present, and any notion of permanence, even less any notion of transcendence, is beyond my ken. But in truly purposive and willed action, that is in existence, my temporal situation is quite other, for there,

(2) Le Transcendant comme Métaproblématique, included in Du Refus à l'Invocation.
renouncing the spectacular attitude, I am engaged in living my life. The latter no longer appears as a sequence of cards dealt to me by chance, some already dealt, others to fall to my lot, and all passively received. On the contrary, I am engaged in the game and, as I play, I substitute for the spectacular, passive attitude of the recipient the active attitude of one who makes his move in terms of the past play, on the one hand, and of the anticipated aim on the other.

Si... je considère de plus près les lots qui me sont échus successivement, il est clair que je ne puis les traiter comme de simples élements juxtaposables et formant une collection. Ces chances, ces malchances réagissent les unes sur les autres, se colorent, s'interpénèrent. Je ne puis même pas assigner à ces lots déjà tirés des valeurs fixes; ces valeurs varieront, je le sais, en fonction des lots qui me restent à recevoir. (Ibid., pp. 183-4.)

In a word, past and future are conjoined in the present in all existential action, the present being the focal point for the realisation of the self's aims and ideals, located in the anticipated future and grounded in the past.

Now, this impinging of past and future on the present, Marcel goes on to suggest, is only comprehensible if, transcending the temporal modes in which it is realised, there exists a supra-temporal self, acting as final and formal cause and constituting the ground of this permanence exhibited in time. It is conditional on the positing that "I am before receiving; but can I be without being something or someone?"

In short, such activity implies a reference to a self in some way antecedent to the temporal process and, in a sense
to be elucidated later, "timeless". In particular, the facts of permanence and endurance exhibited therein can only thus be accounted for (1).

(1) Cf. Whitehead: "This endurance of objects involves the display of a pattern as now realised. This display is the display of a pattern as inherent in an event, but also as exhibiting a temporal slice of nature as lending aspects to eternal objects (or, equally, of eternal objects as lending aspects to events)." (Science and the Mod. World, p. 157.) "Thus however you analyse the event according to the flux of its parts through time, there is the same thing-for-its-own-sake standing before you." (Ibid., p. 131.)

It may be pointed out that the significance of the Cartesian Cogito lies also here. What it asserts, in propositional form, is the identity of act and thought in self-consciousness. In self-consciousness I accomplish an act of thinking which brings with it awareness of my self as a thinking being. "Le sum n'est que la face réelle du Cogito; le comito, la face consciente du sum." (R. Lefèvre, Le Cogito activité irreductible du sujet, Rev. d'Hist. de la Phil., 1931, p. 326.) It is both an act and a thought. As the former, it is an act of transcendence whereby by my doubt I transcend the objective content of my thought. As the latter, it is consciousness of a self as transcending what it thinks. Self-conscious thinking is then the activity of a transcendent self which by its doubt can accept or refuse the "object" of thought: it is a willing, purposive activity. Essence and existence are one; the self is only in so far as it acts and is aware of acting freely as a being transcendent with respect to its thought-content.

And there precisely the temporal implications of self-consciousness are manifest. The latter is impossible apart from the awareness of a self as "subject" transcending temporal succession on the one hand, and of a self as "object" on the other, constituted in time. Without the first condition no self-consciousness would be possible; for the self would be aware only of the immediate point in succession in which its subjective and objective being would be absorbed and fused. Only a self which itself transcends succession can become conscious of succession and so distinguish itself as subject from the flux of its objective appearances. And only so can it organise, by the infusion of its subjective transcendence and changelessness into the heterogeneity of these appearances, a permanence within time which is the characteristic of self-realisation. By such purposive and transcendent activity the self constitutes itself as causa sui and substance (cf. Traité des Passions, Part I, Art. 17).
Marcel's philosophy, like that of Whitehead, makes room for "eternal objects" which, again like the former's, are individuals and not generalities (1). Although he refuses to define the unity of the self as a "law" or a "substance", in so far as the latter is taken to be an abstract generality (in this he follows Bergson in denouncing the concept as artificial), he claims that the self does constitute a substance definable as a concrete individuality or what he terms a "toi". What he says of the self may be applied to any other reality. While hesitating to employ those terms, he conceives such realities in the sense of the Platonic essences or, more correctly, the Aristotelian Forms.

Marcel is throughout intent on affirming a transcendent order of eternal Being beyond time and process. In the preface to Homo Viator he quotes a passage from Proust's La Prisonnière which in a sense serves as the theme of his book. "Ce qu'on peut dire, c'est que tout se passe dans notre vie comme si nous y entrions avec le fait d'obligations contractées dans une vie antérieure." He underlines its

(Note (1) contd. from previous page.)

It is, we may remark, precisely by his refusal to recognise the Cogito as his starting-point that Spinoza can deny transcendence and evolve his doctrine of the Single Substance (cf. L. Brunschvicg, La Révolution Cartésienne et la notion spinoziste de la substance, Rev. de Mét., 1904, pp. 760-8).

(1) "The first principle is that each eternal object is an individual which, in its own peculiar fashion, is what it is. This particular individuality is the individual essence of the object, and cannot be described otherwise than as being itself." (Science and the Mod. World, pp. 197-8.)
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Platonic affinities and adds: "Ce qui est au contraire affirmé ici avec force, et ce qui doit être sans nul doute retenu, c'est la transcendance, au sens précis et séculaire de ce mot, des normes auxquelles l'homme de bien comme l'artiste se reconnaît tenu de conformer sa vie." (H.V. p. 7.)

While commenting on the discrepancy between the two currents of Proust's thought, his "empirisme à aimantation nihiliste" on the one hand, which exhibits life as a radical temporal discontinuity rendering impossible personal construction and personal relationships, on the other the above-mentioned Platonic strain, he declares his gratitude that at certain supreme moments at least Proust should have been led to "reconnaître l'existence d'astres fixes au ciel de l'âme." (Ibid., pp. 7-8.)

Marcel affirms, then, that the temporal process with its double element of novelty and permanence can be accounted for only by reference to such "timeless" essences, that, in the words of Whitehead, "the things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal (1)." Process has to be understood in terms of an ingestion of such timeless essences into time, where they become actualised, again to employ the vocabulary of Whitehead which comes so readily to hand in this field, as "actual entities" or "actual occasions". They are the "onta" of Plato, whose ingestion into the formless chora infuses into it order and characterises (1) Process and Reality, p. 54.
it as process (1).

Yet, if without such "timeless" essences both novelty and becoming would be meaningless (2), it is none the less true that they are, in themselves, mere potentialities. Whitehead's definition of their metaphysical status might well be that of Marcel when he writes: "the metaphysical status of an eternal object is that of a possibility for an actuality (3)." As such, considered as the Platonic essences abstracted from time, as mere potentialities for life, they are not of primary significance for a philosophy of existence - although their metaphysical status as transcendent essences ingredient in and giving meaning to process is not in doubt. The essences he deals with are not, says Marcel, to be assimilated to "ces entités...que la métaphysique classique immobilisait au ciel pur de la spéculation, se mettant par là en dehors des conditions qui peuvent seules nous permettre de comprendre l'existence humaine et la place qu'y occupe l'échec sous toutes ses formes". (H.V. p. 163.) Such essences or possibilities are indeed instances of what Whitehead has termed "vacuous actuality" (4).

(2) Proc. and Real., pp. 54, 62.
(3) *Science and the Mod. World*, p. 198. For the development of this particular theory of eternal objects see the whole Chp. X, and cf. D. Emmet, op. cit., pp. 113-5.
On the contrary, Marcel is concerned with essences as they are actualised in time, with "incarnation" — "l'acte infiniment mystérieux par lequel une essence prend corps". (H.V. p. 97.) (1). His essences are rather the Forms of Aristotle or, to put it more clearly, it is the essence realising itself in time as "form" which is his preoccupation. The same indeed may be said of Whitehead, notwithstanding his Platonic affinities. In both "the general Aristotelian principle is maintained that, apart from things that are actual, there is nothing — nothing either in fact or in efficacy (2)." For whatever metaphysical status may be attributed by Aristotle to the form a parte rei, as it exists in the Divine Mind (the forma ante rem for Saint Thomas and the Scholastics), it remains true that the reality is alone constituted for him by its implication in process as a concrete actuality (in re) (3).

(1) For this reason, the judgment of existence, derivative or mediata in Rationalism, is primary in Marcel's Existentialism. "Au départ de cette investigation, il nous faudra placer un indubitable, non pas logique ou rationnel, mais existentiel; si l'existence n'est pas à l'origine, elle ne sera nulle part; il n'y a pas, je pense, de passage à l'existence qui ne soit escamotage ou tricherie." (R.I. p. 25.) To refuse or deny existence to things is only possible by virtue of a logical trick which attributes ontological significance to a hypothetical distinction between essence and existence.

(2) Proc. and Real., p. 54.

(3) Professor Emmet quotes the Sophist with respect to Whitehead, where Plato criticises the separation of Being from Process and the conception of the forms as detached essences. None the less, the Platonic viewpoint involves a depreciation of time and a doctrine of contemplation of the timeless, which are contrary to the standpoint of both a Marcel and a Whitehead, for whom the "timeless" is not only realised but revealed solely in time. She indeed admits as much in her first paragraph. (Op. cit., pp. 134-6.)
It is this standpoint which determines, as we shall see more fully shortly, the sense of the concept of eternity in Marcel's philosophy. Eternity, in so far as it is a "positive notion", has to be referred less to the properly timeless than to a certain modality of actual existence, that is to a certain mode of duration. It is not the contrary of time, rather is it time experienced with such intensity that in the present instant not only the immediate present but the realised past and the still unrealised future are made operative. Eternity is not the "timelessness" of pure possibility but the "time-fulness" of a being whose possibility has become actuality, the eternity enjoyed by the form realised, the entelechy or actus purus of Aristotle (1).

With these remarks we rejoin the second part of the assertion to which the analysis of the present instant constrains us: namely that the instant of duration is the very means by which the transcendent eternal essences are realised.

Those "timeless" essences bear to the temporal process the relation of both final and formal cause. They act immanently by way of efficient or formal causation in respect of their past realisations operative in the present and, by way of final causation, as what Whitehead calls the "subjective aim" of present action. The present of purposive (1) Aristotle, Metaphys., Bk. IX, Chp. III, § 10.
action and existential experience is the mode in which, in so far as those transcendent aims grounded in memory and anticipation are projected in the present act or present experience, the eternal becomes actual. For the instant of duration is itself a "small eternity". It contains, besides change, elements of permanence and simultaneity; it is a grouping together of past, present and future in a simultaneous present. We may agree with Wildon Carr that it is sensed (1), yet it involves both an element of immediate memory and an element of immediate anticipation, elements which, theoretically, might be expanded ad infinitum to embody within the moment of attention the whole of the self's past, present and future (2).

It is Marcel's contention that, as immediate memory and anticipation are supplemented by memory and anticipation proper, such an "eternisation" (the term is Marcel's) becomes possible (3). In so far as the present instant and the

(2) "There is nothing contradictory in supposing that our whole life with its continuous past, its full present, and its prospective range and activity might be through and through conscious, an awareness not concentrated into a moment, but such consciousness would not serve the mode of activity for which our whole organisation seems contrived." (Wildon Carr, op. cit., p. 28.)
(3) We may compare Saint Augustine's conception of a "distending" of the mind by an expansion of consciousness to a point where past, present and future are made present to it and thus enabling a passage from time to eternity. "Inde mihi visum est nihil esse alid tempus quam distentionem: sed cujus rei, nescio, et mirum, si non ipsius animi." (Conf., XI, 8. 25, 33.) "Dicturus sum canticum, quod novi; antequam incipiam, in totum expectatio mea tenditur; cum autem coepero, quantum ex illa in praeteritum decerpsero, tenditur et memoria mea, atque distenditur vita hujus actionis.
sequence of instants that link up the duration of lived time embody within themselves, as operative causes, past and anticipated future conjoined with the present, in that measure the "timeless" essences of selves and things are revealed and realised: Time itself becomes, in Plato's phrase, "the moving image of eternity". A simultaneity, endowed with all the actuality of living emotion and enduring decision, is achieved (1).

Time, then, will be the means by which the transcendent eternal is realised and revealed. The instant, by whatever

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meae in memoriam propter quod dixi et in expectationem propter quod dicturus sum; præsens tamen adest attentio mea, per quam traicitur quod erat futurum, ut fiat praeteritum." (Conf., XI., 58, 28, 38. Cf. E. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin, 2nd ed., Paris, Vrin, 1945, pp. 253-4.) But a distinction should be made at the outset. Saint Augustine's concept of "distention", with which Wildon Carr's thesis has affinities, seems to involve a process of expansion of consciousness, one moreover which, in Augustine's view, encountering the natural limits of the human mind, renders impossible a final passage from time to eternity. In any case, the eternity envisaged is little more than a whole of time. Marcel's conception of eternity, like the one at least implicit in Whitehead, is different. Eternity may be a certain "consciousness of time", but it is not an expansion of the present to embrace past and future, but rather a certain intensity or plenitude of present experience become the narrow focal point for the emergence, in varying degrees of actuality, of what is potential in the self in the form of its past and unrealised future. Marcel's "instant" is not so much that of Augustine as of Aristotle. And on this point he differs fundamentally, as we shall see, from the Absolute Idealists such as Royce.

(1) "This property (retention, endurance or reiteration) amounts to the recovery, on behalf of value amid the transitoriness of reality, of the self-identity which is also enjoyed by the primary eternal objects." (Whitehead, Science and the Mod. World, pp. 130-1.)
307.
simultaneity and continuity it embodies, is the focal point of its realisation. It is the "substance" of time, the centre which participates in timelessness. "Succession and continuity," writes Bosanquet, are the "two inseparable factors of a reality which is fundamentally temporal" and "the distinctive being of the self is inversely as its dependence on...successiveness." Duration is therefore "one with the relative timelessness of a finite self (1)." The instant has to be thought of as the means whereby possibility becomes actuality, on the one hand causing to endure what has ceased to exist, and on the other bringing into existence what has not yet existed. For even more than the projection of the past into the future it is the vehicle of the projection of the future into the past. It is the medium of what Rilke has called the "spirit of metamorphosis", conceived not as pure change but as the principle of "eternisation".

We have now dealt with the preliminaries essential to the discussion. The problem, central in any Existentialism, but the one which for Marcel surpasses all others, is that concerning the modes of transcendence, namely the manner and conditions of achieving, however fragmentarily or precariously, the infusion of eternity into time in the life of the self.

Marcel's most original contribution to the problem of time lies in his description of human life in terms of a drama and of man himself as "homo viator".
III. Memory and Anticipation.

The two agents of the process of "eternisation" in the present are memory and anticipation. The doctrine of immediate memory has a prominent position in Marcel's thought. For him as for Bergson, the past is not dead: "Plus le passé est pensé in concreto, moins il y a de sens à le déclarer immuable." (E.A., p. 186.) The past is not a dead weight except in so far as it has been converted into an "object" and situated in some irrevocable point of the uniform time-series by the activities of intellectual memory. In real memory, on the contrary, as immediacy and feeling, the past relives in present experience and is operative in present action, albeit wearing on itself the mark of the past and preserving its autonomous status qua past (1).

On répondra qu'il n'est possible de voir que ce qui est actuel, le passé comme tel ne pouvant être objet de vision, et la mémoire n'étant qu'une reconstruction. De plus en plus je sens que cette théorie est fausse; je suis convaincu que le passé en tant que passé ne peut pas plus être réellement dissocié du passé en tant que présent à la conscience que l'objet vu de l'objet dit réel. Je vois l'objet lui-même, je me souviens du passé lui-même. Ceci n'est intelligible pour le passé que parce que je suis mon passé. (J.M. p. 189.)

Contrairement à un lieu commun qui pèse sur ce que j'appellerai la philosophie courante, il n'est pas vrai de dire que le passé soit immuable, parce que nous ne pouvons pas

(1) Cf. the doctrine of memory as "immediacy" in Hume and Alexander. M. Wahl and M. de Corte have noted the strain of "radical empiricism" in Marcel's philosophy.
The view that the past and future, while experienced immediately in the present, "are enjoyed as past and future", which is given such prominence by Alexander (1), is highly important in this context. The process whereby the past, according to Marcel, "illuminates" the present does not rob the past of its autonomous status; and the same may be said of the future in anticipation. The recognition of what he calls a certain "temporal pluralism" can alone guarantee the integrity of the transcendent, eternal order displaying itself in a present *gros du passé et chargé de l'avenir*. Failure to recognise it leads to a hypostatisation of time and the present instant or "instantanéisme", that is directly to a doctrine of immanence.

In this connection Marcel's conception of immediate memory has to be distinguished from the affective memory of Proust, whose nature and function are quite different. Proust finds in sensational experience a radical discontinuity and heterogeneity refractory to all identity and permanance. But he was led to the discovery that the present sensation is capable in certain conditions of setting in motion what Ribot calls the "mémoire affective" or "mémoire du coeur", whereby a past emotion, thanks to the recurrence of a similar

(1) Space, Time and Deity, Vol. I, pp. 113, 125, 133.
situation, relives anew in all its intensity and, experienced simultaneously with the present emotion, establishes an affective, subjective identity. The self is thrown out of the rut of time and contingent experience, and grasps both itself and the object of experience as timeless (1).

Now what is all important to note is that the affective memory involves the union in the instant of an isolated present feeling with an equally isolated past feeling – the conjoining of two atomic elements of experience separated by a considerable interval of time. "Et je sens tressaillir en moi quelque chose qui se déplace; voudrait s'élever, quelque chose qu'on aurait désancré, à une grande profondeur; je ne sais ce qu'est, mais cela monte lentement; j'éprouve la résistance et j'entends la rumeur des distances traversées (2)." Moreover, what it establishes is merely an identity, a generality, a type: it disengages "une qualité commune à deux sensations" by the perception of "une de ces identités (1) It is interesting to note that the concept of affective memory presupposes that emotions are sui generis and not mere accompaniments of sense-images. (Cf. Ribot, Problèmes de psychologie affective, p. 695.) The type of identity established by way of affective memory is wholly subjective and emotive, the very content of memory being affectivity. Cf. Proust: "la mémoire de l'intelligence et des yeux ne nous rendant du passé que des fac-similés inexacts qui ne lui ressemblent pas plus que les tableaux des mauvais peintres au printemps, etc." (quoted by L. Pierre-Quint, Marcel Proust, Paris, Kra, 1925, p. 147). Cf. also on this point Ch. Blondel, Marcel Proust. Hétérogénéité du réel et généralité, Rev. Phil., July-Aug., 1931, p. 19. (This article was later incorporated in his volume, La Psychographie de Marcel Proust, Paris, Vrin, 1932.)

entre le présent et le passé", filling Proust's consciousness "où habituellement les sensations particulières laissaient tant de vide, par une essence générale (1)."

Those experiences of Proust are instances of what Janet has termed "presentification" (2). But this "presentification" is simply the presentation of an element of the past to an element of present consciousness with which it is conjoined to form an "essence générale". Each and every such experience is an isolated impression, differing from the particular sensation only in its function of generalising. It does not allow of any energising of the past in the present; there is in Proust no solution of the problem of personal continuity, no drama, no realisation, no destiny. His doctrine remains within the limits of empiricism; and Benjamin Crémieux is right to speak of it as constituting a "sur-impressionnisme" (3).

Proust's doctrine is therefore, at least in part, another

(3) XXe Siècle, 1ère série, Paris, Gallimard, 1924, p. 83.

To do justice to Proust, however, it must be said that, if his doctrine does not provide a satisfactory basis for an ethical philosophy, it is because it does not set out to do so. It is, first of all, a psychology of the Cartesian type, describing a new Cogito, that is a pure experience where the pure subject, subtracted from contingent, empirical temporal conditions, is enabled to intuit the pure sensation. It is, secondly, on a higher plane, a religious philosophy, describing moments of grace, wherein the temporal discontinuity and the disrupting "interruptions du cœur" are transcended and overcome in a visionary experience of the eternal.
form of what Marcel has called "instantanéisme". In fact, his memory theory is an instance of what Whitehead terms "presentational immediacy", whose elevation into the sole mode of knowledge is at the root of the psychological atomism of the Sensationalists such as Hume and Condillac.

Marcel's conception of memory is quite different. Memory, for him, is the function permitting the full range of the past, without interval, to become operative in the present, although its elements are, like the "petites perceptions" of Leibniz's monad, active in varying degrees of actuality or potentiality. It is thus, to employ Whitehead's term, "a mode of causal efficacy", the instrument of endurance, repetition, growth and realisation.

It is precisely the function of memory to provide the basis for such realisation and continuity; it is by memory that the past is, by way of efficient causation, operative in the present so as to allow repetition, pattern and endurance. Memory is, for Marcel, a principle of "consecution", to employ Leibniz's admirable term (1). Whitehead attributes the same rôle to memory: in the event which realises itself in the specious present there is, he declares, "a memory of the antecedent life-history of its own dominant pattern, as having formed an element of value in its own

(1) "La mémoire fournit une espèce de consécution aux âmes, qui imite la raison, mais qui en doit être distinguée." (Monadol. § 26.)
antecedent environment (1)." Similarly, Marcel defines the content of memory as a "melody" (2); it is by memory that there is infused into the life of the individual melodic pattern.

This role of memory by which, as Whitehead says, the "decisions" of the past represent "stubborn fact" and qualify the present, is the principle of what the latter calls "objective immortality" and what Marcel calls the "permanence ontologique". (3). It is likewise the prime agent of Marcel's "fidelity", by which, in the personal order, this "permanence ontologique" is secured. And thus memory is the instrument of transcendence, of the process of realisation of the eternal, by enabling the past to become operative in the present and so providing an element of simultaneity within and above successivity. Without it, the eternal life and the

(1) Science and the Mod. World, p. 131. It is by memory that "we - as enduring objects with personal order - objectify the occasions of our past with peculiar completeness in our immediate present." (Proc. and Real., p. 225.)

(2) Quatuor en fa dièse, Paris, Plon, 1920, p. 177.

(3) Cr. Leibniz's theory of "perceptions insensibles", likewise adduced to account for permanence and the consciousness of self-identity. "Ces perceptions insensibles marquent encore et constituent le même individu, qui est caractérisé par les traces qu'elles conservent des états précédents de cet individu, en faisant la connexion avec son état présent; et elles se peuvent connaître par un esprit supérieur, quand même cet individu ne les sentirait pas, c'est-à-dire lorsque le souvenir exprès n'y serait plus." (Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain, Avent-propos, p. 16, Œuvres philosophiques, Paris, Ladrange, 1866, Vol. I.)
consciousness of eternity would be impossible for man (1).

Finally, Marcel stresses that this function of memory is dependent on the fact of "incarnation", that is our immediate participation in our body and, through it, in reality as a whole - in the universal compresence. Here again the analogy with Whitehead is obvious. "It is," the latter writes, "by reason of the body, with its miracle of order, that the treasures of the past environment are poured into the living occasion (2)."

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Linked with memory, as the instrument of ontological permanence, is anticipation, which is, with respect to the future, what memory is to the past.

The possibility of anticipation and prevision, as Gunn has pointed out (3), involves the view that the future is "something" and not, as Broad would have it, a mere "nonentity". Marcel has broached the problem in connection with the seer's vision of the future. But this question is

(1) Von Hügel equally recognises that it is the continuance of the past in the present which gives the germ of man's eternal experience. From it, he declares, "we may rise...to experiences of simultaneity transcendent yet human, in which perception of change is wholly in abeyance." (Quoted by Hilda D. Oakley, Time and the Eternal Life, Church Quarterly Review, 1913.)

(2) Proc. and Real., p. 480. It is in and through it that we have experience of causal efficacy and the origin of the idea of cause. Cf. Ibid., pp. 113, 166, 171.

(3) Cf. Gunn's discussion, op. cit., p. 404 sqq.
only a special case of the more general problem of anticipation. It is the latter with which we have to deal at the moment, irrespective of the claims for prophetic vision proper and, even more, of claims respecting foreknowledge of the future of another (the latter depends less on the temporal theory than on the theory of "presences" and "communications").

In the Journal Métaphysique Marcel writes as follows:

Sur la Prédiction à propos du livre d’Osty.
L’objection fondamentale contre la prédiction c’est 'on ne peut voir que ce qui est; or l’avenir n’est pas'. Mais il y a là un paralogisme. On n’a sûrement pas le droit de dire que ce qui n’est pas encore n’est en aucune façon. (J.M. p. 189.)

There follows the passage already quoted - "Je suis mon passé". At once the query is made: "Mais suis-je aussi mon avenir?"

A negative reply would mean the impossibility of anticipation and, at bottom, the impossibility of prospective action. But if in some sense I am my future, although not necessarily in the sense that I am my past, the future too, although not necessarily in the same way, must somehow be "given". "Cet univers que le devin appréhende, ne faut-il pas qu’il soit donné?" (J.M. p. 190.) The question, then, is to determine in what way the future is given in the present of experience.

At this point Marcel makes the following comment:

(En écrivant ceci) J’écrivais en somme que toute vision se réfère en dernière analyse à un ordre, à un monde au sein duquel l’être et la pensée coïncident (comme dans une imagination créatrice); je me servais même du mot supra-conscience pour désigner cet ordre qui transcende le dualisme du sujet et de l’objet. (J.M. p. 190.)
There is here involved undoubtedly the notion of a fully realised eternity as a sort of notion-limite: the notion of a totum simul as enjoyed by a fully realised essence where past, present and future are known and co-habit in a closed present. Such a "supra-consciousness" is of course an ideal state beyond the limitations of human consciousness. It is towards it that the latter aspires in existence and that it may hope to realise in an immortal life when its existence is one with its essence; the self which is in the fullest sense of the term, in the fullness of its being, would then be wholly transparent to itself and have simultaneous knowledge in an eternal present of its past, present and future. Such a supra-consciousness is that of God in actual fact - Pure Act wherein possibility and actuality, essence and existence are one. For the human being, no matter to what completeness of realisation he may come in moments of full existence, there will always be a residue of potentiality. If he is at such moments pure act, substance and causa sui, it is in a dependent manner with regard to the Divine Actuality (in this sense, the notion of substance, to employ the old phraseology, is not "univocal" as applied to God and the creature). For if his full past and unrealised future, we shall see, are operative in the present of his action, yet it is in varying degrees of actualisation or, which is the same thing, varying degrees of potentiality, - this is true of his realised past, self-evident of his unrealised future.
In God alone - perhaps in the after-life of the self - there are no degrees; each and every element of the essential self, all past, present and future states have passed into actuality.

None the less, it is with reference to such a fully realised eternity that the problem of anticipation and, consequently, that of self-realisation in time can be clarified. For the specious present of duration constitutes the gateway to such an eternity, itself being a "small eternity". As long as we take as system of reference the spatial world of physics and its uniform, homogeneous time-system and assume as axiomatic "qu'il y a à chaque moment une seule coupe temporelle possible du monde, une heure de l'univers, et que le Présent unique se détails en une infinité de présents individuels" (J.M. p. 193), anticipation is an impossibility. In such a spatial representation the subject is divorced from its object (which may be the self itself), and the latter is situated irrevocably in a point of time said to be past, present or future, the present being taken to be an indivisible point alone the object of actual experience.

If on the contrary we consider the temporal situation of a "participating subject", the latter is seen to be in immediate communication with its "object" on a plane of duration; its various elements are grasped not in a succession of parts but in continuity: it then becomes
possible to affirm that the subject is aware of the "whole" (Marcel reverts here to the metaphor of "l'improvisation sentie"):  

Pour autant que je me pense comme sujet à la fois actif et passif, comme affecté du dehors de façons multiples, il est évident que la situation S vue par le devin ne peut pas ne pas n'apparaître comme extérieure, non donnée, non prévisible. Mais dès le moment où je m'élève à l'idée d'une liaison immanente (non pensable d'ailleurs en langage relationnel) entre moi et les autres (ou l'univers) cette situation cesse d'être extérieure, elle est le développement d'une situation actuelle qui me dépasse et dont par essence je ne puis prendre conscience. (J.M. p. 190.)

For the present of lived time has all the simultaneity of the process within which it is immanent.

As a dramatist Marcel likes to speak of "situations" and, preferably, of "scenes" to denote the units of existential experience. A "scene" is, we might say, that portion of our destiny which reveals itself in the specious present, better still it is the unit of our eternal destiny, the specious present being the temporal unit of its realisation. Now, the scene itself is a unity where past, present and future merge:

...à ce plan, il n'y a pas de sens à parler d'éléments extérieurs les uns aux autres. Une scène est un tout indivisible, où l'on ne peut découper des termes, isoler des rapports que par abstraction. (J.M. p. 191.)

Moreover, it transcends the categories of objective space and time:

La scène possède une unité réelle, ce sont des personnes réelles qui y prennent part, et il
It is not riveted, as it were, to some point in an irrevocable succession: "une scène n'est pas rivée par avance à un certain point de l'espace, à un certain point du temps." (Ibid., p. 167.) The individual destiny forms a "drame" composed of such "scenes" worked out in the temporal process: "a dynamism of situations transcending individual destinies and yet for them only a matter." (Ibid., p. 137.) So that in any present occasion, in any "scene" which is in process of enactment, the realised scenes of the past and no less the unrealised scenes of the future are immanent, procuring that "consciousness of the eternal" which is both the consciousness of time itself and the consciousness of destiny as a process with retrospective and prospective range.

There is thus in durational experience a "rapport entre l'immédiat, l'anticipé, et aussi le remémoré" (H.V. p. 58) or what Marcel calls a "triangulation". From which it follows that the future is not "nothing"; it is already "given" or operative in the present:

C'est uniquement parce qu'on se place illégitime-ment sur le "terrain des faits" qu'on est amené à poser en principe que l'avenir n'est pas donné - et ne peut donc être que conçu. Il serait bien plus conforme à la réalité de dire qu'en anticipant, je touche, j'encaisse par avance, j'opère un certain prélèvement sur un donné à venir et très littéralement escompté. (H.V. p. 57.)
In short, the future is given in the sense of being that to which my present action tends; it is already immanent in the present in the form of purpose; and present action is inconceivable apart from this "making an advance" on the future.

In the rôle given to anticipation Marcel once again is echoing contemporary theory. Whitehead, for example, maintains that "the future certainly is something for the present... Cut away the future, and the present collapses, emptied of its proper content. Immediate existence requires the insertion of the future in the crannies of the present (1)." But the future is immanent in a sense different from the one in which the past is said to be immanent in the present. The past has existed; the future is yet to exist; the future is therefore operative in the present as the yet undetermined effect (the future possible) of a cause which is the present: the past as the already determined cause of which the present is the effect (2). In other words, the future is effective in the present as that which is to be the outcome of both the present and the past and has to conform to the necessities of the pattern shaped and shaping (3).

(1) *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 246.
(2) "The occasion arises as an effect facing its past and ends as a cause facing its future." (Ibid., p. 249.)
(3) "The future is immanent in the present by reason of the fact that the present bears in its own essence the relationships which it will have to the future. It thereby includes in its essence the necessities to which the future must conform." (Ibid., p. 250.) Cf. *Proc. and Real.*, p. 305. Cf. also Leibniz, *Monadology* § 22.
Anticipation is therefore first of all the guarantee of continuation; it is the consciousness of duration - I shall remain myself. Marcel shows that any type of fidelity, involving a measure of self-identity, is impossible unless the future is something for the present. The "attitude phénoméniste ou instantanéiste", which denies the future as causally determined by the present, renders unthinkable the continuity necessary for self-realisation. The moral value of a promise or engagement is obliterated otherwise. To give a promise implies that it will not be "remise en question", and is in fact already to form the future. "Il est clair que cette volonté active de non remise en question intervient comme facteur essentiel dans la détermination de ce qui sera." (H.I. p. 211.)

Yet the future has a different metaphysical status from that of the past. Whereas the past is the realm of efficient causes, the future is the realm of ends and purposes. It belongs in a sense to a different order of reality and enjoys a superior metaphysical status. However much grounded in past and present, it presents aims transcending actuality. It is the realm of final causes determining the present. From this angle, then, anticipation is the principle of novelty and prospective realisation. It is the consciousness of finality and what we might call, employing the term of Heidegger and Sartre, projection -
I shall be other than I am (1). Anticipation is thus one with what Whitehead calls "appetition".

It is as endurance and project that anticipation cooperates with memory in the present to become the agent of that "permanence ontologique" without which transcendence would be impossible. In the meantime let us stress certain conclusions which Marcel draws from his doctrine of the future. The instant of real time, in so far as those powers are operative in it, enable the subject to transcend correspondingly successivity and attain a measure of simultaneity. We must assume that reality may be experienced at varying and indeed infinite levels, according to Marcel. There is an exact correspondence between the degree of reality to which penetration is made and the level of temporal experience. It is in this way, thinks Marcel, that premonition may be legitimated. The future "exists" in some sort at a deeper level of reality than either past or present by the very fact of its transcendence with respect to these. To the subject living on the objective plane it is simply nothing, what is not. But to one who "ex-sists" in process, the future is both immanent and imminent as the outcome of the pattern which is being resolutely worked out in the present, on the one hand, and as the purpose to which this activity is directed, on the other.

(1) "The whole doctrine of the future is to be understood in terms of the account of the process of self-completion of each individual actual occasion." (Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 247.)
The consciousness of finality becomes a peculiar sensitivity to the future. Anticipation takes on the appearance of faith, a "giving credit to reality". It becomes then a "feeling" for the future, not as what is actually to be, but as a direction or as a pattern whose content remains to be filled in— in short, as the reality in the making (1).

This sense of the future admits of varying degrees, all dependent on the level at which the present is experienced and realised:

Pourtant ne faut-il pas reconnaître que ce qui n'est pas encore pour moi peut être déjà pour un autre qui a une sorte d'avance (metaphysique) sur moi? (J.M. p. 194.)

Anticipation, as Marcel will say of hope itself, may become a form of prophetic vision procuring a "metaphysical advance" based on a deeper experience than normal of process. We shall see how Marcel links these views with his doctrine of communication in a metapsychical philosophy. They are, however, independent of the latter and in themselves involve no occultism. They go little further than the views of Alexander, for example, discussing the possibility of foreseeing the future. Neither claims that the actual future is likely to be foreseen in so far as such a future is not already pre-formed in the present immediacy, although even here it may be a question of sensitivity. "The future,"

(1) Cf. Lady Macbeth: "Thy letters have transported me beyond this ignorant present and I feel now the future in the instant." (Macbeth, Act I, Sc. V.)
writes Alexander, "will be what it will. But since it will be the causal outcome of what is present actually, there may be minds so sensitive to the influences at work in the world that they may divine certain future events. What seems to me open to the gravest question is that any character of the future which transcends our hitherto experienced order of fact should be foreseen. Yet the clairvoyant might be like a person of genius—more sensitive to things than the ordinary run of persons... But there is no intrinsic impossibility or even improbability in the alleged powers (1)."

Generally speaking, the openness of mind with respect to metapsychical phenomena exhibited in such thinkers as Marcel, Alexander and Whitehead is part and parcel of the basic philosophy of process and com-presence which has enlarged the whole scope of metaphysical speculation by reintegrating mind or, more properly, what the ancient philosophies used to call "spirit" into the universe.

IV. Time and Eternity.

We may now more easily comprehend the function and status of the instant in Marcel's philosophy. His general theory of time in relation to eternity follows on the lines of the classic doctrine, largely derived from Aristotle and revived in contemporary philosophy, according to which the "instant" provides the means for the realisation of timeless, transcendent essences. It is in terms of the process whereby transcendent essences, serving as final causes with respect to the time-process, are realised that the present of lived time is to be conceived. As such, the instant is the moment of self-realisation, of passage from possibility to actuality. "The present," says Whitehead, "is the immediacy of teleological process whereby reality becomes actual (1)." It is inseparable from the self's "appetition" or urge towards the future embodied in its present experience by reason of the timeless purposes to which it aspires (2). The present is thus aimed at the future, being the means of transforming into actual fact the eternal ends which we anticipate. "This is due," as Kierkegaard writes, "to the fact that the eternal means first of all the future, or that the future is the incognito in which the eternal, as incommensurable for time, would nevertheless maintain its relations with time. Thus we sometimes speak of the future as identical with eternity:

(1) Proc. and Real., p. 304.
(2) This "appetition" is what appears in Whitehead's philosophy as conceptual feeling or the "feeling of eternal objects". Cf. Ibid., p. 43 sqq. and D. Emmet, op. cit., pp. 147-8.
the future life = eternal life (1)." It is the same thought which Valéry expresses when he writes: "'L'Avenir' est la parcelle plus sensible de l'instant (2)."

The insistence on the forward movement of time must not, however, lead to the conclusion that the instant is a mere passage from present to immediate future. The result would be a hypostatisation of time itself and the replacing of purpose by the gratuitous and heterogeneous urgings of the present immediacy. On the contrary, the definition of the instant as the locus of a passage from possibility to actuality marks a return to the Aristotelian and Scholastic notion of time, that is as a continuous process of growth, exhibiting permanence in change. The eternal, in fact, is immanent in the immediate present not only in the form of the anticipated future, endowed with objective reality, but also as the already realised past, endowed with full formal reality. Self-realisation is accomplished only on the condition that final causation is supplemented by efficient causation (3) in such manner that, both past and future causally determining the present, the latter exhibits permanence within novelty, unity within multiplicity, identity.


(3) These two of course merge in causative action. Cf. W. James, Some Problems of Philosophy, London, Longmans Green, 1911, p. 213.
within difference. "The concept of activity," writes Wildon Carr, "implies change. Change is not mere succession, the alternation of existence and non-existence, it is becoming, the becoming actual of what was potential. Change implies continuity. The new creation which constitutes it is the new form or order which the old undergoes (1)."

It is this conception of the instant as grouping in its range both past and future which legitimates the metaphysical theses of contemporary philosophy, the organic philosophy of Whitehead and no less the Existentialism of Marcel. Ceasing to appear as an indivisible instant, the present is seen to contain both simultaneity and successivity and can thus be presented as the means whereby eternal essences are realised. The renewal of metaphysics is indeed bound up with a revival of Aristotelian conceptions of time (2).

Of this renewal Whitehead is the most conspicuous example in the English-speaking world. He describes the present as constituting a "passage from re-enaction to anticipation" wherein the entity's "activity in self-formation passes into its activity of other-formation (3)." This is the field of

(2) "If we are a part of the world, then the t of physics must become but a partial element in real time, and a more inclusive philosophy thus rewon might again consider the evidence in favour of attributing movement to the future rather than to the present, while the idea of the past as dead and vanished might be consigned to oblivion with other curious relics of an over-mechanical age." (E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, London, Kegan Paul, 1932, p. 86.)
(3) Adventures of Ideas, p. 248.
what he calls "objective immortality", resultant from the property which the entity enjoys as embodying eternal objects of "repetition, endurance or reiteration (1)." By this repetition and continuity of heritage the entity becomes the incarnation of a value and, albeit in time, assumes the prerogatives of self-identity and simultaneity attributable to the eternal essence.

Marcel's doctrine of time follows not dissimilar lines. He too recognises the operative power of future and past in the living present creative of enduring values. He thus distinguishes throughout the course of time a "permanence ontologique" very like Whitehead's "objective immortality":

"Idée d'une permanence ontologique - permanence de ce qui dure et qui implique l'histoire, par opposition à la permanence d'une essence ou d'un arrangement formel. (E.A. p. 138.)"

A permanence which is "l'expression phénoménale...d'une liaison substantielle qui ne peut, elle, se consommer que dans l'éternité." (H.V. p. 159.) A permanence, too, which is the incarnation of value in that it provides "le miroir dans lequel il nous est donné de lire toujours imparfaitement, toujours à travers une buée déformante, le visage authentique de notre destinée." (Ibid., p. 213.) For value itself is that mirror and "ne peut être pensée comme réalité...que si elle est référée à la conscience d'une destinée immortelle."

(1) Science and the Mod. World, p. 130. Cf. Santayana: "I am not myself unless I re-enact now the essence of myself, which I may re-enact at all times and places." (The Realm of Essences, London, Constable, 1928, p. 19.)
By this recognition of the factors of permanence and repetition as constitutive of value Marcel adopts the viewpoint not of a Bergson but of a Claudel. This viewpoint, so strongly expressed by Whitehead, involves a criticism of the radical empiricism whose principal exponents were the 18th century philosophers. Whitehead has described their error as the failure to integrate in their theory of knowledge the "mode of causal efficacy". Hume recognises only a mode of "presentational immediacy" which limits the subject to immediate sense-experience and, as this mode reveals no causality, he is obliged to treat and explain causality as a thought-construction whose ultimate ground is custom or habit. His error and, Whitehead adds, that of Kant is to derive the concrete from the abstract (1). For what is primitive is not the mode of presentational immediacy but of causal efficacy. The present is no mere point in a succession but charged with past and future. Presentational immediacy sees the present alone as positive, past and future are defined negatively. In the mode of causal efficacy, that is of purposive action, the reverse is the case: the present can only be conceived negatively with respect to the past and

(1) Proc. and Real., p. 244.
Marcel's theory of time stresses the mode of causal efficacy, for this mode points the way to transcendence. Indeed, the following passage echoes Whitehead's criticism of Hume and, although in different terms, posits the latter's mode of causal efficacy:

"À chaque instant, mes impressions, au sens très général que Hume donne à ce mot, se détachent sur un certain "background" dans lequel la réflexion seule est en mesure de discerner, peut-être assez imparfaitement d'ailleurs, ce qui appartient au passé ou à l'avenir, ou ce qui n'est qu'un horizon de possibilités flottantes. Contrairement à ce qu'on est bien souvent tenté d'admettre, il n'est pas exact de soutenir que ce "background" s'oppose au donné comme du simplement conçu ; il est en quelque façon donné lui aussi (mais sous d'autres espèces), par exemple dans la mesure où j'anticipe l'avenir, lorsque je me réjouis ou m'attriste ou m'inquiète d'une certaine perspective. (H.V. p. 57.)"

Then follows the passage already quoted on the immanence of the future in the present. And, as this theory of time is the corollary of the doctrine of the embodied self and of compresences, Marcel suggests that the term "human condition" should replace in philosophical speculation that of human "nature". "Quiconque reprendrait aujourd'hui l'entreprise de Hume devrait, il me semble, intituler son ouvrage De la Condition Humaine." (R.I. pp. 122-3.) The operative power

(1) "In considering the causal model, the past and the future were defined positively, and the contemporaries of M were defined negatively as lying neither in M's past nor in M's future. In dealing with presentational immediacy the opposite way must be taken. For presentational immediacy gives positive information only about the immediate present as defined by itself." (Ibid., p. 174.)
of past and future, indeed, implies the recognition of eternal objects beyond the field of temporal process and finding therein the means to endure and be re-enacted. But no less does it involve and even depend on what Whitehead calls the "witness of the body" and Marcel "incarnation" - organic connection with the universe of things, a realm of "presences" whose locality is not finally determinable but which are part and parcel of our subjectivity as feelings which model our activity and are essential to self-realisation (1).

To return to the main topic, it is according to the degree in which past and future are made operative in the present, that is according to the intensity with which the present is lived that continuity and permanence are secured. "L'esprit," to quote Valéry, "est une puissance de prêter à une circonstance actuelle les ressources du passé et les énergies du devenir (2)." Duration then becomes the means of what Marcel calls "eternisation"; in the measure we secure re-enaction we realise, he says, a "unité supra-consciente et supra-historique", image or reflection of the "perennité vivante" which is eternity itself. (H.V. p. 11.)

(1) "The bonds of causal efficacy arise from without us. They disclose the character of the world from which we issue, an inescapable condition round which we shape ourselves." (Whitehead, Symbolism, its meaning and effect, Cambridge University Press, 1928, pp. 68-9.) M. Wahl has noted the analogy between Whitehead's doctrine and Marcel's. (Cf. La philosophie spéculative de Whitehead, Rev. Phil., 1931, p. 368.)

(2) Mélange, p. 27.
In the "instant" man suspends in some measure the flight of
time, like Rilke's angel, transforming the visible into the
invisible: "Erde, ist es nicht dies, was du willst: unsichtbar
In uns erstehn?"

The "instant" is the meeting place of permanence and flux, of
the one and the many, of identity and difference (1). It
assures us that "in the inescapable flux, there is something
that abides (2)." And this property of the instant that it
"holds within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards
and forwards, that whole amplitude of time, which is eternity
(3)" is the sole means of transcending time in existence (4).

Seen thus, the "instant" is the point of intersection of
time and eternity. It has in Marcel's philosophy the same
status as in Kierkegaard's where it is defined as the
"synthesis of the eternal and the temporal", the category of
"spirit" as opposed to "nature" and as such "not properly an
atom of time but an atom of eternity. It is the finite
reflection of eternity in time, its first effort as it were
to bring time to a stop (5)." In the instant deeply lived,
we can say, in the words of Spinoza, "sentimus nos aeternos

(2) Proc. and Real., p. 478.
(3) Whitenead, The Aims of Education, London, Williams and
Norgate, 1929, p. 23.
(4) "The perfect realization is not merely the exemplification
of what in abstraction is timeless. It does more: it
implants timelessness on what in its essence is passing. The
perfect moment is fadeless in the lapse of time. Time has
then lost its character of 'perpetual perishing'; it becomes
the 'moving image of eternity'." (Proc. and Real., p. 479.)
(5) Concept of Dread, p. 79.
esse".

For, however similar the temporal theories of Marcel and Whitehead, their context differs as between what is an organic philosophy and what is a religious philosophy. With Saint Augustine and Pascal, Marcel sees in the "instant" the portal to a religious Ontology. In the "absence" or alienation of reality, its relegation to some point in what is a mere past, lies for him the very root of evil, the deliverance of the self to the anguish of successivity and its consequent dereliction. Salvation is to be found in the "retour au maintenant", the "never-failing Now" of Boethius, that same redeeming instant of which Mr T.S. Eliot has spoken in a recent poem:

But to apprehend
The point of intersection of the timeless
With time, is an occupation for the saint —
No occupation either, but something given
And taken, in a lifetime's death in love,
Ardour and selflessness and self-surrender (1).

The consciousness of time as a means of perpetuation enables the existent subject to experience his life as destiny or, to employ Marcel's favourite term, as "drama". The "scene", as already said, may be described as the eternal as it is mirrored in the "instant", a fragment of destiny, for by reason of the property of the instant to compose a simultaneity, it constitutes "un tout indivisible". Like the instants in which they are reflected, the scenes may at first sight appear discontinuous, but this discontinuity is

(1) The Dry Salvages.
overcome as the sequence of instants is unified by the repetitions of purposive action. The life of the individual is a sort of "matter calling for the active intervention" of the subject; it being for him to weave the various scenes into a pattern by integrating the scenes he has acted and those he purposes to act into a meaningful unity of which the present is the focal point. Then only the metaphor of a "lottery" ceases to be applicable to his life; the latter becomes a destiny, an effort to "prolonger au delà du domaine où peut s'exercer l'observation, une courbe." (H.V. p. 8.) Here for Marcel is the realm of "hope", which has become more and more for him the prime category of transcendence and which is the râcéognition that "toute vie humaine se développe à la façon d'un drame". (Ibid.; p. 9.) And in releasing this perspective, the sense of death as one's own, as eigentlich, has an all-important part to play by reason of its temporal reference; for it constitutes an absolute end, set in the future but impinging on the past and the present, providing purpose and pattern, forcing a revaluation of the present in the light of eventual salvation or perdition:

Au milieu de tant de nuées qui s'accumulent et qui descendent en quelque sorte de l'inconnu de l'avenir vers les profondeurs d'un passé qui de moins en moins se laisse reconnaître comme donné, une assurance demeure invariable: je mourrai. Ma mort seule, dans ce qui m'attend, est non-problématique. C'en est assez pour qu'elle s'impose à moi comme un astre fixe dans l'universel scintillement des possibles (P.I. p. 134.)

Kierkegaard has shown in similar fashion how the "instant"
and sequence of "instants" procure consciousness of destiny. He also shows how, if objective time is taken as reference, there is, in the true sense, no past, future or present at all (1). Only in the instant of real time, where they are co-present, do these divisions become significant and acquire an individual and specific reality. "The instant is that ambiguous moment in which time and eternity touch one another, thereby positing the temporal, where time is constantly intersecting: eternity and eternity constantly permeating time. Only now does that division we talked about acquire significance: the present, the past, and the future (2)."

For, as Kierkegaard has rightly underlined, it is the condition of any "eternisation" and any creation of destiny that past and future should preserve an autonomous status of their own as distinct from the immediate present. This most important point we shall take up later with respect to Marcel, for it constitutes the most original element in his temporal doctrine. Suffice to say for the moment that, in common with Kierkegaard, he considers the "instant", understood as the focal point of a past and future which, although immanent in the present, yet retain their distinct metaphysical status, to be the temporal mode wherein man attains consciousness of destiny with all it entails by way of possibility of repentance, moral responsibility and salvation. Apart from such an "instant" transcendence, hope, repentance - the fundamental categories

(1) Concept of Dread, p. 77.
(2) Ibid., p. 80.
of a religious philosophy—would be meaningless abstractions. Marcel's whole philosophy echoes the judgment of Kierkegaard when he writes: "The concept around which everything turns in Christianity, the concept which makes all things new, is the fullness of time, is the instant as eternity, and yet this eternity is at once the future and the past. If one does not give heed to this, one cannot save any concept from heretical and treasonable admixtures which destroy the concept. One does not get the past as a thing for itself but in simple continuity with the future—and with that the concepts of conversion, atonement, redemption, are resolved in the significance of world-history, and resolved in the individual historical development. One does not get the future as a thing for itself—and with that the resurrection and the judgment come to naught."
the doctrine of Saint Thomas and Duns Scot as to the *totum simul* and the nature of the eternity enjoyed by God, the Angels and man respectively - involving a subtle distinction between the *nunc stans*, the *aevum* and the *praesens non fluctuans* - we may, for illustrative purposes, liken the eternity which Marcel's philosophy attributes to man to a *praesens non fluctuans*. The *totum simul* proper relates rather to the *nunc stans* enjoyed by the Divine actuality. It is superior to the eternity attainable by the contingent creature not in its "plenitude" so much as in its character of "totality". That is, in God, in whom possibility and act, essence and existence are one, every moment of His past and future enjoys the same single degree of actualisation in His eternal present; so that he has no past or future as such and is devoid of change, in so far as change signifies deperition. The creature, on the contrary, in whom essence and existence are separate cannot be in the same sense Pure Act. He can achieve a measure of simultaneity resultant from past and future being operative in his present; in this sense, he too realises his essence as act and experiences a measure of the "plenitude" the Godhead enjoys. But his past and unrealised future, present always with some degree of actuality (this is true even of the future, which is no "mere possible", for then it would be simply nothing), are so in varying degrees. There remains, then, in the present of purposive action a margin of what logic obliges us to term
possibility but what is in fact an infinitely varying degree of actuality. In the moment of self-realisation which the self experiences the whole range of his past and unrealised future is represented and projected in the present, but the resultant act is but the narrow focal-point of all that is eternally potential. In short, the eternity which man can enjoy is a present which holds within it a distinctive past and future.

It is precisely this residue of "possibility" (or, more correctly, the impossibility of transforming each and every potentiality of the self into a single and simple degree of actuality) which is for the creature the guarantee of the transcendent; but for this "something over" which he constantly experiences, the opposition between immanence and transcendence would have no meaning. Moreover, it is the condition of the whole movement of transcendence that characterises the life of man viewed as a "drama". Before him he has incessantly as his goal the state of full self-realisation and the possession, if not of a nunc stans, at least of something approaching it. At the utmost, all he can now enjoy is a plenitude where time leaves something to abide, yet falls short of the eternity which is an eternal present because past and future have become wholly actual, and of the Actus purus which has no degrees. The life of the individual appears thus as a nisus, a striving within time experienced as both the barrier and the means to eternal life.
The classical philosophy has always maintained that, in enjoying this measure of eternity, and so realising its being and essence, the self experiences itself as substance and causa sui. It possesses the essential attributes of substance and cause, namely the state of being dependent solely on itself, selecting by its free decision those potentialities in its past that, in Whitehead's phrase, are "relevant" to its future and actualising them in the present of its decision. It enjoys what the latter again calls a state of "satisfaction", having absorbed its data (1).

Marcel has always been reluctant to use those terms and he has often put on record his rejection of the notion of causa sui in particular. But this latter rejection seems to be based on a misunderstanding due to the fact that he identifies the notion of causa sui with that of autonomy, which can have no place in a philosophy that, starting from an initial compresence of selves, affirms self-realisation to depend on a mutual activity and creation, on a complex mystique of "calls" and "responses". But the notion of causa sui (or of substance) does not, as Whitehead's organic philosophy shows, preclude mutuality and interdependence. All that it implies is, to use Marcel's own phraseology, that what is "received" is incorporated freely into the being of the self. Indeed, Marcel's own description of the permanence obtained as "l'expression phénoménale...d'une liaison (1) Cf. Proc. and Real., p. 214."
substantielle" (H.V. p. 169), as a "plénitude qui est l'être même" indicates that he himself attributes to the self in its momentary realisations the characteristics of substance and causa sui as generally understood (1).

Of course, this realisation of the self as substance and causa sui would not be of the same character as that enjoyed by the Divinity or by the immortal self. It is, Marcel says, but the "expression phénoménale et trompeuse d'une liaison substantielle qui ne peut, elle, se consommer que dans l'éternité". That is what Descartes meant when he declared the terms substance and cause cannot be employed univocally of God and man. God is absolute substance and cause in that He is fully-realised Act. Man is act only in a subsidiary sense, the simultaneity he may enjoy embodying a margin of possibility. It is significant that Descartes should stress the deficiencies of memory in this connection; these certainly constitute the main obstacle to a full actualisation of the past in the present (2). The difference between the substance or being of God and those of man is further underlined when it is pointed out that, in Marcel's

(1) With Descartes and Spinoza Marcel would identify substance and causa sui, as opposed to the Scholastics, notably Saint Thomas, who make a radical distinction between them (ens in se and ens a se), substance being for them a mere substratum or supposition of existence. The Cogito ergo sum itself is the expression of their identity. (Cf. Brunschvicg, La Révolution cartésienne et la notion spinoziste de la substance, Rev. de Mét., 1904, p. 788.)

view, the moments of existence or self-realisation are themselves discontinuous, and that whatever continuity may be achieved is ultimately dependent on grace. So that the individual life can never be anything but an approximation even to the subsidiary being which he enjoys at privileged moments. None the less, in these brief "scintillations d'existence" he achieves a type of substantial and causal "plenitude".
V. Time and Freedom.

As with Kierkegaard, the time problem assumes greatest urgency in Marcel's philosophy in its relation to the problem of freedom and necessity. His important reflections on this theme throw the most vivid light on his temporal doctrine as a whole and, indeed, serve both to bring out the fundamentals of that doctrine and to illustrate what has gone before. It must be borne in mind that Marcel is not a systematic philosopher and the theory here presented in this chapter is an interpretation made in the light of Marcel's numerous phenomenological studies. Even more is this the case in the present instance where the temporal implications of free action are brought to the surface and clarified in and through the analysis of the concrete situations of despair and hope.

In a lecture entitled *Esquisse d'une phénoménologie et d'une métaphysique de l'espérance*, included in *Homo Viator*, Marcel, seeking to define the existential of despair, relates it to a certain "épreuve" described as a "mode de captivité". (H.V. p. 40.) He then goes on to underline the intimate connection between despair and time:

> Il faut souligner le rôle que joue ici la durée: je m'apparaiss comme captif si je me trouve non seulement jeté, mais comme engage sous une contrainte extérieure dans un mode d'existence qui m'est imposé et comporte des restrictions de tous ordres pour mon agir propre. (Ibid., p. 41.)

For what characterises the "épreuve" is "l'impossibilité... d'accéder à une certaine plénitude". (Ibid.) Despair is then the outcome of a certain mode of temporal experience; it has
its source in "l'angoisse de se sentir livré au temps". This mode of temporal experience is itself one with the consciousness of necessity, being a "capitulation devant un certain fatum posé par le jugement". (Ibid., p. 49.) It is rooted in the process of objectivation whereby self and things are alienated and disposed in the discrete time-series of conceptual thinking.

In other words, the experience of despair is inseparable from the phenomenon which we might describe as the loss of the past and the future. On the one hand, the past is no longer felt as operative in the present, becoming an insignificant dead-weight. This is most evident in the despair experienced on the death of someone loved, in what Marcel terms the "dialectique de la mort" where "elle risque de nous coincer dans une angoisse sans issue, de nous rendre prisonniers d'une expérience écartelante, opposant irréductiblement un donné et un remémoré qui, bien loin de pouvoir se fondre, sont voués à se démentir inlassablement l'un l'autre". (Ibid., p. 42.) But on the other hand, the past, once "immobilised" and rendered incapable of fusion with the present, preserves an untold power to destroy and contaminate the future, and to render purposes and ideals equally ineffective in present experience:

Mais ce qu'il faut voir, c'est que plus nous immobilisons le passé, plus l'avenir à son tour se présente à nous comme du révolu avant la lettre, du révolu par anticipation; cette contamination de l'avenir par le passé est au coeur de tout fatalisme. (R.I. p. 74.)
We are then confronted by a situation where alone the present of suffering, the "épreuve", fills and absorbs the consciousness. The mind is, as it were, "hypnotisé sur une certaine image précise". (H.V. p. 61.) For despair is essentially "fascination", the contracting of a "habitus" — a "cramp" or an "enchantment", concentrating the mind on the image of destruction that the present destruction calls up.

As a result of this fascination, the individual cannot escape from the immediate present, that is from a present objectified, immobilised and transformed into a point divorced from past and future, from process. He is then led to "eternise" this isolated present itself, to believe and feel that what he is and experiences within the arbitrary cut in time will recur with an irrevocable necessity throughout time:

Le désespéré ne contemple pas seulement, il n'a pas seulement devant lui cette répétition morne, cette éternisation d'une situation dans laquelle il est pris comme une barque est prise dans les glaces; par un paradoxe malaisément concevable, il anticipe cette répétition, il la voit dans l'instant même, et il possède en même temps l'âcre certitude que cette anticipation ne le dispensera pas de continuer à vivre l'épreuve au jour le jour, indéfiniment, jusqu'à cette extinction qu'il anticipe aussi à vrai dire, mais non comme un remède. (H.V. pp. 56-7.)

The consciousness of necessity is thus bound up with the consciousness of time as "closed", as a "prison", where future and past cease to be effective; "comme si l'avenir, drainé de sa substance et de son mystère, ne devait plus être que le lieu de la répétition pure." (Ibid., p. 80.) It may be
noted in passing that this is precisely the temporal experience at the root of Baudelaire's "ennui". Marcel has further noted, with characteristic penetration, that this form of "instantaneism" is paradoxically a consciousness both of time as closed and of time as pure succession:

And here again, this is precisely the paradox residing in Baudelaire's temporal experience.

In any case, at the centre of despair and determinism is an experience of time which precludes all sense of realisation and destiny and substitutes for it what Kierkegaard calls the Stoic "resignation to fate", the sense of mournful recurrence.

Now, existence becomes possible only on the condition that this fatalism is rejected, making room for hope. And this transcending of necessity is accomplished by the recovery of the true, full "instant" wherein past and anticipated future are operative. It permits what Marcel calls a "reconciliation" with the past, transforming it from a dead-weight into a force determining the present. No less the future, as the goal of action and as grounded in both present and past, is immanent therein. The "instant" is thus the focal point of a junction between "l'imédiat, l'anticipé et aussi le remémoré" or of a "triangulation". (H.V. p. 58.)
Life as lived in duration or existential experience is a process where the present gathers up in itself the past and bears within the future—like the motion of a sailing-ship conditioned by the double force of water and air, to use Marcel's happy metaphor.

It is this sense of process which liberates the self from the fascination of narrow immediacy and from the image of that false eternity or Nietzschean "eternal return" on the one hand, and of that false anticipation, which is the sense of mere recurrence, on the other. If despair results from an "undoing" (se défaire) or disruption of the self's reality, hope springs from an inward "consolidation", from the "volonté de rester celui que je suis". (Ibid., p. 51) It is consciousness of process: "celui qui espère... s'apparaît à lui-même comme impliqué dans un certain procès." (Ibid., p. 47)

If despair marks a "soillure" and "flétrissure" of experience, hope embodies an "appel à l'existence d'une certaine créativité dans le monde". (Ibid., p. 59) It is one with the "entraîn" or "ardeur à vivre" which is the very "substance de la vie". (Ibid., pp. 57, 58).

Hope, therefore, in Marcel's view, has a precise temporal reference and must be assimilated to patience which, in the individual, is linked with "sa réaction à la durée, plus précisément à la temporalité, c'est-à-dire au fait qu'il y a place pour le changement dans le réel". (Ibid., p. 52)

It consists in "taking one's time"; for example, the exercise
of patience with regard to another person implies "un subtil respect de la durée ou de la cadence vitale propre à l'autre" in order to move and transform him. (Ibid., p. 54.) Hope, like other modes of existential experience, although to a greater degree, supposes "an original relation of consciousness to time", being both a consciousness of process and "confidence" in this process, so as in some manner to "espouse" it and "favour it from within". (Ibid., p. 53.)

This consciousness of process arises when past and future cease to be isolated from the present and are experienced as immanent therein, while at the same time retaining an autonomy of their own, so as to constitute an enduring growth, a unity within multiplicity, a multiplicity overlapping unity - "un certain pluralisme temporel, une certaine pluralisation temporelle de soi." (Ibid., p. 54.) Hope and existence in general may be described as a "pouvoir de fluidification", a power of infusing past and future, otherwise dead and immovable, into the present:

On pourrait dire encore que si le temps est par essence séparation et comme perpétuelle disjonction de soi par rapport à soi-même, l'espérance vise au contraire à la réunion, à la recollection, à la réconciliation. (Ibid., p. 72.)

In so far as the individual breaks the circle of determinism which his enslavement to the present image entails, he emerges into the realm of hope and freedom. He recovers his initial spiritual nisus. Time, ceasing to be "closed", is experienced as the means of realising an essence immanent in, yet transcending time: "tout se passe alors
como si le temps, au lieu de se refermer sur la conscience, laissait passer quelque chose à travers lui. (Ibid., p. 71.)
Finality and purpose become active factors in experience; the future, with all the timeless ends it embodies, active in the present and foretold in the past, regains its superior metaphysical status as the final cause governing action.
Existence is this veritable "prophetic consciousness", the urge towards and the anticipation of a fully realised eternity which the future carries mysteriously hidden within itself: "elle affirme comme si elle voyait." (Ibid., p. 71.) It is very precisely a "mémoire du futur": (Ibid., p. 72.)

This process accomplished by means of the "instant" is what Kierkegaard terms "Repétition" and Marcel "Fidelity" (at bottom synonymous with hope). It is the movement towards self-realisation by virtue of the enduring content of the present. Although Marcel's thought, as he has often declared, is independent of Kierkegaard's, it is impossible not to note the similarities of the two doctrines under discussion.
Kierkegaard defines his Repetition, in opposition to the Platonic recollection, as a "forward-looking recollection" (Marcel's "mémoire du futur"). "Repetition is a decisive expression for what 'recollection' was for the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowledge is a recollection, so will modern philosophy teach that the whole of life is a repetition. The only modern philosopher who had an inkling of this was Leibniz. Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions; for what is recollected has
been, is repeated backwards, whereas repetition properly so-called is recollected forwards. Therefore repetition, if it is possible, makes a man happy, whereas recollection makes him unhappy (1)." He speaks elsewhere of the category of repetition "by which one enters eternity forwards (2)."

We shall discuss in the following section the importance of this distinction; suffice to say that existence, for Marcel as for Kierkegaard, is essentially a forward movement. The Platonic "instant" of recollection involves a stopping of time, that is the destruction of the future and of movement so as to attain, by a total transcending of time, contemplative vision of the timeless essence. For a philosophy of existence, the actual is everything; its aim is to show how eternity is infused into time and movement; and this precisely by means of "repetition" or "fidelity".

In these operations the important factor is obviously the prospective urge which transforms into actuality the future instinct with timeless ends. This is the "forward-movement" of all existential experience. It is perhaps to stress this that Marcel, who in Etre et Avoir speaks throughout of "fidélité", comes to prefer the term "fidélité créatrice" in Du Refus à l'Invocation, and in his last work, Homo Viator, identifies the latter with hope itself. It is, however, important to observe that fidelity is by no means a pure urge to the future; it requires equally preservation of

(1) Repetition, Oxford Univ. Press, 1942, pp. 3-4.
(2) Concept of Dread, p. 80, note.
and continuity with the past. The elimination of the past leads to the equally erroneous Heraclitean "instantanéisme". Kierkegaard himself has noted that "recollection" has its place within "repetition", which includes both it and anticipation. "The dialectic of repetition is easy," he writes, "for what is repeated has been, otherwise it could not be repeated, but precisely the fact that it has been gives to repetition the character of novelty... When one does not possess the categories of recollection or of repetition the whole of life is resolved into a void of empty noise (1)." Marcel says the same thing in those passages previously quoted where he speaks of the necessary "triangulation" of temporal experience or where he talks of hope as involving both an element of "return" and of "novelty":

By fidelity the individual infuses eternity into time, placing "the seal of eternity on the act of creation perpetually renewed". (R.I. p. 132.) Fidelity is, for Marcel, as repetition is for Kierkegaard, the category of

(1) Repetition, p. 34.
spirit. It is, he says, commenting on Jaspers, the mark of true "purity of soul":

La pureté d'âme, c'est la vérité de l'existence qui, en fait, ose et réalise l'impureté dans le monde pour saisir, dans la conscience continue de sa culpabilité la réalisation de la pureté comme tâche infinie dans la tension de la vie temporelle. (R.I. p. 320.)

In fidelity man recovers the consciousness of destiny, of his life as "accomplishment" (Erfüllung) to use Jaspers's term (1). Fidelity and hope are the instruments of this self-realisation throughout time; they are the virtues by and in which "is consummated the unity of our destiny both temporal and supra-temporal". (H.V. p. 123.) But process as a whole has to be considered as a movement of transcendence directed towards an ultimate self-realisation, an ultimate eternity or plenitude of which those consummations are but a reflection. This is what Kierkegaard means when he states that "the true repetition is eternity (2)." Fidelity and hope, then, as teleological activities, transcend at every moment the actuality and the immediate representation; they are ultimately, and with them all forms of existential experience, modes of belief and faith, just as treason and despair are modes of incredulity, for there is a point where "incredulity coincides with a certain radical infidelity". (R.I. p. 222.) Existence, to sum up, is transcendence: "Le croyant est celui qui ne se heurtera à aucun obstacle insurmontable sur

(2) Repetition, Editor's Introduction, p. xxvii.
To say that existence is transcendence is to say that it is freedom.

De l'être comme lieu de la fidélité... Ici apparaît une solidarité entre la philosophie de l'être et la philosophie de la liberté, que le métaphysicien ne saurait à mon sens affirmer trop vigoureusement. (R.I. p. 222.)

To posit actuality is to posit freedom, as opposed to necessity, transcendence as opposed to immanence, existence as opposed to logic, movement as opposed to mediation and deduction. Marcel would agree fully with Kierkegaard's repudiation of all attempts to make logic account for reality or to identify the real and the rational. To make this identification is to identify the actual and the necessary. Thus the application of deduction to reality, as attempted by Descartes and Spinoza, envisages the reduction of the real with its contingent content to a logically necessary sequence of propositions (1). Logic is, however, the negation of movement; a deductive sequence of propositions in no sense constitutes a passage; whatever movement the mind appears to

(1) Indeed, the ultimate ideal of Rationalism inspiring the notion of a mathesis universalis, common to Leibniz and the analytical philosophers of the 18th century, is the reduction of reality to a single proposition: an ideal most forcibly expressed by D'Alembert (Discours préliminaire de l'Encyclopédie, ed. Picavet, Paris, Colin, 1929, p. 39) and to be found to-day in Valéry who owes much to 18th century analysis, notably to Condillac.
make is bound up with the limitations of thought which prevent it from grasping the entire sequence at once and is more apparent than real. The intuition operating at each stage is the fluctuating point of a single intuition. Nor does it embody novelty, the passage from non-existence to existence. What we have is a series of identities which are at bottom expressions of a single changeless identity (1).

The same strictures are valid for the Hegelian mediation, which was an attempt to introduce "movement" into logic. It is against Hegel that Kierkegaard and, following him, Marcel and all other Existentialists, are reacting. Hegel likewise identifies the actual and the logically necessary. The actual he defines not as the existent, which is the unity of

(1) Cf. D'Alembert, Disc. prélim., pp. 37-8. The conception stated involves the further view that truth is a matter of definition and expression, the view expressed in Condillac's well-known dictum: "Une science bien traitée n'est qu'une langue bien faite" (Langue des calculs, Paris, Charles Houel, An VI, p. 7) and lately revived in the Logical Positivism.

It is interesting to note that it was precisely in terms of this theory of reasoning that both Diderot and Rousseau came to deny the competence of analysis in fields outside mathematics. (Cf. Diderot, Pensées sur l'interprétation de la nature, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Assezat, Vol. II, Paris, Garnier, 1875, pp. 9-10.) Rousseau's criticism of analysis and rational inference in general is based on the view that all reasoning is a continuous process whereby an initial proposition is transformed by gradual stages and that this very transformation is tantamount to a deformation (Lettres Morales, Lettre II, Correspondance générale, ed. Ducour, Vol. III, Paris, Colin, 1925, pp. 352-3). It is interesting to see how Rousseau takes Condillac's definition of analysis, based on the doctrine of transformed sensation, and uses it as a sort of boomerang to throw doubts on the whole process of rational inference.
thought and being given in immediacy, but which, being unreflected, is still "appearance", but this same unity made explicit in terms of logical identity and therefore devoid of all transition. "Being is, in general, unreflected immediacy and transition into another. Existence is immediate unity of being and reflection; hence appearance: it comes from the ground, and falls to the ground. In actuality, this unity is explicitly put, and the two sides of the relation identified. Hence the actual is exempted from transition, and its externality is its energising (1)."

What Hegel calls mediation is the operation of reflection whereby the contradictions revealed in the light of thought are reconciled, the transition which these contradictions involve overcome and the real or actual - namely the whole of which the divided members are part, or being as reflected and reduced to logical identity - is viewed as necessary.

In such a doctrine movement is relegated to the status of appearance and phenomenon; being and actuality are identified with the rational and logically necessary, free from all contingency. Moreover, Hegelian mediation, however much it may claim to be a "movement in logic", is not in any sense a kinesis, a bringing into existence. No less than intuition, it is simply a certain ordering of the data, in this case - since we are dealing with a logic of contraries

and not of identity - the contradictions discerned beneath immediacy, so as to reveal them as illusory. Whatever transition is imposed upon the reflecting mind is not process, which is a bringing into existence, but a continuous movement of reconciliation and approximation, and one which is to culminate in a state that is void of movement and is really a form of contemplative vision.

In contrast with the doctrine of immanence, the existential philosophy refuses to identify the actual and the logically necessary. The actual is that which exists and has become, therefore that into which there enter freedom and contingency (what Kierkegaard calls possibility). Logic, transcending movement, cannot grasp reality; the latter is grasped in process, in its passage to actuality, that is simultaneously with the transcendent acts of freedom that bring it into existence in the "instant" of repetition or fidelity. Existence is therefore the realm of what Kierkegaard calls "paradoxes", transitions that are not conclusions but acts effected by "the leap".

Repetition, as Kierkegaard describes it, is transcendence, "a religious movement by virtue of the absurd (1)." It is opposed to logical mediation which "cannot be employed at all in the sphere of freedom, where the next thing constantly emerges, not by virtue of immanence but of transcendence (2)." In short, it is a category of transition analogous to the

(1) Repetition, Editor's Introduction, p. xxvii.
(2) Ibid., p. xxix.
Aristotelian kinesis, namely a passage from possibility to actuality effected by a transcendent act of freedom which brings into being the reality not yet actual of the future (1).

"In the sphere of freedom...there is possibility, and actuality emerges as a transcendency (2)."

Marcel defines his fidelity in exactly the same way, describing the "voeu créateur" which animates the creator of any enduring object:

Le voeu ne prend corps qu'à partir d'une certaine saisie de l'artiste par une réalité qui est donnée bien moins à son regard qu'à une sorte de toucher interieur; mais cette réalité appréhendée comme telle se présente en même temps à moi - et il y a là à la fois un paradoxe et un mystère - comme indépendante par rapport à mon vouloir propre et comme néanmoins tributaire de l'acte par lequel je la fais passer dans l'existence. Le voeu créateur n'est autre chose que le fiat en vertu duquel je me décide à mettre toutes mes énergies au service de ce possible, qui déjà s'impose à moi, mais à moi seul, comme une réalité, afin de le transformer en une réalité pour tous, c'est-à-dire en une oeuvre constituée. (H.V. p. 162.)

In short, existence is the realm of becoming, as opposed to the continuous logical approximation, which is a sort of "mouvement sur place" of the mind enabling it to picture terms under the category of identity. But if existence is opposed to logical necessity and logical continuity, as transcendence to immanence, it would be equally wrong to deny to existence any element of necessity or continuity, to fail to recognise the type of necessity and continuity involved in

(1) Cf. Aristotle, Physics, III, i...
moral freedom and compatible therewith. The concept of freedom, in Marcel's view, is certainly not that of free-will, of liberty of indifference. This would mean transforming each act of liberty into a unique, unmotivated decree. Such an absolute heterogeneity is incompatible with teleological process.

In several interesting passages Marcel has analysed the fact of liberty and its temporal implications. On the one hand, he rejects the outworn determinism that conceives the act of freedom as involving a sort of mechanical action of clearly defined motives upon the will, consequent on deliberation. Such a definition of freedom is a distortion of the free act by a posteriori analysis:

Non seulement l'action volontaire ne suppose pas une estimation objective préalable au terme de laquelle je discernerais par avance ce qui est en mon propre pouvoir et ce qui ne l'est pas, mais il faut dire au contraire que la formule authentique du vouloir, c'est je veux, donc je peux. (Ibid., p. 67.)

Indeed, liberty, according to Marcel, belongs to the order of the "mystery" or "meta-problematical". Only an arbitrary analysis can dissociate the self from its will and institute between will and motives a subject-object dualism in place of the concrete subjective unity; for everything in the experience of free action points to the fact that "our liberty is ourselves" and is "l'âme est notre âme." (R.I. p. 78.) For that reason, as Bergson has recognised, purposive action transcends the realm of specifiable and objectively definable
ends. Any type of "vocation" bears witness to this; that of fatherhood, to take one of Marcel's examples, "se situe en deça de la zone où les motifs s'explicitent et se formulent. L'expérience montre distinctement que plus elle est impérieuse, moins il est facile d'en rendre compte en invoquant telle fin couramment reconnue comme bonne (l'argent, le pouvoir, la sécurité, la renommée, etc.)." (H.V. p. 146.)

In short, what characterises the act of freedom is the identification of motives and act; it is the projection of the whole personality:

Plus...une action engage totalement la personnalité agissante, plus elle participe de la vocation, et plus elle est unique par essence, de telle sorte qu'il ne saurait être question pour l'agent de la recommencer, ni pour d'autres de l'imiter au dehors. (Ibid., p. 145.)

Such a definition of freedom is of course of Bergsonian inspiration, as Marcel acknowledges in the same passage. Liberty, declares Bergson, is "le rapport du moi concret à l'acte qu'il accomplit"; "nous sommes libres quand nos actes émanent de notre personnalité entière, quand ils l'expriment, quand ils ont avec elle cette indéfinissable ressemblance qu'on trouve parfois entre l'œuvre et l'artiste (1)."

Now, in stressing, in opposition to any atomic conception of mental process, the transcendence of free action with respect to objectively specifiable ends considered as the "objects" of action, Marcel is far from introducing by the back door the concept of liberum arbitrium. Indeed, on this (1) Essai sur les données immédiate, pp. 167, 132.
point his position is much clearer than that of Bergson. To make the preceding stipulation is tantamount to affirming all the more strongly that the act is fully motivated or, as Marcel prefers to say, "surmotivé":

Cela veut dire que l'acte accompli par vocation apparaît à celui qui le juge du dehors comme essentiellement gratuit, alors que le sujet lui-même l'éprouve au contraire comme pleinement nécessaire ou comme surmotivé, comme trop nécessaire en vérité pour pouvoir être expliqué ou justifié. (Ibid., p. 145.)

The very fact that it cannot be justified or explained in terms of specific motives arises from the fact that it is fully motivated within the concrete situation, the question of justification having no meaning except for a posteriori reflection. All that is denied is that freedom involves a dualism of motives and act. Anything in the nature of a doctrine of gratuitous action is rejected. Marcel is saved from any such way of thinking by his "transcendentism" if we may so call it. We have already seen at the beginning of the chapter how, in his view, purposive action bears within itself a reference to a transcendent self instinct with purposes transcending time and operating throughout time as final causes - a relation of self to self which is "religious in essence." (H.V. p. 65.) Freedom, in short, is self-realisation.

The temporal implications of freedom follow from this. If liberty is not mere indifference, the possibility of choosing indifferently this rather than that, independently...
of any determining motive, but rather the fully motivated and fully necessary act that realises the transcendent purposes of the essential self, then freedom is inseparable from the mode of fidelity or self-realisation in time. The condition of authentic freedom is that the act render operative in the present both past and future. These transcendent purposes have to be realised throughout the course of time, and do so by their power to determine the present by way of efficient causation in respect of past realisations and by final causation in respect of what is yet to be realised.

A free act, says Marcel, is the act which frees us from the past or the future as a mere dead weight, that is as a non-entity powerless to influence the present: "Je ne serais pas éloigné de penser qu'un acte est libre...dans la mesure où il est libérateur," (R.I. p. 74.) — which frees us by transforming them into motive forces. Freedom is thus perpetuation or "vocation", continuity and renewal. Subjection to necessity is, as we have seen, the result precisely of a temporal discontinuity. Marcel has seen clearly the intimate relation between fatalism and temporal discontinuity on the one hand, freedom and temporal continuity on the other.

Marcel's concept of freedom is thus the negation of indifference. He defines liberty in purely Leibnizian terms
as the power to act or not in conformity with motives (1). Such freedom involves a moral necessity (as opposed to a mechanical or logical one), where the determination of volitions is compatible with their contingency. For freedom loses nothing by the assertion that the will is determined by purposes immanent in process; the act of will is the means of realizing the continuity implicit in the instant: it is precisely in bringing it to actuality that the will is free.

Moreover, in his rejection of liberty of indifference Marcel is in agreement with that other great defender of freedom, Kierkegaard. The latter has shown that freedom is not the opposite of necessity but the opposite of that type of mechanical necessity or fatalism which is guilt (2). And this guilt is experienced precisely when the acts of the individual are a meaningless, disconnected jumble. It is remedied by the infusion of the sense of repentance and atonement, in short by the acquired sense of responsibility when the self, by the recovery of the "instant" with its full retrospective and prospective range, is enabled to bring

(1) "Tant qu’un homme a la puissance de penser ou de ne pas penser, de mouvoir ou de ne pas mouvoir conformément à la préférence ou au choix de son propre esprit, jusque-là il est libre." (Nouv. Essais, Bk. II, Chap. XXI, § 8.)
(2) The Concept of Dread, p. 97. Cf. Leibniz: "Il me semble qu’a proprement parler, quoique les volitions soient contingentes, la nécessité ne doit pas être opposée à la volition, mais à la contingence,...et que la nécessité ne doit pas être confondue avec la détermination, car il n’y a pas moins de connexion ou de détermination dans les pensées, que dans les mouvements (être déterminé étant tout autre chose qu’être poussé ou forcé avec contrainte). (Op. cit., Ibid., § 13.)
continuity and moral purpose into his life; only in this measure does he become free. Then, as Kierkegaard puts it, "so soon as the actuality of freedom and of the spirit is posited, dread is annulled (aufgehoben)... but fate is too, for thereby providence also is posited (1)." Providence and destiny replace fate. But in a system of indifference it is precisely the notion of moral responsibility, of moral or religious growth, which would be impossible. "Un acte de pure liberté," writes Jules Lachelier, "serait, en effet, un acte indépendant de toute manière innée ou acquise de penser et de sentir: il serait donc étranger à tout ce qui constitue notre caractère personnel; et nous n'aurions aucune raison de nous l'attribuer et de nous en croire responsables (2)." Jules Payot in like manner declares that free-will or indifference is incompatible with morality. "La morale," he says, "n'a besoin que de la liberté, ce qui est très différent. Et cette liberté n'est possible que dans et par le déterminisme (3)."

In temporal terms this signifies that freedom is inseparable from a solidarity of past, present and future. The fact that "les actes successifs qui composent l'histoire d'une même vie sont liés entre eux, influent les uns sur les autres et forment une série où tout se tient (4)." The

(1) Concept of Dread, pp. 86, 87.
(2) Psychologie et Métaphysique, p. 119.
(3) L'Éducation de la Volonté, Paris, Alcan, 1894, p. 33.
concept of free-will, on the contrary, is bound up with the assertion that each act is a self-contained temporal unit. Its logical conclusion is the doctrine of the "gratuitous act", the most radical expression of temporal discontinuity. In an illuminating passage entitled "Le vide et le plein" Valéry has brought out vividly the connection between the "gratuitous" and temporal discontinuity on the one hand, and between the positive freedom in necessity, and temporal continuity on the other. "Je mets là ce livre; je regarde mes objets familiers, je me caresse le menton; je feuillette ce cahier. — Et tout ceci se passe sans empêchements, comme librement, — comme si c'étaient des événements séparés, indépendants, séparés par du vide, et comme sans action les uns sur les autres... Mais je puis tout à coup voir tout autrement — et vouloir voir que tout ceci se tient comme les engrenages d'un mécanisme, les compartiments d'un parquet — et que chaque modification est rigoureusement une substitution — comme dans un liquide où une molécule ne se déplace qu'une autre ne la remplace. — Rien n'est plus gratuit. Rien n'est plus isolé. Les objets ne sont indépendants qu'en apparence. Leurs distances, leurs non-contacts sont apparences. Et ma sensation de liberté... (1)." All Heraclitean doctrines which end by attributing value solely to the present at the expense of past and future are inimical to freedom, for they reduce acts to mere caprice. The free act, on the contrary, (1) Mélange, pp. 28-9.
is essentially an "engagement" with respect to a transcendent realising itself throughout the course of time:

Il est évident que renoncer à suivre une vocation pour quelque motif que ce soit... ce n'est en aucune façon se libérer ou s'émanciper: c'est même exactement l'inverse. (H.V. p. 146.)

C'est dire que le vœu, bien loin de se réduire à une simple velléité, présente au contraire l'aspect d'un engagement et d'une décision. Mais cet engagement ou cette décision ne s'accomplit pas purement et simplement dans l'enclume de moi-même, un transcendant y est impliqué, si indistincte que soit encore la conscience que j'en prends. (Ibid., p. 162.)

There is a different version of the same doctrine of the "gratuitous" involved in the Kantian notion of "autonomy", of which Marcel is the pronounced antagonist. The reason for this antagonism is not hard to find. Kant's conception of freedom as autonomy implies a sort of eternal present situated outside time. In so far as man is a physical being, his will is subject to the forms of his sensibility, to space and time, in terms of which he organises the data of his sense-experience. As such, that is as "phenomenon", he is subject to an empirical causality whereby his acts are determined by his past: "the determining principles of every action of the same reside in what belongs to past time, and is no longer in his power." On the other hand, he is, according to Kant, conscious of himself as an intelligible being, as "thing-in-itself" or noumenon. As such, he is no longer subject to conditions of time and may then know himself as "only determinable by laws which he gives himself through
reason (1)," as the source and ground, itself non-temporal, of temporal perception - that is as autonomous or free. Freedom seems then to signify for Kant independence with regard to time, and therefore to be exclusive of process: its very definition is "transcendental freedom". A conception entirely alien to Marcel's philosophy, which can conceive no liberty apart from moral necessity and responsibility, that is apart from the transforming action of time itself. "Ma liberté ne peut...s'affirmer jusqu'au bout qu'en épousant ma destinée personnelle, bien loin de prétendre la survoler." (R.I. p. 46.) (2).

It is indeed, for Marcel, a condition of free action that past and future should be made operative in the present. Freedom is in no sense the "autonomy", whose corollary is some form of temporal "instantaneism", but fidelity, continuity and renewal. The ultimate freedom possible to man is the state where he acts as causa sui, that is in a temporal plenitude wherein the enduring and moving present is so charged as to form an eternity within time. Valéry once again has described this self-causation as the ultimate aim of the free mind, he too linking it with repetition. "Vivre doit donc, à mon sens, s'ordonner contre revivre. C'est dire qu'une

(2) Cf. M. Blondel: "C'est la morale...qui étudie et procure cette insertion d'une réalité supérieure dans la succession des choses périssables, une liberté dans la chaîne du devenir, une immortelle responsabilité dans la destinée de l'agent humain." (De l'Action, Vol. II, p. 313.)
carrière de vie doit avoir pour désir essentiel une connaissance de soi-même si accomplie, que rien ne puisse plus, quand elle touche à son plus haut point, en modifier la structure, les formes et les modes... Cette extrême connaissance ressentie serait aussi la dernière pensée possible, et comme la dernière goutte de la liqueur qui emplit tout à fait un vase. La mesure étant comble, la durée de ma vie me semblerait exactement épuisée (1)."

VI. **Instantaneism.**

The condition of the realisation of the eternal in time is the coincidence in the lived present of a past and a future which, although co-present, yet retain their autonomy as distinctive temporal features. Any consciousness of time, which fails to make allowance for a temporal "triangulation", for a "certain pluralisme temporel, une certaine pluralisation temporelle de soi" (H.V. p. 54), must likewise fail to account for the two factors of transcendence and immanence that intersect within existence and end by elevating... the one at the expense of the other.

Leaving aside objective time, with its succession of discrete, mathematical points, there are two forms of what Marcel has designated "instantanéisme", the one leading to a pure Immanentism, the other to a pure Transcendentalism.

The first is to be found in the Heracliteanism of Bergson. It is in its rehabilitation of the present that Marcel sees the true value of Bergsonism and it is by development of the Bergsonian conception that he sees the possibility of a "passage from creative evolution to a religious philosophy". None the less, Bergson's definition of the "instant" is, as it stands, unsound.

In an important article On the Aesthetics of Adriano Tilgher (1), Marcel refutes the "réalisme du temps" which is at the source of the dramatic theories of both Tilgher and

Pirandello. The latter makes a distinction between "form" and "life", as between the artificial and the real, and, like Bergson, sees in becoming the fundamental reality. Bergson, indeed, although starting from the self and its unity, arrives at a Monism; he comes to identify time with the very stuff of reality and ends up in its hypostatisation and substantialisation. "It is," he declares, "the foundation of our being and, as we feel, the very substance of the world in which we live (1)." His is not a philosophy of Being, but a philosophy of life and becoming. Beyond change there is nothing; the word eternity has little meaning; at the most, for Bergson as for Alexander, it is synonymous with the incessant urge of evolution. "He who installs himself in becoming sees in duration the very life of things, the fundamental reality. The Forms, which the mind isolates and stores up in concepts, are then only snapshots of the changing reality. They are moments gathered along the course of time; and because we have cut the thread that binds them to time, they no longer endure... They enter into eternity, if you will; but what is eternal in them is just what is unreal (2)."

From the point of view of our discussion it is worth while

to analyse more closely the implications of Bergson's temporal doctrine. At first sight, the theory of duration seems to fulfil all the conditions required for self-realisation, but a closer examination shows that this is not so. It is true that Bergson emphasised the continuity of real time as the progress of the past gnawing into the future. "Car notre durée n'est pas un instant qui remplace un instant: il n'y aurait alors jamais que du présent, pas de prolongement du passé dans l'actuel, pas d'évolution, pas de durée concrète. La durée est le progrès continu du passé qui ronge l'avenir et qui gonfle en avançant. Du moment que le passé s'accroît sans cesse, indéfiniment aussi il se conserve (1)." Nothing would seem to be less like an "instantaneism". Yet if we consider his thesis in the light of his intuitionary theory, it is precisely that it would involve.

The fundamental feature of Bergsonism is the radical dualism it establishes between intuition or pure perception on the one hand and intelligence on the other. The former is for him not only the contrary of what is conceptual but also of what is relational: whatever is relational is to be referred to the secondary, derivative activity of intelligence which replaces the fusion and interpenetration of immediate experience and perception by static concepts. Now, strictly speaking, if all relation is foreign to the data of pure perception, it means that consciousness not only of space but (1) Evolution créatrice, pp. 4-5.
of time too, in so far as it involves discrimination between past, present and future, is excluded therefrom. By that we mean the consciousness of time present in perception and sensation itself, it being granted that the derivative conceptual time is not involved in the discussion.

The problem that arises is whether immediate experience is wholly non-relational or whether in fact it does not involve what William James calls "dynamic relations", as opposed to the static relations evolved by the conceptual intelligence. The ideas of James are here of much significance. He, indeed, while opposing perception and conception, allows for the "dynamic relations with which the perceptual flux is filled (1)." Concepts, he declares, are the result of a secondary intellectual activity substituting the static for the perceptual flow. But he also declares most categorically that those concepts are elaborations of the primitive percepts, and this applies to conceptual relations. Relations in short, are already embodied in the flux of sensation: "Les relations de toute sorte: temps, espace, cause, etc., font partie intégrante du flux des sensations tout autant que les sensations elles-mêmes (2)." The data of immediate experience involve, then, some discrimination and distinction, and these perceptual, dynamic relations are the basis of the static relations later evolved. It is in

(1) Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 81.
this way that James is enabled finally to justify the rôle of intelligence and demonstrate the interpenetration of percept and concept in our experience and knowledge as a whole. Boutroux has well brought out the opposition between Bergson and James on this point. "En outre, si la connaissance intellectuelle est, pour Bergson, dérivée et non primitive, c'est qu'elle contient des éléments qui apparaissent comme étrangers aux données immédiates et purement intuitives de la conscience: celles-ci, en effet, se réduisent à la durée en soi, dégagée non seulement de l'espace, mais du temps lui-même. Pour James, c'est proprement le degré de complexité et de richesse de l'expérience qui en mesure le degré d'autenticité. L'expérience absolument immédiate et intuitive serait l'expérience totale (1)."

But leaving aside this further development, the central fact is that in immediate experience James finds relation (at a non-conceptual level) while Bergson denies it. One might indeed enquire whether Bergson accounts for experience at all. For, if it transcends all relation and discrimination, it would be, as James declares, a total experience, a complete fusion. Bradley saw this when he declared that "qualities are nothing without relations (1)," relationless qualities being mere abstractions, and sought to show how relations

(1) William James, p. 90.
"break out" and "fall between" qualities of appearance (1). But Bradley, like Bergson, attributes this element of relation to intelligence while, unlike him, he opts for intelligence, declaring that feeling has no part in philosophy; confronted by the partial immediacy of feeling, which has concrete reality but no ideal truth, and an ideal truth which loses the wholeness of reality, he is led in his dilemma to envisage "beyond the vanishing point of the whole conceptual perspective, an 'absolute' reality, in which the coherency of feeling and the completeness of the intellectual ideal shall unite in some indescribable way (2)."

None the less, Bradley's view that qualities without relations are meaningless is sound. Were qualities not so bound up with relations of difference and simultaneity, consciousness and process would be impossible. It may even be claimed that Bergson's pure perception does not refer to consciousness at all but to a sort of "pre-consciousness" (just as Le Roy talks of a "pré-logique" when defining his Bergsonian logic of feeling).

It remains then to affirm that this element of relation is to be found in immediate experience itself, as James in fact does (3).

(1) Cf. R.W. Church, Bradley's Dialectic, London, Allen and Unwin, 1942, p. 26 sqq., and Bradley, op. cit., p. 28 sqq. (2) James, op. cit., p. 94. (3) Cf. Ibid., p. 219, n. 1, where he shows the consequences of a denial that "perceptions can give us relations immediately".
It is, however, in its application to time that the assertion assumes its full significance. It suffices to distinguish wholly the temporal doctrine of Bergson from those of James, Whitehead and Marcel. For the latter, immediate experience involves awareness of relation: relations of difference on the one hand, a distinction between past, present and future; relations of identity on the other, a simultaneity of past, present and future - allowing by their combination the present of experience to become the intersecting point of permanence and change.

Now, in spite of appearances, Bergson's duration does not permit this, for it is non-relational and must transcend all temporal structure. Consider, for example, his doctrine of memory. He asserts that in memory the whole past is preserved and presses upon the present: "En réalité le passé se conserve de lui-même, automatiquement. Tout entier, sans doute, il nous suit à tout instant." No doubt only part of it emerges in consciousness, but it is all there at the back of the present: "Notre passé se manifeste donc intégralement à nous par sa poussée et sous forme de tendance, quoiqu'une faible part seulement en devienne représentation." The present is, then, the amalgamation of this past with novelty: "Il concentre dans son indivisibilité tout le perçu avec, en plus, ce que le présent y ajoute (1)."

But, given the Bergsonian theory, the subject cannot be

(1) Evolution créatrice, pp. 5, 6, 7.
conscious of the past as such. His temporal experience would be confined within a present, for he would lack the means of identifying the past (1). What he must be aware of must be a **global** experience where no discrimination is possible and one which is, to all intents and purposes, wholly a present. Bergson describes it as being an "état simple", and it is clear from the context that he means by that that it is one, absolute state. Moreover, he infers therefrom that each present is wholly novel, if only by the fact that it is "simple" and "indivisible", and not only novel but absolutely unpredictable: "ce qui n'a jamais été perçu, et ce qui est en même temps simple, est nécessairement imprévisible (2)."

In short, the present is a distinct moment of novelty, incommensurable with any past or with any future moment. It exists in consciousness as a pure "élan", an indeterminate prospectivity. Duration appears as pure heterogeneity, each instant being as it were self-sufficient. This is borne out by many passages where Bergson treats the past, qua past, as a mere idea. "Le passé n'est qu'une idée, le présent est idée-moteur (3)." The present is the moment of prospective

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(1) Cf. S. Alexander's criticism of Bergson's doctrine of the past on this score. (*Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. I, p. 140 sqq.) It is undoubtedly this same point that Marcel is making when he rejects as unacceptable what he calls Bergson's notion "du passé entièrement présent". (*Journal Métaphysique* III, *Fragments*), *Confluences*, No. 16, Jan., 1943, p. 12.)

(2) *Evolution créatrice*, p. 7.

(3) *Matière et Mémoire*, p. 62.
urge, an urge which is thwarted by the influx of the past (1). The result is a form of "instantaneism", the exaltation of the present instant and the attribution to it of an autonomous status, as when Péguy, referring to Bergson, writes: "Un homme vit que le présent n'était point l'extrême rebord du passé, du côté de la récence, mais l'extrême bord du futur du côté de la présence... Il montra... qu'il fallait saisir le présent dans le présent même... qu'il y a dans le présent un certain être propre (2)." It has its culmination in Gide, who places value in sensation alone, in the maintenance of a state of constant "gratuity" whereby the

(1) "On montrerait sans peine que les différents degrés de la tristesse correspondent, eux aussi, à des changements qualitatifs. Elle commence par n'être qu'une orientation vers le passé, un appauvrissement de nos sensations et de nos idées, comme si chacune d'elles tenait maintenant tout entière dans le peu qu'elle donne, comme si l'avenir était en quelque sorte fermé." (Essai sur les données immédiates, p. 8.) Cf. R. Mourgue's article where he quotes pathological evidence in support of Bergson's theories, cases of advanced schizophrenia characterised by the total loss of the prospective sense. (Une Découverte scientifique. La durée Bergsonienne, Rev. Phil., 1935.)

For Guyau likewise the past tends to be described in terms of what is no longer efficaceous for present action. "Le passé... c'est de l'actif devenu passif, c'est un résidu au lieu d'être une anticipation et une conquête. A mesure que nous dépensons notre vie, il se produit au fond de nous-mêmes, comme dans ces bassins d'où l'on fait évaporer l'eau de la mer, une sorte de dépôt par couches régulières... Cette cristallisation intérieure est le passé." (La Genèse de l'idée de temps, p. 39.) Jankelevitch associates Guyau's doctrine with Fouillée's philosophy of idées-forces and relates them to the theory of effort in Haine de Biran (Guyau declares that time exists in germ in consciousness "sous la forme de la force, de l'effort." Ibid., p. 35.) He applies the term "dynamisme atomistique" to both. (Op. cit.)

(2) Note conjointe sur M. Descartes, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 281.
It is not possible in the Bergsonian system to account for what is permanent in time; for if all relation is excluded and consciousness is that of a present without discrimination, no such permanence is possible. The latter requires that time exhibit both novelty and simultaneity and that our experience of time include experience of a past as such and of a future as such and of elements common to them and to the present. For Bergson, all simultaneity, being relation, is to be referred to spatial, that is conceptual, representation (2).

The resultant exaltation of the prospective urge, of an instant which is a mere passage, and the devaluation of the past and of the future itself as such render impossible any realisation of being. Pushed to its extreme, it would culminate in that state described by Pascal in a famous passage: "Nous ne nous tenons jamais au temps présent... Le présent n'est jamais notre fin; le passé et le présent sont nos moyens; le seul avenir est notre fin. Ainsi nous ne vivons jamais, mais nous espérons de vivre; et, nous disposant

(1) The force of Gide's "instantaneism" is well brought out in passages such as the following. "Et je pris ainsi l'habitude de séparer chaque instant de ma vie, pour une totalité de joie, d'isolée." (Les Mouturrites terrestres, Oeuvres complètes, Vol.II, p.91.) "L'habitude de ta pensée te gêne; tu vis dans le passé, dans le futur et tu ne perçois rien spontanément. Nous ne sommes rien, Myrtil, que dans l'instantané de la vie; tout le passé s'y meurt avant que rien d'à venir y soit né. Instants! Tu comprendras, Myrtil, de quelle force est leur présence!" (Ibid., p.121.)

(2) "Espace et Temps ne se pénètrent que dans les systèmes en mouvement où le physicien réel n'est pas, ou n'habitent que des physiciens par lui imaginés." (Durée et Simultanéité, Paris, Alcan, 1929, p. 254.)
toujours à être heureux, il est inévitable que nous ne le soyons jamais (1)."

Moreover, the concept of freedom is distorted in such an instantaneism by its identification with pure novelty. Although no one has done more than Bergson himself to restore the concept of liberty, his actual conception of the latter cannot wholly escape criticism by the very fact of its being somewhat equivocal. He certainly defines freedom as the power to "act in conformity with one's self" and the free act as one which expresses the whole self. The latter is thus intermediate between the moral freedom of the determinists and free-will, for it cannot be wholly undetermined by the past, while at the same time it is the projection of the past-present which is the self. But, as we have seen, the past is dissolved ultimately in the present, which becomes a moment of pure novelty. It is significant that Bergson adds: "La liberté, telle que je l'entends, est située entre ces deux termes, mais non pas à égale distance de l'un et de l'autre, s'il fallait à toute force la confondre avec l'un des deux, c'est pour le 'libre arbitre' que j'opterais (2)."

Is causality not present in immediate experience precisely in the form of relation (not of course as a category of the understanding)? It is, we may say, bound up with the awareness both of difference and of identity in time and with

the process of uniting in action this double element in consciousness. It is much more than mere consciousness of change or of a changing ground; it is more than mere prospectivity, it is purposiveness. The mere presence of the past in an undifferentiated present or the mere awareness of change (for these rivet the mind to a self-sufficient instant) are insufficient to provide motivation, without which freedom is arbitrary. Motive for action requires awareness of the past and of the future as distinctive powers within the immediacy of experience, the self being thereby enabled to take cognisance of their content, real or possible, and draw from them the ends to be realised in the present. Freedom cannot be conceived apart from a process of continuous realisation throughout a differentiated temporal range. It is precisely this element of permanence and simultaneity which Bergson depreciates. In his aversion to it, says Von Hügel, he has stopped half way; "he has removed the mechanical obstacles to Liberty, but he has not discovered the spiritual conditions and requisites for the same Liberty. Indeed, by his strenuous exclusion of all permanence and of every aim and ideal, as of so many abstractions essentially hostile to Freedom, he has, most unintentionally, brought us back, in this anti-Finalism, to that Naturalism which he had so successfully resisted when it masqueraded as a shear
Mechanism (1)."

The Heraclitean current associated with Bergsonism thus ends up in an Immanentism. What is denied is precisely the realm of transcendent eternal selves that provide the unity to be made explicit in temporal continuity. Kierkegaard has spoken no truer word than when he says: "eternity is most easily disposed of by living merely in instants (2)." Time becomes an end, whereas it is merely a means. And as a means, it is more than a passage, it is the vehicle of continuity and permanence. This it can only be if within the instant past and future retain a properly guaranteed reality of their own.

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(1) Eternal Life, Edinburgh, Clark, 1912, p. 301. Bergson's rejection of Finalism, in so far as it involves repetition, is clearly stated in the following passage, together with the concomitant doctrine of temporal heterogeneity. "Bref, l'application rigoureuse du principe de finalité, comme celle du principe de causalité mécanique, conduit à la conclusion que 'tout est donné'. Les deux principes disent la même chose dans leurs deux langues, parce qu'ils répondent au même besoin. C'est pourquoi ils s'accordent encore à faire table rase du temps. La durée réelle est celle qui mord sur les choses et qui y laisse l'empreinte de sa dent. Si tout est dans le temps, tout change intérieurement et la même réalité concrète ne se répète jamais. La répétition n'est donc possible que dans l'abstrait. Ce qui se répète, c'est tel ou tel aspect que nos sens et surtout notre intelligence ont détaché de la réalité précisément parce que notre action, sur laquelle tout l'effort de notre intelligence est tendu, ne se peut mouvoir que parmi des répétitions... Dès que nous sortons des cadres où le mécanisme et le finalisme radical enferment notre pensée, la réalité nous apparaît comme un jaillissement ininterrompu de nouveautés dont chacune n'a pas plutôt surgi pour faire le présent qu'elle a déjà reculé dans le passé."

(Evolution créatrice, p. 49.)

(2) Concept of Dread, p. 135.
There is, however, another form of "instantaneism", such as to be found in the Eleatic, Platonic and Schopenhauerian philosophies. These describe a type of "instant" or "eternal present" which marks a release from temporal contingencies — namely the instant of contemplation or "recollection". It is assumed that the course of time may be brought to a halt by a transcending of the consciousness of the future in favour of an instant that grasps within its range the whole of time. In the previous version we were confronted, broadly speaking, with an elimination of the past as such, here by an elimination of the future as such.

Curiously enough, this type of instant is to be found, no less than the foregoing one, in Bergson's philosophy. Bergson's doctrine of memory is at least as important as his doctrine of the élan vital. Pushed to the extreme, as Miss Hilda Oakley has pointed out, the principle it involves of the survival of the past in the present (coupled, we may add, with the denial of any relational element in the pure intuition of duration) would denote the total impossibility of change (1). "Oui, je crois," writes Bergson, "que notre vie passée est là, conservée jusque dans ses moindres détails, et que nous n'oublions rien, et que tout ce que nous avons perçu, pensé, voulu depuis le premier éveil de notre conscience, persiste indéfiniment (2)." If that is so, it suffices that, given certain conditions, the present of consciousness should be

(1) Hilda Oakley, op. cit.
limited to the content of past and immediate experience for the mind to experience a veritable totum simul. The condition required is the elimination of the prospective sense - "une conversion brusque de l'attention", such as the threat of imminent and sudden death, "quelque chose comme un changement d'orientation de la conscience qui, jusqu'alors tournée vers l'avenir et absorbée par les nécessités de l'action, subitement s'en désintresse. Cela suffit pour que mille et mille détails 'oubliés' soient remémorés, pour que l'histoire entière de la personne se déroule devant elle en un mouvant panorama." So that Bergson concludes that "une attention à la vie qui serait suffisamment puissante, et suffisamment dégagée de tout intérêt pratique, embrasserait ainsi dans un présent indivisé l'histoire passée tout entière de la personne consciente (1)."

Thus, what appeared in the preceding analysis as a self-sufficient and at every moment novel instant of time now appears as a strictly non-temporal instant or eternal present. And it appears so for, at bottom, the same reasons, namely because the perception of time excludes, in Bergson's definition, numerical succession, discrimination or simultaneity even; without these, the present of experience will be devoid of temporal characteristics. "Elimions le nombre de la durée, interne," writes Jacob, "et la prétendue 'durée vraie' devient l'absence réelle de durée, se confond avec l'éternité (1) La Pensée et le Mouvant, pp. 192-3. My italics.
intemporelle des théologiens. En effet, si, par nature, les événements se pénètrent, tout est dans tout; le passé et l'avenir résident tout entiers dans le présent... Là où fait défaut toute distinction numérique, il n'y a pas plusieurs choses qui coexistent, mais une seule chose. Or si le successif et le simultané ne répondent à rien de réel, c'est le temps qui perd toute réalité; et si le temps n'est qu'une illusion, que devient ce monde sensible auquel on attachait tant de prix (1)?

Professor Lovejoy is thus perfectly right in asserting that "Bergson is at once a thorough Eleatic and a thorough Heraclitean; that the essence of his philosophy consists in an analysis of the time-concept which leads him to just this contradictory combination of doctrines; and that he is a radical anti-intellectualist because, while thus led (in fact, if not in intent) to describe the temporal as self-contradictory, he, unlike Bradley, is unwilling to call it 'mere appearance' (2)."

It is noteworthy that a similar dualism, involving the two at first sight contradictory forms of instantaneism, is to be found in Heidegger's doctrine of time. Temporality, it may be recalled, constitutes for Heidegger the "ontological sense" of dread. In daily existence (Dasein), man is the prey of ennui or "preoccupation" (Sorge). This latter is linked

(1) La philosophie d'hier et celle d'aujourd'hui, Rev. de Mét., 1898, p. 197.
with his subjection to temporal flight and decay (his dereliction or Geworfenheit). He is unable to grasp his being as a "presence", that is in its inner reality; his aims are all denied realisation and his being constantly thrown into the past. His sense of the future is mere preoccupation, the conviction that all to which he aspires will be eaten up by time. Thus the being of man becomes like that of "things" (Vorhanden) which are "in-sistent" in time and exist in the mode of the "having been" (Gewesenheit).

Human "ex-distence" is made possible by dread. Dread is the experiencing to the limit this preoccupation, this sense of Geworfenheit, this impossibility of realising being in the present; in it man sounds the immovable rock of his finite condition. Experienced at this deep level, dread meets the revelation of death. Death transcends all succession, it is the one end which is absolute and which it is given to finite man to realise, the one "possibility" among impossibilities. Confronted by the "existential of death," man may, by the "resolute decision", assume "being-for-death" and recover; through the exercise of his Seinkommen, the sense of "possibility" and so secure his being as a presence. This he does in and through "freedom-for-death", that is by accepting his death and infusing into his present the sense
of death, so taking upon himself his finite destiny (1).

Infused with this sense of death, man's life ceases to be anonymous and becomes a "pro-ject", having now, in each of its moments, a sure end and purpose, in conformity with which he realises his true being as a finite creature.

Temporally, the passage from anonymity to existence, from Das Man to the Ich, signifies the substitution of "historicity" (Geschichtlichkeit) for "history-of-the-world" (Zeitlichkeit). But it is here that the equivocal nature of the doctrine becomes apparent. It is indeed open to two interpretations. Either each moment is to be transformed by the ever-present menace of death, thus delivering the self over to an extreme of temporal discontinuity. In this case we would have an example of the former type of instantaneism. But a more careful scrutiny of the doctrine and its implications suggests another quite different interpretation.

In dread the individual experiences the inner reality of time; he finds that the constant lapse of being into a past has an ontological significance, it is the very experience of the human reality in its ultimate finiteness. This indeed is death and what death means. Death is the infinite

(1) "Elle met la réalité-humaine dans la simplicité nue de son destin. Par-là nous désignons l'historial originel de la réalité-humaine, l'historial qui consiste dans la décision-résolue authentique, et dans lequel, libre pour la mort, la réalité-humaine transmet elle-même à elle-même, dans une possibilité dont elle hérite, mais que pourtant elle choisit." (Qu'est-ce que la Métaphysique? suivi d'extraits sur l'être et le temps, transl. by H. Corbin, Paris, Gallimard, 1938, p.183.) (Sein und Zeit, V, p. 74.)
concealed within the finite. But it is linked with Gewesenheit, which the individual can conceive now, no longer as a mere fact of a being past (Vergangenheit), but as the "having-been-a-Presence" (Da-Gewesen) (1). This Gewesenheit is the temporal expression of Being itself: it means "Being-having-been".

If we look now at the future as it appears in the mode of historicity, we find that its "being" consists likewise in a "having-been" (Gewesend), for the future that the self anticipates in the present of its new freedom is death, and death is the metaphysical reality experienced at the core of becoming as lapse or collapse into the "having-been".

Thus, the newly found present is a state of "ex-sistence", in the precise sense of the term, namely a total transcending of time as process; it is the release from temporal condition, whereby the self enters into a being which is a sort of "past". Heidegger calls it an "ekstatic unity" (2). This is made perfectly clear in a passage such as the following: "Seul un existant qui dans son Être est essentiellement Avenir, tel (1) "En un sens ontologique rigoureux, une réalité-humaine qui n'existe plus n'est pas simplement passée; elle est un 'Ayant-été une Présence' (Da-Gewesen)." (Ibid., p. 182.) (Sein und Zeit V, p. 73.) (2) "L'avenir à moi-même n'est possible qu'en tant que je suis ayant-été (ich bin gewesen). L'Être-ayant-été (Gewesenheit) naît de l'avenir, en ce sens que c'est l'Avenir étant-ayant-été (gewesend) qui dégage de lui-même le présent. Tel est ce que Heidegger nomme l'unité ekstatique des extases de la temporalité. Ainsi, l'Historialité de l'Être n'est pas tant dans une unité supérieure de stasis (repos) et de kinesis (mouvement), que dans le phénomène de l'ekstasis de la stasis." (Corbin, Ibid., p. 183, n. 1. Cf. Sein und Zeit, V, p. 55.)
que, libre pour sa mort, il puisse, en se brisant sur elle, se laisser rejeter sur la présence qu'il réalise en fait, - en d'autres termes: seul un existant qui, en tant qu'avenir, est en une simultanéité initiale un existant qui 'est Ayant-été' (Gewesend) peut, en se transmettant à lui-même la possibilité dont il hérite, assumer sa propre déréliction et, dans l'instant, être pour 'son temps'. Seule une temporalité authentique, qui est à la fois une temporalité finie, rend possible quelque chose comme un destin, c'est-à-dire une historicité authentique (1)." When, therefore, Heidegger speaks, as here, of a "finite temporality", he refers to a sort of eternal present, a present of "recollection", where past and future no longer exist as autonomous states. "Pas plus qu'elle ne s'abandonne au passé, la répétition ne tend à un progrès. Pour l'existence authentique, passé et progrès sont, dans l'instant, indifférents (2)."

What he is affirming is that at the core of "finite" temporal succession, as experienced in dread, there is an "infinite", a non-temporal - that in fact the finite is but the obverse side of this infinite. Moreover, this temporal formula is simply an explicitation of his central ontological affirmation. For the ultimate "ground" which he seeks and finds he describes as a "not-being" (un-wesen) (3). This un-wesen is simply the inmost non-temporal core of the

(1) Ibid., p. 190. (Sein und Zeit, V, p. 74.)
(2) Ibid., p. 191. (Ibid.)
(3) Vom Wesen des Grundes, III.
Gewesenheit - the absolute "having-been". What Heidegger discovers at the core of Being is, in fact, Nothing. "L'Etre pur et le Néant pur sont donc identiques." Cette thèse de Hegel reste vraie. Etre et Néant se com-poses réciproquement, non point parce que tous deux - envisagés par le concept hégélien de la Pensée - concordent dans leur indétermination et leur immédiateté, mais parce que l'Etre lui-même est fini dans son essence et ne se révèle que dans la transcendance de la réalité-humaine qui, dans le Néant, émerge hors de l'existant (1)." The root of Heidegger's philosophy is the German doctrine of Night, the philosophy of the Indeterminate One, common to Eckhart and Boehme (2).

The rapprochement between Heidegger and Bergson is of interest. Both present a doctrine of time whose concealed premises seem to be Eleatic. So that we can interpret their "instant" both as an "atom of time" and as an "atom of eternity." Their thought seems to demonstrate that a failure to integrate time and eternity within a properly conceived process condemns the metaphysician to a state of equivocation where he oscillates between an explicit Immanentism and temporal instantaneism on the one hand, and a more implicit Transcendentalism and non-temporal instantaneism on the other.

To revert to the main discussion, it has to be affirmed that the instant of recollection, wholly transcending time,

(1) Qu'est-ce que la Métaphysique? op. cit., pp. 40-1.
(2) Cf. A. de Waehlens, La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger, Louvain, 1942, p. 360 sqq.
has no place in Marcel's philosophy. The latter denies wholeheartedly any possibility of a total transcending of process in a so-called totum simul. It is on this score that he criticises the metaphysical optimism associated with Leibniz:

"En derniere analyse, l'optimiste en tant que tel prend toujours son point d'appui dans une experience non point du tout saisie au plus intime et comme au plus vécu d'elle-même, mais au contraire considérée à une distance suffisante pour que certaines oppositions s'atténuent ou se fondent dans une certaine harmonie générale. L'optimiste n'hésite pas à extrapolier les conclusions auxquelles on est conduit pour peu qu'on veuille bien considérer "les choses" avec un recul suffisant et sur un "espace de temps" assez ample. (H.V. pp. 45-6.)"

Such an instantaneism can have only one issue— a mysticism or transcendentalism claiming arbitrarily and, it would seem, impossibly the existence of privileged moments when Time comes miraculously to a stop (1).

It is largely against the Platonic or semi-Platonic version of the eternal present that Marcel, following in the footsteps of Kierkegaard, reacts. The conception of an extra-temporal instant of recollection has of course its source in Plato. No doubt Plato introduces movement into logic by overthrowing the principle of non-contradiction, whose rigorous application led to the Parmenidean doctrine.

(1) We may note that Claudel can envisage no other eternity than this, the mere end or stopping of time. "Lors le Temps sera fermé sur nous et le Présent en sera le centre éternel." (Art Poétique, Paris, Mercure de France, 1915, p. 192.)
of the One, and by substituting for it a dialectic that exhibits a participation of contraries - the One and the Many, Being and non-Being - in one another (1). Nevertheless, the progress of this dialectic accomplished in time is directed to no other end than the suppression of dialectic; that is, by the discovery and isolation, over and above the present of becoming (to ‘nun), of the "instant" (exaihphnes), a temporal absolute or differential that is neither one nor many, movement nor repose, being nor non-being. Indeterminate and beyond all designation, it is the medium for a revelation of the indeterminate, Eternal Being (2). In the instant so conceived movement and dialectic are suspended and give way to recollection or contemplation. Time comes to a stop. In it is exhibited, in the words of M. Wahl, "la nécessité de la dialectique et pourtant l'évanouissement dans l'instant de cette dialectique même (3)."

Kierkegaard, in a note on the Parmenides, has explained how the Platonic instant fails to fulfil the requirements of a synthesis between eternity and time and glides from time to eternity. "Eternity and the instant are the extreme terms of the contradiction, whereas otherwise conceived the dialectical witchcraft makes eternity and the instant signify the same thing. It is only with Christianity that the

(1) "De la sorte, le mouvement et la spiritualité seront rétablis, là où il y avait immobilité et matérialité." (J. Wahl, Etude sur le Parménide de Platon, Paris, Rieder, 1926, p. 104.)
(2) Cf. Ibid., pp. 169-70.
sensuous, the temporal, the instant are to be understood, precisely because it is only with it the eternal becomes essential (1)." The Platonic depreciation of time cannot conceive the instant of process, seen as the meeting-place of immanence and transcendence, time and eternity and as the medium for the realisation of the eternal in time.

"Hellenism", he says, "did not understand the instant; for even if it comprehended the atom of eternity, it did not comprehend that it was the instant, did not define it with a forward orientation but with a backward, since for Hellenism the atom of eternity was essentially eternity, and so neither time nor eternity had true justice done it (2)." The consequence is a doctrine of contemplation and recollection: "The Greek eternity lies behind, as the past into which one enters only backwards (3)." In contrast with it is repetition, which is to recollection as process is to contemplation, for "repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions (4)." And the instrument of all repetition or self-realisation is the instant of process, that is the instant which unites and yet preserves the autonomy of both past and future, so making possible the spiritual growth and salvation with its retrospective and prospective sense, its perspective of repentance and redemption. "The concept around which everything turns

(1) Concept of Dread, p. 74, n. 1.
(2) Ibid., p. 79.
(3) Ibid., p. 80.
(4) Repetition, p. 3.
in Christianity,...is the fulness of time, is the instant as eternity, and yet this eternity is at once the future and the past. If one does not give heed to this, one cannot save any concept from heretical and treasonable admixtures which destroy the concept. One does not get the past as a thing for itself but in simple continuity with the future — and with that the concepts of conversion, atonement, redemption, are resolved in the significance of world-history, and resolved in the individual historical development. One does not get the future as a thing for itself — and with that the resurrection and the judgment come to naught (1)."

In his views Marcel echoes these passages of Kierkegaard, although he has been less systematic in his criticism of Platonism itself. In contemporary thought, the doctrine of recollection still plays a considerable rôle, in such philosophers as Santayana for example (2). In French thought, its claims have been powerfully voiced in recent times by Proust, whose doctrine on this point comes into clear conflict with that of Marcel. Proust's aesthetic involves a depreciation of time as mere appearance, as when, referring to Vinteuil's sonata, he writes: "Pour n'avoir pu aimer qu'en des temps successifs tout ce que m'apportait cette Sonate, je ne la possédai jamais tout entière: elle ressemblait à la vie (3)." He envisages, however, an issue from temporal

(1) Concept of Dread, p. 81.
(2) Cf. The Realm of Essences, p. 61.
 discontinuity and pure succession by means of the mémoire involontaire, in the manner already described, when, at certain privileged moments, the present becomes instinct with the past so as to eliminate the temporal and prospective consciousness: "L'être qui alors goûtait en moi cette impression la goûtait en ce qu'elle avait de commun dans un jour ancien et maintenant, dans ce qu'elle avait d'extra-temporel, un être qui n'apparaissait que quand, par une de ces identités entre le présent et le passé, il pouvait se trouver...jouir de l'essence des choses, c'est-à-dire en dehors du temps (1)." What he envisages here is a veritable liberation from the contingencies of time, a state of "indifference". Thus, in the famous passage on the madeleine we read: "Mais à l'instant même où la gorgée mêlée des miettes du gâteau toucha mon palais, je tressaillis, attentif à ce qui se passait d'extraordinaire en moi. Un plaisir délicieux m'avait envahi, isolé, sans la notion de sa cause. Il m'avait aussitôt rendu les vicissitudes de la vie indifférentes, ses désastres inoffensifs, sa brièveté illusoire de la même façon qu'opère l'amour, en me remplissant d'une essence précieuse (2)." Time has simply ceased to flow. What we have is what Fernandez calls a state of "contemplation esthétique" (3), or what Crémiieux, with even more penetration, terms a state of

"abstention" or "ataraxy" (1).

Against this form of instantaneism, no less than against the previous one, Marcel reacts in the same strong fashion, for in both he sees a like, although contrary, error, namely the failure to allow for that "triangulation" which gives its due value both to the past and to the future, each, to employ Kierkegaard's phrase, as "things for themselves", and without which time as a spiritual category, as the medium of self-realisation or existence, is inconceivable.

The recognition of this "triangulation" in temporal experience, so stressed in Marcel's philosophy, is tantamount to the recognition, such as we have in Alexander, of a spatial element inseparable from time (2). The rejection of the Bergsonian "instantaneism" means nothing less than that; for, as we have seen, Bergson ends up in such an "instantaneism" precisely because he fails to allow for the spatial element of discrimination, for "distance" (and this because he sees in space simply an ideal construction, neglecting the space of pure experience which is just as much an "immediate datum" as the pure temporal).

The recognition of such a spatial element as inseparable from temporal experience, that Time is indeed "intrinsically

(1) "L'idéal de sagesse qu'il nous propose, c'est peut-être tout simplement l'abstention. Mais que l'on y regarde de près, et l'on verra que cette abstention est proche parente à la fois de l'ataraxie stoïcienne et du renoncement chrétien."

(XXe Siècle, le série, p. 98.)

spatial (1), is essential to a philosophy of existence which seeks to safeguard both Immanence and Transcendence, as does Marcel's. It is in the light of a spatio-temporal philosophy that the latter presents human destiny as a dialogue between the self's present and its past, as process and drama.

(1) Ibid., p. 143.
VII. Essence and Existence.

What is perhaps most significant in Marcel's theory of time, and what suffices to classify him as an Existentialist, is that Time is rehabilitated as the means and the sole means by which eternity may be experienced. The ideal eternity of the Platonic schools is recognised for what it is—a mere possibility—and Time ceases to be mere appearance to become the very mode in which eternity becomes actuality. Marcel claims to hold within his grasp a "positive notion of eternity". In a passage that bears the stamp of Bosanquet, he writes:

Et ici on s'éleve, je crois, à une notion absolument positive de l'éternité. L'univers, en tant que tel, n'étant pas et ne pouvant pas être pensé comme objet... est entièrement transcendant à ce que j'ai appelé une représentation cinématographique quelconque. Et il en est exactement de même du moi; à un certain plan, je ne peux pas ne pas m'apparaître comme contemporain de l'univers (coaevus universo), c'est-à-dire comme éternel. (B.A. p. 24.)

His view of Time comes nearest to that of Von Hügel, who distinguishes between succession, duration and eternity: clock-time, historicity and simultaneity. Von Hügel sees in duration "not a barrier against Eternal Life, but the very stuff and means in and by which we vitally experience and apprehend that Life (1)." This view is related, as in Marcel, to the recognition of the bodily and physical factors conditioning the apprehension of the spiritual. For both, the transcending of Time can be accomplished only in Time itself by virtue of what is most real therein.

(1) Eternal Life, p. 386.
Marcel, like Von Hugel, seems to conceive a sort of continuity between duration and simultaneity. The element of pure successivity, which adheres to the present instant of duration, gives way at a certain level to the element of simultaneity, and, by virtue of this process of approxondissement, some measure of eternity and of absolute experience is achieved, its degree depending upon the effort of will involved in the repetition. Expounding the doctrine of time in the philosophy of Jaspers, Marcel declares, in terms applicable to his own theory:

Ainsi l'existence, pas plus qu'elle n'est isolable de la communication, c'est-à-dire d'un certain coesee spirituellement appréhende, ne se laisse saisir en dehors d'un certain enracinement dans la durée. Celle-ci cesse alors d'être écoulement pur, pour devenir manifestation de l'Existence qui se conquiert par ses décisions. C'est par là que le temporel peut être transcende, non au bénéfice d'un intemporel abstrait, "mais de telle façon que dans le temps je sois au-dessus du temps sans être en dehors de lui." En tant que j'agis et que j'aime inconditionnellement dans le temps, c'est l'éternité elle-même qui y prend place... L'éternité n'est ni l'intemporel ni la durée perpétuelle, mais la profondeur du temps en tant que manifestation historique de l'existence.

(R.I. pp. 294-5.)

The consciousness of eternity is procured, in a word, not by any flight from time, but by a certain deepening of the consciousness of time. "Pas de reniement," exclaims Marcel in his essay on Rilke: "oh! bien au contraire, une adhésion infinie à l'exister (Zustimmung zum Da-sein)." (H.V. p. 322.)

This conception of eternity as the "depth of time" is linked, for Marcel as for Claudel, with the idea of a cosmic
rhythm. He notes with approval that in Rilke "the sense of being and the sense of becoming are intimately fused" (H.V. p. 309.) In passages previously quoted he defined the existential consciousness as the consciousness of process embodying an "appel à l'existence d'une certaine créativité dans le monde"; as being one with the "ardeur à vivre" which is the very "substance of life". In his essay on \textit{L'Etre en situation} he develops Minkowski's definition of the cosmos as a "primitive dynamism" and relates the consciousness of this cosmic rhythm to the consciousness of time; remarking on his own account that "il est clair... que nous ne prenons pas une conscience également vive ou intense à chaque moment de notre durée de ce 'dynamisme primitif'". (H.V. p. 111.)

What is most significant in the modern, and particularly Existentialist, view of time is the substitution for the traditional equation of eternity with timelessness of a new equation of eternity with what we might call timefulness. Now, this assertion in its turn involves a reversal of the Hegelian conception of the Absolute. The Absolute and the Eternal are no longer synonymous with the totality. The eternal present which Marcel's philosophy envisages constitutes an "image of eternity" in so far as it grasps within an actuality remembered past and anticipated future. But this past and future, operative in the present, are certainly not a whole past and a whole future made actual with one single degree of actuality. It is not possible, in Marcel's view,
without quitting actual experience and converting reality into an object, to have a view of the whole of time, as Hegel and, it would seem, even Leibniz would suggest. It is undoubtedly this viewpoint that determines Marcel's use of the term *totum simul* to describe the successivity characteristic of the objectified real. What he is criticising is the *totum simul* of Royce.

There is, in Royce's definition of the specious present, a curious misapprehension which has been pointed out by Gunn (1). He defines the latter indeed as a *totum simul*. He takes as an analogy the hearing of a musical composition, where all the notes are grasped as a whole and at once, the length of the time-span varying, within limits, from individual to individual. And he proceeds from this conception of the specious present of human consciousness to define the nature of the Divine present as one where the Absolute Consciousness is aware simultaneously of the whole time-series (2).

There are here, it would seem, two flaws. First, in conformity with his Absolute Idealism, Royce, far from distinguishing, as do the Mediaevalists and Marcel himself, between Time and Eternity, conceives eternity as simply the

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whole of time. His conception of time is quantitative rather than qualitative; as Gunn remarks: "All such arguments aim at establishing a quantitative view of the Eternal, they attempt to grasp what they confess to be infinite in limits that are finite. They would be better employed in elucidating further the conception of the Eternal as qualitative, as truly timeless, not as totum or stretch of the whole of Time, which whole they do not know... Here, as in other cases, it is quality not quantity that matters (l)."

Secondly, the analogy of the Divine present with the specious present is surely not valid. The Divine consciousness may be conceived as knowing simultaneously the whole of the time-series, because in the Divine Mind there is nothing which is not actuality. In the specious present of human consciousness, on the contrary, as already stressed, however much the whole range of the past and future may be immanent therein, they emerge with varying degrees of actuality or possibility, the present itself being a selective point. As Gunn suggests, the hearing of a piece of music does not imply that there are present to us at once all the notes of a melody; we are aware of an actual whole only if that whole is no longer a present but completely a past. The reality will then have been converted into an object detailed in succession. The so-called totum simul (1) Op. cit., p. 361.
is purely quantitative, it is in strict fact less a simultaneity than a synthesis. I suggest that it is this view of a *totum simul* as an actual whole which Marcel is criticizing, and that that accounts for his use, at first sight so curious, of the term *totum simul* to describe objective succession (1). It is indeed a similar criticism that he makes of Royce's assertion that the consciousness I have of my self is identical with that which God has of me:

Mais qu'est-ce qui l'autorise, encore une fois, à affirmer que saisir totalement, expliciter sans réserves c'est encore avoir conscience? En croyant affranchir la conscience des conditions, soi-disant contingentes qui limitent sa puissance d'appréhension, est-ce qu'il ne tend pas à la dépouiller précisément de ce qui fait d'elle une réalité positive? (2).

It is for the same reasons that Marcel rejects the point de départ of a metaphysician such as M. Lavelle who, he says, "prétend se transporter au coeur de l'être" or, in Lavelle's own words, "retrouver l'acte primitif dont dépendent à la fois mon être propre et l'être du monde (3)," precisely because he claims that the mind may, in some privileged way, grasp the totality. Against this assertion Marcel reacts vigorously:

Aucune démarche ne me semble métaphysiquement plus importante que celle par laquelle je reconnais que je ne puis sans contradiction penser l'absolu comme un observatoire central d'où l'univers serait contemplé dans sa totalité, au lieu d'être appréhendé d'une façon partielle et latérale, comme il l'est par chacun de nous. (R.I. p. 8.)

(2) La Métaphysique de royce, Rev. de Mét., 1919, p. 241.
And he adds that it is the merit of Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Heidegger (of Marcel also, we may say) to have recognised that "l'existence (et a fortiori la transcendance) ne se laisse reconnaître ou évoquer que par delà le domaine d'une pensée en général procédant par repères sur... les communaux du monde objectif." (Ibid., p. 9.)

The whole of this problem centres on the relation between transcendence and immanence, essence and existence. For Marcel, the instant of existential experience is the point of emergence of the eternal, but this eternal cannot be a mere actual object spread out in time. To believe so is to fall into the error of Immanentism and hypostatise the temporal order itself, or into the error of Transcendentalism and depreciate unduly that order. Both transcendence and immanence must find their place in what claims to be a metaphysical and a religious doctrine. Present experience must contain within it an element of operative possibility not wholly explicated which is the part of the "mystery" in immediate existential experience and at the same time the guarantee of the transcendent.

This is simply to assert that essence and existence remain distinct in the human being. Royce, indeed, accepts the cardinal thesis of Hegel that essence is existence and that existence is "essential Being" (1). On the contrary, (1) Cf. Hegel, Logic, pp. 252, 258 (§ 138, 139, 140, 142). The influence of Fechner's world soul philosophy is apparent on Royce. In both, we see a Monism cohabiting with a personal pluralism.
the creature differs precisely thereby from the Divine Being, in whom essence and existence, possibility and actuality are one (1). And such distinction, albeit not separation, is

(1) Tillich describes the viewpoint common to the Existentialists and to the Mediaevalist as follows: "The Unconditioned cannot be conditioned by a difference between its essence and its existence. In absolute Being, there is no possibility which is not an actuality, it is pure actuality. In all finite beings on the other hand, this difference is present: in their existence as something separated from essence is the mark of finitude." (The Existential Philosophy, Journal of the History of Ideas, Jan., 1944, pp. 47-8.) The distinction is, of course, common in classical philosophy; Leibniz, for example, affirms the creature's resemblance to God in respect of his essence, his difference in respect of his existence. (Monad. § 42, 45.)

Historically, the distinction between essence and existence is the fundamental principle of Christian theology and is common to all the Scholastics, although Saint Thomas has given it its most systematic expression. "In Deo idem est esse et essentia." "In omnibus autem aliis, etiam in substantiis intellectualibus, differt esse et quod est." (Contra. Gent. Lib. I, c. XII; Lib. II, c. LII.)

In Christian theology the distinction serves mainly as a guarantee against the Pantheism or Monism of the Eleatics, which posits being univocally as a genus, thereby attributing reality solely to the One. Allied with the principle of the "analogy" of being, it serves to explain the multiplicity of beings in relation to the single Divine Being. Being, it is affirmed, is not a genus ("Ens enim non est genus, sed multipliciter dicitur de diversis." Saint Thomas, In Metaphysica, Lib. I, c. 5, lect. 9); it is an "analogue", that is a transcendent attribute that may be predicated of the Necessary Being and of the contingent being alike, of the Ens subsistans, in whom essence is identical with existence, and the Ens participans, whose being is composed of the two separate principles of essence and existence. (Cf. L. Rougier, La Scolastique et le Thomisme, pp. 128-9; 133-4; 469-75. Cf. also M. de Wulf, Hist. de la phil. médiévale, Louvain, 1900, p. 264 sqq.) It becomes, therefore, possible to posit a single Necessary Being on the one hand, and a diversity of contingent beings on the other, deriving their degree of being from the former by way of analogy or participation. "Non enim ens de multis aequivoce dicitur, sed per analogiam, et sic oportet fieri reductionem in unum." (Saint Thomas, Contra Gent. Lib. II, c. XV. Cf. E. Gilson, The Philosophy of Saint Thomas, p. 273.)
for the creature, in so far as he follows out its implications in his experience, the very guarantee of his transcendent nature, as Marcel himself recognises:

D'abord il est évident qu'un être ne réalise pas dans l'immediat, dans le pur maintenant "la plénitude de ce qu'il est", par exemple un sentiment très profond. (J.M. pp. 194-5.)

The type of "participation" he may experience in moments of self-realisation must fall short of a merging of self and essential being.

The implications of this distinction are fruitful with regard to the temporal problem. It is clear that the type of eternal life or totum simul capable of being experienced on earth differs from the Divine eternity and perhaps from that which man himself may hope to enjoy after death.

"Eternal Life, in a real, though not in the fullest sense," writes Von Hügel, "is attributable to man. This lesser eternal life appears to have its range between the pure Simultaneity of God, and mere Clock-time, and to have its

(Note (1) contd. from previous page.)

In Existential philosophy, the distinction between being and essence is preserved in so far as it accounts for the characteristics of contingent beings and notably the fundamental temporal experience of eternity within time, unity within multiplicity. Needless to say, the complex ontological structure of Scholasticism founded thereon, with its hierarchy of beings, goes by the board. We may say that the traditional problem of the one and the many, which the distinction involves, is in the Existential philosophy no longer treated as a problem of speculative theology, but as one of Existential experience; it is concerned with the relation not of existence to Being in general, but rather of the existent self to the essential self in "passionate" experience.
true form in Duration — an ever more or less overlapping succession, capable of being concentrated into quasi-simultaneities. And this lesser eternal life, although unending, is never boundless; nor does it (here below at least) ever become entirely actual (1).

This inferiority, as already suggested, is not one in respect of quality — in the sense of plenitude — but in respect of scope and breadth. The present of existential experience, while enduring from a past into a future, none the less remains contracted within the limits of a present which constitutes, to use Whitehead’s term, an “époque”.

Not all past and future immanent therein is actualised with one single degree of actuality; only those parts relevant to present action emerge as fully actualised, leaving a remnant of what we might call operative possibility. We must, on the other hand, conceive the Divine Being as existing in a present which actualises the whole of his possibilities with one single degree of actuality. It is precisely this notion of the existential present as constituting a contraction that Marcel offers us in a passage describing the relation of past and present:

Disons encore que cette chaîne de rapports temporels, spatiaux, spatiaux-temporels, peut être contractée par mon imagination jusqu’à ce que l’existant pensé me devienne co-présent. L’espèce de champ magnétique où se distibuent ces chaînes toutes ordonnées par rapport à mon existence actuelle est ce que j’appellerai l’orbite existentielle. (R.I. p. 28.)

We see from this that Marcel does not consider the instant in the manner of Saint Augustine as an expansion of the present into the past and future, but rather in the manner of Aristotle as the point of emergence of past and future possibility within the contracted focal point of the present.

What has here taken place is a reversal of the Hegelian identification of the Absolute with the Whole. The Absolute is no longer the Whole or the Infinite, but rather finite experience reflecting and projecting the Whole and the Infinite within its limited range and characterised subjectively by fulness and intensity of feeling (1).

The distinction between the totum simul of human and Divine experience involves that, already discussed, between the types of substantiality and self-causation attributable to them respectively. But there is a more important aspect of the matter which deserves full discussion, as it throws

(1) M. Wahl, in his article on Whitehead, relates this new absolute to Bradley's "finite centre" or "centre of feeling", the unit of being which he eventually designates as the "absolute" (Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 189-90, 246,) and which he distinguishes from the self, the latter being "appearance" (Ibid., pp. 248-9; Appearance and Reality, pp. 103-20).

It may be recalled that the reaction against the identification of the Absolute with universality is a common feature of the Romantic philosophies. The latter, developing the Leibnizian thesis that the best possible world is the one where no possibility is left unrealised, proclaimed that the harmony and rationality of the universe manifest themselves in the maximal differentiation of the creatures and are made actual only in so far as each individual, by the maximum exploitation of his finite possibilities, finds a measure of absolute being within his finiteness itself (Cf. A. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Oxford Univ. Press, 1936, Chp. X).
light on a central problem of Existentialism and one which has become perhaps the major problem confronting French Existentialism in its most recent stage, namely the problem of Value.

To assert that the present of existential experience is the focal point of selected possibilities is to stress the fact that value is conditional on choice or selection and that it involves a measure of limitation. "Realisation therefore," writes Whitehead, "is in itself the attainment of value. But there is no such thing as mere value. Value is the outcome of limitation. The definite finite entity is the selected mode which is the shaping of attainment; apart from such shaping into individual matter of fact there is no attainment. The mere fusion of all that there is would be the nonentity of indefiniteness (1)."

It would seem, then, that value is inseparable from a condition where self-realisation is never full and complete. Bréhier has raised this problem in an important article of which the conclusion deserves quotation: "Pourquoi l'homme ne croit-il pas, au fond, que les valeurs se réaliseront? Pourquoi renvoie-t-il dans le domaine de l'utopie la cité parfaitement juste, la connaissance parfaitement exacte, l'oeuvre d'art porteuse de toutes les beautés? Est-ce par une sorte de découragement, par la conscience d'une imperfection radicale? N'a-t-il pas aussi le sentiment qu'une

réalisation parfaite aurait un aspect définitif, mécanique, qui lui enlèverait tout son prix et qui détendrait les ressorts de la volonté et de l'action? S'il en est ainsi, c'est qu'il y a, présent dans les valeurs, un absolu qui n'est pas lui-même valeur, mais qui interdit de prendre aucune valeur comme se suffisant à elle-même. La philosophie des valeurs ne peut donc pas être autonome: le fait que les valeurs évoquent des aspirations humaines, la manière même, heurtée, imprévisible dont nous aspirons aux valeurs et dont les valeurs se déterminent dans cette aspiration, sont inexplicables dès que l'on pose les valeurs en absolus (1).

We should have, therefore, to infer that value is bound up with that specific type of existence we call human, involving properly human conditions of consciousness where the essential possibilities of the self are never wholly realised. Value would imply necessarily, as the condition of its appearance, what M. Le Senne has termed the "obstacle" and which, according to Bréhier and himself, is present only in human existence. This, however, raises an important problem that is only treated by implication in Marcel's works, but which we might proceed to clarify.

This conception of value as being inherent in human existence and consciousness alone on the lines suggested by Bréhier, has been developed by Valéry and, more especially, by the Idealism that passes under the name of Existentialism (1) Doutes sur la philosophie des valeurs, Rev. de Mét., 1939, p. 414.
evolved by Jean-Paul Sartre; leading to the apotheosis of existence pure and simple, that is of the unconditioned aspirations and exercise of the human will at the expense of essence. Sartre distinguishes between the en-soi, the self-contained necessity of the realised object, and the pour-soi, typified by human consciousness, where alone, by virtue of the "altérité" or subject-object relation it involves, a "néant" intervenes between the self's ideals and its acts and so gives room for freedom. The outcome of such a doctrine is the rejection of any type of eternal life as appertaining wholly to necessary and completed "things", in favour of existence, which is through and through non-completion and temporal striving.

We may suggest, however, that from the point of view of temporal theory there is no justification for that type of opposition which the Idealist of the voluntarist sort sets up between human and Divine experience and existence. And, if we interpret his works correctly, Marcel would reject such an opposition. For if the type of eternity enjoyed by man differs from that which God enjoys or which he himself may enjoy in a fully realised state, the difference need not and must not be one of quality. The present of realisation, for man, is the point of emergence of selective possibilities; it does not realise all in one single degree of actuality. The present of fully realised being is one whose whole range of possibilities are actualised in one single degree. But
this latter eternity is still qualitatively of the same character. It is also pure act where, in one single instant, Being realises its essence by a simple act of its will. Here too there is then choice and selection, but this choice and selection involve a "limitation" that is at one and the same time an infinite fullness.

If this is so, eternity — meaning, in particular, the Divine eternity itself — is not, as Sartre or Bréhier would suppose, non-temporal, nor is it necessity, nor is it external to value. It is freedom, self-creation, temporal fullness and value, but all these in an infinite degree. Is not this what Descartes means when he says the Divinity "fait en quelque façon la même chose à l'égard de soi-même que la cause efficiente à l'égard de son effet (1)", namely that God's eternal existence is a self-creation? It is certainly what Kierkegaard signified when he declared that "eternity is the true repetition (2)"; or when he called attention to the temporal character of God's eternal created activity (3).

We may say that the Divine existence, no less than human existence, is self-creation and self-realisation, an infinite "fidelity" or infinite "repetition".

(2) Concept of Dread, p. 17 note.
(3) "If God Himself had not willed repetition, the world would never have come into existence. He would either have followed the light plans of hope, or He would have recalled it all and conserved it in recollection. This He did not do, therefore the world endures, and it endures for the fact that it is a repetition." (Repetition, p. 6.)
These views are everywhere implicit in Marcel's definitions of value.

La valeur ne peut être pensée comme réalité... que si elle est référée à la conscience d'une destinée immortelle. (H.V. p. 211.)

Qu'on entend par là sinon que la valeur est le miroir dans lequel il nous est donné de lire toujours imparfaitement, toujours à travers une buée déformante, le visage authentique de notre destinée, ce "plus vrai que nous-mêmes" auquel il ne sera donné de s'épanouir dans sa plénitude que dans un monde dont le propre de notre expérience terrestre semble consister à nous ouvrir, à nous entre-bailler, et peut-être dans des cas extrêmes à nous interdire l'accès. (Ibid., p. 213.)

When, therefore, he defines value as he does in such passages, he is placing value neither in a non-temporal state which is indifferent to the process of self-realisation on earth, nor in a finite temporal activity which is indifferent to eternity. He is stressing the fact that existence is the meeting-place of time and eternity, that it exhibits eternity, freedom and value in so far as it participates in that fuller eternity, freedom and value which is the infinite eternal life or immortality. This is the fuller, inner significance of the phrase Marcel wrote at the beginning of the Journal Métaphysique: "Il y a liaison immanente entre la réalité de Dieu et la réalisation de Dieu dans le saint; mais la réalité de Dieu ne peut apparaître au saint que comme ce dont il participe." (J.M. p. 5.)

This conclusion, moreover, is of the utmost importance for our subject. For it involves the view that eternal life
is not, in the strict sense, non-temporal; rather is it a
fullness of time or time-fulness. To deny this would be to
refuse the Divine Being and, indeed, immortal being in general,
existence, freedom and purposive evaluation - in fact
spirituality itself, if we define the latter, as does M. Wahl,
as movement in opposition to the immobility that is
materiality (1).

For what is perhaps most interesting in Marcel's theory
of time is the continuity, albeit distinction, established, as
in Von Hügel, between succession, duration and eternity as
corresponding to varying degrees of reality; for we must
assume there are "des niveaux temporels distincts de réalité
ou de vie". (J.M. p. 195.) They constitute an ascending
hierarchy of orders, each infinite with regard to the inferior
one, and each infinite within its own limits, as is the whole
continuum. Thus, duration, at one pole, merges in succession,
at the other in eternity, while in between infinite degrees of
simultaneity are to be found. Eternity is, then, from the

(1) Etude sur le Parménide, p. 104. It is therefore perfectly
just to declare that Existentialism, as opposed to Platonism,
does not separate essence and existence, even if it distinguishes
between them. (Cf. J. Wahl, Existentialism, a Preface, New
Republic, October, 1945.) What is being affirmed is that
value is the product of a union of essence and existence, each
being of equal importance in its constitution, the one as
providing the ends, the other the means of realisation.
"Recto et verso d'une même 'valeur', l'essence et l'existence
sont coordonnées et dominées par l'acte, mais non l'une par
l'autre. Agir c'est faire exister ce qui mérite d'être, et,
réciproquement, la préfiguration de ce mérite est déjà une
maniÈre d'exister. C'est en ce sens que...nous pouvons nous
hausser à 'imiter Dieu'." (R. Bertrand, Note sur l'essence
et l'existence, Rev. de Mét., July, 1946, p. 198.)
point of view of our contingent, immanent experience, the ever-fleeting "limit" of time; from the transcendental point of view, time is the "image" or "appearance" of eternity. Yet this conception of eternity as transcending, and at the same time a promotion of, time excludes the Platonic and Mediaeval definition of eternity as pure immutability. Marcel himself has declared that it is only in terms of duration that we can attain a "positive view" of eternity. Duration and eternity have in common the feature of dynamism, although differing infinitely, as the relative to the absolute, in the degree of simultaneity obtaining. So that the realised essences, in so far as they can be conceived as transcending duration, are not accurately described as timeless, if by that is meant that they are devoid of all the activity which characterises time. They are rather to be conceived in terms of the actus purus of Aristotle, or the God Causa Sui of Descartes whose existence does not preclude activity or self-creation, but only that activity which comprises growth or depertion (1).

What is more significant still is that Marcel's theory of Time (and of Space) is bound up with a theory of orders of reality. This latter constitutes the central intuition of his metaphysics, no less than that of Pascal with whose (1) On Descartes' theory of time, in many respects similar to that of Marcel, cf. the highly interesting interpretation of J. Vigier, Les idées de temps, de durée et d'éternité dans Descartes, Rev. Phil., 1920.
conceptions the similarity is striking (1). Reality is seen as comprising an infinitely complex hierarchy of infinite and convergent orders situated at varying levels of depth; so that the ultimate being of things is obscurely hidden.

It is this structure of the real which conditions the type of dialectic employed by both Marcel and Pascal. The principal reproach both would direct against the discursive method of Descartes and its universal application to "realities" is that it is valid only for a reality which is, in its essence, clear and distinct. And if Descartes applies it alike to physics and metaphysics, believing reality can be deduced more geometrico, it is because he considers it to be ultimately intelligible, to constitute in its essence a clear and distinct whole; the contradictions or obscurities it seems to contain having a subjective source and being capable of being dissolved by the introduction of order and method into the inquiry. Spinoza's geometrical Monism has its source in such an intuition, so different from that of Marcel or Pascal, expressed in the familiar formula: idea adequatio rei.

Moreover, to say that the real is thus a clear and distinct whole, is to say that it exists on one level; only then can the use of a discursive method be justified. Given,

however a reality whose structure is complex, riddled with contradictions and obscurities, admitting varying levels of being, the application to it of the discursive method can only distort it, transforming the realities it contains into abstract concepts (the process of generalising being at bottom a process of levelling), decanting them of their concrete and qualitatively distinct content. There is therefore required, as Marcel and Pascal have both comprehended, a type of dialectic which, avoiding such distortion, consists in "submitting" to the real and, through sensation and feeling, by a sort of absorption, penetrating into ever deeper levels of experience, probing ever deeper layers of reality; approaching through the medium of duration, although without ever wholly attaining, complete one-ness with the eternal essences of selves and things.

There remains one final point to stress. It is the fact that the moments of self-realisation or communion procured by the transcending of time in depth are discontinuous. And this is where, whatever points of similarity obtain between them, Marcel parts company with a Whitehead, for instance, whose thought is rooted in and rarely transcends a philosophy of nature - and where Marcel reveals himself as a strict Existentialist. The rift in existence is a central theme of
his thought. He sees it subject to an irrevocable "law of intermittence" (R.I. p. 53.) A wholly continuous transcending of objectivity and the realm of "having" is impossible for the finite creature:

Une condamnation sans appel de l'avoir équivaudrait au fond à la plus teméraire répudiation de l'existence finie par l'être fini lui-même... si nous restons, si faiblement que ce soit, permeables à l'espérance, ce ne peut être qu'à la faveur des brèches, des fissures qui subsistent dans l'armure d'avoir qui nous recouvre. (H.V. p. 83.)

Fidelity is no "preliminary datum", for "the faithful soul is doomed to undergo the experience of night" and "it is through these errors and those vicissitudes that we are given to see the intermittent gleam of the indefectible". (Ibid., p. 210.)

It cannot constitute the "permanence of an essence", meaning by that the sort of continuity obtaining in the field of logic or even, we may add, in the field of organic nature. (and it is this latter type of continuity that Whitehead's doctrine stipulates).

Taken with the fact that in moments of realisation and communion man cannot enjoy possession in its fullest sense, this still more fundamental fact of his incapacity to achieve a continuity even of such moments of plenitude condemns him, not, as we shall see, to despair but to the condition of homo viator, of searcher, and endless searcher, after that life and that final communion which immortality alone can bring. His life is a transcendent movement towards a state of transcendence whose image he bears within his immortal soul, but of
which the full vision will not be vouchsafed on this earth.

In conclusion, the central fact in Marcel's doctrine of Time is the claim that time may be transcended only by a deepening of temporal experience and not by any relief from temporal conditions (1). Emerging from Objectivity into Existence the self, in moments of profound personal experience, transcends the successivity characteristic of objective thinking and recovers the "instant" or point of intersection between time and eternity; and by the exploitation of what is most real in time, working through the powers of immediacy—sensation, memory and premonition—it realizes by ever deeper penetrations, although fragmentarily and partially, the transcendent essence immanent within it, or communes, no less partially and fragmentarily, with the transcendent essences of other selves and things; building as far as it may a stable order of personal relationships by that "spirit of metamorphosis which, from our fleeting world, can extract the changeless." (H.V. p. 358.)

In this view Marcel is in line with the positive mysticism of Saint Augustine and Von Hügel, and no less with the temporal theories of Phenomenology and Existentialism. Being is

revealed only in Existence, and for this reason only "dans le drame et à travers le drame (1)." The Existentialist starts from the union of general and particular, the point of intersection between Time and Eternity. The instant of duration, which is the temporal mode of existential experience, alone provides a gateway to the Eternal: "moments théopathiques", M. Jean Grenier calls them, in which we become "témoins d'une présence (2)." It is in this sense that Max Scheler has defined the aim of metaphysics as the discovery of the "Eternal in man" and adds: "Darum darf das Ewige kein Asyl sein, in das man flieht, weil man Leben und Geschichte nicht mehr ertragen zu können meint. Und das wären schlechte 'Aeternisten', die nur aus Geschichtsflucht sich der Idee des Ewigen hingäben... Die Geschichte anerkennen, sie sehen in ihrer harten Realität - aber sie zu speisen aus dem Borne des Ewigen, ist angemessener als sie fliehen (3)."

In conformity with those directives of Existentialism, the metaphysics of Gabriel Marcel is concerned with the realisation and the revelation of Being in and through

(1) Cf. Von Hügel: "For man's soul, though it does not energise in mere Clock-time, cannot grow if we attempt to eliminate Duration, that interpenetrative, overlapping kind of Succession, which is already, as it were, halfway to the Simultaneity of God." (The Mystical Element in Religion, Vol. II, p. 235.)
(2) L'Individu et l'Absolu, Fontaine, Feb., 1942.
(3) Vom Ewigen im Menschen, Erster Band, Halbband I., Leipzig, Der Neue Geist-Verlag, 1923, p. 2.
concrete, particular situations (1). For him, Metaphysics is grounded in history and drama; it is the philosophy of the concrete and, as such, sees in Time the sole avenue of approach to Eternal Being. The reality of Time, not as itself a substance, but as the essential mode of realisation and apprehension of substances, that is the very cornerstone of Marcel's metaphysics. For Existence, in the words of Jaspers, is itself "Tiefe der Zeit".

(1) In this respect, Marcel's philosophy reveals itself once more in opposition to Thomism and faithful to the phenomenological method as practised by the Existentialists. The "essences" are not attained, as it were, in themselves, thanks to a process of abstraction whereby the contingent conditions of time and space are dissolved. On the contrary, they are "revealed" in the concrete spatio-temporal situations in which they are involved.
CHAPTER VIII
SPACE, TIME AND EXISTENCE

I. Space.

Hitherto, we have dealt only with the temporal instant. But Marcel's analysis of the "instant", which is the unit of existential experience, is richer and more complex than might at first appear. In common with philosophers such as Whitehead and Alexander, he affirms the inseparability of Time and Space. He conceives the instant of living experience not only as temporal but spatial, identical with the spatio-temporal event of contemporary physics. In fact, his theory of Time has an almost exact parallel in his theory of Space. As we have already seen, such a doctrine of Space was already anticipated by his doctrine of Time. Now let us see how it is developed in terms of his conception of presences and participations. This development follows on naturally from his recognition of the "spatiality" of time. For to say that temporal experience involves a varying element of "distance" as between present and past is to say that the relation between the two is that of a "dialogue" where each preserves its distinction within communion. The relation of the self's present to its past in its "pure" spatiality is the prototype of the relation between self and other selves and things. Spatiality is, in Marcel's philosophy, if we may put it this
way, simply temporal experience seen in depth: it is the medium for communications and presences: it is that which gives spiritual substance and volume to subjective experience developing in time.

In speaking of the distinction between the orders of "Being" and "Having", we have already noted that both Time and Space are modes of "having". Reflective thought, indeed, in order to analyse its object, requires to situate any given reality in successive points of Space as of Time:

The objectifying activity of thought consists essentially in the alienation of the self from the real. And the degree of this alienation may be said to vary in exact proportion to the degree in which the self adheres, in space, to the reality, whether it be its own essential self, or some other self or thing:

In other words, objective, conceptual Space, with its implied dispersion, separation and division may, in moments of
Existence and participation, be transcended and immediate contact in Space secured with Being. Thus in death itself, which seems to be the very triumph of Space, in so far as it implies radical separation. Yet, when properly understood, when experienced, death is seen to be the annihilation of Space; for the dead who, to reflection, appear separated and lost, are "present" in the minds of those who love intensely and grieve for them. In such experience, Space is transcended in so far as it means separation and "éloignement", and yields to the feeling of some one who is immediately present in Space:

Le mort n'est plus "nulle part", mais seulement en moi. (E.A. p. 43.)

Négation de l'espace - négation de la mort. (Ibid., p. 42.)

This transcending of Space, in moments of existential experience and in the participations of sensation and feeling, like the transcending of Time, is not accomplished by a destruction of Space, by any gratuitous release from spatial conditions (1), but rather by virtue of a return to what is most real in Space; that is, to the concrete "spatial instant" of immediate experience. The vision and possession

(1) As is involved, for example, in the mystic experience of the Platonic type. Cf. Rousseau: "Alors tous les objets particuliers lui échappent; il ne voit et ne sent rien que dans le tout. Il faut que quelque circonstance particulière resserre ses idées et circonscrive son imagination, pour qu'il puisse observer par parties cet univers qu'il s'efforçait d'embrasser." (Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, VIIe Rêverie.)
of Being is secured, not outwith, but within the limits of deep experience with its irradicable spatio-temporal structure.

There is here involved a distinction, parallel to the temporal distinction between succession and duration, between objective, conceptual space on the one hand and real, concrete space on the other. As modern psychology teaches, there exists, in contrast with the homogeneous, uniform, conceptual space, which is an intellectual construct, a qualitative sentiment of space, as much an immediate datum of experience as is the "specious present" of duration, and differing entirely from the homogeneous, uniform, geometrical space, in that it exhibits qualitative differences of direction. Such is the "spatial instant", the unit of concrete spatial experience (what Marcel calls the "here", corresponding to the temporal "now").

It is by virtue of this "spatial instant" (inseparable from the temporal "instant") that objective space may be transcended in sensation and feeling. As long as we remain within objective space, in which realities are isolated as so many "objects" in fixed points of a continuum which serves as a receptacle for our representations, we convert the universe of selves and realities into a system of irreversible and fixed relations expressing, in quantitative terms of distance, the qualitative spatial relationships obtaining in immediate experience between selves and between selves and our self. In immediate experience alone, in moments of Existence, we
recapture the "spatial instant" which, like the temporal
"instant", permits, to a greater or less degree, a prise de
contact with reality; the self, other selves and things
becoming, to a greater or a less degree, "present" to us:

...il y a déjà dans le fait de penser à quelqu'un (1)
une active négation de l'espace, c'est-à-dire de
ce qu'il y a de plus matériel et aussi de plus
illusoire dans l'avec. (E.A. p. 42.)

This theory of Space, in keeping with the theory of Time,
makes room for all varieties of meta-psychical phenomena.
What memory, for example, is with regard to Time, telepathy
is with regard to Space. Both constitute "indices
ontologiques", by virtue of which realities are grasped
outwith the seeming limits of normal spatio-temporal
experience: "...la télépathie ne serait-elle pas par rapport
à l'espace, ce que la mémoire est au temps?" (Ibid., p. 140,
n. 1.) We said before that Marcel's doctrine of communica-
tions between selves depends upon the validity of such meta-
psychical and seemingly supra-normal experiences. He admits
the claims of telepathy, he allows too for "materialisations"
in space from the future or the past, or from distant points
of space. His dramas are full of such "meetings" (in the
spatial as well as the temporal sense), such contacts and
occult influences from beyond the grave or from distant
spheres, putting us in communication with "presences";
contacts which transcend the conditions of normal space-time

(1) Marcel employs the term "penser à" (or andenken) to
describe participation and immediacy.
experience and localised in the spatio-temporal "instant". Nor must such experiences be considered, in Marcel's view, abnormal. All personal relationships involve, however little it may be realised, telepathic communication and even "materialisations". As do memory and premonition, they nourish "fidelity" and make possible personal attachments.

It is worth while underlining once again, in passing, that this theory of participations and communications is "magical" in character, bearing, as before suggested, considerable resemblance with the "idéalisme magique" of Novalis and other German Romantics:

J'exprimerais cela en disant que le Andenken est magique en son fond; qu'il va à l'être même par delà les intermédiaires dits psychologiques (dont la nature ontologique demeure d'ailleurs pour nous impénétrable). (Ibid., p. 43.)

Although denying that what is essentially a "metaphysical act" is a mere imaginative construction, as Proust and the Idealists declare, he yet notes that it always presents "une face correspondant à l'activité de la pensée prise comme édification ou comme reconnaissance". (Ibid.) Such a passage suffices to show that Marcel's Realism, as already stressed, is not of the naive type, aiming at the seizure of an object which is, so to speak, "already there". The revelation of the Transcendent is accompanied by a transforming activity of the subject mind; there is novelty in every act of participation, novelty on both sides of the "relation" of immediacy. The two terms of Transcendence and Immanence are intertwined in the theory of participation.
The "suppression of distances" in such supra-normal experience is "liée à une transformation de la notion physique d'espace" (Ibid., p. 104); moreover, the possibility of such experience depends upon a theory of orders. We must assume that Space, like Time, admits of varying levels of reality (corresponding to the varying levels at which the reality may be experienced). Space comprises a hierarchy of "zones concentriques" of diminishing reality. At one pole it is pure Objectivity and quantitative relation, at the other it is pure Subjectivity, pure concreteness and quality. Between these two poles there is room for infinite degrees of concreteness. In so far as reality or essences exist in the fully realised state, they would have the spatial characteristic of absolute concreteness (a spatial simultaneity analogous to temporal simultaneity; a "spacelessness" which is none other than a "space-fulness", as "timelessness" is in fact a "time-fulness"). This absolute spatial concreteness is of course denied to the creature; but, in so far as he exploits the "instant" of immediate spatial experience, he can approach it and participate, to a greater or less degree, in the "space-less" essences of the real; establish, to a greater or less degree, a "one-ness" with his self or other selves, and abolish quantitative spatial relation. In relation to another self, he may dissolve the spatial obstacles set between them, penetrating beyond the intervening "concentric zones" which form about him a sort of core of resistance protecting him as a "soi", and attain spatial
intimacy with the other:

Il a pu arriver à certains d'entre nous de faire telle ou telle rencontre qui brisait en quelque sorte les cadres de cette topographie personnelle et égocentrique; je peux comprendre par expérience que d'un inconnu rencontré par hasard monte un appel irresistible au point de renverser soudain toutes les perspectives; ce qui paraissait immédiatement proche semble soudain infiniment lointain, et inversement. Ce sont là des expériences transitoires, des brèches qui se referment aussitôt; je crois cependant que ces expériences - si decevanties soient-elles, et elles le sont au point de laisser au fond du coeur une impression d'amère tristesse et comme de derision - ont cet avantage inappreciable de nous faire prendre brusquement conscience du caractère contingent de ce que j'ai appelé notre espace mental, et des cristallisations qui en fondent la possibilité. (Ibid., pp. 102-3.)

The condition of such a transcending of Space is a "deepening" of experience, by virtue of a "deepening" of the "spatial instant"; a progressive penetration of what is "most real" in Space; an unremitting extraction of its inmost concreteness, permitting a corresponding participation in Being at its varying levels of reality.

We see then that the structure of the real, for Marcel, on its spatial side corresponds exactly with that on its temporal side, and likewise how such a structure conditions the "dialectic in depth" employed by Marcel in his ontological enquiry.

Moreover, it is such a "deepening" of Space and its "instant" that accounts for the possibility of the supra-normal experiences described above. As long as we take objective space as reference, they are unaccountable. If, on the
contrary, we admit a qualitative view of space and varying
qualitative levels of space, we can comprehend how space may
be "annihilated" in deep existential experience. For the
"spatial instant" itself contains implicit within it the
"whole" of Space; all things, in immediate experience, are
virtually present to us in space (and at all times), as is my
body. And at certain moments, by virtue, for example, of
telepathy which, like memory and premonition, is a unique
type of participation allowing a peculiarly deep penetration
of reality, "distant" realities may become actually present in
the "spatial instant". The self, descending into ever
deepen levels of space, approaches progressively nearer the
ultimate "space-less" or absolute spatial simultaneity
which is the ideal realm of transcendent essences and where
all "distance" is abolished. The more it descends in depth
of spatial experience, the more it may attain "one-ness" with
the reality it experiences; the more it becomes possible for
such a reality, over and beyond all distance, death and
separation (contingent in character as they are), to
communicate directly with the self.

As in the case of Time, the means of such a transcending
of the objective categories of Space and of entering the
"space-less" order is provided by Space itself - by what is
most real in it, a concrete Space of immediate feeling, which
opens on, in proportion to the level of experience attained,
to the transcendent, "space-less" realm. For the "time-less",
"space-less" realities are realised and made manifest only in Space and Time, of which the complex structure of Existence is woven.

In his last two works (Homo Viator and Du Refus à l' Invocation) Marcel has taken up in greater detail the problem of spatial experience in a series of phenomenological studies aimed at clarifying the content of "being-in-situation" (être-en-situation). In his already published article on Jaspers he had noted that "the representation which we form of a situation is essentially spatial". (R.I. p. 301.) Being is always "en situation" (Da-sein), subject to limiting conditions of space no less than of time. The existential experience of the subject, as lived in the primitive ontic experience or cogito, is experience of a subject with which the universe is co-present, although this compresence may be distorted or denied. And it is this co-presence of things with self which gives experience its volume and density. Experience reveals

l'existence non seulement d'un soi, mais d'un monde où le soi se reconnaît, s'exerce, se répand; monde intermédiaire entre le clos et l'ouvert, entre l'avoir et l'être, et dont mon corps apparaît nécessairement comme le symbole ou le noyau matérialisé. Mais il est permis de supposer que nous sommes dupes des plus grossières apparences lorsque nous hypostasions, lorsque nous traitons comme une réalité indépendante et refermée sur soi ce qui n'est
It is the presence of this "Atlantide métaphysique" which is the fundamentum of spatial experience.

This is borne out, declares Marcel in his essay on *Moi et Autrui* in *Homo Viator*, by the analysis of the conditions in which the individual posits itself as a self or person. Taking as an example the child that offers flowers he has gathered to his mother and who exclaims: "Regarde, c'est moi que les ai cueillies," he notes that there is implicit in the positing of self a type of exclusion: "it is I and not another;" but, paradoxically, an exclusion which is at the same time an inclusion, for the very act of excluding others includes at least one other, a "toi" to whom the child addresses himself and whom he takes as witness of his very selfhood. In every such act of affirmation "je me produis, c'est-à-dire je me mets en avant". (H.V. p. 17.) Moreover, there is a reference not only to a "toi" but to the flowers held out for admiration, to a whole complex which is posited with the self:

"Poursuivant notre analyse, nous constaterons que ce moi, ici présent, traité comme centre..."
d’aimantation, ne se laisse pas réduire à un contenu spécifiable qui serait "mon corps, mes mains, mon cerveau"; c’est une présence globale. Présence glorifiée par le magnifique bouquet que moi j’ai cueilli, que moi je t’apporte; et je ne sais pas si tu devras admirer davantage le goût dont il témoigne ou la générosité dont je fais preuve en te le donnant, moi qui aurais si bien pu le garder pour moi. C’est ainsi que la beauté de l’objet rejaillit en quelque façon sur moi, et si je fais appel à toi, encore une fois, c’est comme à un témoin qualifié que j’invite à s’émerveiller de l’ensemble que nous formons le bouquet et moi. (H.V. pp. 16-17.)

In short, there is at the root of all experience a compresence of the world in space with the self:

Présence signifie plus et autre chose que le fait d’être là; en toute rigueur, on ne peut pas dire d’un objet qu’il soit présent. Disons que la présence est toujours sous-tendue par une expérience à la fois irreductible et confuse qui est le sentiment même d’exister, d’être au monde. (Ibid., p. 18.)

But a compresence which, becoming fully conscious, leaves the self free to alienate in space to a greater or less degree the autrui which is given with it:

De très bonne heure s’opère chez l’être humain une jonction, une articulation entre cette conscience d’exister que nous n’avons sans doute pas de raison valable de dénier à l’animal, et la prétention de se faire reconnaître par l’autre - ce témoin, ce recours, ou ce rival, ou cet adversaire qui, quoi qu’on ait pu dire, fait partie intégrante de moi-même, mais dont la position peut varier presque indéfiniment dans mon champ de conscience. (Ibid.)

It is thus impossible to assign to the self precise, defined frontiers; the self is but an "accent" which is conferred upon some particular aspect of an experience which is global:
Si cette analyse est exacte dans son ensemble, il faudra voir dans ce que j'appelle moi, non pas du tout une réalité isolable, que ce soit un élément ou un principe, mais un accent que je confère, non pas, bien entendu, à mon expérience dans sa totalité, mais à telle portion ou tel aspect de cette expérience que j'entends sauvegarder particulièrement contre telle atteinte ou telle infraction possible. C'est en ce sens qu'on a souvent, et à juste titre, fait ressortir l'impossibilité qu'il y a à assigner à ce moi des frontières précises. (Ibid., pp. 18-19.)

It becomes possible to practise localisations in space which are more or less arbitrary. For if "moi ici présent" (the self present to self in the spatio-temporal instant of self-realisation) implies necessarily a reference to the "other", this very localisation of the self in a spatio-temporal present may, by a gratuitous disjunction operated by objective thought, lead to an exclusion from this "here" and "now" of the global realities of which it is the focal point. That is, the ici maintenant is taken to be a point in spatio-temporal succession, a discontinuous moment of the space-time nexus, and at one and the same time the real self is alienated and the other selves with which it is compresent disjoined from it. For it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the ici maintenant of immediate existential experience is but a focal point wherein, temporally, is mirrored both past, present and future of the self and of the others with which it has sustained relations and also, spatially, the multiple intricate spatial contacts which these enjoy with each other. It is a whole within a whole, the point wherein
the essence of self and selves achieve realisation and communion within the framework of space-time.

"Incarnation", the "donnée-pivot" is, of course, the central fact governing the mode of spatial representation or rather the mode of existence in space. For it is by our manner of experiencing our body that we are or are not spatially in contact with the universe and others. For we can "opposer le j'appartiens à dans un monde clos au j'appartiens à dans un monde ouvert, et montrer que le second seul comporte une justification positive". (R.I. p. 129.)

We can admit or accept the "cohésion fondamentale" implicit in the experience of the body or not, and on this acceptance or non-acceptance, which is the foundation-stone of liberty, depends the transcending of objective, quantitative space, and thus self-realisation or communion with others:

De même qu'il est de mon essence en tant que vivant d'être en situation, il est de l'essence de mon corps en tant que mien d'être la substance de l'épreuve qui est à la lettre constitutive de moi-même, puisqu'au terme je serai ou ne serai point. (Ibid., p. 136.)

And in this act of adhering to my body (j'appartiens à mon corps) lies the only "authentic liberty" as opposed to the negation of the body (and thus of the transcendent) represented in the extreme case by Kirillov in Dostoievski's Possessed, for whom suicide is proclaimed the true freedom. (Ibid., p. 137.) Herein lies the initial mystery, whose connection with spatial experience is manifest - "le mystère initial et en son tréfonds impénétrable de la 'naissance-au-
réel". (Ibid., p. 123.) For therein the self is grasped as "le porteur de certaines énergies mystérieuses, cosmiques ou spirituelles, dont lui-même sent obscurement la transcendance". (Ibid., p. 127.) Upon this attitude adopted towards the body depends, in fact, our qualitative experience of space:

Il est trop évident que lorsque nous disons: le propre de l'homme est d'être en situation, nous ne visons ni exclusivement, ni même principalement, le fait qu'il occupe une place dans l'espace; mais il y aurait lieu ici de procéder en quelque sorte par graduations et de montrer comment des déterminations en apparence purement spatiales sont susceptibles de se qualifier d'une façon de plus en plus interne. (Ibid., pp. 113-14.)

Thus, for example, the situation where one lives in a valley between two mountains, a situation expressed spatially by the preposition between (entre); for the man living in that valley this preposition presents "if not a dynamic at least a pre-dynamic schema" (Ibid., p. 114): he can feel as if he were held in a vice or as if he were occupying a mediatory position, etc. Such situations for the living and existing being are no mere "spatial determinations" but "qualified situations":

C'est seulement au prix d'une abstraction vicieuse que nous dissocions ce vivant, le fait qu'il vit, et les schémes dynamiques par lesquels s'exprime sa situation. En réalité, tout cela est rigoureusement inseparable. (Ibid.)

All sorts of other seemingly external relationships, such as influences and environment can likewise be expressed in terms of qualitative space:
Dans l'un et l'autre cas, certaines connexions qu'on serait tenté au premier abord de juger purement externes s'intériorisent, se qualifient par conséquent, et du même coup qualifient à leur tour une certaine manière d'être ou de se sentir. (Ibid., p. 117.)

They are all functions of a certain consciousness of that "primitive dynamism" or spatio-temporal cosmic rhythm already spoken of.

But the most important point is that this communion admits of qualitative degrees:

Il est clair, d'autre part, que nous ne prenons pas une conscience également vive ou intense à chaque moment de notre durée de ce "dynamisme primitif". (Ibid., p. lll.)

It varies, parallel with the consciousness of time, from the consciousness of an objective, quantitative space to that of "l'espace interne", the spatial ici or instant wherein self and things are present and realised and which corresponds to the temporal maintenant.

Marcel has clarified his notion of this "real space" in his article on Rilke. There he relates Rilke's "passion for space" manifested in his cult of the Russian steppe, to his cult of "intimacy":

Je ne pense pas qu'on puisse séparer l'impression profonde et durable que devait lui laisser son voyage en Russie en 1899, de cette passion de la distance et des lointains, mais il faut ajouter aussitôt que cette passion elle-même se conjugue chez lui avec son culte de l'intimité.

(H.V. pp. 302-3.)

The intimacy of which Marcel speaks is that of the "presence" of self or selves. And it is essentially spatial:
Peut-être pourrait-on dire sans paradoxe que l'intimité pour lui n'exclut pas la distance, mais peut-être en quelque façon l'exige.

Abstand, Entfernung, Ferne - voilà des mots essentiellement rilkiens. (Ibid., p. 303.)

In a passage which further clarifies Marcel's views he comments on Rilke's concept of the "open":

L'ouvert, c'est ce qui entoure la créature - mais non pas à la façon de l'espace vide ou d'un fluide dans lequel baignent les choses; c'est le fait que la créature est finie, qu'elle a une limite, ou plus exactement, c'est l'autre aspect, l'aspect corrélatif de celui-là. Il ne s'agit donc pas de la limite relative d'un être, c'est-à-dire en somme de ce qui n'est qu'adjacent, mais de sa limite absolue, de l'Autre pur et simple, de l'Autre en tant qu'Autre, c'est-à-dire de Dieu, de la puissance créatrice de Dieu. Ceci s'éclaire du point de vue psychologique si l'on songe qu'il y a des actes qui sont déterminés par un objet: le fait de considérer une chose, de l'éprouver, de la façonner, etc.; mais qu'il en est aussi d'autres qui n'ont pas à proprement parler d'objet, mais qui consistent soit à s'enfoncer dans l'être, à explorer ses profondeurs, soit à rayonner hors de lui et au-dessus de lui comme pour le survoler. Dans les deux cas, la limite est dépassée, mais non pas en ce qu'on la franchit pour passer à côté: elle est dépassée absolument. Cet absolument (überhaupt), c'est dans un cas le mystère de l'intériorité, dans l'autre, celui de la transcendance (Enthoberheit), et de l'espace absolu (absolute Weite). Dans les deux cas, l'homme se laisse lui-même derrière soi en tant qu'être particulier qui observe, juge, convoite, etc., et accomplit ainsi son être de pure créature. L'être se distend, commence à fleurir, et devient ainsi lui-même. L'ouvert, c'est la direction dans laquelle ceci se réalise. Nous avons vu la semaine dernière que, pour Rilke, la religion ou Dieu lui-même est une direction du cœur. Nous voyons ici que l'ouvert peut être conçu en hauteur et en étendue, mais aussi selon la perspective de l'intimité et du secret. (Ibid., pp. 338-9.)
Marcel adopts for himself this definition of the "open", inasmuch as it fits in with his opposition between "the closed" and "the open" derived from Bergson. From the point of view of space-theory what is important is the conception of a real or absolute space—what is most real in space—the ici whose very localisation exhibits the presence of the transcendent and is its means of realisation and revelation. "L'ouvert c'est la direction dans laquelle ceci se réalise," (Ibid.)—in every respect comparable in function with the temporal "now".

This space is what Marcel calls "l'espace interne" and he also calls it "cosmic space" (and also Weltinnenraum). It is the locus of that "cosmic rhythm" wherein all realities exist and energise in space and time.

Rilke has restored this consciousness of cosmic space and rhythm, of the presence of our selves to the universe and of it to us:

...cet amour révérentiel du crée que les hommes de ma génération auront vu se tarir sous leurs yeux en tant d'âmes vouées au désespoir et à la plus miserable adulation de soi. (Ibid., p. 356.)

The condition of such restoration of presences and of their realisation and revelation is the return to immediate existential experience, to the spatial instant of such experience, by a sounding of what Rilke calls the "dimensions en profondeur de notre dedans". (Ibid., p. 350.)
In the importance given to concrete space, Marcel differs considerably from Bergson, and is more in conformity with psychological fact. Whereas Bergson makes an absolute opposition between Space and Time, the one pure objectivity, the other pure subjectivity and concreteness, Marcel distinguishes rightly between conceptual, objective Time and Space on the one hand and concrete Time and Space on the other (1). Psychology discerns, indeed, in immediate experience a qualitative sentiment of Space, which is as much a "donnée absolue de la conscience" as temporal duration. In fact, even Bergson is led to recognise what he calls a "spatialité des choses" (2). There is thus a Space as there is a Time, not therefore to be opposed to each other, but to be contrasted with the conceptual, objective Space and Time, which are a product of the analytic intelligence.

But Marcel goes further, in that for him Space and Time are inextricably conjoined. We were obliged to treat them separately to facilitate our analysis. But in actual fact, the unit of existential experience, which serves as a portal to the Transcendent, is neither a wholly temporal nor a wholly spatial instant, but a spatio-temporal instant. The structure of the real is through and through spatio-temporal: a conception identical with that of Whitehead and Alexander. Moreover, if we bear in mind that the spatio-temporal instant is the locus of all spiritual essences, their point of inter-

(2) Bergson, Evolution créatrice, p. 221.
section with the space-time order of created life, when it is stressed that all such essences may be defined as "Forms" in the sense of forces or centres of spiritual energy manifested and actualised in space-time, it is seen that Marcel's universe of selves, with its contacts, communications and participations, all of them "energising" in Space-Time, closely resembles the universe of spatio-temporal "events" and "centres of energy" familiar to contemporary physical science and to the philosophies derived therefrom.

But the conception of space outlined, especially related to that of an infinite, Absolute Space, has perhaps a deeper significance and source. It brings to mind the religious space-philosophies developed in the 17th century, notably Thomas-More's doctrine of space as the Divine Presence (1), and more especially that of Thomas Traherne. In the latter we find the Divine Space assimilated to "internal space" and what is, at bottom, "intimacy". "It surroundeth us continually on every side, it fills us, and inspires us. It is so mysterious, that it is wholly within us, and even then it wholly seems and is without us... Our bodies themselves are not so much ours, or within us as that is (2)." The similarity is no less striking in the way in which Traherne links Space and Time, Absolute Space and Eternity, as together constituting an infinite duration which is simultaneously an

infinite comprence and which is the focal point of the mystic experience of communion. "This is the space that is at this moment only present before our eyes, the only space that was, or that will be, from everlasting to everlasting. This moment exhibits infinite space, but there is a space also wherein all moments are infinitely exhibited, and the everlasting duration of infinite space is another region and room of joys. Wherein all ages appear together, all occurrences stand up at once, and...give an inward infinity to this moment, and compose an eternity that is seen by all comprehensors and enjoyers (1)."

II. Spatio-temporal Situation.

Taken together, Space and Time as modes of objective thought are "modes conjugués de l'absence". (P.A. p. 172.) They involve the alienation of reality and its conversion into an "object". They are, for this reason, the fundamental forms of "temptation" and "treason". (E.A. p. 30.) On the one hand, they deliver over self and selves to an infinite spatio-temporal succession. On the other, by reaction as it were, they harden the self in that attitude of pride, possessiveness and "indisponibilité" which is the negation of metaphysical and ontological consciousness:

Dans le fait de reconnaître son insignifiance par rapport à l'infini du temps et de l'espace, se combinent l'orgueil et la fausse humilité, car on prétend coincider idéalement avec ce double infini réalisé comme objet du connaître. (E.A. p. 30.)

It is in this attitude, suggests Marcel, that we have the origin of that rationalistic Pantheism or Monism whose chief representative is Spinoza - "God-drunk" or, more appropriately "drunk with the Infinite".

Yet if Space and Time as "phenomenal" are the agents of dispersion, sin and despair, they provide, by what is real in them, the instruments of our salvation. As such, they are "conjugated modes" of presentification and participation. For, in the qualitative spatio-temporal instant of immediate experience, Being - self, selves and things - is realised and revealed. It constitutes a point of intersection between the "time-less", "space-less" (or better "time-ful"),
"space-ful") essences of things and the contingent forms of Space-Time: It provides thus the gateway to and the means of realising or apprehending the Transcendent. Salvation is only by way of immanent subjective experience, with its irradicable concrete spatio-temporal structure, by virtue of a return to the "here" and the "now":

Vertigineuse proximité de Dieu. Retour à l'ici, au maintenant, qui reprennent une valeur, une dignité sans analogue. (Ibid.)

In proportion as the "here" and "now" of concrete spatio-temporal experience is exploited, is penetrated, widened and deepened, as the subject transcends the residue of "objectivity" it contains, he experiences, at ever deeper levels, the "Time-lessness" and "Space-lessness" characteristic of essential Being; he realises correspondingly his Essential Self, participates correspondingly in other selves and things, in their spatio-temporal simultaneity, in a "Time-less", "Space-less" present, albeit without ever attaining wholly this ideal limit.

Thus the "instant" of immediate experience is through and through, neither wholly temporal nor wholly spatial, but spatio-temporal. What gives it its "depth" and its "substance" is precisely this union within it of the ici and the maintenant:

Le passé et l'avenir, au sein du profond, se rejoignent dans une zone qui est à ce que j'appelle le présent ce que l'Ici absolu est à l'ici contingent; et cette zone où le maintenant et le alors tendent à se confondre, comme tout à l'heure le proche et le lointain,
Finally, the spatio-temporal structure of experience is, in Marcel's philosophy, function of a system of orders or levels of reality which, in its turn, conditions the "dialectic in depth" of existential and subjective thinking, which aims, through sensation and feeling and the allied, semi-occult powers of immediacy, at probing the hard core of immanence, and at participating, at ever deeper levels, in the Transcendent Essences actualised in Space-Time (2).

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In its spatio-temporal structure, human existence appears to Marcel as essentially dramatic. His main criticism of Kantism is directed against its "anthropocentrisme" (R.I. p. 45) and the principal feature of this "anthropocentrisme" which is to posit the self as, in a sense, creator of a reality in terms of its own constitutive and purely formal space-time laws:

Il ne s'agit pas ici de faire appel à rien qui ressemble aux postulats kantiens, puisque ceux-

(1) Le Sentiment du profond, loc. cit.
(2) "Il faut qu'il y ait un ordre de l'univers comme il y a une dialectique de l'expérience intime, comme il y a une hiérarchie des façons de vouloir et d'aimer... En sorte qu'il est bien vrai, au sens métaphysique le plus substantiel du mot, que c'est aux cimes de l'action personnelle, dans les espaces transparents de la conscience prophétique, que se révèle à l'âme militante l'ultime secret de sa nature, de sa destinée." (Hocking, Rev. Phil., 1919, p. 54.)
ci n'intéressent qu'un sujet pur, considéré autant qu'il est possible en dehors de ses conditions d'insertion dans une expérience concrète qui présente un degré de spécification en quelque sorte infini. Ces postulats ne se laissent pas concevoir en dehors d'un formalisme moral qui semble précisément ne reconnaître ce qu'il y a d'irréductible dans le drame humain, dans le fait que toute vie humaine se développe à la façon d'un drame. (H.V. pp. 8-9.)

This denial of any but a subjective, formal reality to space and time is the necessary accompaniment of a pure Idealism which takes as its premiss a self detached from reality and isolated from the transcendent of selves and things and, no less, from the process or "drama" wherein and whereby this transcendent is progressively revealed, affirmed and brought to consciousness. For a philosophy, on the contrary, which starts from the primitive fact of "incarnation" the "acte infiniment mystérieux par lequel une essence prend corps", for such a philosophy the dramatic structure of existence becomes central.

Marcel has come to employ the image of the "voyage" to describe this character of existence and to stress most fully and clearly its spatio-temporal characteristics:

Rien ne saurait de prime abord sembler plus irrationnel que de lier l'existence d'un ordre terrestre stable à la conscience d'une position qualifiée d'itinerante, c'est-à-dire à la situation fondamentale du voyageur. (H.V. p. 6.)

And yet such it is, he believes: and in such terms may be described the "fundamental situation" of "being-in-situation", of which all other situations are but variations. So much
so, that we may say: "être, c'est être en route". For by such a description we underline the essential spatio-temporal conditions which govern spirituality and the process of realisation and participation in Being:

Existence is the mode of living wherein the transcendent manifests itself both in space and time: by virtue of the spatio-temporal "instant" or "ici-maintenant" of real experience, focal point of past, present and future and focal point of "presences".

Existence, defined as a "voyage" or a "pelerinage", in conformity with Rilke's conception (H.V.p. 314), is then essentially transcendence, a movement of transcendence tending towards the future of full self-realisation, of fully realised presences, with its term in God - a movement which, however discontinuous and broken in fact, is yet continuous by the intention by which it is supported and driven. A movement which is at once temporal and spatial: "Dieu c'est une direction donnée à l'amour." This movement, this élan which Marcel defines as "hope" has, for its mode of action, the spatio-temporal "here and now", acquired by an exerci...
of "fidelity" or the "voeu créateur" which makes of the present a focal-point of past, present and future and of past, present and future presences: "Je ne puis comprendre les natures religieuses qui accueillent et éprouvent Dieu comme le donné, sans s'essayer à lui productivement (ohne sich an ihm produktiv zu versuchen)." (1)

Finally, it must not be omitted to stress in Marcel's space-time doctrine the role played by the extra-sensory and meta-psychical powers, premonition on the one hand and telepathy on the other. For it is these "magical" powers which play a considerable rôle in the space-time experience of the existing subject to enable him to gather up along the road of his pilgrimage, within the "existential orbit" of spatio-temporal duration, the presences which accompany him upon his journey and which, compresent with his own self, constitute that "communion" of family and tradition beyond the grave itself without which no self-realisation, no destiny is possible:

Je citerai ici en le modifiant légèrement, mais sans en alterer le sens véritable, un texte de la première partie de mon Journal Métaphysique: "Quand je dis: César a existé... je ne veux pas seulement dire que César aurait pu être perçu par moi; je veux dire qu'il y a entre l'existence de César et la mienne, c'est-à-dire ma présence organo-psychique à moi-même, une continuité temporelle objectivement déterminable; cette présence est le repère par rapport auquel s'ordonne la multiplicité infinie de ce qui peut être pensé par moi-même comme existant; toute existence peut être

(1) Rilke, quoted Ibid., p. 314.
The spatio-temporal instant as susceptible of providing communion with the dead is a notion stressed by Rilke in a passage quoted with evident approval by Marcel: "Si étendu que soit le 'dehors' avec toutes ses dimensions sidérales, c'est à peine s'il se laisse comparer aux dimensions en profondeur de notre dedans, qui pour être presque insondables, n'ont pas besoin de la spatialité du cosmos. Si donc les morts ou ceux qui sont à naître ont besoin d'un asile, cet espace imaginaire n'est-il pas le séjour le plus agréable et le plus approprié qui puisse s'offrir à eux? Je me figure de plus en plus que notre conscience usuelle habite le sommet d'une pyramide dont la base en nous (et en quelque manière au-dessous de nous-mêmes) s'étend si loin que plus nous nous voyons capables de nous y enfoncer, plus nous paraissions être entraînés en des zones de l'existence terrestre ou même cosmique qui ne sont plus soumises au temps ou à l'espace. Dès ma prime jeunesse, j'ai formé cette conjecture (sur laquelle ma vie ultérieure a dans la mesure du possible tenté de se régler) qu'à proximité de la base de cette pyramide de conscience, l'être dans sa simplicité pouvait devenir
événement pour nous, la présence infrangible et simultanée
de tout ce qu'à la pointe supérieure et normale de la
conscience de soi, il ne nous est donné d'éprouver qu'à
l'état d'écoulement." (H.V. p. 350.) It is interesting to
see in this quotation a sort of parallel to Marcel's views
on a Space-Time which is essentially "internal" or "cosmic"
and the field wherein the personal substances energise.
III. Dread and the "Ontological Weight" of Human Experience.

In the light of the spatio-temporal structure of existence the situation of man in its metaphysical and ontological aspect stands fully revealed. This situation bears the mark of division and contradiction. Existential experience exhibits the empirical self as an "irreducible" fact (an irréductible) existing only in relation to the essential self, experienced as an "au delà", immanent and transcendent to the empirical self:

Et je pense que la double existence de cet irréductible et de cet au-delà tend justement à définir la condition métaphysique de l'homme. (E.A. p. 227.)

This empirical self or "irreducible" is but the expression of "la déficience ontologique qui est propre à la créature, tout au moins à la créature déchue". (Ibid., p. 255.) It is in essence an "inertie" or at least a "negative activity", expressing itself in the various practical operations proper to ordinary living; as opposed to the essential self whose activity is manifested in the spheres of religion, art and metaphysics, activities directed upon "mysteries", not "problems" and culminating in a revelation of the Transcendent.

Given this metaphysical situation of cleavage, it follows that Existence is no facile achievement, nor least of all a continuous state. It is of the very essence of our freedom that we may lack "fidelity" and fail to realise the essential:

Dans l'ordre de la philosophie concrète, l'essence est toujours susceptible d'être manquée, bien loin qu'on puisse l'assimiler
à ces entités, à ces ouïe inaltérables, que
la métaphysique classique immobilisait au ciel
pur de la spéculaion, se mettant par là en
dehors des conditions qui peuvent seules nous
permettre de comprendre l'existence humaine
et la place qu'y occupe l'échec sous toutes ses
formes. (H.V. p. 165.)

The world of Marcel is a "monde cassé", as is the world of
Pascal and Kierkegaard. At the centre of man's spiritual
nature is this fact of division, duality, this "duplicité"
which Pascal has so uncompromisingly analysed, and the source
of a constant anxiety or "metaphysical need". It is this
inner cleavage which constitutes "le poids ontologique de
l'existence humaine" and which makes despair the "donnée
centrale de la métaphysique". (E.A. p. 149.) Ontologically,
the situation of man involves an element of peril and risk
inasmuch as, delivered over to time and space, he is alienated
from Being and driven back on those negative, autonomous
activities appertaining to the order of "Having"; and in
that the brief moments of Existence which he achieves cannot,
owing to the very "irreducible" nature of the empirical self,
be prolonged into a continuous state:

Il faudrait dire alors que le besoin ontologique
s'accentue ou s'alguise autant que l'homme se
trouve placé dans une situation qui met davantage
à nu l'état de peril qui fait partie intégrante
de sa réalité même. Ceci rejoindrait sans doute
la lignée de pensee qui va de Kierkegaard à
Heidegger. (E.A. p. 55, n. 1.)

Repeating the words of Pascal, Marcel sees life as a wager
of which the stake is man's soul itself, its damnation or
salvation. So that, as for Pascal, the final solution (or
rather cure, for the situation of man is not a problem, but rather a "malady" of which metaphysics provides the cure) is in the form of a moral wager of which fidelity, and beyond fidelity, faith, are the instruments. Marcel, again like Pascal, tends to stress the voluntary character of fidelity, faith, and belief in general. Inasmuch as Being or Existence can be accepted or denied, fidelity and faith constitute the mark of liberty; they are an adherence to Being, just as the negation of Being is a rupture of this adherence. In both cases we are in the presence of a free decree of the vital subject:

The ontological structure of human existence is the same for Marcel as for a Pascal or a Kierkegaard. We find in all the recognition of an essential paradox, productive of an inner anxiety, itself the source of an "ontological need". Further, the recognition that this vital need must be satisfied, inasmuch as man is, to employ Pascal's term, "embarqué", is "engaged" in a situation where it is a question of life and death for the soul. Finally, recourse, in dire need, to will and faith. All such experiences as hope, love, etc., are themselves forms of fidelity or faith: fidelity is
their common denominator; it is the essential instrument of the realisation of the essential Existence.

At the centre of Marcel's philosophy is the sense of anguish, inspired by the consciousness, obtained in existential experience, of the finite, empirical nature within us in conflict with an eternal, infinite Self (1); and the recourse to fidelity and faith as solvents of the anguish this conflict inspires and as instruments of the recovery of true Being on the plane of Existence.

Most worthy of note in this analysis of what Marcel calls the "ontological weight of human existence" is the isolation of an element in affective experience, namely dread, which is, psychologically, a priori and, ontologically, the motive principle of Being and Existence. Marcel's philosophy, indeed, contains a phenomenology of dread and despair, as a counterpart to a phenomenology of hope, the two at bottom inseparable.

(1) Cf. the following description of Heidegger's starting-point: "L'homme est l'être fini qui a conscience de sa nature finie et pour qui, par suite, l'existence même est un problème - un problème vécu. Il s'ensuit que, d'une part, il se voit se dresser derrière lui l'ombre d'un "être", d'un Sein infini et créateur, que sa conscience interroge, et cherche à pénétrer, et que, d'autre part, il ressent au contact et devant le spectacle du monde infini, dans lequel il est lui-même inséré, les sentiments caractéristiques de l'angoisse (Angst) et du souci (Sorge)." (E. von Aster, Les Aspects principaux de la philosophie allemande contemporaine, Rev. de Mét., 1931, p. 269.)
What must first of all be stressed in this phenomenology is the affirmation of a fundamental element in human experience prior to despair itself - an *a priori* of the affective life defined as dread ("inquiétude" or "angoisse") ("l'inquiétude comme disgrâce fondamentale, comme donnée universelle". (E.A. p. 107.) Its *a priori* character is emphasised by the use of the term "inespoir", borrowed from Hardy, to define it. This primary inquiétude or dread, fundamental to the human creature, has its *raison d'être* in man's duplicity and the inner tension which he experiences as a being situated on the double plane of "being" and "having". Marcel relates it to the Christian doctrine of the fall and the ensuing sin, in that dread is the mark of sin upon man. But, by this fact, dread is essentially related to the consciousness of time. In itself an *a priori*, dread, when directed upon particular objects, localised in the emotions, infused with representative elements, becomes despair. And as such, despair is "l'angoisse même de la temporalité, l'angoisse de se sentir livré au temps". (E.A. p. 106.) In short, it becomes the expression of the conflicts of a self which aspires to realise the eternal within, to remain identical with itself, while subject to change and flux.

We have already analysed fully the relation between despair and temporal consciousness. Suffice to stress certain aspects necessary to its present clarification. Despair is inseparable from the treatment of reality as a
mere "donné" to be detailed in succession: as a mere "inventoriable":

Le donné se présentera toujours à nous comme inventoriable en droit, comme ce dont, par un procédé quelconque, on doit bien pouvoir finir par faire le compte: sans doute y a-t-il ici l'idée implicite que ce composé a dû lui-même se constituer par voie d'addition ou de juxtaposition, et que je dois pouvoir reproduire en idée le processus par lequel cette addition ou cette juxtaposition s'est opérée en fait. (R.I. p. 96.)

L'inventoriable est le lieu du désespoir...
observation pour moi fort importante, car j'y vois la racine de ce que je serais porté à appeler la tragédie de l'avoir. (Ibid., p. 97.)

An attitude which itself derives from the "avidité" of a subject seeking power of manipulation over the real.

Despair is, at bottom, linked with the idea of a "collection":

Ici encore, c'est bien la collection qui est au centre. Je constitue en moi ou avec moi une sorte de bibliothèque ou de muséum, à quoi il s'agit d'incorporer les éléments intéressants que j'aurai pu retirer de ma conversation avec l'autre. Conversation où je ne donne rien, où je ne livre rien - que ce qu'il faut pour déclencher les réponses que je souhaite. Autant dire que mon interlocuteur ici n'est en aucune façon traité comme un être; il n'est même pas, à vrai dire, un autre, car moi-même, dans cette relation fictive et non vivante, je n'interviens pas comme être, comme quelqu'un de réel. (Ibid., pp. 98-9.)

But the adoption of this attitude is the adoption of a certain attitude towards time whereby for the sense of process is substituted a monotonous succession or recurrence which suppresses the forward-looking présent vécu in favour of a present transformed into a past, source of that "ennui" and "dégout" and that sense of imprisonment so vividly experienced.
by Baudelaire.

Je suis depuis quelque temps dans un endroit dont les ressources m'ont d'abord paru inépuisables: mais peu à peu j'ai parcouru tous les chemins, vu toutes les "curiosités"; voici que je suis saisi d'une sorte d'impatience, d'ennui; de dégoût. Je me sens en prison. L'endroit où je séjourne ne m'est apparu que comme le lieu d'une certaine collection d'expériences à faire, et ces expériences ont eu lieu. (Ibid., p. 97.)

Il est certain qu'à la racine de cette avidité il y a avant tout la conscience du temps qui passe, de l'irrévocable; la vie est courte; il faut ajouter ceci et encore cela. (Ibid., p. 98.)

Anxiety, indeed, is inseparable from the loss of that "disponibilité", characteristic of true, passionate living.

When the artist clings to his work already accomplished, anxiety appears:

Il importe au plus haut point de distinguer entre l'œuvre à faire et l'œuvre déjà réalisée. A partir du moment où je me crispe sur mon œuvre accomplie, où elle devient pour moi le centre du monde, où c'est par rapport à elle que je juge sois les œuvres des autres que je lui compare, soit ceux qui l'ont appréciée de telle façon qui me satisfait ou au contraire me déplait, — elle se transforme en un avoir sur lequel ma pensée est anxieusement braquée, quelque chose sur quoi je referme une main raidie. Par là je me mets en état d'indisponibilité radicale. (Ibid., p. 75.)

The very contrary of the sense of hope and achievement which he experiences in active creation:

Précisément parce que l'œuvre est à accomplir, il est impossible de la traiter comme un avoir. Remarquons aussitôt que ceci peut se transposer sur un plan qui n'est plus du tout celui de l'œuvre d'art, mais celui où je me pose moi-même comme étant à accomplir, à créer. Une opposition analogue à celle que je viens de souligner entre l'œuvre faite et l'œuvre à réaliser existe entre moi comme ensemble de qualités données et moi comme création continue. (Ibid., p. 76.)
Once the lived present of self-creation within process is lost, anxiety appears to paralyse the subject:

"Cette anxiété, c'est le souci comme rongeur, comme élément paralysant, qui vient arrêter tous les élans, toutes les initiatives généreuses. Ce qu'il faut bien voir, c'est que l'anxiété ou le souci peut se résorber dans un état d'inertie interieure au sein duquel le monde est vécu comme stagnation, comme putrescence. (Ibid., pp. 76-7.)"

The extreme limit of this despairing consciousness of time is the goût du néant accompanied, as in Baudelaire for example, by the sentiment du vertige, the sentiment du gouffre (1). All of which are manifestations of the fascination of death. For the exclusion of the future and the conversion of the present into a past has for its term the suppression of all consciousness of movement, the nihilistic awareness of a fatum or, as Baudelaire calls it, an "irreversibility" which empties time of its significance and substitutes a vacuum, a void, a sense of néant or death:

"Cet inespoir qui s'oppose à l'espérance comme la crainte s'oppose au désir, c'est vraiment la mort dans la vie, la mort anticipée. (Ibid., p.77.)"

At this limit dread takes on its most positive character as the supreme limiting situation - the mystery of death. For Marcel as for Jaspers and more especially Heidegger, death is the final ontological situation:

"Certsains pourront être surpris de la place que tiennent la mort, le suicide, la trahison, dans tous mes écrits; j'estime que cette place ne sera jamais trop considérable, et que toute philosophie qui cherche à les éluder ou à les

escamoter se rend elle-même coupable de la pire trahison qui soit; elle en est d'ailleurs inévitablement punie, en ce sens qu'elle manque ses prises, pour parler comme un alpiniste.

( Ibid., p. 100. )

For "La circonstance extrême par excellence, c'est la proximité immédiate de la mort, et aucun d'entre nous ne peut être sûr que sa mort n'est pas, en effet, imminente". (Ibid., p. 105.)

At its term dread becomes as it were an absolute: but as such it opens the portal to Being and to the transcending of dread. Confronted by the supreme menace of his death, made conscious, in this final moment of dread, of a fate which robs time of its significance, the individual gains the necessary recul, the necessary breathing-space to readjust himself to Time and to regain control over the being which is lost to him. "Fate is the nothing of dread," says Kierkegaard (1). For dread apprehended in all its reality is the means of recovering that "possibility" whereby fate may be transcended, so that dread may become the "nothing of fate".

It is here that the ontic function of despair and death is fully revealed:

Au lieu que pour un alpiniste le vertige constitue un empêchement dirimant, je ne serais pas éloigné de dire que le vertige est une condition positive de toute pensée métaphysique digne de ce nom. En effet, une certaine conscience, une certaine attirance du vide est peut-être nécessaire pour que l'affirmation de l'être dans sa plénitude puisse se produire dans toute sa véhémence. (Ibid., p. 100.)

(1) The Concept of Dread, p. 87.
Death is the supreme instance of "absence". Now absence in general has an ontic function. Both it and death are "épreuves". (Ibid.) This latter term has to be taken in its temporal signification as "put to the test of time". Marcel elucidates fully in Une philosophie concrete (in Du Refus à l'Invocation) the corollary notions of "test" and "obstacle" in the light of Le Sene's Obstacle et Valeur. He takes, as usual, a concrete instance of two young people who, unsure of their feelings, separate for a time. In short, they put their love to the "test" of time. At the end of this period of absence they will be in a position to recognise their feelings. It is obvious that this "test" is something more than an "obstacle". It is not in itself a source of value, as Le Sene the Idealist would suggest (1), but a condition of evaluating:

Le temps et la séparation ne sont pas seulement ici obstacle, résistance; ou plutôt cette résistance sera ici utilisée, une valeur fonctionnelle lui sera conférée; cette valeur consiste à rendre possible ce qu'on pourrait appeler une confrontation intérieure. (Ibid., p.101.)

Ne soyons pas dupes des mots; le temps par lui-même ou la séparation ne jugent pas, ils ne décident pas; mais ils éclairent la conscience, ils lui permettent de se repérer par rapport à elle-même; les jeunes gens se rencontrent un an plus tard; ils reconnaissent...

(Ibid.)

(1) The Idealism of a Le Sene or a Sartre suggests that value is inherent solely in the fact of self-consciousness, duality and non-immediacy (what Sartre calls the "pour-soi"). But this is to mistake the condition of value for value itself. Reflexion, with its implicit duality, negation or "obstacle", is the means of regaining an immediacy lost, in which value alone resides.
In short, the "test" of time provides a sort of suspension of the immediate existential experience in favour of an objective mode, a voluntary lapse from temporal duration into the plane of mere succession, productive of despair: "À la base de l'épreuve, nous trouvons une récussion de l'expérience immédiate." (Ibid.):

La fonction propre de l'épreuve sera de rendre possible un jugement réfléchi qui permettra de qualifier, par rapport au reel, l'affirmation immédiate émise à l'origine. (Ibid., p. 102.)

But by the very introduction of this "test" and "obstacle", the individual finds the conditions for a more willed and purposive adhesion to existence: he gains in this interval the freedom of movement necessary to revalue his situation and feelings, and to make the necessary "leap" of existence, recover on a higher plane the lost immediacy, procure a new consciousness of time as the agent and instrument of this recovery.

If now we apply these remarks on the nature of the "test" to death, the supreme "test", we discern how, in the consciousness of the proximity of death dread may come to act not only as the fascination of despair but as the supreme motive-power to unlock and unleash the possibilities of existence.

For death is the final limiting situation, the final "obstacle", "test" or "échec". It is, above all, the final affirmation of "absence". In the experience of the néant, not only is absence a lapse from duration into temporal
succession but, by the fact this temporal succession is experienced at its very limit, consciousness of succession itself is lost even to the transcending of all temporal consciousness. In this type of "absence" the suspension of duration is absolute: it constitutes a veritable détachement whose releasing force and power is correspondingly absolute. It creates a total void or gap wherein the subject gains a moment of complete, as it were unconditioned freedom: his very enslavement to fate and the determinism of succession, experienced at its term, procures a moment of release, an all-decisive interval which he may utilise and whose utilisation depends solely upon an act of will-power (1).

Herein lies for Marcel the ontological import of suicide. At this limit the subject is confronted with a choice - the choice of "to be or not to be". The choice of suicide is not the acceptance of death, for death is as nothing, but rather the refusal of being: it is the supreme negation, the ultimate "refusal". As such, it must be distinguished from self-sacrifice, which is the limiting case of the acceptance of being, the supreme response to "invocation":

(1) It is just because it accomplishes a release from time that it provides the possibility of an unconditioned freedom as distinct from the motivated freedom of existence and fidelity, which springs from this choice. There is thus in Marcel's philosophy a double freedom or a double moment of freedom: there is in it place for a "freedom of choice" as well as for a "freedom in choice". (See below Chps. XI and XII.)
Il n'y a pas, il ne peut y avoir de sacrifice sans espérance, et l'espérance est suspendue à l'ontologique. Mais le suicide est, au contraire, à base de négation... Le suicide est essentiellement un refus; c'est une démission. Le sacrifice est essentiellement une adhésion... (Ibid., p. 106.)

But leaving aside the special case of self-sacrifice, the choice before the individual confronted by death is a choice of being or a refusal of being. On the one hand dread at this supreme point may exercise such a fascination as to paralyse all initiative:

La pensée de notre mort, c'est-à-dire du seul événement à venir que nous puissions regarder comme certain, peut exercer sur nous une fascination telle qu'elle envahisse en quelque sorte notre champ d'expérience tout entier, étouffe toutes nos joies, paralyse toutes nos initiatives. (Ibid., p. 224.)

The "obstacle" or "échec" may have this fascinating and hypnotic effect. But note that the "fascination" is only the ground-work of this final despair: by virtue of the release from determinism described above, dread offers a possibility of choice: and the fascination of death and despair itself gives way to an act of freedom constituted by the refusal of being and the acceptance of death and suicide.

And, for the same reason, dread of death offers the possibility of choice of being: the affirmation I am my life, which liberates the individual finally and decisively from the "pessimisme objectif de la mort". (Ibid., p. 225.) Death is transformed "par la fidélité qu'il m'appartient de
témoigner, en une réalité positive." (Ibid., p. 310.)
Thereupon, in fact, by the acceptance of being, of my being transcending my life yet realised only by my life and my living, the individual assumes in this first act of fidelity the responsibility for its realisation. He recovers the vista of hope and, by the further exercise of fidelity, infuses hope into his life. In short, he recovers the consciousness of time as process, to be utilised as an instrument of self-realisation and communion with others by the willed purposive activity centred on the forward-looking present - which is hope; a process inseparable from the assumption of responsibility towards the past - which is repentance.

In conclusion, dread in its culminating form - the dread of death - operates as the supreme "test" or "obstacle", but an "obstacle" which is not an end in itself, rather the condition and means of transcending all dread:

Je suis pleinement d'accord avec M. Le Senne pour reconnaître une valeur positive, stimulante de l'obstacle en tant que tel; et il s'agit précisément de savoir comment ici peut s'opérer cette conversion à la faveur de laquelle l'obstacle se changera en tremplin. (Ibid., p. 233.)

And this precisely for the reason that dread affords the possibility of freedom and choice by the privileged and indeed paradoxical place it occupies in the economy of human existence. By dread, the individual grasps his self as "possible existence", to use Jasper's term - a possibility which is pure freedom and choice. Implicated and made
Conscious of his implication in a situation where transcendence is everywhere revealed, he can accept or refuse the transcendent:

Ici tout est fonction de la liberté et de la liberté seule. (Ibid., p. 102.)

Ici apparait une solidarité entre la philosophie de l'être et la philosophie de la liberté, que le métaphysicien ne saurait à mon sens affirmer trop vigoureusement. (Ibid., p. 222.)

And herein, in the possibility of betrayal and refusal which is enveloped in the act of freedom, lies the essence of the human situation, the raison d'être and, at the same time, the ontological import of dread:

Cette possibilité de subversion ou même de destruction par la réflexion est enveloppée dans l'essence même de l'acte libre; c'est dans la mesure où nous sommes libres que nous sommes exposés à nous trahir et à voir dans la trahison le salut; et c'est ce qu'il y a de vraiment tragique dans notre condition. (Ibid., p. 213.)

In his analysis of dread Marcel seems inspired by Kierkegaard mainly. In fact the essential moments of Kierkegaard's dialectic of dread are repeated in that of Marcel. First, the relation of dread to sin, dread being the "presupposition of original sin" (1). Secondly, the definition of dread as the "possibility of freedom (2)."

(1) The Concept of Dread, p. 41.
(2) Ibid., p. 139.
For in it fate and determinism are transformed into a "nothing", and fate is seen to be the "nothing of dread". Producing a sort of hiatus or vacuum, it makes a place for the "qualitative leap", the emergence of "possibility". Lastly, the relating of dread to the temporal consciousness. For dread annuls fate, in so far as it annuls the irrevocability of temporal succession. Fate is the "nothing of dread". "Dread and nothing regularly correspond to one another. So soon as the actuality of freedom and of the spirit is posited, dread is annulled (1)." "Dread discovers fate, but when the individual would put his confidence in fate, dread turns about and takes fate away; for fate is like dread, and dread is like possibility... a witch's letter (2)."

When, in fact, dread "posits sin", that is assumes the responsibility of past and future, it banishes the temporality in which sin is rooted, the enslavement to the "instant abstracted from the eternal (3)," the meaningless discrete present. It recovers, by its choice, the full instant of salvation and faith, in which the past is enclosed as what may be redeemed through repentance in the present, and from which the future, rectified and ordered towards the ends of hope and providence, emerges. "Fate then is the nothing of dread. It is nothing, for so soon as the spirit is posited

(1) Ibid., p. 86.
(2) Ibid., p. 143.
(3) Ibid., p. 83.
dread is annulled; but fate is too, for thereby providence also is posited (1)." "When the discoveries of possibility are honestly administered, possibility will then disclose all finituds and idealize them in the form of infinity in the individual who is overwhelmed by dread, until in turn he is victorious by the anticipation of faith (2)." In such manner, the "possibility of freedom" which dread introduces into human life becomes the "springboard", as Marcel calls it, for those activities of fidelity and hope, repentance and faith which permit the synthesis of the eternal and the temporal.

Outwith this instant whose recovery dread makes possible, no salvation, no sense of providence nor of guilt or repentance – the essential categories of the Christian faith – are capable of emerging. Only in the domain of existence can they operate, by way of the initial "qualitative leap". And they are inseparable from a consciousness of time as process. As long as the subject is located on the plane of mere succession where there is strictly no past, present or future, he is incapable of assuming responsibility for his past, for any such responsibility must operate in the present and it cannot so operate when the present is a point divorced from the past. He cannot then know repentance; at most remorse such as Baudelaire has described, the mere weight of a dead past, which clogs and annihilates all initiative.

(1) Ibid., p. 87.
(2) Ibid., p. 141.
Nor, on the other hand, can he know the counterpart of repentance which is the sense of providence, for this sense is conditional on the future becoming the hope and possibility of salvation by means of the present directed towards ends of self-realisation. But here again the present is divorced from the future.

Only with the instant of temps vécu, where the present is conditioned by a past whose evil is accepted and utilised for the purposes of present purification and where the same present is the means of realising the good which the future holds out as a goal, can the sense of guilt and sin become fruitful for the purposes of salvation. Time then becomes not a barrier but the very means of spiritual purification and salvation:

La pureté d'âme, c'est la vérité de l'existence qui, en fait, ose et réalise l'impureté dans le monde pour saisir dans la conscience continue de sa culpabilité la réalisation de la pureté comme tâche infinie dans la tension de la vie temporelle. (Ibid., p. 320.) (1)

Then and then alone does dread fulfil at long last its primary metaphysical and religious function, as befits its

(1) No one has experienced more deeply than Baudelaire the critical moment in the dialectic of dread where dread destroys itself, giving way to possibility; discontinuity and irreversibility yield to the consciousness that the present may become by repetition the means of the soul's "repairing" and rebirth. "Que de pressentiments et de signes envoyés déjà par Dieu, qu'il est grandement temps d'agir, de considérer la minute présente comme la plus importante des minutes, et de faire ma perpétuelle volupté de mon tourment ordinaire, c'est-a-dire du Travail... Tout est réparable... (Œuvres, Vol. II, pp. 668, 670.)
place in the structure of the human situation, and at the same time reveal its "presupposition" - the fact of original sin (1).

(1) Marcel's concept of dread must be related to the remarkable study of M. René Lacozre: L'Angoisse et l'émotion (Paris, Boivin, 1938). M. Lacozre seeks to prove that the emotions are not primary but derived from an a priori of the affective life, namely "l'angoisse". "Il y a un fond d'émotivité qui précède toute expérience et qui coïncide avec l'éveil de la conscience de soi; au commencement, on ne trouve pas l'action, mais la peur. C'est d'elle que procèdent les terres enfantines et que s'alimentent nos émotions." (p. 111.) It is "une disposition permanente de la sensibilité, un thème fondamental et premier qui se confond avec l'être même". Penetrated with representational elements, it is transformed into emotion, but in itself it has for its sole object the being of the individual. Moreover, it becomes explicit only in its relation to temporality, as the expression of a conflict between a being which seeks permanence and is subject to change. "C'est pourquoi l'angoisse n'est plus dans notre vie une inquiétude continuellement présente à nos cœurs; elle est la douleur soudaine, qui émeut l'être jusqu'au fond de lui-même, toutes les fois que pour vivre, il doit renier ce qu'il a aimé." (p. 271.) And precisely it is this moment when dread assumes its most intense form, as the field of freedom, choice and possibility with its perspective of fidelity or infidelity that it assumes an import and function no longer merely psychological but ontological.

This major work constitutes a remarkable phenomenology of dread which anticipates a dialectic of dread. And the moments of this dialectic have been enumerated by G. Marcel.